tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/indyref2-27414/articlesindyref2 – The Conversation2023-02-16T17:34:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2001202023-02-16T17:34:50Z2023-02-16T17:34:50ZAfter Nicola Sturgeon, what’s next for Scottish independence?<p>In the wake of Nicola Sturgeon’s surprise resignation, it cannot be overlooked that she became leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) after it had suffered a double blow. The party had failed to achieve its cherished goal of <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-decides-14-reflections-on-an-incredible-campaign-31871">independence</a> in 2014, and lost its (then) best asset, <a href="https://theconversation.com/alex-salmond-resigns-following-defeat-in-scottish-independence-referendum-31816">Alex Salmond</a>.</p>
<p>Salmond led the SNP from the fringes to power and was often credited with its success, much as Sturgeon is now. Sturgeon, the deputy leader, had the difficulty of becoming the leader of a party whose primary purpose was <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-what-has-changed-since-the-last-referendum-185985">independence</a> just after it lost a referendum on the subject. It was not until after the UK voted for Brexit in 2016 (with a majority in England and Wales but not Scotland) that the SNP was able to reengage with its primary purpose.</p>
<p>However, with a surge of new members after 2014 and her high profile during the referendum campaign, Sturgeon had very high approval ratings after she became SNP leader. Her political rallies <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-30115800">sold out large venues</a> and she led her party to win 56 out of 59 seats in the Westminster election of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-the-new-political-landscape-mean-for-the-future-of-the-union-41558">2015</a>.</p>
<p>She also led the SNP in the cross party discussion which resulted in the Scotland Act of 2016. This granted Scotland more devolved powers over taxation and health, and was a win for the SNP, arguably taking Scotland a step closer to independence. Indeed, under Sturgeon, independence <a href="https://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-response-categories-collapsed-to-three/">became a more popular governance option</a> than devolution. </p>
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<p>Sturgeon’s daily briefings and communication skills during the pandemic allowed her to continue as an asset to her party. And it showed in the 2021 Scottish elections, when the SNP won nearly half of the seats.</p>
<h2>An asset in past elections</h2>
<p>After nearly nine years, Sturgeon leaves her post with a still high approval rating, though it has taken a <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2023/02/15/nicola-sturgeon-seen-doing-good-job-scots-most-her">bit of a blow</a> in the wake of the row over policy for transgender prisoners in Scotland. Her personal popularity and her signficant role in her party’s recent success raises the question of whether her successor will be able to deliver the same growing enthusiasm for independence.</p>
<p>But we should be careful of attributing too much importance to individuals in Scotland’s political landscape. When Ruth Davidson was Scottish Conservative leader, she did very well in the 2016 elections. Commentators thought the Conservatives <a href="https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/politics/scottish-politics/1830201/ruth-davidson-resignation-leaves-tories-vulnerable-to-snp/">would do worse</a> without her in 2021, but they won the exact same number of seats. </p>
<p>Certainly Sturgeon was an asset in past elections for the SNP, but public opinion in Scotland has been divided along constitutional issues <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/yes-pulls-ahead-and-snp-strengthens-support">since the 2014 </a> independence referendum. Her departure alone is unlikely to change this.</p>
<p>The SNP is not just a party of government, it is also the largest party of the pro-independence movement. The fate of both are linked. When the SNP government performs well, support for independence can increase. The high levels of support for Sturgeon and the SNP during the pandemic coincided with record levels of support for independence, <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/18953255.independence-support-hits-58-per-cent-snp-majority-holyrood-cards/">up to 58%</a>.</p>
<p>In choosing a successor to Sturgeon, the SNP needs to consider how to balance its quest for independence with effectively delivering policy. The next leader has to both lead the Scottish government and be able to convince “soft nationalists” (voters who are generally sympathetic to independence but are unsure about its potential impact on them) that they should support independence. </p>
<h2>Independence – is there a plan D?</h2>
<p>Sturgeon leaves behind an SNP that is still by far the most popular party in Scotland. It has the most seats in the Scottish parliament and local councils, the majority of Scottish Westminster seats and a large party membership.</p>
<p>The litmus test for the new party leader will be how convincing their strategy for achieving independence is. If they are able to deliver successful policy that helps (or at least does not undermine) their aim to build support for independence, they could reinvigorate not just the party but also the wider independence movement. Among other issues, this will involve avoiding damaging public sector strikes and honing a new approach to the gender recognition bill. </p>
<p>Sturgeon’s “plan C” for independence (which was looking more likely after the UK supreme court’s November ruling) was to treat the next general election as a de facto referendum. But this plan was not supported by all in the SNP, so will need to be revisited with a new leader.</p>
<p>The wider question, though, for any new SNP leader and first minister, is about how to both win support for independence and unite a country that is evenly split. Under Sturgeon there has been too much focus on processes of how and when a referendum should be held, and less on convincing voters.</p>
<p>If a new leader can galvanise a consistent and clear push for independence over a sustained period, a future UK government could agree to a referendum to recognise a new settled will in Scotland. The impact of the 2014 and 2016 referendums has been to create, for the first time, a potential pro-independence majority. The challenge for a new SNP leader is to harness support and make that majority consistent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall is affiliated with the EIS trade union.</span></em></p>Support for independence doesn’t depend on the departing SNP leader, but her successor will need a new plan.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000102023-02-15T17:52:42Z2023-02-15T17:52:42ZNicola Sturgeon resignation: the unanswered questions for Scotland and the SNP she leaves behind<p>When <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacinda-ardern-the-politics-of-kindness-is-a-lasting-legacy-198186">Jacinda Ardern</a> resigned as New Zealand’s prime minister a few weeks ago, Nicola Sturgeon assured voters she still had plenty <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-insists-there-is-plenty-left-in-the-tank-and-that-she-hopes-to-be-leader-to-take-scotland-to-independence-3996354">left in the tank</a>. Yet apparently, Scotland’s first minister had been thinking about her own future for some time. She said so in her resignation speech on Wednesday, which came as a surprise to much of Scotland. </p>
<p>Despite a recent and consistent wave of <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/23255163.gender-reform-bill-row-will-become-trans-rights/">difficulty and controversy</a> over the <a href="https://www.parliament.scot/bills-and-laws/bills/gender-recognition-reform-scotland-bill">gender recognition reform bill</a>, the quest for another independence referendum, a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-63973961">finance investigation into the SNP</a> and an <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/homenews/23315585.ferguson-marine-ferry-fiasco-firm-costs-taxpayer-nearly-500m-far/">ongoing “ferry fiasco”</a>, there was no clear indication that Sturgeon was going to quit. </p>
<p>Having been in parliament since the age of 29 and Scotland’s leader since 2014, Sturgeon is both the first female, and longest serving, first minister. She said she will stay on until her successor is elected. But that successor will inherit a government wrestling with several controversies and constitutional questions.</p>
<p>Sturgeon’s life’s mission of Scottish independence remains unfulfilled – and Scotland is deeply divided about “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">indyref2</a>”. Recent polls have shown <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/scottish-independence-support-for-independence-grows-in-fourth-consecutive-poll-3951529">support for independence</a>, but there are indications that support <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/snp-scottish-nicola-sturgeon-scottish-government-holyrood-b2276023.html">may be slipping away</a> in light of the ongoing challenges facing the SNP-led Scottish government. </p>
<h2>The future of indyref2</h2>
<p>Three Conservative prime ministers (Theresa May, Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak) have all refused to grant the Scottish parliament authority to hold another independence referendum, saying “now is not the time”. And the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/supreme-court-judgment-on-scottish-independence-referendum/">UK supreme court ruled</a> in November 2022 that the Scottish parliament does not have the authority to hold a referendum on independence without Westminster’s permission.</p>
<p>This has led to a divide within the SNP about how to achieve independence. Sturgeon had announced that her “plan C” was to approach the next general election as a de facto referendum on independence.</p>
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<p>This was met with mixed reactions from within the SNP, other nationalist movements, <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/23316759.two-thirds-scots-reject-de-facto-referendum-independence/">and the wider public</a>. SNP MP Stewart McDonald was particularly vocal, highlighting this move as <a href="https://www.holyrood.com/news/view,de-facto-referendum-will-not-deliver-independence-snp-mp">damaging for the independence movement</a>. Alex Salmond’s Alba Party has also been <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/23314433.alba-call-special-holyrood-election-indyref-strategy-update/">very critical</a> of the plan. </p>
<p>However dominant the SNP has been in Scottish politics over the last decade, it has never secured more than <a href="https://electionresults.parliament.uk/election/2019-12-12/results/Location/Country/Scotland">50% of the votes cast in Scotland at any UK general election</a>. No party has achieved this level of support in Scotland since the 1950s, although the SNP came very close in its landslide UK general election of 2015. </p>
<p>Not winning 50% of the vote at the next election would mean the SNP has difficult questions to answer about Plan C and the future of the independence discussion. Sturgeon’s resignation opens the door for a reconsideration of this approach.</p>
<p>And while Sturgeon emphasised that she is not leaving because of recent political pressures, there have been issues which have made her last few weeks particularly controversial – chiefly, the gender recognition reform bill, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-reasons-related-to-the-use-of-section-35-of-the-scotland-act-1998">which the UK government blocked from receiving royal assent</a>. This was the first time the UK government has intervened to prevent legislation passed by any devolved body from becoming law.</p>
<p>To members and supporters of the SNP, it is part of an ongoing intransigence and political interference from the UK government. The SNP, and others, consider this an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64309606">assault on devolution</a> itself. The implications for intergovernmental relationships within the UK are not fully clear, but the frosty relationship between Holyrood and Westminster became even colder. </p>
<p>However, for all the debate and vitriol surrounding the gender bill, it’s important to remember that it passed quite easily – 88 votes in support (drawn from all parties in the Scottish parliament) and only 33 against (drawn from two parties, the majority of Scottish Conservatives aligned with seven SNP MSPs). The latter was a rare occurrence: transgender issues, and the bill on gender recognition in particular, have highlighted a divide within the SNP – a party legendary for its internal discipline and focus. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/isla-bryson-scotlands-transgender-prisoner-policy-was-assessed-as-not-affecting-women-198909">The recent case</a> of transgender prisoners within Scottish jails led to a very public debate, and the reversal of the Scottish Prison Service’s policy that allowed trans prisoners to be accommodated based on their self-declared gender. As the issue dominated headlines, polling showed <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/23300229.nicola-sturgeon-approval-rating-falls-trans-prisoner-row-dominates-headlines/">declining support</a> for Sturgeon and the SNP.</p>
<p>Taken together, this leaves the next, <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/replace-nicola-sturgeon-snp-leader-angus-robertson-kate-forbes-2150294">yet to be chosen</a> first minister with several issues (constitutional, legal and social) to deal with. Sturgeon’s departure has left a clouded political picture – with no immediate successor clear, and several constitutional and party issues unresolved. </p>
<h2>Leadership legacy</h2>
<p>Sturgeon’s no-nonsense, direct approach is a reason why she remains one of the most admired politicians in the UK. She has commanded a level of <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2023/02/15/nicola-sturgeon-seen-doing-good-job-scots-most-her">positive support</a> that few others – especially the several Conservative prime ministers who have come and gone during her tenure – could match. Under her leadership, the SNP has dominated parliamentary elections in Scotland, whether for <a href="https://www.parliament.scot/msps/elections">Holyrood</a> or <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2019/results/scotland">Westminster</a>.</p>
<p>The SNP has been the party of government in Scotland for the past 15 years, and Sturgeon has been its face for the past eight. As she underlined in her resignation speech, she has come to represent these issues and debates in the public eye. By stepping down, she appears to hope this will allow for a more reasoned debate around the issues that Scotland faces, and the aim of independence that the SNP cherishes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Murray Leith has previously received funding from the European Union and the Scottish Government.</span></em></p>What does the future hold for Scottish independence and the SNP after Nicola Sturgeon?Murray Leith, Professor of Political Science, University of the West of ScotlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1859852022-06-29T13:19:01Z2022-06-29T13:19:01ZScottish independence: what has changed since the last referendum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471425/original/file-20220628-14234-l4p3qx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=66%2C38%2C3646%2C2432&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://webgate.epa.eu/id/57683064">Michael Reynolds / EPA-EFE</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If the SNP Scottish government and Nicola Sturgeon, first minister, get their way, then in October 2023 voters in Scotland will <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-61968607">again be asked</a> “Should Scotland be an independent country?”. This will be the same wording used in September 2014 for the first independence referendum. This, on a massive turnout of 84.6%, saw 55.3% of voters against and 44.7% voting for independence. </p>
<p>As in 2014, the proposed referendum would be consultative, not binding. If supported, it would be a start to negotiations on Scottish independence between the Scottish parliament and the UK parliament (which would, constitutionally speaking, still have to approve Scotland’s departure). The referendum question will be the same, but politically, much has changed in nine years when it comes to support for Scottish independence, not least the UK’s own Brexit referendum.</p>
<p>To hold the first “indyref”, Westminster granted Holyrood a section 30 order. This mechanism allows for the temporary transfer of power, so the Scottish parliament can deal with issues that are normally dealt with at the UK level, such as constitutional questions.</p>
<p>However, since then, two UK prime ministers, Theresa May and Boris Johnson, have consistently refused to grant a section 30 order for the purposes of indyref2, arguing in both <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/137269">2017</a> and 2019 that “<a href="https://www.shropshirestar.com/news/uk-news/2019/07/29/boris-johnson-sees-no-reason-for-scotland-holding-second-independence-vote/">now is not the time</a>”. Sturgeon has again written to Johnson asking for that authority, but it is unlikely the prime minister will change his mind.</p>
<p>Sturgeon, very aware that “no” was likely to be the answer again to her section 30 request, has preempted that decision by directly asking the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s top law officer, to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-61974087">refer the proposed Scottish referendum bill</a> to the UK Supreme Court. Very few people saw that move coming, and it plays well in terms of putting the Scottish government slightly more in the driving seat, legally speaking. The SNP government’s plan A was always to ask for a section 30 order. This is their amended plan B, which was to move ahead with a referendum anyway, subject to legal arguments they would no doubt face.</p>
<p>Sturgeon has now also announced a plan C. If no referendum is allowed, the SNP will fight the next UK general election on the lone issue of independence for Scotland.</p>
<h2>What’s changed in Scotland?</h2>
<p>We must never forget that few expected the 2014 result to be almost 45% in favour. The pro-independence movement gained a lot of ground during the referendum campaign – ground it has not lost since. The SNP has become the dominant force at Holyrood in every subsequent Scottish election. The 2021 Scottish parliament elections saw <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13047?casa_token=ppeVYOaO0bAAAAAA%3A_UqDWTtREjbjyWukGa3kb1stvgnvmKs1NPIsvUV6Kbftk69oa6wPXCz2w5FJ5iw09DYVwHvY7Nsi3Q">another SNP victory</a>, and a pro-independence majority, when you include the Green Party.</p>
<p>The 2014 referendum did not hurt the SNP – in fact, it helped the party a lot. It has seemingly changed the nature of voting behaviour in Scotland. The Scottish Labour Party, long dominant in Scotland, was devastated at the 2015 UK election. The SNP won 56 seats out of 59, leaving Labour, the Scottish Conservatives, and the Scottish Liberal Democrats with only one each. While the pattern for UK elections in Scotland has shifted somewhat, in 2019 the SNP won 45% of the vote and the lion’s share of the seats again. Sturgeon <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/nicola-sturgeon-to-demand-powers-for-scottish-independence-referendum?CMP=fb_gu&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook">claimed a fresh mandate for an independence referendum then</a>.</p>
<p>Brexit has also changed the playing field. In 2016, the UK voted, by 51.89% to 48.11% to leave the EU. Scotland, on the other hand, voted 62% to 38% to remain. Scotland, the SNP and others argued, was being <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/scotland-did-not-vote-be-dragged-out-eu-michael-russell-3006463">“dragged out” of Europe</a> against its will. The links between Europe and Scotland have always seemed strong, and the attitude towards the EU, especially the political attitudes, more positive. The SNP has always argued that Brexit represents significant constitutional change for the UK, and is therefore a reason to hold another referendum. But the UK government and Boris Johnson have insisted the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50789771">2014 result must stand</a>.</p>
<p>Then, there was the COVID pandemic. While this caused social, political and economic ructions that few saw coming, it also illustrated the fact that Scotland had its own parliament, its own first minister, and could make its own rules, with different priorities and <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/19641823.uk-scottish-governments-different-covid-messaging-caused-confusion-mps-find/">message</a>. Irrespective of any difference in outcomes, Scotland’s ability to govern itself was more evident than ever before.</p>
<p>Polls over the last few years have <a href="https://ballotbox.scot/independence">occasionally shown</a> a potential pro-independence majority in Scotland, albeit a slim one. Furthermore, the pro UK union parties in Scotland (Scottish Labour, the Scottish Conservatives and the Scottish Liberal Democrats) are not as united as they were last time. It would be politically very difficult for them to run a united campaign as they did in 2014. </p>
<p>Indyref2 may have a better chance of success than 2014’s referendum, but a year is a long time. What may change in that year? The legal decision around the referendum and the potential granting of a Section 30 order will no doubt have impacts. </p>
<p>If the UK continues down paths that further isolate it from the EU and the wider world stage, Scottish attitudes to the Union may harden. But, Boris Johnson is <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/satisfaction-boris-johnson-hits-new-low-scots-feel-cost-living-crisis-bite">personally very unpopular</a> in Scotland. If he is replaced as PM before a referendum takes place, this might change the game and positively impact pro-UK Union attitudes in Scotland.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Murray Leith has previously received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020, and the UK Ministry of Defence. He is currently working on research funded by the Scottish Government.</span></em></p>Nicola Sturgeon has announced plans for indyref2. An expert explains what’s changed since the last time.Murray Leith, Professor of Political Science, University of the West of ScotlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1668412021-08-31T14:19:34Z2021-08-31T14:19:34ZNew Scottish government: key takeaways from the SNP deal with the Greens<p>The SNP and Scottish Greens have <a href="https://www.snp.org/nicola-sturgeon-announces-historic-snp-greens-cooperation-deal/">published an agreement</a> that outlines the terms of their collaboration in government. This is not a coalition but a governing partnership – and one that is unique in the history of Scottish and UK politics.</p>
<p>It’s the first time the Greens will enter a national government in the UK, working with a party that has been in power for a decade and a half. The deal outlines the issues on which the two parties agree to cooperate – rent controls, new rights for tenants, active travel, green energy and renewables. The two parties have agreed to reform the <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/review-of-gender-recognition-act-2004/">Gender Recognition Act</a> to “ensure the process by which a trans person can obtain legal recognition is simplified” and, crucially, to secure a second independence referendum.</p>
<p>There are areas explicitly excluded from the deal – issues on which the two parties disagree – such as decriminalisation of sex work (Scottish Green policy) and using GDP to assess economic wealth (the SNP position). Other issues like the funding of local government are not addressed at all, leading to some criticism that the agreement lacks substance.</p>
<p>The deal commits the Scottish Greens to backing the SNP in parliamentary votes on budgets and legislation relating to agreed policy areas. The two Green co-leaders will become government ministers. One will sit on a newly created sub-committee on climate change.</p>
<h2>Will the Greens make a difference?</h2>
<p>The parties claim that their deal will lead to a “greener, fairer, independent Scotland”. And indeed, the SNP has gone further than ever before on green issues. However, the SNP is well aware of its net-zero commitments and is likely to have moved in this direction anyway.</p>
<p>The negotiations focused on what the parties had in common, meaning the SNP hasn’t given too much away. Ultimately, the nature of this agreement means the parties maintain distance on fundamental issues like taxation and the meaning of a strong economy.</p>
<p>Many of the pledges are also extremely vague, like the promise to review the climate impact of new road-building projects. Non-binding terms like “working towards” and “consultation” are prolific. On oil and gas extraction, there is a commitment to review policy and to transition away from fossil fuels, but the SNP appears wary about the pace of change and offending the business sector. This all points to a cautious approach and the SNP being firmly in control.</p>
<p>But having governed for over a decade, a deal with the Greens suggests the SNP is open to new ideas. As well as making it easier to pass legislation through parliament, the deal with the Greens also has the potential to refresh the SNP’s image and enhance its environmental credentials in the run-up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/cop26-80762">COP26</a>.</p>
<p>The risks are higher for the Greens than they are for the SNP. Voters are likely to see any failure of government as Green failure too. And with only two ministers, their ability to effect meaningful change is limited. They may find themselves carrying the can for any mistakes without ever having been in a position to take a different path.</p>
<p>And while this agreement takes the Greens a step closer to power (and away from protest), members are keen to preserve their identity as a radical and democratic party. They are not entirely trusting of the SNP, who they see as centralising, and with a different ideological perspective.</p>
<p>In the end, however, the deal is attractive to the Greens too. After all, what would be the point of being a political party if the opportunity to shape policy was not embraced? Being in government allows the Greens to make a stronger case for change.</p>
<h2>Indyref2</h2>
<p>The parties are bound by a shared belief in Scottish independence, and the deal reinforces their intent to secure a second referendum (by the end of 2023, if the pandemic allows). But they are each free to develop their own vision of independence because they have different perspectives on what an independent Scotland would look like. The pro-independence majority in the Scottish parliament exists with or without this deal – indyref2 legislation would have been supported by the Greens anyway – but the SNP leadership will claim the agreement strengthens the case for a new referendum. The UK government will disagree.</p>
<p>The deal revives the principle of power-sharing in Scotland. The Scottish parliament was designed for coalitions – initially bringing together Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The SNP defied these “norms” by winning a majority in 2011, and by functioning as a minority government following elections in 2007 and 2016. The SNP worked with others, including but not exclusively the Greens, to pass legislation and budgets.</p>
<p>In 2007, having explored the idea of coalition with the Lib Dems, the SNP signed a “cooperation agreement” with the Greens but this was limited in scope. The new deal extends cooperation between the SNP and Scottish Greens to new levels. Although they entered a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/10/alex-salmond-hypocrisy-former-scottish-tories-leader-annabel-goldie">confidence-and-supply deal</a> with the SNP in 2007-11, the Scottish Conservatives (who bizarrely described the new deal as <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/19528641.douglas-ross-denies-anti-families-comment-dig-greens-lgbt-support/">“anti-family”</a>) will be the only major party never to have participated in a formal power-sharing arrangement at Holyrood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lynn Bennie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A green party is in government in the UK for the first time.Lynn Bennie, Reader in Politics, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1608182021-05-14T13:31:12Z2021-05-14T13:31:12ZScots less likely to identify as ‘European’ than others in the UK, survey reveals<p>Scottish election results have put pressure on the UK government at Westminster to authorise a second referendum after pro-independence parties won an overall majority in the Edinburgh parliament. </p>
<p>It seems likely Boris Johnson will refuse this for now and so it may be there is no movement until after the next general election. Eventually, if the Scottish government did win a second referendum, it would negotiate independence from Britain and subsequently apply to join the European Union.</p>
<p>A key argument made by nationalists is that an independent Scotland would prosper inside the European Union much as similar sized countries like Ireland and Denmark have done in the past. However, this strategy has overlooked a problem – namely, that the Scots are the least likely to identify themselves as Europeans in all of the three nations which make up Britain. </p>
<p>This is evident in our recent nationally representative survey of over 3,000 voters in Britain. The survey was conducted by DeltaPoll, and it is nearly three times larger than the average opinion poll.</p>
<p>In our survey, just under half of the respondents described themselves as “British” and another third as “English”, with the self-described “Scottish” the third-largest group. Just one in 20 respondents described themselves as “European”.</p>
<p><strong>National identities in Britain</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing that British people are significantly more likely to see themselves as British than European." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401019/original/file-20210517-13-wtqhda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Responses to the question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as British, English, European, Scottish, Welsh, or something else?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A separate question asked how respondents voted in the 2016 referendum. A majority of all of the identity groups voted to remain in the EU, with the sole exception of the English. Some 61% of them voted to leave, and it was enough to decide the outcome. English identity is a strong marker of Brexit support.</p>
<p>If we repeat the analysis, but this time looking only at respondents who live in Scotland, the picture is very different. Almost two thirds of the people described themselves as “Scots” with just under a third describing themselves as “British”.
