tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/uk-election-2019-75714/articlesUK election 2019 – The Conversation2023-05-10T13:47:52Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050612023-05-10T13:47:52Z2023-05-10T13:47:52ZLabour take note: red-wall voters want an ambitious plan for renewal – not tough talk and flag waving<p>If <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-65475817">projections</a> can be relied on, Labour has good reason to feel confident of supplanting the Conservatives as biggest party at the next general election. Yet it remains far from clear that Keir Starmer is heading for a House of Commons majority. </p>
<p>A Tory-to-Labour swing of <a href="https://labourlist.org/2023/05/bbc-labour-would-win-312-seats-and-tories-226-at-general-election-now/">4.5%</a> in 2023’s local elections fell marginally short of the 5% switch-around he needs to enter single-party government at Westminster. </p>
<p>Labour made gains in this year’s <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/20419058211045127">red wall</a> salvage operation, which included the successful recapture of councils in Stoke-on-Trent and Blackpool. But it still stuttered in post-industrial areas where it might have been expected to capitalise on broken Tory promises about <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1095544/Executive_Summary.pdf">levelling up</a>. </p>
<p>Among its tally of mixed results were only modest advances in once deep-red heartlands such as Bassetlaw, Sandwell and Darlington, as well as other <a href="https://localtrust.org.uk/insights/research/left-behind-understanding-communities-on-the-edge/">“left-behind”</a> places New Labour annexed in 1997, such as Great Yarmouth. </p>
<p>That’s to say nothing of the party’s failure to sway <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/election-97-worcester-woman-gets-the-elbow-1266047.html">“Worcester woman”</a>. The fabled floating voter credited with propelling Tony Blair to victory voted Green in 2023. Party co-leader Carla Denyer mused that “deep dislike of the Tories” had failed to translate into enthusiasm for “Starmer’s uninspiring Labour”.</p>
<p>So what exactly do people want from Labour? And why is it still struggling to fully exploit the mix of ennui and anger felt by so many voters who turned Tory in <a href="https://www.survation.com/latest-data-shows-rishi-sunak-losing-2019-conservative-voters-lags-starmer-on-key-issues-for-the-public/">2019</a>?</p>
<h2>Buses, doctors, jobs</h2>
<p>While carrying out fieldwork for my recent book, <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745344621/the-left-behind/">The Left Behind</a>, I interviewed residents, business owners, community activists and parish councillors in several post-industrial areas contested in the local elections this year – from Stoke and Great Yarmouth to Leigh in Greater Manchester. Doing so gave me a clear sense of the concerns preoccupying voters in the regions that switched to Conservative MPs in 2019 but are still waiting for promises of levelling up to materialise.</p>
<p>Most apparent was the need for a vision of a more socially just, interventionist approach to regulating the economy and reviving public services. This is the most likely way to motivate a resurgence in Labour support.</p>
<p>The “anyone-but-the-Tories” backlash witnessed in the locals followed a campaign dominated by party-political point scoring over who could talk toughest on <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/starmer-crime-tories-labour-prosecution/">crime</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/apr/02/labour-announces-plans-to-crack-down-on-antisocial-behaviour#:%7E:text=Labour%20has%20announced%20a%20series,who%20breach%20antisocial%20behaviour%20injunctions">antisocial behaviour</a>. But my interviewees were much more likely to complain about poor-quality, precarious jobs, lack of opportunities for young people, unaffordable housing and the impact of long years of austerity on overstretched schools and GPs, desolate high streets and unreliable or non-existent bus services. </p>
<p>Labour may have comfortably won the council election in the ward covering the sprawling post-war Stoke housing estate of Bentilee, but it did so on a paltry turnout of <a href="https://www.stokesentinel.co.uk/news/stoke-on-trent-news/labour-sweep-board-bentilee-ubberley-8408425">16%</a>. Here there is a deep-seated disillusionment with politicians of all hues which was described by a local pensioner who told me: “So many people on the estate now say, ‘I’m not voting; they’re all a waste of time’”. </p>
<p>She despaired of the fact that an area once characterised by “employment, and plenty of it” in pottery factories (where she worked as a manager’s PA) now had few jobs other than in a single area of “rejuvenation”: distribution centres. </p>
<p>A retired ex-miner had a similar tale in Leigh. Lamenting the collapse of its once thriving coal and cotton industries, he asked despairingly, “How can you have an apprentice in Tesco?”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, villagers from Forsbrook, near Stoke, and Belton, outside Great Yarmouth, united in condemning the threadbare state of local buses. Belton parish councillors despaired at how a village of 4,000 (mainly elderly) residents now had no GP, and the nearest surgery was three miles away with no connecting bus link. </p>
<p>A carless foodbank volunteer, from nearby Gorleston, said she had been forced to turn down several paid jobs in town because she had no way of reaching work in time for the start of her shifts.</p>
<p>On the rare occasions when people did mention crime or antisocial behaviour (key concerns, according to team Starmer) they tended to view them as symptoms of under investment, not delinquency. Though critical of “gangs” that drove her and her son out of Bentilee, a working single mum reflected that young people had “nothing to do” there thanks to the closure of its youth club. </p>
<h2>Asking the wrong questions</h2>
<p>As ever, perceptions of which issues are most salient to voters depend on what exactly you ask them and how you frame your questions. The “deep-dive” focus groups that pollster Deborah Mattinson conducted in ex-Labour strongholds for her 2020 book, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Beyond-Red-Wall-Labour-Conservatives/dp/1785906046?asin=B084H6DRSR&revisionId=f2a0e275&format=1&depth=1">Beyond the Red Wall</a>, were almost exclusively concerned with asking why so many people had abandoned the party in 2019. </p>
<p>Perhaps unsurprisingly, three factors featured prominently: dislike of Jeremy Corbyn; a sense of being ignored and patronised by middle-class, socially liberal Labour leaders; and frustration at the party’s nebulous position on Brexit. </p>
<p>In the three years since, Mattinson, now Starmer’s director of strategy, seems to have continued asking herself (and subsequent focus-groups) much the same questions. As a result, instead of addressing the evident material interests of red-wall voters, Labour is still fighting the last war. </p>
<p>It is straining to distinguish itself from Corbyn’s party by out-toughing and out-flag-waving the Tories. All this is guided by the alliterative triad of “pride, place and patriotism” Mattinson sees as integral to contemporary working-class values. </p>
<p>Starmer is fond of reminding journalists <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/keir-starmer-labour-conference-pledges-b1928605.html">“the world has changed”</a> whenever he is asked to justify abandoning the pledges he made on standing as Labour leader. When the time comes to write his manifesto for the coming election, he would do well to apply this same rationale to memories of contests past – and not just 2019’s.</p>
<p>While Britain’s economic outlook might well be bleaker than when Blair took office (as Starmer often observes when asked why he is scaling back Labour’s ambitions), so too is the state of its collapsing public realm. </p>
<p>The people in lost constituencies want Starmer’s Labour to spend more, not less, than New Labour. This is the most significant aspect of “red-wall sentiment”, and yet the one Starmer seems reluctant to recognise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Morrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Labour strategists seem determined to cast Starmer as the sensible ‘adult in the room’, but in order to win lost areas he needs to be much more radical than that.James Morrison, Associate Professor in Journalism, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597232021-04-27T15:59:00Z2021-04-27T15:59:00Z‘Strategic lies’: deliberate untruths used as a political tactic – new study<p>It’s Boris Johnson’s word against that of his former alter ego, Dominic Cummings. And, depending where you have read or heard about the accusations and counter-accusations flying between the pair, one or both are being a trifle “economical with the truth”. The fact that most of what people see will have originated in either leaks from <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2021-04-25/dominic-cummings-not-in-the-clear-over-chatty-rat-lockdown-leak">unnamed witnesses</a>, or via the as yet unsubstantiated claims on <a href="https://dominiccummings.com/">Cummings’ blog</a>, will have only further muddied the waters.</p>
<p>But the biggest problem the prime minister and his erstwhile chief adviser have is that a growing number of people, whether inside or outside the Westminster bubble, are finding it increasingly difficult to take either men at their word.</p>
<p>It’s their own fault, really. They have both long been devotees of what I and my colleague Caroline Fisher <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1940161221994100">describe in a new journal article</a> as “strategic lying”. This is a technique – honed by Cummings himself during the Brexit campaign and played masterfully during the 2019 election campaign – in which a politician tells a deliberate lie with the purpose of shifting the news agenda onto his or her preferred territory. </p>
<p>It doesn’t matter if the lie is easily rebutted. Indeed in one sense rebuttals are part of the plan because they result in the subject of the lie being amplified and kept on, or near, the top of the news agenda. The ultimate goal of strategic lying is to have an impact on the salience of issues. </p>
<p>As American media scholar Spiro Kiousis and colleagues explain in a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s1532754xjprr1803_4?journalCode=hprr20">2010 study of US election coverage</a>, this is a central objective for all political public relations messaging, particularly during an election. </p>
<p>Agenda-setting theory is useful for understanding this strategy, especially in the digital age. It is, if it ever was, not just a top-down activity but involves messages moving from politicians, to the media, to the public and back up again with the message being tailored at every point. </p>
<p>The related concepts of “priming” and “framing” come into play here – often seen as extensions of agenda-setting, they look at not at just what issues are being discussed in the media, but how they are discussed, the context and emphasis – in plain language, “spin”.</p>
<h2>‘Brilliant’ Brexit ploy</h2>
<p>The classic strategic lie was the slogan painted on the side of the Leave campaign’s bus during the Brexit referendum that claimed that the UK sent £350 million a week to the EU. It was a figure that was easily, and frequently, rebutted – not just by Remain campaigners but by all the <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/350-million-week-boris-johnson-statistics-authority-misuse/">reputable fact-checking</a> organisations. </p>
<p>But that didn’t matter. Cummings, made no attempt to defend the figure in his blog about the campaign but instead <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/dominic-cummings-how-the-brexit-referendum-was-won">described it</a> as “a brilliant communications ploy” saying that it “…worked much better than I thought it would”.</p>
<p>Cummings’ ploy could be seen up and running within days of the Leave campaign’s launch, when ITV’s News at Ten devoted a full eight minutes to an interview in which Johnson was repeatedly and robustly challenged over the truth of the £350 million claim. The more naïve might have thought that the interview had effectively destroyed the Leave campaign’s key slogan. But far from it. The interview, and similar ones on other news bulletins, meant the issue of the UK’s payments to Europe was seen by millions of viewers as the most important issue of the campaign. </p>
<p>In addition, once a statement – or lie for that matter – has found a sympathetic ear, then no amount of rebuttal will convince people <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2441776.2441895">that it is not true</a>. This is because the lie fits their worldview and to believe anything else would create a sense of cognitive dissonance, something we all <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/2495">seek to avoid</a>. Furthermore, people’s memories of corrections fade rapidly, but the memory of the <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.160802">original lie remains</a>.</p>
<p>Hence, Remain campaigners found that every time they sought to rebut statements such as the £350 million claim – or, for example, the notion that Turkey was about to join the EU (it wasn’t, but it kept the issue of immigration front and central) – they found themselves inadvertently rebroadcasting the lies. This has been described <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ccc/article/12/4/435/5678718?login=true">by media scholar Caroline Jack</a> as “unintentional amplification”, which in turn leads to another phenomenon which she identifies as “inadvertent legitimisation” – the act of giving credibility to “strategic lies” simply by repeating them. </p>
<h2>Mud sticks</h2>
<p>Striking quick and hard is one of the key components of the strategic lie playbook, as the Brexit referendum demonstrated and could also be seen during the 2019 general election. In the first week of the campaign, the Conservatives posted a doctored video clip showing Labour’s then EU spokesperson, Keir Starmer, apparently stumbling over a question about the party’s Brexit stance. But in the original Starmer had not stumbled at all.</p>
<p>Challenged about the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/nov/05/tories-unrepentant-about-doctored-video-of-keir-starmer-tv-appearance">doctored clip</a>, Conservative party chairman James Cleverly sought to laugh it off by telling BBC Breakfast that, “Everyone could see the video was ‘obviously edited’ because of the music underneath.”</p>
<p>Notwithstanding this, the doctored clip was viewed over a million times in the days immediately following and Labour’s subsequent disavowal posts were seen by many more – just one BBC report of the incident received 1.1 million hits on Twitter.</p>
<p>Clearly, strategic lying raises a number of major ethical issues, but there is also an important practical one. What do journalists, particularly those working for the regulated public service broadcasters, do when faced with the conflict between disseminating what they know to be a lie and their legal responsibilities to exercise “due impartiality”? </p>
<p>Do they challenge the lie on-air, quote an opponent, quote a fact-checking organisation or just not broadcast the lie? All are, or could be, problematic in the current regulatory environment. The quality of our democracy depends on the quality of the political debate within the public sphere. New campaigning techniques represent a real threat to both the debate and our democracy and something needs to be done urgently to address this problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivor Gaber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lie is halfway around the world before the truth gets its trousers on.Ivor Gaber, Professor of Journalism, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1299332020-01-14T14:47:25Z2020-01-14T14:47:25ZThree reasons why Boris Johnson’s promise to revitalise the north could come back to haunt him<p>For his forthcoming Budget on March 11, Chancellor Sajid Javid has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-launches-budget-process-to-usher-in-decade-of-renewal">promised to</a> “unleash Britain’s potential – uniting our great country, opening a new chapter for our economy and ushering in a decade of renewal”. This was on the back of the Conservative Party’s 2019 <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">election manifesto</a> commitment “to use our post-Brexit freedoms to build prosperity and strengthen and level up every part of the country”. </p>
<p>Yet so far, the government of Boris Johnson has been noticeably vague as to precisely what is to be “levelled up” or over what time frame – beyond talking about more funding for <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/education/2020/01/itll-take-more-money-boris-johnson-make-good-his-promise-better-schools">schools</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/14/johnson-huawei-critics-must-tell-us-whats-the-alternative">health, police</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0acabafa-1f4c-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b">infrastructure</a> in England. There are at least three very good reasons for being in no hurry to get into details. </p>
<h2>1. The manifesto paradox</h2>
<p>The Conservatives made manifesto commitments not to raise the rate of VAT, income tax or national insurance, and not to borrow to finance day-to-day current spending. Their plans to borrow to finance net public investment in infrastructure will not average more than 3% of GDP over the current parliament, and even those modest plans <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">will be reassessed</a> if debt interest reaches 6% of revenue.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN261-Tax-revenues-and-spending-on-social-security-benefits-and-public-services-since-the-crisis.pdf">According to</a> the Institute for Fiscal Studies, commitments already made on increased funding for the National Health Service (NHS) in England mean that, beyond the Department of Health and Social Care, total day-to-day spending on public services is “set to be 16% below 2010-11 levels (21% in per-person terms)”. So under current plans, austerity will continue for the majority of services in the majority of communities in England.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2019/results">having won</a> its 80-seat majority on the back of punching significant holes in the Labour Party’s much vaunted “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50771014">red wall</a>” of constituencies across the midlands and north of England, the Johnson government will not be able to sate public expectations if its ambition is limited to a few high-profile infrastructure projects. The Johnson government therefore faces a strategic domestic political, ideological and policy dilemma of how to reconcile its fiscal conservatism with all the talk of uniting and levelling up. </p>
<h2>2. The London dilemma</h2>
<p>One possible solution would be for the government to redistribute resources away from the “southern powerhouse” of Greater London, the south east and east of England <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319625591">to stoke</a> the “midlands engine” and that other powerhouse further north. Yet the government <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ad1bc24e-339d-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de">has just been warned</a> against that course of action by both Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, and Paul Dreschler, the chair of business lobby group London First. </p>
<p>Lest the Treasury forget, on the tax revenue side of the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/articles/countryandregionalpublicsectorfinances/financialyearending2018">national balance sheet</a>, only London (£38.9 billion), the south east (£21.9 billion) and the east of England (£4.2 billion) actually produced net fiscal surpluses in the financial year ended March 31 2019. Everywhere else was in deficit, including the north west (£20.1 billion), the north east (£10.7 billion) and Yorkshire and the Humber (£11.3 billion), Scotland (£14.8 billion) and Wales (£13.4 billion). It won’t be easy to reduce inequality without killing the golden goose – or at least giving it a few bruises. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309953/original/file-20200114-151887-lvomdq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/articles/countryandregionalpublicsectorfinances/financialyearending2018">ONS</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>3. The bad lieutenants</h2>
<p>There is no shortage of blueprints on what might be done. Dominic Cummings, Boris Johnson’s chief special adviser, <a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2019/11/27/on-the-referendum-34-batsignal-dont-let-corbyn-sturgeon-cheat-a-second-referendum-with-millions-of-foreign-votes/">has identified</a> A Resurgence of the Regions, <a href="http://www.softmachines.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ResurgenceRegionsRALJv22_5_19.pdf">a paper</a> by Richard Jones, a professor in the department of physics and astronomy at the University of Sheffield, as an agenda “about how the new government could really change our economy for the better, making it more productive and fairer”. </p>
<p>Jones’ 2019 paper outlined a classic technocratic blueprint for more direct strategic intervention “to build up the innovation capacity of those regions of the UK which currently are economically lagging”. He advocates rebuilding innovation outside the south east by establishing institutes that would translate research into actual commercial products and services, and foster similar ecosystems for innovation to those in London and Cambridge – while allowing different regions to pursue deviations that suited their strengths. </p>
<p>Hitherto, the principal proponent of such thinking within the Conservative Party was the arch-Remainer Michael Heseltine. <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34648/12-1213-no-stone-unturned-in-pursuit-of-growth.pdf">He urged</a> the Cameron government to “leave no stone unturned” in pursuing growth in the English regions, and <a href="https://englishcitiesmichaelheseltine.premediastudio.com/MichaelHeseltine/pubData/source/Empowering_English_Cities__Lord_Heseltine.pdf">advised the</a> May and Johnson governments to create a new dedicated department. </p>
<p>This would mean a return to the politics of the government of Edward Heath, who, like Heseltine, <a href="http://www.industrialstrategy2017lordheseltine.co.uk/MH-industrial-strategy.pdf">envisaged</a> large-scale Whitehall intervention via a national industrial strategy. Rejecting such dirigisme, Margaret Thatcher was more open to ideas about <a href="https://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/111028103106-WhyBritainneedsaSocialMarketEconomy.pdf">moving towards</a> a German social market economy <a href="https://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/111026104730-5B6518B5823043FE9D7C54846CC7FE31.pdf">focused on</a> individual entrepreneurship, risk-taking and market competition. </p>
<p>Johnson is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/12/boris-johnson-no-right-call-himself-one-nation-conservative">reported to have told</a> his cabinet colleagues that he was “basically a Brexity Hezza”. But to even contemplate a return to such interventionism would be to court open ministerial revolt from a government containing all five authors of the quintessential Thatcherite work from 2012, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Britannia-Unchained-Global-Lessons-Prosperity/dp/1137032235">Britannia Unchained</a> – including Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, Home Secretary Priti Patel and International Trade Secretary Liz Truss. </p>
<p>Britannia Unchained advocated unleashing Britain’s potential by dismantling the chains of public subsidy, taxes, welfare dependency and stifling regulation. The aim was to raise prosperity by encouraging a buccaneering entrepreneurial spirit, shaped by “graft, risk and effort in pursuit of long-term rewards”. Technocratic intervention was definitely not the order of the day. </p>
