tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/ibrahim-boubacar-ke-ta-57341/articlesIbrahim Boubacar Keïta – The Conversation2022-01-20T13:22:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1751512022-01-20T13:22:39Z2022-01-20T13:22:39ZIbrahim Boubacar Keïta promised Mali honour and unity: his legacy is disappointing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441724/original/file-20220120-9087-1ien2vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by John Macdougall/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Days after Mali was placed under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/west-africa-bloc-ecowas-hits-mali-with-sanctions-after-poll-delay">heavy sanctions</a> by the Economic Community of West African States to punish the military junta’s reluctance to conduct elections, citizens woke up on Sunday, 16 January 2022 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malis-ousted-president-ibrahim-boubacar-keita-has-died-says-former-justice-2022-01-16/">news</a> of the death of former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. </p>
<p>Keïta, who was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/16/world/africa/ibrahim-boubacar-keita-dead.html">ousted in 2020</a> by the army after seven years in power, died in his Bamako home, aged 76. </p>
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<p>He served as president of the republic from 4 September 2013 to 18 August 2020. However, his influence in Malian politics had been considerable for over three decades. </p>
<h2>Early years</h2>
<p>Keïta had his primary, secondary, high school and university education in Mali, Senegal and France. </p>
<p>He returned to Mali in 1986 with a master’s degree in history and a diploma of advanced studies in politics and international relations from the University of Pantheon-Sorbonne. </p>
<p>During his stay in France, Keïta frequented French radical left-wing political circles, where he became friends with <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/3375/Alpha_Cond%C3%A9">Alpha Condé, who later became Guinea’s president</a>.</p>
<p>Upon his return to Mali, his first jobs were with French and international NGOs. At the same time, Keïta was an activist of the <a href="https://partyfacts.herokuapp.com/data/partyall/40359/">Alliance for Democracy in Mali – Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice</a>.</p>
<p>He also held the position of deputy campaign manager for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alpha-Oumar-Konare">Alpha Oumar Konaré’s </a> presidential election in April and May 1992. </p>
<h2>The road to the top</h2>
<p>For his effort during these campaigns, President Konaré decided to appoint him in June 1992 as his diplomatic advisor and spokesperson. Less than six months later, in November 1992, Keita was sent out of the country as Mali’s ambassador, first to Ivory Coast, then later to Gabon, Burkina Faso and Niger. </p>
<p>Keïta’s stay abroad lasted only one year. In November 1993, he was recalled to take over the <a href="https://www.socialistinternational.org/news/in-memoriam/ibrahim-boubacar-keita-1945-2022-1959/">Ministry of Foreign Affairs</a>. </p>
<p>On 4 February 1994, Konaré appointed him <a href="https://currentaffairs.adda247.com/former-malis-president-ibrahim-boubacar-keita-passes-away/">prime minister</a>. He held this position until February 2000. </p>
<p>Keïta rose to the top of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali – Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice and became its president in 2000. </p>
<p>In the run up to the 2002 presidential election, Keïta wanted to run as a candidate to succeed Konaré. This led to disagreements within the party. </p>
<p>Keïta <a href="https://apnews.com/article/9d0dcd895dd20105edef9633dd5420f4">resigned</a> as prime minister on 14 February 2000, and then from the party’s presidency in October 2000. </p>
<p>He later left the party to create his own party, <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Rally_for_Mali">the Rally for Mali</a>.</p>
<p>Keïta was the Rally for Mali candidate in the 2002 presidential election. He obtained 21% of the votes cast in the first round. This placed him third, behind <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Amadou-Toumani-Toure">Amadou Toumani Touré</a> (28.7%) and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Soumaila-Cisse">Soumaïla Cissé</a> (21.3%). </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Keïta’s coalition won the most seats in the legislative elections, which enabled him to be <a href="https://www.socialistinternational.org/news/in-memoriam/ibrahim-boubacar-keita-1945-2022-1959/">elected</a> president of the National Assembly from 2002 to 2007.</p>
<p>In 2007, Keïta contested for the presidency again. He stood against the incumbent, Touré, and lost. </p>
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<p>In early 2012, terrorist groups <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali">took control</a> of the entire north of Mali. This led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/3/22/mali-mutiny-topples-president-toure">coup</a> against Touré in March 2012. </p>
<p>Following the military intervention in Mali, the interim president Dioncounda Traore organised a presidential election.</p>
<p>Keita stood for election and won this time to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23677124">emerge</a> as president of the republic in 2013. He was re-elected in 2018.</p>
<p>He ran on the campaign slogan of returning honour to the country. Keita promised to “reconcile hearts and minds” and ensure unity in the deeply divided West African country. </p>
<p>He also promised to rebuild the country’s infrastructure, some of which was damaged by terrorist actions. </p>
<h2>The legacy</h2>
<p>Keita’s government suffered from <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200905-mali-s-military-junta-opens-talks-on-transition-to-civilian-rule">endemic corruption</a> and illicit enrichment. </p>
<p>This became even more pronounced after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33213931">peace agreement</a> signed in Algiers, which offered partial autonomy to the north of the country. The agreement was aimed at ending hostilities with rebels in northern Mali. </p>
<p>On 5 June 2020, the Malian capital, Bamako, witnessed a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_who-behind-malis-surging-protest-movement/6193002.html">large-scale protest</a> rally calling for the resignation of Keita. </p>