Perhaps more surprisingly, only 1.6% of respondents in Scotland identified themselves as Europeans. That’s a much lower proportion than in the rest of Britain. </p>
<p><strong>National identities in Scotland</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing that only people who identify as Scottish are particularly positive towards holding a second referendum." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400291/original/file-20210512-14-1jl0gtu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Answers from across Britain to the question ‘should Scotland be allowed to hold a second referendum on independence from the United Kingdom?‘</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What are the implications of this for a second referendum on independence for Scotland? We asked the following question, again across the whole of Britain: “Should Scotland be allowed to hold a second referendum on independence from the United Kingdom?”</p>
<p>The most enthusiastic supporters for a second referendum turn out to be the “European” identifiers – no doubt because they believe that if independence is achieved, it will lead to Scotland joining the EU. It is also noteworthy that while there is a clear majority of Scots identifiers supporting a second referendum some four out of ten of them do not want one.</p>
<p><strong>Support for a second independence referendum in Scotland across identity groups in Britain</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing support for a second independence referendum in Scotland is highest among people who identify as 'European'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400748/original/file-20210514-17-1d47f60.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Who wants a fresh vote?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this respect, attitudes are strongly influenced by what happened to respondents during the COVID-19 crisis. No less than 64% of those reporting serious financial problems favoured a second referendum, compared with only 38% who reported no financial problems at all. The logic of this is simple, if an individual had a really rough time coping with the pandemic they want a change, and this desire extends to the constitutional order in Britain.</p>
<p>As a result, these individuals favour another referendum on independence for Scotland. If, however, they survived the pandemic without any financial problems, they tended to oppose constitutional change. That said, this finding is unlikely to boost support for a second referendum, since only 11% of Scots identifiers reported having serious financial problems compared with 62% who stated that they had no such problems.</p>
<h2>Independence – or just the referendum?</h2>
<p>We should also be careful not to assume support for a second referendum is the same as support for independence. Not surprisingly, a majority of Scots identifiers favour independence in our survey – but significantly fewer than the number who support a referendum. All of the groups, apart from the Scots identifiers, were more likely to oppose independence than to support it, and this included the Europeans. The least enthusiastic were the British identifiers, who, as we know, are the largest group.</p>
<p><strong>Support for independence across identity groups</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing support for independence in Scotland is higher among people who identify as 'Scottish' than those who identify as 'European'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400753/original/file-20210514-15-1giqf4r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Wanting a referendum is not always the same as wanting independence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Faced with the reality of a decision on whether or not Scotland should become an independent state, as opposed to a question about the right to choose their own future, many Scots clearly have misgivings.</p>
<p>Over the past few months Scottish polls on independence have shown considerable volatility. In early December, when the UK was just beginning the vaccine rollout, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence">47.5% said they would vote yes in an independence referendum</a> and 41.5% said they would vote no. Five months later, in early May, these numbers were reversed with 42.9% indicating they would vote yes and 47.1% saying they would vote no.</p>
<p>It appears that the UK’s successful vaccine rollout combined with the EU’s difficulties in implementing a similar program combined with heavy-handed threats to cut off vaccine supplies to the UK have taken a toll on the EU’s reputation. They may also recall the painful years of negotiation that followed the vote to leave the EU in 2016.</p>
<p>If the Scottish nationalists did win a referendum on independence by the small margin that current polling suggests might occur, then a declaration of independence would probably create a backlash in the rest of Britain. This would make the negotiations over Brexit look easy by comparison – and the recriminations would probably last for years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160818/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the ESRC</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke has received funding from the National Science Foundation US</span></em></p>Very few people in Scotland identify as ‘European’ – so EU membership is not the big draw some might hope.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at DallasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1605962021-05-10T08:56:42Z2021-05-10T08:56:42ZScottish elections: what happened – and what comes next?<p>The casual observer, looking at the 2021 Scottish election results, could be forgiven for thinking “nothing to see here”. The parties’ vote shares barely changed and, as a result, neither did their seat shares. The elation of a gain in the constituency races, such as the <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/19287754.snp-take-ayr-conservatives-second-gain/">SNP’s victory over the Conservatives in Ayr</a>, is swiftly followed by the realisation that this probably means the loss of a seat via the regional list – the part of the electoral system designed to keep the overall result proportional.</p>
<p>But the fact that so little has changed since the last Holyrood election in May 2016 is, in itself, noteworthy because the interim has hardly been uneventful. First there was the EU referendum, its shock result and seemingly endless fall-out – including talk of a Westminster <a href="https://www.snp.org/westminster-power-grab/">power grab</a> on the responsibilities returning from Brussels. Then there was a global pandemic. More recently, the governing SNP has been rocked by what might euphemistically be called the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-and-alex-salmond-were-grilled-by-scotlands-parliament-a-legal-expert-explains-156518">“whole Alex Salmond business”</a>.</p>
<p>There were certainly signs of a Brexit effect beneath the surface. On the regional list, the national figures suggest a swing of around one percentage point from SNP to the Conservatives – although it should, however, be noted that not many votes actually travel directly between the two parties. However, that swing was closer to four points in the North East, the Scottish region most sympathetic to Brexit and in which the Conservatives made gains in recent UK general elections. By contrast, in more Europhile Lothian, there was a swing of nearly two points in the other direction. A similar pattern can be seen <a href="https://twitter.com/ScotVoting/status/1391074423139078145?s=20">at the level of individual constituencies</a>. The Conservatives are the Brexit party in Scotland, a status that both wins and loses them votes.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table showing how the Scottish parliament vote panned out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399590/original/file-20210509-13-1ih9370.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Scottish parliament results in full.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even these regional differences are relatively small, though. Where there were big swings in the vote, such as the 12-point shift from Labour to the Conservatives in Dumfriesshire or the 11-point swing from the Tories to Liberal Democrat leader Willie Rennie in Fife North East, they were not about Brexit but about independence.</p>
<p>A recurring pattern in the results was that of anti-independence tactical voting, with many supporters of the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib Dems willing to unite behind whichever of those parties was best placed to defeat the SNP. This prevented the SNP from picking up key target seats like Dumbarton and Aberdeenshire West that would have otherwise have been within reach – and were always its best bet for winning a majority of seats despite falling short of 50% of the vote.</p>
<h2>The next referendum debate</h2>
<p>The real driver of this election, then, as of every Scottish election since the 2014 referendum, was the constitutional question. According to <a href="https://scottishelections.ac.uk/">Scottish Election Study</a> constituency vote intentions data, fully 92% of voters were opting for a party that shared their view on independence. </p>
<p>The strength of this alignment is extraordinary – it far outstrips, for example, the link between Brexit views and voting in the 2019 general election – and it leaves little or no room for issues like the pandemic, education, the Salmond affair and so on. This is not to say that such things are ignored by the public. It’s just that, when voters are asked about those issues, their opinions generally turn out to be squarely in line with their constitutional preferences. In that Scottish Election Study survey, 89% of independence supporters thought that the SNP would do a good job of governing Scotland if elected. Just 13% of pro-union voters said the same.</p>
<p>Boiled down, then, the 2021 election confirms that the Scottish electorate is divided pretty much straight down the middle on independence. Would it have made much difference had the SNP won one more seat and gained its majority? Not in the Scottish parliament, where a pro-independence majority was all but guaranteed anyway. And <a href="https://twitter.com/ScotVoting/status/1390977020788621322?s=20">not according to the voters</a>, more than 60% of whom don’t believe this election has any bearing on whether there is a mandate for a referendum anyway. Many think there is already a mandate, whatever the result, and many others on the unionist side believe that no result in any direction could be considered a mandate for a referendum.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1390977020788621322"}"></div></p>
<p>While the independence polls continue to shiver around 50:50, the political arguments will retain a somewhat hypothetical flavour – arguments about the mandate to hold a referendum that neither side will be keen to risk having.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Johns is part of a team whose universities receive funding from the Economic & Social Research Council.</span></em></p>Read the constituency results to understand where the independence debate heads next.Rob Johns, Professor of Politics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600502021-05-07T09:53:30Z2021-05-07T09:53:30ZScottish election: when will key results come in?<p>Polls have now closed in the 2021 Scottish election but pandemic restrictions mean that counts will take longer than usual. Instead of election night drama, we will see results trickle in over 48 hours. </p>
<p>Here are the key moments to look out for and when to expect them. </p>
<h2>Friday afternoon: key marginals declare</h2>
<p>Voters in Scotland get two ballots, one for their single-member local constituency (like Westminster elections) and another for a seven-member regional contest. </p>
<p>Seats at the regional level are allocated proportionally but, crucially, the votes parties get on this half of the ballot are divided according to the <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/politics/19274629.regional-list-vote-counted/">number of constituency seats they win in the relevant region</a>. For example, in 2016, the SNP took 45% of the Glasgow region’s list votes but won zero list seats as they had swept every constituency. Labour, by contrast, took four of the seats with 24% of these ballots.</p>
<p>The SNP won so many constituencies in 2016 that they only took four list seats, and <a href="https://ballotbox.scot/scottish-parliament/polling-scottish-parliament">the 2021 polls suggest</a> they’re likely to lose regional vote share this time around. That means they’ll need to win several new constituencies if they are to return to Holyrood with a majority.</p>
<p>With that in mind, keep an eye on some of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-55246467">important marginal seats</a> up for grabs. Several of these are due to report their results on Friday afternoon and early evening. The one generating the most interest is <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/19277303.holyroods-tighest-fight-dumbarton/">Dumbarton</a>, where the Labour incumbent Jackie Baillie beat the SNP by just over 100 votes in 2016. She is one of the few constituency MSPs who may benefit from a sizeable personal vote this time around.</p>
<p>The Conservative-held <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/19274825.holyrood-election-snp-going-ayr-finally-topple-tory/">seat of Ayr</a> is also very close, with fewer than 1,000 votes separating them and the SNP last time.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/19276389.davidsons-former-seat-within-robertsons-grasp/">Edinburgh Central</a> is attracting a lot of attention as it is the seat vacated by former Scottish Conservatives leader Ruth Davidson. This is a symbolic target for the SNP, whose candidate is Westminster veteran and former deputy leader, Angus Roberston.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/05/05/constituency-profile-three-horse-race-tories-snp-labour-eastwood/">Eastwood</a> is another affluent marginal to keep tabs on. This seat hosts the tightest three way Tory-Labour-SNP fight in the country – they all polled at over 30% in 2016. This result could be an early indication of where things might be headed. </p>
<p>All of these, as well as other close contests like North East Fife and Edinburgh Southern, are expected to declare on Friday afternoon or early evening. There are also a few “bellweather” seats – that is, those which tend to closely reflect the overall national constituency vote. </p>
<p>While the seat of Strathkelvin and Bearsden is unlikely to change hands, the three main parties came in just a couple of points away from their national vote shares in 2016. The situation is similar in Renfrewshire North and West and Clackmannanshire and Dunblane. If the SNP can increase their vote share substantially in these areas it would bode well for their chances of securing a majority, but if Labour are resurgent, it could complicate things.</p>
<h2>Saturday: Labour, the Conservatives – and Salmond</h2>
<p>The regional seat results are highly dependent on what happens in the constituencies. The final couple of seats in each region are often allocated on very fine margins, so the overall result may come down to the wire. </p>
<p>Labour and the Conservatives are highly dependent on the list vote, so this is really where second place will be decided. The <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/scottish-parliamentary-elections/results-and-turnout-2016-scottish-parliament-election">Conservatives won 23% to Labour’s 19%</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>Saturday will be the big day for regional results as the counts are completed for the final few constituency seats in each area. West Scotland and the Highlands and Islands regions will only have one seat apiece to count on Saturday, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-56972971">so they may be among the earliest to report</a>. However, the different processes in place due to pandemic restrictions mean it’s difficult to know for sure.</p>
<p>The smaller pro-independence parties are worth keeping an eye on in the regions. The Scottish Greens look poised to increase their share again, meaning they’re likely to pick up a handful of seats. </p>
<p>Former First Minister Alex Salmond has also returned to the political scene with the aggressively pro-independence Alba Party, which is running candidates in every region. The party will need to clear around 5% of the vote in at least one region to stand any chance of winning seats. Salmond himself is hoping to do so in the North East.</p>
<p>Be wary of assuming that a big swing in one region will give a clear picture of the national result. Some areas, like the more eurosceptic Highlands and Islands, might lurch further to the Conservatives, while others could see some degree of transfer from the SNP to Labour or vice versa. Split-ticket voting also looks set to increase, which might throw a spanner in the works for the SNP as they look to hold on to their handful of regional seats.</p>
<h2>Turnout</h2>
<p>Turnout increased slightly at the last Scottish election in the wake of the 2014 independence referendum, up to 55.6% from 2011’s 50.4%. We’ll start to develop an idea of how turnout might be shaping up as soon as the first few constituency results are known. A lower-than-expected turnout may be bad news for the SNP.</p>
<p><a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/3d4ny">A study</a> of 2020 elections shows that turnout is lower when COVID-19 cases and deaths are higher. But COVID-19 cases are at their lowest level in Scotland since last summer and half of all adults have been vaccinated, so it seems unlikely that anxiety about the disease will have had much impact.</p>
<p>The number of people registered to vote by post has <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/media-centre/more-one-million-postal-voters-registered-scotland">shot up from 725,000 to more than one million</a>. Those with postal ballots are significantly more likely to vote, so this will help hold numbers up.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the campaign was low-key, which typically reduces turnout. Parties couldn’t canvass the way they normally would. And even though door-knocking was allowed by the end of the campaign, most candidates decided against it. The simple fact is that, as virus restrictions eased, most people had better things to do than tune into political bickering on the telly.</p>
<p>The SNP will be hoping that in-person turnout has held up. Postal voters tend to be older and therefore more prone to voting Conservative or anti-independence. If in-person turnout among younger voters collapses, that will probably hurt the chances of an SNP majority. Given the likelihood of tight margins in many seats, and the complicated way list seats are allocated, we may be waiting until Saturday evening or even later to know whether this has materialised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fraser McMillan receives funding from the ESRC as a Scottish Election Study Research Associate. He also receives ESRC funds as the ScotGov Tracker project's Principal Investigator.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>As part of the Scottish Election Study team, Christopher Carman receives research funding from the Economic & Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Johns receives funding from the ESRC as part of the Scottish Election Study team.. </span></em></p>When should you tune in for the big announcements over the weekend?Fraser McMillan, Research Associate (Politics), University of GlasgowChristopher Carman, Chair Professor, Politics, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600422021-04-30T12:02:25Z2021-04-30T12:02:25ZScottish independence: what’s at stake in May elections<p><em>This is a transcript of episode 13 of The Conversation Weekly podcast “<a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-why-may-election-is-crucial-for-independence-movement-and-the-uk-podcast-159883">Scotland: why May election is crucial for independence movement, and the UK</a>”. In this episode, as Scotland prepares to vote in landmark parliamentary elections on May 6, we explore why the question of independence from the UK is dominating the debate. And a team of researchers working with fruit flies, has discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. What might that mean?</em></p>
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<p>Dan Merino: Hello and welcome to The Conversation Weekly.</p>
<p>Gemma Ware: This week, as Scotland prepares to vote in parliamentary elections on May 6, why the question of independence is dominating the debate. </p>
<p>Kezia Dugdale: If there’s a majority for independence you will see the SNP demand the right to hold a referendum and you’ll see Boris Johnson say no to it very quickly.</p>
<p>Dan: And – a team of researchers working in fruit flies, have discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. </p>
<p>Sarah Ackerman: Plasticity is really important for us to form and maintain connections in the brain. </p>
<p>Gemma: I’m Gemma Ware in London.</p>
<p>Dan: And I’m Dan Merino in San Francisco. You’re listening to The Conversation Weekly, the world explained by experts. </p>
<p>Gemma: People in countries around the world are clamouring for independence – or to secede from the nations that govern them. From Kurdistan in the Middle East, to Kashmir in India, or the Anglophone Ambazonia region of Cameroon. </p>
<p>Dan: Yep, there’s even a secessionist movement here in California, though it’s relatively tame in the grand scheme of things.</p>
<p>Gemma: In recent decades, some parts of the world have voted in referendums for independence. South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 after a brutal conflict, as did East Timor in 2002. </p>
<p>Dan: Elsewhere, independence movements have led to constitutional and political crises. In 2017, Catalonia in Spain held an independence referendum which was ruled illegal by the country’s constitutional court. </p>
<p>But the Catalan parliament went ahead and unilaterally declared independence anyways. This was accompanied by a brutal crackdown by the Spanish police and the eventual arrest of Catalan pro-independence leaders.</p>
<p>Gemma: And that brings us to Scotland, where there is loud and growing support for independence from the United Kingdom. Now Scots are heading to the polls on May 6 in elections for the Scottish parliament. </p>
<p>Dan: Scotland held an independence referendum seven years ago in 2014, and voted to remain in the UK. But a lot’s happened since then.</p>
<p>Gemma: Yes, and the Scottish National Party – known as the SNP – led by Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon – is arguing that the circumstances have changed so significantly that they warrant a second referendum, or indyref2. </p>
<p>Gemma: If pro-independence parties win a majority in the Scottish parliament – Sturgeon will ask the UK government in Westminster, led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, for a second referendum on Scottish independence. To find out more about what’s at stake in these upcoming elections, I’ve spoken to three experts, including one high-profile politician turned academic, to explain the situation. </p>
<p>Kezia Dugdale: Hello, I’m Kezia Dugdale. I’m the director of the John Smith Centre at the University of Glasgow, where I also teach public policy. </p>
<p>Gemma: Before that, Kezia was a politician. She served as leader of the Scottish Labour Party between 2015 and 2017 and represented Edinburgh and the Lothians in the Scottish parliament, for nearly a decade. I asked Kezia why questions about the constitutional arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are dominating the debate ahead of the Scottish parliamentary elections on May 6. </p>
<p>Kezia: So we’ve had a Scottish parliament since 1999. So this is the 21st year or so of devolution. The parliament’s very much coming of age and it’s matured and it has substantially more powers than it did when it first opened its doors in 1999. So it’s largely responsible for health, education, housing policy, justice and communities. It’s increasingly got more powers around welfare, certain powers to do with, for example, disability benefits, and also increasing tax powers. But the vast majority of the social security system, foreign policy, defence are all still reserved to the UK parliament. So is the constitution, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t completely dominate Scottish politics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-has-changed-peoples-minds-on-independence-qanda-with-kezia-dugdale-former-scottish-labour-leader-159858">'Brexit has changed people's minds on independence': Q&A with Kezia Dugdale, former Scottish Labour leader</a>
