tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/left-wing-politics-36242/articlesLeft wing politics – The Conversation2020-04-04T10:01:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1355822020-04-04T10:01:27Z2020-04-04T10:01:27ZKeir Starmer elected as Labour party leader – so, who is he?<p>Party leaders matter more than ever in today’s politics. They embody their parties in the public’s mind and, for many voters, assessing a leader is a cognitive shortcut simplifying the process of electoral choice. So, Keir Starmer’s election as the UK’s Labour party leader, defeating Rebecca Long-Bailey (the “continuity candidate”) and Lisa Nandy, will have a major effect on the party’s prospects for revival.</p>
<p>Starmer starts in the job during a global crisis that few can have anticipated. At this moment in time, it’s impossible even to guess the political consequences of the Coronavirus epidemic, though they are bound to be profound. It’s pointless to speculate how the pandemic will affect Starmer’s leadership, other than much will depend on his capacity to inspire trust and confidence in an age of fear, anxiety and insecurity.</p>
<p>Starmer was only elected to parliament in 2015. He therefore enters his new role with less political experience than any of his predecessors. But he has accumulated invaluable experience outside politics. On joining the bar, he rapidly established himself as one of the brightest barristers of his generation. In 2002, he was appointed a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen%27s_Counsel">Queen’s Counsel</a> (QC) and became joint head of Doughty Street Chambers (Amal Clooney was a colleague) specialising in human rights cases. </p>
<p>In 2008, he was appointed to one of the most senior positions in the judicial system, becoming director of public prosecutions (DPP) and <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps">head of the Crown Prosecution Service</a> (CPS), staying in the post until 2013. He was held in high regard in the profession and, in 2014, received a knighthood for services to law and criminal justice. Those who worked with him attest to his integrity, his meticulous attention to detail, his diligence and his keen forensic skills.</p>
<p>In 2016, a year after his election, Starmer joined the shadow cabinet in the crucial role of shadow Brexit secretary. He tended to be low key, avoiding controversy and the factional battles tearing the party apart. However, relations with the Corbyn wing of the party could be tense.</p>
<p>During the leadership contest, some on the left depicted Starmer as a classic establishment figure – well-groomed, well-spoken and a knight to boot. More seriously, he was held responsible for the crushing 2019 election defeat for his determined advocacy of a second Brexit referendum and his close association with the Remainer cause. On more personal grounds, he was disparaged (and not only by Corbyistas) as bland, wooden, lacking in personality and charm and with no capacity to enthuse.</p>
<p>Surprisingly little is known about Starmer’s political beliefs or ideological standpoint. For virtually all his life as an MP, he has served on the frontbench, which means he has been constrained by the conventions of collective responsibility from articulating his views outside his own brief. So while we know much about his views as a human rights lawyer on matters of civil liberty and criminal justice, we know little of his thinking on questions of social and economic policy. </p>
<p>However, he has also been careful to avoid aligning with either the more vociferous Labour tribes – the Blairites and the Corbynistas – and most people surmise (in my view accurately) that his sympathies lie on the soft left of the party.</p>
<p>The implications of Starmer’s triumph for Labour’s policy is, as yet, unclear. But there is no doubt there will be a major change in leadership style. Here it may be useful to apply sociologist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40015266?seq=1">Max Weber’s distinction</a> between leadership that follows the “ethic of ultimate ends” and that which is shaped by the “ethic of responsibility”.</p>
<p>The believer in an ethic of ultimate ends views their task as a single-minded dedication to a cause and his unquestioned faith in his values. This was the ethic that regulated Corbyn’s conduct as leader, as manifested by his conviction that he always occupied the moral high ground, that he possessed a monopoly on political rectitude and that those who disagreed were motivated by malign intentions.</p>
<p>The “ethic of responsibility” is governed by the idea that the ethical order is, by nature, pluralist and that people can quite legitimately, and in good faith, disagree. In this model, dictates of morality are rarely unambiguous and leadership should be judged not by the purity of its intentions but by results. </p>
<p>Starmer’s record as a lawyer, his performance as a frontbencher and his personal disposition all suggest that his conception of leadership will follow this path. One can, therefore, predict that he will give priority to binding party fractures and to managing the party though persuasion, conciliation and coalition-building.</p>
<p>In a “broad church” approach, he will try to integrate senior figures on the Corbyn left (such as Long-Bailey) in the collective leadership. But he is no doubt aware that some will be irreconcilable. Given that the Corbyn left is well entrenched in the governing National Executive Council (though they will lose their majority), the constituency parties and some unions, it will be interesting to see how Starmer responds. </p>
<p>Corbyn decisively failed due to an inability to establish a rapport with the bulk of the electorate. To forge such a rapport, leaders must be able not only to articulate the party’s policies and principles with clarity and conviction but also <a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685936.001.0001/acprof-9780199685936">evoke confidence</a> in their capacity to discharge the responsibilities of government.</p>
<p>Starmer in his public appearances has demonstrated that he has the capacity to communicate fluently and persuasively, to master complex briefs and to think on his feet. He may not come over as a charismatic figure, nor one equipped with great oratorical skills. Nor one, indeed, one who can electrify his audience. But perhaps, in these very troubled circumstances, people are looking for a calm, steady and reassuring hand at the till.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Shaw received funding from the Carnegie Foundation and the ESRC. He is a member of the Labour party </span></em></p>Much is known about the new leader’s career but very little about his political positions.Eric Shaw, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1220792019-08-21T11:21:06Z2019-08-21T11:21:06ZWhat is a ‘moderate’ politician? Four key tests<p>The term “moderate” is thrown around an awful lot. We’re given to understand that Pete Buttigieg, Beto O’Rourke and Amy Klobuchar are <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/warren-and-sanders-are-democrats-new-insiders/595156/">moderates</a> currently running for the US presidency. As I show in my book <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/march-of-the-moderates-9781788317344/">March of the Moderates</a>, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder, and Bill Clinton were leading moderates in the ascendancy two decades ago. Meanwhile, many commentators would assert that Donald Trump and Jeremy Corbyn definitely aren’t moderate.</p>
<p>Given how often we use term “moderate”, it deserves a bit of unpacking. We can all assert moderate or extreme positions on various issues. We all have different views on tax and spending, for example, and these often vary according to national contexts. Like the terms “progressive” or “liberal”, the concept of being moderate is pretty malleable.</p>
<p>Yet I’d argue there are four key criteria to moderate politics. These might be imperfect, but they do at least capture a sense of the matter.</p>
<h2>Are the party and the people on the same page?</h2>
<p>The first move must be to “moderate” between your party and the electorate.</p>
<p>Let’s face it, joining a political party is a pretty weird endeavour. About <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05125">one million</a> British citizens are members of political parties – around 2% of the adult population. That’s about the same number of Britons who <a href="https://www.thinkbox.tv/Research/Barb-data/Top-programmes-report?tag=Channel5">currently watch</a> the Australian soap Neighbours. In both cases, these are figures well down on their heyday. </p>
<p>This is a problem – because the types of people who are political tend to be very political.</p>
<p>To secure a party’s nomination, candidates often must gain the backing of a trade union or business association. This might require flirting with an extreme position or two - often rampant nationalisation for candidates of the Labour left, or uncosted tax cuts for the Conservative right - <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-says-cash-available-17281327">as seen recently with Boris Johnson</a>. But then, in order to win an election among the wider public, they may well need to stand up to union brinkmanship, or take on corporate vested interests.</p>
<p>This switch is not easy, but it is necessary. Otherwise we end up with politicians ranting to the converted. A recent case of particular importance is Johnson’s presentation of a no-deal Brexit as the will of the British people (the majority of whom are known to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/no-deal-brexit-boris-public-opinion-poll-against-delay-cancel-second-referendum-a9062686.html">oppose it</a>) rather than the will of his party (the majority of whom <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-supporters-want-no-deal-brexit-and-less-talk-of-climate-change-new-survey-of-party-members-reveals-118633">support it</a>). Some sense of what is moderate outside your own echo chamber is vital.</p>
<h2>What are rivals doing?</h2>
<p>The second moderating factor is between one’s party and the other side. Basically, the other team will occasionally have a point. Accepting this is good tactics and good policy. Blair did not undo the broad architecture of Margaret Thatcher’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22076774">trade union reforms</a>, for example. Clinton understood that voters had quite liked Ronald Reagan’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?destination=%2farchive%2fpolitics%2f1980%2f10%2f24%2fdefense-policy-the-reagan-approach%2fbe641e85-e6b0-4c9e-8ab5-6e3cbfe6a012%2f%3f">tough talking defence policy</a>. And David Cameron rightly bought some of the socially liberal ends of New Labour. Crucially, the people agreed, and these figures all won elections.</p>
<p>This doesn’t mean abandoning your big goals. A national minimum wage and public service investment for New Labour, hiking tax credits for the New Democrats, or reducing the deficit for the Cameron coalition. All these things still happened. But a little light and shade doesn’t hurt, particularly in an age of hung parliaments, or adversarial relationships between the White House and Congress.</p>
<h2>What’s coming out of their mouth?</h2>
<p>Thirdly, moderate candidates talk moderately. They accept that there are limitations to what can and should be said. This is not pussyfooting around or being overly politically correct. If you dehumanise sections of the electorate you not only cut them off for voting for you, but in believing in the democratic process at all – and that has consequences.</p>
<p>Moderates accept that politics is about compromise, and maybe that is not such a bad thing. Calling Hillary Clinton “crooked” or Biden “sleepy” might win you an election, but it harms the health of the broader polity.</p>
<h2>Are they selling change too hard?</h2>
<p>Finally, moderate politicians moderate between the past and the future. In 1992, US media strategist James Carville pitched Bill Clinton as the candidate of “change versus more of the same”. In 1997, New Labour declared that “Things Can Only Get Better”. These were both accurate, and summed up the achievements both would indeed deliver. Projecting such ambitious visions for the future certainly is important. </p>
<p>But such figures also recognise that the electorate is often fundamentally conservative in many ways. They look backwards, and view change cautiously – in some areas <a href="http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39284/bsa35_full-report.pdf">even suspiciously</a>. If you throw a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/march-of-the-moderates-9781788317344/">George McGovern</a> or <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/08/jeremy-corbyns-fans-should-look-what-happened-michael-foot">Michael Foot</a>-style kitchen sink at voters, or indeed a Corbyn-sized one, a significant caucus will rise against you.</p>
<p>This is particularly true for the left. Put an immoderate left-wing candidate against an immoderate right-wing one, and the right nearly always wins. Think <a href="https://psmag.com/news/explaining-an-election-1984-edition">Reagan vs Walter Mondale</a> and, in some ways, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_United_States_presidential_election">George Bush vs Michael Dukakis</a>, too. The genius of Blair and Clinton was to recognise that politics, particularly from opposition, is generally conducted on a conservative playing field. Big change has to be sold cautiously, and with trade offs elsewhere.</p>
<p>I’m not pretending that these rules are without problems. Nor that they capture every conceivable “moderate” candidate. But in an age where a lot of mud is thrown it is best to be as precise as possible. With Americans <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/247016/conservatives-greatly-outnumber-liberals-states.aspx">more likely</a> to describe themselves as “moderate” than “liberal” in 49 of the 50 states (Maine is the exception), such politics forms the best Democratic route back to the White House. Like alcohol or food consumption, everything may be best in moderation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding moderate politics can help us navigate the extremes of the current age.Richard Carr, Lecturer in History and Politics, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179272019-05-29T12:43:19Z2019-05-29T12:43:19ZHow Germany’s Green party took on the far right to become a major political force<p>A green wave has flooded Europe in the 2019 European elections. The big winners of the night were the German Greens, who took <a href="https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/index.html">20.5%.</a> of the national vote, almost doubling their 10.7% share from 2014. This best ever result is even more significant given the exceptionally high turnout in Germany of <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/previous-elections">61.4%</a>. </p>
<p>The German Greens will now be represented by 21 MEPs – ten more than in the last parliament. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats (SPD) suffered a historic defeat, losing 12 of their MEPs. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) lost five. </p>
<p>These staggering pro-Green results in the European elections have firmly put environmentalism on the political agenda within both Germany and Europe. The once dominant European Parliament party groups of the centre right and the centre left have lost their majority, which means the Green bloc could become kingmakers. Both sides will need support from the Greens to create broad pro-EU majorities, giving the group a strengthened hand to push for real, European, ecological change. </p>
<h2>A real alternative</h2>
<p>In eight months of PhD fieldwork on the Greens in Berlin, Kiel and Stuttgart, I have some observations about how the party has transformed to become the main political challenger in Germany – a country known best for its economy and car manufacturers. </p>
<p>The German Greens have no doubt benefited from their perceived competence on climate change and increased awareness of the need for proactive environmental protection. But they are also deliberately repositioning themselves as a real alternative to the parties of government. And the approach seems to be working. The party welcomed more than <a href="https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-02/mitgliederzahlen-gruene-rekord-zuwachs-partei-ostdeutschland">10,000 new members in 2018</a> alone, a figure that continues to rise.</p>
<p>The Greens have further cemented their status by taking strong positions on issues beyond the environment. They are emphatically pro-Europe, and anti-racism and the far right. </p>
<p>During my fieldwork, I found that this issue has been just as important as climate change for those joining the party. Membership numbers started to rapidly increase, for instance, as the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the national parliament. Rather than pander to the AfD’s anti-immigration rhetoric, as other political parties have done, the Greens have taken a very adversarial approach to the newcomers. </p>
<p>When the AfD made a formal complaint to parliament in February 2018 about a speech by National Green MP Cem Özdemir <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/oezdemirs-bundestagsrede-zur-afd-deutschland-ist-staerker-als-es-ihr-hass-jemals-sein-wird/21003244.html">accusing the AfD of racism and censorship</a>, Green politicians hit back. Green MEP Sven Giegold collected instances of AfD politicians being racist and Islamophobic so that the party could put forward its own complaint to the same all-party parliamentary committee and <a href="https://sven-giegold.de/nehmt-der-afd-die-maske-runter-schickt-uns-belege-fuer-den-rassismus-der-afd-fuer-den-aeltestenrat-des-bundestags/">then published them on his website</a>.</p>
<h2>Groundswell</h2>
<p>This positioning of the party as an alternative happens on the streets as much as in institutions. The German Greens unapologetically mobilise within movements that oppose the AfD and racism, such as the “Europe for All” march that campaigned for a Europe free from the far right. They also support groundbreaking ecological movements, from campaigns to phase out coal to the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/school-climate-strikes-69510">#FridaysForFuture</a> school strikes for climate, inspired by environmental activist Greta Thunberg.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the CDU and SPD – the two traditionally catch-all parties of Germany – are perceived to have taken little action on climate change during their time in a grand coalition government. They appear to have been punished for this at the polls, with both parties losing vote share to the Greens in the EU elections in comparison with the vote shares achieved during the last <a href="https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2019-05-26-EP-DE/index.shtml">German general election</a>. </p>
<p>The German Greens also seem to be the only party to have successfully undertaken reform strategies since the general election of 2017. Party members elected new party co-leaders Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock in January 2018, who appear to have stopped infighting between leftist and reformist party wings.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, infighting continues unabated in the CDU and SPD. The CDU is plagued by those calling for a shift to the right after Angela Merkel’s tenure as chancellor comes to an end. And the leader of the SPD youth wing, Kevin Kühnert, has made his name by openly criticising his own party’s role in the grand coalition. </p>
<h2>A Green chancellor?</h2>
<p>The European elections saw the Greens perform overwhelmingly well in cities and in western states. The affluent state of Baden-Württemberg is run by a majority Green coalition, headed by prime minister Winfried Kretschmann, and the state capital, Stuttgart, has a Green mayor, Fritz Kuhn. Despite the controversial introduction of a <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/in-stuttgart-demonstrierten-700-buerger-gegen-dieselfahrverbote-15998025.html">one-year provisional diesel ban</a> in Stuttgart at the start of this year, the Greens managed to increase their vote share in the municipal elections held alongside the EU elections. The Greens are now the largest party in Stuttgart, ahead of the former leaders, the CDU. This increased trust of green politics in the affluent west could be seen in the party’s similarly strong showing in the state elections in wealthy Hesse and Bavaria last October.</p>
<p>However, in eastern states, where economic deprivation and political dissatisfaction are much higher, the Greens struggle to break through in the same way. Despite coming second only to the CDU overall in the European elections, the Greens have scored much lower vote shares in areas of Germany that used to belong to East Germany, with only a <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europawahl-ergebnisse-deutschland-1.4464207">few, metropolitan exceptions</a>.</p>
