tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/ali-bongo-30895/articlesAli Bongo – The Conversation2023-09-05T13:40:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128092023-09-05T13:40:23Z2023-09-05T13:40:23ZGabon coup has been years in the making: 3 key factors that ended the Bongo dynasty<p>The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> that put an end to the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56-year hold</a> on power in Gabon has been many years in the making. </p>
<p>Its roots can be traced back to when deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/29/gabon-president-ali-bongo-hospitalised-in-saudi-arabia">suffered a stroke</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>The political crisis caused by Bongo’s illness and the opaque manner in which he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/gabonese-president-ali-bongo-defies-illness-father-s-shadow-4c2dba69">continued</a> to hold the reins of power through close family members during his convalescence created tensions within the power circles. </p>
<p>On one side were critics who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-cabinet-idUSKCN0RC0I720150912">demanded</a> his resignation and sought to end the Bongo dynasty’s grip on power in the oil rich Central African country. These critics were mostly responsible for the emergence of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/01/albert-ondo-ossa-everything-must-be-done-so-that-general-oligui-nguema-hands-over-power-to-me_6119686_124.html">Albert Ondo Ossa</a> as a consensus opposition presidential candidate at the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>On the other side were loyal members of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a>. The party was founded by former <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">president Omar Bongo</a>, who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009. In this group were party members who continued to play an institutional charade of cabinet meetings and rubber-stamp legislation that masked the troubling absence and incapacitation of Ali Bongo. </p>
<p>The group also includes powerful clan members inside the Bongo dynasty jockeying for position and wealth in the uncertainty surrounding Ali Bongo’s health.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist</a> specialising in African politics and the politics of the oil industry in Africa, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240810975_The_Rentier_State_in_Africa_Oil_Rent_Dependency_and_Neocolonialism_in_the_Republic_of_Gabon">researched</a> the implications of oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in Gabon.</p>
<p>My view is that the corrupt oil-rentier dynastic regime that ruled Gabon for the past half century was brought to an end by a combination of three factors. They are Ali Bongo’s illness; the contagion effect of other recent successful coups in Africa; and the power tussle between General Brice Oligui Nguema (the coup leader, who is said to be Bongo’s distant cousin) and Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, Ali Bongo’s wife. The former first lady was believed to be preparing her son, Noureddine Bongo, to succeed his father. </p>
<h2>Factors in favour of coup</h2>
<p>Before the coup d’état there was little hope that Ali Bongo Ondimba would lose his third re-election bid. </p>
<p>His party had over <a href="https://data.ipu.org/node/62/elections?chamber_id=13398">80%</a> of the seats in the legislature, control of regional and municipal governments, and a hold on the courts and the security apparatus of the state. </p>
<p>Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election, which the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%. That was before the military struck. </p>
<p>One of the factors that encouraged the military intervention in Gabon is the contagion effect of recent successful coups in Africa. A series of coups in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) appear to have demonstrated to Gabon’s military that not only was a successful coup possible, it was acceptable. </p>
<p>After the coup, crowds came out in Libreville and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">danced</a> in the streets. </p>
<p>The second factor is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/1/has-gabons-all-powerful-bongo-dynasty-really-lost-its-55-year-grip">power tussle</a> between the coup leader, Nguema, and Sylvia Bongo. The deposed president’s wife is widely believed to have grown in influence after her husband suffered a stroke in 2018. Nguema was relieved of his duties as head of the president’s security.</p>
<p>If it is true that Sylvia was preparing her son to succeed his father, Noureddine would have been the third generation of the Bongo family to rule Gabon. Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46885467">succeeded</a> his father in 2009. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Prior to the 30 August coup, the only thing that seemed to have united the numerous opposition parties in Gabon (who barely managed to rally around a joint candidate just nine days before the 26 August poll) was the desire to remove Ali Bongo from office. </p>
<p>Now that a coup appears to have achieved that, it will be difficult for Albert Ondo Ossa to take office.</p>
<p>Given what appears like the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/08/31/US-urges-Gabon-military-to-preserve-civilian-rule-">willingness</a> of France and the United States to accept this palace coup, the only question is whether Nguema will lead a transition to civilian rule, hold elections, refuse to present himself for office, or become the next member of the Bongo clan to rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo’s illness, the contagion effect of other recent successful coups and palace power tussles are factors responsible for Gabon’s recent coup.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127302023-09-01T15:07:57Z2023-09-01T15:07:57ZCoup in Gabon: Ali Bongo the eighth west African leader to be ousted by military in two years<p>Gabon’s prime minister, Ali Bongo, has become the latest in a string of African leaders to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66652015">ousted by a military coup</a> in recent years. Bongo, who had just won a third term in power, was ousted by a junta of senior officers who have named <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66666585">General Brice Oligui Nguema</a> – the former head of the presidential guard and Bongo’s cousin – as the country’s new “interim president”.</p>
<p>The coup in Gabon is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/recent-coups-west-central-africa-2023-08-30/">eighth in west and central Africa since 2020</a>, and the second – after Niger – in as many months. He is being held under house arrest from where he made an emotional plea for help for him and his family from international “friends of Gabon” to “make noise”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Deposed Gabonese president, Ali Bongo, makes an emotional plea for help after being placed under house arrest.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The coup appears to have brought an end to his family’s <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/timeline-gabon-since-independence-in-10-dates/">55-year hold on power in Gabon</a>. His father, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, was president for almost 42 years from 1967. When he died in hospital in 2009, his son won the presidency in an election criticised at the time as little more than a dynastic handover.</p>
<p>News of Bongo’s removal from power was greeted by many with jubilation, with crowds taking to the streets in support of the military junta. There has long been talk of corruption in Gabon, with many believing that revenues from the country’s considerable oil wealth are not being distributed evenly, leaving many in poverty.</p>
<p>Gabon, a <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3520.htm">member of Opec</a>, produces more than 200,000 barrels of oil a day, but – despite having one of Africa’s highest incomes per capita – more than one-third of the population of 2.3 million are thought to be living below the poverty line, according to the UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/GAB.pdf">Development Programme</a>. </p>
<h2>Contested election</h2>
<p>The result of the August 26 election, which appeared to hand Bongo his third term in power, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66620070">widely disputed</a>. Before polls even closed there were complaints that many of the polling stations did not have papers bearing the name of Bongo’s main opponent, former university professor and one-time education minister, Albert Ondo Ossa. </p>
<p>There were reported long delays in polling stations being opened, the internet was shut down, and a curfew was imposed as polls closed. It took three days for the electoral authorities to announce that Bongo had won with 64.3% of the vote compared with 30.8% for Ossa. The coup is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/a-coup-in-gabon-who-what-and-why">reported to have taken place</a> within an hour of the results being announced.</p>
<p>This was not an attempt to unseat Bongo. In 2016, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20160831-gabon-bongo-wins-presidential-election-commission-ping">outbreaks of violence</a> which resulted in more than 50 deaths after an extremely tight election result which Bongo won by 49.8% of the vote against his main opponent, Jean Ping with 48.2%. </p>
<p>There was also a coup attempt in January 2019, when a group of army officers tried to take power while Bongo was undergoing treatment for a stroke in Morocco. The 2019 botched coup attempt was an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190108-gabon-botched-coup-ali-bongo-disputed-elections">early signal</a> of Bongo’s weakening grip on the military. He responded in December 2019 by arresting his chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, on corruption charges.</p>
<p>But this time, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">loud celebrations</a> in the capital Libreville would seem to indicate that, for now at least, the military junta enjoys a level of popular support.</p>
<p>Any unrest is likely to be met with a military clampdown. Gabon’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/">human rights record</a> has been mixed, with reports of abuse and violence, especially <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/gabon/report-gabon/">against dissident voices</a> after the 2016 election. All of which have serious consequences for governance and stability in the short to long term, both in Gabon and across the region. Under Bongo, Gabon had a Freedom House score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2023">20 out of 100</a>, reflecting the tight grip held by Bongo through his control of the military. Now the military has control.</p>
<h2>International reaction</h2>