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<p>So after the 2011 Scottish parliament elections, the SNP had a majority, and they used that majority to call for an independence referendum. There was a two and a half year campaign with the referendum taking place in September 2014. The no side won that with 55% of the vote to the yes side’s 45%. And we thought that that would be the end of the constitutional question, but I’m afraid that’s not been the case. Because it was a relatively close margin, questions around the settlement that the Scottish parliament has and it’s continued place in the United Kingdom have continued to dominate. And they’re dominating this election campaign. </p>
<p>So whether you are yes or no, what you were in 2014, what you are today, is still the biggest dominating factor over how you will vote in party political terms. So if you’re a Yes voter, very likely SNP, perhaps Green, if you’re a No voter, the vote splits three ways between Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<p>Gemma: Over the past few years, calls for a second independence referendum have been growing louder. To understand where the support for this indyref2 is coming from, we need to go back to what’s happened since Scotland voted to remain part of the UK in 2014.</p>
<p>Darryn Nyatanga: My name is Darren Nyatanga and I’m a final year PhD candidate at the University of Liverpool, where I’m researching the constitutional impacts of Brexit on the UK’s unionship.</p>
<p>Gemma: Darren explains that in the immediate aftermath of the independence referendum, the UK government in Westminster moved to devolve more powers to Scotland.</p>
<p>Darryn: So during the campaign for that referendum on independence, the three main parties in Westminster – so at the time that was the Conservatives and the Lib Dems who were in coalition together, and the Labour party – made a pledge to devote more powers to Scotland if they voted to remain within the UK. So they honoured this vow, it was known as “the vow”, by passing a law, known as the Scotland Act of 2016, which devolved extensive powers, including fiscal powers to Scotland, and it also insured the permanency of the Scottish parliament and the Scottish government within the UK’s constitutional order, something which meant a lot to nationalists, because the debate really was about Scottish institutions making Scottish decisions. </p>
<p>Gemma: But then, a few months later, the UK held another referendum, on whether to leave the European Union. The UK as a whole voted 52% to leave, 48% to remain, and the path to Brexit was set in motion. But in Scotland, 62% of the population voted to remain as part of the EU. </p>
<p>Darryn: So this meant that Scotland was taken out of the EU against its democratic will. So this is the point that the Scottish government have been hammering on in relation to their need to have a second vote on independence because for them there’s a significant change in circumstances prevailing from the 2014 vote. </p>
<p>Gemma: Economically, Scotland’s situation has also changed significantly since 2014. To find out more about the state of its economy, I called up economist Graeme Roy, a colleague of Kezia Dugdale’s at the University of Glasgow, where he’s dean of external engagement at the School of Social Sciences.</p>
<p>Graeme: The UK is one of the most unequal economies on a regional basis in Europe. But within that Scotland, outside of London and the southeast, the really strong parts of the UK economy, Scotland comes in pretty much next on most indicators. And it has core strengths in areas that you’d expect in things like energy with the North Sea, but also in other areas such as financial services, and that’s propelled it to be a relatively strong economy within the UK. There are challenges though as well, like many other parts of Europe: de-industrialisation, issues around social inequality et cetera. So it’s very much a mixed bag, it’s got its core strengths but its also got its challenges. </p>
<p>Gemma: You mentioned there the North Sea so you’re talking oil there but the oil economy has has actually shifted dramatically even in the last few years, hasn’t it?</p>
<p>Graeme: Very much so. So North Sea oil is fairly much in its twilight years. There’s still potential there for the next couple of decades but it’s on a much smaller scale than it has been in the past. The opportunity, and where policy makers are focusing their attention both at a Scottish and a UK level is the ability to shift into new forms of energy.</p>
<p>Gemma: As you’ve written in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">piece for The Conversation</a>, the economic questions were kind of a big part of the of the independence referendum that Scotland had in in 2014, but what’s changed since then?</p>
<p>Graeme: So quite a lot has changed actually. So firstly, there’s been quite a number of changes to the economic context. The changes in the oil and gas industry has removed a significant potential source of revenue for any future independent Scotland. Oil prices are lower and the tax system is now much more generous in terms of taxing less than it had in the past. And that really matters in a Scottish context because it’s got higher public expenditure than the rest of the UK so oil revenues would have been one way to help it support that. I think the other change is obviously COVID and Scotland like every other country in the world has gone through a tremendous economic upheaval. </p>
<p>I think the second thing is about the politics of all of this, and the politics have clearly also changed since 2014. Brexit being the obvious example of that, where in 2014 the argument was that voting to stay part of the UK was a way to guarantee and be, retain membership of the European Union. But obviously then the subsequent referendum in 2016, and the UK now leaving, has changed that. And that has a number of implications, in particular for issues around borders, issues around potential currency choices. The whole dynamics of that debate has changed. </p>
<p>Gemma: After a prolonged Brexit negotiation period with many twists and turns, the UK finally left the EU on January 31 2020. But the full effects of Brexit weren’t felt until January 1 this year, when a transition period ended and the new rules governing the relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU came into effect. </p>
<p>Graeme: The immediate challenges have been concentrated largely in a relatively small number of sectors so things like fishing and the ability to get products, fresh products to market quickly have been impacted negatively impacted by some of the challenges at borders during the switchover to the new Brexit arrangements. </p>
<p>I think the biggest challenge, though, I think for the Scottish economy, as for the UK economy, is less about the immediate impact of Brexit but more about the longer-term challenges. So about nearly half of all Scottish international exports go into the EU. We have an ageing population so we rely on migrants coming in to Scotland to help support our economy, and Scotland’s done well through universities and businesses with that collaboration with Europe. So it’s those things that will gradually be eroded over time that I think are the greatest concern for the Scottish economy.</p>
<p>Gemma: All this has increasingly boosted support for an independent Scotland. Here’s Kezia Dugdale again.</p>
<p>Kezia: Since January 2020 there have been 25 opinion polls on the constitutional question. Twenty-two of them have shown yes ahead of no which is very new. I think there were only two polls ever in the run up to 2014 that had yes ahead of no. So now you’re looking at for the past nearly 18 months yes being consistently ahead. </p>
<p>Gemma: There have been some recent exceptions, with a few polls showing no just back in front, which some analysts suggest may be down to the success of the UK’s coronavirus vaccine rollout. But in general, Kezia says the reason people have moved from no to yes, in favour of independence in the past few years, has to do with Brexit. </p>
<p>Kezia: What’s changed since 2014? Again you need to look at who they are. They are people age 25 to 45, tend to live in urban centres like Edinburgh or Glasgow or along the central belt, where at least two thirds of Scotland’s population can be found. They are educated to a university degree level, mostly. They are socially centre-left but economically centre ground or to the centre-right. So by that I mean there are supporters of gay marriage but they don’t want high taxes, right. So they’re that type of voter. They are passionately proudly pro-European in their identity and almost all of them voted Remain and they’re very angry about it.</p>
<p>So if presented with a binary choice and that binary choice is an independent Scotland in Europe with a progressive leader or staying in the United Kingdom led by, by Boris with a sort of “Little Britain Brexit” mindset they’re choosing the progressive independent Scotland in Europe. They might not like it. They certainly don’t love it but it’s better than what they’ve got.</p>
<p>Gemma: All these issues are now swirling around as Scotland goes to the polls on May 6, in an election campaign taking place in the shadow of the pandemic. Scotland relaxed some of its coronavirus restrictions on April 26, but still, this has been an election campaign like no other. I asked Graeme Roy what the pro-independence movement’s economic case for independence is now going into these elections.</p>
<p>Graeme: The case for the economics of independence is very much built around gaining powers of an independent country like many other small independent countries in Europe and using them in a way that is explicitly targeted to the challenges and opportunities within the Scottish economy. And they often point to other countries that they would like to be comparable to, so Denmark, Norway, places like that that they can say well look these countries are successful and arguably more successful in the UK in many ways, have better outcomes. If Scotland was to be independent then we could seek to follow their lead and have the same quality of life and same strong economy as they do. Of course that’s easy to say. The ability to actually do that is much harder. </p>
<p>Gemma: And let’s look at the flip side there. So the unionist parties, the main one being the Conservative party but also Labour is also a unionist party, is against independence – what is their argument, I guess for economically remaining part of the United Kingdom?</p>
<p>Graeme: One is their argument that Scotland actually does well within the UK. They would also argue that Scotland receives higher public spending per head than most other parts of the UK and therefore again that’s an advantage that Scotland gets by being part of the UK that would be removed if it tried to go on its own and pay for everything on its own. And I think the other strand then is just to, to highlight the point that any transition from the status quo to a new model would be challenging and there’d be uncertainty and particularly in a post-COVID world or when we’re trying to recover from one of the greatest economic shocks we’ve ever had, this challenge of trying to do that at that point in their view wouldn’t make sense.</p>
<p>Gemma: The SNP’s election manifesto says that the party will seek to hold a second referendum “after the COVID crisis is over” – a timeframe widely interpreted as being within the five year term of the next parliament, so before 2026. But under UK law, the Scottish government cannot agree to unilaterally hold an independence referendum. It must seek the permission of the government in Westminster to do so – via something called a Section 30 order. Here’s Darryn Nyatanga again. </p>
<p>Darryn: So the UK government has thus far continued to refuse to grant this order in council, with the prime minister, Boris Johnson, stating that the vote in 2014 was a once-in-a-generation vote. </p>
<p>Gemma: And if Scotland should choose to have a referendum on its own that might spell further kind of questions down the line?</p>
<p>Darryn: Yes, I think this would turn more from a political question into a legal question because the Supreme Court will probably be tasked with looking into the competencies of the Scottish government on, basically unilaterally, holding a referendum.</p>
<p>Gemma: If Scotland did decide to hold a referendum without Westminster’s approval, and then unilaterally declare independence, like Catalonia did in 2017, this could lead to serious questions about the legitimacy of the outcome. And damage any future SNP bid for Scotland to rejoin the EU. </p>
<p>Darryn: International recognition of a newly independent state is much more likely to be forthcoming if the independence process is perceived to have been legitimate. So for Scottish independence, then, it needs to be done in a legitimate manner. And the decision must be accepted by the UK, the EU and the rest of the international community. This is key because the Scottish government want independence, but with EU membership. So if the EU does not recognise the legitimacy of the independence, then they most likely wouldn’t be forthcoming in terms of accepting them as a member state. </p>
<p>Gemma: So the way it’s held really matters?</p>
<p>Darryn: Really does matter, yes.</p>
<p>Gemma: Nicola Sturgeon has ruled out making a unilateral declaration of independence. But this makes the results of the upcoming elections – and the size of the majority – all the more important. Here’s Kezia Dugdale again.</p>
<p>Kezia: So we have 129 members of the Scottish parliament, you’ve got 73 constituency seats. The remaining 56 seats are made up of eight regions which each elect seven MSPs proportionately, using a formula called the De Hond’t system. And this combination of first past the post and PR means that we’ve had a more colourful parliament than you would expect in the UK system. But this system of PR, where it’s called the additional member system overall, is designed to produce coalitions. In fact it’s supposed to stop outright majorities.</p>
<p>Gemma: And that is what happened, until 2011, when the SNP won a majority in the Scottish Parliament for the first time. It was this majority that then led the Conservative prime minister at the time, David Cameron, to agree to the Scottish independence referendum. At the 2016 Scottish parliamentary elections, in the wake of the defeat for the yes campaign in that referendum, the SNP narrowly lost its overall majority, falling short by two seats. But Nicola Sturgeon still remained as first minister of a minority government.</p>
<p>Ahead of May 6, the polls have the SNP well in the lead, but it’s unclear whether they have enough support to get an overall majority. Kezia Dugdale thinks this will be difficult.</p>
<p>Kezia: We’re now back in the strange situation where because it happened once people think it can be recreated, which is quite unfair actually on the SNP because they found the sweet spot in 2011, this imaginary sweet spot where they broke the system. It will be very difficult for them to replicate that. </p>
<p>Gemma: But the Green Party is also running on a pro-independence ticket, as is a new party, called Alba, lead by Alex Salmond, the former leader of the SNP who split from the party in bitter and controversial circumstances after allegations of sexual assault. He was acquitted of all charges in 2020, but the affair led to a flurry of other legal challenges and government inquiries that at one point earlier this year appeared to threaten Sturgeon’s own position as first minister. </p>
<p>Even if the SNP doesn’t win an outright majority in May, if more than half of the seats in the Scottish parliament go to parties running on a pro-indepenence platform, the pressure will mount on Boris Johnson to grant Scotland a second referendum. I asked Kezia what options Nicola Sturgeon has available. </p>
<p>Kezia: She has zero options because she’s ruled out what’s commonly referred to as UDI, a universal declaration of independence. I think she’s right to rule that out. So this all boils down to mandates and morality really, right? So if there’s a majority for independence you will see the SNP demand the right to hold a referendum and you’ll see Boris Johnson, I think, say no to it very quickly. The question is how long that no will hold for and what the argument that underpins it is.</p>
<p>So the first thing they’ll say is not during a pandemic. They might say not now, not ever, you said once in a generation. That’s a much riskier strategy for the UK government to take. And there’s a growing school of thought that says if the majority is big, if independence or a second independence referendum feels somehow inevitable, it’s in the UK government’s interest to go now rather than delay for a long period of time.</p>
<p>Gemma: She says that’s because of the current state of pandemic in the UK. </p>
<p>Kezia: As the health element of the pandemic crisis comes to a close. The economic element of the crisis just begins. There are serious concerns now about what happens to business, when the furlough payments end, the system that was supporting so many jobs. Huge number of lost opportunities for young people. A suggestion we could have seriously high rates of youth unemployment come Christmas. Knowing all that, the government are currently spending a lot. We’ve got one of the most right-wing chancellors we’ve seen in my lifetime and he’s spending like a left-wing socialist.</p>
<p>So there’s lots of money swishing around and there’s lots of money coming to Scotland just now and there’s lots of means by which you can demonstrate the value of the United Kingdom to Scotland just now, because of the receipts that are coming in to Scottish bank accounts, whether that be in government or elsewhere. In 18 months time that spending has to stop. It’s going to run out and the UK government will then have to decide what taxes have to go up and what public sector saving decisions or cuts have to be made in order to balance the books. So the longer you wait to hold a second independence referendum, the less advantageous the
circumstances are for the UK government to make the arguments they want to make.</p>
<p>Gemma: Your prediction is that she will ask for one. Westminster will say no. Do you then see there being kind of this, this big standoff or will there just be continual asks? How will it, how will it play out?</p>
<p>Kezia: Yes there’ll be a lot of Punch and Judy-style back and forth politics and every time the UK government says no, it will work in the SNP’s favour to be quite honest, because it reaffirms everything they tell the electorate about the UK government not observing the will of the people of Scotland. </p>
<p>Gemma: For Darryn Nyatanga, the UK is heading towards a constitutional crisis, where it’s quite possible that a majority of people in Scotland don’t want to be part of the UK, but haven’t got a way to leave. </p>
<p>Darryn: For the Conservative party, they are more than happy to continue with the current arrangements of centralisation, but with devolution. Longer-term, if Scotland is to remain within the UK’s union, then its constitutional settlement definitely needs to be reformed. So the best way to do so in my opinion is to radically alter the constitutional status of the United Kingdom as a whole. So moving from a unitary state where power is centred within London, so within the capital, to a federal state. So Canada, for instance, has proven that nationalism can be contained within a federal system. So the largest secessionist party in Quebec, despite spells in government, has so far been unsuccessful in leading the province to succession from Canada. So this is mostly owed to the fact that Quebec under federalism enjoys high levels of autonomy and central representation, something which Scotland lacks at the moment.</p>
<p>Gemma: I asked Graeme Roy what options might be put on the table, to alleviate the inevitable anger of the SNP and its electorate if Westminster continues to refuse Scotland a second referendum even if there is a pro-independence majority. </p>
<p>Graeme: So it’ll be really interesting to see whether part of any response from the UK parties and the UK government is to open up a conversation about what more powers could be given with the hope of trying to satisfy the people who might be on the borderline between wanting Scotland to have more autonomy and the decisions in Edinburgh to be taken at a much more local level and bespoke level for Scotland, but they maybe would be happy with that rather than going to full independence. </p>
<p>Dan: What always interests me about these kind of secessionist movements is that the people can vote and do whatever they need to do, but at the end of the day, the ruling government really has all the cards and that creates interesting scenarios.</p>
<p>Gemma: Yeah and whatever the outcome on May 6, politicians in Edinburgh and in London are gonna have to weigh up their options very carefully. </p>
<p>Gemma: If you want to hear more from Graeme Roy and Kezia Dugdale, you can listen to their podcast <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/0YQoD0wLwjz1T1ahaWOKnb">Spotlight, from the University of Glasgow</a>, discussing public policy and the political process through a Scottish lens. Search for Spotlight on Spotify to listen. </p>
<p>You can also follow The Conversation’s ongoing coverage of the Scottish elections by clicking the links in the show notes, where you can also find a link to a recent article by Graeme Roy on <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">how Scotland’s economic circumstances have changed since 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Dan: For our next story this week we’re going to join a researcher named Sarah Ackerman to talk about her <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03441-2">new paper on neuroplasticity</a> – and that is the ability of the brain to basically change its structure. Her team was running experiments in fruit flies to try and study why brains in young animals can change so much more easily than the brains in old animals. </p>
<p>Gemma: This heightened neuroplasticity when we’re younger is why kids can learn languages much more easily than adults.</p>
<p>Dan: And there’s still a lot researchers don’t know about this vital ability of the brain. Many diseases are caused by too little or too much neuroplasticity, so being able to turn it or or turn it off has some obvious medical benefits. Sarah and her team wanted to learn what controls these changes to help fight diseases, yes, but this work could also potentially unlock the super-powered learning that comes with a malleable brain.</p>
<p>Sarah: My name is Sarah Ackerman, and I am a post-doctoral fellow in the <a href="https://www.doelab.org/people">Doe Lab</a> at the University of Oregon. I’m really broadly interested in how the body makes and maintains a functioning brain. And specifically what I have been focusing on in my research really for the last ten years since I was a graduate student, is on this special group of cells called glia.</p>
<p>So the human brain is made up of billions of neurons that talk to one another, and this communication is what allows us to do what we need to do. But 50% of the human brain is actually not made of neurons, but made up of these other cell types called glia. And the fact that there are so many of them means that they must be doing something important, but they’ve been largely ignored by the neuroscience community for a long time because we just didn’t know what they did.</p>
<p>So I’m interested in how these glial cells are instructing the neurons to form these connections that allow us, for example, to move through our environment.</p>
<p>Dan: OK. So we’ve got the brain, 50% neurons, 50% glia. What are they doing? </p>
<p>Sarah: We know that there are lots of different types of glial cells. They’re present both in the brain, the spinal cord, out on our nerves, in our limbs.
And in general, we can say that they are necessary for the long-term health of neurons. And they’ve become really a focus of neuroscience research because there’s a lot of evidence that in different neurological disorders or neurodegenerative disorders that these glia are becoming sick and dying. So I think one of the most studied cases of this is in multiple sclerosis where you get loss of the glial cells that wrap around neurons in the brain. And when you lose those glia, the neurons die and then you end up with multiple sclerosis. And so we know there’s a lot of variety. They do a lot of things, but if we were to sum it up into one word, they’re there to allow neurons to survive for a long time. </p>
<p>Cause if you think about it, the neurons that are present in our adult brains, they’re the same neurons that were born when you were in the womb and so they have to make it a long time. And these glia are what are there to help them. </p>
<p>Dan: The importance of the cells that keep neurons alive – that has got to be huge. But your research was looking at something a little more specific than just the, like, maintenance, so to speak. What was it that you were looking at?</p>
<p>Sarah: Yeah, so there’s this one type of glia called an astrocyte and they’re called astrocytes cause they have this really beautiful star shaped structure in the brain. So if you, if you strain to look at them, you see these little stars kind of all throughout the nervous system and these are these astrocytes.
