tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/drc-elections-41211/articlesDRC Elections – The Conversation2023-12-06T13:44:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170182023-12-06T13:44:46Z2023-12-06T13:44:46ZDRC elections: three factors that have shaped Tshisekedi’s bumpy first term as president<p>Africa’s second-largest country by land mass, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/27/dr-congos-president-felix-tshisekedi-to-seek-re-election/">scheduled to go to the polls on 20 December 2023</a>. President Felix Tshisekedi will be seeking re-election. However, his first tenure has been decidedly mixed. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s first term has been defined by three major factors: questions over the legitimacy of his 2019 election victory, violence in eastern DRC and the state of the country’s economy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.qmul.ac.uk/history/people//academic-staff/profiles/loffmanreuben.html">researched extensively and taught</a> on contemporary Congolese politics for 15 years. In my view, while Tshisekedi has had some successes, including the DRC’s joining of the East African Community and a modest upturn in economic growth since the pandemic, much work remains to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy questions haunt the presidency</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has been president since January 2019 after an election that one of his then opponents, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">Martin Fayulu</a>, claimed was stolen. These claims were supported by a <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/who-really-won-the-congolese-elections/">Congo Research Group</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">Financial Times</a> analysis of voting data that found Fayulu had won the election. The courts, however, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/20/drc-court-confirms-felix-tshisekedi-winner-of-presidential-election">upheld</a> Tshisekedi’s win.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is also mired in controversy. DRC’s electoral commission has promised a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">rebrand</a> in an effort to shake off the irregularities of the 2018 poll. It has registered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-registers-around-439-million-voters-december-general-election-2023-05-22/">nearly 44 million voters</a> in the country of 102 million people. </p>
<p>However, Fayulu, as well as the United States, the European Union and other international election observers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">have raised doubts about the accuracy of voter records</a>. Fayulu has threatened to boycott the 2023 elections if the voter lists are not redone and audited.</p>
<p>The electoral commission cleared <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/twenty-four-candidates-sign-up-congolese-presidential-race-december-2023-10-08/">24 candidates</a> to run for president. They include 2018 presidential contender Moïse Katumbi, Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege and Augustin Ponyo, a former prime minister. The campaign period has officially began and already there are plans to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-katumbi-race-takes-shape-in-drc-presidency-poll-4451764">rally opposition support</a> behind Katumbi.</p>
<p>Given the controversies involved in this election, as well as in his assumption of office in 2019, Tshisekedi will need to work hard both to win the upcoming poll and do so in a way that citizens believe to be credible.</p>
<h2>Violence in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>While eastern DRC was unstable <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">before</a> Tshisekedi came into power, the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-condemns-latest-attack-eastern-dr-congo-act-horrific-brutality#:%7E:text=Eastern%20DRC%20has%20been%20plagued,among%20the%20top%20three%20globally.">escalation of violence since 2022</a> has made it a defining feature of his presidency.</p>
<p>At least <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">120 armed groups are active in the region</a>. One of the most significant of these armed groups is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">M23</a>. In March 2023, M23 violence led to the displacement of about 500,000 people. In recent weeks, it has broken a <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/renewed-fighting-breaks-truce-in-congo/7321665.html">months-long truce</a> and resumed attacks in eastern DRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">International</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">regional</a> peacekeepers have been trying to address the conflict in eastern DRC. Yet, their presence points to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">failure</a> of the Congolese government to deal with the violence on its own.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drc-is-president-tshisekedis-state-of-siege-a-cover-up/a-57426558">state of siege</a> announced by Tshisekedi in the eastern region’s provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in 2021 <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">worsened</a> the human rights situation there. The military took over key state posts from civilian leaders. This despite the Congolese army being <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">linked to violence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>It was meant to last one month, butt the siege was extended many times by Tshisekedi’s government. Two years on, there has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">no “meaningful public debate” about it</a>. In the run-up to the December elections, Tshisekedi announced he would “<a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/dr-congo-to-end-state-of-siege-in-ituri-north-kivu-15377066">gradually ease</a>” the siege. Such interventions have made it difficult for Congolese people to believe that Tshisekedi’s policies have resulted in a more peaceful Congo.</p>
<h2>Economic growth and prospects</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has registered some success in managing the Congolese economy. The country’s GDP growth rate went down during the pandemic but has made a modest recovery. It <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/gdp-growth-rate#:%7E:text=Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20gdp%20growth%20rate%20for%202022%20was,a%202.65%25%20decline%20from%202019.">increased to 8.92% in 2022 from 6.20% in 2021</a>, with the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining industry</a> being a major driver. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">In 2022</a>, the DRC joined the East African Community as its seventh member. Tshisekedi’s hope was that this move would <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2402-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-joins-eac-as-its-7th-member">promote trading relationships and reduce tensions with the DRC’s neighbours</a>. Entry gives the DRC access to a market of <a href="https://www.eac.int/gender/75-sector/investment-promotion-private-sector-development/162-184-706-market-size-access-trade-policies#:%7E:text=The%20internal%20EAC%20market%20has,population%20of%20over%20460%20million.">146 million consumers</a> and means it can start importing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60901159">more goods from its east African neighbours</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC also signed a mining deal with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/18/uae-signs-deal-to-develop-mines-in-eastern-dr-congo">the United Arab Emirates in July 2023</a>. The deal is worth US$1.9 billion and involves developing at least four mines in Congo’s northeast region. Such deals are important because <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining is the main driver of economic growth in the DRC</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi also <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/this-dollar850-million-investment-aims-to-fast-track-congos-copper-exports/y86zk27">broke ground on a new road</a> cutting through Zambia to Tanzania to speed up the movement of Congolese exports. The DRC is landlocked – the new road will cut about 240km from the journey between some of the country’s copper and cobalt mines, and a port in Tanzania. </p>
<p>But Tshisekedi’s economic record isn’t all positive.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is causing financial problems for the state. It’s expected to cost about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">US$1.1 billion</a>. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">The World Bank predicts</a> that the election will widen the country’s fiscal deficit in 2023 to -1.3% of GDP. Further, foreign exchange pressures caused by spending on security and pre-election processes have seen the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-12/congo-struggles-to-steady-franc-amid-conflict-election-spending?leadSource=uverify%20wall">Congolese franc slide 20% against the dollar</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s government is looking to increase revenues from a much anticipated re-negotiation of a China-DRC mining deal. The president is under pressure to get more from the deal, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/whether-drc-china-mining-deal-will-be-restructured-remains-uncertain-/7118892.html">which is worth US$6.2 billion</a>. Tshisekedi wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/congo-hike-stake-copper-cobalt-venture-with-china-2023-05-24/">70% stake</a> in the Chinese-Congolese firm Sicomines, up from the original 32%. </p>