<p>The African Union has responded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup">suspending Gabon’s membership</a> and, if the EU and other western countries react the same way as they have to other recent coups, sanctions are likely to be imposed. France, which has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military ties with Gabon, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed">400 soldiers stationed in the country</a>, has roundly condemned the coup and called for the election result to be respected, as has the UK. The US has called the events in Gabon “deeply concerning”, while the EU has said the coup would be discussed by ministers this week, according to its top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who said: “If this is confirmed, it’s another military coup, which increases instability in the whole region.”</p>
<p>Gabon is not a member of west Africa’s regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). But the events in Libreville will put pressure on the regional body which is already discussing ways to reverse the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">recent coup in Niger</a> which occurred barely a month ago. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of central and west African countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Troubled region: political instability is rife across central and west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/west-central-africa-political-map-capitals-212454859">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup puts France in a difficult position, given its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/31/gabon-crisis-is-another-challenge-to-frances-african-strategy">close relationship with Ali Bongo</a>, and it might feel pressure to intervene militarily, given that Ecowas already has its hands full with Niger. French influence in a region it once saw as its imperial backyard has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysis-france-losing-its-diplomatic-grip-on-west-africa-hsxhq6k0v">taken a battering</a> in the past two years with coups in francophone countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger.</p>
<p>Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135#:%7E:text=Russian%20military%20advisers%20arrived%20in,2022%2C%20it%20delivered%20arms%20shipments.">trying to strengthen its influence in the region</a> and might see an opportunity to gain further influence by supporting Gabon’s military junta. China, too, is keen to play a growing role in the region – although Beijing tends mainly to concentrate on building economic ties on the resource-rich continent.</p>
<p>But the aftermath of recent events in Libreville will no doubt be watched most closely by the various other longstanding rulers in the region whose democratic mandate might be weaker than their dependence on their armies or foreign mercenaries to keep them in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo is the latest in a string of leaders to be ousted in military coups since 2020.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115372023-08-17T15:47:46Z2023-08-17T15:47:46ZGabon: how the Bongo family’s 56-year rule has hurt the country and divided the opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542667/original/file-20230814-15-yo99yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gabon President Ali Bongo Ondimba speaks during a trade conference in London in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> appears set to end the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years hold</a> to power in Gabon. A group of senior military officers <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/military-announce-coup-in-gabon-as-senior-officers-seize-power-after-presidential-election-12950578">announced</a> that they had seized power shortly after President Ali Bongo Ondimba was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">declared winner</a> of the country’s recently held presidential poll.</p>
<p>The coup leaders claimed the 26 August general election was not credible. They announced a cancellation of the election result, closure of all borders and dissolution of all state institutions including the legislative arm of government.<br>
Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election that the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%.</p>
<p>Ali Bongo, (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">son of former president Omar Bongo who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009</a>) contested the election on the platform of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a> (PDG), founded by his father. The party has monopolised power in the oil-rich central African country for more than half a century.</p>
<p>The Bongo family has held onto power for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years</a>. It has done so through single-party government, corruption in the mining and oil sectors, and political kinship. According to some estimates Ali Bongo personally controls <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/8-richest-dictators-history-172424055.html">US$1 billion</a> in assets, much of that secreted overseas, making him the richest man in Gabon. </p>
<p>In addition, the constitution has been <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">changed several times</a> in the past decades to ensure the Bongos’ continued rule. </p>
<p>First, term limits were removed from the constitution in 2003, ensuring that Bongo could serve as president for life. </p>
<p>Second, traditional two-round ballots were changed into single-round ballots, also in 2003. This was to ensure that Bongo’s opponents could not rally around a single challenger in a run-off. </p>
<p>Third, instead of requiring that the winner obtain a majority, all that is needed for Bongo to be re-elected is a plurality. This means a majority could be less than 50%, as long as the winner has the most votes. Had he been required to win a majority of votes, Ali Bongo, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">49.8%</a> in the 2016 election, would not be president today.</p>
<p>Fourth, in April 2023, the presidential term was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230407-gabon-reduces-presidential-term-to-five-years-before-elections">reduced</a> from seven to five years, ensuring the presidential elections would occur at the same time as legislative and local elections. </p>
<p>In the past, after presidential elections, opposition parties would organise against Bongo’s ruling party to capture seats in the legislative and local elections. The change makes it much more likely that all the institutions of government power will be taken by Bongo and his party in one single election. </p>
<p>Bongo’s party increased its seats in the national assembly, holding 63 out of 120 seats in 1990 and most recently 98 out of 143 in 2018. The ruling party has also increased its seats in the senate from 52 out of 92 in 1997, to 46 out of 67 in 2021.</p>
<p>The continuous rule by the Bongos has not been good for a country of just <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a> people. Gabon is a resource-rich country and was once heralded as the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>”. Because of its small population and large oil reserves, per capita income is at least <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Gabon/gdp_per_capita_ppp/#:%7E:text=GDP%20per%20capita%2C%20Purchasing%20Power%20Parity&text=The%20average%20value%20for%20Gabon,2022%20is%2013949.16%20U.S.%20dollars.">US$13,949.16</a>. In neighbouring Cameroon, per capita income is only <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp-per-capita">US$3,733</a> </p>
<p>But Gabon’s “average” is belied by a population where a third of the citizens live below the poverty line and unemployment stands at about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a> among young people.</p>
<h2>Dynastic republic</h2>
<p>Gabon is not a monarchy but a “dynastic republic”.</p>
<p>In dynastic republics, presidents have concentrated power in their hands and established systems of personal rule. They transmit state power through nepotism to their family and kin. This includes sons and daughters, wives and ex-wives, brothers and sisters, half-siblings and step-siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, in-laws, illegitimate children and so on. </p>
<p>Under this system, the classical ideal of a legal-rational state – where position and rank are distributed based on merit in the name of the rational (efficient and effective) functioning of government -– is corrupted. </p>
<p>In all dynastic republics around the world – including Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Turkmenistan and most recently Cambodia –- an institutionalisation of traditional family power through the modern vehicle of a single ruling party has been critical.</p>
<p>In Gabon, this is the Parti Démocratique Gabonais. The party holds the presidential palace and has a majority in the national assembly (98/143 seats) and in the senate (46/67 seats). It also controls the courts, and the regional and municipal governments. </p>
<p>It is critical to understand that no man rules alone. Only with a large party apparatus can a man and his family rule a republic with millions of people.</p>
<p>But why has the rule by one man and his family been tolerated? </p>
<p>The answer is the political elite need him to keep their own positions.</p>
<p>The economist <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107671/1/81962733X.pdf">Gordon Tullock</a> hypothesised back in 1987 that dynastic succession appeals to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle. In 2007, professor of government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231991883_THE_RESILIENCE_OF_RULING_PARTIES_Jason_Brownlee_Authoritarianism_in_an_Age_of_Democratization_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_2007_Pp_xiii_264_2399">Jason Brownlee</a> tested this theory by looking at 258 non-monarchical autocrats. He found that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent when the incumbent had arisen from a party and his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Dictator_s_Handbook.html?id=UBY5DgAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Bruno Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith</a> argue that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>essential supporters have a much greater chance of retaining their privileged position when power passes within a family from father to son, from king to prince, than when power passes to an outsider.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Omar Bongo founded the PDG in 1967 as a de jure one-party system. After constitutional reforms in 1990, he permitted the existence of opposition parties. But because he never held free or fair elections, the democratic opposition has never managed to wrest power from either the Bongos or their ruling party.</p>
