tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/propaganda-9578/articlesPropaganda – The Conversation2024-02-22T13:44:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238292024-02-22T13:44:03Z2024-02-22T13:44:03ZHow you can tell propaganda from journalism − let’s look at Tucker Carlson’s visit to Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577087/original/file-20240221-18-sh4e18.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=114%2C0%2C1196%2C867&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tucker Carlson at a Moscow grocery store, praising the bread.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://tuckercarlson.com/tc-shorts-moscow-grocery-story/">Screenshot, Tucker Carlson Network</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tucker Carlson, the conservative former cable TV news pundit, recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68223148">traveled to Moscow to interview</a> Russian dictator Vladimir Putin for his <a href="https://tuckercarlson.com/">Tucker Carlson Network, known as TCN</a>.</p>
<p>The two-hour interview itself proved dull. Even Putin found Carlson’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-tucker-carlson-soft-interview/">soft questioning “disappointing</a>.” Very little from the interview was newsworthy. </p>
<p>Other videos Carlson produced while in Russia, however, seemed to spark far more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/business/media/tucker-carlson-putin-navalny.html">significant commentary</a>. Carlson marveled at the beauty of <a href="https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1757901280830505037">the Moscow subway</a> and <a href="https://tuckercarlson.com/tc-shorts-moscow-grocery-story/">seemed awed by the cheap prices</a> in a Russian supermarket. He found the faux McDonald’s – rebranded “Tasty-period” – <a href="https://tuckercarlson.com/tc-shorts-russias-version-of-mcdonalds/">cheeseburgers delicious</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08821127.2007.10678081">scholar of broadcast propaganda</a>, I believe Carlson’s work provides an opportunity for public education in distinguishing between propaganda and journalism. Some Americans, primarily Carlson’s fans, will view the videos as accurate reportage. Others, primarily Carlson’s detractors, will reject them as mendacious propaganda. </p>
<p>But closely considering these categories, and evaluating Carlson’s work in context, might deepen public understanding of the distinction between journalism and propaganda in the American context. </p>
<h2>Promoting authoritarians</h2>
<p>Carlson’s ability to secure the Putin interview was commendable. Interviewing dictators – <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/12/31/pol-pot-interview-turns-into-90-minute-lecture/82248268-f801-4a46-90e0-c961fef31505/">even the most murderous ones</a>, such as Cambodia’s Pol Pot – can represent a significant journalistic achievement. </p>
<p>Yet, Carlson’s listless approach to the Russian dictator, who <a href="https://www.miragenews.com/full-text-transcript-of-tucker-carlson-putin-1171489">droned on endlessly</a>, proved a wasted opportunity. Despite Carlson’s passivity, the interview did, in fact, reveal aspects of Putin’s intentions likely unknown to many Americans. For example, <a href="https://www.wnyc.org/story/navalny-putin-russia-ukraine">Putin blamed Poland for provoking Hitler’s attack on the country in 1939, which sparked World War II</a> – a statement at odds with the facts. He also seemed to signal his desire to <a href="https://www.wnyc.org/story/navalny-putin-russia-ukraine">attack Poland, or another neighbor</a>, in the near future. Had Carlson’s trip concluded with the interview, it might have been judged journalistically worthwhile.</p>
<p>Yet, that’s not what Carlson did. </p>
<p>Producing a travelogue, Carlson toured Moscow and made videos extolling the glories of Russian society, culture and governance. The Moscow subway impressed him, while the low prices in a Russian supermarket “radicalized” him “against our American leaders.” </p>
<h2>‘Classic case of propaganda’</h2>
<p>There are numerous ways to evaluate the truthfulness of Carlson’s reports.</p>
<p>For example, if things are as copacetic in Russia as Carlson claims, then emigration out of the country should be minimal, or at least normal. Yet, since the 2022 Ukraine war mobilization, Russians have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/sanctions-and-russias-war-limiting-putins-capabilities">fled their country in historically high numbers</a>. </p>
<p>Even those cheap supermarket prices Carlson loved are a mirage. They exist only through subsidies, and with Russia’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">continued devaluation of the ruble in</a> 2024, combined with a planned huge increase in military spending, Russia’s government <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">continues to make every Russian poorer</a> to fund its war. </p>
<p>In other words, what’s cheap to Carlson is expensive and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-russian-inflation-could-near-8-this-year-2023-12-14/">getting more expensive for almost all Russians</a>. This trend will continue in 2024, as Putin recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-russian-inflation-could-near-8-this-year-2023-12-14/">projected Russia’s inflation rate to be 8%</a> in 2024 – more than double <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-10/us-inflation-is-set-to-fade-in-2024-as-goods-prices-keep-falling">the projection for the United States</a>. In fact, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-russian-inflation-could-near-8-this-year-2023-12-14/">Russian citizen complained</a> directly to Putin in December 2023 about the price of eggs, and Putin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-russian-inflation-could-near-8-this-year-2023-12-14/">uncharacteristically apologized</a>.</p>
<p>But research shows that fact-checking Carlson’s claims <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-checking-may-be-important-but-it-wont-help-americans-learn-to-disagree-better-174034">is not likely to change</a> many people’s opinions. We know most people don’t appreciate being told their preferred information is inaccurate, and when untruthful reports accord with their perception of reality, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9548403/">they’ll believe them</a>. </p>
<p>Instead of categorizing Carlson’s Russia videos as “reporting,” “journalism,” “information” or “fake news,” we could define it instead as a classic case of propaganda. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Screenshot of a headline that says 'Tucker Carlson: Moscow ‘so much nicer than any city in my country’'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=125&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=125&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=157&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=157&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577091/original/file-20240221-22-re1ejc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=157&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A headline from The Hill about Carlson’s Moscow visit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://thehill.com/homenews/media/4465352-tucker-carlson-moscow-putin/">Screenshot, The Hill</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Emotionally potent oversimplifications’</h2>
<p>Propaganda is communication designed to bypass critical and rational examination in order to provoke intended emotional, attitudinal or behavioral responses from an audience.</p>
<p>Public understanding of propaganda usually links it to lying, but that’s not quite correct. While some propaganda is mendacious, the most effective propaganda will interlace carefully selected verifiable facts with emotional appeals. </p>
<p>For an average American, those Russian supermarket prices really were cheap. But that’s a selected truth presented without context essential for understanding. </p>
<p>Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once described propaganda in a democracy as “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/984945-rationality-belongs-to-the-cool-observer-but-because-of-the">emotionally potent oversimplifications</a>” peddled to the masses, and that’s precisely what Carlson’s videos seem to provide. </p>
<p>That Carlson has evolved into a propagandist is not surprising. In 2022, The New York Times analyzed his Fox News broadcasts between 2016 and 2021. The paper concluded that Carlson’s program became <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/30/us/tucker-carlson-tonight.html">far less interested in rational dialogue and critical exchange</a> – by interviewing people who disagreed with him – as it evolved into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/30/us/tucker-carlson-tonight.html">a monologue-driven format</a> in which Carlson preached often <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/30/us/tucker-carlson-tonight.html">factually dubious</a> assertions to his audience. </p>
<p>At one time, early in his career, Carlson <a href="https://www.cjr.org/the_profile/tucker-carlson.php">demonstrated significant journalistic talent</a>, especially in magazine feature writing. But his dedication to accuracy – and even basic truth-telling – was exposed as a sham <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/05/all-the-texts-fox-news-didnt-want-you-to-read.html">when his texts</a> from the Dominion voting machine lawsuit were revealed and illustrated <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/05/all-the-texts-fox-news-didnt-want-you-to-read.html">his mendacity</a>.</p>
<h2>Distinguishing between Gershkovich and Carlson</h2>
<p>Carlson is not <a href="https://theconversation.com/normalizing-fascists-69613">the first American reporter</a> to travel to a foreign dictatorship and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hitler-at-home-how-the-nazi-pr-machine-remade-the-fuhrers-domestic-image-and-duped-the-world-47077">produce propaganda in the guise of journalism</a>. </p>
<p>The New York Times’ Walter Duranty <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/08/1097097620/new-york-times-pulitzer-ukraine-walter-duranty">infamously ignored</a> the Stalin dictatorship’s horrific starvation of millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s. The Times’ Berlin correspondent Guido Enderis specialized in “<a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/history/articles/new-york-times-nazi-correspondent">puffy profiles of leading Nazis</a>” while whitewashing the regime’s <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/history/articles/new-york-times-nazi-correspondent">more evil aspects</a> in the mid-1930s. </p>
<p>More recently, correspondent Peter Arnett was <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/media-jan-june03-arnett_03-31">fired from NBC News</a> for appearing on state-controlled Iraqi TV in 2003 and praising the success of “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/media-jan-june03-arnett_03-31">Iraqi resistance</a>” at the outset of the U.S.-Iraq war. Although Arnett’s comments did not originally appear on NBC, they were rebroadcast widely. </p>
<p>But what makes Carlson’s actions particularly galling to some was that his propaganda appeared while Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich remains imprisoned by Putin’s regime for alleged spying, but which was really accurate reporting from Russia. When Carlson questioned Putin about Gershkovich, the dictator replied that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-swap-deal-free-wsj-reporter-gershkovich-might-be-possible-2024-02-09/">a prisoner exchange might be negotiated</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the distinction between journalism and propaganda is the difference between Gershkovich and Carlson. </p>
<p>Gershkovich sits in a Russian prison for investigating the truth about Putin’s Russia in service to the American public and his employer. Carlson flies around the world <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/01/tucker-carlson-hungary-orban-00004149">praising authoritarian leaders</a> such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, while “rooting” for dictators like Vladimir Putin when they attack their neighbors. “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/11/26/20983778/tucker-carlson-rooting-for-russia-ukraine-invasion-america-first">Why shouldn’t I root for Russia? Which I am</a>,” he said in 2019 about the Ukraine-Russian conflict. </p>
<p>To expose abusive governmental power and hold it accountable “<a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript">to the opinions of mankind</a>” is literally written in America’s Declaration of Independence. To travel abroad praising dictatorships for their subways and cheeseburgers while ignoring their murderousness, and to return “radicalized … against our leaders” because foreign supermarket prices are low, is certainly not journalism. It is propaganda.</p>
<p>Carlson’s videos may have one beneficial result: If enough Americans learn from them how to detect propaganda and distinguish it from ethical and professional reporting, then perhaps Carlson unintentionally provided a valuable media literacy service to the nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Socolow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tucker Carlson’s sycophantic interview with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, and his subsequent praise for Russia’s subways, supermarkets and cheeseburgers, was not journalism. It was propaganda.Michael J. Socolow, Professor of Communication and Journalism, University of MaineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158152024-02-15T01:53:26Z2024-02-15T01:53:26ZCan we be inoculated against climate misinformation? Yes – if we prebunk rather than debunk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575202/original/file-20240213-24-2257zy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=239%2C58%2C4606%2C2971&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/montreal-canada-september-27-2019-woman-1547586671">Adrien Demers/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last year, the world experienced the hottest day <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/07/05/hottest-day-ever-recorded">ever recorded</a>, as we endured the first year where temperatures were 1.5°C warmer than the pre-industrial era. The link between extreme events and climate change is <a href="https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/extreme-heat-in-north-america-europe-and-china-in-july-2023-made-much-more-likely-by-climate-change/#:%7E:text=July%202023%20saw%20extreme%20heatwaves,China%20(CNN%2C2023).">clearer than ever</a>. But that doesn’t mean climate misinformation has stopped. Far from it. </p>
<p>Misleading or incorrect information on climate still spreads like wildfire, even during the angry northern summer of 2023. Politicians falsely claimed the heatwaves were “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/08/09/phoenix-heat-wave-republicans-00110325">normal</a>” for summer. Conspiracy theorists claimed the devastating fires in Hawaii were ignited by <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattnovak/2023/08/11/conspiracy-theorists-go-viral-with-claim-space-lasers-are-to-blame-for-hawaii-fires/?sh=1d46579e4529">government lasers</a>. </p>
<p>People producing misinformation have shifted tactics, too, often moving from the old denial (claiming climate change isn’t happening) to the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/16/climate/climate-denial-misinformation-youtube/index.html">new denial</a> (questioning climate solutions). Spreading doubt and scepticism has hamstrung our response to the enormous threat of climate change. And with sophisticated generative AI making it easy to generate plausible lies, it could become an <a href="https://www.stockholmresilience.org/download/18.889aab4188bda3f44912a32/1687863825612/SRC_Climate%20misinformation%20brief_A4_.pdf">even bigger issue</a>.</p>
<p>The problem is, debunking misinformation <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01623-8">is often not sufficient</a> and you run the risk of giving false information <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-024-05651-z">credibility</a> when you have to debunk it. Indeed, a catchy lie can often stay in people’s heads while sober facts are forgotten. </p>
<p>But there’s a new option: the <a href="https://interventions.withgoogle.com/static/pdf/A_Practical_Guide_to_Prebunking_Misinformation.pdf">prebunking method</a>. Rather than waiting for misinformation to spread, you lay out clear, accurate information in advance – along with describing common manipulation techniques. Prebunking often has a better chance of success, according to <a href="https://harpercollins.co.uk/products/foolproof-why-we-fall-for-misinformation-and-how-to-build-immunity-sander-van-der-linden?variant=39973011980366">recent research</a> from co-author Sander van der Linden. </p>
<h2>How does prebunking work?</h2>
<p><a href="https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/how-fake-news-spreads-real-virus">Misinformation spreads</a> much like a virus. The way to protect ourselves and everyone else is similar: through vaccination. Psychological inoculation via prebunking acts like a vaccine and reduces the probability of infection. (We focus on misinformation here, which is shared accidentally, not <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/news/what-is-climate-misinformation-and-why-does-it-matter-disinformation-opponents-of-climate-science-greenwashing/article67771776.ece">disinformation</a>, which is where people deliberately spread information they know to be false). </p>
<p>If you’re forewarned about dodgy claims and questionable techniques, you’re more likely to be sceptical when you come across a YouTube video claiming electric cars are dirtier than those with internal combustion engines, or a Facebook page suggesting offshore wind turbines will kill whales. </p>
<p>Inoculation is not just a metaphor. By exposing us to a weakened form of the types of misinformation we might see in the future and giving us ways to identify it, we reduce the chance false information takes root in our psyches. </p>
<p>Scientists have tested these methods with some success. In <a href="https://publichealth.jmir.org/2022/6/e34615/">one study</a> exploring ways of countering anti-vaccination misinformation, researchers created simple videos to warn people manipulators might try to influence their thinking about vaccination with anecdotes or scary images rather than evidence. </p>
<p>They also gave people relevant facts about how low the actual injury rate from vaccines is (around two injuries per million). The result: compared to a control group, people with the psychological inoculation were more likely to recognise misleading rhetoric, less likely to share this type of content with others, and more likely to want to get vaccinated. </p>
<p>Similar studies have <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/gch2.201600008">been conducted</a> on climate misinformation. Here, one group was forewarned that politically motivated actors will try to make it seem as if there was a lot of disagreement on the causes of climate change by appealing to fake experts and bogus petitions, while in fact <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-97-climate-consensus-is-over-now-its-well-above-99-and-the-evidence-is-even-stronger-than-that-170370">97% or more</a> of climate scientists have concluded humans are causing climate change. This inoculation proved effective. </p>
<p>The success of these early studies has spurred social media companies <a href="https://sustainability.fb.com/blog/2022/10/24/climate-science-literacy-initiative/">such as Meta</a> to adopt the technique. You can now find prebunking efforts on Meta sites such as Facebook and Instagram intended to protect people against common misinformation techniques, such as cherry-picking isolated data. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/youtube-how-a-team-of-scientists-worked-to-inoculate-a-million-users-against-misinformation-189007">YouTube: how a team of scientists worked to inoculate a million users against misinformation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Prebunking in practice</h2>
<p>A hotter world will experience increasing climate extremes and <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2020RG000726">more fire</a>. Even though many of the fires we have seen in recent years in Australia, Hawaii, Canada and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/10/chile-wildfires-vina-del-mar-achupallas">now Chile</a> are the worst on record, climate misinformation actors routinely try to minimise their severity. </p>
<p>As an example, let’s prebunk claims likely to circulate after the next big fire. </p>
<p><strong>1. The claim: “Climate change is a hoax – wildfires have always been a part of nature.”</strong></p>
<p>How to prebunk it: ahead of fire seasons, scientists can demonstrate claims like this rely on the “<a href="https://newslit.org/tips-tools/news-lit-tip-false-equivalence/">false equivalence</a>” logical fallacy. Misinformation falsely equates the recent rise in extreme weather events with natural events of the past. A devastating fire 100 years ago does not disprove <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/report/spreading-wildfire-rising-threat-extraordinary-landscape-fires">the trend</a> towards more fires and larger fires. </p>
<p><strong>2. Claim: “Bushfires are caused by arsonists.”</strong> </p>
<p>How to prebunk it: media professionals have an important responsibility here in fact-checking information before publishing or broadcasting. Media can give information on the most common causes of bushfires, from lightning (about 50%) to accidental fires to arson. <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/bushfires-firebugs-fuelling-crisis-as-national-arson-toll-hits-183/news-story/52536dc9ca9bb87b7c76d36ed1acf53f#:%7E:text=Victoria's%20Crime%20Statistics%20agency%20told,older%20men%20in%20their%2060s.">Media claims</a> arsonists were the main cause of the unprecedented 2019-2020 Black Summer fires in Australia were used by climate deniers worldwide, even though arson was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-11/australias-fires-reveal-arson-not-a-major-cause/11855022">far from the main cause</a>.</p>
<p><strong>3. Claim: “The government is using bushfires as an excuse to bring in climate regulations.”</strong> </p>
<p>How to prebunk it: explain this recycled conspiracy theory is likely to circulate. Point out how it was used to claim COVID-19 lockdowns were a government ploy to soften people up for <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/climate-lockdowns-became-new-battleground-conspiracy-driven-protest-mo-rcna80370">climate lockdowns</a> (which never happened). Show how government agencies can and do communicate openly about why climate regulations <a href="https://www.dcceew.gov.au/climate-change/strategies">are necessary</a> and how they are intended to stave off the worst damage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="firefighter putting out bushfire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=220&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=220&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=220&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575160/original/file-20240212-26-6ztcl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">False information on bushfires can spread like a bushfire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/australia-bushfires-fire-fueled-by-wind-1566620281">Toa55/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Misinformation isn’t going away</h2>
<p>Social media and the open internet have made it possible to broadcast information to millions of people, regardless of whether it’s true. It’s no wonder it’s a golden age for misinformation. Misinformation actors have found effective ways to cast scepticism on established science and then sell a false alternative. </p>
<p>We have to respond. Doing nothing means the lies win. And getting on the front foot with prebunking is one of the best tools we have. </p>
<p>As the world gets hotter, prebunking offers a way to anticipate new variants of lies and misinformation and counter them – before they take root. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/7-ways-to-avoid-becoming-a-misinformation-superspreader-157099">7 ways to avoid becoming a misinformation superspreader</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Turney receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is a scientific adviser and holds shares in cleantech biographite company, CarbonScape. Chris is affiliated with the virtual Climate Recovery Institute, is a volunteer firefighter with the New South Wales Rural Fire Service (the NSW RFS), and is a Non-Executive Director on the boards of the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and deeptech incubator, Cicada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sander van der Linden consults for or has received funding from Google, the EU Commission, the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Alfred Landecker Foundation, Omidyar Network India, the American Psychological Association, the Centers for Disease Control, UK Government, Facebook/Meta, and the Gates Foundation.</span></em></p>When we see false information circulating, we might move to debunk it. But prebunking lies and explaining manipulation techniques can work better.Christian Turney, Pro Vice-Chancellor of Research, University of Technology SydneySander van der Linden, Professor of Social Psychology in Society, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221832024-02-06T15:58:28Z2024-02-06T15:58:28ZNorth Korea has demolished its monument to reunification but it can’t fully erase the dream<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573050/original/file-20240202-27-xopp8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C49%2C971%2C610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://bjornfree.com/kim/">Bjørn Christian Tørrissen</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea has <a href="https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/01/24/WSRI6MUUQNG63BCQGXK24QLCYU/">demolished</a> the Arch of Reunification, a monument that symbolised hope for reconciliation with the South. The decision to demolish the monument came shortly after the regime’s leader, Kim Jong-un, delivered a <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1705369092-194545332/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-policy-speech-at-10th-session-of-14th-spa/">speech</a> declaring it an “eyesore”. </p>
<p>In the same speech, Kim said that the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, which have <a href="https://www.history.com/news/north-south-korea-divided-reasons-facts">remained divided</a> since August 1945, was no longer possible and called for an amendment to the North Korean constitution to reflect South Korea’s status as his country’s “principal enemy”. </p>
<p>Unveiled in 2001, the Arch of Reunification <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1452002412-480315630/monument-to-three-charters-for-national-reunification-erected/">featured</a> two Korean women wearing traditional dresses – called <em>hanbok</em> (한복 “Korean clothes”) in South Korea and <em>chosŏn-ot</em> (조선옷 “Korean clothes”) in the North. The women jointly held up an image of the unified Korean peninsula, reflecting the North Korean government’s genuine desire at the time to reunify the two countries.</p>
<p>This is not the first time North Korea has destroyed symbols of Korean cooperation, dialogue and hope for unification. In June 2020, North Korea recorded and released <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53060620">footage</a> of it blowing up a joint liaison office with South Korea near the border town of Kaesong. The site was opened to help the the two countries communicate. </p>
<p>The following year, in August 2021, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-says-inter-korean-hotlines-will-be-restored-monday-kcna-2021-10-03/">North Korea severed</a> the Inter-Korean hotline – a series of over 40 telephone lines that connect North and South Korea – in protest against military drills jointly undertaken by South Korea and the US. Kim did, however, restore the hotlines two months later and urged Seoul to step up efforts to improve relations.</p>
<p>The Arch of Reunification’s demolition signals North Korea’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/unification-with-south-korea-no-longer-possible-says-kim-jong-un">determination</a> to brand reunification as impossible. But, despite the physical erasure of this monument, its depiction on five official postage stamps serves to immortalise the monument and what it symbolised.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A postage stamp depicting the Arch of Reunification against a clear blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572249/original/file-20240130-25-13pl4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamp issued on 30 May 2002 to mark the 30th anniversary of the Joint Declaration by North and South Korea for reunification.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Propaganda postage stamps</h2>
<p>Postage stamps function not only as items that display the paying of postage rates, but also as small carriers of propaganda messages. They have, in the past, been described as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200948401900204">“ambassadors”</a> conveying official viewpoints, and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1014307914500">“windows of the state”</a> that illustrate how it wishes to be seen by its own citizens and those beyond its boundaries. </p>
<p>In most authoritarian states, revisions to official party narratives require the alteration and removal of symbols associated with the previous narrative. The most <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4209080">notable example</a> of this is the removal of former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s name from many cities and landmarks following his death in 1953. </p>
<p>This formed part of the de-Stalinisation movement in the late 1950s and dismantled Stalin’s “cult of personality”. Stalin had used art and popular culture to improve his status as leader and inspire loyalty. </p>
<p>In a similar way, the official North Korean postage stamp <a href="http://www.korstamp.com.kp/">catalogue</a> removed five stamps from its listings that depicted the Arch of Reunification. Stamp catalogues provide information relating to when stamps were issued, who designed them, their dimensions and colour. Having this information is important when collecting and analysing them.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A postage stamp depicting the Arch of Reunification against red background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572252/original/file-20240130-17-zh61fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamp issued on 25 July 2016 to mark the 7th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s not certain exactly when the stamps were removed. But <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/changes/http://www.korstamp.com.kp/home/index-en.html">Wayback Machine</a> (a digital archive of the World Wide Web) indicates there was a change to the website on January 19, placing the change squarely within the timeframe of Kim’s speech and the <a href="https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/01/24/WSRI6MUUQNG63BCQGXK24QLCYU/">reported demolition</a> of the monument. All visual and textual references to the stamps have been removed from the website.</p>
<p>NK News also <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/why-north-korean-websites-are-suddenly-vanishing-from-the-internet/">reported</a> around this time that North Korea was purging propaganda websites of old content, suggesting a rewriting of the official narrative. </p>
<p>There is precedent for this. North Korea has previously removed listings from its official stamp catalogues after they have been issued because they run contrary to new state narratives.</p>
<p>In 1960, for example, North Korea released a set of five stamps celebrating the <a href="https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002723908">reconstruction of Pyongyang</a> after the Korean War (1950–1953). Two of the place names shown on the stamps, “Mao Zedong Square” and “Stalin Street”, were later renamed “Triumph Arc Square” and “Victory Street”. However, as the stamps issued in 1960 contained the original names, their visual depictions in subsequently published stamp catalogues were not included.</p>
<h2>The reunification dream lives on</h2>
<p>The Arch of Reunification was first depicted on a North Korean postage stamp in May 2002, almost one year after its unveiling. But the monument has been depicted more recently, on two stamps issued in 2015, and two more stamps issued in 2016 and 2021 respectively.</p>
<p>North Korea is seeking to erase any remnant of the Arch of Reunification’s depiction. But, unfortunately for North Korea, these stamps exist in the private collections of foreign stamp collectors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A North Korean postage stamp issued in 2021." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572253/original/file-20240130-29-35mal4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean postage stamps issued on 20 February 2021 to mark the 8th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Hall</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The stamps were released to the world through Korea Stamp Corporation (North Korea’s state-run postal authority) offices in Russia and China at the time of issue. These stamps can still easily be bought from stamp dealers on online platforms such as eBay. </p>
<p>For that reason, North Korea can never fully erase these depictions of the unification dream as it doesn’t have full control over how its state narrative is presented and potentially altered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222183/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Arch of Reunification has been destroyed – reversing decades of government policy targeting eventual reunification with the South.David Hall, PhD Candidate in Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2068822024-01-25T12:22:11Z2024-01-25T12:22:11ZIt’s a myth that England was created on the battlefield – most of it happened at the negotiating table<p>The story of the making of England is often represented as a <a href="https://www.historyextra.com/period/viking/vikings-history-facts/">battleground between the English and the Vikings</a>, with waves of plunder, conquest and combat. Of the multiple English kingdoms, only one, Wessex (based in south-west England), led by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/alfred_the_great.shtml">Alfred the Great</a>, stopped a great Viking army in its tracks through warfare in the 870s. </p>
<p>Alfred the Great’s grandson <a href="https://www.historyanswers.co.uk/history-of-war/michael-wood-on-athelstans-great-war-to-unite-anglo-saxon-england/">Athelstan</a> then secured the future of England by winning the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brunanburh">Battle of Brunanburh</a> against a coalition of Vikings and Scots in 937. </p>
<p>This “kings and battles” narrative is well established, but the story is skewed by the propaganda of medieval royals. Stories are important, because our views of the past shape perceptions of modern conflict and identities.</p>
<p>The lesser known part of the creation of England is that it required the suppression of once <a href="https://www.heritagedaily.com/2016/05/anglo-saxon-and-british-kingdoms-c-800-interactive-image/111088">independent kingdoms</a> that pre-dated the Viking Age. Also, close reading of the <a href="https://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item126532.html">Anglo Saxon Chronicle</a> which is our main source for English history in this period, suggests that integration and negotiation were more important in the making of England than battles and bloodshed. </p>
<p>Arguably, the creation of England was not a simple ethnic conflict between the English and Vikings but a power grab by Wessex, clothed in the garb of saving people from “foreign” oppression. </p>
<p>There is evidence that people living at the time saw events more in terms of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/100686703/Warfare_and_Peoplehood_The_Vikings_and_the_English_Draft_paper_May_2017_">regional identities</a> than ethnic binaries. However, the main surviving written sources, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3800136/Annals_armies_and_artistry_The_Anglo_Saxon_Chronicle_865_96">(such as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle)</a>, were composed under Wessex’s influence and therefore give a one-sided view.</p>
