tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/uhuru-kenyatta-32798/articlesUhuru Kenyatta – The Conversation2023-11-13T01:10:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151712023-11-13T01:10:58Z2023-11-13T01:10:58ZWilliam Ruto’s first year: he promised to make life easier for Kenyans, but things got worse<p>It’s more than a year since President William Ruto was <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/william-ruto-sworn-in-as-kenya-s-fifth-president--3947134#:%7E:text=Tuesday%20September%2013%202022&text=Dr%20William%20Ruto%20has%20been,and%20the%20registrar%20Anne%20Amadi">sworn into office</a> as Kenya’s fifth president. He assumed power at a time when Kenya was beset by rising food and fuel prices, high unemployment and a worrying <a href="https://kippra.or.ke/enhancing-public-debt-management-in-kenya/">debt burden</a>. </p>
<p>During the election campaign, Ruto promised to fix an economy afflicted by <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/government-t-if-kenya-loses-2-billion-daily-to-corruption--4406504">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/uhuru-helpless-in-fight-against-graft-mudavadi-145707">ineptitude</a>. He promised to entrench good governance and place the poor <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58246207">at the centre</a> of economic policy. He pledged to address <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/dp-says-he-will-not-negotiate-with-ethnic-kingpins-as-he-eyes-2022-presidency-10993118">ethnicised politics</a> and to <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/its-the-rule-of-law-not-man-ruto-says-as-he-presides-over-swearing-in-of-6-judges-n305649">uphold</a> constitutionalism and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Ruto’s promises were significant. The rule of law and constitutionalism are key to economic planning and development, governance and equitable sharing of national resources. They are the guardrails against impunity, democratic backsliding, lawlessness and political instability. Throughout Kenya’s postcolonial period, the political elite have exploited ethnicity to obtain power at the expense of the collective wellbeing and social cohesion. Elite entitlement has also weakened state institutions, leading to corruption and impunity. </p>
<p>I have studied democratic transitions, conflict and state building and elections in Africa. My 2018 <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-65295-5">book</a> examined how the political class had exploited ethnicity for political and economic advantage, resulting in weak and even dysfunctional state institutions in Kenya. </p>
<p>In his election campaign Ruto identified the major issues that required urgent attention. He addressed issues that needed swift action without constitutional changes, such as thawing the tension between the executive and the judiciary, decoupling the police finances from the executive, and taking port operations back to the coastal city of Mombasa from the inland town of Naivasha. But resolving Kenya’s economic hardships has proved a hard nut to crack, as his 9 November 2023 state of the nation address <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/11/president-ruto-vows-to-tackle-soaring-cost-of-living-in-inaugural-state-of-the-nation-address/#:%7E:text=NAIROBI%2C%20Kenya%2C%20Nov%208%20%E2%80%93,place%20to%20achieve%20this%20goal.">acknowledged</a>. Just over a year since he was sworn in, Ruto is no nearer to turning the Kenyan ship around. </p>
<h2>Economic turbulence</h2>
<p>As a candidate, Ruto portrayed himself as an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58246207">outsider</a> to Kenya’s power matrix who was best placed to improve the living conditions of the poor and excluded. But the economy has not improved under his watch. If anything, living conditions have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221221-life-is-worse-kenya-s-ruto-marks-100-days-in-office">worsened</a>.</p>
<p>The cost of living is higher after a steep increase in the petrol price and the local currency’s loss of value. Ruto’s government has imposed <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kenya-tax-increases-economy-ruto-d69cdbb21d5fd7cff4a6a406736f6bdd">new and increased taxes</a> on Kenyans, ostensibly to reduce or remove the need for external borrowing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-is-now-in-charge-of-kenyas-shaky-economy-where-to-start-190454">William Ruto is now in charge of Kenya’s shaky economy: where to start</a>
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<p>The government was quick to remove <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/15/kenyas-new-president-scraps-petrol-subsidy">fuel</a> and <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/no-more-unga-subsidies-for-kenyans-president-ruto-says-n305820">food</a> subsidies, but has been slow to address <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/wastage-wont-be-tolerated-president-ruto-says-as-he-orders-ministries-to-cut-budgets-by-10-percent-n328610">government wastage</a>. </p>
<p>The government key strategy was to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-11-09-ruto-subsidising-fertiliser-a-masterstroke-in-lowering-cost-of-living/">subsidise</a> fertiliser to boost harvests and achieve food security. It remains to be seen whether this will happen. More deliberate measures are required to turn around agriculture as the mainstay of the economy. </p>
<p>On the question of centring the poor and marginalised in governance, Ruto focused on the financial sector. The government rolled out the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-11-09-ruto-hustler-fund-has-exceeded-peoples-expectations/">“Hustler Fund”</a> to make credit more affordable.</p>
<p>But the fund’s impact on overall living standards through job creation, for instance, is likely to be cancelled out by a punitive tax regime and a struggling economy. </p>
<h2>Rule of law</h2>
<p>Ruto’s first public event as president was to <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/president-ruto-appoints-six-judges-rejected-by-uhuru-kenyatta-3947510">approve</a> the appointment of six judges <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001414750/heartbreak-for-six-judges-as-uhuru-rejects-their-appointment#:%7E:text=A%20statement%20from%20State%20House,to%20meet%20the%20required%20threshold%E2%80%9D.">left in limbo</a> by his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta. He also made good on his promise to allocate more funding to the judiciary.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-how-kenyas-new-president-took-on-powerful-political-dynasties-178787">William Ruto: how Kenya's new president took on powerful political dynasties</a>
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<p>However, to entrench the rule of law and constitutionalism calls for more than this. Judicial officers must act with utmost integrity. To affirm equality before the law, errant senior state officers and the political elite must face the law and if found guilty sanctioned decisively.</p>
<p>The Kenyan judiciary is still <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/overwhelming-majority-kenyans-see-corruption-judiciary-afrobarometer-survey-shows/">bedevilled by corruption</a> that impedes access to justice. Disturbingly, it is seen as more inclined to punishing the poor while letting the rich and political elite act with impunity. Ruto himself has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-07-03-blow-to-ruto-as-high-court-terms-creation-of-50-cass-illegal/">obeyed</a> court rulings that went against him, unlike under Kenyatta, when <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/national/article/2001452909/defying-courts-set-uhuru-kenyatta-on-collision-course-with-judiciary">disregard</a> for the law was the norm. Critics, however, including the Law Society of Kenya, have <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-william-ruto-on-spot-over-defiance-of-courts-3985948">accused</a> his administration of disobeying court orders like his predecessor.</p>
<p>Ruto <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/no-kenyan-will-go-through-extrajudicial-killings-ever-again-president-ruto-n318192">spoke out</a> against extrajudicial and summary executions and enforced disappearances perfected by the police over the years. He sought to accord the police financial and operational autonomy. Thus he transferred accounting for the police budget to the police as he had promised.</p>
<p>Despite these changes, a culture of impunity and lack of transparency continues to undermine the Kenyan police. Extrajudicial executions continue. The police must be placed under <a href="https://www.chrips.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Local-Policing-Accountability-in-Kenya.pdf">civilian oversight</a> as envisaged under the constitution. </p>
<p>The failure to set up a commission of inquiry into state capture under his predecessor, as promised during campaigns, dented Ruto’s commitment to the fight against corruption. A year later, a commission of inquiry has not been formed and the issue seems to have been abandoned altogether. </p>
<p>It is unlikely that Ruto will fulfil his manifesto unless he reins in runaway corruption and the culprits are held to account. The rule of law demands that proceeds of crime be recovered and offenders charged for economic sabotage. This approach would obviate the need to burden Kenyans with taxes and more borrowing.</p>
<h2>National cohesion</h2>
<p>Appointments to government positions have been undermined by the age-old problems of <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/politics/article/2001467756/storm-over-cas-shortlist-full-of-oldies">recycling appointees</a>, <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/taxman-in-bid-to-withdraw-tax-evasion-claims-against-ca-chair--4044370">patronage</a>, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/politics/article/2001437466/dp-ruto-faces-criticism-over-nepotism-claims">nepotism</a>and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/310735/kenya-ruto-accused-of-tribal-and-political-bias-in-state-appointments/">ethnicity</a>. Just as worrying are senior government officials publicly advancing <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-10-08-gachagua-i-am-unapologetic-over-shareholder-remarks/">exclusionary ethnic politics</a> with impunity. Ruto must rein them in. </p>
<p>It is also a setback that Ruto acceded to <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/it-is-illegal-court-told-as-petition-filed-to-stop-national-dialogue-committee-talks-at-bomas-n328347">talks</a> to assuage the opposition elite who had resorted to violent protests against his historic victory. These elitist self-serving talks could lead to constitutional amendments creating <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-11-10-dialogue-team-retreats-to-prepare-final-report/">more political positions</a> under a cynically flawed logic that this approach enhances national cohesion. This is an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2001313447/ruto-lets-create-jobs-not-seats">about turn</a> on Ruto’s part.</p>
<p>Ultimately national cohesion is Ruto’s pressing challenge. Kenya is divided on many fronts – economic, ethnic, regional and religious – a legacy of previous governments. Ruto needs to look beyond ethno-regional appointments. For legitimacy and transformation, he needs to ideologically reconnect with and dignify the “hustler nation”, the disenfranchised constituency that propelled him into power. Bar this, he could face an intensely contested reelection bid like his predecessors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just over a year since he was sworn in, Ruto is no nearer to turning the Kenyan ship around.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111292023-08-08T15:09:37Z2023-08-08T15:09:37ZKenya’s political dialogue is a welcome sign of democracy at work – if both sides understand their roles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541515/original/file-20230807-26-bhua21.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Raila Odinga, the leader of the Azimio la Umoja coalition in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Kenya’s presidential <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/15/william-ruto-declared-winner-of-kenya-presidential-election-amid-dispute">election in August 2022</a>, the new government has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62631193#:%7E:text=Argues%20that%20he%20did%20not,questions%20about%20the%20tallying%20process">in conflict</a> with the opposition. </p>
<p>In democratic systems, such conflict is healthy; it can enhance governance. But it <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/20/kenyas-violent-protests-sabotaging-economy-president-ruto-says/">must not interfere with</a> the government’s ability to perform its constitutional functions.</p>
<p>In Kenya, the friction between the government and opposition led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/21/death-toll-rises-as-kenyas-cost-of-living-protests-continue">mass protests</a> in March 2023. The <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20230320-kenyan-opposition-leader-raila-odinga-calls-for-weekly-rallies-over-cost-of-living-crisis">opposition</a> organised them <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/20/africa/kenya-cost-of-living-protests-explainer-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=A%20wave%20of%20deadly%20protests,businesses%20attacked%20and%20schools%20closed.">around</a> rising taxes and the high cost of living. </p>
<p>If carried out peacefully, political protests can <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2020/06/10/are-peaceful-protests-more-effective-than-violent-ones/">deepen democracy</a>. Kenya’s have often <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/7/13/deadly-anti-government-protests-roil-kenya">deteriorated into violence</a>, however. <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/police-have-killed-30-protesters-since-march-2023-amnesty-international-4309868">Heavy-handed government interventions</a> have then created even more violence. This threatens the sustainability of the country’s democratic institutions. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-protests-in-kenya-have-a-long-and-rich-history-but-have-been-hijacked-by-the-elites-202979">Mass protests in Kenya have a long and rich history – but have been hijacked by the elites</a>
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<p>The opposition recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/29/kenya-government-and-opposition-agree-to-talks-after-protests">called off street protests</a> to engage the government in dialogue. I have <a href="https://www.weber.edu/goddard/John_Mbaku.html">studied democratisation and political economy in Africa</a> for more than two decades, and in my view, these talks are an opportunity to strengthen Kenya’s democratic systems.</p>
<p>Both the government and the opposition have a duty to work towards creating a Kenya in which all citizens can live peacefully, by the values that are important to them, and elect who they want.</p>
<p>But for this to happen, each party to the talks must understand its constitutional role. It must play its part constructively and within the law. The opposition should be a check on the exercise of government power, but it must not obstruct governance. The opposition should evaluate public policy and offer alternatives, but allow the government to formulate the national agenda. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the government must recognise the important role the opposition plays in a democratic system. An effective opposition provides the government with feedback that advances national objectives. It contributes positively to peaceful coexistence, the protection of human rights and national development.</p>
<h2>The importance of the talks</h2>
<p>The opposition suspended its call for mass protests in July 2023 to engage in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kalonzo-lead-azimio-team-in-talks-with-kenya-kwanza-4322554">dialogue</a> with the government. The talks will be facilitated by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. Opposition leader Raila Odinga wants the talks concluded in <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/inside-politics/raila-issues-demands-to-ruto-194622/">just over seven weeks</a>.</p>
<p>Odinga’s team of five has tabled <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-08-03-azimio-invites-ruto-team-for-first-meeting-lists-5-issues-to-be-discussed/">five issues</a>. It wants the government to:</p>
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<li><p>address the cost of living</p></li>
<li><p>reconstitute the elections agency</p></li>
<li><p>audit the 2022 poll</p></li>
<li><p>prevent state interference with political parties</p></li>
<li><p>resolve outstanding constitutional issues. </p></li>
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<p>The government also brings a <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-08-07-ruto-sets-tone-for-kenya-kwanza-azimio-dialogue-at-bomas/">five-member team</a>. Its list includes establishing the offices of the leader of opposition and prime cabinet secretary, as well as implementing <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/193-27-equality-and-freedom-from-discrimination#:%7E:text=(8)%20In%20addition%20to%20the,be%20of%20the%20same%20gender.">gender diversity laws</a>. President William Ruto has said he has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-08-07-ruto-sets-tone-for-kenya-kwanza-azimio-dialogue-at-bomas/">no interest</a> in reopening debate on the results of the 2022 election. </p>
<p>These talks are a welcome sign of Kenya’s democracy maturing. But as the ruling party, Kenya Kwanza, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kalonzo-lead-azimio-team-in-talks-with-kenya-kwanza-4322554">has reminded</a> the opposition coalition, Azimio la Umoja, that the opposition’s job is to analyse government policies and offer alternatives. It is not to force its economic and political agenda on the government.</p>
<p>Regardless of what is <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kalonzo-lead-azimio-team-in-talks-with-kenya-kwanza-4322554">on the table for discussion</a>, the dialogue should enhance governance and promote national development. </p>
<p>Parties to the talks should:</p>
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<li><p>consider ways to enhance government efficiency, accountability and productivity </p></li>
<li><p>concentrate on creating jobs, fighting inflation and helping Kenyans deal with climate change and other development challenges </p></li>
<li><p>help Kenya strengthen its democratic institutions, and promote their growth and maturity </p></li>
<li><p>provide an institutional environment within which all Kenyans, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, can live together peacefully. </p></li>
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<h2>Understanding the roles</h2>
<p>In emerging democracies, such as Kenya’s, a key source of conflict is the failure or inability of the government, the opposition and their supporters to understand and appreciate the roles that the constitution gives them. </p>
<p>In a functioning democratic system, the opposition is part of the governance architecture. It makes sure that the government is open, transparent and accountable to both the people and the constitution. However, it must not <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/18/kenya-braces-for-3-days-of-anti-govt-protest-all-the-details">frustrate</a> or interfere with government. </p>
<p>The government must consult and interact peacefully with all stakeholders, not just its supporters. This is critical in a country like Kenya which has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-politicians-continue-to-use-ethnicity-to-divide-and-rule-60-years-after-independence-207930">significant diversity</a> of people, cultures, values, languages and economic and social aspirations.</p>
<p>A misunderstanding of roles could paralyse the government and make it non-functional. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The present dialogue’s function must be:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>to strengthen the government, not cripple it</p></li>
<li><p>to advance the interests of all Kenyans, not just of specific politicians or ethnic groups</p></li>
<li><p>to improve the rule of law, not to open up political spaces for the benefit of opposition leaders</p></li>
<li><p>to build the country’s democracy, not to tear it down </p></li>
<li><p>to unite Kenyans, not to divide them</p></li>
<li><p>to ensure the advancement of a peaceful and productive Kenya.</p></li>
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<p>Kenya’s national leaders – both in government and opposition – must build a political system in the country that advances inclusive development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government and opposition have a duty to work towards creating a Kenya in which all citizens can live peacefully.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082732023-08-02T18:07:16Z2023-08-02T18:07:16ZCould Trump turn his politics of grievance into a get-out-of-jail card? Neither prosecution nor even jail time has prevented former leaders in Israel, Brazil and Kenya from mounting comebacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540488/original/file-20230801-15-hfb8gb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3876%2C2831&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump enters a political rally while campaigning for the GOP 2024 nomination on July 29, 2023, in Erie, Pa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-u-s-president-donald-trump-enters-erie-insurance-news-photo/1563680624?adppopup=true">Jeff Swensen/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump has declared, “<a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5060238/pres-trump-i-justicei-retribution">I am your retribution</a>,” and it appears to be a guiding theme of his 2024 campaign. </p>
<p>He now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/08/01/us/trump-indictment-jan-6">faces a total of three indictments</a>, following Special Counsel Jack Smith’s announcement on Aug. 1, 2023 that Trump had been charged with four counts in his effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election – the most serious charges so far. There’s likely to be an additional indictment from Fulton County, Georgia, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/31/georgia-2020-election-investigation-trump/">prosecutor Fani Willis</a>. </p>
<p>If elected, he promises to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-retribution-indictment-documents-biden-american-democracy-5a8ec37b359fee85d0f0956139d79f51">punish his perceived enemies</a> – everyone from prosecutors at the Justice Department and in New York and Georgia to the Biden family and Republicans in Congress who don’t <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-rally.html">help him</a>. </p>
<p>Trump and his allies are ramping up their <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-allies-in-congress-leap-to-defend-former-president-after-federal-indictment">rhetoric</a>, playing the victim card with cries of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-vpdWQFcyo">witch hunt</a>” and making promises to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/trump-vows-appoint-prosecutor-target-171530172.html">use the machinery of government</a> to punish anyone who has attempted to hold Trump accountable. </p>
<p>While appeals to grievance have been used in presidential campaigns, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/06/09/trump-president-run-criminal-charges-indictment">never before in American history</a> has a leading contender for a major party’s nomination made their personal grievances related to criminal liability and payback the centerpiece of their presidential run. </p>
<p>Is a campaign based on grievance and retribution likely to sway voters? And what are the implications if Trump wins back the White House? </p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-economy/authoritarianism-and-elite-origins-democracy">democracy</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/american-government-politics-and-policy/social-origins-electoral-participation-emerging-democracies">voting behavior</a> and political corruption globally, we note that while the politicization of prosecutions is becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecuting-a-president-is-divisive-and-sometimes-destabilizing-heres-why-many-countries-do-it-anyway-188565?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton">increasingly common</a> in other democracies, it can be hard to figure out how these dynamics affect elections. </p>
<h2>Political muscle can trounce a prosecution</h2>
<p>Candidates under investigation can leverage their political muscle to run for office – and as a means to avoid prosecution. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28167/chapter-abstract/213005469?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Kenya’s 2007 presidential election</a>, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were two prominent politicians backing opposing coalitions that engaged in post-election clashes after allegations of vote rigging. </p>
<p>Members of both factions were investigated, and Kenyatta and Ruto were personally charged with organizing the violence among their supporters. Their cases were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16675268">referred to the International Criminal Court</a>, or ICC, after the Kenyan government slow-rolled local prosecutions. </p>
<p>But as the cases dragged on, these erstwhile enemies forged an electoral alliance to win the 2013 contest. Kenyatta ran as president and Ruto his deputy, by – ironically – pushing a “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28167/chapter-abstract/213006037?redirectedFrom=fulltext">peace narrative</a>” during the campaign. </p>
<p>This flexing of political muscle, a crusade questioning the ICC’s legitimacy and grassroots mobilization led to their eventual victory. That essentially ended their legal woes internationally and domestically. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">ICC dropped</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760">charges</a>, and they were reelected in 2017. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large crowd holding a sign in Hebrew and English that shows a fist and says 'We've just started.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540492/original/file-20230801-27-oxqrx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israelis protest moves by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government to limit the power of the country’s Supreme Court.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-aerial-view-of-kaplan-street-as-israelis-gather-to-news-photo/1563351079?adppopup=true">Yair Palti/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Undermining accountability</h2>
<p>Should Trump win, he can appoint an attorney general who will follow his bidding and suspend prosecutions brought by the special counsel, or he can simply pardon himself of federal charges. </p>
<p>He can further seek to avoid trial or imprisonment by invoking a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution">Department of Justice rule</a> that presidents cannot be under federal criminal indictment or in jail while they serve in office, although a candidate can <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-an-indictment-wouldnt-end-trumps-run-for-the-presidency-he-could-even-campaign-or-serve-from-a-jail-cell-194425">run for president and be elected under indictment or from jail</a>. A novel legal strategy for Trump would be to try to apply this also to state jurisdictions like New York and Georgia.</p>
<p>Any attempt to challenge the constitutionality of such actions – pardoning himself, dismissing the special counsel, ending state and local indictments – would no doubt end up at the Supreme Court. The court majority is conservative, suggesting it might rule in Trump’s favor. Additionally, <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/episode-5-john-mulaney/id1548294013?i=1000621655751">precedent and legal scholarship</a> also suggest that the court would deem at least some of these actions constitutional. </p>
<p>Beyond ending immediate prosecutions, victorious candidates can use winning office to further erode democratic institutions and the rule of law. </p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel has served as prime minister <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html">during his own corruption trials</a>. After losing office in 2021, he came to power again in 2022 while under indictment. </p>
<p>Netanyahu and his allies in parliament have pursued legislation to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/24/1189720508/israel-politics-netanyahu-judiciary">weaken the independence</a> of the Supreme Court, a portion of which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-contentious-judicial-reform-becomes-law-in-israel-netanyahu-cements-his-political-legacy-210043">recently passed by the legislature</a>. He and his allies have promised to go after the former attorneys general and other prosecutors overseeing Netanyahu’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-netanyahu-corruption-trial-courts-4e18ed8f34e65707bd47e37696da4705">criminal cases</a>. The attempts to diminish the Supreme Court’s power have resulted in months of anti-government protests. </p>
<p>Trump and his campaign view a 2024 win as an opportunity to significantly <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/22/trump-2025-radical-plan-second-term">increase the power of the executive branch</a> to go after a “deep state” that has investigated Trump and his allies. That potentially undermines the independence and functioning of everything from the State and Justice departments to local law enforcement.</p>
