tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/australia-china-relations-53906/articlesAustralia-China relations – The Conversation2024-03-22T02:55:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262322024-03-22T02:55:54Z2024-03-22T02:55:54ZPositive outlook, with a dash of humour: Wang Yi’s visit sets the tone for a real diplomatic reboot<p>There is a prominent view in Australia that bilateral relations with China remain inherently “<a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/8011557/australia-china-relationship-fragile/">fragile</a>”. </p>
<p>Canberra and Beijing might have started talking to each other again after Labor returned to power in May 2022. But some deep-seated differences remain, such as around the role the United States should play in the emerging regional order. </p>
<p>And at any moment these differences might see the Albanese government put in Beijing’s doghouse, just as the Morrison government was in 2020.</p>
<p>After the visit to Australia this week by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, however, we can be a little more confident the current positive trajectory in Australia-China relations has some resilience.</p>
<p>Wang’s <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/press-conference-parliament-house-canberra">main purpose</a> for making the trip was to join Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong for the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/australia-china-foreign-and-strategic-dialogue-joint-outcomes-statement">reinstated</a> annual Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue, a regular, high-level meeting that was put on pause during the lowest point of China-Australia relations. </p>
<p>Following his meeting with Wong, Wang also had a roundtable discussion with a group of Australian business leaders, academics and think tank experts, hosted by the <a href="https://acbc.com.au/media-release/media-release-acbc-roundtable-with-chinas-foreign-minister-wang-yi/">Australia-China Business Council</a>. I was a part of this session. </p>
<p>Perhaps unsurprisingly, Wang talked up China’s domestic and international achievements during this session, such as the fact that China’s economy consistently contributes to one-third of global economic growth. </p>
<p>He also defended Beijing’s positions on a range of issues, such as the introduction of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-article-23-means-for-the-future-of-hong-kong-and-its-once-vibrant-pro-democracy-movement-226186">controversial national security law</a> this week in Hong Kong. And there was more than one critical reference to the United States.</p>
<p>But when Wang explained how Beijing hoped to manage ties with Canberra moving forward – and what China wanted to get out of the relationship with Australia more broadly – it was striking that in both tone and substance his remarks were almost identical to those of Wong.</p>
<p>Wang’s tone was not exuberant. But it was unmistakably positive and assiduously forward-looking. The assertive, <a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-chinas-newly-aggressive-diplomacy-wolf-warriors-ready-to-fight-back-139028">“wolf warrior”-style</a> diplomacy that characterised China’s foreign policy in recent years was nowhere to be seen. And the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/nov/20/chinas-infamous-list-of-grievances-with-australia-should-be-longer-than-14-points-top-diplomat-says">14 grievances</a>” the Chinese embassy issued in 2020 to express the country’s frustrations with Australia remained in the drawer. </p>
<p>And like his Australian counterpart, Wang hoped that Beijing and Canberra would maintain “mature, stable and productive” relations. His aim was for the “diverse engagement” between the two countries to continue and the “untapped potential” of the relationship to be realised. </p>
<p>After all, Wang said, Australia and China had “more common interests than differences”. On the latter, the task was not to pretend they didn’t exist, but rather to “manage and rise above” them. </p>
<p>This sounded an awful lot like Wong’s <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/press-conference-parliament-house-canberra">exhortation</a> in a press conference following her meeting with Wang that Australia and China need to “manage their differences wisely”. </p>
<p>Wang even managed a note of humour, joking to business leaders in the room that despite Australia running a massive <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-trade-goods/latest-release">bilateral trade surplus with China</a> (more than $A100 billion in 2023), Beijing did not consider this a problem. He quipped he did not intend launching any “301 investigations” against Australia, name-checking the tactics that <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/tariff-actions">Washington has deployed</a> to reduce its trade deficit with China. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-fooled-by-biden-and-xi-talks-china-and-the-us-are-enduring-rivals-rather-than-engaged-partners-217978">Don't be fooled by Biden and Xi talks − China and the US are enduring rivals rather than engaged partners</a>
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<h2>Avoiding diplomatic pitfalls</h2>
<p>Given Beijing’s previous behaviour toward Canberra, such as using trade restrictions to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2023.2212612">disrupt A$20 billion worth of Australian exports</a> in 2020, Wang’s rhetoric this week could arouse some scepticism. </p>
<p>But recent events suggest more is at play – and the relationship is actually on firmer ground than might be expected. </p>
<p>Last November, a Chinese warship <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-11-18/unsafe-and-unprofessional-interaction-pla-n">directed</a> a powerful, hull-mounted sonar at an Australian naval vessel in the East China Sea, causing minor injuries to divers who had been removing fishing nets entangled in the ship’s propellers. </p>
<p>Neither side shied away from making clear their positions on the incident – and these were at odds. </p>
<p>Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/television-interview-sky-news-afternoon-agenda-5">described</a> the Chinese actions as “dangerous, unsafe and unprofessional”. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of National Defence, meanwhile, <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16267999.html">said</a> Australia ought to “respect the facts” and “stop making reckless and irresponsible accusations”.</p>
<p>Despite this strong language, however, neither side prolonged or escalated the impact of the incident.</p>
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<p>The same dynamic was apparent when Beijing announced last month that an Australian citizen, Yang Hengjun, had received a suspended death sentence in China for “<a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zagx_0/sgxw/202402/t20240205_11240737.htm">espionage</a>”. </p>
<p>Wong <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/sentencing-dr-yang-jun">described</a> the verdict as “appalling”. Albanese <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/doorstop-interview-canberra-4">said</a> his government had conveyed to Beijing “our dismay, our despair, our frustration, but to put it really simply, our outrage at this verdict”. She continued to advocate loudly on Yang’s behalf to Wang this week, as well. </p>
<p>Beijing took a <a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zagx_0/sgxw/202402/t20240205_11240737.htm">very different position</a>, saying the Chinese court respected Yang’s procedural rights. </p>
<p>But when asked whether Australia might take more extreme steps in response to the verdict, such as recall Australia’s ambassador to Beijing or rescind an invitation for a high-ranking Chinese official to visit, Wong quickly hosed down such suggestions. Chinese Premier Li Qiang is still <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/press-conference-parliament-house-canberra">expected</a> to visit Australia this year, reciprocating Albanese’s trip to China last November. </p>
<p>And at the same time, Trade Minister Don Farrell <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/australia-can-launch-a-new-trade-boom-with-china-farrell-says-20240301-p5f8yv">continued to talk up</a> areas of mutual benefit between the countries. He said just days after the verdict that while Australia already has a roaring A$300 billion trade relationship with China, this “doesn’t mean that figure can’t be A$400 billion”.</p>
<p>Evidently, neither side wishes to return to the dysfunction of 2020–21, when the response to political differences was megaphone diplomacy, cutting off dialogue and crimping areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. </p>
<p>None of the episodes of the last few months are proof positive that Australia-China relations could not be thrown off course again by a more extreme development. If Canberra walked away from adhering to the “<a href="https://www.uts.edu.au/acri/research-and-opinion/commentary/australia-and-us-paths-china-taiwan-are-diverging">One-China Policy</a>”, for instance, or if Beijing ramped up its aggression towards Australian naval vessels in international waters, the future of the bilateral relationship would quickly darken. </p>
<p>But for the time being, the outlook is more stable and optimistic than it has been for a good while. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-yang-hengjun-have-any-legal-hopes-left-after-receiving-a-suspended-death-sentence-in-china-222750">Does Yang Hengjun have any legal hopes left after receiving a suspended death sentence in China?</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Laurenceson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Differences between Australia and China will remain, but both foreign ministers this week stressed the need to manage them better to avoid another diplomatic freeze.James Laurenceson, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262212024-03-20T04:33:54Z2024-03-20T04:33:54ZChinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declines to front media after talks with Penny Wong<p>Foreign Minister Penny Wong delivered a forthright message to her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, at the Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue in Canberra on Wednesday. </p>
<p>“I told the foreign minister Australians were shocked at the sentence imposed on Dr Yang Hengjun,” she said at a news conference following their meeting. “And I made it clear to him the Australian government will continue to advocate on Dr Yang’s behalf.” </p>
<p>Yang, an Australian citizen, was given a <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-yang-hengjun-have-any-legal-hopes-left-after-receiving-a-suspended-death-sentence-in-china-222750">death penalty sentence</a> on espionage charges earlier this year, although it is set to be commuted after two years of good behaviour.</p>
<p>The media did not hear Wang’s version of the conversation because the Chinese foreign minister had previously indicated he would not front the news conference. Normally with senior visiting figures, there is a joint press conference after the talks. </p>
<p>Unusually, given Wang’s absence, media arrangements were the same as if he had been there. Australian and Chinese journalists were allocated three questions a side. Wang did not hold a separate news conference.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-yang-hengjun-have-any-legal-hopes-left-after-receiving-a-suspended-death-sentence-in-china-222750">Does Yang Hengjun have any legal hopes left after receiving a suspended death sentence in China?</a>
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<p>The visit of Wang, who met Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on Wednesday afternoon, comes as Australia is hoping for an early end to the remaining trade sanctions China imposed when it put the former Coalition government in the freezer. </p>
<p>China’s final decision on lifting its tariffs on wine is due by March 31. In an interim determination last week, the Chinese said the tariffs were no longer necessary. </p>
<p>Australia is still waiting for progress on the restrictions on lobsters and some beef abattoirs.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Australia has dropped anti-dumping action against Chinese wind towers, an action the Chinese saw as a good gesture. </p>
<p>Wong in the meeting welcomed the progress on removing trade impediments and “reiterated our desire for the removal of remaining impediments on beef and lobster.” The two foreign ministers also discussed the volatility of the nickel market.</p>
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<p>“I made the point that predictability in business and trade is in all our economic interests,” Wong said.</p>
<p>Wong did not shy away from a range of sensitive subjects, raising Australian concerns about human rights in Tibet and Hong Kong and expressing “our serious concern about unsafe conduct at sea, our desire for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in our region”.</p>
<p>Wong said the dialogue enabled the two countries to manage their differences. </p>
<p>“It doesn’t eliminate them, but this government in the interests of Australia will always seek to manage those differences wisely. </p>
<p>"As I said at the outset of my meeting, China will always be China, Australia will always be Australia.” </p>
<p>On Thursday, Wang will meet former Prime Minister Paul Keating, who has previously been critical of Wong and the Albanese government regarding the threat China poses and the government’s support for AUKUS. Ahead of this meeting, Keating said in a written statement earlier this week: “I have supported Foreign Minister Penny Wong in her attempts to lower the loud hailer and ‘stabilise’ relations with China”.</p>
<p>Wong said her meeting with Wang was the latest in the process of achieving a “stable relationship” between the two countries.</p>
<p>The foreign and strategic dialogue only recommenced under the Labor government, after the hiatus in the bilateral relationship in the latter days of the Coalition government. </p>
<p>Wong said arrangements were “on track” for a visit later this year by Chinese Premier Li Qiang.</p>
<p>Responding to a question, Wong also pushed back against former US President Donald Trump’s attack on Australia’s ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd. </p>
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<p>Trump lashed out at Rudd – who some years ago was highly critical of Trump – in an interview with right-wing political figure and broadcaster Nigel Farage. </p>
<p>Farage told Trump that Rudd had said horrible things about him. </p>
<p>Trump replied: “I heard he was a little bit nasty. I hear he’s not the brightest bulb. But I don’t know much about him. But if, if he’s at all hostile, he will not be there long.”</p>
<p>Asked if Rudd would be kept in Washington if Trump became president again, Wong said: “The answer is yes”.</p>
<p>She said Rudd was a “very effective ambassador […] doing an excellent job advancing Australia’s interests in the United States”. </p>
<p>“Even Mr Dutton has expressed confidence in Mr Rudd,” she said. Rudd would be able to work closely with whoever won the presidential election, she added.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wong says she delivered a strong message to her counterpart on the sentencing of Australian writer Yang Hengjun on espionage charges.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167272023-11-02T19:13:43Z2023-11-02T19:13:43ZThe ‘drums of war’ are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China<p>Fifty years ago this week, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam visited the People’s Republic of China, establishing a relationship that has become mutually beneficial in terms of economic growth and development to both China and Australia. </p>
<p>It was in many ways a bold step into the unknown. While the two economies are clearly complementary, their political systems are very different, as today’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, repeatedly points out. </p>
<p>Prior to Labor’s election victory in 2022, the Coalition government struggled to manage the necessary ambiguity in Australia-China relations, determining that politics (and in some cases ideology) had to be more important than economics. </p>
<p>Albanese’s visit to Beijing, starting this weekend, should be welcomed as it signals an alternative approach to the outright hostility that characterised much of Australia-China relations after 2017.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ping-pong-diplomacy-australian-table-tennis-players-return-to-china-five-decades-after-historic-tour-215537">Ping-pong diplomacy: Australian table tennis players return to China, five decades after historic tour</a>
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<h2>From ‘drums of war’ to ‘stable relations’</h2>
<p>In an Anzac Day 2021 message to his staff, later published to some fanfare in The Australian, the then-Home Affairs secretary, Mike Pezzullo, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/the-drums-of-war-are-growing-louder/news-story/bf29fb3cf94b89f84eaeb22fd32d9724">warned</a> the “drums of war” were beating. It was a clear reference to Australia’s tensions with China. </p>
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<p>Peter Dutton, the minister of defence, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/25/australian-defence-minister-says-conflict-over-taiwan-involving-china-should-not-be-discounted#:%7E:text=2%20years%20old-,Australian%20defence%20minister%20says%20conflict%20over,China%20%27should%20not%20be%20discounted%27&text=The%20Australian%20defence%20minister%2C%20Peter,%22good%20relations%22%20with%20Beijing.">agreed</a> that war with China over Taiwan “should not be discounted”. In an <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/dutton-vows-to-call-out-beijing-and-declares-everyday-australians-are-with-the-government-20210501-p57o14.html">interview days later</a>, he said the Australian Defence Force was “prepared for action”:</p>
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<p>[…] protection for our borders and our waters to the north and west remains a clear priority.</p>
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<p>Echoing the spirit of Winston Churchill’s <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00002969">1954 comments</a> at the White House that “jaw-jaw is always better than war-war”, the Albanese government has rejected this perspective of the Morrison government.</p>
<p>The new government’s <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/albanese-to-head-to-china-within-months-after-accepting-xi-jinping-s-invitation-20230907-p5e2n1.html">formula</a> is to “work towards productive and stable relations with China based on mutual benefit and respect”. Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have both emphasised that Australia will cooperate where it can and differ where it must.</p>
<p>Given the government’s commitment to the US alliance, this difference with its predecessor may seem little more than rhetorical. But rhetoric in international political relations can carry substantial weight. This is especially true during periods of geopolitical instability, such as the world is experiencing now.</p>
<h2>Room for cooperation</h2>
<p>This wider context puts necessary limits around what the government might hope to achieve – and what Australia should expect – from Albanese’s trip to Beijing. </p>
<p>The emergence of an explicit “strategic competition” between the US and China, and the role of Australia in that competition through AUKUS, means the days of a more open and easy-going relationship are unlikely to return soon. </p>
<p>But the Australia-US alliance is only one part of the Australia-China relationship, even if it has dominated headlines of late. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-china-australia-relations-head-back-to-room-temperature-with-albaneses-november-visit-216151">View from The Hill: China-Australia relations head back to room temperature, with Albanese's November visit</a>
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<p>Australia and China also have differing priorities and ambitions in the Pacific. And both countries continue to have very complementary economies. These links require a more nuanced management of the relationship, and could certainly be the subject of discussion during Albanese’s visit.</p>
<p>Australian governments have long regarded the Pacific islands as holding great geopolitical and economic importance. Until recently, however, this has not been matched by attention to the concerns and development priorities of these nations, namely the consequences of climate change and the need for basic infrastructure. </p>
<p>This gap has been filled by China through its Belt and Road Initiative. When the Chinese government <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-s-wang-yi-seeks-support-for-pacific-security-deal-20220530-p5apjk">attempted to reach</a> security agreements with some of the Pacific islands, the Australian government reacted with a series of official visits, additional economic assistance and the promise of initiatives to develop economic and cultural relationships.</p>
<p>There is certainly room for cooperation between China and Australia in this area. Despite its continued use of fossil fuels, China has developed a sizeable renewable energy industry, far greater than Australia as a proportion of energy production. </p>
<p>The two countries could also cooperate in the provision of development assistance to the Pacific.</p>
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<h2>Why the trade relationship matters to both sides</h2>
<p>The bilateral trade relationship will definitely be on the table for discussion in Beijing. China is Australia’s largest trading partner, <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/AUS">accounting for</a> 34% of all exports and 28% of imports. </p>
<p>More importantly, Australia is one of few countries that has a major <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/28/australias-exports-to-china-are-jumping-despite-their-trade-fight.html">trade surplus</a> with China. In 2022-23, Australia’s surplus on the trade of goods with China was around <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/international-trade/international-trade-goods/aug-2023#">A$87 billion</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/bring-on-the-year-of-the-rabbit-why-theres-new-hope-and-prosperity-tipped-for-australia-china-relations-197892">Bring on the Year of the Rabbit: why there's new hope and prosperity tipped for Australia-China relations</a>
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<p>Despite the rhetoric of the Morrison government portraying China as a threat to Australia, the disappearance of this economic relationship would pose an equally significant challenge. This has only been reinforced by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/30/australia-eu-free-trade-deal-collapses-g7-fta-european-union">collapse of talks</a> to establish a free-trade agreement between Australia and the European Union in recent days.</p>
<p>For the moment, trade is one aspect of the relationship that is equally important for the Chinese leadership, despite the imbalance in the size of the two economies. While the import of Australian resources is clearly significant – and there is some evidence the tariffs China imposed proved harmful to its own economy – the reason for China’s attention on trade lies elsewhere. </p>
<p>The Chinese government is currently seeking to join the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership">Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement</a>. This is the successor free trade association to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which then-US President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2017. To that end, China needs the support of member states, including Australia.</p>
<p>In a series of meetings between Australian and Chinese officials this year, which led to the first <a href="https://apnews.com/article/australia-china-resume-dialogue-relationship-6f0f3e763eadfcb734c1b55aabff2ea5">high-level dialogue</a> between the countries since 2020, there’s been hope that a bilateral basis for renewed stability is now emerging. </p>
<p>Without these indications, Albanese would presumably not be visiting Beijing now. It may not be as dramatic a move as Whitlam’s visit in 1973, but inevitably there is an element of a step into the unknown.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David S G Goodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are limits around what Australia might hope to achieve and what it should expect in Beijing, but there is room for cooperation.David S G Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163652023-10-25T08:52:34Z2023-10-25T08:52:34ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Don Farrell’s high noon for European free trade deal, and hopes for lobster exports to China<p>Last weekend Australia had a big win when China agreed to review over the next five months its prohibitive tariffs on Australian wine, This weekend Trade Minister Don Farrell hopes to finally land a long-awaited free trade deal with the European Union, for which negotiations have been going on for years. </p>
<p>Farrell tells the Conversation’s podcast that if agreement can’t be reached, Australia will need to walk away because the Europeans will be entering election season. </p>
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<p>At the end of the day, my job is to make a decision on the national interest. And if on balance, the things that are good about the European trade agreement outweigh the things that are bad – because there’s always bad things in agreements – then I feel I’ve got an obligation to the Australian people to say yes, we’ll sign this agreement.</p>
<p>If we haven’t got a deal, the Europeans move into their electoral cycle for elections next year. And I think we will have lost the opportunity for two, perhaps three years to come back and resolve this.</p>
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<p>Next week Farrell will leave with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for China. That country now has removed or, in the case of wine, is moving to remove all the trade restrictions it imposed on Australia – with the exception of those on lobsters and a handful of meat exporters. </p>
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<p>There is light at the end of the tunnel. I think Australian [wine] producers should start thinking about getting their product back into China as quickly as they can after that date, at a zero tariff. The [Chinese] minister himself has confirmed to me just how much he likes Australian wine. The Chinese have got a very strong palate for Australian wine and I’m confident that once we get that tariff removed, we’ll get Australian wine back onto Chinese supermarkets and into restaurants.</p>
<p>We have found alternative markets for our lobster, but not at the price that the Chinese were buying, so it’s a significant issue. And there’s one or two abattoirs in Australia who during COVID volunteered to suspend their exports because they had COVID in their abattoirs. They have not yet been given permits to go back in. But again, that’s just a process issue and I think with a bit more push on our part, we’ll get both the lobster and the meat back in to China.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-special-minister-of-state-don-farrell-wants-donation-and-spending-caps-for-next-election-208107">Politics with Michelle Grattan: Special Minister of State Don Farrell wants donation and spending caps for next election</a>
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<p>In the podcast Farrell, who is also Special Minister of State, canvasses his progress on electoral donations and spending caps. Independents have expresed some reservations about the government’s intentions, exchanging views with him at a recent meeting. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t agree with [the independents’] assessment of what the impact of caps will do to the election result. In fact, in many ways I think they themselves will be beneficiaries of such a system.</p>
<p>I’ll keep talking with them. I’ve given them an assurance that, as with the other political parties, I’ll talk with them. I hope they will see that caps are necessary to stop really wealthy Australians buying election results.</p>
<p>The reality is we’ve seen over the last two federal elections really, really rich Australians seeking to buy election results. And I don’t think that adds to democracy in this country. I think that takes away from democracy.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>Senator The Hon Don Farrell
Special Minister of State</p>
<p>Transcription: PROOF COPY E & OE
Date: Thu, 2023-10-26 12:00
Topic(s): Trade with China, AU-EU Free Trade Agreement, electoral reform.