<p>Protests were followed by a coup led by <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200819-mali-s-opposition-says-it-will-work-with-coup-leaders-on-political-transition">Colonel Assimi Goïta</a> on 18 August 2020. The military garrison arrested Keita and he relinquished power under pressure from the army.</p>
<p>The crisis that followed is yet to be resolved. Today, Mali is under heavy sanctions due to the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f4525017-eb6f-47ee-b05e-d381e1b05407">perceived reluctance</a> of the military junta to quickly organise elections and yield to a democratically elected government. </p>
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<p>The transitional government has presented its <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-16/former-mali-president-keita-dies-at-76-family-confirms">condolences</a> to Keita’s family, while the country reels under ECOWAS sanctions and arm wrestling with France, a fallout of the refusal of its military rulers to conduct elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mady Ibrahim Kanté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For about three decades, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta played different roles in Mali’s politics.Mady Ibrahim Kanté, Lecturer, Université des sciences juridiques et politiques de BamakoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1664192021-08-24T14:15:31Z2021-08-24T14:15:31ZMali’s roadmap for lasting peace has laudable goals: but it doesn’t go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417556/original/file-20210824-23-10j7w8v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the M5 opposition movement show their support for the military junta, calling for a new and inclusive Mali in Bamako in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Hadama Diakite</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the military coup in 2012, Mali was praised for <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230604636">its transition to democracy in West Africa</a>. That is no longer the case. </p>
<p>Malians are caught between the stubborn legacies of a colonial past, a global political economy that has left them impoverished, a dysfunctional government, violent inter-ethnic conflicts, and attacks from terrorists and their own armed forces. It is considered the epicentre of violence in a violent region. It is, therefore, no wonder that <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/central-mali-populations-caught-between-terrorism-and-anti-terrorism">the prognosis for peace and human security for Mali has become so dire</a>. </p>
<p>In 2020 as jihadist and inter-ethnic violence escalated, support for Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita had plummeted. This was despite the fact that he had been elected by a large majority in 2013 and re-elected five years later. By August 2020, as elections were approaching, he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/19/malis-keita-resigns-as-president-after-military-coup">resigned</a> after being detained in a military-led coup. </p>
<p>Then, by May 2021, the country experienced its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/29/what-next-after-malis-coup">second coup</a> in nine months, this time by some members of the transitional leadership itself on the grounds that the transitional government wasn’t following its own charter. Weeks earlier, a former rebel leader who had been part of the peace process was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/13/mali-ex-rebels-say-prominent-leader-shot-dead">assassinated</a>. </p>
<p>Violent groups, including those linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, frequently unleash attacks in north, central and eastern Mali, and their presence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/25/its-time-for-a-reality-check-in-mali">is spreading</a> into the country’s south and across borders.</p>
<p>It is against this background that Malian prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/31/malian-pm-choguel-kokalla-maiga-presents-2021-2022-action-plan//">announced</a> a government action plan to the governing National Transitional Council to prepare for presidential and legislative elections in February and March 2022. The plan was approved quickly by the governing council.</p>
<p>The plan includes the contributions of 25 ministerial departments under the chairmanship of the prime minister, with the <a href="https://www.ml.undp.org/content/mali/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2021/journees-d-evaluation-du-plan-d-action-du-gouvernement-avec-l-ap.html">support of the United Nations Development Program</a>. </p>
<p>The basic components of the plan fall into four categories – strengthening national security, driving institutional reforms, holding elections and promoting good governance. These are the key areas that must be addressed to increase trust in the peace process set in motion by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d'Alger.pdf">2015 Algiers Peace Accords</a> which brought a partial ceasefire to parts of the country.</p>
<p>In my view, it is unlikely that the plan will reduce armed conflict and reform political institutions enough to achieve its goals. It will not lead to a more sustainable peace unless it is more inclusive and can connect what a professor of conflict resolution, Pamina Firchow, describes as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/reclaiming-everyday-peace/BEB6532292D692933AABC68EFFF9ACB3">everyday peace at the local level</a> with measures to ensure national security.</p>
<p>But that doesn’t mean the plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, it means that more needs to be done to achieve its goals.</p>
<h2>Strengthening national security</h2>
<p>This is the central component of the plan. The prime minister praised the peacekeeping efforts of the Malian Armed Forces and emphasised the need to respond to terrorist attacks, especially in the northern and central regions of the country. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the plan calls for better military training and equipment. At the same time, there is a commitment to demilitarise the country, to reorganise economic production away from military purposes, and to reintegrate former state and non-state armed combatants into the civilian economy by providing vocational training and job opportunities. </p>
<p>To carry out these security plans, the government promises to make the 2015 Algiers Peace Accords <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire">more inclusive</a>. </p>
