tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/uganda-2507/articlesUganda – The Conversation2024-03-25T15:08:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259342024-03-25T15:08:37Z2024-03-25T15:08:37ZKenya’s greylisting for weak action on money laundering and terrorism financing: what that means and what must happen next<p><em>Kenya and Namibia are the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">latest</a> African countries to be placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list over their weak measures against money laundering and terrorism financing.</em></p>
<p><em>Being on the grey list is <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ke/en/blog/fatf-grey-list.html">typically seen</a> as an indictment of a country’s ability to identify and effectively redress financial crimes. It warns investors to be cautious in dealings with the country.</em></p>
<p><em>Financial crimes researcher <a href="https://scholars.latrobe.edu.au/ldekoker">Louis de Koker</a>, who has recently studied the <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/5/81">economic consequences of greylisting</a>, answers questions on the move.</em></p>
<h2>Why is Kenya on the grey list?</h2>
<p>In February 2024 Kenya was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/23/fatf-financial-crime-watchdog-adds-kenya-and-namibia-to-its-grey-list.html">greylisted</a> by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/home.html">Financial Action Task Force</a> (FATF), the world body that sets standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. At the same meeting, Namibia was also listed while Uganda was removed from the grey list.</p>
<p>The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental group of economically powerful countries, maintains a set of standards to safeguard the integrity of the international financial system. Kenya, Namibia and Uganda are not members of the task force but they are members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, an associated regional body. </p>
<p>All countries that are members of the Financial Action Task Force or any of the regional bodies are regularly evaluated by their peers. Countries are rated on technical compliance with the standards, as well as the effectiveness with which those standards are implemented. </p>
<p>Kenya’s mutual evaluation reports revealed a host of strategic deficiencies. Kenya, for example, had not taken appropriate steps to investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing offences or to assess and mitigate crime risks associated with crypto assets.</p>
<p>When a country performs poorly in its mutual evaluation the Financial Action Task Force may place it in a one-year <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/More-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html#:%7E:text=The%20FATF%20continually%20identifies%20and,and%20was%20enhanced%20in%202009.">observation period</a>. During the observation period, the country works with the Financial Action Task Force or its regional body to address the identified weaknesses.</p>
<p>If at the end of the observation period the country has not been able to address the deficiencies appropriately but has an action plan to address them and has made the political commitment to do so, the task force may put that country on its list of “jurisdictions under increased monitoring”, also known as the “grey list”. This is what happened to Kenya and Namibia in February 2024.</p>
<h2>What are the consequences?</h2>
<p>At face value, the list sends a positive message. According to the Financial Action Task Force, countries on the list have committed themselves to resolve the identified deficiencies within agreed time frames. They are therefore working actively to improve their compliance with the Financial Action Task Force standards. Greylisting also triggers international technical and other assistance to help countries to improve their compliance levels.</p>
<p>The market, however, tends to respond negatively to countries that are greylisted. Some countries and regulators (including the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/high-risk-third-countries-and-international-context-content-anti-money-laundering-and-countering_en">EU</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2">UK</a>) also compel their institutions to treat the businesses and persons linked to greylisted countries as higher risk customers and parties. The accompanying enhanced due diligence measures (such as collecting and verifying more information about the customer and the customer’s funds) slow down the pace of business, increase transaction costs and may even threaten deals and business relationships.</p>
<p>In the past two years, the Financial Action Task Force has <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">called on</a> foreign regulators and their markets to take a measured approach. It added explicitly to its greylisting statement that it does not call for enhanced due diligence measures against greylisted countries and cautioned against termination of business relationships. It is not clear that this has had the intended effect.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/5/81">study</a> my co-authors and I found that greylisting appears to continue to have a negative economic impact on listed countries. Correlations point to a negative impact on GDP growth rates and, worryingly, even development aid appears to be adversely affected. Some of the negative impacts may lag after delisting. Uganda may, for instance, take some time to see the positive benefits of being off the list.</p>
<p>Impact, however, differs from country to country, and smaller economies are often likely to face greater impact than large economies.</p>
<h2>What does Kenya need to do now?</h2>
<p>Since its 2022 mutual evaluation report, Kenya has been working to improve its compliance levels. Now it must implement the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">agreed action plan</a> to address the remaining strategic deficiencies. Actions include completing a national terrorist financing risk assessment and sharing the results with the public and private sector stakeholders. Kenya is also committed to improving its risk-based supervision of regulated entities including licensing and supervision of virtual asset (crypto) service providers.</p>
<p>Other actions required include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>enhancing risk-based compliance and the reporting of suspicious transaction reports to the <a href="https://www.frc.go.ke/">Financial Reporting Centre</a></p></li>
<li><p>increasing the number of money laundering and terrorist financing prosecutions to match the country’s risk levels</p></li>
<li><p>revising the framework for the regulation of non-profit organisations and their oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate non-profit organisations’ activity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Uganda spent four years on the grey list. Given what Kenya will need to achieve, a time-frame of three to four years may be realistic.</p>
<h2>Why does greylisting matter to Africa?</h2>
<p>Greylisting poses a challenge for sub-Saharan Africa. Since February 2024, the region accounts for 12 of the 21 grey-listed countries. The listed countries include <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-been-grey-listed-for-not-stopping-money-laundering-and-terrorism-funding-what-it-means-200696">Nigeria and South Africa</a>. The economic impact of this level of simultaneous greylisting on the development of the region as a whole gives cause for concern. </p>
<p>The reasons why countries from this region have not been able to meet the task force standards adequately should be probed. Is there really a sufficient level of political commitment to fight money laundering, corruption and terrorist financing? Given the negative impact of crime and the negative impact of a failure to implement the crime combating standards, can the region afford political complacency?</p>
<p>The task force is about to start another round of mutual evaluations. Countries that are delisted in this round may be listed again in the next round. The listed countries have the opportunity now to ensure that these serious crimes are combated appropriately. Doing so will serve the national interest and prevent a relisting in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis de Koker received funding from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GiZ) to research the economic impact of greylisting.</span></em></p>Kenya must complete a national terrorist financing risk assessment and share it publicly.Louis de Koker, Professor of Law, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247502024-03-18T13:42:37Z2024-03-18T13:42:37ZPress freedom in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda: what journalists have to say about doing their jobs<p>A majority of the world’s population has experienced a decline in press freedom in recent years, according to <a href="https://www.unesco.org/reports/world-media-trends/2021/en">a UN report</a>. In east Africa, the results are mixed and debatable. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">Rwanda</a>, both international press freedom rankings and journalists on the ground say press freedom has increased over the past 10 years. In neighbouring <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">Uganda</a>, both international rankings and local journalists say media freedom has declined. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">Kenya</a>, rankings reflect declining freedom over the past decade, but reporters acknowledge they have more freedom than their counterparts in Uganda and Rwanda.</p>
<p>In our roles as associate professors in journalism and mass communication, we interviewed and surveyed more than 500 journalists in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. We learned that the evolution and current state of press freedom in the region is complex. In our book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">Press Freedom and the (Crooked) Path Toward Democracy: Lessons from Journalists in East Africa</a>, we provide an updated state of press freedom in these three countries. </p>
<p>We argue that much of the academic research that classifies global media systems has overlooked the world’s most developing nations, and those that have included developing nations have failed to consider their historical contexts. They have worked from a misguided premise that nations develop in a linear fashion – from non-democracy to democracy – and from a restricted press to a free press. In reality, press freedom and democracy ebb and flow. </p>
<p>We examine the impact of social, political, legal and economic factors on media in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya to help with understanding media systems outside the western world. </p>
<p>We chose to study these three countries because they represent varying stages of development and democracy building. Rwanda, which experienced a genocide in 1994, is in relatively early (though fast paced) stages of reconstruction. Uganda, which experienced a civil war in the 1980s and unrest in the 1990s but arguably not to the extent of Rwanda’s genocide, can be considered in a middle stage of development. Kenya, which has remained largely peaceful, can be understood as being in a more advanced stage of development.</p>
<h2>Rwanda</h2>
<p>In Rwanda, despite 30 years of economic, social and media progress and development, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">lingering impacts</a> from the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi permeate the country’s media. <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti/">Multiple laws</a> limit free expression in the name of genocide prevention, and international press freedom rankings indicate the nation is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">not free</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we found</a> that many Rwandan journalists believe that they have a great deal of freedom and that outsiders don’t consider the country’s history when evaluating the media. Outsiders, for example, hear that Rwandan journalists cannot criticise the president or high-ranking government officials and immediately think there is no press freedom. But local journalists say they don’t feel oppressed. They feel relatively free to choose their story topics. They don’t want to publish critical stories because they want to foster peace. </p>
<p>Journalists believe their role is to act as unifiers and right the wrongs of their predecessors who exacerbated the genocide. Public trust in the media <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/49408/chapter-abstract/418504465?redirectedFrom=fulltext">remains high</a>, according to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077699021998647">focus groups</a> conducted with members of the general public. In Rwanda, there appears to be a relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict. That is, the more time that passes since the country experienced war, the more press freedom it has. </p>
<p>Prioritising social good over media rights has helped the country unify and develop, but over the long term <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we see signs</a> that Rwanda’s linear path towards increasing democracy and press freedom may not continue. Rather, prioritising peace at the cost of press freedom could limit development and reinforce existing <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-a-dictator-who-clings-to-power-but-its-not-just-for-his-own-gain-204834">authoritarian power structures</a>.</p>
<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>In Uganda, the relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict has been less linear. Some media restrictions have lessened and others have worsened. </p>
<p>Despite a sustained period of peace after conflict with the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> in the northern part of the country that began in the 1980s, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">press freedom is not increasing</a> as time passes. Overall, journalists in the country largely agree with the international perception that they’re restricted and that the situation is worsening the longer President Yoweri Museveni remains in power. Journalists in Uganda perceive their press freedom to be lower than journalists in neighbouring countries. They also have a more pessimistic outlook. </p>
<p>Government interference, some of which stems from the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/02/media-minefield/increased-threats-freedom-expression-uganda">conflict</a> and some that’s <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/eron-kiiza-defends-the-press-uganda.php">new</a>, remains pervasive. Worn down by government intimidation and repressive laws, coupled with low pay and lack of necessary equipment, some journalists <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097">told us</a> they had turned to unethical behaviour, such as acting as spies in the newsroom. </p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya is home to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">freest media environment</a>. It’s also the only one in our study that has seen changes in presidential leadership in recent years. But just because a nation regularly holds elections doesn’t mean the path to democratisation and media freedom is smooth. </p>
<p>External measures indicate that Kenya has more press freedom than Uganda and Rwanda, and journalists in the country perceive this to be true. However, data show ups and downs of media freedom that have mirrored varying political administrations and events, including spurts of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These ebbs and flows are largely due to politicians or powerful members of society who share ideological goals or have financial interests like <a href="https://kenyamedia.reboot.org/">owning major media houses</a> and influencing coverage. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges, journalists attribute Kenya’s state of press freedom to the vast international connections the country and its leaders have. An empowered civil society – which stems from both a space for dissent given by public officials, and the culture and spirit of Kenyans – has promoted the growth of human rights, including media freedoms.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>After a nuanced examination of the factors that affect the media in each of these countries, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">our book lists</a> a set of factors that affect press freedom and democracy building. </p>
<p>Specifically, we believe each country’s distance from conflict, political benchmarks, international linkages and civil society strength are central to understanding its degree of press freedom, development and democratisation. </p>
<p>While these factors are not the only elements that influence media landscapes, they are a starting point for better understanding and theorising about press freedom environments. </p>
<p>A free and independent press allows the public to hold leaders accountable, make informed decisions and access a diversity of opinions. This makes it important to accurately understand how free varying media landscapes are, and why.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Important factors, such as conflict, are central to understanding a country’s degree of press freedom, development and democratisation.Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityMeghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253022024-03-13T14:22:57Z2024-03-13T14:22:57ZFinancial abuse from an intimate partner? Three ways you can protect yourself<p><a href="https://www.divorcelaws.co.za/what-is-financial-abuse.html">Financial abuse</a> occurs when one person takes control over another person’s ability to acquire, use and maintain financial resources. An example is being denied access to your own funds or being forced to deposit your salary into a joint bank account but not having access to the account. It could also take place when large withdrawals are made from joint bank accounts without any explanation. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.isdj.org.za/">Institute for Social Development and Justice</a>, a South African non-profit company, financial abuse can vary and change shape or form but happens when access to economic opportunities is controlled or limited by an intimate partner. </p>
<p>This can happen when your partner withholds financial information or hides money from you. Another example is when your partner refuses to allow you to work, thereby controlling your ability to earn an income. Or being coerced into paying for most of the household expenses when you earn less than your partner. Alternatively, it can happen when the abuser racks up debt on a credit card, knowing the card is not in their name. </p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2021-014.pdf">Domestic Violence Act</a> identifies financial abuse as a criminal act. Several other African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe also recognise it to be a criminal offence. But it remains largely unprosecuted.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, financial abuse is not a new problem. Over the years, my <a href="https://researchprofiles.canberra.edu.au/en/persons/bomikazi-zeka">research</a> has found that the proper use of financial services can help those in disadvantaged situations to turn income into wealth. But when money is entangled with relationships, it can become a tricky situation to navigate. </p>
<p>Financial abuse can happen to anyone, irrespective of age, gender, marital status, employment status or income levels. When financial abuse occurs, it is women who are more likely to see their financial security threatened should the dynamics in a relationship take a turn for the worse. Women are more likely to experience financial abuse since it can happen in tandem with <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10896-023-00639-y">other forms of abuse</a>. </p>
<p>When you know the signs, you can put the following three measures in place to increase your financial safety: prevent, prepare and protect. </p>
<h2>Prevent</h2>
<p>Knowing your partner’s financial history is an important starting point in preventing financial abuse. Ask about how they have managed their debt in the past (and how they got into it in the first place) or whether they are actively saving money. </p>
<p>Broaching the money-talk conversation is difficult but this information should give you insight into their past financial behaviours which could influence and explain future financial behaviours. </p>
<p>Another strategy in prevention is asking about their attitudes towards money in relationships. For instance, do they believe that gender roles influence who manages money? Engaging in this topic early can also help you set boundaries about how money is managed within the relationship. </p>
<h2>Prepare</h2>
<p>Learning the signs of financial abuse can help you be prepared. If you suspect that financial abuse is beginning to emerge then keep close tabs on it by documenting all the evidence. This is important because an abuser may gaslight you into thinking you’re exaggerating, especially when the signs are subtle. Document as much evidence as you can and ensure you have copies of all important legal documents as this will help you, should you require legal assistance. </p>
<p>If you don’t already have one, speak to a financial advisor about how you can protect your finances and assets. </p>
<h2>Protect</h2>
<p>As far as possible, keep an independent source of income as this reduces any likelihood of dependency on a partner. Financial dependency can lead to feelings of isolation and hopelessness, which makes it more difficult to leave an abuser because they control the finances. </p>
<p>Another way you can protect your financial position is by making sure you don’t sign any documents you don’t understand. Often abusers will acquire financial assets in their partner’s name and leave them with the financial burden of the repayments, thereby entrapping them through debt. </p>
<h2>Getting help</h2>
<p>While the measures outlined here are not exhaustive, they are a good starting point to think about when your finances are merged with someone else’s. </p>
<p>If you are concerned about your financial safety, there are ways to get help. FIDA-Kenya, a women’s rights organisation in Kenya, offers <a href="https://www.fida-kenya.org/">free legal aid</a>. In Nigeria, the Women at Risk International Foundation operates a 24-hour confidential toll-free <a href="https://warifng.org/contact-us/">helpline</a>. </p>
<p>You can access free counselling from a social worker via the South African Department of Social Development’s <a href="https://gbv.org.za/about-us/">website</a>, which provides a call centre facility 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The call centre operates an emergency line number on 0800 428 428. You can visit the <a href="https://thewarriorproject.org.za/helplines/">website</a> of the Warrior Project, a non-profit organisation, for more information on helplines and resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225302/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bomikazi Zeka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When money is entangled with relationships, it can often become a tricky situation.Bomikazi Zeka, Assistant Professor in Finance and Financial Planning, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235682024-03-11T12:51:48Z2024-03-11T12:51:48ZFintech is sold as the answer to Africa’s problems, but digital money services have downsides which media often overlook<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577861/original/file-20240226-16-p2toeq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The research assessed newspaper coverage of fintech in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The online financial products and services known as “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/what-is-fintech/">fintech</a>” have become deeply embedded in the economic and social life of many African countries over the past decade.</p>
<p>Headlines across the continent often extol fintech’s virtues. Technology is “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5S19bJvbYrE">driving financial inclusion</a>” and “<a href="https://observer.ug/businessnews/63783-fintech-revolutionizing-how-we-spend-our-money">making life better for people</a>”. It’s helping “<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001452750/how-fintech-tools-can-help-cushion-kenyans-during-inflation">consumers to manage inflation</a>”. Fintech is “<a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/09/27/how-nigeria-is-expanding-financial-inclusion-through-fintech">too sweeping to ignore</a>”. And, if it’s not embraced, “<a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/10/06/on-boarding-financially-excluded-rural-women">the country and the entire economy will be left behind</a>”. </p>
<p>These headlines depict a popular story about fintech: it is the answer to several of Africa’s economic problems. This story is also appearing in policy documents in countries like Uganda. Fintech is now a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3dno0vThbc">key component</a> of the country’s <a href="https://bou.or.ug/bouwebsite/bouwebsitecontent/FinancialInclusion/2023/Signed_2023_2028_National-Financial-Inclusion-Strategy_.pdf">National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2023-2028</a>. </p>
<p>However, a counter-narrative is emerging. Political economists, anthropologists and social theorists warn that fintech is an example of an exploitative, <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/ideas/2021/07/09/neocolonial-components-of-algorithmic-capitalism-in-africa-today/">neocolonial</a> and <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/histories-of-racial-capitalism/9780231190756#:%7E:text=Racial%20capitalism%20is%20not%20simply,value%20from%20racial%20classification%20">racialised</a> form of platform capitalism, a system by which a fairly small number of commercial networks profit from user activities and interactions. They caution that it is inherently <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/10/kenyas-mobile-money-revolution">anti-development</a>. It is, they say, likely to cause a crisis of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/lifestyle/debt-trap-ensnared-by-loans-women-turn-to-suicide-as-escape-4086004">consumer debt</a>, <a href="https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/perpetual-debt-silicon-savannah/">emotional distress</a>, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/smart-company/suicide-that-jolted-cbk-inside-plan-to-rein-in-digital-lenders-251530">self-harm</a> and <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/opinion/2019/11/29/data-protection-in-the-age-of-huduma-namba-who-will-benefit/">data piracy</a>. </p>
<p>We wanted to know how the press in Africa reports on fintech. Are its failings and potential pitfalls acknowledged? Is it mostly presented as a “good news” story?</p>
<p>So, in a project we began two years ago with South African political economist <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/monobook/book/9781529221770/9781529221770.xml">Scott Timcke</a>, we <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2023.2275816">set out to answer these questions</a>. This kind of analysis helps reveal how public attitudes about this new pillar of everyday economic life are formed. It also shows whether the press is serving as the public’s watchdog with regard to economic matters and corporate affairs. </p>
<p>Our analysis, the first to look at how the fintech story is being told in the African press, reveals that the coverage is celebratory and offers limited cautionary and critical reporting to the public and to policymakers. We found that fintech is most often covered with a positive tone and as a business story. </p>