<h2>Complicated ethnic identities</h2>
<p>From the reign of Alfred to Aethelstan, the power of the kingdom of Wessex gradually extended over the former kingdoms of Mercia (roughly the modern Midlands), East Anglia and Northumbria. Each of these kingdoms had been settled by Vikings from the 860s. </p>
<p>We see regional names “Northumbria” and “East Anglia” used in the Anglo Saxon Chronicle to describe armies led by Vikings from the 890s. This suggests that a few decades after Vikings settled, they were identified by the English areas in which they lived. These regional armies presumably combined locals and newcomers. The Vikings were going “native” and a new culture blending <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Scandinavian">Anglo-Scandinavian</a> identities developed in areas under their control.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Painting of Alfred The Great." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=783&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571172/original/file-20240124-27-jmn6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=983&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alfred the Great.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/king-alfred-the-great-846849899-101256">National Trust Images</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An English identity was not a barrier to leading vikings and vice versa. This is illustrated after the death of Alfred the Great when the rule of his son Edward was disputed by a cousin, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%86thelwold_%C3%A6theling">Æthelwold</a>. Æthelwold led combined armies including vikings, but his rebellion was crushed. </p>
<p>In 918, the <a href="https://blogs.bl.uk/digitisedmanuscripts/2016/02/anglo-saxon-chronicles-now-online.html">Mercian Register</a> reports that the Viking leaders of York were willing to pledge obedience to <a href="https://theconversation.com/aethelflaed-the-anglo-saxon-iron-lady-79315">Æthelflæd</a>, leader of English Mercia shortly before she died. </p>
<p>When Edward seized control of Mercia from Æthelflæd’s daughter, it may have provoked dissent, with a rebellion against him reported at the end of his reign. This isn’t so much an ethnic conflict as reluctance of independent kingdoms to be united under the male line of Alfred the Great.</p>
<p>In the mid-ninth century, the word <em>Angelcynn</em> (literally “Anglian-kin”) appears in charters as an equivalent to <em>gens Anglorum</em> (Latin for “English-speaking people”). The name was promoted in the Viking Age as a unifying label for the peoples of Wessex and Mercia. </p>
<p>Ethnic labelling was important to legitimise new structures of power and to generate a sense of loyalty. Englishness was an identity that people could opt into, even with Scandinavian heritage. </p>
<p>The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle linked the genealogy of Wessex rulers to the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/heirs-of-the-vikings/genealogy-building-a-viking-age-dynasty/9A7666480D61C9904C35E7FA7B09A65E">Danish royal line</a>. This helped legitimise English leadership over Viking held areas and develop a sense of shared history.</p>
<h2>Forging a new English identity</h2>
<p>Traditionally history has been seen to be shaped by decisive conflicts. But England was forged on the negotiating table more than on the battlefield. In relation to Alfred the Great of Wessex and his successors in creating an English kingdom, the most critical conflicts are seen as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Edington">Edington (878)</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Battle-of-Brunanburh">Brunanburh (937)</a>. </p>
<p>Edington was a significant victory for Alfred as it brought the Viking leader Guthrum into an agreement which included his baptism. Rather than being forced, Guthrum’s baptism may have served an agenda to build links with the church in his new kingdom. Guthrum continued to rule East Anglia until his death in 890. </p>
<p>Brunanburh is sometimes hailed as one of the greatest English victories as Athelstan led the men of Wessex and Mercia to victory against a coalition of Vikings, Scots and Britons. However, the battle was far from decisive. </p>
<p>When Athelstan died two years later, Northumbria came back under Viking control. It was the Northumbrian’s expulsion of their last viking king Erik in <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8954733/The_Chronology_of_the_Last_Scandinavian_Kings_of_York">954</a> and acceptance of the Wessex king Eadred that marked a final chapter in the unification of England.</p>
<p>From 878 to 954, the <a href="http://www.mcllibrary.org/Anglo/">Anglo Saxon Chronicle</a> recorded many battles but also many peace treaties and submissions. Peace treaties were often short-lived but they were important in limiting bloodshed and maintaining lines of communication between rival groups. </p>
<p>It was only once the boundaries of the English kingdom were successfully expanded (a non-linear process which ran from 927 until 954) that <a href="https://esawyer.lib.cam.ac.uk/browse/ch_date/0600.html">royal diplomas</a> began to use derogatory terms, such as “barbarian” to describe non-English, including viking, customs to promote conformity.</p>
<p>From 980 a new wave of Scandinavian attacks shook England culminating in the reign of a Scandinavian king <a href="https://www.historyextra.com/period/anglo-saxon/king-cnut-danish-why-called-great-rule-england-success/">Cnut</a>. This threatened the Wessex line under king Aethelred and as he began losing his grip on power, ethnic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scapegoating">scapegoating</a> of Danebecame a new tactic in a bid to unite his subjects. </p>
<p>In 1002, “the king ordered to be slain all the Danish men who were in England… On St Brice’s Day (<a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2016/11/11/the-st-brices-day-massacre-then-and-now/">13 November</a>) because it was made known to the king that they treacherously wanted to deprive him and then all his counsellors of life and to possess this kingdom thereafter.” Apart from a few notable examples, such as a recorded massacre at <a href="https://museumofoxford.org/the-st-brices-day-massacre">Oxford</a>, the order doesn’t seem to have been enthusiastically followed. The use of persecution as a political weapon failed.</p>
<p>While historians tend to praise the deeds of kings and victorious battles, the work of making England was done through decades long integration and negotiation, swallowing once independent kingdoms into a new political reality. It was only at the end of this process that a narrative of ethnic conflict between English and vikings became part of our national story.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/something-good-156">Sign up here</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clare Downham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Not a simple tale of English kings overcoming Vikings, the creation of England involved far more bureaucracy than the epic legends let onClare Downham, Senior Lecturer, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136962024-01-11T12:50:09Z2024-01-11T12:50:09ZNorth Korea ramps up military rhetoric as Kim gives up on reunification with South<p>North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un is continuing to ramp up his focus on nuclear weapons and taking a more aggressive military stance towards <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">his neighbour South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>In his 2023 year-end speech, in which he outlined his plans for 2024, Kim said inter-Korean relations had become “a relationship between two hostile countries and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">two belligerents at war</a>”. For years Kim’s policy has been to attempt to reunify the two countries, which were separated in 1953 after the end of the Korean war. A tight <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/27/north-korea-moves-heavy-weapons-to-border-with-south">military border</a> has made it almost impossible for ordinary people to pass in or out of North Korea. </p>
<p>The North Korean leader also announced a plan to launch three new military <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">spy satellites</a> in 2024, highlighting the country’s continued focus on its space and military programmes. </p>
<p>In the first few days of January, state sources released photographs of his <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-launcher-factory-demands-flaws-in-production-fixed/">visit to a missile launcher factory</a>, and Kim was reported as saying North Korea <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/31/asia/north-korea-reconciliation-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html">needed to “prepare for war”</a>.</p>
<p>In statements that showed Kim’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, he is reported as saying that he “judged the Republic of Korea <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/kim-jong-un-visits-missile-launcher-factory-demands-flaws-in-production-fixed/">clan to be our main enemy</a>” and North Korea must keep “continuously stockpiling unparalleled overwhelming power”, due to growing hostilities with South Korea.</p>
<p>Kim’s new year’s plan was followed a few days later by North Korea firing around <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-67889551">200 artillery shells</a> towards Yeonpyeong island in South Korea. Over the days that followed it <a href="https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=182941">fired more shells</a> towards South Korea’s west coast. </p>
<p>During her <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/01/03/Kim-Yo-Jong-Yoon-Suk-Yeol-new-years-greeting-nuclear-weapons-threat/9961704260985">new year’s greetings</a> to South Korea, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who is seen as an increasingly powerful figure, issued a statement which appeared to support the pursuit of further nuclear capabilities. </p>
<p>This has prompted <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/07/17/asia-pacific/jake-sullivan-north-korea-nuclear-test">renewed discussions</a> among experts over the possibility of North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-warns-it-may-rethink-moratorium-nuclear-missile-tests-2022-01-19">last nuclear test</a> that it conducted was in 2017.</p>
<p>In 2022, North Korea <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20230928-north-korea-changes-constitution-and-declares-itself-a-nuclear-state">revised</a> its constitution to declare itself a nuclear state, and in 2023 North Korea recorded a record number of nuclear weapons tests, causing concern in South Korea and the US.</p>
<h2>Russia and North Korea</h2>
<p>Russia has moved closer to North Korea after its invasion of Ukraine. Facing international sanctions Putin has been forced to look for allies further afield, and has turned to Kim for a military weapons deal. Russia is believed to have used North Korean short-range ballistic weapons <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/05/europe/russia-north-korean-missiles-ukraine-asia-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">in attacks on Ukraine</a> on December 30 and January 2. </p>
<p>This has signalled a deepening of the relationship with Russia, as well as creating a new income stream for North Korea from military sales. Use of the missiles will also help North Korea gather information on how the weapons perform in a war-time context, something that will concern both South Korea and its allies. </p>
<p>The US State Department issued <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-dprk-russia-ballistic-missile-transfers/#:%7E:text=We%20condemn%20in%20the%20strongest,%2C%20and%20January%202%2C%202024.">a statement on behalf</a> of the US and 47 other nations condemning North Korea. It said: “Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine also provides valuable technical and military insights to the DPRK. We are deeply concerned about the security implications that this cooperation has in Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Indo-Pacific region, and around the world.” </p>
<h2>Kim’s historical position</h2>
<p>Until recently, Kim Jong-un had focused on three long-term plans. First, he sought the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-new-years-speech-n-koreas-kim-says-he-wants-peace-with-south/2013/01/01/bce3a4dc-53dd-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html">unification of the Korean peninsula</a> to continue his grandfather Kim Il-sung’s plans. Kim Il-sung invaded South Korea in 1950, but after a bitter conflict pitting South Korea, supported by the US, UK and United Nations, against North Korea, supported by the USSR and China, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/war-and-truce-the-korean-armistice-at-70">armistice was signed</a> in 1953. </p>
<p>Kim has also continued the work of his grandfather and father in developing North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.</p>
<p>The North Korean leader has pursued economic development, along with military development, in previous years. But his growing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korean-special-economic-zone-poised-revival-new-russia-trade-2023-11-29/">relationship with Putin</a> could ease some of the pressures, with the special economic zone on the borders of the two countries showing signs of new investment in the port and transport.</p>
<p>Despite a struggling national economy, Kim and his inner circle still enjoy a <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2023/12/kim-jong-un-appears-to-reward-top-officials-with-luxury-mercedes-cars">luxurious lifestyle</a>, while ordinary people in North Korea are reported to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-65881803">starving to death</a>. </p>
<p>The country’s border is still closed, with only minimum access to other countries such as China and Russia, while self-isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-fears-of-a-new-famine-after-three-years-of-covid-isolation-and-harsh-repression-207852">devastated</a> the North Korean economy. The <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3173601/china-north-korea-trade-recovering-after-covid-induced">levels of trade</a> with China are not close to pre-pandemic levels. </p>
<p>The regime is known to make money out of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64494094">cyber hacking</a>, but any profits seem to be spent mostly on nuclear development and Kim’s family.</p>
<p>One option that could stimulate the economy is for Kim Jong-un is to reopen his national borders, which would boost trade and tourism and help to revitalise the economy. However, opening the borders carries another threat for Kim – risking public resentment as the North Korean population becomes better aware of just how low living standards are in their country compared with their neighbours. </p>
<h2>Control of information</h2>
<p>Before the COVID-19 lockdowns, some North Koreans received financial help through <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-food-shortage-kim-jong-uns-covid-19-policy-could-lead-to-mass-starvation-162966">Jangmadang</a></em> (grey markets – literally, “outdoor market” in Korean). Some people received <a href="https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/blog/how-a-north-korean-defector-sends-money-back-home">remittances</a> from their relatives who had defected to South Korea. But since the border closure, none of those economic activities have been available. Basic support provided by humanitarian aid groups has also been <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/north-korea-facing-humanitarian-and-strategic-challenge">stopped</a>. </p>
<p>Among illegally traded items were <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-food-shortage-kim-jong-uns-covid-19-policy-could-lead-to-mass-starvation-162966">K-pop and K-dramas</a> from South Korea shared via USB or SD cards. Using illegal methods like these, South Korean culture has gradually leaked into <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003390282/international-aid-sustainable-development-north-korea-sojin-lim">North Korean society</a>, much to Kim’s <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north-korea-and-china-arent-the-allies-you-think-they.html">intense disapproval</a>. </p>
<p>North Korea’s new year change of direction is causing concern in the west, but it will also be watched carefully by neighbouring China, which is wary of any threats to its regional and global power. China’s president, Xi Jinping, will be carefully <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/north-korea-and-china-arent-the-allies-you-think-they.html">monitoring the growing relationship</a> between Moscow and Pyongyang, and its ability to destabilise the region, or put pressure on China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sojin Lim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kim Jong-un is continuing to release statements about a possible military conflict with South Korea.Sojin Lim, Reader in Asia Pacific Studies (with special reference to Korea), MA North Korean Studies Course Leader, Co-Director of the International Institute of Korean Studies, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197962023-12-18T22:48:17Z2023-12-18T22:48:17Z‘Politically neutral’ Russian athletes can now enter the Olympics – but don’t expect many to compete<p>Earlier this month, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced Russian and Belarussian athletes <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/strict-eligibility-conditions-in-place-as-ioc-eb-approves-individual-neutral-athletes-ains-for-the-olympic-games-paris-2024">will be able to compete</a> in the 2024 Paris Olympics if they are politically neutral. The decision from the committee’s executive board reversed an earlier ban. </p>
<p>The IOC made this change even though the Russian National Olympic Committee remains suspended from competition for its <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-executive-board-suspends-russian-olympic-committee-with-immediate-effect">violation</a> of “the territorial integrity of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine”. For its part, Russia <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/09/1218406353/russian-belarus-athletes-ioc-2024-olympic-games">rejects</a> the decision.</p>
<p>The committee’s decision has enraged Western leaders, particularly those in Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1142889/kyiv-says-ioc-encouraging-war-ukraine">accused</a> the committee of effectively giving “[…] Russia the green light to weaponize the Olympics”.</p>
<p>While it might seem like a good idea not to hold individual athletes responsible for the decisions of governments, the decision is more complicated that it appears.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/refugee-team-offers-a-way-for-russian-and-belarusian-dissidents-to-compete-at-the-paris-olympics-202427">Refugee team offers a way for Russian and Belarusian dissidents to compete at the Paris Olympics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Athletes caught in the middle</h2>
<p>More than 30 Western nations, including Australia, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2023/dec/08/athletes-who-have-not-supported-ukraine-war-to-compete-at-paris-2024">have previously called for</a> a complete ban on Russian participation in the Games. </p>
<p>IOC President Thomas Bach <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67711799">defended his decision</a> by arguing “individual athletes cannot be punished for the acts of their governments”. </p>
<p>The ruling came with <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/strict-eligibility-conditions-in-place-as-ioc-eb-approves-individual-neutral-athletes-ains-for-the-olympic-games-paris-2024">strict conditions</a>. Athletes must not be open supporters of the Russian invasion and they cannot be affiliated with Russian or Belarussian military or security services.</p>
<p>They cannot compete under their home country’s flag, or with national emblems or anthems.</p>
<p>The committee estimates that only 11 athletes – six Russians and five Belarussians – will qualify under these regulations.</p>
<p>The committee has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/64604212">slowly working towards this policy</a> since the spring of 2023. </p>
<p>The call may seem reasonable. After all, why should Russian and Belarussian athletes, especially those not supportive of the invasion, suffer from the actions of their government?</p>
<p>But it’s not quite that cut and dry.</p>
<h2>Different, inconsistent approaches</h2>
<p>The rule change seems inconsistent. As the committee continues to ban the participation of Russian teams, not all neutral Russian and Belarussian athletes will be able to participate. </p>
<p>Sporting federations can also continue to ban Russian and Belarussian athletes from competition and therefore qualification for the Games. World Athletics President <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/world-athletics-defies-ioc-maintains-113900349.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAK8RYILhtTwcf8F72FRd3jOng0u7BeehrhgaTPszxpb7HT9ufXfwDnRCQSfZc9McQRQCjCxxmdsURC3tDSmswrm1A60uNAT8dg">Seb Coe confirmed</a> that the organisation will continue to ban them. </p>
<p>By contrast, World Taekwondo and World Judo have both allowed Russian and Belarussian athletes to <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">compete in qualification</a>.</p>
<p>In September, the International Paralympic Committee also decided neutral athletes <a href="https://www.paralympic.org/news/ipc-general-assembly-partially-suspends-npc-russia">can compete</a>.</p>
<h2>What can Ukraine’s allies do?</h2>
<p>With the Paris 2024 games only seven months away, the IOC’s decision seems final. But frustrated Western leaders have other options. </p>
<p>In the past year, Western officials have <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/30/paris-olympics-if-russian-athletes-are-cleared-to-compete-will-a-boycott-threat-have-any-e#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20has%20threatened%20to%20boycott,the%202024%20Paris%20Olympic%20Games.">threatened to boycott</a> the Olympics if Russian and Belarussian athletes competed. </p>
<p>There is a long history of politically motivated Olympic boycotts and threatened boycotts. In 1980, the United States and 66 other countries boycotted the Moscow games <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/08/history-olympic-games-boycotts/">in response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan</a>. Eight other countries, including Australia, competed under an Olympic flag to signal their opposition to the invasion. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-year-of-sporting-mega-events-the-brisbane-olympics-can-learn-a-lot-from-the-ones-that-fail-their-host-cities-187838">In a year of sporting mega-events, the Brisbane Olympics can learn a lot from the ones that fail their host cities</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In 1984, in response, the Soviet Union and its allies boycotted the summer Olympics in Los Angeles. </p>
<p>A boycott of the Paris Olympics would be devastating to the organisers, but it remains very unlikely. France is a Western nation and a strong supporter of Ukraine. President Emmanuel Macron recently <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/eu-should-give-ukraine-full-and-enduring-support-macron-65f3b496?refsec=topics_afp-news">encouraged the European Union</a> to continue supporting the beleaguered nation.</p>
<p>As a more palatable approach, Western leaders could ban athletes from Russia and Belarus from competing in international athletic competitions in Western Europe in the run-up to the games. This would likely make it impossible for any athletes from those countries to qualify for spots in Paris. </p>
<p>As historian Heather Dichter <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/190/monograph/chapter/3034403">has shown</a>, travel bans have a long history in the Olympics. </p>
<p>In the 1960s, there was a <a href="https://members.shafr.org/assets/docs/Passport/2022/September-2022/passport-09-2022-dichter.pdf">NATO-wide ban on East German athletes</a> travelling to compete in events in Western European countries. This effectively barred them from participation in several major sporting competitions and from qualifying for the Olympics. </p>
<p>Some Western leaders have already attempted to use this strategy against Russian and Belarussian athletes. Polish President Andrzej Duda <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/media/q-a-on-solidarity-with-ukraine-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-and-the-status-of-athletes-from-these-countries">refused to issue visas</a> to Russian and Belarussian fencers for a qualification competition in June. The International Fencing Federation moved the matches to Bulgaria where the neutral athletes could compete. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gender-inequality-will-still-be-an-issue-at-the-paris-2024-olympics-despite-the-games-being-gender-balanced-210883">Gender inequality will still be an issue at the Paris 2024 Olympics — despite the Games being gender-balanced</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As a more drastic step, French officials could simply ban all Russian and Belarussian athletes from travelling to Paris during the Olympics. The committee would likely have no recourse at this late date.</p>
<p>It would would align with the approach of some other EU member nations that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230523-russian-tourists-seek-new-destinations-as-europe-shuts-its-doors-over-ukraine-war">ban Russian tourism and travel</a>. </p>
<p>However, the French National Olympic Committee would likely oppose such a move. They might worry that it threatens the viability of their likely future <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/news/the-french-alps-and-salt-lake-city-utah-invited-into-respective-targeted-dialogues-to-host-the-olympic-and-paralympic-winter-games-2030-and-2034">2030 Winter Olympic Games</a>.</p>
<p>At a time when so much international attention has turned to the Israel/Hamas war, will leaders, however frustrated, do anything in response?</p>
<p>Only time will tell, but one thing’s for sure: whatever happens will be carefully calculated to account for the vast array of geopolitical moving parts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Rathbone does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The International Olympic Committee has ruled politically-neutral individual athletes are eligible, but some nations aren’t happy about it.Keith Rathbone, Senior Lecturer, Modern European History and Sports History, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090882023-07-06T20:50:54Z2023-07-06T20:50:54ZWhat Vietnam’s ban of the Barbie movie tells us about China’s politics of persuasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536099/original/file-20230706-16210-k7hkwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4874%2C3378&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Actor Margot Robbie blows out a candle on the cake to celebrate her birthday during the pink carpet event for the movie 'Barbie' in Seoul, South Korea, in July 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Barbie has always had some degree of notoriety. She is at once <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/cultural-history-barbie-180982115/">a symbol of female empowerment, ridicule and consumerism</a>. People might suspect that the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/barbie-movie-vietnam-china-ninedash-df593a95b5826b03429d28ab855081a8">ban of the <em>Barbie</em> movie by the Vietnamese government</a> is motivated by these concerns. Instead, international political intrigue provides a better explanation. </p>
<p>Territorial disputes run deep in Southeast Asia, having both real and symbolic value. Claims by both Korea and Japan of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan-dispute">the Dokdo (Takeshima) Islands are more than three centuries old</a>, while Japan, Taiwan and China each claim ownership of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/asia/japan-china-senkaku-islands-ships-intl-hnk-mic-ml/index.html">the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands</a>.</p>
<p>Amid the frothy <em>Barbie</em> plot, the attentive viewer might notice a map depicting a broad area claimed by China in international waters that <a href="http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/SOUTHCHINASEA-RULING/010020QR1SG/index.html">buffer the Philippines, Malaysia/Indonesia, Vietnam and China</a>. The Chinese claim of the vast swath of territory, known as the “nine-dash line” because this symbol demarcates China’s claims in the region, ignores both international law and the counterclaims of other countries.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1677020203819884546"}"></div></p>
<p>One map in one movie might seem innocuous. But the Chinese Communist Party revels in the persuasive power of pop culture, going so far as to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/">purchase radio stations to broadcast its messages in other countries</a>. </p>
<h2>Appropriating culture</h2>
<p>While critical viewers might discount the <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/china-propaganda-censorship-control/">overt propaganda</a> of many Chinese movies, they are likely less aware of the <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Display/Article/3267338/mapping-chinese-influence-in-hollywood">increasing influence China has in Hollywood</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond movies, China has made more overt claims to the cultures of other countries. Korea is an example. </p>
<p>China has claimed traditional Korean songs (<em>arirang</em>), <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3166389/hanbok-years-kimchi-china-denies-cultural-appropriation-over">dress (<em>hanbok</em>)</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/01/stealing-our-culture-south-koreans-upset-after-china-claims-kimchi-as-its-own">the quintessential culinary staple, <em>kimchi</em></a>. </p>
<p>In the case of kimchi, Chinese <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/pao-cai-v-kimchi-chinese-south-koreans-clash-on-social-media">state media claimed</a> that the International Organization for Standardization’s recognition of <a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/78112.html"><em>pao kai</em></a>, a Chinese fermented vegetable dish, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55129805">extends to kimchi</a>. Yet such assertions ignore international recognition of <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/tradition-of-kimchi-making-in-the-democratic-people-s-republic-of-korea-01063">kimchi-making</a> and <a href="https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FStandards%252FCXS%2B223-2001%252FCXS_223e.pdf">kimchi as uniquely Korean</a>.</p>
<p>Posts on Weibo, China’s popular social media platform, show the hashtag <a href="https://www.koreaboo.com/news/china-south-korea-thief-country-kimchi-hanbok-stolen/">#小偷国# (thief country)</a> when referring to Korean’s cultural products as China’s own.</p>
<p>Online debates over fermented cabbage, dresses and songs might seem trivial. But on a psychological level, <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1991-97016-000">culture and physical territory are central to group identities</a>. The attempted slow erosion of independent cultural identities can pose future threats.</p>
<p>Vietnam’s concerns about a momentary glimpse of a map in a movie must be viewed in these terms. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People in scrubs wearing masks and gloves handle mounds of fermented cabbage with red chilis colouring them red." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Employees of a South Korean financial institution make kimchi to donate to needy neighbours at the organization’s headquarters in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2022. Even kimchi has been subject to cultural appropriation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cultures evolve</h2>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/13/china-s-influence-in-south-asia-vulnerabilities-and-resilience-in-four-countries-pub-85552">Imperial China’s former sphere of influence</a> included countries like Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan. Known as the “Middle Kingdom,” it framed itself as a <a href="https://www.chinasource.org/resource-library/blog-entries/from-the-middle-east-to-the-middle-kingdom-7/">parent culture</a>. But this is not how cultural evolution works.</p>
<p>People innovate, ideas are adopted within a group, they spread beyond the boundaries and borders of groups and are adapted by others. The Vietnamese, for example, <a href="https://ethnomed.org/resource/traditional-vietnamese-medicine-historical-perspective-and-current-usage/">developed their own folk medicine</a>, often appropriated by the Chinese as <a href="http://www.joaat.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=57&id=356">“southern medicine (<em>Thuốc Nam</em>).”</a></p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-us-should-pay-attention-to-the-china-south-korea-culture-clash/">By making claims on other cultures in the region, China is attempting to legitimize its influence</a> as it seeks global superpower status.</p>
<p>Understandably, when China makes claims on regional cultural traditions — and territory — <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/south-koreans-are-rethinking-what-china-means-their-nation">its neighbours fear for their autonomy</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A plane flies over a hilly island." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Japanese maritime defence plane flies over disputed islands, called the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kyodo News)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Eyeing territory</h2>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party has set its sights on what it calls the South China Sea, ignoring <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html#:%7E:text=BEIJING%20%E2%80%94%20An%20international%20tribunal%20in,waters%20had%20no%20legal%20basis.">a 2016 international ruling</a> on the illegitimacy of its claims to the area.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A combo photo shows an artificial island with just a few structures on it, and the same island almost 25 years later with what appears to be a military base on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This combo photo shows the same Chinese structures on an man-made island in February 1999, top, and March 2022 in a disputed area of the South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photos/Aaron Favila)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The party has dedicated considerable effort to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/yes-china-has-the-worlds-largest-navy-that-matters-less-than-you-might-think/">building up a powerful navy</a> and constructing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says">artificial islands atop coral reefs to place military bases</a>.</p>
<p>If not in form, then in spirit, the Chinese government’s actions are similar to Imperial Japan’s notion of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299608405994">“sphere of co-prosperity”</a> in the Pacific from 1931 to 1945. During this time, parts of Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and other countries were subjected to brutal colonial rule.</p>
<p>While an arms build-up is underway, China’s main weapon is its <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-soft-power">soft power</a>, a persuasive approach to international relations that involves the use of economic or cultural influence.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007">Belt and Road Initiative</a> represents an explicit, direct means to influence countries with financial support. Shaping the content of movies presents a more implicit, indirect means that often goes unnoticed.</p>
<h2>Persuasion through media, messages</h2>