And specifically what I was looking at is the role of these astrocytes in neuro-plasticity. OK, so neuroplasticity is this big word, but all it really means is the ability of neurons to change their shape and to change their signalling strength in response to, for example, experiences. And so what I was studying is how these glial cells are shaping or instructing the level of plasticity that occurs in the brain at different periods in well, in this case, the fruit fly’s life, but hopefully this will extend into how this works in humans as well. </p>
<p>Dan: OK, so we’ve got neuroplasticity allows basically neurons to change. Why is that important? What does that mean for me?</p>
<p>Sarah: Neuroplasticity allows for you to learn and embrace new tasks. So you have probably heard the phrase “practice makes perfect”. So when we practice a certain task, for example, playing a piano or learning a new sport, this engages or turns on plasticity in the brain, and this allows those neurons to start changing and strengthening their connections so that you become a better player over time. And so plasticity is really important for us to form and maintain those connections in the brain that enable us to do different tasks.</p>
<p>Dan: Your work was looking at how astrocytes – those star-shaped cells – can turn off plasticity. So what do you mean turn that off? It sounds like I’d always want my plasticity on full crank, 100%, right?</p>
<p>Sarah: Yeah, that’s a great question. So we know that neuroplasticity is really, really strong in a child’s brain. So for example, I’m sure many of your listeners like me have tried to learn a new language at some point in their adult life and found it to be like just impossible, where children can pick up multiple languages really quickly. So what is the deal with that? </p>
<p>Well, in childhood, the brain is super plastic or malleable and that allows kids to learn new tasks and skills really quickly. But then at some point in our maturing brain, this plasticity starts to wane. And so the question is why? Why would we not want to be like super plastic all the time? Well, there’s some evidence that prolonged plasticity, beyond childhood, is linked or can contribute to neurological conditions where you see kind of the activity of neurons is not controlled well in the brain. So think of epilepsy or schizophrenia. And so there’s a certain point in our life where we want these neural connections to be solid. We want there to be a little bit of flexibility for learning and memory, but not so much dramatic plasticity that the connections are constantly rearranging.</p>
<p>Dan: OK, so we’ve got this need to shut down plasticity or control it or limit it in some way. Why fruit flies?</p>
<p>Sarah: Fruit flies are really an excellent model for neuroplasticity because while they’re simple, they have many of the same cell types, including astrocytes and neurons. And they have many of the same genes that are present in humans. And in fact, there have been six Nobel prizes awarded for research in flies that changed our understanding of how biology works in humans.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A colorful microscope image of a developing fruit fly brain." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=342&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394317/original/file-20210409-13-1a039sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this image showing a developing fruit fly brain on the right and the attached nerve cord on the left, the astrocytes are labeled in different colors showing their wide distribution among neurons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah DeGenova Ackerman</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And so I wanted to use the fruit fly in order to identify different ways that the brain restricts plasticity to these earlier developmental stages or these young brains. And fly is a great model for that, because we have the ability to change the activity of neurons, in other words, to induce plasticity at different stages and see what happens under different manipulations.</p>
<p>And so what I found is that the neurons in the fruit fly brain are really plastic early in life as, as we know for humans as well, and then this plasticity wanes. But if I got rid of these astrocytes, these glial cells, these neurons maintain their plasticity much later in development.</p>
<p>Dan: This stuff could potentially have relevance to humans and people, and you know, potentially other animals too. But what are some of those potential applications? </p>
<p>Sarah: There are a lot, they’re all kind of a ways down the road, but in humans, like spinal cord injuries or neck injuries, for example, there’s very limited recovery for these patients because of failure to re-engage in the mature nervous system. So my goal is to use the fly to identify common and core principles that regulate plasticity so that we might take advantage of these pathways or try to find therapies or drugs that alter or work through these pathways to either increase or dial up plasticity or dial down plasticity whenever it’s needed. Or even, you know, age related, memory loss that doesn’t shoot all the way to dementia. All of these conditions are somehow influenced by plasticity mechanisms, just going awry, whether too much or too little or at the wrong time. And so if we can really understand the basic mechanisms that are shaping plasticity, this could become a way that we could really impact a lot of lives. </p>
<p>Dan: Awesome. Well, Sarah, thanks to you and to your undergrad for making a difference. </p>
<p>Sarah: Thank you. </p>
<p>Dan: You can read an article that Sarah Ackerman has written about her research on theconversation.com. We’ll put <a href="https://theconversation.com/astrocyte-cells-in-the-fruit-fly-brain-are-an-on-off-switch-that-controls-when-neurons-can-change-and-grow-158601">a link</a> in the show notes. </p>
<p>Gemma: To end this episode. We’ve got some reading recommendations from our colleague, Moina Spooner at The conversation in Nairobi, Kenya.</p>
<p>Moina: Hi, this is Moina Spooner from The Conversation, based in Kenya. We’ve had a couple of big stories in the East African region this week. The first is on Somalia, where there have been clashes between militia groups and soldiers of the federal government. Claire Elder, a lecturer from the London School of Economics and Political Science, explains how the current government’s decision on April 12 to seek a two-year extension has thrown Somalia’s fragile political process into disarray. With the situation now escalating, she argues that external mediation is needed as <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-toxic-elite-politics-and-the-need-for-cautious-external-mediation-159270">toxic elite politics take root</a> and the political window for a Somali-led process is closing.</p>
<p>Another big story in the region is Kenya’s announcement that it’s going to close the country’s two main refugee camps, Kakuma and Dadaab. This means that all the refugees will now need to be repatriated. It would affect over 400,000 people, most of whom are of Somali origin. Kenya is trying to legitimise this action by labelling the refugees as a threat to national security.</p>
<p>The pretext is that the camps are abetting terrorists, namely Al-Shabaab. Oscar Mwangi, an associate professor of political science from the National University of Lesotho, argues that in doing so, Kenya has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenya-is-on-thin-ice-in-its-justification-for-sending-somali-refugees-back-home-159356">failed to comply with international law by compromising the refugees’ rights</a>. And that Kenya has also disregarded its commitments to international humanitarian obligations. That’s all for me for now. Take care and I hope you enjoy the reads.</p>
<p>Gemma: Moina Spooner there in Nairobi. That’s it for this week. Thanks to all the academics who’ve spoken to us for this episode. And to The Conversation editors Laura Hood, Steven Vass, Jane Wright, Moina Spooner and Stephen Khan for their help. And thanks to Alice Mason, Imriel Morgan and Sharai White for our social media promotion. </p>
<p>Dan: You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or send us an email at podcast@theconversation.com. And if you want to learn more about any of the things we talked about on the show today, there are links to further reading in the shownotes, and you can also sign up for our <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email</a>. </p>
<p>Gemma: The Conversation Weekly is co-produced by Mend Mariwany and me, Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. </p>
<p>Dan: And I’m Dan Merino. Thanks so much for listening everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A transcript of episode 13 of The Conversation Weekly podcast, including new research on neuroplasticity in the brain.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1598582021-04-29T12:42:04Z2021-04-29T12:42:04Z‘Brexit has changed people’s minds on independence’: Q&A with Kezia Dugdale, former Scottish Labour leader<p><em>Scotland is going to the polls on May 6 for what promises to be a landmark national election. It’s the first since the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/scotland/results">Brexit referendum</a> in June 2016, which led to Scotland (and Northern Ireland) leaving the EU against its will.</em> </p>
<p><em>Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has long said this is a “<a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-right-choose-putting-scotlands-future-scotlands-hands/pages/7/">material change</a>” in the nation’s circumstances that justifies a second referendum on Scottish independence. Support for independence has been much improved ever since. Sturgeon is now using the May election to seek a mandate for a second referendum.</em> </p>
<p><em>To help understand the machinations, we caught up with Kezia Dugdale for our podcast <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-why-independence-is-central-to-may-election-campaign-podcast-159883">The Conversation Weekly</a>. She is the director of the John Smith Centre at the University of Glasgow and a lecturer in public policy. She was Scottish Labour leader between 2015 and 2017. Here are some edited extracts from the conservation.</em></p>
<p><strong>Q: Can you explain what’s at stake on May 6?</strong></p>
<p>The No side won the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">2014 referendum</a> with 55% of the vote, and we thought that that would be the end of the constitutional question. But because it was relatively close, questions around the devolution settlement and Scotland’s continued place in the UK have continued to dominate. Whether you are Yes or No to independence is still the biggest factor over how you will vote in May. </p>
<p>Labour people get very uncomfortable with such a binary dynamic. People in the party don’t define themselves as either nationalists or unionists so much as social democrats or democratic socialists. Some might support independence; some might support the United Kingdom. Some like me support a federal solution, with a lot more devolution across the four nations of the UK, but retaining a UK-wide network to redistribute power and wealth. That’s quite different to a unionism that is much more about queen and country, a flag-waving British nationalism. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Listen to Kezia Dugdale’s interview in <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-why-may-election-is-crucial-for-independence-movement-and-the-uk-podcast-159883">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>.</em></p>
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<p><strong>Q: Does that division over unionism prevent an electoral coalition between the unionist parties?</strong></p>
<p>A little bit. You have to remember that there were some odd bedfellows in the 2014 referendum. In the context of British politics, the Labour and Conservative parties are arch enemies. For them both to be on the same side of an argument was very unusual. </p>
<p>After the referendum, Labour voters felt guilty about voting for the union. They had thought it was right, but it wasn’t comfortable. They didn’t like their party working with the Conservatives. The SNP exploited this, to their credit, saying, this is supposed to be the progressive Labour party, and they sided with the Conservatives to sustain the status quo.</p>
<p>It was a very potent political message. Labour has been burned very badly from winning the referendum. And let’s remember it was Labour’s ability to persuade left-of-centre voters to vote No that took the campaign over the 50% line. </p>
<p>To put it in context, I was the party’s education spokesperson in 2014. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, we lost our leader (Johann Lamont). Then we lost another leader (Jim Murphy), in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32635871">2015 UK election</a>, because he lost his seat. The day before that election, Labour had 41 members of parliament. The day after, it had one. I was deputy leader in that election, and everybody sort of turned and looked at me. It was my turn to take over the mantle, which I did. </p>
<p>In the 2016 Scottish parliament election, when I was leader, we lost a third of our seats. Not quite the damage of 2015, but not vastly better. And in the 2017 UK election – I’m still leader at this point – we started to make up some ground. We went from one MP to seven, but interestingly, the seats we won were seats with very heavy No votes in 2014. You could look at a seat in Scotland, find out the referendum result, and take a pretty good guess about who would win there in the UK election. </p>
<p>In that election in 2017, there were another 20 seats where the majority fell for the SNP MP from tens of thousands of votes to under 1,000. Come the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2019/results/scotland">2019 general election</a>, with so many close-run seats, everybody expected to see the SNP lose substantially again, but Labour fell from seven seats back to one. I was long gone by this point, but we’re talking about six or seven years of Labour being punished for its role in the 2014 referendum. </p>
<p>Labour was also punished by the Conservatives, who were ruthless at saying you can’t trust Labour with the union; they’re not as strong as we are; not as trustworthy. They suggested I was soft on the union because I favour a federalist solution. So the Conservatives kept on attacking Labour. The SNP were attacking Labour saying they’ve sold you out. And that in many ways is why Labour is the shell of what it once was: bear in mind it was the dominant force in Scotland for most of the latter half of the 20th century.</p>
<p>In the current election campaign the Conservatives’ main message is vote for us to stop a second independence referendum. They’re also challenging the Labour party to form a unionist alliance. That’s a win-win for them. They know an alliance is never going to happen, and it reminds everybody who might be thinking of voting Labour that they sided with the Conservatives in 2014.</p>
<p><strong>Q: The Scottish parliamentary system was designed to make it harder for one party to get the majority, but now the whole focus of this election is the majority. Why?</strong></p>
<p>We have 129 members of the Scottish parliament, 73 of which represent constituencies. The remaining 56 seats are made up of eight regions which each elect seven MSPs (members of the Scottish parliament) proportionately, using our formula called the <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/19209143.everything-wanted-know-dhondt-voting-system-holyrood-election/">D'Hondt system</a>. </p>
<p>This combination of first past the post and proportional representation means we’ve had a more colourful parliament than in the UK. We have Green politicians because they come in via the list, for example. This system is designed to produce coalitions and to stop outright majorities. It did that until 2011, when the SNP managed to break the system with the force of their popularity and win a majority (in 2016, the party fell short of a majority). </p>
<p>We’re now in the situation where people think 2011 can be recreated, which is actually quite unfair on the SNP. The polls show the SNP constituency vote <a href="https://ballotbox.scot/">at around 50%</a> – phenomenally high after 14 years in power. They will, I think, fall short of an overall majority, but will have a majority for independence if the Green vote delivers what it looks like delivering. </p>
<p><strong>Q: Can you explain the Alba party?</strong></p>
<p>Alex Salmond (the former first minister) has broken away from the SNP and set up Alba. He has taken a number of people with him who would be described as fundamental nationalists: people who want an independence referendum yesterday, definitely today, and not in two years’ time. They’re also very against some of the more socially liberal policies that the SNP have advocated under Sturgeon.</p>
<p>Salmond is asking people to vote SNP in their constituency vote and to vote for Alba on the list. His <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4485248f-bf6a-401e-8824-807e3b2010f2">argument</a> is that if you vote Alba, we could get a “super-majority” situation where two-thirds of MSPs are supporters of independence. It would then be impossible for the UK government to refuse a second referendum, is how the argument goes.</p>
<p>A problem for Salmond, and he has many, is that he will have to get somewhere between 6% and 8% of the list vote in every region to return members of the Scottish parliament in each. But the polls show that Alba is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-56889344">barely scraping 3%</a>. </p>
<p>It’s likely that he will manage to get to 6% in the north-east of Scotland. He has represented both the Banff & Buchan and Gordon constituencies in that region. He’s very well known and popular there. That would elect him to the Scottish parliament, but in my view there will be nobody else with him. That’s not a super majority. </p>
<p><strong>Q: What has led to the shift in independence support and do you think Yes would actually win a second referendum?</strong></p>
<p>Since January 2020 (at the time of the interview) there have been <a href="https://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask/?removed">25 opinion polls</a> on the constitutional question. 22 have shown Yes ahead, which is very new. I think there were only two polls in the run-up to 2014 that had Yes ahead. There have been two recent exceptions where No has started to climb again, and people suggest that might be to do with the success of the vaccine roll-out across the UK. But the reason for people moving from No to Yes is quite well evidenced and it’s to do with Brexit. </p>
<p>I was closely involved in the polling in the 2014 referendum. The targeting that we did broke Scotland down into five different categories of voters, with undecideds being a big wedge in the middle. That’s about 1 million Scots that we considered could be persuaded one way or the other, and both the Yes and No campaigns heavily focused on them. </p>
<p>When you looked at who they were and what they cared about, it boiled down to economic security. This is why so much of the No campaign focused on arguments around what the currency in an independent Scotland would be, who the lender of last resort would be, who would underpin pensions – all these big economic questions. </p>
<p>Those same people are up in the air just now, who could fall either way, but what’s changed since 2014? These are people aged 25 to 45 who tend to live in urban centres like Edinburgh, Glasgow or along the central belt. They are educated to university degree level mostly. </p>
<p>They are socially centre-left but economically centrist or centre right. By that I mean they are supporters of gay marriage but don’t want high taxes. They are passionately, proudly pro-European and all voted Remain. And they’re very angry about leaving the EU. </p>
<p>If presented with a binary choice of an independent Scotland in Europe with a progressive leader or staying in the UK led by Boris Johnson with a little-Britain Brexit mindset, they’re choosing the progressive independent Scotland in Europe. </p>
<p>They might not like it. They certainly don’t love it. But it’s better than what they’ve got. In short, Brexit has changed people’s minds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protester holding up sign that says 'Scotland voted remain'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397561/original/file-20210428-17-1y8vlgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brexit: 62% of Scots voted to remain in the EU at the 2016 EU referendum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-united-kingdom-23rd-june-2018-1119225317">Ben Gingell/via Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Q: If there’s a pro-independence majority, what are the options available to Nicola Sturgeon to hold a second referendum?</strong></p>
<p>She has zero options because she’s ruled out UDI (universal declaration of independence). I think she’s right to rule that out. The constitution is reserved to the UK parliament, so only the UK parliament can say yes to having a second referendum.</p>
<p>This all boils down to mandates and morality. If there’s a majority for independence, you would expect the UK government, as in 2011, to say yes to a referendum. But if there’s a majority for independence in the election, you will see the SNP demand the right to hold a referendum, and Boris Johnson will I think say no very quickly. The question is how long that no will hold for and the arguments that underpin it. </p>
<p>The first thing they’ll say is, not during a pandemic. They also might say, not now not ever, you said once in a generation. That’s a riskier strategy. And there’s a growing school of thought that if the majority is big, if independence or a second referendum feels inevitable, it’s in the UK government’s interests to go now rather than delay for a long period.</p>
<p>The UK government is currently spending a lot because of the pandemic. We’ve got one of the most right-wing chancellors in my lifetime and he’s spending like a left-wing socialist. So there’s lots of money coming to Scotland and lots of means by which you can demonstrate the value of the UK to Scotland. </p>
<p>In 18 months’ time, that spending has to stop. The UK government will then have to decide what taxes go up and what public sector saving decisions or cuts have to be made to balance the books. The longer you wait to hold a second referendum, the less advantageous the circumstances for the UK government.</p>
<p><strong>Q: How do you think everything will play out?</strong></p>
<p>There’ll be a lot of Punch and Judy-style back and forth. Every time the UK government says no, it will work in the SNP’s favour because it reaffirms everything they tell the electorate about the UK government not observing the will of the people of Scotland. Bear in mind that message has been hammered home consistently since the EU referendum. </p>
<p>Westminster considers itself a protector of the union and Boris Johnson describes himself as the minister for the union, but it never seems to amount to very much. In the past 12 months we’ve had the UK government announce a massive decentralisation around UK government departments, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-56380128">including to Scotland</a>. Equally it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/nov/27/no-10-reportedly-wanted-union-flag-on-oxford-coronavirus-vaccine-kits">has suggested</a> putting Union Jacks on vaccine vials to remind people that it’s the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccine saving people right now.</p>
<p>But these are superficial arguments for the union. I’ve always said that to save the union, you need an argument of the head and an argument of the heart. The No campaign is very good with arguments of the head. They’ll point to Scotland’s balance sheet and falling oil revenues and the fact that Scotland benefits greatly from public spending redistributing wealth generated largely in London and the south east. </p>
<p>A problem with federalism is that there isn’t one clear definition of what a federalist Britain would look like. There will be different answers in different parts of the country. Also, to what degree would you devolve further powers? Many would argue that the benefit of the UK is the ability to share the same tax system to redistribute wealth, and a UK-wide social security system to spend the receipts of that taxation. </p>
<p>Other people will say federalism should allow you to have localised social security and localised income tax-raising powers, and that’s perfectly legitimate. But it would decrease the strength of my argument as to why the union is a good thing. So there’s no one common thread.</p>
<p><strong>Q: To what extent are Catalonia and Quebec useful comparisons?</strong></p>
<p>I don’t profess to be an expert on Catalonia. But the comparisons aren’t particularly strong because Catalonia is considered an area of substantial wealth and is a net contributor to Spain’s wider economy. Unionists in the UK will argue the reverse is the case with Scotland – especially with the oil price a fraction of what the <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-future/">2013 white paper</a> for Scottish independence was based on. </p>
<p>There’s a huge gap in the economics of Scottish independence, which leads a lot of people to say Scotland’s too wee, too poor, too stupid to be independent. As I understand the arguments in Catalonia, it’s the reverse. </p>
<p>I went to Quebec about two years ago. The province had two independence referendums in succession and then <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/30/terrebonne-hold-out-of-quebec-separatism-faces-end-of-the-dream">just seemed</a> to have had enough. The big changing factor was that after the second referendum, the nationalist parties started losing really heavily. </p>
<p>People assume, I think a bit lazily, that if there were a second independence referendum in Scotland and the No campaign won again that somehow support for nationalism would also fall through the floor. I’m not wholly convinced.</p>
<p><strong>Q: What’s the tenor of the debate in this Scottish election and how does it feel to be watching rather than taking part?</strong></p>
<p>I’m thoroughly enjoying it to be honest. Five years ago I was the one in the TV debates and running around the country doing photo calls. Now I’m an academic and I get to muse on it at leisure. </p>
<p>It doesn’t feel like the campaign has been set alight yet. I’m actually worried about turnout. I don’t think there’s huge awareness that the elections are taking place, because of the pandemic and the degree to which COVID is monopolising the news. </p>
<p>This also means the tenor is not as toxic and acrimonious as recent electoral contests in Scotland. I think it’s likely to stay that way, and something spectacular would have to happen in the next ten days for the SNP not to win. The constitution and COVID are the dominant issues. COVID is largely about competence and that works largely to Nicola Sturgeon’s credit. </p>
<p>The one sore point for her and her record is social care and elderly people being discharged from hospitals into care homes during the pandemic without being tested. That scandal doesn’t look like hurting her just yet. But she’s committed to a public inquiry into decisions she took during the pandemic, so that will be a very difficult issue for her in 12 months or so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kezia Dugdale is affiliated with the John Smith Centre which exists to make the positive case for politics and public service.</span></em></p>Ahead of the Scottish election on May 6, the former Scottish Labour leader explains what’s at stake – and what could happen next.Kezia Dugdale, Director, John Smith Centre, Senior Lecturer, School of Social & Political Sciences, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1598832021-04-29T10:54:32Z2021-04-29T10:54:32ZScotland: Why May election is crucial for independence movement, and the UK – podcast<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>, as Scotland prepares to vote in landmark parliamentary elections on May 6, we explore why the question of independence from the UK is dominating the debate. And a team of researchers working with fruit flies, has discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. What might that mean?</p>
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<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>It’s been seven years since Scotland voted to remain in the UK in the 2014 independence referendum. At the time, it was billed as a once-in-a-generation vote, but now Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, argues that the UK’s Brexit from the European Union is a change significant enough to warrant a second referendum. Meanwhile, support has been growing for independence <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3ea5b867-9a3c-404e-b2f9-c644fee4e3bd">over the past few years</a>.</p>
<p>Sturgeon’s Scottish National Party (SNP) is the largest pro-independence group. If pro-independence parties hold a majority in the Scottish parliament after the May 6 election – Sturgeon will ask the UK government in Westminster, led by Boris Johnson, for a second referendum on Scottish independence. But he’s unlikely to agree. </p>
<p>In this episode, we speak to three experts to explain what’s at stake and what could happen next. Kezia Dugdale, is director of the <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/johnsmith/">John Smith Centre</a> and a lecturer in public policy at the University of Glasgow, as well as a former leader of the Scottish Labour Party. She explains that a person’s stance on independence is “still the biggest dominating factor over how you will vote in party-political terms” in Scotland. Dugdale predicts that if there is a pro-independence majority, but Johnson’s government refuses to grant Scotland permission to hold a second referendum, “there’ll be a lot of Punch and Judy-style back and forth”. But she says that every time the UK government says no it will work in the SNP’s favour because, “it reaffirms everything they tell the electorate about the UK government not observing the will of the people of Scotland”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-has-changed-peoples-minds-on-independence-qanda-with-kezia-dugdale-former-scottish-labour-leader-159858">'Brexit has changed people's minds on independence': Q&A with Kezia Dugdale, former Scottish Labour leader</a>
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<p>Darren Nyatanga, a PhD candidate at the University of Liverpool, where he’s researching the constitutional impacts of Brexit on the UK union, explains the process through which a second referendum could happen. He says the referendum’s legitimacy is vital, particularly given the SNP’s wish for an independent Scotland to rejoin the EU. “If the EU does not recognise the legitimacy of independence,” he says, then its unlikely they will be forthcoming in “accepting them as a member state”.</p>
<p>And economist Graeme Roy, dean of external engagement at the <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/">College of Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow</a>, sets out the economic arguments used by both sides in the independence debate. Roy says that a lot has changed economically for Scotland since the 2014 referendum, particularly due to falling revenues from North Sea oil. “That really matters in a Scottish context,” he says, because it has higher public expenditure than the rest of the UK, “so oil revenues would have been one way to help it support that.”</p>
<p>For our next story, we hear about some new research into neuroplasticity – the brain’s ability to change its structure. The brains of young animals can change more easily than adults – which is why, for example, kids can learn languages more easily than adults. Many diseases are caused by to little or too much neuroplasticity – and being able to turn it off and on has obvious medical benefits. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03441-2">New research</a> published recently by Sarah Ackerman, postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Neuroscience and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, University of Oregon, and her team, on their research using fruit flies, looked into what controls these changes. The goal is to help fight diseases, but this work could also potentially unlock the superpowered learning that comes with a malleable brain. We talk to her about what she’s found. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/astrocyte-cells-in-the-fruit-fly-brain-are-an-on-off-switch-that-controls-when-neurons-can-change-and-grow-158601">Astrocyte cells in the fruit fly brain are an on-off switch that controls when neurons can change and grow</a>
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<p>And Moina Spooner, commissioning editor at The Conversation in Nairobi, Kenya, gives us her recommended reads for the week.</p>
<p>The Conversation Weekly is produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>A transcript of this episode <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-whats-at-stake-in-may-elections-160042">is available here.</a></p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TmUP1StPf0">BBC</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QlMKebueygY">News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNMA9kra_fg">ITV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYJPh0TIPKQ">Sky News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWNjKsUJnQU">Channel 4 News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7GM4nK5axc">The Telegraph</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1PQBND3Xa4">CBS News</a>. </p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, how researchers have discovered a biological switch that can turn neuroplasticity on and off in the brain. Listen to episode 13 of The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1586532021-04-09T14:58:12Z2021-04-09T14:58:12ZScottish election: Alex Salmond’s Alba gamble could yet tip scales on second independence referendum<p>The Scottish elections on May 6 are potentially shaping up to have a big impact on the constitutional future of Scotland and the UK. There is little doubt about who the largest party will be after the elections. Despite 14 years in power, the Scottish National Party (SNP) will get there comfortably. </p>
<p>First of all, there are the <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/19054486.nicola-sturgeon-popular-leader-uk-poll-finds/">high ratings</a> of the first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, for her handling of the coronavirus. These compare favourably not just to her rivals in Scotland but also to the ratings of UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson.</p>
<p>However, the SNP will remain dominant for other reasons too. There is the impact of two referendums. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">first on independence</a>, which divided Scotland on its constitutional future in the UK in 2014. The second on the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results">UK’s membership</a> of the EU in 2016, which led to Brexit but was rejected by the majority of voters in Scotland. Five years on, most recent polls are showing a pro-independence majority in Scotland.</p>
<p><strong>Scottish independence poll tracker</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Poll tracker for Scottish independence" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394014/original/file-20210408-23-198xs1m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask/?removed">What Scotland Thinks</a></span>
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<p>The nature of <a href="http://www.parlamaid-alba.org/gd/visitandlearn/Education/16285.aspx">Scotland’s electoral system</a>, ironically created by a Labour government, also benefits the SNP. The parliament has 129 members and voters have two votes – the first for a candidate and the second for a party. The first vote is for the 73 constituency MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) and the other is for the 56 regional list MSPs, in which the party votes are used to make the overall result more proportional to voting behaviour. </p>
<p>The SNP will dominate the constituency seats as they will win the support of most independence supporters, while the pro-union parties will split the unionist vote among themselves. Because there are more constituency seats than list seats, this means that the SNP tends to come out top overall. </p>
<h2>Any other business?</h2>
<p>Although the SNP will almost certainly remain dominant in Scotland, there are numerous other questions that still need to be answered. First, who will finish second? Either the Conservatives or Labour. Both have new leaders in Scotland since the last election there. In 2016, the SNP won 63 seats (down six from 2011), two short of an outright majority. The Conservatives won 31 (+16), Labour won 24 (-13) and the Greens and Lib Dems won 6 (+4) and 5 (-) respectively. </p>
<p>The Conservatives’ Douglas Ross supports the idea of a unionist alliance. He <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/19205501.douglas-ross-fails-form-pro-union-alliance-labour-libdems/">reportedly tried</a> and failed to persuade Labour’s Anas Sarwar and the Lib Dems’ Willie Rennie to agree to a public pledge to refuse to work with any pro-referendum parties and to come together to force out the SNP if there were sufficient numbers in Holyrood. Ross will now be focused on portraying his party as the main unionist opposition to Sturgeon’s SNP.</p>
<p>Labour will mostly likely try to play to what they view as their strength: not talking about the constitution and focusing on other issues. This appeals to certain voters but they could just as easily end up squeezed unless Sarwar can break through. That’s a tough task in a rather polarised electorate. Focusing on the post-COVID recovery may aid Labour, or it could just remind voters that Sturgeon is considered to have performed well during the pandemic.</p>
<p>Finishing second is really the dream for Labour. Having lost votes at every previous Scottish parliamentary election, it would certainly be an improvement, albeit they would still be distantly behind the SNP. The party that was once the dominant force in Scotland remains a shadow of its former self.</p>
<p>The joker in the pack is the former first minister, Alex Salmond, the leader of the <a href="https://www.albaparty.org/">new Alba party</a>. Twice SNP leader and with over 30 years in front-line politics, he is a formidable campaigner. Yet <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-to-fall-short-of-majority-as-alex-salmonds-alba-party-deprives-snp-of-key-list-seats-poll-shows-3192641">Salmond’s popularity</a> is much diminished, with <a href="https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/alex-salmond-behind-boris-johnson-23873752">ratings below</a> those of Boris Johnson.</p>
<p>Nonetheless Salmond is a renowned gambler. He is hoping his new <a href="https://www.albaparty.org/">Alba party</a> can persuade enough SNP voters to back his party on the regional list. Alba has attracted those independence campaigners unhappy with Sturgeon’s more cautious leadership of the SNP, though Salmond has become a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-55996021">controversial figure</a> following the parliamentary inquiry into the handling of his sexual assault charges.</p>
<p>Salmond has talked about achieving a “supermajority” for independence at the May election, though so far the opinion polls have been variable: <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nationalists-on-course-to-win-supermajority-g05l8c0st">some say</a> Alba will win a few seats and that the pro-independence parties will achieve a supermajority, while others predict that Salmond <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-to-fall-short-of-majority-as-alex-salmonds-alba-party-deprives-snp-of-key-list-seats-poll-shows-3192641">could deprive</a> the SNP of a majority without Alba winning any seats. </p>
<p>This may also affect the pro-independence Scottish Greens. They could end up with a similar role to 2016-21, providing crucial votes to the SNP government in return for some of their policies being adopted – or in coalition.</p>
<h2>Trouble for Johnson</h2>
<p>From the UK government’s perspective, ideally the SNP will fall short of winning a majority of seats. This would make it easier for Johnson to refuse to allow Sturgeon to hold another independence referendum.</p>
<p>However, if the SNP does well and the pro-independence parties do win a large majority, forces outside the SNP may become more important. The more hardline yes supporters no doubt hope that Alba could win enough regional list members to allow up to two-thirds of seats to be controlled by the pro-independence parties.</p>
<p>If blocked from holding a referendum by Westminster, a two-thirds majority would give the pro-independence forces control over the Scottish parliament’s ability to dissolve itself. This would allow a fresh election to be potentially held as a direct plebiscite on independence, setting Scotland on a collision course with Westminster.</p>
<p>This is unlikely, however. Alba may not win the number of seats they dream of and Sturgeon’s more moderate approach is extremely unlikely to sanction such a move, wary of the recent example <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/catalan-government-suspends-declaration-of-independence">of Catalonia</a>, where a unilateral declaration of independence failed.</p>
<p>Nevertheless the SNP, facing competition for the first time from another party whose primary purpose is also independence, may still feel pressured to push for a referendum through the Scottish parliament with or without the support of Westminster. But Sturgeon would only proceed with such a strategy if the referendum were legal, <a href="https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/opinions/second-scottish-independence-referendum-without-s30-order-legal-question-demands-political">and opinion</a> on that <a href="https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/corporate-report/2019/12/scotlands-right-choose-putting-scotlands-future-scotlands-hands/documents/scotlands-right-to-choose-putting-scotlands-future-in-scotlands-hands/scotlands-right-to-choose-putting-scotlands-future-in-scotlands-hands/govscot%3Adocument/scotlands-right-choose-putting-scotlands-future-scotlands-hands.pdf">remains disputed</a>. </p>
<p>In short, it’s a vital election in Scotland. As the UK slowly emerges from the pandemic, a constitutional clash between supporters of Scottish independence and Johnson’s UK government looks a distinct possibility. The situation is only likely to get more intense as we move towards May 6.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall is affiliated with both the SNP and EIS but writes in a personal capacity. </span></em></p>There’s everything to play for as Scotland counts down to May 6.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1579852021-03-26T17:52:32Z2021-03-26T17:52:32ZScottish independence: could wind power Scotland back into the EU?<p>Now that First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has survived the investigation over the handling of the case against Alex Salmond, Scotland’s attention is turning to the country’s May election. With the SNP seeking a clear mandate for a second referendum on the back of the vote, independence is back to the top of the agenda. It remains to be seen how Salmond’s new pro-independence <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/26/alex-salmond-launches-new-independence-focused-political-party-alba">Alba party</a> will affect the outcome, but according to the latest independence polls, support for leaving the UK is <a href="https://natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/what-scotland-thinks/">still narrowly</a> in front. </p>
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<p>Yet there is much more economic and political uncertainty in Scotland than in 2014. Following Brexit, Scotland is having to choose which economic area it most wants to associate with – the UK or the EU. </p>
<p>Remaining in the UK means continuing Scotland’s existing economic relationship with England and Wales while facing a more complex relationship with the EU and more controversially Northern Ireland, which effectively remains in the single market.</p>
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<span class="caption">Finances are a thorny matter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/DyENefFUKlk">Illiya Vjestica/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>What about voting for independence and joining the EU? One major problem is the EU fiscal rules, which require a general budget deficit of no more than 3% of GDP per member (this is <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economic-governance/news/commission-wants-to-keep-fiscal-rules-suspended-in-2022/">temporarily suspended</a> because of COVID). </p>
<p>In 2019-20, <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/government-expenditure-revenue-scotland-gers-2019-20/">Scotland’s deficit</a> amounted to 6.9% if North Sea oil revenues are included (or 7.5% without it). This was a considerable improvement on earlier years, but still well above the threshold – and that was before the pandemic. </p>
<p>Now UK borrowing is hitting <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/282796/uk-government-borrowing/#:%7E:text=In%20February%202021%2C%20the%20government,in%20this%20provided%20time%20period.">record highs</a> and the Institute for Fiscal Studies thinks Scotland’s effective deficit will have reached <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14982#:%7E:text=Scotland's%20implicit%20budget%20deficit%20could,Institute%20For%20Fiscal%20Studies%20%2D%20IFS">close to 30%</a> in 2020-21. This will affect the long-term debt burden of both the UK and Scotland, and raises questions about how an independent Scotland’s share of the UK debt should be calculated. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">Scottish independence referendum: why the economic issues are quite different to 2014</a>
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<p>Any analysis of independence economics should therefore start by asking whether an independent Scotland could balance the books by increasing revenues and decreasing spending and how willing Scottish society would be to potentially make sacrifices.