<p>With some of these eastern states due to have state elections later this year, this will be an interesting test for the #GreenWave. Whether they prove successful or not in these regional votes, this European electoral success could lead to the Greens playing a big role in the next national government coalition negotiations. We could see the return of the Greens as a junior coalition partner after 16 years in opposition, this time with the CDU, or as the leading party in a left-coalition with the SPD and The Left Party.</p>
<p>If the Greens maintain their position as Germany’s second party ahead of the SPD, this coalition could even mean that Germany could have a Green chancellor in the not too distant future. Not bad for a supposedly “one-issue” party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chantal Sullivan-Thomsett receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council competition of the White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities. </span></em></p>Germany’s Green Party were the big story on the night of the European elections. Their strategy has been to expand beyond climate policies to become a true alternative to establishment parties.Chantal Sullivan-Thomsett, PhD Candidate in German and Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1033152018-09-23T11:31:24Z2018-09-23T11:31:24ZLabour: why Jeremy Corbyn still struggles to turn his dream of a social movement into reality<p>During his 2016 leadership campaign Jeremy Corbyn spoke to a packed meeting of supporters. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36872411">“We are a social movement,”</a> he said.</p>
<p>Corbyn has certainly overseen a transformation of the Labour Party. From fewer than 200,000 members prior to the 2015 election, he is largely responsible for its rise to more than 550,000 by the end of 2017. By some distance, Labour is now the largest UK political party.</p>
<p>But, Corbyn claims, Labour is more than a conventional party. If it is, that is thanks to Momentum, to which 40,000 Labour members belong – an organisation which styles itself as <a href="https://peoplesmomentum.com/about/">“people-powered”</a> and is fired by the ambition to “transform the Labour Party, our communities and Britain”. Growing out of Corbyn’s 2015 leadership campaign, Momentum employs methods associated with those social movements in which many of its leading figures cut their teeth. Many believe these new ways of doing politics helped Labour do unexpectedly well in the 2017 election by mobilising once disengaged younger voters.</p>
<p>On closer inspection, however, Labour looks little like a social movement. And Momentum’s activities are more conventional than its leaders would have you believe. But if Corbyn is to achieve in government the radical changes for which the left has campaigned since the 1970s, a social movement is precisely what Labour has to become.</p>
<p>The Labour left always <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-labour-20-years-on-assessing-the-legacy-of-the-tony-blair-years-76884">criticised</a> the party’s established parliamentary focus and strategy of winning over floating voters by promising modest reforms because – they believed – it meant Labour would never achieve transformative change. To do that, generations of leftists argued, the party needed to look beyond Westminster and mobilise the active participation of millions behind a full-blooded socialist programme. For the left, looking beyond parliament would offset the timidity of their own leaders and the awesome power of capitalism.</p>
<h2>Enter, Corbyn</h2>
<p>When elected as an MP in the 1980s, Corbyn urged Labour to focus less on the parliamentary game and build a campaigning organisation. Instead the Labour leadership pursued the parliamentary road – a process that culminated in Tony Blair’s 1997 landslide.</p>
<p>Two successive election defeats propelled Corbyn into the Labour leadership, still with an unchanged desire to transform society but now armed with the power to achieve it. And a large number of innovative social movements – most notably <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/occupy-movement-1734">Occupy</a> – were now emerging to challenge capitalism from the ground up, fired by a politics <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/impact-of-occupy-movement/">echoing many of Corbyn’s preoccupations</a>.</p>
<p>Corbyn encouraged some social movement activists to join the party. But as astute <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2034724">Corbyn sympathisers</a> have pointed out, a social movement has aims and methods very different to that of a political party. The latter aims to win votes based on the policies it proposes and to then apply them in government. But the former seeks something more profound: to challenge established ways of thinking and help ordinary people re-imagine their political capacities so they can become active agents in their own liberation. Merging the two approaches into one organisation capable of entering government would be unprecedented.</p>
<p>Pro-Corbyn journalist Paul Mason nonetheless believes Labour <a href="https://medium.com/mosquito-ridge/why-i-joined-momentum-e2e8311ea05c">can do this by</a> becoming “a horizontal, consensus-based organisation, directly accountable to its mass of members” – and indeed it must do this if Corbyn is to win power. The shadow chancellor, John McDonnell, argues that Labour needs to go even further once in government so as to unlock the peoples’ potential – especially as its radical economic programme <a href="https://newsocialist.org.uk/when-we-go-into-government/">will rely on</a> the “active engagement on a daily basis between government and civil society and the real experts on the shop floor”.</p>
<h2>Inspired but not acting</h2>
<p>But evidence that Labour has actually started to morph into a social movement is patchy. Momentum’s membership still represents less than 10% of Labour members. Local Momentum branches are working with the homeless, asylum seekers, women’s and youth groups as well as food banks. The political efficacy of such efforts however remains uncertain. In any case, the organisation has in the main focused on internal party matters: winning seats on the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/momentum-labour-party-reforms-jon-lansman-jeremy-corbyn-nec-plp-mp-a8420806.html">National Executive Committee</a> (NEC) and ensuring the selection of approved candidates. </p>
<p>In this it has enjoyed some success, recently winning all nine NEC seats voted for by members, although its slate won little more than half of votes cast. And, despite Momentum’s attempt to generate enthusiasm, over two-thirds of Labour members <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/elections/2018/09/pro-corbyn-candidates-sweep-board-elections-labour-s-ruling-nec">failed to vote</a>. Perhaps even more surprisingly, earlier this year a similar proportion of Momentum members did not <a href="https://labourlist.org/2018/04/women-and-minorities-triumph-in-latest-momentum-election/">vote in elections</a> for the organisation’s own governing body.</p>
<p>It is undoubted that most Labour members approve of Corbyn. But their failure to even click online in support of his favoured NEC candidates suggest few are prepared to assume the arduous obligations of being a member of a social movement – something which requires an intense involvement in local communities. This is possibly because most who recently joined Labour are largely mature, former members who quit the party during the <a href="https://esrcpartymembersproject.org/2016/11/21/explaining-the-pro-corbyn-surge-in-labours-membership/#more-1222">Kinnock and Blair years</a>. They have a conventional view of political action. If they are the ones flocking to the Labour leader’s rallies and tweeting the hashtag #WeAreCorbyn, some see this as evidence more of a personality cult rather than of a social movement, many of which – like Occupy – are uncomfortable with the very concept of leadership.</p>
<p>The MP Clive Lewis <a href="https://twitter.com/labourlewis/status/1038890498298191873">tweeted recently about the party</a>, saying: “The birthing of something new is … painful. But at the end of that process something with immense potential is created. It will wobble. It will stumble. But with the right care & support, it will thrive.” </p>
<p>It is arguably too early for us to see a fully transformed Labour Party. Perhaps the party’s <a href="https://labour.org.uk/about/democracy-review-2017/">Democracy Review</a> will help it acquire the characteristics of a social movement: that is certainly the hope of many Corbynites.</p>
<p>An election is less than four years away. But Corbyn’s social movement is barely born. That means any government he leads will lack the kind of extra-parliamentary support the left has always considered necessary for the success of its transformative agenda. Lacking such support, therefore, a Corbyn government will ironically struggle to counter opposition from the City and business except through parliament – that is, just like every other Labour government that has come before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Fielding is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>Managing day-to-day politics and radically transforming the world is a big task.Steven Fielding, Professor of Political History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1035402018-09-21T13:11:15Z2018-09-21T13:11:15ZLabour conference: a major stress test for the ‘broad church’<p>Jeremy Corbyn has promised Labour MPs that their party will remain a “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45478946">broad church</a>”. This year’s Labour Party conference will no doubt test that commitment. </p>
<p>“The Labour Party,” MP Gerald Kaufman wrote in 1966, “would not be what it is – maddening, perhaps, but also capable of arousing strong positive emotions – if people not only with widely differing views but also with widely differing analyses of episodes in the Party’s history did not come together as fellow members.” This is a good description of the broad church. Labour finds strength through its difference, channelling the best of what can sometimes appear to be troubling antagonisms. But how applicable is this to the Labour Party right now?</p>
<p>Jon Lansman, the founder of Momentum and a member of Labour’s governing body, the National Executive Committee (NEC), tweeted recently that “Tony Blair was never in the right party and there will never be a return to his politics” within Labour.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1037962859022561280"}"></div></p>
<p>Lansman’s latter suggestion is, perhaps, a defensible medium-term prediction. But suggesting that Blair was “never” in the right party? The early Blair, even as leader, was very comfortable inside the Labour Party. The Labour members who elected him recognised that Blair represented a challenge to some of the party’s traditions, but also saw a leader arguing for a socialism (he and Gordon Brown were not reluctant, in the early days of New Labour, to use the word) with recognisable themes, rooted in the party’s history, and more politically nuanced than the connotations of the label “Blairite” suggest today.</p>
<p>The later Blair moved some distance away from his party. He disengaged with its traditions – a damaging legacy for his successors that aided Corbyn’s rise. But to ignore the different versions of Blair’s “politics” – and to further an analysis of Labour as a homogeneous entity temporarily taken over by a “Tory”, is to question Labour’s broad church.</p>
<p>Tony Benn, for whom Lansman once worked, eloquently expressed the “different Blairs” in his diaries. In 1994, watching Blair make a speech, he wrote: “It was really quite radical … I think he’s frightened the life out of the Liberals … It was a good and radical speech and I have no complaint about it at all.” Watching Blair depart 12 years later, he saw a leader who “hectored us and bullied us … making us feel totally inadequate”. Both parts of this analysis can be true.</p>
<h2>Practical and ideological</h2>
<p>In a recent pamphlet <a href="http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Centre-Ground-150618.pdf">Centre Ground</a>, the Labour MP Chris Leslie contrasted an “evidence-based” approach to politics with an “ideologically driven approach”. Competing traditions within Labour have conflicting views on the role of ideology. From its foundation, the party’s ideology has been unclear and figures from both left and right have argued for a more precise vision. Many have blamed the sometimes rudderless nature of Labour’s politics on its misguided pragmatism. Others have sought to protect its “practical” outlook, thinking values like fairness were sufficient to guide it.</p>
<p>The broad church has, in the past, made room for both. To be too readily dismissive of ideology is to ignore rich Labour traditions, including from the centre and right of the party. As Andrew Thorpe wrote in his history of the party, Labour’s early years brought together not only those focused on “controlling markets and other apparently mundane issues”, but also those who seemed to embody a more radical set of beliefs.</p>
<p>What Michael Foot called “imaginative sympathy” within the Labour Party – recognising the legitimacy of Labour’s competing traditions, whatever your own view – appears to be running rather low in some sections of the movement. Dissent, including from former Labour leaders and <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair-doubts-labour-cant-13205944">prime ministers</a>, can be reasonably met with rebuttal – but seeking to ostracise falls short of a commitment to Labour’s broad church. So too does the view that to hold ideological belief, with great fervour, is somehow out of place within the Labour Party. </p>
<p>Such discord is not without precedent, of course. Holding the broad church together has been challenging for past Labour leaders, including for Foot. Yet with a conference agenda focusing in large part on internal party democracy (the longstanding “who decides” question in Labour’s politics) and including constituency party motions on “<a href="https://theconversation.com/labour-deselection-and-reselection-rules-explained-102938">open selections</a>” and a referendum on the government’s Brexit deal, this conference could be one of the more memorable stress tests of Labour’s broad church.</p>
<p>It’s also an opportunity for Corbyn to set out how he sees Labour’s broad church – and to work out how to channel it into positivity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103540/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl Pike is member of the Labour Party in Tower Hamlets.</span></em></p>The long history of inclusivity within the Labour Party is likely to come under pressure next week.Karl Pike, PhD candidate and Teaching Associate, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/917932018-08-09T11:43:06Z2018-08-09T11:43:06ZWe live in a populist age – but who are ‘the people’?<p>Populism is seemingly <a href="http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-populism/">sweeping the globe</a>, threatening the established status quo. Optimistically, it promises to bring about much needed change to what appears to be a corrupt political and economic order. More ominously, it is dangerously promoting racism, sexism, xenophobia, jingoism, and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism">attacking basic human rights</a> around the world.</p>
<p>It is therefore important not to blithely <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/06/labours-populism-middle-classes">conflate</a> different populist and grassroots movements. The left-wing movements championing greater inclusion are plainly very different from right-wing ones keen on reinforced or increased exclusion. But despite their profound differences, they have one thing in common: they claim to represent a supposedly victimised popular majority, “the people”.</p>
<p>Exactly who these “people” actually are is far from clear. All sides are embroiled in an ongoing struggle to determine how to define which populations count and which do not. Lost in the public outcry regarding populism is a deeper conflict over who matters socially, economically and politically.</p>
<p>In the wake of the recent upsurge in populist movements, there have been a number of attempts to better define what the word “populism” actually describes. Perhaps the best and clearest recent definition comes from <a href="https://www.macmillanihe.com/resources/sample-chapters/9780230013490_sample.pdf">Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell</a>, who write that populism:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But populism doesn’t just appeal with an “us-versus-them” attack on elites; it also offers its supporters a passionate sense of solidarity. It mobilises individuals and communities under a common identity, one that can be socially invigorating and politically empowering. Populism is therefore an opportunity to dramatically redefine the political landscape, and to fill the relatively vacuous term of the “people” with any of various new meanings. </p>
<p>But just as some ideas of “the people” are exclusionary, others are radically inclusive.</p>
<h2>Different demands for different people</h2>
<p>The late political theorist <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/273-on-populist-reason">Ernesto Laclau</a> declared that at its roots, populism is linked to a specific politics – that even the most seemingly mundane protest can reveal the limitations of an existing system and the potential to establish something radically different. If those in power cannot meet these demands, they and the values they represent will suddenly look vulnerable and replaceable.</p>
<p>While Laclau was writing about the general logic of populism, the content of this demand matters greatly for the specifics of these fraught times. Calls for greater democracy, for instance, focus popular attention on democratising political and economic organisations. By contrast, fearmongering against immigrants (to take one example) seeks to restrict political power and economic benefits, making them the preserve of a chosen population.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1369148117701753">ideology</a> driving these demands and identities is therefore of paramount importance. The resurgence of authoritarian and fascist rhetoric speaks to the dangers of demagogues playing on the dissatisfaction of the majority for the creation of a more repressive and less equitable social order. However, the infusing of progressive ideals with a populist spirit can catalyse movements and identities that broaden politics to reach previously invisible groups.</p>
<h2>Narrow and broad</h2>
<p>Populism has the radical potential to foster not just exclusion, but greater inclusion. By instilling a shared sense of injustice, inclusive movements can alert their followers to the plight of other people whom they’ve been socialised to ignore, forging bonds first of empathy and then of solidarity. This in turn means their preferred definition of “the people” can be expanded to include more and more citizens.</p>
<p>In recent years, a number of scholars and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jeremy-corbyn-populist-labour-donald-trump-boris-johnson-theresa-may-dangerous-a7795676.html">commentators</a> have challenged how far the label “populism” should be extended. They question whether figures such as Jeremy Corbyn should even be called populists, arguing that <a href="https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/renewal/25-3-4/corbyn%E2%80%99s-labour-and-the-populism-question">failing to make the distinction</a> between exclusive and inclusive movements reflects lazy and even disingenuous thinking. When any challenge to “sensible”, “moderate” politics is derided as populist regardless of its stated aims, the political dominance of the establishment is consolidated.</p>
<p>This argument for a tighter definition of populism is prudent, but inclusion-minded movements shouldn’t be let off the hook entirely. If movements on the left remain fixated on bringing down maligned or incompetent elites, they will tie themselves to a dangerous politics of sovereignty, one where the overriding goal is simply to take power. This is a very narrow vision. Instead, the imperative must be to find new ways to more equitably organise society and share power.</p>
<p>Ultimately, these sorts of political movements should always be thought of as beginnings, not ends in themselves. Radical, inclusive politics should be much more than a critique of those at the top; it needs to be an ongoing debate over who “we” are and how “we” can be empowered. In an age when the forces of xenophobia and nativism are on the rise, these concerns are perhaps more timely than ever before. Modern politics isn’t just a struggle between left-populists and right-populists: it’s a race to define and expand who the “people” are and what they can achieve together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Bloom is a member of the Labour Party</span></em></p>Right-wing and left-wing populists both claim to speak for victimised or disenfranchised majorities. Here’s the difference.Peter Bloom, Senior Lecturer in Organisation Studies, Department of People and Organisation, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006032018-08-08T20:08:34Z2018-08-08T20:08:34ZWhy some veterans feel alienated on campus and how universities can help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230522/original/file-20180803-41338-1n6r7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C0%2C1019%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Discipline, leadership and time management are some of the positives veterans say they bring to their studies. But not everyone has a chance to demonstrate these.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/44693311@N05/15892238135/in/photolist-qdkSHM-ha2Ag6-9pZycd-ar5aZd-nLkeWE-aikuZT-bRxfra-bX314o-bRxhS6-aiouvL-ar3LHs-9pYPdY-8g3nSc-UvJ6r7-8UxkpF-ar3wmL-ar2TTi-ht7dBp-7HVkvw-9wbG1B-pVUu4i-ar2uei-aUyvXM-bX2Esb-ar1qip-azjskM-9obcus-rc1Qtv-mJXUqJ-7mWFLM-28Z7vwc-nmdj86-hzuMH5-5xE5gj-aUyvRD-9pM58L-TatzfX-htCYa6-7zG9o4-8e2akB-aAx7Fp-p6ABHm-21Fgy3W-pFLBKn-nyg9Wo-8Vm6FG-d1ibP-bAGhA3-aHpmFP-8ViAgD">rekrsoldier/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some veterans say they find campus alienating, don’t feel they belong and fail to disclose their military status when they enrol, according to one of the first snapshots of Australian veterans’ experience of university.</p>
