tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/land-redistribution-68439/articlesland redistribution – The Conversation2024-03-21T14:40:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261352024-03-21T14:40:20Z2024-03-21T14:40:20ZThis is how President Ramaphosa got to the 25% figure of progress in land reform in South Africa<p>Nearly three decades into democracy, land reform remains central to South Africa’s transformation policies and agricultural policy. </p>
<p>We have over the years pointed out that the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043?login=true">progress on land reform has been incorrectly reported</a>. It’s been consistently understated.</p>
<p>We have argued that, if the statistics are treated carefully, the progress has been much better than politicians and activists often claim.</p>
<p>We were encouraged earlier this year when South African president Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5d28EqZ-t8">acknowledged</a> in his <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/state-nation-address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-8-february-2024">State of the Nation address</a> that there had been better progress in land reform. The commonly cited argument is that land reform has been a failure and that only 8%-10% of farmland has been returned to black South Africans since apartheid ended in 1994.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa stated that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Through redistribution, around 25% of farmland in our country is now owned by black South Africans, bringing us closer to achieving our target of 30% by 2030.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This figure is based on an update of <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-5-myths-about-farming-debunked-195045">our work</a> at the Bureau of Economics Research and the Department of Agricultural Economics at Stellenbosch University.</p>
<p>Below we provide a detailed explanation of how we arrived at this figure. We also highlight policies the government can use to fast track the land reform programme to ensure that black farmers become central to a growing, and inclusive agricultural sector.</p>
<h2>Land reform data</h2>
<p>In reviewing the progress with land reform we should be mindful that the land reform programme consist of three elements (refer to <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">Section 25 of the constitution</a>: redistribution, restitution and tenure reform.</p>
<p>Substantive progress has only been made in the land redistribution space and through the process of land restitution managed by the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/62/commission-on-restitution-of-land-rights">Land Claims Commission</a>.</p>
<p>The progress of land reform can only be tracked where we have surveyed land, and land with title deeds registered. Even then it is tricky as the title deeds do not record the “race” of the registered owner.</p>
<p>To understand the progress with land reform it is important to start from the correct base. How much farm land is in question here? </p>
<p>In 1994, total farm land with title deeds (thus outside what the apartheid government set aside for black people) covered <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">77.58 million hectares of the total surface area of South Africa of 122 million hectares</a>. It is assumed, merely by the fact that black ownership of farm land in South Africa was not possible before 1991, that all <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">77.58 million hectares were owned by white farmers when land reform was initiated in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>Let us now unpack the progress with land reform based on the various data sources.</p>
<h2>Land restitution</h2>
<p>The land restitution process involves the restoration of land rights to black communities who lost their (registered and legally owned) farm land as a result of various forms of dispossession introduced by the apartheid-era governments after 1913.</p>
<p>Through the process of land claims, the Land Claims Commission has transferred 4 million hectares back to communities who previously were dispossessed (Source: various annual reports of the Land Claims Commission). </p>
<p>What’s missing from this calculation is the fact that communities have also been able to elect to receive financial compensation instead of obtaining the formal rights to the land.</p>
<p>Over the years a total of R22 billion (about US$1.1 billion) was paid out in financial compensation (Source: various annual reports of the Land Claims Commission). The commission never reported the number of hectares for which financial compensation was paid out for. It took some work by us to get the number of hectares of farmland involved in financial compensation from the commission, and it has now been confirmed that a total of 2.68 million hectares have been restored in this way.</p>
<p>That means that, in total, the restitution programme managed to restore the land rights of black communities equivalent to 6.68 million hectares.</p>
<h2>Land redistribution</h2>
<p>For the first 10 years of the land reform programme the government applied a market assisted programme of land redistribution based on the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/2537/Kirsten_Approaches(1999).pdf?sequence=1">willing-buyer-willing-seller principle</a>. Government grants assisted the purchase of the land by groups or individual beneficiaries. </p>
<p>These initiatives resulted in the transfer of 7.55 million hectares of farm land to black South Africans (Source: Various annual reports by Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development to parliament). This is probably where the stubbornness of the 10% figure came from. People have focused only on the one dimension of the land reform programme.</p>
<p>One element of redistributive land reform that is usually ignored is the private acquisition of farmland by Black South Africans outside the formal government assisted processes. Here individuals have used their own resources or financial arrangements with commercial banks or the <a href="https://landbank.co.za/Pages/Home.aspx">Land Bank</a> through which they fund the purchase farm land. </p>
<p>The only way you can find the exact number of these deals is to comb through every land transaction and, based on the surnames of the seller and buyer, confirm that the land was transferred from White to Black.</p>
<p>The Bureau of Economic Research at Stellenbosch University estimated that since 1994 a total of 1.9 million hectares of farm land were acquired by black South Africans without the assistance of the state. This might even be an undercount because some surnames such as Van Wyk, Van Rooyen, and even Schoeman do not necessary belong to white South Africans, and then there are many transactions to proprietary limited companies that are majority black owned but with typical names that would resemble an Afrikaans name such as Sandrift Boerdery. These are not picked-up in these searches.</p>
<h2>Government acquisition</h2>
<p>Our final source of the data is the farmland acquired by the state. The first is via the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-government-has-been-buying-land-and-leasing-it-to-black-farmers-why-its-gone-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it-211938#:%7E:text=By%20June%202023%2C%20the%20state,to%20the%20leasing%20of%20land.">PLAS</a>) that was introduced in 2006 after dissatisfaction with the earlier land reform efforts.</p>
<p>By August 2023, the state had acquired 2.54 million hectares of productive farmland through the programme and lease it out to beneficiaries. The <a href="https://www.gtac.gov.za/pepa/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ALHA-Spending-Review-Report.pdf">State Land Holding Account Entity</a> is the custodian of this land.</p>
<p>Most of the roughly 2500 beneficiaries have a 30-year lease agreement with the state.</p>
<p>In addition, state owned enterprises and provincial governments have also acquired farmland which is now used for non-agricultural purposes. A total of 630 000 hectares have been acquired over the last 30 years.</p>
<h2>Getting to 25%</h2>
<p>If we now add all the numbers together:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Restitution: 6.68 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Government Land redistribution: 7.55 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Private transactions: 1.9 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy programme: 2.54 million ha</p></li>
<li><p>Government acquisition for non-agricultural use: 0.63 million ha</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This gives a total of 19.3 million ha or 24.9% of the total of all freehold farmland in South Africa. The correct way to word the statement on the progress of with land reform since 1994 is therefore as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Almost 25% of all farm land previously owned by white land owners have been restored, redistributed to black South Africans or moved away to state ownership.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This does not say anything about the financial and commercial viability of the land that was transferred and doesn’t speak to the fast tracking of the land reform programme to bring about a just, equitable and inclusive commercial agricultural sector. Here we need more specific policy interventions.</p>
<h2>Policy considerations</h2>
<p>There are vast tracts of land within the government books that could be transferred to black South Africans for the benefit of agricultural progress and land reform success. The government should consider the following steps:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Establishing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency</a>. It would primarily be responsible for land registration and transfer under the redistribution programme. It could operate under the <a href="https://landbank.co.za/About-Us/Key%20Policies/1.%20Land%20Bank%20Act.pdf">Land Bank Act</a>, effectively execute the government policy, and deal with beneficiary selection.</p></li>
<li><p>The government’s <a href="https://www.greenagri.org.za/blog/blended-finance-scheme/">Blended Finance programme</a>, in collaboration with the <a href="https://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/resourcecentre/newsletters/issues.pdf">development finance institutions</a> and other financial institutions, should provide financial support to the selected beneficiaries.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Almost 25% of all farmland previously owned by white landowners has been restored, redistributed to black South Africans, or moved away to state ownership.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977722023-01-15T07:22:38Z2023-01-15T07:22:38ZFarming in South Africa: 6 things that need urgent attention in 2023<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504399/original/file-20230113-11-7zcjed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa’s agricultural sector has great potential to reduce poverty and create jobs.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s agriculture remains an important sector of the economy and holds <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1830175X">great potential to reduce poverty</a>. It’s also central to the political economy of the country, as evident in the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) recent <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">policy documents</a>. </p>
<p>The ANC <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">acknowledges</a> that agriculture</p>
<blockquote>
<p>holds the potential to uplift many poor South Africans out of poverty through increased food production, vibrant economic activity, and job creation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is not a misplaced view. There is compelling <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1830175X">evidence</a> that, on average, growth in agriculture is more poverty-reducing than an equivalent amount of growth outside agriculture. This brings home the need to invest in and expand agricultural production, particularly for the benefit of poor rural communities.</p>
<p>This is a view that many have held since the publication of South Africa’s National Development Plan in 2012. The plan <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">argued for the expansion of agricultural production and agro-processing</a> and held up the prospect of nearly a million jobs that could be created. </p>
<p>But year after year, challenges have distracted the country from its agricultural expansion goals. </p>
<p>The year 2023 will be no different. There are six key themes that are likely to underpin the sector, particularly in the first half of this year. These are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the impact of energy shortages and associated costs to businesses and consumers, after the severest power outages the country has ever seen </p></li>
<li><p>the expansion of exports</p></li>
<li><p>land reform</p></li>
<li><p>the fallout from collapsing local administrations</p></li>
<li><p>lack of progress on key regulations</p></li>
<li><p>the financing of the sector.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Unless these challenges are addressed, the country’s agricultural sector won’t achieve the growth and job creation prospects it’s capable of.</p>
<h2>The impact of power cuts</h2>
<p>The country can expect intensified discussion about the impact of energy shortages on agriculture, food, fibre and beverages production.</p>
