tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/eff-28719/articlesEFF – The Conversation2023-04-24T15:40:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2041412023-04-24T15:40:59Z2023-04-24T15:40:59ZSouth Africa votes in 2024: could a coalition between major parties ANC and EFF run the country?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522956/original/file-20230426-681-u13v67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the opposition EFF carry a mock coffin bearing the face of the President Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the ruling ANC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phill Magakoe / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s 2024 national and provincial <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2024.php">elections</a> are regarded as a realistic opportunity for coalition governments to be formed in some provinces and also at the national level. This would mark a dramatic change from the current situation in which coalition governments have only been formed at local level.</p>
<p>Electoral trends since 2016 underscore these expectations. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-have-made-their-voices-heard-now-what-for-local-councils-63854">ANC lost its majorities</a> in metropolitan councils in Gauteng and Nelson Mandela Bay. Its majorities in the national and provincial legislatures also declined. But support for opposition parties did not escalate at the same time. Voter turnout continued its <a href="https://www.gcro.ac.za/outputs/map-of-the-month/detail/voting-patterns-in-the-2016-local-government-elections/">declining trend</a>. </p>
<p>In the coalition debate an important permutation is about who would constitute the coalitions.</p>
<p>One option that’s been talked about with increasing intensity is <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2023-04-09-lesufi-admits-anc-could-plunge-to-40-in-gauteng/">a coalition </a> between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). </p>
<p>In terms of experience, the ANC has run the national government since 1994. It also governs eight of South Africa’s nine provinces and most of the 257 metropolitan, district and local municipalities. (In the past, the ANC was also involved in provincial coalitions in <a href="https://theconversation.com/post-election-pact-failure-echoes-of-fraught-history-between-south-africas-anc-and-inkatha-172696">KwaZulu-Natal</a> and the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-forms-coalition-governments-in-three-hung-municipalities-in-western-cape-1fecbfb0-f630-4495-9244-c17b64c494e1">Western Cape </a>. For it’s part the EFF lacks experience in any form of government. </p>
<p>The possibility of an ANC-EFF coalition has generated a great deal of debate. But such an alliance would prove difficult to put together, and made to work. That’s for two reasons: ideology and policy. These two have proved key determinants of successful coalitions elsewhere in the world.</p>
<h2>The EFF</h2>
<p>Most of the EFF’s leaders are former ANC Youth League figures who were expelled <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/thurs-10am-a-decade-of-the-eff-how-an-expulsion-changed-the-politics-of-sa-20191226">in 2013</a>. They differed on ideological grounds from the ANC senior leadership about expropriation and nationalisation of land, mines and banks. The EFF describes itself as a Marxist-Leninist party <a href="https://effonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/FINAL-EFF-CONSTITUTION-02.03.2020.pdf#page=8">influenced by the thoughts of Frantz Fanon</a>. The ANC, on the other hand, still regards itself as a liberation movement in a <a href="https://www.southafricanlabourbulletin.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/16.-Social-democracy-and-the-ANC.pdf">social democratic tradition</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2016 local government election the ANC lost its absolute majority in the key Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan councils. A coalition government was the only option for them. In Ekurhuleni, the ANC formed a coalition <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/aic-agrees-on-coalition-with-anc-in-ekurhuleni-2058557">with the African Independent Congress</a> but in the other three councils a more expanded coalition was required.</p>
<p>In the three instances, an ANC-EFF coalition was a definite possibility. But the latter preferred an informal cooperation understanding with the Democratic Alliance (DA), the country’s main opposition party, and its formal coalition partners. The EFF’s cooperation was essential for the DA grouping because on their own they would be <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-26-00-the-tables-could-turn-on-kingmaker-eff/">a minority government</a>. Towards the end of the term close to 2021, the EFF withdrew its cooperation from the DA coalition. This resulted in regime changes after successful motions of no confidence by the ANC alliance. This demonstrated the EFF’s “kingmaker” qualities and political pragmatism. But, it harmed the public’s faith in coalitions.</p>
<p>A similar tendency has recently emerged in KwaZulu-Natal province where the EFF and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) shared power in about 25 local governments, in some instances already since the 2016 elections. Recently the EFF announced that they will withdraw from these coalition governments, and pair with the ANC to form new governments. Their earlier cooperation with the IFP was directly <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/the-eff-ultimatum-and-the-mayhem-of-coalition-governments-86619630-4486-463d-be69-e59b0106ffeb">aimed against the ANC</a>.</p>
<h2>The EFF’s coalition strategy</h2>
<p>The EFF’s strategy has been unpredictable most of the time. At the time of the 2021 local government elections, the party’s main negotiator, Floyd Shivambu, articulated the following strategy: the EFF did <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/eff-lays-down-conditions-for-any-coalitions-with-other-parties-20211106">not want to share power in a local government</a>, but rather wanted to reach a package agreement that it control all the executive positions in Ekurhuleni. The ANC would do the same in Johannesburg, and the DA control all the positions in Tshwane.</p>
<p>Shivambu failed to convince the other parties. The final outcome was conventional, power-sharing coalitions with the DA at the core, excluding the ANC and EFF. Both parties, however, managed to entice smaller parties in the DA grouping to break ranks and removed the DA-led governments in no confidence motions. New speakers and mayors in the Gauteng metropolitan councils were elected from minute parties like the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/09/28/cope-s-colleen-makhubele-elected-as-joburg-council-speaker">Congress of the People</a>, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2023/01/27/al-jama-ah-s-thapelo-amad-is-johannesburg-s-new-mayor">al Jama-ah</a> and the <a href="https://www.tshwane.gov.za/?p=51991">African Transformation Movement </a>, and not from the ANC or the EFF.</p>
<h2>The latest ANC-EFF approach</h2>
<p>In the centre of municipal power – the mayoral committee – real power sharing between the ANC and EFF is being implemented mainly in Ekurhuleni and to a lesser degree in Johannesburg.</p>
<p>What does the latest ANC-EFF approach tell us? It is widely speculated that it is primarily confined to Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, and that the ANC’s provincial leaders, including <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2023-04-09-lesufi-admits-anc-could-plunge-to-40-in-gauteng/">Premier Panyaza Lesufi</a> favour such an approach. But, most of the party’s national leaders do not show the same appetite for it. Recently, for example, the ANC Veterans’ League and its leader, Snuki Zikalala, expressed a preference for the DA over the EFF as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-04-16-grand-coalition-2024-veterans-leagues-snuki-zikalala-suggests-da-is-better-partner-for-anc/">a possible coalition partner</a>.</p>
<p>In the Gauteng provincial election in 2019, the ANC received a slim majority of <a href="https://www.gcro.ac.za/outputs/map-of-the-month/detail/2019-gauteng-provincial-election-results/">only 50.12%</a>. Therefore, an ANC-EFF provincial coalition in 2024 is not inconceivable. A similar national coalition, however, would be a different kettle of fish.</p>
<h2>A national coalition government</h2>
<p>National government is primarily responsible for national policies. The question is whether the ANC and EFF will be able to find each other in policy terms. Take for example land ownership which is a policy priority for the EFF. They favour expropriation of white-owned land for redistribution to the mainly landless black majority, without compensation and that all land acquired through land reform <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/eff-blames-anc-for-failure-to-pass-expropriation-without-compensation-bill-20211207">must be state-owned</a>. On the other hand, the ANC’s expropriation policy ranges from zero to extensive compensation for specific property features, and ownership is not limited to the state.</p>
<p>For more than two years, a parliamentary committee considered different proposals for amending section 25 of constitutional property rights. The fact that the ANC and EFF could not find each other on such an amendment <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-12-08-heres-why-the-eff-rejected-the-land-expropriation-without-compensation-bill/">collapsed the process</a>. If the two parties cannot find each other on such an important and symbolic policy matter, how can they agree on other policy matters?</p>
<h2>The challenge of power-sharing</h2>
<p>The final test of any coalition is: can parties agree on how to share power? So far, the EFF and ANC have avoided it in the case of top positions. In Johannesburg and Tshwane, more recently, they have not nominated their own members for the positions of mayor and speaker but gave them to very small parties. </p>
<p>In November 2022, the EFF tried to nominate its candidate as Ekurhuleni mayor but failed. The <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-11-08-how-the-anc-eff-partnership-failed-in-ekurhuleni-and-led-to-the-re-election-of-mayor-tania-campbell/">DA’s candidate was re-elected</a>. It means that the ANC and EFF are not yet able to decide how to share these positions. </p>
<p>In a national government, the stakes for all the parties will be even higher. A minister’s position includes many personal gains, a high status and the power to reward patronage networks. It complicates power sharing as a strategic mechanism to cultivate cross-cutting loyalties which should stabilise the mosaic of interests in a coalition. This is the outstanding test for the ANC and EFF. They have not yet been in a situation of sharing power to the satisfaction of both sides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ANC and EFF differ on ideology and policy – an alliance between them would prove difficult to put together and made to work.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1733382021-12-08T15:27:27Z2021-12-08T15:27:27ZHere are five factors that drove low voter turnout in South Africa’s 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436313/original/file-20211208-25-myoagt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abstention in the 2021 local government election was largely driven by a combination of individual and administrative barriers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guillem Sartorio/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do so few South Africans vote? The 2021 local government elections witnessed the lowest turnout for democratic elections in South Africa: <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/csir-predicts-48-voter-turnout-for-2021-local-government-elections/">just under half</a> of registered voters came to the polls. This reflects a longer trajectory of declining voter turnout, which has been in evidence since <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608">at least 2009</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa is not alone in facing declining voter participation. Internationally, this is a trend that has been documented <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">since the 1990s</a>. Nonetheless, falling turnout is a critical barometer of the health of the post-apartheid democratic project. How people vote is a signal of their political and ideological preferences – but whether they vote at all tells us something about people’s approval or disapproval of the institution of democracy itself, as they experience it. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608">Most of the available research</a> into the barriers to voting and motivations for abstention has used social attitudes surveys, either conducted before or some time after an election. While valuable, such surveys cannot capture the mood of the people in the period immediately after the election. </p>
<p>This is what we set out to do. <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Methods+brief.pdf/23b045d3-4368-ad32-41d6-78797dae92da?version=1.0&t=1638353453174">With our team</a> we conducted 3,905 telephone interviews, talking to both voters and non-voters in five metropolitan municipalities: eThekwini, Nelson Mandela Bay and the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane. People were asked about their participation in the 2021 and 2016 local government elections, as well as the 2019 national and provincial election.</p>
<p>Five main reasons emerged for not voting. The most common were individual barriers and administrative barriers, followed by complaints about service delivery and corruption, uninterest or disillusionment, and a lack of political alignment. </p>
<p>Our research supports <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2020.1715161?journalCode=cpsa20">other analysis</a> highlighting that the South African electorate is becoming less tied to race and identity based voting but are increasingly making a wider evaluation of the performance of political incumbents.</p>
<h2>Who are non-voters?</h2>
<p>Electoral non participation was a <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Voter+abstention.pdf/f68bc266-00e4-8070-f074-3b466ac5119f?version=1.0&t=1638354848974">much more fluid phenomenon</a> than we had anticipated. </p>
<p>When looking at voter abstention amongst eligible voters across the last three elections, we found that only 14% of those surveyed had abstained in all three of the last elections – a category to whom we referred as “hardened abstainer”. </p>
<p>Of those who abstained in the 2021 poll, more than half (58%) had voted in at least one of the last two elections. In contrast, 59% of those surveyed who had abstained in the previous two elections opted to vote in the 2021 election. This highlights that, while we know that more people are choosing to abstain, this is also a complex phenomenon: people are making largely context-based decisions on whether to vote or not.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Voter+abstention.pdf/f68bc266-00e4-8070-f074-3b466ac5119f?version=1.0&t=1638354848974">Our research</a> showed that non-voters were more likely to be young (under 35), and students – 59% of whom abstained from the 2021 local government election within the five municipalities. They are also more likely to be black African, Indian or coloured than white. Non-voting was also higher at both the lowest and highest income groups. </p>
<p>But voter abstention is driven by much more than a socio-demographic profile: it reflects how people assess the political landscape.</p>
<h2>Five key reasons</h2>
<p>We asked participants to explain in their own words why they chose not to vote. Five main reasons emerged.</p>
<p>A third (34%) of the responses cited an individual barrier. The most common were not being in their registered voting district on election day, being at work or simply being too busy. </p>
<p>A further 22% indicated some form of administrative barrier. The most common reasons here were not being registered or not having an ID. Of this group, about a quarter had attempted to vote but encountered a problem at the voting station; either they found they were not registered or were registered in a different voting district. </p>
<p>The third most common explanation was what we termed performance evaluations – reasons related to complaints about service delivery and corruption. This accounted for 19% of explanations and centred on people not having seen changes for themselves or their communities. </p>
<p>One respondent said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…according to me … this thing of voting is useless because there is corruption and we are not working. This voting this is not working for us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Performance evaluations were more frequently cited by black African non-voters and by the unemployed. They also featured more prominently in the explanations provided by those living in informal settlements (30%), backyard rooms (27%) and township and government-provided RDP houses (21%) than in those offered by people living in suburban houses (11%) and of those living in flats, apartments or townhouses (12%).</p>
<p>A further 17% were uninterested or disillusioned with voting. Men spoke of this more often than women, as did those with higher levels of education. Levels of self-reported uninterest and disillusionment also seemed to increase with income: 32% of those earning more than R40,000 a month reported being uninterested and disillusioned, about double the rate of those earning under R10,000 a month.</p>
<p>A lack of political alignment was the least common reason, accounting for only 4% of explanations overall. However, it is interesting to note that this reason was more commonly expressed among high income earners. </p>
<h2>The future of voter turnout</h2>
<p>Overall, then, abstention in the 2021 local government election was largely driven by a combination of individual and administrative barriers. Not registering to vote is a preemptive disengagement from electoral democracy, while being “too busy” suggests that participating in electoral democracy is not strongly valued by some. These reasons are deeply suggestive of a particular form of disengagement from electoral democracy</p>
<p>Encouragingly, our findings seem to suggest that voter abstention is a fluid phenomenon. Abstaining in one election does not necessarily mean disengagement with the electoral process forever. This, perhaps, puts the onus on political parties to connect with those who disengaged from the 2021 local government election and speak to their concerns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carin Runciman received funding from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this research. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Bekker received funding from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this research. </span></em></p>The South African electorate is becoming less tied to race and identity-based voting but are increasingly making a wider evaluation of the performance of political incumbents.Carin Runciman, Director, Centre for Social Change, University of JohannesburgMartin Bekker, Computational Social Scientist, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726472021-11-29T14:08:08Z2021-11-29T14:08:08ZWhy South African political parties must find a balance between rural versus metro support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434404/original/file-20211129-27-jnd5yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mxolisi Kaunda mayor of eThekwini. If parties or individuals succeed in the politics and practicalities of governing a metro, the rewards are considerable.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren Stewart/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The trouble with metropolitan cities, or metros, is that, even in the best of times, they are hellishly difficult to govern. By metros I mean large, complex and dynamic urban agglomerations that are recognised internationally as metropolitan. In South Africa the definition includes small agglomerations of Buffalo City (on the east coast) and Mangaung (in the central interior). </p>
<p>In at least five of South Africa’s six largest metros the challenges of governing are compounded by political fragmentation and uncertainties of governing as a minority or through a coalition. A host of new mayors are about to take up their posts <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/president-cyril-ramaphosa-calls-up-new-mayors-to-congratulate-them-on-being-elected-9d57361b-716e-4444-a2da-f3a9a9024a87">following local government elections</a>. </p>
<p>The new mayors in these metros may have been handed a poisoned chalice.</p>
<p>The difficulties in governing rest in at least two realities. First, metros are local government writ large, and local government deals with immediate, concrete issues that cannot be obfuscated in the generalities of policy. If a national department falters, the failings may be concealed for a long time through political bravado. If local government fails, the consequence is visible, directly affecting the lives of residents. Local government has nowhere to hide. </p>
<p>Secondly, metros are complicated because their citizens are contrarian. They are, on average, more aware of their rights, more informed, and more educated, than elsewhere, and less likely to vote based on historical loyalties. The media spotlight is generally intense, and interests are diverse and shifting, making it difficult for a single party to maintain a dominant position for long. </p>
<p>In South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) held on to five of the six metros <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/historic-losses-anc-mark-new-era-south-african-politics">for over two decades</a>. But as its electoral support waned the large metros were among the first to fall. </p>
<p>Metros may be a graveyard for political ambition. But if parties or individuals succeed in the politics and practicalities of governing a metro, the rewards are considerable. A metro may be a springboard to national power.</p>
<p>South Africa’s recent municipal election has amplified trends at play since at least the 2011 municipal election. It has revealed more sharply than before a shifting political geography with consequences for the character and prospects of major parties including the ANC. </p>
<h2>Global examples</h2>
<p>In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party has dominated national politics since 1955, and there are enduring electoral loyalties. Nevertheless, an independent candidate was elected <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/tokyos-governor-throws-in-with-a-new-political-party/">Governor of Metropolitan Tokyo</a>. </p>
<p>In India, the National Capital Territory of Delhi rejected the country’s two dominant parties – Modi’s Bharatiya Janata and the Congress Party – and voted the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/asia/indias-governing-party-heads-for-crushing-defeat-in-delhi-elections.html">Aam Aadmi Party</a> (translated literally as the Common Man’s Party) into power. </p>
<p>In Tanzania, the dissonance between national and metro politics provoked <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202102250209.html">President John Magufuli</a> to disband the City Council of Dar es Salaam in February 2021. </p>
<p>In Russia, Vladimir Putin’s <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1340299">United Russia</a> battles to retain control of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which is gradually dragging down the fortunes of the party. </p>
<p>More positively for political ambition, the UK’s prime minister <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/6/10/18638824/boris-johnson-tory-leader-prime-minister-brexit">Boris Johnson</a> was able to use his position of Mayor of London to achieve national high office, and in a different political system, <a href="http://en.people.cn/leaders/jzm/biography.htm">Jiang Jemin</a>, advanced from Mayor of Shanghai to National President.</p>
<p>The fickleness of metro voters presents a political risk, but it also requires political formations to remain agile with potential long-term advantage. A rural base with loyal voters does not have this effect. In the 1987 general election, South Africa’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/05/01/running-for-change-in-s-africa/9fd3633a-ed08-431c-b587-40f6f63398ba/">National Party suffered erosion in its metro base</a>. Wynand Malan, Dennis Worrall, Esther Lategan, and others, abandoned the party, taking metro voters with them. This helped catalyse a pragmatic response by a faction of party leaders. But the party never recovered. </p>
<h2>The shifting political geography</h2>
<p>South Africa’s 2021 municipal election reveals a wide difference in the geographic base of parties. Around 37% of South Africa’s population lives in the six large metros. But these municipalities only accounted for <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">27% of the voters in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects the degree of alienation in the metros. </p>
<p>The population in secondary, or <a href="https://iudf.co.za/knowledge-hub/documents/">intermediate cities</a>, is 9%, followed by large towns at 16%, and rural and small towns at 38%. </p>
<p>If a party receives significantly more support from one of these categories than the population share, then it has established within this category a geographic base.</p>
<p>Over time such a base may shape the character of the party. A party with a metro base may be oriented more towards social liberalism, as voters engage with diversity on a daily basis. But this is not always the case. A response to ethnic diversity may be a populist embrace of xenophobia or a retreat into some form of sectarianism. A party may have a dual base, metro and rural, for example, and while this allows for a larger pool of potential voters, it also adds to complexity of its internal politics.</p>
<p>In 2021, the ANC <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-04-the-finish-line-crushing-blows-to-anc-less-severe-punches-for-the-da-and-some-significant-surprises/">saw only 26%</a> of its support coming from the large metros, <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">down from 32.4% in 2011</a> when it had a political base spread across different geographies.</p>
<p>The political base of the ANC is now the rural Eastern Cape and Limpopo, followed by Mpumalanga and North West, reflecting <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/opinion/2021-11-07-corruption-and-incompetence-have-turned-the-anc-into-a-bantustan-party/">loyalties in rural areas</a>. The exception is KwaZulu-Natal where the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has made a comeback in the north and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has made inroads in the south. </p>