<p>One way to do this would be to integrate some of the non-state armed forces into the national army to better protect local communities from criminal violence and intransigent insurgents. This would create the kind of everyday peace in the markets, schools and neighbourhoods that is now lacking. </p>
<p>Yet the plan does not go this far.</p>
<h2>Political and institutional reforms</h2>
<p>There have been a number of meetings in recent years for this purpose. Based on the recommendations that have come out of these forums, the plan calls for a series of national meetings that will give voice, without censorship, to all citizens from the local to the national level.</p>
<p>The prime minister gave the assurance that the recommendations resulting from these meetings will be enforceable during the remaining six months of the transition period and afterwards.</p>
<p>According to the prime minister, there is an</p>
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<p>…urgent need for reforms to renovate not only the political framework and adapt the fundamental texts of the Republic, but also endow our country with strong and legitimate institutions that will allow lasting political stability and social peace.</p>
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<p>But this language alone is unconvincing coming from him. He has shown very little interest in democracy, local or national, throughout his career, beginning with his early association with the former authoritarian leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/world/africa/moussa-traore-dead.html">Moussa Traore</a>.</p>
<h2>A general election</h2>
<p>The action plan calls for “transparent, credible and inclusive general elections” to lead Mali’s return to a “normal constitutional order”. It stresses, in particular, the inclusion of refugees and displaced people. To this end, a single election management body will be established to ensure free and fair elections.</p>
<p>While a highly desirable goal, the mechanisms for conducting such elections do not exist. And it is unrealistic to think they could be created in such a short time. </p>
<p>One might even ask whether the president and prime minister are simply setting things up for an extension of the 18-month charter for the transitional government and their own leadership roles within it.</p>
<h2>Good governance and a stability pact</h2>
<p>To root out corruption, the plan calls for a “social conference” that will produce a new “social stability pact”. This will be the basis for a new social contract between citizens and the government that will “improve the living conditions of the populations and ensure a fair distribution of national wealth”.</p>
<p>Through negotiations and compromise, the conference will address the root causes of violence and inequality, not merely their symptoms. Ample funds will be provided for “basic social services” such as health and education, and bring civil service salaries into “harmony”.</p>
<p>This too, albeit vague, is a laudable goal. But it ignores the way in which heavy reliance on foreign aid can short circuit the relationship between citizens and the state, replacing political loyalty with clientelism. </p>
<p>Another telling silence is the absence of any mention of the work of the Malian Commission for Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, which has been interviewing refugees and displaced people for the last five years to prepare the ground for reparations. </p>
<p>I have been involved in the peacebuilding process, working with Malian teachers, artists and activists since 2004 to develop university-level peace-building courses and community programmes in the country. Since 2016 our team has worked with the commission to disseminate information on the causes and effects of armed violence in Mali, and creating materials to prepare citizens for local peace-building dialogues. </p>
<p>At a minimum, the plan should have referenced the work of the commission, especially its involvement with refugees and internally displaced persons.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Even though confidence in the 2015 peace agreement and in the 2020 provisional government has faltered, many Malians <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad386-malians_eager_for_change_still_look_to_democracy-afrobarometer_dispatch-25aug20.pdf">still prefer</a> democracy over one-party and military rule. This is an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>There is much that needs to be done before a new government can be elected, however. The action plan’s generalities may buy the president and prime minister a prolongation of the transition, but that may be all. New elections under the current circumstances might only heighten political frustration, and lead to more inter-ethnic violence and an increased terrorist presence in the region, with Mali as its epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen L. Esquith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever its flaws, it doesn’t mean the government action plan should be ignored or opposed. Rather, more needs to be done to achieve its goals.Stephen L. Esquith, Professor of political theory and global ethics, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617232021-05-28T12:35:51Z2021-05-28T12:35:51ZMalians welcomed previous coups, but not this one<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403324/original/file-20210528-23-koax2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colonel Assimi Goita (pictured here) led the two most recent coups.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MICHELE CATTANI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/25/timeline-what-happened-in-mali-since-a-military-coup-in-august">coup in Mali</a> on 24 May provoked a collective cry of frustration among many Malians <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/26/au-ecowas-and-french-president-condemn-mali-coup/">as well as from</a> its external partners. But it was not a great surprise. </p>
<p>Mali’s last coup was only nine months earlier, in August 2020. The transitional government put into place shortly afterwards was an awkward mix of putschists and politicians, led by a general brought back from retirement to sit in the presidential chair and a career diplomat made prime minister. Members of the junta held key cabinet positions as ministers of security and of defence, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57239805">Colonel Assimi Goïta</a>, the coup leader, was named vice-president of the Transitional Council. </p>