<p>South Africa’s persistent power cuts are a significant challenge across the economy. At the end of 2022, the South African Reserve Bank <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/monetary-policy-review/2022/Monetary%20Policy%20Review%20October%202022.pdf">highlighted</a> the risks that persistent power cuts represent to the growth prospects of the country’s economy in 2023. </p>
<p>The agricultural sector and food producers have not always been as vocal as, for example, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/strikes-load-shedding-cause-mining-production-to-plummet-20220609">mining industry</a>, about the impact on their businesses. This is likely to change this year. Power outages have started to <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/kfc-is-closing-shops-due-to-load-shedding-as-suppliers-struggle-20221228#:%7E:text=KFC%20has%20temporarily%20closed%20some,it%20struggles%20with%20supplier%20problems.&text=We%20are%20sorry%2C%20but%20due,of%20your%20favourite%20menu%20items.">disrupt the production of even essential food items</a> This includes potato chips processing, milling and poultry meat processing. </p>
<p>At primary production, farmers using irrigation systems face <a href="https://www.freshplaza.com/africa/article/9486875/punnet-shortages-felt-in-south-africa-s-table-grape-packhouses/">production difficulties</a> in the current environment. </p>
<p>And there are disruptions across a range of food value chains. Importantly, this also brings extra costs to food companies and farmers, some of which could be transferred to the consumer over time. Consumer food price inflation is already elevated, estimated to have averaged around 9% in 2022 (from 6,5% in 2021), driven mainly by <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/10/19/reflections-on-south-africas-food-price-inflation-data-of-september-2022/">global agricultural commodity challenges</a>.</p>
<h2>Export expansion</h2>
<p>Expect a major focus on the need for expansion of agricultural export markets.</p>
<p>South Africa’s agricultural sector is <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/Portals/0/Statistics%20and%20Economic%20Analysis/Statistical%20Information/Abstract%202021.pdf">export-oriented, exporting roughly half its products by value</a>. Organised agriculture groups are pushing to expand exports.</p>
<p>This is not a new discussion, but it is likely to gain momentum in 2023 as the growth in domestic production necessitates that South Africa reaches new markets. The priority countries should be <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/12/18/south-africas-agricultural-exports-maintain-solid-growth/">China, South Korea, Japan, the USA, Vietnam, Taiwan, India, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, the Philippines and Bangladesh</a>. All have sizeable populations and large imports of agricultural products, specifically fruits, wine, beef and grains.</p>
<h2>Land reform</h2>
<p>Land reform will be back at the top of the agricultural agenda as the drive for inclusion of black farmers in the sector is highlighted in the <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/docs/agrinews/May%202022.pdf">Agriculture and Agro-processing Master Plan</a>. </p>
<p>But the discussion is likely to focus on redistribution (rather than land restitution and tenure). The focus could be on the launch of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">Agricultural Development and Land Reform Agency</a>. For much of 2021 and 2022, the agency was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/cyrilramaphosa/cyril-ramaphosa-land-reform-process-state-land-to-be-released-soon-to-black-farmers-20201005">mentioned</a> on various occasions by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa and the minister of agriculture, Thoko Didiza.</p>
<p>Working with the private sector and redistributing some state-owned land, the agency is expected to accelerate land redistribution. </p>
<h2>Deteriorating municipalities</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">threat</a> of deteriorating municipal service delivery, corruption in public offices and the failures in the network industries such as roads, rail, water, electricity and ports have occupied agribusiness leaders for some time.</p>
<p>These inefficiencies have:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>increased the cost of doing business</p></li>
<li><p>taken investment away from productive agribusiness activities to maintaining roads and other infrastructure</p></li>
<li><p>constrained expansion, and</p></li>
<li><p>made conditions even more challenging for new entrants.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This year, the country’s organised agriculture groupings are likely be more vocal about these challenges as they continue to constrain the agricultural sector expansion, and make conditions even more challenging for new entrants.</p>
<h2>Slow progress in fixing regulations</h2>
<p>There are likely to be signs of the growing unease about the slow progress in agricultural regulations.</p>
<p>The country’s agricultural sector faces regulatory constraints, such as the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-01-12-red-flags-raised-agricultural-organisations-and-experts-warn-that-animal-vaccine-production-in-south-africa-could-fail/">dysfunctional State Veterinary Service</a>. This dysfunction negatively affects the production of key vaccines. There is also a need to modernise the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Seeds and Remedies <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/fertilizers-farm-feeds-seeds-and-remedies-act-28-may-2015-1101#:%7E:text=The%20Fertilizers%2C%20Farm%20Feeds%2C%20Seeds,to%20regulate%20the%20importation.">Act 36 of 1947</a>. This is key in enabling the importation and registration of key agro-chemicals that are essential for boosting productivity of the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>For an extended period, South Africa <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter-abstract/323739043?redirectedFrom=fulltext">embraced science and led the continent in agricultural productivity</a>, benefiting from the adoption of critical agrochemicals, seeds and livestock remedies.</p>
<p>But there’s been a drift away from this positive path. The country now lags behind its competitors due to delays and large backlogs in the office of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/fertilizers-farm-feeds-agricultural-remedies/agricultural-remedy">Registrar of Agricultural remedy</a>. The result has been that crucial productivity-enhancing inputs haven’t been released to the agricultural industry. </p>
<p>The failures in <a href="https://www.obpvaccines.co.za/">national vaccine production</a> also remain an issue.</p>
<p>The pressure will intensify to resolve all of these issues, especially as they are part of the legislative points the <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/220607Agriculture_and_Agro-processing_Master_Plan_Signed.pdf">Agriculture and Agro-processing Master Plan</a> should address. The plan seeks to address key hindrances to growth at a commodity level. Notably, the master plan is a social compact approach. It has already been given the support of major agricultural private sector role-players. </p>
<h2>Finance</h2>
<p>The need for agricultural finance, particularly developmental finance for new farmers, hasn’t been given enough attention.</p>
<p>At the end of 2022, the focus was on the <a href="https://landbank.co.za/Products-and-Services/Pages/Blended-Finance.aspx">blended finance instrument</a> by the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development and the Land Bank. The instrument will contribute positively to the sector’s growth and to serving the needs of some new farmers. </p>
<p>In 2023, there will be a drive for the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development to broaden the blended finance instrument to accommodate more financial institutions, and increase its scale to reach more farmers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197772/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p>Year after year, challenges have distracted the country from its agricultural expansion goals.Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1972012023-01-09T13:26:46Z2023-01-09T13:26:46ZThe South African government has been buying farmland for black farmers. It’s not gone well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503265/original/file-20230105-1865-xupra0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Acquired land was used mostly for raising livestock rather than growing fruit, vegetables or field crops.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Titmuss/Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the African National Congress came to power in South Africa in 1994, <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/policy-documents-1994-agricultural-policy/">an expressed priority was land reform</a>. This was to address the fact that black farmers had been excluded from the agricultural economy for most of the 20th century. The aim of land reform was to provide agricultural land to disadvantaged people, raising their productivity, income and employment. </p>
<p>A plethora of policy initiatives were launched. The target was to distribute 30% of agricultural land to black farmers. In 2006 the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy</a> (PLAS) was adopted. This replaced the land redistribution programmes implemented between 1996 and 2006. The acquisition programme involved the government buying farmland previously owned by white farmers and redistributing it to black farmers. </p>
<p>But, overall, it’s become clear that the new approach to redistributing farmland has been mostly ineffective. Failure can be attributed to limited implementation, poor institutional capacity and corruption.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.arc.agric.za%2FPages%2FBiometry.aspx&data=05%7C01%7C%7C1584a1faa2094b38624508dae1a4a59d%7Ca6fa3b030a3c42588433a120dffcd348%7C0%7C0%7C638070394852634326%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C2000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=vlFhP%2FWhEaeVcuDfIOPXoFZembkylR7THuz5kDcNUPo%3D&reserved=0">research report</a> first released in 2019 shed fresh light on how the most recent strategy has unfolded. Compiled by the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, it provided a sober look at what happens when government bureaucrats get involved in land reform and farming decisions. </p>
<p>The main findings were that the performance on most farms bought under the acquisition scheme had been disappointing. More than half the current beneficiaries were not reporting any substantial production. The same percentage were evaluated as having a low capacity to achieve commercial status. </p>
<p>We argue that the data collected and interviews with stakeholders clearly indicate the reasons for failure. They include poor beneficiary selection, inadequate support and infrastructure, and rampant crime. Post settlement support was found to be inadequate, and stakeholders appointed to support the new farmers were poorly monitored and not working in an integrated manner. Agricultural infrastructure, both off farm and on farm, needed attention.</p>
<p>Based on our decades of experience in studying land policy, we believe that there is scope for the successful integration of farms acquired under the scheme into profitable value chains. But for this to happen, existing constraints need to be addressed.</p>
<h2>The plan</h2>
<p>The land acquisition programme was approved “in principle” in July 2003. It was officially implemented in 2006.</p>
<p>Between 2003 and August 2022, the state acquired 2.9 million hectares of farmland previously owned by white farmers through the Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy. Around R12 billion (US$706 million) has been spent on the acquisition of these farms over the last 16 years. This land is made up of 2,921 farms and is under 30-year leases to beneficiaries. </p>
<p>The state also owns an additional 3,172 farms. It is unclear when and how these were acquired. Our best guess is that they were bought in the earlier iterations of the land redistribution programme. </p>
<p>The strategy was a noble attempt at land reform. It had some clear objectives:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>acquire land of high agricultural potential</p></li>
<li><p>integrate black farmers into the commercial agricultural sector</p></li>
<li><p>improve beneficiary selection</p></li>
<li><p>improve land use planning</p></li>
<li><p>ensure optimal productive land use.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>To establish the commercial potential and status of the farms, the Department of Rural Development and Land asked the Agricultural Research Council to conduct an analysis of all the land purchased under the scheme. Its remit was to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>determine the agricultural potential of the land</p></li>
<li><p>establish the performance of the new farmers</p></li>
<li><p>define criteria for beneficiary selection</p></li>
<li><p>define criteria for contracting support agencies</p></li>
<li><p>establish interventions to help the scheme achieve its objectives.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Most farms acquired under the initiative had high potential. It’s therefore possible to dismiss the myth that the land acquired for land reform was of poor quality.</p>
<p>The assessment showed that land acquired through the programme was generally of good or fair quality, and 98% of farms had fair to good natural resources. </p>
<p>Most farms (59%) were large enough in size and had a natural resource base sufficient to support viable enterprises. Some (7%) were doing well, despite limitations, indicating that it is possible for the programme to achieve its objectives.</p>