<p>The Chinese deal is one way in which Tshisekedi’s economic achievements could have impacted the lives of Congolese people given the hoped-for investment in schools, roads and hospitals. However, its unclear how many of these infrastructure projects have been implemented. At the same time, the country’s mining industry has been plagued by allegations of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/window-opportunity-build-critical-mineral-security-africa#:%7E:text=The%20Sino%2DCongolais%20des%20Mines,in%20exchange%20for%20infrastructure%20investments.">human rights abuses</a>. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>In his presidential campaign, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-tshisekedi-kicks-off-re-election-bid-with-vow-consolidate-achievements-2023-11-19/">Tshisekedi has emphasised</a> his administration’s economic and diplomatic achievements rather than the situation in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/opposition-candidates-jostle-for-position-before-drc-election">pushback</a> from opposition candidates on these achievements means Tshisekedi will need to campaign hard to win. An election that is seen as illegitimate will only further damage Tshisekedi’s credibility, especially given the amount of money the Congolese government is spending on it.</p>
<p>One of the best things Tshisekedi could do for his country now would be to run a free and fair election. This would go a long way towards rescuing his troubled term in office so far.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanitaties Research Council, and the Presbyterian Historical Society. He is affiliated with the Labour Party. </span></em></p>Plenty remains to be done to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115392023-08-28T14:43:12Z2023-08-28T14:43:12ZDRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543291/original/file-20230817-43619-bs2zp0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier guards a camp in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in January 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">three-decade conflict in the eastern region</a> of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to the proliferation of <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">hundreds of armed groups</a>. With the violence appearing to take an <a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/why-violence-in-the-south-kivu-highlands-is-not-ethnic-and-other-misconceptions-about-the-crisis/">ethnic slant</a>, several groups have emerged claiming to be protecting their communities from attacks. One such group is the Twirwaneho, which has <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=13">become more active</a> since 2019. Christopher P. Davey, who has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=TYPO3qoAAAAJ&hl=en">extensively studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, explains how the Twirwaneho’s claim of communal self-defence highlights the fractured nature of Congolese politics.</em></p>
<h2>What is the conflict in the DRC all about?</h2>
<p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a theatre of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">increasingly violent conflict</a> since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">Rwandan genocide of 1994</a> pushed over a million refugees across the common border. Rwanda’s efforts to capture those responsible for the genocide sparked two wars in <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">two wars</a>. Violence, driven by armed groups, has been persistent since. </p>
<p>Central to Congo’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa, the underrepresented social and economic groups in the eastern region, and external parties. Added to this mix are transnational armed groups, foreign militaries, the <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/monuscos-2022-mandate-streamlined-but-missing-key-protection-language/">UN peacekeeping mission</a> and Congolese state actors like the military. </p>
<p>This has resulted in the world’s <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-refugee-crisis-explained/">longest-standing refugee crisis</a>. It has also led to the proliferation and fragmentation of <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CRG-Armed-Groups-in-the-Congo.pdf#page=5">dozens of armed groups</a> in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One of these groups is the Twirwaneho, a <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf#page=6">Banyamulenge</a> – or South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsi – self-defence/armed group. </p>
<p>This group is important to understand because its rising profile demonstrates the <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.com/jason-k-stearns-the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name-the-unending-conflict-in-the-congo-princeton-up-2022">unending nature of Congo’s war</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the Twirwaneho?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">Banyamulenge</a> are a minority group in South Kivu, eastern DRC, who have faced <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">attacks based on their ethnicity</a>. Formed in the early 2010s, Twirwaneho (meaning “let’s defend ourselves” in the Banyamulenge language) is a contemporary response by mutinying national army officers to continued conflict and local self-defence needs within the Banyamulenge community. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government</a>
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<p>The overlap between <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/self-defence">self-defence and armed groups</a> is not unique to the DRC. <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/aop/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012/article-10.1163-24680966-bja10012.xml">My research</a> on the history of Banyamulenge soldiers shows that the <a href="https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups">gumino</a> (“let’s stay here”) self-defence tradition was part the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s international campaign in the late 1980s. It was used to raise funds and recruit for the <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/52/Rwandan+Civil+War+%281990+-+1994%29">Rwandan civil war</a> (1990-1994). </p>
<p>This led to a generation of fighters <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886260519900281">trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front</a> who got into the ranks of various armed groups across both Congo wars. </p>
<p>These groups include Twirwaneho. Its leader is Michel “<a href="https://blog.kivusecurity.org/tag/makanika-2/">Makanika</a>” Rukunda, who was once in the Congolese national army before he mutinied in 2019. He transformed Twirwaneho militias into a militarily coordinated, and internationally represented and funded, fighting force. But he is also accused of human rights violations that have placed him on the European Union <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.190.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A190I%3ATOC">sanctions list</a>. </p>
<p>The Twirwaneho’s direct role in national politics is minimal. However, the group has become a symbol of defiance for both the community it claims to defend and those who <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-banyamulenge-how-a-minority-ethnic-group-in-the-drc-became-the-target-of-rebels-and-its-own-government-201099">see Tutsis as foreign invaders</a>. Also, a <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">report</a> from the UN group of experts on the DRC hints towards collaboration between Twirwaneho and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Rwanda-supported M23</a>.</p>
<h2>Is the group keeping the peace or fuelling conflict?</h2>
<p>The Twirwaneho <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho/status/1664342022675746817/photo/1">claim</a> that neighbouring armed groups and the national army make up a coalition launching counterattacks on Banyamulenge villages. This is in reprisal for Twirwaneho operations against the military and <a href="https://chimpreports.com/burundi-army-fights-red-tabara-rebels-in-drc/">other armed groups</a> and connected populations. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">My research</a> shows that the Twirwaneho are related to, but distinct within, an array of armed groups in DRC engaged in a complex political, economic and at times existential struggle. </p>