Michelle Grattan, host: Next week, Anthony Albanese heads to China, the first Australian Prime Minister to go there since 2016. This follows the gradual unfreezing of the China-Australian relationship over the past year and a half, with the removal of most restrictions that China imposed on Australian commodities. The latest breakthrough is on wine, with China undertaking to review the prohibitive tariffs over the next five months.</p>
<p>Trade Minister Don Farrell has been at the centre of the negotiations, and he will accompany the Prime Minister to China. But first, he will be in Japan this weekend for the G7 Trade Ministers meeting. While there, he’ll have talks with European counterparts on the vexed issue of the proposed Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the European Union. This is likely to be the High Noon meeting for this agreement. Either it will be landed, or Australia will walk away.</p>
<p>Don Farrell joins us today to talk about trade and in his other role as Special Minister of State, electoral reform. Don Farrell, while in Japan you’ll be meeting with your European Union counterparts in the hope that you can ink a Free Trade Agreement. You’ve said you won’t be signing anything unless it’s in Australia’s interests. What are the prospects for success, do you think?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade, Don Farrell: Michelle, I’m going to meet the Europeans with an open mind and optimistic disposition. I was forced to walk away from Brussels earlier in the year when I believed that the Europeans didn’t make us a good enough offer. I’m hoping that the time lapse between then and now gives them the opportunity to make us a better offer, and on that basis if it’s good enough, I’ll be recommending to the Australian people that we should accept it.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Now one reason why a deal hasn’t been struck earlier is that the Europeans have a desire to protect product names with geographical connotations. This would restrict Australian producers from using names like “feta” and “parmesan”. Where is that up to, and what other sticking points have there been?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Look, they have been difficult issues to work with, but I think that if we could resolve the rest of the package, then I think we can resolve all of those outstanding issues. I think they’re capable of being resolved with a little bit of goodwill, and I’m hoping that if we can get a full package, that we’ll have a successful outcome with those names.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, is the name issue still a really difficult thing to get resolved?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: The name issue has not yet been resolved. I think it is capable of being resolved, but there’s a lot of balls in the air at the moment, and all of them have to land in the right spots for us to be satisfied that we’ve got an acceptable deal.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: What other things are still outstanding? You only have a few days.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah. Well, it’s funny, I think the Europeans talk about this as the end game, and I think they sort of somehow think that everything suddenly sort of collapses and we resolve all of the issues, and I’m hopeful that that’s the way it ends. As I said, I do want a successful outcome. But our access to their agricultural markets is an important one.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Well, that’s always been difficult.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah, it’s always been difficult. They have a very protectionist system. In fact, one of their arguments to me is that we were so successful in our UK Trade Agreement that lots of their market into the United Kingdom has been taken up by Australian beef and sheep meat and sugar. So, we need a better offer from them on sheep meat, on beef and on sugar.</p>
<p>Again, I’m hopeful that if they understand, you know, where we’re coming from ‑ and I’m trying to make it as clear as I can ‑ that if the offer is the same as the one I got in Brussels earlier in the year, I’m going to reject it again. So, it has to be a better offer. At what point do you accept or reject? Well, that’s the really hard bit, and of course, you know, I’ll have the National Farmers’ Federation up in Japan, I’ll have the meat and livestock, and so forth, all of those people will be up there, they’ve all got an interest in it, and I’ll want to consult them.</p>
<p>But at the end of the day, my job is to make a decision on the national interest, and if on balance the things that are good about the European Trade Agreement outweigh the things that are bad, because there’s always bad things in agreements, then I feel I’ve got an obligation to the Australian people to say, “Yes, we’ll sign this agreement.”</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: But this is the High Noon weekend, is it? If you can’t get a deal, that’s it.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Look, I think for a range of reasons, not least the fact that from this point onwards, if we haven’t got a deal, the Europeans move into their electoral cycle for elections next year, and I think we will have lost the opportunity for two, perhaps three years to come back and resolve this.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Now let’s turn to the China trip, and the wine deal in particular. In 2019, we exported more than a billion dollars’ worth of wine to China. Now in 2022, we’re down to 16 million, so a huge, huge fall. What kind of impact has this had on producers, they seem to have had more trouble getting alternative markets than producers for some other commodities that have been hit, and I should add that you were a wine producer, and I think you still live on your old vineyard, is that right?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: I do, yes. Beautiful part of the world, Clare Valley. Yes. So, look, roughly 170,000 people work in the wine industry in Australia. It’s a big employer, and it’s a particularly big employer in South Australia; 50 per cent of all Australian wine comes from South Australia, 80 per cent of premium wine comes from South Australia, and of course one of the reasons our sales were so high was we were selling a lot of premium wine into China. I’ve seen firsthand how my neighbours in the Clare Valley this year left many of their red grapes on the vines, they didn’t take them off, because their vats are already full with wine from previous years that they haven’t been able to sell.</p>
<p>We’ve been working really hard on this issue. The Chinese knew how important it was to us, and as you’ve correctly said, unlike other products, we found it very difficult to find alternative markets, into say India or the United Kingdom. So, this was an important breakthrough last weekend. I’m going up to China with the Prime Minister next week. I always felt that by that time we would have had an indication from the Chinese that they were prepared to move on this topic. We followed identically the barley dispute, so we’re to suspend our World Trade Organisation dispute in return for a fast-tracked review of the tariffs.</p>
<p>I’m confident that based on all of the previous announcements of freeing up products back into China, that we’re going to get there on wine. It will take five months, I’ve no doubt about that, but there is light at the end of the tunnel. I think Australian producers should start thinking about getting their product back into China as quickly as they can after that date at a zero tariff. The Minister, himself, has confirmed to me just how much he likes Australian wine. The Chinese have got a very strong palate for Australian wine, and I’m confident that once we get that tariff removed, we’ll get Australian wine back onto Chinese supermarkets and into restaurants.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Now the Chinese restrictions on Australian commodities were at one stage $20 billion worth. It’s now down, I think, to about 2 billion. Does that include the wine?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: That includes the wine, but if you exclude the wine, then we’re down to $1 billion.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, what’s left?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: So, what’s left is some lobster, of all things, you might think, but we haven’t been able to get our lobster back in. We have found alternative markets ‑‑</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Put a few on the plane when you go perhaps.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Well, let’s hope so, Michelle. But we have found alternative markets for our lobster, but not at the price that the Chinese were buying, so it’s a significant issue, and there’s one or two abattoirs in Australia who ‑ or during Covid volunteered to suspend their exports because they had Covid in their abattoirs. They have not yet been given permits to go back in. But again, that’s just a process issue, and I think with a bit more push on our part, we’ll get both the lobster and the meat back into China.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, it’s nearly all done.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah. Well, look, it’s been a difficult task, Michelle. It almost seemed insurmountable when we started this process, to get $20 billion worth of trade ‑ I mean, you think about that $20 billion, it’s twice our total sales to the United Kingdom. I mean it was a large amount of money. So, no, we’ve worked hard, the Prime Minister in particular has taken great interest in the progress here, as has the Foreign Minister, as has the Agriculture Minister. It’s been a Team Australia approach.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, can you give us some insights into these negotiations that you’ve had with the Chinese officialdom and political system? What’s been the flavour of them?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Look, I ask myself, how would I like to be treated? And so, I try and treat the Chinese officials, particularly, Wang Wentao, who’s my equivalent, the way I would like to be treated myself. As I said, he’s a big supporter of, personally a big supporter of Australian wine. Tonight, I’m going to visit the Chinese Embassy, and I’ll be taking a bottle of my wine with me, just to make sure that he understands just how good the Australian product is. But it’s a case of respect. China is our largest trading partner by a long way.</p>
<p>Last year, two-way trade between Australia and China was at a record level, $299 billion. If we’d had the wine back in last year, we would have actually hit the $300 billion mark. So, this is an important market for us. We have to treat them, I think, with respect. We never are going to agree on a range of political issues; we’re a democracy, you know, they’re an autocracy, but in a sense, we need one another. They need our products, they need our high-quality food and beverage, and we need to be able to continue to sell there.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, in these negotiations, not just on wine, but on other things, have you mixed the informal contacts a bit with the formal across‑the‑desk stuff?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah. And so, one of the reasons I’m going to the trade meeting next week in Shanghai is, well, it’s the Minister’s own turf, he’s from Shanghai, former Mayor of Shanghai, and you’ve actually, just like ordinary relations, you’ve got to, you know, build a relationship with your counterparts, and going to his hometown, I had originally hoped I was going to stay at The Peace Hotel on The Bund, the Charlie Chaplin room, which he managed to restore when he was the Mayor of Shanghai, that wasn’t possible for a range of reasons.</p>
<p>But I’ll be meeting with him. We’ll renew our friendship. We’ve now met, either by Zoom or personally, three times, this will be number four. He has agreed to come to South Australia to visit the vineyards in South Australia. All of those things I think help build a relationship of trust, and hopefully, we don’t get back to the situation we found ourselves, where suddenly overnight Australian businesses are losing trading opportunities into China.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Now I want to change to a very, very different topic. In your role as Special Minister of State, you joined the conversation to discuss your objectives for electoral reform earlier in the year. Can you give us an update where that’s all up to?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah. So, what happens after every election is that the Special Minister of State refers the election outcome to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. I did that very promptly. Since the election they’ve been looking at aspects of the last election, and in particular from my point of view, how we can improve transparency and accountability at the next election. I have a view that there’s a couple of ways we can do that. One is by reducing the disclosure amount of money before you have to disclose donations. Currently, it’s about $16,000, we want to get that down to about $1,000. But more importantly, the concept of real-time disclosure. So that if you’re in an election period and you’re contemplating voting for a particular candidate, you ought to know where that candidate’s getting their donations from.</p>
<p>And look, the reality is, we’ve seen over the last two Federal Elections, really, really rich Australians seeking to buy election results, and I don’t think that adds to democracy in this country, I think that takes away from democracy. So, we’re looking at things like caps, spending caps, expenditure caps. But the undertaking I’ve given to all of the parties, I’ve given it sort of privately, and I’ve given it publicly, I’ve given it in the Parliament, is that I want to talk to all of the various parties because I think electoral reform in this country works best where you’ve got a consensus position.</p>
<p>So, my aim is to keep walking through the JSCEM process, it will be completed by the end of the year, and hopefully, I can sit down with the political parties, the other political parties, and the independents. I’ve already met, I had eight or nine of the independents in my boardroom the other day. But I’m hopeful that with a bit of goodwill, that we can get a consensus on how we move forward with Australian electoral outcomes.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: They’re worried, the Independents, that you’ll do a deal with the Libs and the Nationals, and that will disadvantage new players or small players like them.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Look, I don’t agree with their assessment of what the impact of caps will do to the election result, in fact in many ways, I think they themselves will be beneficiaries of such a system, and what I don’t think that the Teals quite comprehend is that the reason they were so successful at the last election is that they had Scott Morrison as the Prime Minister, they had integrity issues to run on, and of course, they had climate change issues to run on. None of them will be in existence at the next election.</p>
<p>But look, I’ll keep talking with them. I’ve given them an assurance that, as with the other political parties, I’ll talk with them. I hope they will see that caps are necessary to stop really wealthy Australians buying election results. I just don’t think we can have another Federal Election where that’s a potential outcome.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: We’re talking here about Clive Palmer.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah, we’re talking about Clive Palmer.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: But he didn’t get much, he only got one Senator.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: No, but he affected the election outcome. I don’t think there’s any doubt at all that the reason Bill Shorten didn’t win the 2019 election was the more than hundred million dollars that Clive Palmer spent on that election.</p>
<p>These people are not necessarily after political influence in the sense of having people in Parliament. What they’re after is the result, and getting a favourable result, and I just don’t think Australians want a situation where one individual can spend so much money to get a successful electoral result.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: What’s your timetable for bringing in this legislation, and will it include truth in advertising?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah, truth in advertising is a difficult one. I think most people would agree that getting accurate information about electoral issues is an important part of our democratic process. Just how you do that is a more difficult proposition. South Australia has done that, this got debated a couple of nights ago in the Estimates process. Senator Birmingham piped up that he didn’t like the way the South Australian system worked and thought it actually worked against free speech, but ‑‑</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: You think it’s okay?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Look, I think it’s one option to think about. I don’t say it’s the perfect option. Some of the Teals have got some of their own ideas on this. And, of course, the other issue is who would you get to determine the truth or otherwise. The AEC have said, look, they would not be happy to do it, they’re job is to run the election, not to monitor, you know, arguments during the course of the election.</p>
<p>I had quite an unusual item pop up about me personally during the Referendum. I woke up one morning to discover that the allegation was that I had usurped the role of the Governor‑General in signing the writ to issue the Referendum. Now that was a completely preposterous proposition. But it was floating out there in the social media. And once it gets out there, Michelle, it’s very hard to, you know, to counteract. They had a photograph of my signature on the writ document, and of course, my signature was there, because I witnessed the Governor‑General signing the document.</p>
<p>So, I personally know what it’s like to have these sort of allegations made against you, but it’s a tough one. We should do something about it. It’s a question of making sure that if we do do something about it, we don’t truncate free speech in this country. I mean that’s one of the great advantages of our system. People do have the right for free speech. I don’t want to truncate that, but if it’s possible to come up with a mechanism to ensure that people are getting accurate information, or have the ability to get accurate information, then I think that would be a good outcome.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, you’ll try and get it in the legislation.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: I’ll try and have some discussions with the other party, and other parties, and if there’s a way through this, then I’m happy to look at it.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, when would you be bringing in this legislation?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Okay. So, the process is nearing an end, we’ve only got, what, five or six more weeks before the end of the year. I would hope that we can make some progress before the end of the year, if not very early in the new year.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: So, a bill in either late this year or early next on at least the donation and spending side.</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: Yeah, yeah. The important thing here is making sure that the Australian Electoral Commission has adequate time to make changes to their system to reflect any changes in the legislation. Real-time disclosure of donations is actually quite a big task, it rolls off the tongue pretty easily, but in fact, to be able to do that, a whole lot of new processes are going to have to be set up. I want to make sure the AEC has got plenty of time to do that, to trial it, and to make sure that it works for the next election.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: And so that would take probably a year or so?</p>
<p>Minister for Trade: It could take as much as a year, yeah.</p>
<p>Michelle Grattan: Don Farrell, thank you very much for talking with us today on trade and the electoral system. Good luck for your trip to China, well, and to Japan indeed. That’s all for today’s Conversation Politics Podcast. Thank you to my producer, Mikey Burnett. We’ll be back with another interview soon, but goodbye for now.</p>
<p>Media Contact(s)
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, the Minister for Trade and Special Minister of State Don Farrell joins The Conversation to canvass Australia's prospective trade agreement with the EU, relations with China, and electoral reformMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097632023-07-25T12:24:41Z2023-07-25T12:24:41ZNATO isn’t the only alliance that countries are eager to join – a brief history of the Five Eyes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538355/original/file-20230719-19-92axgr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C23%2C5182%2C3457&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania saw movement toward expanding the alliance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LithuaniaNATOSummit/379be0fe4c174cd79e040b362b0c85ad/photo">Paul Ellis/Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit-and-where-it-leaves-the-military-alliance-209665">NATO summit</a> in <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Vilnius</a>, Lithuania, it is anticipated that <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-a-history-of-neutrality-ends-after-200-years-183583">Sweden</a> will soon become <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">the alliance’s 32nd member</a>.</p>
<p>The heart of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-70-is-nato-still-important-5-essential-reads-128267">alliance</a> – which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">established</a> in the aftermath of World War II to promote the collective security of its mostly Western European members – is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_89597.htm">North Atlantic Treaty</a>, which requires that <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">if one member is attacked</a>, then all of the other members will respond as if they themselves had been attacked.</p>
<p>Its most recent addition came in April 2023, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-joins-nato-in-a-major-blow-to-putin-which-doubles-the-length-of-the-alliances-border-with-russia-203217">Finland</a> became <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm">the 31st country</a> to join.</p>
<p>At present, NATO currently recognizes <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm">Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine</a> as aspiring members.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-nato-new-alliances-could-defend-democracy-and-counter-putin-177683">NATO isn’t the only alliance</a> that countries across the globe are eager to join.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1338655960">For more than 75 years</a>, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. have been <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing">sharing intelligence with one another</a> as part of what they call the Five Eyes alliance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">I am a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst</a> who now studies and teaches <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXXZBEkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political science</a>. I know from personal experience that the Five Eyes is still very active in the 21st century, even though it’s not as well known as its younger sibling NATO.</p>
<h2>Origins</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a typewritten letter with handwritten markings and a 'Most Secret' stamp across the top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1941 document in which U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved sharing key intelligence secrets with the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/">Image courtesy of America’s National Churchill Museum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1940, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1083458138">during the prime ministership of Winston Churchill</a>, a secret effort by U.K. codebreakers to deconstruct Germany’s Enigma machine succeeded, allowing the British to read German military messages. These messages ended up being a major source of intelligence throughout World War II, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1075737">providing much-needed information</a> about German troop numbers, military maneuvers and technological developments.</p>
<p>British mathematician <a href="https://theconversation.com/imitation-game-will-finally-bring-alan-turing-the-fame-he-so-rightly-deserves-34324">Alan Turing</a> is probably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-visionary-war-hero-and-the-only-choice-for-the-50-note-106470">most widely recognized</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-was-one-of-many-persecuted-by-whitehall-for-their-sexuality-58018">person</a> who worked to help crack the Enigma machine. But in reality it was the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575581/geniuses-at-war-by-david-a-price/">collective effort</a> of hundreds of men <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-female-enigmas-of-bletchley-park-in-the-1940s-should-encourage-those-of-tomorrow-36640">and women</a>, including <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/management/organisation-studies/decoding-organization-bletchley-park-codebreaking-and-organization-studies">mathematicians, linguists and even chess champions</a>.</p>
<p>Parallel to these developments, <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/BROOKS_Stealing_the_Japanese_Codebooks_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol25_No2_Fall_2019.pdf">U.S. codebreakers</a> were able to successfully <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/OLESON_WIMAD_Breaking_of_JN-25_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol26_No2_WinterSpring_2021.pdf">crack diplomatic codes</a> used by the Japanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/europe/bletchley-park-us-britain-surveillance.html">In February 1941</a>, an American military delegation was invited to visit the U.K. codebreaking operation, based on an estate called <a href="https://bletchleypark.org.uk">Bletchley Park</a>. However, when “approving the visit, Churchill … <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=633">prohibited any British discussion of their success against the Enigma</a>” machine, according to a 2016 speech by Richard Ledgett, then the <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/1621334/richard-h-ledgett-jr-named-nsas-new-deputy-director/">deputy director of the U.S. National Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>Upon their arrival, the American officers “<a href="https://news.wcmo.edu/features-carousel/conversation-with-nsa-ledgett/">explained how to break the Japanese codes</a>,” Ledgett said, going on to observe that the information “<a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=698">caused the British to re-examine their initial decision</a>” to keep their Enigma success a secret.</p>