<p>While most veterans <a href="https://www.latrobe.edu.au/cheedr/publications">we surveyed</a> were satisfied with their university experience, our research highlights what universities need to do to better, from admission to completion. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/six-ways-to-improve-equity-in-australian-universities-61437">Six ways to improve equity in Australian universities</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>The transition to civilian life is often difficult for the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/VeteranSuicide/Report/c06">5500 or so</a> military veterans discharged from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) each year.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/safer-australia-budget-2018-19-defence-overview">defence budget</a> climbs towards 2% of GDP, more young veterans will transition to civilian life. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bringing-the-war-home-the-rising-disability-claims-of-afghanistan-war-vets-56021">Bringing the war home: the rising disability claims of Afghanistan war vets</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Veterans face relatively high rates of <a href="https://create.piktochart.com/output/21845816-veteran-employment-report-final-conflict-copy">unemployment</a>, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/VeteranSuicide/Report">disability and mental health risks</a>. One pathway to new careers and financial independence is through higher education. </p>
<p>The Australian Department of Education and Training collects no specific data on the number of veterans enrolled in higher education or their success, retention and outcomes.</p>
<p>We surveyed 240 university student veterans with the <a href="http://www.asva.org.au/">Australian Student Veterans Association</a>. </p>
<p>Most were in their 30s or 40s, male and about one-third had a disability, impairment or long-term medical condition that may affect their studies.</p>
<h2>Access is the first hurdle</h2>
<p>Although many veterans earn both military and civilian qualifications from their military service, including diploma-level awards, few universities provide credit for these.</p>
<p>Veterans are not considered one of the <a href="https://docs.education.gov.au/node/45221">six equity groups</a> in Australian higher education. They typically receive no admission bonus points, special consideration, or recognition of prior learning for their service.</p>
<p>An exception is <a href="https://www.qtac.edu.au/">Queensland</a>, where all universities agree to equate military service to an Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR). Under this system, different types/length of military service are given entrance ranks.</p>
<p>We also found that veterans were unlikely to: feel prepared for study; receive support from their institutions to settle into study; or see orientation activities as relevant and helpful.</p>
<h2>What does success look like?</h2>
<p>Once enrolled, most student veterans surveyed felt positive about university life. 94% would recommend university to other veterans. </p>
<p>One respondent noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>University is very challenging and gives you a huge sense of achievement when you finish. Also helps you move forward and realise that your military service doesn’t necessarily define you.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Veterans also identified strengths they brought to study. These included discipline, leadership and time management. These skills were perceived as central to academic success, particularly given student veterans are relatively likely to have family responsibilities and/or a disability.</p>
<p>The presence of student veterans on campus can also benefit other students. As one student noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the skills and attributes developed in the ADF will make you very competitive at an academic institution. The values and life experience you bring will also benefit all around you.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Isolated and unappreciated</h2>
<p>Despite these strengths, many student veterans do not feel a sense of belonging on campus. Some of our respondents felt isolated, and many felt university culture was not respectful or appreciative of military service. Only one third of respondents disclosed their military status to their institution.</p>
<p>One fifth of respondents were not comfortable discussing their military experience at university. Nearly one third felt their university was not “veteran friendly”. One student advised:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(Try) not to get involved with political conversations as many students who haven’t served, and haven’t seen the world, hold very immature viewpoints and don’t understand how veterans think.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What can we do better?</h2>
<p>Universities could recognise military service at admission. Institutions could work with tertiary admissions centres to equate service to ATAR levels, as agreed by the Queensland universities. This process alone would lead to a substantial increase in student numbers. </p>
<p>More broadly, universities could introduce financial support for student veterans, including bursaries, fee waivers and scholarships. Identifying veterans on university enrolment forms would enable demographic, success, and completions data to be collected.</p>
<p>The Australian Student Veterans Association has chapters on several university campuses. Expanding those chapters and other support groups would provide valuable resources and peer networks. Better promotion of disability services, counselling and other services would also help.</p>
<h2>Let’s harness diversity</h2>
<p>Our research confirms that veterans often enter university with life experiences, strengths, and perspectives different from those of other students (and staff). </p>
<p>This diversity can create high social and academic value. A diverse student body can provide a <a href="https://www.aacu.org/publications-research/publications/making-diversity-work-campus-research-based-perspective">stimulating and creative intellectual environment</a>. As such, it has the potential to improve the university experience of all students.</p>
<h2>Invest for the future</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/forevergibill.asp">US</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/enhanced-learning-credits-further-and-higher-education-scheme-changes">UK</a> and <a href="http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/services/transition/education-training-benefit">Canada</a> all invest significant resources in supporting military veterans to access and succeed at university.</p>
<p>This investment has been shown to have financial benefits overseas. For instance, US veterans with bachelor degrees earn an average <a href="https://ivmf.syracuse.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/I-AM-A-POST-911-Student-Veteran-REPORT.pdf">US$17,000 more each year</a> than their non-veteran counterparts.</p>
<p>Similar benefits are likely in Australia given the <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/graduate-winners-assessing-the-public-and-private-benefits-of-higher-education/">typical financial advantage</a> of graduates.</p>
<p>But more than a financial gain for individual veterans, access to and success at university for veterans is an equity issue. </p>
<p>The difficulties of transition to civilian life are well documented. By accepting more veterans, universities could assist this transition while simultaneously improving the learning experience of all students. </p>
<p>Higher education should be accessible to those who have served in the defence of the nation.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The authors wish to acknowledge advice and support from Matthew Sharp, co-founder of the Australian Student Veterans Association, and Matthew Wyatt-Smith, CEO, Australian Student Veterans Association.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Harvey received funding from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs through the Supporting Younger Veterans grant program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lisa Andrewartha received funding from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs through the Supporting Younger Veterans grant program.</span></em></p>While many military veterans do well on campus, not everyone feels welcome or their views matter. Here’s what universities can do better.Andrew Harvey, Director, Centre for Higher Education Equity and Diversity Research, La Trobe UniversityLisa Andrewartha, Senior Research Officer and Senior Project Coordinator, Centre for Higher Education Equity and Diversity Research, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009762018-08-03T14:47:57Z2018-08-03T14:47:57ZHere’s why it matters that Labour’s governing body has moved away from the IHRA definition of antisemitism<p>Reports in <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/jeremy-corbyn-hosted-event-likening-israel-to-nazis-6sb5rqd5x">The Times</a> about Jeremy Corbyn attending a 2010 event at which comparisons of Israel with Nazism were repeatedly drawn have, once again, raised questions about the relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism.</p>
<p>Corbyn sponsored the event, held on Holocaust Memorial Day, as part of a series entitled Never Again for Anyone – Auschwitz to Gaza. An official speaker was reported to have declared that: “Nazism has won because it has finally managed to Nazify the consciousness of its own victims.”</p>
<p>This all came to light shortly after the Labour party’s National Executive Committee decided to distance itself from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) <a href="https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism">definition of antisemitism</a>. The IHRA definition specifically includes drawing “comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” in its examples of antisemitic discourse. </p>
<p>But the NEC has issued new guidelines, removing this from its list of examples. In its place comes a much weaker formulation, referring to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-all-labour-members-need-to-read-parliaments-antisemitism-report-67252">Shami Chakrabarti report’s recommendation</a> that Labour members “resist” Hitler, Nazi and Holocaust comparisons. This is because “such language carries a strong risk of being regarded as prejudicial or grossly detrimental to the party”.</p>
<h2>An unfortunate tradition</h2>
<p>Watering down the IHRA’s definition seems ill-advised, not least because Labour representatives have an unfortunate tradition of promoting and perpetuating the analogy. In May 1948, Ernest Bevin was reported by his own under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office as railing against Zionists. The staff member described how “he says they taught Hitler the technique of terror – and were even now paralleling the Nazis in Palestine. They were preachers of violence and war – ‘What could you expect when people are brought up from the cradle on the Old Testament?’.”</p>
<p>Bevin’s antisemitism was unusual in what was, at the time, a strongly pro-Zionist Labour party. A more calculated and systematic attempt to equate Zionism with Nazism began to appear as the result of party members’ involvement with the much more radical forms of anti-Zionist campaigning that emerged in the 1970s. </p>
<p>Christopher Mayhew, founder of the Labour Middle East Council (the first significant pro-Palestinian organisation within the party), did much to popularise the analogy. He wrote in 1971 that: “Germans who massacre Jews are tried and executed. Jews who massacre Arabs are elected to political leadership.” Mayhew’s response to <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/menachem-begin">Menachem Begin’s 1977 Israeli election victory</a> was to remark that “it must be hard for Arabs to understand a country in which Germans who have massacred Jews are tried as war criminals while Jews who have massacred Arabs are elected Prime Minister.”</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230587/original/file-20180803-41366-tk2wyx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The infamous Free Palestine cover.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Visual representations of the Zionism-Nazism analogy also emerged in the 1970s. They were imported into British public life via Soviet propaganda and Palestinian activist networks. Free Palestine, a newsletter backed by the Palestine Liberation Organization, featured regular contributions from Labour MPs alongside controversial imagery. It even adorned the front page of its April 1975 issue with an image of a Palestinian prisoner reaching out from a prison cell window, the bars of which formed the shape of a swastika.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/labour-antisemitism-row-there-was-nothing-zionist-about-hitlers-plans-for-the-jews-58656">Ken Livingstone’s</a> Labour Herald newspaper went on to adopt the “Zionism equals Nazism” trope with great enthusiasm in the 1980s. Perhaps the most notorious example was a 1982 cartoon which, under the caption “The Final Solution”, depicted Begin in SS uniform, standing atop a mound of bloodied corpses, making a Nazi salute.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230588/original/file-20180803-41354-wuyasw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Begin depicted in the Labour Herald.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Perhaps inevitably, this imagery brought Labour’s pro-Palestinian MPs into contact with views that one would more usually associate with the politics of the far right.</p>
<p>In 1987, MP Andrew Faulds received a letter from a Warley East constituent which stated that “it is readily forgotten that Jewish financiers created the German monster” and that “Judaism (Zionism) is as racially exclusive as the ‘master race’ ‘chosen people’ and just as ruthless against the Palestinian people”. Replying to this letter, Faulds made no criticisms of the overt antisemitism on display whatsoever. Instead, he thanked his correspondent for “your support for my anti-Zionist position” and remarked that it was “extraordinary how the Zionist propagandists manage to con public and international opinion”. Faulds, partly because of his public profile as a noted television actor, was an important figure in developing institutional links between the Labour party and pro-Palestinian groups such as Palestine Action.</p>
<p>The outbreak of the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3677206.stm">second Intifada</a> and regular bouts of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza, saw a further spate of Zionism/Nazism analogies and comparisons in the 21st century. Corbyn himself, at a 2010 demonstration outside the Israeli Embassy in London, proved incapable of describing conditions in Gaza without making reference to Nazi Germany’s sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad during World War II. </p>
<p>Livingstone, Corbyn’s close ideological ally, returned to the theme in 2005, describing a Jewish Evening Standard journalist as “just like a concentration camp guard”. Livingstone’s longstanding commitment to presenting the history of the Holocaust through the distorting lens of ideas about Zionist-Nazi collaboration was, of course, the cause of a major antisemitism crisis in the Labour party in 2016.</p>
<p>The conclusion that this kind of imagery and language shattered the boundaries between criticism of Israel and antisemitism seems inescapable. It is within this ignoble tradition that Jeremy Corbyn has chosen to place himself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100976/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Vaughan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>HIgh-profile Labour figures have long chosen to compare Zionism to Nazism.James Vaughan, Lecturer in International History, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009742018-08-02T13:52:16Z2018-08-02T13:52:16ZJeremy Corbyn, antisemitism and the problem of nothingness<p>Let me be honest: I am not a specialist in French existential philosophy. But as the debate concerning Jeremy Corbyn’s handling of accusations of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/antisemitism-8903">antisemitism</a> within the Labour party shows no sign of abating, I was suddenly reminded of Jean Paul Sartre’s classic work, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Being_and_Nothingness.html?id=L6igUcpDEO8C">Being and Nothingness</a>. Corbyn’s apparent inability or unwillingness to take a clear and definite position on a whole range of topics made me think of “being nothing” and “the art of nothingness” almost as a form of political statecraft – be as vague as you can be on as many issues as possible in order to avoid the unavoidable flack that comes with taking a decision or adopting a position. </p>
<p>Let me also be clear: I am not a specialist in the history of analysis or antisemitism. But I am aware that Sartre’s next book, Anti-Semite and Jew, was written shortly after the liberation of Paris from German occupation in 1944. It sought to explain the etiology or roots of hate through a focus on antisemitism.</p>
<p>The main idea was that the “antisemite” was a largely homogenous and identifiable group in society (bourgeois, reactionary, uncomfortable in the modern world, etc.). This group attributed all of its misfortunes and perceived threats to the presence of Jewish people and, through this thought process, divested itself of responsibility for failure or fate. Antisemitism was not therefore a rational “idea” based on evidence and experience, but a deep-seated emotional construct: a negative passion in the form of hatred. </p>
<p>George Orwell was not impressed. “I think Sartre is a bag of wind,” he wrote to his publisher “and I’m going to give him a big boot”. In <a href="http://www.orwell.ru/library/articles/antisemitism/english/e_antib">Antisemitism in Britain</a> (1945) Orwell suggested that antisemitism was not confined to any one identifiable social strata and was in fact to be found within all classes. Put slightly differently, it was a shared problem and the starting point for any investigation should not be “them” but “me”.</p>
<p>“The point is that something, some psychological vitamin, is lacking in modern civilisation”, Orwell wrote “and as a result we are all more or less subject to this lunacy of believing that whole races or nations are mysteriously good or mysteriously evil. I defy any modern intellectual to look closely and honestly into his own mind without coming upon nationalistic loyalties and hatreds of one kind or another”.</p>
<p>The point that Orwell was making – and which brings me back to Jeremy Corbyn and the problem of nothingness – is that antisemitism is an issue that demands more than half-hearted letters of apology or new disciplinary frameworks. It demands open reflection, a vision for the future and, most of all, political leadership. And leadership appears to be what is lacking. </p>
<p>From bursting onto the political stage and leading the Labour party to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/uk-election-2017-37907">glorious defeat</a> in 2017, Jeremy Corbyn seems to have spent 2018 as the “Where’s Wally?” of Westminster. The general sense of absence and anonymity is almost palpable. This has been particularly obvious in relation to Labour’s stance on Brexit and came to a head last month when a large number of frustrated anti-Brexit activists chanted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2018/jun/23/wheres-jeremy-corbyn-anti-brexit-protesters-chant-in-london-video">“Where’s Jeremy Corbyn?”</a> as they marched on Westminster. </p>
<h2>The joy of nothing</h2>
<p>Nothingness as a political strategy clearly has its benefits. With Theresa May <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-has-survived-chequers-but-what-comes-next-could-be-worse-99771">skewered from all sides</a>, saying nothing on as many issues as possible and waiting for the government to implode might appear a rational strategy for the official opposition. But it’s not good enough for a country that urgently requires fresh ideas and bold thinking. Which brings me (strangely) back to Sartre.</p>
