tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/la-cite-30598/articlesLaïcité – The Conversation2024-01-26T13:20:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207252024-01-26T13:20:10Z2024-01-26T13:20:10ZFrance’s biggest Muslim school went from accolades to defunding – showing a key paradox in how the country treats Islam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569761/original/file-20240117-21-kh948e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1022%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students attend a class at the Averroès school in Lille, France, in September 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/students-attend-a-class-at-the-averroes-high-school-in-news-photo/1801185507?adppopup=true">Sameer Al-Doumy/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>France is famously strict on enforcing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13310-7_6">what it calls “laïcité</a>”: keeping religion out of the public sphere. Yet more than <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/289657-lenseignement-prive-sous-contrat">7,500 private schools</a> receive government funding, and most are Catholic. In a country where about 1 in 10 people are Muslim, just three Muslim high schools receive state support – or did.</p>
<p>In December 2023, local authorities of the French Ministry of the Interior confirmed a decision to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/frances-largest-muslim-school-threatened-closure-amid-scrutiny/story?id=105542824">revoke state funding from Lycée Averroès</a>, France’s largest and most acclaimed private Muslim high school. Authorities cited “<a href="https://www.la-croix.com/dissensions-autour-du-lycee-musulman-averroes-prive-de-subventions-publiques-20231211">serious breaches of the fundamental principles of the Republic</a>,” <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/11/27/lycee-prive-musulman-averroes-avis-consultatif-favorable-a-la-resiliation-du-contrat-avec-l-etat_6202633_3224.html">raised concerns over certain texts in religious education classes</a>, and accused administrators of opaque financial management, among various alleged infractions. </p>
<p>None of these claims are supported by previous inspection reports, and <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/nord-0/lille/lycee-musulman-averroes-syndicats-politiques-directeur-de-grande-ecole-tour-d-horizon-des-soutiens-affiches-2884994.html">many French scholars and activists have denounced the decision as politically motivated</a>, setting off a political firestorm.</p>
<p>Lycée Averroès, located in the suburbs of Lille, opened in 2003 and was granted state funding in 2008. In 2013, it was named the best high school in France, <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/France/Le-lycee-musulman-Averroes-de-Lille-meilleur-lycee-de-France-2013-03-28-926203">according to the Parisien newspaper’s rankings</a>, and has consistently <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1309270/article/2023-03-29/lille-averroes-et-faidherbe-dans-le-top-3-des-lycees-de-la-region">ranked among the region’s best</a> in recent years. Teachers and administrators <a href="https://www.lycee-averroes.com/">pride themselves</a> on being dedicated to both French Republican and Islamic values. As <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2017.1303768">our research</a> has shown, the school often goes above and beyond to teach civic values such as equality and laïcité.</p>
<p>In many French Muslim communities, the school is seen as a beacon – an example of a Muslim institution that succeeded <a href="https://ballardbrief.byu.edu/issue-briefs/religious-discrimination-against-muslims-in-france#:">despite discrimination</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/islam-and-the-governing-of-muslims-in-france-9781350214538/">political tensions around Islam</a>, and the French Republic’s <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/122/article/843095">strict secularism</a>.</p>
<p>The defunding decision represents a common paradox in contemporary France: Many of the steps its government takes to supposedly protect “<a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/french-brief-reinforcing-principles-republic-french-paradox">French Republican values</a>,” better “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12942">integrate” Muslim minorities</a> or prevent radicalization have the potential <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/france-terrorism-muslims-confusion/2020/11/13/e40332be-2042-11eb-ad53-4c1fda49907d_story.html">to do the opposite</a>.</p>
<h2>High scores, high scrutiny</h2>
<p>Private schools in France <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pur/109889?lang=en">can receive state funding</a> for up to <a href="https://www.cafepedagogique.net/2023/06/02/enseignement-prive-8-milliards-de-fonds-publics-et-pas-de-controles/">about three-quarters of their operating budgets</a> if they agree to certain stipulations. Teachers can provide optional religious education, but otherwise must follow the national curriculum and admit students of any religious background, based on merit alone. </p>
<p>The first Muslim schools opened in 2001, and <a href="https://www.theses.fr/2021UPSLP080">dozens more have been established</a> since. But <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pur/109988?lang=en">as the first one to be granted state funding</a>, Averroès has been under <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/973367/article/2021-04-01/suspension-des-subventions-du-lycee-averroes-le-tribunal-administratif-rappelle">particularly close scrutiny</a> since its inception. The school has previously faced controversies related to <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/lycee-musulman-averroes-a-lille-la-region-sommee-de-verser-500-000-euros-a-letablissement-12-10-2022-LMTHICKKVNCR7PXBLWSUY4D6JQ.php">funding it received from an organization in Qatar</a>, and a former teacher’s claims, made a decade ago, that Averroès was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150206-teacher-quits-french-muslim-school-over-insidious-islamism">teaching “Islamism</a>.”