<h2>Comebacks follow prosecutions</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man standing, gripping a metal rail with one hand, the other hand raised with a fist, in the nighttime." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540498/original/file-20230801-25-6joorn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former Brazilian president Lula Inácio da Silva was elected once again in 2022 after his conviction and imprisonment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-elect-for-the-leftist-workers-party-news-photo/1244370111?adppopup=true">Caio Guatelli / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Examples from other countries show that prosecution or even jail time does not prevent former leaders from mounting comebacks.</p>
<p>Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected once again in 2022 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/23/how-one-companys-deep-web-corruption-took-down-governments-across-latin-america/?itid=lk_inline_manual_54">after his conviction and imprisonment</a>. He argued that a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/09/brazil-lula-operation-car-wash-sergio-moro/">judge who was in cahoots with prosecutors</a>, and who became Lula’s predecessor’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazils-chief-justice-authorizes-investigation-into-bolsonaro/2020/04/27/54d95f52-88f6-11ea-80df-d24b35a568ae_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_54">justice minister</a>, revealed the politicized nature of Brazil’s justice system. That allowed him to play the victim card successfully at the ballot box.</p>
<p>Trump is innocent until proved guilty. His hard-core “Make America Great Again” supporters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/upshot/poll-trump-republican-primary.html">tell pollsters</a> they believe in his complete innocence. We expect this is not likely to change, regardless of evidence prosecutors show to a jury and what those juries decide. </p>
<p>But if the facts of the cases and evidence presented at trial appear to moderates and independents as nothing burgers, or if swing voters otherwise feel the judicial process has unfairly targeted Trump with prosecutorial overreach, that could conceivably turn Trump’s <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/">persistent unfavorable ratings</a> into electoral victory.</p>
<p>Recent polling makes clear that while Trump has consolidated support for the Republican nomination among the MAGA crowd, <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/">nearly half of Republicans surveyed</a> are still considering other options. </p>
<p>In any event, his platform of victimization and retribution shows no signs of abating. Whether enough Republicans will turn out to vote and moderates swing toward Trump, and whether enough Democrats decide to stay home, suggest that this is still a very high-risk strategy for Trump, but if successful, likely to reward him with time away from jail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has made personal grievances and payback the centerpiece of his presidential run. Will this strategy work? Two experts who study democracy look at others who have used these tactics.James D. Long, Professor of Political Science, Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonVictor Menaldo, Professor of Political Science, Co-founder of the Political Economy Forum, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079302023-07-19T14:08:02Z2023-07-19T14:08:02ZKenya’s politicians continue to use ethnicity to divide and rule – 60 years after independence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535299/original/file-20230703-259537-edbjvx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Kisumu confront police officers after Kenya's disputed 2017 elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1963, Kenya’s politicians have fed and manipulated ethnicity to win elections. </p>
<p>With some 40-odd ethnic groups, Kenya is a country of ethnic minorities – it has no single dominant community. During elections, political parties and candidates <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/27/specter-of-politics-as-usual-in-kenya-s-2022-election-pub-87578">do raise policy issues</a>, but ethnicity, or tribalism as it’s popularly called in Kenya, is the default vote-hunting strategy. </p>
<p>With few deviations, voting is akin to an ethnic census. Leading presidential candidates are usually from the populous ethnic groups. Of Kenya’s five presidents – three have been Kikuyu and two Kalenjin – come from two of the country’s biggest communities. This has raised <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62373083">issues of exclusion and fanned ethnic animosity</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320132659_The_Kenyan_State_and_the_Ethnicity_Challenge">My research</a> into <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">ethnicity in Kenya</a> has found that it is central to political power. The two have a symbiotic relationship. In my view, ethnicity is not an expression of cultural identity or a reservoir of talent for nation building. It has been politicised and is linked to social status. It determines people’s fortunes, making it integral to social mobility, stagnation or regression.</p>
<p>Since no single ethnic group is populous enough to politically impose its will on others, winning presidential candidates have had to build alliances with other ethnic groups. Political elites have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">built ethnicity into the system of governance and administration</a>. </p>
<p>For self-preservation, successive governments have arbitrarily <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/kenyans-of-indian-descent-become-44th-tribe-428220">created more ethnic groups</a>. They have cemented ethnically based administrative units and emphasised ethnic differences. </p>
<p>This has normalised the exploitation of ethnicity for political and economic gain. The populace buys into ethnic politics under the false hope that their respective ethnic leaders will help them better their lives.</p>
<h2>How ethnicity plays out</h2>
<p>Throughout 60 years of independence, Kenya has held <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322533176_'I_do_not_know_who_won_the_elections'_How_Not_to_Conduct_Elections_and_Kenya's_Democratic_Reversals">inconclusive elections</a> marred by rigging and executive interference. The transitional elections held in 2002 and 2022, however, were exceptions. Electoral disputes are <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=scr">often protracted</a>. They can degenerate into <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/ethnicity-and-violence-new-dynamics-kenyas-elections-35968">inter-ethnic violence</a>. </p>
<p>Ethnic politics in Kenya manifests itself in four major ways. </p>
<p>First, the Kenyan state is <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347999393_Ethnicity_and_Political_Pluralism_in_Kenya_in_Journal_of_African_Elections_Special_Issue_Kenya_72_pp_77-112">colonial in orientation</a>. It is extractive, discriminatory and oppressive. It is also insidiously ethnicised, elitist and classist. Successive Kenyan presidents, starting with the first, Jomo Kenyatta, anchored the state to ethnicity. </p>
<p>Second, historical land injustices in which communities and individuals have been dispossessed of their ancestral land – first by colonialists and then the post-colonial elite – manifests in ethnic politics and electoral violence. A lack of justice across the board, and especially for <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-status-government-kenyas-0">victims of state-instigated ethnic violence</a>, has also contributed to ethnic consciousness. </p>
<p>Third, institutional disregard for the rule of law makes ethnic politics attractive, with the political elite evoking it to evade accountability. Their deliberate effort to erase memory and distort Kenya’s contested history fuels ethnicity, too. So does a lack of trust among the people, and between the people and the government. </p>
<p>Fourth, ethno-regional political figures – essentially, personality cults – have an outsized influence on Kenyans’ psyche and political choices. This comes at the expense of civic identity, personal agency and a pursuit of collective aspirations. </p>
<p>Ethnicity often <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-political-elites-switch-parties-with-every-election-how-this-fuels-violence-205005">determines party loyalty</a>. Individuals form political parties under the assumption that members of their ethnic group will rally behind them. Further, since independence, the president’s co-ethnics have <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001385110/six-tribes-dominate-top-government-jobs-report">disproportionately held state positions</a>. </p>
<p>Ethnicity has been on the upsurge with urbanisation in Kenya. Contrary to popular belief, the <a href="https://www.khrc.or.ke/index.php/publications/183-ethnicity-and-politicization-in-kenya/file">Kenyan elite are fixated on ethnicity</a> – not the masses – since it determines access to the benefits of modernity. The elite tend to advance their political and economic interests through ethnicity. This has made it pervasive in the media, academy, politics, religious formations, civil society and state apparatus.</p>
<p>There is a link between ethnicity, elite ambitions and the impact of modernisation. Missionary education and the spread of infrastructure affected Kenyan communities differently. So did nature, which gave some communities arable land and others harsh environments. Disparities in development provide a basis for ethnicity. </p>
<h2>False starts</h2>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> sought to neutralise ethnicity. It requires that state appointments <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#chp_Seven">reflect Kenya’s diversity and enhance inclusivity</a>. It also seeks to <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/172-chapter-seven-representation-of-the-people/part-3-political-parties/258-91-basic-requirements-for-political-parties">streamline political parties</a> to enhance national cohesion and harmony. </p>
<p>The constitution also provides for the <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/139-chapter-eleven-devolved-government/part-1-objects-and-principles-of-devolved-government/343-174-objects-of-devolution">devolution of power and resources</a> through county governments. This aims to cure winner-take-all politics, which has fuelled resentment and animosity. </p>
<p>The constitution, however, is only as good as society’s political culture and norms. It cannot transform Kenyan society by itself. Governance shortfalls and excesses that have undermined the state for decades persist. </p>
<p>Ethnicity hasn’t always been Kenya’s bugbear. In elections held before independence in 1962, for instance, candidates won elections on the strength of vision and national appeal. <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/weekly-review/kenya-s-president-who-never-was-cia-files-reveal-fresh-details-about-tom-mboya-4297404#:%7E:text=Two%20years%20before%20Mboya%20was,he%20had%20acquired%20many%20enemies.">Tom Mboya</a>, a Luo, defeated <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/jomo-s-foreign-minister-dr-munyua-waiyaki-dies-at-91-389930">Munyua Waiyaki</a>, a Kikuyu, in a Kikuyu-dominated constituency. </p>
<p>However, ethnic consciousness heightened after a fallout among the post-colonial elite. The quest to monopolise political power and control national resources raised the stakes. This resulted in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">political assassinations, authoritarianism and a constriction of the political space</a>. Some politicians abandoned policy-oriented programmatic politics and resorted to ethnic mobilisation to claw back receding influence. </p>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-young-voters-have-a-dilemma-they-dislike-ethnic-politics-but-feel-trapped-in-it-186855">inability to transcend the ethnic ideology</a> has made it hard to devise alternative bases for political organisation. </p>
<h2>Class vs tribe</h2>
<p>Kinship ties and ethnic bigotry have trumped class-based national identities. In the lead-up to Kenya’s 2022 elections, opponents of class politics <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/07/three-reasons-ethnicity-will-count-for-less-in-kenya-upcoming-vote/">equated it to ethnic politics</a>. They claimed it sought to incite the poor against the rich. </p>
<p>Unlike ethnic politics, however, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/122/487/205/7133587">class politics is programmatic</a>. It is not based on primordial identities and differences. It affords people an opportunity to resolve social, economic and political concerns through the ballot. </p>
<p>William Ruto, as a presidential candidate in 2022, shifted the discourse from <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-election-promises-an-economists-perspective-186480">ethnicity to the economy</a> through a “<a href="https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/9/hustlers-versus-dynasty-kenyas-new-class-politics/">hustlers vs dynasties</a>” ideology. He prevailed. Had Ruto designed his <a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-how-kenyas-new-president-took-on-powerful-political-dynasties-178787">strategy</a> solely around ethnicity, he would likely have been defeated – the opposition lived true to tradition and crafted a <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/raila-unveils-odm-led-azimio-la-umoja-alliance-for-2022-race/">broader ethnic alliance</a>.</p>
<p>While Ruto’s margin of victory was thin – just over <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/QLTlLJx0Vr.pdf#page=3">230,000 votes</a> – it illustrates that Kenya is not impervious to class politics as an alternative form of political organisation. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Moving away from ethnic politics requires an overhaul of the Kenyan state to ensure social justice, the rule of law and access to opportunities for all. This would begin to dismantle ethnicity as an operative ideology. </p>
<p>It requires decolonising the state to rid it of oppressive, extractive and predatory inclinations. This has to start with an overhaul of the education system to make it relevant to Kenyan society. There is need to empower the minds of citizens by instilling in them a sense of national pride and consciousness. </p>
<p>The trouble is that the political elite have no incentive for such reform – it would render them vulnerable to a conscious citizenry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s inability to move past ethnic ideology has made it difficult to develop alternative bases for political organisation.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082422023-07-09T11:35:15Z2023-07-09T11:35:15ZKenya at 60: six key moments that shaped post-colonial politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533521/original/file-20230622-8708-1flywg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta waves at a crowd. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harry Benson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya celebrates 60 years of independence this year. As a political scientist who has <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">studied</a> Kenya for the past 20 years, I consider a turning point from each decade that helped to shape the east African country’s post-colonial politics. I haven’t selected elections, assassinations or other moments that have enjoyed much coverage over the years. Instead, I turn to often-forgotten moments that shed light on the country’s key steps forward – and backwards – and the role of agency and institutions.</em></p>
<h2>1964: The Lanet mutiny</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, governments across <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808104534id_/http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/mcgowan_2003jmas_-_african_military_coups_1956-2001-_frequency_trends_and_distribution.pdf">Africa fell</a> to military coups and countercoups. These nations suffered the arbitrary and authoritarian rule of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/ethnic-inequalities-in-kenya/EAFC4455E840815B624147EE930C1C34">military leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya managed to avoid this fate. A regiment based at Lanet in Nakuru did stage an unsuccessful mutiny in 1964. In response, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta – as Kenyan political scholar <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">Musambayi Katumanga</a> has detailed – opted to keep the military small. He relied instead on various police units. </p>
<p>Kenyatta also “gradually altered the military’s ethnic composition”, which, at that time, was disproportionately composed of officers from Kalenjin, Kamba, Samburu and Somali communities. He increased the number of co-ethnic Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most economically dominant ethnic group. </p>
<p>These measures helped to ensure the military’s loyalty to the regime. But at a cost. The multiplication of security units undermined control and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">accountabiliy</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy of ethnic recruitment and promotion reinforced a sense of an ethnically biased state. It was a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">strategy copied</a> by Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, after a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/nation-prime/how-ochuka-coup-attempt-changed-kenya-1910656">coup attempt in 1982</a>. Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, also adopted it after the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007/8 post-election crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>1976: The Change the Constitution Movement</h2>
<p>By the mid-1970s, Kenyatta was unwell. To prevent the automatic succession of his vice-president, Moi, a group of prominent Kikuyu politicians attempted to <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">change the constitution</a>. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Power transferred peacefully to Moi upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the attempt had three important legacies:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the military had once again been kept out of national politics </p></li>
<li><p>the new president was made acutely aware of the insecurity of his position</p></li>
<li><p>a popular sense grew of how a Kikuyu elite felt entitled to rule.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>1980: The crackdown begins</h2>
<p>For the first year or so, Moi largely followed in Kenyatta’s footsteps, or “nyayo” in Kiswahili. He blocked any real opposition but left space for broader political debate. </p>
<p>However, in 1980, Moi’s more authoritarian streak began to show. He banned the Nairobi University Students’ Organisation and deregistered the University Academic Staff Union and Kenya Civil Servants Union. He also ordered ethnicity-based associations to wind up their affairs in the interest of “national unity”. </p>
<p>Authoritarianism came to characterise the 1980s as people were required to follow in Moi’s footsteps. </p>
<h2>1990: Timothy Njoya’s new year speech</h2>
<p>In November 1991, the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/">Paris Club of donors</a>, an informal group of western creditors, suspended US$350 million in aid to Kenya until political reforms were initiated. The following month, a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament, paving the way for a return to multi-party elections. </p>
<p>This timeline could mistakenly be taken to suggest that it was donor pressure that forced constitutional reform. But there was already substantive pressure for multi-party politics from within Kenya. </p>
<p>A tidal change occurred at the dawn of 1990 when, in a new year speech, theologian Timothy Njoya <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tmmTQgt0iXQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=i+say+to+you+ethnic+politics+kenya+lynch+&ots=u7HbNNpU6Q&sig=Fc0hDJagdL31LFjKxkRkf8E4qkc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=i%20say%20to%20you%20ethnic%20politics%20kenya%20lynch&f=false">speculated</a> on how much longer Kenya would be a one-party state. Opposition elements –- most notably, religious and civil society leaders, and politicians marginalised from the political centre –- became increasingly vocal in their demands for multi-party politics.</p>
<p>It was these domestic demands – together with the threat of suspended aid – that forced Moi’s hand and prompted a return to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. Still, Moi <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">sought to control</a> the transition. </p>
<h2>2005: The constitutional referendum</h2>
<p>In 2002, Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition ousted independence party Kanu in a landslide victory. This prompted a moment of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518447">great optimism</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>However, divisions soon wracked the coalition as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2005.9627591">reports emerged</a> of corruption scandals and ethnic bias. Promises of constitutional reform were watered down. Popular frustration showed when Kenyans rejected the draft constitution in the 2005 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00020180601035674">referendum</a>.</p>
<p>The referendum and general elections that followed meant that Kenya was in intense campaign period for over two years. This elongated campaign drew attention to frustrated hopes. It also presented the government as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020180601035674">from and for the Kikuyu</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum also increased confidence in the electoral commission. This meant that people paid relatively little attention to developments like Kibaki’s unilateral <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1592326">judicial appointments</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, the referendum fostered a sense that the opposition would win the 2007 election unless it was rigged. Together with a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf">problematic election</a> and history of unpunished election-related violence, these factors fuelled Kenya’s greatest post-colonial crisis. More than 1,000 people were killed and almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056240903346194">700,000 displaced</a> in violence after the 2007 election.</p>
<h2>2011: A new chief justice</h2>
<p>The 2007/8 crisis paved the way for a new <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2023-03/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf">constitution</a> in 2010. Among other things, it devolved power to 47 new county governments. It also established a new bill of rights and created the supreme court. The latter has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine presidential election petitions, and determine appeals from the court of appeal. It also determines cases that involve interpretation or application of the constitution. </p>
<p>As the highest court in the land, the leadership of the supreme court is critical. It marked a turning point when Willy Mutunga –- a highly respected human rights advocate –- was appointed as the court’s first chief justice. Some criticise Mutunga for having <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2015.1029296">validated</a> Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s election in 2013. However, he also presided over <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/SPECJU/2015/6.html">decisions</a> that protected the devolution of power and the bill of rights. And he oversaw <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/kenyas-democracy-hinges-strong-chief-justice">reforms and judicial learnings</a> that helped to establish a more independent court. Reforms that – together with his successor’s brave leadership – made the supreme court’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">annulment of the August 2017 election</a> possible.</p>
<p>The lesson from these moments: individuals can make a difference for good or bad, particularly when they help to reshape the institutions that will outlive them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In recent years Gabrielle Lynch has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and University of Warwick. </span></em></p>Jomo Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi set the tone for ethnic and authoritarian politics which Kenya has wrestled to free itself from in recent decades.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063502023-06-15T14:00:34Z2023-06-15T14:00:34ZMama Ngina Kenyatta at 90: the quiet power behind Kenya’s famous political family<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529907/original/file-20230603-15-pe3jy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Kenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few witnessed the building of the young Kenyan state from within as did Ngina Kenyatta, the widow of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Mama Ngina, as she is known, will mark her 90th birthday on 24 June 2023. She was by her husband’s side when Kenya won independence 60 years ago and for many turbulent years thereafter. Although Kenyatta was polygamous, it was the younger Mama Ngina who took on the roles of first lady. </p>
<p>Ngina married Jomo Kenyatta in 1952 at the age of 19. That year, Kenyatta was arrested and subsequently <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2012/04/kenya-jomo-kenyatta-sentenced-hard-labor/">jailed</a> on charges of masterminding the anti-colonial Mau Mau uprising. By then, he had spent years abroad (mainly in England), where he embraced anti-colonialist and Pan-African ideas. Back home he was elected president of Kenya African Union, before becoming the front figure of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that would go on to lead Kenya to independence. </p>
<p>Kenyatta’s marriage to Ngina was his fourth. He had married Grace Wahu in 1920, Edna Clark in 1942 and Grace Wanjiku in 1946. The last marriage had political significance because Ngina was the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3937204">daughter of a senior chief</a>, Muhoho wa Gatheca, who held an administrative position of great influence. By then, Kenyatta was expanding his political base, so this marriage secured an alliance with an important clan.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina is to be seen in many official photographs of the early days, protectively herding their young children in State House. The first-born was Christine Wambui-Pratt, who is today an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001450285/ku-to-award-uhurus-sister-doctorate">advocate</a> for people living with disability. The second was Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, who became Kenya’s fourth president (2013-2022). The third was Nyokabi Muthama, now a businesswoman and <a href="https://www.thekenyattatrust.org">philanthropist</a>. Muhoho Kenyatta, the reclusive last-born, is reputedly the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/muhoho-the-man-behind-kenyatta-family-business-empire-132182">engine</a> of the Kenyatta family business empire. </p>
<p>Away from family, Mama Ngina was often involved in supporting various <a href="https://theconversation.com/active-citizens-for-better-schooling-what-kenyas-history-can-teach-south-africa-92534">Harambee</a> (community development) projects. Yet very little was known about her and in particular her political influence during this period. </p>
<p>She was, and still is, certainly not uninterested in politics. Though not a frequent public political speaker, she has spoken out in defence of her family. In 2022, she <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/03/mama-ngina-supports-raila-for-the-presidency/">publicly campaigned</a> for Uhuru Kenyatta’s preferred presidential candidate, Raila Odinga. She also sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">associate</a> herself with the Mau Mau independence struggle in an apparent attempt to counter popular <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/48250-controversial-mt-kenya-musician-blasts-uhuru-new-hit-song">sentiment</a> against the Kenyattas among the Kikuyu. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528538/original/file-20230526-21-id6oab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mama Ngina Kenyatta (second left) and Jomo Kenyatta (right) host Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, during a visit to Kenya in 1972. (Photo by William Lovelace/Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Kenyatta’s death and after</h2>
<p>The way she handled the news of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/-end-of-an-era-as-mzee-jomo-kenyatta-dies-892138">Kenyatta’s death on 21 August 1978</a> suggests she was preparing her political survival. At that time, jockeying for succession was fierce and the Kenyan political elite was profoundly divided over it. So as the Mzee (“old man”) – as he was called – died, Mama Ngina and his stepsons Peter Magana and Peter Muigai informed their political allies with great discretion.</p>
<p>According to a report by the authoritative Weekly Review news magazine, one of the first to be informed was <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel Arap Moi</a>, then vice-president and constitutionally next in line to act as president. This placed Moi in the lead of the succession battle at a time when some were <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.id=&brand=ucpress">opposed</a> to his automatic succession. Only thereafter was <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mbiyu-koinange-the-politician-british-aptly-nicknamed-newt--466712">Peter Mbiyu Koinange</a>, Kenyatta’s long-time comrade and a prominent minister, informed, along with Kenyatta’s other children.</p>