<p>In the past, elections in Gabon were followed by protests, which were followed by security force crackdowns and ultimately silence. But the 2023 election may turn out to be different as it appears to have been followed by a military coup.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on 30 August to reflect the coup in Gabon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon is resource rich, but the Bongo family’s continuous rule has been bad news for the country of 2.3 million people.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1291602019-12-27T14:23:18Z2019-12-27T14:23:18ZCountries to watch in 2020, from Chile to Afghanistan: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307993/original/file-20191219-11914-a47ix3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4079%2C2715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anti-government protesters in Chile defend themselves against a police water cannon, Santiago, Nov. 15, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Chile-Protests/78c38eaebd6e417b9c67c5ef12bb8969/211/0">AP Photo/Luis Hidalgo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Where will the world’s attention turn in 2020? </p>
<p>The United States’ impeachment trial of Donald Trump and the United Kingdom’s long-awaited Brexit are sure bets. And after the U.S. military withdrawal from northern Syria in October, Bashar al-Assad may well win his civil war this year.</p>
<p>Many other countries will see pivotal events in 2020, too. Here are five countries to watch. </p>
<h2>1. Venezuela</h2>
<p>This year will bring new depths of misery to Venezuela, which is suffering the worst economic collapse ever seen outside war. </p>
<p>“Most Venezuelans today are desperately poor,” explains St. Mary’s College professor Marco Aponte-Moreno, citing a U.N. statistic that 90% of the people in the South American country live in poverty – double what it was in 2014.</p>
<p>The increasingly severe U.S. economic sanctions passed last year, aimed at crippling the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-reasons-why-trumps-venezuela-embargo-wont-end-the-maduro-regime-121538">only making life harder for poor Venezuelans</a>, Aponte-Moreno writes.</p>
<p>Most Venezuelans today rely on monthly government food delivery to survive. </p>
<p>“If the government runs out of money, poor people will feel it the most – not the government officials,” writes Aponte-Moreno. </p>
<p>It is unclear when Maduro’s rule will end. Last year, his government survived several coup attempts and opposition leader Juan Guaidó’s effort to wrest power from Maduro to become Venezuela’s “rightful” president was backed by 60 countries. </p>
<p>“Maduro has few international allies,” says Aponte-Moreno. “But China and Russia continue to be Venezuela’s most powerful international boosters and have bailed out Maduro by giving his government massive loans.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children bathe with buckets of water in La Guaira, Venezuela, Aug. 17, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Venezuela-Political-Crisis/37e63708c8c54728a3556bb75685d8c1/24/0">AP Photo/Leonardo Fernandez</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. Gabon</h2>
<p>Sixty years ago, Gabon was among 17 African countries to declare their independence from colonial rule. Now, many Gabonese are <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-its-ruling-dynasty-withers-gabon-a-us-ally-and-guardian-of-french-influence-in-africa-ponders-its-future-110076">hoping to enter a new era</a>: democracy.</p>
<p>Gabon’s longtime president Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has run the central African country since the late 1960s, is frail after an apparent stroke. The 60-year-old narrowly survived a military coup last January. </p>
<p>These events have “created a strong national sentiment that Gabon’s five-decade Bongo dynasty is on its last legs,” writes University of Tampa political scientist Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot.</p>
<p>Political upheaval is rare in Gabon, an oil-rich country of 2 million. But stability is not the same as democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A military ‘coup to restore democracy’ in Gabon in Jan. 2019 failed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Gabon-Coup/c0fec374c0c049ed8df0f7c6291bc8d7/13/0">Gabon State TV via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Gabon has had just three presidents” since 1960, writes Ofoulhast-Othamot. “The current president’s father – Omar Bongo Ondimba – ruled Gabon with an iron fist for 42 years,” allowing oil wealth to enrich a tiny elite and dutifully maintaining the country’s loyalty to France. </p>
<p>Surveys show 87% of Gabonese feel that the country is headed in the wrong direction under Bongo.</p>
<p>Gabon’s next presidential election isn’t until 2023. But, Ofoulhast-Othamot predicts, “Bongo’s time in office may run out sooner.” </p>
<h2>3. Chile</h2>
<p>Chile is one of several South American countries to see massive, sustained demonstrations in recent months. Weeks after declaring “war” on protesters, Chilean president Sebastián Piñera relented to their demands to reinvent the country’s constitution.</p>
<p>Chile’s current constitution was written under Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the dictator who ruled the country from 1973 to 1990. Pinochet is reviled for overseeing several thousand extrajudicial executions, torture and forced disappearances. </p>
<p>He also left the country with social and economic policies now “<a href="https://theconversation.com/chiles-political-crisis-is-another-brutal-legacy-of-long-dead-dictator-pinochet-126305">ripping Chile’s social fabric apart</a>,” writes Drake University’s Paul Posner, who studies inequality in Chile.</p>
<p>Pinochet took free market economics to unprecedented extremes in Chile, eviscerating labor rights and ending government funding of the country’s retirement and health care systems.</p>
<p>“These neoliberal reforms came with strong support from the U.S. government,” notes Posner. </p>
<p>Shifting responsibility for providing social services from the state onto the private sector made Chile an economic dynamo. It has grown by around 4.7% annually since 1990. </p>
<p>But that prosperity was unevenly distributed. Unemployment among poor Chileans is 30%, private health care is exorbitantly expensive and even middle-class Chileans can’t afford to retire.</p>
<p>This year, Chileans will vote on a new constitution meant to address these severe social and economic inequities. </p>
<p>“Raised in democracy, Chile’s young protesters expect a fairer share of the country’s wealth,” writes Posner. “And they’re not old enough to fear an authoritarian crackdown for proclaiming their rights.”</p>
<h2>4. Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Eighteen years into the United States’ disastrous war in Afghanistan, renewed negotiations with the Taliban militant group are raising the possibility of peace.</p>
<p>But that will take more than an accord, says peace-building expert Elizabeth Hassemi, a faculty lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.</p>
<p>“History shows that <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-negotiations-resume-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">economic growth and better job opportunities are necessary to rebuild stability after war</a>,” she writes.</p>
<p>Hassemi believes Afghanistan’s “abundant natural resources” could help the country along its path to recovery. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghanistan is open for business, Kabul, Sept. 8, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Daily-Life/b13b4f95db6d4fe7b726c359dbaff1d9/25/0">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Afghanistan produces coveted cashmere, pine nuts and saffron, and the craggy mountains of Panjshir Province hide emeralds of renowned color and purity. In a more stable Afghanistan, says Hassemi, agricultural and mineral exports could bring substantial income to rural areas long held by the Taliban. </p>
<p>“A Taliban accord is necessary to end the Afghanistan war,” Hassemi says. “But creating meaningful jobs and sustainable economic growth will help create a durable peace.”</p>
<h2>5. Mexico</h2>
<p>Thirteen months into Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidency, <a href="https://theconversation.com/cartel-sieges-leave-mexicans-wondering-if-criminals-run-the-country-126986">cartel violence in Mexico has never been worse</a>.</p>
<p>“Recent deadly attacks by criminal organizations have instilled fear across Mexico,” writes Angélica Durán-Martínez, of University of Massachusetts Lowell. </p>
<p>These include two shootouts between cartels and police that killed 30 people in October 2019, a deadly 12-hour criminal assault on Culiacán, Sinaloa, that forced Mexican security forces to release the son of drug kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and the November massacre of nine Mormon women and children in northern Mexico. </p>
<p>López Obrador campaigned on novel strategies to “pacify” Mexico. He proposed pardoning low-level drug traffickers who leave the business, legalizing marijuana and holding trigger-happy soldiers responsible for committing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Today, those proposals remain largely untested. And with <a href="https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2019/12/03/2019-cerrara-con-36-000-homicidios-y-solo-1-de-cada-10-se-castiga-reportes">36,000 murders reported last year</a> – 90% of which went unpunished – 2019 was the bloodiest year in modern Mexican history.</p>
<p><em>This story is a round-up of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
There’s much more going on in the world than the Trump impeachment and Brexit. Here are five momentous global stories to track in 2020.Catesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1100762019-04-01T10:39:03Z2019-04-01T10:39:03ZAs its ruling dynasty withers, Gabon – a US ally and guardian of French influence in Africa – ponders its future<p>The fragility of one of the world’s longest-lasting political dynasties was exposed when the military attempted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-coup/gabon-thwarts-military-coup-attempt-in-presidents-absence-idUSKCN1P10FE">coup in Gabon in January</a>.</p>
<p>The coup, orchestrated by junior members of Gabon’s military, failed to unseat Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has run the central African country since the late 1960s. And Gabon’s next presidential election isn’t until the summer of 2023. </p>
<p>Bongo’s time in office may run out sooner. </p>
<p>The 60-year-old strongman has been effectively unable to rule since suffering <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1N31VY-OZATP">an apparent stroke</a> in October 2018, during Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative – often called “Davos in the desert.” </p>
<p>His evident frailty in recent TV appearances, coupled with the failed coup and lack of an obvious heir, has created a strong national sentiment that Gabon’s five-decade Bongo dynasty is on its last legs.</p>
<h2>One of France’s last neocolonial outposts in Africa</h2>
<p>Political upheaval is rare in Gabon, a diminutive central African nation about the size of the state of Colorado, with a population of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2 million</a> and a lucrative oil industry. </p>