</p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://static.blast-info.fr/attachments/stories/2023/gS9HjS-QQnumCrLXl7NLOw/attachment-kaCAkdjcQz2hkp2n1H3ixA.pdf">official 2020 report</a>, from 2015 through 2020 Averroès was inspected 13 times, making it “the most inspected school” in the region. Notably, it stated that “nothing in the observations … allows (us) to think teaching practices don’t respect republican values.”</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A statue of a seated man in robes on a pedestal, in front of a brightly lit stone wall at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=758&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570988/original/file-20240123-29-tsqi0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=953&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A statue of the medieval Muslim philosopher Averroes in Cordoba, Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/wall-and-averroes-memorial-royalty-free-image/500351883?phrase=averroes&adppopup=true">Domingo Leiva/Moment Open via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Several public figures have argued that the decision to defund Averroès is representative of “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/12/16/la-decision-de-deconventionner-le-lycee-averroes-a-lille-est-inequitable-et-disproportionnee_6206186_3232.html">inequitable and disproportionate” treatment</a> that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105022">French Muslims often face</a> compared to their non-Muslim peers. As our research has shown, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2022.2131735">many Muslim schools undergo more</a> surveillance and criticism <a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/090223/homophobie-au-lycee-stanislas-six-mois-de-silence-du-ministre-qui-confinent-la-lachete">compared to their Catholic</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359479.001.0001">Jewish</a> counterparts. </p>
<p>These double standards largely stem from a political environment rife with <a href="https://www.senat.fr/rap/r19-595-1/r19-595-12.html">fears over Islamic extremism</a> after <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210905-how-the-november-2015-attacks-marked-a-turning-point-in-french-terror-laws">numerous high-profile attacks on French soil</a>. </p>
<p>However, policies intended to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/11/18/le-projet-de-loi-contre-l-islam-radical-et-les-separatismes-finalise-et-transmis-aux-deputes-et-senateurs_6060131_823448.html">save French Muslim youth from radicalization</a> can have an adverse effect, making young Muslims feel that they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/scpo.broua.2005.01">not seen as fully French</a>, and further alienating them. </p>
<p>For some, this sense of unequal treatment manifests in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/religion-paris-radicalism-secularism-france-951fe2ff0b42e8954193f6f9293b0803">frequent protests</a> and other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2018.1440197">demands for justice</a>. But it has sometimes fueled riots, vandalism and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2024/01/17/les-emeutes-de-juillet-2023-dernier-episode-d-une-crise-politique-sans-fin_6211398_3224.html">social unrest</a>.</p>
<h2>Security and separatism</h2>
<p>Other policies that affect education and were made in the name of French secularism have also drawn controversy for potentially discriminating against Islam.</p>
<p>For example, a broad 2021 measure often referred to as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/15/frances-controversial-separatism-bill-explained#:%7E:text=Under%20a%20so%2Dcalled%20%E2%80%9Cseparatism,be%20banned%20from%20French%20territory.">the “separatism law</a>” aimed <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/283224-loi-separatisme-entree-en-vigueur-des-premieres-dispositions">to combat perceived nonallegiance to French values</a>. Among many requirements, the law made independent schools harder to open and easier for the state to close. </p>
<p>Although the text of the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/rdr/1749">law does not explicitly mention Muslims</a>, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.183.0003">political discourse surrounding the law</a> clearly targeted Islam. In an October 2020 speech defending the legislation, President Emmanuel Macron stated, “What we must tackle is Islamist separatism,” which he accused of “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/10/02/fight-against-separatism-the-republic-in-action-speech-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-the-fight-against-separatism">repeated deviations from the Republic’s values</a>.” </p>
<p>Yet there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/separatisme-et-si-la-politique-antiterroriste-faisait-fausse-route-149078?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=bylinetwitterbutton">little evidence of such alleged “separatism</a>.” Rather, studies have <a href="https://www.ined.fr/en/publications/editions/document-travail/trajectories-and-origines-survey-on-population-diversity-in-france-initial-findings-en/">consistently shown</a> that Muslim support for French institutions mirrors that of the larger population.</p>
<p>Other examples of policies that purport to rein in radicalization, but may further fuel Muslims’ isolation, include the 2023 <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/09/05/france-s-century-long-crusade-against-religious-symbols-at-school-from-the-crucifix-to-the-abaya_6124828_7.html">ban on abayas in public schools</a> and the <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/livre-la_politisation_du_voile_en_france_en_europe_et_dans_le_monde_arabe-9782747578875-18971.html">2004 “headscarf” law</a> that banned “ostentatious” <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691147987/the-politics-of-the-veil">religious symbols from public schools</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="About half a dozen women in headscarves look frustrated as they hold signs on the street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570989/original/file-20240123-17-fcypz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Veiled or not veiled, we want equality’: Parents and supporters protest in 2019 against a proposal to ban mothers who wear headscarves from school trips.