<h2>The fintech context</h2>
<p>International and African <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Africas-Media-Image-in-the-21st-Century-From-the-Heart-of-Darkness-to/Bunce-Franks-Paterson/p/book/9781138962323">media coverage of the continent</a> is often accused of fuelling negative stereotypes, a trend characterised as “afro-pessimism”. But in the past decade, much of the media conversation has focused on business buzz and followed an “afro-optimism” or “Africa rising” script, as the headlines above depict. </p>
<p>The fintech ecology is shaped by dynamics from the late 2000s. These include the rapid uptake in <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/sub-saharan-africa-embraces-5g-and-smartphone-adoption-soars-gsma-report-reveals/9xnt95l">broadband use</a> and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash. Proponents claim that fintech will reduce poverty and motivate development (sometimes referred to as “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/33/2/135/5127166?login=false">leapfrogging</a>” or “<a href="https://thefintechtimes.com/here-are-four-cities-in-africa-emerging-as-fintech-hubs/">Silicon Savannah</a>”), uplifting those unserved by formal banking. One 2016 study credited fintech with delivering a remarkable <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aah5309">2% poverty reduction</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>Others call for a more cautious and sceptical approach. Critics dispute claims that fintech produces significant progressive change. They also argue that fintech can be <a href="https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/fintech-digital-futures-paper-tni-web.pdf">exploitative</a> and <a href="https://botpopuli.net/how-fintech-became-the-gateway-to-predatory-lending-in-sub-saharan-africa/">predatory</a>, and that it fuels inequality by further enriching the already wealthy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-mobile-money-system-has-a-dark-side-even-though-its-convenient-new-study-explores-the-risks-207777">Nigeria's mobile money system has a dark side even though it's convenient - new study explores the risks</a>
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<h2>Our analysis</h2>
<p>Previous research into the roll-out of fintech in countries across the continent revealed community-level tactics. “<a href="https://intellectdiscover.com/content/journals/10.1386/jams_00035_1">Change agents</a>” are deployed to recruit new customers for mobile money services. “<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IMR-05-2019-0130/full/html">Brand ambassadors</a>” are hired to “sit in public transport and talk about” fintech products. </p>
<p>We wondered whether journalists were similarly talking up fintech or were warning of its risks. We analysed news coverage and looked at journalism published between 2016 and 2021 by leading newspapers in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa, as well as through the <a href="https://allafrica.com/">AllAfrica</a> news aggregator. We began with a set of 1,190 news pieces and analysed a sample of 368. </p>
<p>Based on our initial examination of articles, we identified nine themes or frames that appeared frequently in news coverage of fintech. </p>
<p>The dominant frame was one we labelled “announcement”: the proclamation of a new fintech product through the media; a celebration of innovation. “Gender inclusivity” was the least common frame. This is the kind of reporting that focuses on a commonly shared <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/06/03/Fintech-Female-Employment-and-Gender-Inequality-518871">rationale</a> for fintech: that it particularly benefits women and gives them new opportunities for equality and participation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-fintech-solutions-succeed-we-built-a-model-based-on-ghanas-experience-169286">What makes FinTech solutions succeed? We built a model based on Ghana's experience</a>
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<p>We paid particular attention to the frame we called “trepidation”. We were surprised that 61% of news stories within that frame had a positive overall tone, despite the frame implying potential danger. This trepidation often appeared as the backdrop for a news item rather than as the main story. </p>
<p>These kinds of stories, we reason, allow government officials to advise the public on safe financial conduct and fintech companies to promote the benefits of their “safe” products. The advice includes guidance on how individuals can enhance their awareness of potential risks, such as fraud, and act with caution. This consumer education approach is typical of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fight-against-economic-fraud-how-african-countries-are-tackling-the-challenge-161432">anti-fraud measures</a> across sectors.</p>
<p>Most stories about the hazards of fintech conclude that it is nonetheless a beneficial force and that any “hiccups” are minor. These can be soothed through state action (such as regulation) or individual responsibility (such as consumer education). Overall, this reinforces a narrative that it is safe and logical to embed fintech in society: it is “sanitised” through this style of news coverage. </p>
<p>Overall we concluded that the journalism in the African press we examined was largely sanitised. The tone, content and sourcing of reporting, even in the context of well-founded fears about fintech, point to an uncritical promotion of fintech products, firms and the entire industry.</p>
<h2>More critical journalism needed</h2>
<p>The breadth of fintech’s expansion across Africa and extent of potential harm it carries – even if its critics are only minimally correct – indicates a pressing need for further analysis of what story is being told. News audiences, politicians and civil society need to demand a more critical journalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coverage is celebratory and offers limited cautionary and critical reporting to the public and to policymakers.Cathleen LeGrand, Postgraduate researcher, University of LeedsChris Paterson, Professor of Global Communication, University of LeedsJörg Wiegratz, Lecturer in Political Economy of Global Development, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250182024-03-07T12:22:50Z2024-03-07T12:22:50ZLord’s Resistance Army: ICC awards reparations to victims of commander Dominic Ongwen – what happens next<p><em>The International Criminal Court (ICC) has recently ordered <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/ongwen-case-icc-trial-chamber-ix-orders-reparations-victims">reparations</a> for victims of Dominic Ongwen, an ex-child soldier turned commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group that terrorised northern Uganda for two decades.</em></p>
<p><em>The court’s order, the first in the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/uganda">Ugandan situation</a>, awards collective community-based symbolic payment for each victim. International criminal law scholars <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=lb2BdAwAAAAJ&hl=en">Tonny Raymond Kirabira</a> and <a href="https://www.westminster.ac.uk/about-us/our-people/directory/uche-miracle-chinwenmeri">Miracle Chinwenmeri Uche</a> answer questions about the ruling</em>.</p>
<h2>Who are the victims in this case?</h2>
<p>The victims are part of the post-war affected communities in northern Uganda. <a href="https://theconversation.com/icc-upholds-jail-term-for-ugandan-rebel-commander-ongwen-why-it-matters-for-africa-196349">Ongwen</a> is one of the top Lord’s Resistance Army commanders charged by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed between 2002 and 2005. The charges include attacks against the civilian population, murder, enslavement as well as sexual and gender-based violence. </p>
<p>Other charges include conscripting children under the age of 15 into an armed group and using them to participate actively in hostilities. </p>
<p>Ongwen was convicted of the crimes in 2021, and is currently serving <a href="https://theconversation.com/icc-upholds-jail-term-for-ugandan-rebel-commander-ongwen-why-it-matters-for-africa-196349">a joint sentence</a> of 25 years of imprisonment in Norway after his unsuccessful appeal in The Hague. When a person is convicted of more than one crime, the International Criminal Court pronounces a sentence for each crime as well as a joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment.</p>
<p>Essentially, not all victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict will receive reparations. This order applies only to those harmed in specific ways by Ongwen, directly or indirectly. Ongwen’s victims recognised by the court included those in the internally displaced people’s camps and victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. Others are children born of those crimes, and former child soldiers.</p>
<p>Ongwen’s liability for reparations was set at €52,429,000 (US$57 million) for approximately 49,772 potential victims. But as he was already declared as indigent, the reparations will be made through the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/tfv">Trust Fund for Victims</a>. This is a separate organisation from the court. It is mandated with implementation of the International Criminal Court’s reparations and assistance programmes.</p>
<h2>What does international law say about reparations in this context?</h2>
<p>Generally, the obligation to repair harm under such a context arises from individual criminal responsibility of the person found to be criminally responsible for crimes. They are also equally liable for the reparations. But the international law has a set of non-legally binding <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-and-guidelines-right-remedy-and-reparation">basic principles and guidelines</a> on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violation of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. States may be responsible for reparations in contexts like that of the Lord’s Resistance Army war in northern Uganda.</p>
<p>The legal dilemma is that Uganda’s criminal justice system, like those of many countries in the developing world, does not have a defined victims’ programme or mechanism for reparations. In that case, the alternative is to look at the existing <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice">transitional justice</a> frameworks or policies to draw pathways for reparations.</p>
<h2>Is there a precedent for the ICC’s reparation order?</h2>
<p>The primary guidance on reparations is derived from <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">Article 75 of the Rome Statute</a>. The article allows the court to make orders for the benefit of victims, including compensation and rehabilitation. The reparations order can be made directly against a convicted person, in this case Ongwen, detailing the nature and scale of reparations he needs to make. The court can equally order the award through the trust fund. </p>
<p>This is not the first reparations order by the International Criminal Court. There were orders in the cases of Congolese rebel leaders <a href="https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/news/lubanga-case-tfv-announces-details-collective-reparation-award">Thomas Lubanga</a>, <a href="https://trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-do/reparation-orders/katanga">Germain Katanga</a> and <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/ntaganda-case-tfv-welcomes-reparations-order-victims-icc-trial-chamber-vi">Bosco Ntaganda</a>. The court also issued a reparations order in the case of Malian Islamist <a href="https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-do/reparation-orders/al-madhi">Ahmad Al Mahdi</a>. These cases included collective reparations with individualised components. The Al Mahdi reparations process included the entire population of Timbuktu as eligible victims.</p>
<p>In the Ongwen case, the court used the principles of reparations set out in the Ntaganda case. But the court expanded the scope of victims as well as the types and modalities of reparations. More notable are the principles in relation to the treatment of child victims; gender inclusivity and sensitivity; and sexual and gender-based violence.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>There are two phases to the court’s practice: the judicial and administrative stages of reparations. The court issues an order under the judicial proceedings. But it works through other administrative channels in the registry, the legal representatives of victims and the Trust Fund for Victims in relation to the execution, implementation and enforcement of the reparations orders. As Ongwen’s case involves individual and collective reparations, the court will monitor and oversee the implementation of the order.</p>
<p>Following this reparations order, we should expect to see another core judicial decision of approving a draft implementation plan submitted by the trust fund. And subsequently there will be a consideration of the trust fund’s periodic reports.</p>
<p>While only 4,096 victims were authorised to participate in the court proceedings, the judges <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/ongwen-case-icc-trial-chamber-ix-orders-reparations-victims">envisage</a> that there will be about 49,772 potential beneficiaries of the reparations. </p>
<p>The court will also be expected to review decisions by the trust fund during the administrative screening, as part of its oversight role during the implementation stage. The trust fund will carry out consultations with victims for the purposes of designing and implementing the reparations awards. This and the process and outcome of fundraising mean that the full implementation of the reparations will take years.</p>
<p>Uganda as the concerned state party is obligated under international law to support the enforcement of the reparation orders. So Uganda’s government would be expected to go out and find people who fall under the court’s order.</p>
<p>But the government is hesitant to single out individuals as direct victims. The Lord’s Resistance Army war affected the entire northern Uganda and part of the country’s eastern region. The available pathway for the government’s formal engagement with Ongwen’s victims will be through the <a href="https://www.ictj.org/news/beyond-symbolism-translating-uganda%E2%80%99s-transitional-justice-policy-real-changes-lives-victims">National Transitional Justice Policy of 2019</a>, which has provision for victims’ reparations and other support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Uganda, as the concerned state party, is expected to go out and find Dominic Ongwen’s victims.Tonny Raymond Kirabira, Lecturer in Law, University of East LondonMiracle Chinwenmeri Uche, Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181712024-01-16T14:13:09Z2024-01-16T14:13:09ZUganda’s battle for the youth vote – how Museveni keeps Bobi Wine’s reach in check<p>Uganda is one of the youngest countries in the world, with an <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth#:%7E:text=Uganda%20is%20one%20of%20the,working%20age%20population%20is%20rapid.">average age of 15.9 years</a>. Young people aged below 30 make up about <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf#page=1">77%</a> of the country’s population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=UG">47 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Young people have legitimate and wide-ranging grievances, from unemployment to disenfranchisement. Opportunities remain limited, with <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth">two-thirds of Ugandans</a> working for themselves or doing family-based agricultural work.</p>
<p>Yet, young people in Uganda haven’t coalesced as an electoral bloc. This is despite the emergence of a presidential candidate who champions youth issues. In the last presidential election in 2021, those aged between 18 and 30 made up <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/what-young-voting-population-means-for-2021-elections-3206502">41%</a> of the total voter roll of 18 million. </p>
<p>Robert Kyagulanyi, the 41-year-old musician-turned-politician popularly known as Bobi Wine, leads the National Unity Platform. It is Uganda’s largest opposition party, known for its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/young-africa-new-wave-of-politicians-challenges-old-guard">youth appeal</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-already-changed-the-ugandan-opposition-can-he-change-the-government-150231">Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in the 2021 election</a> highlights the reality that capturing the youth vote in Uganda is complex. And that this broad category and the role it plays in Ugandan politics is poorly understood.</p>
<p>As it is, the term “youth” lacks a clear definition. Uganda’s government defines the youth as those aged between 18 and 30. However, in practice the “youth” category is much more amorphous. It tends to <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/13550">encompass</a> those who are no longer considered children, but haven’t yet realised the “social markers” that signify adulthood. These include financial independence, marriage and children.</p>
<p>The outcome of the 2021 elections defied expectations, given Uganda’s <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/11_2022NLFS_2021_main_report.pdf#page=135">large and underemployed youth population</a> and the emergence of Bobi Wine. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">paper</a>, we examined youth political mobilisation in this election. </p>
<p>Despite widespread “youth wave” optimism, we identified diverse, embedded strategies and tactics from the ruling party, the <a href="https://www.nrm.ug/manifesto-2021-2026">National Resistance Movement</a>, that obstructed Bobi Wine’s efforts to build a powerful national youth constituency. </p>
<p>The strategies were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the structural capture of youth representation in Ugandan politics</p></li>
<li><p>diverse economic incentives for political loyalty in the form of loan schemes, grants and short-term employment </p></li>
<li><p>well-spun political narratives that draw on entrenched views of youth as beholden to their elders and the state. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>New wine, old bottles</h2>
<p>When Bobi Wine ran in the presidential election, he was aged 38. Commentators worldwide suggested his candidacy represented a <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2019/1003/A-rapper-s-quest-to-be-president">real</a> and <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/bobi_wine_threat_museveni/">unprecedented threat</a> to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule. Museveni, 79, has been Uganda’s president since 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine got <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/16/uganda-president-wins-decisive-election-as-bobi-wine-alleges">35%</a> of the vote. This is about the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415?redirectedFrom=fulltext">same proportion of votes</a> that has accrued to the main opposition candidates in Uganda since multi-party elections resumed in 2006. </p>
<p>For a new entrant on the political scene, this was an impressive achievement – particularly in the light of political repression and patronage that make the <a href="https://time.com/5913625/bobi-wine-uganda-presidential-candidate/">playing field far from fair</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>Bobi Wine’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">violent arrest</a> in November 2020 gained international attention, as did the government’s aggressive response to protests calling for his release. These resulted in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">death of at least 54 National Unity Platform supporters</a>. Security forces perpetrated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">widespread violence and human rights abuses</a> in the run-up to the election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/black-november-remembering-ugandas-massacre-of-the-opposition-three-years-on-217847">Black November: remembering Uganda's massacre of the opposition three years on</a>
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<p>On the eve of the election, the government ordered a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kampala-elections-coronavirus-pandemic-uganda-united-states-65942284f4e73dbf120ace23775baae4">five-day internet shutdown</a>. There were also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/elections/nrm-dishes-out-money-to-locals-ahead-of-polls-3248892">reports</a> of the ruling party dishing out money to potential voters, with instructions to vote for Museveni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">Our research</a> reviewed Ugandan history since its independence from the British in 1962. We found that the possibility of a national youth constituency had been a concern of Uganda’s post-colonial governments. Regimes have long sought to integrate the youth into their political project, while keeping them fragmented and regionally embedded to prevent broader political mobilisation. </p>
<p>Contemporary tactics used by the ruling party to co-opt the youth converge with these historically rooted methods of regime consolidation. </p>
<h2>Splitting the youth</h2>
<p>The National Resistance Movement has an elaborate set of measures in place –from state level to the villages – to prevent youth discontent from becoming a national political threat. </p>
<p>First, the youth are organised into a “special interest group” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41653703">reinforced through quota systems</a>. These are closely allied with the ruling party’s leadership. Political structures, such as youth MPs and representatives, absorb youth representation under regime authority and entrench regional divisions. </p>
<p>Second, the ruling party uses patronage networks and tactics to mobilise young voters. It offers economic rewards for allegiance and generous material compensation for “party-switching” – which is when supporters defect from the opposition to the National Resistance Movement, often quite publicly. Ahead of the 2021 election, Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62550-inside-museveni-s-war-on-the-ghetto">gave state appointments to popular musicians with wide youth appeal</a> who had been working closely with Bobi Wine’s party. </p>
<p>The ruling party also offers young people <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-cries-foul-as-museveni-gives-shs741m-in-cash-donations-1484578">economic incentives</a> during campaigns. These include short-term employment, loans and cash handouts. Youth are often recruited as election workers, special police constables and crime preventers. In these short-term positions, tens of thousands of youth survey their communities and share local intelligence with the authorities, acting as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283">state’s eyes and ears</a> at a village level. Among young, economically precarious men, this is seen as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">an opportunity</a>, even though they become engaged in supporting the re-election of a regime they may oppose. </p>
<p>Third, during the last election, campaign observers were optimistic about the power of social media to amplify Bobi Wine’s message and increase support. But social media is also a tool the National Resistance Movement uses adeptly. Beyond internet shutdowns and disinformation campaigns, we found that Museveni and the National Resistance Movement used social media channels to promote powerful narratives that linked social order and prosperity to a culture of gerontocracy. This refers to a system of governance in which older people dominate.</p>
<h2>What hope for Bobi Wine?</h2>
<p>Well-developed structures, practices and narratives that fragment national youth mobilisation have been seen in recent Ugandan history. In northern Uganda, for example, young people have lived through a recent history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/managing-life-after-war-how-young-people-in-uganda-are-coping-108351">devastating conflict</a> and still struggle with its legacies. </p>
<p>This, combined with long-standing regional and ethnic tensions throughout the country, means that his opponents often describe Bobi Wine first as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=true">political agitator</a> who could tear the country apart, not as the youth’s best chance for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">political liberation and progress</a>. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, if Bobi Wine contests in 2026, he is likely to struggle again. He may attract global media attention, but Museveni and the National Resistance Movement are familiar with his brand of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">“defiance-based” opposition politics</a>. </p>
<p>As commentators increasingly note, the big question remains whether Bobi Wine and the National Unity Platform, without experience in government and in the absence of strong links to powerful military and state players, can realistically achieve a political <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">transition</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>The overall picture is one in which the elite have long seen the youth as an important resource and potential threat – and as such fear and value them. While Uganda’s young people have real and legitimate grievances, they lack modes of political and social organisation – by long-standing design.</p>
<p><em>Arthur Owor, the director for research and operations at the Centre for African Research, is a co-author of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Tapscott receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID) and the Gerda Henkel Foundation's Special Programme for Security, Society and the State.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Macdonald receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID). </span></em></p>Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in 2021 had appeared to present an unprecedented threat to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule.Rebecca Tapscott, Lecturer, University of YorkAnna Macdonald, Associate Professor, Global Development, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180972023-12-12T09:10:47Z2023-12-12T09:10:47ZWhat’s east Africa’s position on the Israel-Hamas war? An expert unpacks the reactions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda<p>The reactions of some east African countries to the ongoing conflict in Gaza have been less dramatic than South Africa’s. South Africa’s parliament has passed a resolution calling for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21/">closure</a> of its embassy in Tel Aviv. Algeria and South Africa have been the most supportive of the Palestinians. Thus far only South Africa and Chad have withdrawn their representatives from Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>In contrast, the reactions from east African capitals have been less dramatic. At the outset of the current conflict in Gaza, Kenya’s President William Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-10-08-kenya-stands-with-israel-ruto-says-amidst-war-with-palestine/">expressed solidarity</a> with Israel and condemned</p>
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<p>terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals-4393308">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-calls-for-peace-as-israel-palestine-war-intensifies-4394110">Tanzania</a> condemned all forms of violence and called for</p>