<p>Goïta has now arrested the president and the prime minister and forced them to resign. </p>
<p>Why? And why has Mali endured three coups in less than a decade?</p>
<p>Regional and global players reacted with dismay. The reaction from Malians themselves was more equivocal. In Mali’s history of coups d’état – in 2020, 2012, 1991, or 1968 – all but the latest has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/africa/Whats-happening-Mali-coup.html">met with enthusiasm</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53868236">even dancing</a> in the streets. Monday’s events were met with ambivalence. </p>
<p>To understand why exasperation or indifference prevailed over outrage, it helps to understand the profound disillusionment – even contempt – with which many Malians regard the political class.</p>
<h2>The unravelling</h2>
<p>In recent weeks, the power-sharing arrangement between military officers and civilians was clearly foundering. President Bah N’daw had briefly dismissed Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, before bringing him back on board. But Ouane struggled to form a government. Teachers’ salaries were going unpaid, and the country’s leading labour union had launched a strike. The steady drip of corruption never ceased. All of that, sad to say, was more or less business as usual. </p>
<p>By all accounts, the trigger for the coup was the proposal to remove members of the transitional government, prying from their hands the power they had recently seized and grudgingly shared.</p>
<p>Mali’s external partners looked aghast at this seizure of power, as the transitional agreement they worked hard to support fell apart. </p>
<p>ECOWAS, the association of West African states, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/26/au-ecowas-and-french-president-condemn-mali-coup/">pointed out</a> that Mali risked losing its neighbours’ support in the struggle against jihadist violence. The US, deeply engaged in Mali and in the wider Sahel, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security-usa-idUSKBN25H23D">suspended</a> military cooperation with Mali and threatened to enact targeted sanctions. In regalian tones, French president Emmanuel Macron insisted that the coup was “unacceptable”. Rich, given that he had <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/france-changes-stance-on-chad-calls-for-civilian-government/a-57352559">condoned</a> an unconstitutional seizure of power in Chad a fortnight earlier. </p>
<p>Popular reaction in Bamako has been more nuanced.</p>
<p>Many Malians were exasperated by news of the coup, and the hashtag #Wuli (“Stand up!”) popped up in Twitter feeds. It is of course easier to tweet than to hit the streets, and the Twitterverse is hardly representative of Malian discourse. Other Bamakois, reached by phone, sighed in resignation as the political drama unfolded in the hills above town. </p>
<p>Their contempt for politicians had trumped any hope that a change of leadership – however it was achieved – would bring change.</p>
<h2>Unseemly alliances</h2>
<p>The truth is that Malian politicians – with a few notable exceptions – bear responsibility for the tumult at the pinnacle of the state. The first and most obvious is by welcoming, even celebrating, an illegal seizure of power that might open up opportunities for them. In a sclerotic system in which some of them have failed for decades to rise to the top, every coup is an opportunity. </p>
<p>This is particularly true of the coalition known as the “June 5 Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces”, commonly referred to as “M5-RFP”. They were prominent in last summer’s <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/07/10/Mali-protests-Keita-Dicko">mass demonstrations</a> that helped force President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita from power. Under duress, Keita resigned, but the rewards that the civilian opposition expected failed to materialise. </p>
<p>As crowds celebrated the officers who had deposed Keita, the politicians were too eager to believe that the men in uniform had done their work for them. Yet the soldiers did not take power in order to share it. When they did parcel out positions, the leadership of the M5-RFP was disappointed: nothing for them. </p>
<p>Another coup is an opportunity to claim power that they have not been able to win on their own. </p>
<p>They might be right. </p>
<p>In August, in order to placate foreign powers, Goïta and his comrades needed civilian partners who would know their place. N’daw and Ouane seemed to be playing that role until suddenly, this week, they were not. They are off-stage, but the junta still needs some civilians among the soldiers’ camouflage.</p>
<p>Goïta <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/mali-strongman-sacks-transition-leaders-vows-elections-in-2022/articleshow/82943684.cms">declared</a> that in spite of the week’s events, elections would be held in 2022, although he did not specify that they would occur in February as had been planned. Whatever his intentions might be, he will need to expand his political base, and he will need civilians willing to accept positions in the government. Were they committed constitutional republicans – or merely cagey survivors hoping to keep a clean slate for the future – Mali’s political leaders might refuse categorically to be part of a government that has come to power by force. Instead, they cheer from the sidelines, hoping to be called off the bench and into the match.</p>
<p>With all that in mind, the question is not why stage a coup, but why not? The jihadist insurgency that has bedevilled Mali for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55147863">nearly</a> a decade has only raised the stakes for the mid-ranking officers who have actually served in the field. They see both the politicians and their own generals as corrupt and illegitimate.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Amadou Haya Sanogo, who led the disastrous coup of 2012, has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trials-mali-01933350b6a0e7556927d776606d85df">never</a> been put on trial for his crimes, which include killing fellow soldiers. Instead, he and every other coup leader has been applauded, and each has seen his fortunes rise. </p>