<p>Afterward, <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=3001">Churchill approved a request</a> to reveal “<a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">to our American colleagues the progress</a> … made in probing German Armed Force cryptography.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1231608251">Throughout the remainder of the war</a>, the U.K. and U.S. continued working together to enhance their codebreaking capabilities. In 1943, this informal relationship was formalized with the Britain-United States of America, or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0161-119791885742">BRUSA</a>, agreement.</p>
<p>This intelligence alliance was further strengthened by <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/brief-history-of-ukusa">the UKUSA agreement</a> signed on March 5, 1946. That same day, Churchill was at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZA5ISi9yhhs&t=59s">Westminster College</a> in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2FM3_h33Tg">Fulton, Missouri</a> – the <a href="https://www.wcmo.edu">college</a> where I now teach – giving his “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Iron Curtain</a>” speech.</p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf">this top-secret agreement was declassified</a> and made publicly available for the first time. </p>
<p>Canada joined the UKUSA agreement in 1948. Australia and New Zealand joined in 1956. Thus, the <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">the Five Eyes was born</a>.</p>
<h2>Recent developments</h2>
<p>To address the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/05/08/china-wants-the-world-to-know-that-resistance-to-its-rise-is-futile">rising power of China</a>, members of the Five Eyes have recently expanded the scope of the alliance <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/five-eyes-blurring-lines-between-intelligence-policy">beyond intelligence sharing into the realm of policy</a>. Five Eyes <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2019/08/five-country-ministerial-and-quintet-of-attorneys-general-concludes.html">attorneys general</a> now regularly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quintet-attorneys-general-statement-support-prosecutor-general-ukraine-and-investigations-and">meet</a>, as do <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1039">finance</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2228642/joint-statement-five-eyes-defense-ministers-meeting/">and defense</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2384146/five-eyes-defence-ministers-meeting-press-release/">ministers</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2020, the once-secretive Five Eyes alliance took the bold step of publicly issuing a joint statement condemning China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838">National Security Law</a> for “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201119004529/https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-hong-kong-2/">undermin[ing] Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy</a>.”</p>
<p>China responded by warning that “<a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/engsghdxwfb_1/202112/t20211221_10473480.htm">attempts by certain countries to meddle in Hong Kong politics</a> … are futile and doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>Notably, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56970640.amp">China is New Zealand’s largest export market</a>. At the time, New Zealand was also hoping to conclude an <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/201911/41742_1.html">upgraded free trade deal</a> with China.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the Five Eyes countries – except New Zealand – issued a joint statement condemning “the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-arrests-hong-kong">mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists in Hong Kong</a> for subversion under the National Security Law.” That same month, China and New Zealand signed <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/202102/44483_1.html">the upgraded free trade deal</a>.</p>
<p>Since that time, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130094/new-zealand-uncomfortable-growing-scope-five-eyes-members">New Zealand</a> has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html">continued to avoid</a> taking as strong a position <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/03/asia/new-zealand-xinjiang-china-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">as the rest of the Five Eyes</a>. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/new-zealand-will-not-join-the-us-coalition-against-china-anytime-soon/">As a result</a>, the U.S. has sought to circumvent New Zealand’s reluctance by formalizing <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/09/22/john-bolton-on-how-a-new-era-of-american-alliances-is-under-way">other agreements</a> without the Kiwis.</p>
<p>For example, in September 2021, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. announced <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">the AUKUS partnership</a>. Under this agreement, the three countries “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">will expand and accelerate [the] sharing of sensitive information</a>.” <a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-exclusion-from-the-aukus-security-pact-reveals-a-failing-national-defence-policy-168235">Canada</a> has expressed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/08/canada-aukus-defence-pact">desire</a> to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-aukus-time-action">join</a> the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2021/09/19/the-strategic-reverberations-of-the-aukus-deal-will-be-big-and-lasting">AUKUS</a> partnership. This would leave New Zealand as the only Five Eyes member <a href="https://theconversation.com/approach-with-caution-why-nz-should-be-wary-of-buying-into-the-aukus-security-pact-203915">outside of the pact</a>.</p>
<p>The Five Eyes alliance has had to deal with other <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicion-creeps-five-eyes">internal difficulties</a> as well. For example, the U.S. has had several notable intelligence failures, including the leaks of classified documents by <a href="https://theconversation.com/redefining-privacy-in-the-age-of-edward-snowden-21891">Edward Snowden</a> and former President Donald <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-exposure-of-highly-classified-documents-could-harm-us-security-and-why-there-are-laws-against-storing-them-insecurely-207484">Trump’s alleged hoarding of classified documents</a>. Both of those events undermine <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/ukraine-russia-war-leaks-classified-damage-control/">U.S. assurances</a> to its allies that it can keep a secret.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd looks at a large sign with the Australian, U.K. and U.S. flags, while three men stand at lecterns just below it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The leaders of the U.S., U.K. and Australia make an announcement about the AUKUS alliance in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USBritainSunak/65a989fb98ac4a08b7d11a699f2c509c/photo">Stefan Rousseau/Pool via AP</a></span>
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<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186">Over the years</a>, several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/could-india-join-five-eyes">India</a>, <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/calls-for-israel-to-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network/">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-lawmakers-push-for-german-entrance-to-five-eyes-spy-alliance/a-17246049">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3148806/chinas-top-diplomat-wang-yi-slams-us-move-south-korea-join">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, the most likely candidate is probably <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-five-eyes-to-six-japans-push-to-join-the-wests-intelligence-alliance-159429">Japan</a>. At the end of 2016, Australia and the U.S. signed a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Australia-Japan-U-S-Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement-Signing.pdf">trilateral agreement</a> with Japan to deepen their covert security cooperation. As of 2020, Japan’s minister of defense was enthusiastically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-wants-de-facto-Six-Eyes-intelligence-status-defense-chief">in favor of joining</a> the Five Eyes. In 2021, Japan’s ambassador to Australia argued that “in terms of interests and capability, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/japan-should-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network-says-ambassador-20210420-p57kv6.html">Japan is the best candidate</a>” to consider for enlarging the Five Eyes. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. House <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/subcommittees/intelligence-and-special-operations-117th-congress">Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations</a> “acknowledge[d] that the <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20210901/114012/BILLS-117HR4350ih-ISOSubcommitteeMark.pdf">threat landscape has vastly changed</a> since the inception of the Five Eyes arrangement, with primary threats now emanating from China and Russia.” It recommended “<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-117hrpt118/html/CRPT-117hrpt118.htm">expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include … Japan</a>.”</p>
<p>Regardless of whether <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/how-japan-sees-china">Japan</a> – or others – ends up joining the alliance, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman warned in 2020 that “no matter how many eyes they have, five or 10 or whatever, should anyone dare to undermine China’s sovereignty, security and development interests,” they should “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-threatens-to-poke-the-eyes-of-five-eyes-nations-over-hk-20201120-p56gep.html">be careful not to get poked in the eye</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO gets the headlines, but the Five Eyes alliance is another close connection between key Western powers, and it may expand.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2038982023-04-17T20:03:47Z2023-04-17T20:03:47ZAustralia’s barley solution with China shows diplomacy does work<p>The agreement between Australia and China to resolve a dispute over Chinese tariffs on Australian barley without World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication is evidence of a distinct improvement in relations. </p>
<p>It raises confidence Australia can maintain a constructive relationship with China even as US-China relations continue to deteriorate. </p>
<p>China imposed an 80.5% import tariff on Australian barley in May 2020, on the grounds Australian barley was sold in the Chinese market at a price lower than its price in Australia (known as “dumping”) and was subsidised, harming China’s barley growers. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of Commerce began an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation into barley in November 2018. At the time it was perceived as retaliation for more than a dozen anti-dumping actions taken by Australia <a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">against Chinese imports</a> over a decade.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/barley-is-not-a-random-choice-heres-the-real-reason-china-is-taking-on-australia-over-dumping-107271">Barley is not a random choice – here's the real reason China is taking on Australia over dumping</a>
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<p>But the timing of the tariff decision, just weeks after Australia called for an international investigation into the origin of COVID-19, meant it was perceived as part of a broader campaign of Chinese economic coercion that included actions against Australian coal, beef, lobster and wine. </p>
<p>In December 2020, Australia lodged its claim against the barley tariffs <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds598_e.htm">with the WTO</a>. The breakdown in the official relationship at the time made it impossible for the dispute to be resolved via consultation. </p>
<p>Last week (on April 11) both parties requested the WTO suspend proceedings. This follows nearly a year of efforts to repair the relationship following the election of the Albanese government.</p>
<p>The agreement came in the same week that Australia <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/australia-china-senior-officials-talks">hosted China’s deputy foreign minister</a>, Ma Zhaoxu, the highest-level Chinese official to visit Canberra in more than six years. </p>
<p>Official visits by China’s Foreign Minister, Qin Gang (who met Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong in March on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in New Delhi) and senior officials from other ministries like agriculture and education, are expected to follow.</p>
<h2>What the barley agreement means</h2>
<p>Digging into <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/step-forward-resolve-barley-dispute-china">the details</a> of the barley deal, China has agreed to conduct an expedited review of barley tariffs in the next three or four months. </p>
<p>China’s Ministry of Commerce <a href="http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zfxxgk/article/gkml/202304/20230403404024.shtml">initiated a review</a>
on April 14, based on an application lodged by the China Alcoholic Drinks Association. The review is needed for the ministry to find a reasonable ground to remove the duties. The standard time frame for such a review is 12 months.</p>
<p>For Australia, this offers a quicker path to get barley back in the Chinese market than proceeding with <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">the WTO case</a>. </p>
<p>While a decision from the WTO panel hearing the dispute was expected in just days, a finding that Australia wasn’t dumping barley on China could have meant another year before the tariffs were terminated. This is because China would retain the option of appealing the decision. Even if it then lost the appeal, it could still have dragged out removing the tariffs.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">Taking China to the World Trade Organisation plants a seed. It won't be a quick or easy win</a>
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<p>The approach sets a useful template for how Australia might similarly get China to remove the tariffs (of 116% to 218%) imposed on Australian wine <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/trade/australian-wine-in-china">in March 2021</a>. </p>
<p>Australia initiated WTO proceeding in June 2021, with the WTO panel established four months later. It is expected to issue its decision by mid-2023. But continuing with the process will also take much longer for the tariffs to be removed. </p>
<p>This approach can also potentially be a template for the parties to suspend WTO dispute proceedings brought by <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds603_e.htm">China against Australia</a> for its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy tariffs on selected Chinese imports.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/it-might-look-like-china-is-winning-the-trade-war-but-its-import-bans-are-a-diplomacy-fail-154558">It might look like China is winning the trade war, but its import bans are a diplomacy fail</a>
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<h2>Knocking on the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s door</h2>
<p>For China, a more strategic goal behind the agreement might be alleviating Australia’s resistance to China joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). </p>
<p>The trade pact involves 11 Pacific-rim nations and now Britain, whose request to join was approved by the other signatories in March.</p>
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<p>China lodged its application to join after the UK, in September 2021. It too needs consensus approval from all CPTPP parties, and Australia has made its position crystal clear: China must end its trade sanctions and show a capability and willingness to live up to the CPTPP’s high standards. </p>
<p>Resolving the barley dispute is a starting point. It will also demonstrate that a rules-based global trading system can influence China’s behaviour. That’s not unexpected, because no country has <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_outlook23_e.pdf">a bigger stake</a> in global trade. Last year China’s goods trade reached $US6.3 trillion, nearly $US900 billion more than the US. </p>
<p>For Australia, beginning a discussion about China joining the CPTPP may speed up regaining market access for its exports, and be an opportunity to secure China’s commitment to a rules-based agreement that exceeds WTO minimums. </p>
<h2>From cautious optimism to reasonable confidence</h2>
<p>The anticipated resolution of the barley dispute is not an isolated achievement. It demonstrates the effectiveness of the Albanese government’s diplomatic approach to China. </p>
<p>This has involved incrementally rebuilding economic cooperation while managing disagreements on values and security issues through calm and professional engagement. Amid geopolitical tensions with the US, China is also looking to stabilise its external environment. </p>
<p>Economic cooperation remains a standout area of common interest. Add in political willingness and diplomatic wisdom, and an assessment of cautious optimism can be replaced by one of reasonable confidence in the upward trajectory of the bilateral relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abandoning its WTO case is a quicker path to getting Australian barley back into China. It could also be a template for resolving tariff disputes over other products, including Australian wine.Weihuan Zhou, Associate Professor, Co-Director of China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyJames Laurenceson, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039292023-04-17T08:27:26Z2023-04-17T08:27:26ZPaul Keating accuses Penny Wong of ‘platitudes’; she says he’s ‘diminished his legacy’<p>Former Prime Minister Paul Keating has launched an extraordinary fresh barrage of criticism against Foreign Minister Penny Wong, accusing her of delivering “platitudes” in her major foreign policy speech on Monday. </p>
<p>In a statement shortly after Wong addressed the National Press Club on “Australia’s interests in a regional balance of power”, Keating said she had provided no policy answers and had adopted the “binary” approach – in her case favouring the United States against China – that she warned others to avoid. </p>
<p>“Never before has a Labor government been so bereft of policy or policy ambition,” he said.</p>
<p>Earlier, answering a question about Keating’s recent cutting description of her “running around the Pacific Islands with a lei around her neck” handing out money, Wong said the former PM had “diminished” his legacy and the subject. </p>
<p>The latest vitriolic exchange reflects the long-running policy animosity between the two, particularly Keating’s hostility to Wong over the issue of China. </p>
<p>In her address, Wong condemned commentators and strategists who viewed what was happening in the region “simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy. </p>
<p>"They love a binary. And the appeal of a binary is obvious. Simple, clear choices. Black and white. But viewing the future of the region simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy means countries’ own national interests can fall out of focus.</p>
<p>"It diminishes the power of each country to engage other than through the prism of a great power.” </p>
<p>Wong stressed the need for countries “with an existential interest in regional peace and stability to press for the responsible management of great power competition”.</p>
<p>She said “strategic competition is not merely about who is top dog, who is ahead in the race, or who holds strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>"It’s actually about the character of the region. It’s about the rules and norms that underpin our security and prosperity, that ensure our access within an open and inclusive region, and that manage competition responsibly.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor's biggest failure since WW1</a>
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<p>She said Australia employed its own statecraft “toward shaping a region that is open, stable and prosperous. </p>
<p>"A predictable region, operating by agreed rules, standards and laws. Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated. A region where sovereignty is respected, and all countries benefit from a strategic equilibrium.”</p>
<p>In her speech, Wong flagged she would not be drawn into discussion of timelines and scenarios about Taiwan. That was “the most dangerous of parlour games”. </p>
<p>“A war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for us all,” she said; “our job is to lower the heat on any potential conflict”.</p>
<p>Wong said of the China relationsip: “the Albanese government will be calm and consistent”, cooperating where it could, disagreeing where it must and managing differences wisely. “We start with the reality that China is going to keep on being China.” </p>
<p>She said that in the pursuit of “strategic equilibrium with all countries exercising their agency to achieve peace and prosperity, America is central to balancing a multipolar region. Many who take self-satisfied potshots at America’s imperfections would find the world a lot less satisfactory if America ceased to play its role.”</p>
<p>Keating said: “In facing the great challenge of our time, a super-state resident in continental Asia and an itinerant naval power seeking to maintain primacy – the foreign minister was unable to nominate a single piece of strategic statecraft by Australia that would attempt a solution for both powers”. </p>
<p>Keating said Wong “went out of her way to turn her back on what she disparaged as ‘black and white’ binary choices, speaking platitudinally about keeping ‘the balance of power’, but having not a jot of an idea as to how this might be achieved.”</p>
<p>Wong had said she was “steadfast” in refusing to talk about regional flashpoints – “that is, refusing to talk about the very power issue which threatens the region’s viability. </p>
<p>"She told us she will turn her back on reality, speaking only in terms of ‘lowering the heat’ and the ‘benefit from a strategic equilibrium’, without providing one clue, let alone a policy, as to how that might be achieved”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/time-to-grow-up-australias-national-security-dilemma-demands-a-mature-debate-202040">Time to grow up: Australia's national security dilemma demands a mature debate</a>
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<p>While Wong had eschewed “black and white” binary choices, she had then made such a choice herself, Keating said.</p>
<p>She had extolled the virtues of the US, “of it remaining ‘the central power’ – of ‘balancing the region’, while disparaging China as ‘intent on being China’”. </p>
<p>She had gone on to say “countries don’t want to live in a closed, hierarchical region, where the rules are dictated by a single major power to suit its own interests”, Keating said. </p>
<p>“Nothing too subtle about that,” he said. “She means China and is happy to mean China.</p>
<p>"This is the person claiming she does not wish to make binary choices. Yet tells us ‘we have to press for the management of great power competition’, while saying, ‘we want partners and not patriarchs’ but articulating not a jot of an idea of how that great power competition can be settled without war.”</p>
<p>Keating, who has been a strong critic of AUKUS, said Wong had said the advent of capability under AUKUS “will ‘change the calculus for any aggressor’ – of course, meaning China.</p>
<p>"As a middle power, Australia is now straddling a strategic divide, a divide rapidly becoming every bit as rigid as that which obtained in Europe in 1914. Australia’s major foreign policy task is to soften that rigidity by encouraging both the United States and China to find common cause and benefit in a peaceful and prosperous Pacific, ” Keating said. </p>
<p>“Nothing Penny Wong said today, on Australia’s behalf, adds one iota of substance to that urgent task.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest vitriolic exchange reflects the long-running policy animosity between the two, particularly Keating’s hostility to Wong over the issue of ChinaMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2017572023-03-14T04:41:22Z2023-03-14T04:41:22ZWith AUKUS, Australia has wedded itself to a risky US policy on China – and turned a deaf ear to the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515076/original/file-20230314-599-sbpcqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=335%2C26%2C3133%2C2300&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stefan Rousseau/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much has been made of Australia’s renewed engagement with Asia and the Pacific since Labor came to power. </p>
<p>Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/penny-wong-launches-charm-offensive-in-pacific-20220526-p5aow0.html">charm offensive</a>” in the Pacific was seen as the beginning of a new process of listening to the region, not dictating to it. Labor’s Asia-Pacific policy has also been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/01/penny-wong-australia-foreign-policy/">hailed</a> as striking a balance between the US and China. </p>
<p>In announcing the AUKUS submarine deal in the US this week, <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/aukus-remarks">Prime Minister Anthony Albanese</a> emphasised it was aimed at allowing nations in the region to “act in their sovereign interests free from coercion” and would “promote security by investing in our relationships across our region”. </p>
<p>The reality of the submarine deal is not, however, in that spirit. Instead, it leads Australia towards half a century of armaments build up and restricted sovereignty within a US-led alliance aimed at containing China. </p>