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<p>restraint to stem further loss of human life.</p>
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<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Michael+Bishku+research&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">scholar</a> of Middle Eastern and African history, I have researched the relationship between Israel and African countries including those in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312006990_Israel's_Relations_with_the_East_African_States_of_Kenya_Uganda_and_Tanzania_-_From_Independence_to_the_Present">east Africa</a>. </p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the reactions of the east African states to the conflict in the Middle East are shaped by two things: the perceived national threat of terrorism by Islamist factions and, for those states with democratic institutions, domestic public opinion.</p>
<p>In my view these three countries are unlikely to change their stance unless the current conflict escalates. On the one hand they will continue to limit their actions to voting in the United Nations for resolutions in support of the Palestinians. On the other they will continue to solicit technical assistance – especially in agriculture and security – from Israel.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Relations between African countries and Israel have been tested before. For example, in 1973, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455585">25 independent African states</a> cut diplomatic relations with Israel after its occupation of Egyptian territory. These included east African states, such as Kenya, which had enjoyed particularly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892">close relations</a> with Israel since its independence from Britain in 1963.</p>
<p>East African countries colonised by Britain <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html">sought</a> technical assistance after independence. This was particularly true in agriculture. They viewed Israel as complementary or an alternative to having to seek assistance from the big powers.</p>
<p>When African states cut off the diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, Kenya was reluctant but had to act in solidarity with other independent African nations. It kept its cooperation with Israel even before the formal ties were restored in 1988. It facilitated Israel’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">1974 rescue operation</a> at Uganda’s Entebbe airport. The operation was meant to rescue passengers of a French jet airliner that was hijacked on its way from Israel to France, and flown to Entebbe. </p>
<p>Tanzania, on the other hand, sought a more neutral course after independence. It found the socialist character of the Israeli Labour governments appealing but Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">1967 Six-Day War</a> complicated relations. </p>
<p>Tanzania was one of the last African states to <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481841?ln=en">renew</a> relations with Israel in 1994. That was a year after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oslo-Accords">Oslo Accords</a> between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Tanzania was also the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">first African country</a> to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1973 and to host a representative office in its capital. </p>
<p>Uganda has had the most tempestuous relationship with Israel. Under the erratic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a> the country broke off relations with Israel and embraced Libya. Israel and Uganda have had good relations under President Yoweri Museveni. Israeli companies <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/bilateral-relations/Pages/Israel-and-Uganda.aspx">currently operate</a> in Uganda’s construction, infrastructure, agriculture and water management, communications and technology sectors.</p>
<p>Uganda joined most other African countries in <a href="https://truman.huji.ac.il/publications/uganda-and-israel-history-complex-relationship">renewing</a> relations with Israel just after the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Uganda, along with Kenya, has militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission. </p>
<p>The ebbs and flows of these relationships have to be seen against the backdrop of the hard work Israel has put in to building <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with a range of other African countries too. By 2023 it had ties with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<h2>National security threat</h2>
<p>Kenya has been affected by instability in neighbouring Somalia and has been the victim of terror attacks. </p>
<p>In 1998, al Qaeda attacks <a href="https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980813.sc6559.html">targeted</a> the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi attack <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-victims-of-1998-us-embassy-bombing-demand-compensation-/7215264.html">resulted</a> in over 200 deaths and thousands of people were injured. Since then, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/nairobi-attack-israel-advising-kenyan-forces">has taken the lead</a> among foreign countries in aiding and advising Kenyan security.</p>
<p>Kenya has suffered attacks since then by al-Shabaab – across its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">border</a> as well as in <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/kenya/">Nairobi</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s security situation has been different. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has not militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission (Amisom). The mission has been operating since 2007 to provide security in that country in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Uganda has its own set of security problems. A terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital Kampala in 2010 was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/13/al-shabab-claims-uganda-bombings">attributed</a> to al-Shabaab. But a bigger threat to Uganda’s security has come from Islamist rebels known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">Allied Democratic Forces</a> based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Domestic institutions and public opinion</h2>
<p>There is one other factor that explains east Africa’s relations with Israel: the religious composition of populations in the region. </p>
<p>Israel is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/truth-many-evangelical-christians-support-israel-rcna121481">popular</a> with many devout Christians in east Africa, as is the case throughout the continent. If given the opportunity, these Christians would make a pilgrimage to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.09">Holy Land</a>. This factor obviously affects <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-in-africa-9781786995056/">public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Muslims in east Africa have a greater concern for the situation of the Palestinians. All three countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – have populations adhering to these two religions. </p>
<p>Given the democratic characters of Kenya and Tanzania, where there have been peaceful transfers of power, public opinion has more of an impact. This explains Ruto’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-ruto-changes-tune-on-israel-hamas-conflict-4431560">change of tone</a> after the initial statement strongly critical of Hamas.</p>
<p>Tanzania has remained consistent in condemning all forms of violence. That country calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as do the other east African states. </p>
<p>Public pressure is less important in Uganda, where Museveni is quite autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael B. Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa’s reaction to the war in Gaza appears shaped by history, affinity to the policies of the west and the threat of terrorism.Michael B. Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165912023-12-11T13:14:25Z2023-12-11T13:14:25Z‘You reach a point where you have nothing. You will just die’ – in East African refugee camps, food scarcity is a mortal concern<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564320/original/file-20231207-19-l8y174.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C2526%2C1411&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Empty bowls at a refugee camp in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For refugees living in settlements across Africa, life got more difficult in 2023. </p>
<p>Shortfalls <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/underfunded-report-implications-underfunding-unhcr%E2%80%99s-activities-2023">in the operating budget</a> of the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/wfp-and-unhcr-call-urgent-funds-avert-more-ration-cuts-refugees-chad">and the World Food Program</a> have brought increased precarity into the daily lives of millions of displaced people across the continent.</p>
<p>Having fled <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/about-unhcr/where-we-work/africa">violence, famine and insecurity</a> in search of survival, many African refugees now find themselves faced with similar circumstances in the very spaces designed to protect them. Most notably, over the past year, refugees in Central and East Africa have watched as their food rations and living stipends – already meager – <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/critical-funding-shortage-forces-wfp-slash-food-rations-refugees-tanzania">have been cut</a> to unsustainably low levels.</p>
<p>In Africa’s <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/uganda?year=2021">largest refugee-hosting country</a>, Uganda, the <a href="https://www.businessamlive.com/unhcr-warns-of-heightened-risks-to-refugees-as-funding-shortfall-hits-650m/">budget for UNHCR programs</a> is currently funded at only 39% of its needs. Burundi, which has experienced <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/burundi-funding-2023">a 35% increase in its refugee population</a> since 2018, as well as a large increase in the number of returned Burundian refugees, has seen its own budget increase by only 12% in that same period.</p>
<p>The reasons for these shortfalls are multifaceted, including the lasting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa">Russia-Ukraine war</a>, which has affected food production and <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/how-will-russias-invasion-ukraine-affect-global-food-security">resulted in an increase of prices</a>. Though refugees themselves say they are offered little explanation – “They just tell us that the order came from Geneva,” one refugee told us in reference to UNHCR’s headquarters in the Swiss capital.</p>
<p>The resulting cuts in food security programs have had <a href="https://doi.org//10.19088/K4D.2022.125">devastating effects</a> on refugee families and communities.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.shu.edu/profiles/alfaniro.html">We spent</a> <a href="https://history.utk.edu/people/nicole-eggers/">three months</a> in Africa this past summer interviewing over 200 refugees across seven refugee camps and urban refugee havens in Burundi, Uganda and Kenya. While we were there to primarily investigate the role of faith and religious community among refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, our interviews touched on many aspects of the refugee experience. All names used in this article have been changed to protect the interviewees identity.</p>
<p><iframe id="4MtaN" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4MtaN/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>‘Just not enough’</h2>
<p>Cuts in food rations were on the minds of nearly all of the refugees whom we interviewed this summer.</p>
<p>In Burundi, for example, a number of refugees explained to us how 2023’s rations for their daily dietary staple – cornflour used to make a hard porridge known locally as “bukari” – had been cut from 10 kilograms (22 pounds) per month to three kilograms (6.6 pounds). One refugee in the Bwagiriza refugee settlement in Burundi, Jean-Claude, explained how if you try to divide that amount of food into 30 piles, one for each day, it’s “just not enough.” Ultimately, he said, “You worry because you have no idea how you will finish the month. Little by little, the quantity of food goes down at home.”</p>
<p>Stories like Jean Claude’s offer a glimpse of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/gmh.2021.43">psychological stress</a> that refugees experience daily as they engage in an unending search for enough food to feed their families – a search that too frequently fails.</p>
<p>To make matters worse, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/record-numbers-of-displaced-africans-face-worsening-prospects">rising inflation</a> has meant that the ability of refugees to draw on whatever modest resources they may possess to supplement their diets has been greatly undermined.</p>
<p>For parents, this leads to further trauma of explaining to their hungry children that there will be no food. One young mother in the Rwamwanja refugee settlement in Uganda told us how, in a desperate ploy to delay disappointment, she put an empty pot of water on the stove to boil just so that her children would go to bed with the hope that there would be food to eat in the morning.</p>
<h2>Hunger and exploitation</h2>
<p>Others resort to even more desperate ends, consuming inedible food that can sicken and even kill them.</p>
<p>“Whole families become sick. Some neighbors ate some roots because of hunger. All of them were vomiting,” a refugee mother named Mauwa explained to us in Burundi. “Mother, father, children … we are forced to eat food that doesn’t agree with us and makes us sick to our stomachs.” </p>
<p>Still others face the worst outcome imaginable.</p>
<p>Amina, a Congolese refugee living in Bwagiriza, described how, following days of not eating, her young child became violently ill after consuming some corn porridge, her severely malnourished body no longer able to digest it. The child’s condition should have been treatable, but because budget cuts had also recently ended medical transport assistance, they were unable to get to the hospital quickly enough and ultimately the child died.</p>
<p>“There is no food. There is no health care,” she said. “We are being trampled. You reach a point where you have nothing. You will just die.”</p>
<p>Other refugees emphasized how ration cuts contribute directly and indirectly to <a href="http://doi.org//10.1186/s13031-020-00336-3">heightening insecurity</a> in the settlements.</p>
<p>“Famine in the camp is torturing us,” said Amani, a father of seven. “Lack of food is causing our children to become thieves. The moment it is dusk, they break into homes seeking the food they saw you bringing into the house. They don’t look for anything else – just food.”</p>
<p>Refugees in Kyaka II and other settlements in Uganda described being exploited by local communities and how women and youths were <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/refugee-camps-in-northern-uganda-choke-on-sexual-abuse-cases-1749666">exposed to sexual violence</a>.</p>
<p>Vumilia, a mother from a Burundian camp, explained how young girls, including her own, were sexually exploited by adults in return for food: “These camps are harming our children. A child as young as 12 is getting pregnant. And it’s because of hunger that she is forced to consent so that she can get some food … and she is raped and she gets pregnant.”</p>
<p>Refugees also observed that ration cuts and food scarcity threaten to turn cordial relationships with local communities into ones defined by conflict.</p>
<p>“We will now be fighting with the [Ugandan host communities] and each other,” explained Furah, a Congolese woman in one of the Ugandan camps, “because you have brought insecurity in the camp. … This will then lead to conflicts. If they don’t kill me, I will kill them.”</p>
<h2>What chance self-reliance?</h2>
<p>In response to these cuts, the UNHCR is increasingly promoting <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/handbook-self-reliance-complete-publication">self-reliance</a> programs, but ration cuts <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2023.2209485">undermine such programs</a>. </p>
<p>Refugees are told that they must learn to depend on themselves and are taught various skills such as gardening, weaving and animal husbandry. But the strain on their resources leaves them unable to invest. </p>
<p>Marceline in the Kavumu settlement explained, “On this question of self-reliance, you ask yourself: With what resources are you supposed to become self-reliant? … If you’re going to tell someone to be self-reliant, you have to give them the materials to start with.”</p>
<p>We’ve seen that refugees work hard to help themselves and each other. But when resources are so minimal, it is impossible for them to bear the burden themselves.</p>
<p>Time and again, we’ve found that refugees are keen observers of the world around them and they can offer critical insight into the conditions that have been created on the ground, particularly in this context of increasing ration cuts. Listening to them reminds us that behind every budget cut is a human story.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger B. Alfani has received funding (Collaborative grant) from the National Endowment for the Humanities.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Eggers has received funding from the National Endowment for Humanities Collaborative Grant.</span></em></p>Budget cuts have resulted in increased hunger in camps in Uganda, Burundi and Kenya that house refugees from across the region.Roger B. Alfani, Core Fellow of Religious Studies and International Affairs, Seton Hall UniversityNicole Eggers, Assistant Professor of History, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178142023-12-10T09:44:56Z2023-12-10T09:44:56ZUganda will soon be exporting oil: an energy economist outlines 3 keys to success<p>Uganda entered into <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/23489/9789461663092.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y#page=86">agreements</a> in 2012 with two foreign oil entities to exploit its oil resources. Total Energies holds 56.67% of the joint venture partnership and China National Oil Offshore Company (CNOOC) has 28.33%. Through Uganda National Oil Company, the government owns the remaining 15%.</p>
<p>Production is due to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/uganda-to-unveil-first-commercial-oil-production-drilling-programme#:%7E:text=At%20peak%2C%20Uganda%20plans%20to,1.4%20billion%20barrels%20are%20recoverable.">start</a> in 2025. As part of the <a href="https://www.unoc.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MPSA.pdf">production sharing agreement</a>, the production licences are valid for 25 years upon extracting the first oil.</p>
<p>To secure the best possible outcome for Uganda, the government needs to focus on three issues: the production sharing agreement, completion of the development stage, and export timing. My co-authors and I identified these areas of crucial concern in a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468227621001721">paper</a> based on <a href="https://nmbu.brage.unit.no/nmbu-xmlui/handle/11250/3098389">my PhD thesis</a>: Four essays on oil price uncertainty, optimal investment strategies and cost transmission of an oil price shock.</p>
<h2>The context</h2>
<p>Uganda <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X18301412">joined</a> the list of prospective oil-producing countries in 2006, with six billion barrels of proven oil reserves in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/the-map-of-Uganda-showing-Albertine-Graben-picture-from-regional-location-map_fig1_301269801">Albertine Graben</a>, part of the western arm of the east African rift valley. Out of this discovery, 1.4 billion barrels are economically viable for extraction. The <a href="https://www.pau.go.ug/a-glimpse-into-the-development-of-ugandas-oil-and-gas-resources/">peak production</a> is projected to be between 200,000 and 250,000 barrels of oil per day, and the extraction is expected to last 25 years. </p>
<p>The cost of extracting oil over this period will amount to about US$19 billion in capital expenditures and operating expenses. Before this production stage, the development of <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/873501591694701210/Uganda-Oil-Revenue-Management-Closing-Gaps-in-the-Fiscal-and-Savings-Frameworks-to-Maximize-Benefits.pdf#page=47">infrastructure</a>, operation facilities, and production wells will cost around US$12.5 billion to US$15 billion. </p>
<p>The annual <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/873501591694701210/Uganda-Oil-Revenue-Management-Closing-Gaps-in-the-Fiscal-and-Savings-Frameworks-to-Maximize-Benefits.pdf#page=34">revenues</a> from oil production are expected to be US$1.5 billion to US$2 billion. The oil revenues have the potential to stimulate Uganda’s economic growth and real household incomes.</p>
<p>But, like many resource-rich sub-Saharan countries, Uganda has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X18300455?via%3Dihub">limited capacity</a> to solely finance and operate immense complex oil projects. Hence the current production-sharing agreement.</p>
<h2>Production sharing agreement</h2>
<p>The interests and strategic investment decisions of foreign companies are bound to be in conflict with Uganda’s. That’s why they need an effective agreement. </p>
<p>Uganda’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/totalenergies-cnooc-sign-off-us10bn-uganda-oil-project/">final investment decision</a> was initially expected in 2015, but was delayed for another seven years. The reasons included tax disputes, negotiations among contract partners, the compensation and relocation of communities affected by the oil project, and oil price volatility.</p>
<p>An effective production sharing agreement is one that maximises returns for both the government and the companies. In my PhD thesis, I examined the implications of the agreement, given the risk factors that influence the project.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Oil%20in%20Uganda%3A%20hard%20bargaining%20and%20complex%20politics%20in%20East%20Africa&publication_year=2015&author=L.%20Patey">agreement</a> sets out how the government and the foreign companies will share risks and revenues throughout the project’s lifespan. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The foreign companies carry the cost of exploration, development of the oil fields and crude oil pipeline, and oil production. </p></li>
<li><p>The government supplies other infrastructure for the oil project, including roads and the Hoima International Airport. </p></li>
<li><p>The foreign companies are allowed to claim up to 60% of their net field revenues as cost. Whatever remains after royalties and cost recovery is the “profit oil” shared between the foreign companies and the government. </p></li>
<li><p>The foreign companies pay royalties to the government based on the daily production. They also pay corporate income tax on their share of the profit oil. So Uganda earns revenues from royalties, profit oil and income tax. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The roadmap to the first oil production</h2>
<p>Being a landlocked country, Uganda has to get its crude oil to a regional seaport. It needs a pipeline through Tanzania or Kenya.</p>
<p>In February 2022, Total Energies and CNOOC signed the decision to develop the oil fields and construct the East Africa crude oil export pipeline. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/eacop-above-the-ground-installations-take-shape-4437656">pipeline</a>, costing an estimated US$3.5 billion to US$5 billion, is scheduled to be completed in time for oil production in 2025. It will take the oil to the port of Tanga in Tanzania.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://totalenergies.ug/projects/eacop">pipeline company</a> with shareholding from the Uganda National Oil Company (15%), the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (15%), Total Energies (62%) and CNOOC (8%) operates the East African pipeline project.</p>
<h2>Exports timing</h2>
<p>It is important that Uganda’s oil gets to the global market at profitable terms. The slump in oil prices between 2014 and 2016 resulted in the foreign companies drastically trimming their local workforce and cutting their investment budgets by 20% to 30%. The drop in oil prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lock-downs in Uganda also created uncertainty about when the oil would be ready to sell.</p>
<p>The uncertainties about the completion of the development stage and crude oil price volatility still prevail. This has raised concerns about whether the project can generate returns for the government and foreign companies. </p>
<p>In my PhD thesis, I focused on estimating the influence of these uncertainties on the value of Uganda’s oil project, taking into account the design of the production sharing agreement. I found that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>For the development stage to start, the global crude oil price must be equal to or higher than US$63 a barrel. The <a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/oil-price">crude prices</a>, which fell below US$25 per barrel in 2020, have recovered to sell above US$80 now. </p></li>
<li><p>The required prices to start oil production differed among the parties. It was US$18 for the government and US$42 for the foreign companies. This suggests conflicting interests. I further found that when crude oil prices are highly volatile, the government prefers to delay production. The foreign companies prefer the opposite. </p></li>
<li><p>I found that as the oil price rises and the project becomes profitable, the government’s revenue share rises faster than that of the foreign companies. But the oil price volatility exposes the government to revenue losses when the prices fall. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The development of the oil fields and pipeline <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ugandas-tilenga-kingfisher-oil-projects-pipeline-track-2025-2023-10-01/">has resumed</a> in Uganda after the COVID period lull. The government needs to design production sharing agreements to allow for options that encourage investments by foreign companies while stabilising government revenues from the oil sector. One option could be delaying investment until oil prices are favourable.</p>
<p>My results indicate that the government’s revenue share is more sensitive to oil price shocks than the foreign companies’ share. These shocks may translate into fluctuations in government oil revenues and, ultimately, macroeconomic instability. The government must consider these shocks when designing and negotiating oil agreements. </p>
<p>Uganda also needs to manage its petroleum fund effectively. It could learn a lesson from how Norway manages its oil fund. Some share of its oil revenues should be put aside for the period when oil earnings begin to decline. This would counteract the macroeconomic instability arising from sudden government oil revenue changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217814/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Micah's PhD thesis was supported within Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research
for Development (NORHED I) under the project- Capacity Building in Education and Research for Economic Governance, a
partnership between Makerere University Business School and Norwegian University of Life Sciences. The funders had no
role in study design; in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report; or in the decision to
submit the article for publication.