<p>Except for a short-lived military coup in 1964, Gabon has been regarded as a bastion of stability in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central-african-republic">troubled central Africa</a>, <a href="http://ut.academia.edu/GYLDASOFOULHASTOTHAMOT">where my research is focused</a>. Oil wealth and the Bongo dynasty’s French backing has contributed to Gabon’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-corrupt-nepotist-who-ruled-gabon-for-40-years-1700197.html">security</a>, and in recent years Bongo has used this stability to turn Gabon into a key <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/meet-ali-bongo-ondimba-obamas-man-in-africa/">U.S. ally</a> in the region.</p>
<p>But stability is not the same as democracy. </p>
<p>Since winning independence from France, in 1960, Gabon has had just three presidents. The first was Léon M’ba, who ruled from independence until 1967. The current president’s father – Omar Bongo Ondimba – assumed power <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/524984?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">after M'ba died</a>. </p>
<p>Omar Bongo went on to rule Gabon with an iron fist for 42 years. To stay in power, he oversaw changes that ensured that the country’s nascent electoral system never became <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-2-page-126.htm">independent, free or fair</a>. </p>
<p>During his rule, the elder Bongo helped to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713675627?casa_token=J8_PMc81kmsAAAAA:74wMxqVYPCQvFxZdf3ttPvD9H7lRvVeu3TzuD65L8EZST9WXaMpw_TH3LrXAlyI78DGWFS_jx_COkQ">keep French political influence</a> and <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gb-forrel-fr.htm">military might</a> alive in Africa by signing several mutual defense treaties with France. His policies benefited the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0963948052000341196">Françafrique</a>” – a now-<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/opinions/francafrique-a-brief-history-of-a-scandalous-word/">disparaged term</a> describing France’s “special” relationship with its former colonies on the continent, which has included supporting dictators who protect its economic interests.</p>
<p>Omar Bongo ensured that Gabon remained a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161015?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">neocolonial enclave</a>,” as anthropologist Michael Reed wrote in 1987 in the Journal of Modern African Studies. </p>
<p>“Gabon’s very identity is inseparable from France,” Reed argued, “and the latter’s continued claim to ‘major power’ status, in which Africa is crucial, requires Gabon’s assistance.” </p>
<p>President Ali Bongo Ondimba, who assumed power after his father died in 2009 – in yet another election marred by <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gabon">irregularities</a> – inherited his father’s fealty to France. </p>
<p>Gabon still routinely aligns itself with French interests in Africa. During Libya’s 2011 political upheaval, for example, Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-01/african-union-refuses-arrest-gaddafi">broke with the African Union</a> and called for the embattled President Muammar Gaddafi <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/11/us-think-tank-hails-african-leader-accused-of-stealing-an-electi/">to step down</a>. France and other Western powers sought to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20110430-libya-muammar-gaddafi-offers-ceasefire-refuses-to-leave">dislodge the authoritarian Gaddafi</a>, while African nations supported Gaddafi, promoting “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2012.761463?src=recsys&journalCode=cjca20">African solutions to African problems</a>.”</p>
<h2>A stable non-democracy</h2>
<p>The rise of Ali Bongo – who was minister of defense during the latter part of his father’s reign – was contentious even within his own Gabonese Democratic Party.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gabon is an island of peace in the often unsettled central Africa region.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bongo was forcefully challenged by a senior former party member in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/gabon-court-rules-president-ali-bongo-rightful-winner-of-september-election">2016 presidential election</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Jean Ping</a>. Boosted by the failure of Bongo’s reform agenda to <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gabon-politics-insight/gabons-bongo-struggles-to-transform-african-oil-republic-idUKKBN0ET1W720140618">transform Gabon into an emerging economy</a>, Ping almost convinced the Gabonese people that the Bongo dynasty had to go.</p>
<p>In the end, Bongo beat <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Ping</a>, a former head of the African Union Commission, by fewer than 6,000 votes, with 50.66 percent of the vote. Ping, along with many local and foreign observers, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-election-election-idUSKCN11C112">considers the results of that race</a> fraudulent.</p>
<p>The 2016 presidential election was damaging for the Bongo dynasty. It was the first time that the opposition to the Bongo family coalesced around a single, credible candidacy. </p>
<p>Ever since then, once peaceful Gabon has experienced <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/01/09/a-libreville-un-putsch-rate-revelateur-du-malaise-gabonais_5406573_3212.html">political crises</a>. Ping’s party <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-votes-for-first-time-since-violence-marred-2016-election-20181006-2">boycotted last year’s municipal elections</a>, and his half of the electorate considers Bongo an illegitimate president. </p>
<h2>Rich and poor</h2>
<p>Gabon has also been in an <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gaulme_crisis_oil_producing_countries_gabon_congo_2018.pdf">economic and fiscal crisis</a> since 2014. </p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, government revenues decreased substantially due to the <a href="http://africa-me.com/gabon-economic-crisis-government-fuels-investor-mistrust-expropriation-veolia-seeg/">fall of global oil prices</a>. Last year, the International Monetary Fund agreed to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-economy-imf/gabons-economy-to-recover-in-2018-needs-progress-on-reforms-imf-says-idUSL8N1TS374">bail out Gabon’s government in exchange for</a> structural reforms, including a <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180626-gouvernement-gabonais-reduire-train-vie-etat">three-year hiring freeze in the public sector</a>.</p>
<p>Inequality is also <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient">very high</a> in Gabon. Historically, its oil wealth <a href="http://www.ga.undp.org/content/gabon/fr/home/countryinfo/">has not financially benefited most of its people</a>, who remain quite poor.</p>
<p>Gabon places <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">110 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index</a>, which assesses longevity, education levels, poverty, social equality, maternal death and other measures of well-being. That is higher than <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">immediate neighbors like Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea</a>, but lower than expected for a middle-income country whose government runs on oil money.</p>
<p>The African island of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mauritius/overview">Mauritius</a>, for instance, whose gross domestic product is similar to Gabon’s – which was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=GA-MU">US$15 billion in 2017</a> – fares far better. It ranks 65th worldwide on the UN’s human development index. </p>
<h2>A future yet to be written</h2>
<p>Surveys show that 87 percent of Gabonese feel that the country is <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/despite-overwhelming-discontent-gabonese-want-democracy-and-reject-military-rule-survey-shows">headed in the wrong direction</a>. They blame Ali Bongo for that, though 71 percent reject any attempt to install a military dictatorship.</p>
<p>Despite attempts by the Gabonese Democratic Party to reassure the public that Bongo’s health is improving, it is <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFL5N20K387">unclear if he will ever recover enough to again lead Gabon</a>. </p>
<p>For now, an amendment of the constitution by Gabon’s constitutional court in November 2018 has ensured that the president remains – at least nominally – <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/gabon-constitutional-court-amends-constitution-address-presidents-absence">in charge</a> while recovering from the stroke.</p>
<p>When Bongo dies or is rendered incapacitated – a scenario that, in my assessment, is already well underway – the Bongo dynasty will end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot is not affiliated with any political organization, but he was a supporter of Jean Ping in Gabon's 2016 presidential election.</span></em></p>Gabon’s strongman president, Ali Bongo, is barely clinging to power after contested elections, a stroke and a coup attempt. The Bongo family has run this stable central African nation for 52 years.Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Adjunct professor, Political Science and International Studies, University of TampaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916902018-02-13T13:16:18Z2018-02-13T13:16:18ZWith a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206165/original/file-20180213-44660-yvjtjz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Democratic Republic of Congo's President Joseph Kabila. Time to step aside.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kenny Katombe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.</p>
<p>The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples. </p>
<p>The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections. </p>
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
<p>In Pretoria President Jacob Zuma <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-finally-falls-on-his-sword-but-not-before-threatening-to-take-the-house-down-with-him-91910">resigned</a> on February 14. He had come under increasing pressure to do so following the December election of Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f727f130-e3e7-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da">as president of the African National Congress</a>, and the future president of the country. </p>
<p>And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html">ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a>, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.</p>
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
<p>The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/dr-congo-president-can-remain-in-office-without-a-vote-court">to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term</a>. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/31/congo-security-forces-shoot-two-dead-during-protest-against-president">mounting national protests</a>, which <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-protesters-killed-anti-kabila-protests-180121105558348.html">the regime has crushed</a>. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.</p>
