tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/freedom-house-32372/articlesFreedom House – The Conversation2023-07-13T12:39:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069192023-07-13T12:39:30Z2023-07-13T12:39:30ZMany once-democratic countries continue to backslide, becoming less free – but their leaders continue to enjoy popular support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537135/original/file-20230712-29-v1zm1l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power since 2003 and has tried to strengthen the executive branch during that time. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/d5b62e740a5e46e1a7c134fc8959c0c0/preview/AP17111331555373.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">is decreasing</a> globally – and has been doing so for the last 17 years, according to 2023 findings published by the nonprofit group Freedom House, which advocates for democracy.</p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons why they remain popular. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Xz968xcAAAAJ&hl=en">political scientist</a> who studies political and economic dynamics in low- and middle-income countries. <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">This phenomenon</a> of societies becoming less democratic after having made progress toward full democracy is known as <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">democratic backsliding</a>. </p>
<p>In my 2022 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.2017891">co-authored research</a>, my colleague, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=h0o27GgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Byunghwan Son</a>, and I identified two key ways that democratic backsliding happens.</p>
<p>First, political leaders weaken democracies when they adopt legal and policy measures that make the executive branch stronger and the other branches of government – such as the judiciary and legislative branches – weaker. This then reduces checks and balances on the executive branch.</p>
<p>Democracy also is weakened when leaders make it difficult for opposition parties to compete in elections. This curtails the citizens’ choice to support candidates who are not the de facto leader, whether it becomes harder to learn about these candidates in the media or because it is dangerous to publicly support their causes. </p>
<p>Political leaders in a range of countries, including China and Nicaragua, are increasingly taking steps to consolidate their power by undermining other branches of government and the opposition. When leaders do so, they are displaying <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">authoritarian tendencies</a>, meaning they try to create a <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/authoritarianism/">government with a very strong executive branch</a> and little tolerance for dissent. </p>
<p>But despite these trends, some leaders who have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/04/hungarys-authoritarian-leader-no-gift-us-conservatives">gained authoritarian</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/no-erdogan-was-not-authoritarian-all-along">reputations among critics</a> – like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary – <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">enjoy high</a> <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1191282/hungary-satisfaction-with-viktor-orban/">approval ratings</a> within their countries.</p>
<p>Why do leaders who diminish democracy have such strong public support? </p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons. </p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s endurance</h2>
<p>Erdoğan has been in power for almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">20 years</a>. He first served as prime minister of Turkey in 2003 and then became president in 2014. He was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/28/europe/turkey-president-runoff-polls-erdogan-intl/index.html">reelected president</a> for another five-year term in May 2023. </p>
<p>Opposition parties are able to compete in Turkish elections, but Erdoğan has taken other legal measures over the years to <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/erdogans-winning-authoritarian-populist-formula-and-turkeys-future/">diminish contenders’ chances</a> among voters. </p>
<p>Since Erdoğan’s AKP political party <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Rise-of-the-AKP-in-the-21st-century">came to power</a> in 2002, he has appointed sympathetic judges. This has also enabled him to remove or jail prosecutors and judges and replace them <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-judges/">with loyalists</a>. </p>
<p>Ekrem İmamoğlu, the former mayor of Istanbul and a member of the CHP opposition party, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">considered a formidable challenger</a> to Erdoğan before the 2023 election. But in December 2022, a Turkish court sentenced İmamoğlu to nearly three years in jail for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">calling Turkey’s supreme election council “fools,”</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/istanbuls-opposition-mayor-barred-from-politics-over-insult-to-regime-officials/">barred him from politics</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s control of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48599281">judiciary system</a> helped remove the threat of İmamoğlu’s popularity. Around 2021, Erdoğan himself was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/turkey-2023-presidential-election-anger-over-prices-threatens-erdogan">experiencing a dip </a>in popularity. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has taken other steps to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">consolidate his power</a>. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-gulen/turkey-orders-detention-of-82-military-personnel-over-suspected-gulen-links-anadolu-idUSKBN28B3UL">detaining military officials</a> who question his authority, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/turkish-journalist-arrested-on-charge-of-insulting-erdogan">arresting journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-bogazici/turkish-police-clash-with-students-protesting-erdogan-appointed-university-head-idUSKBN2991TT">activists and academics</a> who criticize him. </p>
<p>Despite these actions, people reelected Erdoğan – and his <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">approval rating</a> continues to be relatively high, even in the face of a weak <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-erdogans-reelection-means-for-turkey">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-inflation-higher-than-expected-nearly-58-2023-02-03/">high inflation</a>.</p>
<p>Public spending is one key way Erdoğan has maintained people’s support. </p>
<p>Leading up to the May 2023 elections, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdd95bad-8f38-402d-a636-4d27aa20b3cc">went on a spending spree</a> to help consolidate his support. He repeatedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/world/middleeast/turkey-election-economy-president.html">increased the minimum wage</a>, most <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-20/turkey-raises-minimum-wage-by-34-in-second-hike-in-a-year">recently by 34%</a>. He dropped the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">retirement age requirement</a>, giving 2 million people the opportunity to stop working and receive pensions. </p>
<p>Erdoğan, who has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">long championed Islamic</a> causes and groups in a secular country, has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/27/erdogan-kilicdaroglu-rally-supporters-before-turkish-election">rallied conservative constituents</a> by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/turkey-s-erdogan-looks-to-islamic-fringe-refah-huda-to-boost-electoral-alliance#xj4y7vzkg">positioning himself</a> as a leader who will fight for religious rights. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Viktor Orban salutes to a crowd of people while he stands on a podium, with red, white and green flags around him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, greets supporters during an election rally in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/3e62f6ca15ad49d7a5cbf9aa39a92425/preview/AP22091491809418.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Petr David Josek</a></span>
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<h2>Orbán’s hold on Hungary</h2>
<p>Similar trends are underway in Hungary. Orbán has served consecutive terms as prime minister since 2010. He won his <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">fourth election</a> in 2022.</p>
<p>Since 2010, Orbán has taken measures to strengthen his power. In <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">2013, he used his party’s majority</a> in parliament to make constitutional amendments that limit courts’ power. One change involved eliminating all decisions courts made before 2012, discarding a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution/hungary-defying-eu-limits-powers-of-top-court-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">body of law</a> from before Orbán’s time. </p>
<p>More recently in 2018, Orbán tried creating a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-courts/hungary-to-set-up-courts-overseen-directly-by-government-idUSKBN1OB193">parallel court system</a> that would have let a justice minister oversee election-related cases in a separate court system. </p>
<p>However, pressure from the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/31/hungary-scraps-parallel-justice-system-plans-after-eu-failure">European Union</a> – of which Hungary is a member – stopped these planned reforms in 2019. </p>
<p>Orbán has also <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">tried to consolidate his power</a> by weakening independent media. This effort includes <a href="https://www.eurozine.com/viktor-orbans-war-on-the-media/">not renewing news organizations’ broadcast rights</a> and government purchase of media outlets. This, in turn, makes <a href="https://hungarianfreepress.com/2018/07/09/fidesz-holds-budapests-jozsefvaros-in-mayoral-election-amidst-23-percent-turn-out/">it difficult for opposition candidates</a> to get their message out to voters. In some cases, print news outlets have not allowed opposition candidates to place political advertisements, for example. </p>
<p>Despite these developments, Orbán’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/08/03/hungarians-differ-in-their-evaluations-of-democracy-under-orbans-leadership/">approval ratings remain high</a>, hovering around 57% following the 2022 parliamentary election. </p>
<p>Here again, a political leader used high levels of public spending, as well as a nationalist message, to his advantage. </p>
<p>Orbán provided <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d9d736f5-96c6-4b74-a29e-7078390360b9">generous benefits</a> to families, children and armed forces before the 2022 elections. Some of these measures he announced included tax rebates to families with children, additional pay to members of armed forces and canceling personal income tax for workers under the age of 25. </p>