<p>Worse, it hearkens back to a colonial vision of the region as rightfully dominated by Anglophone powers who enjoy a military advantage over others that live there. </p>
<p>In the process, it has also deliberately endangered the spirit – if not the letter of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-southeast-asia-so-concerned-about-aukus-and-australias-plans-for-nuclear-submarines-168260">nuclear non-proliferation agreements</a> – and heightened what our neighbours see as a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/malaysia-warns-aukus-pact-will-spark-nuclear-arms-race-in-indo-pacific-20210918-p58stm.html">destabilising and unnecessary naval race</a> that can only further provoke China. </p>
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<img alt="Penny Wong in the Pacific." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515085/original/file-20230314-24-zvb6yf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Penny Wong has promised Australia will be a ‘generous, respectful and reliable’ partner to the Pacific.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Australian Department of Foreign Affairs/AP</span></span>
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<h2>Relinquishing sovereignty of foreign policy</h2>
<p>The deal confirms two things that nations in the region have long suspected. </p>
<p>First, Australia is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2023/mar/09/media-hype-of-war-with-china-forgets-the-impact-on-australian-society-yun-jiang">incapable of imagining an Asia-Pacific region</a> that is not militarily dominated by the United States. </p>
<p>In addition, the deal suggests we are still politically attached to the United Kingdom – the post-Brexit ghost of a past British empire once again <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/british-subs-could-patrol-indo-pacific-while-australia-procures-its-own-fleet-20220901-p5befb.html">looking east of the Suez Canal</a> towards Asia and the Pacific. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
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<p>The second is that, despite the window dressing, Australia’s deafness to regional misgivings has not improved since the change to a Labor government. </p>
<p>AUKUS and the nuclear submarine deal are far from universally admired in Asia and the Pacific. The ASEAN bloc has repeatedly expressed its wish to avoid an arms race in the region. <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/are-australia-s-neighbours-ready-for-aukus-20230301-p5colo">Regional powers</a> such as Indonesia and Malaysia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/19/we-are-worried-indonesia-and-malaysia-express-concern-over-australias-nuclear-submarine-plan">have made this clear</a> on several occasions. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1440539784087175182"}"></div></p>
<p>Other approaches to regional security do exist. And our neighbours have their own sense of how the Asia-Pacific can best balance the growing influence of both the US and China.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/why-dont-malaysian-policymakers-view-china-as-a-threat/">Malaysia</a>, for example, has emphasised that so clearly identifying China as an enemy will be a self-fulfilling prophesy. The <a href="https://devpolicy.org/aukus-undermines-australias-pacific-family-20211104/">Pacific states</a> have warned against becoming so clearly aligned with the US and sparking a renewed arms race in the Pacific. <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/kiwis-firmly-remain-anti-nuclear-as-aukus-submarines-draw-near-20230207-p5cih6">New Zealand</a>, too, says it sees no sense in moving towards a nuclear-fuelled foreign policy. </p>
<p>Instead of taking these concerns seriously and engaging in deep regional diplomacy to head off future conflict, Australia seems to have has given up sovereign control of its foreign policy. </p>
<p>Canberra is moving towards what former Prime Ministers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/08/richard-marles-insists-aukus-submarine-deal-will-not-erode-australias-military-sovereignty">Malcolm Turnbull</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/oct/13/paul-keating-speculates-king-charles-could-renounce-uks-claim-on-australia">Paul Keating</a> have respectively called “shared sovereignty” and “outsourced” strategic sovereignty. </p>
<p>Contrary to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/08/richard-marles-insists-aukus-submarine-deal-will-not-erode-australias-military-sovereignty">assurances of Defence Minister Richard Marles</a>, Australia has decided to become absolutely central to the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bc6685c1-6f17-4e9e-aaaa-922083c06e70">US policy of containing and encircling China</a>. Retreating from the assumed military role that comes with this would take the kind of foreign policy courage that has not been seen for many decades.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-southeast-asia-so-concerned-about-aukus-and-australias-plans-for-nuclear-submarines-168260">Why is southeast Asia so concerned about AUKUS and Australia's plans for nuclear submarines?</a>
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<h2>War with China is not a certainty</h2>
<p>Th submarine deal also comes against a backdrop of some <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-faces-the-threat-of-war-with-china-within-three-years-and-we-re-not-ready-20230221-p5cmag.html">dangerously incautious media predictions</a> that Australia could be at war with China within three years. </p>
<p>Scarcely to be heard is the view that if war were to occur, it would be a war of choice, not a war to defend Australian sovereignty, even broadly defined. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1635454434120720386"}"></div></p>
<p>Bad assumptions about the future can unfortunately drive bad policy. The assumption of a regional war is in part a consequence of viewing China through the lens of the faulty idea of an inescapable “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3158816/us-and-china-war-why-thucydides-trap-or-cold-war-analogies-are">Thucydides Trap</a>”. </p>
<p>For adherents of this belief, war between the US and China is simply a natural fact dictated by history when a rising power challenges an established power, similar to what happened in the war between Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece.</p>
<p>Chinese brinkmanship and assertion of control over disputed territories and waters, however, is not a Greek tragedy. And Australian strategic decision-makers should not take for granted that war is coming either between China and Taiwan, or China and the United States – much less with Australia. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
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<p>Herein lies the danger of handing over our sovereign foreign policy decision-making to the US and relaxing into the faux security offered by AUKUS. </p>
<p>We are led to the false sense there is no alternative but to be involved militarily wherever the US is in a conflict, whether that be in Iraq, Afghanistan or a future war over Taiwan. </p>
<p>Ceding Australia’s capacity to make serious decisions about war and peace cannot be accepted unless all pretence of Australian sovereignty is abandoned. Australia could have tried to work towards a regional approach with other Asian and Pacific countries. But this week’s agreement makes that all but impossible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Fitzpatrick receives funding from the Australian Research Council (FT210100448 - Strategic Friendship: Anglo-German Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region). </span></em></p>Labor has touted a renewed engagement with the Asia-Pacific since coming to power. The submarine deal, however, is not in this spirit.Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1967992022-12-19T03:00:22Z2022-12-19T03:00:22ZWong to visit Beijing as ‘strategic dialogue’ restarts in new breakthrough in Australia-China relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501773/original/file-20221219-14-7wh0l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8029%2C5357&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s relations with China will take another major step forward this week with Foreign Minister Penny Wong travelling to Beijing for the resumption of the bilateral Foreign and Strategic Dialogue, which has been on hold since 2018. </p>
<p>The latest breakthrough follows the meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 summit. </p>
<p>Wong’s Wednesday talks coincide with the 50th anniversary of the Whitlam government establishing diplomatic relations with China on December 21 1972 – an anniversary the Chinese government had been indicating it wanted to mark. They are also part of a round of meetings with foreign ministers that China is conducting.</p>
<p>Australian exporters will hope the meeting paves the way to China easing the trade restrictions it has imposed on Australia. The improved relations may also be positive for detained Australians Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun.</p>
<p>In a statement Albanese and Wong said: “In 1972, then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam took a bold decision, recognising the importance of engagement and cooperation between our two nations and peoples.</p>
<p>"In the decades since, China has grown to become one of the world’s largest economies and Australia’s largest trading partner.</p>
<p>"Trade between Australia and China, as well as strong people-to-people, cultural and business links have delivered significant benefits to both our countries.”</p>
<p>They said Wong was going to Beijing at the Chinese government’s invitation “to meet China’s State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, and hold the 6th Australia–China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue”.</p>
<p>Albanese and Wong said they welcomed the opportunity to mark the anniversary of diplomatic relations. </p>
<p>“Australia seeks a stable relationship with China; we will cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in the national interest.”</p>
<p>Albanese flagged this latest breakthrough on Friday’s podcast with The Conversation, although he did not specify the form it would take. </p>
<p>He said: “China is our major economic partner and I think in coming weeks you will see further measures and activities which indicate a much-improved relationship, which is in the interests of both of our countries, but importantly as well is in the interests of peace and security in the region.”</p>
<p>The thawing in relations, which began with overtures from China as soon as Labor was elected, came after the Chinese government had previously refused to even return the Morrison government’s phone calls. </p>
<p>China had been angered by the Coalition’s tough line on foreign interference and by its harsh rhetoric, for which then defence minister Peter Dutton was notable. Australia’s pressure for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 was a high-profile source of tension. </p>
<p>The Albanese government has been aware of the need for caution as it looks to stabilise the relationship, repeatedly making it clear Australia would not give any concession to get an improvement. </p>
<p>Shadow foreign minister Simon Birmingham said the Coalition welcomed Wong’s plans to visit.</p>
<p>“Engagement between governments is essential to advance areas of mutual interest and to manage differences,” he said, but added that “the ultimate test of any dialogue lies in the outcomes achieved”. </p>
<p>“Minister Wong’s visit will be judged on progress towards the removal of unwarranted tariffs and sanctions on Australian exports; achieving fair and transparent treatment of Australians currently detained in China; advancing regional security via respect for international law; and securing greater transparency on human rights issues of concern,” Birmingham said. </p>
<p>“Australia should also continue to appeal for China to use its influence on Russia to end the immoral and illegal invasion of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>Birmingham said the Wong visit would be the first by an Australian minister since his final visit as trade minister in November 2019.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196799/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest breakthrough in the bilateral relationship follows the meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897802022-11-18T03:58:45Z2022-11-18T03:58:45ZChina’s influence in Myanmar could tip the scales towards war in the South China Sea<p>The fate of Myanmar has major implications for a free and open Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China, which is consolidating its economic and strategic influence in its smaller neighbour in pursuit of its <a href="https://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-indian-ocean/">two-ocean strategy</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<p>Since the coup China has been – by far – the main source of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-economy-idUSL4N2U721T">foreign investment</a> in Myanmar. </p>
<p>This includes <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-approves-25bn-power-plant-project-backed-by-chinese-companies">US$2.5 billion</a> in a gas-fired power plant to be built west of Myanmar’s capital, Yangon, that will be 81% owned and operated by Chinese companies.</p>
<p>Among the dozens of infrastructure projects China is funding are high-speed rail links and dams. But its most strategically important investment is the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-chinas-determination-see-it-through">China-Myanmar Economic Corridor</a>, encompassing oil and gas pipelines, roads and rail links costing many tens of billions of dollars. </p>
<p>The corridor’s “jewel in the crown” is a deep-sea port to be built at Kyaukphyu, on Myanmar’s west coast, at an estimated <a href="https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kyaukphyu-deep-sea-port-poses-challenges-maday-islanders-and-local-fisheries">cost of US$7 billion</a>.</p>
<p>This will finally give China its long-desired “back door” to the Indian Ocean.</p>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Vivekananda International Foundation</span></span>
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<p>Natural gas from Myanmar can help China reduce its dependence on imports from suppliers such as Australia. Access <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/myanmar-chinas-west-coast-dream">to the Indian Ocean</a> will enable China to import gas and oil from the Middle East, Africa and Venezuela without ships having to pass through the contested waters of the South China Sea to Chinese ports. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">80% of China’s oil imports</a> now move through the South China Sea via the Malacca Strait, which is just 65 kilometres wide at its narrowest point between the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra. </p>
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<p>Overcoming this strategic vulnerability arguably makes the Kyaukphyu port and pipelines the most important element of China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-financing-infrastructure-projects-around-the-world-many-could-harm-nature-and-indigenous-communities-168060">Belt and Road initiative</a> to reshape global trade routes and assert its influence over other nations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-south-china-sea-threatens-90-of-australias-fuel-imports-study-188148">Conflict in the South China Sea threatens 90% of Australia's fuel imports: study</a>
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<h2>Deepening relationship</h2>
<p>Most of China’s infrastructure investment was planned before Myanmar’s coup. But whereas other governments and foreign investors have sought to distance themselves from the junta since it overthrew Myanmar’s elected government in February 2021, China has deepened its relationship.</p>
<p>China is the Myanmar regime’s most important international supporter. In April Foreign Minister Wang Yi said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wang-yi-aung-san-suu-kyi-china-myanmar-diplomacy-d68de69436c1462f647f6475b6315c92">China would support Myanmar</a> “no matter how the situation changes”. In May it used its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to thwart <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/russia-china-block-un-statement-034542265.html">a statement expressing concern</a> about violence and the growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Work continues on projects associated with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. New ventures (such as the aforementioned power station) have been approved.
More projects are on the cards. In June, for example, China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the completion of <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2022/06/08/feasibility-study-completed-for-myanmar039s-wan-pong-port-improvement-project">a feasibility study</a> to upgrade the Wan Pong port on the Lancang-Mekong River in Myanmar’s east.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
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<h2>Debt trap warnings</h2>
<p>In 2020, before the coup, Myanmar’s auditor general Maw Than <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/costly-borrowing-06102020151951.html">warned of growing indebtedness</a> to China, with Chinese lenders charging higher interest payments than those from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. </p>
<p>At that time <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Forty-per-cent-of-Myanmar%E2%80%99s-government-debt-held-by-China-46071.html">about 40%</a> of Myanmar’s foreign debt of US$10 billion was owed to China. It is likely to be greater now. It will only increase the longer a military dictatorship, with few other supporters or sources of foreign money, remains in power, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/23/how-the-coup-is-destroying-myanmars-economy/">dragging down Myanmar’s economy</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar should therefore be seen as crucial to the long-term strategic interests of the region’s democracies, and to global peace and prosperity, given the increasing belligerence of China under Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Xi, now president for life, this month told the People’s Liberation Army to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/09/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-army-to-focus-on-preparation-for-war">prepare for war</a>. A compliant and indebted Myanmar with a deep-sea port controlled by Chinese interests tips the scales towards that happening. </p>
<p>A democratic and independent Myanmar is a counter-strategy to this potential. </p>
<h2>Calls for sanctions</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s democracy movement wants the international community to impose <a href="https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/cut-the-cash/">tough sanctions</a> on the junta. But few have responded.</p>
<p>The United States and United Kingdom have gone furthest, banning business dealings with Myanmar military officials and state-owned or private companies controlled by the military. </p>
<p>The European Union and Canada have imposed sanctions against a more limited range of individuals and economic entities.</p>
<p>South Korea has suspended financing new infrastructure projects. Japan has suspended aid and postponed the launch of Myanmar’s first satellite. New Zealand has suspended political and military contact. </p>
<p>Australia has suspended military cooperation (with some <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/myanmar-sanctions-regime">pre-existing restrictions</a> on dealing with military leaders imposed following the human rights atrocities committed against the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561">Rohingya</a> in 2017. </p>
<p>But that’s about it. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<p>Myanmar’s closest neighbours in the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations are still committed to a policy of dialogue and “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/will-asean-finally-change-its-approach-toward-myanmar/">non-interference</a>” – though <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/malaysian-fm-says-asean-envoy-welcomes-idea-of-engaging-myanmars-nug/">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/indonesian-fm-says-myanmar-military-to-blame-for-countrys-crisis/">Indonesia</a> are increasingly arguing for a tougher approach as the atrocities mount. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://myanmar.iiss.org/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> says the only country now more violent than Myanmar is Ukraine. </p>
<p>Given its unique geo-strategic position, self-interest alone should be enough for the international community to take greater action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Htwe Htwe Thein receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grant. </span></em></p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China.Htwe Htwe Thein, Associate professor, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948172022-11-17T09:31:11Z2022-11-17T09:31:11ZGrattan on Friday: A lot may be changing in China-Australia relations, but a lot is staying the same<p>In retrospect, there were various signposts pointing to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ice-breaking meeting with Anthony Albanese in Bali on Tuesday. </p>
<p>One of the more obscure, perhaps, was China’s ambassador to Canberra, Xiao Qian, seeking out Peter Dutton for a chat, which took place last week.</p>
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<p>Why would the ambassador want a catch-up with the opposition leader, who in the former government had been one of the loudest voices warning of the danger posed by the increasingly assertive superpower? </p>
<p>One answer is that preparation for what has been dubbed Xi’s current broad “<a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-s-schizophrenic-friendship-with-cherished-australia-20221115-p5bylx">charm offensive</a>” was comprehensive. </p>
<p>The meeting with Xi has been the showstopper of Albanese’s summit-season trip – including the East Asia and ASEAN-Australia summits, the G20 and APEC – from which he returns this weekend.</p>
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<p>For the PM, having the bilateral relationship begin to stabilise and move to a more constructive footing, after China had relegated Australia to “the freezer” for years, is the culmination of a very successful first six months on the world stage. </p>
<p>It will be all the more satisfying for Albanese personally, because December 21 marks the 50th anniversay of the Whitlam government establishing diplomatic relations with China. This was one of that government’s earliest acts, following Gough Whitlam’s ground-breaking visit to China as opposition leader and preceding a 1973 prime ministerial trip.</p>
<p>The new Australia-China rapport has to be seen in both multilateral and bilateral contexts. </p>
<p>China, for its own reasons, is lowering the temperature in its international relations. Its economic problems (fuelled by its COVID-zero policy) may be one factor driving this. Also Xi, now his leadership has been further strengthened by the recent 20th Party Congress, may feel he has more latitude to alter the tone of foreign policy. </p>
<p>Hence the very long meeting with Joe Biden, which the US president cast as positive, and Xi’s benign attitude to several other leaders in the past few days. </p>
<p>The change in stance towards Australia may partly be in the slipstream of this wider move. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/word-from-the-hill-albanese-xi-meeting-is-the-first-step-on-long-march-194730">Word from The Hill: Albanese-Xi meeting is the first step on long march</a>
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<p>Bilaterally, however, the defeat of the Morrison government has enabled and facilitated the recalibration of the relationship. If Scott Morrison were still PM, the fridge door would likely have remained shut for some time. </p>
<p>The Albanese government, from its first days, has handled adroitly the run-up to Tuesday’s meeting. It responded appropriately to China’s initial overtures for a rapprochement, sending positive signals while making it clear it would not give ground on substantive issues. </p>
<p>We now find ourselves in a somewhat paradoxical situation. While we look to better times with China, Australia’s defence preparations, which include a strategic review to report in March, are all about improving our preparedness (including our interoperability with the Americans) against a possible threat from that country. </p>
<p>Defence Minister Richard Marles, who was also acting prime minister this week, sought to square this circle when he addressed the Sydney Institute on Monday. </p>
<p>“A commitment to stabilising our relationship with China does not mean we won’t also maintain a clear-eyed focus on our security,” Marles said. </p>
<p>“The idea that Australia has to choose between diplomacy and defence – or as some critics would have it, between co-operation and confrontation – is a furphy, and a dangerous one at that.</p>
<p>"Speaking frankly about what we see in our region isn’t confrontation, it’s common sense. Improving our national security isn’t provocation, it’s prudence.”</p>
<p>On the threat side, Marles was blunt. “We must adapt to the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be. A world where post-Cold War optimism has been replaced by the reality of renewed major-power competition. A competition in which Australia is more relevant now than at any time in our history because its centre of gravity is in our region, the Indo-Pacific, where it is driving the biggest military build-up we have seen anywhere in the world over the last 70 years.</p>
<p>"The risk that this competition becomes confrontation, with all the destructive power of modern weapons, is a threat that we recognise and want to avoid.</p>
<p>"That’s why sober, responsible and clear-eyed statecraft has never been more important,” Marles said.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-g20-may-be-a-talk-fest-but-its-a-talk-fest-we-need-at-a-time-of-growing-division-194156">The G20 may be a talk fest, but it's a talk fest we need at a time of growing division</a>
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<p>The Xi meeting was never expected to yield immediate “announceables”, whether the lifting of restrictions on $20 billion in Australian trade or the release of detained Australians, journalist Cheng Lei and writer Yang Hengjun. </p>