<p>Why would the current crop of colonels act any differently than they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali’s recent coup is a reflection of power wrangling between politicians and the military.Gregory Mann, Professor, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1616212021-05-26T19:02:40Z2021-05-26T19:02:40ZInside Mali’s coup within a coup<p>On the afternoon of May 24, the Malian transitional president, Bah Ndaw, and his prime minister, Moctar Ouane, were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57236104">arrested</a> by members of the armed forces and taken to the Soundiata Keïta military facility in Kati, a camp that has <a href="https://www.lci.fr/international/tensions-au-mali-le-camp-de-kati-deja-a-l-origine-du-coup-d-etat-de-2012-2162015.html">been at the heart of every coup</a> that has taken place in the country. Two days later, Ndaw and Ouane resigned, according to a spokesperson for the military junta, known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP).</p>
<p>Mali has been under a transitional government for 18 months, following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53830348">coup d’état of August 18, 2020</a>, in which the military overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita. General elections are <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210415-mali-le-pouvoir-fixe-les-%C3%A9lections-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-et-l%C3%A9gislatives-%C3%A0-d%C3%A9but-2022">scheduled for early 2022</a>, between February and March.</p>
<p>This current situation seems to be taking the country back to the starting point of August 2020. So how did Mali get here?</p>
<h2>A tense background</h2>
<p>The popular fervour that accompanied the 2020 coup d’état faded very quickly. The junta, which had initially embodied the much hoped-for change, eventually appeared to be a repeat of the system it overthrew. None of the dignitaries of the old regime were questioned, including those against whom there were strong accusations.</p>
<p>On May 14, Ouane submitted the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/14/mali-to-form-new-broad-based-transition-government">resignation of his government</a> to Ndaw, who then immediately reappointed the prime minister to his post and asked him to begin discussions with the political class with a view to forming the next government. This was seen as a welcome step, because it re-established a dialogue between the new authorities and the political class, which had broken down in the months since the 2020 coup. But it seems to have gone badly.</p>
<p>The May 14 cabinet reshuffle took place in an extremely tense context. The M5 protest movement – which opposes the transitional government and is calling for the <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/index.php/themes/politique/26776-mali-le-m5-rfp-demande-le-limogeage-du-pm-et-la-dissolution-du-cnt">dissolution</a> of the National Transitional Council – had already scheduled a demonstration for June 4.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Mali National Workers’ Union (UNTM) had begun a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-centrale-syndicale-entame-la-deuxi%C3%A8me-phase-de-sa-gr%C3%A8ve/2252494">second straight week of strike action</a>, which was to continue until May 28. Given the political situation, and having no one to talk to in the absence of a government, the union suspended its strike and called on its members to return to work on May 26 until the situation returned to normal.</p>
<p>The colonels of the “ex-CNSP” were informed of the new government at the same time as ordinary Malians – that is, through the media when the list of new ministers was published on May 24. They were surprised to see that two of their members: the minister of defence, Sadio Camara, and the minister of security and civil protection, Modibo Koné, had been left out.</p>
<p>Their reaction was not long in coming: barely an hour after the publication of the new composition of the government, Ouane and Ndaw were arrested and taken to the military camp in Kati.</p>
<h2>The role of the vice-president</h2>
<p>Colonel Assimi Goita, the vice-president of the transitional government, who is also the leader of the junta, could not have been clearer in a communiqué which was read out on national television on May 25. In it, he denounced the prime minister and the president for forming the new government “without consultation with the vice-president”, namely himself.</p>
<p>Goita also underlined his attachment to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/mali-que-pr%C3%A9voit-la-charte-de-la-transition/a-55134016">transition charter</a>. But this charter clearly stipulates that he does not have the right to replace the transition president. The post of vice-president did not exist before the coup, and was created specifically to be occupied by a member of the junta – it’s therefore seen as a way for the junta to plan for the possibility of leading the transition.</p>
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<p>For this reason, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made the lifting of sanctions on Mali <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-cedeao-veut-des-pr%C3%A9cisions-sur-les-pouvoirs-du-vice-pr%C3%A9sident-/1992288">conditional</a> on adding to the charter a provision clearly stipulating that the vice-president cannot himself replace the president of the transitional government.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the detention of the president and prime minister is a temporary impediment or a permanent removal. In the second case, which seems to be the most likely, Mali is facing a coup d’état within a coup d’état.</p>
<h2>Courting M5</h2>
<p>On May 25, ECOWAS sent its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/26/us-mali-politics">transitional envoy</a>, former Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, to Mali. The attitude of ECOWAS, and more generally of the international community – France, the United States and the UN through its Malian mission, <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/">Minusma</a> – will be decisive in the outcome of events.</p>
<p>The coup plotters are aware of this and are now seeking to secure the support of the people and political actors, in particular M5 – the protest movement that, in weakening Kéita’s power, allowed the 2020 coup to take place.</p>
<p>Although M5 was at the heart of the earlier coup, it ended up being mostly excluded from the transition, with the exception of a few of its members. Things may not be the same this time. The junta invited the M5 movement’s leaders to Kati just hours after the arrest of the president and prime minister. This may have been a way for the military to offer the leaders of the movement new positions in government, both to secure their support and to make amends for excluding them in the past.</p>