<p>During Nairobi fieldwork, to understand more about the international side of the movement I met three young former rebels who had fled the Twirwaneho. They joined the group after their schools closed following increased local conflict. Graduating from students to soldiers, they fought this anti-Twirwaneho coalition. Echoing his community’s sentiment, one former Twirwaneho officer told me they are “not an armed group”. He emphasised this point: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… I was seeing myself as a civilian who decided to come and protect my community.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Inherent in the Twirwaneho’s fight are claims of stopping a Tutsi genocide in the DRC, also made by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23</a>. However, increased fighting across North and South Kivu has <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A7ae8352e-191d-39b0-858d-496fa13a25b2">exacerbated violence against all civilians</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s behind the group’s rising profile?</h2>
<p>Makanika as the emerging leader of the group has instilled discipline and “patriotism”. In my fieldwork I heard consistent claims of insufficient promotion and pay for Banyamulenge soldiers in the national army and persecution of their people. These claims became reasons for joining, along with a narrowing of options for traditional <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/jamh/6/2/article-p107_2.xml">livelihoods</a>. </p>
<p>As command centred under Makanika, his diaspora reputation grew. Many Banyamulenge in the US and African Great Lakes region credit him with preserving the community. Young Banyamulenge men have left families and careers to join the Twirwaneho. The group recruits school children, pressures community members to join and draws on existing self-defence groups. </p>
<p>Coordinated by the <a href="https://twitter.com/MahoroMpa">Mahoro Peace Association</a>, the Banyamulenge diaspora has contributed <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">hundreds of thousands</a> of US dollars to displaced families in <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">South Kivu</a>. This is not an <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57e92e4d4.pdf">uncommon practice</a> across other groups in the country. </p>
<p>The peace association <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1238442/accusations-of-funding-militias-in-south-kivu.html">asserts</a> it does not actively raise money for Twirwaneho, but its leadership advocates for fighting to reclaim the homeland. This implicitly encourages support. </p>
<p>Many Banyamulenge do not consider any funds sent as support for an armed group. Rather, it is seen as mobilisation for the survival of the community. </p>
<h2>What’s the end game?</h2>
<p>What the Twirwaneho want is a complex question. Their <a href="https://twitter.com/twirwaneho">social media</a> posts broadcast goals of Banyamulenge peace and security in Congo. Yet, violence in the DRC is <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-violence-has-many-causes-the-uns-narrow-focus-on-ethnicity-wont-help-end-conflict-208774">not a simple ethnic conflict</a>. Although many Banyamulenge support the group, they are divided on how its goals are to be accomplished.</p>
<p>It is easy to see how a diaspora is willing to support the survival of their community. However, armed groups typically result in continued violence and military competition: rebels fight for material gains that do not translate into increased security for civilians.</p>
<p><em>This piece was written in collaboration with researchers at the <a href="https://gecshceruki.org/">Conflict and Human Security Research Group</a> (GEC-SH/CERUKI).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey is affiliated with Clark University and Education for Global Peace, and works for Binghamton University SUNY.</span></em></p>Central to the DRC’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa and underrepresented groups in the eastern region.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010992023-03-13T12:24:32Z2023-03-13T12:24:32ZThe Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513396/original/file-20230303-18-fisnxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Banyamulenge community members at the funeral of one of their own in eastern DRC.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Banyamulenge are a minority ethnic group in South Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In December 2022, the UN adviser on the prevention of genocide raised concerns about attacks against the community based on “<a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2022/un-special-adviser-prevention-genocide-condemns-escalation-fighting-drc">ethnicity or perceived allegiance with neighbouring countries</a>”. The Banyamulenge have <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">long been viewed</a> as not being Congolese. The government, however, has often dismissed claims that the community is facing targeted attacks <a href="https://www.politico.cd/encontinu/2022/11/24/pretendus-discours-de-haine-en-rdc-une-fiction-qui-ressemble-aux-discours-segregationnistes-portes-par-le-rwanda-patrick-muyaya.html/121636/">as fiction</a>. Delphin R Ntanyoma, who has <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">extensively researched</a> the Banyamulenge, explains why they are facing persecution.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Banyamulenge and how has their status changed over time?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge live in eastern DRC in South Kivu province. They are mostly seen as affiliated to the Tutsi of the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">African Great Lakes region</a>, and they speak a language close to Kirundi (Burundi) and Kinyarwanda (Rwanda). The Banyamulenge settled in South Kivu between the 16th and 18th centuries, having come from what are today Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. They are largely cattle keepers. </p>
<p>They mostly occupy the southern part of South Kivu province: the Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira territories. In the 1960s and 1970s, some Banyamulenge moved to Katanga in the DRC’s southern region. The region has rich pastures for cattle herding and is close to the large cities of Lubumbashi and Mbujimayi, providing business opportunities. However, in 1998, nearly 20,000 Banyamulenge were forced to flee Katanga after they were <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_10298.html">attacked for being “foreigners”</a>. </p>
<p>Since 1984, the DRC has not organised a <a href="https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/DRC-census-working-paper-fina-online.pdf">general census</a>. The historian <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/nl/title/banyamulenge-qui-sont-ils-dou-viennent-ils-quel-role-ont-ils-joue-et-pourquoi-dans-le-processus-de-la-liberation-du-zaire/oclc/42719868">Joseph Mutambo</a> estimated the group had around 400,000 people in 1997. There are no clear estimates today, but it’s safe to assume that they have grown in number. </p>
<p>Colonial history in the Great Lakes region has categorised local communities into <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">“native” and “immigrants”</a>. Farmers are seen as native, while cattle herders are largely perceived as immigrants, foreigners and invaders. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-history-matters-in-understanding-conflict-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-148546">Why history matters in understanding conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo</a>
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<p>Based on these assumptions, the Banyamulenge have been viewed as foreigners and were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Africa-04.htm">denied citizenship in the 1980s</a>. A decade later, the Congolese state <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/drc-banyamulenge-seeking-political-solution-tensions">sought to expel them</a> after a parliamentary resolution to send back all Rwandan and Burundian descendants. </p>
<p>This added to the perception that the Banyamulenge were “invaders”. I have researched the drivers of violence in South and North Kivu for six years, with a focus on the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Behind-Scenes-Banyamulenge-Military-extinction/dp/2343186979">Banyamulenge situation</a>. It’s clear that much of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14687968211009895">violence targeting them</a> revolves around the misconception that they are <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">strangers in their own country</a>. </p>
<h2>Who’s who on the list of their political adversaries?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge’s political adversaries range from local politicians to armed groups and militias. Most of the politicians who rally their constituents against the Banyamulenge are from neighbouring ethnic communities. These include the Babembe, Bafuliro, Banyindu and Bavira. Members of these ethnic communities consider themselves “native”. Political figures outside South Kivu have also spread the idea that the Banyamulenge are outsiders. </p>