<p>Orbán used <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/viktor-orbans-hungary-populism-election-nationalism/">nationalism</a> – expressed through anti-immigrant rhetoric – as a strategy to garner support during elections, as well. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/viktor-orban-against-race-mixing-europe-hungary">He has discussed</a> the drawbacks of “race mixing” and migration in order to drum up support among Hungarians who are concerned about the influx of newcomers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, some of whom are wearing headscarves, wave Turkish flags and appear to celebrate." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate his reelection in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/ec312af9c2e14ade9d5dd4e2db4680c0/preview/AP23134852367603.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Ali Una</a></span>
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<h2>Authoritarianism a broader trend</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s and Orbán’s attempts to consolidate power are only two examples of a broader, rising trend of authoritarianism across the world. </p>
<p>A total of 60 countries – <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/11/10/under-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-has-become-a-one-party-state">including Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reorienting-us-policy-toward-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-coup-emblematic-regional-democracy-failures">and Myanmar</a> – experienced declines in freedom in 2022, while only 25 improved, according to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule">Freedom House</a>. The U.S. received a score of 83, or “free,” according to this list, which considers political rights and civil liberties and scores countries based on these factors. </p>
<p>Using money to give incentives to voters and invoking nationalism are two ways leaders like Erdoğan and Orbán maintain support. But other factors, like <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">rising inequality</a>, may also play a role in why people turn to strongmen leaders for answers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nisha Bellinger receives funding from Social Science Research Council (SSRC). </span></em></p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, are two leaders who have consolidated power using a similar playbook.Nisha Bellinger, Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Studies, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019982023-03-18T16:01:27Z2023-03-18T16:01:27Z20 years on, George W. Bush’s promise of democracy in Iraq and Middle East falls short<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516090/original/file-20230317-1658-o8gjxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iraqi person walks down a road blocked by burning tires in Basra in August 2002. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1242803428/photo/topshot-iraq-politics-sadr-demo.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=S4tOIc6I7PC-scxNWjeb_aZUVwt5U2jKeyr1k5lyhzo=">Hussein Faleh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President George W. Bush and his administration put forward a variety of reasons to justify <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">the 2003 invasion of Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>In the months before the U.S. invasion, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-justifying-war">Bush said the looming conflict</a> was about eradicating terrorism and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/">seizing weapons of mass destruction</a> – but also because of a “<a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html">freedom deficit</a>” in the Middle East, a reference to the perceived lag in participatory government in the region.</p>
<p>Many of these arguments would emerge as poorly grounded, given later events. </p>
<p>In 2004, then Secretary of State Colin Powell reflected on the weak rationale behind the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/world/powell-says-cia-was-misled-about-weapons.html">main arguments for the invasion</a>: that there were weapons of mass destruction. He acknowledged that “it turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases deliberately misleading.” </p>
<p>In fact <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313">Iraq did not have a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction</a>, as Powell and others had alleged at the time.</p>
<p>But the Bush administration’s rhetoric of building a more free, open and democratic Middle East persisted after the weapons of mass destruction claim had proven false, and has been harder to evaluate – at least in the short term. <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html">Bush assured</a> the American public in 2003 that, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.” </p>
<p>He focused on this theme during <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739">the ground invasion</a>, in which a coalition force of nearly 100,000 American and other allied troops rapidly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/toppling-saddam-hussein-statue-iraq-us-victory-myth">toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime</a>. </p>
<p>“The establishment of <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html">a free Iraq</a> at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution,” Bush said in November 2003. He also said that the U.S. would be pursuing a “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”</p>
<p>Twenty years on, it is worth considering how this “forward strategy” has played out both in Iraq and across the Middle East. In 2003, there was indeed, as Bush noted, a “freedom deficit” in the Middle East, where repressive <a href="https://www.eui.eu/documents/rscas/research/mediterranean/mrm2008/09ws-description.pdf">authoritarian regimes dominated the region</a>. Yet, in spite of tremendous upheaval in the Middle East over the past two decades, many authoritarian regimes remain deeply entrenched.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of men appear to be protesting in the street and raise Iraqi flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Iraqis demonstrate to show support for Saddam Hussein in February 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1798778/photo/activists-in-iraq-rally-for-peace.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=oPWRXG5RzA-kS2bmMT5D9rlLapEelUW5FMqeyCxxqKQ=">Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Measuring the ‘Freedom Gap’</h2>
<p>Political science <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1waDubkAAAAJ&hl=en">scholars like myself</a> try to measure the democratic or authoritarian character of governments in a variety of ways. </p>
<p>The non-profit group <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> evaluates countries in terms of democratic institutions and whether they have free and fair elections, as well as people’s civil rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and a free press. Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology">rates each country</a> and its level of democracy on a scale from 2 to 14, from “mostly free” to “least free.” </p>
<p>One way to think about the level of democracy in the region is to focus on the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/arab-league">23 countries and governments that form the Arab League</a>, a regional organization that spans North Africa, the Red Sea coast and the Middle East. In 2003, the average Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2003_complete_book.pdf">score for an Arab League member</a> was 11.45 – far more authoritarian than the global average of 6.75 at the time. </p>
<p>Put another way, the Freedom House report in 2003 <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2003_complete_book.pdf">classified a little over 46%</a> of all countries as “free,” but no country in the Arab League met that threshold.</p>
<p>While some <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/08/heavy-lies-the-crown-the-survival-of-arab-monarchies-10-years-after-the-arab-spring/">Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia</a>, were ruled by monarchies around this time, others, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/arab-spring-autocrats-the-dead-the-ousted-and-those-who-survived">like Libya</a>, were ruled by dictators. </p>
<p>The nearly <a href="https://www.pbs.org/tpt/dictators-playbook/episodes/saddam-hussein/">30-year-long regime</a> of Hussein in Iraq fit this second pattern. Hussein was part of a 1968 coup led by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Baath-Party">the Ba'ath political party</a>, a group that <a href="https://www.encyclopediaofmigration.org/en/the_bath_party_in_iraq/">wanted all Arab countries</a> to form one unified nation – but also became known for human rights violations. The Ba'ath Party relied upon <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/164.htm">Iraq’s oil wealth</a> and <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2018/03/29/baath-party-archives-reveal-brutality-saddam-husseins-rule/">repressive tactics against civilians</a> to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2745001.stm">maintain power</a>. </p>
<p>The fall of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saddam-hussein-fell-then-violence-iraq-spiralled-2023-03-14/">Hussein’s regime in April 2003</a> produced a nominally more democratic Iraq. But after fighting a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/21172">series of sectarian insurgencies</a> in Iraq over an eight-year period, the U.S. ultimately left behind <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/all-us-troops-to-leave-iraq/2011/10/21/gIQAUyJi3L_story.html">a weak and deeply divided government</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A row of newspapers show a bearded man with words like 'We got him' and 'Saddam captured.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newsstand sells papers reporting the capture of Saddam Hussein, former leader of Iraq, by U.S. forces in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/2811512/photo/papers-run-story-on-saddam-capture.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=1H9qDW1rPW1wVPbyKH3HUrgRll8pRZ36ZhzVeS-rM6A=">Graeme Robertson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Post-invasion Iraq</h2>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-pullout-idUSTRE7BE0EL20111215">2003 invasion</a> succeeded in ousting a brutal regime – but establishing a healthy and thriving new democracy proved more challenging. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/05/religious-politics-iraq">Rivalry between</a> Iraq’s three main groups – the Sunni and Shiite Muslims as well as the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in the country – paralyzed early attempts at political reorganization. </p>
<p>While Iraq today has a constitution, a parliament and holds regular elections, the country struggles both with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/bdc-snapshots-the-iraqi-states-crisis-of-legitimacy/">popular legitimacy</a> and with practical aspects of governance, such as providing <a href="https://www.unicef.org/iraq/what-we-do/education#:%7E:text=Decades%20of%20conflict%20and%20under,Iraqi%20children%20out%20of%20school.">basic education</a> for children. </p>