<p>Sartre’s 1944 play No Exit was not a premonition (or prediction) of the UK’s current constitutional crisis but a treatise on the existence of hell. Many in the Labour Party now feel themselves trapped within the political equivalent of a Sartre play. Many other people – the vast swathes of the British public that would laugh at the idea of joining a political party – just feel trapped in a world that appears defined by increasing insecurity and growing inequality. This is a time in which the Labour party should have most to offer the British public but it generally appears divided, hesitant, lacking in leadership, unsure of where it is going or why. That’s the problem of nothingness. </p>
<p>It was probably for exactly this reason that Sartre concluded his Being and Nothingness with a section entitled “Having, Doing and Being”. Could this be a leitmotif for Corbyn to reflect upon over the summer?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100974/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Flinders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Corbyn has avoided taking a position on numerous issues this year. But this one really needs a response.Matthew Flinders, Founding Director of the Sir Bernard Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/949232018-04-13T11:19:16Z2018-04-13T11:19:16ZLabour and anti-semitism: these are the roots of the problem on the left<p>The current crisis in the Labour party has exposed some profound <a href="https://theconversation.com/labour-jeremy-corbyn-and-four-fault-lines-that-will-now-define-the-party-94311">fault lines</a> on the left. Despite considerable evidence of mounting antisemitism inside the party, which finally provoked a <a href="https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/jewish-community-protests-in-parliament-square-against-labour-antisemitism-enough-is-enough-1.461420">major protest</a>, some have responded with unabashed hostility. </p>
<p>Rather than taking the side of the overwhelming majority of Jews, and taking their obvious hurt and dismay seriously, some have charged them with dishonesty. They say they are <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/labour-poll-says-antisemitism-row-is-exaggerated-8tdj7wffh">exaggerating</a> or inventing antisemitism where it does not or scarcely exists. They accuse them of manipulation and of conspiring against the leader of the party when he has every opportunity of rescuing the country from the disasters visited upon it by the Conservative government.</p>
<p>Beyond this, some have sought to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/30/labour-antisemitism-and-criticism-of-israel">explain away</a> antisemitism as a consequence of the supposedly bad behaviour of Jews, in the form of the conduct and even the existence of the state of Israel, and the supposedly uncritical support given to it by Jews in Britain.</p>
<p>Leaving aside the obvious fact that many Jews in the UK are by no means uncritical of many of the policies of the Israeli government, the central problem with these responses is that they partake of some classic antisemitic tropes. </p>
<p>The idea that Jews are not to be trusted when they say they have been attacked, the charge that they engage in special pleading and that they plot and scheme together for malign purposes, have long formed staples of antisemitic discourse. Historically, they have been central to the idea that there is a “Jewish Question” which somehow must solved – either by Jews behaving better (ideally by ceasing to be Jews) or (if they will not do so) by getting rid of them.</p>
<h2>The ‘Jewish Question’</h2>
<p>The far right was the most radical in its enthusiasm to solve the “Jewish Question” through the Holocaust but the notion that there is such a question has been shared by some on the left, too. It was first formulated in the modern world in the <a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526104977/">Enlightenment</a>. </p>
<p>Some thought that there was something peculiarly problematic about Jews. This was not just their particular religion (seen as worse even than Christianity which at least had the virtue of making a universalist claim) but their behaviour and particular identity (as a “nation within a nation”). Even some of those who thought that Jews should now be included and given rights did so conditionally. The rights should be given on the basis that their supposedly “bad” behaviour should improve and their loyalties to each other be abandoned. If not, the door was left open to the possibility that Jews should be got rid of.</p>
<p>As antisemitism developed into an ultimately genocidal ideology, the persistence of the notion of a “Jewish Question” helped shape the response to it among some on the left. To them, antisemitism was somehow understandable because of the way Jews supposedly behaved, and that antisemitism might even be harnessed to the socialist cause, since antisemites were laying the blame for the evils of capitalism on Jews. This has been described as the “<a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/01/radicalism-fools-rise-new-anti-semitism">socialism of fools</a>” (not that helpful a formulation actually insofar as it suggests antisemitism is still some kind of socialism). </p>
<p>During and immediately after the Holocaust this way of thinking played its part in the reluctance of some to prioritise solidarity with Jews or to recognise the catastrophe that had befallen them. Worse, it helped shape a new form of Stalinist antisemitism in the communist bloc. Jews were violently attacked for their supposed disloyalty and treachery to the cause.</p>
<p>It was then that key elements of the latest reformulation of the “Jewish Question” were developed – in the form of an antizionism. This way of thinking focuses obsessively on Israel, where, not coincidentally, large numbers of Jews now live after the catastrophe that nearly destroyed the whole group. This state is regarded by some as uniquely evil. It is guilty of the worst of all crimes – of genocide, crimes against humanity and apartheid – and is the gravest threat to world peace. Once again, Jews have supposedly failed the test for inclusion in the modern world, now in the form of the world of legitimate nation states.</p>
<p>There has always been, on the left, another way of thinking – not about an imagined “Jewish Question”, but about antisemitism. From this perspective, the problem is not, and never has been, the behaviour, identity or religion of Jews, which is no worse than that of other groups. The problem is a view of the world which projects all the problems of society (at the national or international level) onto Jews.</p>
<p>It’s a view which not only fails to grasp the threat posed by antisemitism but condones and colludes with it. It’s a view that others (sadly) on the left need to challenge. They need to reject the whole idea of a “Jewish Question” in favour of an elemental and principled solidarity with Jews as they come under attack once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Spencer is the author, with Robert Fine, of Antisemitism and the Left – On the Return of the Jewish Question, Manchester University Press, 2017.</span></em></p>The very debate around how Labour has dealt with this issue revolves around some key tropes of anti-semitism.Philip Spencer, Emeritus Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Kingston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/943112018-04-03T15:16:15Z2018-04-03T15:16:15ZLabour, Jeremy Corbyn and four fault lines that will now define the party<p>“What did last week reveal about the state of Labour?” the journalist Helen Lewis <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/01/if-corbyn-is-not-to-appear-a-passenger-he-must-learn-to-lead">asked</a> in the midst of fresh calls for more action to tackle antisemitism in the <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/luciana-berger-four-types-of-vicious-abuse-just-one-way-to-deal-with-it-xdd2c903z">party</a>. Jeremy Corbyn’s own actions, and the time it took for him to apologise for the issue, have also come in for scrutiny. Lewis concluded that “Corbyn’s strengths as a speaker are matched by his weakness as an actor. That some supporters believe any criticism must be motivated by jealousy, disloyalty or factionalism. And that there is no appetite for a breakaway party or another doomed attempt to topple him”.</p>
<p>Prior to Lewis’ compelling article, another columnist, Rafael Behr, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/27/dissident-mps-westminster-blairites-tories">noted</a> that the “unfolded triptych” of Corbyn’s responses – or lack thereof – to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/sergei-skripal-50988">Skripal Salisbury attack</a>, antisemitism and Brexit necessarily raised questions over Labour’s future.</p>
<p>As we approach a year since Theresa May decided to call an election which severely damaged her own political standing, and enhanced Corbyn’s, a look at the state of Corbynism is apposite. How can it be understood, and from where does it draw its power?</p>
<p>Analysing the Labour party through the different interpretations of its ethos – what it means to be Labour – can help form a broader understanding than that gained from looking at party policy or organisation alone. This can be done through analysing different positions taken along key fault lines in Labour’s ethos. </p>
<p>There’s the role of theoretical revision and the renewal of party aims; the idea that individual policies – rather than values – become symbolic of a person’s socialism; decision-making within the party; and the balance between “instrumental” politics (concerned with the attainment of power) and “expressive” politics (the defence of principle).</p>
<h2>Party goals</h2>
<p>The Corbynite ethos, certainly in terms of the leadership, is reasonably clear. So far there is little sign that theoretical revision or reforming party objects is a priority. That isn’t to say Corbyn’s leadership is not ideologically distinctive – it clearly is – but there hasn’t been a sustained effort to revise the party’s aims and values. </p>
<p>When he first became leader, Corbyn swiftly disowned a rumour that he was planning to revise Tony Blair’s amendment to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/aug/09/clause-iv-of-labour-party-constitution-what-is-all-the-fuss-about-reinstating-it">clause IV</a> of the party constitution. Since 1918, clause IV has been regarded as an anachronistic shibboleth or a timeless call to arms, depending on a person’s view of public ownership (that is the people, through the state, owning large parts of the means of production, distribution and exchange in the economy).</p>
<p>Corbynite political economy is avowedly interventionist (as demonstrated by the <a href="https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf">2017 manifesto</a>), and Labour’s series of events on its <a href="https://labour.org.uk/new-economics/">“new economics”</a> contributes something, but the Corbyn programme is not underpinned by a clearly articulated alternative worldview. Indeed, the slogan “the many, not the few” was printed on New Labour’s membership cards. The “party objects”, then, remain those written in 1994. What aspects of Labour’s doctrine to focus on remains up to individual Labour people.</p>
<h2>Policy as faith</h2>
<p>Shorn of a coherent theoretical basis for the party’s socialism, some Labour policies can become emblematic of the party’s worldview. This is more prevalent in the Corbynite ethos. Public ownership – with the usual caveats of what form it will take – has been reinstated as part of Labour’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-41379849">socialist identity</a>, for example.</p>
<p>This is a longstanding characteristic of Labour’s ethos. A “means” becomes symbolic of values, engaging with socialist history and acting as a “glue” for the movement. Labour’s commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament, despite it being considered electorally harmful in the mid-1980s, was maintained because the party leadership judged changing it a step too far for the movement at the time. At times of strife, certain policies also become factional tools – as has happened in the party’s past with public ownership and nuclear weapons, with support or opposition to both used to symbolise affiliation with Labour’s left and right.</p>
<h2>Making decisions</h2>
<p>The fiercest debates about Labour’s immediate future should be expected in the area of internal democracy, particularly while the Corbynite left is seeking to reform the process of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/19/labour-democracy-review-asks-nec-to-agree-more-powers-for-member">intra-party decision-making</a>.</p>
<p>As has long been the case, arguments from across the Labour party around the question of “who decides what” will have some merit – though of course each argument will also have a seemingly all-important factional edge. While Corbynism posits enhanced party democracy in its interpretation of Labour’s ethos, it isn’t a simple democratic/non-democratic equation. The Corbyn leadership operation, including Momentum, has demonstrated its appetite for “grip”. It has, for example, been known to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/25/how-momentum-stopped-vote-single-market-labour-conference">select issues for debate</a> at conference which work better for the leader. That’s the very kind of party management for which previous leaderships have been attacked.</p>
<h2>Instrumental vs expressive</h2>
<p>That leaves the relative priority given to instrumental and expressive politics. The Corbynite ethos has been orientated towards the expressive (something shared, historically, with the majority of Labour members), yet there are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36775102">interesting debates</a> on the Labour left about what Corbynism means for Labour’s tradition of “parliamentary socialism” when factoring in the place and role of Momentum, the campaigning organisation set up to support Corbyn.</p>
<p>There’s also frustration with Corbyn’s Brexit stance within Labour. One could argue a more pro-European approach would be “expressive” of the party’s principles, and that Corbyn is adopting a more “instrumental” electoral line by avoiding taking a firm stance in either direction. Similarly, Europe is a trigger point for attitudes to party democracy. Labour’s pro-European membership could challenge the frontbench position. Yet, agree or disagree with the Labour campaign to stay in the <a href="https://www.labour4singlemarket.org/">single market</a>, such a policy does not represent an alternative to Corbynism as an identity, it is simply a policy (however vital people may judge it to be).</p>
<p>There are substantive differences along the four fault lines identified above, though they are rarely expressed. The extent to which they are debated and resolved will in part define what it is to be Labour in the months and years ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl Pike is a member of the Labour Party in Tower Hamlets.</span></em></p>As the party faces more internal strife over antisemitism, it’s worth considering what Labour stands for.Karl Pike, PhD candidate and Teaching Associate, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/931532018-03-12T12:23:00Z2018-03-12T12:23:00ZGermany’s Social Democrats: where did it all go wrong?<p>In March 2017, Martin Schulz was announced, with great fanfare, as the new leader of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). As the party’s candidate for chancellor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/24/martin-schulz-boost-to-germanys-spd-raises-stakes-for-angela-merkel">“Saint Martin”</a> was set to storm the 2017 elections, oust Angela Merkel and bring the SPD back to power.</p>
<p>Twelve short months later, the SPD’s dreams lie in tatters. Its 20% vote share in the September vote was its <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-wins-a-fourth-term-in-office-but-it-wont-be-an-easy-one-84578">lowest ever</a> in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. After the election, Schulz committed the party to an opposition role as a point of principle, rather than entering another coalition with Merkel’s CDU. </p>
<p>However, when the CDU failed to form an alternative coalition with two smaller parties, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier persuaded Schulz to backtrack on that commitment in the interests of political stability and to work with Merkel on a new “GroKo” (grand coalition). The SPD’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-grand-coalition-gets-the-green-light-but-pressure-mounts-on-spd-leader-martin-schulz-90473">U-turn on the GroKo</a> was felt by many in the party as a <a href="https://newsocialist.org.uk/anti-coalition-campaigning-spd/">betrayal</a>. Since then the SPD’s leadership has imploded, its Young Socialists (<a href="https://www.jusos.de/">Jusos</a>) group has mutinied and the party has been widely ridiculed in the press. Where did it all go so horribly wrong?</p>
<h2>Social Democrats in the doldrums</h2>
<p>In many ways, the downturn in the German SPD’s fortunes mirrors the fate of similar parties elsewhere in Europe. Structural changes in European economies and societies have played out badly for social democrats in general.</p>
<p>A decline in manufacturing in favour of an expanding services sector has undermined social democratic parties’ traditional voting “clienteles”. Globalisation and the progressive liberalisation of employment markets have weakened the collective power of labour, traditionally the bedrock of parties of the left in European countries. </p>
<p>The emergence of the gig economy and the trend towards casual labour are resulting in a workforce with fragmented, often conflicting interests. European social democrats have generally failed to keep up with the changing concerns of low-income workers –- and the German SPD has been no exception.</p>
<h2>The rise and fall of Martin Schulz</h2>
<p>Schulz’s dynamic approach and self-styled image as an establishment “outsider” was hoped to spark a fresh connection with the German electorate. But this persona ultimately worked against him. Most of Germany’s party leaders have built a public profile as government ministers at federal level. In contrast, Schulz had forged his political career largely at the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-eu-parliament-president-martin-schulz-rival-angela-merkel-germany-elections-sdp-a7544151.html">European level</a>. His only notable political post in Germany had been as a small-town mayor. As such, he was virtually unknown to the German public. Compared with Merkel – a high-profile national and international leader – Schulz was the invisible man. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/05/schulz-effect-rip">“Schulz effect”</a> failed to deliver in key regional elections in Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, leaving the SPD <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/martin-schulz-effect-fades-further-poll/">struggling to reignite its federal campaign</a>.</p>
<p>Worse, Schulz seemed to lack political sense. He boxed himself in with points of principle in the fluid political situation after the election, only to have to retract them later. Having claimed he would never serve in a Merkel government, he later angled for the top job of foreign minister in the new cabinet. His credibility was fatally undermined. His vacillations ultimately contributed to his resignation as party leader.</p>
<h2>You emotional bread roll!</h2>
<p>The deep divisions in the SPD over leadership and policy added to the party’s woes. These came to the fore during the GroKo negotiations. Tensions between Schulz and the current foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, exploded in a playground spat when Gabriel, quoting his little daughter Marie, called Schulz “the man with the hairy face”. Schulz retaliated by calling Gabriel an <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/martin-schulz-to-sigmar-gabriel-you-are-just-as-much-a-bread-roll-of-emotion-as-i-am/">“Emotionsbrötchen”</a>. Literally an “emotional bread roll”, the unflattering term carried shades of “big girl’s blouse” and “drama queen”.</p>
<p>The row has done nothing for the party’s public image. A recent opinion poll showed that 58% of respondents believed the SPD was <a href="http://www.dw.com/de/ard-deutschlandtrend-zweifel-an-der-regierungsf%25C3%25A4higkeit-der-spd/a-42787544">no longer fit for government</a>. In spite of its record allocation of ministerial posts, the SPD will enter the new coalition as a weakened force. The designated minister for the Home ministry, the Christian Social Union politician Horst Seehofer, has already <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/csus-horst-seehofer-confirms-he-will-join-angela-merkels-cabinet/a-42793190">exploited the situation</a> by engineering the transfer of construction policy from the SPD’s environment portfolio to his own.</p>