<p>Those who take issue with the Banyamulenge claim to be protecting their country from “invaders”. This has led to armed mobilisations and the use of local militias, like the MaiMai and Biloze-Bishambuke. These militias have vowed to <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-warning-the-vulnerability-of-banyamulenge-invaders">expel the Banyamulenge or eliminate them</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Since 2017, Burundian rebel groups like Red-Tabara and Forces Nationales de Liberation have joined local militias in attacks against the Banyamulenge. The Red-Tabara’s involvement raised questions about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rwanda-un-idUSKCN0VD04K">Rwanda’s role</a> after UN reports claimed that the country had supported the rebel group with logistical and training skills. </p>
<h2>How are the Banyamulenge targeted?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge have been targeted by Congolese security services and local militias in major attacks <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_brf2287.html">in 1996</a>, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/27798/drc-belgium-pursues-case-against-ex-minister-icj">1998</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">2004</a>. </p>
<p>A new wave of violence against the group <a href="https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/province-sud-kivu-un-champ-de-bataille-multidimensionnel-meconnu">began in 2017</a>, and has since led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and the destruction of <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/rapport-sur-les-attaques-anti-banyamulenge-en-rd-congo">hundreds of villages</a>. That year was marked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-would-like-to-forget-88170">intensifying conflict in the DRC</a> over election delays. </p>
<p>The looting of Banyamulenge-owned cattle has been a constant occurrence <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26309798">since the 1960s</a>. Cattle constitute a major source of income and livelihood, and looting has worked as a strategy to impoverish the community and jeopardise their future. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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<p>Due to the widespread destruction of villages, the remaining Banyamulenge in South Kivu live in small localities like Minembwe, Murambya/Bijombo, Mikenge and Bibokoboko. They continue to face <a href="https://kivutimes.com/minembwe-attaque-des-mai-mai-biloze-bishambuke-ilunga-et-yakutumba-plusieurs-villages-sous-le-feu-la-societe-civile-alerte-les-autorites/">regular and coordinated attacks</a>, which have prevented the community from accessing pastures and farmland beyond a two-kilometre radius. </p>
<p>Armed militias in South Kivu have <a href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/the-banyamulenge-genocide-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-on-the-interplay-of-minority-groups-discrimination-and-humanitarian-assistance-failure/">prevented and constrained</a> humanitarian organisations from getting aid into Banyamulenge settlements. </p>
<p>Hate speech has played a major role in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">fuelling violence</a> against the community. Twitter, Facebook, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG2YPRq3Uqw">YouTube</a> and other social media platforms have thousands of posts and videos that claim the Banyamulenge are not Congolese citizens and shouldn’t be in the country. </p>
<p>Such dehumanising and hateful speech feeds the minds and hearts of young people, mainly men, who consider attacks against the Banyamulenge a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5253c0784.html">“noble” cause</a>. <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/blog/democratic-republic-of-congo-rising-concern-banyamulenge">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/hate-speech-and-genocide-in-minembwe-d-r-congo">activists</a> have called for greater attention to be paid to these attacks.</p>
<h2>Who’s behind the attacks?</h2>
<p>The Banyamulenge are targeted because they are viewed as “foreigners”. For decades, local armed groups and militias have mobilised to get rid of those perceived as invaders. This ideology is transmitted across generations. </p>
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<p>In addition, the Congolese national army has played a role in enabling attacks against the Banyamulenge by <a href="https://twitter.com/KivuSecurity/status/1304083139334156289">providing ammunition to militias</a> or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYdu8U7At0">opening breaches when rebels attack civilians</a>. Huge destruction has taken place in areas where the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/10/28/eastern-Congo-Kivu-conflict-regional-tensions">Congolese army is present</a> but didn’t intervene. </p>
<p>There are three possible reasons for the army’s general inaction. First, some military commanders and soldiers may believe the narrative that the Banyamulenge are not Congolese. Second, some military commanders create chaos and conflict pocket zones to serve one or more protagonists in the <a href="https://www.africangreatlakesinform.org/page/african-great-lakes">Great Lakes region</a>. Third, violence allows military commanders to access operational funds – and looted cattle can be turned into money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Banyamulenge have been viewed as strangers in their own country – the violence targeting them revolves around this misconception.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793202022-03-23T12:13:45Z2022-03-23T12:13:45ZDRC is set to become 7th member of the east Africa trading bloc: what’s in it for everyone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452234/original/file-20220315-17-1w168gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Felix Tshisekedi waves an official copy of the nation's Constitution during his swearing in on January 24, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/democratic-republic-of-the-congos-newly-inaugurated-news-photo/1087921674">TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Shortly after his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46819303">controversial</a> electoral victory in early 2019, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Felix Tshisekedi sought to get his country admitted into the East African Community. <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2373-democratic-republic-of-congo-inches-closer-to-joining-eac">Recently</a>, the East African Community ministers recommended the DRC’s admission, a decision set to be <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/east-africa/drc-finally-joins-eac-next-week-three-years-after-application-3755792">formalised</a> by the bloc’s presidents when they meet on 29 March. Regional integration expert Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi discusses key points of the decision.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the state of East African Community integration?</h2>
<p>East African Community is one of the most vibrant and best performing blocs in Africa. This is according to the <a href="https://www.integrate-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII2019_technical_report_EN.pdf">African Regional Integration Index</a> which ranks blocs on five aspects of integration - trade, productive, macroeconomic, infrastructural and movement of people.</p>
<p>Currently, it has six members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. </p>
<p>East Africa’s integration is envisioned under <a href="https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars">four pillars</a>. These are the customs union, the common market, the monetary union, and the political federation. So far, the bloc has been implementing protocols on a customs union and a common market. These have <a href="https://mocu.ac.tz/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/OMUCHESI-JONATHAN-ANGANI_The-Interaction-Between-Intra-regional-Investment.pdf">helped improve</a> trade and investments in the region since 2006 and boosted country relations. </p>
<p>Under the customs union protocol taxes on goods produced within the region have been eliminated. East Africa is also applying a <a href="https://www.eac.int/documents/category/eac-common-external-tariff">common external tariff</a> on imports from outside the region. </p>
<p>In the long run, an operational customs union should open up the regional economy so that small economies are able to gain access to industries that would otherwise be out of their reach. </p>
<p>For its part, the purpose of a common market is to ease cross-border movement of goods, persons and workers. It’s implementation has <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Promise_and_Efficacy_of_E_African_Community1.pdf">seen</a> the east African governments harmonise immigration procedures and order border posts to operate for 24 hours. Some of the governments in the region, <a href="https://www.eac.int/working-in-east-africa">notably</a> Rwanda and Kenya, have also waived the work permit fee for citizens from the region. </p>
<p>The bloc is now preparing the ground for its third pillar, the <a href="https://www.eac.int/monetary-union">monetary union</a>. This began with the adoption and signing of the East African Monetary Union Protocol on 30 November 2013. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/afr1506.pdf">protocol</a> set a timeline of 10 years within which the partner states need to have a common currency. That’s in 2023, a deadline that’s unlikely to be met. There has been mixed progress in the implementation of agreed action on this front. </p>