<p>The report noted that roughly 60% of all the farms had the potential to achieve commercial levels of production. Another 23% had the potential to reach significant (medium scale) levels of production. </p>
<p>Roughly 10% of the land had the capacity to support only livelihood level production. </p>
<p>According to the data, all the farms under review collectively employed 12,129 part-time and 7,045 full-time workers. Each farm on average employed six full-time and four part-time workers. Based on the potential of these farms, a total of 60,050 workers should be employed, suggesting that the growth and employment targets of the programme have been missed by a mile.</p>
<p>The report also looked at whether the farms were operational and in commercial production.</p>
<p>It found that performance on most was disappointing. More than half the current beneficiaries were not reporting any substantial production, and more than half the beneficiaries were evaluated as having a low capacity to achieve commercial status.</p>
<p>The report also addressed signs of degradation.</p>
<p>Nearly half (47%) of the farms that had been acquired were found to have some degree of degradation, while 13% were seriously or severely degraded. This was based on an evaluation of the land through satellite imagery and the data collected for the farm, compared to the potential based on land capability maps. Of concern was the high number of commercially viable farms (42%) and medium-scale farms (53%) that showed signs of degradation such as erosion and overgrazing.</p>
<p>The question of whether farmers were engaged in optimal farm enterprise mix was also addressed. It appears that most tended to avoid high value commodities (fruit, vegetables and field crops) in favour of livestock. This could be attributed to lack of skills, water constraints, insufficient suitable infrastructure and moveable assets, or limited access to capital. Of concern is the significant number (350) of farms that produced no commodities.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The analysis showed that access to capital was one of the most critical resource limitations. To access capital from a commercial bank, the land bank or any private financial services outlet, farmers require collateral. Where farmers have title deed, this is facilitated. Lease agreements are not deemed collateral.</p>
<p>This points to the need to transfer the farm title deeds to farmers who have proven their capability. This would enable them to access finance via the Land Bank under its <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-didiza-launches-r32-billion-blended-finance-scheme-land-bank-assist-farmers%C2%A0-24">newly launched blended finance programme</a>.</p>
<p>Farms with better infrastructure – housing, fencing, water reticulation, fixed assets and equipment – performed better. This illustrates the importance of infrastructural investment. </p>
<p>For land reform success in the future, the importance of selecting beneficiaries based on the criteria of entrepreneurial aptitude, resilience and technical skills will also be vital. The criteria described in the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy stated that beneficiaries should be evaluated. But this appears not to have happened in practice. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/what-the-anc-decided-at-its-national-conference/">latest resolution</a> on land reform passed by the ANC argues for legislative instruments to manage the state acquisition of land. The failures set out above suggest that the state will always be a poor player in redistributing land as it will always hold onto it. </p>
<p>The point of identifying mistakes in policy is, surely, not to repeat them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aart-Jan Verschoor was part of the Agricultural Research Council team that conducted a study and wrote a report commissioned by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform on the South African government's land acquisition programme .</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colleta Gandidzanwa was part of the Agricultural Research Council team that conducted a study and wrote a report commissioned by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform on the South African government's land acquisition programme .</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government’s approach to redistributing farmland has been mostly ineffective. Failure can be attributed to limited implementation, poor institutional capacity and corruption.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityAart-Jan Verschoor, Senior Manager - Agrimetrics, Agricultural Research CouncilColleta Gandidzanwa, Researcher, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1950452022-11-26T11:36:52Z2022-11-26T11:36:52ZLand reform in South Africa: 5 myths about farming debunked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496971/original/file-20221123-14-970hoe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most farmers in South Africa run small-scale operations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl De Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s land reform policy remains highly contested. But, in our view, a number of persistent myths about farmland statistics and the structure of commercial agriculture skew debates. This makes it difficult to reach some common understanding about the realities of land and agriculture in the country.</p>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa became a democracy, white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">surface area of 122 million hectares</a>. The new government set a target of <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">redistributing 30% of this within five years</a>. This target date has been moved several times and <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">is now 2030</a>.</p>
<p>According to popular belief between 8% and 10% has been redistributed so far. But as we show below this is incorrect as it omits a number of key statistics.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">17%-20% of the 77,58 million ha</a> is suitable for field crop, irrigation and horticultural production. More than 55% of farmland is only ideal for extensive grazing (land that is poor and dry but animals can roam widely, the Karoo being an example), and another 20% for intensive pastures and animal production (land, the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands being an example, that receives good rains and has good pastures for grazing). </p>
<p>This shows that the potential of farm land being used to create full-time sustainable livelihoods is limited. This suggests that a careful and measured approach needs to be adopted in redistribution efforts. </p>
<p>These realities are the basis for our arguments against five standard myths about agriculture and land in South Africa. That’s not to say that there isn’t a great deal still to be done. But failure to recognise the gains that have been achieved means that policies can’t be developed based on what’s been achieved so far.</p>
<h2>Myth 1: 40,000 white farmers own 80% of all South Africa’s land</h2>
<p>First, let’s turn to the number that’s quoted about white farmers.</p>
<p>The number of 40,122 commercial farmers is widely quoted as the total number of farmers earning a commercial income from farming. The number comes from the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">2017 census of commercial agriculture</a>.</p>
<p>But the number is flawed.</p>
<p>Firstly, the census only considers farmers who are registered for VAT (for which the the threshold is a turnover of R1 million a year (about US$59 000 today).</p>
<p>Adding in two other groups – the number of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">households involved in commercial farming</a> as their main source of income and those that practice farming as a secondary source of income – the total number of households comes to 242,221.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to estimate the “race” of commercial farmers. But, using different data sources including the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf">2011 population census</a>, the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">2017 agricultural census</a> and the <a href="http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-RELEASE-for-CS-2016-_Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf">2016 community survey</a> we estimated that most commercial farm enterprises are black owned. And that only 18% of these households are white. </p>
<p>Now to the 80% figure.</p>
<p>In 1994 white farmers owned 77.58 million ha of freehold land. We estimate that white farmers now <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">own 61 million ha of freehold farmland</a>. This follows the implementation of redistribution and restitution programmes and other transfers of land to the state and black farmers. It still represents 78% of freehold farmland but covers only 50% of the total surface area of South Africa. </p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> white commercial farmers (around 44,000 farming units) own 61 million ha – 78% of the farmland that comes with private title deeds or 50% of all land in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Myth 2: Commercial agriculture is characterised by large-scale white farmers</h2>
<p>This myth results from a misinterpretation of the concept of “commercial” and “scale”.</p>
<p>Commercial agricultural production indicates production beyond subsistence needs, with some (or a major share) of the total production sold to the market. This usually also involves the purchase of production inputs such as seeds and fertiliser.</p>
<p>But commercial production happens at various levels or “scales of production”.</p>
<p>The scale of farming is not determined by land size. Instead it refers to the <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2019/03/16/the-perception-that-south-africas-agriculture-is-dominated-by-large-commercial-farms-is-incorrect/">gross farm income (or turnover) of the farming enterprise</a>.</p>
<p>Land size is not a good indication of the scale of the farming operation. For example, a small irrigation farm of 10 ha can deliver millions in turnover while a 10,000 ha extensive grazing farm is unlikely to exceed R1 million in turnover per annum.</p>
<p>If we unpack the census of commercial agriculture, commercial farming in South Africa consists largely of small-scale family-based operations. Almost <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/37171/chapter/323739043">90% of all VAT-registered commercial farming businesses</a> can be classified as micro - or small-scale enterprises (turnover below R13.5 million). While this is true, it’s also a fact that there are just over 2,600 large farms with turnover on average above R22.5 million per annum. These farms are responsible for 67% of all farm income and employ more than half the agricultural labour force. </p>
<p>If we take account of the farms that are not registered for VAT it is evident that 98% of all farming operations in South Africa are small-scale operations.</p>
<p>But, a mistaken leap is made to say that all white commercial farmers are “large-scale” operations, and all black farmers are “small-scale”. In the process, most writers on South African agriculture confuse the “scale of the operation” with the “race” of the operator.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> most white commercial farmers in South Africa are small-scale and family-based operations. Only a small minority (2 600) are large-scale operations. Most of these are owned by white farmers.</p>
<h2>Myth 3: Commercial farmers are hoarding land and not selling any farms</h2>
<p>It is often argued that white commercial farmers are holding on to their land and not offering it for sale to potential buyers. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.deeds.gov.za/">Deeds office records</a> provide insights into the activity in the farmland market. Between 2013 and 2021, the annual number of farm transactions recorded varied between 2,000 and 4,000. In 2021 2,585 farms were sold and registered to new owners. Most (58%) of these were farms smaller than 300 hectares. </p>
<p>Between 2003 and August 2022, the state acquired 2.8 million ha which brings the total area of farm land acquired by the state since 1994 to 3,12 million ha (or 4% of freehold farmland). This suggests that the state is also active in the market.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> The farmland market is active with around 2% of total farmland with private title deeds traded annually.</p>
<h2>Myth 4: All black farmers with private title deeds acquired their land through the land reform programme</h2>
<p>Deeds records show that since 1994 black South Africans have privately acquired a total of 1.78 million ha of farmland <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">through normal self-financed market transactions</a>. </p>
<p>Over the same period the government redistribution programme has assisted beneficiaries to acquire a total of 7.2 million ha of farmland. Thus, for every four hectares transferred by the State to black South Africans, private transactions contributed another one hectare to the process.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> Black farmers have acquired almost 2 million ha of farmland (2,3% of total freehold farmland) on their own without any assistance from the state sponsored land redistribution programme.</p>
<h2>Myth 5: South Africa has only redistributed 8% of farmland to black people</h2>
<p>The debate on the expropriation of land is largely driven by the myth that white farmers are hoarding land and are inflating prices, and therefore, it is impossible to remove the racially skewed land ownership patterns in South Africa.</p>