<p>Indeed, in 2023, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2023">Freedom House</a> continues to score Iraq as “Not Free” in its measure of democracy.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/21/obama-us-troops-withdrawal-iraq">military withdrawal in 2011</a>, Iraq has lurched from one political crisis to another. From 2014 to 2017, large portions of western Iraq were controlled by the extremist militant <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">Islamic State group</a>. </p>
<p>In 2018 and 2019, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-economy-analysis-idUSKBN1WH1S8">rampant government corruption</a> led to a string of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212">anti-government protests</a>, which sparked a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fear-spreads-among-iraqi-protesters-as-government-cracks-down-keeps-death-toll-secret/2019/11/11/be210a28-03f9-11ea-9118-25d6bd37dfb1_story.html">violent crackdown</a> by the government. </p>
<p>The protests prompted early <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/10/11/1045092941/iraq-election-results-sadr">parliamentary elections in November 2021</a>, but the government has not yet been able to create a coalition government representing all competing political groups. </p>
<p>While Iraq’s most recent crisis avoided descending into civil war, the militarized nature of Iraqi political parties poses <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/01/shiite-rivalries-could-break-iraqs-deceptive-calm-in-2023/">an ongoing risk of electoral violence</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man pushes a cart in a desolate looking area with sandy, dirt ground and blue skies." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi man pushes a cart in Mosul after the government retook control from the Islamic State in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/632292674/photo/topshot-iraq-conflict-mosul.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Nhx4QWu-dMm2zA-P6RdP4cf62WwjFwQMUkSrHcfjkf4=">Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The post-invasion Middle East</h2>
<p>While Iraq continues to face deep political challenges, it is worth considering the U.S. efforts at regional democracy promotion more fully. </p>
<p>In 2014, widespread protest movements associated with the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution">Arab Spring</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings">toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya</a>. In other countries, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680">such as Morocco</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482679">Jordan</a>, monarchs were able to offer concessions to people and remain in control by delaying public spending cuts, for example, and replacing government ministers. </p>
<p>Yet sustaining stable democracies has proved challenging even where the Arab Spring seemed to succeed in changing political regimes. In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19256730">Egypt, the military</a> has reasserted itself and the country has slid steadily back to authoritarianism. In <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">Yemen, the political vaccum</a> created by the protests marked the start of a devastating civil war. </p>
<p>The average Freedom House democracy score for <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">members of the Arab League</a> is today 11.45 — the same as it was on the eve of the Iraq invasion. </p>
<p>It is hard to know if U.S. efforts at democracy promotion accelerated or delayed political change in the Middle East. It is hard to know if a different approach might have yielded better results. Yet, the data – at least as social scientists measure such things – strongly suggests that the vision of an Iraq as an inspiration for a democratic transformation of the Middle East has not come to pass.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Urlacher is affiliated with North Dakota Dem/NPL and serves as vice chair for District 18.</span></em></p>The Bush administration invaded Iraq with plans for it to become a democracy. But according to some social science measures, the country isn’t any more democratic than it was before 2003.Brian Urlacher, Department Chair and Professor, Political Science & Public Administration, University of North DakotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975032023-01-26T13:25:17Z2023-01-26T13:25:17ZUkraine has a mixed record of treating its citizens fairly – that could make it harder for it to maintain peace, once the war ends<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506191/original/file-20230124-13-qmopx8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukraine has a mixed human rights record over the past several decades, new data shows.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1240050560/photo/topshot-ukraine-russia-conflict.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=HmYiHMmU5wIyNzfo1m2PQ-_53IyaA_eZQGDZLuahxTw=">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the dominant Western media narrative has been clear – Russia is the “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/cold-war-echoes-russia-us-ukraine-0050dd806e5f8748bf59b5e84d15b959">global villain</a>,” and Ukraine a model country victimized by an unjust war. But while the war may be unjust, Ukraine had its share of problems before the conflict with Russia intensified in 2022. </p>
<p>Expert analysis shows that Russia launched <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-crime-and-punishment-illegal-war-in-ukraine">an illegal war</a> and has committed the vast majority of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-russia-committing-genocide-in-ukraine-a-human-rights-expert-looks-at-the-warning-signs-180017">human rights violations </a> in the conflict – <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3190982/russia-trying-terror-attacks-on-ukrainian-civilians/">such as targeting</a> Ukraine’s civilians.</p>
<p>Ukraine has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/20/world/europe/russian-soldiers-shot-ukraine.html">allegedly committed </a> war crimes against Russian soldiers during the conflict. Much like Russia, the country has had a mixed record over the past two decades regarding treatment of its citizens. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oyR7hesAAAAJ&hl=en">We are</a> human rights <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1WM6bk8AAAAJ&hl=en">scholars who</a> helped launch the world’s largest quantitative data set – <a href="https://cirights.com">known as CIRIGHTS</a> – to track global human rights in December 2022.</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that while Ukraine’s prewar human rights record is better than Russia’s, it is far below the global average. Along with an ongoing problem of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/ukraine">government corruption</a>, Ukraine has been cited by Western <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/ukraine#d91ede">human rights groups</a> for not prosecuting hate crimes and failing to properly address and respond to gender-based violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blond middle-aged woman holds a child in a blue snowsuit up against her, next to two other older children, as seen through a window of a train and a large fence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506163/original/file-20230124-27-zyzszh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian women and children pass through the Przemysl train station in Poland after fleeing the war in April 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1390462714/photo/poland-welcomes-more-than-2-million-ukrainian-refugees.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=6kSRqGXuFUCuf-s62QUfx1xyMMzq0Wi1kdsp-zam678=">Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine’s human rights record</h2>
<p>Ukraine scores in the bottom third of all countries in terms of its human rights record, according to our data. Its score of 42 out of 100 is the same as that of the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/central-african-republic-un-reports-detail-serious-violations-some-possibly">Central African Republic</a> – a country rife with violence against civilians and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic">political instability</a>. </p>
<p>Several factors contributed to this ranking. Ukraine’s military, for example, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/world/ukraine-used-cluster-bombs-report-charges.html">known to have</a> indiscriminately used <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/20/ukraine-widespread-use-cluster-munitions">cluster munitions</a> in highly populated areas of Donetsk – in the eastern part of Ukraine that is occupied by a rebel government – in 2014, killing civilians. Ukraine’s police also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26280710">killed numerous protesters in Kyiv during the 2014 protests</a>, which led to EU sanctions. </p>
<p>Other human rights and freedom monitors like the U.S. nonprofit Freedom House have reported more recently that Ukraine was “<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2022">partly free</a>” when it came to issues like expression, access to information and the press. The country ranked just below the global average, with a score of 59 out of 100. </p>
<p>Other <a href="https://www.refworld.org/publisher,OHCHR,,UKR,,,0.html">human rights analyses</a> show that the extent to which people in Ukraine are free from government torture and forced labor and enjoy such privileges as freedom of religion and expression has improved since 1991, when the Soviet Union broke up – and Ukraine gained its independence – <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/human-rights">the country’s ranking</a> still stands below that of Ukraine’s Western European neighbors, like Poland and Hungary.</p>
<p>Unless Ukraine addresses its human rights shortfalls, it could risk not achieving or maintaining lasting peace, no matter when or how the war eventually ends. <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/2/41">Research shows</a> that human rights violations <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00442.x">create social and political problems</a> that can lead to conflict both within a country and internationally. </p>
<p><iframe id="Tfv8U" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Tfv8U/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>While many human rights measurement projects tend to focus on if and how a government <a href="https://rightstracker.org/en/metrics">uses physical violence</a> against its people, <a href="https://cirights.com/">our project</a> aims to measure <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/">all 30</a> internationally <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights">recognized human rights</a>, including women’s rights and workers’ rights.</p>