<h2>How do countries get admitted?</h2>
<p>The criteria for admission into the bloc is provided under Article 3 of the East African Community <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2487/download">treaty</a> signed in 1999. The regional law provides the following grounds for admission of a new member:</p>
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<li><p>acceptance of the Community as set out in the East African Community Treaty;</p></li>
<li><p>adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice;</p></li>
<li><p>potential contribution to the strengthening of integration within the East African region;</p></li>
<li><p>geographical proximity to and interdependence between it and the partner states;</p></li>
<li><p>establishment and maintenance of a market driven economy; and</p></li>
<li><p>social and economic policies being compatible with those of the Community.</p></li>
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<p>So far, the body has had <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-history">three</a> admissions: Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. The DRC shares borders with Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan. There has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/lawyer-sues-to-block-congo-s-admission-to-eac-bloc-3445788">opposition</a> to its plan to join the East African Community due to its past human rights record. </p>
<h2>What does the East African Community gain?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s admission would give the bloc its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tshisekedi-launches-construction-congos-first-deep-water-port-2022-01-31/">first port</a> on the Atlantic coast. At the moment, the region relies on Indian Ocean-based seaports of Kenya and Tanzania for trade with the rest of the world. The challenge of <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/press-release/change-in-piracy-threats-in-indian-ocean-prompts-re-think-of-high-risk-area/">intermittent</a> piracy off the Somalia coast has exposed the need for an alternative trade route. </p>
<p>The DRC is also set to significantly expand the regional trading bloc’s size. The DRC’s geographical area is far much larger than all the six East African states put together. The DRC has a geographical area of 2.4 million sq km while the bloc is about 1.8 million sq km. The additional geographical area - known uniquely for its copper, coltan, cobalt, tin and other minerals - is set to boost East Africa’s profile as an investment destination. </p>
<p>On a world stage, the East African Community gains a bigger clout with the DRC’s huge population (consumer base) of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD">about</a> 90 million people and an economy of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZG">nearly US$50 billion </a>. It is <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts">estimated</a> that the bloc has a population of 177 million people and an economy of US$193.7 billion. </p>
<h2>What’s in it for the DRC?</h2>
<p>The DRC is already doing substantial trade with the East African Community bloc which could <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eac-scorecard-drc-admission-win-trade-rows-slow-business-3669232">benefit</a> from lower or eliminated tariffs. Goods produced in the DRC will no longer be subjected to customs taxes at any of the region’s border points.</p>
<p>It already has established trade relations with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/world-bank-drc-rwandas-most-promising-trade-partner#:%7E:text=By%202019%2C%20Rwanda%20had%20exported,the%20report%20noted%20in%20part.">Rwanda</a>, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/drc-and-burundi-agreements-3472358">Burundi</a> and <a href="https://gltfp.comesa.int/uganda-and-democratic-republic-of-congo-develop-a-simplified-trade-regime-tool-kit/">Uganda</a>. For imports, parts of the DRC rely on the trade corridor that runs from Mombasa port via Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These connections are set to firm up as national agencies of the East African governments ease tariffs and administrative barriers on the new bloc member.</p>
<h2>Does it matter that this is the third bloc the DRC is joining?</h2>
<p>Generally, membership in more than one customs union is technically impossible. Firstly, one country cannot apply different common external tariffs. Secondly, integration agenda differs from one bloc to the next meaning overlapping membership may lead a country to conflicting obligations. According to the World Trade Organisation, the practice <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm">hurts global trade liberalisation</a>, especially when affected traders have to meet multiple sets of rules.</p>
<p>But <a href="http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle/11671/24273/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-2005.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">analysis</a> of the treaties of the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa shows they do not preclude members from maintaining prior trade arrangements or entering into new ones.</p>
<p>The DRC is already a member of the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. But it won’t be the only East African Community country with overlapping membership of regional blocs. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa while Tanzania is a member of Southern African Development Community. </p>
<p>The East African Community, for instance, has not been able to establish a full customs union since it had to allow Tanzania to grant preferences to its southern Africa partners. </p>
<p>The three blocs are currently <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/tripartite-cooperation/">harmonising their agenda and laws</a> with the aim of integrating their economies and markets.
This fits into the broader objective of the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>, of accelerating economic integration of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The admission of DRC will extend the East African Community bloc’s reach to the Atlantic Ocean.Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi, Lecturer In Governance and Regional Integration, Catholic University of Eastern AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1094222019-01-08T06:04:31Z2019-01-08T06:04:31ZThe DR Congo is bracing for election results and it’s likely to get bloody. Here’s what you need to know<p>When Congolese gynaecologist Dr Denis Mukwege <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/55721-denis-mukwege-nobel-lecture-2/">received his Nobel Peace Prize</a> a few months ago, he inferred responsibility for what happens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to everyone who owns a smart phone. As well as diamonds and oil, the country is rich in the gold, coltan and cobalt vital to the production of the smart phone in your pocket. </p>
<p>But it is also rich in strife. The DRC is holding its breath while the electoral commission decides the results of elections held on December 30, 2018. The Congolese constitution <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/drc-president-joseph-kabila-seek-term-pm-180612163432778.html">limits presidents</a> to two five-year terms. But current president, Joseph Kabila, has now been president for 18 years.</p>
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<p>But that may be about to change. Martin Fayulu, the man supported by a former rebel commander who had been previously charged (<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba">but later acquitted</a>) with allowing rape and crimes against humanity under his leadership, may have won the election away from the ruling party.</p>
<p>But though one of the most trusted institutions in the country, the Catholic church – which deployed tens of thousands of election observers – announced it knew of a clear winner, the results can only legally be declared by the electoral commission. And the commission <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/dr-congo-edge-presidential-election-results-delayed-190105181501718.html">announced further delays</a> in the results over the weekend.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/poll-in-the-drc-looms-but-the-election-is-unlikely-to-bring-change-107235">Poll in the DRC looms. But the election is unlikely to bring change</a>
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<p>In the meantime, however, the New York Times has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/world/africa/fayulu-congo-presidential-vote-catholic.html">announced Fayulu’s</a> win. Anticipating violence and unrest, the US has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-sends-troops-ahead-of-possible-congo-election-protests/2019/01/05/635dae74-10cb-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b2ca4ef208d4">sent troops to neighbouring countries</a> to protect US citizens and diplomatic facilities. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UN’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/un-security-council-to-meet-on-drc-elections-20190104">Security Council</a> met to discuss the issue on Friday. Although the meeting was closed to the public, it is known the Council was unable to agree on steps forward. There is to be another meeting in an open session in New York on Tuesday.</p>