<p>These arguments typically ignore the statistics on the land market and the fact that black South Africans have been acquiring farmland on their own. These arguments also conveniently ignore other factors, such as bureaucratic inefficiences, patronage and corruption – that have slowed down land reform.</p>
<p>In addition, the incorrect presentation of the progress with the land reform process is also maliciously used to inflate the argument for expropriation. If South Africans are true to themselves and correctly report the statistics, then they will be much closer to the 30% target. We estimate, using various official datasets, that up to August 2022, the land statistics were as follows:</p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Table" id="datawrapper-chart-hog5n" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/hog5n/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="536" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Based on these numbers extracted from official sources it is evident that South Africa has made much more progress than what is been punted around. It is, therefore, disingenuous of analysts and commentators not to take account of the real progress made here.</p>
<p><strong>Fact:</strong> Taking account of all the pillars of the land reform programme, it is estimated that 24% of all farmland has been redistributed or land rights have been restored. This is close to the 30% target, which could be reached by 2030.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Based on official statistics, we conclude that the country has made more progress towards land reform than is generally suggested.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836882022-05-31T13:32:29Z2022-05-31T13:32:29ZANC policy papers touch on key issues facing agriculture and land reform in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465761/original/file-20220527-17-63tk59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rural development is one of the priorities identified by South Africa's ruling party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by: Galivel/Andia/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">policy discussion document</a> published by the African National Congress (ANC) presents a positive change from the <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf">ambiguous agriculture policy</a> the South African governing party has maintained in the recent past. The latest document talks to the primary issues that, if implemented relentlessly, would drive the sector’s growth in ways that would benefit all.</p>
<p>The policy document is set for debate at the ANC’s policy conference in July, which is a precursor the party’s elective conference scheduled for December this year.</p>
<p>The previous policy documents were clouded by the <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf">proposals to amend the constitution</a> to allow for expropriation of land without compensation under specific circumstances. Beyond the push for radical land reform, there was inadequate reflection on the drivers of growth in the agricultural economy, and the importance of food security. The recently released document has a sharp focus on the key interventions to drive the agricultural and rural economy. It highlights the sector’s role in job creation and reducing poverty.</p>
<p>The ANC <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">acknowledges</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>agriculture remains an important sector of the South African economy. It holds the potential to uplift many poor South Africans out of poverty through increased food production, vibrant economic activity, and job creation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The policy discussion document draws from the insights of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1830175X">a 2018 collection of studies</a> which found that, on average, growth in agriculture is more poverty-reducing than an equivalent amount of growth outside agriculture. This brings home the need to invest and expand agricultural production. That is if South Africa is to reduce poverty, raise its economic growth rate and the rate of development, specifically in the rural communities.</p>
<p>Overall, my assessment is that the idea presented by these discussion papers on agriculture, land reform and rural development are sound. They also speak to the core issues that have held back the growth of agriculture in South Africa.</p>
<p>That said, once these ideas have been adopted as the governing party’s policy positions, they still need to be translated into government policy. There’s a risk they may be diluted along the way. A lot also will depend on how well government is able to implement the proposals.</p>
<h2>The big issues</h2>
<p>The ANC <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">acknowledges</a> that the growth of the agricultural sector partly depends on effective land reform which includes bringing into production underutilised land. Such land is mainly in the state owned farmlands and the <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2018/02/28/these-provinces-have-unused-land-suitable-for-agriculture/">former homelands</a> in the provinces of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-narrow-the-big-divide-between-black-and-white-farmers-in-south-africa-172328">weak land governance, infrastructure and institutions</a> in these areas are amongst the key constraints to agricultural progress. </p>
<p>The ANC now places emphasis on the Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency, first announced by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2020 and more recently in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000">State of the Nation Address in 2022</a>. The agency would ideally focus on the redistribution pillar of the land reform programme. The other pillars are land restitution and tenure. The agency would <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">bring about</a> national coordination, reduce red tape, and become a one-stop shop for issues related to a decentralised redistribution of agricultural land.</p>
<p>Details of how the agency will function haven’t yet been set out. The minister of agriculture, land reform and rural development, Thoko Didiza, is expected to announce these <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2022-state-nation-address-10-feb-2022-0000">before the end of June 2022</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/umrabulo-policy-conference-2022-2022-05-20">ANC policy papers</a> also emphasise the need to improve the functioning of municipality and the network industries – road, rail, water, electricity and ports. These are issues <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/05/09/municipal-service-delivery-and-infrastructure-constraints-are-costly-for-south-african-farmers/">I have emphasised several times</a>. Some of the challenges the sector has faced in the recent past stem from the poor functioning of network industries and the failure of the municipalities.</p>
<p>Municipalities provide services such as water and sanitation, electricity, roads and technological infrastructure. These are fundamental for <a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">the functioning</a> of the agribusinesses and agriculture at large. Some agribusinesses have now resorted to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2022-05-06-wandile-sihlobo-municipal-service-delivery-and-infrastructure-constraints-are-costly-for-farmers/">using their own funds</a> to provide these services. These are resources which would have ideally been used to support new entrant black farmers and agribusinesses.</p>
<p>If these challenges could be addressed, along with the release of state land to properly selected beneficiaries, South Africa could achieve improvements in <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">agricultural production and job creation</a>.</p>
<p>The discussion papers also focus on rural development, acknowledging its multi-dimensional nature. Rural development <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/Lists/news/DispForm.aspx?ID=7514">encompasses</a> better infrastructure such as roads, water and electricity, and the building of schools and health facilities.</p>
<p>Here again, the challenge of deteriorating infrastructure remains a major hindrance. If improved, along with municipality governance and service delivery, South Africa would achieve a vibrant rural economy.</p>
<p>Agriculture, fishing, aquaculture, mining and tourism are among the key industries that would contribute more to economic growth and job creation with improved infrastructure. These industries contribute a decent share to the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/GDP%202021%20Q4%20(Media%20presentation).pdf">economy and job creation</a>. </p>
<p>The one glaring omission in the documents is the idea on “land donations”, which was <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-04-24-anc-considers-land-donations-among-new-policy-proposals/">floated in the media</a> in April 2022. But it was first proposed by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_1.pdf">Presidential Advisory Panel Report on South Africa’s Land Reform and Agriculture</a>. Land donations would be an additional instrument to accelerate land reform.</p>
<p>The potential land donors would include churches, mining houses, and big farming businesses. The state would provide <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">incentives or nudges for such a programme</a>. This would help increase the land supply for the redistribution pillar of land reform.</p>
<p>Perhaps, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-land-reform-agency-could-break-south-africas-land-redistribution-deadlock-165450">Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency</a> will incorporate land donations as one of its instruments.</p>
<h2>What’s to be avoided</h2>
<p>The discussion documents will no doubt be revised by the ANC’s policy conference. One hopes that their thoughtful approach to agriculture, land reform and rural development will not be diluted.</p>
<p>This is especially because the dilution of the policy proposals might affect existing government approaches to agriculture and agribusiness. The <a href="https://wandilesihlobo.com/2022/05/13/what-to-make-of-south-africas-agriculture-land-reform-and-rural-development-budget-vote-speech-and-master-plan-launch/">Agriculture and Agro-processing Master Plan and the budget vote speech</a> have acknowledged the sector’s contribution to economic growth, job creation, and the potential for its further expansion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p>Policies, if implemented, would drive the agricultural sector’s growth in ways that would benefit all.Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826052022-05-12T13:18:17Z2022-05-12T13:18:17ZBlack farmers in South Africa need support: how it could be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462211/original/file-20220510-12-3lndx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Subsidies for black farmers would deliver an inclusive sector and correct past racial biases.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most countries in both the rich and the developing world have some sort of programme to help early career farmers (mostly, but not exclusively young people) to get established in a farming or agribusiness enterprise. South Africa sticks out like a sore thumb, even against many African countries, in not having such a programme.</p>
<p>In our view, subsidies for black farmers in South Africa are justified. This is because they would help deliver a more inclusive agricultural sector and correct past racial biases.</p>
<p>South Africa used to have an extensive support system for farmers. Under apartheid white farmers received a host of subsidies.</p>
<p>Based on our collective five decades researching the agricultural sector in South Africa we are strongly of the view that the country needs to introduce a agricultural support framework that is more comprehensive, broad based and flexible to enable black farmers to join the ranks of commercial agriculture.</p>
<p>In this note we take a leaf from the experience of the earlier support programmes for white farmers and the farmer support programmes for black farmers implemented by the Development Bank of Southern Africa in the 1980s and propose a support programme that we believe would have a rapid and sector-wide impact. </p>
<p>These lessons provide the principles for a new agile, broad-based programme of support that should enable the establishment of farming enterprises that were previously excluded from commercial agriculture. We specifically deal with direct financial support to farmers. We don’t address other important tasks of government that are also part of the support framework for any farming enterprises. These include, among many, research, agricultural product standards and a state supported Land Bank.</p>
<p>But there are two provisos to our proposals: it isn’t possible, or desirable, to simply re-implement what was there before. And secondly, any new support programme must be tailored to the specific circumstances of today. This includes taking into account the country’s current fiscal constraints.</p>
<h2>The history of subsidies</h2>
<p>South Africa reached <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/673701468203650200/pdf/477690PUB0AFR0101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf">high levels of overall subsidisation</a> of agriculture in the late 1980s. These were so pervasive that the country was on a par with the EU and US <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228355007_Distortions_to_Agricultural_Incentives_in_South_Africa">when measured on a per capita basis</a>. The apartheid government pursued this path because rural votes carried more weight than urban votes due to the electoral system based on constituencies, and because it could afford a strong subsidy programme.</p>