<p>In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">reelection in October</a>. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171003-eye-africa-cameroon-anglophone-unrest-kenya-election-protest-oromo-festival-ethiopia">faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon</a> and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/Reviews%20&%20Outlooks/Cameroon---Risks-Will-Rise-On-Upcoming-Election/36227">leaves room for speculation and uncertainty</a>. </p>
<p>In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">election at the end of this year</a>, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13861843">with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001</a>. There are fears this will happen again.</p>
<p>Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">are expected to hold presidential elections this year</a>. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170928_sg_report_on_mali_september_eng.pdf">is not immune to terrorist attacks</a>.</p>
<p>No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/24/egypt-heading-towards-elections-president-sisis-name-ballot/">will certainly be reelected president of a country</a> he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/former-egyptian-general-arrested-by-military-after-announcing-presidential-bid-sami-anan">now controls unchallenged</a>.</p>
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
<p>In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">who had been in power for 38 years</a>. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">protests</a> demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigerias-president-warns-togo-about-political-instability-20180208">to restore calm</a>. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/04/togolese-president-faure-gnassingbe-is-new-ecowas-chairperson/">the organization until June 2018</a>. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.</p>
<p>Like Togo, Gabon experienced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">similar ‘transition’</a> from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-mulls-amnesty-for-post-election-violence-20170914">marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression</a>. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.</p>
<p>The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-president-defends-constitutional-change-after-parliament-gives-okay-20180111">‘monarchisation’ of power</a>. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.</p>
<p>In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/guinea-bissau-president-names-new-prime-minister-0">since 2014</a>. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-mission-to-guinea-bissau-to-assess-the-implementation-of-conakry-and-bissau-agreements/">under the aegis of the regional west African body</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ecowas-threatens-guinea-bissau-sanctions-as-crisis-drags-20171217">Vaz runs the risk of sanctions</a>, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/ecomib.htm">the regional troop deployment</a>. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012414125957785808.html">mostly known military coups and instability</a>. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.</p>
<p>In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/08/chad-suspends-10-parties-for-disturbing-public-order/">plagued the economy</a>. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr20/7045/2017/en/">his repressive methods</a>. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/civil-unrest-chad-idriss-deby/">is expected to hold legislative elections this year</a>.</p>
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.</p>
<p>What the continent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/africa/12prexy.html">needs most are strong institutions</a>, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTNk4q6zRw8">paradigm shift</a> as embodied with determination, class and panache by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PNJjpw-Qb4">Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed M Diatta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa needs strong institutions. But they can only be built if there’s a change in leadership.Mohamed M Diatta, Ph.D. Candidate & Lecturer in Political Science-International Relations, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/847272017-10-03T12:16:02Z2017-10-03T12:16:02ZGabon’s political force is its thriving hip-hop scene<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187574/original/file-20170926-17414-bikw6d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Duo Movaizhaleine and artist Wonda Wendy take a minute's silence to honor the dead during a concert in Paris, February 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Silber Mba </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Gabon as in <a href="http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_CEA_209_0143--masculine-strength-and-rap-music.htm">other African states</a>, rap has become instrumental in constructing political identity.</p>
<p>On August 17, Gabon celebrated 57 years of independence with a massive <a href="http://news.alibreville.com/h/74818.html">free concert</a> in the capital, Libreville. The aim: to promote national unity in a festive fashion. An impressive lineup of local hip hop stars – including Ba'Ponga, Tris, Tina and Ndoman – were invited to draw in the younger crowds.</p>
<p>The celebrations held particular significance in light of another, darker anniversary. Last year on August 31, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">shockingly violent</a> crisis erupted following President Ali Bongo’s <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/09/09/presidentielle-gabonaise-comment-truquer-une-election-pour-75-000-euros_4995385_3212.html">contested electoral victory</a>.</p>
<p>One year on, the country is <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/468781/politique/gabon-un-an-apres-la-presidentielle-un-pays-en-situation-delicate/">still feeling</a> the social, political and economic effects, as is its rap scene.</p>
<h2>Violent demonstrations</h2>
<p>In the early 1990s, Gabon’s government was shut down by violent demonstrations and a general strike. It forced dictator Omar Bongo, who <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-2-page-126.htm">had been in power since 1967</a>, to set up a national conference reestablishing a multiparty system and granting greater freedom of expression.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘African revolution’, one of V2A4’s first hits, explicitly mentions the misappropriation of public funds.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Against the backdrop of this popular uprising, the youth of Libreville began writing rap music. Inspired by American hip hop artists like Public Enemy and NWA, and French rappers like NTM and Assassin, they expressed their need for escape, freedom and change.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Si'Ya Po'Ossi X bluntly describes daily life in the ‘mapanes’, poor urban areas where the majority of people live.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet this subversive scene hasn’t been totally exempt from the kinds of ties between music and politics that have existed since the onset of African independence in the 1960s. In fact, some protest rappers have links to the “system” through family ties with political elites. V2A4, for example, is made up of the son of the Interior minister (a close relative to former president Omar Bongo) and the child of a local businessman. Both study in France and live off the wealth of the “system”.</p>
<h2>Bling Gabon style</h2>
<p>From the 2000s on, inspired by <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-gangsta-rap-2857307">gangsta rap</a>, video clips have started to feature more gold chains, souped-up cars, women in suggestive poses and virile displays of masculinity.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The rapper Kôba is an icon of bling culture in Gabon.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Ushered in by bling style rapper Kôba, a new generation of rappers began to write songs that deviated from the protest-driven hip hop of their predecessors. This trend was encouraged by the appearance of new record labels, with close ties to the government and elites, further reinforcing the link between music and politics.</p>
<p>This fusion between music and politics reached new highs during the 2009 election. Presidential candidate Ali Bongo used the popularity of rap artists to attract youth support and distinguish himself from his father, Omar, who had died in June that year.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Presidential candidate Ali Bongo on stage with rap stars from Hay'oe, who supported his campaign.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Following his election in 2009, Ali Bongo brought new faces from the world of hip hop into the government. Due to these kinds of affiliations, Bongo’s semi-authoritarian regime has exercised particularly tight control over the hip hop scene, in particular via the media.</p>
<h2>Without jobs</h2>
<p>Right from the start, Bongo’s first seven-year term in office was <a href="https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=POLAF_144_0157">marked</a> by a decline in living standards and social infrastructure and continuing high unemployment levels – more than 20% of the population, and 35% of young people are <a href="http://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2015/03/31/gabons-unemployment-conundrum-why-economic-growth-is-not-leading-to-more-jobs">without jobs</a>. This, while the Bongo family’s spending has <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2015/08/20/ali-bongo-seme-a-tout-va-la-fortune-de-papa_1366491">reached outrageous highs</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://gabonreview.com/blog/musique-f-a-n-g-entre-nouveau-single-diatribe-contre-censure/">Censorship</a>and the co-option or <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/12/20/gabon-des-manifestants-reclament-le-depart-du-president_4544324_3212.html">silencing of opposition</a> have become increasingly common. Dissenting hip hop artists now have to find alternative ways to spread their messages.</p>
<p>Most subversive rap is now produced abroad, with several well-known Gabonese rappers making their music in China, South Africa, the US or France. These artists-in-exile form a highly political network. Their songs reach the streets of Libreville through social media, becoming calls for political debate and action.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The title ‘Mister Zero’ was recorded in south of France by rapper Saik1ry who condemned Ali Bongo’s disastrous record, now an anthem at opposition demonstrations. </movie
Back home, many artists continue the fight in spite of censorship. In 2015, outspoken rapper Keurtyce E became the first to release a song openly opposing the current regime.