<p>In shaping the political priorities of the March budget, Johnson therefore has another very difficult mission on his hands. How to reconcile the conflicting constituencies of the north and south, of fiscal conservatism and levelling up; and how to pull it all off without poisoning relations with his key lieutenants. In short, “getting Brexit done” could be the least of his worries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When you look at what the PM is up against, the Brexit trade negotiations might almost seem like light relief.Simon Lee, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1260412020-01-13T13:56:43Z2020-01-13T13:56:43ZHow ‘WhatsApp group admin’ became one of the most powerful jobs in politics<p>When the British parliament <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/boris-johnson/news/106431/mps-back-moves-forcing-number">asked the government</a> in 2019 to publish the messages that key officials were sending to each other about Brexit via text message, email, Facebook and messaging apps, it drew attention to the extent to which elected officials have been sidestepping official channels in their communications. </p>
<p>The push came in September, when tensions over Brexit were high and there were concerns that the government was being dishonest about its motives for suspending parliament for five weeks – a move that was ultimately <a href="https://theconversation.com/q-a-supreme-court-rules-boris-johnsons-prorogation-of-uk-parliament-was-unlawful-so-what-happens-now-124119">ruled as unlawful</a> by the Supreme Court. </p>
<p>Clearly parliamentarians thought important information was being shared on these platforms that the public needed to know about. In a rather telling move, the government refused to comply with the request. The incident shows how messaging apps have come to play an important role in operations – and how they allow officials and politicians to evade scrutiny.</p>
<p>Political groups are increasingly alert to the potential of messaging services like WhatsApp and Telegram for operating closed communities. The emergence of the European Research Group (ERG) within the UK Conservative Party is a case in point. This is an organisation for Conservative members of parliament who were enthusiastic about leaving the European Union long before the 2016 referendum and subsequently pushed for as hard a Brexit as possible. </p>
<p>Shortly after the referendum, key ERG leaders <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/19/whatsapp-wars-brexiteers-row-number-messages-secret-chat-forum/">came together in a WhatsApp chat group</a>. The then chairman of what was still a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-backing-mps-plot-their-attacks-on-whatsapp-sw5gp7680">little-known organisation</a>, Steve Baker, became an administrator of the group.</p>
<p>By the time the existence of the WhatsApp group was revealed four months later, the ERG was becoming more and more influential within the Conservative Party. Some would argue that its actions ultimately helped to thwart Theresa May’s attempts to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/14/theresa-may-defeated-on-brexit-again-as-erg-tories-abstain">get her Brexit deal through parliament</a>. The ERG voted again and again to block her deal, denying her the votes she needed.</p>
<p>This was quite an achievement for an organisation largely made up of backbenchers. At times, it isn’t even entirely clear to the general public which parliamentarians are members of the ERG, yet they were able to exert significant influence over their party without having to go public with their operations. </p>
<p>That was, in no small, part, thanks to networks beyond the reach of traditional scrutiny mechanisms such as the WhatsApp group. The ERG WhatsApp group members <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/19/whatsapp-wars-brexiteers-row-number-messages-secret-chat-forum/">described</a> their chat as an “extremely effective” way of organising as it helped them to agree on “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/06/jacob-rees-mogg-and-the-shadowy-group-of-tories-shaping-brexit">lines to take</a>” in parliament and in the media.</p>
<p>Many similar WhatsApp groups now exist in parliament. They unite MPs of different parties that range from Labour factions to the “One Nation” group of moderate Tories. Communicating in a WhatsApp group even allows MPs to organise across party boundaries, helping them to defy the official party line on key issues.</p>
<h2>The all-seeing admin</h2>
<p>This new type of political organising affects how power is distributed within parties and movements. A traditional party has a leader and a whip; a WhatsApp group has an administrator. A new breed of operative therefore wields significant power. </p>
<p>Administrators make decisions regarding who to add or remove from a chat and, often, what content is shared. This means that, if a group gets big enough, a relatively low-level party operative can become an important figure. In the traditional sense of party structures, Steve Baker, for example, is not a leading politician. But as administrator of the ERG WhatsApp group, he can <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/19/whatsapp-wars-brexiteers-row-number-messages-secret-chat-forum/">control who is in and who is out</a> of a discussion group that has played a central role in the direction taken on Brexit.</p>
<p>Research in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318">recent social movements</a> such as Occupy Wall Street and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1161817">the Indignados</a> has shown that social media administrators can become leading voices in protest communities even when such movements are presented as “leaderless” and “horizontal”. However, social movements are not the same as elected representatives. They do not have to conform to the same regulations around transparency and accountability that apply to our elected politicians.</p>
<h2>An encrypted universe</h2>
<p>The content of influential online groups is also often as invisible as the people taking part in them. This is because messaging platforms like WhatsApp are encrypted and designed as extremely private spaces. </p>
<p>There can be benefits to encryption of course. Protest movements depend on this security to protect themselves from the threat posed by undemocratic states. But elected politicians should not abuse the capabilities of digital media like the encryption mechanisms of platforms. Otherwise, society risks losing track of government communications related to important matters such as Brexit. The history can be deleted or hidden away in private company servers. While Downing Street’s confidential memos on the prorogation <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/05/prorogation-parliament-abuse-power-high-court-shocking-brexit">were eventually released</a>, such digital communications remain out of reach. </p>
<p>The other problem here is that government business is increasingly conducted on the communication platforms of private companies. What power does this give Whatsapp, and its parent company Facebook, over the communications of our governments? </p>
<p>We still know relatively little about how messaging platforms are reshaping parties’ internal operations. Unless we turn the spotlight on these internal dynamics, shadow organisations inside parties will continue to influence politics with no accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126041/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aliaksandr Herasimenka is affiliated with The German Marshall Fund of the United States. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastasia Kavada does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The hand that taps ‘remove from this group’ is the hand that rules the world.Aliaksandr Herasimenka, PhD candidate, Visiting Lecturer, School of Media & Communication, University of WestminsterAnastasia Kavada, Senior Lecturer, School of Media and Communication, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1292792020-01-10T12:27:10Z2020-01-10T12:27:10ZWhy Boris Johnson should stick to his ‘one nation’ promise and resist the urge to swing to the right<p>Boris Johnson and the Conservatives routed Labour in the general election and one of the key reasons for this victory was the prime minister’s campaign rhetoric about <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/one-nation-conservatism-explained_uk_5df39be3e4b04bcba183df7f?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAF-on3FCQUYSctdAtBPGslDWoaSQ3fMvxBDidirDnlN76xrRRITaWb75Pz61DG-niPIOc27iz8T-aBKyXEl-m5CFRMkO2GMil6NhLMPC0bsZu6JBrNzYUMWiyh9HdSNQxteVtjnhyfvYGjgZv9OnV89Ki7i-1TrQQxsAxT2t6mn1">“one nation” Conservatism</a>. This phrase was coined by <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/from-benjamin-disraeli-to-boris-johnson-one-nation-conservatism-wins-again-in-britain">Benjamin Disraeli</a>, the 19th-century Conservative prime minister who saved the party from long-term decline by starting the process of reining in the effects of free-market capitalism on British society.</p>
<p>In the modern era, one nation Conservatism means supporting the welfare state and investing in public services, particularly in health, education and social housing. The arch advocate of this was Conservative prime minister <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315835846">Harold Macmillan</a>. In the 1959 election campaign, Macmillan claimed that his one nation policies had ensured that “our people have never had it so good”. Interestingly enough, he won that election with 365 seats, the same number as Johnson captured in 2019. Johnson needs to continue this tradition of moderate Conservatism if he is to sustain the party’s electoral success.</p>
<p>A look back at the relationship between Conservative vote shares in successive general elections since 1945 and the party’s <a href="https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/">score on a summary left-right ideology scale</a> shows why. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308411/original/file-20200103-11951-1qxx43l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tacking to the centre wins votes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Whiteley/Harold D Clarke.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>A low score on the left-right scale indicates that the party shifted to the centre of the ideological spectrum. A high score indicates a shift to the right. From 1945 to 2017, there is a strong negative correlation (-.50) between the Conservative party’s vote and its ideological score (we don’t yet have data for 2019). Put simply, when the party moves to the centre of the ideological spectrum, it wins a larger percentage of votes.</p>
<p>It is evident that the Conservatives did particularly well electorally in the 1950s when Macmillan pursued his “one nation” policies. It did so again as it sought to recover from Tony Blair’s landslide victory for Labour in 1997, shifting towards the centre under successive leaders. This took a long time to achieve but after quietly moderating some of its austerity policies, the party finally won a modest majority under <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230237025_2">David Cameron</a> in the 2015 election.</p>
<h2>What about Thatcher?</h2>
<p>The party swung hard right under Margaret Thatcher, the high point of this being the 1987 election manifesto. At first sight, the Thatcher era appears to contradict the idea that the party needs to seek the centre of the ideological spectrum, since she was anything but a “one nation” Conservative. But a closer look at this period reveals why right-wing policies were electorally successful at that time.</p>
<p>Thatcherism was made possible by Labour moving to the far left after it lost the 1979 election. This shift produced a decisive defeat for Michael Foot’s Labour party in the 1983 general election (which was almost as bad as Jeremy Corbyn’s loss in 2019). Emboldened by Labour’s 1983 debacle, Thatcher campaigned for the 1987 election on the most right-wing agenda of any governing party in the post-war period. Although the Conservatives won the 1987 election, this set the scene for Thatcher’s downfall following her thwarted attempt to impose a widely despised <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/poll-tax-9726">poll tax.</a></p>
<p>As is well known, Labour did not make itself electorally competitive until the 1990s, giving Thatcherism its chance to dominate British politics for nearly two decades. The temptation for many Conservatives at the present time will be to try to repeat this given the recent knockout blow to Labour. It would mean more cuts in public spending, tax cuts for the wealthy and for corporations, further privatisation of state assets, attacks on the welfare state, employment rights and trade unions.</p>
<p>One reason this strategy would be much riskier now for the Conservatives than in the 1980s is growing electoral volatility. As is well known, psychological attachments to the major parties have greatly weakened over time (see graph below showing trends in partisanship from 1964 to 2010). This means that the pursuit of Thatcherite policies by the Conservatives would likely bring a rapid adverse reaction among newly won former Labour supporters in the North and the Midlands. It would also risk the loss of ideologically moderate voters in all parts of the country.</p>
<p>This argument is premised on the proposition that Labour will come to its senses and try to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ditch-the-people-or-policy-what-historic-trends-suggest-labour-needs-to-do-next-128961">shift to the centre</a> in the next few years – something that is far from clear. If it continues on its current path, Labour could be unelectable for years to come. In turn, this could embolden the Conservatives to temper and perhaps abandon their commitment to “one nation” policies, believing that they have little to fear from an ideologically extreme and electorally enfeebled Labour party. Although such a move to the right might be tempting neo-Thatcherite Conservatives, the historical record testifies that it would be a potentially costly strategic error.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke receives funding from the National Science Foundation (U.S.)</span></em></p>There is speculation over what the PM actually needs to do to hold on to his new voters.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at DallasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1291562020-01-07T13:58:04Z2020-01-07T13:58:04ZWhy media education in schools needs to be about much more than ‘fake news’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308619/original/file-20200106-123395-goukla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C24%2C5475%2C3639&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/education-school-student-computer-network-technology-397853056">Rawpixel.com/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2019 general election is already being remembered as the one where <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-should-look-closely-at-britains-decision-to-elect-a-man-so-renowned-for-his-untrustworthiness-128733">misinformation went mainstream</a>. It was, of course, already on the political agenda after the 2016 referendum and US election, with growing numbers of <a href="https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/russian-influence-uk-terrorist-attacks/">academics</a> and <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/179109.htm#_idTextAnchor063">parliament</a> sounding the alarm over foreign actors using so-called “<a href="https://theconversation.com/facebooks-fake-news-plan-is-doomed-to-failure-social-media-must-do-more-to-counter-disinformation-75953">fake news</a>” to disrupt the democratic processes.</p>
<p>But what was seen over the election period was not the work of fringe actors. Instead, major political parties appeared to adopt tactics previously associated with shady players operating at the edges of the information ecosystem. No major party was entirely innocent, as evidenced by <a href="https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/uk-general-election-2019-round-up-voting-day/">First Draft’s Cross Check project</a>. But the Conservatives’ campaign repeatedly adopted controversial tactics. Tactics such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/20/twitter-accuses-tories-of-misleading-public-in-factcheck-row">having its press office pose as a fact-checking service</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50595930">editing BBC news footage</a> to imply that prominent journalists supported the party’s line on Brexit.</p>
<p>Voters, <a href="https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/thousands-of-misleading-conservative-ads-side-step-scrutiny-thanks-to-facebook-policy/">the evidence suggests</a>, were caught in a storm of <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-did-a-report-really-find-0-of-labour-ads-misleading">misleading Facebook posts</a>, memes and tweaked videos. This was a covert propaganda campaign and its impact has yet to be established.</p>
<p><a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/DNR_2019_FINAL_1.pdf">Research from the Reuters Institute for News</a> has shown for some time that growing numbers of people in the UK access their news online – 74% in 2018. Over a third (39%) get news via social media.</p>
<p>But recent reports have revealed that the situation is even more complex, with work by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/05/uncovered-reality-of-how-smartphones-turned-election-news-into-chaos">the Guardian</a> and <a href="https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/174088/bbc-news-review-deck.pdf">Ofcom</a> showing people over-reporting news consumption, skimming over headlines and consuming so-called news via user-generated memes, celebrity influencer posts and politicians on social media.</p>
<h2>Information crisis</h2>
<p>There have been <a href="https://reformpoliticaladvertising.org/">calls for urgent reform to the laws around political advertising</a> to take account of this confusing digital landscape during elections. This is something that politicians must take seriously in the months that follow.</p>
<p>But there is also space for a bottom-up response to this information crisis. The future electorate must be taught how to navigate the modern news landscape. Young people also need to be helped to understand why – in this age of misinformation – public interest news is more important than ever.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-spot-fake-news-an-experts-guide-for-young-people-88887">How to spot fake news – an expert's guide for young people</a>
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<p>Far from being “digital natives”, evidence from the US points to a generation of young people who have no idea where their information online comes from, or why they are reading it. A <a href="https://ed.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-find-students-have-trouble-judging-credibility-information-online">report by the Stanford History Education Group</a> evaluated the online reasoning skills of 3,446 high school students age 12 to 17 between June 2018 and May 2019. They described the results they found as “troubling”.</p>
<p>There is no evidence to suggest young people in the UK are any better. In fact, the 2018 <a href="https://literacytrust.org.uk/policy-and-campaigns/all-party-parliamentary-group-literacy/fakenews/">Commission on Fake News and the Teaching of Critical Literacy Skills</a> found that only 2% of children have the critical literacy skills needed to identify a credible news story.</p>
<h2>News literacy needed</h2>
<p>A growing number of educators, policy makers and third-sector groups are calling for news and critical digital literacy to be taught in schools, with over <a href="https://literacytrust.org.uk/research-services/research-reports/fake-news-and-critical-literacy-final-report/">half of teachers reporting</a> that the current national curriculum does not equip pupils with the literacy skills they need to tackle fake news.</p>
<p>In its <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf">final report on Fake News</a>, published in February 2019, the UK parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reiterated its calls for digital literacy to be the fourth pillar of education alongside reading, writing and maths. But thus far these calls have fallen on deaf ears.</p>
<p>In its <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/2184/2184.pdf">response to the committee’s report</a> the government insisted there was no need, arguing students already study the core components of digital literacy in history, English and IT. There have <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1630/163002.htm">also been suggestions </a> that governmental action is not needed because others are active in this space. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308621/original/file-20200106-123373-yxmmja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It’s not just children either, half of all people now get their news from social media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/minsk-belarus-november-6-2016-boy-516190801">AlesiaKan/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>There are indeed news organisations, charities and others running news literacy workshops in schools, covering topics such as how articles are put together, and why news matters. The government-commissioned <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_DCMS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf">Cairncross review into the future of journalism</a> highlighted some of these and suggested that more collaboration between them could be encouraged as part of a governmental media literacy strategy. </p>
<p>These initiatives, such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/newswise">NewsWise</a>, a Google-funded partnership between the Guardian Foundation and the National Literacy Trust aimed at primary school children, do valuable work. But many are limited in scope and scale, reliant on external funding and in most cases not subject to any independent evaluation or benchmarking.</p>
<p>And the numbers do not add up. There are close to nine million schoolchildren in England according to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/812539/Schools_Pupils_and_their_Characteristics_2019_Main_Text.pdf">Department for Education figures</a> from 2018-2019. But such initiatives are reaching no more than 10,000 children – and that is a generous estimate. This is insufficient to deal with the scale of the challenge.</p>
<h2>Check your sources</h2>
<p>After he found himself at the centre of a “fake news” row about a genuine picture his newspaper published of a boy lying on the floor of Leeds General Infirmary during the final week of the election campaign, <a href="https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/health/do-not-believe-a-stranger-on-social-media-who-disappears-into-the-night-an-open-letter-from-our-editor-to-you-1-10147697">the editor of the Yorkshire Post urged readers</a> not to trust a social media poster who “disappears into the night”. Instead, he urged them to appreciate the difference between that and verified, independent and accountable journalism.</p>
<p>But this is easier said than done. News is no longer spoon-fed by a handful of gatekeeper media outlets. This is not a bad thing, but to enable tomorrow’s votes to adopt a healthy news diet, schools must equip them with the skills to do this. And the government needs to act to make this happen sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frances Yeoman receives funding from the British Academy/ Leverhulme small research grants fund for her research work on news literacy education. She also holds a bursary from the Association of Journalism Educators. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Morris receives funding from the British Academy/ Leverhulme small research grants fund for her research work on news literacy education.