<p>Mama Ngina took a low profile after the succession. She was <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenyatta-business-empire-goes-into-expansion-drive-2045420">inheriting</a> a huge <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/rise-and-rise-of-the-kenyatta-family-business-empire-139094">business empire</a> which continued to expand. Today, the holdings include <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/political-families-own-half-of-private-wealth-952330">land</a> as well as shares in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/mama-ngina-listed-top-investor-at-kenya-power-with-2-2-million-shares-864034">companies</a> in banking, real estate, hospitality, mining, insurance, airlines, education, energy, dairy farming, transport and telecommunications. </p>
<p>Her role during the political transition was rewarded with political support by President Moi, according to news reports. </p>
<h2>Protecting “our son”</h2>
<p>In 2013, the matriarch bounced back to the centre of Kenyan politics, the first woman to have been spouse and now mother of a sitting president. That would not have seemed likely when Uhuru Kenyatta was indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/23/kenya-trial-international-criminal-court">crimes against humanity</a>. The charges stemmed from the 2007-2008 post-election violence, in which Uhuru and William Ruto were on opposite sides. With Mama Ngina’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/queen-mother-mama-ngina-the-power-behind-uhuru-kenyatta-s-throne-3944964">financial muscle behind them</a>, the two formed the unlikely alliance that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/3/10/kenyatta-wins-kenyas-presidential-election">swept to power in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>Planning began in April 2011, when Mama Ngina appeared at <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000137547/pre-icc-confirmation-prayer-rallies-united-uhuru-kenyatta-and-william-ruto">rallies</a> where prayers were said for the indicted duo. According to the Daily Nation, Mama Ngina brokered the coalition between the two. She also bankrolled the promotion of “our son” for president in Mount Kenya region, inhabited by her co-ethnics and related tribes.</p>
<p>Uhuru’s ICC case was dropped in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019">2014</a> and Ruto’s in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35965760">2016</a>. They soon fell out. Ngina blamed Ruto for the rift. This in her eyes meant Uhuru was not to blame for breaking his <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2020/01/16/fear-and-loathing-why-kikuyus-may-end-up-voting-for-ruto-in-2022/">2013 campaign promise</a> to back Ruto after his own term.</p>
<p>Now, for the first time, Mama Ngina has little or no influence over proceedings in State House. What’s more, the Kenyattas are seen as <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2023/01/section-of-kenya-kwanza-senators-accuse-kenyatta-of-sponsoring-azimio-rallies/">anti-government</a> for the first time since independence. </p>
<h2>Mau Mau uneasy legacy</h2>
<p>Mama Ngina recently came to the defence of the Kenyattas, who are <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/gachagua-criticises-kenyattas-over-mau-mau-neglect-land-troubles-4207716">accused</a> of sidelining freedom fighters and their families. The historical <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/217022">grievance</a> is that they did not benefit from post-independence allocations. </p>
<p>Ngina has sought to <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/04/11/mama-ngina-and-field-marshall-muthonis-locs-sanitising-the-kenyattas/">realign herself</a> with the Mau Mau. She has claimed that <a href="https://hardtalkkenyan.wordpress.com/2023/04/21/field-marshal-muthoni-wa-kirima-and-i-were-the-true-mau-mau-freedom-fighters-founding-first-lady-mama-ngina-kenyatta/">she was among the Mau Mau women fighters</a>. There is no archival evidence to support this, and her husband denounced the movement before independence. The group remained banned under his and the next presidency. It was finally <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2003-09-01-kenya-lifts-ban-on-mau/">lifted</a> in 2003.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that in an election campaign heavy with economic empowerment promises, this claim was her way of identifying with the marginalised, on behalf of the Kenyattas’ candidate. She can be counted on to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-02-04-ive-paid-all-taxes-stop-tarnishing-my-family-name-mama-ngina-tells-ruto-allies/">defend</a> the family name, in good times and bad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anaïs Angelo receives funding from the Austrian Science Fund. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catheline Bosibori consults to Africa politicum. she has previously received funding from KAAD . She is affiliated with The Adam smith Fellowship, Mercatus centre USA.</span></em></p>You can count on Mama Ngina Kenyattta to defend the family name, in good times and bad.Anaïs Angelo, Elise Richter Fellow, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Universität WienCatheline Bosibori N, Adam Smith Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050052023-05-16T10:59:38Z2023-05-16T10:59:38ZKenya’s political elites switch parties with every election – how this fuels violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524923/original/file-20230508-173480-qsf6ds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters at the launch of the Jubilee Party manifesto in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jubilee-party-supporters-of-kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-news-photo/801424352?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Barely seven months after leaving office, Kenya’s former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/kanini-kega-led-jubilee-faction-kicks-out-uhuru-as-party-leader--4220148">is battling</a> to keep together the party that won him a second term and a majority in parliament in 2017. His <a href="https://web.facebook.com/TheJubileeParty/?_rdc=1&_rdr">Jubilee Party</a> performed dismally in the 2022 election. Only 27 out of 290 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/mps">members of the national assembly</a>, four out of 47 <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/senators">senators</a> and one county governor out of 47 were elected on its ticket. This isn’t surprising in Kenya where political elites switch parties and coalitions with every election. No political party or coalition has ruled for more than one term since the opposition deposed the independence movement, KANU, in 2002. Gilbert Khadiagala, a political scientist who has researched <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364268431_Coalition_politics_in_Kenya_Superficial_assemblages_and_momentary_vehicles_to_attain_power">the fluidity of Kenya’s political coalitions</a>, explains the impact of this.</em></p>
<h2>What is the background of Kenya’s fluid political landscape?</h2>
<p>The onset of the multiparty era in the early 1990s <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Multi-Party+Politics+in+Kenya">brought</a> a new phase of complex political coalitions and alliances. They were competing against the previously dominant political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Typical of Africa’s post-colonial dominant parties, KANU governed for more than two decades through authoritarian methods. Under presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002), KANU co-opted opposition figures into an elaborate system of patronage and coerced critics who didn’t toe the party line. </p>
<p>The coalitions that emerged were based primarily on ethnic and regional affiliations – they were overwhelmingly elite-based. The first was the Forum for the Restoration Democracy (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Forum-for-the-Restoration-of-Democracy">FORD</a>). However, barely a year into its existence, FORD broke into two major factions – FORD Kenya and FORD Asili – in August 1992. Further splits followed. </p>
<p>The dominant coalitions that participated in the August 2022 elections – the Kenya Kwanza alliance (led by William Ruto) and the Azimio alliance (led by Raila Odinga) – comprise many smaller parties. They are products of previous failed attempts at alliance building.</p>
<p>In 30 years of competitive politics, coalitions were expected to gradually stabilise into coherent political parties with national reach and resonance. Instead, political coalitions in Kenya have not advanced beyond their narrow bases. They remain fundamentally ethnic and regional machines that are frequently scrambled together on the eve of elections to win power. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.academia.edu/3497247/Political_movements_and_coalition_politics_in_Kenya_entrenching_ethnicity">studied</a> Kenya’s politics for 30 years. It’s my view that Kenyan coalitions that rise and fall with every election do not provide the foundation for steady and enduring party systems. These coalitions postpone the evolution of national parties that would lend some predictability and stability to political competition.</p>
<p>Parties should broadly reflect – and manage – societal differences. In Germany, for instance, parties have come together to overcome certain historical differences by calling on shared interests. Germany’s coalition governments are largely based on well-established political parties, not conglomerations concocted before elections as in Kenya. And <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/nejo.12310">political parties negotiate</a> these governing coalitions after elections, not before.</p>
<p>Throughout Africa, where ethnic and regional divisions are paramount, political mobilisations deepen societal differences. Electoral violence occurs because winning coalitions control all the national resources. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/victors-go-spoils-how-winner-takes-all-politics-undermine-democracy-sierra-leone">winner-takes-all</a> political systems of countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone face a related problem: they have very small independent private sectors. So winners are tempted to use political power to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-2/nsia-pepra_e.pdf">grab</a> national resources. </p>
<h2>What are the main weaknesses of fluid political coalitions?</h2>
<p>They cause instability in the country. Unstable coalitions contribute to electoral violence as losing coalitions vent their grievances. Following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/12/kenyan-protests-against-kenyatta-election-victory-turn-deadly">violent aftermath</a> of the 2017 Kenyan elections, Odinga’s coalition at the time, the National Super Alliance (NASA), threatened to agitate for the secession of his support base from Kenya. </p>
<p>In 2002, there was a brief phase of optimism for an enduring coalition. The National Rainbow Alliance (NARC), led by Mwai Kibaki, was a grouping of the leading ethnic groups ranged against Moi’s chosen successor, Kenyatta. But it ended in <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">civil conflict</a> in 2007-2008 after Kibaki marginalised key allies largely on ethnic and regional lines. </p>
<p>The Government of National Unity <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/LS_Kenya_Powersharing_FINAL.pdf">crafted</a> by international actors in 2008 became an uneasy and unwieldy coalition. Its members decamped to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-government-of-national-unity-about-to-collapse">new coalitions</a> in the next elections. </p>
<p>Subsequent political alliances have reproduced the conditions for anxiety and chaos after every election. Despite the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> giving more power to Kenya’s 47 counties, political elites remain fixated on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14662043.2015.1089006?needAccess=true&role=button">winning presidential elections</a> to gain power at the centre. </p>
<p>The unstable coalitions also account for widespread corruption. Winning coalitions <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-run-for-office-in-kenya-heres-how-much-itll-cost-you-183683">expend enormous resources</a> to fortify their power. To do this they have to loot state resources. </p>
<h2>What are the strengths of these loose coalitions?</h2>
<p>In societies where ethnic groups coincide with regions, coalitions are one of the means of organising competitive politics. The loose coalitions enable leaders who neither share policies nor vision to temporarily accommodate each other. This creates a semblance of national unity. The fluid coalitions are, therefore, essential in such political landscapes until national cohesion and coherence are achieved. </p>
<p>When the search for presidential power ceases to be politically relevant and salient, Kenya’s politics will be normalised. Transforming coalitions into solid parties may take time. But it’s the only way out of the prevailing political stalemate. </p>
<h2>What adjustments should be made?</h2>
<p>Kenyans do share basic bread-and-butter interests. When those interests are highlighted – instead of ethnic and regional affiliations – political parties with national outreach could emerge. </p>
<p>It’s elites who emphasise cultural and ethnic differences between regions. They have a large stake in the stalemate continuing, instead of building institutionalised parties. The puzzle for Kenya is how to transform ethnic diversities and identities into the foundations for predictable and organised politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fluidity of the country’s short-lived coalitions is a major cause of instability in Kenya.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2035802023-04-16T07:18:52Z2023-04-16T07:18:52ZFrom advertising blackmail to physical threats, Kenya’s journalists are under attack – but they must also regain public trust<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520468/original/file-20230412-16-78wq4n.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Journalists take cover during March 2023 protests in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boniface Muthoni/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In recent months, Kenyan journalists have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/editorials/stop-this-unwarranted-affront-to-media-freedom-4167720">harassed</a>, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/editorials/denounce-this-blatant-attempt-to-muzzle-media-4170448">intimidated</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/journalists-attacked-as-anti-government-protests-continue-in-kenya-/7030753.html">attacked</a> by government officials, politicians and members of the public. George Ogola, a professor of media industries, explains the impact of these attacks on media freedom in Kenya.</em> </p>
<h2>What are the major emerging threats against media freedom in Kenya?</h2>
<p>Kenya’s media face threats from both state and non-state actors as <a href="https://theconversation.com/moi-and-the-media-how-kenyan-journalism-suffered-under-his-iron-heel-131681">repressive practices of the past</a> reemerge. Government and opposition politicians are actively undermining media freedom in the country. This isn’t entirely new. But the threats have taken a new dimension as they are publicly defended – even boldly justified – by some of the perpetrators. These threats are economic, political and physical.</p>
<p><strong>Economic squeeze.</strong> In what it claimed was a measure of austerity to curb government spending – but which was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to muzzle media criticism – the previous government established a media buying agency, the <a href="https://ict.go.ke/directorate-of-government-advertising-agency-gaa/">Government Advertising Agency</a>. All government advertising is now channelled through this agency. </p>
<p>Critical media were and are now regularly “punished” through the <a href="https://rsf.org/en/government-orders-state-sector-withdraw-advertising-standard-group-media">withdrawal of government advertising</a>. In the run-up to the August 2022 elections, one of President William Ruto’s senior policy men <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidNdii/status/1552249429406744576?s=20">warned the media</a> that they were best advised to look for advertising elsewhere as it would not be business as usual with state advertising.</p>
<p><strong>Political threats.</strong> The <a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-vs-kenyas-media-democracy-is-at-stake-190780">emerging systematic media repression</a> has also taken the form of brazen political threats from within the senior ranks of government. In what seemed like a well-calibrated attack by the ruling coalition, several politicians accused the media of being a “<a href="https://twitter.com/Aaroncheruiyot/status/1632672857040846850?s=20">cartel</a>” which needed to be “crushed”. These alarming sentiments were <a href="https://twitter.com/KIMANIICHUNGWAH/status/1633125734473674752?s=20">shared by the ruling party’s majority leader</a> in parliament. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-vs-kenyas-media-democracy-is-at-stake-190780">William Ruto vs Kenya's media: democracy is at stake</a>
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<p>More draconian threats have included alleged plans to shut down media houses and the internet. Against the background of <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-protests-in-kenya-have-a-long-and-rich-history-but-have-been-hijacked-by-the-elites-202979">opposition protests</a> in the country in March 2023, the Kenya Media Sector Working Group claimed the government had intended to <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/journalists-call-out-govt-over-alleged-plan-to-shut-internet-media-over-azimio-protests-4182216">shut down the broadcast media and the internet</a> ahead of a planned demonstration. The president <a href="https://ntvkenya.co.ke/news/ruto-on-plan-to-shut-down-mainstream-media-internet/">denied such plans</a>.
Meanwhile, opposition leader Raila Odinga called on his supporters to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-03-21-uproar-over-railas-call-for-boycott-of-the-star/">boycott the Star newspaper</a>, a local daily, accusing it of bias. Even though he later withdrew the order, the disregard for the principles of media freedom was apparent.</p>
<p><strong>Physical assaults.</strong> In what seemed like a return to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">repressive 1980s</a> during Kenya’s struggle for political pluralism, journalists were physically assaulted by the police and demonstrators in recent mass protests. Incredibly, the inspector general of police described the risk of assault as part of journalism’s “<a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-04-04-it-wasnt-deliberate-koome-tells-media-over-attacks-during-demos/">occupational hazards</a>”. </p>
<h2>What does the law say about media freedom?</h2>
<p>Kenya has a relatively strong legal framework that supports media freedom. This is in addition to instruments like charters, treaties and declarations. </p>
<p>The freedom and independence of all types of media are guaranteed by <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/200-34-freedom-of-the-media">Article 34 of the constitution</a>. <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/199-33-freedom-of-expression">Articles 33</a> and <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/201-35-access-to-information">35</a> further guarantee freedom of expression and access to information, respectively. </p>
<p>Additional legislation includes the <a href="https://mediacouncil.or.ke/sites/default/files/downloads/media-act-2013.pdf">Media Council of Kenya Act (2013)</a>, which established the Media Council of Kenya. The council promotes and protects the freedom and independence of the media. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/AmendmentActs/2013/KenyaInformationandCommunications_Amendment_Act2013.pdf">Kenya Information and Communication (Amendment) Act (2013)</a> established the Communications Authority of Kenya. It licences and regulates postal, information and communications services. The act gives the authority “independence from government, political or commercial interests”.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eala.org/uploads/The_Treaty_for_the_Establishment_of_the_East_Africa_Community_2006_1999.pdf">East African Community treaty (1999)</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights#:%7E:text=Article%2019,media%20and%20regardless%20of%20frontiers">Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> and the African Union’s <a href="http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.html">Declaration of Principles on Human Rights in Africa (2002)</a>, all ratified by Kenya, advocate for media freedom. </p>
<p>Other key advocates for media freedom include the Kenya Union of Journalists, the Kenya Editors Guild and the Media Owners Association. </p>
<h2>Are media outlets free of blame?</h2>
<p>There is a growing public wariness about the performance of the media, which are increasingly being accused of partisanship and poor journalism. </p>
<p>The Kenyan media have always been embedded within the broader contests for political power forced upon them by <a href="https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/resources/Internews_FactuallyTrue_Legally_Untrue-MediaOwnership_Kenya2013-01.pdf">media ownership structures</a>. Journalists are also wedded to Kenya’s polarising, ethnically inflected politics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyatta-has-gone-about-stifling-the-free-press-in-kenya-91335">How Kenyatta has gone about stifling the free press in Kenya</a>
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<p>A study of the structural conditions of journalism in Kenya describes the media culture as one that “<a href="http://www.mecodem.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Lohner-Banjac-Neverla-2016_Mapping-structural-conditions-of-journalism-in-Kenya.pdf#page=5">fluctuates from critical to concordant, clientelist reporting</a>”. Coverage can reflect the ethnic loyalties of the writers or media houses. This has eroded public trust in sections of the media. </p>
<p>Further, the media licensing regime has traditionally been transactional. Political support is rewarded with licences and access to state advertising. </p>
<p>Importantly, too, as economic challenges become existential threats to many media organisations, they have been forced to reduce their workforce, weakening gate-keeping processes. </p>
<p>These organisations also have to contend with the speed of social media as competitors. As the focus shifts to speed, quality is undermined. </p>
<p>The professional precarity of journalists afraid to lose their jobs has also made them susceptible to self-censorship and bribery. </p>
<h2>What are the options for the media?</h2>
<p>Continued exposure to advertising blackmail from the government weakens the media’s ability to operate independently. It is, therefore, critical that Kenya’s media find ways of diversifying their revenue streams. </p>
<p>Media organisations must continue to raise awareness about the importance of media freedom. They must push back against attempts to undermine their independence and encroach on their freedoms. </p>
<p>There are also enduring legal threats, such as the misapplication of laws like the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ComputerMisuseandCybercrimesActNo5of2018.pdf">Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act</a>, which criminalises the publication of false information. Such laws are routinely abused and must, therefore, be fought. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-is-being-misused-in-kenyas-political-arena-why-its-hard-to-stop-it-177586">Social media is being misused in Kenya's political arena. Why it's hard to stop it</a>
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<p>Lastly, the media must continue investing in training and capacity building for journalists. The allure of speed in an attempt to compete with social media may be tempting, but it risks undermining ethical reporting, fact-checking and quality journalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203580/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Ogola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a growing public wariness about the performance of the media, which are increasingly accused of being partisan.George Ogola, Professor of Media Industries, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990102023-02-08T14:28:18Z2023-02-08T14:28:18ZKenya’s president wants taxes to replace foreign debt – seven ways to get there<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507825/original/file-20230202-21-1mdptm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are fears that Kenya's debt has been funding mostly government salaries.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyas-cabinet-secretary-for-national-treasury-henry-rotich-news-photo/974392922?phrase=national%20treasury%20kenya&adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the run-up to Kenya’s 2022 polls, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THIygUIpS9w">economic issues</a>, particularly public debt and joblessness, took centre stage. The Kenya Kwanza team led by William Ruto suggested that Kenya had over-borrowed, a habit they pledged to stop. Ruto’s rivals <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/uhuru-defends-jubilee-s-sh6-7-trillion-debt-spree-3835802">defended</a> the debt, insisting investment in infrastructure would spur economic growth. </p>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Medium-Term-Debt-Management-Strategy-2023.pdf#page=24">nominal debt</a> stood at KSh9.14 trillion or US$74.1 billion by the end of December 2022. That accounted for 67% of the GDP. More than half of the debt, 51% (US$37.87 billion) was owed to foreign entities. A debt limit of no more than 64% of the national GDP is <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/509771468337915456/pdf/WPS5391.pdf">recommended</a> for developing countries such as Kenya.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-breached-its-public-debt-ceiling-how-it-got-there-and-what-that-means-190006">Kenya has breached its public debt ceiling – how it got there and what that means</a>
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<p>Global institutions like the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-19/imf-approves-447-million-for-kenya-to-address-debt-reforms?leadSource=uverify%20wall">International Monetary Fund</a> and the World Bank are concerned about Kenya’s debt sustainability. </p>
<p>Aside from the sheer amount being borrowed, there are fears that the debt has been funding <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/state-uses-sh162bn-loan-illegally-on-salaries-utilities-3950530">recurrent expenditure</a>, mostly government salaries. It’s true, though, that big projects like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mombasa-port-how-kenyas-auditor-general-misread-chinas-standard-gauge-railway-contracts-182610">standard gauge railway</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nairobis-new-expressway-may-ease-traffic-woes-but-mostly-for-the-wealthy-170164">expressway</a> have been partly funded by debt.</p>
<p>Debt politics has further been fuelled by the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-road-colonialism-chinese-characteristics">narrative</a> that by saddling Africa with debt, China is able to call the shots on trade, investment and even geopolitical issues. </p>
<p>Ruto is now in power and seems determined to reduce public debt. The government still has to rely on domestic and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/imf-approves-disbursement-44739-million-%20kenya-2022-12-20/">foreign</a> borrowing, but Ruto wants to reduce it. He intends to do that by <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/09/30/kenya-president-ruto-wants-to-reform-tax-system-to-reduce-inequality//">collecting more taxes</a> and using <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001460511/ruto-talks-tough-on-debt-eyes-pensioners-savings-to-fund-projects">national savings</a> to pay for what the country needs. </p>
<p>The Kenya Revenue Authority has been given new <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/business/president-ruto-s-tax-targets-leave-kra-in-a-pot-4077264">revenue targets</a> – US$10 billion more to raise in one year, an almost 50% increase. It is expected to double current collections in five years to US$48 billion by 2027, an election year.</p>
<p>The targets seem too ambitious under the current socio-economic circumstances. In trying to achieve the target, the formal sector is likely to be the hardest hit as its revenues are public and hard to hide. Higher taxes could depress demand too, leading to lower tax revenues and job losses. </p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>But increased tax collections could benefit everyone if the taxes are put to good use. Here are seven ways Ruto’s government can raise tax collection and cut reliance on foreign debt:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Focus on economic growth</strong> – Tax is charged on income or profit. To meet the target, Ruto should focus on accelerating economic growth. That is how former president Mwai Kibaki – who raised GDP growth to 7% – managed to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000049257/president-kibaki-s-economic-legacy">triple</a> tax revenues, from US$2 billion in 2002 to US$6 billion by 2011. </p>
<p>Of late, economic growth has been lower than expected, and is <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries-east-africa-kenya/kenya-economic-outlook">projected</a> to slow from 5.9% in 2022 to 5.7% in 2023. </p>
<p>The economy grows when we invest or consume more. Ruto should make Kenya a more investment-friendly country by looking at business regulations and laws.