<p>We believe that this kind of comprehensive data helps all people have an easy, transparent and reliable way to understand a country’s human rights record.</p>
<p>Hundreds of undergraduate and graduate research assistants, as well as 10 faculty members across different schools, scored each human right for all countries of the world for each year since 1981, based on publicly available research and human rights reports. Each country’s scores in the 2022 report card are based on the most recent year for which scores were available for all human rights scored by the CIRIGHTS data project. </p>
<p>The scorers work independently with a rigorous set of scoring guidelines to consider 25 human rights measures and then work together to resolve differences to agree upon a numerical score. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://cirights.files.wordpress.com/2022/12/crights-2022-report.pdf?force_download=true">December 2022 annual report</a> placed Canada and Sweden at the head of the class, with a 96 each, followed by New Zealand, Norway and Portugal at 94. At the bottom were Iraq, with a score of 12, China at 10, and North Korea and Syria with 6, and Iran at 2. The U.S. was not measured in this report card, since the U.S. government does not report on its own human rights. Subsequent reports will include analysis of the U.S. drawn from other sources. </p>
<h2>Ukraine’s recent history of protests</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.mdpi.com/403000">Research has shown</a> that violations of human rights increase the likelihood of violent protests, terrorism and rebellion. </p>
<p>Ukraine, like Russia, has a history of citizens’ fighting corruption through public grievances, which turn into mass protests. Its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Revolution">Orange Revolution</a> in 2004 and 2005, for example, resulted <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/orange-revolution-ukraine-votes-for-change">in widespread marches</a> in protest of the alleged fraudulent election of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, a candidate backed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>Following a run-off election, Yanukovych’s anti-corruption opponent Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko was elected in January 2005. </p>
<p>But five years later, Ukranians voted Yanukovych right back into office.</p>
<p>In 2014, mass protests once again emerged in Ukraine after the government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact">abruptly canceled</a> an economic trade and political agreement with the European Union, following Russian pressure. People protested the decision, and Yanukovych’s government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/ukrainian-president-anti-protest-laws">passed new laws</a> to limit protests. Emboldened, police violently repressed the demonstrators – leading to more <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-ukraines-euromaidan-protests">violent and deadly riots</a>. </p>
<p>The 2014 and 2015 clashes culminated in the ouster of Yanukovych and the overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government. The protests also coincided with <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine">Russia’s invasion and annexation</a> of Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula. </p>
<p>Conflict between Russia and Ukraine has since dramatically intensified, spreading across much of Ukraine in 2022. This conflict has only made domestic human rights conditions more important. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person raises a blue and yellow striped flag above a large crowd of people, who are mostly covered in smoke." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506170/original/file-20230124-13-t04tuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainians take to the streets during the 2004 Orange Revolution to protest an alleged fraudulent election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/488564807/photo/ukraine-opposition-rally.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=3IGKn3tYZ2PwP4gOGGrY01e8oyn9Q48V30DE5CZc1Y4=">Sergey Supinski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Our data shows that Russia ranked as the 12th-worst human rights violator in the world over the past two decades, placing it far below Ukraine. Russia is known to be responsible for thousands of civilian deaths in the eastern <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer">Donbas region</a> of Ukraine, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/23/ukraine-war-un-report-details-abuse-and-torture-in-russian-prisons.html">as well as the torture</a> and imprisonment of Ukrainian citizens living in Russia.</p>
<p>And our analysis showed that Ukraine’s record for protecting civil and political rights, as well as other kinds of rights, were substantially better than Russia’s in recent years. Our scores are consistent with scores provided by other groups that track <a href="https://www.politicalterrorscale.org">human rights</a>. </p>
<p>The statistical evidence from all sources shows that both Russia and Ukraine have poor human rights records and are a long way from achieving a passing grade. This means for both countries it will be hard to achieve internal peace after the war ends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New data from 2000 through 2019 shows that Ukraine’s human rights record is better than Russia’s – but worse than that of its Western European neighbors.David Cingranelli, Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Human Rights Institute, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkBrendan Skip Mark, Professor of political science, University of Rhode IslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1732652021-12-07T13:51:12Z2021-12-07T13:51:12ZBiden’s summit for democracy: what Africa needs to bring to the table<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435874/original/file-20211206-13-1vgsoks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US president Joe Biden and Democratic Republic of Congo president Felix Tshisekedi at the G20 summit in October 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Erin Schaff/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventeen African countries have been invited by US president Joe Biden to join nearly 100 <a href="https://www.state.gov/participant-list-the-summit-for-democracy/">other invitees</a> for a <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy">virtual “Summit for Democracy”</a> due to take place this week. A second summit, in person, is planned for next year.</p>
<p>There are three issues on the agenda: defending against authoritarianism; addressing and fighting corruption; and promoting respect for human rights.</p>
<p>Africans have a great deal to contribute. It’s also an opportunity for them to advance their interests – as individual countries as well as collectively.</p>
<p>The US claims it has already consulted widely with non-governmental actors. This means that the views of African media, scholars and other stakeholders should weigh in.</p>
<p>Taken together, the summit’s three topics all beg for greater specificity plus realistic action plans and resources. Africa can – and must – be seen as offering vital and affordable opportunities to design, test and scale collective efforts. On each of the three broad topics they can make important contributions. </p>
<h2>The democracy question</h2>
<p>It remains a US bureaucratic mystery how the host <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/bidens-global-democracy-summit-raises-an-awkward-question-can-ours-endure">selected invitees</a>. Of the 113 countries chosen, an estimated 69% <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/22/who-s-in-and-who-s-out-from-biden-s-democracy-summit-pub-85822">are regarded</a> by a Carnegie Endowment study to be “Free”; 28% are “Partly Free” and 3% “Not Free”. </p>
<p>Among the African invitees are Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<p>Even the host country, America, has been deemed in recent global surveys <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FIW2021_World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf">by Freedom House</a> and the Swedish NGO <a href="https://www.idea.int/gsod/">International IDEA</a> to have shown authoritarian characteristics. Its democracy ranking has been lowered. Europe <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/chapters/the-role-of-the-european-union-in-democracy-building/eu-democracy-building-discussion-paper-16.pdf">too struggles</a> with illiberalism. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, all 54 member states of the African Union have <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">ratified</a> an inclusive Constitutive Act that implicitly condemns authoritarianism and explicitly affirms democratic goals. These are given <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">operational meaning</a> with the later adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. </p>
<p>All African governments are obligated to hold periodic elections, subject to international observation. These are deficient in many ways. Nevertheless they constitute practical expression of a new norm in intra-African relations: the “principle of non-indifference”. This refers to the commitment to no longer tolerate internal abuses of domestic power. The pro-democracy practice has been <a href="https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/promoting-democracy-and-peace-africa-role-african-union">praised</a> as path-breaking globally by International IDEA. </p>
<p>Beyond formal commitments to defend against authoritarianism, there is also <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/announcements/2020-annual-review">persistent popular support</a> for democracy throughout the continent. This is despite <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290275977_Democracy_in_Africa_successes_failures_and_the_struggle_for_political_reform/">many often volatile democratic deficiencies</a>.</p>
<p>Africans can also constructively disagree with the US host and engage others on two big issues related to tensions between illiberal and liberal democracies. </p>
<p>One is to seek constructive ways to engage all other nations, even in only limited ways, rather than to try to ostracise or penalise them. Today virtually all nations claim to be democratic, even the most autocratic. If the 2022 summit is to be credible then better ways must be found than for the US alone to decide who should participate and how. </p>
<p>A second issue where Africans can set a good example is their pragmatic but principled engagement of China. For African countries, the goal is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-06-17-ramaphosa-demonstrates-shrewd-statesmanship-as-he-performs-a-delicate-g7-balancing-act/">a productive relationship with both China and the west</a>. This point was made by Cyril Ramaphosa as the lone African guest at the last <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjxCM3-avvs">G7 Summit</a>.</p>
<p>This would advance Africa’s development as well as lower tensions between China and the US.</p>
<p>It’s an outcome that deserves urgent attention from the other attendees at the democracy summit.</p>
<h2>The corruption question</h2>