<p>Over time, this is likely to shift the orientation of the ANC, and further reduce its ability, and willingness, to engage with the intensity of metropolitan dynamics. Furthermore policies may eventually change to reflect its more traditional and conservative base.</p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance (DA) is a metro-based party with 58.5% of its electoral support in 2021 coming from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/blow-anc-opposition-da-mayors-elected-major-safrican-cities-2021-11-23/">the big six metros</a>. Its secondary base are the large towns of the Western Cape, with inroads elsewhere such as in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. The major challenge for the DA is the narrowness of its base within the metros, where it’s still supported predominantly by white people. </p>
<p>Only 33% of the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-10-road-to-2024-eff-makes-a-splash-in-local-poll-but-no-red-wave/">EFF’s support</a> comes from the metros. Its support in the Gauteng metros tracks its support nationally, with party support significantly underrepresented in Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay. Its highest support in proportional terms comes from Polokwane and surrounds, although there was some decline here, and the industrial towns of the Mpumalanga and northern Free State. There is no red wave for the EFF in the metros.</p>
<p>Among the smaller parties, the IFP has a rural base, with only 13% of its support from the large metros although the 2021 elections did indicate a slight rise in its support within eThekwini and Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Action SA is currently 100% metro, and it remains to be seen where it will broaden its base in a bid for national power. The FF+ has an urban base but much of this is on the industrial and mining fringes of Gauteng, in the Vaal, West Rand, and Mpumalanga Highveld rather than in the metro core.</p>
<p>The geographical base of a party matters, although this intersects with other dimensions of a political base such as class, race, age, and gender. The rural and small town vote cannot be ignored as 38% of the electorate is significant. There are also intense linkages between the rural and the urban in South Africa, and geographic concerns cannot be easily separated. Also, having a metro base is risky because of the complexity of governing at this scale in the face of a demanding electorate. However, turning away from the metros may pose a serious risk for long term prospects, as a party separates from a potent source of political vitality. </p>
<p>The ANC must beware.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Harrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Metros may be a graveyard for political ambition. But if parties or individuals succeed, the rewards are considerable.Philip Harrison, Professor School of Architecture and Planning, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1656782021-08-10T15:35:51Z2021-08-10T15:35:51ZTo postpone, or not to postpone? South Africa’s local elections hang in the balance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414855/original/file-20210805-25-1uxw047.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some political parties, including the Economic Freedom Fighters, want municipal elections postponed because they can't host campaign rallies. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Efforts are under way to postpone South Africa’s local government elections, set for October 2021, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/iec-will-ask-concourt-to-postpone-local-govt-elections-to-february-next-year-20210804">because</a> of the COVID-19 pandemic. Elections in October would have ensured that the poll met the current constitutional requirement that local elections be held every <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/">five years</a>, and within 90 days of the date of the previous municipal elections.</p>
<p>The problem is that the country’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> doesn’t pronounce on postponement of elections beyond the 90 days’ window period. Because of this, the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">electoral commission</a> has asked the Constitutional Court to <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/iec-asks-concourt-to-postpone-elections-contemplates-23-february-2022-as-the-new-date-20210804">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission’s application to the Constitutional Court comes after it accepted the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/freeandfair/">findings of an inquiry</a> into the feasibility of the October elections being free and fair, amid challenges posed by the pandemic. </p>
<p>The inquiry found that it was unlikely that the elections would be free and fair because of the health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/covid-19/alert-level-3-coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown">state of disaster regulations</a> the government put in place to counter it. The inquiry recommended that the elections be postponed by four months, to no later than February 2022. It advised the electoral body to approach “a court of competent jurisdiction” <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/freeandfair/">to seek a postponement within the law</a>.</p>
<p>The findings appear to be less about the impact of the pandemic on the voters, and more about how political parties will approach the election. Civil society organisations were not unanimous that postponement would be the best option. Political parties in general did not use the pandemic – and new party funding dispensation – as stimuli to modernise their activities.</p>
<p>No dramatic alternatives for the current health protection protocols (except vaccinations) were presented to improve personal safety during the election. It’s still not clear whether the situation will indeed be better in February. Another four months might not make such a difference.</p>
<h2>The inquiry’s considerations</h2>
<p>The inquiry reached its decision after considering presentations made by interested parties.</p>
<p>Former <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/judges/former-judges/11-former-judges/70-deputy-chief-justice-dikgang-moseneke">Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke</a>, who chaired the inquiry, conceded that all the non-pharmaceutical interventions – including social distancing – were effective means of mitigating the risks. But, in his opinion, that was not enough and it would become acceptable to hold elections only once a higher number of voters had been inoculated against the SARS-CoV-2 virus. </p>
<p>The inquiry linked these health considerations to the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitutional requirement</a> of the right to life, and bodily and psychological integrity.</p>
<p>Another consideration was the anticipated electoral dynamics. Uncertainty about the safety of public spaces, according to the inquiry, could result in a very low voter turnout. </p>
<p>Justice Moseneke indicated that he was also influenced by practices in other parts of the world. In the majority of cases, the elections were not postponed.</p>
<p>Another important consideration was the opinions of political parties about their ability to campaign during the pandemic. The parties were divided on this matter. The Democratic Alliance, the main opposition party, was in favour of continuing with the election. The Economic Freedom Fighters, the third largest party, was in favour of a postponement. Its main complaint was that it would not be able to campaign as usual. That means it would not be possible, for example, to hold large rallies and door-to-door canvassing.</p>
<p>The governing African National Congress’s position changed a number of times. It was initially more in favour of postponement, but after President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the election date of 27 October, the party supported its continuation. It adopted a pragmatic stance at the time of the inquiry.</p>
<p>The political parties’ focus was mainly on the campaign period and less on how a postponement would affect the voters. </p>
<p>In my view, arguing that the parties would not be able to campaign as they have done in the past is not convincing. Most sectors of society have made changes to the way they operate during the pandemic – many of them will become permanent. </p>
<p>Political parties must do the same.</p>
<p>A good illustration of this is how parties campaign. A number of avenues are now open to parties to canvas votes that offer alternatives to old-style knocking on doors and holding mass rallies. More than 90% of all households have a radio, and a very high percentage have access to cellphones, and can receive an SMS or other instant messages. And <a href="https://www.nab.org.za/uploads/files/NAB_Report_2019.pdf">most households have a television set</a>. Not to mention the huge potential provided by social media.</p>
<p>They create opportunities for new (low risk to exposure) forms of campaigning, and challenge the notion that only the old way of campaigning can produce a free and fair election.</p>
<h2>Mitigating the risks</h2>
<p>The inquiry was also mandated to provide recommendations to the electoral commission for mitigating the risks of an election in February 2022. The recommendations focus on two areas: the campaigning period and the voting process.</p>
<p>For improving the campaigning process, it recommends that all the health protocols should be applied in all the different voting activities. In addition, more voter registration opportunities should be created, and the broadcasting authority <a href="https://www.icasa.org.za/">ICASA</a> should ensure more equitable access to broadcasting opportunities for all the parties.</p>
<p>The hours of voting should be extended, and so should opportunities for special votes. The times for voting should be staggered in alphabetical order according to voters’ surnames. Electronic voting should be considered (presumably only in future elections).</p>
<p>The question is: do these recommendations suggest that major changes ought to be made before an election can take place, and that much more time is required for that? </p>
<p>The answer is most probably, no. Except in the case of more voter registration opportunities, it would be possible to implement all of these recommendations in time for elections to be held in October.</p>
<h2>Who counts: voters or parties?</h2>
<p>The public debate about possible postponement of the local government elections concentrates mainly on its potential negative impact on South Africa’s constitutional and democratic tradition. </p>
<p>That is an important aspect of the debate, but it should not be the only one. Political parties’ relationship with the public, and the preferences of the voters versus those of political parties, should also be included in the equation. Voters’ views appear to have not carried enough weight. </p>
<p>As it is, South Africans have shown less and less interest in local government elections. Their voter turnout is generally much lower than those of national and provincial elections. Most of the time it is around 50% – <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608150183902">it was about 57% in the 2016 local elections</a>. </p>
<p>Whether the next local election is postponed or not, a low voter turnout is again predictable. The onus is more on political parties to change the public opinion about the importance of local elections than on how the parties can campaign for this election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165678/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s not convincing to argue that the political parties would not be able to campaign as they have done in the past.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1453332020-09-06T09:27:40Z2020-09-06T09:27:40ZWho stands to win or lose if South Africa were to hold all elections on the same day<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355574/original/file-20200831-16-bc6bxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Failure to campaign due to COVID-19 has fuelled calls to synchronise polls.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa usually follows an electoral schedule of national and provincial elections taking place two calendar years before the municipal elections. The next municipal elections should be held <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/elections/2321148/2021-municipal-elections-set-down-for-4-august-iec/">in 2021</a>, about 15 months after the national and provincial elections held <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>Now, for the first time, there’s discussion about <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/407507/anc-and-eff-agree-on-new-election-changes-for-south-africa-report/">synchronising all the elections</a>, <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/407507/anc-and-eff-agree-on-new-election-changes-for-south-africa-report/">prompted</a> by the governing African National Congress (ANC) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the third largest party. They want all elections to be held on the same day, presumably in 2024.</p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party, <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/anc-eff-agree-on-postponing-local-elections-20200613">does not</a> support the idea. Most smaller parties have not yet taken a public position on it.</p>
<p>The debate raises two important questions: the first, why now?; the second, who stands to benefit from the synchronisation? </p>
<p>Those in favour have presented several motivations. One is that doing so would result in <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/anc-eff-agree-on-postponing-local-elections-20200613">cost saving</a> for political parties and the Electoral Commission of SA.</p>
<p>Campaign fatigue, because of elections being held almost every 30 months, has also been mentioned. Both are perennial issues. The next question, therefore, is: why now?</p>
<h2>Not ready to campaign</h2>
<p>One can start with the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on politics in South Africa. </p>
<p>Most of the political parties’ preparations for the 2021 campaign <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-08-covid-19-could-impact-south-africas-2021-local-elections/">have been delayed</a> since the country went into lockdown in March, to curb the spread of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Moreover, the ANC has had to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-03-16-all-anc-conferences-postponed-for-three-months/">postpone</a> its national general council conference, due to have been held in June. The council meets midway between the party’s five-yearly elective conferences, to evaluate progress in <a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/politics/2020-01-03-five-political-stories-that-will-shape-2020/">implementing the party’s conference resolutions</a>, among <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/understanding-the-ancs-national-general-council-ngc/">other things</a>. </p>
<p>The same happened with the DA. Its <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2329426/das-virtual-federal-congress-to-take-place-on-31-october/">federal congress</a> and the party’s leadership elections have also been postponed. </p>
<p>The major parties are, therefore, not in a good position to wage election campaigns.</p>
<p>The ANC faces even more woes.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa is at a delicate point in his efforts to turn the tide against corruption. Evidence is already emerging of a fight-back campaign by several leading ANC members, <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/zuma-rubbishes-ramaphosas-open-letter-to-anc-members/">including former president Jacob Zuma</a>, whose <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2351444/anc-nec-meeting-masina-demands-ramaphosas-resignation/">vested interests are threatened</a> by Ramaphosa’s anti-corruption drive. The decisions by the ANC’s national executive committee meeting at the end of August could be regarded as an endorsement of the Ramaphosa strategy and therefore a serious setback for its opponents. </p>
<p>Previous experiences of acrimonious nomination processes in the ANC during municipal elections raise red flags for a similar process in the near future. In the past, the process exposed deep divisions within the party, even <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-political-killings-have-taken-hold-again-in-south-africas-kwazulu-natal-143908">political killings</a>. </p>
<p>An election in 2021 would also pose a challenge for the parties as they could not yet successfully address the negative consequences of the 2016 municipal elections. These saw the ANC <a href="http://702.co.za/articles/15703/anc-s-losses-in-key-metros-high-on-agenda-at-nec-4-day-meeting">lose its absolute majorities</a> in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Ekhurhuleni metros.</p>
<p>At the same time, the DA’s coalitions and cooperation with the EFF in most of these metros <a href="https://theconversation.com/turmoil-in-south-africas-capital-city-points-to-the-need-to-overhaul-local-democracy-139565">have failed</a>. The EFF could not sustain its <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2018-08-30-eff-kingmaker-strategy-means-it-abdicates-any-duty-for-governance/">kingmaker role</a> in these the metros, and also failed to secure executive positions for its councillors. Neither of these parties has since improved its position in the metros.</p>
<p>Another development in favour of synchronisation is that the appetite of private donors for funding political parties is in decline, affecting their ability to finance election campaigns. The new legislation on <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/political-party-funding-bill-signed-law">political party funding</a>, which forces parties to disclose all donations <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-south-african-law-wont-end-the-toxic-mix-of-money-and-politics-121461">above R100,000</a>, removes the confidential nature of the relationship between funders and parties, and is expected to further discourage private funding for parties. </p>
<p>With this in mind, the parties expect to have less money to campaign in future. A reduction in the number of campaigns would therefore benefit them. At this stage it is almost impossible to predict the cost implications of a decline in private donations versus the financial gains of synchronised elections. </p>
<h2>Who would benefit from synchronisation?</h2>
<p>For parties participating simultaneously in elections at different levels, synchronisation would enable more centralised and coordinated election campaigns. The bigger parties which contest elections at all three levels would benefit the most. It would not reduce the number of candidates who would have to be nominated. It might even complicate coordination of several nomination processes at the same time. But it would be only once in five years instead of every 30 months.</p>
<p>For them, it would mean one nomination process for candidates, one publicity campaign, one process to produce election manifestos, and potentially only one campaign message. Human and financial resources could be used more effectively. </p>
<p>Currently, electoral legislation can accommodate all of this. What would have to change, however, would be section 159(1) of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>, to extend the five-year term for municipalities until 2024. The test would be whether the voters accepted a one-fits-all approach.</p>
<p>Based on past experiences, the majority of parties are <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Parties/Political-party-list/">registered for municipal elections only</a>. Thus, they would not share in these “economy of scale” benefits. Whether they would be disadvantaged by the bigger parties’ savings cannot be accurately predicted. That would depend on whether local campaigns were overtaken by national campaigns, or maintained a character of their own.</p>
<p>Smaller, local parties would most probably be disadvantaged by the bigger parties merging their campaigns at the different levels into one “national” campaign. Municipal issues would then receive much less attention and local parties might be “swamped” by the national character of the campaigns. National leaders could be more visible outside the national centres and make an impression on voters who were only used to their local candidates. </p>
<p>Were this to happen, it would see the demise of smaller local parties. But it would also reduce the irritation of having fragmented and unstable coalition governments which often depend on these parties.</p>
<h2>Splitting of votes</h2>
<p>The arguments presented so far presume that voters would be consistent in voting for the bigger parties in all three spheres. But if voters were motivated to split their votes and vote for different parties at the different levels, that would create opportunities for smaller parties to perform better.</p>
<p>Evidence shows that South Africans split their votes between the 2014 national and the 2016 municipal elections. Three metros in provinces controlled by the ANC voted for a DA coalition. In the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/vote-splitting-the-new-voter-strategy/">2019 national and provincial elections</a> in both Gauteng and the Western Cape, about 3% of the DA supporters voted for the ANC at national level, but for the DA at provincial level.</p>
<p>There’s also the Constitutional Court <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-06-11-concourt-ruling-opens-door-for-independent-candidates-to-stand-for-election-in-sa/">judgment in June 2020</a> which instructed Parliament to amend the electoral system to allow for independent candidates to contest national and provincial elections. It could change electoral practices in many respects. How that would happen is not easy to predict. But that change, coupled with election synchronisation, means a radical change in electoral dynamics can be expected in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The bigger parties which contest elections at all three levels would benefit the most – but voters might split their votes.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1283332019-12-13T06:47:15Z2019-12-13T06:47:15ZPolitics and fashion: the rise of the red beret<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305224/original/file-20191204-70155-1ub9nk9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan opposition politician Bobi Wine takes a selfie with Zimbabwe's opposition leader Nelson Chamisa </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-who-is-bobi-wine-and-why-is-he-creating-such-a-fuss-102138">Bobi Wine</a> has come a long way in two years. The self-styled “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-49204562/bobi-wine-on-the-road-with-uganda-s-ghetto-president">Ghetto President</a>” of Uganda used to be a music star, playing politically charged reggae beats to packed houses. In 2017, the politics took over. </p>
<p>Donning a red beret, he formed the <a href="https://twitter.com/people_power_ug?lang=en">People Power movement</a>, running a successful grassroots campaign to be elected as a parliamentary representative. Now, he’s challenging <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/02/world/africa/yoweri-museveni---fast-facts/index.html">Yoweri Museveni</a> for the presidency in 2021.</p>
<p>In two years, Wine’s red beret has become synonymous with a fiery spirit of Ugandan resistance, long since thought to be extinguished after 33 years of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-museveni-has-twisted-ugandas-constitution-to-cling-to-power-118933">ironclad rule</a> by Museveni.</p>
<p>In the beret, Wine cannily put the “brand” in “firebrand” across his multiple social media platforms. In response, the regime is turning to unconventional <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/10/31/uganda-museveni-big-bobi-wine-problem/">suppression tactics</a>. On September 18, 2019, a <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/428052967/Updf-Insignia-and-Uniforms-in-Uganda-Gazette#download&from_embed">government gazette</a> listed the red beret as official military attire, effectively <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/uganda-bans-red-beret-bobi-wine-signature-headgear-190930150137387.html">banning it</a> from public life.</p>
<h2>Symbolism</h2>
<p>Perhaps fittingly for a time of stark global inequality, red headgear is currently marking global populist movements of all political persuasions. The French Revolution brought us the “<a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/phrygian-cap-bonnet-rouge-1221893">bonnet rouge</a>” and red is historically synonymous with <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-state-blue-state-how-colors-took-sides-in-politics-93541">leftist politics</a>. But <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/fashion/trumps-campaign-hat-becomes-an-ironic-summer-accessory.html">red baseball caps</a> famously heralded the 2016 US election of Trump in a rustbelt resurgence.</p>
<p>South Africa has its own version of working-class red: the <a href="https://twitter.com/EFFSouthAfrica?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Economic Freedom Fighters</a>. The opposition party’s trademark red beret forms part of a trio of headgear including the wrap and hard hat. Within weeks of the party debuting their look, sales skyrocketed. Similarly, Make America Great Again hat sales have soared to <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/1-million-make-america-great-again-hats-sold">one million</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>A beret may not make a worker’s revolutionary, but it certainly makes a statement. Its history is equal part bohemian artist and militant revolutionary; it’s been worn by everyone from Rembrandt to Robert Mugabe, the Beatniks to the Black Panther movement.</p>
<p>Fittingly, Wine styles himself as both artist and activist, his career as a musician merging seamlessly into his political manifesto. “When we sing ‘Tulivimba mu Uganda empya’ (We shall move with swag in a new Uganda), we summarise what our struggle is about - DIGNITY,” <a href="https://twitter.com/HEBobiwine/status/1191024480417701888">proclaimed Wine</a> in a tweet.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305221/original/file-20191204-70149-1of3rec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An EFF supporter carries a painting of party leader Julius Malema during an election rally.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">STR/EPA-EFE</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Social media</h2>