<p>A key strategy in persuasion is to flood information ecosystems with desired messages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/344428">If we fail to critically reflect on their content, our acceptance increases</a>. This is the same rationale behind <a href="https://doi.org/10.1362/146934712X13286274424271">product placement</a>.</p>
<p>When presented in ubiquitous media, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.547065/full?source=Snapzu">such as memes</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/caj.1985.22.2.125">or postage stamps</a>, an audience can begin to lose track of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3">the credibility of the source</a>. While a map in a fluffy movie can be discounted, the repeated presentation of images, dialogue and values that support the goals of the Chinese regime is concerning.</p>
<p>Beyond film, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00377990903221905">history textbooks</a> and classrooms are the latest battleground for wars that continue to live in collective memory. Studies of Japanese textbooks, for example, have noted shifts in how the horrific crimes of Imperial Japan, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140802269021">including the Nanjing massacre, are represented</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000485">Publishers appear to engage in self-censorship to ensure a favourable position within the market</a>. </p>
<p>Hollywood also seems to have willingly adopted <a href="https://pen.org/report/made-in-hollywood-censored-by-beijing/">self-censorship</a>, with some <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/quentin-tarantino-wont-recut-once-a-time-china-1248720/">notable exceptions</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://pen.org/report/made-in-hollywood-censored-by-beijing/">A 2020 PEN America report entitled “Made in Hollywood, Censored in Beijing</a>,” details how Hollywood decision-makers are increasingly making decisions about their films “based on an effort to avoid antagonizing Chinese officials who control whether their films gain access to the booming Chinese market.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-bakery-to-wagashiya-a-textbook-case-of-moral-education-in-japan-75626">From bakery to wagashiya: a textbook case of 'moral education' in Japan</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The power of pink persuasion</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjb/e2004-00382-7">many movies</a>, <em>Barbie</em> is unlikely to have any lasting impact on society. Its brief moment in the spotlight will likely amuse audiences, but it also adds another small brick to the wall being built by China to expand its influence.</p>
<p>Once the context of cultural and territorial appropriation is appreciated, the action of Vietnam’s National Film Evaluation Council to ban the film shouldn’t be surprising. While a total ban might be excessive, the appearance of the map in the film disregards Vietnam’s autonomy and international agreements.</p>
<p>Hollywood — and other hubs of popular media and social media — are ultimately subject to the demands of <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/feature/movie-theaters-box-office-historical-data-trend-1235354702/">viewers</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/technology/2023/4/15/23683554/twitter-dying-elon-musk-x-company">users</a>. Regulations aimed at preventing Chinese influence won’t be sufficient as they might replicate the kind of censorship seen in China. </p>
<p>Instead, education systems need to teach <a href="https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1046525">media literacy that will help consumers be more critical about the content they’re watching and reading</a>, providing them with an understanding of history and the intellectual tools to challenge persuasion campaigns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Richard Schoenherr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Once the context of cultural and territorial appropriation by China in Southeast Asia are understood, Vietnam’s ban of the Barbie movie isn’t surprising.Jordan Richard Schoenherr, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999092023-03-30T10:33:30Z2023-03-30T10:33:30ZUkraine: Kremlin warning of ‘forever war’ reflects shifting Russian rhetoric about ‘special military operation’<p>Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, warned Russians that they must <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/putin-prepares-russia-for-forever-war-with-west-as-ukraine-invasion-stalls">prepare for a “forever war”</a>. “Things will get much harder,” Peskov told a gathering of the country’s political elite. “This will take a very, very long time.”</p>
<p>It’s a far cry from Vladimir Putin’s “<a href="https://stories.state.gov/what-is-a-special-military-operation/">special military operation</a>”. This was supposed to sweep into Kyiv in a matter of days, weeks at the most. Once there, Russia would be able to free Ukrainians from the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/its-not-rational-putins-bizarre-speech-wrecks-his-once-pragmatic-image">gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis</a>” who were preventing Ukraine from assuming its natural role as a part of the motherland. </p>
<p>A war which was going to take days or weeks could now take many years. And far from rescuing Ukraine from fascists, the conflict is now a bitter struggle for Russia’s continued existence. As Putin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/putin-prepares-russia-for-forever-war-with-west-as-ukraine-invasion-stalls">told workers at an aviation factory</a> recently: “For us, this is not a geopolitical task, but a task of the survival of Russian statehood, creating conditions for the future development of the country and our children.”</p>
<p>But then Kremlin narratives have been notably flexible and self-serving over the years. This was brilliantly highlighted in the recent BBC documentary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0dlz7gc">Putin versus the West</a>, which took a close look at shifts in Russian political rhetoric over the past decade.</p>
<p>This is the period we might accurately refer to as “Putin II”. In 2012, Putin resumed the presidency after getting around the constitutional ban on serving three consecutive terms by making his prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, president for one and then resuming the top job. Since then he has ramped up the historical nationalism somewhat. </p>
<p>But even as far back as 2008, in a meeting with then US president, George W. Bush, Putin was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/19/ukraines-not-a-country-putin-told-bush-whatd-he-tell-trump-about-montenegro/">questioning Ukrainian sovereignty</a>: “You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a country.” </p>
<p>Shortly after his troops entered Crimea, leading to its annexation in March 2014, he doubled down on this theme, insisting that it was the Bolsheviks (“may god judge them”) who <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603">gave much of south-east Russia to Kyiv</a>. In the same speech he said Nikita Khrushchev, a former leader of the USSR, may have added Crimea to Ukraine to atone for the famine of the 1930s – but that this was something “for historians to figure out”.</p>
<p>This message of Ukraine as a historical aberration has been a common and fairly unwavering element of Putin’s discourse since 2012. </p>
<h2>‘Firehose of falsehood’</h2>
<p>In 2016, the Rand Corporation, a US thinktank, developed a model for Russian propaganda it called the “<a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html">firehose of falsehood</a>”. The Kremlin uses all the machinery of state (including a tame media) to embellish and perpetuate its lies with the purpose of confusing the widest possible audience. There have been several constant mantras emerging from the Kremlin over the war and in its build-up. One is that Ukraine’s pro-Russian former president Viktor Yanukovych had been <a href="https://voxukraine.org/en/the-maidan-in-2014-is-a-coup-d-etat-a-review-of-italian-and-german-pro-russian-media/">ousted in a coup</a>, meaning that all subsequent Ukrainians governments have been illegitimate. </p>
<p>The Kremlin logic trail then continues that, as a result, Ukraine is not a democracy. Of course, the fact that after the invasion began, the Zelensky government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/13/viktor-medvedchuk-arrest-matter-to-kremlin">cracked down on pro-Russian agents</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/20/ukraine-suspends-11-political-parties-with-links-to-russia">banned pro-Russia political parties</a> is taken as further proof of Kyiv’s lack of commitment to democracy.</p>
<p>So, if not a democracy, Ukraine must be a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518046.2022.2058179">fascist state</a>. This old chestnut goes back to the aftermath of the second world war and was used to quell any pro-independence sentiment in Ukraine and Byelorussia (Belarus). As a British journalist in Russia at the time, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Winterton">Paul Winterton</a> wrote of Stalin’s rhetoric in his memoir Report on Russia: “if anyone attacks us or offends us or effectively disagrees with us, we will call him a fascist. Some people are bound to take up the cry.” Putin clearly learned much from his predecessor.</p>
<p>He has learned from the Nazi playbook, too, insisting he sent his troops into Ukraine to <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claims-that-ukraine-is-committing-genocide-are-baseless-but-not-unprecedented-177511">prevent genocide</a> of the Russian-speaking population (Hitler insisted that German-speaking Poles were being threatened in the Danzig corridor and the ethnic German population of the Sudetenland needed his protection). </p>
<p>Perhaps his cheekiest <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/02/ukraine-debunking-russias-legal-justifications">claim was that</a> the invasion was legal under the UN charter. Having ratified the existence of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic and signed treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, <a href="https://theprint.in/world/full-text-of-vladimir-putins-speech-announcing-special-military-operation-in-ukraine/845714/">Putin said</a>: “I made a decision to carry out a special military operation. Its goal is the protection of people who, during eight years, suffer from abuse and genocide from the Kyiv regime.”</p>
<p>In other words, he was legally bound to invade Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Ignoring the signs</h2>
<p>It must have been obvious for years that something was bound to happen. But, on the whole, the west preferred to ignore the signs. Poland may have clearly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/10/poland-warning-europe-russia-aggression-ukraine-smolensk-plane-crash">sounded the alarm</a> about Russian aggression as early as 2015, but other European countries preferred not to hear it. Germany wanted cheap gas and still believed economic integration with Russia would bring <a href="https://www.thetrumpet.com/26877-germany-pursues-a-hidden-agenda-with-russia">peace</a>. </p>
<p>In Britain, the ruling Conservative party – including Boris Johnson – had enjoyed cordial relations with (and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/23/oligarchs-funding-tories">received millions in donations</a> from) the Russian establishment. </p>
<p>In Hungary, the prime minister Viktor Orban had largely modelled his illiberal democracy on Putin’s Russia, and has maintained <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/03/hungary-orban-russia-conservative-politics/">tacit support</a> for Russia even since the invasion. There are also <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/italian-politicians-and-big-business-bought-into-russian-occupation-of-crimea">close ties</a> between members of the Italian government and Russia – although Giorgia Meloni defied political pressure to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-ready-risk-unpopularity-over-support-ukraine-2023-03-21/">declare support for Kyiv</a>.</p>
<p>But, for years, Putin’s messaging had been there for all to see. But much of the world was unable – or unwilling – to see Putin’s rhetoric for what it was: paving the way for an aggressive invasion aimed at conquest.</p>
<p>So far it appears that most Russians <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/having-it-both-ways-russians-both-support-and-oppose-war">continue to back Putin and his invasion</a>. But now that it looks set to become a “forever war”, it’ll be instructive to see whether – and how quickly – that might change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What started as a short military operation will now take years and years. Changing its tune is all in a day’s work for the Kremlin.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2001652023-02-17T07:52:11Z2023-02-17T07:52:11ZAre calls to cancel two Palestinian writers from Adelaide Writers’ Week justified?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510800/original/file-20230217-3249-8vze77.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C11%2C3982%2C1982&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pictured, left to right: Mohammed El-Kurd, Louise Adler and Susan Abulhawa.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The organisers of the 2023 <a href="https://www.adelaidefestival.com.au/writers-week/">Adelaide Writers’ Week</a>, which starts on March 4, are under pressure to withdraw invitations to two Palestinian writers: one for her views about <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-struggle-between-normality-and-madness-why-volodymyr-zelenskys-speeches-have-captured-the-worlds-attention-193224">Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a>, and the other for his views on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-labor-party-has-long-struggled-over-a-position-on-israel-and-palestine-heres-why-162611">Israel</a> and Zionism.</p>
<p>South Australian Premier Peter Malinauskas <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/antisemitics-spark-premiers-festival-boycott/news-story/09596c20728da36910a29dac24dfd923">has condemned both authors</a>. “I completely abhor the comments that have been made … they don’t accord with SA’s value system,” he said. “I’ve got to be frank, I’m surprised they are being facilitated at Adelaide Writers’ Week. I won’t be going along to hear them speak.”</p>
<p>Each case raises issues about freedom of speech and the phenomenon of “cancel culture”, but the cases are not identical.</p>
<h2>The cases against Susan Abulhawa and Mohammed El-Kurd</h2>
<p>The first concerns <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/author/susan-abulhawa/">Susan Abulhawa</a>, a Palestinian American writer who has published a series of novels, including a bestseller, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/mornings-in-jenin-9781408809488/">Mornings in Jenin</a>, based on the hardships of Palestinians in their continuing confrontation with Israel. </p>
<p>The second concerns <a href="https://www.mohammedelkurd.com/">Mohammed El-Kurd</a>, a Palestinian writer and poet who lives in East Jerusalem and whose appearance at Harvard University in October last year <a href="https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2022/10/25/psc-speaker-protest/">generated protests</a> from some pro-Israel students who criticised his rhetoric as antisemitic. </p>
<p>Of the two, Abulhawa’s case is more straightforward. The objections to her, raised principally by Ukrainian voices in Australia, are fundamentally political. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-16/adelaide-writers-week-defends-scheduling-susan-abulhawa/101981806">They arise</a> from tweets she has published saying Zelenskyy would rather drag the world into a third world war than give up his ambitions for Ukraine to join NATO, and describing him as far more dangerous than his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>She has also <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/festival-spreading-putin-propaganda/news-story/a8a5c56a0312e32df4b66b47b6d1e5ba">written tweets</a> declaring: “DeNazify Ukraine”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1626182384872718338"}"></div></p>
<h2>Extreme views</h2>
<p>The president of the Association of Ukrainians in South Australia, Frank Fursenko, describes these views as “extremist” and says they contradict what most people feel about Ukraine’s position.</p>
<p>There is no question they are extreme views: they certainly contradict the Western world’s view of what is happening in Ukraine, and play into <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-vladimir-putin-the-greatest-russophobe-of-all-186642">Putin’s propaganda</a> about supposedly wanting to rid Ukraine of neo-Nazism.</p>
<p>However, none of that justifies silencing her. Her remarks are <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/festival-spreading-putin-propaganda/news-story/a8a5c56a0312e32df4b66b47b6d1e5ba">reported to be</a> distressing to Ukrainians and doubtless would outrage much popular opinion, both here and in other countries broadly opposed to Putin’s invasion.</p>
<p>But they are essentially political, and in a liberal democracy the bar is set high if silencing political speech is to be justified.</p>
<p>Distress and outrage fall well short. The bar is generally set at the level where the speech does, or is likely to do, objective harm: intimidation, humiliation, vilification, incitement. </p>
<p>It is true the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00089">Racial Discrimination Act</a> sets a lower bar by including the more subjective tests of insult and offence, but we are not talking about race speech here.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/today-is-not-my-day-how-russias-journalists-writers-and-artists-are-turning-silence-into-speech-185120">'Today is not my day': how Russia's journalists, writers and artists are turning silence into speech</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Grossly offensive, but antisemitic?</h2>
<p>El-Kurd’s case is more complex: some of what he has tweeted has been denounced by the Anti-Defamation League as antisemitic.</p>
<p>In particular, the league has objected to his accusing Zionists of eating the organs of Palestinians and of lusting for Palestinian blood, and to his comparison of the State of Israel to the Nazi regime.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510799/original/file-20230217-28-2xm6c4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some of what Mohammed El Kurd has tweeted has been denounced by the Anti-Defamation League as antisemitic.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By any objective test, these accusations are grossly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, and civilised societies are rightly vigilant to challenge speech that creates any equivalence with the Holocaust.</p>
<p>However, are they antisemitic? The Anti-Defamation League says they are, and the league’s point of view must be respected.</p>
<p>But a counterview is that El-Kurd’s comments are directed at Zionists and at the State of Israel specifically, rather than at Jews as a people, and that therefore they are political in nature rather than racist.</p>
<p>This is a distinction on which people of goodwill can differ.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-about-the-rise-in-anti-semitism-why-we-need-real-stories-for-better-holocaust-education-in-australia-153645">It's not just about the rise in anti-Semitism: why we need real stories for better Holocaust education in Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Fact vs opinion</h2>
<p>Louise Adler, the director of Adelaide Writers Week, is the daughter of <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-jewish-womans-story-of-surviving-the-holocaust-by-passing-as-catholic-and-sheltering-with-nazis-is-rightly-hard-to-read-191003">Holocaust survivors</a>. She has drawn a different distinction – between the authors’ tweets and their published works.</p>
<p>This is a distinction based on proportionality. Should what an author says in a tweet be given the same weight as what they say in a substantial work of literature? She argues it should not.</p>
<p>A further distinction is between fact and opinion. No one is disputing the fact the Holocaust happened: it is a question of whether referencing the Nazis in a critique of Israel or Zionism amounts to antisemitism. No one is disputing the fact that Russia invaded Ukraine; the issue instead hinges on competing opinions about Zelenskyy’s strategy in response.</p>
<p>This distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion is an important one, and it affects the criticism of both Abulhawa and El-Kurd.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-free-speech-64797">Explainer: what is free speech?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Calls to cancel ‘unjustified’</h2>
<p>The SA opposition leader, John Gardner, has fallen into this trap with his opportunistic call on the festival organisers to cancel both writers. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-16/adelaide-writers-week-defends-scheduling-susan-abulhawa/101981806">He compared</a> Abulhawa’s tweets to spreading vaccine misinformation.</p>
<p>That is nonsense. Both speakers have engaged in tweets that are clearly polemical. But they are comments, not assertions of fact. Misinformation is a statement of erroneous fact.</p>
<p>Liberal democracies tolerate political opinions – however extreme, distressing or offensive – that fall short of violating the harm principle.</p>
<p>For that reason, as well as for considerations of proportionality, the calls to cancel Abulhawa and El-Kurd are unjustified.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls have erupted to cancel two writers from Adelaide Writers’ Week – including from South Australia’s Opposition leader. Why? And are they justified? Denis Muller weighs the evidence.Denis Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1988942023-02-01T16:30:57Z2023-02-01T16:30:57ZUkraine war: casualty counts from either side can be potent weapons and shouldn’t always be believed<p>The war in Ukraine is shaping up to be one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/06/23/ukraine-war-deaths-soldiers-history/">bloodiest of the 21st century</a>, with both sides reported to be losing hundreds of soldiers each day as the conflict moves towards its first anniversary. But quite how many people are dying in this bitter struggle depends on who is doing the reporting. </p>
<p>Norway’s defence chief, General Eirik Kristoffersen, claimed recently that Russia has <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/whats-the-truth-about-casualty-numbers-in-ukraine/">suffered 180,000 casualties to Ukraine’s 100,000</a>, not counting 30,000 Ukrainian civilian casualties. The chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, claimed that Russian casualties are “<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/milley-russia-has-significantly-well-over-100000-casualties-in-ukraine-2023-1?r=US&IR=T">significantly well over 100,000 now</a>”. US intelligence has reportedly suggested this figure is <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/21115234/russia-war-deaths-ukraine-188000/">around 188,000</a>.</p>
<p>But truth is said to be the first casualty of war and it is certainly possible that <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/whats-the-truth-about-casualty-numbers-in-ukraine/">Kristoffersen and Milley are downplaying</a> the number of Ukrainian casualties while overestimating Russia’s. </p>
<p>US-based <a href="http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/author/chris/">military historian Christopher Lawrence</a> believes that we tend “to take government claims of other people’s losses at face value”. He was referring to the <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/whats-the-truth-about-casualty-numbers-in-ukraine/">Ukrainian claim last August</a> that 121,480 Russian soldiers had been killed, against their own reported <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/almost-9000-ukrainian-military-killed-war-with-russia-armed-forces-chief-2022-08-22/">death toll of 9,000</a>. </p>
<p>Russia has only provided two casualty reports. The most recent was on September 21 2022, when defence minister Sergei Shoigu said that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-partial-mobilisation-will-see-300000-drafted-defence-minister-2022-09-21/">5,937 Russian troops</a> had been killed. Mediazona, an independent Russian publication which is working with the BBC News Russian service to monitor the death toll, <a href="https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng">puts the figure at 12,538 deaths</a>. So the numbers vary wildly from source to source.</p>
<p>Casualty reporting is a powerful tool of war propaganda, seen most starkly in the tit-for-tat accounts of two incidents around the new year. Ukraine claimed that its <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-claims-up-to-400-russian-troops-dead-in-barracks-strike-12778467">rocket attack on a Russian army barracks in Makiivka</a> near Donetsk in the east of Ukraine on New Year’s Eve killed 400 Russian soldiers. </p>
<p>Russia countered that the attack, while deadly, had killed only about 60 troops (although prominent pro-Moscow blogger and former military leader Igor Girkin reportedly claimed the death toll <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/01/02/hundreds-killed-ukrainian-himars-flatten-russian-barracks-one/">was in the hundreds</a>).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Donbas showing major towns and cities." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507610/original/file-20230201-11117-xvmqx2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tit-for-tat: attacks on Russian and Ukrainian barracks are reported to have killed hundreds, but reports vary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UN Office for the Cooperdination of Humanitarian Affairs.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile Russia claimed its revenge airstrike on Kramatorsk in the northern part of the Donetsk region killed 600 Ukrainian troops, a figure <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-denies-russian-claims-that-massive-missile-strike-killed-600-ukrainian-troops-12782481">swiftly denied by Kyiv</a>, which called the Russian claim “propaganda”. Ukraine’s assessment was verified by several news teams which did not find the extensive damage such an airstrike would inevitably cause.</p>
<p>Even those not directly involved in the conflict calibrate numbers to show those they don’t support in a bad light. The EU Commission president estimated that <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/ukraine-says-casualty-figures-in-war-cannot-be-disclosed/2752498">over 20,000 civilians have died</a> in Ukraine to date – although a spokesperson later removed the estimate which she said included both dead and injured and “was meant to show Russia‘s brutality”.</p>
<h2>Information warfare: soft war</h2>
<p>Alongside combat and air strikes, contemporary conflicts increasingly involve the use of “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/soft-war/E1A1AC1A137D46792396EE55F6A5255D">soft war</a>” tactics, such as economic sanctions and propaganda. Winning wars is not only about defeating the enemy on the battlefield, but also about influencing public opinion, domestic and international. </p>
<p>What has become known as “<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-information-operations-information-warfare/">information operations</a>” can deliver a decisive advantage to a warring state away from the battlefield. We’ve all heard of “<a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2010/01/psyop/">psychological operations</a>” – better known by their acronym Psyops – which aim to put an adversary off balance or influence foreign audiences and their governments to provide support. </p>
<p>Reports of decisive victories or unspeakable atrocities are important in the battle for hearts and minds. Casualty figures are also part of that battle.</p>
<h2>Civilian combatants</h2>
<p>Another factor which complicates assessments of the human cost of this war is the way both sides have pressed civilians into military service. Russia drafted 300,000 reservists and conscripts late last year, many of whom are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/28/russia-says-82000-conscripts-from-emergency-draft-already-in-ukraine">already in the field</a>, some of them in the front line to protect more experienced troops in the rear. </p>
<p>Ukrainian intelligence officials are warning that the Kremlin plans a new conscription wave for <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-mobilize-new-conscript-military-intelligence-war-ukraine/">up to 500,000 men</a> to fight in Ukraine in 2023.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in July 2022 Ukraine introduced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/06/ukraines-military-plans-to-limit-free-movement-to-make-conscription-easier">system of permits</a> prohibiting men eligible for conscription from leaving their region, to help the armed forces to locate potential conscripts. Since Zelensky declared martial law on February 24 2022, Ukrainian men between the ages of 18 and 60 became eligible for military service. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s authorities said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/06/ukraines-military-plans-to-limit-free-movement-to-make-conscription-easier">conscription would occur in waves</a>, starting with those with previous military experience, and would reflect the army’s needs. This is in addition to about 100,000 Ukraininan civilians who enlisted in the territorial defence force (military reserves) in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. </p>
<p>Under international law, civilians who become combatants, either through conscription or through enlisting, also <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule6">become legitimate targets</a>. </p>
<p>Body counts are often seen as a proxy for how a war is going. But it’s not as simple as that and these figures don’t always give an accurate indication of the real situation on the battlefield – materially or morally. In war, the concern is the amount of force necessary to achieve military objectives versus ethical considerations, especially when civilians-as-combatants become legitimate targets. </p>
<p>Whoever “wins” this war will achieve a <a href="https://www.historyhit.com/who-was-pyrrhus-and-what-is-a-pyrrhic-victory/">pyrrhic victory</a> (a win at excessively great cost). As in all wars, the “glorious dead” will be exploited for advantage by both sides. But that will only make us, once again, lose sight of the real, flesh-and-blood human losses and the grieving loved ones they leave behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198894/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lily Hamourtziadou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In war, each side tends to minimise its own losses and overestimate the enemy death toll – Ukraine is no exception.Lily Hamourtziadou, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1895322022-12-05T19:03:26Z2022-12-05T19:03:26ZRory Cormac’s How to Stage a Coup is an entertaining critique, not a how-to manual<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498811/original/file-20221204-55991-2f8xmj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C6%2C4237%2C2833&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Katie Kitamura’s brilliant novel <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/intimacies-9781529112078">Intimacies</a> (2022), the story of a former African dictator being tried in the International Criminal Court, there is a summary of the case against the accused: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The national electoral commission and outside observers called the election in favor of the accused’s opposition. The accused refused to cede power […] He then indulged in some creative accounting, nullifying the votes in districts where his opponent polled strongly, ordered the army to close the borders, and barred all foreign media. The accused then […] formed an army of mercenaries and began a process of ethnic cleansing, leading to death squads and mass graves. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>When I read this, I thought it was a chilling but generic story of autocracy in action. It reminded me of the arresting claim in Jess Hill’s essential book on the subject of domestic violence <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/see-what-you-made-me-do">See What You Made Me Do</a> – that abusers follow such a familiar pattern it is as if they have a manual. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: How to Stage a Coup and Ten Other Lessons from the World of Secret Statecraft – Rory Cormac (Atlantic Books).</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The same could be said of dictators when they defy election results, constitutional processes, and the rule of law. They follow a well-trodden path from mendacity to violence, so much so that the formula has been set out in Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s bestseller <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/how-democracies-die-9780241381359">How Democracies Die</a> (2019). </p>
<p>From a delightful podcast interview with Kitamura, however, I learnt that the case detailed in her novel was not generic, but based on the actions of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Gbagbo">Laurent Gbagbo</a>, the former president of Ivory Coast. Kitamura had travelled to The Hague to sit in the viewing gallery and watch Gbagbo’s trial before the International Criminal Court. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496922/original/file-20221123-12-zzzo3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court, January 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Dejong/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Can a “coup” be staged by a leader clinging to power when election results have gone against them? The answer is yes. Donald Trump has provided the most obvious recent example of an attempt to overthrow due process, the Constitution, and other branches of government. </p>
<p>Rory Cormac’s <a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/how-to-stage-a-coup/">How to Stage a Coup</a> places Trump’s actions into a much longer history of nefarious behaviour by leaders and nations. The focus of the book is largely on what states covertly do to other states, rather than what dangerous leaders inflict upon their own people. But in the age of cyber warfare, Cormac wisely contends that populist politics at the national level creates internal divisions that are more easily exploited by foreign enemies. </p>
<p>Donald Trump has been central to making US politics more openly xenophobic, anti-democratic and sadistic. It is not surprising that Russia and other enemies of the US have poured fuel on this dumpster fire, seeking to create even more instability by aiding Trump’s most extreme supporters and, as Cormac writes, also aiding his radical opponents. </p>
<h2>Disinformation</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=872&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1096&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1096&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496918/original/file-20221123-21-zibkdy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1096&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The charm of Cormac’s book is its accessibility. He has achieved the rare academic feat of writing a bestseller. How to Stage a Coup is breezily written in a style that suits aeroplane reading. I recently spotted copies piled up in a tower in a bookstore at Sydney Airport. </p>
<p>This is not a criticism – Cormac has done the public a service by producing such a readable history of covert action, one that ends with a series of warnings about what democratic states like the UK, US and Australia need to do to make them less vulnerable to interference. </p>
<p>One of the joys of reading a popular history of espionage and foreign interference by a true expert like Cormac is the dazzling array of examples he presents. Many of these remarkable and disturbing anecdotes made me want to interrupt my fellow travellers’ action films on a recent flight to Dubai and say “listen to <em>this</em> story if you want to be truly entertained”. Cormac is not above making references to Hollywood and James Bond, reminding the reader that this material is often more incredible than the kinds of plots the passengers on my plane were engrossed in. </p>