<p>There is some speculation an easing of the trade sanctions might begin around the anniversary of diplomatic recognition. Ambassador Xiao has been showing a keen interest in that milestone, talking to people with first-hand knowledge of Whitlam’s travel to Peking (now Beijing). </p>
<p>A cursory glance at history indicates it is important to put the Xi meeting into a longer-term, cautionary context. It was only in 2014-15, under the Abbott government, that Xi addressed the Australian parliament, and the two countries signed and celebrated their free trade agreement.</p>
<p>Then things went quickly downhill. During Malcolm Turnbull’s prime ministership, China was riled by Australia legislating against its actual and potential interference. In particular it was infuriated by the rejection of Huawei’s participation in the 5G network.</p>
<p>The climate (on both sides) grew colder under Morrison. China progressively ramped up trade restrictions. It was angered by the Australian government’s call for an inquiry into the origins of COVID, which began in Wuhan. Australian ministers could not get calls returned.</p>
<p>Now we have the defrost, with Xi declaring at the start of his talks with Albanese: “China-Australia relations had been at the forefront of China’s relations with developed countries for a long time, which is worth cherishing. In the past few years, China-Australia relations have encountered some difficulties, which we didn’t want to see.” </p>
<p>It is worth recalling that the ups and downs of recent years have come within Xi’s presidency. It is not as though there was regime change; rather, it has been changes of stance during one man’s leadership, prompted often by Australia’s push-back against China’s behaviour (or the perceived risk of it). </p>
<p>Relieved as we are to be out of the freezer, we have to remember circumstances can always see us returned there. </p>
<p>That’s where Canada is at present, following its reaction to China’s meddling and pressure. At the G20, Xi did not accord PM Justin Trudeau a bilateral meeting. After Trudeau <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/world/xi-jinping-filmed-in-staged-public-rebuke-of-justin-trudeau/news-story/fa889f31f721857db47b79d78e4969c2">grabbed him for a “pull-aside”</a> (as such encounters are termed) and the Canadian media were briefed on the discussion, Xi publicly upbraided Trudeau. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/albanese-xi-meeting-wont-resolve-australias-grievances-overnight-but-it-is-a-real-step-forward-194511">Albanese-Xi meeting won't resolve Australia's grievances overnight. But it is a real step forward</a>
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<p>As the bilateral relationship unfolds in coming days, Dutton should have the opposition maintain, as far as possible, a solid front with the government. </p>
<p>After his session with the ambassador, he tweeted: “We had a constructive meeting where we discussed security, trade and human rights issues. I will continue to engage in an open and honest dialogue in matters relating to the safety, security and prosperity of our region.”</p>
<p>It’s important that government and opposition present a united face to China.</p>
<p>Australia should take full advantage of the new rays of sunshine in the relationship. But Australians should, and probably do, understand that this is a relationship where clouds can quickly gather, brought about by both the actions of China and the reactions that an Australian government may consider (rightly or wrongly) to be necessary in the national interest.</p>
<p>Dennis Richardson, who has formerly headed the defence department and the foreign affairs department, captures the moment succinctly. </p>
<p>“We’ve reached the end of the first phase of the Albanese government’s efforts to improve Australia’s relationship with China. The substantive challenge of turning that into real outcomes in trade now begins. But whatever happens on that front, Australia and China’s strategic perspectives remain at odds.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194817/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the PM, having the bilateral relationship begin to stabilise and move to a more constructive footing culminates a very successful first six months on the world stage.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945112022-11-15T11:30:06Z2022-11-15T11:30:06ZAlbanese-Xi meeting won’t resolve Australia’s grievances overnight. But it is a real step forward<p>There were smiles all round as the Australian and Chinese leaders met formally for the first time in more than six years.</p>
<p>The meeting was brief, just 32 minutes, but Prime Minister Anthony Albanese led afterwards with the message that it “was a positive and constructive discussion”. </p>
<p>President Xi Jinping said in his opening remarks that the difficulties in the bilateral relationship were not what the Chinese side wanted to see. </p>
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<p>Yet beyond conciliatory words and photo opportunities, the Australian public is being hit with contrasting takes on what the meeting means for relations with our most important trading partner and the “<a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F35c9c2cf-9347-4a82-be89-20df5f76529b%2F0005%22;src1=sm1">big guy</a>” in the regional room. </p>
<p>On one hand, it’s been described as a “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/anthony-albanese-to-hold-landmark-talks-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping-at-g20-summit-20221114-p5by7m.html">landmark</a>” and “<a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/xi-tells-australia-we-should-cherish-our-relationship-20221115-p5bydk">historic</a>” event – a “<a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/out-of-the-deep-freeze-xi-agrees-to-meet-albanese-20221114-p5by61">huge reset</a>” of Australia-China ties. </p>
<p>What’s conjured up is images of wine and rock lobster flowing freely through Chinese customs once again, and the detained Australians Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei stepping off the prime ministerial jet alongside Albanese when it lands in Sydney later this week. </p>
<p>Others, however, are keen to moderate expectations. Treasurer Jim Chalmers <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/from-detained-australians-to-the-20-billion-question-what-anthony-albanese-raised-in-xi-jinping-meeting/9bfy6zovf">warned</a> earlier this week that</p>
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<p>I don’t think anybody pretends that some of the issues that China has raised, certainly some of the issues that we have raised, will be solved overnight. </p>
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<h2>A diplomatic off-ramp</h2>
<p>The reality is that Canberra and Beijing’s assessments of their respective interests remain far from aligned. </p>
<p>For starters, let’s be clear on what led to a meeting even taking place. Two factors combined, with neither being sufficient alone.</p>
<p>First, by the end of 2021, Beijing had ample evidence the hardline approach it was taking to shifting Canberra’s positions wasn’t working. </p>
<p>The trade sanctions deployed in 2020 were having no discernible impact on the Australian economy at large. They were, however, generating plenty of negative headlines for China internationally. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Australian public opinion towards China collapsed. By early 2022, <a href="https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/utsacribida-poll-2022">polling</a> revealed that far from backing down, 58% of Australians supported the adoption of a “harder Australian government line on China”, compared with just 17% who disagreed. </p>
<p>This meant Beijing was alive to face-saving off-ramps. </p>
<p>Second, by restoring diplomacy to centre stage in managing China relations, the new Australian government delivered such an off-ramp. Australian political leaders were now once again referring to China as a “comprehensive strategic partner”, while emphasising that “both sides”, not just China, would need to reflect on their handling of differences. Challenges posed by China’s behaviour are acknowledged by the current government but not talked up for domestic political gain. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-handshakes-to-threats-can-the-election-bring-a-fresh-start-in-our-fractured-relationship-with-china-178415">needlessly provocative rhetoric</a> provided the trigger for Beijing cutting off senior-level political dialogue in early 2020. A tighter diplomatic ship overseen by Foreign Minister Penny Wong has now permitted its restoration. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-a-new-australian-government-and-foreign-minister-comes-fresh-hope-for-australia-china-relations-182785">With a new Australian government and foreign minister comes fresh hope for Australia-China relations</a>
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<h2>A step forward</h2>
<p>The next question is, will the meeting make a practical difference?</p>
<p>Albanese himself <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-15/face-time-with-china-s-xi-a-sign-of-success-says-albanese/101653624">said</a> that simply “having the meeting is a successful outcome”.</p>
<p>That’s not as trite as it might sound. </p>
<p>A meeting does not guarantee the Australian grievances will be addressed. But there’s no doubting that in China in 2022, the person these grievances need to be put to, and who has the authority to address them, is the Chinese president. </p>
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<p>Even superpowers understand this. In the lead-up to a meeting between US and Chinese leaders on Monday, President Joe Biden’s national security advisor Jake Sullivan <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/australia-china-relations-thaw-but-temperature-still-set-to-zero-20221113-p5bxsx">emphasised</a> that</p>
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<p>There just is no substitute for this kind of leader-to-leader communication in navigating and managing such a consequential relationship.</p>
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<p>We can also be confident that a decisive signal has now been sent throughout the Chinese bureaucracy that there’s official blessing to engage with Australia again.</p>
<p>A meeting of trade ministers to dig into ongoing disputes would naturally follow. </p>
<p>Australia’s ambassador in Beijing, Graham Fletcher, can expect to see his access improved. </p>
<p>Even Chinese companies considering investing in Australia, and parents weighing up whether to send their children to study here, will now be revising their assessments of risk downwards, the opposite of the trend in recent years. </p>
<p>Another factor giving cause for optimism is that while the Australian government hasn’t offered up compromises to get trade sanctions removed or detainees released, Albanese will have been able to credibly deliver messages directly to Xi that assuage core Chinese sensitivities. </p>
<p>Behind closed doors, he would have been able to say that Australia’s position on Taiwan and our “One China” policy <a href="https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/australia-and-us-paths-china-taiwan-are-diverging">has not changed</a> since diplomatic relations were struck 50 years ago. The Australian government unequivocally does not support Taiwanese independence. </p>
<p>And in contrast to the US, nor do we support the economic containment of China. On Monday, Trade Minister Don Farrell went as far as describing recent trade sanctions on China imposed by the Biden administration as “<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/don-farrells-pitch-for-fair-trading/news-story/96ada11b72a25e13b71a71e69de07da7">draconian</a>”. </p>
<p>The meeting isn’t a “reset” back to the sunny days of 2015. But it is on the dysfunction since 2020. Australia is a step closer to having a relationship with China on par with what other US allies and partners in the region have been able to maintain all along. And that’s unambiguously a positive step forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Laurenceson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canberra and Beijing’s assessments of their interests remain far from aligned. But as Albanese himself said, simply ‘having the meeting is a successful outcome’.James Laurenceson, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1886422022-08-12T04:44:49Z2022-08-12T04:44:49ZVIDEO: China tensions, the Barilaro affair, Albanese’s jobs summit, and more teals on the move<p>University of Canberra Professorial Fellow Michelle Grattan and University of Canberra Vice-Chancellor Professor Paddy Nixon talk about this week in politics.</p>
<p>They discuss Australia’s relationship with China as tensions rise over Taiwan, the inquiry into that New York post former NSW Nationals leader John Barilaro never got to take up, and the Albanese government’s jobs summit. They also canvass the prospects for a fresh batch of “teals’, gearing up for state elections in Victoria and NSW. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan discusses the political week that was with Professor Paddy Nixon, Vice-Chancellor and President of the University of CanberraMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1885362022-08-11T01:08:12Z2022-08-11T01:08:12ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: How far will China go? La Trobe’s Nick Bisley says its ‘risk appetite’ has gone up<p>The Chinese reaction to United States Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit further escalated tensions in our region, as China becomes more bellicose in language and action. </p>
<p>On Wednesday, China’s Ambassador Xiao Qian spoke at the National Press Club. He talked about wanting a positive relationship between Australia and China, while reiterating China’s uncompromising line towards Taiwan, and giving a chilling prediction of what the Taiwanese would be in for post reunification. </p>
<p>“The least thing we are ready to do is use force. That is one of the reasons why China has been so patient for several decades. […] We’re waiting for a peaceful unification. But […] we can never rule out the option to use other means […] when compelled, we are ready to use all necessary means.”</p>
<p>“My personal understanding is that once Taiwan is united, come back to the motherland, there might be process for the people in Taiwan to have a correct understanding of China.”</p>
<p>In this podcast, Michelle Grattan speaks with Nick Bisley, Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, an expert in Asian foreign relations and Australia’s foreign and defence policy. </p>
<p>Bisley says “what we are probably entering into, at least for the next few months, is a period of much sharply-heightened instability and military kind of friction in and around Taiwan”.</p>
<p>“China has made very clear for decades now that under certain circumstances it would use military force to deal with what it sees as a rogue province. And those circumstances are largely around a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan or some other really significant move away from the old status quo.”</p>
<p>“I think what what we see out of this crisis is that China’s risk appetite has gone up and its willingness to put up with what it sees as kind of provocations has gone down.</p>
<p>"So the likelihood of them using military force to coerce Taiwan – it’s not going to happen this year or next year, but its likelihood of occurring in the next four to five years has distinctly increased.”</p>
<p>On whether there is the likelihood of a conflict between China and the US as tensions between the two nations continue to rise, “the constraints that domestic politics puts on each side means that we could end up in a situation where they are backed into a corner and find that there’s few ways out other than some kind of military action, which then escalates.”</p>
<p>But “if there is a proper conflict between the US and China, everyone loses pretty significantly.”</p>
<p>“When we look back in February 2022, thinking about what Putin would do in relation to Ukraine, we all thought he’s not going to do a full-blown invasion. It doesn’t make any sense. It’s not in his interest to do so. I think we’ve always thought that about Taiwan. It’s just not in the US’s interest to do the full-blown military operation. And the lesson has got to be from Ukraine, is that sometimes rationality doesn’t always win.”</p>
<p>On whether the Albanese government is handling the rising tensions with China well, Bisley says: “They’re playing a reasonable hand in what is a pretty difficult set of circumstances.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan speaks with Nick Bisley, Professor at La Trobe University about escalating tensions with China over Taiwan, and the Chinese Ambassador's recent address to the National Press Club.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870612022-07-18T20:06:28Z2022-07-18T20:06:28ZWhy China’s challenges to Australian ships in the South and East China Seas are likely to continue<p>Last week it was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-13/australian-defence-warship-tracked-by-chinese-military/101229906">reported</a> an Australian warship had, in early July, been closely followed by a Chinese guided-missile destroyer, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, and multiple military aircraft as it travelled through the East China Sea.</p>
<p>This incident followed a <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/chinese-fighter-jet-intercepts-australian-surveillance-aircraft-south-china-sea/e99a9d3e-8453-4f1d-ae01-130e6681d8f8">confrontation</a> on May 26, when an Australian maritime surveillance plane was dangerously intercepted by a Chinese fighter over the South China Sea.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-05/australian-government-wont-be-intimidated-in-south-china-sea/101127204">Reportedly</a>, the Chinese fighter flew treacherously close to the Australian plane, releasing flares, before cutting across its path and dropping chaff (a cloud of aluminium fibre used as a decoy against radar).</p>
<p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. When they do occur, it’s important to place them within their broader historical and geopolitical context and not sensationalise them – we must not frame them as if we’re on the brink of war.</p>
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<h2>The good news: 3 reasons not to panic</h2>
<p>There are three reasons why the significance of these events shouldn’t be exaggerated. </p>
<p>First, Asia’s seas are among the world’s busiest. The warships of different navies are constantly operating in close proximity with each other and most of these interactions are professional and even courteous. This includes most encounters with the Chinese navy.</p>
<p>A second, and related, point is that both the Chinese and Australian navies have grown significantly in size over the past decade. More ships means more total days at sea, which means more opportunities for the navies to come into contact.</p>
<p>Most of these encounters are innocuous. In our research on <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-papers-indo-pacific-endeavour-reflections-and-proposals-australias-premier-naval-diplomacy-activity">Australia’s naval diplomacy</a>, for instance, the team at Macquarie University investigated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-09/chinese-spy-ship-docks-next-to-hmas-adelaide-in-fiji/9852748">reports</a> a Chinese ship had spied on HMAS Adelaide visiting Fiji.</p>
<p>The reality, however, was the Chinese ship was deployed semi-permanently to the South Pacific as a satellite relay and regularly came in-and-out of Suva (Fiji’s capital) for supplies. It was nothing more than a chance run-in.</p>
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<p>Third, although confrontations aren’t common, they are also far from unprecedented. During the Cold War, the warships of the United States and the Soviet Union frequently sparred. Few forward deployments occurred without some contact with the opposing forces that may have included overflights, shadowing or dangerous manoeuvring. </p>
<p>Indeed, potentially dangerous interactions were common enough that in 1972 the Americans and Soviets signed the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm">agreement</a>. The agreement spelt out the “rules of the road”. The superpowers also committed to an annual meeting between their senior naval officers, with the hosting responsibility alternating between them.</p>
<p>The agreement didn’t eliminate incidents at sea, but it did create a mechanism for the two parties to vent their frustrations, voice their protests and work constructively on solutions. As the meetings were between the two nations’ top professional naval officers, there was a <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/incidents-sea">high degree of mutual respect</a> and a genuine attempt to make the seas a safer place for their sailors.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-signals-a-sense-of-crisis-over-taiwan-this-is-why-it-is-worried-about-chinas-military-aims-164562">Japan signals a 'sense of crisis' over Taiwan — this is why it is worried about China's military aims</a>
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<h2>The bad news: these incidents will continue</h2>
<p>The US attempted to replicate their Soviet agreement with China. In 1998, the US and China <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/august/military-maritime-consultative-agreement">agreed</a> to the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which copied many of the successful parts of the Soviet agreement, including the annual meeting between their admirals to discuss concerning incidents.</p>
<p>The challenge, however, is that the geopolitical backdrop to the US-China agreement is significantly different from its Cold War antecedent. During the Cold War, tensions at sea rose and fell just as they did on land. However, the areas where the Soviet Union attempted to assert its claims (such as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea) were isolated and icy and generally unimportant to everyone except the Soviets. The Americans would prod there occasionally on intelligence gathering, freedom of navigation operations, or simply to rile up their rivals – but on the whole both sides understood the game.</p>
<p>In contrast, China has claimed exclusive coastal territorial sovereignty over the majority of the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and large parts of the East China Sea. These are among the most geopolitically important and busiest waterways in the world.</p>
<p>Beijing’s options for convincing regional states to recognise its claims are limited, especially when foreign navies continue to traverse these waters, dismissively ignoring China’s sovereignty declarations.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<h2>Beijing has few options</h2>
<p>Politically, China could attempt to horse trade, such as we’ll treat you as the custodians of the South Pacific if you accept our claims to the South China Sea. Or use economic and diplomatic coercion.</p>
<p>In Australia’s case, neither of these strategies are likely to be successful as they would undermine our relationship with the US, and there’s the fear China will renege in the future. </p>
<p>This leaves tactical deterrence. Describing how deterrence works, American economist Thomas Schelling used the <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1007.3938&rep=rep1&type=pdf">analogy</a> of two people in a row boat where one starts “rocking the boat” dangerously, threatening to tip it over unless the other one does all the rowing. The threat is shared equally between them, but the boat rocker is counting on the other to back down because their appetite for risk is lower.</p>
<p>Confrontations in the air and sea are risky for both the perpetrator and the target. On 1 April 2001, for instance, a Chinese fighter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hainan_Island_incident">collided</a> with an American signals intelligence aircraft. The American plane was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island, while the Chinese plane crashed and the pilot died.</p>
<p>What China is counting on is Australia not being as risk tolerant as they are. They hope Australia will blink first. But, Australia has shown no indication it will stop deploying to the region. Indeed, the aircraft that was threatened and damaged by chaff on May 26 was one of two Australian aircraft flying out of the Philippines at the time. The Australians were not deterred and the second aircraft appears to have flown missions on <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/details-surface-on-china-s-dangerous-interception-of-raaf-p-8a">May 27, May 30 and June 2</a> through the same airspace as the incident occurred.</p>
<p>As China and Australia have few other options than to continue doing what they’re doing, these incidents look likely to continue.</p>
<p>When they occur, however, it’s important they’re not taken out of their historical and operational contexts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lockyer receives funding from the Department of Defence through its Strategic Policy Grant Program. The funding supports his ongoing research on conventional maritime deterrence. </span></em></p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. But we shouldn’t frame them as if we’re in the brink of war.Adam Lockyer, Associate Professor in Strategic Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1850322022-06-17T02:29:43Z2022-06-17T02:29:43ZMarles shifts tone on China at defence summit – but the early days of government are easiest<p>In its first month in power, foreign policy and national security have played a major part of the new government’s activities. </p>
<p>Very soon after the election, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attended the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad) leaders’ meeting in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Penny Wong has made trips to the South Pacific and Indonesia. And this month, Defence Minister Richard Marles met ministers and other key figures in Singapore and Japan.</p>
<p>Marles’ historic trip sheds some light on the new government’s approach to national security matters.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-great-albanese-is-in-indonesia-but-australia-needs-to-do-a-lot-more-to-reset-relations-here-are-5-ways-to-start-184446">It's great Albanese is in Indonesia, but Australia needs to do a lot more to reset relations. Here are 5 ways to start</a>
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<h2>Signalling a new approach</h2>
<p>Marles was in Singapore to join the first in-person Shangri-La Dialogue to be held since 2019.</p>