<p>Indeed, Wine’s social media presence is key to his success, spreading message and image interchangeably. Using his prolific <a href="https://twitter.com/HEBobiwine">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/www.bobiwine.ug/">Facebook </a> and <a href="https://www.instagram.com/bobiwine/?hl=en">Instagram</a> presence, he is relentlessly visual: nearly every update is accompanied by an image of beret-clad supporters. His near daily updates centre less on local rallies than on his <a href="https://time.com/collection/time-100-next-2019/5718843/bobi-wine/">increasingly high profile</a>, Western travel and media coverage. It’s a canny move in a country where 78% of the population is under 35.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305417/original/file-20191205-39023-cow7ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bobi Wine and his red beret made it onto the Next 100 list.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Time magazine</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Ugandan regime is nothing if not wise to this: on July 1, 2018, the government instigated what was dubbed a <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/uganda-social-media-tax-stays-for-now/">“social media tax”</a>, charging Ugandans 200 shillings (roughly five US cents) a day to use a bouquet of 60 internet applications, including WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. While the price may not seem prohibitive, it still presents a big structural barrier in a country where 41.7% of people were living on <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=UGA">less than $2 a day</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>“Social media use is definitely a luxury item,” announced Museveni, ironically on his <a href="https://www.yowerikmuseveni.com/blog/museveni/president-responds-feed-back-earlier-statement-new-social-media-and-mobile-money-taxes">personal blog</a>. He continued: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Internet use can sometimes be used for education purposes and research. This should not be taxed. However, using internet to access social media for chatting, recreation, malice, subversion, inciting murder, is definitely a luxury.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The social media tax has added a new twist to Museveni’s suppression tactics. While virtual private networks allow more savvy Ugandan users a way around the problem, others take the hit and pay the price.</p>
<h2>Familiar tactics</h2>
<p>Wine’s tactical use of music and fashion follows Museveni’s own playbook. The Ugandan president released his own popular song in November 2010. </p>
<p>Unlike Wine’s populist reggae, Museveni’s <a href="https://youtu.be/MOHcnrrG1YU">“U Want Another Rap”</a> is mostly sung in Runyankore, a language predominantly spoken in rural areas of the country. Its heavy-handed lyrics emphasise individual resilience, like “harvesters … gave me millet, that I gave to a hen, which gave me an egg, that I gave to children, who gave me a monkey, that I gave to the king, who gave me a cow, that I used to marry my wife.”</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305427/original/file-20191205-39001-k8f6py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Museveni wears trademark wide-brimmed hat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Hutchins/EPA-EFE</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In line with this folksy approach, Museveni famously favours a wide-brimmed conservative sunhat with leather string. Like Wine’s, the hat is a feature of most leadership portraits. The contrast couldn’t be starker: an old man with a broad-brimmed gardening hat and his young, hip rival in revolutionary red branded beret. </p>
<h2>Practicality</h2>
<p>Against the backdrop of a Ugandan dictatorship that controls media narrative, then, viable opposition needs a boost. Wine’s choice of symbol fits well. Berets are convenient: cheap to produce and impossible to ignore. The splash of red next to the face makes its way into every photograph. Unlike a T-shirt, headgear is easily stashed or discarded during confrontation without immediately signalling a clothing item has been removed.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.rosiefindlay.com/">Dr Rosie Findlay</a>, digital fashion media specialist and author of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2018/02/15/book-review-personal-style-blogs-appearances-that-fascinate-by-rosie-findlay/">Personal Style Blogs: Appearances that Fascinate</a>, says the fact that the beret is being deployed on social media should not be overlooked. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The colour pops on the small screen and is immediately recognisable, a literal fashion statement in how its symbolism immediately marks Wine’s image with his politics.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the face of the banning of the red beret by Museveni, Wine seems <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1WF1YV?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">unfazed</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>He thinks it is about the beret - it’s not. This is a symbolisation of the desire for change. People Power is more than a red beret, we are bigger than our symbol.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With 18 months before the next Ugandan election and two hats in the ring, let us see if revolutionary spectacle can translate into substantial governance.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305428/original/file-20191205-38997-196sc6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US President Donald Trump holds his famous red cap, a symbol of the rising right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Reynolds/EPA-EFE</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carla Lever does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bobi Wine in Uganda does it; so do the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa. The red beret is worn to signify the revolutionary. Its power lies in a symbolism that combines art and politics.Carla Lever, Research Fellow at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221332019-09-01T09:22:14Z2019-09-01T09:22:14ZBlack South Africans explain who they voted for in last poll, and why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289629/original/file-20190827-184229-uu1t3j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans who receive welfare grants vote for the governing African National Congress more than any other party. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In May this year South Africans went to the polls to vote in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-africans-vote-today-sixth-national-elections-apartheid">sixth national and provincial elections</a> of the democratic era. The election was a test of strength for the governing African National Congress (ANC), whose electoral support has declined <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/the-anc-in-terminal-decline/">over the last decade</a>. </p>
<p>The election affirmed the pattern of ANC decline, with its <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/IECOnline/Reports/National-and-Provincial-reports">worst electoral performance to date</a>. The <a href="https://effonline.org/about-us/">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, founded in July 2013 by expelled former ANC Youth League President, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/julius-sello-malema">Julius Malema</a>, and which describes itself as a far-left political party, saw growth in its support. Meanwhile the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), a broadly liberal party, saw a <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">decline in support.</a> </p>
<p>But who voted for these parties and why? </p>
<p>To answer this question, the Centre for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg surveyed over 5,000 voters in an exit poll on the day of the election. Twenty three sites across eight of South Africa’s nine provinces were surveyed, with most sites concentrated in Gauteng, the economic hub of the country. The survey focused primarily on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/the-economics-of-south-african-townships-special-focus-on-diepsloot">townships</a> and informal settlements, whose residents are mostly poor and black; 91% of respondents were black African, and 22% lived in informal dwellings or shacks. </p>
<p>Similar surveys were also conducted on the day of the 2014 national and provincial <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/115/460/419/2195267">elections</a> and the <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Documents/LGE%202016%20Report%20CR%2011%2001_Final%20Cover%20Included.pdf">2016 local government election</a>. </p>
<p>The survey asked a range of demographic questions – such as age, gender, race, ethnicity and employment status – as well as questions about participation in protests, and who respondents voted for and why. </p>
<p>The survey sample was not nationally representative. But, the areas chosen provide a crucial insight into the historic heartlands of support for the governing ANC.</p>
<h2>Who votes for what party?</h2>
<p>The survey asked about all political parties but we concentrated our analysis on the three largest political parties: the ANC, the DA and the EFF. </p>
<p>As the ANC continues to experience declining electoral support, our survey provides some understanding of the patterns that lie beneath deepening electoral competition in South Africa. Age, gender, ethnicity, receipt of government benefits, and participation in protest were all found to significantly correlate with voters’ choices of different parties. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/contact/Documents/Final%202019%20election%20report.pdf">Our analysis</a> shows that the ANC and the DA secured their greatest support among older voters, while the EFF secured the greatest support among younger voters, as one might expect. </p>
<p>In line with our previous surveys, we found that women were more likely than men to vote for the ANC. Nearly two-thirds of women (64%) voted for the ANC, compared to only 55% of men. </p>
<p>Nearly half of all DA voters surveyed had full time jobs compared to about a third of ANC and EFF voters. </p>
<p>The data also revealed interesting ethnic differences. IsiXhosa speakers were most likely to vote for the ANC while Sepedi speakers were most likely to vote for the EFF. </p>
<p>In previous surveys, we found that the ANC, then under the leadership of President Jacob Zuma, drew particularly strong support from isiZulu speakers. But in this round of the survey, we observed that while support for the ANC was still strong among isiZulu speakers, they were also the most likely to vote for opposition parties beyond the EFF and DA. </p>
<p>The findings also reveal that those who had reported taking part in some form of protest action over the last five years were more likely to vote for opposition parties. </p>
<h2>Why do people vote?</h2>
<p>The survey included a series of six questions that asked respondents to rate the reasons that they came to vote by “a lot”, ‘“a bit” or “not at all”. The two most influential reasons were “because it is my responsibility to vote” and “to improve the economy”, with 90% and 87% of respondents, respectively, saying that these factors influenced them “a lot”. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, different reasons influenced voters who supported different parties. Nearly two thirds of ANC voters, compared to only half of DA voters, said that the prospect of government benefits influenced their decision to vote.</p>
<p>In contrast, about three quarters of EFF voters agreed that “land redistribution” influenced their decision to vote, compared to less than half of DA voters. </p>
<h2>Explaining voter choices</h2>
<p>The survey also asked people to explain why they voted for a particular party. Personal identification, including reasons based on a sense of trust, loyalty or a personal affinity with a party, was most common among ANC voters.</p>
<p>DA and EFF voters most frequently expressed a desire for “change” as influencing who they voted for. Although it must be noted that a high proportion of ANC voters also expressed the idea of “change” as motivating their decision to vote for the ANC.</p>
<p>A fifth (20%) of EFF voters explained their vote choice in terms of their satisfaction with the party’s policies. This could be related to the <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-effs-2019-election-manifesto-iv">EFF’s manifesto</a> pledges on the issue of land redistribution. We found that land redistribution was a strong motivator for bringing EFF supporters out to vote. Meanwhile, 17% of DA voters explained their vote choice as being related to the desire to increase electoral competition and to put pressure on the governing party.</p>
<p>Our survey was also able to give insight into whether government benefits, in the form of social grants or government housing, may have played a role in influencing party choice. Our findings show that social grant recipients were statistically more likely to vote for the ANC. Receipt of a government house, however, did not have a statistically significant relationship to voting for the party.</p>
<h2>South African electoral politics</h2>
<p>The fault lines identified in the survey may deepen, to the extent that political parties emphasise them in campaign messaging. </p>
<p>At the same time, the salience of factors such as social grants and land redistribution highlight that party policies and performance in government matter as well. As electoral competition continues to escalate in South Africa, it will be useful to monitor the relative significance of, and interaction between identities, policy preferences, and government performance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carin Runciman receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of Johannesburg Research Committee.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marcel Paret does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The survey findings show that people who had taken part in protests over the last five years were more likely to vote for opposition parties.Carin Runciman, Associate professor, University of JohannesburgMarcel Paret, Assistant professor, University of UtahLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1164632019-05-09T13:07:47Z2019-05-09T13:07:47ZWhat the EFF’s self-styled militarism says about South Africa’s third largest party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/273098/original/file-20190507-103071-j2ne0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Economic Freedom Fighters leader Julius Malema at an election rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For weeks the red campaign posters of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party have been omnipresent in South Africa’s streetscape. Most feature its smiling leader, Julius Malema, wearing his trademark red beret. The image is accompanied by the slogan “Son of the Soil”. </p>
<p>In the 2014 general elections, the EFF became the third largest party in the country. It garnered just over 6% of the vote. The EFF’s approach certainly seems to have appealed to a segment of South Africa’s voters. <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-09-the-ff-and-eff-poles-apart-but-both-making-gains/">Early results</a> from the country’s 2019 national elections suggest that the party increased its overall share by a few percentage points.</p>
<p>Since 2014 its salient features – from its authoritarian organisation and challenges of democratic procedure in parliament, to ultra-nationalism, xenophobia and strong-arm tactics – have led commentators such as <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2018-07-02-effs-fascist-agenda--rapidly-clarifies-itself-through-malemas-racial-outbursts/?device=feature_phone">Prince Mashele</a>, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/gareth-van-onselen/why-the-eff-is-a-fascist-political-party_a_23391414/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAApQc2d-46Y0k4q0axMzPc3WtvCEjSqXtyM2dmDbHW3Al2erWGNjJ4W4JydemhGcwLG4OU_a_Wu1nRAGFbdYhykYOB6nC86eoFakHvOLdrudn7Vtmfvkmxux8qhBr8AM3wTrAXnWRJpbHp3YLdSloVycc2iB_ZuQ_rZQ5kt2FISU">Gareth van Onselen</a> and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-02-23-its-difficult-but-not-impossible-to-see-creeping-fascism-in-the-eff/">Ismail Lagardien</a>, to characterise the EFF as a fascist, rather than democratic party.</p>
<p>An often mentioned feature of the EFF is its adoption of a quasi-military party aesthetics. Its dress code consists of red berets and other faux military gear. Its organisational names include “commander-in-chief”, “ground forces”, “military wing” and “student command”. </p>
<p>In addition, songs and dances from the days of the armed struggle against apartheid feature prominently in the party’s rallies. This is not uncommon for political parties previously involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. In rallies of the African National Congress (ANC), for instance, its Umkhonto weSizwe veterans often perform a few routines. However, it would be unimaginable for the ANC’s leaders, such as its president Cyril Ramaphosa, say, to fire machine guns at rallies – as Malema recently did.</p>
<p>In my view the EFF’s militarised aesthetic is more than a sideshow or blast from the past. It forms a key part of its highly performative, symbolic and spectacle-oriented brand of politics. </p>
<p>My current <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/project/Aesthetics-and-politics-in-the-South-African-post-colony">research</a> focuses on the entanglements of aesthetics and politics in the South African “postcolony”. It studies the prominent presence of politics in contemporary art practices. It also looks at the role of artistic and cultural contestation in movements such as #RhodesMustFall. </p>
<p>The EFF is a fascinating case because, of all political parties, its aesthetic dimension is most pronounced. It serves both key symbolic and instrumental purposes. In analysing and making sense of the EFF, I take its militarised aesthetic to be as important as its manifestos, speeches, press releases and policy proposals. It reveals both what the party stands for, as well as the reasons for its strong appeal to some, and its repulsiveness to others.</p>
<h2>Militarised aesthetic</h2>
<p>The EFF’s militarised aesthetics serve multiple purposes.</p>
<p>First off, its self-stylisation as a present-day liberation army enacts its core stance. This is that despite the end of the apartheid regime, the struggle for South Africa’s liberation is far from complete. </p>
<p>Second, it dramatises the EFF’s self-positioning as a breakaway party of the ANC. Its military antics serve as an indictment of the ANC’s alleged betrayal of the liberation struggle.</p>
<p>Third, its reenactment of the struggle days satisfies a longing for simpler times with a clearer enemy and more straightforward courses of action: to nationalise, to fight and “take back”.</p>
<p>Fourth, a militarised aesthetics aggrandises a party that, after all, represents only a minority of South Africans. The spectacle of 100 uniformly dressed EFF supporters marching with party flags creates the illusion of a vast army of freedom fighters across South Africa, ready to mobilise at a moment’s notice.</p>
<p>Fifth, a militarised party culture is an effective way to deal with the organisational challenges of a political start-up. It serves to quell internal dissent. It makes everyone tow the party line and maintains tight control over party structures.</p>
<p>Lastly, militarisation evokes an acute sense of being under siege by hostile forces out to destroy the party. </p>
<h2>Precedents</h2>
<p>The performance of militarisation has had many precedents in the history of black resistance movements. In the US, for instance, it was common in organisations ranging from Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association and the Nation of Islam, to the Black Panthers and rap band Public Enemy. </p>
<p>A militarised aesthetic doesn’t in itself imply fascist leanings. It can signify different things. It can have different aims or effects. It can serve to demonstrate self-discipline and organisational capacity, or a readiness to defend oneself forcefully when unfairly attacked. </p>
<p>For example, the inclusion in the EFF’s logo of the raised fist as a symbol of the black power movement invites comparisons with the Black Panthers Party. Active in the 1960s and 1970s, the party’s paramilitary dress code of leather jackets and black berets as well as the demonstrative waving of rifles, were key to their campaign of <a href="https://www.socialistalternative.org/panther-black-rebellion/the-black-panther-party-for-self-defense/">armed self-defence</a> against routine police violence against African Americans. </p>
<p>Similarly, the EFF’s military aesthetic can be understood as a declaration of intended self-defence on behalf of South Africa’s workers and poor.</p>
<h2>Bling aesthetics</h2>
<p>One may question, however, whether the EFF’s military aesthetic is not merely cosmetic given the party leaders’ widely reported indulgence in <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/pics-malemas-millions-473967">luxury lifestyles</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than a blatant contradiction, the demonstrative display of material wealth can be seen as an enactment of the party’s central ideological argument. Namely, that only by acquiring economic independence will the impoverished black majority be able to attain true political freedom and social emancipation. </p>
<p>An aesthetic of conspicuous consumption can therefore be seen as equally essential to the EFF as its aesthetics of militant socialism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthias Pauwels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The EFF’s militarised aesthetic is more than a sideshow. It forms a key part of its spectacle-oriented brand of politics.Matthias Pauwels, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161802019-05-01T09:42:33Z2019-05-01T09:42:33ZSouth Africa’s black middle class is battling to find a political home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271553/original/file-20190429-194627-1inzf5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">None of South Africa's political parties are offering middle class black people a home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s black middle class is growing numerically – and growing politically restive. But does it see the world differently from others? Does this translate into voting behaviour? </p>
<p>These questions require close consideration because the black middle class is already a critical constituency in some of the country’s wealthier provinces such as Gauteng, and is looking for a political home that’s stable and serves its class interests.</p>
<p>The post-apartheid project was meant to unlock the economic energies of all South Africans. But sluggish economic performance, coupled with a decade of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a> and the scorn former President Jacob Zuma felt towards <a href="https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Zuma-scolds-clever-blacks-20150429">“clever blacks”</a>, has left the black middle class angry and wary. </p>
<p>They are angry at their exclusion from mainstream economic activity, where “boardroom racism” and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-business-must-tackle-its-deeply-rooted-prejudice-94686">racial ceiling are clearly at work</a>. And they are wary that unless they are members of the governing African National Congress (ANC’s) “charmed circle”, their chances of accessing state funds – normally required to help grow and stabilise the indigenous bourgeoisie after liberation – are at best slender. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-10-anc-poll-says-it-is-winning-white-voters/">recent survey</a> conducted for the ANC and which the party has not released publicly, asked over 3 000 Gauteng voters a range of questions about attitudes to politics past and present. The survey <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-10-anc-poll-says-it-is-winning-white-voters/">showed</a> that there are stresses and strains in the body politic in general, many of which are most acutely felt by the black middle class.</p>
<p>As a young man from Johannesburg put it in a focus group:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The one thing that is changing that is killing the ANC is the individuals inside. There literally is a clique, if you belong to this clique within the party, you will be all right and if you are against any of their ideas, you are pushed to the side.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The implications for the ruling party are clear: if its policy of appointing party loyalists to government positions <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">(cadre deployment</a> and state capture (or even overt patronage) remain the order of the day, the black middle class will simply withdraw all support from the ANC. This would be a dire indictment of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>Definition challenges</h2>
<p>Many academics, correctly, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2017.1379700">spend a lot of time</a> worrying about the precision of various definitions of (middle) class. These range from occupation to income and education to consumption, through to subjective self-identification. They also correctly bemoan the clumsiness of survey attempts to measure class <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqkBEv58wzs">in all its nuances</a>. </p>
<p>While accepting the weaknesses of most definitions, we nonetheless need to develop and use what we can to try to understand if such a class exists, and what its political behaviour might be.</p>
<p>In this case, we started with a household income in excess of R11 000 a month. This is scarcely a princely income, but analysed in the context of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/race-and-ethnicity-south-africa">“black African”</a> income generally, it certainly includes the “middle stata”. </p>
<p>To make the definition more nuanced we included those who self-identified as upper-middle class (or, in less than 2% of cases, “upper class”). </p>
<p>As the voting intention graphic below shows, even with this rough and ready definition, there seem to be different political dynamics at play for the black middle class.</p>
<h2>Voting patterns</h2>
<p>The graph makes a number of key issues clear. Firstly, the ANC has held – or regained - the loyalty of the majority of black middle class Gautengers, but only just. Where 63% of non-middle class black Africans in Gauteng (who were registered to vote) told us they will vote ANC, this dropped to 56% among the black middle class. Their loyalty is remarkable, given the past decade.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Part of the reason is the state of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the leading opposition party. The DA should be the natural home for an emergent and ambitious middle class, with its talk of equal opportunities, its general dislike of <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Cadre-deployment-contradicts-NDP-DA-20130508">cadre deployment</a> and its strident attacks on ANC corruption. However, the DA is deeply divided - over race. </p>