<p>Corruption is a pervasive problem throughout Africa. It is abetted by the complicity, or at least lax regulations, of many non-African governments that will be attending the summit, especially the US. </p>
<p>This was a <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20210708/report-high-level-panel-illicit-financial-flows-africa">key conclusion</a> of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, chaired by Thabo Mbeki and commissioned by the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The panel focuses on driving the issue onto the agendas of African governments, and will meet again virtually on 12 December.</p>
<p>Recent revelations by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-54226107">FinCEN Files</a> and <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/global-investigation-tax-havens-offshore/">Pandora Papers</a> show the scale and extent of corrupt practices that rob African countries of vital tax revenues. The founding president of the NGO Global Financial Integrity, Raymond W Baker, and a member of the high level panel, told me in an email that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is so serious as to be what is now probably the major driver of economic inequality and the key reason for the weakness of democracy. Aggressively addressing threats to democracy while inadequately addressing threats to economic and financial integrity will continue to bolster the global drift to authoritarianism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Given Africa’s poverty and inequality, exacerbated by COVID-19 and climate change, pressing for necessary political resolve and institutional capabilities to redress this issue must and can become a global priority. </p>
<p>Last week the US government released a new <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/06/fact-sheet-u-s-strategy-on-countering-corruption/">Strategy on Countering Corruption</a>. It could serve as a reference for the African High Level Panel to test US resolve to cooperate with Africans in this vital area. </p>
<h2>The human rights question</h2>
<p>On this, too, Africa can make a vital global contribution. </p>
<p>Human rights are not just a moral imperative. In Africa’s international relations the emphasis is pragmatic. “Today’s human rights abuses are tomorrow’s refugees” has become a politically salient cliché in a continent struggling to mitigate and prevent forced migration and all the human suffering and instabilities, nationally and regionally, the phrase implies. </p>
<p>Human rights abuses are “early warning” signs of conflict that have given political impetus to the “principle of non-indifference”. Preventing unregulated mass migrations to the European countries that comprise the biggest contingent – 39 – invited to the Summit for Democracy should ensure a rapt audience for <a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue_11.pdf">African ideas</a> about what can and should be done cooperatively to address this problem. </p>
<p>In fact, most of the forced migration occurs among African countries. But ways and means to address this key human rights problem have global implications, with Africa <a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue_11.pdf">the vanguard</a>.</p>
<h2>African agency</h2>
<p>African leaders and publics can – and must – set their own agendas on the issues to be raised at the summit. This is because they must shoulder the primary responsibilities for the issues on the agenda – defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights – from two perspectives. </p>
<p>Firstly, they must deal with the consequences of these big challenges.</p>
<p>Secondly, they must implement policies to achieve the objectives of plans to tackle them.</p>
<p>The credibility of African governments is at stake at the summit. So is the possibility for building mutually beneficial partnerships that can become more inclusive. </p>
<p>Currently, wealthier democracies have not been reliable partners with African nations in their common battle against the global pandemic. Unless the summit can lead to real partnerships with African countries striving to sustain democracy, African countries invited to the 2022 summit would be justified in declining to attend.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau is retired and pursues non-ruminative scholarly and non-profit interests. </span></em></p>Africa can make important contributions to the issues on the agenda: defending against authoritarianism; fighting corruption; and respect for human rights.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1654152021-08-04T14:57:47Z2021-08-04T14:57:47ZCOVID-19: how democracies have fared compared with authoritarian regimes<p>When Francis Fukuyama published his bestselling book, <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/133/13399/the-end-of-history-and-the-last-man/9780241991039.html">The End of History</a>, in 1992, democracies were on the rise. Today, democracies across the world are declining in number, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">according to Freedom House</a>, a think tank which tracks comparative regime changes over time. Fukuyama’s argument then was that liberal democracy had triumphed over the alternative Soviet model, because it provided efficient and accountable governance that delivered a prosperous economy, effective healthcare, education and welfare. In sharp contrast communism had failed. </p>
<p>COVID-19 has been the biggest challenge to the effectiveness of governments this century, and one argument that has been put forward, particularly by China, is that the one-party state model is more effective at dealing with the pandemic than are democracies. The assertion is that disagreements and confusions in democracies stand in the way of effective collective action and disturb “social harmony”. The success of the Chinese economy in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56768663">recovering from the pandemic</a> means this idea has to be taken seriously. But when it comes to the COVID crisis, is this argument actually true?</p>
<p>There are clearly many factors that will go into judging how successful different countries are in containing the pandemic, including lockdowns and quarantines. But a look at how countries categorised as democracies or authoritarian regimes performed in relation to death rates suggests further enquiry will be needed to answer the question. Death rates are not a simple measure, with different data sources, healthcare systems and variations in spending across countries complicating the picture. That said, the <a href="https://covid19.who.int/?adgroupsurvey=%7Badgroupsurvey%7D&gclid=Cj0KCQjw0emHBhC1ARIsAL1QGNdMQ8WG-duC_NpkmcBMBLwe63tw5sfIDZOXdlIgHN7Co_Uva1e_zokaAgTpEALw_wcB">World Health Organisation</a> has the most reliable data available on COVID deaths as a percentage of cases across the world.</p>
<p>Freedom House rates the state of democracy across the world by looking at factors such as freedom of speech, the existence of free and fair elections, the right to participate in politics and respect for the rule of law in more than 200 countries and territories across the world. In a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">recent report</a> they classified all states and territories into three categories: “Not free”, “partially free” and “free”. </p>
<p>Altogether the report identified 54 authoritarian or “not free” states and territories including China and Russia – a number that has increased by nine since 2005. In addition, they classified 59 countries as semi-authoritarian or “partially free”, such as the Philippines, with one additional state joining this group since 2005. Finally, they classify 82 countries as democracies or “free”, a tally that has declined by seven over the 15-year period. The report gloomily concluded that “since it spread around the world in early 2020, COVID has exacerbated the global decline in freedom”.</p>
<h2>Death rates</h2>
<p>Some 20 months into the worldwide pandemic we can start to test the claim of the superiority of authoritarian regimes over democracies in managing it. WHO data on COVID death rates is one way to begin to judge how effective different states have been in dealing with the pandemic.</p>
<p>The WHO <a href="https://covid19.who.int/?adgroupsurvey=%7Badgroupsurvey%7D&gclid=Cj0KCQjw0emHBhC1ARIsAL1QGNdMQ8WG-duC_NpkmcBMBLwe63tw5sfIDZOXdlIgHN7Co_Uva1e_zokaAgTpEALw_wcB">provides data</a> on the cumulative number of cases and the total number of deaths in each state or territory since the start of the pandemic. </p>
<p>A useful measure of the performance on these states in handling the pandemic – and one used by researchers at Johns Hopkins University in the US – is the percentage of cases ending up in deaths. If a large proportion of the cases result in deaths, it suggests that a ccountry’s health service may be performing poorly in managing the pandemic. </p>
<p>To illustrate this using the US, the WHO data published on August 23, 2021 showed that it had a total of 11,301 cumulative cases and 188 deaths per 100,000 population, so the percentage of deaths per cases was 1.7%.</p>
<p>Again it is important to remember that many factors may explain variations in death rates across countries, reflecting geography, population density, standards of living, inequality, the quality of governance and the state of democracy. </p>
<p><strong>COVID deaths by region (%), August 2021</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing the percentage of deaths relative to case numbers in a variety of regions representing 222 countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419039/original/file-20210902-26-1buai8l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cumulative percentage of deaths in relation to cases in WHO regions in July 2021 (222 countries and territories).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">World Health Organization</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The WHO categorises all countries and territories into six geographical regions and the figure above shows the death rates in each of them. </p>
<p>Clearly, South-East Asia and Western Pacific countries did best in when it came to controlling the death rates, the latter including China, which had a death rate of 4.7%, nearly three times larger than the US, although the region as a whole did better than the Americas. </p>
<p>Interestingly, Europe and South-East Asia had rather similar death rates in this respect. In contrast, the Eastern Mediterranean region stands out clearly as the worst of all. This region contains failed states such as Sudan as well as countries wracked by internal wars such as Syria and Iraq. Not surprisingly, war really weakens a state’s response to COVID-19. The worst case in that region and indeed in the world was Yemen, with percentage of deaths per cases reaching 19%. </p>
<p>These averages conceal large variations. In Africa, the Seychelles had a death rate of 0.5%, whereas in Zimbabwe it was 3.5%. Similarly, in the Americas, Cuba had a rate of 0.7% and so did very much better than Peru at just over 9%. The best performing territory in Europe was the Faroe Islands, in the North Atlantic, at 0.1% and the worst was Bosnia and Herzegovina with a rate of 4.7%. In Britain the rate was 2%.</p>
<h2>COVID and democracy</h2>