<p>Although Cormac provides many illustrative historical examples of covert action, the strength of the empirical evidence is his focus on cyber warfare and disinformation – a term that he notes “comes from the Russian <em>dezinformatsiya</em> and only entered the English lexicon in the late 1970s”. </p>
<p>One recent example he highlights is a Chinese propaganda effort that focused on Italy at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which aimed to deflect claims that China hid information about the virus. Chinese propaganda presented China as offering generous medical support to sick Italians and suggested the virus might have originally come from the United States. </p>
<p>Russians and Iranians also suggested COVID began in the US. Proving the maxim often misattributed to Mark Twain – “a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes” – bogus stories on the origins of COVID were picked up by newspapers such as the Helsinki Times and the New Zealand Herald. </p>
<p>The disinformation strategy has parallels to Soviet propaganda in the 1980s, which spread the claim in the Indian media that US scientists had created the AIDS virus. The story was later pushed by Moscow and East Germany across Africa, South America and Europe. During the COVID pandemic, Cormac claims, “pro-Kremlin media sensationalized reports” linking blood-clots to the AstraZeneca vaccine. He argues that Russia and China both engaged in COVID disinformation schemes “to demonstrate the failure of democracies” to protect their own people. </p>
<h2>American misdeeds</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497150/original/file-20221124-19-8lgmfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US hatched multiple plans to overthrow the president of Cuba, Fidel Castro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public domain</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>How to Stage a Coup is not just rightly critical of Russian and Chinese covert actions. It also ably details American misdeeds in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere. “Between 1951 and 1975,” writes Cormac, “the US conducted over nine hundred covert actions.” </p>
<p>He mentions several ridiculous plans the US had to overthrow Fidel Castro, such as a proposed operation to fake the second coming of Jesus Christ, which would be signified by submarines firing “star-shells into the night sky to signal Christ’s arrival and spark an insurrection”. </p>
<p>A lot of covert action has terrible consequences. It often removes imperfect leaders, only to replace them with murderous dictators. One story of Cormac’s I had not read about before was that the Australian government “dutifully established a spy station in Santiago” in 1970 to support American efforts to discredit and destabilise the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. The Allende government was eventually overthrown in 1973 in a US backed military coup that installed Augusto Pinochet as dictator. Such out of area action is an example of Australia trying to curry favour with the US, with little thought for the consequences on the local population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C1988%2C1098&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C1988%2C1098&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497158/original/file-20221124-26-jm0hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">General Gustavo Leigth, General Augusto Pinochet, Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, and General Cesar Mendoza: leaders of the military junta that seized power in a violent coup in Chile on September 11, 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cormac does not just offer examples of nefarious covert action, he also offers advice on how states might better counteract attempts to undermine them. A key recommendation is to address disinformation from the bottom up. Children should be educated about disinformation techniques at high school. Another recommendation is to have expert units to address cyber attacks and disinformation within governments. </p>
<p>One interesting example of fighting back that Cormac provides is the UK spy agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) being “instructed” by ministers during the COVID-19 pandemic to “take out anti-vaxxers online and on social media”. This led to these people being blocked from communicating with each other by encryption programs. The targeting of misguided UK residents was challenged as being beyond GCHQ’s remit. </p>
<p>There are many other bizarre and brutal examples in the book. In 2017, a tourist at Kuala Lumpur airport was tricked into putting a poisoned cloth to the mouth of Kim Jong Nam – Kim Jong Un’s half-brother – in a deadly fake “candid camera” situation. The story of a professor at the University of Nottingham, who was a critic of the Chinese government, having an email sent from their account informing their colleagues they were resigning to take up a position at another university is chilling. Fake emails like this obviously have the ability to cause a lot of reputational damage and personal distress. </p>
<p>I highly recommend Cormac’s How to Stage a Coup to anyone with a general interest in the history of covert action and disinformation. It provides an accessible guide to this complex and nightmare-inducing topic. Academic readers will probably wince at the regular references to how the real world of covert action does or does not resemble James Bond films, while enviously dreaming of their next book being piled high at any bookshop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189532/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon O'Connor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Written in a breezy and accessible style, How to Stage a Coup is a dazzling compendium of underhanded tactics.Brendon O'Connor, Associate Professor in American Politics at the United States Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924912022-10-25T18:03:13Z2022-10-25T18:03:13ZCitizens’ social media, like Mastodon, can provide an antidote to propaganda and disinformation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491498/original/file-20221024-5750-cbjv96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4936%2C3280&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Citizens' social media platforms are powered by open-source software.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/citizens--social-media-can-provide-an-antidote-to-propaganda-and-disinformation" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In early October, the Pew Research Center released a report called “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2022/10/06/the-role-of-alternative-social-media-in-the-news-and-information-environment/">The Role of Alternative Social Media in the News and Information Environment</a>.” While the report is well-researched and reveals a great deal about the current state of digital media, news and right-wing propaganda, it is wrong about alternative social media. </p>
<p>The report focuses on seven alternative social media sites: BitChute, Gab, Gettr, Parler, Rumble, Telegram and Truth Social. These sites help put the “alt” in alt-right by <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2022/10/06/content-from-prominent-alternative-social-media-accounts-highlights-extreme-vaccine-skepticism-anxiety-over-lgbtq-issues/">harbouring transphobes, anti-vaxxers and Jan. 6 insurrection sympathizers</a>.</p>
<p>The report provides content analysis on these sites and shows how some Americans might rely upon them for news. For those of us concerned with the rise of bigotry, fascism and disinformation in the United States, the Pew report offers some valuable insights into the role of these particular alternative social media sites.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1578056256912297993"}"></div></p>
<p>However, the problem with the report is that it misses a large number of alternative social media sites that <em>actively and effectively oppose</em> the right-wing propaganda coming from the seven sites. This distracts us from real-world solutions to the problems of online hate speech, disinformation and surveillance capitalism.</p>
<h2>Defining alternative media</h2>
<p>The report’s core fault is conceptual and methodological. Its definition of “alternative social media” is “social media sites with relatively small user bases that have typically emerged as alternatives to larger, more established social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.” </p>
<p>Although this definition does put “alternative” in opposition to mainstream (as alternative media theory has long done), the authors’ central concern with size influences their methodology and ultimately blinds them to the diversity of alternative social media. </p>
<p>For example, the seven sites they selected for the study had to meet the following criteria: “they had publicly accessible posts, were mentioned in news media, and had at least 500,000 unique visitors in December 2021.” </p>
<p>While 500,000 unique visitors is indeed small in relation to Instagram or YouTube, this threshold excludes a significant number of alternative social media sites that do not harbour transphobes, anti-vaxxers or insurrectionists.</p>
<h2>The fediverse</h2>
<p>There is a network of very small online communities that band together through both technology and shared social values, known as <a href="https://fediverse.party/">the fediverse</a>. These sites run software such as <a href="https://joinmastodon.org/">Mastodon</a>, a microblogging service, or <a href="https://pixelfed.org/">Pixelfed</a>, an Instagram-like image sharing service.</p>
<p>In contrast with both corporate social media, such as Facebook and alt-right alternatives such as Truth Social, fediverse sites are often <em>purposely</em> small. For example, the site <a href="https://queer.party/about">queer.party</a> currently has 6,000 registered users — and it is currently closed to new members, because the administrators of that site have no desire to make it much larger. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-far-right-online-spaces-use-mainstream-media-to-spread-their-ideology-189066">How far-right online spaces use mainstream media to spread their ideology</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>However, even though they are small, there are <a href="https://fediverse.party/en/fediverse/">about 9,000 fediverse sites</a>. And they are not islands: as the name “fediverse” implies, <a href="https://newatlas.com/what-is-the-fediverse/56385/">a portmanteau of “federated” and “universe</a>,” these sites band together, not unlike the <a href="https://ca.startrek.com/database_article/united-federation-of-planets">United Federation of Planets</a> of <em>Star Trek</em> fame.</p>
<p>Queer.party users can communicate with those on <a href="https://climatejustice.social/about">climatejustice.social</a>, who might connect to members of the academic-focused <a href="https://scholar.social/about/more">scholar.social</a>. Overall, the fediverse has millions of members.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yZoASOyfvGQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Technologist Derek Caelin describes how the ‘fediverse’ dealt with right-wing trolls.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Importantly, these sites can <em>defederate</em> with those who act unethically. For example, while Gab is a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211024546">nasty, anti-Semitic place full of Nazis</a>, it could have been worse. Much worse. </p>
<p>Early in its history, Andrew Torba, the founder of Gab Social, a far-right networking site, <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/2019/07/16/gab-mastodon-challenges-content-moderation-more-distributed-social-network/">proclaimed his desire to make a large network</a> – a federation – of white Christian nationalist sites. This would be achieved through Gab’s use of Mastodon software, which would enable such a federation. </p>
<p>However, Gab’s plan to make a large network of sites was thwarted by the concerted efforts of fediverse administrators and users, who used a co-ordinated campaign to isolate Gab from the rest of the fediverse. The effort worked: <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/20691957/mastodon-decentralized-social-network-gab-migration-fediverse-app-blocking">Gab gave up its dream of creating a decentralized network of fascists</a>, and is now a centralized site – not much unlike the mainstream social media sites it was trying to escape.</p>
<h2>No surveillance</h2>
<p>The fediverse is by and large <a href="https://www.fediverse.to/">free of targeted and behavioural advertising</a>, a key technology of surveillance capitalism. In contrast to Facebook, fediverse sites don’t monitor your activities and sell the resulting data to marketers and advertisers. </p>
<p>This is another contrast to the right-wing social media the Pew report focused on: Truth Social, for example, offers advertisers <a href="https://truthsocial.com/advertising">means to target audiences</a> and has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/truth-social-join-rumbles-advertising-platform-2022-08-23/">partnered with Rumble</a> to expand its advertising efforts. Indeed, in this sense, Truth Social isn’t alternative at all — it’s aping the practices of Facebook. </p>
<p>Fediverse sites eschew surveillance capitalism, largely in favour of <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/proudhon/1849/the-coming-era-of-mutualism.html">more mutualist</a> ways of supporting each other. </p>
<h2>False dichotomies</h2>
<p>Ultimately, if we reduce “alternative social media” to be solely large, right-wing alternative media – as the Pew report does – we get a false dichotomy where the extent and diversity of the types of media available is greatly reduced. </p>
<p>On the one hand are the mainstream corporate social media, which, for all their faults, have in fact <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/dealbook/trump-facebook-twitter-deplatforming.html">deplatformed people like Donald Trump</a>. And on the other hand, we have alt-right social media, which fosters bigotry.</p>
<p>The result is we miss out on innovations in platform governance that both go beyond the corporate model and actually do a very good job at marginalizing hate speech and undermining surveillance capitalism. </p>
<p>More nuance is needed here: the Pew report focuses solely on what mass media scholar Kristoffer Holt calls “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Right-Wing-Alternative-Media/Holt/p/book/9781032338200">right-wing alternative media</a>.” And in doing so, it misses a more democratic form of alternative media, what communication scholar Clemencia Rodríguez refers to as “<a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1073260968">citizens’ social media</a>.”</p>
<p>And for all of us tired of both big tech and online trolling, citizens’ social media is our way forward.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/social-media-and-society-125586" target="_blank"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479539/original/file-20220817-20-g5jxhm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=144&fit=crop&dpr=1" width="100%"></a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert W. Gehl does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Citizens’ social media is a form of alternative media that challenges both mainstream media and right-wing propaganda.Robert W. Gehl, Ontario Research Chair of Digital Governance for Social Justice, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909092022-10-20T19:04:39Z2022-10-20T19:04:39ZFriday essay: George Orwell is everywhere, but Nineteen Eighty-Four is not a reliable guide to contemporary politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485229/original/file-20220919-66827-beee7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C1%2C659%2C304&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eric Blair, aka George Orwell, from his Metropolitan Police file c.1940.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives UK</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 2017, Donald Trump’s advisor Kellyanne Conway was quizzed on White House press secretary Sean Spicer’s false claims about the number of attendees at the president’s inauguration. When pressed on why Spicer would “utter a provable falsehood”, Conway said that Spicer was offering “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/meet-the-press-70-years/wh-spokesman-gave-alternative-facts-inauguration-crowd-n710466">alternative facts</a>”. </p>
<p>Her wording was widely characterised as “Orwellian”. Everywhere from Slate to the New York Times to USA Today, journalists were linking the new administration to George Orwell’s dystopian fiction. Less than a week after Conway’s claim, the sales of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/books/1984-george-orwell-donald-trump.html">gone up an estimated 9,500%</a>. </p>
<p>In a serious case of “I know you are but what am I?”, Republicans have gotten in on the act, accusing the left of being the fulfilment of Orwell’s dark prophesy. In April this year, for instance, Donald Trump Jr. tweeted: “Historically, was there ever a despotic regime that didn’t have the equivalent of a Ministry of Truth?” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1520030951862067200"}"></div></p>
<p>Almost everyone in every quarter sees Orwellian undertones in the manoeuvrings of their opponents. Like Elvis, Orwell has been spotted everywhere.</p>
<p>But we should be suspicious, not simply because the designation is thrown around so freely and is plastic enough to fit almost all political phenomena indifferently, but because one of the legacies of Nineteen Eighty-Four itself is to leave us with a more finely tuned sense of what such propaganda looks like. Orwellian strategies are harder to propagate because of, well, the overwhelming success of Nineteen Eighty-Four. </p>
<h2>The Orwellian paradox</h2>
<p>Some historical nuance is required. Orwell was responding to mid-twentieth century political regimes – Stalinist Russia, in particular. He was ringing the alarm bells on a new phenomenon: state control had moved beyond speech to thought and perception. Winston Smith, the protagonist of Nineteen Eighty-Four, reflects:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears. It was their final, most essential command.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1121&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1121&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485786/original/file-20220921-22-sikp9n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1121&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is a paradox here. </p>
<p>Propaganda is a mode of communication – pervasive, insistent, controlled. Orwell shows it flooding the airwaves, invading every workspace and living room through the screens on which the image of Big Brother is ever-present. Yet the goal of this kind of propaganda is to move beyond the phase of control through language to a regime of thought control where such communication has become redundant.</p>
<p>The world of Big Brother is austere in every way – colourless, devoid of all entertainments and sensory pleasures – so language itself is subject to the principle of reduction and elimination. The Party officials in charge of Newspeak are in the business of “cutting language down to the bone”. They are destroying scores of words every day so that “thoughtcrime” will ultimately become impossible, because there will be no means of articulating it, even inside the confines of your own mind.</p>
<p>Thought is already being suppressed in the novel through an embargo on logic and evidence, which starts with a simple reversal of anything that might be regarded as an established truth. This means, conversely, that the regime of Big Brother is threatened by any and every expression of reality-based knowledge. And so: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four. If that is granted, all else follows.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Big Brother’s propaganda is thus a self-eliminating program, working constantly and assiduously to make itself redundant. Eventually, there will be no words to protest with, or even to think with; there will be no perceptions to express and no realities to intrude upon the counterfactual world the Party is creating.</p>
<h2>The counter-Orwellian paradox</h2>
<p>The principles of <em>glasnost</em> (openness) and <em>perestroika</em> (restructuring), which began to take hold in Soviet culture from the end of the “real” year 1984, served to dismantle the regime that prevailed in the USSR for much of the 20th century. Alternatives became possible again; enquiry and conjecture were licensed; inventiveness was set free.</p>
<p>And here is the counter-Orwellian paradox. Under the new policy of openness, propaganda could thrive again. For what is propaganda if not a system of alternatives, as Kellyanne Conway so astutely grasped? </p>
<p>The principle here is not to force one alternative on a population. By rendering <em>any</em> alternative as <em>a priori</em> plausible, this form of propaganda casts doubt on “official” accounts. All <em>they</em> can offer is a version of truth, one that will necessarily reflect their <em>own agendas.</em></p>
<p>In February this year, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Kiselyov">Dmitri Kiselev</a>, a fast-talking Russian version of Fox News commentator <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_Hannity">Sean Hannity</a> and a prime-time host with the Kremlin’s official media outlet <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rossiya_Segodnya">Rossiya Segonya</a>, stated this outright: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Objectivity is a myth that is proposed and imposed on us. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, in 2017, Fox News’ version of Dmitri Kiselev, Sean Hannity, went on CBS and told Ted Koppel: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t pretend that I’m fair and balanced and objective. You do. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>When the program went to air, Hannity blasted CBS and called it “fake news”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485782/original/file-20220921-26-mal6o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian theorist Alexander Dugin, author of The Fourth Political Theory.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mehdi Bolourian/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If we want to understand what is going on here, Orwell is not our guide. We would do better to turn to the writings of Russian political theorist <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/23/who-is-russian-ultranationalist-alexander-dugin">Alexander Dugin</a>. </p>
<p>Dugin is an ideologue who aligns himself with Vladimir Putin’s visionary sense of Russian destiny. While he dismisses the suggestion that he is “Putin’s brain”, he is the most influential analyst of the cultural environment Putin has sought to create.</p>
<p>In his book <a href="https://arktos.com/product/the-fourth-political-theory/">The Fourth Political Theory</a>, Dugin makes the case for a new political direction, one that moves away from the modernist regimes of Marxism and fascism, whose extremes of ideological conformity he calls “uninteresting” and “worthless”. The literalism of such regimes of control, he says, makes them “entirely useless”.</p>
<p>Without making direct reference to Nineteen Eighty-Four, Dugin’s critique at times echoes the debates at the core of Orwell’s novel. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Party official O'Brien makes an extended doctrinal statement. He foresees a world with no need for art, literature or science, a world where curiosity and all forms of “enjoyment of the process of life” are eliminated. Such a world would never endure, protests Winston Smith:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It would have no vitality. It would disintegrate. It would commit suicide. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Dugin would no doubt take Winston’s side in this exchange. He proposes a cultural model that is much more flexible, cunning and resourceful than anything O’Brien and his masters might envisage.</p>
<p>The Fourth Political Theory draws its “dark inspiration” from postmodernism, an ethos Dugin despises, but uses as a Trojan horse to penetrate the defences of the world of liberalism (Dugin’s anathema). All the pleasures and enjoyments banished from the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four come surging back.</p>
<p>“I do not really understand why certain people, when confronted with the concept of the Fourth Political Theory,” Dugin writes, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>do not immediately rush to open a bottle of champagne, and do not start dancing and rejoicing, celebrating the discovery of new possibilities. After all, this is a kind of a philosophical New Year – an exciting leap into the unknown.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In this brave new world – which is not Aldous Huxley’s any more than it is Orwell’s – “nothing is true and everything is possible”. </p>
<p>The journalist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Pomerantsev">Peter Pomerantsev</a>, a more congenial guide for those who find Dugin’s new ideology hard to stomach, uses this phrase as the title of <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/peter-pomerantsev/nothing-is-true-and-everything-is-possible/9781610396004/">his book</a> on the propaganda culture surrounding Russian television, where “Everything is PR” is a declared principle.</p>
<p>The “postmodern” influence here is, more specifically, the influence of French theorist <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/baudrillard/">Jean Baudrillard</a>, who proposed that the “real” was no longer accessible in a world where layers of image replication – “simulacra” – had evolved into an autonomous pseudo-reality. This is the world in which a television celebrity becomes president and the presidency becomes a celebrity media game. </p>
<p>In such a world, propaganda thrives and manipulation is rife. With no shared or objective reality, the individual subject of liberalism can gain no traction. According to Dugin, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If we lose our identity, we will also lose alterity, the capacity for “otherness”, and the ability to distinguish between self and not-self, and consequently to assume the existence of any alternative viewpoint. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The image here is not one of a strong difference being asserted, but of a fragile and slender one under threat; and the threat is real. As alterity is lost, the obsession with creating antagonists increases, as if it were a mode of survival. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485783/original/file-20220921-13-jx7muq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jean Baudrillard lecturing at European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland, June 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mirroring</h2>
<p>One of the key insights of the French-American cultural theorist <a href="https://mimetictheory.com/who-is-rene-girard/">René Girard</a> is that adversaries are often involved in an intense and escalating mirroring. They increasingly come to reflect each others’ logics, strategies, and rationales. That this state of affairs can invariably only be seen outside the viewpoint of antagonists (who see between themselves all sorts of radical differences) is of little import.</p>
<p>In the parallel cases of the US and Russia, we should look beyond the trivialities and psychopathologies of two men who have had toilets made out of gold for them, who brag about their wealth but evade questions about it, who view women as ornaments, who obsess over the smallest criticisms, and whose “strong man” bluster is always in the service of some nostalgia about a mythical era. </p>
<p>Putin and Trump have lavished each other with praise: Putin has described Trump as a “brilliant, talented person”; Trump has called Putin “a strong leader […] a powerful leader”. But the sincerest flattery, as we know, appears as imitation.</p>
<p>As Russian television has embraced the world of images, with all its extravagance and glamour and duplicity, it has become more like Fox News, and vice versa. When Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, the news on Russian state media was editorially committed to official Kremlin positions. One of its methods was to echo Fox News. In February, a prime-time overview of the news of the week – presented by Kiselev – featured an opening monologue from <a href="https://www.fox.com/tucker-carlson-tonight/">Tucker Carlson’s Fox program</a>.</p>
<p>The situation in America since Trump was voted out of office has, if anything, become more dire. As evidence unfolds of his involvement in the January 6 coup attempt and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/fbis-mar-a-lago-search-warrant-affidavit-reveals-how-trump-may-have-compromised-national-security-a-legal-expert-answers-5-key-questions-189500">appropriation of top secret documents</a> as his private property, the legal case against him is fraught with obstacles created by the propaganda enterprise he continues to lead.</p>
<p>What should be clear cases of right and wrong under the US Constitution, and of guilt under law, have become a contest over truth in a hall of mirrors. Every accusation prompts an equal and equivalent counter-accusation. The confusion thickens with the strategy of the pre-emptive strike: whatever Trump has done wrong, he has already accused his opponents of doing just that.</p>
<p>With the prospects of a MAGA dominated election looming, no one can predict the consequences, but it is clear that American democracy is fighting for its life in a political environment that may be damaged beyond hope of recovery.</p>
<p>We need to entertain the idea that Orwell’s success in recognising the propaganda of his day might have incurred a cost – namely, that we are now too confident that we know what propaganda is. Good propaganda is precisely that because it is hard to pick; it rarely wears a neon sign around its neck. Enforced subscription to the Party’s messages has been replaced by voluntary consumption of the Kool Aid. The French philosopher <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simone-weil/">Simone Weil</a> once said that “truth is a need of the soul”. But we are often now satisfied with a more Trumpian, Twitterian logic: “A lot of people agree with me […] a lot of people are saying”.</p>
<p>It is not that nothing of the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four remains, or that the novel does not serve as a reminder of what a certain kind of political control can look like. There are, no doubt, statements by Trump and Putin that are, in some sense, “Orwellian”. Regimes with Orwellian characteristics still exist – like Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, for example, which is known for its compulsory slogans (“Assad or we Burn the Country”) and for torturing those who subvert them. </p>
<p>But large parts of the world now have fewer uses for the kinds of ideological strong-arming depicted in Orwell’s novel. And this is one of the reasons propaganda is harder to track. If our capacity to detect propaganda only surfaces in relation to what we oppose, we are all the more likely to respond in kind. In a post-Orwellian world, we are producers as well as consumers of the inflated rhetoric, sensational imagery and crazed dramaturgies promoted by those who are all too conscious of what they are doing.</p>
<p>As the philosopher <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/williams-bernard/">Bernard Williams</a> contended 20 years ago, we live in an uncomfortable era. On the one hand, we have a heightened sensitivity about being fooled; on the other hand, we are living with a general scepticism of whether anything at all might answer to “the truth”. We are deeply committed to something we don’t even know whether we believe. </p>
<p>How this tension will – or might – be sorted out is not something that will be resolved by philosophers or social theorists. It will be taken up and lived out in that increasingly murky domain that we still call, with less confidence than ever, “politics”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In today’s world, propaganda thrives and manipulation is rife, but in ways that Orwell never envisioned.Chris Fleming, Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney UniversityJane Goodall, Emeritus Professor, Writing and Society Research Centre, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1905142022-09-26T18:12:55Z2022-09-26T18:12:55ZThe war in Ukraine shows how libraries play a vital role in challenging disinformation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485393/original/file-20220919-2934-5tzrx6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4904%2C2511&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The library at the Barockhaus Museum in Görlitz, Germany. Libraries play a vital role in preserving texts and challenging disinformation. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Libraries have always been places of knowledge. For many of us, they offer insight into the socio-cultural and political changes happening around the world. I see this regularly as a librarian developing collections in Slavic and East European studies for the <a href="https://onesearch.library.utoronto.ca/">University of Toronto Libraries</a>.</p>
<p>The content on library shelves reflects the culture around us. It may mirror changes in ideologies, popular culture and political leadership. Consider the many <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/31/books/trump-books.html">White House memoirs and exposés</a> that were published during Donald Trump’s presidency. And think about all the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/guides/learning/books-about-covid-19-pandemic#a-stunning-novel-spanning-six-months-in-the-pandemic-3">fiction, poetry and graphic novels</a> inspired by COVID-19. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Book cover" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485156/original/file-20220917-30193-hxe2mm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crimea Forever with Russia by Sergey Baburin is one of the books on Ukraine’s list of banned Russian texts. (Kmbook)</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Literature also plays a significant role in times of war. It can be used to justify or oppose conflict. Such content can take the form of scholarly analysis, journalistic investigation, fictional musing and even propaganda. </p>
<h2>Information as weapon</h2>
<p>I became acutely aware of propaganda beginning in 2014. Russian books shipped to Toronto brought the faraway politics of Moscow to my desk in a very real way. The university library received works titled <em>Crimea Forever with Russia</em>, <em>Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution as Weapons of the Dollar</em> and <em>The Battlefield is Ukraine: The Broken Trident</em>. </p>
<p>The authors of these books made historical and legal arguments for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine">reintegration of Crimea with Russian</a>. These publications deny or ridicule the existence of a Ukrainian state and nation with its own distinct language and customs. They blamed the U.S. and NATO for backing the <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CO%5CR%5COrangeRevolution.htm">Orange Revolution</a> and <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevolution.htm">Maidan Uprising</a> to break up the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-approves-new-foreign-policy-doctrine-based-russian-world-2022-09-05/">Russian World</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Blue book cover with text in Ukranian and the dates 1932 and 1933." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1048&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1048&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485158/original/file-20220917-32364-9oryx9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1048&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Holodomor 1932-1933 by Vasily Marochko is one of the books on Russia’s list of extremist material.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://archive.org/details/marochko2007/mode/2up">(Internet Archive)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ukraine’s State Committee of Television and Radio Broadcasting reviews and restricts content deemed “anti-Ukrainian.” There are currently 300 titles on the committee’s list of publications aimed at “<a href="http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/printable_article?art_id=181891">eliminating the independence of Ukraine</a>.” </p>