<p>Schulz’s failure has highlighted the need for a generational change in the SPD’s leading elites. The top-down designation of Schulz’s deputy <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/andrea-nahles-would-take-the-reins-of-a-troubled-spd/a-40706641">Andrea Nahles</a> (47) as the new leader ignores the <a href="https://newsocialist.org.uk/anti-coalition-campaigning-spd/">Jusos</a>’ demands for greater transparency and democracy within the party.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the coalition agreement between Merkel and the SPD focuses on those issues on which there is the greatest agreement between the coalition partners. These included minor reforms to the health service to smooth out the worst inequalities and gaps in provision, a focus on digital modernisation and some minor measures to assuage Germany’s emerging housing crisis. These policy guidelines <a href="https://theconversation.com/germany-finally-has-a-government-but-the-spd-grassroots-could-still-derail-it-91435">fall far short</a> of the root-and-branch reform that SPD members had hoped for in health and housing.</p>
<p>The new GroKo only cements the SPD’s long-standing problem in forging a policy identity both independent of the CDU and meaningful to a new, stable cohort of voters. To achieve this, it needs to address some of the leading <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/07/26/germany-s-working-poor">concerns of the working poor</a> in Germany: low pay rates, a long overdue pensions reform; equal access to health services; reform of the education sector; and the entry and integration of immigrants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Hogwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The SPD is in government with Angela Merkel again after signing a coalition deal. But life has been harder for the social democrats.Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/917522018-03-06T19:31:22Z2018-03-06T19:31:22ZMis-red: why Bill Shorten is not a socialist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207997/original/file-20180227-36700-v05u1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bill Shorten is the longest-serving Labor leader since Kim Beazley in his first stint in office.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Successful politicians need fortune to smile on them – to be “hit in the arse by a rainbow”, as Paul Keating said of Peter Costello. If this is so, federal Labor leader Bill Shorten’s backside must by now be glowing brightly with all the colours and shades of the spectrum, from red and orange through to indigo and violet.</p>
<p>First, there was Kevin Rudd’s parting gift to the Labor Party: <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-13/how-do-labor-leadership-voting-rules-work/4955726">the changes</a> in 2013 to the way Labor leaders are elected. These changes have provided Shorten – and indeed any future Labor leader – with impressive insulation against an internal challenge. </p>
<p>It’s perhaps a modest claim to fame, but Shorten is the longest-serving Labor leader since Kim Beazley in his first stint in office (1996 to 2001).</p>
<p>Shorten’s luck didn’t end there. The Abbott government turned out to be one of the most accident-prone in our history. Episodes such as the <a href="http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/federal-budget/australians-think-federal-budget-2014-is-the-worst-in-a-very-very-long-time-according-to-this-graphic/news-story/3aede549c1cfe0db6eb3fc205feaba53">2014 budget debacle</a> are a once-in-a-generation political gift, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/feb/03/how-giving-prince-philip-a-knighthood-left-australias-pm-fighting-for-survival">knighthood saga</a> a once-in-a-century job. </p>
<p>Even a <a href="https://www.tradeunionroyalcommission.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx">royal commission into trade union corruption</a> – seemingly designed by the government to damage Shorten – backfired after the commissioner, Dyson Heydon, accepted an invitation to speak at a Liberal Party fundraiser. That revelation landed on Shorten, who had made an uncomfortable appearance before the inquiry, like manna from heaven. Heydon’s eventual report had all the impact of last year’s telephone book being dumped in a wheelie-bin. </p>
<p>Malcolm Turnbull’s coup against Tony Abbott raised expectations that a more “progressive” prime minister would move the Coalition closer to the centre of Australian politics. Such hopes were almost immediately dashed, with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationals-extract-their-pound-of-flesh-from-turnbull-47582">refreshed Coalition agreement</a> strengthening the more conservative National Party. </p>
<p>The government’s poor performance at the 2016 election – and Turnbull’s subsequent loss of authority – eliminated any possibility of a more centrist Coalition. This was yet more good fortune for Shorten. </p>
<p>It would be hard to argue that Shorten quite deserves so much luck but in politics, deserts don’t count for a hill of beans. Turnbull and the Coalition appear to be in two minds about what to do with the Labor leader. Sometimes, in their telling, he is a “<a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-08/turnbull-and-shorten-trade-barbs-during-question-time/8252540">social-climbing sycophant</a>” with a habit of sucking up to the rich and powerful. </p>
<p>When Turnbull is in this mode, there is a clear subtext: that if I were not here as prime minister, Bill would be sucking up to rich and successful people like me. It’s hard to imagine this goes down especially well with most voters, who don’t mind people becoming rich and successful but dislike those who boast about it.</p>
<p>But Turnbull also <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/bill-shorten-the-most-dangerous-left-wing-leader-in-generations-says-malcolm-turnbull-20170812-gxuug0.html">told a Liberal audience</a> in August last year that Shorten is “the most dangerous left-wing leader of the Labor Party we have seen in generations”. </p>
<p>More recently, Finance Minister Mathias Cormann <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/bill-shorten-accused-of-plagiarising-jeremy-corbyn/news-story/0a86de9bf23c6efabc6663651cd090a1">accused Shorten</a> of plagiarising the “socialist, populist playbook” of British Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. And Turnbull <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/malcolm-turnbull-joins-insiders/9394476">railed against</a> “the most anti-business, the most anti-investment, the most anti-jobs policy of any Labor leader since Whitlam”. </p>
<p>These claims are about pushing the government’s stalled company tax cuts, a key issue that will divide the parties at the next election. But Turnbull and the Coalition have a hard sell, and it will take more than a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/feb/16/abc-removes-corporate-tax-cut-analysis-after-complaints-from-malcolm-turnbull">letter of complaint</a> to ABC management and a bit of <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/malcolm-turnbull-stresses-urgency-of-company-tax-rate-cuts/news-story/a367d37a553fda7c1641811dba63b42a">PR work with Donald Trump</a> to get voters – and crossbench senators – around to their way of thinking.</p>
<p>The prosaic reality about Shorten, however, is that he is in many ways a garden-variety centre-left leader. </p>
<p>This species has become endangered – in some countries, virtually extinct – in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. But Australia is different. It was touched more lightly by the crisis than most other western economies. And partly for that reason, it has not experienced populist explosions of either left or right. </p>
<p>Pauline Hanson is small beer compared with Trump or France’s Marine Le Pen; the Greens will not emulate successful left-populist parties such as Greece’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/syriza-everything-you-need-to-know-about-greece-s-new-marxist-governing-party-10002197.html">Syriza</a> or Spain’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemos-revolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics">Podemos</a>; and there are no Jeremy Corbyns lurking in the Labor caucus room. </p>
<p>Without such pressures, Labor has been able to craft its policies in a much more relaxed environment than many European social democratic and labour parties. Shorten goes through the motions of praising the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/10/bill-shortens-first-year-five-things-we-learned">Hawke-Keating reform model</a>, but he is sufficiently in tune with the times to know that this will only get him so far.</p>
<p>Such gestures are becoming a little like the way Chinese capitalists praise Chairman Mao: it’s diplomatic but also increasingly irrelevant.</p>
<p>Labor under Shorten makes an issue of inequality without hammering it home in the more forthright manner of the left-wing political forces that are transforming British and European politics.</p>
<p>And while the ALP has made plenty of gestures to the populist right over issues such as refugees, that has been a gradual capitulation to the centre-right in the context of two-party competition rather than, as in the case of some European countries, a panicky attempt to stop a right-wing populist party from stealing its working-class base.</p>
<p>Now that the Barnaby Joyce affair is losing steam, there will be a return to the more normal pattern of party contestation, at least until the government’s next own-goal. In the meantime, the contest between Turnbull and Shorten, like that between Abbott and Shorten before it, will be largely one between two unpopular leaders, performed for an electorate which, while less shaken by the times than many overseas, is becoming measurably ever more stroppy.</p>
<p>Dealing with that problem and its electoral consequences has become the central issue of Australian politics, whoever wins the next election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91752/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Bongiorno does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The reality is that Bill Shorten is, in many ways, a garden-variety centre-left leader.Frank Bongiorno, Professor of History, ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/898442018-01-12T13:48:59Z2018-01-12T13:48:59ZWhy labour movements in the UK and US need to build their own ‘special relationship’<p>Most people see the so-called special relationship between Britain and the United States as a compact of states and armies, of presidents and prime ministers. They leave out another “special” relationship between the two countries – between their workers, and their unions.</p>
<p>That relationship has a long history. British emigrants in the 19th century formed many early American unions. For 200 years, British and American workers have collaborated in the creation of labour parties, in the struggles of the low paid, of women, of people of all races and of trade unionists persecuted for heeding the call to organise and strike. They have exchanged fraternal delegates to their conventions. They have swapped warm words about solidarity and justice. They have also failed to live up to those words – more than once.</p>
<p>The history of labour’s special relationship has never been more relevant. British and American workers need allies to reverse the long decline of their unions and living standards. They need help to take advantage of <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-capitalism-has-opened-a-major-new-front-for-strike-action-logistics-89616">new opportunities in logistics</a> and other industries. They both face populist, anti-union governments – and, to resist them, the new forces associated with Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders
need to work closely together. </p>
<p>Three individuals and campaigns, from the 19th century to the present, could help British and American trade unionists to think about solving those problems today.</p>
<h2>The Morgan plan</h2>
<p>Admirers of Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders might not know of the Morgan Plan, a document drawn up in 1893 by a British-born machinist, Thomas Morgan. That plan was an 11-point programme directly inspired by the recent moves in Britain towards the <a href="https://www.wcml.org.uk/our-collections/protest-politics-and-campaigning-for-change/independent-labour-party-ilp/">Independent Labour Party</a>, a forerunner of today’s Labour Party. It called for the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to demand the nationalisation of key industries, much like British Labour’s old <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/aug/09/clause-iv-of-labour-party-constitution-what-is-all-the-fuss-about-reinstating-it">Clause IV</a>. It also demanded that the AFL set up an American Labor Party. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1122&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1122&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201409/original/file-20180109-36009-84wl7m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1122&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Samuel Gompers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=21394509">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If we haven’t heard of the Morgan plan, we probably recognise the means used to defeat it. Before the AFL’s 1893 convention, most affiliated unions endorsed it. Yet the federation’s president, Samuel Gompers, and his allies managed to defeat the plan and the socialists who advocated it. They did so through shrewd handling – a cosy word for manipulation – of the convention. </p>
<p>Gompers tried to dilute Morgan’s 11 planks by having the convention vote on them one by one. He then convinced enough delegates that Morgan’s programme would make enemies of the Democratic and Republican parties and mean ruin for American labour. The delegates who came pledged to support Morgan voted him down.</p>
<p>Corbynistas and Sanders supporters should not dwell on the fact that the process was rigged. They should emphasise the fact that British-American cooperation (nearly) led to an American Labor Party – in 1893! Americans who want to try that route again should learn from the Morgan plan – and its failure. Like their predecessors, they can learn from and work with their British friends.</p>
<h2>Emma Paterson</h2>
<p>Few people better sum up the potential of labour’s special relationship than Emma Paterson. Born in 1848, she became an active trade unionist before the age of 20 and served from 1872 and 1873 as secretary of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage. A trip to the United States in 1873 changed her life. While there, she saw women organising their own unions, especially in female-dominated industries.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201416/original/file-20180109-36043-5b8sut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Logo of the American National Women’s Trade Union.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Paterson’s feminism and trade unionism came together on her return to Britain. She called for special efforts to organise women in largely female trades, and to promote that cause, helped to set up what became the <a href="http://spartacus-educational.com/Wtu.htm">Women’s Protective and Provident League</a>, later renamed the Women’s Trade Union League. Paterson edited the Women’s Union Journal, spoke at countless meetings and picket lines, and was a tireless advocate of women as voters and as trade unionists until she died in 1886.</p>
<p>Transatlantic cooperation did not stop with her death. Activists in the British and American Women’s Trade Union Leagues maintained close ties well into the 20th century. Thanks to them, and to pioneers such as Emma Paterson, British women in the workforce are now more likely to be unionised than men, and American women nearly as likely. They show us what can be done when feminism combines with trade unionism -– and when British and American trade unionists learn from each other.</p>
<h2>Fight for $15</h2>
<p>They still do. In the past decade, in the same kinds of industries that Paterson singled out for special attention – low-paid, usually (but not only) made up mainly of women and people of colour – organising has begun in places where unions seldom existed before.</p>
<p>The most conspicuous example has been the American <a href="https://fightfor15.org/">Fight for $15</a>, a campaign that grew out of strikes by fast food workers in 2012. It now encompasses a range of service workers, from home carers to hotel cleaners and even casual university teachers. It has won political victories around its central claim: a US$15 minimum wage that workers could live on. New York, Seattle and Los Angeles, among other cities, have agreed to raise their minimum wage to $15 by the end of the decade.</p>
<p>Their example has spread elsewhere in the world. In the UK, the Bakers, Food, and Allied Workers’ Union has taken up the cause of fast food workers – and in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-striking-mcdonalds-workers-are-taking-on-the-fast-food-giant-83260">September 2017</a>, McDonald’s workers went on strike for the first time since the company opened its first British store in 1974. Their action and their demands – union recognition, an end to zero hours contracts, and a £10 hourly wage – drew on earlier American struggles.</p>
<p>This is a perfect moment to revive labour’s special relationship. Against Donald Trump and Theresa May, we have the legacy of Thomas Morgan and Emma Paterson. I know which alternative I would rather choose.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author is opening a public exhibition about the shared history of the British and American labour movements with the Trades Union Congress Library. It will tour the US and UK in 2018, beginning with Manchester's Working-Class Movement Library in February.</span></em></p>Labour movements on both sides of the Atlantic have a rich history that’s worth rereading now.Steven Parfitt, University Teacher in History, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/892052017-12-15T14:52:22Z2017-12-15T14:52:22ZHow Latin America bucked the trend of rising inequality<p><a href="https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality/">Income inequality</a> is gaining <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017">attention</a>. </p>
<p>The good news is that we know how to tackle it: <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/global-wealth-tax">tax global wealth</a>, provide a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3b7938e6-c569-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab">universal basic income</a>, broaden access to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9552.html">quality education</a> and <a href="http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf">promote decent work</a>. </p>
<p>The bad news is that many governments are not interested – and neither are their electorates. In order to stem rising inequality we need to understand what drives resistance, politicisation and government responsiveness.</p>
<p>Latin America offers some useful lessons. Here, income inequality has actually fallen, as shown by a decline in the average Gini index <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600818.2016.1140134?journalCode=cods20">by 13%, from 2000-2012</a>. This bucks the global trend, of <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017">growing income inequality</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199298/original/file-20171214-27593-qu2vz8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Income inequality has fallen across Latin America.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality/#income-inequality-in-latin-americaref">Our World in Data</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Income inequality in Latin America partly fell due to <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22016">labour market shifts</a>. Poor people’s wages rose due to the commodities boom (which fuelled demand for unskilled labour); higher skills (facilitated by government investment in education); and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/falling-inequality-in-latin-america-9780198701804?cc=gb&lang=en&">active labour market policies</a> (enforcing labour laws and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-latin-american-economics-9780199571048?cc=gb&lang=en&">increasing minimum wages</a>). </p>
<p>This was complemented by the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15915">redistribution of wealth</a>. Rising public spending on healthcare, education and social protection improved both coverage and quality for all citizens. </p>
<p>We now need to understand why these policies were adopted. I think there are three possible explanations: increased government revenue (due to the commodities boom); democratisation (incentivising political parties to court poor voters); and social movements that make inequality a political issue.</p>
<h2>Extra government revenue</h2>
<p>Arguably, public spending to benefit all levels of society was enabled by the 2000s commodities boom. This was accompanied by improved terms of trade, economic growth, increased tax/GDP ratio, debt cancellation, reduced dependence on the US and international financial institutions, as well as more foreign aid to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. </p>
<p>But why did governments choose to redistribute, rather than enrich the elite? Latin American economies had also grown in the 1990s, but inequality continued to soar (just like the US today). But in the 2000s, we saw rising support for leftist parties, promising redistribution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199297/original/file-20171214-27558-1l0185d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trends in ideological orientation of 18 Latin American governments, 1990-2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002458/245825e.pdf">UNESCO</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Democratisation</h2>