<p>Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 several initiatives were introduced to support the development of commercial (only white) farmers. This included the <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/acts/land-bank-act_1912-018">Land Bank in 1912</a> and after the recession that followed the First World War, the establishment of the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/24416">Farmers Assistance Board in 1925</a>. </p>
<p>Other initiatives included the establishment of irrigation schemes, tenant farmer support programmes and the development of the local agricultural market infrastructure and organised agricultural marketing arrangements.</p>
<p>Substantially increased public investment in agricultural research and development preceded industry support and continued to grow until the mid-1970’s.</p>
<p>By the early 1990’s, however, all subsidy support to farmers was phased out.</p>
<p>The withdrawal of the support had two unfortunate consequences. First, farmers that could moved to larger scale operations to benefit from economies of scale. This lead to the growth of very large scale (‘mega’) farming operations. </p>
<p>Second, it was accompanied by the abolition of support measures, from direct subsidies to indirect market interventions, from funding of research and extension, to the withdrawal of subsidies on conservation works. </p>
<p>The result was that ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ black farmers were bereft of the support services that they had previously been denied.</p>
<p>Many attempts have been made to remedy this situation. But in all instances the interventions were piecemeal and unsuccessful.</p>
<p>In addition, most support programmes became very bureaucratic and were focused on individual cases. This led to long delays in decision making. And no broad-based impact. </p>
<h2>Features of a new system of financial support</h2>
<p>The support programme we envisage for new entrants into agriculture is linked to the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/land-reform-programme">land reform programme</a>. It is designed to support the transformation of the agricultural sector to bring about a much more diverse and representative corps of farmers in South Africa.</p>
<p>A useful starting point is to do sustainable and productive settlement of qualifying farmers and beneficiaries on land already acquired by the state through the Progressive Land Acquisition programme whereby the state acquires farm land from willing sellers among the white farming community.</p>
<p>The land to be settled should be offered to potential beneficiaries by means of a notice published by the relevant District Land Committee in the government gazette and all major newspapers. The advertisement could already have a business plan in place, if, for example, it’s known what type of farming enterprise would be pursued. Where there is no business plan, the applicant needs to provide one. </p>
<p>All interested individuals would need to comply with certain criteria that will be used in the selection process. The minimum requirements (in addition to the existing policy of beneficiary selection) would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Being at least 18 but younger than 50 years.</p></li>
<li><p>Having qualifications and experience suitable for productive use of the land.</p></li>
<li><p>Preference for beneficiaries who farmed before or who have worked on commercial farms.</p></li>
<li><p>Intending to personally occupy and work the land.</p></li>
<li><p>Be of good character, not guilty of, or charged with, any criminal offence.</p></li>
<li><p>Able to access sufficient operational capital to develop and work the holding.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Selection would need to be objective and protected from political influence or patronage.</p>
<p>The land purchase by the selected beneficiary would be financed by a long-term mortgage (25 to 40 years) from the Land Bank at beneficial rates and terms. Interest and capital repayments for the first two or three years would be deferred and amortised into the outstanding debt to make the initial phase of the enterprise financially feasible. </p>
<p>This would require the Land Bank to change its current funding model to support the development mandate of the bank. The focus should be on long term mortgage finance.</p>
<p>Another possible approach would be to lease the land to the beneficiary for up to five years before the lessee can exercise the option to buy the land. </p>
<h2>Supporting beneficiaries</h2>
<p>The support programme must not be hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape and endless committee meetings. This is one of the reasons the current <a href="https://www.nda.agric.za/docs/casp/casp.htm">Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme</a> has failed to reach as many farmers as possible.</p>
<p>The following principles should apply:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Avoid project-based and piecemeal approaches to farmer support.</p></li>
<li><p>Scale-up existing systems to ensure a broad-based and inclusive approach with ease of application and qualification.</p></li>
<li><p>No public tenders for farm input purchases or on-farm investments have to be issued. This would ensure time isn’t wasted and opportunities for patronage minimised.</p></li>
<li><p>Only on-farm infrastructure should be supported. These would include boreholes, animal handling facilities, poultry houses, fencing, orchards and barns.</p></li>
<li><p>Fixed improvements to land such as conservation works, fences, contouring, soil improvement programmes and investments for ‘regenerative agriculture’ should also qualify.</p></li>
<li><p>A universal flat rate per specific item would apply for refund claims by farmers. The rate should be not more than 80% of the market rate/value of the specific item.</p></li>
<li><p>Farmers could appoint any service provider following initial budget approval and initial inspection by government officials.</p></li>
<li><p>Payment should be processed following post-implementation inspection and full documentation and proof of payment to service provider.</p></li>
<li><p>Production and operating expenses such as wages, fuel, seeds and fertiliser should be funded with production finance from co-ops, agribusinesses, or commercial banks.</p></li>
<li><p>Machinery and implements should be financed by term loans from dealers, banks or agribusinesses.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>New farmers find it hard to survive in the initial years before a revenue stream has been established. It would therefore be sensible to support the family with a personal maintenance allowance of R 3 500 per month for the first 24 months.</p>
<p>A programme like this would play an essential role in ensuring a successful outcome of South Africa’s land reform programme and build a new ‘crop’ of commercially oriented black farmers.</p>
<p>In our view, subsidies for black farmers in South Africa would be justified. This is because they would help deliver a more inclusive agricultural sector and correct past racial biases.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Subsidies for black farmers in South Africa would build a new ‘crop’ of commercially oriented farmers.Nick Vink, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch UniversityJohann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1654502021-08-03T15:22:42Z2021-08-03T15:22:42ZHow a land reform agency could break South Africa’s land redistribution deadlock<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414137/original/file-20210802-14-1a1o5qb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The distribution of agricultural land in South Africa remains deeply unequal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by David Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Columnists/CyrilRamaphosa/cyril-ramaphosa-land-reform-process-state-land-to-be-released-soon-to-black-farmers-20201005">conceded</a> that the country’s land reform programme is taking too long to address the challenge of land ownership inequality in South Africa. Bureaucratic delays, patronage and political influence, and opportunism among beneficiaries and landowners are among the challenges that have hindered South Africa’s land reform programme progress.</p>
<p>At the same time, the government’s farmer support programmes haven’t been agile and quick enough to provide the necessary support for beneficiaries.</p>
<p>In 1994 when South Africa became a democracy white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total surface area of 122 million hectares. The new government set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">target of redistributing 30% of the 77 million hectares within the first five years in government</a>. This target has been consistently moved over the years, and now the aim is to reach 30% by 2030, in line with the National Development Plan’s <a href="https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/NDP_Chapters/devplan_ch6_0.pdf">agriculture and land reform objectives</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/4653/wp_57_successful_farmland_redistribution_south_africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Our estimates</a>, which include restitution, redistribution, private transactions and state procurement, suggest that 13.2 million hectares (or 17%) have already been transferred from white landowners to the state. An additional 3.08 million hectares have been transferred to black owners and 10.135 million hectares through private and state supported transactions including land restitution. </p>
<p>Adding 2.339 million hectares of land that was identified for restitution but for which communities elected to receive financial compensation as the means for restitution brings the total area of land rights that were restored since 1994 to 15.56 million hectares. This is equivalent to 20% of formerly white owned land. </p>
<p>We argue that things can happen much quicker if the arteries of land reform are unblocked.</p>
<p>One proposal is the creation of a Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency. Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000">announced</a> the creation of such a body in his state of the nation address in February 2021.</p>
<p>Here, we outline how the proposed agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control. The state’s only role would be to create an enabling environment. The heavy lifting would be the task of landowners, agribusinesses and large corporates. Their job would be to facilitate equitable and sustainable land reform. </p>
<p>We believe that the model set out below, with the agency as proposed by the president as the starting point, would give South Africa another chance to get a meaningful land reform programme under way. </p>
<p>The model could be the vehicle through which farmland can be returned to the majority of South Africans, with two notable differences to previous efforts. Firstly, it would ensure that beneficiaries weren’t being set up to fail, as has been the case in the past. Secondly, commercial farmers, who benefited from the past injustices, would have an opportunity – in a non-politicised way and with little red tape – to contribute meaningfully to land reform.</p>
<h2>How it would work</h2>
<p>The agency would ideally bring about national coordination, reduce red tape, and become a one-stop shop for issues related to a decentralised redistribution of agricultural land. This would not require additional fiscal outlays. It would, instead, use existing sources of material and other forms of support from the commercial agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The agency idea was developed out of proposals on decentralising land reform first set out in South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a> released in 2012. The ideas in the plan were echoed in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_0.pdf">a 2019 report</a> by the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture.</p>
<p>The central principle is to locate the responsibility of redistributive land reform with district-level land committees. These would design locally based solutions created on the dominant farming enterprises while considering an area’s community and social dynamics.</p>
<p>The agency would take the job of land acquisition and redistribution out of the government sphere and put the responsibility on the shoulders of those who have benefited from the previous regime. </p>
<p>At the district level, farmers, communities, agribusinesses and other private sector role players would craft local solutions within a framework managed by the agency.</p>
<p>Local District Land and Agricultural Development committees would be established within a particular area. They could comprise ten voting members (all bona fide farmers: five black and five white). This structure could then elect a chairperson and invite six other members (agribusinesses, banks, community and so on) to join. </p>
<p>The local committee would have to consult with all stakeholders in the area and register as a non-profit company with a memorandum of incorporation, a budget, and a board of directors. </p>
<p>The functions of the committee would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the listing of land, </p></li>
<li><p>the identification of potential beneficiaries in terms of objectively agreed criteria, </p></li>
<li><p>funding, training and support programmes, </p></li>
<li><p>monitoring of enterprises, and</p></li>