<p>So, what is actually going on in the DRC?</p>
<h2>Who were the lead candidates?</h2>
<p>President Joseph Kabila had <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drcs-shadary-pro-kabila-loyalist-blacklisted-by-the-eu-20181217">handpicked the government’s candidate</a> to run in the elections. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46447089">Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary</a> had been Interior Minister and enjoyed the full resources of the government for his campaign, including unlimited access to state-run media outlets. </p>
<p>Shadary is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/eu-renews-sanctions-dr-congo-ruling-party-candidate-181211053903725.html">subject to an EU travel ban</a>, asset freeze and sanctions. This is due to his role in obstructing Congo’s electoral process and carrying out a crackdown against protesters angry over the vote which had been delayed for years.</p>
<p>The government is good at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/17/dr-congo-campaigning-violently-suppressed">repressing political opposition</a>. During previous elections, SMS communication was cancelled. But this year the government also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/drc-electoral-fears-rise-as-internet-shutdown-continues">turned off the internet</a>. Key independent radio and television programs <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/01/drc-electoral-fears-rise-as-internet-shutdown-continues">have been closed</a> and reporters ejected from the country. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1081328243620409344"}"></div></p>
<p>In turn, opposition parties have struggled to form coalitions or campaigns to topple the government democratically. In a landmark sign of cooperation, seven opposition parties banded together to endorse a single candidate, Martin Fayulu, to run against the ruling party’s pick. </p>
<p>But that agreement barely lasted 24 hours before the parties with the largest membership <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/13/congo-oppositions-electoral-pact-to-fight-ruling-party-collapses">withdrew their support</a> to run their own leaders instead. </p>
<p>After the pact collapsed, former warlord, Jean-Pierre Bemba maintained his support for Fayulu. Bemba had returned to the DRC after <a href="https://theconversation.com/bemba-acquittal-overturns-important-victory-for-sexual-violence-victims-99948">being imprisoned</a> at the Hague for charges he allowed his troops to use sexual violence in war crimes and crimes against humanity when he deployed them to the neighbouring Central African Republic. Bemba’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/08/former-congo-leader-jean-pierre-bemba-wins-war-crimes-appeal-international-criminal-court">conviction was later</a> overturned on technical grounds.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bemba-acquittal-overturns-important-victory-for-sexual-violence-victims-99948">Bemba acquittal overturns important victory for sexual violence victims</a>
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<p>Despite this record, he was a popular choice to run against the current president but was deemed ineligible by the electoral commission due to witness tampering charges that had been upheld by the International Criminal Court. So, Fayulu prevailed. </p>
<p>Fayulu is a wealthy businessman, a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-12/former-exxon-manager-leads-congo-opposition-s-bid-for-presidency">former Manager at Exxon Mobil</a> who has been politically active in opposition for many years. He was even injured when government forces fired on opposition protesters in the capital in 2006. </p>
<p>He has promised to create an environment conducive to business and investment in the DRC, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election-candidates/candidates-to-succeed-kabila-after-congos-presidential-election-idUSKBN1OH017">to revise mining and oil contracts</a>. This won’t necessarily improve the lives of the average person as oil is <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/04/04/politics-and-oil-unseen-drivers-violence-congo-s-ituri-province">seen as a driver</a> of conflict and displacement in the parts of the country with such reserves. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>Many state functions fail in the DRC. The <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update">country ranks</a> 176 out of a possible 189 on the Human Development Index. In the <a href="http://poll2018.trust.org/country/?id=democratic-republic-of-the-congo">latest Reuters Poll</a>, it came in as the seventh worst country in the world to be a woman. An estimated 70% of Congolese have <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/fact-sheets/usaiddrc-fact-sheet-health">little or no access</a> to health care. Serious diseases are rife, with <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/don/13-December-2018-ebola-drc/en/">a current Ebola outbreak in the country</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/congos-controversial-voting-machines-start-arriving-idUSKCN1MU0MJ">made questionable decisions</a> about the election logistics in the years and months leading up to the poll. Early in December one of their warehouses was burned to the ground, including the thousands of electronic voting machines stored there. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/QE2yBGaG6zc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An electoral commission warehouse in the DRC.</span></figcaption>
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<hr>
<p>In the lead up to the election, more than one million voters who live in largely opposition-held areas (and those facing the Ebola outbreak) were told they <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-29/almost-a-million-congolese-denied-vote-because-of-ebola/10672976">would not be allowed to vote</a> for health and security reasons. But <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-31/congo-bars-1-million-from-election-voting-over-ebola-outbreak/10674582">mock elections were staged</a> in the area to show they were able to do so.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2018/1133">United Nations Security Council published a report</a> of “major security incidents including attacks against civilians, security forces and United Nations peacekeepers in many provinces,” as well as illegal importation of military materiel. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/05/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">Human Rights Watch have reported</a> violence, widespread irregularities and voter suppression during the election.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drcs-flawed-election-means-for-emerging-democratic-culture-in-africa-109410">What DRC's flawed election means for emerging democratic culture in Africa</a>
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<p>Given Fayulu is not the government candidate, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/dr-congo-edge-presidential-election-results-delayed-190105181501718.html">further violence</a> is likely. The President has shown his reluctance to let go of power. He and his party have the capacity to either announce Shadary the winner of the election, regardless of the count; or to simply refuse to give up power. </p>
<p>Either way, it is looking more and more likely it will get bloody.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson is a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security. </span></em></p>The US has sent troops to countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of Congo in anticipation of violence and unrest once the election results are announced.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
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<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
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<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876262017-11-28T09:18:40Z2017-11-28T09:18:40ZWhat drives instability in Africa and what can be done about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196470/original/file-20171127-2077-1y8tht6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to French counter-terrorism forces in northern Mali, in May.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Christophe Petit Tesson</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor and young, but also because it is growing and dynamic. Development is disruptive but also presents huge opportunities. The continent needs to plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Levels of armed conflict in Africa rise and fall. Data from the <a href="http://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a>, the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a> and <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/">others</a> indicate that armed conflict peaked in 1990/91 at the end of the Cold War, declined to 2005/6, remained relative stable to 2010/11 and then increased to 2015, although it peaked at lower levels than in 1990/91 before its most recent decline.</p>