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/parents-and-members-of-le-collectif-66-des-mamans-en-colere-news-photo/1146681939?adppopup=true">Raymond Roig/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One study argues the 2004 ban <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000106">harmed Muslim girls’ graduation rates</a>, subsequently affecting their employment opportunities. Similarly, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-schools-ban-on-abayas-and-headscarves-is-supposedly-about-secularism-but-it-sends-a-powerful-message-about-who-belongs-in-french-culture-213543">abaya ban</a> has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/how-do-you-distinguish-between-an-abaya-and-a-maxi-dress">criticized by human rights activists</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230830-un-criticises-france-for-banning-abaya-in-schools/">the United Nations</a> and the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-concerned-frances-expanding-interpretation-ban-religious">U.S. Commission for Religious Freedom</a> for unduly restricting freedom of religious expression and potentially fueling discrimination. </p>
<h2>The future of pluralism</h2>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/muslim-and-catholic-experiences-of-national-belonging-in-france-9781350380448/">our fieldwork</a>, we believe France’s Muslim schools <a href="https://theconversation.com/muslim-schools-are-allies-in-frances-fight-against-radicalization-not-the-cause-149802">may help reduce radicalization</a> and one of its causes: young people’s sense that being both fully French and fully Muslim <a href="https://www.europe1.fr/societe/selon-un-sondage-ifop-pour-le-journal-du-dimanche-78-des-francais-jugent-la-laicite-menacee-3927717">is incompatible</a>.</p>
<p>As one young French Muslim told us, “I’ve always been made to feel as though I’m not ‘une vraie française’ (a real French person).” Such “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199">everyday exclusion</a>” can fuel <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-migrations-societe-2023-4-page-3.htm">alienation</a>, <a href="https://arcade.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/Occasion_v09_hargreaves_final.pdf">resentment</a> or even <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2022.2147913">emmigration</a>.</p>
<p>Institutions like Averroès, however, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2017.1303768">offer a haven</a> from the <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253218346/muslim-girls-and-the-other-france/">discrimination students may experience in public schools</a>, and create a space for pupils who want to wear a headscarf or abaya. In addition, they actively <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/provence-alpes-cote-d-azur/bouches-du-rhone/marseille/rentree-marseille-eleves-musulmans-catholiques-se-rassemblent-hommage-samuel-paty-1890562.html">denounce terrorism</a> and <a href="https://www.20minutes.fr/lille/1512739-20150108-lille-hommage-charlie-hebdo-lycee-musulman-averroes">radicalization</a>.</p>
<p>But recent actions suggest that the French government may have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-closes-mosques-with-powers-that-some-critics-say-use-secretive-evidence-2022-04-05/">lost confidence in Muslim institutions</a> as a way to foster French values. France shut down <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/france/#:%7E:text=The%20government%20dissolved%20by%20decree,21%20mosques%20since%20November%202020.">672 Muslim establishments between 2018 and 2021</a>, including mosques and <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/france-has-shut-down-dozens-mosques-islamic-schools">independent Muslim schools</a>.</p>
<p>Most immediately, the decision to defund Averroès will impact its students and staff. The school offers scholarships to <a href="https://static.blast-info.fr/attachments/stories/2023/gS9HjS-QQnumCrLXl7NLOw/attachment-kaCAkdjcQz2hkp2n1H3ixA.pdf">approximately 62% of its student body</a>, including its nonstate-funded middle school – a number which will likely prove untenable without funding.</p>
<p>More broadly, such steps may intensify challenges to French Muslims’ sense of value and belonging, obstructing the path toward peaceful pluralism and paradoxically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/31/opinion/france-terrorism-muslims.html">increasing the risk of radicalization and separatism</a>.</p>
<p>Yet we believe there is a third risk, as well. The French Republic considers secular neutrality and equality <a href="https://editionsdelaube.fr/catalogue_de_livres/etre-francais/">core pillars of French identity</a>, but many critics view its policies on Islam as prime examples of inequality and bias. Such discord may <a href="https://www.ldh-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/HL195-Idees-en-debat-Loi-sur-le-separatisme-la-liberte-de-culte-entravee.pdf">undermine these values’ legitimacy</a>, if not their very essence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincent Geisser is affiliated with organization
President of the Center for Information and Studies on International Migration (CIEMI, Paris)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Ferrara and Françoise Lorcerie do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some of the measures the French government has taken to fight radicalization can do the opposite, three social scientists argue.Carol Ferrara, Anthropologist & Assistant Professor, Department of Marketing Communication, Emerson CollegeFrançoise Lorcerie, Professeure, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)Vincent Geisser, Sociologue, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193582023-12-13T16:58:27Z2023-12-13T16:58:27ZAre French and English secularist traditions that far apart?<p>Those who watched <a href="https://theconversation.com/king-charles-iiis-coronation-oath-is-a-crucial-part-of-the-ceremony-experts-explain-202870">the coronation of King Charles III</a> in May 2023 would be forgiven for thinking that the United Kingdom is the very opposite of a secular country. In Westminster Abbey the new head of state received his mandate from the Archbishop of Canterbury and thus became head of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/king-charles-defender-of-faith-what-the-monarchys-long-relationship-with-religion-may-look-like-under-the-new-sovereign-190766">Church of England</a>. But appearances can be deceptive. </p>