<p>This meeting, also known as the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2022">Asia Security Summit</a>, has been run annually since 2002 by the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies. It brings together defence ministers, chiefs of defence forces and related security policy makers from across Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>Marles’ plenary <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/speeches/address-iiss-19th-shangri-la-dialogue-singapore">speech</a> at this meeting was one of the most interesting made by an Australian leader in some years.</p>
<p>It underscored the continuity in Australian policy: the importance of the UN and international law, the focus on the alliance and the commitment to defence expenditure increases made by the previous government. </p>
<p>But it also showed where key changes would be made, including a much greater focus on climate change, a change in attitude and approach to the South Pacific and a subtle but significant shift in tone toward China. </p>
<p>Marles’ predecessor had tended to paint China’s regional activity in <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/prepare-for-war-peter-dutton-issues-ominous-warning-as-he-says-china-is-on-a-very-deliberate-course-at-the-moment/news-story/6807bf2105118d8a31da4a663292ee38">semi-apocalyptic terms</a>. </p>
<p>By contrast, the new defence minister emphasised recognising the reality of China’s rise but framed it in terms of responsibilities that come with it. He also stressed the need for China to accept and respect the restraints the great powers must exercise.</p>
<p>It was a thoughtful and measured approach that is a good sign of the direction of Australia’s regional policy.</p>
<h2>Getting back on track with France, sideline meetings with allies</h2>
<p>The deputy prime minister also had an extensive set of meetings on the sidelines of the dialogue.</p>
<p>This included 15 bilateral meetings with the defence ministers of Singapore, Solomon Islands, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Fiji, Indonesia, Canada, the US, Timor Leste, Philippines and Sri Lanka. </p>
<p>He also met with the French defence minister, himself newly appointed, making the point on <a href="https://twitter.com/RichardMarlesMP/status/1535747742441828352">social media</a> that Franco-Australian defence cooperation was “back on track”. </p>
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<p>While in Singapore, Marles took part in the latest meeting of the Trilateral Security Partnership, an initiative of Japan, the US and Australia to advance shared security goals.</p>
<p>This produced a wordy <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/statements/united-states-japan-australia-trilateral-defense-ministers-meeting-2022">joint statement</a> of intent to strengthen their collaborative initiatives in Asia.</p>
<h2>An historic meeting with China’s defence minister</h2>
<p>But the meeting garnering the most attention was with China’s defence minister, Wei Fenghe.</p>
<p>This was notable less for its content, which by all accounts followed relatively routine patterns, but for the fact it happened at all. </p>
<p>There have been no meetings between Australian and senior Chinese government figures for some years. The Australian ambassador in China has had virtually no access and the broader diplomatic relationship has been essentially non-functional. </p>
<p>It was a brief meeting and involved no major breakthroughs. But the fact it happened at all indicates Australia should be able to navigate back to a working relationship with Beijing without having to make concessions.</p>
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<h2>Shoring up the Japan-Australia relationship</h2>
<p>Marles then travelled to Tokyo for meetings with counterparts in Japan. </p>
<p>Australia and Japan are one another’s most important security partners after the US, and each sees the other as a crucial component in their regional security strategy. </p>
<p>Despite considerable goodwill, this part of the trip did not yield any significant further developments in the two countries security cooperation – as was made clear by the somewhat sparse joint <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/rmarles/statements/joint-statement-advancing-defence-cooperation-tokyo-japan">statement</a> it produced. </p>
<p>This may well be a function of the fact the two are already doing a lot together. Their practical capacity to do a great deal more, particularly of any strategic significance, is relatively constrained by resource limitations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C35%2C3956%2C2322&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C35%2C3956%2C2322&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469385/original/file-20220617-25-vy4kml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Marles travelled to Tokyo for meetings with counterparts in Japan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo via AP Images</span></span>
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<h2>The early days are the easiest</h2>
<p>The new Labor government has had a good first month or so on the foreign policy front.</p>
<p>It has been are active, engaged and well received by regional powers. It has struck a prudent balance between the changes it seeks and the importance of continuity. </p>
<p>Marles has played his part successfully, particularly in communicating the need to have a productive relationship with China while not giving ground on core issues. </p>
<p>But the early days are the easiest ones and the true test of the new government’s foreign policy has yet to come.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-wong-makes-her-mark-in-the-pacific-the-albanese-government-should-look-to-history-on-mending-ties-with-china-184144">As Wong makes her mark in the Pacific, the Albanese government should look to history on mending ties with China</a>
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</em>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the think tank that runs the Shangri-La Dialogue.</span></em></p>Defence minister Richard Marles’ historic trip sheds some light on the new government’s approach to national security matters.Nick Bisley, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1827852022-05-22T01:42:19Z2022-05-22T01:42:19ZWith a new Australian government and foreign minister comes fresh hope for Australia-China relations<p>An Albanese government in Canberra means an improved trajectory in Australia-China relations is a real possibility. </p>
<p>Sure, there will be no “re-set” like we saw in the heady days of 2015. The world has changed; Australia and China certainly have.</p>
<p>And, of course, Beijing will need to be ready to chart a different course, not just Canberra. </p>
<p>After all, in 2020 it was Beijing’s decision and Beijing’s decision alone to respond to political disagreements by cutting off senior level dialogue and hitting Australia’s exports.</p>
<p>Further tempering the outlook is that the architect of China’s assertive foreign policy turn, President Xi Jinping, is expected to be re-instated for a third term when the Communist Party of China meets for its 20th National Congress later this year. </p>
<p>But the Morrison government’s actions and reactions were not irrelevant. The current dire state of bilateral relations between Canberra and Beijing was not inevitable.</p>
<h2>Missed opportunities</h2>
<p>It is an observable fact, for example, that the Morrison government abandoned the <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-handshakes-to-threats-can-the-election-bring-a-fresh-start-in-our-fractured-relationship-with-china-178415">more diplomatic approach</a> it had pursued in 2019. </p>
<p>Rock bottom in Australian diplomacy came in March this year, when an airliner <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/17/china-air-crash-that-killed-132-may-have-been-deliberate-says-us-report">crashed</a> in southern China, killing 132 people. </p>
<p>Yet in contrast to the leaders of the UK, Canada, India and others – all countries that have had their own acute challenges with Beijing – neither the prime minister nor his foreign minister, Marise Payne, saw any reason to issue even a short statement of condolences. </p>
<p>Imagining Canberra has no agency to promote a relationship recovery also misses the fact every other capital in the Asia-Pacific region has managed to maintain relations with Beijing in a more constructive state. </p>
<h2>The role and value of diplomacy</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/utsacribida-poll-2022">poll</a> by the Australia-China Relations Institute shows the Australian public recognise the current situation is not as one-sided as Canberra or Beijing like to suggest. </p>
<p>A clear majority of respondents, 78%, agreed that, “The responsibility for improving the relationship between Australia and China lies with both countries”. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/independents-have-questions-to-answer-over-china-comments-coalition-says-20220505-p5aitl.html">commentators</a> insist there is no prospect of an improvement. They typically point to there being bipartisan agreement “China has changed” and to <a href="https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/china-consensus-australia">overwhelming agreement</a> between the major parties on the suite of policies justified in response. </p>
<p>But this assessment dismisses the role and value of diplomacy. </p>
<p>As Allan Gyngell, former head of the Office of National Assessments <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/why-the-g20-meeting-in-bali-is-make-or-break-for-australia-20220503-p5ai38">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is not beyond the capacity of effective diplomacy to return the situation between Australia and China to something more closely approximating that of other US allies.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Penny Wong as foreign minister</h2>
<p>The Chinese embassy in Canberra will have cabled back to Beijing the conciliatory diplomatic touches incoming foreign minister, Senator Penny Wong, has pursued from opposition. </p>
<p>Morrison has <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-18">claimed</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia has done nothing to injure [the] partnership [with China], nothing at all.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But in May last year, Wong <a href="https://www.pennywong.com.au/media-hub/speeches/speech-to-launch-peter-hartcher-s-red-zone-king-s-hall-old-parliament-house-canberra-19-05-2021/">insisted</a> the differences between Australia’s interests and China’s interests,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>do not mean that there’s nothing we can do. They don’t mean that there’s no room for improvement in our own actions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And unlike the Morrison government, Wong took time to <a href="https://twitter.com/SenatorWong/status/1506501563917172742?s=20&t=Ing6siZ1MAq7wQYr17oThQ">express</a> her condolences after the China plane crash tragedy in March.</p>
<p>Another difference is Wong looks beyond just Washington and London for insight into Australia’s challenges. </p>
<p>In November last year, she <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/director-s-chair-penny-wong-politics-china-and-job-foreign-minister">singled out</a> Singapore, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Their insight into China, their insight into the region, are second to none […] [Singaporean] Prime Minister Lee [Hsien Loong] is a thinker and a leader whose writing and speeches on these issues, I think, are second to none. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was Singaporean Prime Minister Lee who stood next to Morrison last June and <a href="https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/Transcript-of-the-QnA-segment-at-the-Joint-Press-Conference-of-the-SG-AU-Leaders-Meeting-Jun-2021">offered</a> the following advice</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There will be rough spots [with China] […] you have to deal with them. But deal with them as issues in a partnership which you want to keep going and not issues which add up to an adversary, which you are trying to suppress.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A new opportunity</h2>
<p>There’s one other factor pointing to a more positive future. Beijing has form in using the arrival of a new government as an opportunity to undertake a face-saving adjustment. </p>
<p>The Australia-China relationship began to sour during the government of Malcolm Turnbull (between September 2015 and August 2018). Turnbull’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, did not visit China in the final two and a half years of her tenure. </p>
<p>Morrison was the Turnbull government minister responsible for <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/6164495%22">signing off</a> on the ban of Chinese technology company, Huawei, from Australia’s 5G rollout. </p>
<p>Yet when Morrison subsequently emerged as prime minister, Beijing took the opportunity to <a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/gdtp_16/201811/t20181106_734811.htm">invite</a> his new foreign minister for a formal visit less than three months later. A month after Morrison won another term in May 2019, he <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/doorstop-osaka-japan-0">secured</a> a meeting with China’s president Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing would now also recognise that any plan it once had to change Canberra’s political decision-making by disrupting Australia’s trade has been a dismal failure.</p>
<p>It not only cratered Australian elite and public opinion, but damaged China’s reputation as a responsible great power and reliable trade partner elsewhere (notably in North America and Europe). </p>
<p>All this raises the prospect that when the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Australia and the People’s Republic rolls around in December, the occasion might now be marked with some celebration – not just awkward silence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Laurenceson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing has form in using the arrival of a new government as an opportunity to undertake a face-saving adjustment.James Laurenceson, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1777412022-02-27T19:11:58Z2022-02-27T19:11:58ZScare-mongering on China is a threat to our democracy, and responsible media must guard against it<p>There is a great deal more at stake than national security in Scott Morrison’s hyper-partisan and grossly dishonest accusation that Anthony Albanese and his deputy, Richard Marles, are carrying the hopes of the Chinese regime at the forthcoming election.</p>
<p>It undermines the stability of our democracy and shows we have reached a dangerous point in our political discourse.</p>
<p>Two factors are at work here: extremely divisive political rhetoric and the willingness of the country’s dominant newspaper company, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, to lend it a megaphone.</p>
<p>Morrison and Murdoch are trying to do to Australia’s democracy what Murdoch and Donald Trump did to America’s between 2016 and 2021.</p>
<p>They are working together to create division where none exists in pursuit of their own political and ideological interests. No lie is too big to be used for this purpose.</p>
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<p>The English philosopher A.C. Grayling and two American political scientists, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt – among many others – <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/the-good-state.html">have shown</a> how these factors have combined to weaken democracy in the United States and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, their arguments go like this:</p>
<p>Hyper-partisanship – in which fierce disagreement is expressed in extreme language – leads to a breakdown in the consensus on which democracy depends.</p>
<p>When the consensus breaks down, so does the acceptance by each side that the other side has political legitimacy.</p>
<p>When that acceptance breaks down, the peaceful transfer of power that democracies achieve by holding elections is severely threatened. We saw this on January 6 2021, when the Trumpian mob assailed the Capitol in Washington.</p>
<p>Propaganda, spin and outright falsehoods promoted in the professional mass media and on social media contribute powerfully to these consequences.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448480/original/file-20220225-13-4spelu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The storming of the US Capitol in January 2021 is an example of what can happen when hyperpartisanship spirals out of control.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Minchillo/AP/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Levitsky and Ziblatt, in their book <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">How Democracies Die</a>, argue extreme polarisation leads political rivals to see each other as mutual threats. This in turn encourages a win-at-all-costs attitude and leads to a corrosive refusal to accept that the other side is entitled to govern.</p>
<p>If democracies were to be diverted from this destructive course, it was necessary for them to recapture the civility, sense of freedom and shared purpose that defined democracy’s essence in the mid-20th century.</p>
<p>It is here that the professional mass media have a crucial role to play. It lies within their power to promote civility of discourse, articulate a society’s shared purpose and debunk lies.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/too-much-sugar-not-enough-spice-60-minutes-morrison-interview-was-not-journalism-it-was-confected-pap-177058">Too much sugar, not enough spice: 60 Minutes' Morrison interview was not journalism, it was confected pap</a>
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<p>However, after Morrison’s crude and baseless accusations, Murdoch’s newspapers, including <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/chinese-propaganda-outlet-endorses-anthony-albanese-as-better-pm-than-scott-morrison/news-story/e3e26b3a608654854fef7c64f853bfb1">The Australian</a>, The Daily Telegraph and the Herald Sun, and his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAhbhM7oNaU">Sky News channel</a> all trumpeted the message that Albanese and Marles were Beijing’s preferred candidates for the election.</p>
<p>Morrison used as evidence <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1252207.shtml">an article in the Global Times</a>, a propaganda mouthpiece for the Chinese government, written by former Australian diplomat Bruce Haigh, entitled “Weak Australian leadership inhibits potential relationship reset with China”.</p>
<p>Purely as a matter of logic, it is difficult to follow the Morrison argument.</p>
<p>The proposition seems to be that he can swallow material from a recognised Chinese government propaganda outfit and use it as credible evidence that someone else – namely the Labor leadership – is being manipulated by the Chinese government.</p>
<p>On top of that, the article quoted was far from flattering of Albanese. It characterised him as a cautious politician inclined to accept the US view of the world without giving it any independent thought.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448483/original/file-20220225-13-1s5ko2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Morrison government has gone hard on accusing Richard Marles (left) and Anthony Albanese of being China’s ‘pick’ to win the 2022 federal election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<p>At this point, it is only fair to point out there have been two remarkable exceptions to the Murdoch media chorus. Both <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/pm-right-on-china-wrong-on-labor/news-story/26cb39b079521e597fee796ee5296891">Greg Sheridan</a>, The Australian’s foreign editor, and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/china/13763928">Andrew Bolt</a>, the Herald Sun and Sky News commentator, have spoken out, strongly disapproving of Morrison’s accusations.</p>
<p>In doing so, they echoed what the more responsible elements of the Australian media have done, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/former-diplomats-spy-chiefs-warn-against-politicising-china-debate-20220216-p59wy6.html">focusing on the warnings</a> from the current head of ASIO, Mike Burgess, and a previous head, Dennis Richardson, that Morrison’s conduct undermines national security.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-faraway-conflict-feeds-into-morrisons-national-security-pitch-177833">Grattan on Friday: Faraway conflict feeds into Morrison's national security pitch</a>
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<p>The election is still scheduled for three months’ time, and the pressure on these responsible elements of the media is only likely to become more intense. Who knows what new conspiracy theories and hobgoblins the politicians will drum up between now and then?</p>
<p>Much will depend on whether Australia’s political leaders can climb out of the gutter, not forgetting that Albanese slung the “Manchurian candidate” slur back at Morrison.</p>
<p>Another important factor will be what happens on social media.</p>
<p>Hyper-partisanship is fuelled by social media through the echo-chamber effect, a phenomenon American political analyst Cass Sunstein examines <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691175515/republic">in his book #republic</a>.</p>
<p>He argues people could join the political debate wholly within these echo chambers among like-minded people, isolated from alternative views. They are exposed only to information of questionable quality and arguments that become increasingly strident and extreme as participants stir themselves up into a frenzy of hostility towards the opposing viewpoint.</p>
<p>This hostility then provides further incendiary material for unscrupulous politicians to exploit. Not long after, the contents of echo chambers can seep out into the public discourse.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/national-security-once-meant-more-than-just-conjuring-up-threats-beyond-our-borders-177632">'National security' once meant more than just conjuring up threats beyond our borders</a>
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<p>Australia’s democracy is in some respects better designed than America’s, especially with its independent electoral commission, preferential ballot and compulsory voting. These all provide some protection against the electoral impact of extremism.</p>
<p>But it is not indestructible. It rests on consensus, and that is preserved by tolerance and restraint, what Levitsky and Ziblatt call the “guardrails of democracy”.</p>
<p>We have seen precious little of either in the past week from the Morrison-Murdoch machine, leaving it to the rest of the media to try to see that those guardrails hold up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Morrison government has gone hard on accusing Labor of being China’s “pick” at the federal election, and in doing so is leading the country down a dangerous path.Denis Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734222021-12-08T03:47:43Z2021-12-08T03:47:43ZWhy Australia’s diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics is important, but unlikely to have any significant impact<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436274/original/file-20211208-15-xjeu3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Koki Kataoka</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison has announced a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in Beijing in February. This means that while athletes will still compete in the games, no officials will represent Australia at the event. </p>
<p>The move follows the United States’ <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/06/politics/us-diplomatic-boycott-winter-olympics/index.html">announcement</a> earlier this week of a diplomatic boycott. New Zealand has also said it will not send officials to the winter games, and other countries are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/world/asia/us-boycott-beijing-olympics-reaction.html">expected to follow suit</a>.</p>
<p>Morrison said the Australian boycott was due to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/China_hidden_camps">China’s treatment</a> of the mostly-Muslim Uighurs in the far western province of Xinjiang. In explaining the decision, he said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>people have been very aware that we have been raising a number of issues
that have not been received well in China, and there’s been a
disagreement between us on those matters.</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-will-follow-us-in-diplomatic-boycott-of-chinas-winter-olympics-173425">Australia will follow US in diplomatic boycott of China's Winter Olympics</a>
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<h2>What is the purpose of a diplomatic boycott?</h2>
<p>A “diplomatic boycott” is a new phenomenon - even the term itself appears to be a new invention. Traditionally, when it comes to the Olympic Games, countries either opted for a full boycott – which meant they did not attend in any capacity – or they participated. </p>
<p>So a diplomatic boycott appears to offer those countries engaging in it the best of both worlds: they still allow their athletes to compete (a full boycott would likely be very poorly received in their home countries), but they also register their dissatisfaction with China’s human rights record in the process. </p>
<p>It is something of a slap in the face to China, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/07/china-attacks-us-diplomatic-boycott-of-winter-games-as-travesty-of-olympic-spirit">initial reaction from Beijing</a> has been hostile, referring to the US’s stance as “posturing” and arguing the country hadn’t been invited in the first place.</p>
<p>The Olympics movement has long had difficulty managing China’s human rights record alongside the country’s hosting of games. China lost the bid for the 2000 games to Sydney in a close vote <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-2000-olympics-go-to-sydney-in-surprise-setback-for-china.html">largely because of its human rights record</a>, but it won the 2008 summer games on the promise it would improve. </p>
<p>In hindsight, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) should have pushed the issue harder. But they wanted to stay allied with China, and chose not to. </p>
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<p>So is a diplomatic boycott even worthwhile?</p>
<p>Some officials, including the IOC’s Dick Pound, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/06/ioc-diplomatic-boycott-beijing-olympics-523801">believe it will achieve little</a>, and I tend to agree. But it’s a face-saving measure for everybody – a way of expressing discontent without actually withdrawing from the competition, and punishing the athletes in the process. </p>