<p>But what of the relationship between performance in handling the pandemic and democracy? This appears in the graph below, which shows the average death rates using the Freedom House classification. The figure shows that democracies had significantly fewer deaths per 100,000 cases than authoritarian regimes such as China and semi-authoritarian regimes such as the Philippines. </p>
<p><strong>COVID deaths by political category (%)</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bar graph showing the ratio of deaths to cases broken down into different levels of authoritarianism." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419042/original/file-20210902-13-6mjjlt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ratio of cumulative deaths to cases in authoritarian and democratic systems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Whiteley/University of Essex</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An obvious factor which could explain this is that democracies tend to be richer than authoritarian regimes and so they clearly have the resources to fight COVID that other states may lack. However, while there is a relationship between GDP or national income and the death rate, it’s rather weak. The correlation between these two measures was -0.16 across the world, indicating that national income has only a rather modest role in reducing death rates. Note that if a 1% increase in GDP produced a 1% decrease in the death rate the correlation would be -1.0, whereas the actual correlation was much weaker.</p>
<p>Further analysis is needed to explore the many other factors that might be at work in explaining state responsiveness to COVID. But it’s clear the argument that authoritarian states are superior to democratic states when it comes to dealing with the pandemic is not supported by these comparative death rates.</p>
<p>The complexities of the relationship between governance and the pandemic is highly complex and so we are starting a research project to examine this issue in more detail, looking at the comparative politics of COVID. But for now looking at the big picture certainly suggests that countries that have abandoned democracy over the years aren’t simply “better” dealing with the pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the ESRC. </span></em></p>Why the argument that authoritarian regimes are better at handling pandemics isn’t that simple.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076752018-12-02T09:44:27Z2018-12-02T09:44:27ZTaking Africa’s democratic temperature as a dozen countries prepare for polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247701/original/file-20181128-32180-15epy30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elections, and observer processes are a big priority in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/6124051652/in/photolist-akancs-8mSagA-an1fUo-cL6KV5-Thx7Mf-9Z4FLs-8mRHm3-fjNXKj-6pqC1Q-7TECcV-7TECci-bU3m84-6h8Vwe-bo9sEL-6pqDGN-eF6DxB-4RuJch-9JG8Yy-52Tnxd-6he2Fj-ayfYsU-5m3orW-9JDiYp-yUF2J3-8muuvR-8mP4va-5kY7Ma-aGQLMe-eFKQnc-aDbz5M-8qKc2R-7TECbM-9JDkWM-9FMELA-6pkkLf-nekXcc-9XzUDt-mhtT8X-5HdCsH-eF5XEp-6hfvuc-6j6JjX-9vQJrY-p7MRfr-aWdBRB-7THSNG-6hfQfP-fa865-9p5LqF-dni4cx">UN Photo/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than a <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2019.php">dozen national elections</a> will be held across Africa next year. All 55 members of the African Union (AU) are obligated to hold regular and ostensibly democratic elections. They must also invite teams of AU election observers to publicly monitor, assess and <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">report the results</a>. </p>
<p>Is all this electoral activity helping to entrench democracy as the foundation for national and regional security, development and integration? Or have elections become the means for demagogues to grab power – or, more typically, for powerful elites and authoritarian rulers to entrench themselves? </p>
<p>Democratic theory prescribes credible elections as a necessary, but insufficient means, to consolidate real democracy. Real democracy typically abets peace and security. National circumstances vary. But three additional conditions are also vital. They are freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and an independent nonpartisan judiciary to resolve disputes and ensure the rule of law predominates. </p>
<p>Most deadly conflicts in Africa occur within – not between – <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf">sovereign states</a>. Recognising this, the AU has made observing and assessing democratic elections an <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/guide-elections/">integral part</a> of its operations. This often happens alongside observers from regional economic communities.</p>
<p>As observations improve, so do opportunities to gauge whether electoral violence and other severe human rights abuses threaten regional peace and security. </p>
<p>In mid-November, there were three important developments at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. These promise to improve Africa’s long-term prospects for collective self-reliance and democratic peace. And this will happen regionally, nationally and locally. </p>
<p>The first was a streamlining of the continental body’s operations. The second was a move to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of member countries. The third was a renewed commitment to improve the depth, duration, and diligence of African election observation missions. </p>
<h2>Three Changes</h2>
<p>President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has been the chair of the AU this year. He has driven a set of administrative and financial reforms to improve its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35132-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">efficiency and effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>Headline reforms include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reducing the number of AU Commission portfolios, </p></li>
<li><p>Introducing merit-based hiring and promotion procedures, and </p></li>
<li><p>Reducing dependence on foreign donors. This has been achieved by revising the scale of member state contributions and penalties for nonpayment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The key structural reform will be combining the portfolios of Political Affairs and Peace and Security. This makes sense strategically. It will ensure that the lion’s share of AU resources supports both urgent peacemaking needs and creates conditions conducive to developing politically capable states. Failures on either front could jeopardise the AU’s strategic plan for the <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">socio-economic transformation of the continent</a>.</p>
<p>Two other developments complement these shifts.</p>
<p>One is the Assembly’s decision to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181118/11th-extraordinary-summit-summary-key-decisions">key governance areas on the continent</a>. This promises substantial improvements in the role and functioning of the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. The mechanism was established in 2003. It aims to encourage member states to critically and regularly assess their progress in governance and socio-economic development. </p>
<p>After much initial excitement, the mechanism devolved into a largely technical and widely ignored exercise. Its governing Forum of Heads of State sought to infuse it with greater political clout and relevance in 2016. It mandated its new director, Professor Eddy Maloka, to produce an Africa-wide comparative assessment of governance challenges facing AU member states. </p>
<p>This will be presented to the next regular AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/The-key-outcomes-of-the-African-Union-Summit/434750-4648608-sdx3oaz/index.html">February 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The final change involves beefing up election monitoring. Ten years ago the AU entered into a formal partnership with the <a href="https://eisa.org.za/">Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</a>. The parties agreed on 16 November to seek ways to extend and improve the partnership. </p>
<p>The institute is based in Johannesburg. It boasts an all-African staff from more than a dozen nations. It has helped AU missions on several fronts. This has included the training and application of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a common set of observation principles and democratic election standards, and </p></li>
<li><p>more comprehensive, rapid and technologically advanced tools and training of AU observers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The partnership has also helped the AU to acquire a leadership role among domestic and international election observer groups pursuing greater electoral transparency and accountability. This is true even within Africa’s most troubled states. </p>
<h2>Is democracy dying?</h2>
<p>These efforts would seem to run counter to the question “Is Democracy Dying?”, which has become a preoccupation in the era of US President Donald Trump. African politics, too, are vulnerable to demagoguery, debauchery and divisiveness. More notable is the proliferation of progressive forces at all levels of African politics. They are exposing and combating corruption and other egregious abuses of power. </p>
<p>Progress is slow, erratic, and dangerous for democracy advocates and activists to pursue. Yet in a year when <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018">Freedom House’s latest global survey</a> concludes democracy is in decline, Africa may well be bucking the trend. </p>
<p>The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s 2018 <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/">Index of African Governance</a> found that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance on our continent, on average, is slowly improving … approximately three out of four African citizens live in a country where governance has improved over the last ten years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite Africa’s many problems, it continues to sustain a wide variety of democratic experiments. Extensive surveys by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the non-partisan research network, show the majority of Africa’s citizens still prefer democracy to the alternative. This is a reality the African Union increasingly recognises and is attempting to support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau serves on the EISA Board without compensation and in that capacity was a member of the team that met with AU officials on 16 November 2018. </span></em></p>Surveys shows that the majority of Africans prefer democracy, despite its flaws, to the alternatives.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760272017-04-18T15:21:21Z2017-04-18T15:21:21ZThe state of South African journalism: There’s good news and there’s bad news<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164830/original/image-20170411-26715-16fbhzj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's media landscape has changed fundamentally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Wits University’s Journalism and Media Studies Department have just published their latest State of the Newsroom report. The annual publication maps key developments in the South African media landscape – from changes in circulation and audiences, to shifts in media ownership, digital trends in the newsroom, transformation of the news media, political, legal and regulatory issues, and the status of media freedom in the country. Politics and Society Editor Thabo Leshilo asked the editor and lead researcher …</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the “State of the Newsroom” report and what does it say?</strong></p>