<h2>France v Russia</h2>
<p>Since the president and his prime minister were arrested, a certain opinion has been formed by supporters of the junta who believe that the current situation comes down to a confrontation of two divergent points of view.</p>
<p>The first, represented by the arrested executive, is seen as beholden to the interests of France – the publication of the new cabinet came barely 48 hours after Ndaw’s return from Paris. The second, representing the junta, opposes the influence of Mali’s former coloniser, promoting instead a rapprochement with Russia.</p>
<p>This latter argument carries a lot of weight with those who have a negative view of the French military presence in Mali, and who regularly <a href="http://lhistoireenrafale.lunion.fr/2021/01/20/mali-une-manifestation-contre-la-presence-de-la-force-barkhane/">protest</a> against operations in the country.</p>
<p>An immediate analysis that can be made regarding this latest power grab is that the members of the junta are worried they have not been sufficiently involved in the formation of the new government, especially after the dismissal of two of its members.</p>
<p>Beyond the simple loss of these ministerial posts, it’s probable the junta saw the announcement of the new government as the beginning of the process of its removal from Mali’s political affairs. This could also have meant the beginning of legal problems for those involved, given that the Malian constitution makes coup d’état a crime for which there is no statute of limitations.</p>
<p>What happens next? The transitional government will probably receive the support of ECOWAS and of Mali’s international partners, first and foremost France. It is now up to these different players to intervene, because they are the only ones able to resolve this fast-moving situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Boubacar Haidara ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Mali’s president and prime minister have just been arrested and dismissed by the military junta which brought them to power in the first place a few months ago. How did this happen?Boubacar Haidara, Chercheur associé au laboratoire Les Afriques dans le Monde (LAM), Sciences-Po Bordeaux., Université Bordeaux MontaigneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1448462020-08-28T12:22:26Z2020-08-28T12:22:26ZMali celebrates after president’s ouster – but there are few ‘good coups’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354491/original/file-20200825-22-1l01kww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C8%2C5439%2C3628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The scene in Mali's capital on Aug. 18, 2020, after Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and his prime minister were overthrown by the military.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/crowds-cheer-as-soldiers-parade-in-vehicles-along-the-news-photo/1228096969?adppopup=true">John Kalapo/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Immediately after Mali’s unpopular president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, was removed on Aug. 18 by the military in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">swift and bloodless coup</a>, many Malians celebrated.</p>
<p>Keita’s ouster came after years of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200811-malian-protesters-regroup-to-demand-the-resignation-of-president-keita">corruption, mismanagement and failed promises</a>. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200420-mali-election-runoff-tarnished-by-intimidation-and-allegations-of-vote-rigging">Credible allegations</a> of fraud and election-related violence further fueled popular anger after a contested parliamentary vote in March. </p>
<p>After his ouster, there was a veritable <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/08/20/mali-coup-coronavirus/">jubilee among the citizen protesters</a> who had demonstrated since June to demand Keita’s resignation. They flocked to the streets holding signs reading “This isn’t a coup, it’s a revolution” and “mission accomplished.” </p>
<p>Some countries have seen <a href="https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/12/2/192/2367607">democracy take root</a> after an <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002716654742?journalCode=jcrb">autocratic regime</a> was ended by a coup, including Nigeria in 2010 and even Mali itself, back in 1991. </p>
<p>But there are very few “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/13/why-does-united-states-still-believe-myth-good-coup/">good coups</a>.” Overthrowing a corrupt leader is an easy fix for the moment, but history shows the price is almost always political and economic instability – and, usually, another military coup.</p>
<h2>Coup risk</h2>
<p>I am a quantitative political analyst who uses coup data and a machine learning system called <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast">CoupCast</a> to examine why coups happen and predict where they are likely to occur. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/">data collected by the research network I work with</a>, there have been 466 coup attempts in 95 countries since Jan. 1, 1950. This data clearly shows that so-called “coup events” – that is, both failed and successful coups – <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2019/04/17/how-to-predict-when-a-despot-will-fall">substantially increase the risk of another coup event</a> in the future.</p>
<p>Once a country has had a single coup event, it will have, on average, five such events over 70 years. Between 1950 and 2020 we find only 19 examples of countries that experienced just one coup, among them South Korea, Iran and Zimbabwe. Thirteen countries have had at least 10 coup attempts since 1950, with Bolivia topping the list at 22.</p>
<p>Research suggests <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168016630837">a new authoritarian regime</a> is most likely to emerge after a coup – and it may well use <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168016630837">violent repression</a> to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X19881747?journalCode=afsa">assert its power</a> in an unstable era.</p>
<p>Mali follows this pattern. Until President Amadou Touré was overthrown in a 2012 coup, its government was relatively stable. The post-coup period was characterized by popular anger, lack of political progress and economic troubles. By April of this year, Coupcast placed Mali among the countries most likely to see a coup event in 2020.</p>