<p>Armed conflict has <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/future-im-perfect-mapping-conflict-violence-and-extremism-in-africa">changed</a>. Today there are many more non-state actors involved in armed conflict in Africa – representing a greater fracturing of armed groupings. So it’s not a matter of “government vs an armed group” but a “government vs many armed groups”. Insurgents are often divided and sometimes even fighting amongst themselves. This greater fragmentation complicates peacemaking.</p>
<p>Terrorism has also <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/violent-islamist-extremism-and-terror-in-africa">increased</a>, but depending on how one defines it, it has always been widely prevalent in Africa both as a tactic to secure decolonisation as well as between and among competing armed groups. The big question for 2017 is: is violent political extremism going to move from the Middle East to Africa? Put another way, is it in Africa that Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will find solid footage as they are displaced from the Middle East?</p>
<p>Anti government <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/less-armed-conflict-but-more-political-violence-in-africa">turbulence</a> has also increased in recent years. In Africa, this has led to disaffection and violence around elections that are often rigged rather than free and fair. Generally this is because governance in many African countries present <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-democracy-in-africa">a facade of democracy</a> but don’t yet reflect substantive democracy. </p>
<p>Seven relationships lie behind patterns of violence on the continent, and provide insights into whether it can be managed better.</p>
<h2>Relationships explaining violence</h2>
<p><strong>Poverty</strong></p>
<p>Internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poor countries than in rich ones. This is not because poor people are violent but because poor states lack the ability to ensure law and order. The impact of poverty is exacerbated by inequality, such as in <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/economics-governance-and-instability-in-south-africa">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Updated forecasts using the <a href="http://pardee.du.edu/understand-interconnected-world">International Futures forecasting system</a> indicate that around 37% of Africans live in extreme poverty (roughly 460 million people).</p>
<p>By 2030, 32% of Africans (forecast at 548 million) are likely to live in extreme poverty. So, while the portion is coming down (around 5% less), the absolute numbers will likely increase by around 90 million. It’s therefore unlikely that Africa will meet the first of the Sustainable Development Goals on <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/reasonable-goals-for-reducing-poverty-in-africa-targets-for-the-post-mdgs-and-agenda-2063">ending absolute poverty</a> on a current growth path of roughly 4% GDP growth per annum. </p>
<p><strong>Democratisation</strong> </p>
<p>Democratisation can trigger violence in the short to medium term, particularly around <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-insights/turbulent-elections-in-africa-in-2016-the-need-for-truth-telling-from-the-au">elections</a>. Recent events in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenya-grapples-with-domestic-and-foreign-security-threats">Kenya</a> are an example. Where there is a large democratic deficit, as in North Africa before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-vibrant-civil-society-is-central-to-democratic-consolidation-in-tunisia-55525">Arab spring</a>, tension builds up and can explode. </p>
<p>And a democratic deficit – where levels of democracy are below what can be expected when compared to other countries at similar levels of income and education – often leads to instability. </p>
<p>Instability is also fuelled by the manipulation of <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/elections-in-2017-can-the-au-up-its-game">elections</a> and constitutions by heads of state to extend their stay in power. Examples include <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-can-burundi-bury-the-ghosts-of-its-troubled-past">Burundi</a>, the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/without-elections-the-drcs-economy-will-continue-to-slide">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> (DR Congo) and Uganda.</p>
<p><strong>Regime type</strong> </p>
<p>The nature of the <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html">governing regime</a> is another structural factor. Most stable countries are either full democracies or full autocracies. But most African countries have mixed regimes with some elements of democracy mixed with strong autocratic features. They present a façade of democracy but lack its substantive elements. Mixed regimes are inherently more unstable and prone to disruptions than either full democracies or full autocracies.</p>
<p><strong>Population structure</strong></p>
<p>Africa’s <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html">population is young</a>, with a median age of 19. By comparison, the median age is 41 in France (a relatively young country by European standards). So 22% of adult French are in the youth bulge of 15-29 years compared to 47% of Africans.</p>
<p>Young countries tend to be more turbulent because young men are largely responsible for violence and crime. If young people lack jobs and rates of urbanisation are high, social exclusion and instability follow. </p>
<p><strong>Repeat violence</strong></p>
<p>A history of violence is generally the best predictor of future violence. Countries such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/malis-electoral-cycle-fraught-with-obstacles-and-instability">Mali</a>, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/challenges-ahead-for-au-in-ending-car-conflict">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/in-sadc-the-interests-of-ruling-parties-come-first">DRC</a> are trapped in cycles of violence. This is very difficult to break. It requires a huge effort and is very expensive, often requiring a large, multi-dimensional peace mission that only the UN can provide. But, scaling peacekeeping back rather than scaling it up is the order of the day at the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-trumps-stance-on-africa-means-for-continental-security-efforts">UN</a>.</p>
<p><strong>A bad neighbourhood</strong> </p>
<p>Where a country is located can increase the risk of violence because borders are not controlled and rural areas not policed. Most conflict in Africa is supported from neighbouring countries. Violence spills over national borders and affects other countries while poorly trained and equipped law and order institutions generally cannot operate regionally.</p>
<p><strong>Slow growth and rising inequality</strong> </p>
<p>Africa is quite unequal, so growth does not translate into poverty reduction. In addition, the world is in a low growth environment after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, with average rates of growth significantly lower than before. Africa needs to grow at average rates of 7% or more a year if it is to reduce poverty and create jobs, yet current long term forecasts are for rates significantly below that.</p>
<h2>Opportunity amid challenges</h2>
<p>These seven related factors indicate that the notion that Africa can somehow “silence the guns by 2020”, as advocated by the African Union as part of its <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">Agenda 2063</a> is unrealistic. Violence will remain a characteristic of <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/assessing-long-term-state-fragility-in-africa-prospects-for-26-more-fragile-countries">a number of African countries</a> for many years to come and Africa should plan accordingly. </p>
<p>In the long term only rapid, inclusive economic growth combined with good governance can chip away at the structural drivers of violence. It is also clear that middle income countries are making progress in attracting foreign direct investment but that poor countries will remain <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-in-the-world-report/fertility-growth-and-the-future-of-aid-in-sub-saharan-africa">aid dependent</a>. </p>
<p>Much more international and regional cooperation will be required as part of this process, including substantive and scaled up support for <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/turning-point-for-the-au-un-peacekeeping-partnership">peacekeeping</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some African countries present a facade of democracy. The absence of substantive democracy is contributing to instability on the continent.Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856172017-10-16T13:12:55Z2017-10-16T13:12:55ZElections in Africa: democratic rituals matter even though the outlook is bleak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189998/original/file-20171012-31381-thdt34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An elderly woman displays her inked finger after casting her vote during the 2016 presidential elections in Uganda. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/James Akena</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multi-party systems established in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1990s have endured despite electoral violence. But democratic hopes have been dashed or perverted throughout the rest of the region. The governments built on the ruins of the civil wars in Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda have all relied on armed political groups to stay in power. </p>