</span></em></p>Uganda needs to focus on production sharing, infrastructure development and export timing.Micah Lucy Abigaba, Energy Economics Lecturer, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186282023-12-07T14:15:45Z2023-12-07T14:15:45ZTerror in Uganda: what’s driving the Islamic State-linked rebels<p>The Islamic State Central Africa Province recently <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/suspected-adf-rebels-kill-foreign-tourists-in-western-uganda-4404976">attacked</a> and killed two foreign tourists and a citizen in a Ugandan nature park. Located in the country’s west near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Queen Elizabeth National Park is about 400km from the Ugandan capital Kampala. </p>
<p>The attack was aimed at Uganda’s most important source of foreign currency, the tourism sector. The sector generated <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-targets-52b-earnings-from-tourism-annu-NV_163086">7.7% of Uganda’s gross national product</a> before a slump linked to the Covid pandemic. </p>
<p>The attack highlights a departure from previous attacks by the armed group towards new targets: western tourists in Uganda. It also highlights how regional rivalries in the border areas of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">Congo-Uganda-Rwanda</a> function as oxygen that has enabled the organisation to survive and grow. </p>
<h2>The evolution</h2>
<p>The group, originally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">formed and financed</a> by the rulers of the DRC (then Zaire) Mobutu Sese Seko, and Sudan Omar al Bashir to launch insurgent attacks on their common enemy in the mid-1990s – Uganda. The ADF was thus initially used by Mobutu and Bashir as a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">weapon</a> in regional rivalries to check Yoweri Museveni’s influence. </p>
<p>At the time of its formation in 1995, ADF was a rather weird merger of <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">two vastly different organisations</a>. </p>
<p>The first consisted of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda that had been based around the mainly Christian Bakonjo-Baamba people of the Rwenzori region in western Uganda, and near the border with DRC. </p>
<p>The second part of the organisation consisted of fighters from the Ugandan Islamic Salafi Foundation, an organisation with roots going back to protests against Uganda’s <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=14">attempts to control</a> its Muslim congregations in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Uganda forced the new group into the eastern provinces of Congo where it was supported by the Mobutu regime before its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">overthrow in 1997</a>. It survived the fall of Mobutu by withdrawing deep into the forests and mountains in the border areas between Uganda and Congo.</p>
<p>Over time, ADF grew more Islamic, partly due to Ugandan amnesties that convinced several of the more moderate leaders of the ADF to defect. Signs of a more radical organisation emerging could be seen from 2011. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant">Islamic State</a> accepted the organisation as a province in 2019. When the ADF leader <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=22">swore allegiance to the Islamic State</a>, there were some defections from the few remaining commanders who had National Army roots. </p>
<h2>Change in strategy</h2>
<p>Since 2021, the Islamic State Central Africa Province has launched two different types of attacks against Uganda. First, terror attacks and assassinations far from the Congolese border in places like Kampala. Second, heavy, more military-style attacks against civilians in Uganda’s border with the DRC. </p>
<p>It’s increasingly using more <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch/">traditional terror tools</a> and has introduced new propaganda material, such as videos with beheadings. Suicide bombings have also become part of its repertoire. The group even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-links-islamist-rebels-attempted-murder-minister-2021-07-01/">attempted to assassinate</a> Ugandan government leaders. </p>
<p>From 2022, the group has carried out heavier raids into Uganda, including attacking a school in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65937484">June 2023</a> in a town near the Uganda-Congolese border. It has also launched several attacks against <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/un-adf-backed-by-islamic-state/7143149.html">businesses in the border zone</a>. </p>
<h2>Uganda’s response</h2>
<p>The increase in the Islamic State Central Africa Province attacks led to a Congolese-approved <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/deal-devil-heart-great-lakes">Ugandan intervention in Congo</a> that began in December 2021. The rebel group initially withdrew into the deep forests of the Rwenzori mountains and the Ituri rainforest in the north-eastern parts of Congo. These are close to the DRC’s Virunga National Park, another large area of wilderness and mountains that’s perfect to hide in. </p>
<p>This renewed pressure might have led parts of the rebel group into Ugandan territory in the Rwenzori Mountains National Park. This isn’t too far from Queen Elizabeth National Park where the recent terror attacks occurred. </p>
<p>This latest intervention continues a pattern of Ugandan and Congolese offensives that lead to temporary withdrawals of the rebel group into the forest and mountains around the Uganda-Congo border. These offensives usually end with the rebels returning into towns and cities upon Ugandan and Congolese withdrawals. </p>
<p>Importantly, the current offensive has failed to end terror attacks inside Uganda.</p>
<p>Adding to the complexity of the intervention are ongoing attacks from the largest guerilla group in eastern Congo, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement</a> (M23). M23 has had <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/14/drc-m23-rebels-recapture-kishishe-where-they-are-accused-of-a-massacre-in-2022/">recent success</a> on the battlefield, recapturing towns from government forces. </p>
<p>The M23 offensive takes place to the south and west of the area where the Islamic State in Central Africa Province is operating, but has repercussions for the group. First, the recent round of warfare in eastern DRC has created a record <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/renewed-fighting-raises-fears-for-peace-in-dr-congo-wider-region/3051713">6.9 million</a> refugees due to escalating violence, creating chaos that the group can take advantage of. </p>
<p>Second, the ongoing fighting has drawn the Congolese army away from its campaign against the Islamic State in Central Africa Province, and hinders Congolese-Rwandese cooperation against it. This is due to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Rwandan support for the M23</a>, which Kigali officially denies providing. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The Islamic State in Central Africa Province thrives on <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Congolese-Rwandese</a> rivalry, as well as regional mistrust dating back decades. Creating real regional cooperation and trust would be the first step toward ensuring that the Islamic State’s local outfit is stopped. It would also help address nearly three decades of fighting in the Congo. </p>
<p>For this to happen, however, African – as well as other international actors – need to stay focused on the conflict in Congo and the unrest in the Uganda-Rwanda-DRC border areas. It’s also important to actively strive for dialogue, especially <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/us-pressure-on-drc-rwanda-paying-off-4445108">between Rwanda and Congo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I would like to thank journalist Adolph Basengezi for his comments on the situation in Congo's north-east, aiding my analysis on the current conflict.</span></em></p>Regional rivalries have functioned as oxygen, allowing the rebel group to survive and grow.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182632023-11-24T15:44:52Z2023-11-24T15:44:52ZUK’s failed asylum deportation plan puts Rwanda’s human rights and refugee struggles in the spotlight<p>The UK Supreme Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf">ruled on 15 November 2023 that</a> sending asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful. The plan would have seen <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/apr/14/tens-of-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-could-be-sent-to-rwanda-says-boris-johnson">tens of thousands</a> of asylum seekers sent from the UK to Rwanda, which would then process and host such refugees indefinitely.</p>
<p>Along with countless <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/uk-abandon-rwanda-asylum-transfer-plan">refugee and human rights groups</a> – including <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-we-do/uk-asylum-and-policy-and-illegal-migration-act/migration-and-economic-development#:%7E:text=UNHCR%20believes%20the%20UK's%20announced,established%20international%20refugee%20protection%20system.">the United Nations</a> – I raised <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uks-plans-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-raise-four-red-flags-182709">red flags about the plan</a> and welcome the decision to halt it. My <a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/people/evan-easton-calabria">research and work</a> over more than a decade has focused on the livelihoods and survival of refugees in east Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-rwanda-plan-unlawful-a-legal-expert-explains-the-judgment-and-what-happens-next-217730">UK court’s decision</a> is grounded in the view that Rwanda is unsafe for asylum seekers because it might force them to return to their home country. Forced return is against <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rights-of-refugees-in-africa-are-under-threat-what-can-be-done-182892">international human rights law</a> as refugees and asylum seekers may be persecuted again in their country of origin. </p>
<p>Much of the recent media focus has been on what the ruling means for the UK and its migration policy. But it’s also important to understand the implications for Rwanda itself and for the refugees already residing there. </p>
<p>Rwanda currently hosts <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa">more than 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers</a>. Most are from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. It’s one of the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/rwanda/#people-and-society">most densely populated</a> countries in Africa and has a <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_RWA.pdf#page=1">high poverty rate</a>, which matters for its ability to host refugees. In the UK’s effort to deter irregular migration, it sought to outsource the asylum-seeking process and ultimately refugee hosting to Rwanda. The east African nation would in return <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/#:%7E:text=In%20return%2C%20the%20UK%20has,around%20%C2%A312%2C000%20per%20person">receive development funds</a>. Neither side of this deal was taking the needs of asylum seekers into account. </p>
<p>The recent UK court ruling highlights two things that Rwanda and its development and humanitarian partners need to consider:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the east African nation’s human rights record</p></li>
<li><p>international support for refugees and asylum seekers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Failing to address the current gaps in these two areas reflects a disregard for human rights that falls on the international community’s shoulders, too.</p>
<h2>Rwanda’s human rights record</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf#page=4">evidence</a> considered in the UK ruling adds to ongoing documentation about Rwanda’s poor human rights record. Refugees and citizens in the country have experienced political repression, including being <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/articles/2018/04/04/please-tell-us-where-we-belong-a-deadly-refugee-protest-in-rwanda">killed during protests</a>. A recent <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/rwanda-global-playbook-abuse-silence-critics">Human Rights Watch report</a> documented Kigali’s use of threats, kidnapping and even killing of Rwandan refugees and migrants abroad who undertake or are affiliated to political activism. </p>
<p>Worrying past evidence of the treatment of asylum seekers includes the outcome of a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/israel-secret-deal-over-deporting-african-migrants-reckless-and-illegal">secretive deal between Israel, Rwanda and Uganda</a> to receive African asylum seekers (mostly from Eritrea and Sudan) between 2014 and 2017. A majority of those deported from Israel to Rwanda immediately left, some through <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/10/moving-under">dangerous migration routes</a>. </p>
<p>In its recent ruling, the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf#page=2">UK court concluded</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>there were substantial grounds for believing that there were real risks that asylum claims would not be properly determined by the Rwandan authorities. There were, therefore, real risks of refoulement {forced return}.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The evidence provided by the UN Refugee Agency highlighted <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/sites/uk/files/legacy-pdf/631f52a84.pdf#page=3">serious issues in Rwanda’s asylum system</a>. This included a lack of adequate legal representation, the risk of bias by judges and lawyers in politically sensitive cases, and current practices of forced return. A failure to comply with international law suggests Rwanda may well continue to benefit from development funding while sending asylum seekers home or <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/10/moving-under">pressuring them to leave the country</a>.</p>
<p>To rectify these failings, the government of Rwanda must commit to eliminating forced return. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms in Rwanda to do so, the international community – including the UN Refugee Agency and activists in the region – must continue to document evidence of human rights violations and speak out. If these violations don’t cease, Rwanda should no longer be funded as the “<a href="https://www.devex.com/news/q-a-new-book-puts-fresh-scrutiny-on-donor-darling-rwanda-99584">donor darling</a>” that it has been. </p>
<h2>Areas for improvement</h2>
<p>At the same time, the UK court ruling illustrates the need for humanitarian and development partners to support Rwanda to improve its conditions for refugees and its asylum-seeking process. In its written evidence for the case, the UN Refugee Agency <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/sites/uk/files/legacy-pdf/631f52a84.pdf#page=3">assessed that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>long-term and fundamental engagement is required to develop Rwanda’s national asylum structures to fairly adjudicate individual asylum claims.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This statement is both a critique of the limitations to the existing asylum infrastructure in Rwanda and an important call for action. </p>
<p>As of 31 October 2023, the UN Refugee Agency’s Rwanda operation was only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-funding-2023">38% funded</a>. This means that refugees within Rwanda <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-operational-update-6137">lack healthcare support and have limited access to legal counselling</a> and assistance.</p>
<p>These figures demand a closer look at the treatment of refugees in Rwanda and the region. These funding deficits restrict the rights of those refugees most in need.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-rwanda-plan-unlawful-a-legal-expert-explains-the-judgment-and-what-happens-next-217730">Supreme court rules Rwanda plan unlawful: a legal expert explains the judgment, and what happens next</a>
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<p>Efforts to improve the asylum system can and should build on the promising practices within Rwanda that relate to refugees. These include <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-operational-update-6137">over 90%</a> of children born as refugees having their birth registered, and a provision on the <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/turning-policy-into-reality-refugees-access-to-work-in-rwanda/">right to work</a>. Urban refugees and refugee students can also <a href="https://globalcompactrefugees.org/good-practices/community-based-health-insurance-urban-refugees-and-refugee-students-rwanda">access</a> the national community-based health insurance scheme. </p>
<p>Non-legal barriers – such as lack of access to capital for businesses and poor camp infrastructure, including limited electricity – still play a role in impeding access to these services for many refugees. However, these are important rights to continue to actualise – and ones that many other refugee-hosting countries don’t offer at all. </p>
<p>The court’s attention to Rwanda’s human rights violations may lead to restricted development funding or wider repercussions for the country from the international community. But there’s a need for more – not less – investment in refugee assistance in Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>There are two best possible outcomes of the UK-Rwanda migration deal being deemed unlawful. </p>
<p>First is that it leads to commitments by the government of Rwanda to improve its treatment of refugees, including Rwandan refugees abroad. Second is that it encourages the UK and other countries to examine their own unlawful practices, such as the <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/migration-and-displacement/refugees-and-asylum-seekers/scared-confused-alone-the-dark-truths-of-immigration-detention">indefinite detention of asylum seekers</a> and ongoing attempts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/outsourcing-asylum-seekers-the-case-of-rwanda-and-the-uk-180973">externalise asylum</a>. </p>
<p>Just as Rwanda’s human rights record should not be brushed under the rug, neither should the international community’s limited support for refugees.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Easton-Calabria receives funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Research conducted through these grants is unrelated to the contents of this article.</span></em></p>The government of Rwanda must commit to eliminating the forced return of refugees and asylum seekers.Evan Easton-Calabria, Senior Researcher at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, and Research Associate at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2174542023-11-14T14:10:37Z2023-11-14T14:10:37ZProjects funded by the World Bank Group’s private sector arm fuel violent conflict – it’s time to reform the system<p>To what extent does private investment help developing countries to reduce conflict and violence and to achieve the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/#goal_section">Sustainable Development Goals</a>? </p>
<p>This is a hotly debated issue. Most international institutions such as the World Bank Group take the stance that the problem is <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/738131573041414269/pdf/Closing-the-SDG-Financing-Gap-Trends-and-Data.pdf">not enough private investment</a>. So they mobilise public resources to subsidise and protect private sector actors with the goal of greatly increasing foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, community, labour and human rights advocates – particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries – tend instead to see the dominant patterns of foreign direct investment as part of a continuing history of <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/suffering-others">exploitation of the developing world</a>.</p>
<p>To help shed light on this debate, we undertook <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4540583">a comprehensive study</a> of thousands of projects of the <a href="https://www.ifc.org/en/home">International Finance Corporation</a> (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. We focused on the period between 1994 and 2022. </p>
<p>We chose the IFC because it claims to invest with developmental purpose. It also purports to apply the highest standards of social and environmental performance. Additionally, many other private and public actors follow its lead in setting standards. If the IFC is getting it wrong it would be a good indicator of how things stand in the broader global system. We focused our study on the relationship between IFC projects and armed conflict, as violence has a clear and detrimental effect on human development. </p>
<p>The results establish that IFC projects cause significant increases in armed conflict around the world. A single project, on average, causes 7.6 additional armed conflict events in the year after it is introduced. These findings are consistent with <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877872">other large quantitative studies</a> that question the relationship between foreign direct investment and development. Foreign direct investment that <a href="https://www.tommasosonno.com/docs/GlobalizationConflict_TommasoSonno.pdf">increases violent conflict</a> and makes development nearly impossible appears the rule, not the exception.</p>
<p>We conclude that current approaches to foreign investment need urgent reconsideration, with particular focus on the risk of violent conflict.</p>
<h2>Our methodology</h2>
<p>Many factors influence violent conflict, including the history of intergroup and state-society relations. So the study used sophisticated econometric analyses to isolate the IFC’s impact. </p>
<p>We first geolocated IFC projects and noted the years in which they were approved. Then we tested whether armed conflict rose in the area proximate to the IFC project in the following year. We controlled for other factors – such as the presence of politically excluded groups, GDP, the regime type, or the population size – that affect conflict. </p>
<p>In the analysis, we were careful to match and compare an IFC project area with those areas without IFC projects to which it is most similar. Finally, we considered and controlled for the possibility that conflict was already rising before the IFC project arrived. By excluding these other explanations for conflict events, we were able to make reasonable causal attributions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-priorities-africas-newbie-on-the-world-bank-board-should-focus-on-181521">Three priorities Africa's newbie on the World Bank board should focus on</a>
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<p>Disturbingly, the study found that increases in armed conflict were concentrated in projects that the IFC told local and international stakeholders had potential limited adverse environmental or social risks. It claimed that these could be readily addressed through mitigation measures. These mitigation measures appear to be either ineffective or under-employed. Alternatively, the IFC is mis-classifying projects that carry more substantial conflict risk than it recognises or cares to make public.</p>
<p>One particularly disturbing example is the Ugandan government’s <a href="http://www.humanrightscolumbia.org/sites/default/files/SIPA%20Listening%20to%20community%20voices%20on%20effective%20remedy%20-%20final.pdf">campaign of terror against local citizens</a> to turn land over to an IFC client. The IFC also has yet to resolve activists’ complaints from 2019 of <a href="https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/liberia-salala-rubber-corporation-src-01margibi-bong-counties">gender-based violence and threats of reprisals and intimidation</a> against one of its project partners, Salala Rubber Corporation in Liberia.</p>
<p>The study also demonstrated that capital-intensive projects (that is, agribusiness, oil, gas, mining and infrastructure) have a larger propensity for socio-political and socio-economic disruption. Areas that receive capital-intensive projects experience, on average, an additional death from armed conflict in the following year.</p>
<h2>Not above the rule of law</h2>
<p>These results should perhaps not be surprising. Civil society groups have long concluded that the IFC prioritises its own profits and business interests over the “<a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/suffering-others">suffering of others</a>” in ways that contribute to “<a href="https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=social_encounters">multiple paths of extraction, dispossession, and conflict</a>”. In 2020 Human Rights Watch characterised the IFC as “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/24/world-bank-group-failing-remedies-project-abuses">failing at remedies for project abuses</a>”. This was based on the World Bank Group’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/brief/external-review-of-ifc-miga-es-accountability">own commissioned review</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cautious-welcome-world-bank-and-imf-return-to-africa-but-questions-remain-214888">Cautious welcome: World Bank and IMF return to Africa, but questions remain</a>
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<p>Yet, the IFC’s strategy has been to position itself above the rule of law. It continues to assert sovereign immunity. It claims that, as an international organisation, <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iolr/16/1/article-p105_105.xml">it should not be liable</a> in national courts – even to parties it admittedly harms. </p>
<p>It maintains this stance despite <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/10/17/world-bank-whistleblower-bridge-international/">recent reports</a> of IFC complicity in covering up the sexual abuse of children to further its investment projects. </p>
<p>It appears beyond time for the 186 member governments that own the IFC to demand transparency, accountability and redress for harms done from the corporation and the private sector actors it funds. Others can also play a role. Governments that have perhaps naively relied on the World Bank halo should question the benefits they are told they can expect from IFC investments. The ratings agencies that classify IFC bonds as positive from an environmental, social, and governance perspective may want to question the bases on which such determinations are made.</p>
<p>At the same time, perhaps more credence can be given to recent <a href="https://www.un.org/en/desa/un-secretary-general-calls-radical-transformation-global-finan-cial-system-tackle-pressing">calls by the UN secretary general</a> to reform the global financial system to better support human security and human development. </p>