<p>The current situation in the UK is complex, a product of the contradictions and compromises of British history. In reality, England is on its way to becoming a secular society, but without having adopted the French principle of <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/frances-la-cite-why-the-rest-of-the-world-struggles-to-understand-it-149943">laïcité</a></em>.</p>
<p>The American philosopher <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674986916">Charles Taylor</a> is often quoted as distinguishing three major elements in the secularisation of Western societies: the decline of religious belief, the concept of religion as a personal choice of the believer, and the separation of church and state. With regard to the first two elements, France and England are fairly similar.</p>
<h2>Losing their religion</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/bulletins/religionenglandandwales/census2021">2021 census</a> in England and Wales showed for the first time that less than half the population declared themselves to be Christian: 46%, compared with 59% in 2011. 37% said they had no religion. By comparison, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Europe">the 2019 Eurobarometer</a> pinpoints <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-historique-2022-1-page-171.htm">47% of Christians in France</a>, compared with 40% with no religion. There were 10% of people declaring a religion other than Christianity <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/news/2022/is-religion-dying-in-england-and-wales">in England</a> and 12% in France. <a href="https://www.observationsociete.fr/modes-de-vie/des-croyances-et-pratiques-religieuses-en-declin-en-france/">This decline in religious identity</a> is accompanied by a fall in religious practice in both countries.</p>
<p>There have also been fundamental changes in practices, particularly with regard to what were until recently considered rites of passage. For example, it used to be normal for English men and women to get married in church, but <a href="https://wwww.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/19-may/news/uk/figures-for-2020-show-continued-decline-in-religious-wedding-ceremonies">in 2020 only 15% of couples held a religious wedding ceremony</a>. </p>
<p>The average Anglican church held only four funerals and one wedding in 2020. On the other hand <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24565994">alternative rites abound</a>. It is now possible and accepted to get married, or to formalise a civil union, <a href="https://unconventionalwedding.co.uk/the-best-alternative-wedding-venues/">outside the church or the registry office</a>: in a hotel, but also in a garden, on a boat, on the beach, or anywhere else the couple fancies. </p>
<p>Moreovoer, it is now very common for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanist_celebrant">humanists</a> to preside over weddings and other rites in place of priests. Instead of offering the sacraments, they mark the high points of human life in collective celebrations. They can be called upon for both weddings and funerals.</p>
<p>The same trends can be seen in other social institutions. In the courts, for example, where people used to swear on the Bible, the accused or the jurors can now swear on a religious book of their choice, such as the Koran, the Torah or the Bhagavad-Gita (a key Hindu text), or they can simply make a solemn declaration. At a trial I attended last year, 10 out of 12 jurors chose to solemnly swear that they would do their duty. The religious choice is therefore a personal option, but does not change anything in the course of justice.</p>
<h2>Religion at school</h2>
<p>As far as educational institutions are concerned, France and the UK have a mixed economy that includes state and public schools. In the UK, 6% of young people are in <a href="https://tutorful.co.uk/blog/private-school-statistics-uk-independent-schools">private education</a> compared with almost 17% <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/questions-reponses/290729-la-place-de-lenseignement-prive-en-france-en-cinq-questions">in France</a>. British public schools receive no direct financial subsidy from the state, whereas the vast majority <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/289657-lenseignement-prive-sous-contrat">of French public schools</a> receive substantial public funding.</p>
<p>In the UK, a third of state schools are <a href="https://flashlearners.com/how-many-faith-schools-are-there-in-the-uk/#:%7E:text=The%20number%20of%20faith%20schools%20in%20the%20UK,others%29%2C%20Islam%2C%20Judaism%2C%20Sikhism%2C%20Hinduism%2C%20and%20other%20faiths">so-called “faith” schools</a>, the majority of which are primary schools. In France, on the other hand, religious education takes place mainly in <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enseignement_priv%C3%A9_en_France#cite_note-2">public schools</a>, the vast majority of which (97%) are Catholic schools. </p>
<p>It is in state schools that the differences emerge. The extent to which state schools in France must insist on the exclusion of religious signs and practices is well known. The situation in the UK varies across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as each of the ‘four nations’ oversees the education of its young constituents.</p>
<p>In England, for example, a third of state schools (including secondary schools) have <a href="https://flashlearners.com/how-many-faith-schools-are-there-in-the-uk/">religious status</a> (mostly Anglican and Catholic, but also Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh). This status implies that the school or college is affiliated to a religious organisation, offers religious education courses and maintains a culture informed by the religion in question. The school may accept children of other religions, or of no religion at all, who may manifest their own allegiance while respecting the school’s religious culture. There is a strong resemblance between British state ‘faith’ schools and public schools in France.</p>