<p>Democratisation might help explain falling inequality. The desire to secure votes and retain power may have incentivised political parties to court poor voters, and address their concerns. </p>
<p>However, there is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444594297000224">no robust evidence that democracy reduces inequality</a>. Nor does <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013519409">democracy appear to increase social spending</a> in Latin America. Further, the poorest <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294275685_The_political_left_the_export_boom_and_the_populist_temptation">do not necessarily vote for left-wing parties</a>.</p>
<p>That said, when we look at a 20-year period, democratisation is associated with <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/852">increased social spending</a> and <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo13590041.html">reduced income inequality</a>. Democratisation appears to enable important other factors, such as leftist organising.</p>
<h2>Social movements</h2>
<p>One long-term process has been social mobilisation, which has politicised inequality. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/rise-ethnic-politics-latin-america?format=PB&isbn=9780521153256#RpkSHuuAgOHXX3mr.97">Indigenous parties</a>, representing some of the poorest groups in Latin America, have performed better in countries with stronger, more unified indigenous social movements.</p>
<p>Strikes have also had a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013519409">long-term positive effect on social security spending</a>. Demonstrations have been led by neighbourhood associations, landless people, unemployed workers, coca growers, domestic workers, women’s organisations, pensioners and students.</p>
<p>The movements were largely triggered by economic self-interest. Price increases, mining projects, wage freezes, mass lay-offs, privatisation, economic stabilisation and mineral extraction <a href="http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/sites/default/files/paulalmeida/files/almeida_2015_in_rossi_and_von_bulow.pdf">made inaction too costly</a> for protesters. </p>
<h2>Changing ideas</h2>
<p>Though social mobilisation was triggered by <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/23056385?casa_token=bSUjAuuKf8oAAAAA:1qZnbE-VQNFpo0b6pR1sBxVAb4JSdxOWnO580-u1D67HF2FQgwazSaKRFO5CFhRTttl1inE6mzxySGjtm_OTpw3uay45kzdUh4vH2ipM9bYerEczx_A">economic liberalisation</a>, it then catalysed a shift in ideas. By sharing experiences at rallies and roadblocks, recognising common grievances, puncturing neoliberal orthodoxy, celebrating hitherto marginalised identities and seeing widespread resistance to the status quo, many Latin Americans gained confidence in the possibility of social change.</p>
<p>Key here are “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321807746_Politicising_Inequality_The_Power_of_Ideas">norm perceptions</a>”: our beliefs about what others think and do. If we never see resistance, we may assume others accept the status quo. So we become despondent and reluctant to mobilise. Such norm perceptions can reinforce inequality. But this changed in Latin America, through sustained activism. </p>
<p>Norm perceptions also changed when people saw progress in neighbouring countries. Electoral victories in Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-indigenous-peoples">emboldened indigenous organisations in other countries to form political parties</a>. This regional effect may partly explain why inequality fell in Latin America but not elsewhere.</p>
<p>Also relevant are Latin America’s high levels of urbanisation. People living in interconnected, heterogeneous, densely populated areas are more likely to <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520283329">hear alternative, critical discourses</a>, listen to <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/who-can-stop-the-drums">community radio sharing positive narratives about marginalised groups</a>. They are more likely to see slogans of resistance emblazoned in street art and learn about successful activism. </p>
<p>Such exposure shifts <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321807746_Politicising_Inequality_The_Power_of_Ideas">norm perceptions and enables positive feedback loops</a>. By seeing their peers pushing for change, people may become more confident in the possibility of collective resistance and join forces. This kind of shared learning is clearly much harder in more remote areas.</p>
<p>Through sustained networking and resistance, which secured redistribution and recognition, many Latin Americans have come to expect more of their governments. </p>
<p>But material change has not kept pace with demand. Latin American governments have failed to carefully manage commodities booms and rein in corruption. When prices tumbled, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-populist-pink-tide-is-ebbing-in-south-america-argentine-vote-suggests-1448326259">so did these governments</a>. But inequality remains politicised.</p>
<p>To amplify resistance against inequality, we need to shift norm perceptions. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321807746_Politicising_Inequality_The_Power_of_Ideas">My research</a> on Latin America reveals the importance of seeing widespread resistance, realising the power of collective organising, securing government response – and recognising that inequality can be radically reduced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In order to tackle inequality, we need to understand what drives resistance to it and government responsiveness.Alice Evans, Lecturer in International Development, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856512017-10-17T00:45:12Z2017-10-17T00:45:12ZJust 120 days into his term, Ecuador’s new president is already undoing his own party’s legacy<p><em>Leer <a href="http://theconversation.com/como-el-nuevo-presidente-del-ecuador-deshizo-el-legado-del-correismo-en-tan-solo-120-dias-85812">en español</a>.</em></p>
<p>After months of internal dissent and very public feuding, Ecuador’s president, Lenin Moreno, has been kicked out of his party, the <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/11/01/america/1509507976_009785.html">Alianza Pais</a>, though the decision is <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/11/01/nota/6461203/jose-serrano-mi-lenin-moreno-sigue-siendo-presidente-alianza-pais">hotly contested</a>.</p>
<p>Moreno served as vice president for six years under <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/world/americas/rafael-correa-wins-re-election-in-ecuador.html">Rafael Correa, the popular and charismatic founder</a> of the left-wing political party. In April 2017, he was narrowly elected as the successor to Correa’s administration, which oversaw the most stable political period of Ecuador’s democratic history. </p>
<p>During his presidential campaign against the conservative banker Guillermo Lasso, there were already <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-tense-election-ecuador-is-divided-over-its-political-future-73654">signs that Moreno was distancing</a> himself from Correa. But at the time, these subtle political shifts seemed necessary to win an <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/ruling-party-candidate-lenin-moreno-leads-vote-170220033337504.html">extremely tight race</a> on a continent where <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-a-chilean-outsider-revive-latin-americas-ailing-left-71213">the once-powerful Left is now ailing</a>. </p>
<p>Now, after executing a shocking <a href="http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-ecuador-empieza-distanciarse-bolivarianismo-201708212037_noticia.html">breakaway from both the Alianza Pais platform</a> and its supreme leader, Correa, the party is taking action against him. This political turnaround is complicating Ecuador’s democratic transition and unraveling the Alianza Pais. At risk is nothing less than the will of the people.</p>
<h2>The outstretched hand</h2>
<p>Elected by <a href="https://resultados2017-2.cne.gob.ec/frmResultados.aspx">just 2.3 points</a> over Lasso, Moreno knew his administration would <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-left-won-ecuadors-presidential-election-cue-right-wing-revolt-76262">face serious challenges</a> – among them, governing a highly polarized nation.</p>
<p>To tackle them, candidate Moreno seemed to think that demonstrating autonomy from Correa was a must-do. On the campaign trail, Moreno promised voters “national reconciliation,” “an outstretched hand” and “continuity with change.” Commentators took to calling this stratagem the “<a href="http://panamarevista.com/lenin-moreno-el-delfin-distante/">de-Correafication</a>” of Ecuador.</p>
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<p>Once in office, that process expanded. The president has now engaged every social and political force that Correa’s administration had considered “the opposition,” from the <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/politica-leninmoreno-conaie-comodato-sede.html">indigenous movement</a> to the financial sector and <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/07/12/nota/6277198/lenin-moreno-pide-directivos-medios-que-prensa-sea-primera">media conglomerates</a>. </p>
<p>Moreno has also held talks with <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/correa-pacto-bucaram-ecuador-lenin.html">opposition parties</a> and the <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/consejo-consultivo-presidente-leninmoreno-propuestas.html">Ecuadorian Business Committee</a>, a lobby that had urged the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/15/rafael-correa-ecuador-elections">Correa government</a>, which spent heavily on social welfare, to <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/sector-productivo-dialogo-ecuador-leninmoreno.html">curb public expenditures</a>.</p>
<h2>Pivot time</h2>
<p>Conversation led to action. Moreno acceded to financial sector demands that <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/dinero-electronico-bce-banca-codigomonetario.html">private banks be allowed to work with digital cash</a>. In Ecuador, all electronic payments had previously <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/06/ecuador-becomes-the-first-country-to-roll-out-its-own-digital-durrency.html">been controlled by the central bank</a>.</p>
<p>He also agreed to <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/05/09/nota/6176500/lenin-moreno-anuncia-posibles-cambios-ley-comunicacion-si-no-es">introduce reforms to the Communications Act</a> that will protect freedom of expression, acquiescing to calls from media companies that for years did battle with Correa.</p>
<p>Finally, in a nod to austerity, the new president <a href="https://lahora.com.ec/noticia/1102090789/presidente-moreno-anuncia-baja-de-sueldos-de-altos-funcionarios-y-venta-de-avion-presidencial">cut civil servant salaries</a>, even though Ecuador ranks among the Latin American nations <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40853676">with the lowest public debt</a>.</p>
<p>Such moves worried the Alianza Pais’s base, who fear that the president is subverting Correa’s self-declared “citizen’s revolution.” If so, he’s doing it without any clear political or economic vision. Moreno’s policies are so incongruous that the right-wing Lasso recently offered to “lend” the president his <a href="https://twitter.com/LassoGuillermo/status/892051318705201154">economic plan</a>.</p>
<h2>Both ruling party and opposition</h2>
<p>It didn’t take long for Moreno and his powerful predecessor to begin publicly clashing. </p>
<p>In June, Correa began to “editorialize” the Moreno administration in <a href="http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/punto-de-vista/1/el-caso-odebrecht">opinion pieces in El Telégrafo newspaper</a>. On Twitter, he implicitly criticized the president as having either a “short memory” or acting “in bad faith.”</p>
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<p>Moreno responded in kind. In a public meeting in June, <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/07/11/nota/6275908/declaraciones-cruzadas-lenin-moreno-rafael-correa">he said</a>, “Now we can breath freely, slowly we will all shed our sheep-like behavior.” He added that “<a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/07/11/nota/6275359/lenin-moreno-reconoce-que-situacion-economica-dificil-falta-mesura">the table is not set</a>…he [Correa] could have been a bit more reasonable about leaving things in better condition.”</p>
<p>The former president quickly <a href="https://twitter.com/MashiRafael/status/885273303665061888">took to the internet to condemn</a> the president’s intractability, saying that Moreno’s actions would undo El Correismo – Correa’s self-titled political movement – bow to corporate interests and kill Ecuador’s <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cuanto-ha-cambiado-Ecuador-con-la-Revolucion-Ciudadana%20%E2%80%93%2020150115-0097.html">citizen revolution</a>.</p>
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<p>Adding to the chorus was Moreno’s own vice president, Jorge Glas, a Correa insider. In an Aug. 2 <a href="http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/politica/2/jorge-glas-critica-en-carta-publica-acciones-del-gobierno-de-lenin-moreno">public letter</a>, he protested President Moreno’s rapprochement with conservative forces.</p>
<p>All this fueled the new president’s move to break away from El Correismo, even though just months ago Ecuadorian voters opted in favor of Correa’s legacy. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/virgiliohernandez-ricardopatino-paolapabon-renuncian-cargos.html">resignation, in August, of several senior officials</a> from El Correismo’s progressive wing showed that the <a href="https://medium.com/@MashiRafael/queridos-compa%C3%B1eros-de-alianza-pa%C3%ADs-6fa8b6f38d47">government and the political movement were drifting farther apart</a>. On Nov. 1, that schism became what appears to be an irreparable separation. </p>
<h2>Scandal or political convenience?</h2>
<p>Adding fuel to this national political fire are <a href="https://cuencahighlife.com/massive-odebrecht-bribery-scandal-implicates-ecuador-11-latin-american-countries/">explosive revelations</a> that at least 18 Ecuadorian officials have been implicated in Brazil’s massive <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-odebrecht-corruption-scandal-2017-5">Odebrecht scandal</a>.</p>
<p>The international bribery scheme has taken down several senior members of Correa’s administration, including Vice President Glas. He stands accused of leading a network of civil servants who accepted <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Procuraduria-de-Ecuador-acusa-a-vicepresidente-Glas-por-caso-Odebrecht-20170929-0001.html">US$33 million in corporate kickbacks</a>. </p>
<p>Moreno could ask for no better excuse to isolate his Correa-friendly veep. On Aug. 3, one day after Glas’s critical open letter, the president <a href="http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201708/197139-peru-presidente-lenin-moreno-decreto-retira-funciones-vicepresidente-jorge-glas-criticas.html">stripped the vice president of all official powers</a>. On Oct. 2, Glas was arrested, and he is now in preventive detention while under <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ecuador-vice-president-jorge-glas-arrested-jailed-corruption-bribery-investigation-odebrecht-supreme-a7980691.html">investigation</a>. </p>
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<p>Moreno did promise to “<a href="http://www.andes.info.ec/es/noticias/lenin-moreno-apelara-convencion-onu-lucha-contra-corrupcion-lasso-plantea-eliminacion">battle corruption</a>,” and his <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Presidente-de-Ecuador-firma-decreto-sobre-frente-anticorrupcion-20170605-0033.html">anti-corruption front</a> had seemed likely to please <a href="http://www.expreso.ec/actualidad/ecuador-corrupcion-preocupacion-candidatos-elecciones-YF896067">many sectors of society</a> that are frustrated with public malfeasance. </p>
<p>However, his efforts now appear less targeted at weeding out corruption than at undermining Correa’s legacy. Glas is in jail, but the economic powers that be, such as the South American financial conglomerate <a href="http://www.planv.com.ec/investigacion/investigacion/el-grupo-eljuri-problemas-presunto-lavado-y-evasion">Grupo Eljuri</a> – a key Odebrecht player – have remained immune from prosecution.</p>
<p>Among Lasso’s electoral base, 81 percent now rate <a href="http://mobile.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=wap_news_view&id=2818826916">his administration positively</a>. Moreno’s policies have also been welcomed by people in major urban hubs like Quito and Cuenca, where the administration’s approval rates have risen since June. </p>
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<h2>Referendum time</h2>
<p>It was in this already tangled context that Moreno called for a plebiscite, theoretically a grassroots-inspired way to address national concerns. The president asked <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/09/20/nota/6391027/como-enviar-preguntas-consulta-popular">citizens and parties from across the political spectrum</a> to submit questions that they wanted the government to help answer.</p>
<p>Of the almost <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/09/28/nota/6404002/lenin-moreno-recibe-propuestas-sistematizadas-noticias-este-jueves">400 proposals</a> received, the government will go to referendum next year with just <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Lenin-Moreno-plantea-siete-preguntas-para-consulta-popular-20171002-0054.html">seven questions</a>. Among them will be to roll back <a href="http://ecuadorbeachfrontproperty.com/ecuadorblog/?p=1189">capital gains taxes</a> aimed at limiting land speculation and whether to undo Correa’s rollback of presidential term limits. </p>
<p>The selection process confirms the marginalization of Alianza Pais’s issues – he accepted just <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/09/28/nota/6404341/moreno-acogio-tres-preguntas-ap-reunion-urgente">three of the party’s congressional leaders’ 33 submissions</a>, alienating his own legislative bloc – and the resurgence of bankers, private media, traditional party leaders and financiers in Moreno’s coalition.</p>
<p>Rather than continue his predecessor’s legacy of reforms, Ecuador’s president seems keen to wield his popular mandate as a weapon to kill El Correismo once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Soledad Stoessel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecuador’s president, Lenin Moreno, has been flirting with conservatives. Beyond irking his base, it has also lead to mass resignations and Twitter battles with his powerful left-wing predecessor.Soledad Stoessel, Postdoctoral Researcher, Latin American Political Processes, Universidad Nacional de la PlataLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789182017-06-15T05:36:08Z2017-06-15T05:36:08ZIn Mexico, a firebrand leftist provokes the powers that be – including Donald Trump<p>With its 17 million people, Mexico State, which encompasses the outer suburbs of sprawling Mexico City, tends to have an impact in national elections that goes far beyond its borders. </p>
<p>The behemoth central state, which accounts for some 14% of Mexico’s population, commands significant resources and is President Enrique Peña Nieto’s political bastion.</p>
<p>All eyes were on it during the June 4 gubernatorial elections, which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/06/06/world/americas/06reuters-mexico-election.html?_r=0">pitted the upstart left-wing party MORENA</a>, founded by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (aka “AMLO” locally), the firebrand former governor of Mexico City and two-time presidential candidate, against Peña Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).</p>
<p>In the end, MORENA’s Delfina Gómez, came within three percentage points of her opponent, Alfredo del Mazo, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/world/americas/mexico-governor-race-ruling-party-pri.html">failed to break the PRI’s stronghold</a>. The narrow result, which <a href="http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/06/05/mexico/1496631789_513689.html">MORENA immediately contested</a>, sets the stage for a tumultuous 2018 presidential election.</p>
<h2>Elections AMLO lost</h2>
<p>Though the PRI won the gubernatorial election, it faced fierce competition this time around. The crowded field included political heavy hitters such as Josefina Vázquez Mota, of the centre-right National Action Party (which won the presidency in 2000, bringing Mexico its first-ever non-PRI government). And Juan Zepeda from the Revolutionary Democratic Party, a centre-left party born in the 1980s as a splinter of the PRI. There were also several independent and minor-party candidates.</p>