Higher taxes eat into investors’ profits and could discourage investment. Kenyan entrepreneurs should be able to start businesses without worrying about the taxman <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kra-in-fresh-bid-to-shut-down-keroche-breweries-3885398">closing</a> their premises. </p>
<p>What encourages economic growth is offering quality goods and services that are globally competitive. The economy should reward innovators and those who go the extra mile. Providing services like roads, sewers, power and security will attract investors. Giving citizens confidence creates demand and economic growth. </p>
<p>Once the economy grows, tax revenue grows, whether it’s value added tax or income tax. So, before setting a tax revenue target, Kenya should start with an economic growth target like the 10% rate envisaged in Kibaki’s <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">Vision 2030</a>. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Choose optimal tax rates</strong> – The government should pick tax rates that yield maximum tax revenue. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/tax/here-is-everything-you-want-to-know-about-laffer-curve-and-tax/tomorrowmakersshow/51098997.cms">Theory</a> has it that high tax rates can produce lower tax revenues. High tax rates could lead to inflation as entrepreneurs load the extra charge onto prices. That could lead to lower demand for goods and services, and depress tax revenues.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Share the burden</strong> – Have more people pay taxes. That includes the informal sector. If citizens can see how taxes are working for them, they will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-study-shows-text-messages-can-boost-tax-compliance-heres-what-worked-177522">encouraged</a> to pay. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Eliminate tax exemptions</strong> – There is no need for tax exemptions for investors or firms just because they can lobby the government. Progressive tax rates (high rates for top earners and low ones for smaller incomes) can do all the magic. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Address corruption</strong> – About a third of Kenya’s budget is lost through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption-idUSKCN0WC1H8">corruption</a>, and former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/president-kenyatta-says-over-ksh-2-billion-is-stolen-from-govt-daily-4563455">alluded</a> to this. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Boost national savings</strong> – Higher savings would reduce interest rates on treasury bonds and bills. Since banks and other institutions would be awash with cash, the government would not need to raise rates to attract investment in government paper. Savings would make credit available to the private sector too, leading to lower interest rates and more borrowing, which is an economic stimulus. The national savings level for <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/business/kenya/2021-07-25-kenyans-saving-culture-poorest-in-east-africa--survey/">Kenya</a> is currently low. The government should craft a <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/articles/how-can-policymakers-raise-household-saving">policy</a> to help boost savings among households.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Cede roles to philanthropy</strong> – Many services being provided by the government could be ceded to philanthropists. Examples include mission hospitals and schools. That would reduce the need for tax revenues. The government should come up with an incentive framework for philanthropists. Additionally, some services currently offered by the government can be offered through the private sector more cheaply and efficiently. </p></li>
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<p>Collecting more tax should be coupled with prudent government spending. That has political implications; it could lead to <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/sh300bn-budget-cuts-await-css-3967308">job losses</a> in the public sector, but create efficiency – which is good for the economy in the long run.</p>
<p><em>Since the article was first published, data on Kenya’s debt statistics in the second paragraph has been updated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>XN Iraki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>William Ruto is determined to reduce public debt by collecting more taxes to pay for what the country needs.XN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987982023-02-02T06:48:39Z2023-02-02T06:48:39ZThe body choosing Kenya’s election commission is being overhauled – how this could strengthen democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507316/original/file-20230131-4114-8kr9t0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto (right) takes over from Uhuru Kenyatta as Kenya's president in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has new rules for choosing the people who run its elections.</p>
<p>President William Ruto has signed into law the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php/iebc-amendment-bill-2022-assented-law">Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) Bill</a>. It changes the composition of the panel that selects people to serve on the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/iebc/?mandate">commission</a> is a state institution that has the task of enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy in Kenya. It conducts elections, registers citizens as voters and maintains the voters’ roll. It also fixes the boundaries of electoral constituencies and wards. It settles electoral disputes, registers candidates for election and conducts voter education.</p>
<p>But since it was established in 2011, the commission has been at the centre of Kenya’s history of post-election violence. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000203367/the-truth-lies-and-dangers-as-debate-on-iebc-rages-on">2013</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171018-kenya-election-chief-doubt-free-fair-poll-kenyatta-odinga-demonstrations">2017</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rigging-allegations-begin-kenyan-media-slow-tally-votes-tight-presidential-race-2022-08-12/">2022</a>, the losing political parties accused it of failing to administer elections fairly and lawfully. </p>
<p>In 2017, the Kenyan supreme court accused the commission of “<a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/africa/kenyans-usher-in-year-of-political-reforms-i46ulluz">bungling</a>” the presidential election. In the 2022 elections, the then vice-chairperson of the commission, Juliana Cherera, <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/august-9/4-iebc-commissioners-disown-presidential-results-144903/">disowned the results</a> of the presidential poll before the official announcement. </p>
<p><a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/-raila-calls-for-constitutional-changes-and-iebc-reforms--4001430">Raila Odinga</a>, who lost that poll, called for reforms that would make the electoral commission a much fairer referee of the country’s elections. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/raila-odinga-should-be-thanked-his-election-losses-helped-deepen-kenyas-democracy-190044">Raila Odinga should be thanked - his election losses helped deepen Kenya's democracy</a>
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<p>The new law seeks to <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-11/Independent%20Electoral%20and%20Boundaries%20Commission%20%28Amendment%29%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">streamline the process</a> of appointing members to the electoral commission, making the selection process more participatory and reflective of the country’s diversity.</p>
<p>And it comes at a critical moment. Seven commissioner positions are currently vacant.</p>
<p>A weak electoral agency poses four major threats to Kenya’s democracy: it will fail to deliver fair, free and credible elections; it will disrupt improvements in the country’s transition to democracy; it will prolong the culture of post-election violence; and it will divide the nation’s diverse ethnocultural groups.</p>
<p>It is, therefore, vital that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission be a strong and fully functioning organisation staffed by Kenyans who are dedicated to democratic governance. </p>
<h2>What’s changing under the new law</h2>
<p>Selecting electoral commissioners is a complex job. </p>
<p>The new law brings more independent commissioners and associations into the selection process. Previously, only three agencies nominated the seven commissioners: the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/psc/the-commission">Parliamentary Service Commission</a>, the <a href="https://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/history/">Inter-Religious Council of Kenya</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/lawsocietykenya?lang=en">Law Society of Kenya</a>. Now there are five. The newcomers are the <a href="https://orpp.or.ke/index.php/services/political-parties-liaison-committees-pplc">Political Parties Liaison Committee</a> and the <a href="https://www.publicservice.go.ke/index.php/about-us/mandate">Public Service Commission</a>. They open the door for political parties and the public service to participate in this critical process.</p>
<p>It’s important that the selection panel includes state and non-state organisations that promote election integrity. Only individuals who are citizens of Kenya and meet the integrity requirements in <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#KE/CON/Const2010/chap_6">Chapter 6</a> of the constitution can serve on the selection panel. These individuals must hold a degree from a university recognised in Kenya.</p>
<h2>The vacancies</h2>
<p>Three of the current vacancies in the commission were expected: these commissioners’ terms had expired. But four other commissioners quit under a cloud of suspicion. </p>
<p>Cherera, Justus Nyang'aya and Francis Wanderi resigned after being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2022-12-06-cherera-four-should-be-probed-even-after-resigning-mp-kiarie/">suspended for their conduct</a> during the 2022 election. They had alleged that commission chairperson Wafula Chebukati had <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001462824/cherera-nyangaya-wanderi-and-masit-to-be-investigated-individually-muchelule-says">altered poll results</a> in favour of Ruto. Another commissioner, Irene Masit, was also suspended. She now has <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/irene-masit-breaks-silence-after-skipping-hearings-by-tribunal-probing-cherera-4-n311525">charges pending</a> against her before a tribunal investigating the matter.</p>
<h2>Why elections matter</h2>
<p>Elections are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">a cornerstone of any democracy</a>. They help a nation build and sustain democratic and development-enhancing institutions. </p>
<p>They are a check on government. Elections put the power in ordinary people’s hands to change their government and choose more effective leaders for public service. They also give historically marginalised groups a voice.</p>
<p>To perform these functions, elections must meet certain minimum standards. They must be regular, fair, free, competitive, inclusive, transparent and credible. They must be conducted in strict conformity with the constitution. </p>
<p>That’s why a strong, independent and functioning electoral agency is so vital. </p>
<h2>Risks of dysfunction</h2>
<p>In Kenya, a weak and dysfunctional electoral commission would have dire consequences.</p>
<p>First, the failure to conduct elections that are considered by the majority of Kenyans as free, fair and credible could lead to the type of violence that the country experienced after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007 presidential election</a>. More than 1,000 people died. </p>
<p>Second, a weak commission can derail improvements in Kenya’s electoral system. A strong commission sets codes of conduct for candidates and political parties. This helps guard against various forms of political opportunism, including corruption. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-of-election-rigging-may-fuel-further-abuses-in-kenya-democracy-could-be-the-loser-176113">Fears of election rigging may fuel further abuses in Kenya: democracy could be the loser</a>
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<p>Third, a dysfunctional electoral commission can be manipulated by politicians and their supporters to monopolise political spaces. This situation has played out in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-07-23-voa7-66781532/565192.html">Cameroon</a>, where the ruling party has marginalised the opposition to remain in power since 1990. Similarly, in <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200224-togo-incumbent-re-elected-fourth-term-opposition-alleges-fraud">Togo</a>, President Faure Gnassingbé has monopolised political spaces since 2005. </p>
<p>Fourth, in Kenya, the electoral commission is responsible for creating electoral boundaries. Any weakness in the commission can be exploited to create boundaries that benefit certain politicians and their supporters. This would undermine democracy and create distrust in the country’s democratic institutions.</p>
<p>The new law <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/senators-split-on-proposal-to-change-law-on-iebc-selection-4090866">doesn’t meet the expectations</a> of all of Kenya’s political constituencies – some individuals and groups believe that their voice in the selection panel has been diluted. However, it’s important for all Kenyans to recognise these reforms as an effort in the right direction – towards a stronger and more inclusive commission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198798/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s electoral agency is tasked with enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy – any dysfunctions would have dire consequences.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1764832022-12-21T05:29:27Z2022-12-21T05:29:27ZFemale genital mutilation rates peak in Kenya during school holidays – an alternative option offers a solution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444558/original/file-20220204-13-q8bn3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A past anti-FGM campaign meeting in Kajiado County, Kenya.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyan-maasai-women-raise-their-hands-as-they-gather-during-news-photo/450494548?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Female genital mutilation is a practice deeply rooted in cultural traditions around the world. The <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation">World Health Organisation</a> defines it as comprising all procedures that involve removal of parts of the external female genital organs for non-medical reasons. </p>
<p>The cut is practised for various reasons. Some communities use it as a rite of passage. Some see it as a way of enhancing hygiene and aesthetics, sexual maturity, marriageability and social belonging.</p>
<p>In Kenya, <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/female-genital-cutting-rise-during-covid-kenya">girls are mostly subjected to the cut during the school holidays</a>. They have a long period away from school and hence perceived to have time to heal from the procedure without scrutiny. There is an increased risk for girls during the long holidays as schools in Kenya have closed for about two months, from 25 November 2022 to 23 January 2023. </p>
<p>Female genital mutilation was officially recognised as a form of violence against women and a violation of human rights in the 1993 <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/179739?ln=en">Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women</a>. Ending it contributes to the achievement of <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=5&Target=5.3">Sustainable Development Goal targets</a>. In 2012, the UN General Assembly designated 6 February as the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation.</p>
<p>Kenya is a party to, and has ratified, the convention on female genital mutilation, alongside others that focus on the rights of women and children.
The country has enacted the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2011. This law has provided a good environment for programmes and development of policies for <a href="https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Profile-of-FGM-in-Kenya-English_2020.pdf">22 hotspot counties</a>. </p>
<p>The Kenya Demographic and Health Survey puts the <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr308/fr308.pdf">prevalence</a> of female genital mutilation in Kenya at 21% of women aged 15-49 in 2014. The prevalence is higher among the Somali (94%), Samburu (86%), Kisii (84%) and Maasai (78%). </p>
<p>In 2019, former president Uhuru Kenyatta <a href="https://kenya.unfpa.org/en/news/presidential-commitment-end-female-genital-mutilation-2022">pledged</a> to put an end to female genital mutilation in Kenya by 2022 and concerted efforts executed by government and other stakeholders have advanced the fight to end this vice. The COVID pandemic <a href="https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1610&context=departments_sbsr-rh">slowed the implementation of intervention programmes to end the practice</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://amref.org/">Amref Health Africa</a> (and its associated Amref International University) has for a number of years worked to end female genital mutilation through community-centred interventions and evidence generation. One of its promising interventions is the community-led alternative rite of passage which supports girls to undergo the transition without being cut.</p>
<p>To investigate the effectiveness of this alternative rite of passage, we commissioned an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1701216319310722#!">impact study</a> in 2019. The study focused on the Maasai of Kajiado County in Kenya - one of the female genital mutilation hotspots - where this intervention was tried for 10 years. </p>
<p>The study found that the intervention had a positive impact. It contributed to reducing the prevalence of female genital mutilation. Early and forced marriage of children, as well as teenage pregnancies, also dropped. </p>
<p>Amref hopes this evidence will help to accelerate efforts towards abandonment of the practice and especially among communities that practice it as a rite of passage, from childhood to adulthood. </p>
<h2>Alternative rite</h2>
<p>The alternative rite was designed and created by teams which include community gatekeepers, cultural and religious elders, reformed cutters and administrative officials of counties. Women and men are also involved.</p>
<p>Community members are involved in the alternative rites to ensure that: </p>
<ul>
<li>the initiative is community-driven</li>
<li>only girls who have not been exposed to female genital mutilation are selected</li>
<li>positive aspects of the ritual are included</li>
<li>the girl child is protected.</li>
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<p>The teams select girls to undergo the alternative rite of passage. The ceremony takes four to five days. This model offers an alternative to ritual cutting but seeks to retain the positive aspects of cultural rituals and celebrations around womanhood. </p>
<p>The new ritual combines aspects of the traditional ceremony with educational components of sexual and reproductive health, human rights and gender norms. </p>
<p>The programme supports girls’ self esteem and ability to exercise their power. </p>
<h2>Positive impact</h2>
<p>To date alternative rites of passage ceremonies have been held for over 20,000 girls. </p>
<p>The female genital mutilation prevalence rates declined by 24.2 percentage points, from a mean of 80.8% before the alternative rite rollout, to 56.6% afterwards (between 2009 and 2019). In addition, the intervention contributed to an increase in schooling years for girls by 2.5 years, from an average of 3.1 to 5.6 years.</p>
<p>The study shows that the rate of forced marriages – which was growing at an average rate of 1.2% – has now declined by 6.1%, representing an overall drop of 7.3 percentage points. </p>
<p>Similarly, teenage pregnancy - which was rising by 1.5% annually, has declined by 6.3% over the last 10 years. This represents a 7.8 percentage point drop.</p>
<p>Through this intervention, Amref is able to create an enabling environment that promotes girls’ protection against the cut. It also reduces teenage pregnancies and child marriage while increasing girls’ chances of getting a formal education. </p>
<p>Amref is now collaborating with the Maasai community in redesigning and strengthening the alternative rite. </p>
<h2>The digital tracking tool</h2>
<p>As a result of consultative meetings with communities and stakeholders, the need arose to ensure that the girls remained protected and uncut. Amref has developed and piloted a digital tool to keep track of the alternative rite’s girls. It enables Amref to follow up on the health, education and socio-economic welfare of the girls, working closely with community health workers and teachers. </p>
<p>The tool has already provided some preliminary data on young girls tracked retrospectively, to be monitored up to the age of 25 years. It will keep being improved for wider rollout in the future too.</p>
<p>Creating a database of the alternative rite beneficiaries and their families is useful. This enables us to follow up on their progress after the training and thereby ensuring child protection through ensuring that they remain in school and are not subjected to the cut. This way, we are able to provide psychological support and engage the girls for community activities such as school clubs and inter-generational dialogues.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joachim-osur-1315703">Joachim Osur</a>, an associate professor of sexual and reproductive health and vice-chancellor of Amref International University, conducted the primary research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tammary Esho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Kenya, the prevalence of female genital mutilation has dropped by 24.2 percentage points where an alternative rite of passage is being tried.Tammary Esho, Professor of biomedical sciences, Amref International University (AMIU)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1955892022-12-14T13:23:02Z2022-12-14T13:23:02ZKenya in 2022: 4 essential reads on a year of political drama and economic hardships<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497952/original/file-20221129-7082-dfo64q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Motorcycle taxis queue for fuel in Nairobi in April amid shortages.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The year 2022 was always going to be an eventful one. After nearly 10 years in power, President Uhuru Kenyatta was destined to leave office to make way for the winner of the August 2022 presidential vote. Would it be his former bitter rival turned political ally Raila Odinga? Or would it be close ally turned bitter rival William Ruto?</p>
<p>It mattered to millions of Kenyan voters, too, who would lead the country out of a particularly difficult year. High food prices, record fuel prices and the worst drought in 40 years made for a depressing run-up to the election. </p>
<p>Add to these the nagging fears of potential violence at any point in the election cycle. </p>
<p>The Conversation Africa’s academic experts were there at every turn to provide insights. Here are four essential reads on these and other developments.</p>
<h2>A disputed election, but no violence</h2>
<p>It was not a certainty that Kenya would avoid the ugly election violence for which it has become infamous since the post-election killings in 2007 and 2008. Many Kenyans feared this possibility. But the campaigns and post-election period were relatively calm and peaceful. This was despite vigorously contested, close, disputed and at times tense polls. Gabrielle Lynch explains that a great deal has changed since Kenya stood on the “brink of a precipice” in 2008. A new constitution introduced in 2010 heralded numerous reforms, key among them the dispersion of political power and the independence of the judiciary. Key institutions are in need of further reforms to resolve outstanding grievances.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-elections-are-proof-of-change-since-2007-violence-but-more-reform-is-needed-190043">Kenya's elections are proof of change since 2007 violence, but more reform is needed</a>
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<h2>Kenya’s in a hole: time to stop digging</h2>
<p>President William Ruto, Kenya’s incoming president, inherited an economy reeling from many shocks. Like other African countries, Kenyans face unprecedented levels of food and fuel inflation. His options will be further limited by the country’s high debt levels, which have driven the cost of annual debt servicing to almost 54% of domestic revenues – up from 40% in 2020. The World Bank warned of a high risk of debt default. What’s more, writes Odongo Kodongo, the International Monetary Fund’s downgrade of Kenya’s debt risk makes it more expensive for the country to borrow, leaving it with less to spend on other economic programmes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-breached-its-public-debt-ceiling-how-it-got-there-and-what-that-means-190006">Kenya has breached its public debt ceiling – how it got there and what that means</a>
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<h2>Police getting away with murder</h2>
<p>Police killings of citizens are shockingly commonplace in Kenya. Those who bear the brunt are mostly poor, young and male suspects of crime or terrorism. Investigations are rare unless there is overwhelming public outrage stoked by the media, or the victim is well-known or well-connected. The new government dissolved a police squad accused of carrying out extrajudicial killings, but that alone won’t make a dent when the problem is structural rot within the police service, argues Naomi van Stapele. She suggests ways to restore public confidence in the Kenyan police. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-killings-point-to-systemic-rot-and-a-failed-justice-system-193468">Kenya: police killings point to systemic rot and a failed justice system</a>
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<h2>Genetically modified food debate</h2>
<p>Kenya lifted a ban on the cultivation and importation of genetically modified crops amid the worst drought in 40 years and soaring food prices. The targeted crops include white maize, the country’s main staple food. The decision was welcomed by scientists who see genetically modified crops as the answer for food security. But it is opposed by a spirited lobby concerned about potential risks to health and the environment. Benard Odhiambo Oloo weighs these fears up against available scientific evidence. He calls for a measured combination of public safety vigilance and government transparency. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-lifted-its-ban-on-genetically-modified-crops-the-risks-and-opportunities-192636">Kenya has lifted its ban on genetically modified crops: the risks and opportunities</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
With Uhuru Kenyatta leaving office to make way for a new leader, it was always going to be an eventful year for Kenya.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959372022-12-09T07:31:24Z2022-12-09T07:31:24ZEast African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499498/original/file-20221207-26-fw7v41.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan troops fly the flags of the East African Community and Kenya in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East African Community decided to deploy troops in one of its member states for the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">first time</a> in June 2022. The deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will test the regional body’s ability to respond to complex conflicts. </p>
<p>Already, the regional bloc has scored some early victories. Most significantly, on 6 December, following peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, 53 of the over 100 armed groups operating in the DRC <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">agreed to a ceasefire</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC – which joined the East African Community in April 2022 – has been trapped in <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">cycles of violence</a> for nearly three decades. The reasons include ethnic intolerance, illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos. </p>
<p>The most recent wave of conflict follows the reemergence of the armed group <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. International forces drove the group out of the country in 2013. Its resurgence this past year has led to heightened levels of violence and mass displacement. </p>
<p>This has prompted the East African Community to mobilise a <a href="https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf">regional force</a> that could comprise up to 12,000 troops from member states. It will operate under <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/military-deployments-in-east-dr-congo-4009492">Kenyan command</a>, with a six-month renewable mandate to support the DRC’s national forces in containing, defeating and eradicating negative forces in the restive eastern region. </p>
<p>This is the second time regional actors have deployed a military force to tamp down an M23 insurgency. Following the armed group’s initial uprising in 2013, the 12-member <a href="https://icglr.org/">International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</a> proposed an intervention brigade. It was eventually brought under the <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background">umbrella</a> of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. It became known as the Force Intervention Brigade.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">June decision</a> to deploy an east African force may feel like déjà vu. While some factors are different now, not all developments are promising.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">research </a> has focused on armed conflict settings, with an in-depth analysis of the DRC. In my view, while the current Congo crisis is unlikely to be resolved without military force, any hope for success requires that operations remain closely tied to a political process.</p>
<h2>What’s changed?</h2>
<p>One difference between the East African Community’s intervention now and the 2013 Force Intervention Brigade mission is the merging of political and military processes.</p>
<p>The East African Community will retain authority over the regional force, while also leading the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2695-the-third-inter-congolese-dialogue-under-the-eac-led-nairobi-process">ongoing political dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">downfalls</a> of previous military responses in the Congo is that they haven’t been adequately linked to a political process. When the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, it was intended to be the “teeth” of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013">regional political agreement</a>. However, these military and political interventions were never fully integrated. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the east African region’s effort to integrate the two processes will succeed. Decades of violence indicate just how intractable the conflict is. For instance, so far there has been no indication that Rwanda will cease (or even acknowledge) <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">its support of the M23</a>. The international community hasn’t done much to call for accountability on this front. </p>
<p>Further, the DRC has refused to enter into dialogue with the M23, which it considers a terrorist organisation, for fear that this will embolden other armed groups. </p>
<h2>Crowded theatre</h2>
<p>Deploying a force overseen by the East African Community presents the challenge of communication and coordination with other actors in the region. The confusion this can create was seen in the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/12/ugandan-congolese-troops-joint-operations-monusco/">2021 deployment</a> of Ugandan forces to the DRC to combat the armed group, the Allied Democratic Forces. This confusion largely had to do with the extent of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate to support operations involving foreign forces. </p>
<p>While the mission has indicated its intention to partner with the east African regional force, the practicalities for doing so remain unclear. </p>
<p>There is also a concern that the east African force could elevate the risk of human rights violations. <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/the-sum-of-all-parts/">Past reports</a> have documented the potential harm to civilian protection that can arise from crowded theatres. Actors may interpret their civilian protection obligations in different ways. And it may not be clear who is accountable for violations. </p>