<p>Usually, Olympics are not particularly significant diplomatic occasions in any event - they are more like a big party than a major international meeting. While officials are usually wined and dined by the host country, COVID restrictions mean that will not be happening in Beijing in 2022 to the usual extent, so officials are not missing much, and Morrison is probably saving Australian taxpayers some money.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-beijing-winter-olympics-countdown-begins-calls-to-boycott-the-genocide-games-grow-147352">As the Beijing Winter Olympics countdown begins, calls to boycott the 'Genocide Games' grow</a>
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<h2>Previous Australian diplomatic boycotts</h2>
<p>Threats or talk of Olympics boycotts have long been louder than actual boycotts - once a live option at the height of the Cold War, they are no longer in fashion.</p>
<p>Australia’s most notable dalliance with an Olympic boycott was at the Moscow games in 1980. President Jimmy Carter <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm">announced the US would boycott the summer games</a> in response to the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. </p>
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<p>Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser wanted to follow suit, but the Australian Olympic Committee – which operates independently of government – decided Australia would still compete. In response, Fraser withdrew funding from the AOC. </p>
<p>A few Australian athletes decided not to go to the games, and those who did marched under the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia_at_the_1980_Summer_Olympics">Olympic flag in the opening ceremony</a> instead of the Australian flag.</p>
<p>But years later, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/games-boycott-wrong-policy-fraser-20080319-ge6v5d.html">Fraser conceded</a> an attempted boycott was the wrong move, saying it was a “divisive” idea that had a terrible affect on the athletes.</p>
<p>The US-Soviet Union tit-for-tat boycotts endured for some years. The Russians didn’t go to the Los Angeles games in 1984. But since then, boycotts have fallen out of fashion, in acknowledgement, perhaps, that they achieve little and punish only the athletes.</p>
<h2>Will the athletes be affected by the diplomatic boycott?</h2>
<p>It is very unlikely there will be any repercussions for athletes in all of this. The Chinese will be happy the athletes are competing, and while the politicians will express their discontent with each other, it’s unlikely to have any real impact on competitors.</p>
<p>That is, of course, unless there are noticeable protests by the athletes themselves at the games. The IOC recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/sports/olympics/olympics-protests-tokyo.html">changed its policy</a> to allow mild protest at the games - but not during events or awards ceremonies. If this happened, Chinese officials, the IOC or national Olympic committees would likely take action. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-olympics-have-always-been-a-platform-for-protest-banning-hand-gestures-and-kneeling-ignores-their-history-129694">The Olympics have always been a platform for protest. Banning hand gestures and kneeling ignores their history</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Baka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has followed the United States in announcing it will send athletes, but no officials, to the winter games in February 2022 - a move unlikely to make much political difference.Richard Baka, Adjunct Fellow, Olympic Scholar and Co-Director of the Olympic Research Network, Institute for Health and Sport, Victoria UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1696372021-10-28T01:39:15Z2021-10-28T01:39:15ZThe Chungking Legation: Australia’s first diplomatic mission to China, 80 years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427170/original/file-20211019-18-14t1us7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4662%2C3430&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Frederic Eggleston presented his credentials to Chinese President Lin Sen (林森) at an official reception in Chungking on 28 October 1941</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sydney Morning Herald, November 12 1941</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/fifty-years-after-whitlams-breakthrough-china-trip-the-morrison-government-could-learn-much-from-it-163716">Gough Whitlam’s visit to China in 1971</a> is an iconic moment in the history of Australia-China relations. As prime minister, he officially recognised the People’s Republic of China the following year, heralding a new era of engagement with China.</p>
<p>But Whitlam’s visit overshadows an earlier and equally significant moment in Australia’s relationship with China.</p>
<p>On October 28 1941, Australia opened its first diplomatic mission in China, a legation in the wartime capital of Chungking (Chongqing) in central Szechwan (Sichuan) province.</p>
<p>Until the 1930s, Australian foreign policy was still considered part of British Empire policy. But with the urgency of the second world war, Australia began to exercise a foreign policy distinct from Britain. Australia’s first overseas diplomatic missions were established in Washington and Tokyo in 1940. The Chungking Legation was the third.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427376/original/file-20211019-28-qyau5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Australian Legation in Chungking at No. 71 I Au Tze, c.1942.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chongqing Foreign Affairs Office Archive</span></span>
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<p>Australia <a href="http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article17760364">announced its decision</a> to appoint an Australian Minister to China in May 1941. Sir Frederic Eggleston was chosen for the role and his counterpart, the first Chinese Minister to Australia, Dr Hsu Mo (徐謨), <a href="http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article205171591">arrived in Canberra in September 1941</a>.</p>
<p>The notorious White Australia Policy was still in place, but by the end of the year Australia and China would be allies in defending the Pacific against the Japanese.</p>
<h2>Wartime Chungking</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427383/original/file-20211019-23-pdxgha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stairs leading up from the ferry landing on the Yangtze River at Chungking, 1941.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries, fr205777</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China had been at war with Japan since July 1937. With much of the east coast of the country under Japanese occupation, Chungking served as the wartime capital.</p>
<p>Perched on the steep banks of the Yangtze River, the city was swollen with refugees, suffered heavy bombing, and faced shortages of food, housing and supplies. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-our-side-remembering-the-national-and-international-in-chinas-war-46729">On our side: remembering the national and international in China's war</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>An early challenge for the Legation was finding suitable premises and equipping it. Eventually, a building at No. 71 I Au Tze (遺愛祠) in the Li Family Estate (李家花園) became home to the offices and residence for the staff.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427379/original/file-20211019-14-114kpa9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scenes in Chungking – China’s much-bombed capital, 1942.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chronicle (Adelaide), May 14 1942</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Legation staff were advised to bring all the clothes they would need, medicines including quinine (to treat malaria) and aspirin, and daily items like soap, toothpaste and boot polish. Other stores had to be ordered from India.</p>
<p>Transport to Chungking was difficult. People and supplies first came in by road over the Himalayas via the Burma Road. Later they came by plane, landing on a tiny island in the middle of the Yangtze River.</p>
<p>Alison Waller, wife of First Secretary <a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/waller-sir-john-keith-27590">Keith Waller</a>, <a href="https://halsteadpress.com.au/site/wife-and-baggage-to-follow/">recalled</a>, “you felt you had ten tin trunks sitting on your chest, and you couldn’t breathe because you had to fly right over the Himalayas”.</p>
<h2>The Legation staff</h2>
<p><a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/eggleston-sir-frederic-william-344">Sir Frederic Eggleston</a> (1875–1954), known as “The Egg” to staff, was a warm and thoughtful leader, and a popular and respected member of the foreign diplomatic community. A former lawyer and experienced public servant, Eggleston proved himself an able diplomat, serving in Chungking until 1944, when he was appointed Ambassador to the United States.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=848&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427382/original/file-20211019-16-1drac6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Frederic Eggleston outside the Waichiao Pinkuan (外交賓館), Foreign Ministry reception house, in Chungking.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Diplomatic and office staff sent from Australia worked alongside locally employed staff, including a Chinese teacher, translators and clerks. Australian wives, such as Alison Waller, were also employed by the Legation. </p>
<p>Their work supported the Australian Minister to China, whose role, <a href="http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article47151504">in Eggleston’s words</a>, was “to interpret the Chinese viewpoint to Australia and the Australian viewpoint to China”.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427393/original/file-20211019-23-mdg8pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Charles Lee at the Australian Legation, Nanking, 1947.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Private collection of F.B. Hall</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Among the staff was the first Chinese-Australian diplomat, <a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lee-charles-quo-fong-charlie-29983">Charles Lee</a> (1913–1996), who was born in the Northern Territory to Cantonese parents. </p>
<p>After graduating from the University of Queensland, Lee joined the public service in 1936. He was chosen to become Third Secretary in Chungking because of his general aptitude and his abilities with Cantonese and Japanese.</p>
<p>During his time in Chungking, Lee’s proficient language skills (now including Mandarin), local connections and general knowledge rendered him invaluable. He went on to represent Australia in Indonesia, Singapore and Spain, among other countries, and retired in 1973.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=995&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=995&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=995&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1251&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1251&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/427378/original/file-20211019-13-luy3oc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1251&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brisbane’s Courier-Mail reporting on Maris King’s appointment, 1943.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courier-Mail (Brisbane), July 22 1943</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another notable staffer was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maris_King">Maris King</a> (1922–1997). Only 20 when she left Australia, alone, for Chungking in 1943, King worked as Eggleston’s secretary.</p>
<p>She stayed in Chungking for 15 months and later returned to work in Shanghai and Hong Kong. King went on to have a lifetime career as a diplomat, becoming only the second woman to head an Australian diplomatic mission before her retirement in 1984.</p>
<p><a href="https://halsteadpress.com.au/site/wife-and-baggage-to-follow/">As she recalled</a> of her time in China: “I had a ball! I’m surprised my mother let me go, looking back, because life overseas was so hazardous really in those days, with the war and all that, and I was very young – and female!”</p>
<h2>After the war</h2>
<p>Japan surrendered to China on September 9 1945. With the war over, the Nationalist government moved back to Nanking (Nanjing). The Australian Legation followed, relocating in April 1946 under the charge of a new Minister to China, Professor <a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/copland-sir-douglas-berry-247">Douglas Berry Copland</a> (1894–1971). </p>
<p>The Nanking Legation was upgraded to an embassy in 1948, and closed in 1949 after the Communists gained power. Charles Lee was the only member of the Chungking Legation to stay until the Nanking Embassy closed. </p>
<p>It would be another 24 years until, with Whitlam’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China, a new Australian Embassy opened in Beijing in 1973. But 80 years on, it is worth remembering the changing and complex relationship Australia has had with China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fifty-years-after-whitlams-breakthrough-china-trip-the-morrison-government-could-learn-much-from-it-163716">Fifty years after Whitlam's breakthrough China trip, the Morrison government could learn much from it</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169637/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Bagnall was commissioned by the Chinese Museum in Melbourne to undertake research on the history of the Chungking Legation for a project funded by the Australian Consulate-General in Chengdu, China.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Couchman was employed as Curator at the Chinese Museum in Melbourne and managed a project on the Chungking Legation funded by the Australian Consulate-General in Chengdu.</span></em></p>Under the shadow of World War II, Australia began to form its own foreign policy, separate from the British Empire. A legation in China was Australia’s third foreign outpost.Kate Bagnall, Senior Lecturer in Humanities, University of TasmaniaSophie Couchman, Honorary Research Fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1699302021-10-17T19:14:38Z2021-10-17T19:14:38ZChina’s global diplomatic approach is shifting, and Australia would do well to pay attention to it<p>In 1934, Mao Zedong’s embattled guerrilla forces began what was to prove an epic military withdrawal from southern China to a stronghold in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This became known as the <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1900_mao_march.htm">Long March</a>. It enabled the Communists to break out of so-called “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/mao-lin-biao-and-the-fifth-encirclement-campaign/8F7B0C06F0C4A49A1C3CB73051AF1C04">encirclement campaigns</a>” to fight another day against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists.</p>
<p>In Chinese Communist Party history, there is hardly a more indelible moment. It is certain to have been imprinted on the consciousness of Xi Jinping by his father <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-xi-jinping-learned-and-didnt-learn-from-his-father-about-xinjiang/">Xi Zhongxun</a>, a Mao-era military commissar and later a vice premier.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Chinese history, there is hardly a more indelible moment than the Long March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.schoolshistory.org.uk</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fast forward to 2021, and there have been signs in recent weeks of China seeking to reduce the risk of geopolitical isolation in its own diplomatic “long march” – to become the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA400/RRA447-1/RAND_RRA447-1.pdf">pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific and global rival to the US</a>.</p>
<p>Sometimes forgotten in the ideological debate in the West about Beijing’s motivations under Xi is that Chinese leaders are pragmatists conditioned by ruthless internal Communist Party politics.</p>
<p>So a reasonable question now is whether Xi and his advisers have understood that the risks of overreach in China’s interactions with the outside world outweigh the benefits.</p>
<p>In other words, where lies the <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/geopolitics-is-winning-economics-is-losing-20211013-p58zqs">zero-sum game</a>?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-drives-to-counter-china-come-with-a-major-risk-throwing-fuel-on-the-indo-pacific-arms-race-168734">New drives to counter China come with a major risk: throwing fuel on the Indo-Pacific arms race</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One aspect of Chinese statecraft to keep in mind is that Beijing will seek to get away with whatever it can.</p>
<p>Viewed from behind the vermilion walls of Zhongnanhai, Beijing’s leadership compound, American-led efforts to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/30/four-principles-to-guide-u.s.-policy-toward-china-pub-83074">“contain” China</a> will have taken on some of the characteristics of an encirclement campaign.</p>
<p>Beijing’s reaction has been relatively muted, by its standards, to the recent announcement of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/australia/australia-china-submarines.html">AUKUS alignment</a> between Australia, the UK and the US as a China containment front. But Chinese leaders will nonetheless view this as part of a latter-day encirclement campaign.</p>
<p>Likewise, the elevation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know">Quad grouping</a> of the US, Japan, India and Australia would be seen in Beijing as a further example of US-led China containment architecture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beijing will see a recent meeting of the Quad in Washington as another example of encirclement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarahbeth Maney/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Apart from the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234751.shtml">usual bluster</a> in Chinese Communist Party mouthpieces like the Global Times, what has been Beijing’s response to all this?</p>
<p>The short answer is that it has been engaging in some creative diplomacy to lessen risks of geopolitical isolation.</p>
<p>This has involved:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the engagement at presidential level between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/politics/biden-xi-jinping-china-summit.html">Xi and Joe Biden</a> with promise of a virtual summit by the end of the year</p></li>
<li><p>the makings of a <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1235276.shtml">charm offensive</a> in Beijing’s dealings with the European Union</p></li>
<li><p>an application to join the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/23/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/">Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)</a> on top of joining the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219113.shtml">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)</a></p></li>
<li><p>a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/us/politics/huawei-meng-wanzhou.html">hostage exchange</a>” enabling the release from detention of the daughter of one of China’s most powerful businessmen</p></li>
<li><p>an announcement that China would <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58647481">stop funding coal-fired power stations abroad</a>. This comes ahead of the <a href="https://ukcop26.org/uk-presidency/what-is-a-cop/">United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26)</a>, where it is expected to play a leading role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In Canberra policymaking circles, dominated by a national security establishment wedded to seeing China as a threat, the above developments might be weighed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-for-morrison-aukus-is-all-about-the-deal-never-mind-the-niceties-168248">View from The Hill: For Morrison AUKUS is all about the deal, never mind the niceties</a>
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<p>In the case of Xi and Biden, the issue is not so much whether there is a thaw in Sino-US relations after the wrenching Donald Trump era. It is more about whether the world’s dominant powers can establish a relationship that enables reasonable dialogue and even co-operation.</p>
<p>In the Xi-Biden phone call on September 9, the two agreed there was too little communication between Beijing and Washington. It was followed this month by a six-hour in-person meeting in Zurich between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/politics/biden-xi-jinping-china-summit.html">National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi</a>.</p>
<p>The upshot is that Xi and Biden will meet “virtually” within weeks.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping build a meaningful and productive relationship?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lintao Zhang/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Significantly, Biden in his conversation with Xi reiterated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/biden-xi-jinping-agree-to-abide-by-taiwan-agreement/100518846">America’s commitment to the spirit of the Shanghai communique</a> that enabled the issue of Taiwan to be set aside.</p>
<p>This should be regarded as a positive development.</p>
<p>In Beijing’s dealings with the European Union, the several sessions with top European officials conducted in late September by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi are notable.</p>
<p>Wang’s strategic dialogue with Josep Borell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, followed discussions with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.</p>
<p>These were aimed at clearing the air after strong criticism and censure in Europe of China’s mistreatment of its Uighur minority, and arguments over Taiwan.</p>
<p>In another important development, Xi was due last Friday to speak with European Council President Charles Michel.</p>
<p>On Wednesday of last week, the Chinese leader held a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-holds-farewell-call-with-chinese-president-xi/a-59496213">“friendly” phone call</a> with outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The two discussed preparations for the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/2021-road.html">G20 summit in Rome</a>, climate change issues ahead of COP26 and the European Union’s <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/">stalled investment agreement with China</a>.</p>
<p>The latter has been interrupted because of tensions between Beijing and Brussels on the Uighur issue and other stresses.</p>
<p>This flurry of diplomatic activity could not contrast more sharply with the <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australian-business-faces-years-in-the-china-deep-freeze-20210719-p58aw9">deep freeze</a> in relations between Beijing and Canberra, with high-level contacts at ministerial level suspended.</p>
<p>Perhaps most significant of recent China’s diplomatic manoeuvres has been its request to join the CPTPP, which groups 11 Asia-Pacific countries in a trade bloc.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-great-chance-to-engage-in-trade-diplomacy-with-china-and-it-must-take-it-154737">Australia has a great chance to engage in trade diplomacy with China, and it must take it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Obama administration originally conceived of the CPTPP as a means of pressuring China on trade and security issues. Trump’s abandonment of the trade bloc has enabled China to make a bid for membership.</p>
<p>The Australian government has said <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-applies-to-join-pacific-trade-bloc-as-security-tensions-rise-20210917-p58sgv">China could not be considered for membership</a> until it relaxes its punitive trade campaign against Australian exports. Individual members have veto power over new entrants.</p>
<p>In any case, Beijing would have difficulty meeting the trade-liberalisation requirements of the CPTPP.</p>
<p>On the other hand, China’s request for membership simultaneously with that of Taiwan renews focus on regional trade agreements in which Beijing is active.</p>
<p>China joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last year and is a principal sponsor of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The release of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou back to China has removed a major diplomatic hurdle between Beijing and Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darryl Dyck/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the diplomatic front, the deal enabling <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58682998">Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou’s return to China</a> from Vancouver in a hostage swap removed a significant irritation in US-China ties.</p>
<p>Finally, China’s announcement it was ending its funding of coal-fired power stations abroad was clearly aimed at window-dressing its <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-response-climate-change-study-contrasts-and-policy-crossroads-0">patchy performance on climate issues</a> ahead of the G20 summit in Rome and COP26 in Glasgow.</p>
<p>These diplomatic shifts do not necessarily amount to a breakout moment for China in its troubled relationship with the international community. But it would be a mistake for countries like Australia to assume China will continue to alienate a wider international community if it believes its actions are proving inimical to its own interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mao’s Long March has a storied place in Chinese history. There are resonances in China’s current approach to international relations.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1695432021-10-08T05:26:31Z2021-10-08T05:26:31ZTony Abbott warns China could ‘lash out’ at Taiwan soon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425406/original/file-20211008-23-1w34c2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C4%2C2886%2C1828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former prime minister Tony Abbott has warned China could “lash out disastrously” at Taiwan very soon.</p>
<p>In a speech in Taipei, Abbott condemned China’s growing belligerence towards Taiwan and said Australia should not be indifferent to its fate.