<p>State of the Newsroom 2015-2016 is called <a href="http://www.journalism.co.za/stateofnewsroom/"><em>Inside/Outside</em> </a> to try catch the dynamic of multiple sources of media and news that we are confronted with, a lot of it falling outside of the “mainstream” news. </p>
<p>Although we still have “newsrooms” in the normal sense of professional journalists and media houses, we also have very vibrant independent media sites and projects – The <a href="https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/">Daily Vox</a>, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/">Daily Maverick</a>, <a href="http://www.groundup.org.za/">GroundUp</a>, or projects like <a href="http://www.witsjusticeproject.co.za/">The Justice Project</a> that “write into the news”.</p>
<p>During the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-student-protests-are-about-much-more-than-just-feesmustfall-49776">#FeesMustFall protests</a>, students and academics <a href="https://twitter.com/NMMUFMF">reported </a>from the frontline using social media, and were a source of news from the coalface of the protests for many people. The #FeesMustfall protests showed how independent news producers, like The Daily Vox, could cover unfolding events <a href="https://www.facebook.com/thedailyvox/posts/1021472407978175">more effectively</a> than the mainstream media, and how student social media impacted on the coverage offered by the mainstream. </p>
<p>All of this makes us ask: What exactly do we mean by the “newsroom” today? This State of the Newsroom tries to contribute to the discussion on this phenomenon. </p>
<p><strong>Are there causes for concern? What are the most significant ones, especially in the era of fake news?</strong></p>
<p>If we look at the media landscape generally, there are good and bad signs. For instance, the <a href="http://www.presscouncil.org.za/">Press Council</a> is reinvigorating itself and now has an ombudsperson for online media. The <a href="http://www.sanef.org.za/">South African National Editors Forum</a> has been vocal on issues of media freedom. There are new measurements for broadcast statistics. </p>
<p>I think the diversity of content available is undeniably a good thing. But retrenchments also continue, and newspaper <a href="http://www.bizcommunity.com/PDF/PDF.aspx?l=196&c=15&ct=1&ci=157443">circulation is down</a>. For the first time free newspapers declined in circulation too. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=820&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=820&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=820&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1030&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1030&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164799/original/image-20170411-23215-tq9rcl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1030&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government has bungled the <a href="http://www.channel24.co.za/TV/News/etv-wins-digital-tv-box-case-as-court-slams-minister-as-confused-20160531">digital terrestrial television process</a> – again. Of course, the SABC remains a mess, and the desire by the state to control what’s news is felt increasingly, whether through its <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/media/2015/10/19/zuma-defends-call-for-media-appeals-tribunal">Media Appeals Tribunal proposal</a>, or <a href="https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/apcs-written-submission-south-africa-cybercrimes-a">draft legislation</a> that tries to tighten the grip on the free flow of information in the public interest.</p>
<p>Other signs of concern are the influence management has on editors. Editorial independence in the newsroom is being corroded. </p>
<p>As far as <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/04/17/Huffington-Post-SA-blog-calling-for-white-men-to-be-disenfranchised-a-%E2%80%98sad-day-for-journalism%E2%80%99%E2%80%9A-says-Media24-boss">fake news</a> goes, in some ways I think it’s a red herring. I hope that it will only make news consumers more critical and start to question the veracity of what they read through habit. So I think there’s an upside to fake news. </p>
<p>More worrying is when it starts to look like deliberate propaganda. This goes hand-in-hand with the willingness of political parties and other public speakers to be less than truthful with the facts, or deliberately feeding the public false facts. </p>
<p><strong>What is your view on the growth of alternative news platforms, including the ANC’s in-house news service and the government’s increased use of social media to report on themselves</strong></p>
<p>I think we need to be careful about calling some of these initiatives “alternative”, which in South Africa has a positive, politically progressive history in terms of news media. I have mentioned some initiatives that could be described in this way. </p>
<p>But we are also seeing in South Africa what happens all over the world: social media and the internet being used by the state and its allies and supporters to create a counter-narrative to what’s out there. Perhaps we should call it propaganda 2.0. There’s nothing necessarily unusual about that. </p>
<p><strong>What are the positives and dangers associated with such alternative news platforms as seen against the role of a free press in a democracy?</strong></p>
<p>I think we need to start at the beginning and ask ourselves: What does a free press really look like? What do we want? Does the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/pressfreedomday/windhoek.shtml">Windhoek Declaration</a> on press freedom matter anymore? Do journalists care about our human rights? Are they prepared to be watchdogs to those rights? And if they aren’t, is our press free? </p>
<p>Just as there’s no point talking about a free press if there is unfettered state control, there’s no point talking about a free press if our editors are told what’s in the public interest by advertisers and managers. We have the constitutional guarantees, and indices such as <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa">Freedom House</a> more or less say we are free. Certainly more than other Africa states such as Angola or The Gambia or Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>But we also know that <a href="http://www.giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/south-africa">journalists are surveilled</a> – or at least feel they are which is as bad – and that reporters are kicked out of press conferences, and increasingly coming under physical threat when covering events: from students, from party supporters, from police or private security firms. So there’s no generally accepted idea, of a free press floating around.</p>
<p>At the same time, what contribution the media can make to democracy is not necessarily being answered by what’s being published by mainstream media. Instead, as Levi Kabwato, one of the authors in this year’s State of the Newsroom who looked at transformation in the press found, editors say this kind of thing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I received more threats from owners and executives than from politicians in my entire term as editor. The people we had to be careful of were the owners. I received more threatening letters from companies than politicians. Owners are the real threat to media freedom.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We have to think of transformation more broadly than just how many black people or women are employed in a newsroom, or in terms of ownership. It’s about content too – what’s covered, and why. </p>
<p>This is why the independent and alternative media platforms are so interesting. Just look what <a href="https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/who-we-are/">The Daily Vox</a> says about itself. It wants to: “put the young citizen at the centre of news”. Or <a href="http://www.groundup.org.za/about/">GroundUp</a>: “We report news that Is in the public interest, with an emphasis on the human rights of vulnerable communities.” And they are doing it with a fraction of the budget that big media houses have at their disposal. Good journalism doesn’t necessarily have to cost money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Finlay is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Media studies at Wits University.</span></em></p>The growth of new, vibrant, independent media sites and projects in South Africa have challenged conceptions of what a newsroom is. On limited budgets, some even fare better than mainstream media.Alan Finlay, Lecturer: Journalism and Media Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671262016-10-20T06:27:09Z2016-10-20T06:27:09ZWill oil-rich Kazakhstan ever embrace democracy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141902/original/image-20161016-30277-17rl220.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C83%2C2646%2C1746&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ak Orda, the President's Residence in Astana.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nurseit Niyazbekov</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year, Kazakhstan celebrates the 25th anniversary of its independence from the USSR. Politicians have <a href="http://bnews.kz/en/news/nezavisimomu_kazahstanu__25_let">already started boasting</a> about the country’s successful socioeconomic reforms and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-president-idUSTRE65E0WP20100615">praising President Nursultan Nazarbayev</a> for the country’s achievements. </p>
<p>Thanks to its abundance of natural resources, this young Central Asian republic has managed to attract billions of dollars’ worth of investments and rebuild its economy with <a href="http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Kazakhstan/Economic_growth/">two-digit</a> annual GDP growth.</p>
<p>But while there’s no doubt that Kazakhstan has become an economic success, international <a href="https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kazakhstan">human rights organisations</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/kazakhstan-strategically-valuable-democracy">foreign governments</a> and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/274685/Politics_and_Oil_in_Kazakhstan">academics</a> all have expressed deep concerns about the country’s observance of human rights, protection of civil liberties, and adherence to democratic procedures.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://wagingnonviolence.org/2016/10/trial-begins-land-rights-activists-kazakhstan/">trial of two activists</a> behind an unprecedented wave of anti land-reform demonstrations across the country earlier this year is a case in point. </p>