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<img alt="Crowd of supporters raising their fists and snapping photos of soldiers in fatigues" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=370%2C0%2C5225%2C3104&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354478/original/file-20200824-14-w5hbdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">People cheer on the army in Bamako, Mali, on Aug. 21, 2020, three days after the military overthrew Mali’s president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/malian-army-soldiers-arrive-amid-a-crowd-of-supporters-at-news-photo/1228144336?adppopup=true">Annie Risemberg/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Why coups beget coups</h2>
<p>Just one coup attempt can increase a country’s coup risk for up to 25 years, <a href="https://oefresearch.org/activities/coup-cast">CoupCast’s</a> data analysis shows. Most countries will have another coup before their quarter-century of consequences ends. When that happens, it adds another 25 years of risk. Countries can become trapped in cycles of coups and post-coup crises.</p>
<p>At that point, coup risk can be diminished only by a long period of political stability. Both South Korea and Uruguay, for example, long ago surpassed the risk phase to become stable democracies. </p>
<p>Even after the restoration of civilian rule, though, coups can leave a precedent for military involvement in politics. Once generals have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/02/what-history-coups-middle-east-tells-us-about-venezuela/">had a taste of political influence</a>, it becomes <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/13/why-does-united-states-still-believe-myth-good-coup/">increasingly difficult to stop further interference</a>. </p>
<p>Coup events also <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1536-7150.00162">negatively affect a country’s economy</a> by decreasing foreign economic investment and diminishing domestic productivity. Such economic downturns feed into the coup cycle. As the economy crumbles, popular discontent rises and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002713520531">additional military interventions become more likely</a>. </p>
<p>Mali was only eight years into its 25-year coup risk window when Pres. Keita was overthrown. Now the clock starts again. Hopes on the ground are high that the country will see a <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">better future under a new leader</a>. But history gives much reason to be cautious.</p>
<p><em>This article has been corrected to accurately characterize Mali’s March 2020 contested election.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clayton Besaw is a research associate with the One Earth Future Foundation, a non-profit organization that promotes peace and security in post-conflict countries.</span></em></p>A coup may be a quick fix for a problem leader, but history shows that coups beget more coups.Clayton Besaw, Political Science Researcher, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447742020-08-20T13:08:37Z2020-08-20T13:08:37ZMali’s predictable coup leaves an unclear path to civilian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353713/original/file-20200819-42861-1ef0hb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malian Air Force deputy chief of staff Ismael Wague (centre) speaks during a press conference on August 19, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ANNIE RISEMBERG/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Soldiers have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/soldiers-arms-mali-crisis-deepens-live-updates-200818124326841.html">ousted</a> Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta who has now resigned, alongside the country’s prime minister. Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa asked Bruce Whitehouse, who has carried out studies on coups and violent extremism in Mali, to share his thoughts on what brought on this coup, and what needs to happen next to ensure stability in the country.</em></p>
<h2>What laid the ground for the recent coup in Mali and who led it?</h2>
<p>There are many long-term factors, but the immediate reason for the coup was Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s <a href="http://bamada.net/ibk-vu-par-confrere-francais-un-roi-faineant-tel-est-le-titre-dune-enquete-sur-ibrahim-boubacar-keita-realisee-par-le-journaliste-jean-louis-le-touzet">dismal performance as president</a>. When first elected to the office in 2013, Keita had the ideal resume, having held nearly every top post in the Malian government (foreign minister, prime minister, speaker of the National Assembly). Yet he subsequently did not address the existential threats to Mali’s people and the state, from political violence to corruption. </p>
<p>His 2013 <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201308050030.html">campaign promise</a> to root out corruption and restore the country’s dilapidated sovereignty quickly proved hollow. Scandals over his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/may/16/mali-president-boubacar-keita-private-plane-international-aid-donors">acquisition of a new presidential jet</a> and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/42208/politique/mali-les-contrats-d-armement-surfactur-s-une-bombe-retardement-pour-ibk/">shady defence contracts</a> gave the impression that his administration would be no more transparent or upright than those that came before.</p>
<p>Insecurity was already severe in Mali’s northern regions when Keïta took office, mainly due to jihadi militants and criminal gangs. In the subsequent seven years the situation <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-real-climate-fear-and-insecurity-country-s-north-and-centre-says-expert">steadily worsened</a> as roadside bombings and raids on government targets (including military and police posts, prisons, and administrative buildings) spread to other parts of the country. Many <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/07/c_138952410.htm">troops have been killed</a> by militants, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/mali-military-islamic-state-al-qaeda-jnim/2020/03/10/de3b9c26-4f33-11ea-a4ab-9f389ce8ad30_story.html">soldiers lacked the supplies and vehicles they needed to carry on the fight</a>.</p>