<p>It should be noted that since <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/livinglearning/school/overview/educationact1944/">the 1944 Act</a>, state schools in England other than faith schools, at primary and secondary level, have been obliged to provide instruction in religion once a week, and to hold an “act of Christian worship” every day. In practice, the majority of these schools choose to recognise the diversity of beliefs among pupils, either in religion classes or in collective gatherings. </p>
<h2>Families can choose</h2>
<p>In the UK, parents can choose to <a href="https://theconversation.com/parents-are-pulling-children-from-re-lessons-so-they-dont-learn-about-islam-95235">withdraw their children from religious activities</a>, with trends increasingly leaning in that direction. Pupils themselves can exercise this choice from the age of 16. </p>
<p>Schools interpret these obligations in their own way. For example, the act of worship may take the form of a meeting focusing on school life (academic or sporting successes, discipline and behaviour). And lessons on religion can cover beliefs and practices of all kinds. </p>
<p>Not only do parents have the option of withdrawing their children from these activities, but headteachers can also request that the school be exempted. Ultimately, there is a diversity of situations, between religious enthusiasm and secular practice.</p>
<p>Confrontations are rare and it seems that the system of personal choice by pupils, parents and teachers in terms of religious beliefs and practices contributes to school peace.</p>
<h2>The changing role of religion</h2>
<p>The separation of state and church in the political and legal spheres raises more pressing questions. The Anglican Church receives no state subsidy, but it is “established” like the Church of England <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/topics/zwcsp4j/articles/zgkcr2p">since Henry VIII’s Reformation in the 16th century</a>. </p>
<p>Today, the monarch is still the head of the church, although decisions are actually taken by the government, which is responsible, for example, for approving the appointment of bishops. 26 bishops sit ex officio in the House of Lords and make their voices heard there. </p>
<p>The Church’s political position is mainly symbolic, but it does act as a spokesperson for spiritual and ethical values, which gives it a certain influence in public opinion.</p>
<h2>Towards a secular regime?</h2>
<p>Criticism of religion is now widespread, and a growing minority is calling for the privileges of religion to be excluded from community life. In the UK, two major associations represent this perspective: Humanists UK and the National Secular Society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.librairie-intranquille.fr/ebook/9780349425450/the-little-book-of-humanism-universal-lessons--alice-roberts-andrew-copson-piatkus">Humanists</a> present themselves as non-religious freethinkers who propose a rational and ethical worldview. They draw on a long European and even international tradition, and encourage debate on <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/552033/humanly-possible-by-sarah-bakewell/">philosophical</a> and social issues. While in France humanism can be claimed by many intellectual tendencies, the use of the term in the UK is in practice limited to non-believers.</p>
<p><a href="https://humanists.uk/ceremonies/find-a-celebrant/">Humanists</a> form a support network and provide a large number of celebrants for non-religious rites of passage. They are people trained and accredited to conduct ceremonies such as weddings and funerals, without reference to religion.</p>
<p>They are close to <a href="https://www.secularism.org.uk/campaigns/">the National Secular Society</a>, which campaigns for a “secular democracy where everyone is treated equally, whatever their religion or belief”. Its aims include strengthening the separation of church and state, abolishing religious schools, excluding religion from health institutions and affirming the equality of all before the law, regardless of belief. Its outlook therefore corresponds closely to certain interpretations of the French principle of <em>laïcité</em>. </p>
<h2>Two similar but different histories</h2>
<p>The complexity of the current situation could be developed further. The differences between the four “nations” of the United Kingdom are becoming more pronounced with the rise of nationalism in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In addition, the Church of England is part of an international community of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglican_Communion">46 Anglican churches</a> around the world, especially in former colonies. There are a wide variety of perspectives, particularly in relation to social policy, ranging from the role of women, LGBTQ+ rights to relations with the state and with other religions.</p>
<p>Similar complexities can be found in regions of France that have a different relationship with secularism (<a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/20210-alsace-moselle-outre-mer-les-exceptions-au-droit-des-cultes-loi-1905">Alsace-Moselle, overseas France</a>). This reinforces the idea that England and France face the same challenges. </p>