<p>The DA committed policy <em>seppuku</em> as the election approached, with its members and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mmusi-maimane-feels-pressure-as-white-privilege-race-row-rocks-da-20180506">commentators freely attacking party leader</a> Mmusi Maimane over the issue for fear of alienating their traditional, rather tribal, white voter base. Any mention of race, or redress, or race-based inequality, it seems, was to be banished - while asking those at the receiving end of racism to vote DA. </p>
<p>The signal to black middle class South Africans was clear: fears that the DA remained a “white” party, or a party in hock to white interests, remained; and they were unlikely to be terribly welcome. This remarkable pre-election behaviour split the uneasy alliance of those previously opposed to Zuma and everything he and the ANC represented before Cyril Ramaphosa became the party leader. It seems to have driven those who dipped their toes in DA waters back to the ANC fold, or into the arms of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) or - for a significant number - into the political wilderness.</p>
<p>The ANC has never been able to sustain a strong appeal to higher educated or higher income voters. The DA has now fallen back dramatically in these areas, and the graphic makes it clear that the EFF hold more appeal to black middle class voters than the DA. Whether this is because of their <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2121794/malemas-membership-of-exclusive-inanda-club-divides-opinion/">strident opposition</a> to racism, or is done to fire warning salvos across the bows of both ANC and DA, the result is that the DA and EFF are fighting for the same small portion of black middle class votes - which are unavailable to the ANC - albeit from vastly different ideological positions. </p>
<p>The ANC continues to enjoy the lion’s share of black middle class votes from those willing to vote. But for how long?</p>
<h2>The apathy</h2>
<p>While 67% of black middle class voters do intend to vote, a third will stay at home on 8 May, cursing all political parties for failing to represent their interests, according to the survey. Chunks of the black middle class may vote, but far from enthusiastically. And a great many will not vote.</p>
<p>Among those who said they would vote, according to our survey results, 17% “don’t know” (or won’t tell) who they will vote for – even though many had previously overcome their unhappiness at the perceived “whiteness” of the DA:</p>
<p>And, as commentator Nkateko Mabasa <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-04-23-as-i-experience-class-mobility-will-i-protect-my-interests-like-the-das-black-middle-class/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=SaveLater&utm_campaign=daily-email-alert">puts it</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>although most black South Africans will continue to regard the DA as a white party … there is a growing number of black middle-class liberals who are tired of being ashamed for being regarded as “coconuts” [black on the outside, white on the inside].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Maimane was a very powerful magnet for black middle class voters, but as his party rounded on him over race, white privilege and the need to maintain the white vote, Ramaphosa has inevitably exerted his own magnetic pull. He is charismatic and emblematic of what the black middle class can achieve. It is therefore no surprise that DA support in this key segment has all but evaporated. </p>
<p>Those who will never forgive the ANC its past sins are either opting out or voting EFF. The question for the future is whether any current party can reflect the needs and aspirations of the black middle class - who, importantly, are black as well as middle class - or whether they represent the social base of some not-yet formed political party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt received funding from donors for this survey, conducted on behalf of the African National Congress (Gauteng).</span></em></p>The black middle class are angry at their exclusion from mainstream economic activity.David Everatt, Head of Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1157352019-05-01T09:42:28Z2019-05-01T09:42:28ZRace still colours South Africa’s politics 25 years after apartheid’s end<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271723/original/file-20190430-136787-1gxpztv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African National Congress supporters at the party's manifesto launch. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It would be surprising if race played no part in South African elections. The country’s colonial and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> past ranked alongside the <a href="https://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm">America’s Deep South</a> as among the most racist social orders in the world. If religious polarisation is also considered, South Africa often compared with <a href="https://socialistworker.org/2008/11/24/struggle-in-northern-ireland">Northern Ireland</a> and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/aren-europeans-calling-israel-apartheid-state-190410081102849.html">Israel-Palestine</a> conflict.</p>
<p>The slogan <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/3761/thesis_tshawane_n.pdf">“rainbow nation”</a> seems to have retired along with Anglican archbishop emeritus Desmond Tutu. Personal racist incidents still <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/coffin-assault-judgment-will-be-lesson-for-racists-mlotshwa-20170825">make the headlines</a> and class remains hued by colour at the structural level. Although slightly over half of the country’s middle class is now black, deep poverty is an almost exclusively <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2012.656912">a black experience</a>.</p>
<p>Race continues to divide. Take just the best-known parties among the four dozen contesting the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-go-to-the-polls-in-may-what-you-need-to-know-113418">general election this month</a>. They all represent radically different perspectives on the race issue. And – at the extremes – there is no crossing the colour line. </p>
<p>For example, almost no black Africans will vote for the minority <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/">Freedom Front Plus</a>. Almost no whites will vote for the Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="http://www.effonline.org/Home">(EFF)</a>, the third-largest party. Strident racial rhetoric from some EFF leaders. And its <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-effs-2019-election-manifesto-iv">election manifesto</a> envisages for massive tax rises, a proviso that’s alienated white voters. For its part, the Freedom Front Plus’s campaign to <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/2019-election-manifesto">defend minorities</a> against affirmative action and <a href="https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee_sector_charters.jsp">black economic empowerment</a> doesn’t attract many black voters.</p>
<p>But, when moving towards the leading parties of the centre, the governing African National Congress <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">(ANC)</a>, and the official opposition, the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4em9oNfZ4QIV2oXVCh0xJQRfEAAYASAAEgJeCvD_BwE">Democratic Alliance (DA)</a>, are making serious efforts to reign in racial rhetoric among their leaders and members. They also have manifestos that promote non-racialism.</p>
<h2>Non-racialism</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/must-read-the-anc-s-2019-elections-manifesto">ANC</a> and <a href="http://politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-da-manifesto-2019">DA</a> documents and speeches have repeated their long-held goals of non-racialism. Both try to ensure that people of all colours are represented in their executive structures.</p>
<p>Recently, ANC veterans condemned a statement by their powerful secretary-general urging a vote against <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2118030/anc-veterans-slam-magashule-for-outrageous-racial-utterances-about-whites/">“whites” and for “blacks”</a>. And the party’s election campaign, particularly in Gauteng and the Western Cape, chooses issues and rhetoric which include white voters.</p>
<p>The DA too has more than once disciplined leaders, or got members to resign, because of <a href="https://rekordcenturion.co.za/60851/da-mp-apologises-for-racist-facebook-post">racial comments</a> on twitter or elsewhere </p>
<p>At a deeper level, the DA is attempting a strategy so difficult that it has only been accomplished twice before in South Africa’s history. The party seeks to change from an overwhelmingly white party to a predominantly black party. The South African Communist Party achieved this <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-communist-party-sacp">during the 1920s</a>. The Liberal Party followed a similar path <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">during the 1960s</a>.</p>
<p>Historically, the ANC’s <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-jpeg.pdf">Freedom Charter</a> affirmed that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ANC’s alliances from the 1950s included organisations centred on <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured">coloured</a> – people of both European (white) and African (black) ancestry - , Indian, and white members. It incrementally opened its own membership to supporters of all colours before 1990.</p>
<p>At times, a few commentators have criticised the ANC as being dominated by either <a href="https://hsf.org.za/publications/focus/issue-8-third-quarter-1997/the-truth-about-the-xhosa-nostra">isiXhosa speakers</a> or <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/books-llc-nguni-languages/hhfl-1256-g140">Nguni language speakers</a>, but these complaints found little traction. The ANC’s membership embraced a nation-wide representivity among black Africans, and included <a href="https://hsf.org.za/publications/focus/issue-8-third-quarter-1997/the-truth-about-the-xhosa-nostra">activists from all of the race-based definitions entrenched during apartheid</a>.</p>
<p>Strategically, the ANC is the only African nationalist party that has had to accommodate – in policy and rhetoric – a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/189135/south-africas-white-population-shrinks-even-further-in-2017/">significant white minority</a>.</p>
<p>More than nine-tenths of white settlers fled Algeria <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2524278">after independence in 1962</a>; the same in Angola and Mozambique following independence <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4185453?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">in 1974</a>. This also happened in Zimbabwe between the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/whites-flee-zimbabwe-in-droves-216882">1980s-1990s</a>. White Algerians had the right to French citizenship; white Angolans and Mozambicans had the right to Portuguese citizenship. Over half White Zimbabweans had the right to either South African or British citizenship. </p>
<p>By contrast, the overwhelming majority of white South Africans have no rights to other citizenships.</p>
<h2>The people</h2>
<p>White South Africans are only make up <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022018.pdf">7,8%</a> of the population. But they remain strategically important. They still own most capital and <a href="http://theconversation.com/white-people-in-south-africa-still-hold-the-lions-share-of-all-forms-of-capital-75510">most companies</a>. They constitute a significant proportion of management and in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/121632/these-4-graphs-will-change-your-thinking-on-employment-in-sa/">most of the professions</a>.</p>
<p>The western powers, investors, and media remain sensitive to their concerns and anxieties.</p>
<p>Interestingly, statistics show that white living standards have risen higher than anyone else’s <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/white-south-africans-have-best-quality-of-life-irr-20170508">since 1994</a>. That is not exactly the <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/myth-white-genocide">“genocide”</a> proclaimed by the global alt-right.</p>
<p>There is a wide range of black views on colour and race relations. Some activists in the Rhodes-must-fall and Fees-must-fall <a href="https://www.academia.edu/31837026/An_analysis_of_the_FeesMustFall_Movement_at_South_African_Universities">movements</a> expressed total alienation from whites and “whiteness”. Simultaneously, there are many interracial friendships and some interracial marriages.</p>
<h2>Tensions bound to remain</h2>
<p>The world’s oldest democracy, the US, and the world’s largest democracy, India, also have to grapple with the contradictions between nonracial or non-caste ideals in their constitutions, and affirmative action and preferential procurement laws and regulations.</p>
<p>In South Africa, similar issues continue to be addressed by a host of institutions. These range from the <a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/">Human Rights Commission,</a> to the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/eqcact/eqc_main.html">Equality Court</a> and similar quasi-judicial entities, in addition to test cases decided by the <a href="https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/an-embarrassing-mistake-from-the-constitutional-court/">Constitutional Court.</a>.</p>
<p>Given that the country has the world’s largest white minority living under black rule, colour line tensions will remain a fairly permanent feature of the country’s political landscape. The same can be said of the US, where the world’s largest black minority lives under white rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>South Africa has the world’s largest white minority living under black rule.Colour line tensions might remain a feature of the country’s political landscape.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155952019-04-17T08:55:34Z2019-04-17T08:55:34ZHow portrayal of protest in South Africa denigrates poor people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269611/original/file-20190416-147508-31nmli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man challenges police during a protest in Eldorado Park, Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Poor people in South Africa often feel that the only way they can be heard is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">protest</a>. The past few days have shown that not even this gets them a hearing.</p>
<p>Protests in the townships and shack settlements where most poor people live in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Cape Town are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/look-service-delivery-protests-snowball-as-politicians-shift-blame-21026190">in the news</a>. These are the three metropolitan areas controlled by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA).</p>
<p>The party insists that the protests have been <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/maimane-accuses-anc-of-orchestrating-violent-protests-in-da-led-areas-20190414">organised</a> by the governing African National Congress (ANC). The DA has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-04-07-solly-msimanga-asks-police-to-probe-anc-involvement-in-alex-protests/">has laid a charge</a> against the ANC with the police, claiming that it has proof of the party’s involvement.</p>
<p>Much of the media have supported, denouncing the ANC for disrupting the calm of these cities in a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2019-04-12-anthony-butler-ancs-desperate-election-campaign-behind-the-alex-shutdown/">cynical attempt to embarrass</a> the main opposition party during the current national election campaign.</p>
<p>The effect is, not for the first time, to denigrate poor people by offering a distorted picture of their lives and to keep alive spurious claims about protest which hail back to the era when the apartheid system governed the country.</p>
<p>The consensus between parts of the media and the DA presents protest in South Africa as something abnormal, which must be organised by sinister forces if it is to happen at all.</p>
<p>Protests are still presented as unusual events - the media insists that there has been a “wave of protest” triggered by the election campaign. But protest is commonplace in townships and shack settlements, where most poor people live. </p>
<p>Every now and then - <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/anc-behind-recent-violent-protests-says-maimane">as now </a>- the media announces that <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-01-16-more-protests-in-2018-than-in-any-of--previous-13-years--and-it-could-get-worse/">protest has increased</a>.
In reality, South Africa has experienced constant high levels of protest since 1973, when workers in the port city of Durban <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1973-durban-strikes">struck for higher wages</a>, with only a brief pause between 1994 and 1997. This was prompted, no doubt, by hopes that democracy had ended the need to protest. So, what the media really mean when they announce a “wave” of protest is not that there are more protests, but that they have noticed them more.</p>
<p>At the same time as attention was fixated on protests in DA controlled areas, Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom in North West province and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-04-16-five-arrested-for-steynrus-unrest/">Steynsrus</a> in the Free State were also gripped by protest. None of the commentaries mention these events, which happened in ANC municipalities and so couldn’t have been caused by a desire to embarrass the opposition.</p>
<h2>Organisation</h2>
<p>Horror at the fact that the protest was organised harks back to the apartheid period. The authorities claimed then that black people were content with their lot. When protest erupted, it had to be because it was organised by agitators who manipulated people into believing that there was something wrong with legalised racism.</p>
<p>All protest is organised. So are cake sales and shopping expeditions – any activity in which human beings cooperate needs organising. But that doesn’t mean, as those who mention organisation claim, that people are forced to protest by the organisers.</p>
<p>Unless there is evidence that organisers forced unwilling people to protest, harping on the fact that a protest is organised is like noting that people won’t go to an event unless someone invites them. There’s no evidence that anyone has been forced to take part in the current protests. </p>
<p>Anyone who knows life in townships and shack settlements will know that you don’t need agitators to persuade people to protest – protest organisers simply channel existing anger. Complaining about this denies the justifiable anger that poor people feel at being ignored by both public and private power holders.</p>
<p>If these protests were organised by the ANC, this also says less than we are told. First, the DA and the country’s third biggest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, sometime organise protests directed at the ANC. It’s not clear why these are acceptable but not those which the ANC might organise against them.</p>
<p>Second and more important, in the areas where poor people live, many protests are organised by the ANC – including many which are <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/watch-irate-mkmva-members-storm-anc-kzn-offices-with-list-of-demands-20190107">directed at the ANC</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC has, for many years, dominated the townships. This continues even in those areas governed by the DA. In Johannesburg and Tshwane, the DA governs with only about a third of the vote because the ANC still wins all the wards in these areas. Since this is typical of much of the country, protests often reflect tensions within the ANC - one part is protesting at another. One reason the ANC lost Tshwane in 2016 is that its branches <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/tshwane-anc-members-protest-over-didiza-nomination-20160620">organised protests</a> directed at the mayoral candidate chosen by the party leadership.</p>
<h2>Denigrating poor people</h2>
<p>Politicians and journalists who find it interesting that the ANC organised a protest are again showing that they have no idea how township protest works. Nor does this, in the absence of other evidence, show that people have been manipulated or forced to protest.</p>
<p>Poor township conditions do not justify another way of denigrating the poor favoured by media and politicians – explaining protests away as <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-14-service-delivery-protests-increasing-and-most-are-violent/">“service delivery protests”</a>.</p>
<p>The term “service delivery” is deeply undemocratic. It implies that the role of citizens in a democracy is to wait while those in government who know better “deliver” to them. The democratic view is that everyone is entitled to an equal say in the decisions which affect them – including a say in how government serves them. The “service delivery” explanation reduces citizens to people who benefit or suffer from decisions over which they have no control.</p>
<p>More important, the “service delivery” cliché doesn’t describe why people protest. The issues vary but, in each case, people are saying that their <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">views and needs are ignored </a>– that they have no voice. They don’t want government to “deliver” to them, they want it to listen to them. Journalists often say people are engaged in a “service delivery protest” because they cannot be bothered to ask them why they are protesting.</p>
<h2>Insiders and outsiders</h2>
<p>None of this means that the ANC is the victim of injustice. South African electoral politics are rough and the ANC is guilty of as many assaults on the truth as its opponents.</p>
<p>What it does show is that the default position of the mainstream is to denigrate poor people. They are courted at election time and noticed when their protests spill out of townships, affecting the lives of the insider minority who monopolise public life. </p>
<p>For the rest, the insiders who dominate debate claim regularly that everything they do favours poor people – but never ask the poor what they favour. And, when poor people are persuaded by local organisers or ambitious politicians that they have an opportunity to be heard by taking to the streets, they are reduced by the insiders to passive consumers of “delivered” services or pawns in the hands of agitators.</p>
<p>All of which explains why poor people have been on the streets for more than 40 years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To claim that protests are being organised suggests sinister motives. But all protest is organised. So are cake sales and shopping expeditions.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144472019-03-31T09:11:20Z2019-03-31T09:11:20ZParties aren’t taking big issues seriously in South Africa’s election campaign<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266367/original/file-20190328-139352-fieblf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, leader of South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, on the campaign trail.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA /Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy is meant to be a system in which political parties compete to convince the people that they have answers to their most pressing problems. South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-go-to-the-polls-in-may-what-you-need-to-know-113418">election campaign</a> shows that it does not always operate that way.</p>
<p>The national and provincial elections on <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Events/2019-National-and-Provincial-Elections/">8 May</a>, in which the governing African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>) is hoping to end a <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">decline in its support</a>, is loud and hard-fought. But there is little connection between the problems facing South Africans and the issues over which the campaign is <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/302086/anc-vs-da-vs-eff-promises-on-land-reform-jobs-and-fighting-corruption/">being fought</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s core problem is a <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11969">weak economy</a> which is unable to grow at a rate which preserves people’s living standards. This is a consequence of deeply rooted problems, hold-overs of the country’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-need-to-talk-more-about-economic-legacy-of-apartheid-ben-turok-20180616">minority-ruled past</a> which persist despite 25 years of democracy.</p>
<p>One such hold-over is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-exclusion-feeds-the-politics-of-patronage-in-south-africa-69996">exclusion of millions</a> of people from the economy’s benefits. Many South Africans don’t earn a wage or salary because the formal job market is closed to them. Neither government policy nor business practice have found ways to ensure that they can earn a living and contribute to the economy even if they have no formal job. This reduces both the talents available in the mainstream economy and the markets into which businesses can sell their products.</p>
<p>Another is the survival of the racial patterns of the past, albeit in new forms. This ensures a lack of trust between (largely black) government and (largely white) business which makes cooperation to address economic problems difficult. </p>
<p>Although a growing black middle-class <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/measuring-the-black-middle-class-what-are-the-facts-20180307">has emerged</a>, its members are probably the angriest people in the country because they believe their abilities and qualifications are not recognised by the white business people and professionals who, in their view, remain in charge.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">White monopoly capital: good politics, bad sociology, worse economics</a>
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<p>Besides damaging the economy, this ensures middle-class support for demands such as land <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-12-04-parliament-gives-go-ahead-for-land-expropriation-without-compensation/">expropriation without compensation</a>. The ensuing disputes damage confidence and make growth much less likely.</p>