<p>As opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission, the east African force doesn’t have a protection mandate. It is unclear to what extent it will prioritise civilian harm mitigation in its planning and operations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Protests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission's crisis of legitimacy</a>
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<p>Violations against civilians could undermine the east African force’s legitimacy, which is already likely to be weak given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-exploitation-by-un-peacekeepers-in-drc-fatherless-children-speak-for-first-time-about-the-pain-of-being-abandoned-188248">history of abuses</a> committed by foreign forces in the Congo. Already, Kinshasa has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-agrees-to-eac-force-deployment-no-rwandan-army-3852276">refused</a> to allow Rwanda to deploy troops as part of the regional force. Other contributing countries have a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">history of supporting</a> armed groups in the region. And the political economy of war in the Congo has been of benefit to a number of its neighbours. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211260015.html">noted</a> by Daniel Levine-Spound, a researcher with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (<a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/">CIVIC</a>) based in the Congo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because many of the countries involved in the force have recently undertaken military operations on Congolese soil, there is a significant amount of mistrust and uncertainty among civilians that the force will need to overcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This will require adequate engagement with civil society organisations and prioritising civilian safety in military operations. </p>
<h2>The task ahead</h2>
<p>The M23 of today is not the same M23 of 10 years ago. It has more <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">sophisticated weaponry and tactics</a>, and a more centralised command and control. </p>
<p>Additionally, it’s operating more strategically than in 2013. The boldness of the group’s 2013 march directly on Goma – the capital of North Kivu in eastern DRC – elicited a swift response from the region and the international community. This ultimately led to the group being routed into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. </p>
<p>While M23 is currently operating within the vicinity of Goma, it has avoided taking the city. It has instead focused on taking over larger areas of surrounding territory and could gain control over both roads into Goma. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Whether the east African regional force is up to the task remains unclear. </p>
<p>Its member states’ proximity to the conflict may lead to more sustained political will to tamp down the violence and find a political resolution. Yet, the countries’ individual interests in the conflict mean that not all players will have the DRC’s best interest at heart. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">Previous experience</a> casts doubt on the effectiveness of bringing in foreign military forces to resolve unrest in the Congo. These interventions have in some cases increased violence against civilians, led to the exploitation of natural resources and undermined Congolese authority over its own territory. </p>
<p>A successful intervention will require that neighbouring countries remain accountable to support the security and sovereignty of the Congo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.</span></em></p>There are advantages to a regional force overseen by the East African Community – particularly as the bloc is leading new political talks.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1943502022-11-11T14:37:28Z2022-11-11T14:37:28ZPresidential term limits will be hard to scrap in Kenya – here’s what it would take<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494625/original/file-20221110-26-6ww6p8.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President William Ruto inspects a guard of honour in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A member of parliament in Kenyan president William Ruto’s governing coalition created a firestorm by suggesting that there was a plan to remove presidential term limits in the country. </p>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets a <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/310-142-term-of-office-of-president">two-term presidential limit</a>. </p>
<p>The extent of support for the plan within the president’s party, the United Democratic Alliance, is not clear. In early November 2022, the member of parliament, Salah Yakub, mentioned only that there had been “closed-door discussions” on it. </p>
<p>Yakub is a <a href="https://nairobinews.nation.africa/quick-facts-about-fafi-mp-salah-yakub-who-wants-to-scrap-presidential-term-limits/">first-time member of parliament</a>. His statement drew <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/81461-uda-issues-statement-over-extending-rutos-term-limit">public rebuke</a> from senior lawmakers aligned to the president’s party. This appears to indicate that Yakub is neither part of the president’s inner circle nor a policy stalwart within the party. It’s possible that his proposal is an ambitious effort to improve his standing within the party.</p>
<p>The United Democratic Alliance distanced itself from Yakub’s statement on the day it was reported.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1589910785584955392"}"></div></p>
<p>If, however, the idea was ever realised, it would mean that Ruto, who is 55 years old, could potentially seek re-election for three additional terms. His main political adversary, <a href="https://theconversation.com/odinga-is-running-his-fifth-presidential-race-why-the-outcome-means-so-much-for-kenya-180605">Raila Odinga</a> of the Orange Democratic Movement party, would effectively be prevented from ever running for president again – he is 77.</p>
<p>Kenya’s term limit was introduced before the 1992 elections and retained in the country’s 2010 constitution. The country is still considered a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/world/africa/kenya-election-william-ruto.html">beacon of democracy</a> in a region pervaded by dysfunctional and non-democratic regimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/fafi-mp-salah-yakub-wants-presidential-term-limit-removed-age-reduced-to-75-n309014">Yakub’s view</a> is that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>if a president is doing a good job, then he or she should not be limited by terms.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This mis-states the function of term limits. </p>
<p>They’re not designed to discourage poor performance. The Kenyan constitution provides other ways of dealing with presidents who engage in gross misconduct. This includes <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/130-chapter-nine-the-executive/part-2-the-president-and-deputy-president/313-145-removal-of-president-by-impeachment">impeachment</a>. </p>
<p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and abuse of office, open the government to new people and ideas, and infuse the government with more innovative and creative ways to solve national problems. </p>
<p>Most importantly, term limits reinvigorate the country’s democracy and curb the potential for monopoly. They protect the democratic system from turning into a de facto dictatorship, and prevent the incumbent from becoming a president-for-life. </p>
<p>Term limits are especially important in a country such as Kenya where most citizens still believe that an incumbent administration will favour the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-kibaki-news-idUSGOR34261320071223">president’s ethnic group</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately for Kenya and its democracy, it will be difficult for any government to get rid of term limits. </p>
<p>The constitution provides <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/160-chapter-sixteen-amendment-of-this-constitution/424-255-amendment-of-this-constitution">complex mechanisms</a> for amending certain fundamental provisions, including the term limit for presidents. One of the requirements is that the proposal would have to be approved by Kenyans in a referendum. Voters are <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2019/08/22/bbi-and-the-referendum-another-false-start/">unlikely to accept</a> any efforts to interfere with what is a robust and effectively functioning constitutional system.</p>
<h2>What stands in the way of changing term limits</h2>
<p>Kenya’s constitution sets down the process for amending its provisions. Changing the president’s term requires:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>securing the votes of two-thirds of both houses of parliament – the senate and national assembly</p></li>
<li><p>and the support of a simple majority of the citizens of Kenya voting in a referendum.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These provisions show that the drafters of the 2010 constitution were aware of the importance of constitutional stability and predictability. They were also alive to the value of certain provisions in the proper and effective functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, and the rule of law. </p>
<p>This explains why the drafters adopted more stringent mechanisms for amending democracy-enhancing provisions, which, apart from the presidential term, include those protecting judicial independence and those protecting fundamental freedoms as set out under the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms">bill of rights</a>.</p>
<p>The conditions for securing changes to the constitution are designed to allow Kenyans to participate fully in amendments that could radically alter the nature of their democratic governance architecture.</p>
<p>The 2010 constitution was expected to provide more peaceful mechanisms for dealing with election-related disagreements. A dispute over the presidential results following the 2007 election led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse">widespread violence</a> that killed more than 1,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. After elections in 2013, 2017 and 2022, Kenyans made use of constitutional mechanisms to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/odinga-accepts-but-disagrees-wi-court-decision-on-kenya-election">peacefully resolve</a> related disputes. Thus, Kenyans have gradually come to accept and respect the rule of law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyas-judiciary-can-break-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-182710">How Kenya's judiciary can break the cycle of electoral violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s not likely that a constitutional amendment to change the presidential term would garner the two-thirds majority in parliament. </p>
<p>First, the ruling party doesn’t hold a two-thirds majority in either house and would need the support of the opposition. The opposition is not likely to grant it, considering the amendment could significantly enhance the president’s ability to remain in power for more than two terms. </p>
<p>Second, Kenyans would probably see the amendment as a naked power grab and a danger to their constitutional order. They could punish the proposal’s supporters during future elections. </p>
<p>Third, the complex and prolonged process involved in amending the constitution could derail Ruto’s policy agenda and reduce his re-election prospects. </p>
<h2>Low chances of success</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that politicians have proposed amendments to presidential term limits. It came up when former president Mwai Kibaki wound up his term of office in 2012. It was inferred in the failed <a href="https://www.bbi.go.ke/">2020 effort</a> to amend the constitution. There were also those who thought that at 61, former president Uhuru Kenyatta was <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/05/atwoli-says-uhuru-just-going-on-leave-hes-young-expect-him-back/">too young</a> to leave office in 2022. </p>
<p>None of these efforts moved beyond politicians’ wishes. Opportunistic constitutional changes are unlikely to succeed, given the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60941860">scrutiny from the courts</a> and Kenya’s robust civil society. </p>
<p>In my view, the main party in the ruling coalition should have issued a much stronger statement than it did against the suggestion to increase the president’s term limit. It should have condemned the effort as undemocratic, and designed to weaken Kenya’s relatively robust democratic institutions and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku receives funding from Weber State University.</span></em></p>The purpose of term limits is to minimise corruption and open the government to new ideas that could solve national problems.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1927892022-10-25T13:36:30Z2022-10-25T13:36:30ZKenya’s big railway project makes life even harder for the poor by ignoring their reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490647/original/file-20221019-18-dmirc9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Truck drivers, clearing agents and activists protest over job losses in Mombasa, Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People’s responses to large infrastructure projects – railways, bridges, highways – are rarely neutral. To some, these projects represent powerful social and political promises of <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/PIDA%20brief%20closing%20gap.pdf">transformative change</a> and a brighter future. To others, they mean <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2022/03/nairobis-incendiary-displacements">evictions and the disruption</a> of livelihoods. </p>
<p>The reaction of Kenyans to the country’s Standard Gauge Railway, dubbed the Madaraka Express, is no different. </p>
<p>In 2017, Kenya finished the <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/mombasa-nairobi-standard-gauge-railway-project/#:%7E:text=Main%20construction%20works%20on%20the,of%20operation%20in%20February%202020">railway’s first phase</a>, which connects the Port of Mombasa to the country’s interior. Its <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/news/kenya-nairobi-naivasha-rail-line/">second phase</a> stops abruptly in Naivasha, a town 120km northwest of the capital, Nairobi. Ultimately, the railway is <a href="https://www.eac.int/infrastructure/railways-transport-sub-sector/92-sector/infrastructure/railways">planned</a> to reach Kenya’s border with Uganda at Malaba, helping to further connect East Africa’s regional transport and trade. </p>
<p>Alongside other large projects, such as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12601">transport corridor</a> from the Lamu Port to South Sudan and Ethiopia, the Standard Gauge Railway is central to Kenya’s current national development policy, <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">Vision 2030</a>. </p>
<p>The policy frames these mega-projects as key to attracting the private sector interest needed to fuel economic growth, increase exports and alleviate poverty. From this perspective, the new railway is a powerful symbol of development, change and <a href="https://www.railway-technology.com/news/newskenya-inaugurates-mombasa-nairobi-standard-gauge-railway-5832160/">national pride</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a flip side. In <a href="https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tran.12474">my earlier research</a> on the impact of the railway project, I looked at evictions, displacement and the interruption of livelihoods. In my <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/02637758221125475">new study</a>, I set out to examine how people cope with these disruptions in their lives. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-mega-railway-project-leaves-society-more-unequal-than-before-170969">Kenya’s mega-railway project leaves society more unequal than before</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The resounding response? This mega-project has failed to bring the promised positive changes. My latest research builds on my earlier work, which showed that the project <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-mega-railway-project-leaves-society-more-unequal-than-before-170969">increased socio-economic inequalities across Kenya</a>. I demonstrated that mega-projects tend to represent only <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102459">the interests of state and business elites</a>. </p>
<p>In this study, I further explore how those most disadvantaged experience the changes brought by mega-projects. </p>
<h2>Villages cut in two</h2>
<p>I undertook more than five months of fieldwork during several periods between November 2018 and January 2020 in different urban, peri-urban and rural locations between Mombasa and Narok in the south-west of the country. I interviewed more than 200 people to better understand whether and how the new railway had affected their lives.</p>
<p>Makueni County is located in the south-eastern part of Kenya. Some of the county’s small villages, such as Kima, home to over 400 people, were cut into two when the railway was built. An embankment and fence runs right through what was once a single village. Previously, residents could visit their neighbours and relatives in less than 15 minutes. Today, it takes one hour to reach the closest underpass that connects Kima. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A narrow tunnel under a railway line." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491017/original/file-20221021-21-9vme03.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An underpass in Kima village.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gediminas Lesutis</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a group of men in the village told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(The government is) imagining that they are creating development for the people, but this is not the case, this railway brings serious problems (here) – the road to development is paved on the pain and suffering of poor people like us. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to community leaders, this disruption of local mobility patterns occurred due to a blatant disregard for their lives from both the national government and the project contractor, China Road and Bridge Corporation. </p>
<p>In other parts of Kenya, similar views were expressed by several community liaison officers. They were contracted by Kenya Railways to mediate community relations before and during the railway’s construction. These officers explained how the railway design was developed without prior community consultation and, therefore, ignored existing mobility routes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/projects-like-kenyas-standard-gauge-railway-can-unlock-development-177464">Projects like Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway can unlock development</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Standard Gauge Railway has in fact disrupted livelihoods that depend on local transport systems. </p>
<p>This particularly includes the Nairobi-Mombasa Road A109, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58357186">infamous for traffic congestion</a> caused by long-distance trucks transporting cargo to and from the Mombasa Port to inland destinations in Kenya and beyond. </p>
<p>In Taita Taveta, for instance, over a range of 47 kilometres of the A109 between Voi and Miaseni, local livelihoods fundamentally <a href="https://doi.org/10.14506/ca35.3.05">depend on traffic movement</a>. Alongside this road, there are convenience shops, eateries, guesthouses and brothels. </p>
<p>Outside these facilities, young men wash cars or provide mechanical services for passing truckers. For a small fee of a few hundred Kenyan shillings, older men watch these trucks overnight when drivers stop to rest. Women provide laundry and other services. </p>
<p>Although trucks congest the road, resulting in air and noise pollution, a busy road means economic activity for those in nearby communities. </p>
<p>This reality, however, was ignored by the Kenyan government. In 2018, it passed a <a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/12696-kenyan-government-defends-forced-use-of-sgr.html">national decree</a> obliging all containerised cargo entering the Mombasa port to be transported on the Standard Gauge Railway. According to the <a href="http://www.kta.co.ke/">Kenya Transporters Association</a>, this led to about 12,000 trucks carrying container cargo being put out of business. As a result, a similar number of drivers and truck loaders lost their jobs. </p>
<p>At the time of my research, this had noticeable effects. Alongside the A109 road, guesthouses accommodating long-distance drivers were empty on most days, car washing spots had closed down and drinking houses were mostly frequented by local men. Residents of these areas had been economically dependent on the long-distance truck industry for 30 years. They expressed their discontentment and despair. As one shop owner noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This SGR, it has taken our lives from us, it has left us here with no customers, no movement, no nothing. People are very poor here, so they don’t buy the things I sell here. I need movement to survive. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The railway project’s impact on livelihoods was turned into a <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/ruto-to-reverse-sgr-port-order-3811140">campaign issue</a> ahead of Kenya’s August 2022 elections. A month after being voted in, President William Ruto made good his campaign promise and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/kenya-sgr-cargo-transport-3962084">lifted the order</a> on mandatory use of the railway for containerised cargo. Different groups, including transporters and Mombasa port stakeholders, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/ruto-reverses-uhuru-directive-as-cargo-clearance-reverts-to-mombasa-port-3947560">have praised</a> this move as likely to revive the coastal economy and restore lost jobs.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/t8qmi08d1Ts?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>As demonstrated in <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29477">other contexts</a>, the key to avoiding mega-projects having a dramatic effect on vulnerable groups is to rigorously assess the social and environment impacts before, during and after project construction. </p>
<p>These <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59559-1.00018-9">legal mechanisms</a> exist in Kenya. But there’s not enough political will to use them. </p>
<p>Unless local people’s needs and livelihoods are taken into account when mega infrastructure is planned and implemented, these projects are unlikely to bring the promised development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gediminas Lesutis receives funding from Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Individual Fellowship
(Project ID: 101023118).</span></em></p>Mega-projects tend to represent the interests of state and business elites.Gediminas Lesutis, Marie Curie Fellow, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924202022-10-18T15:31:30Z2022-10-18T15:31:30ZTigray war: two years on, the AU has failed to broker peace and silence the guns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490024/original/file-20221017-18-h1y70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A damaged tank on the road north of Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, in February 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union pledged in 2016 to “<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">silence the guns</a>” by the end of 2020, an ambitious agenda of ending armed conflicts on the continent. Just two months before that deadline, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-22/ethiopia-s-war-toll-grows-as-the-world-looks-away">deadliest war</a> in years erupted in Ethiopia. On 3 November 2020, the armies of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/11/ethiopia-military-operations-reported-in-tigray-region-november-3">attacked</a> the region of Tigray. Since then, the guns have not been silent. Instead, it is the African Union that has been silent.</p>
<p>That war is now two years old. Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during this time. Some <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/13/breaking-tigray-war-mortality-half-a-million-people-ghent-university/">estimates</a> show that over 500,000 civilians have been killed. Rape, displacement and starvation have been prevalent. Tigray has been under a complete siege with no access to land and air transport, telephone and internet access, banks and all kinds of humanitarian supplies. </p>
<p>The AU has shown itself to be of no use or consequence since the conflict started. During the first year of conflict, it failed to even acknowledge that there was a war. Instead, it adopted the Ethiopian government’s narrative of a “<a href="https://twitter.com/abiyahmedali/status/1326069599994056705?lang=en">law enforcement operation</a>” by a legitimate government against a rebellious entity. It was not until August 2021 that the AU took the first steps at mediating. </p>
<p>The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed</a> the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as his “high representative” to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">promote</a> peace, security, stability and political dialogue all over the Horn of Africa region. This was a welcome development. But it soon became evident that the AU was not impartial. And the peace initiative was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">non-starter</a>. </p>
<p>One year on from Obasanjo’s appointment, the AU’s failures are as evident as they’ve been from the start. The AU Peace and Security Council – which is <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">charged</a> with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – has never had any substantive agenda on Tigray. The two times it sat to discuss the war on Tigray were only to hear the briefings of Obasanjo as envoy. </p>
<p>The war has intensified to alarming levels. And another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">attempt</a> by the AU to convene peace talks in South Africa has met delays. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>The AU has failed in applying its norms and principles to the conflict in Ethiopia. Its institutions were not activated and best practices were not utilised. The AU chairperson and his special envoy have put themselves at the service of the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>The AU needs to launch a credible and robust peace process with mediators mutually agreed by the conflicting parties. The guns can only be silenced by engaging genuine peace processes guided by the norms and principles of the AU.</p>
<h2>AU’s failed diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their reservations, the authorities in Tigray gave Obasanjo the benefit of the doubt, and cooperated with him for the whole year. </p>
<p>Obasanjo shuttled between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, six times. Tigray received him as an elderly statesperson and engaged with him constructively. They accepted his advice to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/ethiopias-tigray-forces-announce-release-of-4000-prisoners">release</a> 4,500 prisoners of war as a confidence-building measure. Tigray was told that this would be reciprocated by Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed releasing an equal number of Tigrayan civilian prisoners. But when Abiy failed to deliver his end of the bargain, Obasanjo did nothing. </p>
<p>Before long, the Tigray leadership realised that Obasanjo was not capable of handling a complex problem that has a politico-military, historical and regional dimension. He never produced an organised agenda with measurable outputs. In three of his trips, his main agenda was to ask the authorities to release prisoners of war. </p>
<p>In March 2022, a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html">humanitarian truce</a>” was brokered by the Americans. Obasanjo is not known to have contributed anything towards it. In August 2022, Obasanjo <a href="https://twitter.com/rabdianalyst/status/1556028070716481538?lang=en">proposed</a> inviting Eritrea to the negotiating table, despite knowing that this crossed a red line for Tigray.</p>
<p>The AU failed in other ways, too. It lost its credibility in relation to the current war when it failed to condemn the atrocities. It has never demanded that Eritrea pull out troops from the Tigray war. It was very careful to call Obasanjo’s position “<a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">high representative</a>” and not “mediator”. Also his brief is the Horn and not Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, a clear nod to Abiy’s preference not to be seen to negotiate.</p>
<p>The AU was also behind the three African states represented at the United Nations Security Council. The so-called “A3” – Ghana, Gambia and Kenya – have continuously blocked any security council action, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/ethiopia-informal-interactive-dialogue.php">most recently</a> in September 2022. </p>
<h2>Litany of errors</h2>
<p>The war in Tigray has intensified. Ethiopian and Eritrean armies have encircled Tigray in an attempt to break the resistance. Up to 60% of Ethiopian federal troops are deployed to Eritrea to fight under the command of the Eritreans. The Ethiopian Air Force has moved its operational base into Asmara. So far, several towns have been decimated by indiscriminate air raids and artillery shelling of the joint forces. </p>
<p>Most international actors, such as the UN, US, EU and the UK, have condemned the resumption of hostilities and the involvement of Eritrea in the war. But the AU has not. </p>
<p>In the middle of this, the AU chairperson <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ethiopias-tigray-leader-invited-peace-talks-africa-91023467">invited</a> the president of Tigray for talks in South Africa. The letter fell below the standards of the AU Commission. It did not say who else was invited. It misstated the date for the talks and didn’t say anything about logistical arrangements for the Tigrayan delegates living under a complete siege. </p>
<p>These mistakes are unusual from a bureaucracy that routinely organises such talks.</p>
<p>The letter claimed that there were continuous consultations with the parties on the issues. But the authorities in Tigray <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">denied</a> this. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-to-skip-ethiopia-peace-talks-3977112">strongly worded letter</a>, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta – a would-be co-mediator in South Africa – confirmed this lack of consultation by the AU Commission. There were also reports that the second co-mediator, former South African deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and the South African government were not consulted on the event. </p>
<p>The AU’s listed agenda did not include an immediate <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202210060051.html">cessation of hostilities</a>.</p>
<h2>AU principles</h2>
<p>The chairperson of the AU and his high representative have failed Africa and the norms, principles and institutions of the African Union. The AU needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators. This is what the Tigrayan authorities demanded at the outset. </p>
<p>The AU peace and security council should also be active enough to hold the chairperson in check and hold him to the norms and principles of the union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe (PhD) is affiliated to the Tigraian resistance and now lives in Mekelle. Does everything he can to support the resistance. </span></em></p>The African Union needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915142022-10-03T07:47:20Z2022-10-03T07:47:20ZKenya’s new finance minister has good credentials but he can’t work miracles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487255/original/file-20220929-14-btga69.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President William Ruto has nominated <a href="https://www.weforum.org/people/njuguna-s-ndung-u">Njuguna Ndung'u</a> to head Kenya’s National Treasury. A Central Bank of Kenya governor for eight years between 2007 and 2015, Ndung'u is also an accomplished researcher and a University of Nairobi academic. He has <a href="https://financelawpolicy.umich.edu/speaker/njuguna-ndungu">extensive expertise</a> in macroeconomics (inflation, economic growth, national income and unemployment) and poverty reduction.</p>
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<img alt="Photo of Prof Njuguna Ndung'u" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487063/original/file-20220928-16-19otl1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Njuguna Ndung'u served as Central Bank of Kenya governor between 2007 and 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/central-bank-of-kenya-governor-prof-njuguna-ndungu-news-photo/73513801">Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>If parliament approves his nomination, Ndung'u will lead the treasury in difficult circumstances. The country is just emerging from divisive electoral campaigns. It also faces economic challenges. </p>