<p><a href="http://expansion.mx/politica/2017/05/04/super-requete-bien-asi-van-en-las-encuestas-los-candidatos-del-edomex">Surveys</a> had long predicted a two-way race between Gómez, a former teacher and mayor of the city of Texcoco, and del Mazo. The tight margin of victory – and López Obrador’s subsequent <a href="http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2017/05/21/1164856">cries</a> of <a href="http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2017/06/06/morena-presenta-queja-ante-ine-contra-del-mazo-por-rebasar-gastos-de-campana">fraud</a> – will amplify the stories of malfeasance that plagued the last weeks of the campaign.</p>
<p>Among alleged scandals, Vázquez Mota’s <a href="http://www.proceso.com.mx/472745/sre-indaga-destino-los-mil-mdp-vazquez-mota-recibio-pena-nieto">family</a> was accused of financial fraud, Gómez was said to have demanded <a href="http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2017/04/26/1159897">payment</a> from former staffers to benefit a local party boss and even Obrador’s <a href="http://aristeguinoticias.com/0106/mexico/divulgan-supuesta-llamada-de-hijo-de-amlo-con-yeidckol-polenvsky-video/">closest circle</a> was alleged to be involved in an illicit transfer of funds.</p>
<p>All these accusations, and the illegal behaviour that may or may not underlie them, diminish Mexicans’ trust in elections and divide the electorate between winners and losers, accusers and accused. </p>
<h2>Still a winner, of sorts</h2>
<p>López Obrador, a practiced populist, is talented in making lemonade out of lemons. He may well be able to capitalise on Gómez’s defeat by repeating a local version of the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/americas/mexicos-new-president-faces-uphill-fight.html">national scandal he orchestrated</a> after his own presidential defeat in 2006.</p>
<p>To some, that months-long protest polarised public opinion and confirmed that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXCU0HDJ7Wk">he posed a danger</a> to Mexico’s democracy, as PAN <a href="http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/10/06/politica/008n1pol">leadership</a> then claimed. But, among his base, it garnered him <a href="http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/822">wild support</a>.</p>
<p>Obrador will surely be running for president again in 2018 in his third attempt to capture the office. And Delfina Gómez’s strong finish shows that MORENA is a force to be reckoned with.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"874319133806010369"}"></div></p>
<p>Currently, surveys give Obrador the best chance of winning the 2018 election. When compared to any other possible candidate that <a href="http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2017/04/06/1156225">pollsters</a> can think of, including ex-president Felipe Calderón’s wife and some high-ranking PRI officials, he comes out at least 5% ahead.</p>
<p>But he has been in this favourable position before and still narrowly lost two presidential elections (2006 and 2012). If elected, Obrador has promised to end corruption and to govern for the poor and underserved. </p>
<p>In a country with the <a href="http://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza_2014.aspx">poverty rate of 46%</a> and average trust in government of <a href="http://www.consulta.mx/index.php/estudios-e-investigaciones/mexico-opina/item/884-mexico-confianza-en-instituciones-2016">5.1 on a scale of 10</a>, such changes would be welcome. </p>
<p>Other policy proposals are tougher. Obrador has also suggested <a href="https://www.sdpnoticias.com/nacional/2016/10/31/reitera-amlo-aborto-y-matrimonio-igualitario-deben-someterse-a-plebiscito?fb_comment_id=1216874721688677_1216960955013387">referenda on recent decisions</a> legalising marriage equality and adoption by same-sex couples, and wants to raise the minimum wage and retirement pensions without raising taxes or increasing the deficit. </p>
<p>He also plans to hold a referendum to potentially roll back <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/world/americas/mexican-president-invites-foreign-investment-in-energy.html">recent energy reforms</a> that allowed private investors into the oil market, which had been state-run since the 1930s. </p>
<p>Such promises have fueled comparisons between AMLO and the late president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. And this makes markets – and many Mexicans – jittery. </p>
<h2>AMLO v Trump</h2>
<p>Obrador’s rise has always come with rabble-rousing, both after he lost the 1994 Tabasco governor’s race and when demanding reparations for environmental damage caused by <a href="http://www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2004/126382.html">oil spills</a> on indigenous lands. </p>
<p>At a 2006 campaign event, he repeatedly said to then-president Vicente Fox (PAN) to “<em>¡Cállate chachalaca!</em>” (Shut up, you cawing bird!). This elicited laughter from the crowd but dismayed more <a href="http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/03/23/index.php?section=politica&article=028a2pol">serious observers</a>. It also led the PAN to first liken Obrador <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXCU0HDJ7Wk">to Hugo Chávez</a>..</p>
<p>Ultimately, Obrador lost to the PAN’s Felipe Calderón by less than 0.5%, about 250,000 votes. He called on his supporters to protest the results, for weeks blockaded Reforma Avenue, one of Mexico City’s main thoroughfares, and, eventually began calling himself the “<a href="http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/09/17/index.php?section=politica&article=003n1pol">legitimate president of Mexico</a>”.</p>
<p>But current events and political strategy have conspired to tame AMLO’s fire. His response to losing to Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012, this time by more than 6%, was much less angry. </p>
<p>More recently, the rise and eventual election of US President Donald Trump, with his anti-Mexico rhetoric, served to <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-and-populism-in-mexico-2016-8">boost</a> Obrador’s prospects, as he has been riding the rising tide of Mexican nationalism.</p>
<p>Touring the US in Februray 2017, he defended Mexican immigrants and proposed to reduce the northward flow by improving living standards in Mexico after “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/05/01/andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-mexico-will-wage-a-battle-of-ideas-against-trump/?utm_term=.732421939cf9">three decades of neo-liberal governments</a>”.</p>
<iframe src="https://www.bloomberg.com/api/embed/iframe?id=3870ac2d-f1ff-472d-a770-9c62c322a3cb" allowscriptaccess="always" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>But the firebrand, anti-establishment AMLO must also tread carefully to avoid any comparisons with the firebrand, anti-establishment Trump, who has become odious to Mexicans. </p>
<p>This may have inspired his shifting position on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Trump has threatened to repeal. In 2006, AMLO promised to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061701073.html">restore</a> import tariffs on American corn and beans. Now he says he will <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-14/top-mexico-candidate-blasts-trump-says-can-t-wait-to-redo-nafta">wait to take a position on NAFTA</a> after winning the election.</p>
<p>In Washington, the prospect of an AMLO victory next year seems to have <a href="http://www.nationalobserver.com/2017/04/23/news/why-trump-racing-against-clock-nafta-mexican-election">sped up NAFTA negotiations</a>. The Trump administration knows what Peña Nieto wants in a trade deal; who knows what AMLO thinks?</p>
<h2>An uncertain economy?</h2>
<p>Some financial analysts believe that an Obrador presidency could bring economic <a href="http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/opinion/el-factor-amlo-en-los-mercados.html">instability to Mexico and beyond</a>. The exchange rate of the peso, with its sensitive barometric properties, concurs. </p>
<p>On Mexico State’s election day, it registered the probable victory of MORENA, rising 11 cents after polls closed, only to <a href="http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/mercados/el-peso-baila-al-son-de-la-eleccion-en-edomex.html">drop</a> 21 cents when preliminary tallies handed victory to Del Mazo.</p>
<p>The candidate has <a href="http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2017/05/18/no-estamos-contra-las-instituciones-ni-empresarios-amlo">said</a> that he’s no Chávez and that businesses have nothing to worry about. In keeping, his party is carefully calibrating its image. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="http://www.animalpolitico.com/2017/05/venezuela-morena-apoyo/">MORENA hosted the Venezuelan ambassador</a>, who expressed her gratefulness for the party’s solidarity with the Bolivarian regime on Twitter, only to later delete the tweets. Obrador’s party <a href="http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/metropoli/cdmx/2017/05/30/batres-desmiente-apoyo-de-morena-cdmx-maduro">denounced</a> the whole event as fake and underscored MORENA’s non-interventionist foreign policy.</p>
<p>Some supporters will miss the old firebrand when López Obrador makes his third run for the presidency. Can he square their desires with the sensibilities of the peso?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.
</span></em></p>Can Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexican politics’ long-time left-wing rabble rouser, finally win the presidency?Salvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/773632017-05-11T10:53:56Z2017-05-11T10:53:56ZWhat next for the European left? How to save a struggling movement<p>The paradox of the European left is that while many of the burning issues currently defining political debates are traditionally left-wing concerns, social democratic parties seem incapable of credibly addressing them. This is true whether they are in office or in opposition. The left has failed to persuade voters that it can deal with economic inequality, employment precariousness, accessible housing or making health spending and pension entitlements sustainable. </p>
<p>Lately, however, there appears to have been something of a revival in centre-left parties’ fortunes – in France, Italy, Spain and the UK – that augur if not a resurgence of socialism, then at least a rejection of the forces of far-right nationalism. That revival could help social democratic parties respond to their predicament.</p>
<p>The origins of the paradox of the European left lie in a mismatch in the way democracy and capitalism are organised. Social democracy has traditionally organised at the level of the nation state. The levers of public intervention in matters of risk insurance (employment, health, pensions) remain with national governments. But market forces operate at the regional or global scale.</p>
<p>The European Union does intervene in regulating transnational market competition by, for example, applying Europe-wide rules on protecting employees. But, membership of the eurozone also curtails a national government’s room for manoeuvre in how much it can spend and borrow. Social democratic parties have struggled to navigate the contending forces of democracy and capitalism with the advance of European integration.</p>
<p>As a result, the electoral base of the left has fragmented. In France, the UK, the US and elsewhere, there is a split between those in favour of regulated openness and those in favour of nationalist closure.</p>
<p>The old industrial working class is turning away from parties such as Labour and the French Socialists towards <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukip-5017">UKIP</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/front-national-6287">Front National</a> – parties that want to restore national control over borders and the economy. Meanwhile, other parts of the left’s traditional base – public sector employees, liberal professionals, urban residents with a cosmopolitan outlook – continue to espouse socially liberal ideals and economically centrist policies.</p>
<p>This fragmentation was perfectly illustrated in the first round of the French presidential elections. The socialists lost votes to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">far left</a>, the centre and to the far right. In Spain too, the PSOE has lost support to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/podemos-13452">Podemos</a> on the left and to the centrist upstart, Ciudadanos. In the UK, Labour is haemorrhaging votes in all directions. </p>
<h2>The troubled revival of the left</h2>
<p>Yet, at the same time, social democratic parties seem to be experiencing some kind of revival.</p>
<p>Jeremy Corbyn’s dramatic election as leader of the Labour party in 2015 was made possible by a sudden growth in the number of young and committed party members. Emmanuel Macron’s equally impressive victory in the French presidential election seemed to signal a similar popular momentum. Matteo Renzi took the helm of the Partito Democratico in Italy, committed to tackling the country’s deep structural problems, on the back of an immense surge of popularity.</p>
<p>But unlike the emergence of the “new” left in the 1990s, incarnated by Bill Clinton in the US, Tony Blair in the UK, Gerhard Schröder in Germany, and Lionel Jospin in France, these contemporary movements don’t share the common ideological vision or political organisation needed to win office.</p>
<p>Corbyn is a well-known but unpopular tribune speaker with rehearsed socialist ideas that will not pass muster with the average British voter. Macron is the opposite. He is a capable and well-liked political novice, with a pragmatic but reformist programme that can woo centrist voters. His problem is that he leads a loose movement rather than an established party and may <a href="https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macron-faces-a-really-big-problem-if-he-becomes-french-president-73886">struggle to implement his programme</a> as a result. </p>
<p>Renzi’s problem is also one of implementation. He was a bright and dynamic young leader at the helm of a dominant left-wing party. He wanted to solve Italy’s deep-seated economic problems and to tackle vested interests. However, he lost his gambit to reform the Italian political system in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/italy-referendum-30233">referendum</a> which he himself turned into a plebiscite on his leadership forcing him to resign as prime minister – although he has since <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/30/italys-renzi-set-political-comeback-party-election/">regained the leadership</a> of his party.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168595/original/file-20170509-11023-1qmd7ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Renzi had it, and lost it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The conditions for a successful revival appear to be a combination of protest, personality, policy and organisation. Macron’s reforms could draw upon the groundswell of support offered to Podemos, for example. He could also benefit from the organisational depth of Corbyn’s party and the systemic dominance of Renzi’s.</p>
<h2>A recipe for recovery</h2>
<p>But to sustain this potential momentum, social democratic parties need to adhere to some key principles.</p>
<p>They should, for a start, emphasise the social justice issues that have always been at the heart of social democracy rather than those that tend to push voters into the orbit of far-right parties. That means focusing on long-term unemployment, training and education, health funding, pension reform and the environment. Immigration, identity and terrorism also need to be addressed, but as matters of citizenship, rights and social cohesion.</p>
<p>They should also advance concrete reformist policies that credibly deal with social justice issues, but that also recognise the complexity of living in an open and rapidly changing world. Taking inspiration from Macron and Renzi’s programmes, that means reforming pensions and a sclerotic labour market. It means using state instruments to prevent the worst forms of deprivation and inequity. It means spending public funds to provide social investments in health, training and industry to boost the supply side of the economy.</p>
<p>The split within the left is partly a generational one – so the younger generation of voters, to whom these messages might appeal, needs to be mobilised. These young people are more sympathetic to reformist ideas and must be compelled to turn out to vote. This will require the transformation of loose movements into formal party organisations with resources, personnel and members.</p>
<p>Accepting the need to govern in coalition with other like-minded forces is another essential change. The only alternative to the Conservative government in the UK, for example, is a coalition of Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Similarly, in France, Macron will probably need parliamentary support from Socialists and Republicans to form a <a href="https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macron-faces-a-really-big-problem-if-he-becomes-french-president-73886">working government</a>. Failure to coalesce may result in the failure to win office, as Pedro Sanchez, the fallen leader of the PSOE <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-messy-politics-behind-spains-new-government-67970">realised only too late</a>.</p>
<p>For some of Europe’s social democratic parties, national government is not attainable at the moment. But they should pursue reformist programmes at the local or regional level, testing out their policies as they go. They can also develop transnational coalitions between similar social forces across different countries, for instance in the European Parliament. They can demonstrate that the social and economic ills they seek to address can be done by concerted action in Europe, rather than by nationalist closure.</p>
<p>Only by broadening their thought and action in such a fashion can struggling social democratic parties recover their relevance in the current political landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social democratic parties across the continent are struggling for different reasons. They can learn from each other to bounce back.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/751572017-04-04T20:34:32Z2017-04-04T20:34:32ZEcuador’s populist electoral victory for Moreno shows erosion of democracy<p>After 10 years in power, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa will step down. </p>
<p>However, political power isn’t falling far from the tree. Correa’s hand-picked successor and former vice president, Lenin Moreno, has declared <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-election-idUSKBN1740F8">victory</a> against liberal banker Guillermo Lasso. The election has calmed fears that Correa might attempt to cling to the office after he changed the constitution in 2015 to allow for his permanent reelection. </p>
<p>However, Moreno’s election lacks legitimacy for about half of the electorate amid allegations of electoral fraud. To make matters worse, he won in an unfair electoral field. Correa and his party, Alianza País, used their power as elected officials to campaign for Moreno. State-controlled media blatantly favored Moreno. His party intimidated the opposition and even used thugs to <a href="http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/el-picnic-correista-contra-lasso-el-futbol-desata-la-polemica-politica">attack Lasso</a>. </p>
<p>They branded Lasso as a corrupt banker who would roll back social policies designed to reduce inequality and bring back the free-market past. He was portrayed as an enemy of the common people, and as a representative of the Latin American right that aimed to reverse social policies that benefited the poor. Correa constructed the election as a vote on the legacies of his administration, and more broadly on the sustainability of a political “left turn” in Latin America.</p>
<p>Other recent elections show evidence of a shift to the right in Latin American politics. For example, the election of President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34897150">Mauricio Macri</a> in Argentina, the transfer of power to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/13/michel-temer-brazil-president-rebuild-impeachment">Michel Temer</a> in Brazil and the election of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36459958">Pedro Pablo Kuczynski</a> in Peru.</p>
<p>Lasso was supported by right- and left-wing parties and some social movement leaders who were the victims of Correa’s administration. For Lasso’s supporters, the contest was between Correa’s autocracy and the promise of the liberalization and democratization of Ecuador.</p>
<h2>Rafael Correa’s populism</h2>
<p>Correa was first <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ecuador-correas-plebiscitary-presidency">elected</a> in 2006 after running against Ecuador’s political and economic establishment. To reverse privatization and shrinking of the state, he <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ecuador-correas-plebiscitary-presidency">strengthened</a> the state and used it to reduce poverty and inequality.</p>
<p>Word Bank data show that the number of people living under the national poverty line in Ecuador was <a href="http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/ECU">reduced</a> from 37.6 percent in 2006 to 23.3 percent in 2015. </p>