<p>Chytomo, an online media outlet that covers publishing in Ukraine, has compiled and published a subset of the <a href="https://chytomo.com/en/fifty-propaganda-books-against-ukraine-and-incitement-to-hatred-against-ukrainians-from-russian-publishers/">fifty most egregious examples</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine is not alone in censoring literature. Russia’s Ministry of Justice maintains <a href="http://pravo.minjust.ru/extremist-materials">a federal list of extremist materials</a>. It includes over 5300 articles, books, songs and other online content. Works considered extremist include texts critical of Russian authorities, publications by Muslim theologians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Scientologists and content related to Ukraine. Banned Ukrainian books cover topics such as the <a href="http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CF%5CA%5CFamine6Genocideof1932hD73.htm">Holodomor</a> and 20th century Ukrainian liberation movements.</p>
<h2>Propaganda in university libraries</h2>
<p>The University of Toronto Libraries are not alone in holding copies of books banned by Ukraine or Russia. According to <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/about">WorldCat</a>, 44 out of 50 titles on Chytomo’s list are held by more than one library in North America. These titles are in the most prestigious academic libraries in the United States, such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Chicago and Duke.</p>
<p>Additionally, members of the <a href="https://www.eccslavic.org/projects">East Coast Consortium of Slavic Library Collections</a> acquire and preserve materials that have been banned in Ukraine and Russia.</p>
<p>Libraries emphasize free and equitable access to information and strive to build balanced collections. The <a href="https://repository.ifla.org/bitstream/123456789/1850/1/IFLA%20Code%20of%20Ethics%20for%20Librarians%20and%20Other%20Information%20Workers%20%28Long%20Version%29.pdf">professional code of ethics</a> requires librarians to respect intellectual freedom, which is the right of every individual to seek and receive information from all points of view without restriction. We reject restrictions on access to material based on partisan or doctrinal disapproval, whether by individuals, governments or religious and civic institutions.</p>
<p>Hitler’s Mein Kampf or the collected works of Stalin can serve as primary sources to study society at a particular moment. Inflammatory material of the present serves the same function. </p>
<p><a href="https://europeancollections.wordpress.com/2022/08/20/russian-publications-provocateurs-and-the-war-against-ukraine/">Mel Bach, a librarian at the University of Cambridge, writes</a> that libraries “buy material that is distasteful and worse, from around the world, giving readers present and future the chance to study the extremes that are, devastatingly, part of reality.” </p>
<p>Purchasing such material does not mean that libraries approve of the contents.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wearing a yellow shirt reaches out for a book on a shelf." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486166/original/file-20220922-30324-1yfirt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Libraries have a responsibility to allow people to access information without restrictions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dealing with disinformation</h2>
<p>Dealing with propaganda in its most injurious form — disinformation — requires that students and researchers possess information literacy skills. These skills include the ability to locate, critically evaluate and effectively use information to create new understandings of the world around us. Mastering these competencies will help people distinguish valid or trustworthy facts from ones that intend harm or spur violence. </p>
<p>The Russian government’s use of anti-Ukrainian disinformation to justify its war has led to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/08/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-15-august-2022">civilian deaths</a>, massive destruction and the threat of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-decree-mobilisation-says-west-wants-destroy-russia-2022-09-21/">nuclear devastation</a>. <a href="https://mkip.gov.ua/news/7647.html">Numerous libraries, book collections</a> and other <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/damaged-cultural-sites-ukraine-verified-unesco">cultural sites</a> have been damaged or lost.</p>
<p>Placing propagandist works on bookshelves next to scholarship on similar topics can lend legitimacy to disinformation and war propaganda. People may develop beliefs based on what information is available to them and eventually accept that information as fact.</p>
<p>Laura Saunders of Simmons University <a href="https://www.ala.org/acrl/sites/ala.org.acrl/files/content/conferences/confsandpreconfs/2013/papers/Saunders_Information.pdf">succinctly sums up the ethical question of libraries and weaponized information</a>. She asks “whether there are better or more responsible ways of collecting, organizing and making accessible information that is known to be inaccurate or discredited so that it is not being censored but also is not being promoted as a legitimate or authoritative source.”</p>
<p>Librarians have a responsibility to teach their users to evaluate the credibility and validity of information. We should verify that the information added to our library shelves is trustworthy and help introduce healthy scepticism into their critical thinking to uncover the biases and motivations behind the content we offer them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ksenya Kiebuzinski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Libraries play a crucial role in preserving texts, even controversial ones. They are responsible for teaching people how to evaluate the credibility and validity of information.Ksenya Kiebuzinski, Slavic Resources Coordinator, and Head, Petro Jacyk Resource Centre, University of Toronto Libraries, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901042022-09-23T12:34:10Z2022-09-23T12:34:10ZUS and Russia engage in a digital battle for hearts and minds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485652/original/file-20220920-18-mgviae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5455%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">RT, a Russian government-operated media outlet, is just one of the players in the global information war.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-state-controlled-international-television-russia-news-photo/1241380961">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The battle over Ukraine extends across the world: <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1464884920941967">Information warfare</a> is quickly evolving as key nations seek to influence public opinion and gain political support. </p>
<p>As during the Cold War, Russia and the United States are the two main combatants. <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-military-steps-up-cyberwarfare-effort-113100">Some efforts are clandestine</a>, but plenty of material is broadcast to the public as each country attempts to, in the words of political linguists, <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781442606227/language-capitalism-colonialism/">“constrain the power and influence of the other</a> … and win ‘hearts and minds’ … around the world.”</p>
<p>Key government-sponsored media outlets in the current battle are Russia Today, often known as RT, and two U.S. government-backed operations, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. </p>
<p>But it can be hard for many people to tell the difference between these outlets and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143">independent news</a>. As a <a href="https://newhouse.syr.edu/people/jennifer-grygiel">propaganda scholar</a>, I believe citizens of all nations deserve to know <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/us/politics/russia-rfe-free-press.html">how their media have been filtered</a> and when governments are seeking to influence their views.</p>
<p>My colleague <a href="https://www.sagersmith.com/weston-sager-attorney/">Weston Sager</a> and I developed a <a href="https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol11/iss2/7/">test for determining whether</a> a particular media outlet is, or is not, a government mouthpiece. We examine key factors such as government control, funding, attribution and its resemblance to news.</p>
<p>At their best, these types of outlets provide official government information – at worst, blatant propaganda. Here’s how the main players in the U.S. and Russia measure up. </p>
<h2>Russia Today: Propaganda with some facts sprinkled in</h2>
<p>RT is a multilanguage international media broadcaster that claims to be an “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220907233054/https://www.rt.com/about-us/">autonomous, non-profit organization</a>.” But in reality, it has officially declared to the U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/rt-files-paperwork-with-justice-department-to-register-as-foreign-agent/2017/11/13/20271468-c8ad-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html">that it is an arm of the Russian government</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-rt-coverage-is-biased-and-misleading-but-banning-the-network-may-not-be-a-good-idea-178128">lockstep with the Kremlin</a>, RT has supported the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine and the 2022 Russian invasion of mainland Ukraine.</p>
<p>The outlet has a <a href="https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php">history of publishing sensationalized</a> and biased articles promoting Russian policies and accentuating the perceived failings of the United States and its allies. For example, in 2015, RT devoted extensive coverage to the <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7dj73/russia-propaganda-rt-ban-ukraine-invasion">Occupy Wall Street movement</a>. Not only did this storyline allow RT to selectively showcase people protesting in the United States, it helped further Russia’s narrative that its economic system is superior to U.S. capitalism. </p>
<p>More recently, RT has, without credible evidence, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/04/technology/russia-bioweapons-geneva.html">accused the United States</a> of developing bioweapons in Ukraine and testing them on people there.</p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean that RT is “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920941967">able to dispense with facts all together</a>,” as propaganda often leverages <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143">truthful bits of information</a>, nor that it is strictly anti-American. In 2010, for instance, RT published an interview containing accusations that the Republicans were exploiting racial fears ahead of midterm elections. Then RT publicly <a href="https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php">defended the Obama administration</a> against Fox News host Glenn Beck‘s accusations that Obama was turning the United States into a socialist country. Propaganda works by supporting <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920941967">themes that are in popular discourse at the time</a>. It does not necessarily follow a linear path and may be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/us/womens-march-russia-trump.html">counterintuitive at times</a>. </p>
<p>In the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-rt-coverage-is-biased-and-misleading-but-banning-the-network-may-not-be-a-good-idea-178128">RT was blocked</a> in many nations around the world <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-09-01/ukraine-war-propaganda-from-russia-today-rt-thrives-despite-sanctions">to limit the spread of Russian propaganda</a>. Nevertheless, RT continues to publish its content, especially in <a href="https://theconversation.com/%20merica-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167">less developed countries</a> where the Russian government is working to increase its international reputation and influence. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large stone building with long vertical windows." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485655/original/file-20220920-11487-ppvp23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Voice of America is headquartered in the Wilbur J. Cohen Federal Building in Washington, D.C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VOABuilding/49a5c28c24874594a189ee5676def4b8/photo">AP Photo/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Major US outlets present mostly facts – that support American values</h2>
<p>Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are the U.S. government’s primary international media outlets, though <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220727233718/https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/organizational-chart/">there are other channels</a> as well. </p>
<p>In 1942, during World War II, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220513105818/https://www.insidevoa.com/a/3794247.html">U.S. government established VOA</a> to broadcast pro-Allied messages and to combat Nazi propaganda abroad. In the 1950s, the CIA founded <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201016170050/https:/www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2007-featured-story-archive/a-look-back.html">RFE/RL</a> to counter Soviet propaganda in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Both outlets are now overseen by the <a href="https://www.usagm.gov/">U.S. Agency for Global Media</a>, a <a href="https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/oversight/">part of the executive branch</a> of the federal government. The agency receives <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220601130038/https://www.usagm.gov/our-work/strategy-and-results/strategic-priorities/budget-submissions/">over US$800 million in annual funding from Congress</a>.</p>
<p>Similar to RT, <a href="https://www.wnyc.org/story/voice-of-america-vows-independence-as-trump-calls-for-worldwide-network/">VOA</a> and <a href="https://pressroom.rferl.org/about-us">RFE/RL</a> claim that they are independent media outlets. In support of that claim, they often point to a vaguely defined “<a href="https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/firewall/">firewall</a>” that is supposed to shield their editorial integrity from U.S. government influence.</p>
<p>But the firewall is often strained under the weight of political pressure. In 2020, President Donald Trump’s newly appointed CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/27/us/politics/trump-michael-pack-voice-of-america-firewall.html">rescinded the firewall regulation</a>, which compromised VOA’s independence in advance of the 2020 U.S. presidential election. In 2021, the firewall was legislatively strengthened, but <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104017.pdf">questions remain about its effectiveness at preventing government influence</a>. </p>
<p>Governmental influence over the editorial direction of U.S. state media can also come through legislation. In 2021, Congress introduced a bill that would instruct the agency to “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr4785/BILLS-117hr4785ih.pdf">facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information</a> to Islamic majority countries on issues regarding the human rights and religious freedom of Uyghurs.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Satellite dishes adorn a roof, with church spires in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485657/original/file-20220920-3608-bie9z6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">From this rooftop in Prague, RFE/RL broadcasts across Eastern Europe and into Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prague-czech-republic-satellite-dishes-are-pictured-13-news-photo/55393416">Michal Cizek/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Additional editorial pressure comes from federal law. VOA material must be “consistent” with U.S. foreign policy objectives, “represent America,” “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/6202">present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively</a>” and include <a href="https://www.cjr.org/opinion/broadcasting_board_of_governors_house_trump.php">editorials</a> that reflect <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov">the views of the U.S. government</a>. Under the same law, RFE/RL is required to support the U.S. government abroad. Additionally, federal law also more pointedly provides a new pathway for folding this into a larger outlet that would be expressly required to “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/6209">counter state-sponsored propaganda</a> which undermines the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and its allies.”</p>
<p>VOA and RFE/RL have a history of providing slanted and incomplete portrayals of major events and issues. Scholarship has highlighted how, during the Cold War, RFE spread “<a href="https://thebaffler.com/salvos/an-american-tale-ghodsee">rumors as fact</a>” and displayed a “<a href="https://thebaffler.com/salvos/an-american-tale-ghodsee">consistent pattern of downplaying or ignoring evidence that contradicted RFE’s vision</a> of Eastern Europe as a totalitarian dystopia” early in the Cold War. </p>
<p>U.S. government editorial pressure has also come indirectly through funding cuts, which VOA experienced after senators balked at spending tax money to produce <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/21/archives/voice-of-america-is-candid-in-reporting-on-watergate.html">“unpleasant news”</a> surrounding Watergate. The Reagan administration was known to object to critical VOA coverage and also steered its <a href="https://thebaffler.com/salvos/an-american-tale-ghodsee">“editorial voice”</a> to align with the administration’s political agenda.</p>
<p>Today, VOA often publishes stories about the United States that promote American values, such as recent articles titled “<a href="https://projects.voanews.com/refugees/world-refugee-day-2022/">Refugees Shape America</a>” and “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-festival-celebrates-traditional-food-and-dance-/6728071.html">US International Festival Celebrates Traditional Food, Dance</a>.” </p>
<p>On the other hand, RFE/RL is more focused on <a href="https://www.usagm.gov/2022/02/25/audiences-turn-to-rfe-rl-for-truthful-reporting-about-russias-invasion-of-ukraine">countering propaganda</a>. It includes coverage that is often critical of U.S. adversaries, such as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-soldier-deserter-filatyev-interview/32019717.html">‘We Have To Pay For Our Indifference’: A Russian Deserter Speaks Out After Ukraine War Memoir Hits A Nerve</a>” and “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-grain-exports-changins-routes/32022295.html">Putin Hints At ‘Changing Routes’ For Ukrainian Grain Exports, Warns Of Food ‘Catastrophe’</a>.” </p>
<p>Even though VOA and RFE/RL sometimes publish pieces that show unflattering aspects of the United States, such as “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/the-global-legacy-of-january-6/6384891.html">The Global Legacy of January 6</a>,” this is <a href="https://www.abc-clio.com/products/b4258c/">by design</a>, as the outlets would lose credibility if they ignored important topics covered in independent media.</p>
<h2>Concealed influence</h2>
<p>Because VOA and RFE/RL rely on facts, the U.S. State Department has argued that U.S. government media are less threatening than Russian “<a href="https://www.state.gov/report-rt-and-sputniks-role-in-russias-disinformation-and-propaganda-ecosystem/">disinformation</a>.” But the U.S. approach is still risky: VOA and RFE/RL content more closely resembles independent news, so <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1203&context=nulr">it is more difficult for readers to identify it as government-run media</a>. This is especially problematic in cases in which the outlets are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/technology/facebook-ads-propaganda.html">targeting U.S. citizens</a>, who may not be able to tell that they’re interacting with their own government. </p>
<p>Despite what VOA and RFE/RL claim, they are not independent. Both are funded by the U.S. government and are used to deliver U.S. policy abroad. Even though VOA and RFE/RL may look like news, they aren’t; like RT, their underlying purpose is to bolster their government’s influence around the world.</p>
<p><em>Weston Sager contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190104/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Grygiel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian government media are frequently criticized as being blatant propaganda. How do US government media measure up?Jennifer Grygiel, Associate Professor of Communications (Social Media), Syracuse UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1841972022-06-29T12:07:07Z2022-06-29T12:07:07ZPutin’s propaganda is rooted in Russian history – and that’s why it works<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine is pressing into its fifth month – despite several rounds of failed peace talks, and Western countries’ issuing <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">severe economic sanctions</a> against Russia.</p>
<p>The war isn’t happening just on Ukrainian soil. President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda is propelling the Ukraine war through Russia media, while continuing to intensify tensions with the West.</p>
<p>This propaganda – whether featuring broadcast as talking points on TV shows, or appearing as the now ubiquitous symbol “Z” – works and will continue to work because it is a tried and true tactic repackaged from Russia’s complicated history. </p>
<p>The appeal of Putin’s propaganda is its repetition. It draws from similar kinds of disinformation used during Russia’s imperial and Soviet eras that recycle age-old narratives of the evil West.</p>
<p>Putin’s popularity is skyrocketing, with <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/">83% of people</a> reporting in the latest estimates in April 2022 that they support their leader. Most <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/14/russia-public-opinion-putin-ukraine/">Russians also support</a> the Ukraine war.</p>
<p>As scholars of <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/khrebtan/">critical cultural</a> and <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/communication/people/graduate-student-profiles/epyatovskaya.aspx">international studies</a>, we think that Putin’s popularity and the widespread impact of his propaganda are not accidental. Putin gives Russians what they have been missing since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 – a surge of national pride.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A red banner unfurls across a black and white image of warplanes flying above helmeted soldiers shooting guns." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471204/original/file-20220627-24-q9s8tu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Soviet postcard from World War II shows Russian soldiers in action, with a flag reading, ‘For the Motherland, for Stalin.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/world-war-two-patriotic-russian-war-postcard-depicting-russian-and-picture-id1211756258?s=2048x2048">Photo12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Appeal to former greatness</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2001-05-01/russia-and-russians-history">Most Russians have long considered themselves patriots</a>, ready to give their lives for a bigger goal: to liberate Europe from Nazism and the toxic influence of the West, and to also unify divided countries that were once united under imperial Russia from 1721 to 1917. </p>
<p>The Russian Imperial Army sacrificed itself for the larger goal of preserving Mother Russia during <a href="https://voegelinview.com/russian-empire-1721-1917/#:%7E:text=The%20Russian%20Empire%2C%20which%20lasted,with%20its%20capital%20at%20St.">many wars of this era</a>.</p>
<p>Former Russian Emperor <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Russian-Empire/The-reign-of-Peter-the-Great">Peter the Great</a> became a national symbol of pride and power in the 17th and early 18th centuries as he waged wars against Sweden and others to expand Russia’s territory. Putin has noted the similarities he shares with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/putin-compares-himself-to-peter-the-great-in-quest-to-take-back-russian-lands">Peter the Great</a>.</p>
<p>Political leaders continued to serve as strong figureheads in Russia in later years.</p>
<p>After the Russian Revolution in 1917, for example, Russian Communist leader <a href="https://public-history-weekly.degruyter.com/3-2015-3/lenin-marx-symbols-liberation/">Vladimir Lenin became</a> Russia’s new national symbol of strength. Statues of his face and body <a href="https://www.soviettours.com/wanderer/how-many-lenin-statues-left">appeared at every</a> central square of every city, town and village across the Soviet Union – and many remain intact today.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.timothysnyder.org/books/bloodlands">Joseph Stalin rose to power after Lenin’s death in 1924</a> and became especially prominent as a national symbol and leader during World War II. The war became an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17475759.2016.1184705">identity-crafting experience for the Soviet citizens</a>. <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/world-war-two-casualties-by-country">Some 27 million</a> people in the Soviet Union died during the war, sacrificing themselves for Stalin and the Soviet Union. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A colored photograph shows Lenin behind a Soviet symbol, with Russian text" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=852&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1071&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1071&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471198/original/file-20220627-26635-1ftyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1071&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Soviet propaganda poster reads, ‘Lenin lived, Lenin lives, long live Lenin,’ in Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/lenin-lived-lenin-lives-long-live-lenin-soviet-propaganda-poster-by-picture-id113451513?s=2048x2048">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A Renaissance man</h2>
<p>Decades later, following the fall of the Soviet Union, another political leader emerged as a new national symbol of unity: Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Putin took office in 2000 as a hypermasculine, decisive and fearless leader who took after and aspired to embody previous admired rulers, like Lenin and Stalin. Like his predecessors, Putin was an uncompromising patriot with a historically familiar iron grip on politics. </p>
<p>Yet Putin was also someone who Russians could look to as “one of us.”</p>
<p>Putin plays the role of a strict but caring father to Russian citizens. </p>
<p>As he has cracked down on <a href="https://cepa.org/russia-a-state-of-homophobia/">LGBTQ+ rights</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-domestic-violence-law/">decriminalized domestic violence</a>, Putin has also held <a href="https://www.pnp.ru/politics/2016/04/14/komu-pomog-i-chto-obeshhal-narodu-vladimir-putin.html">annual phone hotline sessions</a> to address citizens’ urgent needs. </p>
<p><a href="https://ria.ru/20130726/952320636.html">Putin also fishes</a>, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/photos/russias-president-vladimir-putin-19690713/image-russian-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-rides-horse-47332220">rides horses</a> and <a href="http://20.kremlin.ru/2000/events/87/235">swims with dolphins</a> – all creating an image of him as tough, yet loving and relatable. </p>
<p>Today, Putin’s popularity cult is also tied to the idea of reanimating Russia’s past to reinstate the country’s greatness. This desire to rebuild Russia as an image of its past justifies Putin’s waging a war on Ukraine and the country’s ongoing <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/75482">political and economic confrontations with the West</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Putin is pictured shirtless, fishing in a river" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471202/original/file-20220627-15-ayfdz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Putin fishes in southern Siberia in August 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/russian-president-vladimir-putin-fishes-in-the-remote-tuva-region-in-picture-id826466096?s=2048x2048">Alexey Nikolsky/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Back to the USSR</h2>
<p>Putin has reminisced about Russia’s glorious past since the early days of his presidency. In 2003, he issued a modification of the Soviet Union’s state anthem into Russia’s new national anthem, <a href="https://www.classicfm.com/discover-music/periods-genres/national-anthems/russia-federation-state-lyrics-history-english-translation/">with only minor changes</a> to the lyrics and the same melody.</p>
<p>In 2005, Putin called the dissolution of the Soviet Union a “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931">major geopolitical disaster of the century</a>,” stressing that thousands of Russians were stranded outside of their home country.</p>
<p>Putin’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union has helped him justify different conflicts, like the <a href="https://www.natcom.org/spectra/shielding-democracy-putins-swords">2008 invasion of Georgia</a>, for example. </p>
<p>Putin defended the forced annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 as a <a href="https://tass.com/society/1267479?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">reunification</a> with Russia. Similarly, Putin says that the <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67438">Donbas region in eastern Ukraine has always been Russian</a>.</p>
<p>According to the president’s worldview, the proverbial Russian bear is simply collecting its strayed cubs. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A drawing in black, yellow and red shows a man with Nazi symbols on his outfit, with a large dollar sign on his head." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471214/original/file-20220627-13-zio4es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A page from a Soviet propaganda magazine from the 1920s says, ‘Capitalist Culture.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/soviet-propaganda-magazine-interior-capitalist-culture-bezbozhnik-u-picture-id1084702032?s=2048x2048">Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Facing West</h2>
<p>Another element of Putin’s appeal to Russians is how he defends the nation against Western powers.</p>
<p>Putin boasts that <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64261">he is immune to the West’s criticisms</a> and <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/press_conferences/67438">condemns the West</a>, particularly the U.S., for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/03/world/ukraine-russia-news">its support of Ukraine</a> and economic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61847300">sanctions</a> against Russia.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://takiedela.ru/list/zablokirovannye-smi/">tightly controlled</a> Russian media regularly parrots the government’s official lines, falsely reporting that <a href="https://www.vesti.ru/article/2759363">anti-Russian sanctions are killing the global economy</a>, for example.</p>
<p>In return, Western criticism of Russia works counterproductively, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-west-thinks-that-russians-suffering-from-sanctions-will-end-up-abandoning-putin-but-history-indicates-they-wont-179075">further unifying Russians and strengthening their patriotism</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two flags - one with the letter Z, one Russian - stand above people's heads during a concert." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/471213/original/file-20220627-17-vxf1mf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People hold flags on the sidelines of a concert in Moscow with the war symbol Z in March 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/march-2022-russia-moskau-people-hold-flags-on-the-sidelines-of-a-to-picture-id1239304206?s=2048x2048">Str/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Different realities</h2>
<p>Narratives in Russia about everything from the Ukraine war to the state of the economy create a very different reality to the one known outside of the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3170078/ukraine-war-russian-z-campaign-whips-support-putins-special">The fusion of nostalgia</a> and <a href="https://thebarentsobserver.com/ru/bezopasnost/2022/03/rossiyskuyu-molodezh-zahlestnula-volna-voennoy-propagandy">state-controlled propaganda</a> in Russia ensures people’s support of the ongoing war. </p>
<p>The call to fight against “<a href="https://iz.ru/1303387/anton-lavrov/obyknovennyi-natcizm-kak-aidarovtcy-soderzhali-plennykh-pod-starobelskom">Nazi Ukraine</a>” has replaced decadesold rallying cries to defeat “Nazi Germany.” </p>
<p>Inspired by the <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-31/myth-great-patriotic-war-a-tool-kremlins-great-power-policy">memory of Russia’s fight against Nazism</a> during World War II, Russia is now leading another sacred war – <a href="https://fortune.com/2022/03/19/world-without-nazism-putin-appears-rally-troops-attack-ukraine-moscow-zelenskyy/">for a world against Nazism</a>, as a banner at a March 2022 event Putin attended read. </p>
<p>The letter “Z” is a new war symbol in Russia that emerged when Russia’s military machinery was spotted rolling down Ukrainian streets in late February. </p>
<p>Since then, Z has grown in its popularity – appearing on military and civilian vehicles, Russian administrative buildings and on walls as graffiti.</p>
<p>Some Russians even wear <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/18/europe/russia-putin-ukraine-invasion-rally-intl/index.html">a “Z”</a> on their clothing. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tut-news.ru/politika/minoborony-raskrylo-smysl-z-simvoliki-na-voennoy-tehnike-na-ukraine?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop">The Russian government has said that “Z” stands for victory</a>, unification and the new wave of Russian patriotism. </p>
<p>This spirit of patriotism is strong across generations, including among <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/23/russian-communists-stage-red-square-induction-for-young-pioneers-a77773">children</a> and <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-generation-z-kremlin-pro-war-propaganda-targets-young-russians/">teenagers</a>. </p>
<p>Propelled by the powerful propaganda and persuasive historic parallelism, <a href="https://dgap.org/en/events/russkiy-mir-russian-world">Russia’s</a> propaganda war continues, and it is not going to stop any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For hundreds of years, Russia has elevated its political leaders as figureheads. That’s part of what makes its propaganda so convincing.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityEvgeniya Pyatovskaya, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820612022-05-11T13:02:54Z2022-05-11T13:02:54ZUkrainian propaganda: how Zelensky is winning the information war against Russia<p>As well as success on the battlefield, wars are often won or lost through information advantage. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we might have expected Russia -– an old hand at propaganda -– to have bested Ukraine early on. </p>
<p>Russia’s deception operations have had a long history of global influence, most recently the troll farms that influenced the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/senate-panel-finds-russia-interfered-in-the-2016-us-election">2016 US presidential election</a> in favour of Donald Trump.</p>