<p>This could include specialised intermediaries between the IFC and sensitive projects in difficult places. Independent and empowered local oversight appears necessary to ensure more inclusive and accountable forms of contextual analysis and risk mitigation planning, monitoring and evaluation of development impact, proactive conflict management, and accessible redress for harms done. This could <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/conflict-environments-need-a-peacebuilding-approach-to-business-development">reduce violent conflict and open more developmental potential for private investment</a> in the developing world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work is part of the project Peace Positive Private Sector Development in Africa (P3A), funded by the Research Council of Norway. Additional funding was received from the Peace Finance Initiative.</span></em></p>A single International Finance Corporation project, on average, causes 7.6 additional armed conflict events in the year after it is introduced.Brian Ganson, Professor and Head, Centre on Conflict & Collaboration, Stellenbosch UniversityAnne Spencer Jamison, Assistant Professor of International Economics, Government, and Business, Copenhagen Business SchoolWitold Jerzy Henisz, Vice Dean and Faculty Director, ESG Inititative; Deloitte & Touche Professor of Management, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116352023-11-07T12:07:59Z2023-11-07T12:07:59ZWorld Bank suspension of Uganda funds over anti-homosexuality law: what this says about the struggle over funds and sovereignty<p>The World Bank issued a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/08/08/world-bank-group-statement-on-uganda">statement</a> on 8 August 2023, announcing that it had effectively suspended all new public financing to Uganda over concerns with the country’s <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/news/6737/president-assents-anti-homosexuality-act">anti-homosexuality law</a>, which “fundamentally contradicts the World Bank Group’s values”. </p>
<p>According to Human Rights Watch, the anti-homosexuality act <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/ugandas-president-signs-repressive-anti-lgbt-law">violates multiple fundamental rights</a> guaranteed under Uganda’s constitution and a number of international human rights agreements which the government of Uganda has signed. The act was first proposed in March 2023, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/uganda-parliament-passes-anti-lgbtq-bill">adopted</a> by the Ugandan parliament in early May. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and the diplomatic and donor community writ large, follow closely what happens in Ugandan politics.</p>
<p>It took three months for the bank to react and issue the statement. This was fairly fast. The World Bank is usually a slow mover because of its due diligence bureaucracy. It takes time to have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership">members</a> on board behind political statements. So, because it took only three months, one could argue there was an internal push from central people or member states. This says something about the bank’s ambiguous relationship to its client states’ domestic politics and how it deals with political concerns.</p>
<p>The World Bank has an apolitical mandate. Article IV (section 10) of the Bank’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV">articles of agreement</a> says</p>
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<p>the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.</p>
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<p>On the other hand, its <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are">mission statement</a> “to end extreme poverty and promote prosperity in a sustainable way” is not only political but requires political action.</p>
<p>As a social anthropologist, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=vQqMFWQAAAAJ&hl=en">researched</a> international aid in eastern Africa and particularly followed the relationship between the World Bank and Uganda since 2006.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s engagement with Uganda has always <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SandeLieDevelopmentality">filtered through</a> into the country’s domestic affairs. In my view, the recent suspension of funding over the anti-homosexuality law was in keeping with that tradition. The previous interventions in domestic issues involved presidential term limits, market reforms and governance reforms.</p>
<p>I believe the interventions should be viewed in the context of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024435">informal and indirect</a> means through which the World Bank seeks to control its clients. Despite its insistence on national ownership of its projects, the World Bank uses its lending portfolio to govern and control its clients. </p>
<h2>Presidential term limits</h2>
<p>In 2005/6, the World Bank <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/world-bank-intends-cut-aid-uganda-report">cut its loans</a> to Uganda by 10% due to technical issues referred to as “prior actions” which the government had failed to implement before signing the loan agreement, causing expenditure overruns in the public administration budget. The real reason for cutting aid, in my opinion, was politics. The World Bank was frustrated when President Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/component/content/article?id=18710:how-term-limits-were-kicked-out-in-2005">lifted</a> the presidential term limit to seek re-election again. </p>
<p>The recent reaction to the anti-homosexuality act thus demonstrates a continuity in how the World Bank responds to domestic political affairs. It also shows a change, as the reaction is not rooted in politics or concealed as a form of techno-bureaucracy, but explicitly linked to values. The tone is different. The World Bank always sought to appear neutral on values. It suggests to me that the institution’s most prominent owners and shareholders have weighed in.</p>
<h2>Market reforms</h2>
<p>During the structural adjustment era, lasting until around 2000, World Bank loans to Uganda and other recipients came with strict conditions and ready-made policies baked into them. The bank could make loans conditional on the recipient state privatising state-owned enterprises or liberalising the economy. Those are highly political and ideological measures in the client state’s sovereign domain. For instance, Museveni bought into a lot of the structural reform programmes which included <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/718281468317110673/uganda-policy-participation-people">market reforms</a> and <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/964971555504602614/pdf/Learning-from-Power-Sector-Reform-The-Case-of-Uganda.pdf">power sector development</a>. This is in contrast to Ethiopia, which until very recently has been considered more resistant to World Bank proposed reforms.</p>
<p>A later disbursement tactic was to make concessional lending contingent on the government making its own national poverty reduction strategy. Once that was endorsed by the bank, the bank would provide financial assistance to help the government implement its own strategy. This bypassed questions about external governance and policy imposition.</p>
<h2>Governance reforms</h2>
<p>As the World Bank withdrew from direct control, it aimed to retain power through other means – while respecting national ownership. Whatever is proposed by aid recipients still needs the bank’s endorsement to become effective.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s power and control don’t just lie in the ability to decide what to fund and when to stop funding. It is just as much a result of the bank’s ability to frame partnership and the conditions under which the recipient exercises the freedom it has been granted. </p>
<p>One of these freedoms concerns the formulation of national development policy. National policy needs the bank’s approval to become effective. So the client government should do as the bank wants it to do, but voluntarily.</p>
<p>The bank can govern at a distance. The policies funded by the bank are defined as the state’s own polices. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and indeed donors in general, always emphasise the principle of national ownership, even as their policies undermine it. This gives donors the advantage of placing the responsibility for failure on their clients if aid programmes do not succeed. And indirect governance structures imply that client governments appear both as objects to be shaped by donor policies and as subjects with whom agreements are made.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>How the World Bank governs and relates to its clients (not just in Uganda) has changed over time, from direct power and policy imposition to more indirect and tacit dynamics concealed as mutual partnership.</p>
<p>The fact that the Ugandan government went on to adopt the anti-homosexuality bill, despite the bank’s indirect governance and technocratic micromanagement, can thus be read as a failure of the partnership arrangement and the bank’s ability to govern at a distance.</p>
<p>Nor did lobbying and arm-twisting by international donors, the US and the EU among others, persuade the government to kill the bill.</p>
<p>More actors and emerging economies are becoming increasingly active as sources of financing, such as China, the Gulf states, Russia, and private actors. These are potentially replacing traditional western donors, marking a shift to more geopolitical rivalry on the African continent. But few lunches are free, and the new, emerging actors pose new conditions and expectations. The World Bank, given its commitment to transparency and democracy, may after all be preferable.</p>
<p>A return to more direct, conditionality-based governance, as practised during the structural adjustment era, could be a way to deal with values, but could jeopardise national ownership and mutual partnership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Harald Sande Lie receives funding from the Research Council of Norway for the research project 'Public-Private Development Interfaces in Ethiopia' (grant no. 315356). </span></em></p>The World Bank’s funding freeze reflects a shift from policy imposition to indirect ways of controlling client nations.Jon Harald Sande Lie, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2152702023-10-12T13:31:06Z2023-10-12T13:31:06ZMauritius is the latest nation to decriminalise same-sex relations in a divided continent<p>The Mauritius Supreme Court has <a href="https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Judgment-AH-SEEK-.pdf">declared</a> unconstitutional a law that criminalises consensual same-sex acts between adult men. The decision boosts the trend in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region towards decriminalisation. Now, a slight majority – nine out of 16 member states – do not prohibit gay and lesbian sexual relations. </p>
<p>I have researched and taught human rights law in Africa, including the rights of sexual minorities, for over three decades, and closely follow the work of the <a href="https://achpr.au.int/">African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>. </p>
<p>The African Commission, as the continent’s human rights custodian, should lend its unequivocal support to the decriminalisation trend. This is particularly significant as attempts are made to further criminalise and stigmatise sexual minorities in parts of Africa.</p>
<p>The commission has not yet expressed its view on the decision. Its <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/events/2023-10-20/77os-public">77th ordinary session</a>, starting on 20 October 2023 in Arusha, Tanzania, is an opportunity to do so. It should build on its 2014 <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/275-resolution-protection-against-violence-and-other-human-rights-violations">guidance</a> to African states on eradicating violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity. </p>
<h2>Mauritius court ruling</h2>
<p>The Mauritian Supreme Court <a href="https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Judgment-AH-SEEK-.pdf">found</a> that section 250 of the <a href="https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/uploads/res/document/mus/criminal-code_html/Mauritius_Criminal_Code.pdf">1838 Mauritius Criminal Code</a>, which criminalises anal sex between two consenting adult men, violates the <a href="https://cdn.accf-francophonie.org/2019/03/maurice-constitution2016.pdf">1968 Mauritius constitution</a>. </p>
<p>The litigant, Ah Seek, a gay Mauritian man and board member of the Mauritian NGO <a href="https://www.actogether.mu/fr/trouver-une-ong/collectif-arc-en-ciel">Collectif-Arc-en-Ciel</a>, invoked a number of constitutional grounds. However, the court based its decision on the most directly relevant ground: the right not to be discriminated against.</p>
<p>In addressing two issues that could militate against a finding in Ah Seek’s favour, the court relied on the approach of other courts in the SADC region. The 2021 <a href="https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/2021.11.29-AG-Botswana-v-Motshidiemang.pdf">judgment</a> by Botswana’s Court of Appeal was particularly relevant. This judgment held that the constitutionally protected ground of “sex” in the Botswana constitution encompassed “sexual orientation”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/botswana-court-ruling-is-a-ray-of-hope-for-lgbt-people-across-africa-118713">Botswana court ruling is a ray of hope for LGBT people across Africa</a>
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<p>The first issue was the contention that Mauritius’ constitution does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on “sexual orientation”. The relevant provision (<a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016">section 16</a>) forbids discrimination on the basis of seven specified grounds, including sex. </p>
<p>The Mauritian court concluded that the word “sex” in section 16 of the constitution includes “sexual orientation”. </p>
<p>The court also emphasised the country’s international human rights commitments. It said that, as a state party to the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>, Mauritius was expected to interpret its constitution in line with this <a href="https://juris.ohchr.org/casedetails/702/en-US">treaty</a>. </p>
<p>The second issue was whether the rarity of prosecutions removed the need for the court to decide. Referring to a <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.html">judgment</a> by the South African Constitutional Court, the Mauritius court held that the mere threat of arrest, prosecution and conviction</p>
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<p>hangs like the sword of Damocles over the heads of homosexual men.</p>
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<p>The court therefore concluded that the constitution protected everyone from discrimination based on their sexual orientation, whatever it might be. </p>
<p>When it was given an opportunity to show any legitimate purpose for this form of discrimination, the state merely made reference to same-sex relations as a “highly sensitive issue” due to the “delicate socio-cultural and religious fabric of Mauritian society”. Rejecting these as justifications for discrimination, the court underlined that Mauritius was a secular state. </p>
<h2>Regional trend</h2>
<p>Greater societal acceptance of homosexuality can be both a catalyst for and a consequence of decriminalisation of same-sex relationships. </p>
<p>In a recent survey by the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/AD639-Uganda-a-continental-extreme-in-rejection-of-people-in-same-sex-relationships-Afrobarometer-9may23-.pdf">Afrobarometer</a>, Mauritius featured prominently as a country in which tolerance (towards an LGBT person as neighbour) had increased from 2014 to 2022. </p>
<p>Nine of the 11 African countries with an above-average tolerance percentage towards LGBT persons were from the SADC. All of these 11 states, except Eswatini, have decriminalised “sodomy laws”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbtiq-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-in-south-africa-major-new-study-identifies-a-diverse-wide-spread-community-199227">LGBTIQ+ migrants and asylum seekers in South Africa: major new study identifies a diverse, wide-spread community</a>
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<p>The conditions for decriminalisation seem to be converging in Eswatini. Its population displays a relatively high level of acceptance (of 42%) in the survey. Also, its Supreme Court has <a href="https://eswatinilii.org/akn/sz/judgment/szsc/2023/23/eng@2023-06-16/source.pdf">signalled</a> some openness to uphold LGBT persons’ rights. </p>
<p>Besides Eswatini, other SADC member states that still retain “sodomy” laws are Comoros, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. With the exception of the Comoros, the laws of these states are relics from British colonial times, when “sodomy” laws were imposed as part of a colonial “civilising” mission. The Mauritius Supreme Court <a href="https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Judgment-AH-SEEK-.pdf">noted</a> that, as a colonial import, section 250 did not reflect Mauritian values and was not the “expression of domestic democratic will”. </p>
<p>Today, just over half of the SADC states do not criminalise same-sex relationships between consenting adults. The Democratic Republic of Congo never legislated on this matter. In <a href="https://media.lesotholii.org/files/legislation/akn-ls-act-2012-6-eng-2012-03-09.pdf">Lesotho</a> (2012), the <a href="http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/5198/Seychelles+parliament+passes+bill+to+decriminalize+sodomy">Seychelles</a> (2016), <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-mozambique-scraps-colonial-era-homosexuality-and-abortion-bans/">Mozambique</a> (2015) and <a href="https://africlaw.com/2021/03/05/decriminalisation-of-consensual-same-sex-acts-in-angola-and-the-progress-of-lgbti-human-rights-in-lusophone-africa/">Angola</a> (2019), the legislature in the last decade or so adopted a new version of the penal code. These offences, stemming from the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/17/alien-legacy/origins-sodomy-laws-british-colonialism">English common law</a> or the <a href="https://www.ahry.up.ac.za/garrido-r#pgfId-1119589">1886 Portuguese Penal Code</a>, were omitted. In Madagascar, the <a href="http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Madagascar/MG_Code_Penal.pdf">penal code</a> criminalises consensual same-sex acts only with a person under 21 years old. </p>
<p>Still, the situation remains in flux. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/14/religious-groups-march-in-malawi-before-court-case-on-lgbtq-rights">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonblade.com/2023/03/13/namibian-supreme-court-hears-three-lgbtq-rights-cases/">Namibia</a>, litigation on related penal code provisions is pending. In Malawi, then President Joyce Banda in 2012 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/18/malawi-president-vows-legalise-homosexuality">committed to repealing these laws</a>. There was also a moratorium on arrests and prosecutions between 2012 and 2016, and a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/26/let-posterity-judge/violence-and-discrimination-against-lgbt-people-malawi">court-ordered review</a> of the constitutionality of “sodomy laws”. </p>
<p>In Namibia, the Supreme Court <a href="https://namiblii.org/akn/na/judgment/nasc/2023/14/eng@2023-05-16">decided in 2023</a> that Namibia must recognise same-sex marriages validly concluded outside the country.</p>
<h2>Diverging trend</h2>
<p>In the rest of Africa, the position of sexual minorities is much more precarious. Thirty-one (almost 58%) of countries still <a href="https://76crimes.com/76-countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal/">criminalise consensual same-sex acts between adults</a>. The trend is towards more restrictive laws and harsher punishment.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/news/6737/president-assents-anti-homosexuality-act">signed into law</a> the <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/sites/default/files/The%20Anti-Homosexuality%20Act%2C%202023.pdf">Anti-Homosexuality Act</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>In Ghana, the Promotion of Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill is <a href="https://www.parliament.gh/epanel/docs/bills/Promotion%20of%20Proper%20Human%20Sexual%20Rights%20and%20Ghanaian%20Family%20Values%20Bill,%202021.pdf#viewer.action=download">being considered</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>In Kenya, the anti-gay <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/20/kenyas-anti-gay-bill-proposes-50-year-jail-term//">Family Protection Bill</a> carries a 50-year jail term. But the Supreme Court decided in February 2023 to allow the NGO National Gay and Lesbian Rights Commission <a href="https://www.humandignitytrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/SC-Application-No.-E011-of-2023-George-Kaluma-v.-NGO-Others.pdf?pdf=George-Kaluma">to be registered</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/being-queer-in-africa-the-state-of-lgbtiq-rights-across-the-continent-205306">Being queer in Africa: the state of LGBTIQ+ rights across the continent</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These laws were initiated as private members bills. They are driven by individuals rather than any political party’s agenda, and bolstered by an anti-LGBT solidarity <a href="https://glaad.org/rachel-maddow-traces-anti-lgbtq-legislation-uganda-activists-arizona/">conference</a> of African parliamentarians. </p>
<h2>African Commission’s role</h2>
<p>Against this background of opposing forces and divergent trends, the role of the African Commission is all the more important. The commission itself has sent mixed signals. It <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/resolution-promotion-and-protection-rights-intersex-persons">affirmed</a> the right to dignity and bodily integrity of sexual and gender minorities. But it also <a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbtq-rights-african-union-watchdog-goes-back-on-its-own-word-197555">refused</a> to grant observer status to NGOs working to promote these rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frans Viljoen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The trend towards decriminalising same sex relations in the SADC region contrasts with moves towards harsher punishment in other parts of Africa.Frans Viljoen, Director and Professor of International Human Rights Law, Centre for Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130852023-09-24T12:02:25Z2023-09-24T12:02:25ZYoung people with sexual or gender diversity are at higher risk of stopping their HIV treatment because of stigma and harsh laws<p>Ending the AIDS pandemic – particularly in eastern and southern Africa – cannot be achieved unless more resources are channelled to meet the needs of key vulnerable populations.</p>
<p>This is one of the themes that emerged during an <a href="https://www.samrc.ac.za/event/11th-sa-aids-conference-2023-20-23-june-2023-durban">AIDS conference in June</a> in South Africa. Prejudice against particular groups – such as men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender communities – interferes with treatment regimes and people’s adherence to treatment. These groups are also at higher risk from HIV due to increased levels of stigma, discrimination, violence and criminalisation. </p>
<p>Our research is part of a three-year <a href="https://www.heard.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/SADC-Symposium-Report_final.pdf">project</a> on HIV-related stigma linked to young people with sexual or gender diversity. The research, conducted in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, involved 156 participants.</p>
<p>The research identified three main findings:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Criminal laws and strongly negative socio-cultural and religious beliefs produced deeply rooted intolerance around sexual or gender diversity. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants spoke about repeated experiences of verbal harassment, being gossiped about and physical violence.</p></li>
<li><p>Other population groups with HIV said their lives had become more tolerable as social awareness and acceptance of HIV had increased over time. However HIV-related stigma regained its potency when linked to sexual or gender diversity, with adverse effects for adherence to antiretroviral treatment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our research provided novel evidence on the deeply rooted fears and anxieties around multiple forms of stigma among young MSM and transgender women in southern Africa. </p>
<h2>Criminalising sex</h2>
<p>Across 13 countries in east and southern Africa, laws and policies criminalise same-sex sexual relations and facilitate the process of stigmatising gay and transgender individuals.</p>
<p>Recently, Uganda passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, which punishes same-sex conduct with life imprisonment. Several acts considered as “aggravated homosexuality” are liable to the death penalty. </p>
<p>Our study also noted that young people had developed various strategies to manage their lives. For example choosing when to disclose or identify as a person living with HIV or as a member of the sexual minority community in others, but rarely being both at once. </p>
<p>The constant worry and stress of living with HIV, and the fear of being stigmatised, could have a significant impact on health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>The burden of concealing their identities resulted in a range of mental, emotional and physical vulnerabilities. Signs of depression as well as frequent alcohol use were evident.</p>
<p>Overall 42% of participants had contemplated suicide at least once. According to one participant, an 18-year-old:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I feel like I am nothing, I am useless. In the community, looking at HIV, I am a gay, people they isolate me. So, I don’t feel comfortable, even failing to go to work and finding some money, whatever. And, sometimes, I decide if I can die today, I can rest. So, a lot of things come into my mind when I am disturbed … Sometimes my parents try to comfort me but, internally, I am really disturbed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As well as signs of depression, frequent alcohol use was evident. </p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas, with those that came closest being provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<h2>Fear of being found out</h2>
<p>Being seen taking antiretroviral therapy or having it found in one’s possession signalled that one was living with HIV. Some individuals preferred to miss doses, occasionally or over more prolonged periods, rather than endure actual or feared stigma linked to being “found out” as someone living with HIV.</p>
<p>A 24-year-old told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What made me to delay taking medication is when my partner wants me to visit his home because he stays in Zomba, and I haven’t disclosed my HIV status to my partner yet, and I can’t take the ARVs with me there. As a result, I go there without the ARVs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A 19-year-old said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It affects me sometimes because, if people reject you, you feel like stopping to take the medication. ‘Maybe am just wasting my time, let me just die.’ It affects me a lot.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other findings we made were that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Many participants had had their status disclosed by LGBTIQ+ peers without their consent. HIV-related stigma is still highly prevalent within the LGBTIQ+ community and has many negative impacts. </p></li>
<li><p>Participants continued to experience or fear stigma related to their sexual orientation at health facilities, which also affected their access to healthcare and retention in care.</p></li>
<li><p>Tailored HIV services for key populations, including young MSM and transgender women, were not reaching everyone; rural areas were the least included.</p></li>
<li><p>Through their experiences, gay young men and transgender women were familiar with the harmful consequences of stigma and yet they were often ostracised from planning and decision-making roles. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Key populations in our study faced inequalities in three main areas: access to HIV services; justice and human rights; and investments in programmes geared towards them.</p>