She is a member of the Green Party of England and Wales.</span></em></p>Only 2% of children have the skills needed to identify a credible news story.Frances Yeoman, Senior Lecturer in Journalism, Liverpool John Moores UniversityKate Morris, Lecturer in Journalism, Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1290432019-12-20T11:06:25Z2019-12-20T11:06:25ZElection 2019: analysis shows increase in women MPs but most are in opposition<p>A record number of women presented themselves for office ahead of the UK’s 2019 election. A total of 37% of candidates were female – an improvement of eight percentage points over the number of women standing in 2017 (29%) and 11 percentage points compared to 2015 (26%). This despite how challenging it can be to organise a campaign for a snap election.</p>
<p>It’s also perhaps surprising given the revelations made by women MPs over the past year about the abuse they receive from the public. When the general election was called, around 20 women from different parties announced they had decided to stand down. Among them were Conservatives Amber Rudd, Nicky Morgan, Caroline Spelman, Seema Kennedy and their former Conservative colleague Heidi Allen, as well as Labour MPs Louise Ellmann and Gloria De Piero. Many of these women cited daily abuse, harassment and intimidation as a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/magazine/the-times-magazine/abuse-stalkers-death-threats-whod-be-a-female-mp-m2wfvqpwc">reason for leaving parliament</a>. This suggests that the aggressiveness of the political environment is undermining efforts to improve representation in the UK.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307922/original/file-20191219-11904-14nwpdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candidates standing in 2019 by party.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet, there are <a href="https://candidates.democracyclub.org.uk/?winner=True">important variations</a> between parties when it comes to how many women they selected to stand. I’ve analysed the data for 2019 and found that Labour became the first party in UK history to offer the electorate more female candidates (53% of the total) than men (47%). This represented an increase of 11 percentage points over previous elections.</p>
<p>The Liberal Democrats increased the proportion of women by 29 percentage points so that 31% of their candidates were women. The Conservative party only increased the number of female candidates by one percentage point, reaching 31% of the total candidates.</p>
<p>Such significant variations may reflect differences in the demographic composition of the party membership, but most likely reflect differences in party attitudes towards gender equality and their commitment to implementing actions that actively encourage women to become candidates.</p>
<h2>The new parliament</h2>
<p>This year, a record number of female candidates will become MPs. Out of a total of 650 MPs, there will be 220 women sitting in the House of Commons. That means they make up 34% of the total number of seats in the House of Commons, an increase of five percentage points.</p>
<p>However, this important achievement comes with two caveats. According to the 2011 Census, women and girls made up <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/2011censuspopulationestimatesfortheunitedkingdom/2012-12-17#key-points">51% of the population in the UK</a>, so the House of Commons is still 17 percentage points away from parity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307911/original/file-20191219-11929-1xk24is.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Proportion of men and women elected to parliament.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second caveat relates to the distribution of seats. For the first time in history, more than half of one party’s seats will be occupied by women – but it’s the party of opposition rather than the party of government. While 51% of Labour MPs are now women, only 24% of Conservatives are. So 40% of women MPs will be in government and 60% in opposition. </p>
<h2>Getting women in, getting them to stay</h2>
<p>There are two ways to increase the proportion of women in the House of Commons. Either they win a seat from a male incumbent MP or they win one that has been left vacant because the MP did not seek re-election. The analysis of the seats that changed hands between women and men after the 2019 election indicates that both sexes are equally likely to challenge and win from an incumbent. Yet, women are significantly more likely to win a seat that has been left vacant. This year, 68% of women stepping down were replaced by other women and 56% of men were replaced by other men. Only 44% of male MPs were replaced by women.</p>
<p>Then comes the matter of preventing another situation like 2019, when so many women decided not to stay on in parliament. <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FL016508%2F1">Survey-based data</a> suggests that during the 2017 election campaign, 38% of candidates suffered from abuse, harassment or intimidation and that <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/intimidation-in-public-life-written-evidence">these actions targeted women</a>.</p>
<p>About one in every two women competing for a seat suffered at least one form of abuse, which put them about ten percentage points above the proportion of men. Once controlling for incumbency, ethnicity, party and age, women are on average, eight percentage points more likely to suffer abuse than men. We don’t yet have data from 2019, but it’s already clear that the tone of the overall debate was adversarial, so we probably shouldn’t expect an improved situation for the women candidates. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/B6NtjxTl-zc","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>Until now, harassment and intimidation haven’t decreased the overall number of women participating in politics in the UK, as we can see from the results of this election. However, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/intimidation-in-public-life-written-evidence">research</a> and anecdotal evidence show that women are more likely to be targeted during campaigns and that the abuse does not stop once they become MPs.</p>
<p>Harassment still has an effect on the length of their careers and their quality of life while in office. So while the 2019 election has produced some good results, the long-term career prospects for women MPs is an issue, both in terms of equal representation in the medium term, and longer term efforts to build female legislative expertise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129043/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofia Collignon receives funding from governmental bodies. The Representative Audit of Britain survey was funded by the ESRC – ES/M500410/1 </span></em></p>The good news is that one party has more women than men now. The bad news is it’s not the party of government.Sofia Collignon, Lecturer in Political Communication, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1290872019-12-19T13:28:10Z2019-12-19T13:28:10ZWhat Boris Johnson’s election win means for British broadcasting<p>No sooner had the ballots closed than Boris Johnson’s new government was advancing and accelerating its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/dec/15/boris-johnson-threatens-bbc-with-two-pronged-attack">attack on public service broadcasting</a>, threatening to decriminalise nonpayment of the licence fee, boycott the BBC’s flagship Today programme and review the remit of Channel 4.</p>
<p>Labour, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/bbc-general-election-bias-labour-corbyn-andy-mcdonald-boris-johnson-a9248226.html">accused the BBC of “conscious” bias</a>, arguing that the corporation’s conduct during the election campaign contributed to Labour’s loss. </p>
<p>While the BBC warned that decriminalisation <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50800128">could reduce funding for programming</a> by up to £200 million, it’s feasible that a much larger proportion of its <a href="http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualreport/2018-19.pdf">£3.6 billion licence fee income</a> could be at risk. </p>
<p>One of the key concerns is journalism. Of all the BBC’s output, news and current affairs is the most time-consuming and expensive. The fleeting shelf life of news content – coupled with the costs of maintaining a global network of producers, reporters and researchers – meant that last year the corporation spent <a href="http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualreport/2018-19.pdf">£355 million on television news and current affairs programming</a>, more than any other genre of programming. </p>
<p>If the Conservative threats are realised, the capacity of journalists to scrutinise and hold to account MPs, councillors and other elected officials around the country could be severely diminished.</p>
<p>The BBC is already struggling to fund the £5 million annual costs of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/nov/04/bbc-asks-private-sector-to-subsidise-local-reporters-scheme">Local Democracy Reporter scheme</a>, which pays for around 150 local journalists in local news media to scrutinise local politics.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1204324957225963520"}"></div></p>
<p>Before introducing the local democracy scheme, the coalition government of 2010 to 2015 ringfenced £40 million of BBC funding to establish a network of local television news services. <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/72921/Local-TV-Framework_July2011.doc">It argued</a> the network would play an important role in “the wider localism agenda, holding institutions to account and increasing civic engagement at a local level”. But of the 34 local services established since 2012, at least 12 have failed to launch, collapsed or been merged. The largest local broadcaster, That’s TV, recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-48939451">closed 13 of its 20 studios</a>. </p>
<h2>Reduced scrutiny</h2>
<p>Weakened accountability of local politicians chimes with Johnson’s unprecedented avoidance of public scrutiny during the election campaign. This was most notably seen in his refusal <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/andrew-neil-boris-johnson-interview-video-questions-nhs-social-care-austerity-a9234956.html">to agree to an interview</a> with the BBC’s Andrew Neil, his <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/ofcom-channel-4-climate-debate-tory-complaint-boris-johnson-empty-chair-ice-sculpture-1331399">empty-chairing at the Channel 4 Leader’s Climate Debate</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/11/boris-johnson-hides-in-fridge-to-avoid-piers-morgan-interview">his hiding in a fridge</a> to avoid an ITV interview on Good Morning Britain.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lZATuljaRxs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Sidestepping broadcast journalism enables Johnson to weaken the appeal of public service broadcasting and drive audiences on to social media, where they can be reached directly without interference from journalistic mediators. Johnson’s disdain for the media during the campaign may not be quite on a par with Trump’s tweet of August 5 2018, in which he labelled the media “dangerous and sick” and an “enemy of the people”, but there are clear parallels between the Johnson and Trump strategies.</p>
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<h2>Plight of local journalism</h2>
<p>Local and regional news is particularly vulnerable because, while no less expensive to gather and produce than international news, it attracts small regional audiences and has little export value. Earlier in 2019, the BBC cut regional nightly news bulletins <a href="https://pressgazette.co.uk/bbc-to-reduce-length-of-news-at-ten-by-10-minutes/">from 11 minutes to seven</a> and the number of <a href="https://www.prolificnorth.co.uk/news/broadcasting/2019/01/bbc-cuts-three-senior-posts-part-england-restructure">staff supporting regional news</a>.</p>
<p>The local newspaper industry is collapsing as readers demand free online news and advertisers find greater reach and targeting on social media. Between 2005 and 2018, there was a net <a href="https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/more-than-40-local-news-titles-closed-in-2018-with-loss-of-some-editorial-275-jobs-new-figures-show/">loss of 245 local news titles</a> in the UK. Today, an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/sep/29/local-newspapers-closing-down-communities-withering">58% of the country</a> is not served by a regional newspaper.</p>
<p>When establishing the local television network, then culture minister Jeremy Hunt <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/7895994/Jeremy-Hunt-Ministry-of-Fun-is-about-to-get-very-horrible.html">cited the success of local TV in the US</a>, claiming:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Birmingham Alabama has eight local TV stations, despite being a quarter of the size of our Birmingham. New York has six … It’s crazy that a city like Sheffield doesn’t have local TV.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But <a href="https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/06/30143308/state-of-the-news-media-report-2016-final.pdf">a study by the Pew Research Center</a> showed how US local television is only kept afloat by “huge influxes of campaign cash” for political advertising during election and midterm years. In the UK, party political broadcasts are transmitted for free, and strictly controlled.</p>
<p>In other parts of Europe and elsewhere in North America, local journalism is heavily subsidised by the state and through levies on major telecoms companies. </p>
<p>Most Canadian towns have <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78549/Local-TV-Report-Dec10_FullReport.pdf">at least one community television service</a> and legislation requires commercial cable broadcasters to support community channels. </p>
<p>In Germany, most cities have a local channel subsidised by the regional government. There, local programming is particularly strong because national broadcasters are <a href="https://rm.coe.int/regional-and-local-broadcasting-in-europe/1680789635">not allowed to provide detailed coverage of local issues</a>, so competition is limited for local channels. </p>
<p>In Spain, around <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78549/Local-TV-Report-Dec10_FullReport.pdf">800 local television services have been licensed</a> since the digital switch-over in 2005, with around half funded by local governments and the rest supported by larger media groups. </p>
<h2>Post-Brexit broadcasting</h2>
<p>Now that a January 2020 Brexit seems certain, one of the most pressing media concerns is whether the UK will continue to align with <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/audiovisual-media-services-directive-avmsd">EU broadcasting standards</a>. Departure from EU alignment could mean more adverts per hour on UK channels, more product placement and a relaxation of the bans on advertising junk food to children.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=618&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307916/original/file-20191219-11951-1vlkvj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The most trusted news brands in the UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If the UK adopts the more commercial US approach to broadcasting, the BBC could be forced to accept advertising or shift to a subscription model. Relaxation of the rules on political advertising is a further possibility. Such a move would probably benefit parties with greater spending power, while further damaging – rather than addressing – concerns around the integrity of political communications.</p>
<p>But Johnson might do well to remember that the BBC remains <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/DNR_2019_FINAL_0.pdf">the most popular and the most trusted</a> news source in the UK, across platforms, across generations and across political perspectives, and is well respected worldwide.</p>
<p>Dismantling the nation’s favourite broadcaster is unlikely to be as easy as he might imagine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerry Traynor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There were some ominous sounds coming out of the election campaign about what the Conservatives might have planned for the UK’s public broadcaster.Kerry Traynor, Lecturer in Professional and Media Writing, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1291032019-12-19T12:01:42Z2019-12-19T12:01:42ZTwo tribes of Islington: the real challenge ahead as Labour seeks a new leader<p>Since Labour’s devastating defeat in the general election, two rival explanations have been offered by those inside the party. For left-wing supporters of outgoing leader Jeremy Corbyn, Brexit was to blame. The policy of promising a second referendum, foisted on the leader by centrist Remainers, alienated pro-Brexit working-class Labour voters in the Midlands and the north of England. Their defection to Boris Johnson’s Conservatives or to Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party massively depressed Labour’s vote in these so-called red-wall constituencies, paving the way for a Conservative victory.</p>
<p>Centrists, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/tony-blair-on-jeremy-corbyn-and-labour-election-loss-1-6430156">blame Corbyn personally</a> for the defeat. His approval ratings were <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/labour-party/jeremy-corbyn/news/106687/jeremy-corbyn-most-unpopular">dire</a> and he acted as a drag on Labour’s support. His <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/04/jeremy-corbyn-says-he-regrets-calling-hamas-and-hezbollah-friends">past associations</a> with questionable causes and perceived lack of patriotism offended traditional Labour supporters. He oversaw a sharp shift to the left, promising <a href="https://theconversation.com/labour-plan-to-renationalise-the-uk-energy-networks-is-a-bad-idea-business-economist-127258">largescale nationalisation</a> that daunted many people. His manifesto also came in for criticism for offering a seemingly endless series of giveaways to voters, with little indication of where the money would come from to pay for them.</p>
<p>In truth, there is no need to choose between these accounts. Both are largely correct. Running a second referendum would effectively cancel the result of the first and that was always likely to enrage Leavers. It stopped being a question about Brexit and became one about whether politicians had to implement the results of popular votes.</p>
<p>Some centrists warned Corbyn’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/labours-brexit-policy-explained-127380">fudged position</a> on Brexit – winning an election and negotiating his own deal with the EU – was driving voters to the Liberal Democrats. Yet most of Labour’s pro-Remain strongholds were in metropolitan areas where it enjoyed huge majorities (51 of the seats Labour was defending had majorities of over 45%, mainly in cities such as London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham). Few of these would have fallen to the Lib Dems. The smaller majorities Labour was defending in pro-Brexit rural and small-town constituencies of the “red wall” were much more vulnerable to a swing to the Conservatives.</p>
<p>The centrists are correct, however, to pinpoint the huge importance of leadership in modern elections. Given the policymaking and patronage power of the prime minister, it matters greatly who holds this role. Voters will take a keen interest in the character of a person seeking to hold this position. While Johnson presented plenty of <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-should-look-closely-at-britains-decision-to-elect-a-man-so-renowned-for-his-untrustworthiness-128733">problems on this front</a>, what really mattered were his weaknesses relative to those of his main opponent, Corbyn. It is extremely difficult for parties to win elections nowadays if their leaders trail far behind their main rivals for the top job.</p>
<p>Similarly, on economic policy, the Corbynites’ insistence that their left-wing manifesto was popular with voters is overly simplistic. When people are asked whether they want free things, whether they are university tuition or broadband, most will say yes. But a manifesto must hang together as a whole and add up properly. Voters were unconvinced that a Corbyn government could afford to provide the things it promised and suspected it would end up taxing, spending and borrowing too much.</p>
<p>The quest for economic credibility will be an essential task for the next Labour leader. That won’t necessarily have to mean adopting the pro-market policies of the Blair years. There is a desire for government intervention, well-funded public services and redistribution among voters – including those who deserted Labour – but they need to be convinced that everything is affordable and budgeted for, which includes not frightening off investors. Otherwise voters will fear economic catastrophe and withhold their support.</p>
<h2>Choices ahead</h2>
<p>The fact that both the left and the centrists have correctly diagnosed one cause of Labour’s defeat respectively, but both have presented them as rival explanations, indicates that whichever side wins control of the party after Corbyn, problems will remain. The preferences of Labour’s 500,000 members, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2017.1403921?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=fbep20">who will choose the new leader</a>, may amplify these problems. Members got what they wanted from the manifesto: a left-wing economic programme and a pledge to hold a second referendum. Leadership candidates may feel they need to accommodate these preferences to have any chance of winning. Left-wingers such as Rebecca Long-Bailey are likely to be <a href="http://repository.essex.ac.uk/17434/">ideologically more in tune</a> with the membership. Centrists, such as Keir Starmer, the party’s Brexit spokesman, have already started to defend Labour’s radical left-wing agenda. But if the contest to replace Corbyn produces another left-wing leader, it becomes more likely that a split will come, as centrists decide that Labour is lost and unelectable.</p>
<p>Labour’s centrists were undermined in the last parliament by their divisions over Brexit. With the completion of Brexit next year, that should no longer be a problem. However, Labour – and indeed, <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/06/21/explaining-the-electoral-debacle-of-social-democratic-parties-in-europe/">social-democratic parties across Europe</a> – face a broader difficulty in winning back the support of working-class voters. Brexit came to symbolise the division within Labour’s electoral coalition on questions of culture, identity and morals, often grouped under the heading of “identity politics”. Liberal-left positions on diversity, immigration and European integration, as well as areas such as criminal justice, security and human rights, are appealing to middle-class professionals and students, but often grate with the social conservatism of traditional working-class communities.</p>
<p>This is a problem for whoever becomes Labour’s next leader, and if there is a split, any new social-democratic party will face the same dilemma. It should be recalled that, whatever their other differences, Blairites and Corbynites are both tribes of Islington. Each signs up instinctively to the liberal left’s socio-cultural agenda and each would be highly resistant to changing position.</p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://unherd.com/2019/12/time-for-boris-johnson-to-show-his-true-colours/">Matthew Goodwin</a> has noted that it is easier for conservative politicians such as Boris Johnson to shift a bit to the left on economics than it is for social democrats to shift a bit to the right on identity and culture. Yet Labour will struggle to win if it simply abandons its traditional supporters. Getting Brexit done will remove a major symptom of Labour’s disconnect with working-class voters, but it will not remove the underlying cause.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Quinn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Centrists are at loggerheads with the left. They’re both right about what went wrong and that’s a problem.Tom Quinn, Senior Lecturer, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1287272019-12-19T10:45:01Z2019-12-19T10:45:01ZDonald Trump enthusiastic about Boris Johnson’s victory – but it won’t be smooth sailing for the ‘special relationship’<p>Boris Johnson has taken the scale of the Conservative Party’s election victory as an emphatic mandate to leave the European Union in 2020. But what of the implications of the vote for the UK-US relationship? Despite <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1205338255832555520?s=20">enthusiastic tweets</a> from President Donald Trump, the longer-term consequences of Johnson’s 80-seat majority for the “special relationship” may point in a different direction to the short-term lessons.</p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the election, the Trump White House will be relieved that it doesn’t have to deal with Jeremy Corbyn as prime minister, a man who has spent his life railing against American imperialism and <a href="https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-world-according-to-corbyn">opposing</a> US foreign and security policies on almost all issues. For the rest of his tenure, whether re-elected or not, Trump can look forward to dealing with Johnson. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/ukus-relations-after-the-three-bs--blair-brown-and-bush(38ac3a61-eb90-490e-8596-1ad8cf59a94d).html">researched the US-UK relationship</a> and how it has evolved under different presidencies. Although Corbyn was looked on with more suspicion by Trump, in practice, the UK’s departure from the EU is the more seismic disruption to transatlantic relations. </p>
<p>In the short term, Trump will see positive implications in the Conservative victory for his own re-election in November 2020. The defeat of big government socialism by populist nationalism will encourage Trump in the belief that he can repeat the success of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2019/jul/23/they-call-him-britains-trump-trump-on-boris-johnson-video">“Britain Trump”</a>. </p>