Trade looks likely to exacerbate this problem – in the short-term at least. Currently more than 60% of Scotland’s commerce is directed to other UK countries (<a href="https://escoe-website.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/16103450/ESCoE-DP-2020-09.pdf">including Northern Ireland</a>, now practically an EU market for trading purposes) while only about 19% goes to the EU. </p>
<p>Ireland was actually similar before it joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. <a href="https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/statisticalyearbook/2004/ireland&theeu.pdf">Just before joining</a>, almost 55% of her exports and 51% of imports were directed to the UK, while only 21% went to the EEC. These shares <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8173/#:%7E:text=They%20are%20taken%20from%20the,surplus%20of%20%C2%A310.0%20billion.&text=Ireland%20accounted%20for%205.8%25%20of,4.2%25%20of%20all%20UK%20imports.">have since</a> completely reversed, though it has taken time and was very complicated and costly for the country as such overhaul requires finding new markets and adjusting to the requirements of new customers, which is always costly for both workers and firms.</p>
<p>Scotland would have to go through a similar adjustment, and voters should be aware of this.</p>
<p>Scottish exports were at least competitive in the EU market pre-Brexit. <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/oil-income-is-a-bigger-issue-than-start-up-costs-warns-economist-j2klfxd2z5b">In 2014</a>, some economists suggested that dwindling North Sea oil revenues were a red herring and that Scotland could develop a competitive advantage in well-performing areas like food and drink, financial services, sustainable tourism and green energy. </p>
<h2>The EU and green energy</h2>
<p>One big question is how rejoining the EU would affect Scotland’s finances. The EU would not subsidise Scottish public sector spending, and would probably not make funds available through the bloc’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/#:%7E:text=The%20Cohesion%20Fund%20is%20aimed,and%20to%20promote%20sustainable%20development.">Cohesion Fund</a>. Scots might not think their country is rich, but it earns <a href="https://fraserofallander.org/new-gross-national-income-figures-for-scotland/">more than 90%</a> of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=EU">the EU’s</a> average gross national income – well above <a href="https://data.oecd.org/natincome/gross-national-income.htm">various needier members</a>. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/">European Regional Development Fund</a> (ERDF) could be of assistance, potentially easing the transition for the nation’s public finances. The ERDF, the 2014-20 budget of which <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/95/european-regional-development-fund-erdf">amounted to</a> €199 billion (£170 billion), focuses on the areas which could well be priorities for an independent Scotland such as innovation and research, the digital agenda, support for small businesses and the low-carbon economy. </p>
<p>Green energy would be of particular mutual interest to Scotland and the EU, especially wind power, for which Scotland has the <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-advantage-scotland-when-it-comes-to-wind-power-15900">most favourable</a> conditions in Europe. Scotland’s accession would be valuable to help the EU meet <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en">its goal</a> of climate neutrality by 2050. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.caneurope.org/content/uploads/2018/09/Assessment-EU-budget-climate-mainstreaming-CAN-Europe-August-2018.pdf">At least 25%</a> of the EU’s long-term budget is to be dedicated to climate action, while the European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm, <a href="https://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/eib_group_climate_and_environmental_ambitions_en.pdf">plans to invest</a> €1 trillion in climate action and environmental sustainability between now and 2030. </p>
<p>Scotland’s <a href="https://www.scottishrenewables.com/our-industry/statistics">wind power capacity</a> is <a href="https://community.ieawind.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=b1ee7fca-f393-c834-293d-4db886b14370&forceDialog=0">comparable with</a> Italy and below only Germany, Spain and France. But more importantly, <a href="https://www.current-news.co.uk/news/renewables-meet-97-4-of-scotlands-electricity-consumption-in-2020#:%7E:text=Scotland%20has%20fallen%20just%20short,37%25%20of%20Scotland's%20electricity%20demand.">97% of</a> internal energy consumption in Scotland originates from renewables. The EU member with the highest green energy consumption is Sweden, with less than 60%. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics#:%7E:text=In%202019%2C%20renewable%20energy%20represented,27%20reached%208.9%20%25%20in%202019.">The EU total</a> is only around 20%, so Scotland would immediately raise this share. </p>
<p>Any increase in Scotland’s wind energy production could also be diverted to supply the EU with green energy, further increasing its overall share. Yes <a href="https://www.nationalgrid.com/stories/energy-explained/what-are-electricity-interconnectors#:%7E:text=In%202019%2C%20interconnectors%20supplied%208,between%20Great%20Britain%20and%20Europe.">there are limitations</a> with the electrical interconnectors, but EU finance could be used to expand them.</p>
<p>As Glasgow gets ready to host the <a href="https://ukcop26.org/">COP26</a> climate conference in November, Scotland’s competitive advantage in green energy ought to be an important part of the economic case for independence if and when the second referendum takes place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Those who talk down an independent Scotland’s prospects are not factoring in one of its biggest natural resources.Piotr Marek Jaworski, Lecturer in Economics, Edinburgh Napier UniversityKenny Crossan, Lecturer in Economics, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1541192021-01-28T16:38:15Z2021-01-28T16:38:15ZScottish independence referendum: why the economic issues are quite different to 2014<p>Independence has returned to the top of the agenda in Scotland after First Minister Nicola Sturgeon signalled that her Scottish National Party (SNP) will hold a consultative second referendum after the May election if there is a pro-indepedence majority in the Scottish parliament – regardless of whether Westminster gives its approval. </p>
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<p>This shift towards threatening unilateral action has coincided with <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/19034634.union-pressure-polls-suggest-people-want-votes-scottish-independence-united-ireland/">the 20th</a> opinion poll <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/scotland/2021/01/scottish-independence-poll-tracker-will-scotland-vote-leave-uk">in a row</a> showing a majority in favour of Scotland leaving the union. The polls are also suggesting that the election will produce another pro-independence majority in Holyrood, or even an outright SNP majority. </p>
<p>If a second referendum takes place, economics will probably be at the forefront of the debate. This happened in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">2014 campaign</a>, when voters became remarkably clued up on everything from the future of the currency to the finer points of imports and exports. But six years on, how have the economic arguments changed, and what will the key battlegrounds be?</p>
<h2>Brexit and the new status quo</h2>
<p>Many of the arguments will be familiar from last time. Independence supporters will argue that Scotland has comparable strengths to other small countries. Many will no doubt contrast their vision of a socially progressive independent Scotland within the EU, with a less favourable future in post-Brexit Britain.</p>
<p>Unionists will emphasise the risks and the costs of putting up barriers with the UK economy. They will argue that Holyrood already has substantial powers over key economic policy areas within skills and education, economic development and, since 2016, <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171029/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf">tax</a>. </p>
<p>But in other ways, the debate has changed markedly. Back then, the choice was between independence and a relatively stable status quo – albeit with a <a href="https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-miliband-nick-4265992">pledge of “more powers”</a> that was made in the days before the vote. </p>
<p>But Brexit makes the future much less certain for the UK and Scotland. Scotland’s economy will be <a href="http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-77_The_Economic_Implications_of_Brexit.pdf">worse off</a>. “No” voters in 2014 who feared that Scotland might find itself outside the EU – even temporarily – might view the economic risks and opportunities very differently this time. </p>
<p>But leaving the EU has also highlighted the practical challenges of economic change. It has given us all a greater understanding of the complexities of unwinding shared economic institutions, the difficulties in negotiating new partnerships, and the costs of breaking apart trade and supply chains. </p>
<p>With Scottish exports to the rest of the UK worth over <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/export-stats-scotland-2018/">three times as much as those to the EU</a>, for example, navigating a smooth transition will carry costs. Voters will ask challenging questions of politicians about how any transition will be managed, and what their “plan B” might be should things go awry.</p>
<h2>Scotland’s pros and cons</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sdi.co.uk/business-in-scotland/scottish-economy-overview">Scotland has a successful economy</a>, with strengths such as energy, financial services and tourism. It has a world-class university sector, is rich in natural resources, and can count on trusted institutions. </p>
<p>It has challenges as well, including <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/poverty-income-inequality-scotland-2015-18/#:%7E:text=20%25%20of%20people%20in%20Scotland,poverty%20rate%20continues%20to%20rise.&text=The%20Palma%20coefficient%20measures%20income,than%20the%20bottom%2040%25%20combined.">longstanding inequalities</a>, an ageing population and a business base that is often <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/high-level-summary-stats-business-innovation/">less dynamic than its competitors</a>. Public spending is higher compared to the UK – <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-2020">by around 17% in the latest figures</a>. This reflects greater needs in areas such as social security, and higher costs of delivering services, but also historical political choices on UK regional funding. This would have to be paid for under independence.</p>
<p>The overarching economic climate is undoubtedly more challenging than in 2014. For example, oil revenues were a key part of the economic case for independence last time around. In <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-future/">Scotland’s Future</a> – the Scottish government’s 2013 independence white paper – annual oil revenues were forecast to be between £7 billion and £8 billion by 2016/17. Revenues ended up <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/350890/united-kingdom-uk-north-sea-revenue/">at virtually zero</a> that year, and are forecast to remain no more than £1 billion <a href="http://cdn.obr.uk/CCS1020397650-001_OBR-November2020-EFO-v2-Web-accessible.pdf">for the foreseeable future</a>. </p>
<p>Then there is COVID-19. <a href="https://www.gov.scot/collections/state-of-the-economy/">Scotland’s economy has been badly</a> hit, with a huge rebuilding task ahead. The SNP argues that independence is needed to help with that recovery. But launching a debate on Scotland’s future, let alone transitioning to independence, after the biggest economic shock in living memory will not be easy.</p>
<h2>The economic model for independence</h2>
<p>The economic model put forward by the independence campaign in 2014 was one of continuity. It proposed to retain sterling, keep the Bank of England, align financial regulation and have an open border with the UK underpinned by the EU single market.</p>
<p>But if a key argument for independence is that Scotland now needs to diverge from post-Brexit Britain, economic alignment with the UK is no longer applicable. The <a href="https://www.sustainablegrowthcommission.scot/">SNP’s 2018 Growth Commission</a> outlined its refreshed model for independence. Yet many in the independence movement have called for a more radical approach, including a new currency. </p>
<p>Herein lies a trade-off. The weaker the alignment with the UK economic model, the greater the opportunity to “do things differently”, but the greater the short-term risk and upheaval. </p>
<p>One major unknown will be how the unionist parties respond to this set of circumstances. Will they concentrate on the risks of independence or will they offer a positive economic case for the union? How too will they respond to the criticism that the UK economy isn’t working for Scotland? </p>
<p>Just before Christmas, Labour leader <a href="https://labour.org.uk/keir-starmer-union-speech/">Keir Starmer promised</a> to launch a “new phase of radical economic and political devolution” in the UK. But we’ve heard similar things before and it remains unclear what detail lies behind this ambition. </p>
<p>There is therefore much work to be done, by all sides, in setting out the economic case for and against independence – particularly when held up against the big debates on the future of our economy, from rebuilding after COVID, through to tackling inequalities and supporting the transition to net zero. </p>
<p>One certainty is that voters are all too aware of how quickly promises made – by all sides – during a referendum can evaporate when the campaign ends. Scotland has an engaged electorate who will demand facts and evidence, just as much as political persuasion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Roy receives funding from ESRC, Nuffield Foundation and Standard Life Foundation. In the past, the Fraser of Allander Institute that Graeme Roy is Director of has received research funding from the UK Government and the Scottish Government. </span></em></p>Economics is set to dominate the debate, just like last time around.Graeme Roy, Head of Economics and Director of the Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1503392020-11-18T13:54:42Z2020-11-18T13:54:42ZScottish devolution a ‘disaster’? Let’s look at the data<p>When the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, recently told a group of MPs that devolution in Scotland has been a “disaster” he raised an interesting question. Has handing greater powers to the Scottish government been a bad move, and, if so, for whom?</p>
<p>Johnson’s comments have been taken as a boon for the independence movement, including among members of the SNP, which is in government in Scotland. Even before he said it, polling put support for Scottish independence at its highest ever – <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/record-public-support-scottish-independence">at about 60%</a>. And looking at the data, it does appear that devolution has been associated with a period of good economic performance.</p>
<h2>The good</h2>
<p>If we look at the Scottish workforce, we find that Scottish employees appear somewhat better off than their English counterparts. In 1999, before devolution, average (median) weekly wages for full-time Scottish employees were more than <a href="https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=99">5% lower</a> than their English counterparts. By 2019, that gap had halved. In 2020 (where caution is needed in interpreting the figures due to the pandemic) they are actually earning more, on average than their English counterparts. </p>
<p>This comparison actually rather flatters England, because the <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1108/9781787567351">cost of living is higher in England</a>. If we compare instead the north-west (a region with a larger population than Scotland), where prices are similar, we see that median full-time wages were on a par in 1999 but by 2019 Scottish median wages were nearly 5% higher. This has been concentrated at the lower end of the income spectrum where improvements arguably are needed most.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1328437520313487363"}"></div></p>
<p>A similar story can be told in terms of productivity, where growth in Scotland has been significantly more rapid than in England (increasing from 1.3% below that in North West England to a remarkable 6.5% above) in the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/datasets/annualregionallabourproductivity">two decades since devolution</a>.</p>
<h2>The bad</h2>
<p>However, in contrast, in terms of life expectancy, Scotland’s performance has been mediocre. Scots can expect to live <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies/bulletins/nationallifetablesunitedkingdom/2017to2019#life-expectancy-at-birth-in-uk-countries">fewer years</a> than the English, Welsh or Northern Irish. Since the pre-devolution period, life expectancy for Scottish men increased at a broadly similar rate to that in the other UK nations (by roughly 4½ years, which is slightly less than England but slightly more than Wales). Life expectancy for Scottish women has fallen somewhat further behind that in England. </p>
<p>However, this data can be somewhat deceptive. It’s extremely difficult to disentangle historical lifestyle factors from the impacts of policy. Certain behaviours known to reduce lifespan are more common in Scotland: we know, for example, that Scots are more likely to <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/bulletins/adultsmokinghabitsingreatbritain/2019#the-proportion-who-are-current-smokers-in-the-uk-its-consistent-countries-and-local-areas-2011-to-2019">smoke than the English</a>.</p>
<p>And comparing Scotland to England as a whole is rather misleading since London is driving a significant chunk of the improvements in England. We have <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/datasets/lifeexpectancyestimatesallagesuk">data on regional life expectancy</a> going back to 2001-3. Scottish life expectancy has increased by 2.28 years for women and 3.66 years for men during that period and the commensurate figures for England are 2.67 and 3.56 respectively. However, life expectancy in London has increased by 3.9 years for women and a remarkable 4.9 years for men in less than two decades. The remaining regions of England look very similar to Scotland.</p>
<p>Another area where one can legitimately criticise the SNP Holyrood administration is on education. Scotland spends considerably more (per child) on pre-tertiary education than any region in England (£6,191 per child against £5,216 in England – and the latter includes the London weighting). Yet it appears to get poor results. Direct comparisons are difficult because of different systems – but Scotland’s scores in <a href="https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Finews.co.uk%2Fnews%2Fscotland%2Fpisa-results-2019-scotland-worst-ever-performance-science-maths-370433&data=04%7C01%7CAlex.DeRuyter%40bcu.ac.uk%7Ce05cf7d0643d4955ec0408d88bb5c71b%7C7e2be055828a4523b5e5b77ad9939785%7C0%7C0%7C637412960127064164%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Lc6bQQNDtsfQMEhAM8v4%2B7vCbyIsj0%2FZD1hHd%2B%2BeQD0%3D&reserved=0">international comparisons</a> are below England’s. </p>
<h2>The verdict</h2>
<p>Scotland’s government is far from perfect, and there are clear areas for improvement. However, that is a failure of a specific administration and not a failure of devolution. Indeed, it is far from clear that Westminster would do any better.</p>
<p>What evidence we have, then, the worst you can say about devolution when it comes to these factors is that the evidence is mixed. And, generally, it looks good. Indeed, to the extent that the health disparities evident in Scotland represent a legacy of decades of diet, alcohol consumption and jobs in defunct sectors such as mining that carried particular health risks, it is still too early to assess the impact of devolved government in tackling deep-seated health problems.</p>
<p>In economic terms, far from being a disaster, Scotland has performed reasonably well since it was handed greater powers. Devolution, we would argue, is only a “disaster” from the perspective of those such as the prime minister, who see the success of a SNP government in Holyrood (having been in power since 2007) as a threat to Scotland remaining in the UK.</p>
<p>If the economic performance of Scotland relative to the English regions at least is anything to go by, then the UK needs more devolution and not less.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am a member of the SNP, however I am not actively involved in its politics.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hearne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It might not have been good for Johnson, but things seem to be working out well for Scottish workers.Alex de Ruyter, Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Brexit Studies, Birmingham City UniversityDavid Hearne, Researcher at the Centre for Brexit Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1291212019-12-19T13:50:57Z2019-12-19T13:50:57ZScottish referendum: the law may not be on SNP’s side, but Boris Johnson’s refusal makes for increasingly unstable union<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307899/original/file-20191219-11951-9nodrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>It’s happening again. As the dust settled on the general election, Scotland’s first minister Nicola Sturgeon announced that Boris Johnson has “<a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/sturgeon-says-johnson-has-no-right-to-block-indyref2">no right</a>” to prevent another Scottish independence referendum. Now the Scottish government has published a 40-page document, <a href="https://www.gov.scot/news/independence-referendum-transfer-of-power-demanded/">Scotland’s Right to Choose</a>, which sets out the “democratic case” for indyref2.</p>
<p>Speaking in the Scottish parliament, Sturgeon declared the election to be a “<a href="https://www.snp.org/nicola-sturgeons-statement-to-the-scottish-parliament/">watershed</a>” that fundamentally altered the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK. </p>
<p>This echoed her speech of March 2017 when she wanted to hold an independence referendum in the wake of the UK’s vote to leave the EU. This request was rejected by Theresa May and led to a fall in support for the SNP in the shock election of that year. Most of that support was recovered in December’s election and the campaigning drums for indyref2 have begun again. What has still not been resolved though are the legal issues surrounding another vote on independence.</p>
<p>In 2012, the <a href="http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence">Edinburgh Agreement</a> was signed by the UK and Scottish governments, following negotiations that determined the legal basis of the first referendum. What is known as a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/465294/Devolution_Guidance_Note_14_orders_made_under_section_30_2_of_the_scotland_act_alterations_to_legislative_competence.pdf">section 30</a> order was granted by the UK government which temporarily gave the Scottish parliament the power to pass a law allowing an independence referendum to be held. But the crucial word here is “temporarily”.</p>
<p>The 2012 order gave the Scottish parliament the right to pass the 2013 <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2013/14/contents">Scottish Independence Referendum Act</a>, then that right was quickly transferred back to London after the 2014 vote.</p>
<p>When the demand was resurrected in 2017, the terrain was very different compared with five years before. In 2012, the UK coalition government played gentler mood music and recognised the authority of the SNP administration and its electoral mandate to hold a referendum.</p>
<p>Yet May’s government was quick to dismiss the demand. It <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scottish-referendum-second-independence-brexit-theresa-may-downing-street-a7627066.html">stated</a> baldly that “a majority of people in Scotland do not want a second independence referendum”. If anything, Johnson’s response, bolstered by a huge parliamentary majority, is even more recalcitrant.</p>
<p>A matter of days after his triumph he was dismissive of the demand. The Conservatives, he said, represent “a majority of people in Scotland who do not want to return to division and <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-second-independence-referendum-scotland-nicola-sturgeon-a4313401.html">uncertainty</a>”. So can the law provide any help to resolve this?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307900/original/file-20191219-11914-btmgxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nicola Sturgeon is pushing hard for Indyref2 in 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/edinburghuk-april-28-2019-nicola-sturgeon-1383265799">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Where do powers lie?</h2>
<p>The root legal problem stems from <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-brexit-could-break-devolution-74106">devolution</a>. The Scottish parliament is not completely sovereign. <a href="https://www.parliament.scot/visitandlearn/Education/18642.aspx">Reserved powers</a> – those that remain with the UK government in Westminster – include defence, foreign affairs and immigration. The list of reserved areas can be changed and have been in the past, with more powers on tax and welfare being transferred to the Scottish parliament. However, reserved areas continue to include constitutional issues – including matters relating to “<a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/schedule/5">the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England</a>”.</p>
<p>Scottish politicians can debate these matters in Edinburgh – for instance, the Scottish parliament made its opposition <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/07/scottish-parliament-backs-symbolic-motion-rejecting-article-50">to Brexit</a> known – but the parliament cannot pass legislation on them.</p>
<p>Before the Edinburgh Agreement of 2012 there was a debate on whether a referendum could be held without permission from Westminster. This remained theoretical, as negotiations were concluded between the UK and Scottish governments and a legal agreement was struck for Scotland to hold a referendum on independence. Given a similar agreement does not seem imminent this debate could be resurrected, but Sturgeon is adamant that she only wants an independence referendum “that is beyond legal challenge”.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/section/30">Scotland Act 1998</a> there is no legal requirement for the UK government to hand the Scottish parliament temporary powers under section 30 to allow a vote on the constitution and the future of the union. Withholding such powers is a political decision – as both May and Johnson have shown.</p>
<p>Yet the very recent memory of the UK government’s humiliating defeat in the Supreme Court over their <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf">prorogation</a> of Westminster in September 2019 has spurred many to consider that a similar legal action could be launched to force Johnson to concede a second referendum. Such hope is likely to be fruitless.</p>
<p>This is because the lack of a positive legal obligation and the refusal of the UK government to concede anything means that any court action would be seeking to review the absence of a decision rather than a proactive move like the suspension of Westminster. This is much more difficult.</p>
<p>Indeed, the Scottish government has been much more circumspect on the potential for legal action. Sturgeon has chosen to use the language of the “democratic case” for transferring powers rather than a legal one. Scotland is being “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-cant-imprison-scotland-says-sturgeon-after-gove-rules-out-independence-vote-ztdz0ml22">imprisoned in the UK</a> against its will” – sets the tone. But again these are political pressures.</p>