<p>Max Bokayev and Talgat Ayan are being prosecuted for organising an unsanctioned rally and inciting social, national, and class discord. According to human rights organisations, however, activists are being convicted for exercising their freedom of speech and right to peaceful assembly. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nazarbaev-delays-land-privatization/27717597.html">cancelling the land reform</a>, the government has shown its reluctance to respect civil liberties and tolerate dissent by prosecuting the protests’ leaders.</p>
<h2>The Kazakhstan way</h2>
<p>Kazakhstan has not always been condemned for its poor democratic record. Until 1994, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan">Freedom House</a>, an influential democracy NGO, labelled Kazakhstan as “partially free”, owing to its post-communist liberalisation campaign. </p>
<p>Leading democracy promotion agencies such as USAID and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe applauded Kazakhstan for adopting a democratic constitution, holding free and fair parliamentary elections, and respecting individual rights and freedoms.</p>
<p>But a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/russian/reports/kazakh/1999/october/topic11.html">dubious parliament dissolution in 1994</a>, the introduction of <a href="http://rus.azattyq.org/a/1376014.html">anti-democratic amendments</a> to the constitution in 1995, and the passing of several bills detrimental to the development of civil society jeopardised Kazakhstan’s early democratisation progress. It is now rated “not free” by Freedom House. </p>
<p>In his book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Kazakhstan-Way-Nursultan-Nazarbayev/dp/1905299613">The Kazakhstan Way</a>, President Nazarbayev argues the measures were necessary to advance socioeconomic reforms. But others view the measures as an attempt to centralise power, form a rubber-stamp parliament, and destroy political opposition.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142233/original/image-20161018-15108-12pho1e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Preseident Nazarbaev on a stamp from 1993.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Empowered by the signing of oil and gas contracts with Western companies and inspired by the economic success of the <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=0gl0QgAACAAJ&dq=asian+tigers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjOoqX-rNrPAhXCWRoKHUV4ClIQ6AEINDAE">Four Asian Tigers</a> – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – in 1997, the Kazakh government declared a <a href="http://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/strategies_and_programs">national strategy</a> that set out major long-term priorities in national security, education and health care. </p>
<p>Since then, when criticised about the nation’s deficit of democracy, Kazakh authorities unanimously cite the <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=AC4dCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=nazarbayev+economy+first+politics+later&source=bl&ots=oimlIUDc4Q&sig=tyYGYpTvC7zXn4-bE79ZFsFw-us&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjj7cbyrtrPAhUDHxoKHb9MDqkQ6AEIKjAD#v=onepage&q=nazarbayev%20economy%20first%20politics%20later&f=false">president’s words</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Democracy in Kazakhstan is not the start of its journey but rather its destination.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A muted opposition</h2>
<p>Kazakhstan is no longer perceived as a country in transition to democracy; it’s now a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17173">consolidated authoritarian regime</a>. </p>
<p>Rigged parliamentary and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/why-is-kazakhstan-even-having-an-election/">presidential elections</a>, <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76946">politically motivated lawsuits</a>, the imprisonment of <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-protests/27748591.html">opposition figures</a>, the <a href="https://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2013-kazakhstan.php">oppression of independent media</a> and flawed rule of law all attest to the regime’s adherence to democracy only on paper. </p>
<p>The reaction of the international community to these shortcomings is often muted by the West’s interests in Kazakhstan’s <a href="http://fride.org/download/COM_Kazajstan_ENG_sep07.pdf">oil and gas resources</a>. Take, for instance, the very <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/01/david-cameron-kaszakhstan-britain">controversial visit</a> to Kazakhstan by then-prime minister of the UK, David Cameron, in 2013.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141907/original/image-20161016-30249-1nv53vr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An opposition demonstration in Almaty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nurseit Niyazbekov</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Opposition is almost non-existent in Kazakhstan. Because of the regime’s powerful propaganda, opponents lack popular support and are subject to intimidation.</p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64745">2011 Zhanaozen</a> city oil workers’ strikes showed, Kazakh authorities tolerate popular dissent – provided it’s not politicised. The protest was tolerated when it began, as a labour conflict. But when protesters began to demand the <a href="http://www.socialistworld.net/mob/doc/5497">resignation of the government</a>, the regime sent special troops to suppress their revolt.</p>
<p>It’s thought <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64745">14 people died and 110 were injured</a>, largely by gunshot. Without a doubt, the Zhanaozen massacre taught both the regime and activists a lesson. </p>
<p>Civic activists harnessed the potential of social media and online activism for advocacy campaigns. The infamous initiative of Serik Abdenov, Minister of Labor and Social Protection, to increase women’s retirement age from 58 to 63 <a href="https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-Labor-Minister-Abdenov-dismissed-20141/">was not welcomed</a> and was rejected with the help of large-scale civic activism in 2013. </p>
<p>The regime, while acknowledging the importance of a timely and effective response to citizens’ demands, realised just how dangerous social media could be. A set of amendments to the country’s <a href="http://medialaw.asia/node/11201">media legislation in 2012</a> and <a href="http://ru.odfoundation.eu/a/5443,kazahstan-reforma-ugolovnogo-zakonodatelstva-ugrozhaet-pravam-cheloveka">criminal code in 2014</a> put <a href="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/14943-internet.html">severe restrictions</a> on materials posted on social media and blogs.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141906/original/image-20161016-30236-1n9yn4i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstration in Almaty to mourn victims of Zhanaozen massacre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nurseit Niyazbekov</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Oil and propaganda</h2>
<p>At the 2015 presidential elections, which again <a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true">fell short of international standards</a>, Nazarbayev won 97.7% of the nationwide vote. </p>
<p>A more reliable <a href="http://astanatimes.com/2014/11/new-poll-shows-kazakh-citizens-positive-outlook-country-fundamentals-explain/">2014 poll</a> commissioned by Eurasian Council on Foreign Affairs found that 90% of respondents feel fairly positive or very positive about their country. It seems that most people support President Nazarbayev and his vision of Kazakhstan’s future. </p>
<p>The regime in general and President Nazarbayev in particular have managed to win the hearts of population through appeasement and propaganda. Oil and gas revenues have allowed the government to rapidly improve people’s living standards and rebuild social infrastructure. </p>
<p>Like most oil-rich autocracies, Kazakhstan is pouring billions of oil money in such grandiose projects as modernisation of its capital Astana and throwing <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anar-valiyev-natalie-koch/sochi-syndrome">international mega-events</a>, such as 2011 Asian Winter Games and the 2017 world exhibition, <a href="https://expo2017astana.com/kz/">EXPO-2017</a>, to be held in Astana. </p>
<p>Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2010 and <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54350#.WAOC7pN97dc">recent election</a> as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council are also meant to improve the country’s reputation in the international arena.</p>
<p>What does the future hold for Kazakh democracy? When will the government decide that time has come for opening up its political system? </p>
<p>Looking to <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/lee-kuan-yews-singapore-as-a-model-for-kazakhstan/">Singapore</a> – a role model for “the Kazakhstan way” – inevitably recalls its former leader, Lee Kuan Yew, who turned Singapore <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32012346">from a small port to a wealthy global hub</a>. </p>
<p>During his 31 years in power, Lee Kuan Yew was notorious for harassing opposition and installing censorship, justifying this by proclaiming the necessity to maintain peace and order in a multi-ethnic society. Asked in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3YFl-dY9Qg">interview</a> about the future of Singapore, he replied that democratisation was not his job, but that of his successors. </p>
<p>Despite his retirement and death in 2015, we do not see any intention on the part of the Singaporean leadership to democratise the country. The scenario is no more optimistic for Kazakhstan. </p>
<p>What about potential cracks in regime after the dictator’s death? As the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2009/nov/01/turkmenistan-after-niyazov">Turkmen</a> and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-07/uzbekistan-after-karimov">Uzbek</a> examples illustrate, a change of leadership in Central Asia does not necessarily mean a change of political course. Authoritarian political culture, the absence of civil society and repressive elites in these republics minimise the chances of a democratic transition. </p>
<p>The population’s strong support of the current regime and the importance attributed to <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=8Tom2gU6rzIC&hl=fr&source=gbs_book_other_versions">political stability</a> in Kazakhstan mean that we should not expect any miracles any time soon. </p>
<p><em>At the time of writing, Nurseit Niyazbekov was visiting SciencesPo University in Paris as a research fellow.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67126/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nurseit Niyazbekov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An abundance of natural resources has helped Kazakhstan attract billions in investments. Despite its booming economy, the government is unlikely to move towards democracy any time soon.Nurseit Niyazbekov, Assistant professor, KIMEP UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.