<p>Corbyn’s defeat has also been seized upon in the Democratic leadership contest with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/democrats-labour-biden-bernie-sanders-warren">presidential candidate Joe Biden warning</a>: “Look what happens when the Labour Party moves so, so far to the left.” There are lessons to be drawn for both parties about the importance of embracing a leadership candidate who appears credible and popular to swing voters.</p>
<h2>Deals brewing</h2>
<p>Trump will also be pleased that Britain will be leaving the EU, which he sees mainly as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/15/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-helsinki-russia-indictments">competitor trading block</a> rather than a promoter of liberal values and rules-based international order. What weakens the EU and its progressive agenda will be welcomed by Trump. For the “America first” president, however, Brexit is <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1205368801438707713?s=20">mainly seen as an opportunity</a> to “strike a massive new trade deal” with “the potential to be far bigger and more lucrative than any deal that could be made with the EU”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1205368801438707713"}"></div></p>
<p>With the UK sending <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7851">45% of its exports</a> of goods and services to the EU in 2018 as opposed to 19% to the US, this would represent quite a change in trade policy. For such a change to occur, a “clean break Brexit” is necessary where regulatory alignment with the EU ends so <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-election-trump/trump-wades-again-into-uk-politics-tells-johnson-farage-to-unite-idUKKBN1XD0H8">that trade policy could come into line</a> with US food and manufacturing standards. This is the line that Nigel Farage and his Brexit Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49688420">advocate</a> to accelerate the transition to such a US trade deal. </p>
<p>The scale of Johnson’s victory, however, means that he can <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-kind-of-brexit-will-britain-now-get-done-after-boris-johnsons-thumping-election-win-128719">now choose the Brexit he wants</a>, unbeholden to the more extreme wing of his party represented by MPs from the European Research Group. Eager to hang on to the new coalition of working-class voters in the north and Midlands, Johnson may seek a Brexit deal with the EU that is less disruptive and damaging to existing trade policies than that advocated by Farage and Trump. Certainly, the extent to which any aspect of the health sector is opened up to the US market will be greatly scrutinised by the opposition and press. Under these circumstances, Trump may not get the deal he wants.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-drug-prices-rise-following-a-uk-us-trade-deal-126473">Will drug prices rise following a UK-US trade deal?</a>
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<h2>Questions of power</h2>
<p>After the UK leaves the EU, the US will also miss its main source of influence in Brussels. The US embassy in London is the largest in Europe because the UK is seen as the best way of persuading the EU to act in concert with Washington. It is through this link, for example, that the US has historically orchestrated common positions on sanctions policies and relations with Russia. With the UK out of the EU, the US will have less influence in Brussels and the UK will correspondingly be of less value to Washington. </p>
<p>Without the <a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-uk-the-european-union-and-nato-brexits-unintended-consequences(85296a63-045d-457f-aae3-100a58e78f5e).html?_ga=2.212951188.1483756723.1576490553-884168932.1575893537">dissenting and cautionary voice</a> of the UK in the EU, the block will also be free to pursue greater integration on defence and security and a more independent European voice in foreign and trade policies. The bridging role that London played in persuading the EU to take a common line with Washington on arms sales to China, or sanctions on Russia will not be easily replaced.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307119/original/file-20191216-123998-176y1dv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The UK will need to justify its permanent seat at the UN Security Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">lev radin/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The role that the UK formerly played within Europe as a voice for liberal internationalism has now also been replaced with a government that is seen as a role model for populist nationalism in Europe. Rather than fulfilling a unifying role, post-Brexit Britain will add to the divisions within the west.</p>
<p>The UK’s ability to maintain its place as a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council will also be questioned once it leaves the EU. Having justified this position for the last 20 years because it represents, along with fellow permanent member France, 500 million Europeans, it will now be difficult to argue that its seat should be maintained to speak for Britain alone. </p>
<p>Trump can probably expect a more obsequious disposition from the UK towards the US as it pursues a new trading relationship with Washington. But future US administrations may come to regret the consequences of this election result and the Brexit that follows on their influence in Europe and the unity of the west in general.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What Boris Johnson’s victory means for US-UK relations.David Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1290992019-12-19T09:59:26Z2019-12-19T09:59:26ZElection coverage: thanks to Brexit, Labour had a media mountain to climb<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307769/original/file-20191218-11951-5etc3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=145%2C137%2C5239%2C3533&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As usual, the UK media landscape offered partisan coverage of the 2019 election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Facundo Arrizabalaga</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>You don’t have to deny the growing political significance of social media to accept that the mainstream media continue to play a vital role in informing and priming public opinion during elections. Moreover, both worlds are <a href="https://www.andrewchadwick.com/hybrid-media-system">deeply connected</a>. Fewer people are buying newspapers but plenty are accessing the same content online.</p>
<p>Broadcast and newspaper content is recirculated constantly via <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/12/uk-news-push-alerts-negative-labour-positive-tories">social media platforms</a> and TV news remains the <a href="https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/157914/uk-news-consumption-2019-report.pdf">principal source of political information</a> for most UK adults. </p>
<p>Crucially, it is professional journalists who, through their privileged access, provide the news and insight about political elites that provide so much of the basis for social media commentary (and complaint).</p>
<p>Loughborough University has been conducting a news audit of the 2019 general election throughout the campaign and our <a href="https://www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/general-election/report-5/">final report</a> has just been published. Our analysis focused on election coverage in weekday TV evening news and the national paid-for press. It provides an empirical basis for testing some of the claims and counterclaims made about the media’s performance during this vital political period.</p>
<h2>A Brexit election?</h2>
<p>One of these is the assumption that Brexit would <a href="https://pressgazette.co.uk/ofcom-backs-sky-news-brexit-election-strapline-in-campaign-coverage-after-labour-complaint/">dominate the media campaign</a>. This had <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-has-had-more-news-coverage-in-the-uk-election-than-labours-core-agenda-new-data-128486">major party political implications</a>, as the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats, sought to bring the issue to centre stage and Labour aimed to shift the agenda onto other matters – in particular, healthcare provision.</p>
<p>Our research shows that the 2019 media election was initially about Brexit, then it wasn’t about Brexit, and then it was again. Figure 1, below, compares the weekly trajectory of the issue in comparison to the other dominant issues in the media agenda. Brexit was the most dominant theme at the start and end of the campaign but in the intervening periods its prominence lessened, to the point that in week four it fell behind the two other substantive policy themes of the campaign: “health/healthcare” and “business/economy/trade”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307736/original/file-20191218-11900-151krsy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brexit dominated the election media agenda in all but week four.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This dramatic decline in the penultimate week needs some interpretation. Brexit haunted the hustings throughout the election – but by that stage it had started to become part of the background context of the campaign rather than its focal point. This seems to have been noted by the prime minister, Boris Johnson, who voiced <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10469823/boris-johnson-warns-jeremy-corbyn-bow-enemies/">his concerns</a> at the time that “people have slightly lost their focus on the political crisis that we face … And I think maybe we need to bring that back”.</p>
<p>His mantra-like reiteration of the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/get-brexit-done-boris-johnsons-effective-but-misleading-slogan-in-the-uk-election/2019/12/12/ec926baa-1c62-11ea-977a-15a6710ed6da_story.html">Get Brexit Done</a>” soundbite in the final days of the campaign undoubtedly fuelled the final rush of Brexit coverage. </p>
<p>But even when Brexit was reported, there was a lack of fiscal analysis as to what implementation might mean. This contrasted with the detailed appraisals frequently applied to other manifesto commitments. For example, the Institute for Fiscal Studies <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-why-the-bbcs-approach-to-the-ifs-is-a-threat-to-its-impartiality-128032">gained considerable media exposure</a> on the basis of its analyses of parties’ spending pledges and projections. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-why-the-bbcs-approach-to-the-ifs-is-a-threat-to-its-impartiality-128032">UK election 2019: why the BBC's approach to the IFS is a threat to its impartiality</a>
</strong>
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<p>Our research shows that 53% of these appearances linked to taxation related coverage and 46% to business and economy coverage. Only 8% connected to Brexit. (NB these percentages are separate and do not add up to 100).</p>
<h2>Partisan press</h2>
<p>We also monitored the scale of press partisanship in the campaign. That the national press in the UK is habitually pro-Conservative is news to nobody – but it is the scale of this partisanship rather than the fact of it that requires analysis. </p>
<p>In the immediate post-mortems after Labour’s substantial defeat, some <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/general-election-2019-1980s-labour-blames-media-failure-1341795">commentators have argued</a> that the party should not seek to attribute its failure – even partly – to the hostility of the national press. Anti-Labour newspaper editorialising is just part of the electoral landscape that the party needs to work around or push through. </p>
<p>Our research is solely focused on content and offers no basis for drawing conclusions about cause and effect. That said, our analysis challenges the view that 2019 was “business as usual” in partisanship terms. Figure 2 shows the week-by-week totals and demonstrates how substantial the negative coverage of Labour was throughout the formal campaign and how it intensified. It is important to appreciate that this count was not entirely comprised of overt editorialising. It also included more factual news coverage that reported upon issues that had obviously negative implications for a party.
</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307739/original/file-20191218-11951-1ictzq6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Every newspaper election item was rated as to whether it had positive or negative implications for each party, although many items either had mixed or no implications for individual parties. We then subtracted the total number of negative from positive stories to gain a positive or negative score for each party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Figure 3 compares the aggregate trends found in 2019 with those we identified, using identical measures, in the 2017 general election. The results show that newspapers’ editorial negativity towards Labour in 2019 more than doubled from 2017. In contrast, overall press negativity towards the Conservatives reduced by more than half. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307742/original/file-20191218-11929-1d8vgjv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">To standardise the measures, we divided the number of positive minus negative items by the total number of newspaper items in each campaign. This produced a decimal number between -1 and +1, where -1 = complete negativity, +1= complete positivity and 0 = complete balance of negativity/positivity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We must rightly be cautious about overly media-centric explanations for political outcomes, but this is not the same as saying the media’s role was insignificant. In 2019, the Conservatives ultimately wrested control of the issue agenda in TV and press coverage and secured a far more emphatic newspaper endorsement than during the previous campaign. These factors cannot have helped Labour’s cause.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Deacon has received funding from The Economic and Social Research Council, the Leverhulme Foundation, the British Academy, the BBC and the Electoral Commission</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic Wring has previously received funding from the Leverhulme Foundation, the British Academy, Guardian, the BBC and the Electoral Commission</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It wasn’t the ‘Sun wot won it’, but the partisanship of the UK press made the Conservatives’ task a great deal easier.David Deacon, Professor of Communication and Media Analysis, Loughborough UniversityDavid Smith, Lecturer in Media and Communication, University of LeicesterDominic Wring, Professor of Political Communication, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1289562019-12-18T16:35:18Z2019-12-18T16:35:18ZBoris Johnson is planning radical changes to the UK constitution – here are the ones you need to know about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307723/original/file-20191218-11904-85x9a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's not just Brexit that he's eyeing up. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With a very large majority in parliament, Boris Johnson is planning radical changes to the <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">UK constitution</a>. His party claims that far reaching reforms are needed because of a “<a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">destabilising and potentially extremely damaging rift between politicians and the people</a>” under the last parliament. The issue at the centre of this “damaging rift”, however, is whether the proposals for constitutional change are a democratic necessity or a cynical attempt by the Conservative government to bolster its power. </p>
<p>These are the most important changes the Conservative government is proposing.</p>
<h2>The future of the union</h2>
<p>The most seismic constitutional challenge for the prime minister is the future of the union of nations that make up the UK. He claims he wants to strengthen the union, but Brexit raises questions about <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/how-can-boris-johnson-keep-the-uk-together/">Northern Ireland</a> and the Scottish nationalism movement has been energised by the 2019 election results.</p>
<p>The Conservatives have been clear about their <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/michael-gove-second-referendum-scottish-independence-indyref2-election-results-a9247446.html">opposition</a> to holding a second independence referendum in Scotland. And legally speaking, it is for Westminster to <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/contents">make decisions</a> – not Holyrood. However, politically speaking, it’s difficult to envisage the UK government being able to arbitrarily force a country to stay in the UK against its will. </p>
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<p>It is likely that Johnson will try to meet this challenge by <a href="https://research.bangor.ac.uk/portal/files/22330245/issue_2_2018_clear_brexit_and_devolution_new_frontiers_for_the_uk_union.pdf">devolving more powers to the regions</a> and offering them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/feb/18/unbalanced-britain-more-devolution-manage-brexit">more money</a>. </p>
<h2>Cutting 50 MPs from parliament</h2>
<p>The Conservative government has <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">detailed plans</a> for changing the way the UK elects its members of parliament, starting with redrawing constituency boundaries to reduce the number of MPs from 650 to 600. The changes were first proposed in 2016 by the independent Boundary Commission. </p>
<p>But it has been noted that moving boundaries could have a greater negative impact on Labour and the Scottish National Party than the Conservatives – which perhaps tells us why the plan features so highly on Johnson’s agenda. It could also mean that <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-boundary-commissions-boundary-review-2018">smaller regions</a>, such as Wales, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45468142">lose disproportionately more MPs than other parts of the UK</a>. </p>
<h2>Holding elections when he wants</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/contents/enacted/data.htm">Fixed-Term Parliaments Act</a> is on the chopping block, too. This act stipulates that general elections must be <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06111#fullreport">called every five years</a>, with early elections held only in exceptional circumstances.</p>
<p>The Conservatives say the act is being used as a tool by opposition parties for “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/election-2019-50537161/boris-johnson-despairs-dither-and-delay-of-parliament">delay and dither</a>”, and has led to “<a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf">paralysis</a>”.</p>
<p>But there is also concern that repealing the act hands the prime minister discretion to decide when to call an election – and, in the most extreme interpretation, could mean that <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2019/12/15/boris-johnson-to-reveal-plan-to-keep-tories-in-power-for-another-decade-11909017/">this government’s term lasts a decade</a>. The question therefore becomes what constitutional safeguards would be put in place to replace this law and counterbalance against the arbitrary power of government? We don’t currently have an answer to that. </p>
<h2>‘Rebalancing’ human rights</h2>
<p>The Conservatives have long talked of repealing the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents">Human Rights Act</a> and replacing it with a “<a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7193">British” bill of rights</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-human-rights-act-is-at-risk-of-repeal-heres-why-it-should-be-protected-111368">UK Human Rights Act is at risk of repeal – here's why it should be protected</a>
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<p>Their debates have centred around the belief that the UK needs to revisit the balance between <a href="https://eachother.org.uk/proportionality-margin-appreciation-human-rights-plain-english/">individuals’ rights</a> – such as freedom of expression – and the wider public interest. That doesn’t mean the Conservatives want to curtail all rights to free speech but that they want greater powers to manage cases in which people use a free speech argument to justify hate speech. The basis of their argument seems to be that if human rights are universal to all then we may have now gone too far – as they also apply to “bad people”. </p>
<p>However, such arguments are flawed. <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/data.pdf">Human rights legislation</a> already recognises that rights are not absolute, and can be <a href="https://eachother.org.uk/proportionality-margin-appreciation-human-rights-plain-english/">proportionally</a> limited as necessary in a democratic society. Instead these proposals seem to be more about giving the government increased arbitary power to deport individuals they deem to be a risk, such as terrorist suspects, rather than having to fight protracted human rights litigation in court.</p>
<p>What’s more, the Conservatives’ actual commitment to retaining the right <a href="https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/article-10-free-expression">free speech</a> can be seen via their proposals to repeal section 40 of the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/section/40">Crime and Courts Act.</a>. This is the law that was introduced following the <a href="https://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/">Leveson Inquiry</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24894403">phone-hacking scandals</a>, which forced publishers not signed up to an approved regulator to pay all legal costs linked to libel claims, even if the claims were ultimately thrown out. The concern is that if publishers are carrying these financial risks, it restricts the freedom of the press and legitimate investigative journalism. </p>
<h2>‘Updating’ justice</h2>
<p>The UK is also about to see its justice system “[updated]” – including judicial review, the process through which people can challenge decisions made by public bodies. This process was famously used in two high-profile <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf">Brexit cases</a> in which the Supreme Court ruled against the government. </p>
<p>Some therefore question whether the prime minister’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/60f97382-1b4e-11ea-97df-cc63de1d73f4">displeasure</a> with these rulings is the real motivation for “updating” the justice system. The Conservative manifesto says the idea is to ensure the process is not being abused “to conduct politics by another means”.</p>
<p>There is a legitimate case for “updating” justice – not least because there has been a rise in the number of people wanting to challenge the state <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/judicial-college/ETBB_LiP+_finalised_.pdf">without being able to pay for legal advice</a>. But judicial review has already been <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reform-of-judicial-review">subject to significant reforms</a> in recent years. The concern is that this may be an attempt by the Conservatives to muddy the waters by reformulating the rules following the tumultuous time the government has had in the courts. </p>
<h2>Parliament or government?</h2>
<p>A constitution, democracy and rights commission is to be set up within a year, which appears to be aimed at reviewing the UK constitution through the guise of addressing trust in politics. </p>
<p>It’s likely that the commission will focus on the relationship between parliament and government. It will, in particular, review of the mechanisms available to parliament to hold the government to account and look at what the government can and can’t do <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/crown-prerogative/">without parliamentary approval</a>. These powers currently include decisions to deploy the armed forces, make or unmake international treaties, and to grant honours. </p>
<p>The courts can review the limits of these “prerogative powers”, and can prevent the government from trying to create new ones. This was a key part of the Brexit case taken to the Supreme Court by campaigner Gina Miller when she argued that the government could not trigger Article 50 to begin the Brexit process in 2016 <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf">without getting parliament’s approval.</a>. </p>
<p>The Conservatives have also hinted at wanting to reform the House of Lords, though it’s not clear how at this stage. It is likely that the new government will want to explicitly <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry1/">reaffirm the supremacy of the Commons over the Lords</a> in a new act of parliament, and possibly even revisit the Lords’ “powers of delay” – something <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/of-course-lords-needs-reforming">Theresa May threatened</a> during her prime ministership when the Lords refused to pass her Brexit legislation <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/lords/lrds-royal-assent/">straight away</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Clear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A large majority gives the prime minister freedom to dramatically alter the machinary of the nation.Stephen Clear, Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, and Public Procurement, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1290972019-12-18T15:56:25Z2019-12-18T15:56:25ZDominic Cummings wants to add more political appointees to the civil service – here’s why that’s a problem<p>Civil servants in Whitehall are worried. One of the first items on the agenda of the new conservative government is reforming the civil service. There are plans to restructure some government departments, close others and <a href="https://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/news/civil-service-hiring-and-firing-rules-set-review-cummings-and-johnson-plot-whitehall">move functions around</a>.</p>