<p>Even the newly <a href="https://www.gov.scot/news/independence-referendum-transfer-of-power-demanded/">published document</a> by the Scottish government
makes no mention of proactive legal action but rather makes a series of political demands for legal reform.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>If there is no section 30 order or negotiated agreement the Scottish parliament could still debate a second independence referendum bill. Normally, if the bill is outside the powers of the parliament and deals with a reserved matter, the presiding officer who chairs the Scottish parliament can give a view that the law should not be discussed.</p>
<p>Last year he did this with the Scottish government’s proposed Continuity Bill which dealt with the potential aftermath <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-43227809">of Brexit</a>. However, it was still debated and voted on as the Scottish government and the Lord Advocate took a different legal position.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307907/original/file-20191219-11946-rb5b94.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boris Johnson has refused point blank to consider a second independence referendum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-24th-july-2019-boris-1460208074">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So a specific second independence referendum could theoretically be debated without the presiding officer’s approval and it could even be passed by the parliament. But it could then be referred to the Supreme Court by the UK government to prevent it becoming law as it is outwith the Scottish government’s powers. This was done in the case of the Continuity Bill, which was <a href="https://www.holyrood.com/news/view,eu-continuity-bill-was-within-competence-of-scottish-parliament-when-it-was_9642.htm">not approved by the court</a>.</p>
<p>Even if this did not happen, any act could face legal challenges in court after it is passed. The legal challenge does not need to be brought by the UK government; any Scottish citizen has the right to bring a legal action. </p>
<p>So a referendum without a section 30 order is full of potential legal pitfalls, and there is no clear route to use the law to force the UK government to give such an order.</p>
<p>Curiously though, there is a <a href="https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/111844.aspx">Referendums Bill</a> being debated by the Scottish parliament which is being voted on just before Christmas. This makes no mention of independence or any substantive topic but instead deals with the mechanics of how any referendum could be organised by the Scottish government.</p>
<p>This is a bit of a sideshow to the main attraction, but even in the discussions about this procedural law there was a concession that the question and substance of any future independence referendum would have to go through the legal process of the Scottish parliament <a href="https://www.commonspace.scot/articles/14934/referendum-bill-msps-reject-50-turnout-amendment-branded-ghost-1979">again</a>.</p>
<p>This likelihood though is purely theoretical until the fundamental division between the UK and Scottish governments is resolved. It does not seem possible that the law can resolve the issue but equally, a point-blank UK refusal to consider any change seems to promise a very unstable future for the union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick McKerrell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prime minister may be assured that this issue will not be going away any time soon as Nicola Sturgeon makes a democratic case for transferring powers rather than a legal one.Nick McKerrell, Senior Lecturer in Law, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288812019-12-13T14:45:09Z2019-12-13T14:45:09ZSNP landslide: Boris Johnson needs smarter response than refusing Scotland an independence vote<p>The UK general election has been an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50766014">emphatic success</a> for the Scottish National Party, which won 48 of the 59 seats in Scotland – 13 more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40246330">two years ago</a>. The scale of its victory was not far off its best ever UK election result in 2015, when it won 56 seats. The party now controls four-fifths of the Scottish seats – a much higher proportion than Boris Johnson’s Conservatives won across the UK. </p>
<p>The SNP’s 45% share of votes at this election is not as high as the 50% it garnered in 2015 in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">independence referendum</a>, but it takes it eight points higher <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">than in 2017</a>. It <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50728970">also now</a> has 11 seats with a share of the vote over 50%, or 20 when you add on the vote shares of the pro-independence Greens. </p>
<p>An SNP surge had been <a href="https://www.electoralcalculus.co.uk/polls_scot.html">predicted beforehand</a>, even if it outperformed on the night. And it creates a major headache for the UK prime minister. It is reminiscent of 1987, when Margaret Thatcher won big across the UK but lost more than half the Conservative seats in Scotland – the “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1988.tb02406.x">doomsday scenario</a>” as it came to be known. That year the Conservative number of seats fell from 21 to 10 in Scotland; this time it’s down from 13 to six. Once again, we can expect much from the SNP about how the Conservatives have no mandate north of the border. </p>
<h2>Unionist misery</h2>
<p>For the Conservatives this election is bittersweet in Scotland. The party’s focus on stopping a second independence referendum and getting Brexit done can hardly be claimed to have been a success: its vote share is down from 29% to 25%. </p>
<p>For Labour the election was dreadful at UK level, but absolutely disastrous in Scotland. The party retained only one of its seven Scottish seats, and its share of the vote is well down in seats it had not held. From being the most dominant party in Scotland for decades until 2015, the Labour vote has effectively collapsed in much of its former heartlands. </p>
<p>Where the party arguably suffered at UK level for having such an ambiguous position on Brexit, in Scotland it also blew hot and cold on an independence referendum. It never sounded as stridently pro-unionist as the Conservatives, but nor was it able to attract back pro-independence voters who abandoned the party in 2015 for the SNP. Until Labour sets itself a more coherent position on these issues, it looks set to remain a marginal diminished force, a pale shadow of its former self. Recriminations will begin and the role of Scottish leader Richard Leonard may be called into question. </p>
<p>The Liberal Democrats had a terrible election. Jo Swinson started off predicting she would be prime minister, but ended up losing her own seat in East Dunbartonshire. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/m-sDE4KrSt8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>The Lib Dems did offset this by winning one extra seat in Scotland – North East Fife. But the party, like all the unionist parties in Scotland, still has to come up with a way to challenge the dominance of the SNP. Certainly if there was unionist tactical voting to stop the nationalists, it did not materially impact upon the overall result.</p>
<h2>The untenable stand-off</h2>
<p>The SNP can legitimately claim that this result reinforces the mandate it already has for an independence referendum from the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/scotland/results">2016 Scottish parliamentary election</a>, in which together with the Greens they took more than half the seats at Holyrood. The party made no bones about its intentions during the campaign, putting a second independence referendum front and centre. </p>
<p>Nicola Sturgeon’s strategy on independence has no doubt energised SNP support and increased the turnout of their voters. It appears to have essentially made the difference in the campaign in Scotland compared to 2017. Now comes the battle over a second referendum. As the first minister <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/nicola-sturgeon-to-demand-powers-for-scottish-independence-referendum">said</a> as the result in Scotland became clear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t pretend that every single person who voted SNP yesterday will necessarily support independence, but there has been a strong endorsement in this election of Scotland having a choice over our future; of not having to put up with a Conservative government we didn’t vote for and not having to accept life as a nation outside the EU. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Conservatives, in turn, will be hoping to focus on the share of the vote. Yet not only is the SNP share higher than expected, the party <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">has never won</a> more than 85% of the pro-independence vote at previous Westminster elections – as the psephologist John Curtice discusses in <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-story-of-the-scottish-parliament.html">this book</a>, for instance. Intriguingly, most of the remaining pro-independence supporters vote for unionist parties. </p>
<p>Assuming that has happened again, this should worry unionists. It would also reflect what <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">opinion polls</a> have been saying in recent weeks, which is that support for and against independence is now virtually neck and neck. More broadly, it would chime with <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5#bar">previous research</a> that has documented the steady rise of Scottish people’s sense of Scottishness in recent years. </p>
<p><strong>Scottish independence polling</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">What Scotland Thinks</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The scale of the Labour defeat suggests that another decade of Conservative government beckons. But realistically, the staunch unionist position that the Conservatives committed to in Scotland is producing diminishing returns, and looks unsustainable in the long term. </p>
<p>If the new Conservative government at Westminster is not going to allow a second referendum on independence, it is now going to need to develop another constitutional position on Scotland – such as a new devolution settlement. Otherwise, the survival of the union looks extremely precarious. </p>
<p>The more that London keeps saying no to a referendum without offering anything in return, the more it potentially strengthens Scottish nationalists by allowing them to accuse the prime minister of being undemocratic – ignoring yet another mandate on top of the 2016 Remain vote and the pro-independence majority in Holyrood. It also forces Scottish unionists to have to choose between the status quo and independence, which risks driving more into the independence camp. For these reasons, the ball is now firmly in Boris Johnson’s court. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Independence support in Scotland is now at critical levels. The ball is in the UK prime minister’s court.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1278832019-11-27T16:14:13Z2019-11-27T16:14:13ZWhy Nicola Sturgeon is pushing so hard for indyref2 now<p>Five years on from the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">independence referendum</a>, the constitutional question around Scotland is once again a major talking point in the UK election. This is mainly due to the Scottish National Party (SNP), which is standing with the explicit intention of pushing for a second independence referendum to be held next year. </p>
<p>In the words of Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, in the party’s <a href="https://www.snp.org/general-election-2019/">2019 manifesto</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At this election there is a choice for Scotland. A chaotic, Brexit-obsessed Westminster could decide our future for us. Or we can demand our right as a country to decide our own future. It’s time to put Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One question begging to be asked is why the SNP is putting demands for an indyref2 at the centre of its campaign this time around. When the party lost 21 out of 56 seats in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40246330">2017 UK election</a>, it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40216748">partly blamed</a> on its support for independence: the SNP’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32635871">great 2015 result</a> was achieved by bringing the nation together, accepting that independence was probably off the table for a generation after it lost the 2014 referendum. </p>
<p>But following the UK’s vote to Brexit in the EU referendum of 2016, the SNP said there had been a material change of circumstances that would justify a new independence poll. When it came to the 2017 election, the proportion of SNP voters who were against independence <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-social-attitudes-attitudes-government-economy-public-services-2017/pages/7/">fell to</a> 17%, compared to 25% in 2015 – meaning many anti-indyref voters had abandoned the party. So why, therefore, push so hard for another indyref now? </p>
<h2>Indy charts</h2>
<p>The first minister’s decision to call for an independence referendum next year comes at a time when support for independence is <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/topics/the-scottish-independence-referendum">up in the polls</a> and large marches and rallies are being organised in Scotland by the pro-independence group <a href="https://www.facebook.com/AllUnderOneBanner/">All Under One Banner</a>. </p>
<p>Independence may have damaged the SNP in 2017 but it has actually been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/snps-manifesto-for-scotland-is-deliberately-cautious-and-rightly-so-78630">little more lukewarm</a> on the issue than this time around. There was nothing in the <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/thesnp/pages/9544/attachments/original/1496320559/Manifesto_06_01_17.pdf?1496320559">2017 manifesto</a> to say that a vote for the party was a vote for another referendum. It instead said that winning a majority of seats would contribute to a mandate for indyref2 “when the time is right”. </p>
<p>The SNP went on to win a majority of seats, but its vote share <a href="https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-social-attitudes-attitudes-government-economy-public-services-2017/pages/7/">plummeted</a> also among pro-independence voters: down to 70%, compared to 85% in 2015. The toned-down indyref policy might help explain, with some voters <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/17967175.nicola-sturgeon-blames-snp-election-loss-turnout/">apparently choosing</a> to stay at home. In the case of the minority of supporters that are <a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14950013.36-of-snp-and-labour-supporters-backed-brexit-finds-survey/">pro-Brexit</a>, it might have given them another reason not to vote SNP. The bold decision to push harder for independence now should keep the party relatively united this time around. </p>
<p>The reason why support for independence has risen is perhaps that a section of Remain voters have switched sides: the SNP’s Remain credentials help the party to distance its brand of civic and cosmopolitan nationalism from the anti-EU, anti-immigrant nationalism that we see in a number of countries. As a result, the pro-independence vote which was already largely pro-EU is now even more solidly in favour of Scotland staying in the EU. This could yet attract additional Labour voters who back independence and feel disillusioned with that party’s mixed messages around the EU. </p>
<p><strong>Indyref voting intentions 2017-19</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/303999/original/file-20191127-112489-due5kv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">What Scotland Thinks</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Labour won six seats in Scotland in 2017, several of them from the SNP by just handfuls of votes – including Glasgow North East, Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath as well as Rutherglen and Hamilton West. The SNP has a decent chance of winning seats like these and of taking share from Labour elsewhere either to win Tory marginals such as Stirling or to defend SNP marginals such as Perth and North Perthshire as well as North East Fife. </p>
<p>At the same time, the SNP has to be careful with competition for its pro-independence vote. The Scottish Greens are standing in many more seats than last time, up from four to 22 and, while they are unlikely to win any seats, in very tight races they could cost the SNP crucial victories. This is another reason for sounding strong on a second referendum on independence. </p>
<p>On the other side of the balance sheet, perhaps, are the Conservatives. The Conservative Party has been heavily criticising the prospect of a Labour minority government reliant on SNP support, perhaps in exchange for a second independence referendum. The Conservative Party leader Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kEB5pqWpJw">claimed</a> in his head-to-head ITV debate with Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn that the Union between Scotland and England was more important to him than Brexit. </p>
<p>The SNP lost 12 seats to the Conservatives in 2017. The hope will be that Brexit has become unpopular enough to push some independence-minded Leave voters back towards the SNP to reduce this haul. On the other hand, tactical voting by unionists could make it difficult to win back those seats – particularly in places such as the North East, where Brexit support is very strong. The latest polling <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/murdo-fraser-boris-johnson-may-not-be-helping-scottish-tories-but-nicola-sturgeon-is-1-5052416">favours</a> the latter scenario, possibly assisted by voters repelled by the SNP’s strong indyref message. </p>
<h2>The aftermath</h2>
<p>What does a victory on the morning after the election look like for the SNP? As always, there is the challenge of managing expectations. Certainly, an increase in seats is expected. Under first past the post, the SNP is so far ahead that not winning more seats would be a blow. Even if the Conservatives do relatively well and hold most of their Scottish seats, it would be viewed perhaps as a disappointment for the SNP. </p>
<p>On the other hand, a very good result for the party – beating the 35 seats won in 2017 – would put Westminster under pressure to decide whether to allow or deny a second independence referendum after the next Scottish parliamentary elections in 2021. That would be quite different, say, to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-we-explain-the-return-of-the-bloc-quebecois-125808">recent revival</a> of Bloc Quebecois in Canada, which has been based on championing Quebec values rather than any independence strategy. </p>
<p>In other words, this UK election is supposed to act as a springboard for the Scottish independence movement. Placing the referendum at the heart of the campaign certainly has its risks for the SNP. But there is certainly a decent case that it will give the party the liftoff towards a new relationship with both the EU and the rest of the UK. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300097/original/file-20191104-88382-xr3pj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerC">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At first glance it seems like a strange strategy to go big on another independence referendum when half of Scots would vote No.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270472019-11-14T15:31:27Z2019-11-14T15:31:27ZJeremy Corbyn’s apparent hardline on indyref2 may make Labour prospects in Scotland even worse<p>The issue of Scottish independence continues to tie the Labour party in knots. Jeremy Corbyn’s pronouncements during a visit to Glasgow are the latest example of Labour’s difficulties in maintaining its traditional role as the party of Scotland’s working classes and liberal intelligentsia – particularly since the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">2014 independence referendum</a>. </p>
<p>Asked about a second referendum, the Labour leader <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-50397033">initially said</a> he would not agree to one in the first term of a Labour government, “because I think we need to concentrate completely on investment across Scotland”. This appeared to bring him close to Conservative leader Boris Johnson’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/07/pm-gives-cast-iron-pledge-to-refuse-second-scottish-independence-vote">“cast-iron pledge”</a> against another Scottish referendum. </p>
<p>Shortly afterwards Corbyn’s aides were clarifying to journalists that this was not a shift from Labour’s previous apparent position, that the party would grant a referendum if the SNP won a majority in the 2021 Scottish election. Corbyn confirmed as much in Hamilton on the next stop of his two-day Scottish tour. </p>
<p>That the Labour leader rowed back on his initial statement speaks to the multi-faced approach that the shifting political dynamics of independence have forced the party to adopt. <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/18003442.shadow-cabinet-minister-says-labour-wont-block-indyref2/">A variety</a> of statements from senior Labour figures in recent weeks and months have ranged from saying they wouldn’t stand in the way of another indyref to expressing almost outright opposition. </p>
<h2>Labour and Scottish independence</h2>
<p>So why does independence cause such difficulties for the Labour party? For decades, Labour was Scotland’s dominant political force. A 1979 referendum vote in favour of creating a Scottish parliament <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/devolution/scotland/briefing/79referendums.shtml">was defeated</a> because there were not enough Yes supporters to clear the turnout threshold. </p>
<p>When a “democratic deficit” emerged during the Thatcher era – in which Scotland broadly voted Labour while England voted Conservative – this gave way to a solid commitment from Labour to create a set of Scottish political institutions within the confines of the UK state. Labour’s motives were twofold: a high-minded democratic justification intermingled with a desire to wrongfoot and decisively defeat Scottish nationalism, which had been <a href="https://www.gerryhassan.com/long-journalistic-essays/the-forward-march-of-scottish-nationalism-and-the-end-of-britain-as-we-know-it/">gaining ground</a> in the 1960s and 1970s. </p>
<p>The idea was that devolution would show Scots that the choice between self-determination and remaining a full member of the UK’s “family of nations” was a false one. Things didn’t exactly pan out that way, however. In the years after the Scottish parliament was finally established by Tony Blair in 1999, the SNP grew in strength and popularity. It took power as a minority government in 2007 and has run Scotland ever since. </p>
<h2>Awkward bedfellows</h2>
<p>The independence referendum was called following the unexpected election of a majority SNP Scottish government in 2011 – the electoral system of proportional representation in Scotland <a href="http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/145353/13/145353.pdf">had been designed</a> by Labour to make it very difficult for this to happen. </p>
<p>The independence campaign placed Labour in the unfamiliar position of arguing against more powers for Scotland. It did so out of conviction, having been a consistent supporter of state centralism and the Westminster system. In the eyes of Scottish voters, the cross-party Better Together campaign put the party in lock-step with UK coalition government leaders David Cameron and Nick Clegg, neither of whom were popular north of the border. </p>
<p>Though Better Together won the referendum with a 55% vote, Labour emerged with little credit, <a href="http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/10/labour-worried/">alienating</a> a considerable amount of its <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/03/strange-death-labour-scotland">traditional voters</a> who had voted Yes. The Conservatives have gained in popularity among No voters, representing a purer expression of British nationhood and traditional unionism. Meanwhile, the SNP have remained the predominant voice of Yes voters. Labour’s more equivocal position – seldom opposed to more powers for the Scottish government, but resolutely opposed to independence – has seen them squeezed from both sides. </p>
<p>It is in this context that Corbyn’s comments must be seen. Corbyn is not just saying no to independence, he is saying no to Scottish self-determination. Rowing back two hours later does not change the fact that he has made it easier for himself and his party to be pigeon-holed as acting as one with the Conservative government on this issue. </p>
<p>This is a mistake. Labour may well be close to finished in Scotland already: it commands only seven of the 59 seats, having had 41 as recently as 2010, and polls were <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10309538/corbyn-worst-election-result-scotland-wales-century/">already pointing</a> to new lows this time around. </p>
<p>Corbyn’s apparently harder position may hasten that demise. It doesn’t make it easier for the party that a substantial minority of its voters <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/poll-four-in-10-labour-members-support-scottish-independence-1-4969884">are in favour</a> of independence. Corbyn’s best way forward was to offer to respect the will of the Scottish people in granting a referendum should its parliament vote for holding one; to accept that Scotland’s strong desire to remain in the EU justifies revisiting the question. Alienating the party’s more doggedly unionist Scottish leadership is a price that Corbyn should have been willing to pay. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerB">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Kippin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With Labour in danger of coming fourth in Scotland, they could have done without fresh independence trouble.Sean Kippin, Lecturer in Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1193192019-06-26T13:09:06Z2019-06-26T13:09:06ZFive constitutional questions the new British prime minister must urgently answer<p>The next prime minister of the UK is set to inherit a range of complex legal and political issues from the outgoing Theresa May. With Brexit on the horizon, here are the five key constitutional questions the next prime minister must consider, in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of the UK. </p>
<p><strong>1. Northern Ireland: what to do about the backstop?</strong></p>
<p>The most immediate constitutional issue facing the next prime minister relates to the Brexit impasse in Northern Ireland. With the EU remaining <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/06/11/no-deal-brexit-looms-jean-claude-juncker-vows-will-no-renegotiatons/">consistent</a> in its position to not renegotiate the backstop, the future prime minister faces tough decisions in finding a workable solution to the Northern Irish question. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://constitution-unit.com/2019/05/31/the-next-pms-territorial-challenges/">dilemma</a> pits the delivery of Brexit against the integrity of the union.</p>
<p>Should the former take priority in the form of a hard Brexit, support will likely rise for a poll on Irish reunification. Conversely, placing precedence on the territorial integrity of the UK, a softer Brexit scenario – or revocation of Article 50 – would safeguard Northern Ireland’s place in the UK but cross fundamental red lines in the Conservative Party’s Brexit policy. </p>
<p><strong>2. Scotland: should there be another independence referendum?</strong> </p>
<p>The Scottish first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, recently committed to holding a second independence referendum <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/may/29/scotland-publishes-second-independence-referendum-bill">before 2021</a>, which leaves the future prime minister with two options. </p>