<p>The government is spending more than it <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-07/debt-plan-in-focus-in-kenya-s-national-budget-before-elections">gets in revenue</a>, inflation is <a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-is-rising-in-kenya-heres-why-and-how-to-fix-it-186479">rising</a> and the value of the shilling is <a href="https://www.african-markets.com/en/news/east-africa/kenya/kenyan-shilling-hits-historic-low-of-119-against-the-dollar-ahead-of-polls">tumbling</a> against major currencies. </p>
<p>Ndung'u has his work cut out for him. Ruto campaigned on the platform of mending a broken economy and redistributing growth dividends to low-income earners.</p>
<p>With a PhD in economics, Ndung'u has a deep understanding of both local and global economic trends. His latest stint was as executive director of the <a href="https://aercafrica.org/leadership/njuguna-ndungu-3/">Africa Economic Research Consortium</a>, a research and policy think-tank.</p>
<p>He has been an advisor to international organisations, such as the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/">Brookings Institution</a> and the <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/about-idrc">International Development Research Centre</a> (Africa’s regional office).</p>
<h2>The job at hand</h2>
<p>The Treasury Cabinet Secretary (finance minister) manages the revenues and expenditures of the country. </p>
<p>The government gets its revenue from taxes, grants, debts and dividends paid by state-owned enterprises. The treasury (ministry of finance) delegates powers to raise such revenues. </p>
<p>On the spending side, the ministry has to contend with the dictates of other institutions like parliament, the central bank and multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Decisions have to be made about how the revenue is shared and used – for recurrent expenditure like paying salaries and debt, and for development such as building roads or hospitals. </p>
<p>In Kenya, the decision is complicated by another factor. The money must be <a href="https://cra.go.ke/">shared</a> with 47 counties.</p>
<h2>What he brings to the position</h2>
<p>Ndung'u will have to make Ruto’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-william-rutos-presidency-would-mean-for-kenyas-economy-188766">bottom-up economics</a> model work. That means focusing on the people at the bottom of the pyramid who lack capital and opportunities to run businesses. The expectation is that empowering this segment of society would create more jobs and give more citizens a higher standard of living. This model is contrasted with trickle-down economics, which gives resources to a few at the “top” in the hope that it spreads down to the masses. </p>
<p>Ndung'u previously worked at the <a href="https://kippra.or.ke/">Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis</a>, which advises government departments, including the National Treasury, on policy issues. In 2001, he helped develop a macroeconomics model to analyse Kenya’s economy. </p>
<p>He is back in familiar waters, having been a central bank governor at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/31/kenya.topstories3">chaotic start</a> of Mwai Kibaki’s second term in 2008, when post-election violence and the global financial crisis slowed down the Kenyan economy. He was a <a href="https://www.bis.org/review/r070706d.pdf">member</a> of the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/prime-minister-named-to-high-level-advisory-team--558748?view=htmlamp">National Economic and Social Council</a> that Kibaki put together to lift the economy. </p>
<p>His most valuable experience for the task at hand is, perhaps, his mastery of <a href="https://www.centralbank.go.ke/introduction/">monetary tools</a> as a central banker. His new role focuses on fiscal policy (spending, tax and debt).</p>
<p>He is likely to work in tandem with the central bank, avoiding fiscal policies that upset monetary measures (like interest rates). Harmony between fiscal and monetary policies would be good for stability of the currency (as <a href="https://theconversation.com/only-a-u-turn-by-the-government-or-the-bank-of-england-will-calm-uk-financial-markets-191523">the UK is finding out</a>).</p>
<p>Ndung'u is also known to have championed <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/investing-financial-inclusion-podcast-njuguna-ndungu">financial inclusion</a>, mainly through mobile banking. This implies mass access to affordable payments, savings, credit and insurance.</p>
<p>He was bold in getting banks to accept mobile money, which was unpopular at the time. This may be a quality needed to drive bottom-up economics. There will have to be institutional changes to accommodate bottom-up economics and some resistance is to be expected. Kenyans are used to trickle-down economics.</p>
<h2>Missing in his tool box</h2>
<p>But Ndung'u lacks political experience in a cabinet dominated by politicians. He is a technocrat and, as Uhuru Kenyatta’s first term showed, some technocrats find it hard to fit into a new political dispensation. <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/uhuru-s-shift-from-a-cabinet-of-technocrats-to-one-of-politicians--7652">Political experience</a> matters even in the most technical of jobs. In addition, Kenyatta lost his political clout partly because his cabinet, dominated by technocrats, lacked the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/technocrat-css-did-not-understand-people-ours-do-rigathi-3970752">political weight</a> to sell government programmes to his core support base. </p>
<p>Ruto, too, needs to be careful, in my view. The Treasury under his regime should give free markets a human face. For example, the removal of subsidies could be seen as heartless.</p>
<h2>What may not change</h2>
<p>I doubt <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/kenya-ruto-appeals-to-world-bank-imf-g20-africa-debt-relief-3958012">debt taps</a> will close during Ndung'u’s tenure. The debt ceiling may be raised again in the new administration. Given the country’s budget deficit, which is about 6.2% of annual production (GDP), borrowing is bound to continue. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-breached-its-public-debt-ceiling-how-it-got-there-and-what-that-means-190006">Kenya has breached its public debt ceiling – how it got there and what that means</a>
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<p>If there is change, it might come in the mixture of debt between long term and short term, as well as bilateral and multilateral loans.</p>
<p>At the moment, Kenya borrows equally from local and foreign lenders. Ruto wants Kenyans to save more, reducing the need for external borrowing. This is unlikely in the short run because of the poverty levels. People save after taking care of the basics, like food and shelter. </p>
<p>Inflation is also likely to remain an issue. Will <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/markets/capital-markets/cbk-announces-sharp-rise-interest-rate-to-fight-inflation-3967182">interest rate hikes</a> slow down inflation? Will government raise wages and salaries to cushion workers? Could cutting taxes be a better option despite fears of stoking inflation? The UK is a good <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/imf-says-uk-fiscal-measures-will-likely-increase-inequality-urges-rethink-2022-09-27/">case study</a> – its tax cuts have led to a weaker currency, which implies higher inflation. </p>
<p>Finally, reliance on fiscal and monetary tools may not bear fruit. Kenya is a very informal economy. Tools like interest rate cuts may not work effectively when people borrow mostly informally.</p>
<p>Foreign direct investment and increased trade would be more <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-investment-china-story">effective</a> than borrowing, as long as the business environment is attractive to investors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191514/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>XN Iraki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Njuguna Ndung'u has the experience that suits Ruto’s bottom-up economics but lacks the political gravitas to appease voters.XN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915352022-09-30T12:05:27Z2022-09-30T12:05:27ZKenya and the ICC: law expert answers 4 questions following death of a key lawyer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487513/original/file-20220930-11-rst14i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto (L, back row), Henry Kosgey (C, back row) and radio presenter Joshua Arap Sang (R, back row), at the ICC in 2011, charged in connection with post-election violence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">LEX VAN LIESHOUT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenyan lawyer Paul Gicheru, one of the people accused of interfering with witnesses in the case involving President William Ruto before the International Criminal Court (ICC), was recently <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-09-27-who-was-icc-suspect-paul-gicheru-and-details-of-his-case/">found dead at his home in Nairobi</a>. He was awaiting the ICC’s verdict.</em> </p>
<p><em>The ICC intervened in Kenya after allegations were lodged about crimes against humanity committed in the post-election violence in 2007/2008. The cases have dragged on since then. In 2011, the court’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, issued summonses for six high-profile Kenyans who became known as the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/how-ocampo-six-became-three--892376">Ocampo Six</a>. The list included Ruto and former president Uhuru Kenyatta. Both travelled to The Hague to defend themselves against the allegations, with Kenyatta <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-uhuru-kenyatta-trial-falls-apart-the-icc-may-be-doomed-32754">making history</a> as the first sitting head of state to appear before the ICC. The case against Kenyatta collapsed in 2014, and the one against Ruto collapsed in 2016, mostly due to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/kenya">insufficient evidence</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>International criminal law expert Tonny Raymond Kirabira answers four key questions about the cases.</em></p>
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<h2>What was the significance of Paul Gicheru’s case?</h2>
<p>Gicheru and another Kenyan lawyer, Philip Kipkoech Bett, were <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/gicheru">indicted</a> by the ICC prosecutor – and warrants of arrest were issued against them in 2015 – for offences against the administration of justice. Specifically, they were alleged to have corruptly influenced prosecution witnesses in order to frustrate the case against Ruto and radio presenter Joshua Arap Sang. </p>
<p>Gicheru surrendered to the ICC in November 2020. Since then he has been on trial in The Hague. On 1 February 2021, he was <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/paul-gicheru-interim-release-conditions-kenya">released from ICC custody</a> and travelled back to Kenya, but under specific conditions that restricted his liberty. Until his death in Nairobi, he was still subject to strict limitations on travel and his ability to communicate to the public about the merits of his case at the ICC. </p>
<p>The court is yet to deliver its decision.</p>
<p>A key dimension in Gicheru’s case has been Kenya’s initially uncooperative approach towards the ICC. In November 2017 the High Court of Kenya <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/143873/">lifted the ICC warrants of arrest against Gicheru and Bett</a>, on the grounds that Kenya had not been consulted, and the country had the capacity to prosecute the cases domestically. </p>
<p>Even when Gicheru voluntarily surrendered himself, the Kenyan government still considered the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/143873/">2017 High Court order</a> that lifted his warrant as valid, implying that the ICC did not have jurisdiction to try him. </p>
<p>Amidst the legal dilemma, the ICC recognised Kenya’s unavoidable role in the case, when Gicheru was released from the ICC detention at the start of 2021. He was expected to travel back to Kenya and return to The Hague during the hearing of his case. However, it was after Gicheru signed a consent to surrender, as provided under Section 41 of Kenya’s International Crimes Act, that the government cooperated with the ICC to enforce the conditions of his interim release during his time in Kenya. </p>
<p>All in all, Kenya demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the ICC by ensuring that Gicheru complied with the court’s conditions restricting his liberty while in Kenya.</p>
<p>Gicheru’s death raises concerns about the ICC’s future engagement with Kenya, considering that cases against journalist <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/09-01/13-1-red2">Walter Osapiri Barasa</a> and Bett are still open. </p>
<p>The ICC requires cooperation and support from Kenya for the arrest and transfer of the suspects to The Hague, and protection of its staff and witnesses involved in the cases. </p>
<p>Before his death, Gicheru’s case was serving to mend Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nyujilp.org/surrender-of-ali-kushayb-and-paul-gicheru-new-perspectives-in-africas-relationship-with-the-icc/">fractious relationship with the ICC</a>, in compliance with Kenya’s International Crimes Act and the Rome Statute. Equally, Kenya remains under an obligation to execute the request for arrest and surrender of Bett and any other suspect indicted by the ICC.</p>
<h2>What does the case tell us about the weaknesses of the ICC?</h2>
<p>Gicheru’s case is a clear demonstration that the <a href="https://www.nyujilp.org/surrender-of-ali-kushayb-and-paul-gicheru-new-perspectives-in-africas-relationship-with-the-icc/">ICC’s ability to deter international crimes and end impunity depends largely on two elements</a>.</p>
<p>First, the nature of its intervention. For example, it’s a lot easier to investigate and gather the necessary evidence in state referrals, compared to situations where the prosecutor intervenes on their own volition, or at the behest of the UN Security Council. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/prosecution-or-compensation-what-kenyan-choices-tell-us-about-international-justice-187941">Prosecution or compensation? What Kenyan choices tell us about international justice</a>
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<p>The second element relates to the profile of suspects. Gicheru’s case had shown that trying mid-level officials as opposed to sitting heads of state offered better prospects for state cooperation.</p>
<h2>What does Gicheru’s death mean for Kenyan cases at The Hague?</h2>
<p>To be clear, Gicheru’s case has no direct links with the previous cases against Ruto and others. The charges in relation to the administration of justice against Gicheru are far from the core crimes that Ruto and others were accused of – crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>The fact that there are no victims involved in Gicheru’s case also means that the ICC’s verdict would not have a tangible impact on the court’s operations in Kenya. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the conviction of Gicheru would justify previous claims that the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-status-government-kenyas-0">Kenyan cases were frustrated by the political elite</a>, as asserted by the prosecutor. </p>
<p>It is important to note that the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/EN-QandA-Ruto.pdf">ICC’s involvement with Kenya is not necessarily over yet</a>. The prosecutor may bring fresh charges in the future when – and if – the necessary evidence is acquired. Ruto was not acquitted of the charges. What happened was that the court terminated the case against him. This means that there can be future prosecutions against him if the prosecutor finds the relevant evidence. </p>
<p>Likewise, the case against Kenyatta can be reopened if the prosecutor submits new evidence to the court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191535/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tonny Raymond Kirabira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ICC can still reopen cases against President William Ruto and his predecessor Uhuru Kenyatta if it lands solid evidence.Tonny Raymond Kirabira, Teaching Fellow, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1898042022-09-23T10:11:40Z2022-09-23T10:11:40ZUhuru Kenyatta failed to turn Kenya into as big an international player as he could – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482493/original/file-20220902-3755-hm5l3f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Uhuru Kenyatta signs a treaty integrating DRC into the East African Community in June 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the notable achievements of Uhuru Kenyatta’s nine-year tenure as president was that he invigorated Kenya’s foreign policy. </p>
<p>A year after his 2013 inauguration, his government launched a <a href="https://www.kenyaembassy.org.tr/uploads/Kenya_Foreign_Policy.pdf">document</a> that outlined Kenya’s diplomatic engagements and foreign relations. It was the country’s first written foreign policy since independence.</p>
<p>Its themes can be distilled into four objectives and practices: regional and continental cooperation; promoting Kenya’s economic interests; revival of pan-Africanism; and an aggressive approach to foreign policy, including a plethora of high-level visits. </p>
<p>It was indeed a dynamic performance. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, in my view, based on the country’s mixed outcomes and foreign policy losses, it’s evident that the Kenyatta government’s foreign policy was not focused, consistent or effectively coordinated. Consequently, it failed to create a regional balance of power favourable to Kenya’s interests. </p>
<p>And while the country became more visible globally and actively engaged in international matters, the returns from this visibility have been dismal – save for an <a href="https://theconversation.com/uhuru-kenyattas-economic-legacy-big-on-promises-but-weak-on-delivery-188698">increased debt burden</a>. </p>
<h2>Regional and continental cooperation</h2>
<p>In the 2014 <a href="https://www.kenyaembassy.org.tr/uploads/Kenya_Foreign_Policy.pdf">Kenya Foreign Policy</a> document, Kenyatta affirmed that Kenya would seek to promote sub-regional and regional integration. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/134839269/H-E-President-Uhuru-Kenyatta-Inaugural-Address">inauguration speech</a> in 2013, he said his government would strengthen regional ties through the free movement of people, goods and investment. He underscored the importance of deepening relations with the <a href="https://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a> and Africa as a whole to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>deliver on the promise of independence and liberation from our colonial past.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, critics faulted Kenyatta for using a pan-African approach to overcome the initial global isolation and non-receptiveness Kenya faced from traditional allies like Britain and the US. This chilly reception from the UK and US followed Kenyatta’s election as president despite his facing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta">an International Criminal Court (ICC) case</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the president’s policy on global politics retracted to operating through the continental body, the African Union. </p>
<p>Kenya became an active contributor to the union’s programmes. In 2014, the country gave <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000103662/kenya-pledges-sh130m-to-africas-heritage-preservation">US$1.1 million</a> to support the <a href="https://awhf.net/">African World Heritage Fund</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, Kenyatta was elected the chairperson of the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. This is a voluntary assessment and monitoring system that evaluates and advises African Union member states on their progress in achieving good governance. </p>
<p>Moreover, Kenya was among the countries that contributed troops to the <a href="https://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/">African Union Mission in Somalia</a>.</p>
<p>Despite all this activity, Kenyatta failed to effectively exert influence and drive regional integration to Kenya’s advantage.</p>
<h2>Pan-Africanism</h2>
<p>A notable element in Kenya’s foreign policy under Kenyatta was the renaissance of pan-Africanism. In his first address to the African Union Summit in 2013, he <a href="https://www.kenyaembassyaddis.org/wp-content/uploads/speeches/presidential/INAUGURAL_STATEMENT_BY_HIS_EXCELLENCY_HON_UHURU_KENYATTA_PRESIDENT_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_KENYA.pdf">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Pan-Africanism has sparked a Kenyan renaissance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The president said he had received tutelage on pan-Africanism from his father, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president. </p>
<p>Arguably, this pan-African reinvigoration into Kenya’s foreign policy was motivated by the existential threats of global sanctions that the regime faced. Yet, Kenyatta’s election against the backdrop of the cases at The Hague turned Kenya into an icon of resistance following what was perceived as the unfair targeting of Africa by the ICC.</p>
<p>During Kenyatta’s inauguration, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/09/controversy-kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-uganda">praised Kenyans</a> for rejecting western neo-colonialism. This was in reference to calls by diplomats that Kenyans should not elect people with cases to answer at the ICC. </p>
<p>The African Union convened an extraordinary summit that <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-leads-push-for-immunity-for-leaders-at-world-court-1399762">declared support</a> for Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, who was also facing charges at The Hague. </p>
<h2>Economic interests</h2>
<p>Kenyatta’s foreign policy of economic prosperity was pursued and achieved via a triple approach. </p>
<p>First was through encouraging trade ties with traditional allies like the UK, US and some countries in western Europe. Second was through a diversification of economic relations to include new markets in the form of a “look east” policy. </p>
<p>Third was through emphasising intra-African trade. Kenya signed trade agreements with states not considered traditional allies, such as Nigeria and Ghana. Additionally, the country quickly signed the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180321/au-member-countries-create-history-massively-signing-afcfta-agreement-kigali">African Continental Free Trade Area agreement</a> in March 2018. </p>
<p>But questions have arisen on whether Kenya has the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uhuru-kenyattas-economic-legacy-big-on-promises-but-weak-on-delivery-188698">financial capacity</a> to meet present and future economic obligations. </p>
<h2>Assertive foreign policy</h2>
<p>Kenya hosted a wide range of high-level international meetings. Subjects ranged from climate change to trade. Kenyatta also received high-level delegations <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moi-put-foreign-policy-at-the-centre-of-his-presidency-134048">reminiscent of former president Daniel Moi’s era</a>. His guests included the pope and leaders of India, Israel, US, UK, China and Japan. </p>
<p>From Africa, Kenyatta hosted leaders from Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda, among many others. </p>
<p>By July 2022, a month to the election that would end his term in office, Kenyatta had made <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/how-uhuru-kenyatta-won-over-world-leaders-charm-offensive-3866492">158 official foreign trips</a>. In contrast, his predecessor Mwai Kibaki made just 33 foreign trips over 10 years of leadership. </p>
<p>The country’s foreign policy during Kenyatta’s second term, which began in 2017, is what I would describe as aggressive or assertive. The country took advantage of any international opportunity that arose to make its mark. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Kenya addressed a UN Security Council meeting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Its envoy to the UN, Martin Kimani, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001438419/amb-martin-kimanis-full-speech-on-russia-ukraine-tension">came out strongly</a> in defence of Ukraine. He stated that the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">Charter of the United Nations</a> was fading due to “the relentless assault of the powerful”. Kimani compared Ukraine’s plight to Africa’s colonial legacy. </p>
<p>Kenya’s aggressive foreign policy direction earned Kenya a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-wins-un-security-council-seat-1443488">seat at the UN Security Council</a> as a non-permanent member. </p>
<p>But this aggressive foreign policy also portrayed Kenya as a nation that “wants everything”. This earned it some opposition regionally. For instance, states like Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Tanzania <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001227877/details-of-how-amina-mohamed-lost-african-union-commission-election">didn’t vote for Kenya</a> in its bid to chair the African Union Commission.</p>
<p>Kenyatta should have streamlined his priorities and made his foreign objectives sharper so as not to appear to be a “Jack of all trades” in foreign affairs. Many foreign interests were projected with little coordination; few were accomplished. </p>
<p>In some cases, the country’s goodwill was squandered in the pursuit of self-interest. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The post-Kenyatta government needs to fast-track the realisation of East African Community objectives. It needs to support South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s active participation in regional integration. The new Ruto regime should also maintain a non-disruptive relationship with Rwanda and Tanzania. </p>
<p>In the Horn of Africa, Kenya needs to diplomatically endeavour to reduce Ethiopia’s growing influence in the leadership of the <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>. </p>
<p>Under Kenyatta, Kenya’s foreign policy practice within the African Union was more “lone ranger”. The Ruto regime will need to forge closer ties with regional powers like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to make it easier for Kenya to push through its agenda at the African Union. </p>
<p>It will also need to renegotiate its foreign debts and re-examine <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/kenya-s-debt-repayments-to-china-shoot-to-sh73-5-billion-3821246">Kenya-China agreements</a> to re-organise debt repayments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilfred Nasong'o Muliro received funding from the African Leadership Centre, London and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). He is affiliated with the International Relations Society of Kenya (IRSK). He teaches International Relations and Diplomacy at the Technical University of Kenya</span></em></p>Kenya’s new president needs to forge closer ties with regional heavyweights to create a balance of power that favours his country.Wilfred Nasong'o Muliro, Lecturer International Relations and Security, Technical University of KenyaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1904542022-09-15T13:38:05Z2022-09-15T13:38:05ZWilliam Ruto is now in charge of Kenya’s shaky economy: where to start<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484097/original/file-20220912-2404-sexf3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto has promised to set aside US$500 million every year to fund micro, small and medium enterprises. Donwilson Odhiambo via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/business-as-usual-for-city-traders-in-nairobi-central-news-photo/1242875944?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s President William Ruto, sworn in as new President on 13 September 2022, has inherited an economy saddled with debt, inflation, joblessness and national pessimism. The International Monetary Fund has also added to his pain: it <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/04/25/pr22132-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-third-review-of-fund-and-credit-facility-for-kenya">recently asked</a> Kenya to broaden its tax base and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/expensive-fuel-looms-as-imf-drops-support-for-subsidy-3886832">scrap the fuel subsidy</a>.</p>
<p>Broadening the tax base will mean bringing more “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58246207">hustlers</a>” – Ruto’s core support base of informal workers – into the tax net. That could annoy his political supporters. Scrapping <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-fuel-crisis-how-the-countrys-subsidy-system-works-181361">fuel subsidies</a> will raise prices and lead to further <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-explains-food-price-hikes-in-kenya-and-what-should-be-done-179597">inflation</a>, something that Ruto campaigned against. The latest fuel price review, that has resulted in <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-09-15-epra-announces-hike-in-fuel-prices/">high fuel prices</a>, shows Ruto is <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/ruto-to-drop-fuel-cushion-in-policy-shift-against-subsidies-3947884">serious</a> on removing subsidies. </p>
<p>Ruto made the economy the main focus of his campaign, promising Kenyans a <a href="https://youtu.be/VK9P41fCR90">radical transformation</a> if he won. But in politics, promises and reality are two different things. Implementing a manifesto will require money and new economic structures, and even face resistance from defenders of the status quo.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-election-promises-an-economists-perspective-186480">Kenya's election promises: an economist's perspective</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Some decisions to turn the economy around can be taken immediately, others later. One reality Ruto must face is that it takes time for most economic policy actions to make a noticeable difference.</p>
<p>This lag can be a political problem, more so when an election is based on great expectations and big promises. For example, lowering taxes on goods and services does not immediately translate into lower consumer prices, because old stocks must be sold first. In addition employers <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp893.pdf">rarely raise or lower</a> wages just because there is inflation or a change in market conditions. </p>
<p>Similarly, cutting interest rates does not lead to an immediate boost in economic activity. Businesses and consumers take time to decide how much to borrow and whether to invest or consume to create demand. </p>
<p>But voters want instant results because they voted instantly! Explaining the lag to ordinary voters should be the starting point of any politician, using a language and tone that does not make it sound like an excuse.</p>
<h2>Turning the economy around</h2>
<p>Based on Ruto’s preference for <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-william-rutos-presidency-would-mean-for-kenyas-economy-188766">bottom-up economics</a>, manifesto and inaugural speech, here are five areas he should first focus on (in no order of merit) to rekindle the economy.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Agriculture</strong>. In his <a href="https://uda.ke/downloads/manifesto.pdf">manifesto</a>, Ruto prioritised five sectors, starting with agriculture. Other sectors include micro, small and medium enterprises; housing and settlement; healthcare and digital superhighway; and the creative economy. Prioritisation of agriculture is by no chance accidental; Ruto was once a minister for agriculture. Many voters <a href="https://oxfarm.co.ke/agri_biz-insights/why-you-should-start-an-agribusiness/">earn a living from farming</a>. And a hungry nation is an angry nation. Ruto must balance the interests along the value chain, from farmers to consumers.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-the-political-economy-of-maize-in-kenya-120336">Understanding the political economy of maize in Kenya</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Agricultural productivity has been the main challenge because of land fragmentation. Improvement in productivity takes time; from seed production to logistics and even raising the purchasing power of consumers. Subsidies are the easiest option for addressing rising food prices. But recent <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001450775/kenyans-dismayed-by-high-flour-prices">maize subsidies</a> demonstrated why they weren’t the best solution.