<p>But it doesn’t stop with structural change. The prime minister’s chief policy adviser Dominic Cummings has long envisaged major reforms for the civil service. According to Cummings, Whitehall is staffed by “<a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2014/10/30/the-hollow-men-ii-some-reflections-on-westminster-and-whitehall-dysfunction/">hollow men</a>” who are plagued with group think and, he believes, would rather play it safe than get things done. To address this dire situation, Cummings has put forward a range of solutions including changing the way <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/14/boris-johnson-plans-radical-overhaul-civil-service-guarantee/">senior civil servants are appointed</a>.</p>
<p>One idea that Cummings is particularly fond of is making greater use of politically appointed experts to staff top jobs in the civil service. This is hardly new, of course. Until the middle of the 19th century, the UK civil service was largely staffed by political appointees. In 1854, a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1954.tb01719.x">report</a> by Stanford Northcote and C. E. Trevelyan, two senior civil servants, pointed out that this method of staffing the civil service led to a system run by “the unambitious, the indolent or the incapable”. </p>
<p>The report therefore recommended civil servants be appointed on merit by an independent body rather than on the basis of their political patronage. These reforms created the basis for the independent civil service which largely persists up to today.</p>
<p>However, political appointees began to reappear <a href="https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/thereturnofpoliticalpatronage.pdf">during the 1960s</a>. The first special advisers of the modern era were appointed by Harold Wilson, who brought in two highly respected economists. Their role was to conduct the government’s battles with a largely conservative civil service.</p>
<p>In 1974, Wilson increased the number of special advisers from a handful to 30. During the years of Conservative government that followed, the number of special advisers stayed fairly static, but they became younger. They were often appointed less for their expertise and more for their political commitments. When Tony Blair’s Labour government came to power in 1997, the number of special advisers almost doubled from 38 to 72. They not only increased in power but also in influence. This trend only continued. By 2015, David Cameron had 95. The latest figures available from December 2018 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/special-adviser-data-releases-numbers-and-costs-december-2018">identify 99 special advisers</a>.</p>
<p>This may not sound like a lot when compared to the 400,000 plus civil servants. However, special advisers often have significant power and influence. They often oversee and manage the activities of civil servants, acting as liaison between them and politicians, helping shape the agenda within the civil service.</p>
<h2>Learning the ropes</h2>
<p>If Cummings gets his way, the number and influence of these political appointees is likely to grow significantly. While his lengthy blog posts make the case for drawing in outside expertise, there is evidence that being too reliant on politically appointed advisers can be dangerous. Much of this comes from the United States, which operates on a patronage system. Each incoming administration can make around 4,000 political appointments in the <a href="https://presidentialtransition.org/workstream/appointments/">federal government agencies</a>.</p>
<p>Champions of political appointees claim they are likely to be more skilled and therefore more able to get the job done. This is only partly true. A study of the US federal government programmes found that political appointees did indeed tend to have higher levels of education and <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x">more varied experience than career bureaucrats</a>. But federal programmes run by political appointees were systematically rated as less effective than those run by career civil servants.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307716/original/file-20191218-11904-1fg3b83.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">It takes time to find your way around in Whitehall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>This is, in part, because it takes a long time for a political appointee to learn the ropes in a public sector organisation. Newcomers to the civil service can bring a fresh perspective, but they also lack the detailed knowledge of the process of implementing their ideas. It can often take years to learn this, by which time political appointees have often grown frustrated and moved on. </p>
<p>During the Reagan administration, political appointees only had a tenure of around <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/009539979002200106?casa_token=sXEMQzwuzLEAAAAA:_RYU0Td5C9C8U1vv9r9X3FcoG25LeJkh5PGxJiz9tLwU7r54azGwSTXW1zjCDCP2y_252NZ-32g">1.7 years</a>. Such rapid turnover is fairly common under most US presidents. Political appointees appear to spend <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/976068?casa_token=aHIIj21WepUAAAAA:2atB101mvEanhmDSbWNwy0rD2iyeuVF15v77mqm7RmmAgryidhAgDxZhNgqh3_hTscX7S-6E0vvNKOlBRG6Ih8_6Anq_6JvWAkn1QVzCn2VNoRpGXQ&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">more time learning the ropes than doing the job</a>.</p>
<p>Another side effect of rapid turnover is that key leadership roles can remain vacant for some time. One study of the US federal government found that politically appointed roles were empty about <a href="https://weblaw.usc.edu/assets/docs/contribute/oconnellforwebsite.pdf">one-quarter of the time</a>. This meant departments were often rendered ineffective as they waited for new leadership.</p>
<h2>Turkey farms</h2>
<p>Political appointees often struggle to achieve much because their beliefs and leadership style are often quite different to careerists in the civil service they have to work with. Rather than generating creative tension, these differences often lead to <a href="https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1395">corrosive conflict</a> between political appointees and career civil servants. Such conflict reduces the effectiveness of the departments which they run.</p>
<p>There is also a significant danger that political appointees only pay attention to a selective set of signals. Because of the route through which they get their job, political appointees tend to focus on issues which their political masters care about.</p>
<p>One final damaging consequence of increasing the numbers of political appointees is that some parts of the civil service can become what US government insiders call “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/jpart/article-abstract/27/2/217/2649135">turkey farms</a>”. These are the government departments that house loyal supporters of a ruling party who aren’t much use.</p>
<p>These “turkeys” end up in the parts of government where they can do the least harm. However, as a department gets crowded with turkeys, it becomes increasingly ineffective and bungling. And since no government department is entirely without use, the turkeys can end up causing real damage. </p>
<p>This is what happened to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/976446.pdf?casa_token=dWulA7CrJqcAAAAA:tTHF0R5dwR5lf5f9A5CQ7XQKh765vBiqgGmMSPmBVpQRQr1wAALMnBRjNazCyVaKXNzyssBC2BzXyMBVX-sQ-TXYEY-KUe7iCem8IMQvn4pjIoi-rw">Federal Emergency Management Agency</a>. For decades, the organisation was seen as a turkey farm with incompetent leadership. And, when faced with large-scale emergencies such as hurricanes, FEMA has often responded in a bungling way. The consequences were made all too plain during the hopeless response when <a href="https://psmag.com/news/close-the-turkey-farm-4039">Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005</a>.</p>
<p>However, this is not to say appointed advisers have no place at all in government. Giles Wilkes, a former special adviser in Whitehall, makes a <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/InsideOut%20SPAD%20The%20Unelected%20Lynchpin_0.pdf">compelling case</a> for using them to manage the day-to-day bargaining process involved in making a government. A survey of special advisers in the UK government also found that they spent the majority of their time acting as political “fixers”, some of their time designing policy and spending much <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66025/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Page,%20Edward_New%20life%20at%20the%20top_Page_New_life_at_the_top.pdf">less time on policy delivery</a>.</p>
<p>By acting as a liaison between politicians and the bureaucracy, appointed officials can – in the best cases – smooth the way in the implementation of new policies. But the evidence from the US seems to suggest that political appointees are often much less useful at getting things done in government in a way which sticks in the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andre Spicer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the US, some federal departments become known as ‘turkey farms’ – stuffed with loyal but ultimately useless political appointees.Andre Spicer, Professor of Organisational Behaviour, Cass Business School, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1289612019-12-17T13:31:31Z2019-12-17T13:31:31ZDitch the people or policy? What historic trends suggest Labour needs to do next<p>After a crushing defeat in the general election, Labour will now embark on a post-mortem investigation of what went wrong. The immediate response by the party leadership, once the scale of the defeat was known, was to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50794076">attribute the result to Brexit.</a></p>
<p>The party’s message on the issue was muddled by trying to straddle the divide between Leavers and Remainers. This approach failed in the European elections in May and has now spectacularly failed again in the general election. The voters wanted Brexit done, and this meant working class Leavers and many Remainers voted Conservative, in order to bring an end to the turmoil.</p>
<p>Since that initial response, the Labour leadership has accepted that it also bears responsibility for the result. Both leader Jeremy Corbyn and shadow chancellor John McDonnell have announced that they will be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50766114">stepping down</a> from leadership positions.</p>
<p>But both also continue to argue that the party’s positions on issues such as nationalisation, taxation and public spending was basically sound, even if it didn’t reach traditional Labour voters in the “red wall” of constituencies across the north of England. The implication of this is that fresh faces are needed to sell the left-wing agenda but the policies do not need to radically change.</p>
<p>Historical trends suggest otherwise. If you chart the relationship between the percentage of seats in the House of Commons won by the Conservative Party and the policy positions taken by the Labour party on the left-right dimension in British politics in every post-war general election, you can see that the further left Labour goes, the greater the Conservative victory.</p>
<p>It has been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/labour-in-brighton-its-not-a-cult-its-too-big-for-that-now-84802">common argument</a> that Labour needs to move towards “the middle ground of politics”, to win again. There is even a formal theory known as the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cFt0k6n_HKc">“median voter theorem”</a>, popularised by the economist Anthony Downs which shows why this is necessary. The median voter is the person who has as many voters on their left as on their right on the left-right scale of political views. A key problem with this idea is identifying exactly what the middle ground of politics means in policy terms.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/">party manifesto project</a> provides an answer to this question. This is a long-running collaborative research project with political scientists in many countries measuring the policy commitments made by political parties in their election manifestos. It systematically codes a whole range of policies using a technique known as content analysis to create numerical scales. These measure how left wing or right wing political parties are in different elections across the <a href="https://www.tutor2u.net/psychology/reference/research-methods-content-analysis%20">world’s democracies</a>.</p>
<p>The chart below shows how left wing or right wing Labour’s manifestos have been in every election since 1945, with a low score indicating that the manifesto was very left wing and a high score indicating the opposite. It can be seen that the most left-wing manifesto was in the February general election of 1974 and the most right-wing one in 1997 when Labour won a landslide victory. Note that there were two general elections in 1974, one in February and the other in October.</p>
<p>There is a clear pattern. Labour swings to the left after an election defeat, which, in turn, produces a surge in support for the Conservatives. This happened after the defeat of the post-war Labour government in 1951, and again rather dramatically after Harold Wilson’s government was defeated by Ted Heath in 1970. The pattern also re-occurred after Margaret Thatcher won the 1979 election and Labour produced “the longest suicide note in history” – as Labour MP Gerald Kaufmann branded the party’s 1983 election manifesto.</p>
<p>Finally, and most importantly, the sharp swing to the left since 2010 has produced a growing Conservative seat share in the House of Commons. We do not have manifesto data for the 2019 general election yet, but it is a safe bet that it is even more left-wing than the 2017 document.</p>
<p>The correlation between the Conservative seat share and the Labour manifesto scores is -0.57, which means as Labour moves to the left and the ideological score falls, the Conservatives win more seats. Another way of showing the same thing is the correlation between the percentage of seats won by Labour and the left-right scale which is +0.39 – Labour wins more seats when it moves to the centre.</p>
<p>The implication is clear. Replacing the faces on the Labour front bench to try to sell the same left-wing policy agenda is not going to bring electoral victory. A thorough review of policy is needed as part of the election post-mortem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke receives funding from National Science Foundation (US).</span></em></p>The leadership insists the manifesto was not the problem in 2019 – but are they sure?Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at DallasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288082019-12-17T13:06:11Z2019-12-17T13:06:11ZWhat would the British parliament look like under proportional representation?<p>Perhaps the only thing on which Nigel Farage agrees with the Liberal Democrats and Green Party is the need for <a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/nick-ferrari/nigel-farage-tells-nick-ferrari-plans-post-brexit/">electoral reform</a> in British politics. </p>
<p>More and more politicians in the UK are pitching for a move to proportional representation (PR), an electoral system in which the overall vote share a party wins determines the number of seats in the legislature. This includes some <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-party-proportional-representation-corbyn-leader-polls-a9249196.html">within the Labour party</a> but not leaders in the Conservative Party, which is doing very well under the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, in which MPs are elected with a majority in local constituencies. </p>
<p>But how would the UK’s December 12 election have turned out under PR? My research has shown how <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269407976_It's_Just_Nice_to_Know_There's_Someone_Close_at_Hand_Representational_Distance_and_Satisfaction_with_Democracy_in_Europe">different electoral systems</a> create distance between the policies preferred by voters and those enacted by political parties that breeds dissatisfaction with democracy. I’ve now analysed the British election result to look at how it might have turned out differently under alternative voting systems. </p>
<p>Any exercise to model an alternative election outcome comes with the major caveat that we don’t know how a different electoral system would affect voting behaviour, especially in the long term. There are also plenty of different flavours of PR. Some, such as the single transferable vote system in Ireland and in local elections in Northern Ireland and Scotland, we can’t model because they would require too much information we don’t have about the different preferences of voters. </p>
<p>I focus here on two PR systems that contain some provisions that would address concerns in the UK about voting for candidates and not just parties: the Dutch and the German electoral system. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-you-are-disappointed-with-the-election-result-there-are-things-you-can-do-to-help-you-move-on-128883">If you are disappointed with the election result, there are things you can do to help you move on</a>
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<h2>Dutch versus German system</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190258658-e-44">Dutch system</a> is the most proportional because all voters choose from a single national list of candidates, rather than selecting representatives for their local district. Voters pick a party and then their chosen MP from that party. This allows voters to either vote for local candidates or nationally popular figures. Any candidate that receives a certain percentage of the vote wins a seat in the parliament.</p>
<p>In contrast, the German mixed-member system <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190258658-e-37">allocates half of the seats</a> to constituency candidates under FPTP, and the other half to regional lists of candidates.</p>
<p>To model what would have happened in the UK under each of these electoral systems, let’s assume that the number of seats remains as it is at 650. In the Dutch case, this would mean that a vote share of 0.154% translates into a seat, 15.4% into 10 seats, and so on. </p>
<p>Under the German system, we would need to redraw constituency boundaries to create 325 seats that would still be allocated under FPTP, and create another 325 seats elected from regional lists. A party gets its vote share from these lists translated into seats if it receives at least 5% of the votes, or if it wins three constituencies.</p>
<p>In the real German system, citizens have two votes, one for the constituency contest and one for the list vote. Here, we have to work out the results of both contests from the one vote people cast. My calculations are based on halving the number of seats each party won to give the constituency results, and using their final vote shares to give the list results.</p>
<p>The basic translation of the election result is presented in the graph below. The Conservatives would not have won an outright majority under either PR system, although they would have won more than 300 seats under the German mixed-member system. The Liberal Democrats do better and the Scottish National Party (SNP) worse under both systems. The Brexit Party and the Greens would only benefit under the Dutch system because both fail to reach the German electoral threshold of 5%.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">UK 2019 seat distribution, by electoral system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinz Brandenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>There are some things that cannot be factored in. For example, as the Dutch system doesn’t use electoral districts, all parties are electable everywhere in the country. That means that English voters could vote for the SNP or Irish voters in Britain could vote for Irish nationalist parties. But also, Northern Irish voters could choose whether to stick with their traditional parties or instead get involved more directly in selecting the UK government by voting for one of the mainstream British parties. </p>
<h2>Searching for a stable majority</h2>
<p>The problem with such a simple comparison of seat allocations under different electoral rules is that it ignores even the most obvious flaw: under PR there are either no or very different needs for tactical voting. </p>
<p>Almost all the poll movement throughout the 2019 election campaign was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49798197">from smaller to larger parties</a>, from the Brexit Party to the Conservatives, from Liberal Democrats to Labour. This represents voters responding to a squeeze that was being applied by the electoral system.</p>
<p>Under a proportional system, there would have been no incentive for the Brexit Party to field a smaller number of candidates, or for Liberal Democrat or Green voters to contemplate lending their votes to Labour. The election result under PR may have looked much more like the polls a month before the election than like the result on December 12.</p>
<p>With this in mind, the second graph shows how the size and composition of different possible coalitions under the highly proportional Dutch system would have changed from the actual result to a more realistic vote share distribution taken from poll averages in early November. I calculated the averages from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2019/dec/11/election-opinion-polls-uk-2019-latest-poll-tracker-tories-labour">all polls published</a> between October 30 when parliament voted for an early election to November 8, a couple of days after its dissolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Possible coalitions in the UK parliament under Dutch-style PR list.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinz Brandenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>A Labour/LibDem/SNP/Green coalition would have been slightly weaker before tactical voting took effect – with 324 seats – than it would have been based on the final result at 330. However, such a coalition would have been very difficult to hold together because, while unified on their position on a second EU referendum, the parties would have been at odds over Scottish independence as well as social, economic and fiscal issues. The only solid majority under either scenario would therefore have been an unlikely comeback of the 2010 coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-labour-lose-in-the-north-of-england-128940">Why did Labour lose in the north of England?</a>
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<p>The German system would have produced similarly unstable outcomes, but there would have even been an outside chance of a majority for the two pro-Brexit parties if the Greens had come close but failed to reach a 5% electoral threshold.</p>
<p>No PR system would have been likely to produce a workable majority for any sustainable coalition, but that is a reflection of the highly fragmented multi-party political system in the UK. And with such high levels of fragmentation, some PR systems would not even robustly reflect the fact that the two pro-Brexit parties combined did not win 50% of the vote share.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128808/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heinz Brandenburg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A chorus of politicians are once again calling for electoral reform after the UK’s 2019 election.Heinz Brandenburg, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288892019-12-16T15:38:35Z2019-12-16T15:38:35ZBoris Johnson’s landslide gives UK economy a Brexit certainty boost – but it’s not out of the woods yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307120/original/file-20191216-124009-wdss0z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On the mend?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/male-model-red-overalls-fixes-pile-315655658">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Now that the dust has settled, the real business of “getting Brexit done” and running the country begins for Boris Johnson. When it comes to the economy, the data is clear: it’s flatlining. Quarterly figures are at their <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpmonthlyestimateuk/october2019">weakest since 2009</a>; there has been modest growth for services but the manufacturing and construction sectors have contracted. The UK’s trade deficit with the rest of the world has <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpmonthlyestimateuk/october2019">also widened</a>. </p>
<p>Much of this is the result of <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-report/2019/november-2019/in-focus-uncertainty-and-brexit">Brexit uncertainty</a>. While Johnson brings a modicum of certainty about the UK’s direction of travel – out of the EU – its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2018.1484718">future beyond 2020 remains uncertain</a>. Securing a trade deal with the EU is of utmost importance. But so too is dealing with the country’s underlying economic problems, which have been exacerbated by the recent uncertainty.</p>
<p>The postponing of the November budget has meant a lack of a detailed assessment of the state of government finances, although there have been some <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance">recent indicators of a weakening here</a>. More broadly, the election took place against the background of an economy that has seen <a href="http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit08_book.pdf#page=40">weak investment</a> and stagnating <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/cepeap/049.html">productivity and wages</a>. Employment remains high; real wages have been growing but for median workers they are still <a href="https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2019/11/Earnings-Outlook-Q2-2019.pdf">below 2007 levels</a>. </p>
<p>Currency and stock markets <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2019/dec/13/markets-surge-pound-ftse-conservative-election-triumph-trump-us-china-trade-deal-business-live">reacted very positively</a> to the election result. The new government clearly hopes that implementing a Brexit deal will encourage investment, which has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-no-deal-brexit-could-put-nearly-20-of-british-jobs-at-risk-and-disproportionately-hurt-weaker-regions-112908">held back by uncertainty over Brexit</a>. </p>