<p>In the current conflict, Russia’s propaganda efforts have consisted largely of censorship within Russia to maintain the fiction of the conflict being a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/26/propaganda-filters-truth-ukraine-war-russian-media">“special military operation”</a> rather than an invasion. Russia has created the narrative that this military operation is about ridding Ukraine of Nazis and fascists.</p>
<p>But propaganda does not have to be solely through media and speech. Russian threats of nuclear deterrence – test-firing a nuclear missile and issuing vague threats of nuclear war – to counter Nato support for Ukraine is one example. The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ecec713e-9be8-49cf-ad00-a5a0678896ad">massing of troops</a> on the Russia-Ukraine and Belarus borders under the guise of a military exercise is another. These actions also convey a propaganda element because they project a threat message: comply, or else.</p>
<p>Interestingly, these fronts have been ineffective. Some Nato countries have countered Russian propaganda by releasing their intelligence assessments, including details of Russian <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-did-russia-stage-any-to-claim-justification-for-invading-ukraine-177879">“false flag” operations</a> which were meant to make Ukraine seem the aggressor. Others are ignoring Vladimir Putin’s threats and arming Ukraine with weapons anyway. Sweden and Finland are now <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/finland-and-sweden-aim-for-nato-membership-prompting-russia-s-fury-/6565066.html">contemplating Nato membership</a> – something previously unthinkable. These all have propaganda value.</p>
<p>Brave Russian civilians <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/russian-activists-protest-vladimir-putin-invasion-ukraine-b988211.html">are demonstrating</a> in in their thousands. And Russian troops are <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/more-russian-soldiers-sabotage-vehicles-avoid-going-ukraine-front-1704954">sabotaging their own vehicles</a>. And of course, Ukraine has been <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/17963288/horrific-moment-russians-shoot-dead-civilian/">releasing images</a> of alleged Russian war crimes. </p>
<p>All of this has frustrated Putin’s plans and shifted the trajectory of the war. Ukraine’s underdog success story now looks more truthful around the world than the Kremlin’s denazification narrative.</p>
<h2>Within Ukraine</h2>
<p>But propaganda is not just the prerogative of the aggressor. Early on, Ukraine recognised the need to control how its citizens disseminated information and how that information would be used by the Kremlin. Consequently, Ukraine <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8716376/russia-ukraine-information-war/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CUkraine%E2%80%99s%20own%20information%20operations%20have%20motivated%20and%20galvanized,a%20survival%20tactic%20that%20needs%20to%20be%20undertaken.%E2%80%9D">made it illegal</a> to share images of Ukrainian troop movements or blast sites on social media, to hinder the Kremlin’s targeting systems. </p>
<p>At the beginning of the war, Ukraine was able to offer stiff resistance because its call to citizens to arm themselves was so successful. In addition to the conscription of men of military age, the <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220225-thousands-of-ukrainians-sign-up-to-fight-for-their-country-as-russia-invasion-continues">overarching narrative</a> in the western media was that thousands of Ukrainians were volunteering to fight. The Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted after Russia launched its invasion: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country” – sending a strong patriotic message that resonated with people of all types, genders and ages.</p>
<p>Ukrainian civilians are also helping the propaganda efforts by <a href="https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/how-ukrainian-civilians-are-using-phones-to-share-the-invasion-with-the-world/">spreading footage</a> of the realities of the war. Many have joined Ukraine’s “IT army” to hack and <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2022/02/28/ukraine-tech-army-civilians-hack-russian-websites/6975901001/">take down Russian websites</a>. </p>
<h2>Narrative to the west</h2>
<p>Outside Ukraine, Zelensky’s public diplomacy efforts have focused on triumphing against giant odds. By highlighting its military successes against much stronger Russian forces, Ukraine leans into the David v Goliath myth, creating hope and support for the “little guy”. Pleading his case to Nato and the parliaments of various allies, including Japan, EU, Israel, UK, Canada, Germany and others, Zelensky has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60855280?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=KARANGA">feted in heroic terms</a>. </p>
<p>Ukraine has also found success in a guilt-based narrative in the west, shaming Nato countries into providing more weapons to help Ukrainians defend themselves and for not severing economic ties to Russia fast enough. The finger was particularly pointed at Germany on this score – and Germany’s president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, was told he <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-not-to-go-to-ukraine-for-now-citing-diplomatic-snub/">was not welcome in Kyiv</a>. Under political pressure, Germany has since announced it will <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-61224804?One%20dead%20after%20missiles%20hit%20Zaporizhzhia%20factory%20-%20Ukrainian%20officials&2022-04-26T10:56:30.020Z&pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:f6202135-69af-43e9-b89a-9330a740ef47&pinned_post_asset_id=6267ad1d77811a20d37c9b98&pinned_post_type=share">send Ukraine tanks</a> after all.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s western guilt trip extends to admonishing Nato countries (particularly Germany) for buying Putin’s oil and gas. This bid to get the west to declare total economic war on Russia is a useful line of persuasion for Zelensky, because oil and gas revenues represent a large tranche of Russian GDP. An embargo could <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61040424">force Russia</a> to cease fire within months, as it loses the resources needed to finance its war effort. The EU has recognised the need for such an embargo and is aiming to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/10/hopes-raised-for-eu-oil-ban-on-russia-despite-hungary-comparing-plan-to-nuclear-bomb">put this in place</a>, despite Hungarian opposition.</p>
<p>In the UK, the Ukrainian narrative taps into the British defence mission to be a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-force-for-good-in-a-competitive-age-foreign-secretary-speech-at-the-aspen-security-conference">“force for good in the world”</a>. It also makes use of British wariness of Russia since the assassination of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19647226">Alexander Litvinenko</a> and the attempted assassination of the Skripals <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51722301">in Salisbury</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>Ukrainian pluck and the country’s surprising success on the battlefield has led the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, to recommend that Ukraine refuse to agree to peace talks with Russia unless it is in a <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10674595/Ukraine-told-not-bully-Putin-amid-Russian-withdrawal-key-airfield-near-Kyiv.html">strong position</a>. This might mean pushing back the Russians to where they were before the invasion. </p>
<h2>How the information war ends</h2>
<p>Projecting Ukraine’s “underdog” status is important in tugging on western heartstrings. The west, but particularly Nato, probably knows Ukraine is operating this line of persuasion – but, given the hardship the country is going through, will respond positively to most of Zelensky’s requests (except enforcing a “no-fly” zone). From the west’s perspective, ridding itself of Putin’s malign influence in diplomatic, informational, military and economic terms would be a useful goal.</p>
<p>Both Ukraine and Russia are engaging in information operations and propaganda, but with different approaches. The Kremlin focuses on deception operations, censorship and false narratives – especially <a href="https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/debunking-denazification">that of “denazification”</a>. Ukraine is focused on diplomacy with the west and Nato, shoring up civilian morale and encouraging them to take up arms, highlighting Russian atrocities and Ukrainian combat wins and maintaining operational security (by denying Russia targeting information). </p>
<p>Ukraine has moral authority because it is using information operations to fight a war of necessity, – an existential battle of survival. The Kremlin meanwhile, is trying to fulfil an ambition to rebuild the Soviet empire that had been shattered after the cold war. In what looks increasingly likely to be a war of attrition, winning the information war will provide a big advantage on the battlefield – which is good news for Zelensky.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Baines is Mayor of Charnwood, Councillor for Charnwood Borough Council, and a member of the Conservative Party. He has received funding from UK and overseas government departments for counter-terrorism/information operations research work. </span></em></p>Ukraine’s savvy president is beating Putin at his own game.Paul Baines, Professor of Political Marketing, Deputy Dean (Strategic Projects), University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820142022-05-02T19:05:41Z2022-05-02T19:05:41ZDebate: In Ukraine, the West cannot allow itself to sleepwalk into another Syrian catastrophe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460317/original/file-20220428-22-kt2bex.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C1%2C1024%2C676&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrians demonstrate in Idlib province on 1 April 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Omar Haj Kadour/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been said over and over again: the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/ukraine-russian-forces-extrajudicially-executing-civilians-in-apparent-war-crimes-new-testimony/">war crimes</a>, or – to take the view of US president Biden – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/13/observer-view-russian-war-crimes-against-humanity-ukraine">crimes against humanity</a> or <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/biden-iowa-genocide/index.html">genocide</a> committed by the Russian regime in Ukraine, resemble those <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/03/03/l-onu-accuse-la-russie-de-crimes-de-guerre-en-syrie_1780442/">perpetrated in Syria</a> since 2015 and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2003/11/25/massacres-en-tchetchenie-un-document-officiel-accable-l-armee-russe_343409_3214.html">in Chechnya</a> in 1999-2000. Be it in Mariupol, Bucha, Kramatorsk, or Borodianka, each day brings its share of macabre revelations.</p>
<p>Western leaders have been quick to express their <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/guerre-en-ukraine/video-guerre-en-ukraine-apres-le-massacre-a-boutcha-les-reactions-internationales-tombent-4ea2f78f-76c8-4129-802a-3af5a936e826">shock</a>. However, this emotional display should itself unsettle us when the international community has spent years looking away from the Russian regime’s crimes. The Russian army’s history in Syria and Chechnya, as well as Putin’s declarations on his intentions in Ukraine, meant the Ukrainians’ fate was predictable. And new crimes will be committed soon should we fail to do all that is in our power to stop them: the major offensives in the Donbass is nothing but a confirmation of Putin’s will of destruction. Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-war-of-extermination-signals-the-end-of-the-international-community-66708">war of extermination</a> in Syria goes on in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine: same old</h2>
<p>As in Syria, hospitals are being <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/health-60866669">deliberately targeted</a>, civilians <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-kyiv-europe-war-crimes-ffe9c24e89689b081b93518c6b7bff1f">murdered</a> and no one knows whether the Russian regime might resort to deploying <a href="https://theconversation.com/chemical-weapons-how-will-we-know-if-they-have-been-used-in-ukraine-181339">chemical weapons</a> the next day, in the same way it had authorised the Syrian president, Bashar Al-Assad, <a href="https://www.gppi.net/media/GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf">to do so</a>. In Syria, Russian forces alone have killed <a href="https://forward.com/opinion/440051/russia-is-carrying-out-a-scorched-earth-policy-in-syria-and-theyre-getting/">more Syrian civilians</a> than Isis – including countless children.</p>
<p>Like in Syria, the Kremlin is pushing propaganda about Ukraine that is not even meant to be credible anymore. The purpose is to sow doubt. In the case of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-hosital-bombed-russia/31744934.html">bombing of the Mariupol paediatric hospital</a>, it has not hesitated to put forward three contradictory takes: firstly, accusing the Ukrainians, secondly, claiming the images were fake, and finally, recognising that Russian forces had destroyed it, but did so because the hospital served as a shelter for a nationalist battalion.</p>
<p>The regime’s propagandists abroad worked to amplify Putin’s claim that in Ukraine, Russia would primarily be dealing with “neo-Nazis”, endlessly hammering in the example of the <a href="https://desk-russie.eu/2022/04/08/le-regime-azov.html">Azov battalion</a>. They had done the same thing for Syria when they mirrored the Kremlin’s assertions that jihadists hid in schools and hospitals. By using terms such as “Nazis” or “terrorists”, they are in fact designating civilians, as though they were people who do not have the right to life.</p>
<h2>The West’s ongoing inertia</h2>
<p>The comparison doesn’t stop there. The Ukrainian conflict most tragically recalls the Syrian one in the West’s failure to take action that could radically change the situation. In other words, save Ukraine and ensure that Russia loses – completely.</p>
<p>Granted, the West is supplying Ukraine with <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/enjeux-internationaux/loccident-multiplie-les-livraisons-darmes-a-lukraine-1394442">defensive and now even offensive arms</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/">heavy sanctions</a> have been adopted against the Russian regime. A broader awareness of its reality has emerged: after some hesitation, war crimes have now finally been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/28/1095277848/ukraine-russia-war-crimes?t=1651477777840">named as such</a>. Europeans have also <a href="https://www.vox.com/22983230/europe-ukraine-refugees-charts-map">welcomed Ukrainian refugees</a>.</p>
<p>But this progress makes our shortcomings even more damning. No one can be sure today the fate of Ukraine in a few months or years will not warrant new points of comparison with Syria: just as Assad continues to rule over Syria and launch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2021/12/08/syrie/russie-12-civils-tues-pres-didlib-par-des-tirs-dartillerie">murderous attacks on the Idlib region</a>, parts of Ukraine could well remain at war and occupied.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460328/original/file-20220428-25-9sthzy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Borodyanka, North West of Kyiv on 10 April 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Military aid, sparingly granted at the beginning, has recently made significant progress. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-and-secretary-austins-travel-to-ukraine/">visit to Kyiv on 24 April</a> has paved the way for a dramatic increase in Washington’s military aid to Ukraine. Recognising Russia’s invasion as a “turning point” that threatened the entire post-World War II order, even Germany broke its <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/">longstanding practice</a> of not transferring lethal weapons it controlled to a conflict zone.</p>
<p>While this certainly allows Kyiv to better retaliate against Putin’s army, the pace is still not sustained enough. Indeed, the weapons provided to Ukraine may not be sufficient for them to expel Russian troops in the weeks and months to come. They are both not numerous enough and sometimes not the most efficient ones. For example, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-will-deliver-anti-aircraft-tanks-to-ukraine/a-61595798">anti-aircraft Gepard tanks</a> supplied by Germany were developed in the 1960s and are another sign of the poor state of the Bundeswehr.</p>
<p>While sanctions are increasing, they’re still insufficient, and it is difficult to comprehend why the West failed to unleash them in their full force from the onset. This would mean: an absolute embargo on Russian gas and oil, in conformity with <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220401IPR26524/meps-demand-full-embargo-on-russian-imports-of-oil-coal-nuclear-fuel-and-gas">MEPs’ wish</a>; the disconnection of all Russian banks, <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/eu-should-sanction-sberbank-and-other-russian-banks-it-ponders">notably Sberbank and Alpha Bank</a>, from the Swift interbank payment system, along with an asset freeze and travel ban on a greater number of Russian personalities close to power – the figure of <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/16253-navalny-s-foundation-lists-putin-s-6-000-bribe-takers-and-warmongers">6,000 has been often mentioned</a>. These measures should have been taken long before the war, and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline should have been abandoned.</p>
<p>While the war crimes have indeed been named, some still shy away from designating their main perpetrator as a war criminal. We know the fallacious reason: such a public assignment would represent a “provocation” that would make him less inclined to compromise. As if, given the immensity of his crimes, this should change anything about his future behaviour.</p>
<p>As for the remarkable solidarity observed in Europe toward Ukrainian refugees, no one knows if it will be sustained in the long run. Such gestures may also provide an excuse for leaders to evade the more pressing task of taking a military stance in the war. For Syrians, the story is here again all too familiar: a good number of politicians had opted to concentrate their resources on tackling the “humanitarian crisis” as a convenient way to make up for their inertia in the face of Assad.</p>
<p>We cannot allow this scenario to reproduce itself in Ukraine: if we are to push the aggressor outside of the country, the only solution is to considerably increase military aid to Kyiv. Focusing on humanitarian aspects, however necessary, will not solve the humanitarian issue or the Russian war on Ukraine – as evinced in Syria by the ongoing <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-8000-idps-rukban-camp-need-urgent-humanitarian-intervention-enar">misery of refugee camps</a>, forced exile of 6 million Syrians and massacres.</p>
<h2>The persistent hold of the Kremlin rhetoric</h2>
<p>The same rhetorical devices that are so sweet to the Kremlin’s ear and were already heard in the case of Syria can also be found in the Ukrainian conflict.</p>
<p>First up is the talk of so-called “red lines”. After Barack Obama’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20180414-syria-chemical-weapons-red-line-obama-macron-assad-russia-usa-france-idlib">disastrous U-turn</a> in the 2013 chemical attack in Ghouta, no White House occupant in their right mind ought to resort to it again. However, Joe Biden’s warnings Russia’s use of chemical and biological weapons would trigger a “proportional” US response appear to match his predecessor’s words.</p>
<p>Such talk is legally and strategically untenable.</p>
<p>On the legal front, chemical and biological weapons are certainly prohibited by international conventions, but so are cluster munitions, which are particularly destructive to civilian populations, and which, <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2022/03/11/these-are-the-cluster-munitions-documented-by-ukrainian-civilians/">according to several investigations</a>, appear to have been used by Russia in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Strategically, prioritising a response to the use of chemical or biological weapons implicitly amounts to minimising crimes committed in a “conventional” fashion against populations. It is also a way of shirking one’s responsibilities in the event war crimes are perpetrated through other methods; if there is to be a red line, it should lie within war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is what happened in Syria where war as well as the related collapse of health infrastructure may have caused <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/revolte-en-syrie/syrie-on-va-vers-une-famine-salarme-le-medecin-raphael-pitti_4638683.html">more than a million deaths</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/EDJVeO_Mw0g?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Drone footage shows scale of devastation in Mariupol (<em>Guardian</em>, 24 mars 2022).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moreover, we continue to be told that “the solution to the crisis can only be political” – albeit in a less explicit fashion than before. Besides the fact that this is not a crisis, but a war, we know where this language led to in Syria. There was no political solution because there simply could not be one so long as Assad remained in power. The leaders locked themselves into unworkable UN resolutions and the fiction of a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_un-mediator-deplores-slow-pace-syrian-constitutional-talks/6201091.html">constitutional committee</a> that predictably achieved nothing. This has only strengthened Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies. To think that it could be in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine is a similar denial of responsibility.</p>
<p>Finally, the illusion of a way out through negotiations continues to be promoted in some circles. Some will say that President Zelensky is open to negotiations; this is the case, but with two conditions <em>sine qua non</em>:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Any solution will have to be accompanied by an international security guarantee in return for Ukraine’s neutrality – which, if we recall, was Ukraine’s status in 2014 under the Budapest Memorandum violated by Russia. This guarantee should be equivalent to that provided by <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the North Atlantic Treaty, if not go beyond it. As Ukraine’s lead negotiator recently said, this would mean it would automatically apply, which is not the case with Article 5.</p></li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://www.lopinion.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-zelensky-defend-lintegrite-territoriale-de-son-pays-en-amont-de-pourparlers-avec-la-russie">territorial integrity of Ukraine is non-negotiable</a>, which means that there can be no question of a lasting Russian occupation of Donbass and Crimea.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These demands run counter to Putin’s plans, who wants Kyiv to recognise his hold on Donbass and Crimea – and probably on the whole area linking these two territories. His project is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-invasion-of-ukraine-attacks-its-distinct-history-and-reveals-his-imperial-instincts-177669">destruction of Ukraine as a free nation</a>.</p>
<h2>Have we learned the Syrian lesson?</h2>
<p>If some Western governments were to try to push Kyiv into accepting concessions on these points, they would be calling into question the sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the foundations of international law. The Syrian example had already taught us negotiations only help to <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-negocier-avec-la-russie-de-poutine-54748">strengthen the Russian regime’s stances and army</a>.</p>
<p>We must now apply the Syrian lesson to Ukraine. Any retreat, accommodation, appeasement with Putin’s regime will result in greater crimes on the ground. If the West delays in decisively helping Ukraine to regain its territory by providing it with all the necessary armaments to do so, the result will be an even greater number of deaths.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas Tenzer is president of the Centre d'étude et de réflexion pour l'Action politique (CERAP), an association independent of parties and interest groups, director of the journal Desk Russia and non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).</span></em></p>When it comes to war crimes in Ukraine, the Kremlin is intimately following the Syrian playbook. To prevent further atrocities, leaders must now draw the lessons from the conflict in Western Asia.Nicolas Tenzer, Chargé d'enseignement International Public Affairs, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810062022-04-14T17:26:27Z2022-04-14T17:26:27ZManifesto published in Russian media reflects Putin regime’s ruthless plans in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457782/original/file-20220412-37987-sro9jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=396%2C172%2C4233%2C3656&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A forensic worker exhumes several bodies from a grave in Bucha, Ukraine, on April 12, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-forensic-worker-exhumes-the-body-from-a-grave-of-mother-news-photo/1239937614?adppopup=true">Anastasia Vlasova/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Shortly after footage emerged of the carnage Russian troops left behind in the town of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/russia-war-crimes-on-the-ground-bucha-ukraine/">Bucha, Ukraine</a>, an article was published April 4, 2022, in one of the largest Russian state-run media companies.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605">article</a> called for even more bloodshed in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Written by journalist and Kremlin-aligned political operative <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/09/russia-putin-propaganda-ukraine-war-crimes-atrocities/">Timofey Sergeytsev</a> and published in <a href="https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html">RIA-Novosti</a>, the article <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/russia-s-chilling-manifesto-for-genocide-in-ukraine-1.10723250?%20%22%22">answers the question</a> posed by its headline: “What should Russia do with Ukraine?” </p>
<p>The answer, Sergeytsev writes, is total annihilation. He writes that “all who have associated themselves with Nazism should be liquidated and banned.”</p>
<p>Sergeytsev urges Russian soldiers to be merciless and force Ukraine to its knees and calls for more of the same inhumane tactics that took place in Bucha and the towns of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61077641">Mariupul</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/24/europe/ukraine-russian-warship-berdyansk-intl/index.html">Berdyansk</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.polisci.txstate.edu/people/faculty.html">an academic focusing </a> on Russian government, politics and society, I believe the article demonstrates what is foremost on the mind of President Vladimir Putin’s regime. </p>
<h2>The silencing of independent Russian media</h2>
<p>Sergeytsev’s piece merits close attention because <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180320003807/http:/ejc.net/media_landscapes/russia#link_312">RIA-Novosti</a> is one of the three largest news agencies in Russia and has a mass circulation. It functions as a loyal mouthpiece of the Russian government and has an inordinate impact on what Russians see and hear about the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>This is the result of the Russian government’s ever tightening control over independent media since 2000, when Putin became president. In his first year in power, Putin shut down companies of media businessman <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-06/14/060r-061400-idx.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_11">Vladimir Gusinsky</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, Putin has used what is known as the Roskomnadzor, <a href="http://government.ru/en/department/58/">the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information technology and Mass Media</a>, a federal agency that monitors and censors Russian mass media and decides which need to be shut down. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A white man dressed in a winter coat is seen looking into the distance" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457965/original/file-20220413-14-edig3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia President Vladimir Putin visits the Vostochny cosmodrome in Belarus on April 12, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russias-president-vladimir-putin-visits-the-vostochny-news-photo/1239931253?adppopup=true">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2022 alone, Putin closed the last remaining independent sources of information in Russia: liberal radio station <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ekho-moskvy-closed/31733880.html">Ekho Moskvy</a>, online television channel <a href="https://deadline.com/2022/03/tv-rain-russia-tv-channel-protest-1234970555/">TV Rain</a>, bilingual news site <a href="https://meduza.io/en">Meduza</a> and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/07/novaya-gazeta-launches-european-edition-in-bid-to-dodge-kremlin-censorship-a77261">Novaya Gazeta</a>, whose editor, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1103262">Dmitry Muratov</a>, was awarded the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/muratov/facts/">Nobel Peace Prize</a> in 2021. </p>
<p>The Russian government not only has total control over all media, but it dictates what can be seen and heard. The war in Ukraine, for instance, can only be referred to as “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-do-so-many-russians-say-they-support-the-war-in-ukraine">a special military operation</a>.” Anyone who calls it a “war” is subject to a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">prison term of 15 years</a>.</p>
<p>Given where it appeared, Sergeytsev’s article must have been published with the knowledge and approval of the Russian government. </p>
<h2>Who is Sergeytsev?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/russia-s-chilling-manifesto-for-genocide-in-ukraine-1.10723250?">Sergeytsev</a> is an experienced Russian political operative who worked on behalf of the Russian government to prop up pro-Russian Ukrainian president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leonid-Kuchma">Leonid Kuchma</a> in 1991. He also supported Ukrainian President <a href="https://fortune.com/2022/03/02/viktor-yanukovych-yanukovich-putin-put-back-in-power-ukraine-russia/">Viktor Yanukovych</a>, whose questionable election victory, promoted by Putin, resulted in <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/">Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004</a>. </p>
<p>Sergeytsev is also a member of the Russian far right <a href="http://zinovievclub.com/authors/timofey_sergeitsev/">Zinoviev Club</a>, named after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/may/19/guardianobituaries.russia">Alexander Zinoviev</a>. Zinoviev was a champion of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Stalin">Josef Stalin</a> as a model leader, the murderous dictator who ruled the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953.</p>
<p>Given this pedigree, it’s not surprising that it was Sergeytsev who wrote the answer to the question about what Russia should do about Ukraine. </p>
<h2>A fight against Nazis?</h2>
<p>In the invented world he describes in his article, Sergeytsev accuses both Ukraine’s former President Petro Poroshenko and current President, Volodymyr Zelensky, of using “total terror” against the Russian “anti-fascists in Odesa, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol and other Russia cities.” </p>
<p>As for <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer">the Donbass regions</a> of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/what-are-donetsk-and-luhansk-ukraines-separatist-statelets">Donetsk and Lukhansk</a> in Ukraine’s east, where pro-Russian separatists have fought Ukraine over the past eight years, Sergeytsev says they have been bravely rebelling “against Ukrainian Nazism.” </p>
<p>Sergeytsev calls for the destruction of all “Nazis that have taken up arms” and that they “should be destroyed to the maximum on the battlefield.”</p>
<p>He includes the Ukrainian armed forces, the national battalions, the territorial defense forces and “a significant part of the masses, which are passive Nazis” and “are also guilty.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly man and woman are seen walking through rubble near a destroyed house." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457784/original/file-20220412-11-ang7ww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this April 11, 2022 photograph, Grigori Zamogilni (R) and Anna Zamogilnaya (L), have been married for 58 years and continue to live in Bucha, Ukraine in time of heavy Russian attacks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/year-married-couple-grigori-zamogilni-and-anna-zamogilnaya-news-photo/1239932399?adppopup=true">Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All “are equally involved in extreme cruelty against the civilian population, equally guilty of the genocide of the Russian people, and do not comply with laws and customs of war,” Sergeytsev writes. </p>
<p>In this piece of bald disinformation, Sergeytsev further writes that the majority of Ukrainians have been drawn to the Nazi politics of their government and “this fact is the basis of the policy of denazification.” </p>
<p>The idea of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-61057245">Zelensky</a>, the only Jewish president outside of Israel, subscribing to <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/victims-of-the-nazi-era-nazi-racial-ideology">Nazi ideology </a>along with his government has nothing to do with reality.</p>
<h2>Russian propaganda</h2>
<p>Sergeytsev’s choice of words, such as “de-Ukrainization” and “denazification,” are terms calling for the destruction of Ukraine. In his April 4 article of 1,700 words, Sergeytsev uses the word Nazi 69 times.</p>
<p>In order to achieve the ultimate goal of “de-Ukrainization,” Sergeytsev calls for a rejection of Ukrainian ethnicity and the peoples’ right to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/self-determination">self-determination</a>. </p>
<p>Echoing Putin, Sergeytsev writes that Ukraine has never been a nation state, adding that its attempts at becoming independent have led to “Nazism.”</p>
<p>Sergeytsev calls on all of Ukraine’s elite to be “liquidated” and “the social swamp which actively and passively supports it should undergo the hardship of war and digest the experience as a historical lesson and atonement.”</p>
<p>The constant use of the word “Nazi” triggers a visceral reaction among the Russian population. During World War II, the Soviet Union suffered horrible atrocities at the hands of the Nazis. In one example, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/siege-of-leningrad-begins">the Nazi blockade of Leningrad</a> lasted from September 1941 until January 1944, a total of 900 days. An estimated over 1 million people died from systematic starvation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A soldier walks through the rubble inside a nearly destroyed building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/457968/original/file-20220413-3788-loipqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Russian soldier steps over the rubble inside the Mariupol drama theater on April 12, 2022, in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-soldier-patrols-at-the-mariupol-drama-theatre-news-photo/1239934838?adppopup=true">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Using the word “Nazi” is bearing fruit for the Kremlin. </p>
<p>The independent polling center Levada showed in late March polls, one month into the invasion, that 83% of <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2022/03/30/odobrenie-institutov-rejtingi-partij-i-politikov/">Russians approved</a> of Putin.</p>