<h2>About symptoms, not causes</h2>
<p>If life worked in the ways in which textbooks say it does, these issues would be at the centre of the election campaign. We would expect parties to be competing to show that they have the best solutions to slow growth, the exclusion of millions from the economy, and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-12-10-racism-complaints-by-blacks-are-on-the-rise-with-gauteng-the-worst/">racial tension</a>.</p>
<p>They are doing no such thing. To the extent that the campaign is about anything other than name-calling, it is about symptoms, not causes.</p>
<p>If there is a key campaign issue, it is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/what-the-das-manifesto-says-about-land-bee-corruption-20190224">corruption</a>. The ANC is trying to convince voters that its new leadership is committed to rooting out <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">misuses of public funds and trust</a> while the opposition insists that it has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-and-corruption-are-bedfellows-18833154">not mended its ways</a>.</p>
<p>Corruption is obviously a huge problem. But there are two problems with the way it is being treated in the campaign. First, the parties are not trying to sell voters concrete plans to root out corruption. Rather, the campaign assumes that corruption will disappear miraculously if some politicians are replaced by others. </p>
<p>The governing party says its leadership will do the trick; the opposition, that only their leaders will. But the problem did not end when the ANC leadership changed and it persists in cities which the opposition won <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mashaba-meets-with-hawks-over-corruption-in-the-city-of-johannesburg-20190130">in 2016</a>. It is deep-rooted whoever governs and will continue until concrete plans to tackle it are implemented. None of the parties have any plans.</p>
<p>Second, corruption is a symptom of the economic problem. If ambitious people cannot get into the middle-class because the doors to the formal economy’s benefits are closed to them, they will <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">use politics to move upwards</a>, and won’t necessarily play fair because the stakes are so high. </p>
<p>If poor people cannot get a wage or salary they will, if they can, attach themselves to politicians and support whoever gives them what they need to get on. If the imagination of the political class does not stretch further than claiming repeatedly that they are clean, their claims to good faith will be undermined by continued sleaze below the surface.</p>
<h2>Immigration, and platitudes</h2>
<p>A more sinister feature of the campaign is that parties are competing to show that they are tough on immigration.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-democratic-alliance-plays-populist-immigration-card-105222">South Africa's Democratic Alliance plays populist immigration card</a>
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<p>This makes economic problems harder to solve – the country has a skills shortage and keeping out people with abilities and qualifications has to harm the economy: the Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, said as much in his <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/budget_vote">February budget speech</a>. </p>
<p>Again this is a response to symptoms, not causes: while hostility to foreigners is a world-wide trend, it takes on its most virulent form when economies cannot meet people’s needs.</p>
<p>The racial issue is, in effect, ignored – except where politicians or parties see mileage in keeping alive the racial stereotypes which cause the problem in the first place. How to encourage South Africans to talk seriously, let alone bargain, across the divide is a non-issue for all the parties.</p>
<p>For the rest, the campaign is about platitudes. All the parties are in favour of creating millions of jobs but no-one knows how. And no-one addresses the reality that the jobs which they claim they will create were extinguished years ago and the crisis will persist until they start talking about how to include in the economy the hundreds of thousands who won’t have formal jobs. </p>
<p>They all support better government services and they all believe their leaders are better than anyone else’s. None of them seem able to move out of their rut to recognise what is ailing the country, let alone to suggest ways of solving problems.</p>
<h2>Limitations of party politics</h2>
<p>The textbook view would suggest that this means the country is incapable of addressing its problems. It does not. It simply means that party politics cannot do this. Progress will depend on whether the key interests in the economy and the society are capable of making deals which will address the problems. Whether or not this happens does not depend on what parties say on the hustings.</p>
<p>But the election is important. It will decide whether politicians are elected who are open to that deal-making. But, as long as the real issues are absent from the campaign, citizens will be given no say in how these issues are tackled. In a democracy, discussions on how to solve problems should happen in public and parties should implement solutions which voters have chosen. South Africa is still far away from that possibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a huge divide between what is important right now and what the election is likely to be about.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140922019-03-26T14:04:33Z2019-03-26T14:04:33ZLand reform in South Africa is doomed unless freed from political point-scoring<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265616/original/file-20190325-36264-15z7oq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Villagers till their fields in South Africa's North West Province. Access to land for small holder farmers remains unresolved.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Jon Hrusa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black landlessness has become a convenient weapon for political populists in South Africa. With elections around the corner, the lingering questions about land reform are ever more crucial and timely. But, challenging questions need to be debated if a radical land reform programme is to be realised.</p>
<p>The pace of land reform has been slow since South Africa’s first democratic elections 25 years ago. Recent <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf">findings</a> confirm that the land reform programme has done very little to achieve equitable distribution and access to land for black South Africans. </p>
<p>By 2017 less than 10% (8.13 million ha) of agricultural land had been transferred through land reform. </p>
<p>The latest political wave of calls for land reform has resonance because millions of black South Africans remain landless and poor. This has led to the issue becoming a potent weapon in the hand of populist politicians. </p>
<p>All hopes for radical land reform have been placed on the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-approves-process-amend-section-25-constitution">amendment</a> of Section 25 of the Constitution to allow for expropriation without compensation. This drastic step could be seen as a strategy by the African National Congress (ANC) to take the wind out of the radical Economic Freedom Fighter’s political sails.</p>
<p>In fact the two parties are much more interested in attracting voters than in genuinely addressing longstanding racial inequalities. As a result many vital questions remain poorly explored. And most are lost in the political noise about land expropriation without compensation.</p>
<p>Some of these questions include: how should land for expropriation and redistribution be identified? Who should benefit from land redistribution in rural areas and which institutions should deliver?</p>
<h2>How should land be identified?</h2>
<p>Where should the country look for land for the accelerated redistribution programme? </p>
<p>Some argue that land redistribution should target tax-indebted farmland (or farms that are financially distressed). Others argue that state-owned land should be the primary target for <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land redistribution</a>.</p>
<p>There’s also a strong argument made by some that the majority of landless people are more interested in relatively smaller pieces of land (0.1 - 1 ha) which they can use for <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">household food production</a>. This land could be acquired closer to the large and small urban centres. </p>
<p>But for black commercial farmers to thrive, a distinction has to be made between black small-scale and large-scale farmers. And their different needs must be prioritised when <a href="https://trello.com/c/chLLIO56/2-assessing-the-performance-of-land-reform">land transfers</a> are being considered.</p>
<p>Others propose a more radical approach that promotes the division of large farms into smaller farms and a radical redistribution that will include decongestion of densely populated urban and <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">rural areas</a>. </p>
<p>Buying land from the current owners is just one of many means of land acquisition that could be pursued. Others include expropriation, donations, release of public land, reviews of unjust leases over public land and, in some instances, granting legal recognition to land occupiers where necessary. </p>
<h2>Who should benefit?</h2>
<p>Prof Michael Aliber, an agricultural economist at University of Fort Hare, argues for an approach to land redistribution that acknowledges the wide range of reasons people want land. This approach should cater for:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the relatively small number of people who want large plots on which to pursue large-scale commercial farming;</p></li>
<li><p>the larger number of people who want small-to-medium plots on which to farm as commercial smallholders, and</p></li>
<li><p>the still larger number of people who want small pieces of land for tenure security and food security. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>For most of the past 20 years, the land redistribution programme has sought to cater to only the first of these three groups.</p>
<p>Aliber argues that the overemphasis on large scale farms has significantly slowed the pace of land reform and led to the capture of the redistribution project by well-connected elites. Yet the primary beneficiaries of land reform should be landless black people and other historically marginalised groups. These include evicted farm workers and farm dwellers, unemployed urban and rural people, women and other rural people who live on communal land.</p>
<h2>Can the state still be trusted to deliver?</h2>
<p>There’s still a great deal of disagreement about which institutions should drive land reform. The poor performance by the ANC government in addressing the land issue, particularly its inadequate support for black land reform beneficiaries and farmers in communal areas over the past 25 years, has seriously depleted public confidence in the role of state in land reform.</p>
<p>For land reform to work, redistribution should focus beyond land transfer. It should begin to focus on providing adequate support for new farmers. Which institutions can deliver on this crucial undertaking? Is it the state, business, civil society or a collective effort? </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, the mounting scepticism about the capacity and political will of the state to deliver is warranted, given the failures of the ANC-led government. </p>
<p>This points to the fact that private sector support remains crucial in promoting commercial agriculture. But, then again, some are still sceptical about the private sector. For land rights activist <a href="http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/10_Advocate-of-the-New-Left.pdf">Mazibuko Jara</a>, the state and civil society <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">need to play a key role</a>.</p>
<p>A land debate left only to vote-hungry politicians is doomed. For politicians, black landlessness is nothing more than a political tool – hence the landless poor have been voting since 1994 but are still without land.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on debates at a <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/News/Pages/Resolving-the-Land-Question-Land-Reform-Experts-Discuss-Equitable-Access-To-Land-At-UWC.aspx">land reform conference</a> hosted by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (University of Western Cape (UWC)), University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University in February at UWC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sonwabile Mnwana receives funding from the Open Society Foundation-South Africa and the Southern Centre for Inequlaity Studies - Wits University. </span></em></p>Land reform programme has done very little to improve access to land for black South Africans.Sonwabile Mnwana, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Fort HareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1036432018-12-12T12:15:45Z2018-12-12T12:15:45ZSouth Africa’s electoral body has its work cut out to ensure legitimate 2019 poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248967/original/file-20181205-186073-8vdm3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans head to the polls in May 2019 but there are challenges.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Niyazz/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is among relatively few African countries that hold regular democratic elections with high levels of integrity, enabling citizens to choose their government. Since democracy in 1994, its elections have been consistently adjudged <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/economist-intelligence-unit-2017-democracy-index-best-countries-2018-1/">legitimate, free and fair</a>.</p>
<p>But there may be trouble on the horizon. The <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/">Electoral Commission of South Africa</a>, the body responsible for municipal, provincial and national elections, is struggling to ensure the integrity of the voters’ roll for the 2019 polls. The elections – for the national and nine provincial legislatures – are <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/">scheduled for May</a>. </p>
<p>It has been more than two and a half years since the Constitutional Court <a href="https://www.gminc.co.za/news/news-list/95-constitutional-court-judgment-iec-v-mhlope-other">ordered</a> the commission <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/15.html">to ensure</a> that all registered voters and candidates have verifiable residential addresses. To date, this hasn’t been done.</p>
<p>The commission was <a href="https://www.gminc.co.za/news/news-list/95-constitutional-court-judgment-iec-v-mhlope-other">ordered</a> to develop a list that captures “sufficient particularities of the voter’s address” for all voters by June 2018. This would enable voters to cast ballots only in the voting districts where they ordinarily live. </p>
<p>The commission’s failure to ensure a credible voters’ roll threatens to undo its legacy of conducting <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/economist-intelligence-unit-2017-democracy-index-best-countries-2018-1/">internationally acclaimed elections</a>. </p>
<p>Even though the court has since acceded to the commission’s request to extend the deadline – it’s now <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-11-22-electoral-commission-granted-more-time--to-finalise-voters-addresses/">November 30, 2019</a>, which is after the elections – it has a duty to ensure that the elections are legitimate despite the problems with the voters’ roll.</p>
<p>This will require concerted efforts by all political parties and other election stakeholders. They will need to use the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/For-voters/My-voter-registration-details/">pre-election registration weekends</a> set aside by the commission for 2019 to guarantee that only those eligible to vote do so.</p>
<p>In addition, to retain public confidence in its credentials as an independent body, the commission needs to do all it can to remove doubts and suspicions regarding the eligibility of voters and candidates. The need for it to ensure – as far as possible – that the largest number of registered voters are <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Call-to-all-South-African-voters-to-visit-voting-stations-on-10-and-11-March-2018/">legitimate</a>, with traceable physical addresses, cannot be overemphasised. </p>
<h2>Why verifiable addresses matter</h2>
<p>Electoral systems rest largely on verifiable election registers. These include <a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=502000">voter and candidate lists</a>. Verifiable voters’ credentials ensure that only those who are entitled to vote do so.</p>
<p>A voters’ roll is also a crucial mechanism for those, like political parties and election monitors or observers, who seek to verify who qualifies to vote. A lack of verifiable addresses suggests a lack of transparency in the electoral system, raising suspicions and doubts.</p>
<p>South Africa’s voting population changes every five years as the number of registered voters increases. Not knowing the extent of the increase, and where to target first-time voters, poses a problem for political parties <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/15.html">during campaigning</a>. It would also be difficult to know how many polling stations to expect in their voting districts.</p>
<p>If a voter’s residential addresses, or other means of determining where they live, cannot be verified, they may be prevented from voting. This denies them the right to choose their leaders or to run for office. Alternatively, they may be allowed to vote through an onerous process that relies on presiding officers’ discretion. This isn’t ideal and is usually viewed with suspicion by duly registered voters. </p>
<p>Another problem is that ineligible people might vote. And others might vote outside of their voting districts, unfairly influencing the outcome. This can undermine the legitimacy of elections. </p>
<p>These hitches and issues are the reason that the Constitutional Court’s 2016 judgment was so welcome.</p>
<h2>Lessons from the past</h2>
<p>The court’s ruling came after by-elections in Tlokwe, or Potchefstroom, a small town in the country’s North West province, were <a href="https://theconversation.com/annulled-local-byelections-shed-light-on-the-state-of-south-africas-democracy-52100">annulled</a> by the Electoral Court in 2013. The annulment followed complaints that the by-elections were not free and fair. </p>
<p>Opposition parties accused the governing African National Congress of bussing in voters from outside the area – which could be done because verifiable addresses were absent from the voters’ roll. </p>
<p>The commission’s failure to comply with the court order to fix the problem raises questions about its preparedness to conduct next year’s crucial elections. There are real fears that the elections <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-c1ebd15cb">might be compromised</a> somehow. This has serious implications for South Africa’s electoral democracy.</p>
<p>The commission has argued that having to record all registered voters’ addresses entails enormous logistical problems and costs. It has pointed out that some addresses, in a conventional sense, were simply not available in populous rural and urban areas that have no house numbers and street names. </p>
<p>It has also contended that making the capturing of addresses obligatory would result in <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/15.html">long queues</a> forming outside voting stations on election day. </p>
<p>The commission has been given an extended deadline to November next year. Nevertheless, it shouldn’t wait that long to act. After all, the credibility of the voters’ roll has international implications. That’s because the management and quality assurance of national elections are no longer the monopoly of individual states. </p>
<p>South Africa must also comply with the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a> and its <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/au2002declaration.pdf">Principles Governing Elections</a>. Both place emphasis on the credibility of electoral infrastructure, <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/lets-address-voters-roll">including voters’ rolls</a>. </p>
<p>The country must also abide by the provisions of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a>, which guarantees the right to vote, among other international <a href="https://www.cvk.lv/pub/upload_file/anglu/Handbook-Internl-Standards_EN.pdf.pdf">instruments</a>. </p>
<h2>Salvaging the situation</h2>
<p>Despite problems with its voters’ roll, South Africa remains a beacon of electoral hope and democracy. Its status as a country that upholds international election management best practices is envied. </p>
<p>The 2019 national elections may still retain a semblance of fair representation in public participation; based on other factors such as voter participation, free political campaigning, and the tolerance of divergent political views and parties. </p>
<p>The commission’s ongoing discussions and mediation efforts with all election stakeholders through the political party liaison committees and civil society organisations are crucial to addressing any potential problems. </p>
<p>A sustainable strategy is to engage relevant civil society bodies to provide continuous voter education long before major elections. This will help ensure addresses are captured correctly in the voters roll.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye receives funding from National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, NIHSS. </span></em></p>South Africa’s electoral commission’s failure to ensure a credible voters’ roll threatens to undo its legacy of free and fair elections.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor and Chair of Department - Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1018682018-08-26T09:26:58Z2018-08-26T09:26:58ZWhat changing the ownership of South Africa’s central bank will, and won’t, do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233250/original/file-20180823-149484-k2vzt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s second largest opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), has lodged a parliamentary <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/17/eff-introduces-bill-to-nationalise-central-bank">motion</a> to amend laws that govern the management and ownership of the country’s central bank. </p>
<p>Judging by the content of <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/bill/acae4cfa-4826-4356-a032-f84f64dc73bc.pdf">the South African Reserve Bank Amendment Bill</a> the EFF is clearly intent on upping the ante on economic policy ahead of the national elections in 2019. The amendments come hot on the heels of the party pushing for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-expediency-is-messing-up-south-africas-land-reform-process-101218">expropriation</a> of land without compensation. The EFF was formed five years ago after it split from the African National Congress, positioning itself on the left of the political spectrum.</p>
<p>The EFF on its own won’t be able to affect the Reserve Bank change given that it only has 25 MPs in parliament. But the ANC has also thrown its weight behind the idea, adopting a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationalising-south-africas-central-bank-isnt-bad-per-se-just-whats-done-with-it-90031">resolution</a> at its national conference last year to nationalise the South African Reserve Bank. </p>
<p>It’s not the call for the nationalisation of the central bank, per se, that’s raising concern. It’s how its been dressed up by the EFF and the prevailing political environment.</p>
<p>What the EFF wants to achieve is control of monetary policy by politicians. This would be dangerous for South Africa. Experiences from other countries that do this, like <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-business-sc-economy-byo-120846.html">Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy/imf-projects-venezuela-inflation-will-hit-1000000-percent-in-2018-idUSKBN1KD2L9">Venezuela</a>, are not good. They are all economic basket cases.</p>
<p>The fact is that a change of ownership of the South African Reserve Bank would not in and of itself be a disaster. Most central banks in the world have a share ownership structure that has the state as the majority, or only, shareholder. The South African Reserve Bank is <a href="https://econrsa.org/system/files/publications/working_papers/working_paper_724.pdf">one of only eight</a> central banks in the world with private shareholders. But this does not equate to politicians running central banks. There are governing structures in place that ensure that central banks – even if the majority shareholder is the state – are free to implement monetary policy without political interference. </p>
<h2>Ownership isn’t the point</h2>
<p>South Africa’s central bank has come under attack over the years. Many of the attacks have come from the left – within the ruling party and its allies the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party.</p>
<p>The unhappiness has revolved around the <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/the-sarb-must-serve-the-people-20170703-2">role</a> of the South African Reserve Bank – particularly its focus on keeping inflation under control by sticking to an inflation target – and its perceived failure to inspire economic growth. These concerns are now being manifested in the debate about the bank’s shareholding structures.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the debate is informed by the mistaken view that private shareholders affect monetary policy. The corollary is that nationalisation would give the government, as the major shareholder, control over central bank policy. </p>
<p>Both assumptions are wrong. </p>
<p>Even though South Africa’s Reserve Bank has private shareholders, they have absolutely no say over monetary policy. Similarly, the state doesn’t dictate monetary policy in the vast majority of central banks that have governments as their major holders.</p>
<p>What this means is that changing the shareholding of South Africa’s bank won’t change the way the bank is run. </p>
<p>The bank main mandate – to keep inflation under control – is in fact anchored in the country’s <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>. To change this focus would require a change in the constitution.</p>
<p>Private shareholders of the South African Reserve Bank have very little influence over it. They play no role in the day-to-day management of the institution and also no role in the appointment of the executive management, the Governor and deputy governors.</p>