<li><p>liaison with government departments and the secretariat of the overarching national agency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The mechanism would not require the state to provide funds for land acquisition since the land would be made available by farmers and transferred to beneficiaries without any funding flows. </p>
<p>What’s being proposed is a form of “self-expropriation without compensation” but on the terms of the existing land owner. This implies that there are no legal processes required to get land for free. It is done automatically by the current landowner and will transfer land to the beneficiary of their choice.</p>
<h2>Success factors</h2>
<p>A number of critical success factors would need to be in place before any transaction was set up. These would include: access to land, ownership or long-term lease, skills, access to markets for inputs and selling products, funding, the exit strategy, and a supportive environment.</p>
<p>Simply put, the new farm enterprise on redistributed land should immediately be linked to commercial value chains.</p>
<p>The district committee would be responsible for coordinating and facilitating implementation in line with the agreed principles. </p>
<p>The national agency would be established by the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform, and Rural Development and supervised by a board of 12 members who would meet quarterly. A small secretariat would have funding and administrative capabilities to liaise with the local committees.</p>
<p>Its main functions would be to create enabling policies and smooth out bureaucratic logjams, set up a land reform fund, prescribe rules for the local committees and record and monitor progress with land transactions.</p>
<h2>Nudges</h2>
<p>To nudge current landowners to make land donations we propose:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Exemption on donation tax for land or finance donated for land reform purposes.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption on capital gains tax when land is transferred to a beneficiary or new entity.</p></li>
<li><p>Registration of title deeds and the important notarial links on the deed signalling the land reform status of the deed. The speedy transfer of title deeds and tradable long-term leases to beneficiaries, including those who occupy land already procured for land reform purposes, will go a long way to support the land reform process.</p></li>
<li><p>Exemption of transfer fees.</p></li>
<li><p>Some recognition mechanisms to upscale voluntary donations. This could be in the form of water rights and access to a land reform fund at beneficial interest rates. The awarding of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment scores could also be used. These were set up <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/29617s0.pdf">by government</a> to advance economic transformation and <a href="https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/fe87cd48/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment---basic-principles">increase the participation of black South Africans in the economy</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The empowerment recognition could also be provided to individuals or companies donating funds to a land reform fund.</p>
<p>What we are proposing is a way forward that avoids top-heavy, bureaucratic focused processes. The agency would largely operate virtually. It would only report on progress and make sure politicians weren’t hindering the redistribution of land. It would facilitate the process of redistribution of land by ensuring that incentives for donation and transfer of land were in place. </p>
<p>This would ensure limited opportunity for political rent-seeking, jobs for friends, and corruption.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz), and also a member of the South African President's Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agency could accelerate land reform by removing the process from political and bureaucratic control.Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch UniversityWandile Sihlobo, Visiting Research Fellow, Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486652020-10-26T15:17:54Z2020-10-26T15:17:54ZProblematic assumptions raise questions about South Africa’s new land reform plan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365238/original/file-20201023-16-1fzjk95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small-scale farming creates more jobs in South Africa.This one is in Soweto, Johannesburg.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sharon Seretlo/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government recently announced a plan to allocate 700,000 hectares of state land to black farmers. Exactly how many farms and beneficiaries this will involve is unclear. </p>
<p>But there’s a huge amount wrong with the idea.</p>
<p>First, it reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid land and agricultural policies, which do little to reduce unemployment or enhance rural livelihoods.</p>
<p>Public response has been mostly <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">positive in character</a>. But land researchers on the left of the political spectrum are asking searching questions about the origins of this land. Also about the status of its current occupiers, and whether the procedures announced provide sufficient safeguards against the process being <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/700-000-ha-of-state-land-redistributed/">captured by elites</a>.</p>
<p>From the right, the Institute of Race Relations think-tank asked why property rights on the allocated farms will continue to take the form of leases, rather than private title. It also asked how beneficiaries will <a href="https://irr.org.za/media/government2019s-new-land-plan-needs-to-do-better-iol">secure bank loans without collateral</a>.</p>
<p>The policy announcement does have some positive aspects. If achieved, the redistribution of 700,000ha in one year would indeed represent an acceleration of <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform">land reform</a>. The minister also acknowledged that the administration of state land had been deficient to date, and admitted that corruption was a problem. This is refreshingly frank talk from a department that has mostly been in denial about these problems.</p>
<p>But below the radar of public debate are other aspects of this initiative which are highly problematic. These include crippling assumptions in relation to farming systems and scale. </p>
<p>I argue that these reproduce the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy, which have done little to reduce unemployment or enhance the livelihoods of the rural poor.</p>
<h2>Key features</h2>
<p>The state will allocate farmland to successful applicants who must <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">show evidence of farming experience</a> or a willingness to learn. Allocations will be biased in favour of women, young people and the disabled. A compulsory training programme will focus on “entry level” knowledge, record keeping and financial management.</p>
<p>Rent will be paid to the state at rates aligned with local land values, and an option to purchase will be offered after 30 years. Beneficiaries must maintain state-owned infrastructure on farms, and regular inspections will take place. Investments in infrastructure must be recorded, valued and reported.</p>
<p>Given that some (unspecified) proportion of these farms is already occupied and used, a land enquiry process will investigate how such occupation came about. It will also look at whether the land is being used “in accordance with the agricultural practices of the area”, and whether occupiers can become beneficiaries.</p>
<h2>Worrying silences</h2>
<p>There’s a lot of detail that’s worryingly missing. For example, official statements neglect to specify how and when this land came to be acquired by the state, and how it has been managed to date. </p>
<p>Secondly, it is positive that weaknesses in land administration are acknowledged, but no details have been offered. It is also not at all clear that the root causes of the failures of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Pro-Active Land Acquisition policy</a> to date are being addressed. These include the absence of area-based planning, inadequate and poorly targeted financial support and a lack of effective extension advice. And the allocation procedures seem similar to those adopted during the presidency of Jacob Zuma, when corruption was rife and <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">elites were favoured</a>.</p>
<p>Nor are the criteria to be used in assessing the performance and productivity of beneficiaries specified, mirroring the lack of clarity on exactly how the suitability of applicants will be assessed.</p>
<p>The lack of clarity speaks to a much deeper problem – the adherence to a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150903498739">particular paradigm of agriculture</a> that I don’t believe is suited to what’s needed in South Africa in the 21st century. </p>
<h2>The wrong model</h2>
<p>The model of “farming” that underlies government’s policies for land and agricultural reform is one of modern, high-tech, large-scale commercial production of agricultural commodities by skilled business managers, in which economies of scale are paramount.</p>
<p>This largely unexamined choice has consequences. From within the paradigm, it is “common sense” that land reform beneficiaries should be “business-oriented”, with the potential to succeed in a highly competitive South African agricultural sector. Lip service is paid to the need to provide land to smallholder and “semi-commercial” farmers. But, in practice, the hegemonic model sidelines farmers operating small-scale farming systems, often successfully, despite inadequate support in a hostile economic environment.</p>
<p>Small-scale farming systems in South Africa tend to be labour rather than capital intensive, and have potential to create jobs <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">on a significant scale</a>. </p>
<p>They tend to focus on high-value horticultural crops, such as fresh vegetables, rather than mechanised dryland cropping systems in which economies of scale are pervasive. They also focus on extensive livestock production, including small stock such as sheep and goats. </p>
<p>Land reform’s current focus on promoting black, “emerging” commercial farmers means that relatively few people – likely to be either middle class already or aspiring entrepreneurs – gain access to a <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">small number of medium-scale farms</a>. Problems with this include high rates of failure, partly due to over-gearing of the new farm enterprises and crippling debt. This is partly due to lack of appropriate planning and support.</p>
<p>These issues need to be understood in the context of a changing agrarian structure. A 2017 <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">census</a> of commercial farming revealed that 67% of income in South African agriculture is earned by only 2,610 farms, 6.5% of the total. They have annual turnover of over R22.5 million (about US$1.3 million) and employ 51% of all workers. Farms earning around R1 million annually or below number 25,000, or 62% of the total, but earn only 2% of total income.</p>
<p>It would seem that black land reform beneficiaries on under-capitalised medium-scale farms are being set up to join the ranks of these marginal commercial producers. Why?</p>
<p>Aspirant black commercial farmers should benefit from land redistribution. But a narrow focus on only this category of beneficiary is likely to end in tears. And the potential of redistribution to create a large number of new jobs is being missed. In the context of massive and <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/1.-Spaull-et-al.-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-2-Synthesis-Findings..pdf">growing unemployment</a>, a middle class land reform agenda is an affront to the transformative promise of post-apartheid democracy.</p>
<p>Detailed recommendations on an alternative approach are available. A recent study for the Treasury Department provided detailed empirical evidence of the potential for employment growth through land redistribution aimed primarily at smallholders and <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">small-scale commercial black farmers</a>. It has received little attention from policymakers, including those managing the development of government’s draft <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Agri-parks/Cammisa/BOJANALA-Agri-Park-MBP-April2016.pdf">Agricultural Master Plan</a>.</p>
<h2>Urgent need to rethink land redistribution</h2>
<p>The social and economic crisis that has followed the COVID-19 pandemic is already shaking the foundations of South Africa’s democracy. Questions of unequal land ownership, always profoundly political, are unlikely to fade away. </p>
<p>Unless addressed, they will contribute to further dissatisfaction with the status quo, creating fertile ground for authoritarian forms of populism.</p>