<p>There were few services available to assist in coping with these multiple stigmas. Those that came closest were provided by “sexual minority friendly” organisations or led by sexual minority peers themselves.</p>
<p>There need to be more community-based organisations that are run by members of these key populations. In Cameroon, for example, the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/cameroon/health/hiv-aids">CHAMP</a> programme supports grassroots advocacy to mitigate stigma and violence and trains peers to offer counselling, </p>
<p>We can only achieve progress if we treat everyone as equal partners in fighting this pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaymarlin Govender receives funding from the National Research Foundation and Sida</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Nyamaruze receives funding from HIV/AIDS Special Fund Round III initiative of the Southern African Development Community. </span></em></p>Stigmatised people living with HIV often suffer from fear, depression and abuse. It’s sometimes easier to stop a treatment regime than risk being ostracised or assaulted by the community.Kaymarlin Govender, Research Director at The Health Economics and HIV and AIDS Research Division (HEARD), University of KwaZulu-NatalPatrick Nyamaruze, Post-doctoral research fellow, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129352023-09-18T14:25:22Z2023-09-18T14:25:22ZWild animals leave DNA on plants, making them easier to track – here’s what scientists found in a Ugandan rainforest<p>The world is losing animals at an alarming <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1244693">rate</a> due to habitat degradation, climate change and illegal human activities in the wildlife protected areas. In fact, it is estimated that, by 2100, <a href="https://www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/spm_africa_2018_digital.pdf#page=25">more than half</a> of Africa’s bird and mammal species could be lost. </p>
<p>Efforts to conserve biodiversity depend on information about which animals are where. Tracking wildlife is instrumental. Existing tracking methods include camera trapping and line transects, which are specific areas and designed trails respectively, that can be revisited from time to time to monitor habitat conditions and species changes. These methods can be expensive, labour intensive, time consuming and difficult to use, and might not detect all the species that are present in an area. Dense rainforests present a particular problem for tracking, since the vegetation is often very thick and doesn’t let much light in.</p>
<p>Recent research has shown that vertebrates leave their DNA in the environment, both as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982221016900?via%3Dihub">airborne particles</a> and on <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-27512-8">vegetation</a>. This offers a useful new way to monitor species. </p>
<p>Our international research team, working in the rainforest of Uganda’s Kibale National Park, wondered whether the environmental DNA methods would be useful to us. We reasoned that if animal DNA was in the air, perhaps it settled and got stuck to leaves. Waxy, sticky or indented leaf surfaces might even be ideal DNA traps. Would simply swabbing leaves collect enough DNA to monitor species and map biodiversity?</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2023.06.031">study</a> demonstrated that many birds and mammals can be detected using this simple, low tech method. It’s a promising tool for large-scale biomonitoring efforts.</p>
<h2>Kibale National Park</h2>
<p><a href="https://ugandawildlife.org/national-parks/kibale-national-park/">Kibale National Park</a> in Uganda is famous for its rich biodiversity and has earned its place as the “primate capital” of the world. It is home to 13 species of non-human primates including the endangered Red colobus monkey and chimpanzees. </p>
<p>To test our idea, the research team went into the park’s dense tropical forest armed with 24 cotton buds. Our task was to swab as many leaves as possible with each bud in three minutes.</p>
<p>To tell which animals gave rise to the DNA in the swabs, the team sequenced a short piece of DNA, called a barcode. Barcodes are distinct for each animal, so the barcode found in the swabs could be compared to a barcode library containing all animals sampled to date.</p>
<p>The team didn’t expect great results, because in rainforest conditions – hot by day, cold at night, humid and wet – DNA degrades quickly.</p>
<p>So we were surprised when the results came back from the DNA sequencer. We’d picked up over 50 species of mammals and birds and a frog, with swabs collected in just over an hour, on only 24 cotton buds.</p>
<p>We detected nearly eight animal species on each of the cotton buds. These species spanned a huge diversity, from the very large and endangered African elephant to a very small species of sunbird. </p>
<p>Detected animals included the hammer-headed fruit bat, which has a wing-span of up to one metre, monkeys like the elusive L’Hoest’s monkey and the endangered ashy red colobus, as well as rodents such as the forest giant squirrel. A great variety of birds was detected too, including the great blue turaco and the endangered gray parrot.</p>
<p>The high diversity of animals, coupled with the impressive animal detection rate per swab, suggests we can now collect a lot of animal DNA simply from leaves. The ease of sampling, a task we can ask anyone on our team to do quickly when they are in the forest, suggests we could use this method to track animal diversity in the park, particularly in areas that are rapidly changing.</p>
<p>One of the team members, Emmanuel Opito, is studying exactly these areas in the park for his doctoral project. He is trying to understand how the invasive <em>Lantana camara</em> and the woody herb <em>Acanthus pubescens</em> inhibit forest regeneration. With this leaf swabbing method, it will be easier to explore how removing invasive species and allowing the forest to regenerate will help animal biodiversity recover. </p>
<h2>Easy way to gather information</h2>
<p>Monitoring animal populations is crucial to comprehend the scale of ecosystem changes and to guide the development of effective management strategies. New technologies like these environmental DNA approaches offer promising support for these efforts. </p>
<p>Because leaf swabbing does not require fancy and expensive equipment or much training to carry out, it can easily be carried out by the staff at Uganda Wildlife Authority, field assistants or biologists working in the forest. </p>
<p>The method can also be scaled up because DNA sequencing technology is becoming more accessible and affordable post-COVID-19. There is a lot of potential for environmental DNA to contribute to biodiversity monitoring at a much larger scale and to inform biodiversity management initiatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212935/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Omeja was supported by the International Development Research Centre.</span></em></p>Many animal species can be detected using a simple, low tech method of collecting DNA from the environment.Patrick Omeja, Senior Research Fellow and Field Director, Makerere University Biological Field Station, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116302023-08-16T15:14:31Z2023-08-16T15:14:31ZWorld Bank freezes loans to Uganda because of anti-gay laws. But it doesn’t mean it’s becoming a human rights watchdog<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542973/original/file-20230816-29-oadrz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gay pride rally in Entebbe, Uganda in 2014 before a tough anti-homosexuality law was passed.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ISAAC KASAMANI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/world-bank-freezes-loans-to-uganda-because-of-anti-gay-laws-but-it-doesnt-mean-its-becoming-a-human-rights-watchdog-211630&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Many people may be tempted to view the World Bank’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/05/31/world-bank-group-on-uganda">recent announcement</a> that it will freeze new loans to Uganda because of the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ugandas-new-anti-lgbtq-law-could-lead-to-death-penalty-for-same-sex-offences-202376">vicious anti-LGBTIQ+ law</a> as a harbinger of the Bank taking a more progressive approach to human rights issues. </p>
<p>While the announcement is welcome, based on my many years studying the Bank and on my research for <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-law-of-international-financial-institutions-9780192862822?cc=us&lang=en&">my forthcoming book</a>, The Law of the International Financial Institutions, I think there are good reasons to be cautious about its significance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/what-we-do">World Bank</a>, which has been operating for over 75 years, has 189 member states as shareholders. It funds development projects and programmes in member states that have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mic/overview#:%7E:text=The%20world's%20Middle%20Income%20Countries,%244%2C046%20and%20%2412%2C535%20(2021).">annual per capita incomes below about US$12,535</a>. The member states elect a Board of Executive Directors that oversees the Bank’s operations and approves all its loans. </p>
<p>The Bank’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement">Articles of Agreement</a> stipulate that it cannot base its decisions on political grounds. The articles state that the Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV">“shall not interfere in the political affairs”</a> of its member states. Nor should its decisions be influenced by the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV">“political character”</a> of these states.</p>
<p>Moreover, the Bank is instructed that it should only pay attention <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-III">“to considerations of economy and efficiency”.</a> And that it should not be affected by <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-III">“political or other non-economic influences or considerations.” </a></p>
<p>The articles don’t define these key terms. They also don’t identify the criteria the Bank should consider when deciding if a particular issue should be excluded from consideration because it is “political” rather than “economic”. </p>
<p>This means that this decision is within the exclusive discretion of the Bank’s decision makers. </p>
<h2>Division of labour</h2>
<p>The Articles were drafted and agreed in 1944. At the time, the division of responsibilities between those who made the “political” decisions and those who made the “economic” ones seemed relatively clear. It was assumed that each Bank member state, as an exercise of its sovereignty, would decide for itself how to deal with the social, environmental, and cultural impacts and consequences of the particular transaction for which it was seeking the Bank’s support.</p>
<p>The Bank, on the other hand, would take the state’s decisions on these issues as given. It would merely consider if the particular loan request was technically sound and economically and financially feasible. </p>
<p>This division of responsibility, of course, was unrealistic. The Bank’s Board of Executive Directors must approve each loan. They represent its member states. It is inevitable that officials elected or appointed by – and ultimately accountable to states – will pay close attention to the political implications of their decisions. And that these considerations may trump the technical merits of the transaction. </p>
<p>Thus, inevitably, political considerations, including human rights, have always been, at least implicitly, a factor in Bank operations. </p>
<p>The futility of the Bank’s attempt to exclude political, including human rights, considerations from its operations can be seen at two levels. Firstly, at the level of the Bank’s relations with its member states. Secondly, at the level of individual transactions. </p>
<p>A good example of the Bank’s failed efforts to exclude political factors at the country level was its decision in the 1960s to lend to Portugal and South Africa to fund the construction of the Cahora Basa dam in Mozambique. The Bank decided to make this <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706106">loan despite a UN General Assembly effort</a> to impose sanctions on these countries because of their colonial and apartheid policies. </p>
<p>Many African states, supported by a majority of UN member countries, argued that the loan should have been denied. Their case was that the policies of the borrowers violated the human rights of their subjects. They were also a threat to regional peace and security. </p>
<p>The Bank’s General Counsel defended the decision on the basis of the political prohibition in the Bank’s articles and on the technical merits of the project.</p>
<p>Despite its ostensible non-political position, the Bank did not make any further loans to South Africa until it became a democratic state.</p>
<p>At the individual transaction level, the Bank funds projects and programmes that have profound social and environmental impacts. Consequently, it is forced to pay attention to some of the political, including human rights, implications of these projects and programmes. </p>
<p>For example, if it finances a road or a renewable energy project, the project will require land. The current occupants of the land may need to be moved to make way for the project. </p>
<p>Alternatively, the project may have social and environmental effects that hurt people. It could, for example, affect the surrounding community’s ability to grow food, or place the community at higher risk of accidents or exposes more young girls and women to the risk of <a href="https://www.inspectionpanel.org/panel-cases/transport-sector-development-project-additional-financing">gender-based violence</a>.</p>
<p>If the affected community belong to minority groups in the country, with their own language, culture, and geographic attachments, they may qualify as indigenous people under international law and the Bank’s policies. In this case, the project may require their <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf">free, prior informed consent</a>. </p>
<p>However, there are disagreements among states and between the Bank and some of its member states about which communities qualify as indigenous and what is required to ensure that their rights are respected. </p>
<p>For example, some states and Bank stakeholders contend that it is enough to seek the consent of the community’s leadership. But others maintain that the consent can only be established if particular vulnerable groups within the communities, such as women, youth, LGBTIQ+, or disabled people, are given specific opportunities to express their consent.</p>
<p>Some states may argue that giving such attention to these vulnerable groups is inconsistent with local practices and customs and that the Bank, pursuant to its own Articles, should not be interfering with these internal “political” matters. </p>
<p>In all these cases, the Bank has to exercise judgement. This means, for example, that in the Uganda case the Bank could decide that it should not extend any new credit to Uganda because of its new anti-LGBTQI+ legislation. </p>
<p>However, it is also easy to see that in another context the Bank – or its Board of Executive Directors – may conclude that on balance it is better to continue lending to the particular country despite serious human rights issues. Or to a particular project because the perceived benefits outweigh the costs. </p>
<p>The challenge, of course, is ensuring that the Bank is making these decisions on a principled and predictable basis. And not according to its own whims and political preferences. And that it can be held accountable for the way in which it makes the decisions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danny Bradlow receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for a project unconnected to this article. He is also a Compliance Officer in the Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU) at the UN Development Programme.</span></em></p>The challenge is to ensure that the bank is making decisions on a principled and predictable basis.Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098932023-08-09T13:08:23Z2023-08-09T13:08:23ZKenya is going digital to boost tax revenue – there are lessons to learn from other African countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540735/original/file-20230802-15-2g1n8k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Billy Mutai/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Imagess</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many African tax authorities have weak capacity to raise revenue. From 1990 to 2020, sub-Saharan African countries <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/brochure-revenue-statistics-africa.pdf#page=3">on average collected</a> only about 12%-15% of GDP as taxes, a much lower share than the 33.5% in <a href="https://www.oecd.org/about/">OECD economies</a>. </p>
<p>For countries that have limited information about taxpayers, constrained resources and informal economies, it can be difficult to collect revenue. What’s more, African tax administrations tend to rely on manual filing and payment of taxes. In-person interactions between taxpayers and tax officials are common, creating opportunities for collusion when paying taxes. African taxpayers also experience <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r5_policypaperno7.pdf">higher compliance costs</a> than similar regions when navigating opaque tax systems.</p>
<p>Kenya has faced many of these challenges. To streamline processes and make them more transparent, the country has in the last decade begun to digitise public services like tax collection. Digitisation also aims to enhance taxpayer identification and monitoring capacity, and lower the costs of compliance for taxpayers.</p>
<p>In the latest policy reforms, the country plans to <a href="https://citizen.digital/news/govt-to-roll-out-unique-personal-identifiers-in-september-n320243">introduce digital identity documents</a> for all Kenyans by February 2024. A digital ID system, e-ID, uses digital technology across the entire ID lifecycle: capturing, validating, storing and transferring data. </p>
<p>In Kenya, each citizen will receive a unique personal identifier. It will be crucial throughout a child’s journey in school. From the age of 18, the identifier will become an official national identity number for access to the full range of public services. </p>
<p>At the same time, Kenya is on course to eliminate cash transactions for all government services. These services include business registration, passport services, and land and property services in 2023. </p>
<p>Combining mandatory electronic tax payment and e-IDs could greatly improve revenue collection and efficiency, and cut taxpayers’ compliance costs. </p>
<p>Electronic filing of taxes has been mandatory since 2016 to collect taxes on employment, business and rental incomes. The <a href="https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/kra-optimizes-itax-ahead-of-june-30-annual-returns-filing-deadline/">system</a> supports a wide range of tasks, from registrations to refunds. Taxpayers can still pay taxes using cash, however, by visiting authorised banks or Kenya Revenue Authority service centres. Universal e-payment of taxes is expected to change all that.</p>
<p>We have between us years of research in governance, public finance and taxation conducted in African countries. Our view is that a number of challenges and constraints need to be considered to unlock the benefits of a fully digitised tax administration, not just in Kenya but elsewhere.</p>
<h2>Technology and taxation</h2>
<p>Technology can strengthen tax administration in <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/promise-limitations-information-technology-tax-mobilisation/">at least three ways</a>:</p>
<p><strong>1. Identifying the tax base:</strong> using third-party information, technology can create comprehensive databases of taxable subjects, making it easier to determine what tax is payable. Kenya’s digital ID would improve the way government databases work together and the revenue collector’s “view” of taxpayers.</p>
<p><strong>2. Enforcing compliance:</strong> technology can automatically check what a taxpayer reports against other data sources. Efficient e-filing platforms can automatically identify missed or late declarations. The unique identifiers provided by an ID scheme make this work.</p>
<p><strong>3. Facilitating compliance:</strong> tax e-filing and e-payment can help <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/blog/tax-compliance-costs-digitalisation/">reduce compliance costs</a>. They improve record-keeping and eliminate travel, queuing and capricious manual practices from tax officials. And the biographic information in the digital ID database helps with tax registration.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/ict-and-tax-administration-in-sub-saharan-africa-adopting-itas-in-uganda-and-sierra-leone/">evidence</a> suggests that important preconditions must be met for IT-based tax reforms to succeed. </p>
<p>In the case of Kenya, accessibility and taxpayer costs should be policy priorities when mandating e-payment. <a href="https://www.academia.edu/57351106/Digitalising_Tax_The_Kenyan_Way_The_Travels_and_Translations_of_ITax_in_Kenya">A recent study on tax e-filing</a>, for instance, revealed that not everyone had access to devices necessary for e-filing, and there were language barriers. These practical challenges typically pushed taxpayers to use intermediaries: they went back to a manual, in-person experience. </p>
<p>These shortcomings increase the risk of errors, misuse of personal data and bribery. Less tech-savvy taxpayers might be vulnerable. As <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/wrong-african-tax-administration/">filing levels are already poor</a>, e-payment solutions should make it easier, not harder, to comply. </p>
<h2>Lessons from other countries</h2>
<p>E-services help improve filing accuracy and timeliness, but one lesson from <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/mandating-digital-tax-tools-response-covid-evidence-eswatini/">our research</a> is that this does not always translate into higher tax revenue. </p>
<p>Positive impacts can be short-lived, as adoption of <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/digital-merchant-payments-as-a-medium-of-tax-compliance/">digital merchant payments in Rwanda</a> indicates. Here, taxpayers quickly reverted to pre-adoption compliance levels. Similarly, in Ethiopia, the <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/icts-tax-compliance-evidence-taxpayer-responses-technological-innovation-ethiopia/">adoption of point-of-sale electronic tax devices increased revenues</a>, but gains were offset by taxpayers inflating other, less verifiable margins.</p>
<p>Making digital systems compulsory, as in <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/technology-tax-rwanda/">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/mandating-digital-tax-tools-response-covid-evidence-eswatini/">Eswatini</a>, does not necessarily lead to people using them. Digital divides emerge between adopters and non-adopters. The less equipped, more marginalised and less tech-savvy taxpayers <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/publication/the-vat-in-practice-equity-enforcement-and-complexity/">fail to take up the tools</a>. </p>
<p>Our research also shows that <a href="https://www.ictd.ac/blog/identity-issues-four-challenges-digital-ids-africa-tax-systems/">digital ID schemes must meet several conditions for tax administrations to benefit meaningfully</a>. Digital IDs must be universally adopted. Identification data should be accurate and up to date. Strong cooperation across government entities is necessary to allow data sharing, as we’ve seen in our ongoing work in Uganda and Ghana.</p>
<h2>Which way for Kenya?</h2>
<p>The government and tax administration must be cautious about digital IDs. Poor-quality and outdated data from e-ID could be damaging to the Kenya Revenue Authority’s functions. The institutions involved should promote a culture of information updating in the population. They should encourage citizens to share valid information with the government.</p>
<p>It’s vital to establish a robust data protection framework and digital trust, especially after the <a href="https://fpf.org/blog/how-the-kenyan-high-court-temporarily-struck-down-the-national-digital-id-card-context-and-analysis/">failure</a> of the country’s National Integrated Identity Management System. Citizens need clarity on data usage and how the new project differs from the previous one if they are to trust the digital ID system. </p>
<p>Similarly, the government and revenue authority must support citizens to move towards fully digitised tax payments. They can do this by creating systems that are simple and secure, and by providing assistance and training. </p>
<p>The development of e-government must happen along with a framework for data protection and cyber-security response infrastructure. Besides threatening citizens’ data privacy and security, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66337573/">system failures</a> – like the one that recently disrupted access to multiple services on the e-Citizen portal – have extremely serious repercussions on citizens’ trust in government and technology.</p>
<p><em>Nimmo Elmi (PhD) contributed to some of the research on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabrizio Santoro receives funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Celeste Scarpini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digital tax filing can improve accuracy and timeliness but it doesn’t always translate into higher tax revenue.Celeste Scarpini, Researcher, Institute of Development StudiesFabrizio Santoro, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Centre for Tax and Development, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094222023-07-17T15:06:46Z2023-07-17T15:06:46ZWhat does it mean to be ‘educated’? In Uganda it’s not just schooling that counts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537064/original/file-20230712-25-lfnlkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The experience of schooling matters as much as the practices it teaches.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Juilliart/Shutterstock (Editorial use only)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How do you gauge whether someone is educated or not? In many parts of the world, the answer relates to the level of formal qualifications they achieve when they are young – do they have a university degree? In what subject and from what institution?</p>
<p>This appeals to the sense that education is something earned and to the belief that schools and universities have the authority to say who is (and who is not) educated. It’s also how economists and social scientists define someone’s education level and link that to what their health and social outcomes might be later in life.</p>
<p>However, as journalist Vanessa Friedman <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/17/style/george-santos-style.html">has written</a> in the New York Times, educational status can change because of the clothes you wear. She uses two examples – a jacket worn by the fictional protagonist of the 1999 film <a href="https://www.gentlemansgazette.com/talented-mr-ripley-menswear-review/">The Talented Mr Ripley</a> and the outfits worn by <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2023/05/george-santos-news-arrested-indicted-mug-shot-clothes.html">disgraced US politician George Santos</a>, a look she calls the “uniform of preppy private-school boys everywhere”. He worked hard, she argues, to appear more credentialed than he was.</p>
<p>These characters, one fictional and one real, are con artists. But they make an important point about the way being educated is not a settled status. It is something that can be worked on in various ways, including through the clothes one wears.</p>