<p>The violence resulted in a major humanitarian crisis. By the end of 2019, the UN estimated that <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053391#:%7E:text=Unprecedented%20humanitarian%20crisis%20in%20Mali%20revealed%20in%20new%20report,-UNICEF%2FKe%C3%AFta&text=Escalating%20violence%20and%20insecurity%20in,the%20UN%20said%20on%20Thursday.">3.9 million people</a> were in need of assistance and protection – an increase of 700 000 since the beginning of the year.</p>
<p>So ordinary Malians, and military personnel alike, were frustrated with Keïta’s government. As a consequence, since June there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200811-malian-protesters-regroup-to-demand-the-resignation-of-president-keita">persistent and massive street protests</a> in Bamako, the capital, demanding Keïta’s resignation. </p>
<p>We don’t yet know much about the officers who led the coup. They call themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People and <a href="https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2020/08/19/meet-malis-new-military-junta-the-cnsp/">appear</a> to be more highly ranked (colonels and possibly a general) than the officers who led previous coups in Mali. Colonel Assimi Goita has <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/kenya/news/africa/army-colonel-assimi-goita-now-mali-s-new-military-strongman-1921554">announced</a> himself as the new leader.</p>
<h2>This is not the first time Mali’s had a coup. The most recent one was in 2012 and, like this one, resulted in military control. How would you rate the transition to a civilian government after the 2012 coup?</h2>
<p>In many ways, the 2020 coup resembles its <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n16/bruce-whitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali">2012 predecessor</a>. Both began as mutinies in Mali’s largest army base in Kati, on the outskirts of Bamako. The international response to both coups has been similar: statements of condemnation and promises of sanctions by the West African regional body, ECOWAS. And both seemed to garner quick popular support. A poll conducted after the 2012 coup <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n16/bruce-whitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali">showed that</a> about two-thirds of Bamako residents backed the junta. The mass protests leading to this coup indicates that many Malians also support change.</p>
<p>One big difference is that the 2020 junta had President Keïta and his prime minister arrested on the first day and the president announced his resignation soon after on television. By contrast, the 2012 junta never managed to capture the president they ousted (Amadou Toumani Touré), leaving the coup’s outcome uncertain for several days.</p>
<p>Though the transition to civilian rule in 2012 appeared to happen relatively quickly - it took about a month for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17642276">ECOWAS to negotiate</a> a handover to an interim civilian government - it masked continued interference from the military who <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bb/">retained</a> considerable power behind the scenes for many months. For instance, just a few weeks after the coup, the military orchestrated <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17642276">a mob attack</a> that sent the interim president abroad for medical treatment. </p>
<p>This situation endured until 2013, when the <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bb/">French military intervention against jihadi militants began</a>. From my own analysis, the presence of French troops discouraged the Malian military from meddling too openly with politics.</p>
<p>In August 2013, President Keita was voted in as president and, until now, seemed to have been able to keep the military in check, but military officers leading the coup appear to have been emboldened by the street protests of the past two months.</p>
<h2>How should the transition to a civilian government this time around be handled to ensure political stability in the country?</h2>
<p>The transition to a civilian government won’t be smooth. </p>
<p>There is significant <a href="http://www.fes-mali.org/images/Rapport_Final_Malimetre_N11_Site.pdf">public distrust</a> in Bamako toward politicians. Under Mali’s 1992 constitution, the speaker of the National Assembly is supposed to become interim president and organise new elections after a president’s resignation, but President Keïta <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/656255/coup-in-mali-national-assembly-dissolved-president-ibrahim-and-cabinet-members-in-jail/">dissolved</a> the body prior to resigning. This leaves no obvious successor.</p>
<p>The constitution also calls for new elections to be <a href="https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en">organised within a very short period</a> - just 40 days - after the establishment of an interim government. Meeting this deadline proved impossible in 2012 for Mali, a poor country torn apart by conflict, and would be equally impossible in 2020.</p>
<p>This leaves the path forward uncertain and requiring negotiation between the junta, Malian civil society groups and political parties, foreign governments, and international bodies.</p>
<h2>What are the likely regional implications, if any, of this coup?</h2>
<p>West African governments don’t like to see a president, particularly an elected one, toppled from power by his own military. ECOWAS will continue issuing strong statements and talking about sanctions. This is also because heads of state throughout the region <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/08/19/apres-le-mali-a-qui-le-tour-l-afrique-de-l-ouest-sur-le-qui-vive_6049357_3212.html">don’t want their own military officers getting any ideas</a> about emulating what happened in Mali. </p>
<p>Yet we saw in 2012 that ECOWAS had neither the will nor perhaps even the capacity to isolate Mali economically. I don’t expect that has changed, but the stakes are different this time: the Sahel is a much more dangerous place in 2020 than it was eight years ago. I would expect France and the UN, which have thousands of troops in the country, to be the real drivers of an international response to this coup.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Whitehouse has previously received external funding from the US government's Fulbright Program.</span></em></p>The transition to a civilian government won’t be smooth.Bruce Whitehouse, Associate Professor, Lehigh University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.