<p>Their powers are limited to electing a minority of board members, the right to attend the ordinary general meeting of the central bank where they also approve the minutes of the previous year’s meeting and the annual report of the bank, and the appointment of the external auditors. </p>
<p>The private shareholders are also entitled to receive a dividend of 10c per share per annum (before dividend withholding tax of 20%). But no individual <a href="http://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/sabr_v21_n1_a1.pdf?expires=1534767451&id=id&accname=57716&checksum=E20513C75F94003F4E8F1600A9AD7E">shareholder</a>, or group of shareholders, can hold more than 10 000 shares. This is to prevent any concentration of power. This means that in any given year the maximum a shareholder can be paid in dividends (after dividend withholding tax) is a paltry R800.</p>
<h2>Expropriation without compensation</h2>
<p>The EFF bill is styled as an amendment to the existing <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/BanknotesandCoin/CurrencyManagement/Documents/SA%20Reserve%20Bank%20Act%2090%20of%201989.pdf">South African Reserve Bank Act</a>. The bill aims to change the ownership of the bank through nationalisation. The state would, under this scenario, own 100% of the bank.</p>
<p>The bill also seeks to move functions currently entrusted to private shareholders to the minister of finance. These include the appointment of some board members and the appointment of external auditors. </p>
<p>Giving the minister the power to appoint certain board members doesn’t make sense given that the SA Reserve Bank Act currently stipulates that the President of South Africa appoints the majority of the board members (including the governor and deputy governors). Giving the finance minister the power to appoint some board members would create two classes of board members – a nonsensical state of affairs.</p>
<p>More disconcerting is the fact that the bill makes no provision for any compensation for current shareholders. The bill simply transfers ownership from shareholders to the state. </p>
<p>The proposed amendment goes as far as to state that the change of ownership will have no financial implications. This may be taken as confirmation that provisions on compensation were not inadvertently omitted or left to be considered later. The stated objective is clearly nationalisation without compensation.</p>
<p>This comes on the back of efforts to push for the expropriation of <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/it-is-ordinary-south-africans-turn-to-speak-about-expropriation-constitutional-review-committee-20180621">land</a> without compensation. </p>
<p>Both moves set a dangerous principle and put South Africa on the dangerous slope of economic disintegration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jannie Rossouw holds shares in the SA Reserve Bank and previously worked for the central bank. He is a C-rated researcher by the NRF and received financial assistance from the NRF in support of his research.. </span></em></p>The push to nationalise South Africa’s Reserve Bank is informed by the mistaken view that private shareholders affect monetary policy.Jannie Rossouw, Head of School of Economic & Business Sciences, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966692018-06-10T08:54:26Z2018-06-10T08:54:26ZMandela centenary: South Africans must not let trifles undermine his legacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221789/original/file-20180605-119888-6yrt84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela embodied South Africa's long, arduous journey to freedom and equality.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year marks a century since liberation struggle hero and global statesman Nelson Mandela was born. Throughout 2018, celebrations and events are being <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/nelson-mandela-100">held in his honour</a>.</p>
<p>The centenary is a good chance for South Africans to reflect on Mandela’s selfless leadership, which embodies the country’s odyssey towards a better society. He is one of those, to paraphrase the Tanzanian author Issa Shivji, whom history continues to remember because his “ideals and actions remained <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2018/05/revolutionary-intellectuals">aligned with the people”</a>.</p>
<p>A better society is about harmonious coexistence, where equality is the organising principle; and all have a fair chance at opportunities to enhance their well-being. Mandela knew that this doesn’t occur by chance, but through a historical process that’s in <a href="https://www.eskimo.com/%7Emsharlow/politics/documents/manifesto.pdf">“perpetual evolution”</a>. His leadership laid a foundation for a better society. </p>
<p>But, over two decades later, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-062015.pdf">poverty and inequality</a> continue to stratify South Africa along racial lines. The country still has a long way go in achieving the ideals he stood for, as enshrined in the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s imaginative foresight in leading the country to democracy is distinctly indelible in history. That’s why it’s worth repeating as part of the centennial celebrations of his life and legacy, lest trifles trump history and spawn national amnesia.</p>
<h2>The meaning of Mandela</h2>
<p>Mandela’s essence lay in service to humanity. In the parlance of the theory of the state, he represented the “whole”, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Making_of_the_Modern_State.html?id=uT3IAAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">“not (his) own personal will”</a>. This was an exception to many post-colonial African leaders’ rule. His struggle for justice was always altruistic, pursued for the good of humanity.</p>
<p>After many years of colonialism and apartheid, democracy finally became the principle of organising South African society in 1994. Mandela’s incarceration for 27 years after being convicted of terrorism was not in vain. History has vindicated him: the United Nations later declared <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> a <a href="http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html">crime against humanity</a>. The policy of racial segregation and oppression could not be sustained, and was dismantled to give way to <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">inclusive democracy</a>.</p>
<p>The hallmark of this was his inauguration as the first black democratically elected president of South Africa. This earth shattering moment marked the intersection of fate with choice, where – in the words of the former prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru –</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finally <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jawaharlalnehrutrystwithdestiny.htm">found utterance</a>. It enhanced the profundity of a nation’s history, following its tryst with destiny.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Tale of two speeches</h2>
<p>Mandela’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-nelson-mandela-his-inauguration-president">inaugural speech</a> powerfully instilled in the new South African nation optimism about its future. Its major thread was reconciliation and unity. </p>
<p>The speech secured the commitment to cross the Rubicon to democracy. It was a corollary of one he made in 1964, which galvanised national consciousness about the insidiousness of the apartheid system and the significance of the struggle for a democratic society. </p>
<p>The two speeches were made in different historical epochs in the fight against racial oppression. Both show the same imagination of humanity’s future, where social equity as a function of equality is the organising principle for common existence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first black president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">/Flickr/PresidenciaRD</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mandela’s approach in shepherding a fledgling democracy was that – for it to take root – the highest office in the land should represent, <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/11/14/nov-14-readers-letters-h-l-menckens-words-sum-up-2016-election/">more and more closely, the inner soul of the people</a>. He brought to the office of the president the ideals that shaped his political beliefs. He did not exact retribution against those who had jailed him. Instead, he invited them to work with him in building a non-racial, prosperous society.</p>
<p>This showed the magnanimity of his personality as a leader. He led the task of reconciling South Africans, and allayed the fears of many, especially of the white populace. He created the opportunity for the post-apartheid state to evolve. </p>
<h2>Amnesia and distortions</h2>
<p>But, are the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/news/lets-use-mandelas-centenary-to-find-the-madiba-in-each-of-us-13491593">centennial celebrations</a> of Mandela’s legacy being used as the opportunity to adequately tell South Africa’s history – especially for younger generations to understand the painful path traversed by the progenitors of the liberation struggle?</p>
<p>I would argue not, since the falsehood that Mandela <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-12-09/was-mandela-right-to-sell-out-black-south-africans-">“sold out”</a> persists. </p>
<p>The extreme view among mainly young South Africans, inspired by the radicalism of demagoguery, is that Mandela went beyond reaching out to whites during the multiparty negotiations that ended apartheid. This view suggests the concessions he and the ANC achieved amounted to political freedom <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-undo-mandelas-economic-deals-52767">without economic power</a> – “selling out”. </p>
<p>But this argument is simply wrong. It ignores the context of that time, and is also oblivious of the complexities of what it takes to build a united nation out of a pariah state. The very delicate transition required ingenuity – not populism – to avert the possibility of plunging the country into war. </p>
<p>The concessions made were necessary to secure political stability. The military solution that Mandela’s detractors would have preferred wouldn’t have been an option. Besides the lethal implications of war, the country’s liberation armies wouldn’t have stood up to the apartheid state’s military. </p>
<p>The only option was to dismantle apartheid through negotiations. This had to be done in a way that appealed to many across the political spectrum and colour line. These are facts of history that shaped post-apartheid South Africa thus far. But they do not seem to be fully appreciated. </p>
<p>The centenary of Mandela’s life offers an excellent chance to bring these facts to the fore, once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation. He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management. He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Nelson Mandela’s centenary celebrations provide a chance to debunk the lie that he sold out black South Africans.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/968032018-05-20T10:39:05Z2018-05-20T10:39:05ZRamaphosa’s new dawn: much better, but not nearly enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219408/original/file-20180517-26300-oneznk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/cyril-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa’s</a> rise to power has been greeted enthusiastically by most South Africans. Their hope is that the new president represents a leadership cohort within the governing African National Congress (ANC) that’s capable of reversing the toxic legacies of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17450447">Jacob Zuma’s</a> presidency. </p>
<p>Under Ramaphosa, the government is proving forceful in beginning to dismantle Zuma’s patronage networks in both party and state, determined in battling corruption. The new administration is also offering hope that South Africa can pursue a more viable economic trajectory. </p>
<p>Yet the Ramaphosa moment is far from being a new beginning.</p>
<p>First, much of the momentum behind Ramaphosa’s assault on corruption comes from fear in party ranks that the ANC is facing the very real prospect of losing its majority at 2019’s general election. The loss of control over three major metros in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx">2016 local government elections</a> came as a great shock to many in the party. The ANC had become complacent about maintaining itself in power. </p>
<p>This was despite extensive evidence – accumulated over five democratic general elections – that the ANC’s electoral dominance was being eroded by a mix of enlivened opposition. It came in the form of a more racially diverse <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a> (DA) and the Africanist populism of the <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (EFF). </p>
<p>From this perspective, ANC “renewal” – the suggestion that the party is capable of overcoming its flaws and restoring its liberation credentials – is necessary for both self-belief and public persuasion. There should be no doubt that there is significant support for the project within the party. But it could well flounder.</p>
<p>If much of the momentum behind ANC “renewal” is situational rather than driven by conviction, then a reformist ANC leadership under Ramaphosa is going to confront major obstacles in the path ahead. </p>
<h2>Return to the ANC’s old elites</h2>
<p>Academic and political analyst Jonny Steinberg has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-05-11-jonny-steinberg-sa-needs-many-presidents-with-backgrounds-like-zumas/">argued</a> that those who assumed state power in 1994 were the descendants of an African elite who, after white conquest, had attended mission schools. This elite had remained intact across generations. The majority of those who led the struggle for freedom were mission-educated, culminating in the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. </p>
<p>In contrast, Zuma was the son of a domestic worker too poor to send him to school. Such a man might have featured as a genuine revolutionary. Instead, Zuma betrayed the hopes of the poor and workers by, in the words of Steinberg, empowering “a bureaucratic bourgeoisie to steal one public utility at a time” while,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>spitting venom at the descendants of the old mission-educated elite, claiming they had used their generations of privilege to sew up a deal with white people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Steinberg’s analysis suggests that the Ramaphosa presidency signifies the return of state power to the hands of the ANC’s traditional elite. But a reformist president and ANC elite at the centre won’t be able to impose their will on those running either the country’s provinces or its state owned enterprises. As the examples of premier <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/supra_mahumapelo">Supra Mahumapelo</a> in North West province and commissioner <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Tom-Moyane">Tom Moyane</a> at the South African Revenue Service demonstrate, there will be strong resistance from within the ranks of the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”. </p>
<p>Present indications are that Ramaphosa will prove able to assert his authority. And that he’s willing to face down political turbulence.</p>
<p>It’s likely that succession of high profile prosecutions are still to come. Even so, the state’s capacity to unravel ANC patronage networks is likely to prove limited. Pursuit of state capture kingpins at the major parastatals and in the provinces will prove hard. In any case, the enthusiasm of the ANC for having its dirty-linen washed in public is likely to diminish, especially if an election is nicely won. </p>
<p>On top of this it should not be overlooked that the newly dominant Ramaphosa faction may need – or want – to establish patronage networks of its own. It will need to make its own peace with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a class which is very much of the ANC’s own making since 1994.</p>
<h2>Changing the political economy</h2>
<p>ANC renewal and the war on corruption is one thing. But transforming the character of the South African economy is quite another. </p>
<p>One view is that the recovery of looted resources and a clampdown on future corruption will provide a more socially just and equitable government. And that it will lead to considerably high rates of growth and developmental welfare. </p>
<p>The thrust of the narrative is not untrue. But this wouldn’t, on its own, amount to a significant change in the economy’s overall trajectory. That’s because there’s little in the government’s economic policy that can seriously be construed as radical.</p>
<p>Much is made of the ANC’s commitment to <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/222155/ramaphosas-plan-for-radical-economic-transformation-and-tackling-unemployment/">“radical economic empowerment”</a>. In particular, the party’s decision to embrace a policy of expropriating land without compensation. Ramaphosa has taken the policy on board. But he’s stressed that land reform must go forward only as a result of extensive dialogue and without endangering food security. </p>
<p>Beyond such ambiguity, and vague commitments to rendering the economy more efficient and competitive, there’s little to suggest that Ramaphosa intends to take the economy in a new direction. There is, for instance, little about breaking up the cartels that dominate the economy. Or of tackling the economy’s historic reliance on the extraction of resources. </p>
<p>Nor is there any evidence – beyond Ramaphosa’s promise of a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">new model</a> of public ownership – that an overhaul of the state economic enterprises such as the power utility Eskom and South African Airways is imminent. </p>
<p>And beyond rhetoric, there is little evidence of new thinking about how to tackle massive inequality or reduce the chronic level of unemployment. </p>
<p>These are early days, and the juggling short-term crises is, perhaps, inevitably taking priority over long-term thinking. But present indications are that the Ramaphosa presidency may prove to be little more than an attempt to purge Zuma-ism from an Mbeki-style neoliberal economy. </p>
<p>The future verdict may well be: much better, but far from enough.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>ANC renewal and the war on corruption is one thing. But transforming the character of the South African political economy is quite another.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937972018-03-27T13:09:01Z2018-03-27T13:09:01ZRamaphosa has started the clean up job. But can he turn the state around?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211567/original/file-20180322-54875-kjykfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is on a mission to rebuild a battered party and state. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s new President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is presently receiving numerous <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-03-03-ramaphosas-cabinet-clean-up-shows-promising-signs-of-what-lies-ahead/">plaudits</a> on how he’s handling the transition from the troubled Jacob Zuma presidency.</p>
<p>Zuma’s generals have been scattered, his underlings fleeing the battlefield. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, against whom Ramaphosa fought for the leadership and under whose wing Zuma thought he would be able to shelter had she won, has been brought into the <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/cyril-ramaphosas-new-cabinet-a-balancing-game-with-key-victories/">cabinet</a> and safely neutralised.</p>
<p>The ousting of Zuma has also had a dramatic impact on the major opposition parties. Both the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have been deprived of their strongest electoral attraction. </p>
<p>The DA is now in a state of major disarray, attempting to resolve its various internal squabbles. For the moment at least – it seems to be heading towards a bloody nose at the 2019 election. </p>
<p>The EFF has played the brief post-Zuma moment more skillfully, most notably by getting the ANC to back its motion in parliament, albeit with amendments, in favour of expropriation of land without compensation. But Ramaphosa has responded in kind by subtly extending an invitation to the EFF to rejoin the ANC, a ploy which will continually compel it to justify its continuing existence, especially if the ruling party continues to steal its policy clothes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ramaphosa continues to bask in the admiration of whites and seems likely to bring disaffected elements of the black middle class back into the ANC. He has brought back hopes of better days for a previously despondent South Africa. </p>
<p>He is master of all the surveys, Mr Action and Mr Clean. </p>
<p>Yet the new president is no fool. He knows that his major challenge, after the depradations of the Zuma years, is to work towards making what he termed in his inauguration speech, a “<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-in-full--read-cyril-ramaphosas-first-state-of-the-nation-address/">capable state</a>”. This revolves around addressing challenges of governance, the party as well as the economy.</p>
<h2>Low hanging fruit</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has had little option but to first turn to addressing immediate problems within the state. The early steps have been relatively easy. The most straight forward task has been to shuffle the cabinet. By doing so he was able to expel or marginalise ministers known for their loyalty to Zuma or their incompetence, while bringing in replacements of known ability and integrity. </p>
<p>He has also moved swiftly to address crises at major parastatals, notably at the power utility Eskom and South African Airways to prevent them defaulting on their loans to banks and other creditors. With new boards now in place, emergency measures have been taken to prevent financial meltdown. </p>
<p>Likewise, Ramaphosa has given notice that he is determined to restore the South African Revenue Service to its former glory. Getting rid of the top brass, notwithstanding the resistance of Zuma’s point man, the commissioner Tom Moyane, should not be too difficult. But, as within the parastatals, it is the problem of what to do with Zuma cronies at lower levels of management that is likely to be more difficult and more time consuming. </p>
<p>Zuma cronies who have been embedded in state organisations for a long time will have set up procurement linkages that will need to be examined closely. This will provoke resistance, some of it overt, much of it covert, for whatever the cronyistic patterns of procurement, they will have been celebrated as black empowerment. Their disruption will be stigmatised as reactionary. Pravin Gordhan, the new minister of state owned enterprises, will probably have to get tough, and the fights could get nasty. </p>
<h2>ANC politics</h2>
<p>The other set of challenges which Ramaphosa faces have to do with his party, the ANC. His narrow victory at the party’s national conference was only secured because he did a deal with David Mabuza, then Premier of Mpumalanga, now promoted to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/who-is-our-new-deputy-president-elect-david-mabuza-20180226">deputy president</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa will, in time, find that this kind of backing was instrumental. Loyalty will come at a price, and Ramaphosa will have to play his cards carefully. </p>
<p>He may have to make alliances with a lot of party power holders he doesn’t like. This may include ceding control of certain provinces to party barons so that their patronage patterns are left intact. </p>
<p>This is a problem because, as Ramaphosa knows, some provincial governments, such as the Eastern Cape, are grossly inefficient. They are staffed by people who simply lack the capacity to do their jobs – but who have strong connections with local party bosses. Disrupting such networks will take determination and courage, and will meet politically costly pushback. Expect little to be done this side of an election.</p>
<h2>The economy</h2>
<p>Perhaps Ramaphosa’s most formidable challenge is how to kick start economic growth. He has been lauded as the man who, with experience in both the trade union movement and in business, can bring labour and capital together around a new consensus. </p>
<p>It’s a nice idea, and one boosted by Ramaphosa’s smooth talk of convening a summit around the economy. But if it is going to be more than just another talk shop, he is going to have to do an awful lot of arm twisting. Both sides are going to have make concessions. </p>
<p>South Africa’s major corporations have been sitting pretty for years. Despite the horrors of the Zuma years, the stock market has <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/2017/07/31/south-africas-stock-market-defies-recession-scales-record-highs/">boomed</a>. The country became a low investment, high profit economy, characterised by the power of huge <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-badly-skewed-to-the-big-guys-how-it-can-be-changed-92365">cartels</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has to convince them that they have to get out of the comfort zone, warning that if they don’t, levels of inequality and unemployment are such that South Africa may explode. Capitalism is going to hit big trouble if they don’t look beyond the short-term bottom line and commit to serious levels of investment, combining this with major commitments to labour-intensive employment and training. </p>
<p>The president is also going to have the difficult job of convincing the unions that they have a greater responsibility to address unemployment. To date their emphasis has been on securing higher wages for their members (that’s what unions do) and they have succeeded in getting the government to implement a minimum wage. </p>
<p>But these wins have come at a cost. For example, central bargaining has resulted in wage agreements with big firms that have imposed massive costs on small and medium sized businesses. </p>