<p>He may transfer to Scotland the powers to hold a second referendum. With <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">opinion polls</a> showing only a modest increase in support for independence since 2014, and the absence of a clear pro-independence majority, this may prove a calculated risk. However, relying on luck in referendums has only a limited chance of success – as David Cameron <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-riding-the-tiger-of-populism-the-conservatives-may-have-destroyed-the-uk-61614">experienced</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>The second option is for the UK prime minister to withhold permission for a second referendum – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/16/theresa-may-rejects-nicola-sturgeons-scottish-referendum-demand">as Theresa May did in March 2017</a>. While legally entitled to do so, the success of this strategy likely depends on the prime minister offering compromises on Brexit (since Scotland voted to remain in the EU) or greater self-government. If the prime minister chooses to simply rely on the exercise of legal authority to maintain the territorial integrity of the UK, it could damage trust – and stability in Scotland. </p>
<p><strong>3. Wales: why is support for independence rising?</strong></p>
<p>In the period since the Brexit referendum, a variety of grassroots movements have emerged in Wales, calling for independence from the UK - culminating in the first ever <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/may/11/thousands-march-in-cardiff-calling-for-welsh-independence">march for independence</a> in Cardiff in May 2019. A recent YouGov poll suggests a significant increase in the percentage of people in Wales identifying as <a href="https://nation.cymru/opinion/indycurious-and-curiouser-new-poll-shows-support-for-welsh-independence-on-the-rise/">“indycurious”</a> – open to consider the option of Welsh independence. </p>
<p>While further investigation is needed to clearly identify the long-term significance of the rise of indycurious Wales, its initial results should not be ignored by May’s successor. Wales has traditionally been the most reluctant of the three non-English parts of the UK to pursue a distinct path away from the UK centre. Therefore, the emergence of data showing that this is changing – and among <a href="https://nation.cymru/opinion/indycurious-and-curiouser-new-poll-shows-support-for-welsh-independence-on-the-rise/">Labour voters in particular</a> – serves as a litmus test on the ascendance of regional dissatisfaction towards Westminster. </p>
<p><strong>4. England: how to provide a political voice?</strong></p>
<p>In 2000, Rick Rawlings, professor of public law at UCL, observed that England had become “the spectre at the feast” in the UK devolution process. Over the last two decades, England has failed to receive a level of devolution comparable to the rest of the UK. While processes have been introduced to provide English MPs with a voice on <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/public/english-votes-for-english-laws/">England only matters</a>, and certain English local authority areas have received additional powers as combined authorities, England remains the most centralised of the UK’s four component nations. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281399/original/file-20190626-76697-ydmq5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=632&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Neglect England at your peril.</span>
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<p>Yet, despite its centralised character, recent <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1369148117730542?journalCode=bpia">research suggests</a> that distinct circumstances emerging in England are now coming to play an important role in the UK’s constitutional and political landscape. Most notably, <a href="https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/news/Taking%20England%20Seriously_The%20New%20English%20Politics.pdf">public attitudes</a> in England show higher levels of euroscepticism, compared to the rest of the UK, and anxiety over England being left behind by the UK devolution process. To successfully navigate these issues, the future prime minister needs to be prepared to address questions on England which may require difficult UK-wide compromises. </p>
<p><strong>5. How do you reunite a disunited kingdom?</strong></p>
<p>This issue facing the next prime minister relates to the UK-wide territorial constitution.</p>
<p>With devolution now in its 20th year, much has changed in the UK’s internal architecture. This has caused an ideological gulf to open up between the UK and devolved governments in their interpretation of the territorial constitution. On the one hand, the UK government maintains the vision of the UK as a “union of solidarity”. On the other, the devolved administrations - particularly Scotland and Wales - see the UK as a multi-national state, whereby each of the four component nations has an equal say on its future development.</p>
<p>The realities of these divisions have been highlighted, for example, in the disputes over the extent to which the UK government had to consult the devolved administrations on the decision to <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-supreme-court-judgment-in-miller-and-its-implications-for-the-devolved-nations/">trigger Article 50</a> to begin Brexit negotiations. Here, the legal superiority of the UK parliament triumphed to the detriment of the security and trust of the devolved administrations. </p>
<p>If the next prime minister is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the UK, and return it to a period of constitutional stability, they must work to find a compromised position in the interpretation of the UK’s evolving constitutional dynamics. </p>
<p>The constitutional challenges facing the next prime minister are significant. Brexit has both highlighted pre-existing fault-lines in the territorial constitution, and exacerbated many of the issues which have emerged over the last two decades of devolution. The task for the next prime minister is to find solutions to these issues where their predecessors have failed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119319/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gareth Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scotland is eyeing another independence referendum and now Wales wants in on the act. England feels left behind and Northern Ireland is at the centre of the Brexit impasse. Things aren’t fine.Gareth Evans, Lecturer in Law, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179982019-06-03T08:26:43Z2019-06-03T08:26:43ZSNP surge in European elections has major implications for a second independence referendum<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276991/original/file-20190529-192361-1t9wk9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Jane Barlow</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fallout from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/european-elections-6507">European elections</a> in Scotland is of interest not just to voters north of the border but also for its potential wider ramifications.</p>
<p>Unlike most of the rest of the UK, where the upstart Brexit Party topped the poll, in Scotland the SNP finished first yet again. The party took more than <a href="https://www.snp.org/snp-victory-in-european-elections/">38% of the vote</a>, picking up half of Scotland’s six seats in the European Parliament.</p>
<p>This is quite a remarkable success for a party that has been in power in Scotland since 2007 and has finished top in every election since 2011.</p>
<h2>The surge</h2>
<p>The party had a clear and unambiguous message going into this election. It wants to stop Brexit. This allowed it to rally support from pro-Remain voters.</p>
<p>However, the SNP also had an anti-Westminster message: Westminster is ignoring the wishes of Scots and the best way to respond is to vote SNP.</p>
<p>All this matters because overshadowing everything in Scottish politics is the constitutional divide between unionists and nationalists and whether Scotland should become independent as the parties position themselves for a possible second independence referendum.</p>
<p>For the SNP, Scotland voting differently from the rest of the UK feeds into the narrative that Scotland is just politically different and should make its own decisions.</p>
<p>The SNP vote is also mainly pro-EU, but some of its voters who want to leave the EU may also want to leave the UK even more. Such voters will support the SNP anyway, viewing it as the best vehicle to deliver independence.</p>
<p>On the unionist side, the result looks initially quite poor for the Conservatives. Nevertheless, their percentage share of the vote was still higher than the party received in England and Wales.</p>
<p>The Conservative anti-independence message to an extent prevented the party from having an even worse election. They are likely to remain the main unionist party, particular as their leader Ruth Davidson has a very high profile, rivalling only the SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon, and is also relatively popular too.</p>
<p>Davidson, though, will want to distance herself somewhat from the UK Conservative Party leadership, given its <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-resigns-how-the-leadership-race-could-play-out-from-here-117762">current turmoil</a>. Before the elections, Boris Johnson, now the main contender to replace Theresa May, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ruth-davidson-bars-boris-johnson-from-party-conference-after-dismal-poll-results-ss9bhz80k">was blocked from attending</a> the Scottish Conservative and Unionist conference.</p>
<h2>Labour losses</h2>
<p>The big losers in Scotland were the other unionist party – Labour. The party lost both of its MEPs and a huge number of voters. It once took one in four votes in European elections but was reduced, this time around, to less than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-48424055">10% of the vote</a>. </p>
<p>Clearly the 2014 and 2016 referendums have taken their toll on the party but this is a particularly poor result for Richard Leonard, the Scottish Labour leader and an ally of Jeremy Corbyn. Leonard has made no real impact despite repositioning the party to the left.</p>
<p>If Leonard has to stand down as leader it is unlikely he will be replaced by a candidate on the left. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/labour-euro-campaigns-chief-neil-findlay-to-quit-holyrood-amid-internal-battles-1-4936243">Neil Findlay</a>, the other key Corbyn ally in Scotland, has already announced he will be standing down at the next election to pursue other interests.</p>
<p>As the Scottish party leader sits on Labour’s ruling national executive this could be problematic for Corbyn. And while Corbyn is under pressure to support a second EU referendum, his Scottish party is under even greater scrutiny. Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in 2016 and the remain parties won more than 60% again in the European elections. The pressure on Scottish Labour is likely to intensify.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Brexit Party did finish a distant second with around 14% in Scotland but this does not place them to do well in the next Holyrood election. UKIP won a seat at the 2014 EU elections in Scotland and gained less than 2% two years later at the Holyrood elections.</p>
<p>The Brexit Party, if it fights other elections in Scotland, is likely to attract mainly unionist voters, fragmenting the vote even further. This would only help the SNP. A Liberal Democrat recovery in Scotland could do likewise.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The SNP is already seeking to capitalise on the European election result, immediately introducing legislation in the Scottish parliament to allow for a possible referendum on independence to be held.</p>
<p>The Conservative Party candidates for prime minister all agree so far that they will not be another referendum on Scottish independence. However, Scottish Conservatives will be hoping that they temper and moderate their language somewhat.</p>
<p>Conservative home secretary Sajid David’s comment that Scotland will not be <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/home-secretary-sajid-javid-mocked-on-twitter-for-scottish-independence-allow-comment-1-4937765">“allowed”</a> to hold another referendum is likely to grate even with unionists, who would rather the line that “Scots don’t want one” was used instead.</p>
<p>Unionists are aware that the SNP will seek to portray the constitutional issue as Scotland versus Westminster and will hope to avoid this. For the SNP it is a waiting game. The ideal situation may be perhaps a no-deal Brexit imposed by Westminster with Johnston as the new prime minister. This might just strain the 300-year-old union to breaking point.</p>
<p>The EU elections are over but both the SNP and Conservatives know that the real battle for Scotland in the run up to the 2021 Scottish elections and the push for indyref2.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ruling party took three of six seats in the European Parliament.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980332018-06-08T15:01:49Z2018-06-08T15:01:49ZSNP deputy leader: Keith Brown’s unconvincing win is bad omen for Nicola Sturgeon<p>White smoke from the Scottish Nationalists: Keith Brown <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44397652">has been</a> elected the party’s deputy leader at the start of this year’s <a href="https://www.snp.org/conference">conference</a> in Aberdeen. His 55.2% polling defeated nearest opponent Julie Hepburn’s 44.8% by a fairly modest margin. </p>
<p>Brown, the cabinet secretary for economy, jobs and fair work, was the only MSP standing after most major candidates decided not to enter the race. A former royal marine who fought in the Falklands campaign in 1982, he was considered the candidate of the party establishment. A rather dull but safe pair of hands, he had <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/indyref2-ahead-vows-keith-brown-after-elected-snp-depute-leader-1-4751545">this to say</a> about a second independence referendum in his victory speech:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I know that decision is in the safest of hands and I am absolutely confident that the person you have just selected me to deputise for – Nicola Sturgeon – will steer us towards that decision.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hepburn is a longstanding party insider who is currently research manager for MP Stuart McDonald. She campaigned for badly needed internal reforms, arguing that the party has failed to capitalise on the large growth in <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/snp-membership-jumps-by-89-460-to-over-115-000-1-4033361">membership</a> in the months after losing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/alex-salmond-resigns-following-defeat-in-scottish-independence-referendum-31816">first referendum</a> in 2014. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222389/original/file-20180608-191943-8q90fv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Julie Hepburn.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">STV</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>She was no protest candidate, but her final tally may have benefited from the votes of Chris McEleny, the left-leaning SNP councillor who was eliminated in the first round. McEleny had demanded a referendum be held within 18 months, and it would have been extremely uncomfortable for Sturgeon had he won. </p>
<p>In electing Brown the membership has backed the leadership’s wait-and-see position, but it’s hardly a ringing endorsement. It is the strongest signal yet of disquiet within the party over its direction on independence. </p>
<h2>Separatist schism</h2>
<p>The SNP is divided over an unenviable choice. Announce the date of a second referendum, knowing a defeat would be a near fatal blow to the main aim of the party – or wait and potentially lose the chance for years to come in the likely event that the Scottish parliament’s pro-independence majority is overturned in the 2021 election. </p>
<p>Sturgeon has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nicola-sturgeon-says-she-wait-for-brexit-deal-to-decide-on-indyref2-a8159046.html">indicated that</a> she will decide in the autumn once the Brexit deal becomes clearer. She and her advisers are well aware that the fortunes of independence are tied to those of a party which has held power in Edinburgh since 2007. </p>
<p>Brexit continues to be the joker in the pack on attitudes to Scottish independence, however. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102">Being outvoted</a> by the English and Welsh on remaining in the EU has <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">not made</a> much difference to Scotland’s desire for divorce from the UK. Yet the National Centre for Social Research <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/15817338.Majority_back_economy_of_independent_Scotland/">found earlier this year</a> that more Scots believed leaving the UK would make Scotland better off than the opposite. Don’t rule out the possibility that fears around the economic impact of a hard Brexit are colouring this view. </p>
<p>Inextricably linked to the timing of the referendum is the issue of currency, an Achilles heel for the Yes movement last time around. Sturgeon duly set up a Sustainable Growth Commission to sketch out a new way forward. Chaired by former MSP and economist Andrew Wilson, it published a report last month <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-prospect-of-4-100-per-voter-deliver-scottish-independence-heres-what-the-indyref-evidence-tells-us-97264">arguing that</a> Scotland should retain the pound for at least a decade and introduce tight controls on deficits and spending. </p>
<p>This was intended to be the start of a more reasoned case for independence that dealt with both the fears of 2014 No voters about the currency and concerns from business, particularly the financial sector. Instead, it has been problematic to say the least. </p>
<p>Predictably, Scottish Labour under the more left-wing leadership of Richard Leonard see an opportunity to revive the old jibe of the SNP being “tartan Tories”, <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/uk-regions/scotland/news/95479/scottish-labour-blasts-%E2%80%98cuts-commission%E2%80%99-pro-union-parties">attacking</a> the report as a “cuts commission”. The first minister <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/16259510.Sturgeon_defends_Growth_Commission_against_left-wing_critics/">insisted that</a> the report is anti-austerity – but days later the London-based Institute for Fiscal Studies undermined her <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/ifs-snp-growth-commission-report-is-continuation-of-austerity-1-4750637">by claiming</a> it would in fact continue the austerity agenda. </p>
<p>Significantly, the SNP is not going to formally debate the report at conference – instead Keith Brown will now chair a series of national assemblies within the party that will debate it in the weeks and months ahead. Yet the report is a sure sign that after 11 years in power, the leadership has begun to lose its touch – compounding <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicola-sturgeons-falling-popularity-could-be-disastrous-for-the-scottish-independence-cause-78957">the feeling</a> around the relatively poor results at last year’s UK election. </p>
<h2>Challenge Nicola</h2>
<p>Ahead of Brown’s lukewarm victory, pressure had already been growing on the party from grassroots organisations. A series of pro-independence rallies have been organised independently of the party by <a href="https://allunderonebanner.com/home">All Under One Banner</a>. One, <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/around-40-000-take-part-in-pro-independence-march-in-glasgow-1-4735359">in Glasgow</a> last month, attracted tens of thousands of supporters – the biggest public demonstration since the 2003 Iraq war. It clearly demonstrates that Yes supporters can still be mobilised. </p>
<p>The SNP is caught between supporters pushing for another referendum, especially those who are pro-EU, and the large proportion of the electorate who don’t want one. Support for independence is still less than 50% in the polls, but it is hard to be sure what to conclude from this. A pessimist would say it’s a signal not to hold another referendum – an optimist might say it is quite favourable considering the SNP has made little effort to mobilise support. </p>
<p>What’s evident is that, on the constitutional question, Scotland remains as divided as it was in 2014. It will take more than the applause for Sturgeon and her new deputy at this year’s rather stage-managed conference to make any inroads into that. The SNP leadership is performing a delicate balancing act, and finding it increasingly difficult to keep anyone happy. Whether Sturgeon can find a way back onto the front foot is going to be the ultimate test of her leadership in the coming months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98033/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three stage-managed cheers for Keith Brown – the left is getting restless over independence.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/972642018-05-25T11:35:40Z2018-05-25T11:35:40ZWill the prospect of £4,100 per voter deliver Scottish independence? Here’s what the Indyref evidence tells us<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220454/original/file-20180525-51091-51gsum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=99%2C52%2C3395%2C2263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sustainable Growth Commission chairman Andrew Wilson presents his report to Nicola Sturgeon. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Gordon Terrace</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An SNP-commissioned report declares that independence could boost economic growth and make Scots <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/independence-would-see-scots-4-000-richer-claims-snp-report-1-4744027">£4,100 richer per year</a>. Unionist parties rubbish the claims. Economists emphasise the uncertainty around such forecasts but are ignored. The keyboard armies resume their online crossfire. In newsroom terms, the latest developments in the Scottish independence debate are all very “dog bites man”.</p>
<p>The SNP has high hopes that its <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/15673056.SNP_s_Growth_Commission_set_to_unveil_case_for_independence_in_early_2018_with_fresh_takes_on_currency__immigration_and_tax/">Growth Commission</a> report will bring fresh momentum to the campaign for another referendum on Scottish independence. But is there good reason to suppose that it will have much impact on the wider public – and, in turn, on the likely timing and outcome of “Indyref 2”?</p>
<p>Not really. </p>
<p>Some of the reasons for this are obvious. A large proportion of the Scottish electorate is immovable on the issue of independence. Some of the rest could be swayed – but not by a report from the SNP, either because they distrust the party in general or because of its obvious partiality on the issue of independence. And most of those who are open to an SNP message about the economic benefits of independence have presumably already been swayed, unless they somehow managed to miss the two-year campaign for Indyref 1. </p>
<h2>Voters crave certainty</h2>
<p>There are also two deeper reasons. Both have to do with the role the economy played in 2014 – and would play in a potential rerun. The first is that it may well have been uncertainty more than pessimism that cost Yes in the Independence referendum. Consider the graph below, which is based on data from the <a href="http://scottishelections.ac.uk/">Scottish Referendum Study</a> and the <a href="http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/about-the-bes-internet-panel-study/#.WwfM5WaQ3OQ">British Election Study</a> internet panel. The left-hand side shows that, while pessimists outnumbered optimists when it came to economic expectations in 2014, the gap was not huge – and barely different from the case of Brexit two years later. </p>
<p>Plainly it is possible to win a referendum from such a position. The big difference between the two cases is on the right-hand side and, specifically, the far larger proportion of voters who were “very unsure” about the impact of Scottish independence. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220453/original/file-20180525-51130-1nt7srd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pessimism or uncertainty?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scottish Referendum Study/British Election Study</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So what will make voters more sure? The SNP report’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44237957?">proposal</a> to keep the pound for at least ten years after independence will help. It’s hard to imagine any forecast of prosperity having much impact, though – especially if, as usually happens, it is swiftly followed by a conflicting forecast. While the partisan will accept or reject these predictions as per their existing views, each new forecast probably only deepens the uncertainty of the wavering voter. </p>
<p>All of this makes it more difficult to believe that the Yes surge in the final months of the 2014 campaign was due to persuading longstanding sceptics that the Scottish economy would thrive under independence. True, those who switched to Yes were more likely also to become <a href="http://www.research.aqmen.ac.uk/files/2017/07/PostGE2015Scotland_Referendum-Impact.pdf">more optimistic about the economics of independence</a>, but that optimism might easily be a byproduct of a switch made for other reasons. Once they have chosen an option, voters are then prone to see all its aspects in a more favourable light.</p>
<h2>Dividing the pie</h2>
<p>What else might have caused the switch to Yes, then? This brings us to the second deeper reason to question the impact of a report like this. The Growth Commission is all about the size of Scotland’s economic pie. Arguably, the independence surge had more to do with how that pie would be divided up. In a campaign that perceptibly reddened in its final weeks, the primary Yes goal often seemed to be persuading voters that an independent Scotland would be more equal and more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/aug/25/scottish-independence-debate-alex-salmond-alistair-darling">redistributive</a>.</p>
<p>There are various signs that this ideological appeal was influential – and more so than any boost to the general macroeconomic credibility of independence. One is that switchers to Yes came very disproportionately from parties on the left (mainly, of course, <a href="http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/when-attitudes-and-behaviour-collide-how-a-referendum-can-upset-the-party-system/#.WwdAt2aQ3OQ">Labour</a>) and were also disproportionately likely to identify as left-wing (in terms of their self-placement on an ideological scale). </p>
<p>Another is that, as the campaign moved into its final weeks, the relative importance of the national economy for voters’ choices declined while two other judgements became <a href="http://scottishelections.ac.uk/2016/09/06/scottish-referendum-study-preliminary-results/">more important</a>: whether voters thought that independence would narrow the gap between rich and poor, and whether they thought it would be good for their personal finances. </p>
<p>People did care, then, about how much pie they personally would get out of independence – they just knew that that was also about how it was shared out. No surprise that those in economically impoverished areas, perceiving a meagre share under current arrangements, were <a href="https://electionsetc.com/2014/09/19/what-the-scottish-independence-referendum-results-tell-us/">readier</a> to support independence. What use is growth if the proceeds go to other people?</p>