Prices of flour never came down substantially, and there were shortages. Is cheaper fertiliser promised by President Ruto subsidised? Increasing competition and efficiency along the value chain is a better option. Agriculture passes the bottom-up test as many citizens at the bottom of the pyramid would benefit.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/changes-in-sub-saharan-maize-trade-spell-potential-trouble-for-kenya-181487">Changes in sub-Saharan maize trade spell potential trouble for Kenya</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Micro, small and medium enterprises</strong> or the “hustler economy”. The new administration has promised this segment a fund of KSh50 billion (US$500 million) per year. The sources of funds and the allocation mechanisms have not yet been announced. It should learn from the <a href="https://www.uwezo.go.ke/">Uwezo Fund</a>, which was set up by the outgoing administration in 2014 to help young people, women and people with disabilities to get finance for entrepreneurship. Its results are mixed, recording low loan uptake and high default rates.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Housing and settlement</strong>. Addressing the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/kenya-needs-2-million-more-low-income-homes-building-them-would-boost-its-economic-growth">housing shortage</a> , particularly in urban areas, is another bottom-up initiative that would benefit lots of citizens. One curious proposal in Ruto’s manifesto is to increase mortgage accounts to 1,000,000, without giving a clear timeline. This is a very bold move because the country has only 30,000 mortgage accounts at the moment in a population of 54 million. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The proposal suggests market forces rather than the the government will drive the housing market. But the interest rates need to come down for more citizens to afford the mortgages. To bring down interest rates, Kenya needs more banks to spur competition. The <a href="https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Directory-of-Licenced-Commercial-Banks-Mortgage-Finance-Institutions-and-NOHCs-1.pdf">current number of banks</a> is not competitive enough to lower interest rates and manage that growth. </p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Healthcare</strong>. A healthy nation is a productive nation. A national insurance system devoid of waste and nepotism could easily fund Kenya’s healthcare. This is a very <a href="https://kenya.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/state_of_kenya_population_report_2020.pdf">young nation</a>. Many Kenyans are not covered by <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/opinion-analysis/letters/having-all-adults-on-nhif-major-step-healthier-kenya-3691880">health insurance</a>. About 80% of Kenyans are in the informal sector and affordable health is out of their reach. Social security coverage is generally low in the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_820312.pdf">informal economy</a>: 75.7% of enterprises
don’t pay contributions for their workers into the National Social Security Fund and National Hospital Insurance Fund.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Digital superhighway and creative economy</strong>. This appeals to the youth and Kenya has a head-start on it. The country must go beyond social media to real work like gaming, outsourcing, software engineering and artificial intelligence. Will Ruto return tablets to schools?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These sectors closely mirror <a href="https://monitoring.planning.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Big-Four-Agenda-Report-2018_19.pdf">the Big Four Agenda</a> of the last government, where Ruto was the deputy president. Some are borrowed from <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/#">Vision 2030</a>, the National Strategy of the late president Mwai Kibaki.</p>
<p>Kenyans and others will be watching to see how Ruto’s economics will differ from those of former presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>XN Iraki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s new president campaigned on economic promises, but meeting them won’t be easy or instant.XN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1894742022-08-30T08:44:30Z2022-08-30T08:44:30ZKenya’s parliament and senate: how will they work together if there’s no clear majority?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481588/original/file-20220829-8701-xcngmp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government has held a <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/election/?election-results">majority</a> of elected seats in both the national assembly and the senate – which together make up parliament – since the 2013 general election. This enabled his Jubilee coalition to drive its agenda largely unhindered over two five-year terms. This will clearly not be the case for Kenya’s incoming president as results for parliamentary seats and the senate show a near <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62444316">50:50 split</a> between the two main coalitions. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi sets out the roles of the two houses and what the absence of a clear majority will mean.</em></p>
<h2>What are the national assembly’s powers?</h2>
<p>Previous Kenyan constitutions centralised powers under an executive president. These were whittled down under the 2010 constitution, which provides for a clear separation of powers. Parliament is one of the three arms of government, along with the executive and the judiciary. Each arm has powers to check and balance the others.</p>
<p>Kenya’s 349-seat national assembly draws heavily from parliamentary traditions practised in the UK and most of its former colonies. </p>
<p>The first piece of business for the new parliament is to elect the Speaker, who maintains order, manages proceedings and governs the administration of business. This <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf#page=64">includes</a> debating and passing proposed laws, and authorising national and county government revenue collection policies and spending by county governments. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2018-04/28_How_Parliament_Works.pdf">Other functions</a> and powers include allocating national revenue between the national and county governments; appropriating funds for national government and state organs’ expenditure; and <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2018-04/29_The_National_Assembly_and_Budget_Making.pdf">overseeing national revenue</a> and expenditure.</p>
<p>Parliament must also approve senior appointments made by the president. It has the power to initiate the impeachment of the president, the deputy president and other state officers. It can also amend or veto bills passed by the senate with a resolution supported by two-thirds of its members. It approves declarations of war and extensions of states of emergency. </p>
<p>The coalition or party that commands a majority has considerable influence in the appointments of the speaker, majority leaders and whips and committee members, and on policy and governance.</p>
<h2>What are the senate’s powers?</h2>
<p>The Kenyan senate is <a href="http://sidint.net/docs/WP8.pdf">unique</a> in several ways. It has no exclusive legislative function given that all bills are subject to approval by the national assembly. The <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-05/Assessment%20of%20Parliaments%20against%20the%20CPA%20recommeded%20Benchmarks%20for%20Democratic%20Legislature.pdf">constitution</a> does not clearly stipulate which of the two houses is the upper house. </p>
<p>The senate primarily oversees the operations of county governments. It debates and approves bills concerning counties. It determines the allocation of national revenue among counties. The chamber’s powers include hearing and determining impeachment charges against errant county governors. </p>
<p>The lack of constitutional clarity provides an opportunity for the national assembly and the executive to sidestep the senate in certain county-related decision-making processes. This enhances tensions between the two chambers.</p>
<h2>What are the power dynamics between the two chambers of parliament?</h2>
<p>The national assembly and the senate have fought <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201807260130.html">turf wars</a> from time to time owing to <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198759799.001.0001/law-9780198759799-chapter-5">constitutional ambiguities</a> in their roles. The lack of clarity has negatively affected coordination and dispute mechanisms. </p>
<p>Bills concerning counties have to be considered in both houses. Those not concerning counties are the preserve of the national assembly. At times it’s not clear whether a bill concerns counties or not. In such cases, it is a constitutional requirement that both Speakers <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198759799.001.0001/law-9780198759799-chapter-5">resolve the ambiguity</a> before the bill is introduced to either house.</p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2019, the national assembly passed 23 laws without the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/202549/">participation</a> of the senate. It unilaterally forwarded 15 others to the senate without complying with constitutional provisions. In October 2020, Kenya’s high court declared the 23 acts of parliament unconstitutional. </p>
<p>The power imbalance is also evident in the way bills are initiated. Laws considered by parliament are usually developed and <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198759799.001.0001/law-9780198759799-chapter-5">sponsored by the executive</a> and introduced in the national assembly. In contrast, bills initiated through the senate are usually private member bills prepared by senators. </p>
<p>The vetting of most presidential appointments is the <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198759799.001.0001/law-9780198759799-chapter-5">preserve of the national assembly</a>. A few require the approval of both houses, for example the appointment of the inspector general of police. </p>
<p>In the event of impeachment proceedings against the president or the deputy president, the process originates in the national assembly but the senate takes the final decision. </p>
<p>Both houses are also involved in decision-making when it comes to <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2018-04/28_How_Parliament_Works.pdf">national crises</a>. This includes approving the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces in and outside the country, and approving the extension of the term of parliament when the country is at war. </p>
<p>In short, the party or coalition that has a majority in both houses can easily influence the legislative agenda.</p>
<h2>What is the place of the opposition in parliament?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-05/Assessment%20of%20Parliaments%20against%20the%20CPA%20recommeded%20Benchmarks%20for%20Democratic%20Legislature.pdf">role of the opposition</a> is mainly located in parliamentary oversight committees. These committees allow opposition legislators to engage in effective oversight of government affairs, such as expenditure. The members are nominated from a party other than the parliamentary party forming the national government.</p>
<h2>What happens when there’s no clear majority?</h2>
<p>In a presidential system like Kenya’s, the incoming president would struggle to achieve his electoral promises or to respond to emerging needs or public demands without a <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/presidential-legislative-powers-primer.pdf">clear majority</a>. This can potentially result in a stalemate between the arms of government, which can disrupt the enactment of essential policies and contribute to public disappointment. </p>
<p>It is for this reason that President-elect William Ruto’s Kenya Kwanza Alliance is rushing to form <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/bitter-exchanges-in-azimio-over-junet-joho-role-in-raila-election-loss-3929342">post-election agreements</a> with rival Azimio la Umoja coalition party’s members of parliament-elect. The registrar of political parties argues that such agreements are unconstitutional since the members of parliament-elect have not followed the required legal procedures for withdrawing from Azimio la Umoja. </p>
<p>The registrar nonetheless emphasises that it is within individual politicians’ constitutional right to associate with any party in parliament. The rush to jump ship underlines the fact that political pacts are more about the rewards of government than political ideologies or policies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Kenya’s parliamentary system, lack of a clear party majority makes it hard for a president to deliver on election promises.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1888322022-08-22T15:44:23Z2022-08-22T15:44:23ZUhuru Kenyatta and Kenya’s media: a bitter-sweet affair that didn’t end happily<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479408/original/file-20220816-19-s6r1xw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's journalists have had a tumultuous relationship with Uhuru Kenyatta's government. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime came into power in 2013. It was the first to implement most of the provisions of Kenya’s <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a>. The media were eager to see how the government, led by Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, would adhere to <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/200-34-freedom-of-the-media#:%7E:text=Freedom%20of%20the%20media,-Chapter%20Four%20%2D%20The&text=(1)%20Freedom%20and%20independence%20of,in%20Article%2033%20(2).&text=(b)%20penalise%20any%20person%20for,any%20broadcast%2C%20publication%20or%20dissemination">article 34</a> of the constitution, which deals with the freedom of the press. The two politicians had promised to expand media freedoms once in power. </p>
<p>The relationship between the media and Kenyatta’s regime went through six stages that defined the president’s nine years in office between 2013 and 2022.</p>
<p>It shifted from <em>“karibuni chai”</em> (welcome to tea) to <em>“nyinyi mzime hiyo mavitu yenu na muende”</em> (all of you switch off your thingies (cameras) and leave). </p>
<h2>1. Courting the media</h2>
<p>Uhuru Kenyatta took over from Mwai Kibaki to become the fourth president of Kenya on 9 April 2013. His relationship with the media started off well. The president warmly welcomed journalists to State House before he and Ruto hosted a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ktnnews/video/2000067681/-president-and-his-deputy-hold-media-breakfast-at-statehouse">breakfast with top editors</a> on 12 July 2013. It was the first time State House was hosting such an event. </p>
<p>Kenyatta called it an opportunity to build relations between the media and the state. Critics saw it as a way of arm-twisting the press to get it on the side of the government. </p>
<h2>2. Rebranding the presidential press</h2>
<p>The media breakfast was soon followed by another move touted as an effort to streamline the State House-media relationship. In July 2013, the Presidential Press Service, which mostly covered the head of state’s movements, was <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/uhuru-unveils-new-media-unit-assures-of-press-freedom-875244">rebranded</a> into the Presidential Strategic Communication Unit. Its mandate was expanded to communicating government policy and branding state events. </p>
<p>The rebrand implied that strategic communication – which is the purposeful use of communication to fulfil a set mission – would be prioritised. The presidential press unit would, therefore, be used to convey news from State House to journalists, and ensure the ruling party’s agenda was achieved. </p>
<h2>3. Divorcing the media</h2>
<p>The cordial start to the relationship between the media and Kenyatta’s regime didn’t last. Soon there were signs that the Jubilee government had taken a road it couldn’t walk comfortably. </p>
<p>Following the October 2013 terrorist attack at the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-29247163">Westgate mall</a>, journalists were thrown out of parliament on allegations of misrepresenting facts. This followed media reports that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/12/22/westgate-questions-and-kenyas-misled-media">soldiers had looted shops</a> during the siege at the mall. In December, parliament <a href="https://cpj.org/2013/12/kenya-parliament-passes-draconian-media-laws/">passed a law</a> that imposed heavy penalties on journalists and media houses found guilty of code of ethics violations. These violations were to be determined by a state agency. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenyatta-has-gone-about-stifling-the-free-press-in-kenya-91335">How Kenyatta has gone about stifling the free press in Kenya</a>
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<p>In 2015, when the media became critical of Kenyatta’s relationship with his deputy Ruto, the president dismissed these reports <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sE5CsBKEZKs">saying</a> <em>“gazeti ni ya kufunga nyama”</em> (newspapers are for wrapping meat). </p>
<p>And at a police service conference in February 2018, Kenyatta <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/news/article/2001268312/pack-up-and-go-kenyatta-matiangi-tell-off-journalists">told</a> journalists to switch off their cameras and leave. </p>
<p>A month earlier, David Mugonyi, the then deputy president’s spokesman, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/article/2001265277/dp-ruto-s-spokesman-threatening-message-to-nmg-journalist-over-story">threatened</a> a journalist, Justus Wanga, with dismissal from his job. This was provoked by Wanga’s newspaper article carried under the title “Cabinet seats that split Uhuru, Ruto”.</p>
<h2>4. Redirecting advertising revenue</h2>
<p>To the chagrin of the media, the government <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-bans-state-advertising-in-private-media-1362418">withdrew advertising revenue</a> from mainstream media in 2017. </p>
<p>The Kenyatta and Ruto regime established a state-run pullout and website, <a href="https://www.mygov.go.ke/index.php">MyGov</a>, which carried all advertising from government agencies. This was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000169804/new-agency-to-handle-all-state-media-advertising">coordinated</a> through a newly established body, the Government Advertising Agency. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-african-governments-use-advertising-as-a-weapon-against-media-freedom-75702">How African governments use advertising as a weapon against media freedom</a>
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<p>The government’s decision redirected about US$20 million in advertising that initially went directly to media houses annually. This accounted for an estimated 30% of total media advertising revenue. The formation of the agency coincided with rising tensions between the media and the government.</p>
<p>Though the move was <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-05-04-media-calls-for-a-rethink-on-state-advertising-agency/">initially criticised</a>, it challenged media houses to think of other ways of generating income. This included tapping into reader revenue and exploiting technology to support daily operations. This, ideally, would have helped free media houses from the government’s use of advertising as a weapon to manipulate coverage. </p>
<h2>5. Snubbing the 2017 presidential debate</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/12/kenya-elections-televised-presidential-debate">2013 presidential debate</a> was the first of its kind for Kenyan media. All presidential candidates were in attendance. It gave journalists an unprecedented opportunity to interrogate them on issues of national leadership. </p>
<p>However, in 2017, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/6/kenyas-uhuru-kenyatta-pulls-out-of-election-debates">Kenyatta snubbed</a> the presidential debate. This was <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/odinga-snubs-kenya-presidential-debate/6675753.html">replicated</a> in 2022 when Raila Odinga, who contested the presidency under the Azimio coalition chaired by Kenyatta, disparaged the debate.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-debates-in-kenya-are-they-useful-or-empty-media-spectacles-183262">Political debates in Kenya: are they useful or empty media spectacles?</a>
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<p>These decisions seemed to undermine the media’s relevance in Kenya. <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/michael-ndonye/article/2001447570/it-will-be-political-indiscipline-to-avoid-the-presidential-debate">In my opinion</a>, snubbing the debate was political indiscipline. It’s not just voters and the media who needed to hear from leaders, but all Kenyans. </p>
<h2>6. Unable to hide</h2>
<p>Despite the tense relationship he had with the media, Kenyatta still found it important to seek its help when he felt cornered. Twice, he sought out journalists to address his home turf, the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2022/08/12/kenyan-presidential-election-mount-kenya-voters-can-swing-the-outcome_5993373_124.html">important</a> central Kenya voting bloc.</p>
<p>Two days to the 9 August 2022 elections, Kenyatta spoke with journalists from vernacular media platforms, urging people from central Kenya to vote for Odinga. Ruto allies <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/august-9/kenya-kwanza-protests-uhurus-kenya-143236/">protested</a> the move. During this interview at State House, Kenyatta appealed for the region’s vote for his preferred successor, Odinga.</p>
<p>The relationship between Kenyatta and the media has been bitter-sweet. However, the media and state are not expected to be bedfellows. It is journalists’ responsibility to hold those in power accountable. That is why it’s a red flag whenever regimes purport to work with the media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Ndonye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The relationship between the state and media soured just months into the Kenyatta regime.Michael Ndonye, Senior Lecturer, HOD-Mass Communication, Kabarak UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1889642022-08-18T15:17:50Z2022-08-18T15:17:50ZWould Kenyan women’s rights be safe under William Ruto? Why they might not be<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479866/original/file-20220818-639-72txbk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto addresses his supporters during a campaign rally in Thika, Kenya, in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ed Ram/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>William Ruto has been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/william-ruto-named-president-elect-3914858">declared</a> the winner of Kenya’s presidential election. </p>
<p>As president, Ruto <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/meeting-promise-2010-constitution">would be charged</a> with defending the 2010 constitution. It overhauled the governing framework of the country by devolving power to county governments. It also enshrined greater rights for women and young people. </p>
<p>However, it’s worth remembering that Ruto led the “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/campaigns-close-ahead-of-kenyan-referendum-99769019/159942.html">No campaign</a>” during the 2010 constitutional referendum. One of the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/08/04/kenya.constitution.churches/index.html">key contestations</a> within Ruto’s camp – which included religious leaders – was the <a href="https://reproductiverights.org/maps/provision/kenyas-abortion-provisions">modest provision</a> around the right to abortion under specific circumstances. </p>
<p>Ruto and his wife Rachel are <a href="https://www.ugchristiannews.com/ruto-is-a-strong-believer-in-jesus-christ-says-pr-kayanja/">staunch Christians</a>. In my view, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/religious-leaders-endorse-dp-ruto-for-president-want-waiguru-as-running-mate-3806644">a presidency</a> that publicly foregrounds the centrality of religious leaders and Christianity as a governing principle is a cause for concern in a secular state. This is pertinent in a global context in which religious fundamentalism continues to shape gender freedoms in negative ways. Therefore, can he be relied on to defend Kenya’s modest wins for women and girls? </p>
<h2>Kenya Kwanza’s ‘Women Agenda’</h2>
<p>Ruto’s coalition Kenya Kwanza’s <a href="https://uda.ke/downloads/manifesto.pdf">68-page manifesto</a> aims to implement a nine-point “women agenda”. This includes fully implementing the two-thirds gender rule in 12 months after assuming office. </p>
<p>It also promises to provide financial and capacity building support for women through a “Hustler Fund” for women-led co-operative societies. Its other pledges include increasing personnel at gender desks in police stations, addressing spousal consent in land sales and tackling low access to sanitary pads. </p>
<p>The coalition promises to establish a social welfare fund for Kenyan women working abroad as a safety net for distressed diaspora citizens. </p>
<p>Kenya Kwanza commits to deploying adequate numbers of community health workers on a regular stipend. Costs will be shared by the national government and county governments. It also says it will make safe, clean and affordable cooking fuels available. </p>
<p>The bulk of these commitments are consistent with demands made by women’s rights activists that led to the current provisions in the constitution. These demands include those addressing land control and ownership for women, and the two-thirds gender rule. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-kenya-courted-a-constitutional-crisis-over-parliaments-failure-to-meet-gender-quotas-147145">How Kenya courted a constitutional crisis over parliament's failure to meet gender quotas</a>
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<p>Additionally, through donor-funded interventions, work has been done on access to sanitary pads and creating gender desks at police stations. </p>
<p>But translating these constitutional aspirations into policy positions and actions has been slow. Often it’s been deliberately thwarted by political actors. </p>
<p>For example, the inability to fully implement the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-parliament-continues-to-stall-on-the-two-thirds-gender-rule-79221">two-thirds gender rule</a> has been bogged down by male MPs citing “cultural norms” and the need for meritocracy. </p>
<p>At the heart of fully implementing these policy propositions lies the more fundamental question of structural inequality that is sustained by cultural and religious diktats. </p>
<p>It is here that Ruto’s religiosity and his desire to anchor Christianity in particular as his government’s guiding compass becomes critical. </p>
<p>Religion and culture have been loud undercurrents in debates on rights, justice and freedom. That under Ruto, religious leaders and associated lobbies will become key actors in policy making is a legitimate fear. Kenyans concerned about equity should keep this in mind if global trends are taken seriously.</p>
<h2>Increased global surveillance</h2>