<p>While no one wants a low wage economy, Ramaphosa would need to convince the unions that something has to give if problems like this are going to be addressed.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s easiest task will be to win the next election. But history will judge him on his ability to do something much bigger: rendering the South Africa state one that is not only capable, but genuinely developmental.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has done well so far but more challenges relating to reigniting the economy lie ahead.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/929402018-03-08T14:17:17Z2018-03-08T14:17:17ZCan Ramaphosa centre the ANC and quell opposition parties?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209526/original/file-20180308-30979-kg74rk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brenton Geach/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>These are early days for the new <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-01-ramaphosa-plays-the-hand-he-was-dealt">Cyril Ramaphosa-led government</a> in South Africa. Two crucial and inter-related strategic challenges face the new President: to consolidate support within the African National Congress (ANC), and to consolidate the ANC’s position as the dominant party in time for the 2019 national elections, seeking to reverse the decline it had experienced under Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>Dealing with internal ANC issues is the most difficult and the foundation for the others. Zuma is <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-time-is-up-but-what-does-it-mean-for-south-africa-91873">out of power</a>, and will not be back. Even though his departure will weaken their capacity to work as a coherent force, it will <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-zuma-regime-is-dead-but-its-consequences-will-linger-for-a-long-time-92066">take time</a> to dismantle the alliance that made up disparate elements he built around him. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has started the job by <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-26-cyril-ramaphosa-cabinet-reshuffle-reaction-anc-da-eff-ifp">removing</a> the most obvious symbols of Zuma’s alliance with the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a> who stand accused of being the major perpetrators of <a href="https://qz.com/825789/state-capture-jacob-zuma-the-guptas-and-corruption-in-south-africa/">state capture</a>. These include former ministers such as <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Communications-Minister-Faith-Muthambi">Faith Muthambi</a> who ran public administration and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Mosebenzi-Zwane">Mosebenzi Zwane</a> who had been given the minerals portfolio. Both became notorious through combining incompetence and corruption, and have no independent power based within the ANC. </p>
<p>Others who had some internal support were demoted into less prestigious and powerful positions – <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/02/26/bathabile-dlamini-for-women-what-the-actual-hell-say-tweeters_a_23371557/">Bathabile Dlamini</a> who has been made minister of women and children and <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/malusi-gigaba">Malusi Gigaba</a> who is back at home affairs come to mind. </p>
<p>Picking fights carefully so as not to tackle all adversaries simultaneously is a wise political strategy. Having won with a small margin does not allow him to go ahead with massive purges, an unwise course of action in any event.</p>
<p>As far as trying to forge the ANC into a cohesive force again, Ramaphosa’s real challenge remains closer to the ground. Among local ANC members and representatives an entrenched ethos sees positions of power as key to material benefit and jobs for relatives, friends and political allies. Tackling this is not going to be easy and it’s not clear that Ramaphosa will be able to do it – certainly not in the immediate term.</p>
<h2>ANC as the dominant party?</h2>
<p>His urgent task is to address the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zumas-demise-is-bad-news-for-south-africas-opposition-parties-91771">electoral challenges</a> posed by the two main opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Both cater to different constituencies disillusioned. </p>
<p>The DA’s main policy platform focuses on good governance and rational management. The EFF’s on <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/is-julius-malemas-eff-a-nation-builder-or-a-wrecking-ball-20180307">radical social change</a>. Their shared opposition to the ANC has made them strange bedfellows in a number of key municipalities, thus removing the ANC from power. But this has already begun to unravel in the wake of Ramaphosa’s ascendancy. In <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-04-nelson-mandela-bay-effs-attempt-to-remove-trollip-ushers-in-a-new-unstable-era-for-coalition-politics/#.WqEhVWpubIU">Nelson Mandela Bay</a> the EFF has withdrawn support for the DA, its dominant coalition partner. More political shifts like this may take place in preparation for the next elections.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa can undercut the DA threat by his (re-)appointment of reputable and fiscally-responsible people. He has already done so in the National Treasury with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-has-chosen-a-team-that-will-help-him-assert-his-authority-92538">Nhlanhla Nene</a> and at public enterprises with <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/pravin-gordhan-back-this-time-as-minister-of-public-enterprises-20180226">Pravin Gordhan</a>. And eliminating blatant cases of nepotism and corruption will also <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-03-01-why-a-complacent-da-could-lose-cape-town-to-anc/">steal DA votes</a> for the ANC.</p>
<p>But tackling the EFF is a more complicated task, as illustrated by the recent reemergence of the land issue, which is now the <a href="https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/if-you-see-a-beautiful-piece-of-land-take-it-malema-20170228">its clarion call</a>. Can this issue affect the ANC’s electoral prospects? What seems to be Ramaphosa’s strategy in the face of this potential threat? </p>
<p>Land isn’t a new issue, having been a material and symbolic <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/land-act-dispossession-segregation-and-restitution">concern for centuries</a>. Colonial conquest and settlement centred on the acquisition of land by force, which played a crucial role in driving indigenous people into the labour market in the 19th and 20th centuries. Addressing the consequences of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/natives-land-act-1913">1913 Natives Land Act</a> was a formative experience for the ANC, which had been <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/anc-origins-and-background">created</a> in the previous year, and remains a challenge to this day. </p>
<p>Land dispossession entrenched the distinctive feature of the South African economy: <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/the-migrant-labour-system">migrant labour</a> as the foundation for black deprivation and white prosperity. </p>
<p>In 1994 a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/land-restitution-south-africa-1994">land restitution process</a> was put in place by the newly elected ANC government. But it hasn’t met the intended targets for a number of reasons. These have included bureaucratic inefficiency, inadequate support structures for small-scale farmers (in financing, marketing, skill development), conflicts among beneficiaries, corruption and limited interest due to the meagre political weight of claimants.</p>
<p>While it is clear that the cost of land due to the need to offer compensation is not the main problem hampering land reform, it has become symbolic of the obstacles facing the process. When the ANC <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-02-27-parliament-adopts-effs-land-claims-motion-but-anc-seeks-amendments/">joined</a> the EFF in parliament in referring the compensation clause for review, it recognised that opposing the motion would be risky, allowing the EFF to speak on behalf of land-hungry people. </p>
<p>It showed that the land conundrum is <a href="https://m.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/real-action-on-land-needed-to-counter-extreme-eff-rhetoric-20180306">electorally dangerous</a> for the ANC.</p>
<p>On the other hand, supporting the motion but amending it to conform to other imperatives (stable economy, increased agricultural production, food security) could keep the ANC ahead of the political challenge while retaining its ability to shape the outcome of the review to suit its general policy direction. </p>
<p>Meeting the challenges from the opposition parties will strengthen the ANC’s dominance and Ramaphosa’s control internally. The internal and external challenges could therefore be met in an integrated way. In a sense, this would allow it to return to the position it had enjoyed during Nelson Mandela’s tenure, exercising hegemony over state and society. </p>
<p>But the road is still long and full of obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92940/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ran Greenstein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Meeting the challenges from the opposition will strengthen the ANC’s dominance. How well its new leadership copes will become clearer over the next few months.Ran Greenstein, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/913522018-02-06T15:34:00Z2018-02-06T15:34:00ZZuma’s reluctance to leave office is offering sound lessons in democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205092/original/file-20180206-88784-1jfe4b2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Jacob Zuma is resisitng attempts by his party, the ANC, to force him out of office.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma is digging in his heels and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-nec-meeting-called-as-zuma-still-refuses-to-step-down-20180205">refusing to relinquish</a> the top job despite mounting pressure from his own party, the African National Congress.</p>
<p>His determination to stay put is being widely condemned by a range of South African voices. But there’s a case to be made that his reluctance is doing South Africans a favour as it is forcing them to clarify various constitutional and political issues. Most obviously, albeit inadvertently, he is asserting the supremacy of parliament over the authority of the party. </p>
<p>Because the top leadership structures of the ANC are divided – including the top six where it seems that only four want him to leave office immediately – Zuma is exploiting what wriggle-room he has left. He’s effectively saying that the forces ranged against him aren’t convincing enough, and that he still has <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-02-06-people-still-want-me-as-president-zuma/">considerable support</a> within the party. </p>
<p>In other words, he is daring the ANC leadership to put a motion of no confidence to the National Assembly and to use the party’s majority to vote him out of office. </p>
<p>His gamble is this: he can survive such a motion if it is put by an opposition party because to support an opposition motion would prove hugely embarrassing to the ANC. The speaker of parliament has already put down a motion of no confidence tabled by the opposition party, the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/06/malema-insists-eff-to-debate-zuma-no-confidence-motion-before-sona">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, for discussion after the budget speech on February 22. </p>
<p>For the ANC to put down its own motion, and then try to ensure it received a majority, would all take time, time, time. And that’s what Zuma wants so that he can rally his supporters, convince waverers that he still has some clout, and maximise his bargaining power.</p>
<p>If the party’s new president <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-takes-on-anc-leadership-role-with-alacrity-and-clarity-of-intent-90095">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> could manage to secure a clear majority of the ANC’s national executive committee (it’s highest decision making body in between elective conferences) asking Zuma to resign, then it is conceivable that Zuma might accede to leave office. But more likely, he would continue to force the ANC to resort to parliament.</p>
<p>And even if he were to step down at the very last moment, his behaviour is reminding South Africans where, ultimately, the power to elect and depose a president lies, and that is, with parliament.</p>
<h2>Zuma’s nine lives</h2>
<p>Zuma has already <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/191110/zuma-survives-another-no-confidence-vote/">survived</a> umpteen votes of no confidence brought about by opposition parties. Not enough ANC MPs have ever voted with the opposition to carry the motion.</p>
<p>In the last event, a small minority of ANC MPs used the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-vote-how-many-anc-mps-broke-ranks-20170808">cover</a> provided by a secret ballot to vote in favour of the motion (or to abstain). But the large majority voted for Zuma to stay in office. At the time, they could use the excuse that the ANC’s national conference was coming up and that it was the appropriate place for the leadership issue to be decided. But now that has passed, Zuma’s <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-08-10-emboldened-jacob-zuma-publicly-supports-his-ex-wife-again/">favoured candidate</a> has lost, Ramaphosa has triumphed, and he now wants the President to resign. What excuse would the ANC MPs have for not supporting the opposition motion this time round?</p>
<p>The justification that they cannot be expected to vote for a motion put by the EFF is morally and politically threadbare. What is Ramaphosa going to do? Argue that internal ANC unity matters more than the needs of the country? What would the popular reaction be to the ANC in effect voting for Zuma to stay in office? </p>
<p>Frankly, the ANC’s cover would be blown.</p>
<h2>The role of MPs</h2>
<p>Beyond the immediate issue of Zuma, South Africa’s political parties need to debate what they expect of MPs. There was <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/your-vote-is-secret-but-your-conscience-will-remain-anc-mps-hear-20170808">much talk</a> prior to the previous vote of no confidence for the need for ANC MPs to display their ‘integrity’, a code word for them to break party lines and vote for the opposition. In other words, it was suggested that MPs should resist acting like party cyphers. Yet, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/do-not-vote-with-conscience-against-zuma-mantashe-warns-anc-mps-20170405">in the ANC’s eyes</a>, its MPs are ‘deployed’ to parliament, and have to obey party dictates. Little or no room is left to individual conscience.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205093/original/file-20180206-88788-10plaqq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=970&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, Deputy State President of South Africa, and president of the governing party, the ANC.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Historically the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-south-africa-parliamentary-conscience-and-the-courage-to-rebel-82280">tradition in parliamentary systems</a> has been that certain issues, often relating to human rights, are resolved by party whips allowing MPs to vote according to their individual consciences. In South Africa, political parties have largely been spared potential conflicts over divisive issues such as the death penalty because they’ve been resolved by the Constitutional Court. </p>
<p>This has meant that, since 1994, MPs have largely been kept in party line because of the threat of being disciplined by their parties. The ultimate threat is their dismissal from the party which in turn means being kicked out of parliament. This follows largely from South Africa’s adoption of a party list proportional representation system. In contrast, in constituency based electoral systems, for instance in the UK, MPs are accountable downwards to voters in their constituencies as well as upward to their party bosses in parliament.</p>
<p>This means that MPs in South Africa are unlikely to put the interests of the people (the voters) above those of their party. This issue is not satisfactorily resolved, as the ANC likes to say it is, by voters having given the majority party most votes at the previous election. </p>
<p>Alas, political life is more complicated than that.</p>
<p>Voters want accountability as well as representation. While most South Africans understand the need for proportionate representation of political parties in parliament, there is nevertheless a substantial hankering for MP’s to be more accountable to the voters. </p>
<p>There is a widespread argument that a change to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-electoral-reform-but-presidents-powers-need-watching-88820">mixed member proportional representation</a> scheme would square this particular circle. Some MPs would be elected from multi-member constituencies (with from three to seven MPs as recommended by the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission on the electoral system) while others would be elected from party lists to bring about overall proportionality. This would mean that South African could be able to identify particular constituency MPs who had particular responsibilities to represent them. </p>
<p>In turn, this would mean that MPs would have to consider more than the interests of party bosses when casting their votes.</p>
<p>It is certainly an attractive idea, and is one which needs a proper airing. Whether practice would match electoral system theory is another matter. For all their numerous faults political parties can’t be dispensed with; nor can they be expected to operate without exerting discipline on their representatives in parliament. </p>
<p>At the same time, citizens want to be represented by individuals who are more than party donkeys. </p>
<p>South Africans need to debate in what sort of circumstances they expect or make allowance for MPs to deviate from the party line. But they need to recognise that there is an inherent ambiguity in the role of MPs: at times, they are faced by conflicting obligations, simultaneously to party versus people. Accountability demands that they justify their decisions. </p>
<p>Ironically, Zuma is banking on that ambiguity, while hoping that ANC MPs duck the need for accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma’s resistance to vacate the top job may be a blessing in disguise as it will stress test the country’s political systems.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869392017-11-16T18:14:08Z2017-11-16T18:14:08ZHow farm dwellers in South Africa think about home, land and belonging<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193778/original/file-20171108-14209-vp5igd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Farm dwellers like Zabalaza Mshengu live in extremely precarious conditions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Association for Rural Advancement</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s unemployment rate puts it in the <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_541211.pdf">bottom ten countries</a> in the world. Hunger levels are growing. It has what Berkeley geography professor Gillian Hart <a href="http://www.academia.edu/30653258/Relational_comparison_revisited_Marxist_postcolonial_geographies_in_practice_2016_">calls</a> a “population surplus to the needs of capital” that must find ways to survive despite living a “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/30653258/Relational_comparison_revisited_Marxist_postcolonial_geographies_in_practice_2016_">wageless existence</a>.”</p>
<p>This is happening against the backdrop of three unfolding social processes. </p>
<p>The first involves deteriorating conditions for survival. A new social category is emerging called the “precariat”: growing numbers of people who struggle to secure the conditions for their survival through traditional means like permanent work. Instead, more and more people survive through multiple jobs that are part-time, insecure and precarious. Guy Standing, who is a professor of economy security at Bath University and coined the term, estimates that <a href="https://www.hse.ru/data/2013/01/28/1304836059/Standing.%20The_Precariat__The_New_Dangerous_Class__-Bloomsbury_USA(2011).pdf">a quarter of the world’s adult population</a> is now in the precariat.</p>
<p>Secondly, land reform is now geared at servicing the economic needs of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1288615?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=crea20">black and white rural elites</a>. Land reform budget allocations are spent on the wealthy rather than poor South Africans who are unable to access land.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the structural legacy of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/natives-land-act-1913">dispossession</a> of Africans from land hasn’t been addressed. Failing to resolve this means that a painful political question is left hanging and becomes an easy symbol to manipulate.</p>
<p>So how do these historical and present conditions constitute the conditions for an emancipatory politics? For instance, will rural people who need land to live on or to farm organise to assert claims for restoration? </p>
<p>One possible answer emerges from research undertaken by the <a href="https://afra.co.za/">Association for Rural Advancement</a> (AFRA), a land rights NGO working with farm dwellers in South Africa’ Kwazulu-Natal province.</p>
<p>AFRA recently undertook a socio-demographic and income <a href="https://app.spisys.gov.za/?dashboard=322127346">survey</a> of 850 households resident on farms in the Umgungundlovu Municipal District to understand more about farm dwellers’ conditions and how these have changed over time.</p>
<p>AFRA’s conclusion is that the politics associated with land is not about an organised emancipatory movement. While the radical opposition party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and some factions of the governing African National Congress (ANC) are <a href="http://www.mweb.co.za/news/ViewArticle/tabid/2909/Article/15376/Malema-calls-for-land-expropriation-without-compensation.aspx">calling for</a> the restoration of land to Africans without compensation to existing landowners, farm dwellers are mainly preoccupied with daily survival strategies.</p>
<p>If work opportunities arise away from farms, then many farm dwellers will choose to leave the farm. However, such opportunities are increasingly limited. Many farm dwellers are now asserting a demand to remain on land they have long ties to. These different strategies fragment farm dweller interests in the land. </p>
<p>But it seems that the potential exists for a social movement of people “surplus” to capital’s requirements. Whether such a movement develops depends on how effectively populist political groups can create alliances within and between the agricultural precariat, those living in city slums and those whose land access is threatened by agreements between traditional authorities and corporate interests like mining. </p>
<p>The International Peasant Movement, <a href="https://viacampesina.org/en/">Via Campesina</a> provides one example of a social movement involving reoccupation of unproductively used farmland. However, we argue that South Africa’s precariat is more complicated because the country is not agriculturally rich and more than half the population is now urbanised and lives in shacks on the edges of cities. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>AFRA defines farm dwellers as rural people who live on large commercial farms owned by someone other than themselves. </p>
<p>In some respects farm dwellers are a relic of the country’s agrarian history, which involved the establishment of capitalist agriculture in the early 1900s on the back of African labour tenants’ unpaid labour. In return, tenants were granted the right to use some of the farmland for their own farming. </p>
<p>Our data shows that farm dwellers are not simply wage workers. They identify intimately with the land they live on. More than half of the interviewees have family graves on the farm. Their livelihoods are land-based: more than half cultivate crops, while just under half own livestock.</p>
<p>We identified three distinct responses of a fragmenting class of agricultural labour to the increasingly strained conditions for its social reproduction. These are: moving away from conditions on farms that make survival intolerable or impossible; seeking out better options in the cities and towns; and holding on to the roots of a familiar life and place on the farm despite deteriorating conditions.</p>
<p>Those who decide to move away from farms usually do so because of landowner decisions. These include explicit measures to evict some or all of the family members – this affected 7% of the total sample of over 7 000 individuals – as well as implicit or “constructive” evictions which involved the impounding of livestock, cutting off access to basic services such as water and electricity, locking gates and preventing children from attending school. </p>
<p>The second response – seeking better options – involves individual farm dwellers who decide to leave the farm. About a quarter of farm dwellers who have the landowner’s permission to live on the farm choose to live elsewhere. Rates of unemployment affecting households on these farms exceed 80%, so those who leave tend to have done so in search of work.</p>
<p>Farm dwellers must contend with difficult living and working conditions. This makes the third response – staying on the farm – perhaps the most surprising.</p>
<p>One factor is farm wage income which makes up 55% of household income. So when people can get work on the farms where they have dwelling rights, it makes sense for them to stay.</p>
<p>There are other explanations for why farm dwellers stay on farms. We call this the politics of holding on to home. </p>
<p>Nearly 75% of all farm dweller households we interviewed had lived on the farm in question for 23 years or longer, and had a parent, grandparent or great grandparent who was born on the farm. When asked “who is the owner of the house you live in?”, 61% said they owned the house – even though they had already stated the name of the farm’s owner. </p>
<p>Among the reasons given were that they had no other home and had never lived anywhere else. </p>
<p>When asked who would take over the home after the household head died, more than half said that someone in their family would take it over. This suggests that a different, parallel conception of ownership co-exists with legal ownership of the land. Farm dwellers know the farmer is the title holder of the farm but are also asserting that they are the owners of their homes.</p>
<h2>Creating alliances</h2>
<p>A political alliance among farm dwellers opting for different survival strategies doesn’t appear to exist yet although the economic conditions are present. It could possibly develop if either the EFF or a breakaway group from the ANC organise it. </p>