Keurtyce directly threatens the President in his song ‘We’ll make a fresh start’
Beyond the lyrical content of these songs, Gabonese artists ingeniously use the musical arrangements to subversive ends.
Clever use of sampling
Sampling, cutting and looping allow artists to anchor their music within the local context, by using samples from traditional instruments or famous local songs, for instance. These techniques also carry political meaning, with artists mixing in lyrics, musical samples or slogans from activist musicians who they see as their ideological forebears.
Pierre-Claver Akendengué, for example, an icon of 1960s pan-Africanism and resistor to the authoritarian regime during the one-party system, remains a major source of inspiration for Gabonese musicians today.
The chorus from Movaizhaleine’s song ‘Aux choses du pays’ (To the stuff of our country) is adapted from the music of Akendengué.
Rapper/producer Lord Ekomy Ndong recently demonstrated another means of subversion. In a new song in which he samples excerpts from a speech by President Ali Bongo, juxtaposed with the words of social media activists, to condemn corruption and misappropriation of public funds.
Subversion through juxtaposition by Lord Ekomy Ndong.
Flareups on social media
During last year’s election, a great rift appeared in the rap scene between supporters and opponents of the president. A series of flareups on social media and diss-and-response songs deepened the divide.
Bongo had his praise singers:
On the one side, rappers aligned with the Bongo family, involved in rallies and producing songs to support the incumbent party.
But Bongo’s opponents were as vocal:
On the other side, protest rappers, denounce increased corruption and poverty since Bongo has taken office.
Rappers who had previously cooperated with Bongo joined opposition movements to demonstrate their disappointment with government failures. It intensified after troops opened fire on demonstrators following the release of the election results. Several people were killed and numerous others disappeared.
Just two months after this crackdown, Kôba, former poster boy for the system, released the song “Odjuku”. The title is a reference to Bongo’s supposed Nigerian biological father. The rapper reignited the controversy surrounding the president’s origins and joined other artists in declaring “On ne te suit pas” (We don’t follow you).
Kôba,‘Odjuku’
Forgetting the quagmire
One year on, the government is trying to make people forget its quagmire with events such as the massive August 17 free concert.
Yet, the protest movement is still active: demonstrations continue within striking government departments and at Libreville University. In the streets of Paris and New York, Gabonese expats rally together.
LestatXXL/Lord Ekomy Ndong ‘Sur mon drapeau’ (By my flag)
Through their songs, rappers like Lestat XXL and Lord Ekomy Ndong, commemorate the sorrowful anniversary of the 2016 repression:
Here no one will forget. We’ll hoist up the flame…
No red on my flag. Nothing will ever be the same.
<em>Alice Aterianus-Owanga is the author of “Rap Was Born Here! Music, Power and Identity in Modern Gabon”, published by Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, September 2017.</em>
<em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast for Word.</em></span></figcaption>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Aterianus-Owanga received funding from French Minister of Higher Education and research for this research, and she is currently receiving fundings from the Swiss National Fund for research. </span></em></p>Rap has become instrumental in constructing identity and radically reshaping relations to politics in Gabon and other African states.Alice Aterianus-Owanga, Postdoctoral researcher in Anthropology, Université de LausanneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/664472016-10-06T20:14:31Z2016-10-06T20:14:31ZAfrican citizens have very low levels of trust in how elections are run<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140142/original/image-20161003-20239-843tin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The charred interior of the Gabon's parliament after it was burned in post-election protests in Libreville.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Edward McAllister/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Only one-third of Africans think that votes in elections are always <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno35_electoral_management_in_africa1.pdf">counted fairly</a>. That’s a problem, as a disputed poll can be a flash point for protests. It also diminishes the public’s faith in democratic processes.</p>
<p>But in citizens’ eyes, problems start long before the polls close. Concerns go back to who gets a fair shot at competing for office, who feels safe in expressing their preferences, and how trustworthy the whole process is.</p>
<p>With at least 25 African countries conducting <a href="https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar">national elections in 2016-2017</a>, great attention is being focused on election management bodies. These are typically national electoral commissions which are crucial players in electoral processes.</p>
<p>They are also vitally important in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud. And, even if it doesn’t swing an election, it can produce political alienation, public mistrust, protest and violence.</p>
<p>The most recent example is Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after President Ali Bongo claimed a disputed <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">re-election victory</a>. Earlier, in Kenya, opposition calls for electoral commission reforms <a href="http://www.kenyanz.com/articles/tired-of-hypocrisy-in-cord-iebcmustfall-265">sparked demonstrations</a> and a violent reaction from security forces. In the Republic of the Congo, election malpractices led to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/congo-police-exchange-fire-militia-reports-160404073833646.html">violent protests</a>. In Ghana <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/25/ghana-gripped-by-economic-anxiety-as-election-countdown-gathers-pace">pre-election anxieties</a> are high amid questions about the electoral commission’s revision of the voter roll for the <a href="http://ghanaelection2016.ghanaweb-news.com/">general election</a> in December.</p>
<p>On average across 36 African countries surveyed by <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer</a>, a pan-African, non-partisan research network, in 2014/2015, citizens had a generally positive view of the quality of their elections, with 65% assessing their most recent national elections as “completely free and fair” or “free and fair, but with minor problems.” </p>
<p>Despite these generally positive evaluations, many of those surveyed found components of the election process wanting. Just half of respondents said they trusted their electoral commission “somewhat” (25%) or “a lot” (25%) (see Figure 1 below).</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1: Trust in national electoral commissions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1 Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: National Electoral Commission?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a number countries perceptions were far less positive. These included Sudan (29%), Morocco (34%), Gabon (37%) and Algeria (43%). </p>
<p>Our results mirror the assessments of election quality by experts from <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016">Freedom House</a> and the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/expert-survey-2">Index</a>.</p>
<h2>Violence as a factor</h2>
<p>Some of the lowest levels of trust were expressed in countries that had experienced closely contested elections in 2016. They included Gabon (25%), São Tomé and Príncipe (31%), and Ghana (37%). Four in 10 citizens (43%) believed the opposition was “sometimes,” “often,” or “always” prevented from running for office, and an alarmingly high 44% said that voters were “sometimes,” “often,” or “always” threatened with violence (Figure 2 below). </p>
<p><strong>Figure 2|Threats of violence at the polls</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections: Voters are threatened with violence at the polls?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If voters consider violence part of the election process – as they did at high rates in Nigeria, Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Kenya – this may limit citizens’ desire to express their own views. Suppression of the opposition and fear of violence at the polls have effects that are not visible, even in a fair vote count. </p>
<p>Consider those who stay home because the party they support is being harassed or they fear being attacked. These are silent voices that could tip the balance in a close election. Other substantial concerns included the bribery of voters and biased media coverage.</p>
<p>More fundamentally, such barriers to competition and participation may weaken public perceptions that elections serve their intended purposes. Half of those surveyed said that elections do not work well as mechanisms to ensure that people’s views were represented (50%) and that voters were able to remove nonperforming leaders from office (51%) (Figure 3).</p>
<p><strong>Figure 3: Performance of elections in Africa</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3 Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:
1. Ensure that members of Parliament/National Assembly representatives reflect the views of voters?
2. Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Countries with the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the representation and accountability performance of elections included Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Madagascar.</p>
<h2>Election flaws are rarely fixed</h2>
<p>Good election management is about ensuring honest and fair political competition. Anything short of that threatens to negate the purpose of holding elections in the first place. Without reliable, scientific survey data to challenge partisan claims, it has been too easy for incumbents to label opposition parties and civil society organisations as “spoilsports”, “troublemakers”, and in extreme cases “traitors” when they raise election quality concerns. </p>
<p>The Afrobarometer survey revealed that ordinary citizens have many concerns about election processes. These were often the same concerns voiced by opposition parties and civil society in protests and post-election petitions.</p>
<p>Despite significant public discontent, shortcomings in the quality of elections are rarely addressed after elections. Post-election protests may be met with government-sponsored repression, and courts often throw petitions out as unsubstantiated or find no way to mitigate the election flaws. </p>
<p>In addition, international observers often pass the buck by saying that although there were flaws in the process these did not determine the outcome of the election. The net effect is that election flaws are rarely fixed. In the worst cases ruling parties exploit them in subsequent elections.</p>
<p>For election authorities honestly promoting better elections, it is necessary to demonstrate high levels of transparency throughout the process and to engage stakeholders directly. Citizens are clearly the key stakeholders in elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with Afrobarometer.</span></em></p>National electoral commissions are crucial in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable fraud and produce political alienation.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/663742016-10-05T10:56:35Z2016-10-05T10:56:35ZGabon: no sign in sight of a family dynasty being displaced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140314/original/image-20161004-20223-stenan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remains of a burned car outside Gabon's National Assembly. It was set alight during unrest after the disputed reelection of President Ali Bongo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Edward McAllister</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the second time in seven years, a presidential election in Gabon has triggered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">violent unrest</a>. Rich in oil, uranium and manganese, Gabon now faces a turbulent future. Incumbent president Ali Bongo’s narrow victory over opponent Jean Ping ignited the country’s main cities and <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-20/gabon-court-to-recount-disputed-vote-results-ambassador-says">forced a recount</a> of the vote. </p>
<p>The crisis erupted when the candidate of the united opposition, 73-year-old Ping, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/gabon-opposition-leader-jean-ping-won-election-160903041118321.html">declared himself the winner</a>. Three days later Bongo, 57, endorsed the <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFL8N1BC4GJ">official result</a> announced by the National Electoral Commission or Cénap. There were only 5,594 votes separating the two from a registered total of 627,805 voters.</p>
<p>In the main cities of Libreville and Port-Gentil, protesters erected roadblocks and <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFL8N1BC5SO">set fire to the National Assembly</a>. Within days there were at least three deaths. More than a thousand protesters and looters were arrested.</p>
<p>The international reaction was to call for peace and a recount of the votes. The United Nations and the European Union meanwhile encouraged Ping to agree to an official intervention of Gabon’s constitutional court. In the end, the court – an institution staffed by judges devoted to Ali Bongo – ruled that the incumbent was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/gabon-court-rules-president-ali-bongo-rightful-winner-of-september-election">victorious</a> with a slightly higher majority than first announced. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, things don’t look good for Bongo. He faced turmoil at the 2009 election, when his ability as a ruler was untested. In the <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-the-Republic-of-Gabons-ratings-to-B1-outlook--PR_347929">current economic context</a> in 2016, he has become a liability. Will his foreign supporters grow weary of his increasingly shaky hold on power?<br>
In Gabon itself, it is not clear whether the elite who have been slighted by Bongo has enough popular backing to confront the heavily armed, well-organised president. Ordinary Gabonese face <a href="https://libreville.usembassy.gov/pr-09242016.html">ruthless retaliation</a>. Foreign observers reported that roadblocks obstructed the main roads in Libreville while <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-election-idUSKCN11X1T1">fighter jets</a> flew low over the city. </p>
<p>Yet Gabon, a nation that the Gabonese like to mock as “the country where nothing ever happens,” can always surprise.</p>
<h2>The birth of a “soft” dictatorship</h2>
<p>Since independence in 1960 Gabon has nurtured strong economic and diplomatic links with its former colonial ruler France. These enduring connections are an important part of today’s volatile situation. In 2009 then French president Nicolas Sarkozy made it known that he <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/former-french-president-sarkozy-under-fire-telling-gabonese-students-go-back-gabon-1582816">supported Ali Bongo’s candidacy</a>. The choice, some said, was to ensure the former colonial power’s name would not be sullied by secret documents that former leader Omar Bongo had stacked at the presidential palace. </p>
<p>France is not the only Western democracy to back the Gabonese government. This is mostly because Gabon has remained a “soft” dictatorship based on popular politics of regional equilibrium and a fairly successful system of redistribution of national wealth. Both have spared the country from the bloody ethnic conflicts of its neighbours, and tempered the rapacity of the local political class.</p>
<p>Under Omar Bongo between 1967 and 2009, the contact between Gabonese politics and the electoral base was built on a flexible system of co-option called “union nationale” or national unity. This was initiated in the 1960s by the first president of Gabon, Léon Mba. A member of the Fang ethnic group and a shrewd opponent of the French colonial regime, Mba surrounded himself with cabinets composed of representatives of all the country’s ethnic groups and provinces. </p>
<p>Mba also singled out Omar Bongo, a young and indefatigable bureaucrat from a minority ethnic group (Teke) in eastern Gabon, as his heir apparent. When Omar Bongo succeeded Mba, he embraced “union nationale” and added new forms of political patronage towards opponents to his regime. </p>
<p>In a country of <a href="http://countrymeters.info/en/Gabon">fewer than two million people</a> where more than 50 different languages are spoken, the public was reassured by the fact that the only ethnic group with a relative demographic advantage, the Fang, would not be in a position to monopolise power to the detriment of others. The Fang make up approximately 35% of the population.</p>
<p>The second key to the political system’s longevity lies in the many channels through which largesse is redistributed. Even if the political elite siphons off the largest part of the national income, most of them keep feeding a pyramid of allies, dependants and voters with money, help and gifts in kind, especially during electoral campaigns.</p>
<p>Gabon is a rich country with a poor population. GDP per capita is <a href="http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1264947">one of the highest</a> in Africa. Yet public education is broken and it daily water or electricity cuts are common. The majority of Gabonese people have no stable employment. Endemic economic insecurity has worsened since 2014 when the drop in oil prices dried up the country’s revenues. </p>
<p>Deprived of regular and equitable returns from mining and oil revenues, the Gabonese are highly dependent on the whims of a political class. This class presents itself as generous and ostentatious – a very popular political style in Gabon – while remaining in control of the national revenue. </p>
<h2>Elections under tight control</h2>
<p>It is also essential to understand the extent of control maintained by the state on electoral operations. The presidential election of 2016 is a perfect example of the government’s stranglehold:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The election date was announced only eight weeks before the vote,</p></li>
<li><p>Candidates had barely five weeks to submit their candidacies,</p></li>
<li><p>The official election campaign was restricted to within 14 days of the vote,</p></li>