<p>Across the globe, religious groups and conservative parties <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2017/12/11/gender-ideology-tracking-its-origins-and-meanings-in-current-gender-politics/">have coalesced around</a> policy and legal propositions, often invoking a challenge to gender ideology as the basis to limit women and girls’ bodily autonomy. </p>
<p>In June 2022, the US supreme court overturned the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02139-3">Roe v Wade</a> ruling. This was a 1973 decision that confirmed that the US constitution gave women the right to have an abortion, thus limiting federal and state abortion laws that restricted these rights. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-abortion-law-decision-brings-attention-to-rights-of-women-in-africa-182602">US abortion law decision brings attention to rights of women in Africa</a>
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<p>The Roe v Wade decision cements a precedent of marshalling moral and religious positions in policy making around women’s rights and gender. This precedent was set in motion during former president Donald Trump’s era through federal funding cuts to organisations such as <a href="https://www.plannedparenthood.org/">Planned Parenthood</a>. </p>
<p>This was also a period that led to concerted efforts in multilateral spaces, such as the United Nations, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-efforts-to-redefine-gender-and-sex-106320">erase the term “gender”</a> and replace it with “women”. This move was aimed at thwarting conversations on gender equality that weren’t solely invested in biology as the basis for understanding inequality. </p>
<p>Similar conversations on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2017/12/11/gender-ideology-tracking-its-origins-and-meanings-in-current-gender-politics/">gender ideology</a> have happened across Europe in France, Germany and Denmark. </p>
<p>Underpinning the organised resistance by religious, conservative lobbies and political parties is a desire to return to interpretations of gender equality that roll back <a href="https://counteringbacklash.org/reclaiming-gender-discourse-to-fightback-against-backlash/">freedoms</a> secured for women and girls over decades. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>If Kenyan and transnational feminist organising has taught us anything, it’s that preparation rather than a response to retrogressive forces is key. I offer three key messages.</p>
<p>The first is that the country must map the arguments, institutions and structures that could be deployed to actively subvert hard-won freedoms. Parliament offices not constitutionally recognised, like those of the first and second lady, and county assemblies are important places to watch and engage. </p>
<p>Second, as feminist researcher Sonia Correa <a href="https://genderit.org/file/gender-ideology-sonia-correa-part-1">points out</a>, religious groups that are working to reverse rights are organised globally. Countering this backlash against women’s rights must be <a href="https://www.awid.org/publications/time-action-stop-anti-rights-infiltration-un">transnational and global in nature</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, it will be critical to create spaces to protect and secure the most vulnerable from what will be interpreted as state-sanctioned defence of “Kenya’s morality”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/Widow-Inheritance-and-Contested-Citizenship-in-Kenya/Okech/p/book/9780367788049">Feminist history</a> has taught us that when the “soul of a nation” is contested, it’s women, girls and those considered deviants whose bodies will serve as the theatre for that battle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Awino Okech does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The centrality of religion as a governing principle is cause for concern given the reversals of women’s rights seen globally.Awino Okech, Associate professor in political sociology, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1874732022-08-17T14:55:20Z2022-08-17T14:55:20ZHow politics has subverted conservation efforts to protect Kenya’s Mau Forest<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477436/original/file-20220803-23-lop19q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A section of Kenya's Mau Forest complex that has been cleared for human settlement.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://watertowers.go.ke/water-towers/">Mau Forest Complex</a> is the largest montane tropical forest in East Africa. This is an ecosystem with rich biodiversity and characterised by high rainfall. </p>
<p>Composed of 22 forest sectors, the Mau is located in Kenya’s Rift Valley, the heart of the country’s fertile and rain-fed highlands. The forest plays a pivotal role in feeding a large part of the country’s water network. </p>
<p>The Mau Forest’s 380,000 hectares have witnessed a long and tormented history of human habitation. It’s a territory hotly contested. </p>
<p>The management of the forest is a key issue in every political election, just like it was in the run-up to Kenya’s <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/inside-politics/ruto-lashes-out-at-narok-leaders-for-inciting-residents-using-mau-issue-120074/">9 August 2022 poll</a>. </p>
<p>Our research has found that <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/Working-Papers/WP185.pdf?from_serp=1">state interventions</a> in the Mau Forest over the last 100 years have been designed to serve specific political-economic interests, rather than to conserve the ecosystem. </p>
<p>There are three key historical periods that are representative of how Mau Forest management policies have been used to pursue political goals. These three periods are the 1930s and 1940s when Kenya was still a British colony; the 1980s in the wake of political liberalisation; and the 2000s when nature conservation policies took centre stage in national politics.</p>
<p>These periods exemplify how past interventions affect present issues. They show, too, how national and international dynamics play out in forest management in Kenya. </p>
<p>The legacy of colonial forest management practices, post-colonial politics of clientelistic land redistribution and the politicisation of forest conservation have made the Mau Forest one of the most controversial areas of Kenya. </p>
<p>The evictions carried out in the Eastern Escarpment and in the Maasai Mau between <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-09-02-rift-mps-take-mau-eviction-to-uhurus-doorstep/">2019</a> and <a href="https://www.kbc.co.ke/evictions-from-state-owned-forests-to-continue-natembea/#:%7E:text=The%20Government%20has%20launched%20an,that%20leftover%2020%20people%20dead">2020</a>, for instance, illustrate these political dynamics.</p>
<h2>The Mau Forest in colonial times</h2>
<p>The several forest sectors that make up the Mau Complex were gazetted as protected areas during the 1930s and 1940s. </p>
<p>The strategic importance of the Mau Forest was that it was at the heart of the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632?casa_token=pbOR4dngZI0AAAAA:kUl5OGOQsaR1unO-6Q5vValoAg8-hpLkd2hy2tWzgNwQ52NJRpMsTjNjc-TRdJpFABQH9XGkcmMtL8CaQoeyHzsX8BFEhd3OCwXtsrNdhJOu9logtBt6">White Highlands</a>”, as they were called then. These were the most fertile parts of the country, and where the British colonialists settled. </p>
<p>Demarcating the Mau Forest as a protected area became the legal premise for repeated evictions of the native Wadorobo, today known as the Ogiek. These were groups of hunter-gatherers and beekeepers who lived as semi-nomads within the forest. </p>
<p>The colonial government established native reserves to better control the territory. These also served as sources of cheap labour and helped prevent Africans from squatting on the British farms adjacent to the forest. By evicting the Wadorobo from the Mau Forest, the colonial government sought to sedentarise these few thousand people by settling them in native reserves.</p>
<p>The policy of population exclusion in forest management was inherited by the independent Kenyan government in 1963. Policy narratives, however, went through several changes as new political priorities arose.</p>
<h2>Political liberalisation</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, African countries faced pressure from international institutions to implement <a href="https://repository.kippra.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/2847/wp%2012.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">“good governance” reforms</a>. These were set as preconditions to access development aid. They included multiparty elections, privatisation of state corporations and decentralisation of services. </p>
<p>In 1991, these international influences articulated to existing internal pressures, resulting in, among other things, the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/kenya-9781848131767/">reinstatement of multiparty politics</a>. This saw the then-authoritarian regime of <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">President Daniel Moi</a> – in power from 1978 to 2002 – devise strategies to stay in control. They included <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Pilfering-the-Public%3A-The-Problem-of-Land-Grabbing-Klopp/5595fc5e1dc5b4d37df943b5ba95f8573a127621">distributing land to buy political support</a>.</p>
<p>Against this background, the Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Programme (1991-1994) was rolled out in the Mau Forest. It was intended to involve local communities in state policies of forest management. It recommended the settling of the few thousand Ogiek people who lived in the forest in designated areas. </p>
<p>The programme, however, became part of the politics of nature conservation. Moi’s government subverted its original purpose, using its recommendations to turn 61,000 hectares of protected forest area into settlement schemes. This was ostensibly for accommodating the Ogiek. </p>
<p>The operation was instead used to <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/how-moi-played-role-in-plunder-of-greater-mau-forest-206962">allocate land</a> to thousands of Kalenjin people – an umbrella group reassembling agro-pastoralists living in the Rift Valley. Forest land was also allocated to a small circle of the country’s economic, military, administrative and political elite. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, extensive forest destruction was state-driven and geared towards a particular political goal. The massive transfer of Kalenjin people and personal allocations were meant to make Nakuru district, in the Rift Valley, a regime-aligned electoral constituency. Moi needed to secure a seat for his party Kanu in the area, which was dominated by the opposition.</p>
<h2>The politics of Water Towers</h2>
<p>By the turn of this century, the Mau Forest had became the exemplification of illegal allocations effected by the Moi regime. National civil society organisations started to hold campaigns against rampant land grabbing. Among the activists who stood out were the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize awardee <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2004/maathai/facts/#:%7E:text=share%3A%201%2F1-,Sustainable%20Development%2C%20Democracy%20and%20Peace,her%20home%20country%20of%20Kenya.">Wangari Maathai</a>.</p>
<p>These land grabs were later documented in the 2004 <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/A_Report_of_the_Land_Commission_of_Inquiry_into_the_Illegal_or_Irregular_Allocation_of_Land_2004.pdf">Ndung’u Report</a>. </p>
<p>The year 2002 was a political landmark for Kenya. The 40-year regime of the ruling party, Kanu, ended with the election of Mwai Kibaki as the country’s third president. In 2008, in the wake of a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/2/28/kenya-signs-power-sharing-pact">power-sharing agreement</a> following <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">post-election violence</a>, Raila Odinga was appointed prime minister, while Kibaki retained the presidency.</p>
<p>Under Odinga’s initiative, rehabilitating the Mau Forest became a government priority. The United Nations Environment Programme played an important role in this process by <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/28379/MauForest.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">exposing</a> the drastic reduction in Kenya’s forest cover. </p>
<p>A task force was established. Its <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2018338351/">report</a>, released in 2009 and endorsed by parliament, painted a grim picture of the decade-long destruction of the Mau. It designed a plan to restore and rehabilitate the forest. </p>
<p>In 2012, the Mau Forest Complex and other forests were given <a href="https://watertowers.go.ke/">new status</a> as Water Towers. These are key forest ecosystems that serve as reservoirs and supply water for the country’s rivers and lakes. This status established their national importance. </p>
<p>The start of this rehabilitation phase resulted in settlers’ evictions from the Mau Forest. However, members of parliament from the Rift Valley <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mps-demand-land-for-evicted-mau-squatters-614656">mobilised protests</a> to halt evictions and call for compensation. </p>
<p>President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto – who at the time were ministers for finance and agriculture, respectively – were part of this mobilisation. </p>
<p>Evictions continued sporadically until 2020. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/23/kenya-mau-forest-evictees-plight-intensifies">Vigorous evictions</a> led by the provincial administration in collaboration with the Kenya Forest Services targeted the Maasai Mau forest sector (in Narok County) and East Mau sector (in Nakuru County). </p>
<p>The fear of deforestation contributing to the drying up the Mara River – located in Narok County – is often advanced as the main reason for conserving these forest sectors. However, evictions occurred in the wake of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/21/analysis-how-kenyas-president-won-over-a-foe-and-alienated-his">cracks within the government</a>. </p>
<p>These interventions demonstrate the extent to which political interests have informed, and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/218730/kenya-2022-odinga-and-ruto-fight-over-the-future-of-mau-forest/">continue to inform</a>, conservation policies in the Mau Forest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefania Albertazzi receives funding from the University of Milan and in the past from the British Institute in Eastern Africa and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francesca di Matteo works for the French Institute for Research in Africa, Nairobi.</span></em></p>Political interests have informed conservation policies in one of East Africa’s most important water towers, the Mau Forest Complex.Stefania Albertazzi, Postdoctoral fellow, University of MilanFrancesca di Matteo, Researcher, French Institute for Research in Africa in Nairobi (IFRA-Nairobi)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1886982022-08-14T08:41:38Z2022-08-14T08:41:38ZUhuru Kenyatta’s economic legacy: big on promises, but weak on delivery<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479003/original/file-20220813-21765-zzb847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Uhuru Kenyatta waves to supporters upon his arrival to take oath for second term on November 28, 2017. Photo by SIMON MAINA/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-waves-to-supporters-upon-news-photo/880862466?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, ascended to Kenya’s presidency in March 2013. This followed a contested poll that they won with a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/08/uhuru-kenyatta-kenyan-election">slim majority</a> of 50.3% of the votes cast.</p>
<p>They took office shortly after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11106558">promulgation of Kenya’s progressive constitution</a> in 2010. That gave them a unique responsibility of providing leadership on its implementation and entrenchment.</p>
<p>Article 43 of the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">new constitution</a> covers economic and social rights. It confers every citizen rights to the “highest attainable standard” of health and access to reasonable standards of housing and sanitation. It also calls for access to adequate food of “acceptable” quality, clean and safe water, social security, and education.</p>
<p>As Kenyatta and Ruto’s second term comes to a close, it is important to establish the extent to which they have lived up to these constitutional expectations.</p>
<p>During the second term of their presidency (2017-2022), Uhuru and Ruto’s government has focused economic strategy on core aspects of Kenya’s Vision 2030, <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/towards-2030/">labelled the Big 4 Agenda</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy rested on four pillars. These were food security, affordable housing, universal health care, and manufacturing and job creation. Through it, the government sought to implement projects and policies aimed at accelerating economic growth and transforming lives.</p>
<p>Despite these grand plans, in my view, the government’s economic performance has been a mixed bag. </p>
<p>On the positive side, the outgoing government boasts of infrastructure projects in sectors such as roads and water. Examples include the completed <a href="https://nairobiexpressway.ke/">Nairobi Express Way</a> and over 2000 dams that are at <a href="https://www.constructionkenya.com/8360/dam-projects-kenya/#:%7E:text=Ongoing%20dam%20projects%20in%20Kenya&text=The%20dams%20include%20Thwake%20Dam,2bn%20dam%20in%20Nyeri.">various stages</a> of construction.</p>
<p>These projects have the capacity to improve lives. For example, better roads will reduce transport time to deliver commodities to markets while completed dams will lower disease incidence by promoting access to clean drinking water.</p>
<p>But there are negatives too. The country’s <a href="https://ilostat.ilo.org/">performance on job creation</a> was weak, with unemployment rates worsening by 2.93 percentage points from 2.81% in 2013 to 5.74% in 2021. Weak job creation is explained by the not-so-robust economy. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/">Between 2013 and 2021</a>, Kenya’s economic growth (GDP) averaged 4.4% while tax revenues stagnated at approximately 14.8% of GDP. </p>
<p>Uhuru and Ruto’s most prominent economic legacy is runaway public debt, whose growth has not been commensurate with economic performance. In this article, I quickly survey what I believe to be the government’s economic performance highlights since 2013. </p>
<h2>Public debt</h2>
<p>When Uhuru and Ruto took office in March 2013, Kenya’s <a href="https://www.centralbank.go.ke/public-debt/">public debt stood at</a> about KSh 1.8 trillion (US$17.95 billion), of which about 45% was externally sourced. Nine years later (by March 2022), the stock of public debt had grown by 343% to almost <a href="https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GP-FORMATTED-QEBR-report-12.5.2021-Draft-Q3-QEBR-final-draft-1-plus-comments-incorporated-copy.pdf">KSh 8 trillion</a> (about US$67 billion). Just over 50% is due to external borrowing.</p>
<p>The excessive reliance on loans has driven the ratio of public debt to GDP beyond 70%. This has raised questions about whether the country has the financial capacity to meet present and future obligations (interest and principal) arising from the debt. </p>
<p>Expectedly, the ballooning public debt has put a lot of pressure on the exchequer. For the year 2022/23, the country is spending <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ke/Documents/tax/Deloitte%20Kenya%20Budget%20Highlights%202022-23%20.pdf">53.8% of every shilling collected in servicing debt obligations</a>.</p>
<p>The heavy debt servicing outlays have affected social infrastructure sectors. Take health. <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2022-Economic-Survey1.pdf">Official data</a> show that government healthcare spending has hardly grown since 2017. It went up from 2.8% of national government expenditure during 2017/2018 to a measly 3.7% during 2021/2022.</p>
<p>This has meant that the country hasn’t been able to effectively address <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2021-05/Unpacking%20of%20the%20FY%202021-22%20budget.pdf">constraints facing the sector</a>. These include inadequate medical equipment and shortage of trained human resource. Both have reduced the quality of healthcare. </p>
<p>The corollary of low quality healthcare is the country’s high disease burden. For example, <a href="https://ascopost.com/issues/february-25-2021/cancer-on-the-global-stage-incidence-and-cancer-related-mortality-in-kenya/">the annual</a> cancer death rates increased between 2012 and 2018 by almost 16%. It is projected to grow further.</p>
<h2>Manufacturing</h2>
<p>In the manufacturing sector, the government allocated about KSh 135 billion in the 2022/23 budget. This mostly targeted satellite industries in the textile, leather, agro-processing, and construction sub-sectors.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://monitoring.planning.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Big-Four-Agenda-Report-2018_19.pdf">gains have been realised</a>. However, inadequate <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2021-05/Unpacking%20of%20the%20FY%202021-22%20budget.pdf">infrastructure</a> in the designated industrial zones has discouraged private sector participation and diminished the potential positive effects.</p>
<p>In particular, energy infrastructure appears to be the waterloo of manufacturing in Kenya. Kenya’s installed electricity generation capacity stood at only 10,730 GWh in 2019, a change of about 20% from the 2013 level of 8,943 according to <a href="https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tables/?country=KENYA&energy=Electricity&year=2019">the International Energy Agency’s data</a>.</p>
<p>This level of generation pales in comparison to recently industrialised economies such as South Korea (581,492) and emerging economies like South Africa (252,639) and Malaysia (175,778).</p>
<p>Given its importance to industrialisation, the low power generation is an impediment to takeoff in the manufacturing sector. It could therefore delay Kenya becoming a <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">newly industrialised middle-income economy</a> providing high quality life to its citizens.</p>
<h2>Food security</h2>
<p>Years of failed economic policies, reliance on rain-fed agriculture and nomadic livestock husbandry, low levels of mechanisation of food production, and insufficient emergency food reserves, have combined to expose swathes of the country to food shortages.</p>
<p>By including agriculture in the Big 4 Agenda, Uhuru’s government sought to reduce the severity of these effects. There <a href="https://monitoring.planning.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Big-Four-Agenda-Report-2018_19.pdf">have been achievements</a> such as the expansion of insurance coverage of farmers, commissioning of national food reserves, commissioning of grain driers, and opening of agro-processing incubation and research centres.</p>
<p>Yet, these achievements have not spawned visible impact: the current drought in the Horn of Africa region has triggered fears of impending food shortages in which an estimated <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/22/drought-in-northern-kenya-causing-millions-to-face-starvation/">3.5 million to 4 million Kenyans</a> could face severe hunger, malnutrition and starvation.</p>
<p>Overall, food production has not performed very well during the 2013–2022 period. For example, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=KE">agricultural value added grew</a> from 18.6% of GDP to 22.4%, a meagre expansion over the nine-year period. This was despite <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/29/kenya-secures-250-million-to-help-500-000-smallholder-farmers-enhance-value-addition-and-access-markets">efforts to support value addition</a> in agriculture, such as processing fruits into juices. </p>
<h2>The fight against corruption</h2>
<p>Like most countries in post-independence Africa, weak institutions and poor governance have been Kenya’s bane. Most Kenyans therefore welcomed Uhuru’s declaration of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/79db0b659ad54950a31f4115b12f9590">corruption as a national security threat</a> and his promise to tackle it. </p>
<p>Kenya has a well-established institutional framework for dealing with dishonesty in the management of public resources. Chapter 6 of <a href="http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken127322.pdf">the constitution</a> imposes high standards of integrity on holders of state offices, and establishes an independent ethics and anti-corruption commission to ‘ensure compliance and enforcement’.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kenya">Kenya still ranks among the worst in corruption perception</a>. This suggests that the public sees the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission as a lame duck institution. </p>
<p>For example, there have even been accusations that the constitutional body has lent itself to partisan political interests since Uhuru’s anti-corruption campaign <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/8/18/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-clash-between-kenyatta-and-ruto">appeared to target political rivals</a>.</p>
<p>Credence was lent to these accusations recently by the leaked information published in the <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/">Pandora Papers</a>. The leaked information appeared to implicate the president’s family in the <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-family-offshore-wealth/">stashing of fortunes in offshore tax havens</a>. Although the report does not necessarily imply financial impropriety, the anti-corruption body has not, to my knowledge, investigated these allegations.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the commission recently demonstrated its mettle when a case that it brought before the court led to a conviction of individuals implicated in a <a href="https://baselgovernance.org/news/kenyas-most-significant-corruption-case-success-shows-theres-still-much-scope-international">maize procurement fraud</a> worth nearly US$3 million. Yet, many similar cases have been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kenyas-finance-minister-arrested-on-corruption-charges/a-49703145">dragging in court for a long time</a> while some <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/25/case-closed-kenya-drops-corruption-charges-against-fa-boss-nick-mwendwa/">have been dropped</a>.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>As the country ushers in a new government, Kenyans hope that the mistakes of the last 10 years can be avoided while the gains realised are built on. For example, will the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/uhuru-kenyatta-built-roads-rail-but-piled-a-whole-load-of-debt-3897466">investment in infrastructure</a> be exploited to maximise welfare gains?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Odongo Kodongo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The most prominent economic legacy of Kenyatta’s government is runaway public debt.Odongo Kodongo, Associate professor, Finance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.