<p>It is urgent that land policies provide real opportunities to create jobs, increase the incomes of the poor and enhance livelihoods. A focus on small-scale farmers is the most practical way to do so. But once again, the Agriculture Minister and her department appear to have their heads in the sand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins has received funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa, and from the European Union</span></em></p>The new initiative reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy. These have done little to improve the livelihoods of the poor.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1369142020-05-05T12:19:46Z2020-05-05T12:19:46ZActivist farmers in Brazil feed the hungry and aid the sick as president downplays coronavirus crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332008/original/file-20200501-42942-pkvb75.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C25%2C4301%2C2742&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mass grave for COVID-19 victims in Brazil, which has more total cases than anywhere else in Latin America, Manaus, April 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/april-2020-brazil-manaus-cemetery-workers-followed-by-news-photo/1211296557?adppopup=true">Chico Batata via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For months, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil has <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-like-trump-brazils-bolsonaro-puts-the-economy-ahead-of-his-people-during-coronavirus-136351">insisted the coronavirus is not a serious threat</a>. Beyond instituting a national lockdown in mid-March, his government has left 209 million Brazilians largely without federal help during the pandemic. </p>
<p>Brazil has the most confirmed COVID-19 cases in Latin America: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage">101,826 infections COVID-19 cases and 7,051 deaths</a> as of May 4. Nonetheless Bolsonaro continues shaking hands, hugging supporters and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/in-brazil-jair-bolsonaro-trumps-close-ally-dangerously-downplays-the-coronavirus-risk">pushing to reopen the country</a>. In April he fired his health minister for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazils-bolsonaro-meets-with-replacements-as-health-minister-firing-looms-idUSKBN21Y338">promoting social distancing</a>.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/27/jair-bolsonaro-coronavirus-brazil-governors-appalled">governors are defying</a> the right-wing Bolsonaro’s calls to restart the economy, and Brazil’s Congress recently approved a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil-hunger-feat/specter-of-hunger-rises-in-brazil-as-coronavirus-wrecks-incomes-idUSKCN22320F">monthly cash payment of US$114 to help 54 million newly unemployed workers</a> – less than the $<a href="https://www.dieese.org.br/analisecestabasica/salarioMinimo.html">190 national minimum wage</a>. </p>
<p>Since other federal aid does not appear to be forthcoming, neighborhood associations, churches, community groups and unions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/14/were-abandoned-to-our-own-luck-coronavirus-menaces-brazils-favelas">are stepping in to support</a> struggling Brazilians. </p>
<p>One of Brazil’s civilian-led initiatives goes well beyond <a href="https://citylimits.org/2020/04/03/mutual-aid-movement-playing-huge-role-in-covid-19-crisis/">the average mutual aid society</a>. Drawing on its vast network of farms, doctors, schools and restaurants, an activist group called the Landless Workers Movement is providing food, medical care and other pandemic support to hundreds of thousands of Brazilians nationwide.</p>
<h2>Landless workers change Brazil</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mstbrazil.org/content/history-mst">Landless Workers Movement was born</a> in 1984, after groups of landless families began to occupy rural estates that were laying fallow. </p>
<p>Brazil has <a href="http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/brazil-eng/Chaper%207%20.htm#N_1">extremely unequal land distribution</a>. One percent of the population owns about 50% of the arable land. </p>
<p>Because Brazilian law requires land to be used for a “<a href="http://people.missouristate.edu/gabrielondetti/assets/Property_Brazil_Ondetti.pdf">social function</a>,” the occupations effectively forced the government to buy up these estates and allow squatters to farm there, not through a land deed but through “use rights.” </p>
<p>Since 1984 the Landless Workers Movement has <a href="http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-03353-2.html">won such land access for 1.5 million aspiring farmers</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332006/original/file-20200501-42946-1n2zh8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement building a home on occupied land in Mato Grosso state, 2000.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/landless-workers-movement-in-brazil-on-november-28-2000-news-photo/124130231?adppopup=true">Patrick SICCOLI/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My research on this <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/occupying-schools-occupying-land-9780190870324?cc=us&lang=en&">Brazilian agricultural movement</a> examines what happens to rural squatters after they win land. New farmers need more than land – they need a home, schools for their children, health care, seeds, fertilizer and, often, training.</p>
<p>As an activist movement, the Landless Workers Movement organizes rallies and protests pushing the Brazilian government to support agricultural communities. More unusually, however, it also has a network of institutions dedicated to serving Brazilian squatter farmers. </p>
<p>In partnership with state and local governments in 23 of Brazil’s 26 states, Landless Workers activists help to run 170 community health clinics, 100 agricultural cooperatives, 66 food processing factories and 1,900 farmer associations, according to the <a href="https://mst.org.br/nossa-producao/">movement’s own count</a>. </p>
<p>These jointly operated services, developed over the past 35 years, are largely funded by the government but staffed and governed by the Landless Workers Movement. </p>
<p>As I documented in <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/occupying-schools-occupying-land-9780190870324?cc=us&lang=en&">my 2019 book</a> on the Landless Workers education initiatives, the group also runs 2,000 primary and secondary schools and co-manages degree programs at 80 universities. Its education system has served more than 400,000 students since 1984.</p>
<h2>Solidarity in practice</h2>
<p>Now, all these resources are being redirected toward the coronavirus pandemic. </p>
<p>The movement has donated over 500 tons of produce like watermelons and yucca to hospitals and poor neighborhoods, transformed <a href="https://mst.org.br/2019/09/05/armazem-do-campo-sp-completa-tres-anos-de-luta-e-resistencia/">six urban cafes</a> into <a href="https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2020/03/26/igreja-e-mst-criam-cozinha-solidaria-para-alimentar-populacao-de-rua-em-pe.htm">soup kitchens</a> for the homeless and converted some <a href="https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/03/30/mst-oferece-centro-de-formacao-paulo-freire-como-hospital-de-campanha-em-caruaru-pe">education buildings into makeshift hospitals</a> staffed in part by its 130 affiliated doctors. </p>
<p>The Landless Workers Movement is also running a blood donation campaign and producing <a href="https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/04/02/acao-solidaria-cooperativa-do-mst-doa-alcool-70-para-hospital-no-parana">rubbing alcohol</a>, soap and face masks for local clinics. </p>
<p>Some 10,000 teachers who belong to the Landless Workers Movement are helping Brazilian public schools adapt to remote learning. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332044/original/file-20200501-42946-hfbwnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Landless Workers volunteers load produce for distribution during the coronavirus pandemic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ronaldo Rodríguez</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To a public steeped in <a href="https://time.com/5816243/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-coronavirus-governors/">President Bolsonaro’s coronavirus skepticism</a>, the movement’s national communications network of newspapers, radio, social media and live streaming – normally used to share organization news – is now broadcasting health information. </p>
<p>Though the Landless Workers Movement is a rural initiative, its pandemic response <a href="https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/03/26/armazem-do-campo-sedia-campanha-solidaria-por-conta-do-covid-19-em-recife">operates in cities, too</a>. </p>
<p>To feed hungry families in Santa Maria da Boa Vista, a poor municipality in northeastern Brazil, activist Ronaldo Rodriguez asked his fellow Landless Workers for donations. In just one day, he told me, his team collected three tons of produce from farmers who’d obtained their land with the movement’s help.</p>
<p>“We are practicing social distancing but also community solidarity,” said Rodriguez, a rural school supervisor who graduated college with assistance from the Landless Workers Movement. </p>
<h2>‘Stay home but not silent’</h2>
<p>Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement is an exception to the rule that grassroots movements avoid partnering with government. Activists typically see their role as <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9781783710454/change-the-world-without-taking-power/">pressuring government from the outside</a> and fear that working with government allows politicians to <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/131609/poor-peoples-movements-by-frances-fox-piven-and-richard-cloward/">co-opt, or take over, their cause</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332046/original/file-20200501-42962-ublbtb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yucca and other fresh produce grown on land that once sat fallow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ronaldo Rodriguez</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Criticism of government remains central to the Landless Workers Movement’s work. With other activist groups, the Landless Workers Movement is <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2020/04/plataformaFINAL.pdf">demanding that the Bolsonaro administration</a> support quarantine efforts, invest in public health and send food and financial assistance to Brazilians. </p>
<p>“The current government has done nothing to help,” says Indiane Witcel, a 26-year-old economist who works as an accountant in one of the movement’s agricultural cooperatives, <a href="http://www.coopan.com.br/">COOPAN</a>.</p>
<p>Witcel was born at COOPAN, in Rio Grande do Sul state, near Brazil’s border with Uruguay, back when it was a squatter encampment. Her mother helped occupy and cultivate the land using the Landless Workers Movement’s preferred <a href="http://rio20.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/altieri_en.pdf">sustainable farming methods</a>. </p>
<p>Since the coronavirus pandemic began, COOPAN has donated 12 tons of its organic rice to poor urban neighborhoods in nearby Porto Alegre city. </p>
<p>“Solidarity should be part of everyday practice,” Witcel told me. “Now more than ever when so many people are in difficult situations.” </p>
<p>With hospitals already <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/brazil-s-doctors-fight-coronavirus-pandemic-while-they-struggle-bolsonaro-n1179461">overflowing</a> with patients and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil-cases/brazil-likely-has-12-times-more-coronavirus-cases-than-official-count-study-finds-idUSKCN21V1X1">COVID-19 infections still climbing</a>, Brazil’s already difficult situation is likely to worsen. </p>
<p>The Landless Workers Movement has a message for Brazilians during this crisis, promoted on Twitter and in its media outlets. Like its coronavirus response, the hashtag slogan combines pandemic assistance with an implicit <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-like-trump-brazils-bolsonaro-puts-the-economy-ahead-of-his-people-during-coronavirus-136351">rebuke to Brazil’s president</a>. </p>
<p>It’s #FicaEmCasaMasNãoEmSilêncio: “<a href="https://twitter.com/mst_oficial?lang=en">Stay home but not silent</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Tarlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a Latin American country hard hit by COVID-19, an agricultural collective is stepping in to help where government won’t, mounting an astonishing national pandemic response.Rebecca Tarlau, Assistant Professor of Education and of Labor and Employment Relations, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1312222020-02-12T14:12:13Z2020-02-12T14:12:13ZWhy Kenya’s Mau Mau gave up their fight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313680/original/file-20200205-149796-1m32hke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A statue of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, who was killed in 1957. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">K. Gituma/Wikimedia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 40 years, successive Kenyan governments turned their back on the Mau Mau. The armed movement sprang up in the early 1950s in protest over colonial land alienation, economic inequalities and political oppression under British rule. Outlawed in 1952, it was crushed in a brutal campaign in which more than <a href="https://www.weidenfeldandnicolson.co.uk/titles/david-anderson/histories-of-the-hanged/9781780222882/">10,000 Mau Mau fighters were killed</a>. Its leader, Dedan Kimathi, was killed in 1957. </p>
<p>A few years later, in 1963, Kenya became independent with Jomo Kenyatta as founding leader. <a href="https://books.google.at/books?id=AmFVjigwkxwC&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">The new government</a> was made up of so-called “moderates”, rather than the “radicals” who had supported Mau Mau claims.</p>
<p>Kenyatta’s relationship to the movement was ambiguous. The British arrested him in 1952 on suspicion of being one of its leaders. But after independence his pleas to <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/9781526111890/9781526111890.00021.xml">“forgive and forget the past”</a> were often accompanied by a clear dissociation from the Mau Mau. He continued to describe them as a <a href="https://books.google.at/books/about/Suffering_Without_Bitterness.html?id=ce33ngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">“disease”</a> and they remained banned under Kenyatta and his successor <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel arap Moi</a>.</p>