<li><p>The 628,124 voter cards printed by government, and not the electoral body</p></li>
<li><p>The voter cards were distributed in a mere three weeks, and, last but not least</p></li>
<li><p>The Constitutional Court, the final arbiter on any dispute, is presided over by a former lover of Ali Bongo’s father.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The end of “national unity”</h2>
<p>Gabonese often express rampant distrust and hatred of the president. Ali Bongo is nicknamed “the Devil”, and is seen as an intruder to traditional Gabonese politics. His coming to power in 2009 imposed a dynastic logic that broke from the political patronage and ethnic equilibrium nurtured in the 1960s. </p>
<p>By contrast, Ping’s slogan – loosely translated as “the right dosage” – gives a nod to the tradition of ethnic and national balance. Ping, moreover, is a seasoned politician who can boast international stature. He served as Secretary General of the African Union from 2008-2012. When his position was not renewed in 2012, Ping resented the lack of support from Ali Bongo.</p>
<p>But the odds against a radical change of power are considerable. The opposition in Gabon is historically weak, poorly organised, and ready to collude with those in power. Most opponents to the regime are technocrats, or known to be close to the Bongo family. </p>
<p>Against these odds, France and the EU did not take the risk of pressuring Bongo to quit and encouraging Ping to claim electoral victory. Yet their lukewarm reaction to Bongo’s swearing-in suggests that the regime is now in survival mode. Opportunities for a legal political change are perhaps now more real than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Florence Bernault does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo seems to have won Gabon’s elections. Yet his contested “victory” has radically changed the political field in this soft democracy, one of Africa’s richest and most stable.Florence Bernault, Professeur, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/648572016-09-06T09:11:06Z2016-09-06T09:11:06ZGabon violence reflects longstanding and deep mistrust of election handling<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136618/original/image-20160905-4773-1ueqdje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Paris against Gabonese President Ali Bongo with placards reading: 1967-2016, 50 years in power is enough!</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gabon’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-01/gabon-eurobond-yields-jump-as-election-outcome-triggers-violence">closest election</a> since independence has erupted into controversy and violence. President Ali Bongo, who succeeded his father’s 42-year rule in 2009, claims the narrowest of victories over challenger Jean Ping. Ping is former chairman of the African Union and son-in-law of the former president.</p>
<p>Massive protests amid allegations of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/opinion/save-gabon-from-election-fraud.html?_r=0">election fraud</a> began after Bongo was declared the winner by a mere 5,594 votes, 49.8% to Ping’s 48.23%. Of particular concern to the opposition and international observers is the reported <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">99% turnout</a> in Haut-Ogooue, Bongo’s home province, where 95.5% of the vote went to the incumbent. Ping won six out of the nine provinces. Turnout in the other provinces was between 45% and 71%, according to the Interior ministry. Even members of the government, including Justice Minister Séraphin Moudounga who has just resigned, have begun to question whether the results “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37281970">tally with reality</a>.”</p>
<p>This close and contested result has been released in a <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/gabon-overwhelming-public-distrust-cenap-and-election-quality-forms-backdrop-presidential-vote">context</a> where Gabon’s electoral commission has continually failed to meet the public’s demands for transparency and confidence in managing free and fair elections. Data from the <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer survey</a> conducted in September and October of 2015 reveal that a majority (51%) of Gabonese had no trust “at all” in the election commission. Another 24% reported “a little bit” of trust <strong>(see Figure 1)</strong>. These are the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gabon enjoys a per capita income <a href="http://www.forbes.com/places/gabon/">four times</a> that of most sub-Saharan African nations. But because it has high levels of income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Oil accounts for approximately 80% of its exports. </p>
<h2>Election mistrust runs deep</h2>
<p>Not only do Gabonese mistrust the electoral commission, they also do not feel elections are free and fair. When asked to judge Gabon’s last election (in 2011 for the National Assembly), a majority (55%) found the elections to be seriously flawed. One-third of citizens (31%) reported that the elections were “not free and fair”. Another 24% found them “free and fair but with major problems”. </p>
<p>The most intense discontent with election quality was recorded among urban residents. A majority (58%) said they were not free and fair or had major problems. This is compared to 45% in rural areas.</p>
<p>At the heart of the protests that have broken out are allegations of fraud in the form of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>multiple voting, </p></li>
<li><p>ballot stuffing, and </p></li>
<li><p>a manipulated vote count. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Afrobarometer data reveal that seven in 10 Gabonese citizens (71%) believe votes are “never” or only “sometimes” counted fairly. A mere 15% believe that the vote count is always fair. Citizens who doubt that votes are counted fairly may question the government’s announcement of fewer than 6,000 votes separating the two contenders and 99% turnout in the president’s home area.</p>
<h2>Fears of violence and intimidation</h2>
<p>Gabonese also expressed major concerns about the environment leading up to elections <strong>(see Figure 2)</strong>. Significant proportions (56%) believe that the government interferes with the political opposition by at least “sometimes” preventing opposition candidates from running. Three-fourths (77%) said the news media “never” or only “sometimes” provides fair coverage of all candidates. That is the worst rating among the 36 surveyed countries. And 71% perceived that voters are “often” or “always” bribed, well above the 36-country average of 43%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>In the 2015 survey, Gabonese also reported high levels of fear of intimidation or violence during election campaigns. Nearly two out of three (64%) expressed at least “a little bit” of fear, including almost one-fourth (23%) who expressed “a lot” of fear. With protests and government response turning violent, the fears of many have become reality. </p>
<p>Since the results were announced and protests broke out, the situation has escalated from:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>protesters’ attacks on the Parliament building to; </p></li>
<li><p>a helicopter attack on the opposition headquarters; </p></li>
<li><p>the arrests of opposition figures and hundreds of protesters as well as several deaths; to</p></li>
<li><p>the government cutting off Internet and social media communication</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Gabon has one of the lowest proportions among surveyed countries (only 45%) who believe that voters are “often” or “always” given a genuine choice in voting. Few citizens believe that elections function “well” or “very well” to ensure that voters’ views are reflected (23%) and that voters can remove poorly performing leaders from office (19%). Both of these figures are the lowest among the 36 surveyed countries.</p>
<h2>But Gabonese have faith in democracy</h2>
<p>Yet despite their extreme levels of discontent with the current implementation of elections, Gabonese still have <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/behind-gabons-election-dispute-citizens-strongly-support-multiparty-democracy-reject-autocratic-alternatives">faith</a> in the ideals of democracy and rule through elections. Two-thirds (68%) of Gabonese citizens say democracy is preferable to any other political system. This matches average support for democracy across the surveyed countries. </p>
<p>Large majorities reject forms of autocracy (one-party, one-man and military rule). And three-fourths (76%) of Gabonese say that regular, open and honest elections are the best way to choose leaders. In their support for multiparty competition (80%), Gabonese are second only to Ivoirians (82%) and far above average (63%) <strong>(Figure 3</strong>).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Afrobarometer results underscore the longstanding concerns of ordinary Gabonese about the extent to which the country’s elections are free, fair and an honest reflection of the will of the people. Unfortunately, neither the government nor regional or international attention addressed these concerns in time to prevent bloodshed. The gap between the reality of Gabon’s elections and its democratic ideals appears to be widening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon has the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.