<p>We are researchers involved in <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/projects/youth-futures-challenging-categories-educated-unemployed-institutional-innovators-rural-uganda/">a project</a> exploring young people’s futures in rural Uganda. As part of this, Ben – an anthropologist – conducted <a href="https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/amet.13151?casa_token=CA3eZvGKf_AAAAAA:42WXwWMZJ24jJf3Avpa8P1royeN9TFTpYVl2wmUR-PnpUMHH5_asQdKpc6guxNycCt2hO7-GbfdCz2P-">a study</a> to understand what young men and women do with their education in the absence of white collar jobs.</p>
<p>We found many women and men, of different ages, continuing to work on their claims to an educated identity throughout their lives. They do this by wearing the right clothes, but also by joining committees, being active in church, speaking what is considered the right sort of English, and presenting their arguments in the “logical” way that those with a good education have been trained in. </p>
<p>These people are not Tom Ripleys or George Santoses. They are doing what they do because being seen as educated has benefits. In this part of Uganda, educated people tend to prevail in disputes and fare better with various authorities; they are also more likely to benefit from government and NGO schemes.</p>
<p>This shows that people can work on their educational status throughout life, and that much of the work of being educated is only indirectly tied to the schooling experience. Policymakers miss this point. They assume that formal qualifications are the best measure of educational status. But “being educated” is not only about the credentials you have: it is also about how others credential you.</p>
<h2>Ivan and Florence</h2>
<p>Oledai is a rural sub-parish of about 180 households near the trading centre of Ngora, in eastern Uganda. Though English is the language of instruction from the late stages of primary school, Ateso is the most spoken language. Residents engage in a mix of farm work and petty trading; some run businesses to make a living. A small number have salaried employment, typically as school teachers.<br>
There is a difference in how young and older people work on their educational status that reflects the fact that very few older people had the opportunity to go to secondary school.</p>
<p>If you ask a resident in the village to take you to the home of an educated person, you might we be directed to Ivan Onai’s grass thatched house. Ivan is in his late 20s; a born-again Christian who is fluent in English. He listens to the BBC World Service to cultivate his vocabulary. </p>
<p>Always well turned out, Ivan serves as a youth counsellor at the sub-county and runs a youth group in the village. Though Ivan dropped out of school after his A-levels, he has cultivated the identity of a university graduate through his manners, political career and committee work. Many feel he is more educated than some of his better-credentialed peers.</p>
<p>Florence Akol, meanwhile, is in her early 40s and went to school at a time when educating daughters was less of a priority in Uganda than <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09540253.2010.499854?casa_token=JBrBgmtddDEAAAAA%3Aut9qBetr1Dn0hKmIWTtdqwNT4QpPGx-NQHc0iYYXW0lEttNmZvFmgpDfHNPx2ky5knn-85mc-As9ig">it is today</a>. She completed only two years of primary education, but went on to raise two daughters who both attended university. Through them she has learned English. She is also treasurer of the village council and treasurer of her clan.</p>
<p>These stories illustrate how schools and universities throughout Uganda are important not only as places where certificates are handed out but also as referents against which ideas of “being educated” circulate more widely in society. </p>
<p>The experience of schooling matters as much as the practices it teaches – committee skills, competence in English, the carrying of books and pens. Committee work requires an understanding of procedure, an ability to do bookwork and, often, a degree of confidence in spoken English. </p>
<h2>The benefit of perceptions</h2>
<p>The wider community often discussed what made someone educated. One older woman, part of a group trying to raise money for school fees, told us that education “trims your manners and helps you think differently” and that “being educated” helped in managing disputes and getting a favourable outcome in the village court. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of 7 women, two children and a man sit on a mat, talking with someone out of the frame" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537065/original/file-20230712-25-bkba5u.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women in Oledai reflect on what it means to be ‘educated’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ben Jones</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This could be observed as the community mobilised around the “parish fund”, a new government initiative meant to help its citizens, or the president’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-emyooga-scheme-works-3415992">Emyooga scheme</a> targeting youth. Those appointed to positions of influence were more educated than the average, and those in committee positions had the capacity to monopolise how the funds would be allocated.</p>
<h2>Policy implications</h2>
<p>We believe that understanding these dynamics is key for policymakers and researchers, who (in Uganda and many other parts of the continent) define educational status through the formal qualifications a person has. They focus on the health or social benefits that come from “human capital”. </p>
<p>We would encourage policymakers to rethink how education is understood so that it comes to be defined as an accredited status – how people evaluate you – as well as a credentialed one – the papers you carry in your pocket. </p>
<p>Investing in areas that shape accreditation would be a way of helping more people access opportunities. In Oledai this might mean offering evening classes to help adults improve their skills in spoken English, or giving people access to training in the sort of bookwork that committees value.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fieldwork was funded by a Mid-Career Fellowship from the British Academy (MD170053) and a further grant also from the British Academy (YF190162). I would like to thank Stella Aguti, Joseph Ochana, Sarah Amongin, and Joel Ekaun Hannington for their support in collecting data and debating the research findings.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucy Njogu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this area, much of the work of being educated is only indirectly tied to the schooling experience.Ben Jones, Senior Lecturer, University of East AngliaLucy Njogu, PhD student, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083412023-07-03T11:15:29Z2023-07-03T11:15:29ZWhy schoolchildren are regularly being targeted by terrorist groups in many countries<p>An Islamic State-linked group in Uganda attacked a school in June, killing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/17/islamic-state-attack-uganda-school">more than 40 people</a>, mostly students, in what seems to be an escalating trend of terrorism against schools. The attackers set fire to school dormitories and used machetes to kill and maim students. </p>
<p>This was the latest in a cycle of shocking attacks on schools around the world. The Nigerian group Boko Haram infamously <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-62324294">kidnapped</a> more than 200 girls from a school in 2014, and it has attacked other schools throughout the country. </p>
<p>Many more attacks have occurred since then. In Afghanistan, IS affiliate IS-K has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/fatalities-confirmed-in-explosions-at-high-school-in-afghan-capital-/6535567.html">repeatedly</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/24/deadly-suicide-bombing-hit-kabul-education-centre">bombed</a> educational institutions in recent years, often killing dozens of children or teens. In 2020 in Cameroon, sources suggest that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201025-there-are-no-words-children-killed-in-attack-on-bilingual-cameroon-school">separatists</a> fighting for their own, independent state attacked a bilingual school, killing eight children.</p>
<p>Why would a group carry out such an attack, killing schoolchildren? These attacks are happening more frequently in recent years, and they also tend to be carried out by particular types of groups.</p>
<p>I recently co-wrote a book, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/41433/chapter-abstract/352767656?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Insurgent Terrorism: Intergroup Relations and the Killing of Civilians</a>, with political scientists Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, examining the use of terrorism (intentional civilian targeting) by rebel organisations in civil wars. We dedicated a chapter to understanding attacks on schools and discovered a few patterns. </p>
<p>First, attacks on schools are on the rise. In the years examined in our book, 1998-2012, we found a marked increase starting in the late 2000s during civil wars. In the 1990s and early 2000s, there fewer than 20 attacks per year on schools by rebel organisations. But between 2009 and 2012, there were more than 90 such attacks per year.</p>
<p>Examining more recent data on terrorism generally, and not only during civil wars, we see a similar increase starting in the late 2000s. The graphic below shows a massive increase in terrorist attacks on schools. </p>
<p><strong>Terrorist attacks on schools, 1970-2020</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing rising numbers of attacks on schools" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The annual average number of terrorist attacks on schools in the 1980s and 1990s, according to the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a>, was less than 60. In the 2000s, the average year saw nearly 80 school attacks. In the 2010s, there was an average of 250 terrorist attacks on schools per year. After the early 2010s peak, the number of attacks started to decrease, but numbers are still far above what they were in the 1990s or early 2000s. </p>
<p>The increase in terrorism against schools is in part because influential global networks such as al-Qaida and IS seem to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/05/26/their-war-against-education/armed-group-attacks-teachers-students-and-schools">encourage it</a>, but also because groups learn from others that this is a good way to bring attention to their cause, to force a government to give in, or to intimidate a rival community.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-new-national-security-bosses-5-burning-issues-they-need-to-focus-on-208505">Nigeria's new national security bosses: 5 burning issues they need to focus on</a>
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<p>A second pattern we noticed was that the organisations that carry out these kinds of attacks tend to have a few attributes in common. Groups that attack schools tend to be in alliances with other rebel or terrorist organisations. These alliances provide <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381608080419">extra</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073">resources</a> to groups, which are essential for large-scale attacks. For example, allies might provide explosives, vehicles or recruits. Cooperative relationships with other rebels can also contribute to heinous attacks because groups learn tactics from each other, and they might pressure each other to use extreme tactics.</p>
<p>This seems to be the case with the group behind the recent Uganda attack, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). It has been cooperating with IS since 2017 and has <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/fatal-transaction-final_0.pdf">received funding from it</a>. The funds and propaganda support seem to have enabled ADF to carry out increasingly vicious attacks. Additionally, other IS-affiliated groups have attacked schools, so it is possible that the main IS encourages this, or that the groups are learning from each other.</p>
<p>We found that groups that had recently been subjected to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718789748">government crackdowns</a> were more likely to subsequently target schools, while groups that had recently received government concessions didn’t attack schools the following year. This is consistent with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1700540">other research</a> finding that government repression of religious freedom seems to lead to terrorist attacks on school.</p>
<p>The Uganda school attack, where boys and girls were killed and buildings set alight with people inside, was apparently intended to send a message to the government and its president Yoweri Museveni. Victims <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65945814">reported</a> that the attackers said: “We have succeeded in destabilising Museveni’s country.”</p>
<p>Interestingly, in our research, we did not find that religiously oriented groups, such as Islamist groups, were more likely than other types of groups to attack schools. Certainly, some Islamist groups have carried out these attacks – such as the recent Uganda school killings.</p>
<p>IS-K’s attacks are intended to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/afghanistan-isis-group-targets-religious-minorities">intimidate</a> the mostly Shia Hazara minority community, consistent with IS-K’s extreme religious views. But non-religious groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Communist Party of India (Maoist), have also repeatedly <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be94312a.html">attacked</a> <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/55505d0015.html">schools</a>.</p>
<p>Overall, attacks on schools occur because militant organisations see that they bring a great deal of attention – including from international news media – to their cause. Terrorism is fundamentally violent propaganda, and groups that use terrorism constantly innovate, seeking new tactics to help them stand out. They also hope the increasingly extreme methods will <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12113">pressure governments</a> to give up.</p>
<p>It seems likely that terrorist attacks against schools are going to continue. Governments should prioritise safeguarding educational institutions, and the international community should work harder to prevent these kinds of attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian J. Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Deadly attacks on schoolchildren by terrorists groups have been growing around the world from 2009.Brian J. Phillips, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Relations, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071192023-06-22T20:07:22Z2023-06-22T20:07:22ZLGBTQ+ people are facing increasing persecution globally, but refugee status is still extremely hard to get<p>The newly passed <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/ugandas-president-signs-repressive-anti-lgbt-law">Anti-Homosexuality Act</a> in Uganda has made a country that was already dangerous for LGBTQ+ people truly treacherous. </p>
<p>The new law includes the death penalty for the so-called offence of “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/29/1178718092/uganda-anti-gay-law">aggravated homosexuality</a>”, defined as same-sex relations involving someone who is HIV positive or under the age of 18.</p>
<p>Many countries around the world are moving towards decriminalising same-sex relations (most recently <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/13/barbados-high-court-decriminalizes-gay-sex">Barbados</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-29/singapore-parliament-repeals-gay-sex-ban/101713976">Singapore</a> and the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/cook-islands-decriminalises-homosexuality/102230188">Cook Islands</a>). Others, however, are seeking to impose harsher laws. </p>
<p>For example, in <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/3214095/womens-wing-tanzanian-ruling-party-demands-castration-homosexuals">Tanzania</a>, the leader of the women’s wing of the government has called for the castration of men convicted of same-sex related offences. <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/29/africa/ghana-softens-lgbtq-stance-intl/index.html">Ghana</a>, meanwhile, appears to have watered down a draconian anti-gay bill, but only after US Vice President Kamala Harris expressed concerns about it ahead of her visit. </p>
<p>This increasing hostility towards LGBTQ+ people in some African nations is causing many <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/anti-gay-sentiment-grows-lgbtq-people-seek-flee-99808634">to flee</a>. But gay and gender-diverse people have historically faced enormous obstacles finding refuge abroad. Today, they remain among the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/ie-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity/lgbti-and-gender-diverse-persons-forced-displacement">most vulnerable and marginalised</a> of all asylum seekers. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1668559015339515904"}"></div></p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-growing-gap-between-countries-advancing-lgbtq-rights-and-those-going-backwards-203329">There's a growing gap between countries advancing LGBTQ+ rights, and those going backwards</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>LGTBQ+ Ugandans have few options</h2>
<p>For LGBTQ+ Ugandans, finding a safe haven is not easy when four of the five countries that border Uganda also criminalise same-sex sexual conduct (South Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). </p>
<p>Kenya is the most common destination for asylum seekers fleeing Uganda. However, there’s been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/queerphobia-in-kenya-a-supreme-court-ruling-on-gay-rights-triggers-a-new-wave-of-anger-against-the-lgbtiq-community-204575">backlash</a> against LGBTQ+ people in that country after the Supreme Court recently ruled that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation violated the constitution.</p>
<p>LGBTQ+ Ugandans in one Kenyan refugee camp reported facing daily hostilities, <a href="https://www.openlynews.com/i/?id=d28df789-96e9-4216-b91e-41532c6ff123">saying</a> the situation there is “as terrible as you can imagine”.</p>
<p>There are now <a href="https://www.thepinknews.com/2023/06/04/uk-government-uganda-refugees-lgbtq/">increasing calls</a> in western countries to open their doors to LGBTQ+ refugees from Uganda, but even in countries with progressive gay rights laws, the process is not so simple. </p>
<p>In Australia, for example, just 1,100 asylum seekers were granted a protection visa because of their sexual orientation from 2018-23. This is barely a drop in the ocean of the reported need. The LGBTQ+ advocacy group <a href="https://www.rainbowrailroad.org/">Rainbow Railroad</a> says it receives an average of 10,000 requests for assistance a year from LGBTQ+ people fleeing persecution. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-lgbt-rights-are-protected-on-paper-but-discrimination-and-homophobia-persist-182949">Rwanda: LGBT rights are protected on paper, but discrimination and homophobia persist</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What international refugee treaties say</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention">1951 Refugee Convention</a> is the leading international treaty governing the rights of people seeking asylum. When it was drafted, however, homosexuality was still a crime in a majority of countries. As a result, LGBTQ+ people are not explicitly protected by the convention, even today.</p>
<p>The convention <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status-refugees">defines</a> a refugee as a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution based on</p>
<ul>
<li>race </li>
<li>religion </li>
<li>nationality </li>
<li>membership of a particular social group</li>
<li>political opinion. </li>
</ul>
<p>In the 1990s, many western countries such as the US, Canada and Australia began recognising LGBTQ+ people as a “particular social group” under this treaty, who could seek asylum if they have a reasonable fear of persecution. </p>
<p>Finally, in 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf">issued</a> guidance on refugee claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. </p>
<p>This should have streamlined the process for those seeking asylum. But many refugee claims made by LGBTQ+ people are still unsuccessful. Why is this the case? </p>
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<h2>Reasons LGBTQ+ refugees are turned down</h2>
<p>Let’s look at Australia as a specific example. Even though Australia recognised LGBTQ+ people as a persecuted group under the Refugee Convention, many claims <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/2003/6.html">were still being rejected</a> until 2003 on the basis that gay people could be safe in their home countries if they were discrete about their sexuality. </p>
<p>Then, in December 2003, the High Court <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,AUS_HC,3fd9eca84.html">ruled</a> it is fundamentally wrong to expect a person to hide their sexual orientation in order to be safe from persecution. </p>
<p>This, however, did not result in the expected increase in successful asylum seeker applications. Many LGBTQ+ people found themselves facing a new obstacle – officials questioning whether they were, in fact, members of the LGBTQ+ community.</p>
<p>For example, in 2020, the <a href="https://jade.io/article/723988">Federal Court considered</a> a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal rejecting the asylum applications of two Pakistani men who feared persecution in their home country because of their relationship. </p>
<p>The tribunal <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/hannahryan/australia-refugees-gay-lgbt-tribunal-pakistan">said</a> it did not believe the men were gay or in a relationship. It questioned the men’s credibility for various reasons. These included the fact the men visited gay venues in Melbourne when they said they wanted to keep their relationship a secret and because of how they responded to questions about their first sexual encounter. </p>
<p>On appeal, the Federal Court found the tribunal’s conclusions about the men’s credibility to be flawed and irrational. The court sent the case back to the tribunal to be heard again.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1257124549122031616"}"></div></p>
<p>It is difficult to understand how such assessments are still being made when there are <a href="https://www.kaleidoscopehrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Best-Practice-Guide-22nd-June-2015.pdf">comprehensive resources</a> available to assist government decision-makers to avoid such mistakes.</p>
<p>The high rate of rejection of LGBTQ+ asylum claims is not unique to Australia. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jul/09/lgbt-asylum-seekers-routinely-see-claims-rejected-in-europe-and-uk">recent study</a> found that across Europe, one in three claims by LGBTQ+ asylum seekers were denied because officials did not believe the claimants’ assertions about their sexual orientation. </p>
<p>And four in ten were turned down because officials didn’t believe they were at risk of persecution in their home countries.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/homosexuality-and-africa-a-philosophers-perspective-185536">Homosexuality and Africa: a philosopher's perspective</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Is there a path forward?</h2>
<p>Many western countries have opened their arms to refugees fleeing war in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and most recently, Ukraine. But armed conflict is not the only reason people need to flee their countries. Uganda is waging war against its LGBTQ+ citizens, and they need to urgently escape.</p>
<p>It is up to countries that respect the rights of LGBTQ+ people to offer them a safe haven. <a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/06/08/providing-lgbtqi-people-safe-home-canada">Canada</a> provides a useful illustration of how this can be done. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced this month his government is partnering with Rainbow Railroad to “help LGBTQI+ people start a new, safe chapter here in Canada.”</p>
<p>For LGBTQ+ people fleeing Uganda, one can hope this is not the only door open to them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Gerber is President of Kaleidoscope Human Rights Foundation, a not-for-profit organisation that advocates for the rights of LGBTIQ+ people in the Asia Pacific region. </span></em></p>Gay and gender-diverse people have historically faced enormous obstacles finding refuge abroad.Paula Gerber, Professor of Human Rights Law, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063522023-06-22T12:32:59Z2023-06-22T12:32:59ZUS talks sanctions against Uganda after a harsh anti-gay law – but criminalizing same-sex activities has become a political tactic globally<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529849/original/file-20230602-25-fcm11k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C31%2C5168%2C3399&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The annual gay pride parade in Entebbe, Uganda, in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/ugandan-man-with-a-sticker-on-his-face-takes-part-on-august-news-photo/453376520?adppopup=true">Isaac Kasamani/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Uganda recently signed an anti-gay bill into law. Called by some the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/22/un-urges-uganda-to-block-worst-in-the-world-anti-lqbtq-bill">worst of its kind in the world</a>,” the law imposes life imprisonment for same-sex relations while using <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341430">colonial language that such acts are “against the order of nature</a>.” </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/AZhtxQY6cJo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Politicians can often present anti-homosexuality laws as being necessary for ‘protection’ of values.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It calls for the death penalty for a category called “aggravated homosexuality,” which includes relations with minors and those considered to be vulnerable. It also criminalizes the “promotion and funding” of same-sex “activities.” </p>
<p>For Uganda, this is a third round of anti-LGBTQ+ legislative furor, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2015.1137479">following similar bills</a> that were passed by the Parliament in 2009 and 2014 and then overturned on technicalities. Still, the 2023 act is unique in its severity and reach. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/29/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-enactment-of-ugandas-anti-homosexuality-act/">The Biden administration has called for immediate repeal</a> – and threatened to cut aid and investment to Uganda. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.bu.edu/sth/profile/nicolette-d-manglos-weber/">a scholar of politics and religion</a> in the region, I have been working with Ugandan community activists and NGO leaders since 2017. These leaders express growing concerns about state corruption and abuse of civil rights. </p>
<p>Leaders pushing anti-LGBTQ+ laws claim to be protecting their citizens from foreign cultural threats, but the 2023 law is better understood as a political tactic to retain power by distracting the public from failures of governance. I argue that it is an example of what sociologists call <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920518803698">a moral panic</a>, and part of a worrying global trend. </p>
<h2>Globalizing anti-LGBTQ+ politics</h2>