<p>However, there is still a lot of work to be done to get to the point where both countries can better understand each other’s experience. The historical paths of France and the UK are very different, despite their geographical proximity. These differences run through their institutions, their political, social and intellectual structures and their languages. And while the two countries often face comparable problems, such as the place of religion in modern society, it is clear that each will have to find solutions suited to their own culture and history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219358/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Kelly is a member of the Labour Party as well as of the South Hampshire Humanists.</span></em></p>On several counts, England is now on its way to becoming a secularist society. Nevertheless, there remain cultural differences that prevent it from embracing the French principle of “laïcité”.Michael Kelly, Emeritus Professor of French in Modern Languages and Linguistics, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2135432023-09-29T12:23:09Z2023-09-29T12:23:09ZFrench schools’ ban on abayas and headscarves is supposedly about secularism − but it sends a powerful message about who ‘belongs’ in French culture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550744/original/file-20230927-25-du7dcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C0%2C3608%2C2392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents watch French air force jets fly over a Paris suburb during the Bastille Day military parade on July 14, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FranceSecularismSchools/bc7bd6cef9b447ab8d9fa8b7303a9f1e/photo?Query=france%20muslim&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5656&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Youcef Bounab</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>France’s decision to ban public school students from wearing the abaya – <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2023/08/29/what-is-the-abaya-the-garment-france-wants-to-ban-from-schools_6113640_8.html">a long dress or robe</a> popular among women in certain Muslim cultures – and the male equivalent, the qamis, has <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/france-abaya-ban-macron-accused-double-standard-uk-royal-visit#:%7E:text=French%20President%20Emmanuel%20Macron%20has,abayas%20worn%20by%20Muslim%20women.">faced criticism</a> since Aug. 27, 2023, when the country’s education minister announced the new rule.</p>
<p>Yet polls suggest that more than 80% of the French population <a href="https://www.ifop.com/publication/la-position-des-francais-sur-linterdiction-du-port-de-labaya-et-du-qamis-a-lecole/">supports the ban</a>, as does the country’s highest court: The Conseil d'État <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/07/world/europe/france-abaya-muslims-school.html">has upheld</a> <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/09/19/interdiction-du-port-de-l-abaya-a-l-ecole-deux-referes-suspension-a-leur-tour-examines-au-conseil-d-etat_6190060_3224.html">the challenged ban</a> twice – most recently <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2437691/frances-top-court-rejects-appeal-against-ban-on-abaya-in-schools">on Sept. 25, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>Education Minister Gabriel Attal cited “laïcité,” or French secularism, as the reason for the ban. Legislation passed in 2004 prohibits “ostentatious religious symbols” from public schools, including large crosses and Jewish head coverings, though its main target <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691147987/the-politics-of-the-veil">has been Muslim headscarves</a>.</p>
<p>Debate over the abaya, however, gets to the heart of <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-weaponization-of-laicite">debates over laïcité</a>. Many critics argue that the abaya <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20230829-cultural-garment-or-religious-symbol-debate-over-france-s-ban-on-abyas-in-school">is a cultural garment</a>, not a religious one, and should be allowed under laïcité. In practice, though, anything associated with Muslim cultures tends to be considered “religious.” Catholic traditions, meanwhile, are often considered “cultural” – and therefore compatible with laïcité.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://emerson.edu/faculty-staff-directory/carol-ferrara">ethnographic research</a> in French schools, where secularism debates are particularly heated, suggests that the abaya ban and the earlier “headscarf law” aren’t really about defending laïcité. Rather, they protect a particular version of French identity – an identity infused with Catholic culture.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People at a protest stand beneath an awning as they hold signs over their faces." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550416/original/file-20230926-15-sl86y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Staff from a school on the outskirts of Paris protest against the government’s abaya ban on Sept. 6, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rally-was-organized-by-staff-from-the-maurice-utrillo-high-news-photo/1648579667?adppopup=true">Mohamad Salaheldin Abdelg Alsayed/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Catho-laïcité’</h2>
<p>Despite its reputation as a staunchly secular country, France has a deep and tangled relationship with Catholicism. </p>
<p>Recent studies show that only about 1 in 3 French people ages 18-59 <a href="https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6793308?sommaire=6793391#onglet-3">consider themselves Catholic</a> – whether in a religious or cultural sense – and <a href="https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6793308?sommaire=6793391#onglet-1">weekly Mass attendance is uncommon</a>. </p>
<p>Yet the faith still has a powerful influence upon French culture. Attending church for holidays, funerals, weddings and baptisms remains commonplace. Crosses, <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/covid-19-les-cloches-des-eglises-de-france-vont-sonner-ce-mercredi-25-mars-a-19h30-20200325">church bells</a> and <a href="https://laportelatine.org/medias/videotheque/paris-video-de-la-procession-de-la-fsspx-du-8-decembre-2021">public church processions</a> are considered ordinary aspects of French culture, despite the official emphasis on <a href="https://editionsdelaube.fr/catalogue_de_livres/etre-francais-les-quatre-piliers-de-la-nationalite/">laïcité as a unifying pillar</a> of national identity. </p>
<p>“I am convinced that the Catholic sap (of France) must still, and forever, contribute to the life of our nation,” President Emmanuel Macron said in <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/04/09/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-conference-des-eveques-de-france-au-college-des-bernardins">a 2018 speech to bishops</a>.</p>