<p>From June 2015 to August 2017 an uninterrupted series of general elections took place in Central and East Africa. Those in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/burundi-president-nkurunziza-wins-disputed-election-150724140417364.html">Burundi (2015)</a> and the DRC (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-election/congo-presidential-election-set-for-november-27-2016-commission-idUSKBN0LG28M20150212">initially set for 2016</a>) were expected to be the most problematic. In both the incumbent presidents were seeking to extend their mandates beyond a second term. In the <a href="http://time.com/4080835/africa-republic-of-congo-protest-sassou-nguesso-violence/">Congo</a>, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-opposition-leader-arrested-days-elections-160215132155444.html">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya</a>, the risk of violent clashes was palpable.</p>
<p>The ruling regimes were not only dated, but worse for wear. At the time of the elections, the presidents of Angola (José Eduardo Dos Santos), the Congo (Denis Sassou N'Guesso) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), all members of the revolutionary or progressive <a href="http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/02/bill-clintons-new-generation-of-african"><em>New Generation</em></a> of African leaders, were all in their seventies and had been in power for 30 or more years. The Presidents of Rwanda (Paul Kagamé), the DRC (Joseph Kabila) and Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza), having served terms of 21, 14 and 10 years respectively, took steps to change their countries’ constitution to seek a third term.</p>
<p>Despite the bleak regional outlook and contagious scepticism among voters, these pious “democratic” rituals have become critical events over the past 20 years. This is true even in the most authoritarian countries where so much is predetermined. From the parties in the running to the authorised candidates and even the results.</p>
<p>As artificial as they may be, these rites still represent a risk for those in power. Rulers need expert skill to ensure both maximum control over their institutions and demonstrations of love from their people. Consequently, the outcome of the race – between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression – is never entirely certain.</p>
<p>From Kinshasa to Kampala, from Brazzaville to Luanda and Bujumbura, courageous dissenters have organised numerous protests, usually with the approval – and sometimes active support – of the general population. These protests express the frustrations and expectations of a generation fed up with regimes clinging to power and responding to growing disillusion with increasing authoritarianism.</p>
<p>The ruling parties have, on the whole, proved themselves highly resourceful and resilient against the desire for change. Their victory has been comprehensive. Only Kenya is the exception: a second vote is set for October 26 following the Supreme Court’s surprise <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenya-supreme-court-criticizes-election-board-in-verdict-on-polls-idUSKCN1BV0QB">decision</a> to invalidate the election results. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/no-congo-election-until-mid-2019-vote-commission-says-angering-opposition-idUSKBN1CG1KW">delaying tactics</a> have so far allowed him to remain in power. And while Dos Santos eventually withdrew his candidature due to illness, the election of his chosen successor has ensured power in Angola <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">remains in his faction’s hands</a>.</p>
<h2>In power until 2034</h2>
<p>The string of Central and East African elections got off to a bad start. In April 2015, the president of Burundi <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">controversially</a> sought a third term in office. Although devastated by 10 years of internal strife, Burundi had become a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7748.doc.htm">symbol of peaceful transition</a> in the region. Three months of tactical manoeuvring and brutal repression were required to bring victory to the incumbent president. This pushed the country back to the brink of civil war and further plunged it down the ranks of the world’s poorest countries. </p>
<p>The resulting crisis and the violent response by this relatively inexperienced president threw discredit on other outgoing presidents in the region, all flagrant repeat offenders. They were forced to up their game.</p>
<p>In February 2016, Museveni took office for the fifth time in Uganda amid relative calm. In March, in a tenser national atmosphere, Congolese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso started on the first of the three extra terms allowed by the recent constitutional reform. He could still be in power in 2031, at nearly 90 years of age.</p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Rwandan President Paul Kagame presided over a constitutional referendum in 2015 enabling him to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">remain in power until 2034</a>. The reform was approved by 98% of voters, with a voter turnout of more than 98%.</p>
<p>Overall, pending the outcomes in Kenya and DRC, each of the self-proclaimed candidates who won the recent bout of electoral contests can boast enviable popular mandates, and even landslide victories.</p>
<h2>Every leader for themselves</h2>
<p>In the eyes of these leaders their longevity, and that of their counterparts in the region, constitutes in and of itself a justification for remaining power.</p>
<p>Their relations, alliances and conflicts were carved out in a shared past, marked by civil wars and fiercely violent regional clashes. Widespread structural insecurity <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-and-rwanda-a-rivalry-that-lies-at-the-heart-of-great-lakes-crises-63795">plagues the entire region</a> as a result. The insecurity is fuelled by governments’ failure to lay down formal, mutually beneficial, political frameworks for cooperation and regional integration. Yet such frameworks would allow them to develop the human resources and agricultural and mining potential of the region in an equitable manner.</p>
<p>In 2013, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo">African Intervention Brigades</a> were authorised to take offensive measures to neutralise the main militia groups in the country’s Eastern region. The Brigades’ main target was the M23, a movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/drc_5.pdf">intelligence</a> later submitted to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The return to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo">low-scale warfare</a> is a sign of a regulated joint governance of the instability.</p>
<p>Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, numerous political and criminal armed groups still control vast, lawless zones. In their own ways, these groups secure the exploitation of natural resources. They supply a lucrative cross-border trade run at the highest levels of government. These activities bring in significant profits for the ruling classes. They also allow countries in the sub-region to export goods they do not produce themselves. And they ensure the continued viability of the various regional and international trade routes towards the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>At every stage of wealth creation, profits are essentially redistributed according to private interests. It is therefore easy to understand why each head of state believes themselves best placed to serve both national and personal interests, and the interests of the political-ethnic groups they represent.</p>
<h2>The price of longevity</h2>
<p>When they came to power, the <em>new generation</em> of leaders from the Great Horn of Africa embodied the new ideal of “good governance”. They were “strong men” at the head of “strong and sustainable democracies”, ensuring the order and security necessary for development.</p>
<p>During the course of these elections, none of these so-called democrats, so regularly and resoundingly “elected” by their citizens, had any thoughts of retirement. Setting aside Kabila, whose fate is still undecided, at least two of them, in Burundi and Uganda, had no qualms about changing their country’s constitution to ensure their own reelection.</p>
<p>But in a region of considerable wealth, it’s by no means certain that government can indefinitely be determined by the life expectancy of leaders who are still incapable of developing the regional cooperative frameworks that would ensure peace, security and prosperity for their citizens.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The outcome of the race between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression is never entirely certain.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.