<p>But despite Russian media efforts to falsely portray Ukrainians as Nazis, there have been reports of Russian soldiers captured by Ukrainian military confused by the purpose of the war, saying <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/we-didnt-see-any-nazis-russian-pows-speak-on-fighting-a-war-they-claim-to-oppose/">they couldn’t find</a> any Nazis or fascists. </p>
<h2>Old and new boundaries</h2>
<p>In addition to calling for the need for “de-Ukrainization,” Sergeytsev writes that Ukraine “must be returned to its natural boundaries.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-catherine-great-invaded-crimea-and-put-rest-world-edge-180949969/">These boundaries</a> were the ones formed between 1765 and 1783 after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Catherine-the-Great">Russia’s Empress Catherine the Great </a>defeated the Turks, annexed Crimea and incorporated the entire southern part of today’s Ukraine known as Novorossiya into the Russian empire. </p>
<p>Sergeytsev says that the five regions in western Ukraine, which he refers to as the “residual Ukraine in a neutral state,” are not likely to become part of the pro-Russian territories and will remain hostile to Russia. “The haters of Russia will go there,” he writes. </p>
<p>For Sergeytsev, compromising with the United States, NATO and other Western nations is not an option. </p>
<p>The reason, Sergeytsev concludes, is because the “collective West itself is the designer, source and sponsor of Ukrainian Nazism.”</p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s Politics + Society editors pick need-to-know stories.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-need-to-know">Sign up for Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susanne Sternthal is affiliated with the Democratic Party.</span></em></p>A Russian journalist and political operative reveals that Russian leadership is planning for the complete destruction of UkraineSusanne Sternthal, Lecturer in Post-Soviet Government and Politics, Texas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799982022-04-13T16:50:23Z2022-04-13T16:50:23Z#PolandFirstToHelp: How Poland is using humanitarianism to boost its propaganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456976/original/file-20220407-22-okywe2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5492%2C3661&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian refugees board transport at the central train station in Warsaw, Poland on April 7, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of the news coverage about the Russian-Ukrainian war propaganda has been about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/mar/15/russia-disinformation-social-media-ukraine">Russian disinformation</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/28/russia-ukraine-propaganda-misinformation-media-zelensky/">Volodymyr Zelensky’s effective war time messaging</a>. </p>
<p>After Zelensky’s viral appearance at the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/zelensky-grammys-speech-worked-b2050673.html">Grammys</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1512905475943186439?s=20&t=dhUqspP1RnzsSQ5UqAHzzQ">Boris Johnson’s recent visit to Kyiv</a>, Ukraine appears to be <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/01/ukraine-is-winning-the-information-war-against-russia.html">winning the information war</a>. But media coverage has focused much less on how other countries’ propaganda machines are working to push certain narratives.</p>
<p>The Polish media has portrayed the country’s reception of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472">2.5 million refugees from Ukraine</a> positively. This pro-messaging fails to acknowledge Poland’s history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/polish-generosity-risks-hardening-anti-immigrant-sentiments-towards-ukrainian-refugees-in-the-long-term-179161">anti-immigrant</a> and <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/dominik-tarczynski-law-and-justice-party-its-not-about-refugees-its-about-illegal-immigrants">anti-refugee</a> policies, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/02/people-of-colour-fleeing-ukraine-attacked-by-polish-nationalists">violence and racism</a> faced by refugees of colour <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/polish-belarus-border-police-teargas-please">at the Belarusian border</a> and the cries for help from <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/03/11/we-cant-take-any-more-refugees-polish-cities-call-on-government-to-seek-eu-and-un-help/">cities overwhelmed by refugees</a>. </p>
<p>While many governments <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2038128">use humanitarianism</a> to shore up national identity and attract external resources — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/hungary-accused-of-inflating-number-of-ukrainian-arrivals-to-seek-eu-funds">like how Hungary</a> inflated their refugee numbers to seek funds from the European Union — the Polish government’s <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23PolandFirstToHelp&src=typed_query">#PolandFirstToHelp</a> campaign is both visible and effective. </p>
<p>In accepting the largest number of refugees from Ukraine with an open-door policy, Poland is no doubt helping many victims of forced displacement. But the country’s double standards and propaganda campaigns are holding it back from making real political and social changes. </p>
<h2>Card stacking propaganda</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda">Propaganda is</a> “the spreading of ideas, information or rumour for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause or a person.” </p>
<p>Scholars like Clyde Miller are careful to point out there is a difference between <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00377996.2021.1921680">“good” and “bad” propaganda</a>. Similarly, political scientist <a href="https://politicalscience.jhu.edu/directory/renee-marlin-bennett/">Renee Marlin-Bennett</a> notes that “propaganda is not necessarily disinformation, it’s <a href="https://twitter.com/suyvonne/status/1509706686348632071?s=20&t=9JHKxWdqDz6b9-JEUWpP2g">biased information</a>.” </p>
<p>Poland’s social media campaign #PolandFirstToHelp is a clear example of card-stacking propaganda, which focuses only on only good news, while problems are left out or lied about. The social media campaign highlights the positive ways Poland has been helping Ukrainian refugees, while burying the negative stories.</p>
<p>The campaign was a response to reports that <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-good-bad-and-ideal-refugees-176926">refugees of colour were experiencing racism</a> at the Ukrainian-Polish border. Instead of taking accountability for the discrimination faced by racialized refugees, the Polish government <a href="https://twitter.com/PolandMFA/status/1499300030393499649?s=20&t=Dphk8S2no8BJpdIN789nxQ">condemned any accusations of racism as “fake news.”</a></p>
<p>Images like <a href="https://twitter.com/stiwari1510/status/1500601775652487170?s=20&t=JQPM29TgR1ZSXK68nW5dag">a photo of empty strollers left for refugees</a> at a train is an example of the kind of content posted under the #PolandFirstToHelp hashtag. This overly positive portrayal of Polish generosity hides the fact that not all refugees are getting a warm welcome. </p>
<p>A Twitter video posted on March 3, 2022, shows refugees of colour being heckled as they get off a bus from Ukraine:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1499481018625052679"}"></div></p>
<p>Polish locals can be heard saying (translated from Polish):</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>“Where are the f–king women with kids?”</p></li>
<li><p>“Where are the women and kids from Ukraine?”</p></li>
<li><p>“What happened to you? Why are you all wearing blackface?”</p></li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<h2>Flag-waving propaganda</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/mcr/article/view/17665/22310">Flag-waving is another type of propoganda</a> that justifies actions by using nationalism or patriotism. </p>
<p>The combination of the two countries’ flags is being shared with the hashtag #PolandFirstToHelp. There’s an image of <a href="https://twitter.com/DashaGurovaa/status/1510286027461562371?s=20&t=mkSS_9KsTH2w_WTKUY-INg">two women embracing with each wearing their country’s flag</a> and another one of the <a href="https://twitter.com/usuk1337/status/1509103869590224897?s=20&t=fVUsboET8eegCUsmr-fEYA">merging of the two countries’ crests</a>. Poland’s postal service even issued a new stamp with hands shaking that are painted in the two countries’ colours. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1508807086926356485"}"></div></p>
<p>Poland is attaching itself and its flag to the Ukrainian flag <a href="https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1346&context=stu_hon_theses">to illustrate unity</a>. However, these images hide a difficult history between the two countries. </p>
<p>The deputy director of the Centre for Eastern Studies, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-paradoxes-polish-ukrainian-relations">Wojciech Konończuk</a>, wrote about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/lens/poland-ukraine-volhynia-massacre.html">Volhynia Massacre</a> that resulted in the killing of up to 100,000 Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943–44: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“On the last National Day of Remembrance, Prime Minister Morawiecki stated, ‘We will never forget the martyrdom of many tens of thousands of Poles … and <a href="https://tvpworld.com/54789495/we-will-never-allow-the-volhynia-massacre-to-be-erased-from-memory-pm">we will never allow this terrible and important part of history to be erased or falsified</a>.’” </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Plain folks propaganda</h2>
<p>Another type of propaganda is known as plain folks. It is employed when regular people are used to sell a product or idea. In this popular video made by <a href="https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1509884611643547655?s=20&t=mkSS_9KsTH2w_WTKUY-INg">Visegrád24</a> — a media group that curates “news, politics, current affairs, history and culture from the Visegrád countries” (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) — an emotional Ukrainian soldier thanks Poland for taking in his family. The video is filled with images of women and children refugees, Polish and Ukrainian flags and emotional music. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1509884611643547655"}"></div></p>
<p>Left out of this narrative is the fact that <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diminishing-solidarity-polish-attitudes-toward-european-migration-and-refugee-crisis">Visegrád lobbied</a> against the EU’s proposal to relocate Syrian asylum seekers across the region in 2015. This lobbying led to one of Poland’s members of parliament, Dominik Tarczynski, to say “<a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/dominik-tarczynski-law-and-justice-party-its-not-about-refugees-its-about-illegal-immigrants">we will not receive even one Muslim because this is what we promised</a>.” </p>
<p>This lobbying contradicts the image of wide refugee acceptance that is being promoted by Poland and groups like <a href="https://twitter.com/visegrad24?s=20&t=QgCaiNX6L41nYFMmixRZzQ">Visegrád24</a>. </p>
<h2>A chance to engage in tough conversations</h2>
<p>Refugees fleeing war and conflict deserves safe passage and the right to be treated with dignity and respect. Refugees crossing the Polish border should not <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/02/people-of-colour-fleeing-ukraine-attacked-by-polish-nationalists">fear being attacked because they are not white</a>.</p>
<p>PolandFirstToHelp rallied the nation around a common cause after a decade of political polarization. However, this moment of unity rests of an unstable foundation. There is a real opportunity for Poland to emerge from this refugee crisis as a more united, accepting and economically strong society.</p>
<p>But in order to do, that the country needs to engage in tough conversations about successful refugee integration that addressees <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/polands-government-stays-silent-as-xenophobia-worsens/a-39941042">long standing issues of xenophobia</a>. Brushing the mistreatment of racialized refugees under the rug does not address the racism at root of the discrimination and ensure future refugees will not have to live through the same treatment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne Su does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Poland has an opportunity to emerge from this refugee crisis a more united, more accepting and economically strong society, but first they need to have tough conversations about immigration.Yvonne Su, Assistant Professor in the Department of Equity Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1801092022-04-10T13:09:41Z2022-04-10T13:09:41ZRussian embassy in Canada weaponizes social media to fuel support for Ukraine invasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456435/original/file-20220405-26-w8x1it.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7431%2C4360&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pro-Ukrainian supporter waves the country's flag outside the Russian embassy on Feb. 24, 2022 in Ottawa, the day Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In order to curb the spread of disinformation by official Russian news sources, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) recently made a symbolic move by banning Russia’s state-run <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-formally-removes-russias-rt-canadian-tvs-2022-03-16/">RT news channel in Canada</a>. </p>
<p>Yet this is an ineffective measure given the way social media channels controlled by the <a href="https://canada.mid.ru/en/">Russian Embassy in Ottawa</a> are spreading disinformation, and how fact-checking is being weaponized by the Russian government to twist reality and confuse people about the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>As a researcher who studies disinformation, I first investigated the way Arabic tweets with hashtags like #WeStandWithRussia and #RussiaHasAJustCause have been used since the beginning of this year. </p>
<h2>New accounts</h2>
<p>In my ongoing research, I’ve collected 26,440 tweets posted by 10,544 unique users who supported Russia. Over 27 per cent of the tweets were posted from accounts created in 2022, including 4,052 tweets in just one day on Feb. 15, 2022, and 5,457 tweets in the month of February alone. The highest number of tweets were posted in January and February 2022 by accounts created in these two months. </p>
<p>When I further examined the most-mentioned Twitter accounts that these users retweeted, I found they were the accounts of the Russian Embassy in Egypt (<a href="https://twitter.com/Rusembegypt">@Rusembegypt</a>) followed by the Arabic-language Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<a href="https://twitter.com/Russia_AR">@Russia_AR</a>). The majority of the other accounts frequently retweeted are related to other Russian embassies in the region. </p>
<p>These findings made me turn my attention to Canada.</p>
<p>The Russian Embassy in Ottawa runs its own Twitter account — @RussianEmbassyC — as well <a href="https://www.engadget.com/telegram-explained-2022-163035068.html">as a Telegram account</a> and <a href="https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/10-incredible-vk-facts-you-should-know-aka-russias-facebook/">VK (Russia’s Facebook)</a> public channels. </p>
<p>Similar to the findings in the Middle East, I have found that the Russian Embassy in Canada is active in spreading disinformation and promoting the Russian perspective on the events taking place in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>‘Fake news’ accusations</h2>
<p>Instead of heavily relying on RT <a href="https://sputniknews.com/">or Sputnik</a>, Canada’s Russian Embassy mostly retweets messages from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Russian embassies from around the world. That includes tweets that attempt to discredit any factual reporting on the war.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1499701438821326852"}"></div></p>
<p>The Russian embassy also frequently posts official statements attacking Canadian politicians as well as Canadian media for what it views as their biased positions about the war in Ukraine. That included an attack on the Canadian government and the news media for allegedly spreading lies.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1506023994369384448"}"></div></p>
<p>The term fake news itself is weaponized to serve the interests of the Russian government, similar to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/13/trump-tweets-legacy-of-lies-misinformation-distrust.html">the way Donald Trump</a> frequently used the term <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439318795849">fake news</a> when he was president of the United States.</p>
<p>One of the most troubling features of this Russian disinformation campaign pertains to the weaponization of fact-checking practices. In a recent tweet, the embassy announced the launch of a new website called waronfakes.com, which attempts to lend credibility to official Russian propaganda.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1500223302941487107"}"></div></p>
<p>The website allegedly provides fact-checking services on the war in Ukraine and is offered in five languages (English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Chinese). Ironically, no Ukrainian or Russian-language content is offered, revealing what foreign audiences are being targeted by the Russian government. Nonetheless Russian content is offered on a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-how-a-fact-checking-website-is-spreading-russian-propaganda/a-61062940">Telegram channel</a>. </p>
<h2>Sudden flurry of new accounts</h2>
<p>To understand who’s retweeting the Russian Embassy’s messages, I collected 4,796 tweets from 2022 posted by 3,796 unique users. Similar to the case of the Middle East, the month of February 2022 had the highest number of Twitter accounts created that subsequently retweeted posts from the Russian Embassy. </p>
<p>While this might not prove any co-ordinated inauthentic activity, it does look suspicious. </p>
<p>The Russian Embassy in Canada mostly retweets messages sent by the Russian Foreign Ministry, like @mfa_russia and @mid_rf, and vice versa. The @mfa_russia account is the second-most active in terms of retweeting messages sent by the Russian Embassy. </p>
<p>Though the official and public efforts in Canada in terms of cracking down on Russian disinformation has been to ban the RT and Sputnik news channels, the reality is that Russian embassies are creating their own information echo chambers. </p>
<p>Social media also creates direct engagement with the Canadian public that cannot be blocked by CRTC. The embassy often sends direct messages like the one below via its Telegram channel: </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A screen grab shows a Telegram message thanking the Canadian public for being supportive of Russia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454900/original/file-20220329-21-1lytriy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian Embassy’s Telegram message thanking the Canadian public for showing support.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other times, the embassy urges the Canadian public to mistrust news coverage of the events in Ukraine.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1498816008756383744"}"></div></p>
<p>My analysis shows the CRTC’s decision to ban RT is ineffective because the news channel can be viewed on multiple platforms in Canada and elsewhere. </p>
<p>Russian disinformation has evolved to increasingly rely on various information sources, including the social media outlets of diplomatic missions around the world as well as fake fact-checking sites like waronfakes.com. </p>
<p>The disinformation war that Russia is fighting is being fought on different linguistic fronts — the English language is only one of them — and it’s mostly being waged on social media.</p>
<p><em>This is a corrected version of a story originally published on April 10, 2022. Figures have been updated in relation to the Arabic tweets and Russian embassy tweets.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180109/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmed Al-Rawi receives funding from the Digital Citizen Initiative- Department of Heritage </span></em></p>The Russian Embassy in Canada is active in spreading disinformation and promoting the Russian perspective on the events taking place in Ukraine.Ahmed Al-Rawi, Assistant Professor, News, Social Media, and Public Communication, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1799892022-04-07T15:24:23Z2022-04-07T15:24:23ZRussia’s feminists are protesting the war and its propaganda with stickers, posters, performance and graffiti<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456190/original/file-20220404-23-r6toau.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1278%2C850&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anastasia Parshkova holds a poster reading 'Thou shalt not kill,' outside Christ the Saviour Cathedral, in Moscow, on March 15, 2022. She was later arrested. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/russia-s-feminists-are-protesting-the-war-and-its-propaganda-with-stickers--posters--performance-and-graffiti" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>After Russia attacked <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-ukraine-nato-feb24-2022-1.6362531">Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022</a>, President Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/europe/russia-censorship-media-crackdown.html">imposed drastic laws</a> that impose prison <a href="https://toronto.citynews.ca/2022/03/04/russia-fake-news-law-blocks-facebook-twitter/">sentences of up to 15 years</a> for those who call out the war <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-war-crimes-3-essential-reads-on-atrocities-in-ukraine-and-the-likelihood-of-prosecuting-putin-180639">and Russia’s crimes</a>. In so doing, Russia has dismantled a varied and rich mediascape. </p>
<p>I have been researching independent and alternative art spaces in in Russia, Cuba and China with art history collaborators <a href="https://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/acm/yi-gu">Yi Gu and</a> <a href="https://arts.uottawa.ca/visualarts/people/alvarez-hernandez-analays">Analays Alvarez</a> since 2020.</p>
<p>After the war began, my work as a historian of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/14534402/Russias_Soviet_Shadow">Soviet art and the contemporary Russian art scene</a>, with emphasis on art and activism, became even more vital. A number of artists have turned to the underground art scene and what is known as <a href="http://eng.partizaning.org/?page_id=22"><em>partizaning</em>, that is, art infiltration</a> to protest the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Protests and media actions, such as flash mobs, have become impossible in Russia due to sweeping censure and police surveillance. In response, numerous women and gender non-conforming people have created a vast decentralized network that co-ordinates spontaneous direct actions, such as protests in residential neighbourhoods and sabotage, which aim to appeal to the Russian <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)18004-0">population of 144 million people</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://t.me/femagainstwar">Feminist Anti-War Resistance</a> is a self-organized, decentralized, Russian-speaking community <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2022/02/russian-feminist-antiwar-resistance-ukraine-putin">that manages anti-war resistance actions and communicates with its members and supporters</a> through <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-telegram">Telegram, the popular social media platform</a>. </p>
<p>This and other self-organized solidarity groups, led and co-ordinated by women on the same platform, are important infrastructure for Russians who stand against the war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Women, queer, trans activists</h2>
<p>Over the past few weeks, I have interviewed artists and activists in Russia. To my surprise, the overwhelming majority of them were women, queer or trans — many of whom were rarely visible as political activists in Russia due to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/12/no-support/russias-gay-propaganda-law-imperils-lgbt-youth#">homophobic laws</a> against them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A Ukrainian flag striped with blue and yellow is seen hanging in an apartment window." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455041/original/file-20220329-13-s4ub90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anonymous activist displayed the Ukrainian flag in a Moscow residential building window in early March 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Maria Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the first days of the war, Russian protests and individuals took to <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CbBP-G-MIk2">social media</a>, hoping that these platforms would mobilize large numbers of people to join the protests. </p>
<p>Protesters have created slogans and posters that tap into the power of language. They have publicized the brutal use of police force by filming violent arrests after one protester stood opposite several heavily armed men. They have created an inventive game that reinterprets recognizable signs to lead Russians to question the war and actions of the government under Putin.</p>
<p>This approach, known as <a href="http://www.artandpopularculture.com/D%C3%A9tournement"><em>détournement</em></a>, was developed in the 1950s as a way to mimic and ridicule propaganda. Activists in recent resistance movements, such as in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1470357218779118">Turkey in 2013</a>, have continued these practices.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A glass case community billboard stand is seen outdoors with a paper sigh with Russian writing glued onto it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454812/original/file-20220328-13-1iz3tr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-war poster that gives information about killed Russian and Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. Shared on Telegram on March 7, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Maria Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Public demonstrations</h2>
<p>In mid-March, for example, Anastasia Parshkova stood in front of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, holding a sign bearing one of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ten-Commandments">the Ten Commandments</a>: “Thou shalt not kill.” </p>
<p>The poster played with the ideas of conforming to Russian Orthodox religion and military ideology, and the image was shared extensively because of the word play. <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10615393/Russian-presenter-quits-pro-Kremlin-TV-channel-goes-hiding-posting-No-war-message.html">Parshkova was arrested</a> for her protest. A simple slogan like “No to war” wouldn’t have gained as much media attention, even though the result would likely have been the same: another protester detained. </p>
<p>As of April 6, <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/03/22/more-than-15000-russians-have-been-arrested-in-anti-war-protests">more than 15,400 people</a> have been <a href="https://ovd.news/news/2022/03/13/spiski-zaderzhannyh-v-svyazi-s-akciyami-protiv-voyny-s-ukrainoy-13-marta-2022-goda">arrested, fined or detained for participating in demonstrations</a> in cities across Russia.</p>
<h2>Everyday actions of resistance</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A skull with a bolt going through it is seen affixed to a grey surface under a triangular public safety sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455030/original/file-20220329-25-9ivk8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘No to War’ poster, shared through Feminist Anti-War Resistance, from an anonymous user based in Moscow, in March 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Maria Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unlike public protests, everyday acts of resistance aren’t meant to garner extensive media attention. Instead, these repetitive actions, led mostly by women, gender non-conforming folks or students, in public spaces, are designed to appeal directly to the public. </p>
<p>One activist, a cultural worker from the LGBTQ+ community in Moscow, who wished to remain anonymous, shared her story in an interview with me. </p>
<p>During the war’s first days, she was looking to form a group to distribute anti-war stickers in her neighbourhood, which is how she became part of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance. </p>
<p>The initiative is co-ordinated by activists. Some are public figures such as <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/29/the-feminist-face-of-russian-protests-a77106">Russian poet Daria Serenko</a>. Others do not live in Russia or have recently fled, according to the information I received from one of the co-ordinators, now based in Europe. The group now exceeds 26,000 users.</p>
<h2>Poster jamming, infiltrations and performances</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="An anti-war flyer resembling a missing persons form." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454815/original/file-20220328-17748-7owv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1072&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Missing person anti-war poster template created by anonymous activists of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance. Shared on Telegram, on March 18, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Maria Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>United by this collective support, ordinary people across the country are now sharing resources and offering help to design, print and distribute anti-war information. </p>
<p>Messages on stickers like “No to War” are popular, but others use art infiltration tactics, hanging posters that mimic the visual style of official municipal posters.</p>
<p>For example, some posters look like missing person posters, but contain information about Russian soldiers who have been killed or are missing, and ask everyone to stand against the war.</p>
<p>Activists are also writing anti-war messages on banknotes and ruble coins. They believe elderly people are the primary users of cash and are most affected by official propaganda and that this approach may desensitize them.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Rows of Russian bank notes (paper money) seen laid out on a table showing hand-written messages." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=677&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=677&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454814/original/file-20220328-17770-5colot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=677&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-War slogans are seen handwritten on banknotes in a photo shared by an anonymous user to Feminist Anti-War Resistance, on March 17, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Maria Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Expressing sorrow, grief and other emotions in public is another type of protest, according to those I have interviewed. When direct political speech is being severely suppressed, the expression of emotions can evoke empathy from frustrated and paralyzed members of Russian society. For example, crying on public transportation allows passengers to witness emotions that are largely suppressed and censured by openly militaristic propaganda. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Three women wearing black carrying white roses are seen standing together with faces blurred out for privacy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=798&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454816/original/file-20220328-15-1r2unkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women in Black initiative by anonymous protesters, on March 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Feminist Anti-War Resistance/Marina Silina)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/russian-resistance-ukraine-putin/">Performance is another form of protest</a>. Activists have organized “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Women-in-Black">women in black</a>” protests, appearing <a href="https://t.me/femagainstwar/768">in public spaces dressed as widows</a>. Some were arrested, anonymous activists reported.</p>
<p>Omnipresent police surveillance pushes society to invent new ways of direct political action. While some public figures, journalists and academics speak out against the war by using <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/our-voices-are-louder-if-we-stay-russian-anti-war-activists-refuse-to-flee">traditional media</a>, a large-scale resistance can also occur without relying on media attention. </p>
<p>Social networks are now being used by anonymous women and gender non-conforming individuals in Russia to co-ordinate resistance that is deeply rooted and witnessed by all kinds of people in cities across Russia in everyday life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179989/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Silina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writing graffiti on bank notes, postering cities and crying on public transit are some ways members of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance in Russia are speaking against propaganda.Maria Silina, Adjunct professor, Department of History of Art, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1806572022-04-06T20:00:04Z2022-04-06T20:00:04ZAs horrific evidence of massacres is uncovered in Ukraine, Russian propaganda gathers pace<p><em>Warning: this article contains distressing details.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The appalling crimes against humanity <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-claims-bucha-massacre-was-staged-by-ukraine/">allegedly committed by Russian soldiers</a> against Ukrainians are a sobering reminder that the most brutal behaviour can be cynically weaponised for political and strategic purposes.</p>
<p>Shortly after images of dead bodies littering the streets of Bucha on Kyiv’s outskirts – <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-bucha-killings-russia-/31785129.html">some with their hands bound</a> – went viral, the Russian propaganda machine kicked into overdrive with a predictable series of spurious “false flag” claims. </p>
<p>For example: the deaths couldn’t have been caused by Russians because its forces <a href="https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1511477641341194243?s=20&t=2VpYpFFtn-vnpyKgx33CnA">had already left</a>. Clearly, it was a <a href="https://twitter.com/francska1/status/1510993878018670595?s=20&t=2VpYpFFtn-vnpyKgx33CnA">British psychological operation</a>. Or it was Ukrainian fascists linked to the infamous Azov Battalion. Or maybe both. In any event, the whole thing was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/lavrov-bucha-fake-ukraine-russia-b2050463.html">staged</a>. </p>
<p>In doing so, they recalled the maxim, often loosely attributed to Josef Goebbels, that accusing others of acts for which you are responsible can be one of the most effective uses of propaganda.</p>
<p>Official Russian channels have quickly repeated the lines pushed by state media, starting with President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-ally-says-bucha-killings-are-fake-propaganda-2022-04-05/">Dmitry Peskov</a>, Russia’s <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1uucq2mcm">UN Ambassador</a>, and numerous Russian embassies worldwide, including in <a href="https://twitter.com/chrizap/status/1511202943022043136?s=20&t=2VpYpFFtn-vnpyKgx33CnA">Australia</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1511202943022043136"}"></div></p>
<p>Russia even attempted to convene the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-seeks-monday-un-security-council-meet-on-bucha-ukraine-/6513990.html">UN Security Council</a> to discuss atrocities – which its forces were clearly responsible for – that it alleged were committed by Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-west-owes-ukraine-much-more-than-just-arms-and-admiration-179383">The West owes Ukraine much more than just arms and admiration</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Revealing Russia’s lies</h2>