<p>Higher investment is necessary for sustainable <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uk-has-its-economic-focus-all-wrong-why-investment-led-growth-is-needed-75757">longer-term growth</a>; since the Brexit vote, growth in the UK has been <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14420">largely driven by consumer spending</a>, with household savings falling to historic lows and personal debt rising. There are limits to the sustainability of this, as household debt levels <a href="https://theconversation.com/ending-austerity-stop-the-uks-dependence-on-private-debt-103395">have now reached worrying levels</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307122/original/file-20191216-124022-7g0n22.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The pound rallied against the US dollar following the Conservative landslide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=GBP&to=USD&view=1M">xe.com</a></span>
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<p>Recent Bank of England <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-report/2019/november-2019/in-focus-uncertainty-and-brexit">estimates</a> indicate that while resolving Brexit uncertainty could improve prospects for investment, much will still depend on the final nature of Britain’s trade agreement with the EU. It is the most productive firms, which tend to be exporters, that have been most affected by this uncertainty. <a href="https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NIESR%20Election%20Briefing%20-%20The%20Economic%20and%20Fiscal%20Impact%20of%20Brexit%20-%20FINAL.pdf">Research suggests</a> that Johnson’s apparent preference for a free trade agreement – “super Canada plus” – would weaken longer-term performance and public finances. </p>
<p>Any such agreement is likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/lets-be-clear-about-what-get-brexit-done-really-means-128347">complex and time consuming to negotiate</a>. Past experience indicates that <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-canada-trade-model-and-could-it-work-for-a-post-brexit-uk-58098">it will take years, not months</a>. Nor is it plausible that negotiating trade agreements with other countries <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-50719616">would offset lower trade with the EU</a>. So the threat of a disorderly no-deal Brexit at the end of 2020 has not gone away. </p>
<p>A softer Brexit, such as a customs union arrangement with the EU, would soften this blow. A clear path to Brexit should lower uncertainty, but it may be optimistic to expect a major improvement in business and consumer confidence in the short term.</p>
<h2>Shaky global economy</h2>
<p>The global economic background remains weak. Global growth <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-global-downturn-looks-likely-yet-its-being-totally-ignored-in-the-uk-election-128258">has been slowing</a>, with weakening performance in the eurozone and the US, Britain’s two major export markets. German manufacturing <a href="https://theconversation.com/eight-charts-that-explain-why-germany-could-be-heading-for-recession-123284">is stuttering</a>. Tensions in the global economy, particularly from the trade disputes <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-trade-wars-global-ramifications-explained-95300">driven by the Trump administration</a> in the US, pose major downside risks to the growth of global markets. The global trade framework is fraying – not necessarily the best circumstances to attempt to negotiate new trade deals.</p>
<p>The Conservative manifesto was light on policy. It only made modest spending commitments, although these may expand in power, and also committed the new administration to not raising income tax, VAT or National Insurance rates – indeed, they have promised to raise the thresholds for paying National Insurance. The Institute for Fiscal Studies thinktank <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/Manifesto-analysis-Public-finances-general%20election-2019_V2.pdf">estimates</a> these plans would lead to a small reduction in government borrowing as a proportion of national income over the lifetime of the new parliament. But, critically, this is dependent on achieving a negotiated Brexit. A no-deal Brexit would lead to economic disruption that would lead to a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2018.1484718">significant rise in government debt</a>.</p>
<p>A key decision for the new government is finding a replacement for Mark Carney as governor of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-bank-of-england-will-struggle-to-stop-the-economic-fallout-of-a-hard-brexit-and-could-even-make-it-worse-124022">Bank of England</a>. He is stepping down on January 31, 2020, the same day the UK is due to leave the EU. The Bank of England has maintained low interest rates and has attempted to stabilise the UK economy over recent uncertain times. </p>
<p>Any upturn in economic prospects may lead to the Bank of England raising interest rates, as inflation is currently close to target (although the recovery in sterling’s exchange rate may dampen inflation by lowering import prices). More generally, Carney’s successor will take over at a crucial moment and is unlikely to have much of a honeymoon period.</p>
<p>Brexit uncertainty aggravated the UK economy’s earlier, underlying problems – low investment by historic and international standards, stagnant productivity and wages. Ending Brexit uncertainty may boost confidence, but it’s hard to say how long this will last. And against the background of a weak global economy the new government still faces major challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Perraton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Johnson brings a modicum of certainty about the UK’s direction of travel – out of the EU – its future beyond 2020 remains uncertain.Jonathan Perraton, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1289402019-12-16T13:05:52Z2019-12-16T13:05:52ZWhy did Labour lose in the north of England?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307132/original/file-20191216-124027-56yj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C54%2C5200%2C3506&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grimsby was one of Labour's big losses on the night. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Conservative strategy of targeting Leave-leaning Labour seats in the North of England has paid off. In the north-east, north-west and Yorkshire and Humber <a href="https://labourlist.org/2019/12/the-60-seats-labour-lost-in-the-2019-general-election/">26 seats</a> switched from Labour to Conservative.</p>
<p>Support for Brexit and the triumph of the Conservative’s dogged focus on their pledge to “get Brexit done” was evidently a key factor in their success in these types of seats in the north, particularly when contrasted with Labour’s commitment to a second referendum and Jeremy Corbyn’s difficultly in outlining his own position on Brexit. The Conservatives won swathes of long-held Labour seats where support for Leave was high in the 2016 EU referendum – places like <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000667">Don Valley</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000569">Bishop Auckland</a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000716">Great Grimsby</a>. They also ran Labour close in some of their safest seats like <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000542">Barnsley East</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000740">Hemsworth</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000982">Sunderland Central</a>. Yet the issue of Brexit alone does not account for the party’s dramatic losses.</p>
<h2>Towns and cities</h2>
<p>Labour’s woes in its traditional heartlands are the result of the broader ongoing <a href="https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/411956/1/Jennings_Stoker_PQ_FINAL.pdf">cosmopolitan-communitarian</a> realignment of party support. This has been bubbling under the surface in England for over a decade. We have seen that younger, more formally educated, liberal minded voters are significantly more likely to vote Labour (and Remain) while older, less formally educated, socially conservative voters are increasingly minded to vote Conservative (and Leave).</p>
<p>Given the demographic spread in England, cities, university seats and more affluent suburbs are arguably Labour’s most fertile areas now. Meanwhile post-industrial towns and former mining villages – many of which are in the north – have become trickier terrain for the party. The economically working class – largely the younger “precariat” – might be spread across the country, but the traditional working class (in terms of both economics and culture) remains centred in these areas of industrial heritage.</p>
<p>This political realignment has been having an impact on Labour’s vote share in its traditional heartlands for several decades. That was true even during the electoral success of the Tony Blair years. The party lost <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2012/10/22/labours-lost-votes">5 million votes</a> between 1997 and 2010. Undoubtedly though, this election was the first time these changes have been significantly reflected in the electoral map. Labour held seats liked <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000619">Canterbury</a> and gained <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000887">Putney</a> but lost in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000785">Leigh</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50779155">Rother Valley</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000915">Sedgefield</a> – Blair’s former constituency in the north-east of England. Brexit divides exacerbated this realignment, but a disconnect in values between Labour and its traditional supporters in working-class communities was central to the party’s failure in the north.</p>
<h2>Disconnect with Labour</h2>
<p>This disconnect in values was apparent in a number of ways. First, there was Corbyn’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f799e14e-0ae8-11ea-b2d6-9bf4d1957a67">personal unpopularity</a>. Polls suggest that he was the most <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/labour-party/jeremy-corbyn/news/106687/jeremy-corbyn-most-unpopular">unpopular opposition party leader</a> in modern times and this undoubtedly hurt Labour. While Boris Johnson’s own popularity ratings were poor as well, Corbyn failed spectacularly in connecting with voters.</p>
<p>Most significant though is the sense that the Labour Party more broadly no longer represents the values of voters in its heartland seats. This is particularly so when it comes to cultural values. On issues such as immigration and law and order Labour appeared to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/06/difficult-truth-labour-social-conservatives">out of step</a> with much of its traditional voter base whose socially conservative views lead them to support tighter controls on immigration and harsher punishment for offenders.</p>
<p>In terms of economic values, evidence suggests that some of Labour’s economic policies such as nationalisation of key infrastructure and higher tax for the biggest earners were <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/12/labour-economic-policies-are-popular-so-why-arent-">popular</a>. However, when viewed as a whole package, Labour’s economic proposals may have worried voters more adverse to change. Additionally, there is a school of thought that argues the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.12639">“post-workerist”</a> ideas flirted with by the party, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/economics-of-a-four-day-working-week-research-shows-it-can-save-businesses-money-126701">a four day week</a>, do not chime with many working-class voters’ perceptions of labourism. It may be that Labour’s vision was too bold for many.</p>
<h2>The new normal?</h2>
<p>When it comes to the impact of all of this on future party politics in the north, if Labour is to stand a chance of regaining many of these seats it must somehow develop an identity and policy platform that can appeal to voters both in traditional heartlands seats in the north and elsewhere as well as to inner city voters and to those in its newer centres of power in more affluent suburbs. This will not be any <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lisa-nandy/lisa-nandy-ippr-speech_b_15216124.html">easy task</a>, especially when it comes to presenting cultural values that appeal to the bulk of voters in all of these different constituencies.</p>
<p>That said, if they wish to retain their gains in the north, the Conservatives must also take steps. Johnson must ensure that he delivers on his promises not just on Brexit but also on, as he puts it, “levelling up” funding and investment on services across the country but particularly in the north. How both of the main parties respond to this radical shake up of the electoral map over the course of the next parliament will determining whether it was a blip – merely voters “lending” their vote to the Conservative’s largely because of Brexit – or whether it is the new reality of England’s electoral geography.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128940/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Swift receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>With historical strongholds lost to the Conservatives, some introspection is needed.Ryan Swift, PhD Researcher in Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1280822019-12-16T12:14:48Z2019-12-16T12:14:48ZHow Labour failed to connect with the British working class<p>Labour entered the UK general election with a double handicap. Brexit was peeling away many of its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results/england">2017</a> voters, <a href="http://natcen.ac.uk/blog/who-voted-labour-in-2017">especially</a> among the working class in the north of England and West Midlands. Jeremy Corbyn <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/08/boris-johnson-fans-now-outweigh-his-detractors">was also hugely unpopular</a> – and perceptions of which leader will make the best prime minister <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/64/1/204/1429800?redirectedFrom=fulltext">are a</a> major voting driver. </p>
<p>Both factors devastated Labour in the north of England and West Midlands as the so-called Labour “red wall” crumbled. Labour’s fate was probably sealed even before the election was called. Yet these handicaps were aggravated by Labour’s campaign strategy, which was poor enough to turn defeat into <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49798197">disaster</a>. </p>
<p>To understand what went wrong with the campaign, we need to step back and ask what makes an effective campaign strategy. There are <a href="https://routledgetextbooks.com/textbooks/9781138100336/default.php">three separate factors</a>: the communicator, the message and the message transmission. </p>
<h2>1. The communicator</h2>
<p>Many voters today are instinctively sceptical about anything that emanates from parties, particularly their leaders. <a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/Persuasive-Communication/Stiff-Mongeau/9781462526840">Research indicates</a> that voters’ views on what politicians say are heavily influenced by the extent to which they seem trustworthy, that is, can be relied upon to make truthful statements; and have the personal qualities and competence needed for leadership. </p>
<p>On both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/14/working-class-voters-didnt-trust-labour-jess-phillips">measures</a> Corbyn was <a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/12/the-polling-that-proves-the-incompetence-and-indecency-of-jeremy-corbyn/">viewed</a> poorly, even next to Johnson, who has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/18/boris-johnson-lying-media">his own</a> well documented <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/british-prime-minister-boris-johnson-conservative-tory-darling-with-lots-of-problems-no-deal-brexit-courts/">problems</a>. Corbyn’s low rating was partly the result of <a href="https://www.thelondoneconomic.com/opinion/jeremy-corbyn-is-the-most-smeared-politician-in-history/18/07/">unremittingly</a> hostile <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/12/uk-news-push-alerts-negative-labour-positive-tories">media coverage</a>. Yet even the most sympathetic observer would struggle to view his communication abilities, and his capacity to inspire trust and confidence, as other than mediocre. </p>
<p>Two obvious examples were <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/jeremy-corbyn-declines-to-apologise-over-antisemitism-claims-but-vows-to-make-society-safe-for-a4297361.html">his refusal</a> to apologise over anti-semitism until late in the day and his <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10481524/jeremy-corbyn-claims-he-watches-queens-speech-christmas-day/">bungled response</a> to a question over whether he watched the Queen’s Christmas message. These demonstrated his lack of mental agility, verbal fluency and emotional intelligence. </p>
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<p>How voters view a leader in an election campaign is also filtered by their existing image. Corbyn was <a href="https://www.cityam.com/jeremy-corbyn-is-the-least-popular-opposition-leader-since-1977-study-reveals/">already</a> the least popular opposition leader in half a century – seen as unpatriotic; unwilling to stand up for British interests; hostile to treasured institutions like the military and the monarchy; and too weak on terrorism. As a result, policies that may otherwise have been well received were treated with disdain or disbelief. It did not help that Labour <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/election-2019-50604051/andy-mcdonald-labour-offers-tremendous-transformation">offered up loyalists</a> such as Laura Pidcock, Rebecca Long-Bailey and Andy McDonald for media interviews, while it locked down more accomplished performers like <a href="https://www.keirstarmer.com/">Keir Starmer</a>.</p>
<h2>2. The message</h2>
<p>A policy will be credible to the extent it is seen as affordable and deliverable. Labour seemed to have problems grasping this. Hardly a day elapsed without the party committing billions to another worthy cause: for the NHS, education, public sector pay, benefits, pensions compensation for “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/50546923">Waspi women</a>”, multiple nationalisations, free broadband, and so on. </p>
<p>Labour strategists seemed to think that the sheer scale, generosity and radicalism of the programme would enthuse voters supposedly desperate for transformative social reforms. In fact, <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/11/he-put-the-milk-in-before-taking-the-teabag-out-hes-a-proper-nutcase-whos-going-to-pay-me-for-a-four-day-week-my-election-focus-groups-in-stoke-bolton-and-west-brom-2/">evidence</a> from <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/11/its-insulting-peoples-intelligence-the-government-is-paying-so-we-are-its-so-overwhelming-i-feel-quite-sick-my-election-focus-groups-in-alyn-deeside-wrexha/">focus groups</a> showed that voters were <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/11/does-he-want-to-be-pm-really-it-was-worse-than-prince-andrew-she-has-bagpipes-playing-in-her-head-all-the-time-my-election-focus-groups-in-scotland/">massively</a> sceptical <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/12/hes-just-a-craven-opportunist-shes-a-bit-militant-for-me-i-want-it-over-and-done-with-now-my-final-election-focus-groups-in-bishop-auckland-warwick-leamington-and-wimbledon/">about</a> Labour’s ability to fund and deliver its pledges. </p>
<p>“Where are they going to get the money from?,” was a constant refrain. It played straight into the hands of the age-old Conservative motif that Labour can’t be trusted with your money and will bankrupt the economy. </p>
<p>The Tories understood that voters rarely follow policy detail, so a party needs to hammer away relentlessly on a few carefully chosen messages: above all, “get Brexit done”. Labour was much more scattergun. Rather than highlighting key Tory weaknesses like the NHS or social care for the elderly, it seemed to flit between policies, never settling on one for very long. </p>
<p>Many voters seemed almost obsessed with getting Brexit done. But both Labour and their 2017 supporters were seriously divided over whether it was desirable. The leadership tried to balance these conflicting pressures through “constructive ambiguity”, but this made them seem indecisive, vacillating and confused. </p>
<p>Brexit also represented something deeper: a collision between Remain-voting civic-minded social liberals and Leave-voting ethno-nationalist social conservatives. This cut across left-right divisions and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-923X.12403">had been losing</a> Labour votes in its heartlands for years. For many working-class social conservatives, Corbyn and his inner circle embodied the “metropolitan liberal elite”. </p>
<p>Certainly, there is no easy resolution for a party that cannot out-compete the Tories over issues like immigration and law and order. But the fact that Labour promoted policies that could have been expressly designed to infuriate such people – the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50551765">pledge to teach British imperialism</a> as part of the curriculum and apologise for the country’s past colonial misdeeds, for instance - did not help.</p>
<h2>3. Transmission</h2>
<p>Trying to change attitudes in a short election campaign is usually fruitless. Parties instead try to ensure that issues that benefit them preoccupy the public mind by securing generous coverage in the media. Labour was heavily handicapped in this “air war” by the predominantly right-wing slant of the print media. This has a knock-on effect on the BBC, since the editorial agendas of its news programmes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/06/bbc-obsessed-agenda-daily-mail-robert-peston-charles-wheeler">appear to be</a> unduly influenced by the press. </p>
<p>This meant that Labour needed particularly to use effective and sophisticated techniques for designing and transmitting its arguments. You do this by <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054">developing</a> an overarching narrative that identifies problems, interprets events and invokes values in a way that mobilises public support for its policy agenda. Margaret Thatcher used to do this very well with notions like, “you cannot spend what you haven’t earned”, using homilies about family housekeeping and balanced budgets. </p>
<p>Labour lacked such a narrative, opting instead to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/general-election-corbyn-speech-labour-boris-johnson-opinion-polls-brexit-a9179366.html">berate</a> the rich and corporate elites in a simplistic way. The underlying reason was the Corbynista conviction that people’s views reflected their class, and that the working classes were naturally left wing. By this reasoning, Labour’s faltering hold on the working-class vote in recent years was due to doubts about its determination to pursue truly radical policies for workers. </p>
<p>Labour saw its principal task as convincing these voters that the compromises of the past were over and that the party could be relied upon to implement promised radical social change. It followed from this that a programme of sustained political education, persuasion and engagement was not necessary. The net result was that, for the first time since the second world war, the <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/12/how-britain-voted-and-why-my-2019-general-election-post-vote-poll/">Tories gained</a> the largest proportion of the working-class vote. </p>
<p>Labour’s ideological preconceptions seemed to distract from a cold, dispassionate analysis of the facts. Deluding others is wrong; deluding yourself is fatal. Corbyn’s team were all but reduced to relying on events to derail the opposition. Without any great change of fortune, the die was cast. The question for the future is, what lessons will Labour learn from this calamity?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128082/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Shaw does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What lay behind Team Corbyn’s woeful campaign.Eric Shaw, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1286772019-12-16T10:23:49Z2019-12-16T10:23:49ZConservative parliamentary majority: what it could mean for schools<p>How will schools fare under a new Conservative government that’s in a strong position to implement its manifesto commitments?</p>
<p>Although much of the Conservative manifesto signalled a business as usual approach to education policy, <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%25202019%2520Manifesto.pdf">there was the big promise</a> of £14 billion extra funding for schools – though this was a reaffirmation of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-boosts-schools-with-14-billion-package">a pledge made by the prime minister, Boris Johnson, in August</a>.</p>
<p>The funding will be delivered over the next three years: £2.6 billion in 2020-21, increasing to £4.8 billion in 2021-22 and £7.1 billion in 2022-23. According to <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2019/schools">some commentators</a>, this should bring real-terms funding per pupil back to 2010 levels – when funding was at its highest. </p>
<p>On the steps of Number 10, the morning after the election, Johnson once again promised “more money for schools”. But with <a href="https://theconversation.com/school-funding-promised-increases-are-actually-real-term-cuts-and-poorer-schools-are-hit-hardest-123618">increasing costs and rising pupil numbers</a> this <a href="https://theconversation.com/headteachers-march-the-school-funding-protests-explained-104012">may not equate to a real-terms increase</a> – as has been the case before.</p>
<h2>More money, fewer teachers?</h2>