<p>In 2003 Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, lifted the ban on the movement. For many, the 40-year clampdown meant its contribution to Kenyan independence had been <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/mau-mau-and-nationhood-pb.html">actively erased from national memory</a> since independence. </p>
<p>Though the reasons why the successive Kenyan governments did not want to talk about Mau Mau history <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/cea_0008-0055_1995_num_35_137_2026">are no longer a mystery</a>, one question remains: why did the resilient Mau Mau freedom fighters fail to maintain revolutionary action after independence? </p>
<p>The research I conducted for my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-and-the-presidency-in-kenya/05E72D9730B9ECD45175F416108E51B7#fndtn-information">Power and the Presidency in Kenya: the Jomo Kenyatta Years, 1958-1978</a>, suggests some reasons.</p>
<h2>Mau Mau resilience</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1354521?scroll=top&needAccess=true">attention</a> to Mau Mau post-colonial history was first caught by an archival file held in the <a href="http://www.archives.go.ke/">Kenyan National Archives</a>. In it were various intelligence reports received by the provincial commissioner of the (then) Eastern Province, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Powerful-Coast-PC-who-used-connections-to-mint-millions/440808-2907916-ms78i9z/index.html">Eliud Mahihu</a>, around the years 1964 and 1965. </p>
<p>Based on these reports, Meru district stood out as a particularly sensitive area. There, Mau Mau fighters holed up in the forests refused to surrender. Whereas virtually all Mau Mau leaders had either been killed or coopted in what was then Central Province, fighters in Meru held firm. Field Marshal Mwariama, Field Marshal Baimungi Marete and General Chui (originally from Central Province) were among them. </p>
<p>Their actions and movements were closely monitored by security officers and informers. The government’s fear was that if not dispersed from their forest camp, the remaining fighters and recently released Mau Mau detainees would form a separate movement. The revival of Mau Mau was a threat to the new political order. </p>
<p>Archival files document how the Kenyan government was trying to neutralise resilient Mau Mau fighters. Ministers and government officials repeatedly toured Meru district offering amnesty for those who would surrender. Police action to clear the forest risked being highly unpopular and even unproductive.</p>
<p>In the end the government chose to coopt remaining leaders, or target them. Mwariama finally surrendered early in 1964. The government hoped to use him as an intermediary to negotiate with Baimungi and Chui – in vain.</p>
<p>This resilience risked strengthening the voice of the populist opposition, whose main demand was that land alienated by colonisers be redistributed for free. The government, on the other hand, was driving its land policy of <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-473158-knv82wz/index.html">“willing buyer, willing seller”</a>. </p>
<p>On 26 January 1965 Baimungi and Chui were both killed by police. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313682/original/file-20200205-149789-1ucoy8x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Baimungi and Mwariama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ambiguous relationship</h2>
<p>The story did not end in 1965. Silencing the Mau Mau movement was also about sending subtle but powerful messages to the restive Meru population. A member of their tribe, <a href="https://mambo.hypotheses.org/963">Jackson Angaine</a>, held the powerful position of Minister for Lands.</p>
<p>As the archives reveal, Angaine was in close contact with both provincial commissioner Mahihu and President Kenyatta about the situation in Meru. But the archives did not reveal much about the relationship between Angaine and the Mau Mau, so I decided to find out more through field work. Meru politicians who had been active in the 1960s and Mau Mau veterans filled out the picture. They helped me to situate Angaine within Meru politics.</p>
<p>In 1954, Angaine was arrested and briefly detained by the colonial authorities. It remains unclear whether this was primarily because he was suspected of belonging to the Mau Mau movement, or because he was accused of the murder of his wife. He was acquitted for lack of proof. </p>
<p>Still, his detention helped to establish him as a follower of the movement. Kenyatta certainly knew that, just like himself, Angaine had an ambiguous relationship to the Mau Mau movement. Appointing him as Minister for Lands would send a positive message to the Meru people. They would believe that the minister in charge of land redistribution was a local follower of the movement. </p>
<p>And so the “willing buyer, willing seller” land policy could quietly go on. The British government was relieved that there would no radical land redistribution that could undermine its interests in Kenya. The new Kenyan government officials could get British loans to buy colonial land and strengthen their control over the country’s main economic resource. Left out of the equation were the <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498506991/Mau-Mau-Crucible-of-War-Statehood-National-Identity-and-Politics-of-Postcolonial-Kenya">landless poor people who would have to wait</a> longer for the promise of land to be fulfilled.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on the research I conducted for my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-and-the-presidency-in-kenya/05E72D9730B9ECD45175F416108E51B7#fndtn-information">Power and the Presidency in Kenya: the Jomo Kenyatta Years, 1958-1978</a> (Cambridge University Press, 2020).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resilient Mau Mau freedom fighters failed to maintain revolutionary action after independence.Anaïs Angelo, Postdoctoral research fellow, Universität WienLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140922019-03-26T14:04:33Z2019-03-26T14:04:33ZLand reform in South Africa is doomed unless freed from political point-scoring<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265616/original/file-20190325-36264-15z7oq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Villagers till their fields in South Africa's North West Province. Access to land for small holder farmers remains unresolved.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Jon Hrusa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black landlessness has become a convenient weapon for political populists in South Africa. With elections around the corner, the lingering questions about land reform are ever more crucial and timely. But, challenging questions need to be debated if a radical land reform programme is to be realised.</p>
<p>The pace of land reform has been slow since South Africa’s first democratic elections 25 years ago. Recent <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf">findings</a> confirm that the land reform programme has done very little to achieve equitable distribution and access to land for black South Africans. </p>
<p>By 2017 less than 10% (8.13 million ha) of agricultural land had been transferred through land reform. </p>
<p>The latest political wave of calls for land reform has resonance because millions of black South Africans remain landless and poor. This has led to the issue becoming a potent weapon in the hand of populist politicians. </p>
<p>All hopes for radical land reform have been placed on the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-approves-process-amend-section-25-constitution">amendment</a> of Section 25 of the Constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation. This drastic step could be seen as a strategy by the African National Congress (ANC) to take the wind out of the radical Economic Freedom Fighter’s political sails.</p>
<p>In fact the two parties are much more interested in attracting voters than in genuinely addressing longstanding racial inequalities. As a result many vital questions remain poorly explored. And most are lost in the political noise about land expropriation without compensation.</p>
<p>Some of these questions include: how should land for expropriation and redistribution be identified? Who should benefit from land redistribution in rural areas and which institutions should deliver?</p>
<h2>How should land be identified?</h2>
<p>Where should the country look for land for the accelerated redistribution programme? </p>
<p>Some argue that land redistribution should target tax-indebted farmland (or farms that are financially distressed). Others argue that state-owned land should be the primary target for <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land redistribution</a>.</p>
<p>There’s also a strong argument made by some that the majority of landless people are more interested in relatively smaller pieces of land (0.1 - 1 ha) which they can use for <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">household food production</a>. This land could be acquired closer to the large and small urban centres. </p>
<p>But for black commercial farmers to thrive, a distinction has to be made between black small-scale and large-scale farmers. And their different needs must be prioritised when <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">land transfers</a> are being considered.</p>
<p>Others propose a more radical approach that promotes the division of large farms into smaller farms and a radical redistribution that will include decongestion of densely populated urban and <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">rural areas</a>. </p>
<p>Buying land from the current owners is just one of many means of land acquisition that could be pursued. Others include expropriation, donations, release of public land, reviews of unjust leases over public land and, in some instances, granting legal recognition to land occupiers where necessary. </p>
<h2>Who should benefit?</h2>
<p>Prof Michael Aliber, an agricultural economist at University of Fort Hare, argues for an approach to land redistribution that acknowledges the wide range of reasons people want land. This approach should cater for:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the relatively small number of people who want large plots on which to pursue large-scale commercial farming;</p></li>
<li><p>the larger number of people who want small-to-medium plots on which to farm as commercial smallholders, and</p></li>
<li><p>the still larger number of people who want small pieces of land for tenure security and food security. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>For most of the past 20 years, the land redistribution programme has sought to cater to only the first of these three groups.</p>
<p>Aliber argues that the overemphasis on large scale farms has significantly slowed the pace of land reform and led to the capture of the redistribution project by well-connected elites. Yet the primary beneficiaries of land reform should be landless black people and other historically marginalised groups. These include evicted farm workers and farm dwellers, unemployed urban and rural people, women and other rural people who live on communal land.</p>
<h2>Can the state still be trusted to deliver?</h2>
<p>There’s still a great deal of disagreement about which institutions should drive land reform. The poor performance by the ANC government in addressing the land issue, particularly its inadequate support for black land reform beneficiaries and farmers in communal areas over the past 25 years, has seriously depleted public confidence in the role of state in land reform.</p>
<p>For land reform to work, redistribution should focus beyond land transfer. It should begin to focus on providing adequate support for new farmers. Which institutions can deliver on this crucial undertaking? Is it the state, business, civil society or a collective effort? </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, the mounting scepticism about the capacity and political will of the state to deliver is warranted, given the failures of the ANC-led government. </p>
<p>This points to the fact that private sector support remains crucial in promoting commercial agriculture. But, then again, some are still sceptical about the private sector. For land rights activist <a href="http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/10_Advocate-of-the-New-Left.pdf">Mazibuko Jara</a>, the state and civil society <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">need to play a key role</a>.</p>
<p>A land debate left only to vote-hungry politicians is doomed. For politicians, black landlessness is nothing more than a political tool – hence the landless poor have been voting since 1994 but are still without land.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on debates at a <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land reform conference</a> hosted by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (University of Western Cape (UWC)), University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University in February at UWC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sonwabile Mnwana receives funding from the Open Society Foundation-South Africa and the Southern Centre for Inequlaity Studies - Wits University. </span></em></p>Land reform programme has done very little to improve access to land for black South Africans.Sonwabile Mnwana, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Fort HareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.