<p>A range of logical arguments reveal Russia’s claims, echoed by the Kremlin’s diminished online army of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/germanys-putin-caressers-start-coming-to-terms-with-their-naivety">Putinversteher</a>, to be ludicrous. </p>
<p>How is it that Western intelligence agencies are so capable as to organise massacres whenever Russian forces are in the vicinity? How can so-called “<a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/04/04/ukra-a04.html">Ukrainian fascists</a>” maintain such tight operational security that they prevent evidence of their culpability from leaking out? Where are all the storehouses of <a href="https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2022/apr/04/russian-ministry-defense/russia-pushes-false-crisis-actor-claims-about-vide/">crisis actors</a> able to deploy quickly to war zones and film fake videos?</p>
<p>But even more compelling is the clear empirical evidence that the Kremlin’s claims are a total sham: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/60981238">satellite images</a> showing bodies in Bucha lying in the streets for days, well before Russian troops withdrew.</p>
<p>As Ukrainian forces regain territory previously occupied by Russian troops, more tales of atrocities are emerging. Human Rights Watch has detailed reports of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas">summary executions</a> in numerous villages, echoing the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2016.1209460">zachistki</a> (“clean-up” or, more accurately, “cleansing”) operations conducted against Chechens from 1999-2005. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456493/original/file-20220406-26-wq10zv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Ukrainian town of Bucha has been utterly devastated by the Russian invasion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Maca Vojtech Darvik</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/ukrainian-officials-uncover-russian-torture-chambers-in-bucha/news-story/8decd95e0c1b3c49d16787b20a892b7f">Other reports</a> suggest Russian forces used a children’s hospital as a torture chamber. <a href="https://www.space.com/ukraine-mass-grave-bucha-satellite-photos">Mass graves</a> in Ukraine are visible from space. <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1510333131320090633?s=20&t=AYauuTsNsT9wOwpiTKjAPA">Ukrainian sources</a> claim the bodies of naked women, some partially burned, have been found dumped by roadsides. The bound corpses of the mayor of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraine-village-mayor-4-others-found-dead-with-hands-tied-behind-their-backs/">Motyzhyn</a> and her family were uncovered, partly buried, outside their village.</p>
<p>Then there is the mounting evidence of systematic humiliation and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/all-wars-are-like-this-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-ukraine">rape</a>. One incident, shared by Ukraine’s ambassador to Estonia, <a href="https://twitter.com/Mariana_Betsa/status/1510966912724963328?s=20&t=2VpYpFFtn-vnpyKgx33CnA">involved a three-year-old girl</a>. Others include tales of mothers repeatedly sexually assaulted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/russian-soldiers-raping-and-sexually-assaulting-women-says-ukraine-mp">in front of their own children</a>. Yet another report from <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/liberated-from-the-russians-a-visit-to-trostyanets-after-the-end-of-the-occupation-a-c088be53-5f6c-4059-8d46-68803276e473">Der Spiegel</a> claimed that Russian soldiers occupying the town of Trostyanets had defecated on the bodies of dead Ukrainians.</p>
<h2>Russian propaganda in the digital age</h2>
<p>The tactics by which official narratives seek to explain acts like these are not new, and have been tools of propaganda and psychological warfare for centuries. </p>
<p>But one of the truisms of the digital age is that online ecosystems give contemporary propagandists new opportunities to shape perceptions through size, scope and veracity. </p>
<p>First, the amount of information available to consumers makes it impossible to process it all. That encourages individuals to <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1710966114">self-select</a> into information belief systems, constructing their own “truths”. </p>
<p>Second, the ability to reach <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/misinformation-evidence-its-scope-how-we-encounter-it-and-our-perceptions-it">new audiences</a> allows malign ideas to be seeded in groups that typically would not seek out such information. </p>
<p>Third, as COVID conspiracies and the Deep State movement have shown, the internet is a great <a href="https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-more-likely-to-use-non-specific-authority-references-twitter-analysis-of-two-covid-19-myths/">leveller</a> in terms of authoritative and false information.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guns-tanks-and-twitter-how-russia-and-ukraine-are-using-social-media-as-the-war-drags-on-180131">Guns, tanks and Twitter: how Russia and Ukraine are using social media as the war drags on</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Russian disinformation is adept at using these enablers. Its <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html">messaging</a> follows the golden rules of effective propaganda: it is simplistic, didactic, and gives its target audiences someone else to blame. This means its interpretation of atrocities has both international and domestic effects. </p>
<p>Internally, the claim Ukrainian fascists and the West were behind alleged war crimes to justify sanctions and provide Kyiv with aid reinforces the Kremlin narrative that the war is really an “existential crisis” for Russia, in which <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-02-23/ukraine-russia-putin-invasion-sanctions-biden">its very survival</a> is at stake.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456499/original/file-20220406-16-zph6pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian propaganda reframes its invasion of Ukraine as a necessary action to ensure its very survival.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Mikhail Klimentyev</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Internationally, it seeks to tap into the pathologies of Western publics that have grown cynical and mistrustful of their own governments, raising doubt and <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2714.html">deepening the fragmentation</a> of societies. </p>
<p>And even if Russia’s own public doesn’t believe the Kremlin line, the likely result is not anger and resistance, but <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/22/putin-disinformation-apathy-00018974">apathy</a> – a sense that all governments are lying to them.</p>
<p>This is deeply worrying, because it raises the spectre that the events in Ukraine will be disbelieved or ignored by one of the few constituencies that might be able to alter their course. Having been conditioned by Putin’s deliberate promotion of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/21/world/europe/russia-military-putin-kremlin.html">militaristic culture</a> celebrating violence as honourable, many in Russia have met news of the conduct of their forces with a shrug at best, or vehement approval at worst.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-on-a-personal-mission-to-rewrite-cold-war-history-making-the-risks-in-ukraine-far-graver-177730">Putin is on a personal mission to rewrite Cold War history, making the risks in Ukraine far graver</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Seeking justice: the weakness of international humanitarian law</h2>
<p>If everyday Russians are unlikely to react by pressing for change, what about international humanitarian law as a way of seeking justice? </p>
<p>That many of the acts attributed to Russian forces constitute war crimes is beyond doubt. They are in clear violation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-the-rules-of-war-tell-us-about-the-deliberate-targeting-of-civilians-178691">Geneva Conventions</a>, particularly those dealing with isolated or local massacres, as well as the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470">1977 Additional Protocol</a> on avoiding targeting civilians. </p>
<p>The barbarity in Ukraine also meets the criteria for other instruments in the human rights toolkit, such as the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/">Responsibility to Protect</a>.</p>
<p>It is even likely the acts committed in Ukraine fit into the broader category of genocide, which according to the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%2520on%2520the%2520Prevention%2520and%2520Punishment%2520of%2520the%2520Crime%2520of%2520Genocide.pdf">1948 UN Convention</a> is defined as “acts committed in whole or in part” to destroy national, religious or ethnic groups. </p>
<p>They go beyond attempts to colonise a people, as Putin initially envisaged when depicting Ukrainian statehood as illegitimate. Instead, this has become a systemic campaign aimed at removing the very idea of Ukraine. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/05/russia-is-committing-genocide-in-ukraine/">Eugene Finkel</a> has pointed out in the Washington Post, there is clear intent, as detailed in Russia’s state-controlled media, that Ukraine’s “name likely cannot be retained”; that its elite needs to be “liquidated”; that a “substantial part of the populace” is also guilty of rampant nationalism; and that Ukraine requires “re-education and ideological repressions lasting at least a generation”.</p>
<p>But we are unlikely to see the perpetrators of these acts arraigned in the dock at an international war crimes tribunal. </p>
<p>For one thing, neither Russia nor Ukraine is party to the <a href="https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%2520parties/pages/the%2520states%2520parties%2520to%2520the%2520rome%2520statute.aspx">Rome Statute</a>, the founding document of the International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>Other alternatives, such as a special tribunal, would be unlikely to see alleged war criminals delivered into custody unless captured by Ukrainian forces. And while branding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/apr/04/joe-biden-vladimir-putin-face-war-crimes-trial-ukraine">Putin</a> and other members of the Russian elite as war criminals is useful for signalling and rhetorical purposes, the only way they are likely to face justice is through the total upending of the Russian political system, and a commitment by any new government to hand them over.</p>
<p>With the first of these highly unlikely, and the second by no means guaranteed, there can be little optimism the perpetrators will face justice any time soon, if ever. </p>
<p>It also puts pressure on both Kyiv and Moscow to end the conflict militarily on their terms, so they can shape the future of what is revealed about its events. </p>
<p>Under those circumstances, the only option for those committed to human dignity is to give Ukraine every tool it requires to protect its people from the horrors that continue to be visited upon them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the International Studies Association, the Carnegie Foundation, and various Australian government agencies.</span></em></p>As terrible images from Bucha and other Ukrainian towns are shown around the world, Russian authorities continue to frame their invasion as a fight for their country’s survival.Matthew Sussex, Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1801072022-04-04T17:33:43Z2022-04-04T17:33:43ZWar-time media reporting is shaping opinions about Russia’s Ukraine invasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455683/original/file-20220331-19520-fnp5e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cars drive past a building with a huge letter Z, a symbol of the Russian military, and a hashtag reading 'we don't abandon our own' in Moscow on March 30, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Propaganda has been an important element in Russia’s war against Ukraine. </p>
<p>What’s been happening in Ukraine since Feb. 24 is seen in a different light and interpreted in different ways, using different terms, depending on where people live. Ukrainian and western media call the invasion a “war,” whereas the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/do-not-call-ukraine-invasion-a-war-russia-tells-media-schools">Russian media use the term “special military operation.”</a> </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-unanswered-propaganda-led-to-the-war-in-ukraine-180202">How Russia's unanswered propaganda led to the war in Ukraine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Shortly after the invasion in Ukraine, <a href="http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203040007?index=0&rangeSize=1">a new law</a> was enacted in Russia. Since March 4, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/europe/russia-censorship-media-crackdown.html">it’s been a criminal offence to publicly transmit, including by means of social networks</a>, any “deliberately false information about the deployment of the military forces of the Russian Federation.” </p>
<p>The scope of “deliberately false information” includes reporting any casualty figures that depart from the officially approved numbers in addition to using the word “war.”</p>
<p>Russia’s governing elite has learned from their own mistakes about the importance of tight controls on the media. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2000.11008749">The Chechen wars of the 1990s-2000s showed</a> that without controlling the media, the true situation in war zones becomes known to the public and can be used against those in power.</p>
<p>The knowledge of the true scope of Russian atrocities fuelled anti-war sentiments and protests. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-grozny-battle-chechen-war-1994-1995/30359837.html">The first Chechen war</a> (1994-96) <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/photos-chechen-war-russia.html">was unpopular from its first moments</a>.</p>
<p>During the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518687">second Chechen war</a> (1999-2009) and especially during the <a href="https://www.history.com/news/russia-georgia-war-military-nato">Russo-Georgian war in 2008</a>, Russia started to deploy “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F17506352211027084">communication power</a>” in addition to military power. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A soldier bows his head and plugs his ears as artillery is fired." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455691/original/file-20220331-20-74mwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian soldiers fire artillery at rebel positions near the village of Duba-Yurt, near Grozny, in January 2000 during the second Chechen war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Maxim Marmur)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia restricted access to relevant information, releasing it selectively and only to trusted media. The types of propaganda techniques first studied by <a href="https://archive.org/details/PropagandaTechniqueInTheWorldWar">Harold Lasswell</a>, an American communications theorist, allowed the Russian regime to create an image of the war that would be more acceptable for both domestic and global audiences.</p>
<p><a href="https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php">Russia Today</a>, a news channel created in 2005, was instrumental in targeting the international audience. Its estimated budget in 2015 was about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/06/-sp-ex-soviet-countries-front-line-russia-media-propaganda-war-west">$245 million</a>. </p>
<p>Russia Today, in particular, has been particularly keen to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2021.1950196">exploit blind spots</a> in mainstream media coverage in the West while simultaneously concealing truths uncomfortable for the Russian government.</p>
<h2>How propaganda works</h2>
<p>My ongoing analysis of news feeds covering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows how propaganda works by identifying those blind spots. I analyzed the content of the war reporting of three major media organizations: <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/">Ukrainska Pravda</a>) in Ukraine, <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/">Gazeta.Ru</a> in Russia and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/">CNN</a> using a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-010-9399-4">mixed-methods approach</a> and a custom-built dictionary that contains Ukrainian, Russian and English terms. </p>
<p>All three media outlets are among the sources of information most often cited in their home countries. The scope of my analysis includes the first month of the war (about 1.4 million words in total in the three languages).</p>
<p>The 10 most used words in the coverage of the war are, starting with the most frequent ones:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Russia</p></li>
<li><p>Ukraine</p></li>
<li><p>Putin</p></li>
<li><p>War</p></li>
<li><p>People</p></li>
<li><p>Zelensky</p></li>
<li><p>Sanctions</p></li>
<li><p>NATO</p></li>
<li><p>Defence</p></li>
<li><p>Oil and gas </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Their relative use varies significantly, however. For instance, the word <em>war</em> is notably absent from the news feed of Gazeta.ru. It can be found in different contexts only: “The West started a financial-economic war against Russia,” or an allegation that Meta — the parent company of Facebook and Instagram — “declared an informational war without rules to Russia.”</p>
<p>My analysis shows the relative emphasis placed by the three media outlets in their coverage of the war. The closer a specific term to a medium is placed on the map, the higher the term’s relative frequency in the medium’s news feed. For instance, the relative frequency of <em>resistance</em>, <em>people</em>, <em>Putin</em>, <em>China</em>, <em>attack</em> and <em>nation</em> is higher in the CNN newsfeed relative to the two other newsfeeds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A graph show words used by news organizations on the war in Ukraine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455353/original/file-20220330-5976-1xhghjs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A content analysis of three news organizations on the Ukraine war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors' calculations</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukrainian calls for ‘truth’</h2>
<p>It appears that Ukrainian and Russian media devote more attention to the issue of alleged fake news than CNN. The word <em>fake</em> is located halfway between the Gazeta.ru and Ukrainska Pravda markers and far away from the CNN marker. </p>
<p>Even the law banning the use of the word <em>war</em> in Russia has “fake” in its colloquial name: “the law on punishment for ‘fakes’ about the operation of the Russian military has been enacted,” as reported by Gazeta.ru. </p>
<p>Calls for knowing and transmitting the truth are most frequent on Ukrainska Pravda: for example, reports featuring <a href="http://litopys.org.ua/shevchenko/shev139.htm">a quote</a> from Taras Shevchenko, a Ukrainian poet: “You have truth on your side” <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vidkritij-list-oleni-zelenskoyi-do-predstavnikiv-svitovih-zm-73437">and one from Olena Zelenska</a>, Ukraine’s first lady: “I address to representatives of foreign mass media: keep showing what is happening here, keep telling the truth.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A dark-haired man stands next to a blonde woman. Both are dressed in black." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455692/original/file-20220331-27-fyx6tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his wife, Olena Zelenska, in November 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mentions of heroes, war casualties and prisoners of war (POW) are notably rare in the Gazeta.ru newsfeed. Instead, the Russian discourse on the war tends to be focused on negotiations, concessions and the role played by the United States in the conflict.</p>
<p>In contrast to Ukrainian media, my analysis suggests Russian media don’t report on war casualties. To comply with the new law, they must wait for official statements — and the Russian government apparently prefers to keep silent on the topic. </p>
<p>When responding to a question on when such information would be forthcoming, Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, simply said: “<a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/22/7333601/">When the Ministry of Defense sees fit</a>.” Subsequently on March 25, the ministry assessed them at <a href="https://ria.ru/20220325/spetsoperatsiya-1780109513.html">only 1,351</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/25/7334422/">Ukrainian sources</a>, however, say Russian losses now exceed the Soviet Union’s losses during the entire 10-year war in Afghanistan, when official Soviet casualties totalled <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060718225045/http:/www.vfw.org/resources/levelxmagazine/0203_Soviet-Afghan%20War.pdf">14,453 dead</a>. NATO has said <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-official-40000-russian-troops-have-been-killed-captured-injured-2022-3">between 7,000 to 15,000</a> Russian troops have died in Ukraine since Feb. 24. </p>
<p>If the Russian population is being misled about war casualties, it’s unsurprising they’re supportive of the “special military operation.” In fact, <a href="https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/specialnaja-voennaja-operacija-monitoring">74 per cent</a> currently back the Russian invasion, an increase of nine percentage points since the start of the war. <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/nezavisimye-sotsiologi-71-rossiyan-ispytyvaet-gordostj-iz-za-voyny-s-ukrainoy/31757535.html">Surveys further show</a> that Russians are “proud” of the military operation.</p>
<h2>Information counter-measures</h2>
<p>This situation is hardly new. Soviet leaders were skilled at controlling information flows. In his satirical novel <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=C1oNAQAAMAAJ&pg=PT370&lpg=PT370"><em>Moscow 2042</em></a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/obituaries/vladimir-voinovich-dissident-russian-writer-dies-at-85.html">Vladimir Voinovich</a>, the late Soviet dissident and writer, imagined that information would penetrate the so-called <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iron-Curtain">Iron Curtain</a> — the political boundary dividing Europe into two separate regions from the end of Second World War — by being projected onto the sky.</p>
<p>Today, the internet has become a more practical medium. But the Russian government has learned to control the internet, restricting access to information deemed undesirable. </p>
<p>The Ukrainska Pravda website had been <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/02/27/7136622/">banned in Russia</a> long before the war started. <a href="https://200rf.com/">A website</a> with information on Russian troops who have died or disappeared in Ukraine was banned shortly after its launch on Feb. 27.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A soldier standing on a destroyed tank takes a selfie on his smartphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455695/original/file-20220401-7236-ktsg61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian serviceman takes a selfie standing on a destroyed Russian tank after Ukrainian forces overran a Russian position outside Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 31, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Dead bodies cannot be indefinitely hidden, however. Eventually news of their deaths will reach the fallen soldiers’ families. And it would hardly be possible for Russian propagandists to argue in that situation that information about the war is just a matter of opinion. </p>
<p>Casualties represent the ultimate reality check. Media reports about them are the most efficient way to expose the truth — regardless of the propaganda efforts my continuing research suggests is ongoing in Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anton Oleinik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The transmission of truth about the war against Ukraine is a criminal offense in Russia. Without access to the complete information about the war, Russian population continues to support it.Anton Oleinik, Professor of Sociology, Memorial University of NewfoundlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786042022-04-04T12:31:57Z2022-04-04T12:31:57ZCyberattacks have yet to play a significant role in Russia’s battlefield operations in Ukraine – cyberwarfare experts explain the likely reasons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455111/original/file-20220329-21-1m41k8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3766%2C2514&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is little evidence that Russia has coordinated cyber operations with conventional military operations in Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UCRANIA-TENSIONESVISTAZO/6fcac2c9fc97432c9669ed9335602447/photo">Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout the latter half of 2021, as it became clear that Russia was massing a large portion of its conventional combat power on the eastern borders of Ukraine, analysts offered contrasting predictions about the role cyberspace would play in an armed conflict. These predictions capture an ongoing debate about whether conflict in cyberspace is destined to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/12/putin-does-not-need-invade-ukraine-get-his-way">supplant conventional conflict</a> or exacerbate it.</p>
<p>As the war has evolved, it’s clear that analysts on both sides of the debate got it wrong. Cyber operations did not replace the military invasion, and as far as we can tell, the Russian government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html">not yet used cyber operations</a> as an integral <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/3/19/22986316/russia-ukraine-cyber-attacks-holding-back">part of its military campaign</a>. </p>
<p>We are political scientists who study the role of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2jdVG2wAAAAJ&hl=en">cybersecurity</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8zd54PAAAAAJ&hl=en">information</a> in international conflict. <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">Our research</a> shows that the reason pundits on both sides of the argument got it wrong is because they failed to consider that cyber and military operations serve different political objectives. </p>
<p>Cyber operations are most effective in pursuing informational goals, such as gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates. In contrast, nations use military operations to occupy territory, capture resources, diminish an opponent’s military capability and terrorize a population. </p>
<h2>A tactical role for cyberattacks?</h2>
<p>It’s common in modern warfare for new technologies to substitute for traditional military tactics. For example, the U.S. has made extensive use of drones, including in conflicts in Yemen and Pakistan where crewed aircraft and ground forces would be difficult or impossible to use. Because drones allow the U.S. to fight on the cheap with much less risk, they substitute for other forms of warfare.</p>
<p>In theory, cyber operations could have played a similar tactical role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the Russian government has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html">yet to use cyber operations</a> in a manner that is clearly coordinated with military units and designed to smooth the advance of ground or air forces. When Russia invaded Ukraine, hackers <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/">disrupted access to satellite communications</a> for thousands of people, and it was apparently a <a href="https://twitter.com/Bing_Chris/status/1503749157995094016">concern for Ukrainian defense officials</a>. But overall, Ukraine has managed to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/29/ukraine-internet-faq/">maintain internet access</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-ukraine-war-keeping-phones-online-becomes-key-defense-11648123200">cellphone service</a> for most of the country.</p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/02/14/russia-and-china-devote-more-cyber-forces-to-offensive-operations-than-us-says-new-report/">sophisticated</a> cyber capabilities, and its hackers have <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/">worked their way into Ukrainian networks</a> for many years. This raises the question of why Russia has not, for the most part, <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/597272-where-is-russias-cyber-blitzkrieg">used cyber operations to provide tactical support</a> for its military campaigns in Ukraine, at least until this point.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="destroyed armored vehicles fill a tree-lined street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454453/original/file-20220325-19-c6h9xg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Destroyed Russian armored vehicles attest to the Ukrainian military’s ability to match up with the Russian military on a tactical level.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-general-view-shows-destroyed-russian-armored-vehicles-news-photo/1238921487">Photo by Aris Messins/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Separate roles</h2>
<p>In recent studies, we examined whether cyber operations mostly serve as complements to, or substitutes for, conventional conflict. In <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">one analysis</a>, we examined conventional <a href="https://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Toronto-2019">military campaigns around the world</a> over a 10-year period using the <a href="https://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs">Militarized Interstate Disputes</a> dataset of all armed conflicts. We also focused on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138">the conflicts in Syria and eastern Ukraine</a>. Our results suggest that cyber operations are generally not being used as either.</p>
<p>Instead, nations tend to use these two types of operations independently from each other because each mode of conflict serves different objectives, and cyberwarfare is most effective for gathering intelligence, stealing technology or winning public opinion or diplomatic debates.</p>
<p>In contrast, nations use traditional forms of conflict to control tangible assets, such as capturing resources or occupying territory. The various goals offered by Russian President Vladimir Putin for invading Ukraine, such as <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/russia-worried-ukrainian-military-buildup-81487170">preventing Ukraine from joining NATO</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-claims-denazification-justify-russias-attack-ukraine-experts-say-rcna17537">replacing the government</a> or <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/ukraine-building-a-nuclear-bomb-dangerous-nonsense/">countering fictitious Ukrainian weapons of mass destruction</a>, require occupying territory.</p>
<p>There may be other reasons for the lack of overlap between cyber and conventional fronts in Ukraine. The Russian military could consider cyber operations ineffective for its purposes. The newness of cyber operations as a tool of war makes it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737138">difficult to coordinate</a> with conventional military operations. Also, military targets might not be accessible to hackers because they might lack internet connectivity. </p>
<p>In any event, <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/x4xxw0wgb1jgx7f/CCO_GK_112121.pdf?dl=0">evidence</a> that the Russian government intends to use cyber operations to <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/expect-shock-and-awe-if-russia-invades-ukraine.html">complement</a> military operations is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002717737138">thin</a>. Our findings suggest hacking groups in previous conflicts faced considerable difficulties in responding to battlefield events, much less shaping them.</p>
<h2>How Russia is using cyber operations</h2>
<p>The main target of Russia’s digital campaign in Ukraine is ordinary Ukrainians. To date, Russian cyber operations have sought to <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2022/03/07/russia-disinformation-ukraine-cyber-warfare/9402421002/">sow panic and fear, destabilizing the country from within</a>, by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-attacks-hacks-and-misinformation-the-many-fronts-of-russias-hybrid-war-in-ukraine-11645871401">demonstrating the country’s inability to defend its infrastructure</a>, for example, by defacing or disabling websites.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A smart phone screen showing text in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454443/original/file-20220325-27-wxstxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Jan. 14, 2022, hackers that the Ukrainian government identified as Russian attacked Ukrainian government websites.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-a-warning-message-in-ukrainian-news-photo/1237728779">Photo illustration by Pavlo Gonchar/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, Russia has been using information campaigns to attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of Ukrainians. Prior to the start of the conflict, White House press secretary Jen Psaki warned of a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">2,000% increase from the daily average in November</a> in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">Russian-language social media content</a>. This suggests that the purpose of these information operations was to make the case for Russia’s intervention on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/01/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-fema-administrator-deanne-criswell-january-14-2022/">humanitarian grounds</a> and to build support for intervention among the Ukrainian public. The Russian government’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">domestic actions</a> emphasize the value its leadership places on information operations.</p>
<h2>A supporting role</h2>
<p>Hackers’ actions tend to occur out of the public eye, rather than in the flamboyantly violent manner favored by Hollywood cyber villains, which means it’s difficult to know for sure what’s happening. Nevertheless, the lack of overlap between cyber and conventional military operations makes sense operationally and strategically. This is not to say that the informational focus of cyber operations has no effect on military operations. Good intelligence is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1611205">essential for success</a> in any military conflict. </p>
<p>We believe Russia is likely to continue conducting information campaigns to influence Ukrainians, its domestic public and international audiences. Russia is also likely to seek to further penetrate Ukrainian networks to access information that potentially assists its military operations. But because cyber operations have not been thoroughly integrated into its military campaigns so far, cyber operations are likely to continue playing a secondary role in the conflict.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand new developments in science, health and technology, each week.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=science&source=inline-science-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik Gartzke receives funding from DoD Minerva, the Hewlett Foundation and the Charles Koch Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nadiya Kostyuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cyberattacks can be devastating, just not on the battlefield, according to researchers who looked at 10 years of armed conflicts around the world.Nadiya Kostyuk, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of TechnologyErik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science, University of California, San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.