<p>Alongside the funding boost also comes a promise of higher expenditure, with starting salaries for teachers of £30,000 a year. Again here, the manifesto restates <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/30000-starting-salaries-proposed-for-teachers">an earlier promise</a>, and what a promise – for some newly qualified teachers this would be a 20% boost on their current salary. </p>
<p>There’s no indication of whether there would be comparable or knock-on uplifts for more experienced teachers, though Gavin Williamson, secretary of state for education, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/832425/SoS_to_STRB_Sept_2019.pdf">suggested that</a> “flatter pay progression” structures in schools will be encouraged.</p>
<p>But school leaders will be agonising over the question of whether the funding injection, estimated at <a href="https://www.ifs.org.uk/election/2019/article/conservative-manifesto-an-initial-reaction-from-ifs-researchers">7.5% by the The Institute for Fiscal Studies</a>, will be sufficient to cover the additional costs of new teachers. If not, a promise that ought to attract more into the profession may actually lead to <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-the-real-reason-teachers-are-quitting-its-not-just-the-money-55468">fewer teachers in schools</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306842/original/file-20191213-85391-13hriq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">More money for new teachers, but schools could still financially struggle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/teacher-sitting-table-her-classroom-primary-634019516?src=f522c7db-8bfc-4c2d-bdeb-f0221d702275-1-1&studio=1">DGLimages/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The government is also promising an additional £780 million package to support children with special educational needs. This money, distributed through local authorities, will go some way towards mitigating the £1.2 billion shortfall projected by a recent <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmeduc/969/969.pdf">official Education Committee report</a>, but wider change will need to happen for this to be effective. Indeed, a <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201919/cmselect/cmeduc/20/20.pdf">further report</a> from the same committee highlighted how additional funding will make little difference to the lives of young people unless there is a “systemic cultural shift” in the way special needs education is managed in schools.</p>
<h2>Reforming the systems</h2>
<p>It’s not just funding that has been promised by the Conservatives, but further reform to school systems too. More places in special schools, for those with the most complex needs, alongside an expansion of alternative provision, for children who are at risk of, or have suffered, permanent exclusion. These may be needed if the Conservatives’ plan to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/aug/27/leaked-documents-reveal-tories-dramatic-plans-for-schools">crackdown on behaviour</a> and back [headteachers] to use exclusions more widely is to be implemented.</p>
<p>There are also commitments to seeing more Free Schools opened, along with “innovative” schools with specialisms – a possible hark back to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4618601">specialist schools</a> movement instigated under former prime minister John Major, and enthusiastically maintained by New Labour.</p>
<p>It’s also very likely that a richer curriculum will be developed in schools. This may be in response to the new <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/education-inspection-framework">Ofsted inspection framework</a>, which looks for an ambitious and comprehensive curriculum. But it will also be a result of new funding for a new premium to provide money for art, music and sport, as well as more PE in primary schools. For many pupils and parents this will be welcome, after a decade of narrowing curriculum driven by too much emphasis on performance data, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752721/HMCI_PAC_letter_311018.pdf">according to the chief inspector of schools</a>.</p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean the Ofsted inspection regime has gone soft. <a href="https://vote.conservatives.com/news/only-the-conservatives-will-protect-standards-in-our-schools">The government has promised</a> to revisit no-notice inspections – where teams simply turn up at schools unannounced. It will also provide extra funding for Ofsted to allow for longer inspections in bigger schools. </p>
<p>This, along with revisiting outstanding schools, may seem fairer, but it won’t take away much of the stress caused by Ofsted – which is identified <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teacher-well-being-at-work-in-schools-and-further-education-providers/summary-and-recommendations-teacher-well-being-research-report">as in issue in its own research</a> – nor will it give the support that struggling schools need. While the manifesto promises to intervene in schools with “entrenched underperformance” it’s not clear what form that intervention would take.</p>
<h2>More choice for parents</h2>
<p>The neoliberal commitment to market forces remains at the centre of ongoing reforms, with the promise that parents will be able to choose the school that best suits their children. <a href="https://theconversation.com/abolishing-private-schools-is-admirable-but-wont-make-choosing-a-state-one-any-easier-for-parents-124111">This concept of “choice” </a> has led to secondary schools becoming larger and fewer in number – with government policy producing not more schools but an increase in different types of schools. For parents, this had made choices at once more limited, but also more complicated – and it looks like this is set to continue.</p>
<p>In the end, the story is of more of the same, but with more power to the Department for Education. The government looks set to continue reforms in the same direction as before. But over time, these may become more rapid and perhaps also more extreme.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128677/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Rolph does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reforms are set to continue in the same direction as before.Chris Rolph, Director, Nottingham Institute of Education, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1286992019-12-14T04:07:33Z2019-12-14T04:07:33ZConservative landslide at UK’s Brexit election; Trump’s ratings rise on strong US economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306915/original/file-20191214-85376-lt9tho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Led by Boris Johnson, the Conservatives won 56% of the vote and will have an 80-seat majority.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/ VIckie Flores</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the December 12 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election">UK election</a>, the Conservatives won 365 of the 650 House of Commons seats (up 48 since the 2017 election), Labour 202 (down 60), the Scottish National Party (SNP) 48 (up 13) and the Liberal Democrats 11 (down one). </p>
<p>The Conservatives won 56% of the seats and will have an 80-seat majority over all other parties. It is the Conservatives’ largest seat haul since 1987, and Labour’s lowest since 1935.</p>
<p>Popular votes were 43.6% Conservatives (up 1.2%), 32.1% Labour (down 7.9%), 11.6% Liberal Democrats (up 4.2%), 3.9% SNP (up 0.8%), 2.7% Greens (up 1.1%) and 2.0% Brexit party. </p>
<p>The Lib Dems thus lost a seat despite a 4% vote share increase, while the Greens won one seat and Brexit party none – that’s first-past-the-post. The Conservative vote share was the highest since 1979 for any party. Labour had a lower vote share in 2015.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2019/results/scotland">Scotland</a>, the SNP won 48 of the 59 seats (up 13), the Conservatives six (down seven), the Lib Dems four (no net change) and Labour one (down six). Lib Dem leader Jo Swinson lost her seat. On popular votes, the SNP led the Conservatives by 45% to 25%, an 8% swing to the SNP.</p>
<p>The election means Britain will Leave the European Union by January 31 under Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal, which was blocked by the previous parliament. Johnson has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/13/boris-johnson-brexit-leave-eu">promised not to extend</a> the transition period to implement a trade deal beyond December 2020, so January 2021 is likely to be when the real Brexit occurs.</p>
<p>This election was a realignment along Brexit referendum leave/remain lines that had been predicted to occur in the 2017 election. A key problem for Labour was that, while “leave” won the referendum by a narrow 51.9% to 48.1% margin, it <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/did-majority-conservative-and-labour-constituencies-vote-leave-eu-referendum/">carried 64% of seats</a> owing to remainers clustering in the big cities.</p>
<p>I wrote for The University of Melbourne’s <a href="https://electionwatch.unimelb.edu.au/articles/working-class-likely-to-deliver-for-boris-johnson">Election Watch</a> that working class voters, who supported leave by 64-36, were likely to deliver Johnson a majority. There were many traditional Labour seats that flipped to the Conservatives, such as former Labour PM Tony Blair’s old seat of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sedgefield_(UK_Parliament_constituency)">Sedgefield</a>.</p>
<p>In the December 5-6 <a href="https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/itsi0h01ub/TheSundayTimes_VI_Results_191206_w.pdf">YouGov</a> poll, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn had a net -47 approval rating, while Johnson was at -13. Corbyn was at -34 with remainers and -67 with leavers, while Johnson was respectively at -61 and +42. Labour’s vote fell with both leavers and remainers, as this chart shows.</p>
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<p>Much of Corbyn’s problems were caused by his reluctance to move from Labour’s successful 2017 pro-Brexit policy; this reluctance hurt him with remainers while leavers detested any move towards remain. As I argued in this <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2019/12/03/uk-election-minus-nine-days/">Poll Bludger</a> article, an explicitly pro-remain Labour leader would probably have been destroyed by accusations of betraying the Brexit referendum.</p>
<p>Corbyn’s left-wing agenda had far less appeal in 2019 than 2017 owing to greatly improved <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/november2019">real wage growth</a>. Before the June 2017 election, annual real wage growth had fallen to -0.5%. In the latest available data, real wage growth is up 1.7%. With the US economy continuing to perform well, it would be inadvisable for Democrats to select a left-wing nominee, such as Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren.</p>
<p>It’s not just UK Labour that has suffered from the desertion of lower-educated working class voters: the left unexpectedly lost the last US presidential election and last Australian federal election owing to this. Swings to the left among better-educated voters are not compensating yet.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/final-2019-election-results-education-divide-explains-the-coalitions-upset-victory-118601">Final 2019 election results: education divide explains the Coalition's upset victory</a>
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<p>After performing badly at the last three UK elections and the Brexit referendum, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2019_United_Kingdom_general_election">UK polls</a> did well this time. Most polls had the margin between the Conservatives and Labour at nine to 12 points, and four polls had it at either 11 or 12 points – the actual margin is 11.5 points.</p>
<h2>Trump’s ratings rise</h2>
<p>In the <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/">FiveThirtyEight aggregate</a>, Donald Trump’s ratings with all polls are currently 41.9% approve, 53.2% disapprove, a net approval of -11.3%, up 1.4% since my November 20 US politics article. With polls of registered or likely voters, Trump’s ratings are 43.1% approve, 52.7% disapprove, a net approval of -9.6%, up 1.4% since November 20.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/buttigieg-surges-to-clear-lead-in-iowa-poll-as-democrats-win-four-of-five-us-state-elections-127210">Buttigieg surges to clear lead in Iowa poll, as Democrats win four of five US state elections</a>
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<p>In the <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/impeachment-polls/">FiveThirtyEight</a> impeachment tracker, 47.4% support removing Trump from office and 45.8% are opposed (46.8-45.2 support November 20).</p>
<p>In current general election head to head polling according to <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/National.html">RealClearPolitics</a> averages, Trump trails Joe Biden by 9.8%, Warren by 7.2%, Sanders by 8.4% and Pete Buttigieg by 4.1%. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3651">Quinnipiac poll</a> conducted in early December, Trump had a 54-42 approval rating on the economy – a record high for him. If the US economy continues to be strong until the November 2020 election, Trump has a good chance of re-election, especially given his likely Electoral College advantage.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-could-win-again-despite-losing-popular-vote-as-biden-retakes-lead-in-democratic-polls-126106">Trump could win again despite losing popular vote, as Biden retakes lead in Democratic polls</a>
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<h2>US jobs situation still strong</h2>
<p>In November, the <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm">US economy</a> created 266,000 jobs, and the unemployment rate slipped 0.1% to just 3.5%. The US conducts two employment surveys every month: the headline jobs growth is from the establishment survey, and the unemployment rate from the household survey. </p>
<p>In this case, the <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.a.htm">household survey</a> was weaker, with just 83,000 jobs added and the drop in unemployment explained by a fall in participation.</p>
<p>Owing to inflation of 0.3% in November, there was no <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/realer.nr0.htm">real change</a> in wages in that month. Over the year to November, real weekly and hourly wages were up a modest 1.1%.</p>
<h2>Democratic contest</h2>
<p>Seven weeks from the February 3 Iowa caucus, Biden leads in the national <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/2020_democratic_presidential_nomination-6730.html">RealClearPolitics Democratic</a> average with 28.4%, followed by Sanders at 18.2%, Warren at 15.8%, Buttigieg at 9.2% and Michael Bloomberg at 5.2%. No other candidate has more than 3%.</p>
<p>In Iowa, it’s Buttigieg 22.5%, Sanders 19.3%, Biden 18.0% and Warren 16.3%. In New Hampshire (February 11), it’s Sanders 19.0%, Buttigieg 17.7%, Biden 14.3% and Warren 13.3%. Biden continues to dominate in South Carolina (February 29) with 35%.</p>
<p>The next <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Democratic_Party_presidential_debates_and_forums#Sixth_debate_(December_19,_2019)">Democratic debate</a> will be held on December 19; seven candidates have qualified. There will be four debates in January and February 2020, with the first on January 14.</p>
<h2>Australian Newspoll: 52-48 to Coalition</h2>
<p>Newspoll has become completely conducted using online methods; previously, it used a mixture of online methods and robopolling.</p>
<p>Since my last Conversation article, there have been two Newspolls by the new method. In late November, the Coalition took a 51-49 lead, (50-50 in the final Newspoll using the old method in early November).</p>
<p>In the latest Newspoll, conducted December 5-8, the Coalition had a 52-48 lead, a one-point gain for the Coalition. Primary votes were 42% Coalition (up one), 33% Labor (steady), 11% Greens (down one) and 5% One Nation (steady).</p>
<p>Scott Morrison had a net approval of -3, up six points. Anthony Albanese had a net approval of -1, also up six points. Morrison led as better PM by 48-34 (46-35 previously). The new Newspoll series appears to give the leaders harsher personal ratings than the old one.</p>
<p>Voters were asked to rate the leaders according to nine attributes. You can read about those results at <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2019/12/08/newspoll-52-48-coalition/">The Poll Bludger</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The election means Britain will Leave the European Union by January 31 under Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal, which was blocked by the previous parliament.Adrian Beaumont, Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1282432019-12-14T02:25:44Z2019-12-14T02:25:44ZJohnson’s thumping win an electoral lesson in not just having policies, but knowing how to sell them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306901/original/file-20191213-85428-ng5yfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">With Johnson's crushing win, Brexit will now happen. But this may also be the start of the break-up of the UK. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Vickie Flores</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>So for all the talk of narrowing polls, tactical voting, and possible shocks leading to a hung parliament, Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/boris-johnson-pledges-to-prioritise-nhs-after-election-victory">achieved a crushing victory</a> over Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party in the UK’s general election of 2019. With an 80 or so seat majority in the House of Commons, Johnson can now deliver on his core promise to “get Brexit done”.</p>
<p>He can also shape the broader social and economic environment in tune with the instincts of those around him. They are, almost to a man and a woman, hard-right libertarian figures with a barely concealed contempt for the welfare state, the National Health Service, social benefits and all the other elements that compose the post-war consensus.</p>
<p>One of the tricks Johnson managed to pull off in this election was to paint himself as a saviour of public services, and and a leader untarnished by ten years of Tory austerity policies. The British public is in for a rude awakening when it finds out Johnson’s brand of rambling One Nation populism was a cover for a much tougher and more conservative agenda than many voters realise.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-kind-of-brexit-will-britain-now-get-done-after-boris-johnsons-thumping-election-win-128719">What kind of Brexit will Britain now ‘get done’ after Boris Johnson’s thumping election win?</a>
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<p>So the puzzle that many commentators are trying to figure out is how it is that a right wing figure of this kind could get one over on Corbyn who pitched his entire campaign on the promise to protect the health service and promote public ownership of key sectors such as the railways and the post office?</p>
<p>What became clear as the night unfolded is that former Labour constituencies in the Midlands and the north of the country have been, and still are, in favour of Brexit. Johnson promised to get Brexit done, and Labour did not. For much of the electorate, this was enough of a reason to cross well established political divides and tribal loyalties.</p>
<p>But it’s also clear that many voters didn’t trust Jeremy Corbyn. They saw him as too beholden to sectional interests, too evasive, too metropolitan and too left wing. Johnson, by contrast, came across as a capable if lovably bumbling figure who was able to articulate not only a clear line on Brexit, but also to distance himself from the legacy of destructive Tory policies. In the end it was Corbyn, not Johnson, who proved to be political Vegemite.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-political-vegemite-becomes-the-uk-prime-minister-let-the-games-begin-119467">Boris Johnson, 'political Vegemite', becomes the UK prime minister. Let the games begin</a>
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<p>This proved a winning formula across England and most of Wales. But elsewhere, the story was rather different. In Scotland, the Nationalists improved their result from 2017, often at the expense of the Liberal Democrats, and indeed the latter’s leader Jo Swinson, who lost her seat to the Scottish National Party (SNP).</p>
<p>This sets up an important byline for 2020 which is the matter of Scottish independence. With Brexit now almost certain to go forward at the end of January 2020, the pressure will immediately mount to allow Scotland to have another independence vote on the back of the SNP’s crushing performance.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306902/original/file-20191213-85371-1vdw6ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Scottish National Party’s strong performance, led by Nicola Sturgeon, will lead to a push for independence vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Robert Perry</span></span>
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<p>While the picture is less clear in Northern Ireland, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50736909">overall trend</a> was towards increased support for the nationalist parties at the expense in particular of the Democratic Unionist Party, which similarly lost its parliamentary leader Nigel Dodds.</p>
<p>While the dynamics in Northern Ireland are quite different from those of Scotland, the realisation that Brexit will now take place is bound to provoke a sustained debate on the need for a border poll on the future of Northern Ireland itself. This may take some years to resolve, but the line of travel is becoming clearer, and it points towards the reunification of Ireland. Johnson’s triumph may thus herald the break-up of the UK – to be greeted, it seems, by English indifference.</p>
<p>But the clearest takeaway remains the state of progressive politics in the UK. The centrist Liberal Democrat party had a very bad election. The Green party managed to increase its share of the vote but only managed to win one seat. The Labour Party was sent packing in many of its traditional working class heartlands in the North.</p>
<p>As long as progressive and left politics is spread amongst these various parties, it seems unlikely that we can expect a recovery any time soon, certainly as far as electoral politics is concerned. The Labour Party will now <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/13/labour-party-leader-runners-riders-jeremy-corbyn-jess-phillips/">hunker down to decide</a> whether it is going to row back towards the centre under a leader such as Kier Starmer, or whether it is going to maintain the more radical position associated with Corbyn, McDonnell and the Momentum faction that now dominates many local constituency parties.</p>
<p>With the victory of Johnson demonstrating the importance of a charismatic and effective leader, attention will turn to the next generation of Labour politicians. It is difficult at this juncture to be confident there is a serious challenger waiting in the wings of the current Labour Party who can provide an effective counterpoint to the ebullient Johnson. But it must. More of the same will not turn the tide.</p>
<p>The right does not have a monopoly on effective communicators and charismatic leaders. But what it does have is a keener appreciation of the dynamics of the moment: that policies do not sell themselves; they have to be sold by someone who has an ability to connect, to articulate a position that voters feel comfortable with, and which chimes with their own experience, values, hopes and fears.</p>
<p>Some call this populism. But the reality is simpler: this is - and always has been – the formula for winning elections. It’s a formula the left would do well to memorise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Tormey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Johnson is back at No 10- but British voters may be in for a rude shock when they realise his is a much tougher and more conservative agenda than many believe.Simon Tormey, Professor of Politics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288852019-12-13T15:06:38Z2019-12-13T15:06:38ZWhat Boris Johnson’s government needs to do to show it is serious on climate change<p>Climate change had a higher profile in the UK election campaign than ever before, with parties <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6bJhKvFVw4">competing hard over their offer to concerned voters</a>. But this was a debate that the Conservatives – who won a landslide majority – largely stood back from. Their manifesto was <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/election-2019-what-the-manifestos-say-on-energy-and-climate-change">light on detail compared to the other parties</a>, and Boris Johnson chose not to take part in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6bJhKvFVw4">the first ever UK televised leaders’ debate on climate</a>.</p>
<p>Conservative candidates were <a href="https://www.desmog.co.uk/2019/12/09/election-2019-more-50-conservative-candidates-fail-show-climate-hustings">conspicuous by their absence in local climate hustings</a>, too. Neither was climate mentioned in <a href="https://vote.conservatives.com/news/the-first-100-days-of-a-conservative-majority-government-and-the-choice-before-the-british-people">their legislative plan for the first hundred days</a>.</p>
<p>The Conservative government did legislate for a net zero carbon emissions target back in June, <a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-the-uks-contribution-to-stopping-global-warming/">following the advice of the Committee on Climate Change</a>. And there was an explicit manifesto pledge to deliver on this target, with no signs of backtracking. In his <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50777071">speech to the party faithful on the morning of his election</a>, Johnson declared his ambition to “make this country the cleanest, greenest on Earth, with the most far-reaching environmental programme”, adding:</p>