<p>By contrast, headscarves, abayas, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20091203-2009-12-03-0710-french-press-review-minarets-mosques-french-poll-46%25-ifop-thierry-henry-handball-fifa-pompidou-strike">minarets</a>, the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/France/Politique/Appels-priere-islamique-Le-Pen-RN-denonce-une-nouvelle-escalade-2020-04-04-1301087872">call to prayer</a>, halal food and Islamic <a href="https://www.francesoir.fr/societe-faits-divers/les-prieres-de-rues-de-clichy-la-garenne-jugees-illegales">prayer in public spaces</a> are often perceived as threats to French identity. Moreover, these get flagged as religious symbols, putting them in conflict with laïcité <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo59260270.html">in ways that Catholic symbols avoid</a>.</p>
<p>Catholicism’s intimate relationship with secularism in France is sometimes referred to as “catho-laïcité,” referring to how Catholicism, laïcité and Frenchness become almost interchangeable. Rather than neutral secularism, “laïcité” can represent a particular, Catholic-infused French identity that views religious or cultural “others” with suspicion.</p>
<h2>Santa Claus in class</h2>
<p>These contradictions are especially evident around Catholic holidays. In the lead-up to Christmas, schools often celebrate with decorations, concerts and even visits from Santa Claus – activities defended as cultural rather than religious. My 3-year-old son’s holiday concert in a public preschool just outside Paris included “O Christmas Tree,” “Little Father Christmas” and “Silent Night,” but no songs from other religious traditions despite many of his classmates’ Muslim heritage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Half a dozen people in red and white fuzzy suits paddleboard beneath a bridge as a crowd watches above." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550414/original/file-20230926-23-1bck3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People dressed as Santa Claus attend a paddleboarding parade on the Ill river in Strasbourg, France, on Dec. 3, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pedestrians-take-pictures-as-paddlers-dressed-as-santa-news-photo/1245331036?adppopup=true">Sebastien Bozon/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Controversies stemming from holiday activities point back to this idea of “catho-laïcité”: Traditions rooted in Christian culture are more likely to be considered cultural and thus compatible with both secularism and “Frenchness.”</p>
<p>In 2018, an elementary school director in southern France <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/politique/education/laicite-une-ecole-annule-les-animations-autour-de-noel-l-education-nationale-intervient-2954198.php">canceled all Christmas-related activities</a> to adhere to the “rules of laïcité” after a parent expressed disapproval. Community backlash was so fervent that the national ministry of education stepped in to intervene and reinstated the ostensibly cultural activities.</p>
<p>More recently, a mayor in northern France issued an <a href="https://www.tf1info.fr/regions/video-insolite-pas-de-calais-le-pere-noel-autorise-a-marcher-sur-les-toits-par-arrete-municipal-lors-du-reveillon-les-24-et-25-decembre-2242157.html">official authorization for Santa Claus</a> to park on rooftops, publicly declaring that Santa would be “within the law” during his visit that season. Local public elementary school students were later surprised with a video of Santa Claus and his elves depositing gifts at their school.</p>
<h2>Fish, fowl and halal</h2>
<p>Discrepancies between how laïcité applies to different religious traditions do not emerge just at holidays. French school cafeterias often serve fish on Fridays, <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/brian-fagan/fish-on-friday/9780786722334/?lens=basic-books">a Catholic tradition</a>, but debates have raged over offering halal food or other substitutes. </p>
<p>In 2015, a town in central France decided to stop providing substitutes for pork, which is forbidden in Muslim and Jewish tradition, in its school cafeterias. Officials argued that providing exceptions had impinged upon secular neutrality. In 2020, the case <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/12/11/proposer-des-menus-sans-porc-a-la-cantine-ne-contrevient-pas-a-la-laicite-juge-le-conseil-d-etat_6063109_3224.html">went to the top court</a>, where judges declared that schools were not obligated under laïcité to provide alternative menu options for religious diets – though they added that doing so would not contradict laïcité.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women in headscarves hold a cardboard sign written in black marker." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C1019%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550431/original/file-20230926-17-jzllgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A placard at a 2019 protest in Toulouse reads, ‘France: it’s you and me.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-with-a-headscarf-holds-a-placard-reading-france-its-news-photo/1178484365?adppopup=true">Alain Pitton/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The following year, a middle school in Bordeaux began providing occasional halal meals, as well as nonhalal alternatives. Nonetheless, the move sparked significant protest from local parent groups that lamented the “<a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/bordeaux/on-bafoue-le-principe-de-laicite-et-c-est-assume-le-menu-halal-d-un-college-bordelais-inquiete-des-parents-d-eleves-20230521">flouting of the principle of laïcité</a>.”</p>
<h2>Other options</h2>
<p>Families seeking alternative education options often turn to France’s state-funded private schools, which are allowed to offer optional religious education but must otherwise follow the national curriculum and accept students of any faith. Yet here, too, the playing field is uneven.</p>
<p>There are more than <a href="https://enseignement-catholique.fr/chiffres-cles-enseignement-catholique/">7,000 Catholic schools</a> to choose from, and at some of them, upward of 70% of the student body <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Actualite/L-enseignement-catholique-face-a-ses-eleves-musulmans-_NG_-2010-09-08-578289">is Muslim</a>. Options for state-funded private Muslim schools, on the other hand – <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2017.1303768">a focus of my research</a> – are sparse. This is due, in part, to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2022.2131735">challenges that Muslim schools face</a> when applying for permits and funding.</p>