<p>For now, the EFF’s focus seems to be on shack settlements and the urban poor and the ANC is too mired in its own <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-03-anc-in-civil-war/">internal wrangles</a> to be able to organise a movement of this kind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donna Hornby is affiliated with the Association for Rural Advancement and the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape. </span></em></p>Farm dwellers’ conclusion is that the politics associated with land is not about an organised emancipatory movement. Farm dwellers are mainly preoccupied with daily survival strategies.Donna Hornby, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/835392017-09-06T18:51:21Z2017-09-06T18:51:21ZCyril Ramaphosa’s leaked emails: echoes of apartheid-era dirty tricks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184880/original/file-20170906-9871-19somya.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A routine smear. This is the view of the overwhelming majority of commentators and analysts about last weekend’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/ramaphosa-in-womanising-e-mail-shock-11056138">“revelations”</a> in the <em>Sunday Independent</em> that Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was a serial womaniser.</p>
<p>The commentariat can expect more such smears. They will come against more than one candidate running for the presidency of the governing ANC - and subsequently of the country. It’s not hard to predict that this slapstick routine will continue all the way to voting at the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">ANC’s national conference</a> in December.</p>
<p>This was at least the second anti-Ramaphosa smear, following an earlier damp squib that alleged that he <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1612116/malema-alleges-ramaphosa-is-the-worse-member-who-beat-his-wife/">abused his ex-wife</a>, a claim she firmly <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/16/ramaphosa-s-ex-wife-abuse-claims-seek-to-prevent-him-from-becoming-president">refuted</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has alleged that rogue elements in the country’s intelligence services hacked into his private emails and doctored them before handing them to the newspaper <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-02-intelligence-resources-hacked-my-email-ramaphosa/">to smear him</a>. This, he said, was intended to scupper his campaign to become president of the governing ANC and the country. He predicted that it would get worse ahead of the governing party’s elective conference.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is in a virtual <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-07-22-poll-has-ramaphosa-beating-dlamini-zuma/">two-horse race</a> with former head of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the presidency of the ANC. Her former husband President Jacob Zuma has <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/dlamini-zuma-indicates-she-is-ready-for-presidency">endorsed her</a> as his preferred successor.</p>
<p>ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe has since urged factions within the governing party to desist from using state resources to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-05-keep-state-resources-out-of-party-wars-says-mantashe/">discredit</a> those competing for the presidency.</p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>Several dimensions of this are worth unpacking. </p>
<p>Police states, unlike democracies, by definition abuse their secret services to spy on peaceful, lawful opponents. But to find a case where the secret services are also abused to spy on factions and rivals within the governing party, one has to go back all the way to the 1960s.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-hendrik-van-den-bergh-1246509.html">General Hendrik van den Bergh</a>, who set up the Bureau for State Security <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-bureau-state-security-boss-established">(BOSS)</a>, to spy on the apartheid regime’s leftist and liberal opponents, also founded the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gmzFBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT60&lpg=PT60&dq=republican+intelligence+services&source=bl&ots=aFTKywMWyA&sig=2MqkJSQe8ANrKKoPaLIdqlsMW1k&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi4h4bdpY7WAhUEvBQKHTfQCOYQ6AEIRzAE#v=onepage&q=republican%20intelligence%20services&f=false">Republikeinse Intelligensie Diens</a> to spy on the then governing National Party’s right-wing faction. These <em>verkramptes</em> (conservatives) broke away in 1969 to form the <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03472.htm">Herstigte Nasionale Party</a>. </p>
<p>It’s painful to make comparisons between the apartheid police state and post-apartheid South Africa’s Westminster-style democracy. But secret service abuse of phone tapping and letter opening leaves analysts no choice.</p>
<p>While it’s now over a decade since a horrified former Intelligence minister <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ronald-ronnie-kasrils">Ronnie Kasrils</a> discovered that some of his subordinates and phone tappers in the National Intelligence Service (NIS) strayed beyond their brief. They <a href="http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/771.1">took opposite sides</a> in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-zuma-fight-it-out-in-damaging-anc-race-379445">acrimonious split</a> between President Thabo Mbeki and his fired deputy Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>What we now seem to have again are rival cliques within the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs.aspx">State Security Agency</a>. Each clique sucks up to a rival politician. One clique made available a selection of Ramaphosa’s emails for others to doctor and leak to the <em>Sunday Independent</em>. Another, different clique, was presumably involved in the earlier <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gupta-leakscom-everything-you-ever-need-to-know-about-guptaleaks-in-one-place-20170721">Gupta email cache</a>. The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Gupta-leaks">“#Guptaleaks”</a> exposed the extent of the alleged corrupt relationship between the powerful <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-24-00-the-gupta-owned-state-enterprises">Gupta family</a> and state officials, parastatals, as well as its influence on Zuma’s government. </p>
<p>A second dimension of the latest smear against Ramaphosa is equally fascinating. The smear organisers, no doubt after some debate between themselves, made the deliberate choice that their smear should be leaked to the <em>Sunday Independent</em> – instead of to <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/"><em>The New Age</em></a> and <a href="http://www.ann7.com/">ANN7</a>. The later was established by Zuma’s friends, the Guptas. With their television station, <em>The New Age</em> are at the heart of <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">state capture </a> allegations and rabidly pro-Zuma and his faction. </p>
<p>This must reflect the spooks’ considered judgement that <em>The New Age</em> and ANN7 are so completely tainted as Gupta business outlets as to be discredited. So, their smear’s only chances of credibility lay with placing their bait in some alternative media go-between. It does help that Steven Motale, the editor of the <em>Sunday Independent</em>, who wrote the story on the leaked emails, is also perceived to be in the pro-Zuma camp, having written an impassioned <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/letter-im-sorry-president-zuma-1899205">open letter</a> in 2015 expressing his regret that he was part of a “sinister” campaign against the president. </p>
<p>Motale also praised ordinary members of the ANC members who “consistently supported Zuma despite the sustained barrage of propaganda against him”. He followed it with another this year in which he condemns former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan as being an impediment to Zuma’s idea of <a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2017/03/27/steve-motale-writes-open-letter-president-zuma/">radical economic transformation</a>.</p>
<p>Presumably this leaking and smearing will continue. There will always be one media outlet desperate enough for an exclusive scoop from the secret services. That, also, has not changed since the apartheid decades. Remember <em>The Star</em> newspaper alleging that thorn in the apartheid government’s side, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/joe-slovo">Joe Slovo</a>, who was general secretary of the South African Communist Party during the liberation struggle, <a href="http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4p3006kc&chunk.id=d0e5784&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">killed his activist wife</a> Ruth First? That was of course a total fabrication by the apartheid regime’s agents.</p>
<p>Here in 2017 though, democracy relies on a politically savvy public of informed voters who will respond to smears not with credulity, but amusement, cartoons, and sarcasm.</p>
<h2>Campaigns, slates and splits</h2>
<p>The remaining months of the formal ANC election campaign between now and the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">national elective conference in December</a> recall to mind Helen Zille’s comment when she suddenly sprung her <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/zille-resigns-as-da-leader-1843970">surprise resignation</a> as national leader of the main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). She commented that any internal DA campaigning longer than a few brief weeks would <a href="http://www.knysnakeep.org/helen-zilles-resignation-explanation/">harm her party</a>.</p>
<p>By contrast, ANC internal campaigning resembles primary years in the United States, stretching over pretty much at least 12 months. The ANC needs to develop mechanisms to manage this without splits - such as those that led to the formation of the <a href="http://udm.org.za/history/">United Democratic Movement</a>, the <a href="http://www.congressofthepeople.org.za/content/page/History-of-cope">Congress of the People</a>, and <a href="http://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> - in its past.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-pleads-for-one-anc-slate-20170512">“Slates”</a> have plagued ANC politics during its 2007 and 2012 conferences. With the slate system, delegates to the national conferences are lobbied to vote for a prescribed list (or slate) of candidates linked to a specific presidential candidate. Such a list then automatically becomes the party’s highest decision making body, its national executive committee.</p>
<p>One solution is for the ANC to change its voting procedures for its national and provincial executive committees. This will ensure that the maximum number of candidates any delegate may vote for should be significantly less than the number of seats contested. This would ensure that while the winning slate still wins, the losing slate gets some representation. So it is neither purged nor splits off to form yet another breakaway party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this analysis in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>South Africa’s Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, claims the intelligence services are being used to discredit him and prevent him becoming the country’s next leader.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823222017-08-10T17:24:47Z2017-08-10T17:24:47ZOpposition parties have found the ANC’s Achilles heel: Jacob Zuma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181667/original/file-20170810-27688-ho88uv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma celebrates winning the eighth vote of no confidence against him.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just when many thought that President Jacob Zuma’s fate was sealed, he emerged victorious against a motion of no confidence in him - for the eighth time. The fanfare associated with his expected loss was largely in sync with the increasing public discontent with his leadership.</p>
<p>On the day of the no confidence vote political parties slugged it out: the ANC was on the defensive, barraged with the opposition parties’ critique of Zuma, who is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-20/jacob-zuma-blamed-for-south-africa-s-woes">blamed for the morass</a> the country finds itself in.</p>
<p>Cautiously couched, and with an eye on winning over ANC MPs who hold the majority of seats in parliament, the opposition’s fusillade sought to <a href="https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/no-confidence-debate-top-10-quotes/">delink Zuma from the party</a>. This made sense as a strategy: after all the ANC has abdicated the responsibility of holding Zuma to account for far too long. In tabling yet another motion of no confidence the opposition appropriated this duty. </p>
<p>The latest motion offered the ANC a chance to make a distinction between itself and its ethically compromised president, and to reclaim its position as a leader of society. It created – albeit unwittingly – the opportunity for the ANC to repackage its sullied image. </p>
<p>But it failed to seize the moment. Instead, it settled for a Pyrrhic victory. Those faithful to Zuma took turns in their deification histrionics of political showmanship and demagoguery fixated on imagined “enemies of the state” and the illusion of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">“regime change” </a>. These falsehoods are peddled to deflect attention from the real dangers to the country’s democracy: a dearth of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-moral-leaders-not-those-in-pursuit-of-selfish-gain-76244">ethical leadership</a> and the <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">capture of the state</a> under Zuma.</p>
<p>Opposition parties took advantage of this. They might not have won the vote of no confidence. But they came away emboldened for trying.</p>
<h2>Opposition parties gaining the upper hand</h2>
<p>The opposition parties are getting smarter in exploiting the ANC’s vacuous leadership. In the latest motion of no confidence debate, they managed to frame the narrative in a way that reminded ANC members about the nobility of the historical foundation of the party, and the reason for its existence. In other words, the opposition parties were teaching the ANC about the ANC.</p>
<p>This featured prominently in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">speeches</a> of Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, Economic Freedom Fighters’ Julius Malema, and United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa. </p>
<p>The danger for the ANC in not being decisive about Zuma is that, over time, the opposition parties may usurp its political capital and project themselves as genuine custodians of its foundational values. In fact, this appears to be their strategy. Some in the ANC are aware of this which probably explains why 26 of them put the public interest first and voted for the motion. </p>
<p>This is what’s required if the party is going to survive in the long term. Acting in the public interest is a strategic political investment. </p>
<p>Despite the fact that some ANC broke ranks, the motion failed to pass. Of the 384 MPs who voted, 177 said they do not have confidence in Zuma – 46% of the total votes. In all 198 (52%) maintained their confidence in Zuma, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">while 9 (2%) abstained</a>. Statistically, the motion was lost by 6%. When abstentions are factored in, by 4%. </p>
<p>Immediately after Speaker of National Assembly Baleka Mbete ,announced the results, Zuma couldn’t wait to ascend the podium in a style reminiscent of his ascension to the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">ANC’s throne in 2007</a> after President Thabo Mbeki had earlier <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">sacked him</a> as the Deputy President of the Republic. </p>
<h2>A victory, but at what cost</h2>
<p>It is all celebrations in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-08-zuma-supporters-celebrate-his-win-outa-considers-legal-action/">Zuma coterie</a>. The vote means that the network of his kindred spirits – those at the centre of the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">capture of the state</a> and profiting from the public purse handsomely – is protected.</p>
<p>But aren’t these celebrations about a trifle? A closer look at the votes reveals something interesting: at least 26 ANC MPs agreed with the opposition parties that Zuma should step down as the president of the Republic. The celebrations are therefore more likely to be a requiem for the possible atrophy of the ANC, whose indecisiveness makes it complicit in creating this peril.</p>
<p>Indeed, as leader of the governing party and of the country Zuma should be worried about the outcome. His legitimacy in his own party has plummeted. Coupled with the negative sentiments about him in broader society, the picture is now gloomier for the ANC. He won the vote and secured the throne. But, at what cost? </p>
<p>The outcome of the no confidence vote has laid bare a fractured ANC. Each time Zuma survives, the ANC loses the battle of regaining people’s trust. </p>
<p>The opposition parties are aware of this, and are exploiting it. Their strategic political gaze hasn’t simply been about reaching the required threshold to oust the president – after all they don’t have sufficient numbers in parliament.</p>
<p>Instead, their motions of no confidence are about obliterating the political credibility of the ANC, using Zuma’s disastrous leadership as a means to this end. They exploit, to their strategic political advantage, the increasing perception that the people of the country are being ignored and are misunderstood by the ANC government. This, in a democracy that came about as a result of the sacrifices of the people, some of whom paid the ultimate price during the liberation struggle.</p>
<p>What emerged in the debate wasn’t about the public interest. Rather it was about protecting the oligarchy. This is surreal. Parliament as the legislative authority is supposed to represent the interest of the people. Hasn’t it sunk into the political conscience of the ANC, after 23 years of its governing the country, that leadership of public affairs should always be driven by the public interest?</p>
<p>In a democracy public discontent is understood as an opportunity to listen closely to what the people want. The ANC will be punished severely at the polls if it continues to fail to understand this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82322/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from National Research Funding(NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).</span></em></p>South African President Jacob Zuma, should be worried about the outcome of the no confidence vote in him. His legitimacy in the ANC and the country has plummeted.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/822802017-08-09T18:43:08Z2017-08-09T18:43:08ZLessons from South Africa: parliamentary conscience and the courage to rebel<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181564/original/file-20170809-32183-tz0vr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The motion of no confidence against President Jacob Zuma displayed tension between party and conscience</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Mark Wessels</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prior to the motion of <a href="http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2017/07/05/zuma-no-confidence-motion/">no confidence in President Jacob Zuma</a> in South Africa’s National Assembly, former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, among others, urged the African National Congress (ANC) MPs to be <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-07-19-pravin-gordhan-makhosi-khoza-pull-no-punches-on-zuma/">guided by their conscience</a>, implying that they should break ranks with their party and vote with the opposition. </p>
<p>The thrust of Gordhan’s argument was that under Zuma the presidency had become corrupt and morally compromised. Therefore a vote against Zuma’s continuance in office would be in the national interest. </p>
<p>The further implication was that voting for Zuma to go would be in the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/266526/nec-decision-to-back-zuma-ill-advised-says-anc-mp-mondli-gungubele">long-term interest</a> of the ANC. The reasoning behind this was that, unless the party is to return to the values for which the liberation struggle was fought, it will wreak its own destruction.</p>
<p>The counter-argument by the ANC hierarchy was that ANC MPs were bound by obligation to the voters who had elected them to vote the way the party instructed. MPs in the South African system are not elected as individuals, but merely as members of their party. To vote against the party line would be to overturn the logic of democracy. </p>
<p>A further argument put forward by ANC speakers in the debate was that the opposition was seeking unconstitutional “<a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">regime change</a>”. This was quite correctly challenged. The opposition pointed out that the motion had been put in terms of the constitution, and that they were seeking to replace the President and not the ANC government. </p>
<p>And yet, although the ANC argument was manifestly “rubbish” (to quote Wits academic Ivor Sarakinsky in <a href="https://www.enca.com/media/video/south-africans-concerned-about-the-constitution">commentary</a> on a local television stations eNCA), the debate highlighted a very real tension at the heart of South Africa’s democracy. Should MPs have the right to vote according to their conscience?</p>
<h2>The role of the political party</h2>
<p>Universally, the rise of political parties alongside the expansion of parliamentary democracy inevitably came at the cost of the independence of individual MPs. It is rare today for any individual not belonging to a political party to secure a seat in any parliament. Belonging to a political party has become a necessity except in the most exceptional of circumstances.</p>
<p>In turn, belonging to a political party requires that MPs or representatives sign up to a <a href="https://www.faust.com/legend/pact-with-the-devil/">Faustian deal</a>. If they want to progress politically, they have to follow the party line, even on occasions where they disagree with party policy. </p>
<p>This is entrenched in the communist notion of ‘democratic centralism’ – once the party has ‘democratically’ made its decision, the individual is politically bound to implement it. </p>
<p>In practice, however, party systems are not always so rigid as this implies.</p>
<p>Parliamentary histories are stuffed not merely with internal party rebellions but individual MPs voting against their own governments. Internal rebellions are prone to occur where party leaderships lose the confidence of their backbenchers (who are usually relaying extra-parliamentary discontent). And individual MPs may choose to vote against their party’s line – often for religious or ethical reasons. They may also do so because they see themselves as representatives of constituencies or interests that are offended by party policy.</p>
<p>Political parties handle such problems in different ways. Often they will seek to fudge policies so as to contain intra-party differences. Alternatively, minority factions within parties may grow to become a majority and secure a change in party policy. </p>
<p>Where parties are split down the middle, party leaderships may try to resolve difficulties by suspending party directives and allowing a free vote (as during the Brexit referendum debate). On key issues, individual MPs who threaten to vote against their parties may be bribed by promises of bounty for their constituents or by compromises made to relevant policy proposals, although ultimately the threat of expulsion from the party lies in waiting. </p>
<p>Individual MPs may also be buoyed up by the honour that accrues to them if they are perceived to be standing their ground on matters of political or moral principle. They may earn the respect of their political opponents as much as the brick-bats of their party colleagues.</p>
<h2>Challenge for the ANC</h2>
<p>The variations, inconsistencies and flexibility built into modern party systems clearly stands as a challenge to the contemporary ANC mantra that MPs are slaves to their party’s requirements. Yet the ANC position is by no means without logic. It is indisputable that under South Africa’s electoral system, as it stands, MPs are elected as party representatives and not as individuals.</p>
<p>National-list proportional representation allows for no individuality of candidates. Voters do not have individual MPs. They simply vote for a party. Under this system MPs are allowed minimal scope for conscience. </p>
<p>But, ultimately, the ANC has no answer to the popular expectation that, when pressed on major issues, MPs should vote for what they think is right. They should vote against that which they think is wrong. They must be guided by their conscience rather than their pockets. </p>
<p>Voters seem to expect that when MPs refer to each other as ‘honourable’ that they should indeed embody ‘honour’. Yet equally, the public distaste for blatant political opportunism, as displayed during the <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/soufloorcross.htm">floor-crossing episodes</a> of yesteryear when minority party MPs jumped ship, mainly to join the ANC for personal and financial reasons, it is clear that voters expect MPs to respect the outcomes of elections.</p>
<h2>Discipline yes, but courage too</h2>
<p>Seemingly there is no consistent set of principles and practices which will satisfactorily resolve the tension between party demands and individual conscience. Yet what does become clear is that there is much more scope for flexibility, tolerance of dissent, and – yes – freedom of conscience in systems where MPs are directly responsible to constituents rather than, as in South Africa, they are wholly accountable to their parties.</p>
<p>Is this why the ANC so forthrightly rejected the recommendations of the Van Zyl Slabbert <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/van-zyl-slabbert-commission-report-electoral-reform-january-2003">Commission on Electoral Reform</a>? The commission recommended a mixed electoral system, whereby MPs would be elected on party platforms but from multi-member constituencies.</p>
<p>There is no escaping the necessity of party systems to get the job of government done. Voters understand the need for party discipline. Yet as the vote of no confidence also shows, they also want MPs to have the courage to rebel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82280/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The motion of no confidence against South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma showcased tension at the heart of South Africa’s democracy. Should MPs have the right to vote according to their conscience?Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.