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<p>And you the people of this country voted to be carbon-neutral in this election - you voted to be carbon-neutral by 2050. And we’ll do it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But targets don’t reduce carbon. Policies do. And despite its much-admired Climate Change Act, the UK’s policy record lately has not been good. The Committee on Climate Change have <a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/reducing-uk-emissions-2019-progress-report-to-parliament/">repeatedly warned</a> that the UK is off track to meet future commitments, a verdict shared by the independent Climate Action Tracker project, which assesses each country’s performance against the Paris Agreement. It <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/uk/">rated the UK as “insufficient”</a>, with policies compatible with a 3°C world – not the 1.5°C level that we desperately need.</p>
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<p>If the new government is serious about its commitment, it will have to signal this soon, and with confidence. Steps that it could and should take straight away include:</p>
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<li><p>instigating a swift <a href="http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/enabling-the-transformation-of-the-energy-system/">review of governance for net-zero</a>, giving responsibility and resources to other government departments, and, crucially, to local areas, to deliver on carbon strategy</p></li>
<li><p>prioritising climate and environmental protection in negotiations for a trading relationship with the European Union</p></li>
<li><p>moving quickly to consult on a phase-out date for petrol and diesel vehicles, as promised in its manifesto</p></li>
<li><p>removing the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/18/windfarm-industry-urges-uk-to-lift-onshore-subsidies-ban">de facto ban</a> on onshore wind energy, which the Committee on Climate Change advised <a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Net-Zero-Technical-report-CCC.pdf">needs to increase in capacity by 1GW a year</a></p></li>
<li><p>confirming its opposition to fracking, and making its moratorium permanent</p></li>
<li><p>pledging to formally consider the results of the national citizens’ assembly on climate change, <a href="https://www.climateassembly.uk/">Climate Assembly UK</a>, due to report in 2020.</p></li>
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<p>More fundamentally, the Conservatives need to develop a much clearer climate strategy. Despite a commitment to the emissions target, they do not yet have a confident story to tell about the way they will achieve it, and how that fits with their party’s philosophy and values. Back in July, <a href="https://www.cen.uk.com/manifesto">41 Conservative MPs proposed just such a story</a>, arguing that “tackling the existential threat of environmental breakdown offers our divided country a new national project … this unifying mission can bring economic regeneration and natural restoration to all parts of the country”. But this debate has not yet managed to break through the hurly burly of Brexit.</p>
<p>The new government will need to be quick, and decisive. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/30/climate-crisis-affects-how-majority-will-vote-in-uk-election-poll">upsurge in public concern on climate</a>, and calls for radical action, show no signs of abating. The Green Party nearly doubled its share of the vote, though they still only have one MP to show for it.</p>
<p>Having spent the past couple of years making a general call to climate action, protesters are now likely to take aim at specific policies and projects, such as airport expansion and <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-has-its-first-new-deep-coal-mine-in-decades-a-result-of-pretending-climate-change-isnt-political-114028">the new coal mines proposed in Cumbria</a> and Northumberland, as well as the money that the UK continues to invest in fossil fuels, at home and abroad. They will be buoyed by their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2019/oct/04/national-theatre-to-end-shell-sponsorship-deal-from-next-year">success in rendering toxic the sponsorship of the arts by fossil interests</a>, and will focus relentlessly on removing the fossil fuel majors’ social license to operate.</p>
<p>And it’s not just protesters who could be thorns in the side of the new government. A sizeable green business lobby, including coalitions such as <a href="http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/">The Aldersgate Group</a> and <a href="https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/">We Mean Business</a>, will be calling for ambitious policy which supports the many businesses who want to be part of the transition to net zero. Though the Conservative manifesto promised funds for green technologies, the amounts are tiny compared to support for high-carbon infrastructure including roads, airports and oil and gas extraction, and these contradictions will provide constant tension.</p>
<p>Next year will show whether the Conservatives’ enthusiasm for carbon targets translates into an enthusiasm for climate policies. In late 2020, all eyes will be on the UK, as it hosts COP26, the most important international climate summit since Paris in 2015, in Glasgow. The government will want to tell world leaders a good story on domestic action. It still has time to write one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Willis receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She is an Associate of Green Alliance and a Trustee of the New Economics Foundation.</span></em></p>After his landslide victory, Boris Johnson declared his ambition to make his country ‘the cleanest, greenest on Earth’. Here’s what he needs to do to prove it.Rebecca Willis, Research Fellow, Exeter University; Professor in Practice,, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288812019-12-13T14:45:09Z2019-12-13T14:45:09ZSNP landslide: Boris Johnson needs smarter response than refusing Scotland an independence vote<p>The UK general election has been an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50766014">emphatic success</a> for the Scottish National Party, which won 48 of the 59 seats in Scotland – 13 more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40246330">two years ago</a>. The scale of its victory was not far off its best ever UK election result in 2015, when it won 56 seats. The party now controls four-fifths of the Scottish seats – a much higher proportion than Boris Johnson’s Conservatives won across the UK. </p>
<p>The SNP’s 45% share of votes at this election is not as high as the 50% it garnered in 2015 in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">independence referendum</a>, but it takes it eight points higher <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">than in 2017</a>. It <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50728970">also now</a> has 11 seats with a share of the vote over 50%, or 20 when you add on the vote shares of the pro-independence Greens. </p>
<p>An SNP surge had been <a href="https://www.electoralcalculus.co.uk/polls_scot.html">predicted beforehand</a>, even if it outperformed on the night. And it creates a major headache for the UK prime minister. It is reminiscent of 1987, when Margaret Thatcher won big across the UK but lost more than half the Conservative seats in Scotland – the “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1988.tb02406.x">doomsday scenario</a>” as it came to be known. That year the Conservative number of seats fell from 21 to 10 in Scotland; this time it’s down from 13 to six. Once again, we can expect much from the SNP about how the Conservatives have no mandate north of the border. </p>
<h2>Unionist misery</h2>
<p>For the Conservatives this election is bittersweet in Scotland. The party’s focus on stopping a second independence referendum and getting Brexit done can hardly be claimed to have been a success: its vote share is down from 29% to 25%. </p>
<p>For Labour the election was dreadful at UK level, but absolutely disastrous in Scotland. The party retained only one of its seven Scottish seats, and its share of the vote is well down in seats it had not held. From being the most dominant party in Scotland for decades until 2015, the Labour vote has effectively collapsed in much of its former heartlands. </p>
<p>Where the party arguably suffered at UK level for having such an ambiguous position on Brexit, in Scotland it also blew hot and cold on an independence referendum. It never sounded as stridently pro-unionist as the Conservatives, but nor was it able to attract back pro-independence voters who abandoned the party in 2015 for the SNP. Until Labour sets itself a more coherent position on these issues, it looks set to remain a marginal diminished force, a pale shadow of its former self. Recriminations will begin and the role of Scottish leader Richard Leonard may be called into question. </p>
<p>The Liberal Democrats had a terrible election. Jo Swinson started off predicting she would be prime minister, but ended up losing her own seat in East Dunbartonshire. </p>
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<p>The Lib Dems did offset this by winning one extra seat in Scotland – North East Fife. But the party, like all the unionist parties in Scotland, still has to come up with a way to challenge the dominance of the SNP. Certainly if there was unionist tactical voting to stop the nationalists, it did not materially impact upon the overall result.</p>
<h2>The untenable stand-off</h2>
<p>The SNP can legitimately claim that this result reinforces the mandate it already has for an independence referendum from the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/scotland/results">2016 Scottish parliamentary election</a>, in which together with the Greens they took more than half the seats at Holyrood. The party made no bones about its intentions during the campaign, putting a second independence referendum front and centre. </p>
<p>Nicola Sturgeon’s strategy on independence has no doubt energised SNP support and increased the turnout of their voters. It appears to have essentially made the difference in the campaign in Scotland compared to 2017. Now comes the battle over a second referendum. As the first minister <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/nicola-sturgeon-to-demand-powers-for-scottish-independence-referendum">said</a> as the result in Scotland became clear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t pretend that every single person who voted SNP yesterday will necessarily support independence, but there has been a strong endorsement in this election of Scotland having a choice over our future; of not having to put up with a Conservative government we didn’t vote for and not having to accept life as a nation outside the EU. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Conservatives, in turn, will be hoping to focus on the share of the vote. Yet not only is the SNP share higher than expected, the party <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">has never won</a> more than 85% of the pro-independence vote at previous Westminster elections – as the psephologist John Curtice discusses in <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-story-of-the-scottish-parliament.html">this book</a>, for instance. Intriguingly, most of the remaining pro-independence supporters vote for unionist parties. </p>
<p>Assuming that has happened again, this should worry unionists. It would also reflect what <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">opinion polls</a> have been saying in recent weeks, which is that support for and against independence is now virtually neck and neck. More broadly, it would chime with <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5#bar">previous research</a> that has documented the steady rise of Scottish people’s sense of Scottishness in recent years. </p>
<p><strong>Scottish independence polling</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=139&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306839/original/file-20191213-85367-ay276q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line">What Scotland Thinks</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The scale of the Labour defeat suggests that another decade of Conservative government beckons. But realistically, the staunch unionist position that the Conservatives committed to in Scotland is producing diminishing returns, and looks unsustainable in the long term. </p>
<p>If the new Conservative government at Westminster is not going to allow a second referendum on independence, it is now going to need to develop another constitutional position on Scotland – such as a new devolution settlement. Otherwise, the survival of the union looks extremely precarious. </p>
<p>The more that London keeps saying no to a referendum without offering anything in return, the more it potentially strengthens Scottish nationalists by allowing them to accuse the prime minister of being undemocratic – ignoring yet another mandate on top of the 2016 Remain vote and the pro-independence majority in Holyrood. It also forces Scottish unionists to have to choose between the status quo and independence, which risks driving more into the independence camp. For these reasons, the ball is now firmly in Boris Johnson’s court. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Independence support in Scotland is now at critical levels. The ball is in the UK prime minister’s court.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288832019-12-13T14:38:12Z2019-12-13T14:38:12ZIf you are disappointed with the election result, there are things you can do to help you move on<p>On the morning after every election, millions of people whose side has lost start the day feeling down. And so it was for Labour supporters after the 2019 election when news of the large electoral victory of the Conservative Party saw many take to social media to share their despair. </p>
<p>Interestingly, the results of previous UK elections had <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.882.4872&rep=rep1&type=pdf">no discernible effect</a> on overall subjective wellbeing at a national level, but it’s a different story for people who strongly identify with a party. Recent research found that political partisans suffer a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280026902_Losing_Hurts_The_Happiness_Impact_of_Partisan_Electoral_Loss">big drop in happiness</a> when their party loses an election.</p>
<p>Supporters of a party who win an election tend to become happier. However, supporters of the winning side tend to only experience a small bump in their levels of happiness following the win. In contrast, those backing the losing party take a much bigger hit to their levels of happiness. This is not surprising. Psychologists have known for some time that we <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/106/4/1039/1873382">suffer from losses</a> much more than we savour equivalent-sized gains.</p>
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<p>The loser’s sense of misery can last much longer than a winner’s joy of victory. One analysis of the 2016 US presidential election found that Donald Trump’s victory gave people who voted for him a fairly <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt3bv7f8sd/qt3bv7f8sd.pdf">short-lived rise in levels of happiness</a>. However, within six months, the joy of victory had worn off. Supporters had returned to their levels of happiness before the election. In contrast, people who backed Hillary Clinton still reported feeling less happy six months after the election than they did before the election. Clinton supporters who spent more of their time consuming media fared the worst. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561125">2015 study in Japan</a> found that changes to people’s levels of happiness following an election loss only lasted for a few days. But the people who fared the worst tended to have unrealistic expectations about how their party would perform. This suggests that those who hoped for the most tended to fall the furthest.</p>
<h2>Just not fair</h2>
<p>The sense of misery that comes from losing an election can have wider impacts. When a party we identify with loses, we are likely to start <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561125">questioning the legitimacy</a> of the election process itself. This can undermine the loser’s trust in basic institutions of democracy. If we stop trusting our political institutions, we often start <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25698616.pdf?casa_token=0KV5Di0M4zYAAAAA:ye3lK7ij85kElpSralN3r0rf6B06OaayzGdcbvI9dOm-1ed4IX4_fv8Ogalhym_BOFle0HH1DWDICH8pM4D7kqItrhnvxXdkl1eTJJmncf5sp0uDiA">looking for alternative forums</a> such as social movements to make ourselves heard.</p>
<p>The despair of electoral defeat has even bigger consequences for those standing for election. Losing candidates are faced with a big challenge to their sense of self. They need to come up with a way of preserving dignity in the face of defeat. To do this, they often <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0891241605279839?casa_token=fq5nFIFyaIAAAAAA:agvIVMD_sMH62zrWSg8pH86Rpw5eStO9UyiLxl-MxWV-venrMGE6FBUQG_miYgUwzZpnnSbnxVE">shift blame from themselves</a> to circumstances which are outside their control. </p>
<p>This may make someone feel better in the short term, but it may not help in the longer term. A <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S016726811930277X?dgcid=raven_sd_via_email">recent study</a> of closely run electoral races in the United States found that the losers live about one year less than the candidate who narrowly triumphed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/306849/original/file-20191213-85417-vh0dp5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dejected Labour supporters at the count in Jeremy Corbyn’s seat of Islington North, December 12 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joe Giddens/PA Wire/PA Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Deal with it</h2>
<p>Dealing with the disappointment that comes from a political loss can be hard. The late sociologist and psychoanalyst <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/feb/18/guardianobituaries.highereducation">Iain Criab</a> noticed there were <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780203422236">some big problems</a> with the way we dealt with disappointments in the modern world. When faced with disappointment, many people disengaged. They would distance themselves from what they had previously cared about and shift their hopes elsewhere. </p>
<p>For instance, following a political defeat, a party activist might switch their dreams for a better world from party work into community activism. While this would bring them a temporary sense of solace, Craib noticed that it often left many trapped in a pattern of disappointment. </p>
<p>This meant they would go from project to project, relationship to relationship, without ever really questioning their own hopes and fantasies. Because they never faced up to their disappointments, they remained trapped in an endless cycle which often ended with despair, disengagement and the search for something new. </p>
<p>To get out of this cycle, Craib thought people needed to confront their own disappointments. We need to ask what it teaches us about who we are, what we value and what we can change. Doing that in a serious way, Craib thought, was how we could transform the disappointment of defeat into an opportunity to reflect, recalibrate with the new reality and eventually move on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andre Spicer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Losers suffer a far greater sense of loss than the corresponding euphoria experienced by those on the winning side.Andre Spicer, Professor of Organisational Behaviour, Cass Business School, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1287382019-12-13T13:08:32Z2019-12-13T13:08:32ZWhat Boris Johnson’s victory means for Britain’s place in the world<p>With Boris Johnson’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-kind-of-brexit-will-britain-now-get-done-after-boris-johnsons-thumping-election-win-128719">impressive election victory</a>, one of the biggest questions in British politics will be answered: Brexit, in some form, will be done. </p>
<p>But what does this election victory mean for Britain’s standing in the world? Who will the UK now count as its allies, and its enemies?</p>
<p>The manner of Brexit matters in terms of Britain’s global standing. The large majority he has secured might give Johnson more room for manoeuvre in Westminster, making a softer Brexit possible. This would undoubtedly allow for smoother relations with the UK’s neighbours, but a softer Brexit might also have more advantages globally. </p>
<p>Overseas, Brexit is viewed as a form of <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/25/brexit-act-of-self-harm-irish-pm-tells-euronews">national self-harm</a> by many, and a softer departure may well prevent Britain’s international standing from being substantially damaged. A softer Brexit, which might involve some freedom of movement, may also allow Britain to strike a stronger bargaining position in future trade negotiations <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026499931730980X">with both the EU and other nations</a>. By remaining at least partially linked to the EU, Britain would be able to present itself in trade negotiations as part of a larger market, giving it more power and a louder voice. </p>
<h2>US and China</h2>
<p>Beyond Brexit, Johnson and US President Donald Trump will undoubtedly remain close, meaning the so-called “special relationship” will be publicly supported and championed. This public friendship may not make Johnson popular on the global stage, but with his majority, and a potential victory for Trump in November 2020, he may not care.</p>
<p>Bonhomie aside, the extent that camaraderie between Johnson and Trump will benefit Britain is more questionable. Securing a favourable post-Brexit trade deal with the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/post-brexit-trade-with-the-us-donald-trump-was-right-when-he-said-a-deal-would-be-tricky-100055">will remain very challenging</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1205368801438707713"}"></div></p>
<p>Britain is already looking to strengthen economic and political ties with Commonwealth countries – Australia’s prime minister, Scott Morrison, swiftly <a href="https://twitter.com/ScottMorrisonMP/status/1205360926691512320">tweeted his congratulations</a> to Johnson. The reality of leaning on the Commonwealth will not be as lucrative as <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-brexit-cant-transform-commonwealth-trade-94919">membership of the EU</a>, but the Conservatives are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-40715005">keen to draw on it</a> nonetheless.</p>
<p>Specific countries, like India, will become increasingly important. An economic powerhouse, the UK will want to secure a trade deal with India. But at what cost? For India, any trade deal with the UK will have to come with the promise of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-special-migration-rules-in-free-trade-deals-work-103709">relaxation of the visa requirements</a> for Indian nationals. That pay-off may be difficult for Johnson to sell to an electorate which has been repeatedly promised a reduction in immigration and a tightening up of immigration policy from the Conservatives. </p>
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<p>China will be another key relationship to watch in future. Relations with China have not been particularly good over the past 20 years. For example China froze investment into the UK under the coalition government following <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10040319/David-Camerons-rift-with-China-could-cost-UK-billions.html">David Cameron’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2012</a>. Johnson’s government will be looking to improve this relationship in the hope of a beneficial trade deal. </p>
<p>But how can this be achieved? One recent example is the Conservative government’s response to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/hong-kong-protests-73625">pro-democracy protests</a> in Hong Kong. It might be expected, because of Britain’s historic links with Hong Kong and Britain’s desire to maintain democracy in the territory, that Johnson’s Conservatives would be outspoken in their support of the democratic movements. </p>
<p>Instead, the Johnson government has been quiet on the violence in the territory, a response which will undoubtedly please the Chinese government. It may be that silence is the cost of a future trade deal with China – a stance which has changed from under the leadership of Theresa May, where Jeremy Hunt was fairly outspoken on Hong Kong <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/jeremy-hunt-backs-hong-kong-citizens-right-to-protest">while foreign secretary</a>. </p>
<h2>Weakened</h2>
<p>For a post-Brexit Britain, there will undoubtedly be some economic opportunities, but there is a cost. Outside of the EU, Britain is a much smaller power on the global stage, both economically and politically. </p>
<p>To secure those all-important trade deals, Britain will have to decide what pay-offs it is willing to make. For all his bluster, Johnson may have to swallow some uncomfortable truths and some uncomfortable compromises. Whether he can sell those at home is another matter.</p>
<p>The size of the Conservatives’ victory will hammer the final nail in the coffin of the hopes of those in the EU, and in the UK, who wanted a reversal of Brexit. Johnson is not a popular man in Europe, but Brexit fatigue has made his European counterparts keen to work with him to get Brexit finished. While securing a trade deal with the EU by the end of December 2020 will be tricky, it is also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9a5fd52-4b2a-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62">in the EU’s interest</a> to make sure that trade remains smooth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128738/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victoria Honeyman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The biggest risk is Britain’s desire to stand alone in the world.Victoria Honeyman, Lecturer in British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.