<p>Alianza País <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carlos_De_La_Torre7/publication/262093836_El_tecnopopulismo_de_Rafael_Correa_Es_compatible_el_carisma_con_la_tecnocracia/links/579f4d3508ae6a2882f60e95.pdf">wanted</a> to rule until they achieved their long-term project of revamping all political institutions. They wanted to transform the nation’s model of political and economic development from what they saw as a bourgeois democracy into a real democracy with equity and social justice. Correa claimed to be the leader of a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carlos_De_La_Torre7/publication/262093836_El_tecnopopulismo_de_Rafael_Correa_Es_compatible_el_carisma_con_la_tecnocracia/links/579f4d3508ae6a2882f60e95.pdf">citizens’ revolution</a>” tasked with bringing Ecuador to its second and definitive independence from foreign domination and anti-national elites.</p>
<p>Like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and other populists, Correa saw the people as a homogeneous entity with one interest and will embodied under his leadership. For example, after wining the 2009 election he <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15335/populist-playbook-the-slow-death-of-democracy-in-correa-s-ecuador">asserted</a> that “Ecuador voted for itself.” Correa believed he was the only voice of the people. He <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-technocratic-populism-ecuador">branded</a> his rivals as enemies of the nation and his citizens’ revolution. Dissent even within his left-wing coalition was interpreted as treason, and Correa used discretion in enforcing laws to intimidate and repress independent social movements and his <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282389906_Surveil_and_Sanction_The_Return_of_the_State_and_Societal_Regulation_in_Ecuador">left-wing critics</a>. </p>
<p>But Correa’s state-centered model of development fell into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/02/25/ecuador-se-despide-de-correa-y-ahora/">jeopardy</a>. The price of oil, which accounts for 58 percent of Ecuador’s exports, collapsed. Ecuador developed a bloated bureaucracy and began overspending without saving for times of economic scarcity. He faced massive demonstrations against his intention to indefinitely remain in power. In 2016, Correa <a href="http://www.larepublica.ec/blog/politica/2016/01/13/correa-ira-a-belgica-tras-dejar-el-poder-aunque-no-descarta-volver/">announced</a> he would temporarily step down from politics, named Moreno as his successor and promised to come back in 2021.</p>
<h2>The end of ‘correismo’?</h2>
<p>Lenin Moreno will inherit institutions designed for autocratic control of the public sphere and civil society. His party controls the congress, the judiciary, the electoral council and all institutions of <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15335/populist-playbook-the-slow-death-of-democracy-in-correa-s-ecuador">accountability</a> like the comptroller and the ombudsman.</p>
<p>Correa <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2015.1058784">took over</a> media outlets and formed a state media emporium. He <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282389906_Surveil_and_Sanction_The_Return_of_the_State_and_Societal_Regulation_in_Ecuador">regulated</a> and closed NGOs, and <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2015.1058784">formed</a> loyal social movements. </p>
<p>But Moreno lacks Correa’s charisma. In my opinion, he will have difficulty controlling the different factions of Alianza País made up of left-wing activists, technocrats, businesspeople and traditional politicians. This is especially true since Correa might actually encourage clashes within the coalition to set himself up as the ultimate deal maker. He might try to dictate to Moreno how to govern. Yet, it is uncertain that Moreno would become his puppet, and quite likely he would have his own agenda and ambitions that could clash with his mentor’s.</p>
<p>Moreno may also face an opposition emboldened by the tight race and allegations of electoral fraud. Perhaps he’ll follow the example of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the handpicked successor to Hugo Chávez. In the absence of Chavez’s charisma, Maduro has turned to an autocratic approach to silence critics. He has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/04/03/cada-vez-hay-mas-presos-politicos-en-venezuela-el-grado-de-represion-se-ha-incrementado-a-un-nivel-brutal/?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Findex">jailed</a> members of the opposition and repressed protests. Venezuela is now in crisis.</p>
<p>Moreno will also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/03/27/la-mineria-amenaza-a-los-indigenas-shuar-en-ecuador/">confront</a> increasing resistance to natural resource extraction from indigenous people, increasing protests against corruption and his election.</p>
<p>The Ecuadorian elections show the perils of populist succession. In order to win, Correa and Moreno used the state and the media, and packed cronies in the electoral council. Even though Moreno won, he lacks legitimacy. Accusations of fraud will haunt his administration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75157/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos De la Torre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent elections in Latin America have suggested a retreat from left-wing politics and populist leaders. But results from Ecuador’s 2017 presidential election suggest otherwise.Carlos De la Torre, Professor of Sociology, University of KentuckyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/740932017-03-30T09:18:34Z2017-03-30T09:18:34ZYes, academics tend to be left wing – but let’s not exaggerate it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161564/original/image-20170320-9121-1odzkvh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">And to the left of your university...</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/radcliffe-camera-all-souls-college-oxford-524754760?src=lX-MEQb9vaQW3f84QTo4iQ-1-12">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.adamsmith.org/research/lackademia-why-do-academics-lean-left">accusation that</a> that academia is disproportionately left-wing and liberal is not a new one. Nor is the main thrust of the claim, in a report by the Adam Smith Institute, contentious. Many accept that <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/opinion/adam-smith-institute-lurch-left-report-flimsy-figures">academics tend towards the left</a>, even if we cannot be sure of precise levels of inclination or whether the tendency is on the rise. The more important issue is whether or not this actually matters, both in terms of impartiality in research and teaching, and equality for staff and students.</p>
<p>It should not be much of a surprise, after all, that certain professional sectors have a bias in their intake – towards both ends of the political spectrum. No-one seems overly concerned about whether the banking industry is predominantly right wing. And in the case of universities facing mostly to the left, there are some good reasons why this is likely to be the case. </p>
<p>First, there is a <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/04/27/study-finds-those-graduate-education-are-far-more-liberal-peers">correlation</a> between levels of education and social liberalism. Given that academics are (by necessity) highly educated, they will at the very least be more liberal on average. Second, they have chosen to become academics, while others chose to do something else. The Adam Smith Institute report states that “openness to experience” is something that attracts people to academia, as we are supposed to be asking questions and finding out about things. </p>
<p>However, there is more to career choice than this. So we should also consider whether the other elements of an academic career also bias the kind of people who choose the industry. For a start, it is part of the public sector. It also involves teaching the next generation, plenty of bureaucracy, and different risk and reward structures from other industries graduates may gravitate towards.</p>
<p>But theories of “<a href="https://publicadministrationreview.org/the-motivational-bases-of-public-service/">public service motivation</a>” do not fully explain the choice to enter academia. It is simply the case that two people with the same skills and knowledge, but different ideas of what they want to do in the world, will differ in their choice of career. Research in this area also suggests that, as might be expected, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10967494.2013.825484">motivations differ by academic discipline</a>. The choice of degree, then choice of further study, and eventual choice of what to do for a living are all intertwined. </p>
<p>We then need to ask whether a general political leaning towards the left has an effect on the work of universities, and on students, staff and society at large. Here evidence is mixed, and is mostly from the US where this discussion has a history going back to at least <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/william-f-buckley-jnr-hero-of-modern-american-conservatism-who-founded-the-influential-national-789318.html">1951</a>. Studies of a few particular disciplines found “<a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1745691612455">discrimination against conservative people and ideas</a>”, although in general, academics identifying as conservative in the US <a href="https://www.aaup.org/article/rethinking-plight-conservatives-higher-education">did not report feeling targeted</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/indoctrination-u-faculty-ideology-and-changes-in-student-political-orientation/25ABD9B1A3577F27B5659941CD52D6C9">Another study</a> found “no evidence that [staff] ideology at an institutional level has an impact on student political ideology”, nor were American conservative students <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446123/summary">disadvantaged by lower grades</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, what the Adam Smith Institute’s figures don’t tell us is what kinds of ideas are held by the 80% they count as left wing. We should expect the problems of bias to be greater when the political distance is greater, but broad brush labels such as “liberal” or “left leaning” do not tell us much. It also becomes difficult to disentangle the actual degree of political bias from that which is perceived – when academia becomes stereotyped as a hotbed of radicalism, the fear of bias will grow.</p>
<h2>The messy reality</h2>
<p>In this way, the Adam Smith Institute links left voting academics with “curtailment of free speech”, “no-platforming” and ideological homogeneity. But these connections imply that society can be divided into two groups, diametrically opposed on a range of issues, and with a deep divide and disagreement. A similarly simplistic approach is also <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0050092">often behind</a> accusations by left-wing activists about right-leaning voters. Too often, arguments on both sides of the debate draw on over-the-top stereotypes and exaggerations that make conflict more likely, not less. As in the US, this debate conjures up “culture wars” with most people in two polarised groups which strongly disagree with each other on a range of issues, and “<a href="http://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/october6/onenation-106.html">look at each other like they are on separate planets</a>”.</p>
<p>Such analysis assumes there is a loud, clear and divided political conversation going on between activists. But this doesn’t allow for <a href="http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/%7Ejcampbel/documents/FiorinaAbramsPopeJOP2008.pdf">the messy reality</a> of ordinary people’s (including academics’) political attitudes. Most people do not fit neatly into one of two divided camps. Instead they are clustered around the centre on most issues, and don’t agree with everything their supposed group believes. Conservative voters can be anti-racist and pro-gay-marriage, while Labour voters can be racist and homophobic.</p>
<p>Many issues just do not exercise some people. Yes, it’s likely that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-british-academics-are-guilty-of-groupthink-73548">most academics voted to Remain</a> in the European Union in the UK referendum in 2016, but for a range of reasons, including access to research funding and a desire to maintain playing host to bright foreign students. It doesn’t have to be because of “groupthink” and unquestioning support for the EU. After all, it is unlikely that most academics are extremists, and many won’t be all that politically minded; much like the rest of society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>University professionals have a mix of views – just like the rest of society.Gavin Bailey, Research Associate, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityChris O'Leary, Deputy Director, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit and Senior Lecturer, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/734672017-02-24T10:17:50Z2017-02-24T10:17:50ZSearching for Corbynism: why no one’s quite sure what Labour stands for<p>As the Labour Party struggles in the search for votes, picking up bruises in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39064149">by-elections</a>, thinking about its doctrine may seem an indulgence. </p>
<p>But Jeremy Corbyn continues to espouse a rather vague political philosophy. It’s still not clear what Corbynism is. That’s not a particularly unusual position – the tendency to skip theory and move on to producing a list of positions on various issues is as old as the Labour party itself.</p>
<p>Radical thinkers on both the right and left of Labour have looked upon this ambivalence with chagrin, which has occasionally resulted in confrontations about the party’s purpose. In or out of power, what does it believe and why?</p>
<p>Many Corbyn supporters have talked about Corbyn’s ideological certainty as a reason to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/Jeremy_Corbyn/11856019/Why-I-voted-Jeremy-Corbyn-sorry-Mum-and-Dad.html">vote for him</a>. Despite his speeches often being a list of positions, his rhetoric seemed to value theory over pragmatism. Yet as Labour appears uncertain even over its core instincts – Brexit, for example – he appears to show a familiar penchant for tactics and positioning rather than vision and ideas.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158113/original/image-20170223-24093-1t4vh1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Bought the t-shirt, but where’s the doctrine?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/garryknight/22760489727/">Garry Knight</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The dispute over the significance of theory, or the aims and values which guide the party, is one of the fault lines in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Doctrine_and_Ethos_in_the_Labour_Party.html?id=3mdaAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Labour’s ethos</a>. There is much that Labour people share, allowing them to be in the same party and adhere to many of the same traditions. Labour stays loyal to its leaders, it writes and pays close attention to internal rules and procedures. It derives much of its identity from an interpretation of the culture of the organised working class.</p>
<p>Yet there are big differences in interpretation on other matters – the role of theory being one of them. Labour’s history is of a more traditional, even pragmatic method to politics. It has often substituted radical rhetoric for a substantive theoretical base.</p>
<p>Many on the left of the party have previously considered certainty in the realm of ideas to be a strength for their wing of the movement – the power of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Wu6tAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Tony+Benn&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8h8-4zKbSAhURM8AKHfuOCm0Q6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=Tony%20Benn&f=false">Bennism</a> being one example. Having powerlessly observed the final years of the 1974-79 Labour government, the Labour left used its organisational strength within Labour to assert its highly interventionist <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9780230373679_4">economic policy</a>. But some in the more social democratic wing have been mindful of it, too. As the Labour cabinet minister and socialist thinker <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230374164_6">Tony Crosland</a> argued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have got to keep making the point that the far left are not the only people who can claim a socialist theory while the rest of us are thought to be mere pragmatists and administrators.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Corbyn’s left</h2>
<p>The Corbynite left also sat and powerlessly observed the final years of the Blair and Brown governments. Yet while it has certainly triumphed (leadership elections included) organisationally, there has been little sign of the kind of ideational dominance seen in the 1970s and early 1980s left.</p>
<p>If Corbynism is to outlive <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/12/corbyn-leadership-labour-party-centrists-left-moderates">Corbyn’s leadership</a>, it must have clear tenets, which it currently lacks.</p>
<p>A distillation of Corbyn’s creed, in <a href="http://press.labour.org.uk/post/151053788194/jeremy-corbyn-leader-of-the-labour-party-speech">his words</a>, is “a new kind of politics, and a conviction that the old way of running the economy and the country, isn’t delivering for more and more people”. In a <a href="http://labourlist.org/2017/01/corbyn-the-people-who-run-britain-have-been-taking-our-country-for-a-ride/">recent speech</a> to the Fabian Society, he used similar rhetoric, suggesting Labour “will put the public back into our economy and break the grip of vested interests … We will shrink the gap in income and wealth and build a more equal society.”</p>
<p>The aspiration for a more equal society is clear, though not distinctive. As for an enhanced role for the state in the economy, without a clearer statement of intent, and a definition of his socialism – one would imagine, for instance, far greater economic management by the state of the commanding heights of the British economy – Corbynism remains undefined.</p>
<p>Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell seems to muddy the waters more. He accepted George Osborne’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34508959">fiscal approach</a> (for a time) which along with an insistence that Labour <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-taxes-party-will-not-raise-john-mcdonnell-investment-spending-a7436391.html">will not raise taxes</a> seems to head in an entirely different direction to Corbyn’s suggestions of a more democratic and equal political economy. </p>
<h2>Tactics, not creed</h2>
<p>Team Corbyn seems to have greater clarity when it comes to strategy. The talk of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/15/labour-plans-jeremy-corbyn-relaunch-as-a-leftwing-populist">“populism”</a> that surrounded Corbyn’s 2017 relaunch was risky in the wake of Donald Trump’s election, but its origins can be found among advocates of a populist strategy on the left, which sees the politics of <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-challenge">“us and them”</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"727424250739568640"}"></div></p>
<p>But this is all tactics, not ideology. It neither defines a political philosophy nor substantiates a creed.</p>
<p>Corbynism began as a formidable coalition of the left which swept to the Labour leadership. It did so largely on the basis of what it wasn’t – New Labour and managerial – rather than what it was. Since then, much of Corbyn’s time has, understandably, been taken up by the burden of leading a divided party.</p>
<p>His assemblage of positions undoubtedly represents a programme of the left, but it lacks both theoretical strength and clarity. This criticism is not, of course, restricted only to the Corbynite left. Much of Labour’s political universe continues to propose useful policy measures to be taken up in local government, or to improve central government policy. Yet it still defines itself on the basis of political thinkers who lost the 1983 general election or who won the 1997 general election. It doesn’t have its own world view.</p>
<p>Renewing a party’s political philosophy isn’t, and can never be the responsibility of the leader alone. Whether Corbynism is something that can survive within Labour, through the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn or another leader, or whether something can replace it, depends largely on whether Labour – as a whole – can produce anything distinctive and concrete.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl Pike is a member of the Labour Party in Tower Hamlets and a member of the Fabian Society.</span></em></p>We know where Jeremy Corbyn stands on certain issues, but where is the vision? What are the ideas?Karl Pike, PhD candidate and Teaching Associate, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.