<p>Few voters will be persuaded by this report, then, or indeed by the wider debate which it reopens. But is that debate at least more fertile soil for one side or the other? At first sight, it looks more like unionist territory. While pessimists outnumber optimists, a discussion of economic consequences is one in which the pro-independence camp is vulnerable. Indeed, in general it helps the No side to be talking about independence and the Yes side to be talking about the union, since the average Scottish voter is far from convinced about either. </p>
<p>However, even if this is favourable ground for them, unionists need to tread carefully. No one studying the 2014 campaign in the round can conclude that Project Fear was a successful strategy. Voters may have their economic doubts about independence but, as we saw again with Brexit two years later, they react against politicians hammering home that negative message. “Yes we can” is liable to beat “No we can’t”. For this reason, many swing voters will like the sound of the SNP’s latest report, even if they aren’t planning how to spend their £4,100 just yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This piece draws on research from the Economic and Social Research Council-funded Scottish Referendum Study (RES-ES/I036818/1). The author gratefully acknowledges the Council's support. </span></em></p>The SNP says every Scottish voter will be financially better off if they vote to leave the UK. But is that what they need to hear to vote yes in another referendum?Rob Johns, Professor of Politics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874102017-11-14T14:29:42Z2017-11-14T14:29:42ZWill Alex Salmond’s RT show make him a Kremlin tool?<p>The decision of former Scottish first minister Alex Salmond to front a weekly political chat show on Russian international channel RT has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/10/alex-salmond-criticised-over-hosting-talk-show-for-russian-broadcaster">widely criticised</a> across the British political and media mainstream. Why would a prominent Western politician risk his reputation by colluding with what many believe to be an propaganda instrument of the Kremlin?</p>
<p>RT’s interest in Salmond is easy enough to fathom. The channel has been sympathetic to Scottish independence, of which Salmond remains a leading proponent. You might expect Putin to back anything that undermines the UK, of course. Hence Sputnik, another state-owned Russian news outlet, <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/russian-backed-sputnik-news-channel-lands-in-edinburgh-1-4199563">recently established</a> an Edinburgh office. </p>
<p>Arguably, RT is more focused on the UK after <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/rt-agrees-to-register-as-an-agent-of-the-russian-government/2017/11/09/bd62f9a2-c558-11e7-aae0-cb18a8c29c65_story.html">the US forced it</a> to register as a foreign agent. The Alex Salmond Show was unveiled soon after <a href="https://www.rt.com/shows/stan-collymore-show/">The Stan Collymore Show</a>, which is a means of extending reach ahead of Russia’s World Cup next year. RT also seems to have a following in Scotland, with pro-independence youth making up a significant proportion of its Twitter followers.</p>
<h2>Editorial power</h2>
<p>Salmond has been guaranteed full editorial independence, making the show with his own company and not in-house at RT. He <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/alex-salmond-show_uk_5a057b03e4b05673aa58b83f">points out</a> he has appeared on RT several times and was once very critical of Russia’s actions in Syria. RT often publicises the full independence it grants star presenters, as a point of difference with the likes of the BBC. <a href="https://www.rt.com/shows/larry-king-now/">Larry King’s show</a> is another example and is made by the host’s production company. </p>
<p>The channel formerly known as Russia Today has definitely evolved since its 2005 launch, partly in response to worsening relations between Russia and the West. Having launched to project a positive Russia to the world, it morphed into the channel of choice for those hostile to perceived US hegemony, then became a propaganda weapon for the Russian state in the “information war” that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-western-plans-to-fight-putins-propaganda-war-could-backfire-42868">reached its zenith</a> following the 2014 Ukraine crisis.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZRdOr6Yqezk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>On the whole, however, RT is a mixed bag. It has broadcast some crude, misleading – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-of-words-how-europe-is-fighting-back-against-russian-disinformation-65444">sometimes downright fictitious</a> – material as news. Some shows are so biased as to be an affront to the intellect. Yet other stories really do provide alternative perspectives on important events. RT’s Yemen coverage has been impressive, for example, while large parts of the Western media have turned a blind eye to the conflict. </p>
<p>It is therefore simplistic to characterise RT merely as a tool of Kremlin propaganda, with chief executive Margarita Simonyan dutifully carrying out endless instructions from Vladimir Putin. For one thing, Kremlin narratives must be made suitable for the foreign environments in which RT operates. This means ignoring some Kremlin positions and even contradicting others – RT’s <a href="http://www.participations.org/Volume%2012/Issue%201/35.pdf">positive promotion</a> of gay culture during the Sochi Olympics was a case in point. </p>
<p>Presenters such as Oksana Boiko, Larry King and George Galloway have strong independent personalities and are never going to be state operatives. Others, including <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Abby-Martin-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Allegations-20170108-0030.html">Abby Martin</a> and Martyn Andrews, have been unafraid to contradict Putin in the past (though <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/rt-host-who-criticized-russias-ukraine-invasion-is-leaving-t?utm_term=.olKYzYWKmA#.fe48p8GRWX">Martin left</a> in 2015). The further from senior management, the more likely it is that the “Kremlin narrative” will be transformed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194594/original/file-20171114-26423-rntc8t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump on Larry King’s show.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">RT</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, a <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf">US intelligence report</a> earlier this year was probably wrong to conflate RT’s output with the “hackers”, “trolls” and “bots” who interfered in US and French elections (the Western media <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-russias-facebook-ad-campaign-wasnt-such-a-success/2017/11/03/b8efacca-bffa-11e7-8444-a0d4f04b89eb_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-f%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.6871a3da20e3">exaggerated</a> their impact in any case). The report’s credibility was undermined by drawing on material from 2009. </p>
<h2>Western drift</h2>
<p>So you need a <a href="https://reframingrussia.com">more nuanced analysis</a> of RT to make sense of why someone like Salmond would work with it. Salmond’s show is a marriage of convenience between two opportunistic agents. It is also an indication of how the ideological landscape has reconfigured over the past two decades – as Western power ebbs to China. Brexit may be the dying gasp of Great Britain, clinging to its image as an imperial power capable of thriving alone; meanwhile, the rise of Scottish nationalism merely confirms the danger of the UK fragmenting. </p>
<p>It should also be said that Putin’s paranoid aggression on the international stage is Russia’s own version of the last imperial gasp. In this sense, the alliance of Salmond and RT is entirely logical: two antagonists seeking to dismantle the British state for different reasons.</p>
<p>The outrage in the UK at RT’s opportunism overlooks the growing global market for alternative output created by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/media-blog/2014/jun/12/objectivity-and-impartiality-in-digital-news-coverage">changing</a> worldwide <a href="https://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/MEDIA279/Social%20Media/With%20Facebook,%20Blogs,%20and%20Fake%20News,%20Teens%20Reject%20Journalistic%20%E2%80%9CObjectivity%E2%80%9D.pdf">attitudes</a>: the growing hostility in many parts of the world to Western superiority, to journalistic objectivity and impartiality, to parliamentary democracy, to Western capitalist monopolies. </p>
<p>Salmond, having exhibited open contempt for <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/alex-salmond-bbc-bias-was-significant-factor-in-deciding-scottish-independence-referendum-10506491.html">the “bias”</a> of the BBC and the London establishment against Scottish nationalism in the past, is clearly confident his RT show will not be met with the same outrage throughout Scotland – albeit current first minister Nicola Sturgeon <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-41941359">has taken</a> a different view. All the same, imagine how far removed attitudes are likely to be in Latin America or India or the Middle East. </p>
<p>In the end, Salmond’s initiative is a gamble. Whether British politicians should appear on RT cannot be answered simply. It’s one thing to appear on Worlds Apart, where Boiko conducts interviews in an open and often vicious debate. It’s quite another to appear on RT “flagship show” Cross-Talk, where real debate is usually a pretence and Putin’s critics are outnumbered by his supporters. </p>
<p>Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn and the many other politicians from mainstream British political parties who have appeared on RT presumably consider that the importance of the issues they are appearing to talk about outweigh the risks of being seen to legitimise Putin. Equally, for others, the particular means that is RT will never justify such an end. </p>
<p>Salmond has in the past proved an astute reader of the political runes. RT represents for him a platform for indulging his career and promoting the causes he believes in. </p>
<p>It is therefore premature to conclude that Salmond’s latest venture marks his decline into irrelevance and disrepute. What it means for RT, and for the so-called information war is rather less clear – and perhaps still more intriguing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hutchings receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vera Tolz receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Scotland’s former first minister has sparked outrage in the UK with his latest move.Stephen Hutchings, Professor Of Russian Studies, University of ManchesterVera Tolz, Sir William Mather Professor of Russian Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812172017-07-19T14:38:30Z2017-07-19T14:38:30ZJack McConnell: United Kingdom can still shape Europe’s future despite Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178701/original/file-20170718-10303-s5ioe9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jack's back. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&authuser=0&site=imghp&tbm=isch&source=hp&biw=1440&bih=756&q=jack+mcconnell&oq=jack+mcconnell&gs_l=img.3..0l4j0i30k1l2j0i24k1l4.1074.1074.0.1656.2.2.0.0.0.0.70.70.1.1.0....0...1.2.64.img..1.1.69.0.8f5qK_wpQWw#q=jack+mcconnell&hl=en&authuser=0&tbm=isch&tbs=sur:fc&imgrc=z1IdNjMnN3bXNM:">DFID</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years after stepping down as first minister of Scotland, Jack McConnell remains a busy man. I caught up with him by Skype in New York, where he was attending the <a href="https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/events/2017-4">UN meetings on development</a>. </p>
<p>Now a member of the House of Lords, he is a veteran of the devolution campaigns of the 1990s and a strong European. As first minister, he was a leader of the <a href="http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/interregionalgroups/Pages/legislative-power.aspx">movement for</a> a stronger role for devolved regions and nations in the EU. What, I asked him, went wrong with last year’s <a href="http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/interregionalgroups/Pages/legislative-power.aspx">Brexit referendum</a>? </p>
<p>The problem, he tells me, was an absence of a vision for Europe. The Remain side could not explain where Europe was going, or the need for a broader solidarity. Instead, they focused narrowly on economic issues like the importance of the single market and on negative campaigning. David Cameron “had nothing positive to say”, repeating the mistake he made in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides">Scottish referendum of 2014</a> that helped bring the No side to the brink of defeat. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, McConnell believes the Brexit battle is over and sees little prospect of reversing the decision. He calls the country’s departure from the European Union “pretty inevitable”. Nor is he impressed by the current focus on the UK keeping the single market or something very close to it – recently <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/vote2007/scottish_parliment/html/region_99999.stm">floated by</a> the likes of Chancellor Philip Hammond, for instance. </p>
<h2>Future of Europe</h2>
<p>Both inside the UK and elsewhere in Europe, McConnell detects a tendency to see the single market as an end in itself. He believes it needs to be part of a bigger picture. Instead of focusing on the technicalities of the single market, Europe needs a broader vision based on solidarity and the whole of the European continent. Instead of focusing narrowly on economics, it could take in a wider agenda, including security threats, climate change and values. </p>
<p>Even though the UK is leaving the EU, he thinks it could still take the lead in these respects by forging links and shifting public opinion. That, of course, would require some rethinking in the UK parties, including his own Labour party. The present Labour leadership under Jeremy Corbyn, he says, shows more interest in revolutionary movements around the world than in the future of Europe.</p>
<p>This overarching failure by politicians in Europe to focus on what the continent could become was one of McConnell’s main themes in a speech he recently gave in Glasgow at the <a href="https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/conferences/upcoming-conferences/11-meetings-and-conferences/312-2017-program-highlights">International Conference of Europeanists</a>. Focusing on the growing gap between politicians and the public, he talked about the role this played in the crisis in Europe and Brexit – as well as in the arrival of “outsiders” as leaders. </p>
<p>He urged a greater role for Europe in global poverty and development, a matter he pursued as first minister and to which he has devoted a lot of time in the House of Lords. Europeans can “help rekindle our own sense of purpose”, he told the audience, by sharing with other countries their experiences in power-sharing in areas with distinct identities within countries such as Scotland, Bavaria and the Basque country. </p>
<h2>Little Britain</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the Brexit referendum, McConnell tells me that he was not optimistic about the Remain campaign. He had predicted Leave’s victory and Scotland’s decision to Remain. What took him more by surprise was the result’s failure to reinvigorate the Scottish independence movement – he had expected it to become unstoppable. </p>
<p>In fact, he says, Brexit has made it harder for the SNP to win the argument: an independent Scotland in the EU risks being cut off from the UK market, which is more important for Scotland than the European single market. He also believes the public is wary of further change and uncertainty after two difficult referendums. </p>
<p>Instead, he says, Brexit provides an opportunity for securing more devolution for Scotland. Powers should come directly back from Brussels to Edinburgh – contrary to the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/16/repeal-bill-has-caused-constitutional-crisis-says-scotlands/">proposals</a> in the Withdrawal Bill published shortly before we spoke. </p>
<p>If powers were repatriated to the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, he believes this would allow them a more equal relationship with the UK government. Edinburgh could share powers in areas like fishing on a voluntary basis, for example, rather than by imposition from London. </p>
<p>McConnell also sees possibilities for Scotland to be more active on the world stage, something he considers neglected in ten years of an SNP government focused on independence. The paradiplomatic activity that he spearheaded as first minister was, he insists, a way of reinforcing the UK by recognising its plurality. He says it reflected the party’s commitment to “shared sovereignty, multilateralism and international cooperation”.</p>
<p>McConnnell’s vision of the UK accords with recent thinking in Scottish Labour circles. This includes Gordon Brown’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/18/gordon-brown-to-push-patriotic-third-option-for-more-powerful-scotland-after-brexit">interventions</a> and the <a href="https://labourlist.org/2017/02/scottish-labour-commits-to-federalism-as-dugdale-reaffirms-her-support-of-the-union/">adoption of federalism</a> as official Labour policy, at Scottish if not UK level. </p>
<p>As the post-referendum research in the Centre on Constitutional Change <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/debating-scotland-9780198789819?cc=gb&lang=en&">has shown</a>, it also chimes with public opinion, which has consistently wanted something less than independence but more than devolution. Even as opinion seemingly shifted away from No and towards Yes during the 2014 independence campaign, the underlying attitudes remained rather stable. It is just that more people thought that voting Yes was the better way to get there. </p>
<p>The question is whether Labour has arrived here too late as political opinion has polarised between the SNP’s independence and the Conservatives’ increasingly intransigent unionism, a polarisation accentuated by Brexit. The current disarray of the UK government and the lack of a majority at Westminster may open up some of these issues. If it does, it is not clear that the opposition parties are in a position to seize the opportunity.</p>
<p>Faced with this question, McConnell returns to the theme of vision and big ideas. He sees a need for a renewal of the political class, away from the professional politicians who have come to prominence since the 1970s, for whom politics is a way of life. </p>
<p>He agrees that Jeremy Corbyn has raised horizons, although not as much as has been claimed. Corbyn has showed a willingness to “stand up for ordinary people” and criticise the behaviour of private companies as well as government. On the other hand, says McConnell, he can be seen as part of a trend towards celebrity politicians and outsiders; a symptom of the current crisis rather than an answer. </p>
<p>In short, McConnell sees good and bad in the current climate: he welcomes the decline of the old deference and the growth of transparency but believes it has been accompanied by a crisis of faith in institutions and a loss of trust. There have been achievements in global development but severe poverty remains. Again and again, he stresses the role of ideas and vision in helping to turn this around. In a world that is increasingly voting against technocrats, the message is that ideas really do matter after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Keating does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scotland’s former first minister on Brexit, Scotland and the need for a new generation of visionaries.Michael Keating, Chair in Scottish Politics, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/790572017-06-23T13:35:15Z2017-06-23T13:35:15ZLions tour reminds us that national identities can be pretty flexible<p>The business end of the British & Irish Lions rugby tour of New Zealand has begun with the first of the three tests against the All Blacks. The home team <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jun/24/new-zealand-british-and-irish-lions-first-test-match-report">won 30-15</a> and are <a href="https://www.oddschecker.com/rugby-union/lions-tour">heavy favourites</a> to win all three encounters – but the Lions are at least in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jun/22/lions-unlikely-lads-new-zealand-first-test">decent form</a>. </p>
<p>After a shaky start to the ten-game tour that could be explained by jet lag and players getting used to one another, the Lions had won the previous couple of games – and played some good rugby. </p>
<p>It’s normal for players in international sports teams to have to gel with compatriots who are rivals from other clubs. But the Lions have the unusual challenge of also having to set aside international team rivalries between England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland when coming together every four years. Travelling across the globe to take on the best team in the world just days after coming together must surely be the toughest assignment in international rugby. </p>
<p>At a time when people’s sense of Britishness <a href="http://static.spectator.co.uk/n3nBJ/index.html">is waning</a> and national identities within the union have been reasserting themselves, this is an even greater challenge. Yet when you take a closer look at the composition of the team, something equally interesting reveals itself. It’s the kind of thing that should make everybody pause for thought, whether you could care less about rugby or not. </p>
<h2>Into the melting pot</h2>
<p>Bringing together four rugby nations to compete as one has always been a big challenge. Carwyn James, coach of the 1971 Lions, prepared his squad for their tour of New Zealand with the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KFXNCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA118&lpg=PA118&dq=I+don%E2%80%99t+want+you+Irish+to+pretend+to+be+English&source=bl&ots=wSYJtT7MbH&sig=arCpx_Ip-UVB6xzvMr04Yd5YkRM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjeqP6W1NPUAhVPbFAKHTn-B54Q6AEIIjAA#v=onepage&q=I%20don%E2%80%99t%20want%20you%20Irish%20to%20pretend%20to%20be%20English&f=false">following speech</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t want you Irish to pretend to be English, or English to be Celts, or Scotsmen to be anything less than Scots. Yet Scots must make bosom buddies of Englishmen, Irish of Welshmen, everybody of everybody – yet at the same time the Irish must remain ideologists off the field and on it fighters like Kilkenny cats; the English must keep their stiff upper lips and just be superior, the Scots be dour as well as radical, and the Welsh to be as bloody-minded as their history demands.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/175360/original/file-20170623-27880-16zekvd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Carwyn James, coach of the victorious 1971 Lions.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the amateur era, the Lions brought together players from quite different social backgrounds – steelworkers from Pontypool would be standing alongside chartered surveyors from Edinburgh. Lifelong friendships were formed during these long tours and, for working-class amateurs, it was a chance to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17460263.2017.1299038">become</a> full-time players for a few months. </p>
<p>Although some of the characteristics that Carwyn James noted in his speech may still live on, the differences are equally striking. Those who pull on the red jersey are now a product of a much more globalised rugby world. The rules about who is eligible to play for a particular country have attracted much attention. If an individual was not born in the country, they <a href="http://www.worldrugby.org/wr-resources/WorldRugbyDIR/Handbook/English/pubData/source/files/Regulation8.pdf">currently require</a> at least one grandparent or parent who was born there or three years of residency (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/39868065">soon</a> to be five).</p>
<p>The squad includes, for example, the prop <a href="https://www.lionsrugby.com/players/mako-vunipola/">Mako Vunipola</a>, who was born in New Zealand to Tongan parents and wears the red rose of England. He speaks with a detectable Welsh lilt having originally moved to the UK as a child to live in south Wales. </p>
<p>He is touring with Scotland winger <a href="https://www.lionsrugby.com/players/tommy-seymour/">Tommy Seymour</a>, who was born in the US and schooled in Northern Ireland. Seymour played for Ulster before moving to Glasgow Warriors and is eligible to represent Scotland through his Glaswegian mother. Or there is centre Jared Payne, who represented New Zealand at Under-21 level but now plays for Ireland, having qualified on residency grounds.</p>
<p>The Lions head coach <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/40320419">Warren Gatland</a> comes from New Zealand – and has coached Wales for the past ten years. Gatland faced comments about the number of Welsh players selected in the original squad and <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/sport/rugby/rugby-news/disgruntled-lions-fan-wrote-open-13209624">attracted criticism</a> for temporarily bringing in four others (and two Scots) on a temporary basis. He had <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/sport/rugby/brian-o-driscoll-left-out-of-final-lions-test-in-australia-1.1451270">previously taken stick</a> for fielding ten Welshmen in the final test match against Australia four years ago (as a Welshman I should add that the Lions <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/23210389">won handsomely</a>). </p>
<p>All this considered, it is probably just as well the Lions don’t sing a national anthem. The national anthem is tricky in Britain since God Save the Queen is often used for England and also the union as a whole. Some Welsh football players <a href="http://www.walesonline.co.uk/sport/football/football-news/welsh-team-gb-stars-slammed-205625">refused</a> to sing it while part of Team GB at the London 2012 Olympics. </p>
<h2>The identity question</h2>
<p>But above all, what the composition of the Lions squad reminds us is that identity is far more complicated than some people think. It is perfectly possible to stand under a number of different banners at the same time. </p>
<p>It is good to recognise this when Scotland can feel very divided over the independence debate; when the UK is leaving the European Union; when the peace process in Northern Ireland <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/13/john-major-tory-dup-deal-could-jeopardise-northern-ireland-peace">is creaking</a> as the Tories negotiate a parliamentary deal with the DUP; and when former English Defence League leader Tommy Robinson is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVa4yb_bChM">calling for</a> a temporary ban on Muslim immigration in the wake of the recent terrorism attacks in the UK. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/AQr5ejCVQrs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>For as long as I can remember, the future of the British & Irish Lions tour has been in doubt. In the modern era in particular, it can often seem like one commitment too many for over-stretched players. The Australian victory in 2013 undoubtedly gave the tour a new lease of life, but the bad start in New Zealand immediately saw fresh questions about whether it should continue. We <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/rugby-union/2017/06/22/lions-future-line-plan-shorten-tours/">are already</a> seeing concerns around the 2021 tour. </p>
<p>As a lover of rugby, I certainly hope it continues. It is a huge part of the game’s folklore, and an important reminder of how different nationalities can come together. That makes it well worth the ticket – and a couple of decent performances against the All Blacks would be celebrated far and wide across Britain and Ireland.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Harris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The birth certificates of the 41 players in the squad touring New Zealand are an eclectic mix.John Harris, Associate Dean Research, Glasgow School for Business and Society, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.