Abbott – who as prime minister concluded the free trade agreement with China – recalled the warmer relations between China and Australia in those days.</p>
<p>“Much has changed in just six years, but it’s not Australia’s goodwill towards the people of China, about a million of whom are now Australians and making a fine contribution to our country,” he said.</p>
<p>Australia had no issue with China, Abbott said. “We welcome trade, investment and visits – just not further hectoring about being the chewing gum on China’s boot.”</p>
<p>He said if the “drums of war” could be heard in the region – as home affairs secretary Mike Pezzullo <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/get-ready-to-fight-for-our-liberty-home-affairs-secretary-michael-pezzullo/news-story/87239deac0153147989ac508d6447046">put it</a> in April – “it’s not Australia that’s beating them.</p>
<p>"The only drums we beat are for justice and freedom – freedom for all people, in China and in Taiwan, to make their own decisions about their lives and their futures,” Abbott said.</p>
<p>“But that’s not how China sees it, as its growing belligerence to Taiwan shows. Sensing that its relative power might have peaked, with its population ageing, its economy slowing, and its finances creaking, it’s quite possible that Beijing could lash out disastrously very soon.”</p>
<p>Abbott said that “our challenge is to try and ensure that the unthinkable remains unlikely and that the possible doesn’t become the probable.”</p>
<p>“That’s why Taiwan’s friends are so important now: to stress that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its own people and to let Beijing know that any attempt at coercion would have incalculable consequences.”</p>
<p>Abbott’s visit comes at a time of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-taiwan-remains-calm-in-the-face-of-unprecedented-military-pressure-from-china-169160">high tension</a> between China and Taiwan, with China repeatedly sending large numbers of military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defence zone.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s defence minister claimed this week military tensions between China and Taiwan were at their worst in more than 40 years. </p>
<p>Asked earlier this week about the visit, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-07/tony-abbott-taiwan-visit-morrison-government-china/100522288">Prime Minister Scott Morrison said</a> it was a private trip and Abbott was not passing on any government messages.</p>
<p>“Tony is in Taiwan as a private citizen, and I didn’t have any conversation with him before that.”</p>
<p>But Abbott has been given VIP treatment during his visit and accorded high-level government meetings.</p>
<p>Australia has a “<a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/does-australia-have-a-one-china-two-chinas-or-one-china-one-taiwan-policy-or-all-three/">one China</a>” policy diplomatically but there are close economic relations between Australia and Taiwan, including trade and investment and, before the pandemic, tourism.</p>
<p>In his speech, Abbott said China had created the new <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-quad-and-whats-on-the-agenda-for-their-washington-summit-167988">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> (between the United States, Australia, Japan and India), “because it’s been so unreasonable”.</p>
<p>“And the more aggressive it becomes, the more opponents it will have,” Abbott said. </p>
<p>The US State Department had just affirmed America’s commitment to Taiwan was “rock solid”, he said.</p>
<p>“I don’t think America could stand by and watch Taiwan swallowed up. I don’t think Australia should be indifferent to the fate of a fellow democracy of almost 25 million people.”</p>
<p>Abbott observed the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, had put it well when <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-03/blinken-calls-china-competition-a-key-challenge-for-the-u-s">he said</a> America would be competitive with China when it should be, collaborative when it could be, and adversarial when it must be.</p>
<p>“Provided it’s real, collaboration is still possible and trust could yet be rebuilt. But Taiwan will be the test,” Abbott said.</p>
<p>He said Taiwan should be welcomed into the Trans-Pacific Partnership.</p>
<p>But China, which is seeking to join the trade pact, “could never be admitted to the TPP while engaged in a trade war with Australia, and in predatory trade all-round”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a speech in Taipei, the former prime minister condemned China’s growing belligerence.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687342021-09-27T03:08:03Z2021-09-27T03:08:03ZNew drives to counter China come with a major risk: throwing fuel on the Indo-Pacific arms race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423254/original/file-20210927-125162-1mqlqi7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=480%2C41%2C4580%2C3636&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Evan Vucci/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An accelerating arms race in the Indo-Pacific is all but guaranteed now that China finds itself a target of new security arrangements — AUKUS and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-quad-and-whats-on-the-agenda-for-their-washington-summit-167988">the Quad</a> — aimed at containing its power and influence.</p>
<p>This has the makings of a new great game in the region in which rival powers are no longer in the business of pretending things can continue as they are.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">AUKUS agreement</a>, involving Australia, the US and UK to counter China’s rise means a military power balance in the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/forget-asia-pacific-it-s-the-indo-pacific-we-live-in-now-where-is-that-exactly-20210810-p58hku.html">Indo-Pacific</a> will come more sharply into focus.</p>
<p>The region has been re-arming at rates faster than other parts of the world due largely to China’s push to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military">modernise its defence capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>In their latest surveys, the London-based <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2021">International Institute of Strategic Studies</a> (IISS) and the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2021-trends-world-military-expenditure-2020">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a> (SIPRI) report no let-up in military spending in the Indo-Pacific. This is despite the pandemic.</p>
<p>SIPRI notes a <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2020">47% increase in defence spending in the Indo-Pacific in the past decade</a>, led by China and India.</p>
<p>China can be expected to respond to threats posed by the new security arrangements by further expediting its military program. </p>
<p>It will see the formation of AUKUS as yet another attempt to <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/aukus-submarine-deal-response-to-chinese-aggression-by-chris-patten-2021-09">contain its ambitions</a> — and therefore a challenge to its military capabilities.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-time-for-a-new-way-of-war-what-chinas-army-reforms-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world-134660">Is it time for a 'new way of war?' What China's army reforms mean for the rest of the world</a>
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<h2>The Quad makes clear its ambitions</h2>
<p>Unambiguously, AUKUS implies a containment policy.</p>
<p>Likewise, the further elevation of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue">Quad security grouping</a> into a China containment front will play into an atmosphere of heightened security anxiety in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>The four Quad participants – the US, Japan, India and Australia – have their own reasons and agendas for wanting to <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-quad-leaders-send-a-clear-signal-to-china-167896">push back</a> against China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Quad leaders in Washington" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Quad leaders unveiled a host of initiatives after their face-to-face meeting last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Evan Vucci/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After their summit last week in Washington, the Quad leaders used words in their <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/">joint statement</a> that might be regarded as unexceptional in isolation. </p>
<p>Together with other developments such as AUKUS, however, the language was pointed, to say the least:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Together, we re-commit to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The “beyond” part of the statement was not expanded on, but might be read as a commitment to extend the Quad collaboration globally.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-quad-leaders-send-a-clear-signal-to-china-167896">With vision of a 'free and open Indo-Pacific', Quad leaders send a clear signal to China</a>
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</p>
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<p>All this has come together at the dawn of a new US administration whose members include several conspicuous China hawks, and at a moment when China has shown itself to be ever-willing to throw its weight around.</p>
<p>Beijing’s crude campaign against Australian exports in an effort to bend Australia’s policy to its will is a prime example. It is doubtful an AUKUS or an invigorated Quad would have emerged without this development.</p>
<p>The Obama administration talked about <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific">pivoting to the Asia-Pacific</a> without putting much meat on the bones.</p>
<p>Under President Joe Biden, this shift will be driven by a hardening in American thinking that now recognises time is running out, and may already have expired, in the US ability to constrain China’s rise.</p>
<p>These are profound geopolitical moments whose trajectory is impossible to predict.</p>
<h2>Australia commits fully to China containment</h2>
<p>Canberra is now a fully paid-up member of a China containment front, whether it wants to admit it, or not. In the process, it has yielded sovereignty to the US by committing itself to an interlocking web of military procurement decisions that includes the <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security">acquisition of a nuclear-propelled submarine fleet</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-submarines-are-a-smart-military-move-for-australia-and-could-deter-china-further-168064">Why nuclear submarines are a smart military move for Australia — and could deter China further</a>
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<p>Whether these submarines are supplied by the US or Britain is a bit immaterial since the technology involved originates in America.</p>
<p>The submarines will not be available for the better part of two decades under the most optimistic forecasts. However, in the meantime, Australia could base US or British submarines in its ports or lease American submarines.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Australia is committing itself to a range of US-supplied hardware aimed at enhancing the inter-operability of its military with the US.</p>
<p>This is the reality of fateful decisions taken by the Morrison government in recent months. Such a commitment involves a certain level of confidence in America remaining a predictable and steadfast superpower, and not one riven by internal disputes.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1442310305854414851"}"></div></p>
<h2>Australian defence spending likely to rise</h2>
<p>What is absolutely certain in all of this is that an Indo-Pacific security environment will now become more, not less, contentious.</p>
<p>SIPRI notes that in 2020, military spending in Asia totalled $US528 billion (A$725 billion), 62% of which was attributable to China and India.</p>
<p>IISS singled out Japan and Australia, in particular, as countries that were increasing defence spending to take account of China. Tokyo, for example, is budgeting for <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2021-08-31/japan-record-defense-budget-f-35-china-2727340.html">record spending of $US50 billion</a> (A$68 billion) for 2022-23.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-quad-and-whats-on-the-agenda-for-their-washington-summit-167988">Explainer: what exactly is the Quad and what's on the agenda for their Washington summit?</a>
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<p>Australia’s <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-budget-climbs-to-44-6-billion/">defence spending stands a tick over 2% of GDP in 2021-22 at A$44.6 billion</a>, with plans for further increases in the forward estimates.</p>
<p>However, those projections will now have to be re-worked given the commitments that have been made under AUKUS.</p>
<p>Neglected in the flush of enthusiasm that accompanied the AUKUS announcement is the likely cost of Australia’s new defence spending under a “China containment policy”. It is hard to see these commitments being realised without significant increases in defence allocations to 3-4% of GDP.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1439175836159066113"}"></div></p>
<p>This comes at a time when budgets will already be stretched due to relief spending as a consequence of the pandemic.</p>
<p>In addition to existing weapons acquisitions, Canberra has indicated it will ramp up its purchases of longer-range weapons. This includes Tomahawk cruise missiles for its warships and anti-ship missiles for its fighter aircraft.</p>
<p>At the same time, it will work with the US under the AUKUS arrangement to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/quantum-sensors-sea-drones-and-hypersonic-missiles-what-are-the-new-frontiers-of-war-20210923-p58ubz.html">develop hypersonic missiles</a> that would test even the most sophisticated defence systems.</p>
<h2>What other Indo-Pacific nations are doing</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/an-intensifying-arms-race-asia-2021-09-21/#:%7E:text=In%25202020%252C%2520the%2520U.S.%2520government,about%2520%25245%2520billion%2520in%2520total.">Many other Indo-Pacific states</a> can now be expected to review their military acquisition programs with the likelihood of a more combative security environment.</p>
<p>Taiwan, for example, is proposing to <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-to-spend-an-usd-869-billion-in-defence-sector-amid-gwonig-threats-from-china20210916225841/">spend $US8.69 billion</a> (A$11.9 billion) over the next five years on long-range missiles, and increase its inventory of cruise missiles. It is also adding to its arsenal of heavy artillery.</p>
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<p>South Korea is actively adding to its missile capabilities. This includes the testing of a <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/south-korea-test-fires-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-2541467">submarine-launched ballistic missile</a>. </p>
<p>Seoul has also hinted it might be considering building its <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/205_235969.html">own nuclear-propelled submarines</a> (this was among President Moon Jae-in’s election pledges in 2017). Signs that North Korea may have developed a submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles will be concentrating minds in Seoul.</p>
<p>All this indicates how quickly the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific is shifting.</p>
<p>Australia — perhaps more so than others — is the prime example of a regional player that has put aside a conventional view of a region in flux. It now sees an environment so threatening that a policy of strategic ambiguity between its custodial partner (the US) and most important trade relationship (China) has been abandoned.</p>
<p>The price tag for this in terms of equipment and likely continuing economic fallout for Australian exporters will not come cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The region is already arming at the fastest rate in the world, but China and other nations can be expected to respond to AUKUS by further expanding their militaries.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1637162021-07-04T20:14:30Z2021-07-04T20:14:30ZFifty years after Whitlam’s breakthrough China trip, the Morrison government could learn much from it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409444/original/file-20210702-15-mddisq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Museum of Australia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Historical anniversaries sometimes – not always – provide an opportunity to take stock. Rarely do two anniversaries coincide that encourage such an opportunity.</p>
<p>That is the case with the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/betweenthelines/on-the-50th-anniversary-of-gough-whitlams-delegation-to-china/13427146">50th anniversary on July 3</a> of the breakthrough Gough Whitlam visit to China and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party">July 1 centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China</a> (CCP).</p>
<p>Australia needs to take stock of a troubled relationship with its <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/chin-cef.pdf">dominant trading partner</a> and guarantor of its economic well-being.</p>
<p>The two anniversaries, within a few days of each other, should remind us of both the costs and benefits of a complex relationship, and indeed the challenges and threats.</p>
<p>Chinese <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary">President Xi Jinping’s speech marking the July 1 centenary of the founding of the CCP</a> in Shanghai by a group of leftist intellectuals could hardly have been more confrontational.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will never allow any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>By any standards, this was a nationalistic and xenophobic speech designed for domestic consumption. But it was also aimed directly at the United States and its allies, including Australia. It was not an address designed to lower the temperature in China’s increasingly fraught relationships with the outside world.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-communist-party-claims-to-have-brought-prosperity-and-equality-to-china-heres-the-real-impact-of-its-rule-163350">The Communist Party claims to have brought prosperity and equality to China. Here's the real impact of its rule</a>
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<p>In some ways, the speech marked a throwback to the sort of language that defined China’s relationships with its perceived enemies in an earlier Maoist era. Xi’s words might be dismissed as propaganda, but in an era of aggressive “wolf warrior” Chinese diplomacy, they represent a new stage in how Beijing views what it perceives to be a hostile international environment.</p>
<p>Xi’s speech was effectively a call to arms by a Chinese leader who has emerged as his country’s new emperor.</p>
<p>In that regard, Xi is a successor to Mao Zedong and not Deng Xiaoping, who exercised power mostly behind the scenes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409443/original/file-20210702-17-137sszr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a nationalistic speech to mark 100 years of the Communist Party in his country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Koki Kataoka</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Xi might have dressed himself in a colour-coded grey Mao suit identical to that worn by Mao when he proclaimed the People’s Republic on October 1, 1949, but there is not much that is grey about his ambitions for his country.</p>
<p>In one of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/01/xi-jinping-warns-china-wont-be-bullied-100-year-anniversary-chinese-communist-party-">more pointed sentences in an hour-long speech</a>, he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Chinese people are not only good at destroying an old world, but also good at building a new world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In Xi’s view, China’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinping%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road</a> thoroughfare does not stop at its frontiers. Whether we like it or not, the Chinese president’s speech marks an aggressive phase in what is clearly perceived by Beijing’s mandarins as a new and more hostile environment.</p>
<p>All this brings us back to the <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/gough-whitlams-delegation-to-china-50-years-on/news-story/296ddccfaf1a2897fd2f8aeee9b6bf6c">anniversary of the Whitlam outreach to China in 1971</a>. Documents associated with that historic visit, usefully published by The Australian, remind us that in an earlier era Australia was well-served by a politician capable of navigating potentially treacherous diplomatic terrain.</p>
<p>At the time, the opposition leader, still 18 months away from becoming prime minister, went to Beijing to distinguish Labor from a stale Coalition facsimile of US policy.</p>
<p>At the heart of the Whitlam mission was to navigate a way for Australia to establish diplomatic relations with China. He needed to accommodate the vexed Taiwan issue so as not to lay himself open to accusations he had “sold out” the Taiwanese.</p>
<p>Whitlam’s <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/whitlams-dateline-peking-labors-leader-reports-on-his-trip-to-china/news-story/d7477e9512573cb797f256bf979f6b73">own dispatches</a>, published by The Australian, and independent accounts of his exchanges with Premier Zhou Enlai, revealed he more than held his own with China’s master diplomat. These included, principally, the question of Taiwan in what became the blueprint for <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief#:%7E:text=Australia%20adheres%20to%20its%20one,economic%2C%20trade%20and%20cultural%20interests.&text=Most%20Australian%20state%20governments%20are%20represented%20in%20China's%20leading%20commercial%20centres.">Australia’s “one China policy”</a>.</p>
<p>This stated that “Australia adheres to a one China policy which means we do not recognise Taiwan as a country, but we maintain economic and cultural ties”. This conforms more or less with the American formula published in the <a href="https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2010/04/shanghai-communique/">Shanghai Communique</a> of February 1972, signed by US President Richard Nixon and Zhou.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409447/original/file-20210702-17-1eael0t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Whitlam and Zhou in China, 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Whitlam was lucky politically in the sense that no sooner had then Prime Minister William McMahon berated him for allowing himself to be “<a href="https://insidestory.org.au/whitlam-in-china/">played as a fisherman plays a trout</a>” by Zhou, it emerged that even as the opposition leader was in Beijing, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was in the Chinese capital arranging a visit by Nixon.</p>
<p>Whitlam’s timing could hardly have been more advantageous to him politically, and more propitious from an Australian point of view. The newly-elected Whitlam government recognised the “one China” formula as one of its first acts after being elected in December 1972.</p>
<p>This was followed by more than four decades of relatively harmonious relations between Canberra and Beijing, upset on occasions by episodes like the Tiananmen massacre. That was until China began to assert itself more aggressively in its own neighbourhood, and ours.</p>
<p>On the 50th anniversary of Whitlam’s ground-breaking mission to Beijing, it is reasonable to ask how he would have managed relations with a more assertive China in this latest period?</p>
<p>Since Whitlam is no longer with us, the <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/australias-relationship-with-china-has-never-been-worse/news-story/8d9ad112e7bcd103307b046976bfcd26">words of Australia’s first ambassador to China</a> and Whitlam’s interpreter on his 1971 China mission might be useful.</p>
<p>In the view of Stephen FitzGerald, Australia needs to find a way to make use of both formal diplomatic channels, and, if necessary, and maybe preferably, “back channels”. This is the realpolitik argument that tends to be ignored in Canberra these days, where China policy is dominated by the national security establishment.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is a different China but that does not absolve us of the responsibility of trying to engaged with it. It does not matter what you think about the government and, let’s face it, the government in China when Whitlam went in 1971 was not exactly a loveable government. China is now economically bigger, more powerful, but you have to engage with a country like whatever you think of it. This is what Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam are doing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison got <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/don-t-have-to-become-like-them-singapore-advises-australia-to-work-with-china-20210610-p5802d.html">similar advice last month</a> from Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong), whose message was that China’s rise is a fact of life and needs to be managed in a way that avoids confrontation, if possible.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You don’t have to become like them, neither can you hope to make them become like you […] There will be rough spots and you have to deal with that. But deal with them as issues in a partnership which you want to keep going and not issues, which add up to an adversary which you are trying to suppress. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the anniversary of the Whitlam breakthrough these sentiments may be all very well, but the reasonable question is what the choice is.</p>
<p>Morrison and his foreign policy team should pay particular attention to <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/in-his-own-words-goughs-insights-on-china/news-story/07b02320120e9957cca540fed60d0c0a">Whitlam’s emphasis</a> in his conversations with Zhou and in his written accounts of his visit to China to Australia’s own significance as a middle power seeking to play a constructive role in the region.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/timeline-of-a-broken-relationship-how-china-and-australia-went-from-chilly-to-barely-speaking-151567">Timeline of a broken relationship: how China and Australia went from chilly to barely speaking</a>
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<p>This was Whitlam’s way of conveying to the Chinese that Canberra, under his leadership, would seek to define itself and its own interests from those of its American ally. That is, not in contradiction to Washington necessarily, but from Australia’s own middle-power standpoint.</p>
<p>This is what could be described as statecraft, a quality absent from Australian diplomacy these days.</p>
<p>Morrison and his advisers might pay heed to these lessons if he is to get Australia out of the diplomatic cul de sac with China in which it finds itself.</p>
<p>A bit of creative statecraft, along lines suggested by FitzGerald, would not go astray.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163716/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In 1971, then-Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam made a significant trip to China. Now, with tensions between the two countries showing no signs of abating, it may be time to look to his example.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624242021-06-10T05:19:07Z2021-06-10T05:19:07ZMorrison’s dilemma: Australia needs a dual strategy for its trade relationship with China<p>En route to this year’s <a href="https://www.g7uk.org/">G7+ Summit</a> in the UK, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison delivered a speech in Perth on “<a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-perth-usasia-centre-perth-wa">A world order that favours freedom</a>”.</p>
<p>He spoke of “Australia’s preparedness to withstand economic coercion in recent times”. As “the most practical way to address economic coercion”, he called for reform of the World Trade Organization, particularly “the restoration of the global trading body’s binding dispute settlement system”.</p>
<p>It wasn’t hard to work out what – and who – he was talking about: China.</p>
<p>But Morrison faces a conundrum in his pitch to reform the WTO to resolve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/29/fuel-on-the-fire-war-of-words-between-australia-and-china-stokes-tension">trade disputes with China</a>, which has blocked or restricted <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3806162">Australian exports</a> of beef, wheat, lobster, timber and coal, and imposed high tariffs on barley and wine. </p>
<p>But it isn’t China that has undermined the role of the WTO as the global mechanism for settling trade disputes peacefully through agreed rules and procedures. </p>
<p>The blame for that rests with the United States, which under the Trump administration effectively rendered <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399300">the organisation’s appeals process</a> inoperable. </p>
<p>By emphasising China’s economic coercion and using it to appeal to the US and others to reform the World Trade Organization, the Morrison government is playing a risky game. It may be squandering an opportunity to engage more constructively with China on common interests.</p>
<h2>Trade disputes with China</h2>
<p>As diplomatic relations between China and Australia deteriorated over the past 18 months – fuelled by things such as Australia leading the call for an independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 virus – China’s trade restrictions on Australian imports escalated. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-australia-china-relationship-is-unravelling-faster-than-we-could-have-imagined-145836">Why the Australia-China relationship is unravelling faster than we could have imagined</a>
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<p>By December 2020 Australia was ready to make its very first complaint against China <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds598_e.htm">to the WTO</a> – over China’s five-year 80.5% tariff on Australian barley. The Morrison government is now <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/02/australia-china-wine-trade-dispute-canberra-considers-involving-wto.html">contemplating a second WTO complaint</a> over China’s tariffs of as high as 200% on Australian wine.</p>
<h2>Appellate Court in limbo</h2>
<p>The WTO established a panel to review the barley tariff in May. </p>
<p>Even if Australia does win its case, it faces the <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">uncertainty</a> of how long China takes in acting on the WTO ruling. </p>
<p>But before that is the problem of the WTO making a final ruling. </p>
<p>Like other court systems the WTO has an appeals mechanism, known as the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is meant to have seven members, and requires a quorum of three judges to hear an appeal. Members are appointed to four-year terms. Appointments require all of the WTO’s 164 member nations to agree.</p>
<p>The US, however, has blocked every appointment and reappointment over the past four years or so. Now the Appellate Body has no members. So no dispute taken to the WTO can be resolved if one of the disputing parties appeals. </p>
<p>If Australia does win its case against China, and China appeals, the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399300">dispute will remain in limbo</a> until the Appellate Body can hear that appeal.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-china-to-the-world-trade-organisation-plants-a-seed-it-wont-be-a-quick-or-easy-win-152173">Taking China to the World Trade Organisation plants a seed. It won't be a quick or easy win</a>
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<h2>Shared trade interests</h2>
<p>On this issue, Australia and China have a shared position. In 2018, for example, they <a href="http://grupopuntadeleste.com/es/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WTGC197-Dec-14-2018.pdf">joined forces</a> with other countries to push for the appointment of Appellate Body members. </p>
<p>They also have common interests on some other reform issues in trade that Morrison mentioned in his speech, such as the digital economy and environmental sustainability. Reducing pollution from <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/envir_17nov20_e.htm">trade in plastics</a> is an example.</p>
<p>Morrison’s speech, however, tended to highlight the differences rather than shared interests in the international trading system.</p>
<p>“We are facing heightened competition in the Indo-Pacific region,” he said. “We know that because we live here. The task is to manage that competition. Competition does not have to lead to conflict. Nor does competition justify coercion.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-biden-presidency-means-for-world-trade-and-allies-like-australia-149735">What a Biden presidency means for world trade and allies like Australia</a>
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<h2>Need for a dual strategy</h2>
<p>Morrison’s speech did acknowledge the need for “all nations to participate in the global system”. Australia, he said, “stands ready to engage in dialogue with all countries on shared challenges, including China when they are ready to do so with us”.</p>
<p>But Australia’s national interest demands more than just standing ready. The government needs to do the proverbial walking and chewing gum at the same time. </p>
<p>Though its primary motivation for WTO reform may be Australia’s trade disputes with China, it cannot ignore the need to promote that reform through engaging and collaborating with China, now the world’s biggest economy and Australia’s <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/trade-investment-glance-2020.pdf">most important trading partner</a> by far. </p>
<p>This won’t be easy. There are some big differences that separate China from Australia and its allies. The Chinese government is far more involved in its economy than the market-based ethos that drove the establishment of the World Trade Organization in the first place.</p>
<p>Negotiating these differences peacefully will require delicate conversations over the boundaries of trade law and policy. That will be impossible in an environment of mutual distrust. </p>
<p>Any WTO reform will <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3133534/chinas-wto-reform-aspirations-take-centre-stage-globalisation-seminar">need China on board</a>. </p>
<p>Finding common ground on reinstating a reformed WTO Appellate Body could be a starting point for tempering this lack of trust. It could pave the way for the two nations to de-escalate and move closer to resolving their disputes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Markus Wagner is the Executive Vice-President of the Society of International Economic Law. He writes in his personal capacity. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Weihuan Zhou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s Prime Minister wants reform of the World Trade Organization to rein in China’s ‘economic coercion’. But it also needs to constructively engage with China on that reform.Weihuan Zhou, Associate Professor, Director of Research and member of Herbert Smith Freehills CIBEL Centre, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney, UNSW SydneyMarkus Wagner, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the UOW Transnational Law and Policy Centre, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.