<p>Anti-LGBTQ+ legislation has been on the rise globally and is often used by political factions to gain public support. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/AOjtrFpgq3Q?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In May 2023, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis visited a private Christian school in Tampa to sign five bills into law that affect LGBTQ+ communities in the state.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many authoritarian heads of state play up the cultural threat of so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/696691">gender ideology</a> and LGBTQ+ rights, describing them as foreign or <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.31920/2050-4306/2019/8n2a3">Western “perversion</a>” that will <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.168.0075">undermine their citizens’ values</a>. </p>
<p>In Russia in 2022, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-law-expanding-russias-rules-against-lgbt-propaganda-2022-12-05/">ratified a law</a> against LGBTQ+ propaganda, using language that is strikingly like Uganda’s new bill. This law makes it illegal to promote same-sex relations <a href="https://time.com/6236822/russia-gay-propaganda-law-discrimination/">or suggest they are normal</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RUbU16qWZXc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new law that makes it illegal to talk about or promote LGBTQ+ relationships or transgender rights.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2014, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan likewise <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/13/nigerian-president-signs-anti-gay-law">signed a law</a> against the public display and promotion of same-sex relationships. And in Brazil, former <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10461-019-02470-3">President Jair Bolsonaro weakened HIV/AIDS medical care systems</a> and pushed <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2022.2084988">laws to ban gender and sexuality education</a> in schools. </p>
<p>In each case these leaders stoked anxieties about LGBTQ+ groups and then took forceful action against the perceived moral danger. They positioned themselves as protectors of core cultural values while expanding their executive power. In other words, they fed and manipulated a moral panic.</p>
<h2>Moral panic as distraction tactic</h2>
<p>In sociology a moral panic is described as a surge in social anxieties about certain deviant groups. </p>
<p>Moral panics start as social norms that are inflamed into something larger: a sense of diffuse and imminent threat from categories of people like delinquents, foreigners or minority groups, seen as agents of broader moral decay.</p>
<p>There is a difference between cultural norms against divergent forms of sexuality and gender expression, and a moral panic over LGBTQ+ groups. Moral panics over sexual minorities are not automatic in religious or conservative cultures. They are usually <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.559">triggered by larger social disruptions or political events</a>. This happened in South Africa, for example, <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526164025/">when public concern over same-sex relations among men</a> peaked in the later years of apartheid. </p>
<p>Moral panics can also be manipulated by political leaders to distract from material problems and failures of governance. If a moral panic starts to drive citizens’ views of political leadership, they may support leaders who affirm their anxieties, even as those leaders violate civil rights and democratic systems. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yEWefG-456A?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Moral panic and culture wars as political strategy in Florida.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For leaders who are under fire or seeking to increase their power, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/psj.12239">moral panics can provide</a> a way for them to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09446-8">show strength by taking legislative action</a> against the perceived threat. </p>
<h2>History in Africa</h2>
<p>Sexuality in Africa is a complex terrain and ripe for the eruption of moral panics.</p>
<p>In the colonial period, European powers often interpreted examples of same-sex relations in Africa as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3884572">evidence of those cultures’ so-called primitivism</a>. Colonial laws enforced the heterosexual, monogamous and conjugal family model by criminalizing homosexuality and other common practices like polygamy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Four people stand outside the Commonwealth headquarters in Central London, carrying pro-LGBTQ+ signs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529855/original/file-20230602-25-6ase8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists and campaigners stage a protest outside the Commonwealth headquarters in central London against discrimination and criminalization of LGBTQ+ people across Commonwealth member countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/activists-and-campaigners-stage-a-protest-outside-the-news-photo/948726170?adppopup=true">Wiktor Szymanowicz/Future Publishing via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Then in the HIV/AIDS era of the 1980s and 1990s, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/19/africa-uganda-evangelicals-homophobia-antigay-bill/">U.S. evangelical missionaries</a> brought extensive humanitarian aid to the region, promoting the belief that HIV/AIDS was caused by homosexual activity and the so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-021-00584-9">gay rights agenda</a>. They worked closely with local partners in African religious life and politics, many of whom became the sponsors of current anti-LGBTQ+ laws. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ims7_3wud7A?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for ‘God Loves Uganda,’ a film exploring the role of the American evangelical movement in Uganda.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today anti-LGBTQ+ moral panics serve an added function. Many African economies are growing through state-managed capitalism and foreign trade. Political power means access to these channels of wealth, which creates incentives for leaders like Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to resist democratic changes in leadership. </p>
<p>For such leaders, passing laws in response to anti-LGBTQ+ moral panics can shift the focus away from these more systemic problems. It is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/04/tainted-imperial-legacy-that-fuels-oppression-of-gay-people-in-africa">public show of governance</a> to cover for broader failures and abuses.</p>
<h2>The Uganda case</h2>
<p>President Museveni has led Uganda for nearly 40 years, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-politics-idUSL2N1540SW">many citizens are frustrated at his tightfisted hold on power</a>. In recent years Museveni has become more explicit in silencing dissent.</p>
<p>Community activists and NGO leaders, LGBTQ+ and otherwise, are directly in the line of fire. From my research, I have learned that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/sixteen-lgbt-activists-arrested-in-uganda-as-hate-crimes-soar">these activists are regularly jailed</a> without due process. Even leaders of churches and mosques now avoid discussing politics publicly for fear they will be harassed. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/education/govt-in-school-drive-to-protect-learners-from-lgbt-promoters--4171946">rumors about homosexual groups targeting children in school</a> are rampant. As is common with moral panics, it is hard to verify or pinpoint the source of such rumors. They spread the idea that LGBTQ+ groups are trying to force the vulnerable into homosexual relationships, stoking protective anxieties among parents. </p>
<p>The wording of the 2023 act, focusing on “aggravated homosexuality” as abuse of minors, and the “promotion and funding” of homosexuality by people and organizations, appears to play into such fears. The use of this language can serve to portray the act’s sponsors as protectors of children and families, even as the government becomes more blatant in its violations of civil rights and freedoms. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Person wearing yellow sunglasses, taking part in a protest, raises a fist and holds a red and yellow sign saying 'Uganda: Kill the bill not the gays. Equality!'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529861/original/file-20230602-29-56jc66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ugandan queer activist Papa De raises a fist outside the Uganda High Commission during a picket against the country’s anti-homosexuality bill in Pretoria, South Africa, on April 4, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/ugandas-queer-activist-papa-de-raises-a-fist-outside-the-news-photo/1250761596?adppopup=true">Phill Magakoe/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Regional activists like Stella Nyanzi and the Rev. Kapya Kaoma have been fighting anti-LGBTQ+ moral panics for decades. And <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/uganda-anti-homosexuality-act-2023-petition-constitutional-court/">Ugandans are already challenging the act in the courts</a>, not just as an LGBTQ+ rights issue, but as part of their push for a different political future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolette Manglos-Weber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of politics and religion explains how anti-LGBTQ laws are being used to distract the public from governance failures in many parts of the world.Nicolette Manglos-Weber, Associate Professor of Religion & Society, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048342023-06-21T14:58:31Z2023-06-21T14:58:31ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is a dictator who clings to power but it’s not just for his own gain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524433/original/file-20230504-25-9wocho.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame at a commemoration of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mariam Kone/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">recently said</a> he was looking forward to his retirement after 23 years in power. Speaking to the press in April 2023, he claimed he “may join journalism in my old age” – a somewhat surprising choice, given the poor <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">state of the freedom of the press</a> in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the chances that Kagame will actually step down seem rather small. After a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-politics-idUKKBN0U209D20151219">controversial referendum</a> in 2015, Rwandans voted to extend presidential term limits, allowing Kagame to rule potentially until 2034. More recently, Kagame was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230404-paul-kagame-re-elected-as-head-of-rpf">re-elected to head the ruling party</a> – the Rwandan Patriotic Front – for another five years. And last year he suggested that he might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OBIiz0PJgQ">run for president again</a> in Rwanda’s 2024 elections. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would consider running for another 20 years. I have no problem with that. Elections are about people choosing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the 65-year-old leader seems to be open to the idea of retirement, he continues to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">feel duty-bound</a> to serve his country, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have been having this discussion within our (ruling) party since 2010 but circumstances, challenges and the history of Rwanda tend to dictate certain things.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> suggests Kagame is not only acting out of self-interest. For the past decade, I have studied dictators – broadly defined as leaders who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26798255?casa_token=H1VtUP6OXN4AAAAA%3ACN4ZMpqRQLjTVWADVkXNAy7DkihYbR37keo8XMMpN6KUdqpLTa1nJyH40iUKhIp-ZKKCl_xcF_PWJnL83ej-Sf_QMuCsg95AIYSyk3X67O8ptoy1N_AH">cannot be removed through elections</a>, or where political opposition doesn’t operate on a level playing field. I have tried to <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289/289">nuance the assumption</a> that all dictators are <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">power hungry</a>. Some dictators are. But often their motives to rule their countries are more complex.</p>
<p>In my view, this is the case with Kagame. While staying in power is necessary to attaining his vision for Rwanda, it isn’t a goal in itself. Kagame’s end goal seems to be a safe and prosperous Rwanda, but not one that’s meant to benefit all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>Although it’s prohibited by law to differentiate among Hutu and Tutsi, ethnic differences <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">still matter in Rwanda</a> – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/rhetorical-legacies-of-leadership-projections-of-benevolent-leadership-in-pre-and-postgenocide-rwanda/916F556DD2CFAB34AEF40A509E4D9229">favouring</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">Tutsi refugees</a> who were driven out of their country in pre-1994 episodes of genocidal violence. Former refugees like Kagame.</p>
<p>Kagame is indeed a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">dictator</a> who <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">restricts</a> serious political opposition, independent media and civil society. But he doesn’t rule only for the sake of being in power. I argue that he’s motivated by more than innate self-interest, which is likely to make him more <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">persevering</a> in the pursuit of his goals.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s Rwanda</h2>
<p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Kagame’s own life story. Following a genocidal killing spree that began in 1959 and targeted his ethnic community, the Tutsi, Kagame and his family <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/56058176?queryString=waugh%20kagame&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false">were forced to flee to Uganda</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">Life as a refugee</a> was difficult. Kagame was confronted with discrimination and became politically conscious as he grew older. This culminated in his role as the leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a>, which fought in Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, and eventually to end the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Throughout his ascent to Rwanda’s highest office in 2000, Kagame has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">pragmatic and ruthless</a>. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rwanda-progress-or-powder-keg/">invasion of Rwanda from Uganda</a> in 1990 sparked a civil war. Kagame was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-Kinzer-Thousand-Rwandas-5-2-2008/dp/B00HTKBBR0">realistic</a> about what his forces were able to do and was <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">more open to the eventual peace talks</a> than many others in his ranks were. </p>
<p>Yet, when mediation failed and the 1994 genocide needed to be ended, Kagame didn’t shy away from <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/gsi.12.2.03">perpetrating mass atrocities</a> to <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">attain this end</a>. After he got into power, his <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">ruthless tactics</a> targeted anyone he believed to be an enemy at home and abroad <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/586476/summary?casa_token=fIZfzS2BSB0AAAAA:e79DaDyhEhWY5BqB4gCoA-JyMoDKnyGaFnrdv2tyHkX-ugS8M9lCzRfu5M7CRfhKic3IeK3iU6k">in the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-kagame-could-be-president-of-rwanda-until-2035-whats-behind-his-staying-power-204051">Paul Kagame could be president of Rwanda until 2035 - what's behind his staying power</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Kagame is also idealistic. He has consistently worked towards the same goal, against all odds, for most of his adult life. He sees the end as justifying the means – whether this entails sacrificing innocent lives to save others during the genocide, or sacrificing freedom for prosperity in post-genocide Rwanda. But for Kagame, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">idealism</a> goes hand in hand with pragmatism: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you are driven by the ideal, but you are able to recognise and work with reality, then managing this reality will help you to embrace it and get there. So, the marathon is the long journey we take towards development, it is reality. But we are driven by an ideal, and this ideal allows us to sprint forward; it motivates us; it helps us to achieve our goals and manage reality.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kagame has <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/828735733?queryString=rwanda%20crisafulli%20redmond&stickyFacetsChecked=false&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&format=Book&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_printbook&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_digital&changedFacet=format">received</a> credit for the manner in which Rwanda prospered after the genocide into a clean, modern country with a growing economy. </p>
<p>These achievements are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">impressive</a> in many respects. But as various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">studies</a> have <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">shown</a>, this growth hasn’t benefited all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>This is because the president’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018900">allegiance</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">lies with</a> his fellow Tutsi.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s mission</h2>
<p>In my view, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">Kagame’s goal</a> is to create a home for the Tutsi population that was chased out of Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The president launched a project of social engineering where, on the surface, ethnicity <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/714811956?lang=nl&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&queryString=remaking%20rwanda&stickyFacetsChecked=false">no longer matters</a> and the economy is thriving due to extensive modernisation. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">ethnicity continues to matter</a>. An example of this is that, for nearly 10 years, the Tutsi have come to be recognised as the only genocide survivors in the country. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">2014</a>, Kagame officially renamed the genocide “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">How Rwanda's annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The name change suggests that only the Tutsi are victimised. Consequently, the Hutu are perceived as either <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">culpable bystanders or perpetrators</a>. It obscures the fact that moderate Hutus were targeted as well in 1994. </p>
<p>In addition, some scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Chronicles-African-Region-French/dp/9057187574">questioned the extent of Rwanda’s economic progress</a>. An Ansoms, a professor in development studies, states that the country’s apparent modernisation hides “<a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">the true extent of poverty and inequality in the countryside</a>”. </p>
<p>For as long as Kagame believes he hasn’t <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">fulfilled his goal</a> of creating a prosperous and stable Rwanda that can be home to former Tutsi refugees like himself, he will continue to seek power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maartje Weerdesteijn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Paul Kagame’s own life story.Maartje Weerdesteijn, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2064152023-06-19T14:04:37Z2023-06-19T14:04:37ZNigerian health workers and absenteeism: study shows how personal and political relationships protect offenders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531635/original/file-20230613-2513-8i55jf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Goallord-Creativity/Shutterstock </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Absenteeism of health workers contributes to poor quality of care. A study in Uganda, for example, showed that it reduced the likelihood of people using primary health centres by <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0256437">30%</a>. Absenteeism also increases the workload for available staff. This adds to work-related stress.</p>
<p>Absenteeism is when workers report late to work, leave before the scheduled time or do not show up, without formal permission. It is frequently <a href="https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/34/7/529/5543565">reported</a> as a problem in health systems in resource-limited settings. A Nigerian study in 2021 found that about <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2021.752932/full">80%</a> of 412 health workers in primary healthcare centres reported engaging in absenteeism. </p>
<p>There are many drivers of this. Previous research has shown that health workers sometimes take on <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7497334/">private money-making activities</a> to augment their low wages. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/37/10/1267/6633906?login=false">Female health workers</a> with families often leave early to care for children, cook and clean their homes. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article/34/7/529/5543565?login=false">Poor supervision</a>, lack of equipment, understaffing and a lack of security have also been linked to absenteeism. </p>
<p>Until now, however, the influence of politics on health worker absenteeism in Nigeria has received relatively little attention. In <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/7/12/e010542">a recent paper</a> we share the findings of our research into this aspect of absenteeism. Our research was part of the <a href="https://ace.soas.ac.uk/">Anti-Corruption Evidence research consortium</a> led by SOAS University of London, which provides high-impact strategies to tackle corruption. </p>
<p>We found that health workers with relatives in positions of power were frequently absent from work. Similarly, health workers who promoted the interests of politically influential people also enjoyed some protection when they were absent from duty. This explains why interventions aiming to reduce absenteeism have had little success. New interventions must look for solutions outside the health system. This could include involving local actors who stand to benefit from a functioning health system. </p>
<h2>Beneficial relationships</h2>
<p>The study was conducted in Enugu State in Nigeria. We interviewed 30 frontline health workers, three health managers and six community representatives about the influence of politics and power on absenteeism of healthcare workers. </p>
<p>Our study identified two types of relationships of significance between health workers and influential individuals. The first was family ties. This reflects the relationship between members of the same family but may extend to close friends. The second was political connections. These relationships are based on shared political interest.</p>
<p>We found that the protection happened in a number of ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>through a direct relationship – for example, a health worker could have an immediate link to a political actor</p></li>
<li><p>relationships could also be indirect – a health worker could be related to someone who could push political actors to work for their interests.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Various benefits could accrue from these relationships. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>finding a job with the help of a political figure</p></li>
<li><p>refusing to be directed by their supervisors </p></li>
<li><p>influencing or distorting workplace relationships </p></li>
<li><p>affecting the decision-making process of health managers </p></li>
<li><p>the absence of any enforcement of rules around absenteeism. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>When politically connected health workers were reported for being absent they would appeal to their “sponsor” for protection. Health managers often failed to take action against the absent health worker out of fear or in the hope of earning their goodwill for future benefits. This could be in the form of being recommended for limited opportunities, like training and workshops. </p>
<p>We found that the administrative heads of primary healthcare centres reported being ignored by health managers at the local government level when they reported health workers who were backed by political actors. </p>
<p>They also reported being persecuted (promotions could be blocked or delayed) for continuing the attempt to bring politically protected staff to order. They could be transferred to an unfavourable health facility and prevented from benefiting from available opportunities.</p>
<p>Such relationships sometimes also involved obeying requests that might be contrary to formal rules.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Top-down enforcement of rules does not seem to be working effectively in this context. We believe this is because breaking rules has become entrenched and structural. </p>
<p>In this context, we advocate <a href="https://ace.soas.ac.uk/publication/making-anti-corruption-real/2022">peer pressure on rule violators</a> to eliminate absenteeism in primary healthcare centres. This means working with health workers who are regularly at their duty posts, community members who want an improved healthcare system and leaders interested in a functioning healthcare system. These people are directly affected by health worker absenteeism. They would not only report rule violators, but also follow up to make sure they were punished. </p>
<p>In this way, politically connected health workers could be brought to account by locally powerful traditional leaders and other influential community actors with the support of other health workers. These outside actors would serve to support the internal enforcement of rules in health facilities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dina Balabanova receives funding from MRC and UKRI.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin McKee receives funding from UKRI, MRC, Horizon Europe and WHO.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aloysius Odii, Eleanor Hutchinson, and Obinna Onwujekwe do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Health workers with relatives in positions of power were frequently absent from work.Aloysius Odii, Lecturer, University of NigeriaDina Balabanova, Professor in Health Systems and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical MedicineEleanor Hutchinson, Associate Professor in Anthropology and Public Health, London School of Hygiene & Tropical MedicineMartin McKee, Professor of European Public Health, London School of Hygiene & Tropical MedicineObinna Onwujekwe, Professor of Health Economics and Policy and Pharmaco-economics/pharmaco-epidemiology in the Departments of Health Administration & Management and Pharmacology and Therapeutics, College of Medicine, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.