<p>Families can also choose from the approximately <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Famille/ecoles-hors-contrat-musulmanes-viseur-autorites-2020-12-07-1201128640">100 independent Muslim schools</a>, run without government funding. However, these face <a href="https://www.saphirnews.com/La-loi-Gatel-destinee-a-mieux-encadrer-l-ouverture-des-ecoles-privees-vise-t-elle-les-projets-musulmans_a24965.html">constant scrutiny</a> compared with the roughly 200 <a href="https://www.ecoles-libres.fr/statistiques/">independent Catholic schools</a> – some of which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09571558221151001">do not support laïcité</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A handful of women in long dresses, and many with headscarves, stand and chat on the grass." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550415/original/file-20230926-17-8ya7k9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People in front of a school in Trappes, France, protest the abaya ban on Sept. 8, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/muslim-people-protest-against-the-interdiction-of-abaya-in-news-photo/1653667947?adppopup=true">Mohamad Salaheldin Abdelg Alsayed/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Future consequences</h2>
<p>It is not clear how the abaya ban will affect students. On Sept. 4, 2023, only about <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/09/07/abaya-le-conseil-d-etat-valide-l-interdiction-a-l-ecole_6188297_3224.html">300 students out of France’s 12 million</a> came to school wearing an abaya, and only 67 refused to remove it, according to the education ministry.</p>
<p>The 2004 headscarf law, however, seems to have harmed Muslim girls’ educational success. According to one key study, the gap in secondary school completion rates between Muslim and non-Muslim women <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000106">doubled among those who were teenagers when the ban was passed</a> because of higher dropout rates. Moreover, the study’s authors argue that this disparity increased <a href="https://humsci.stanford.edu/feature/stanford-scholars-report-french-headscarf-ban-adversely-impacts-muslim-girls">the employment gap</a> between Muslim and non-Muslim women.</p>
<p>Taking a closer look at France’s education system, I argue, shows that the abaya ban isn’t really about laïcité. If it were, Santa and Christmas songs would be relegated to the private sphere, and cafeteria menus would equally accommodate common religious diets. Instead, Catholic symbols are often embraced as integral to French culture, while Muslim symbols are scrutinized or barred – sending students a powerful message about what it means to be “French.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carol Ferrara does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Catholicism, ‘Frenchness’ and secularism are often conflated in French culture, a scholar writes, while non-Christian traditions are viewed with suspicion.Carol Ferrara, Anthropologist & Assistant Professor, Department of Marketing Communication, Emerson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036092023-05-09T15:28:22Z2023-05-09T15:28:22ZFrench universalism sidelines ethnic minorities – why that must change<p>French MP Olivier Serva has urged his government to tackle discrimination against people with afro hair. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/28/france-urged-to-outlaw-hair-discrimination">a recent interview</a> on the national radio station France Info, he reportedly introduced plans to present a cross-party bill to parliament by appealing to the republic’s values of “liberty, equality, fraternity”. </p>
<p>He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is about allowing everyone to be as they are and as they want to be, whether in it’s in the workplace or anywhere else. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Diversity in the public sphere is not something <a href="https://researchportal.northumbria.ac.uk/en/publications/pluralism-and-the-idea-of-the-republic-in-france">French republicanism</a>, as it is currently defined, does very well. As opposed to the American and British approach to immigration that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13691831003764367">has tended to promote multiculturalism</a>, Republican France espouses an “<a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-sociologie-1-2008-5-page-3.htm">assimilationist</a>” model. </p>
<p>There is broad political consensus, from the left to the far right, that what matters is to integrate minorities, culturally, into the national community. People are free to entertain personal allegiances, as individuals, as long as they integrate into the national community and respect its rules. </p>
<p>Every French citizen must fit, either voluntarily or under duress, into the framework of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/crimes-of-solidarity-liberte-egalite-and-frances-crisis-of-fraternite-90010">republican values</a>”. Ostensibly, these values are enshrined in the constitution as freedom, fraternity and equality, as well as <a href="https://theconversation.com/frances-la-cite-why-the-rest-of-the-world-struggles-to-understand-it-149943"><em>laïcité</em></a> (secularism). But they are actually ill-defined.</p>
<p>This universalism is intended to settle any class, gender or race-related inequalities. France sees itself as an exception in the world, on a mission to defend universal values. Anglo-Saxon societies, by contrast, are often branded, by French <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/expressions/la-spectaculaire-derive-de-nos-societes-democratiques">political thinkers</a> and <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/etats-unis-la-fragmentation-culturelle-est-la-plus-grande-menace-qui-pese-sur-la-democratie-20210111">pundits</a> alike, as “fragmented” along religious and ethnic divisions. </p>
<p>However, proclaiming that the state upholds universal principles does not, in itself, act as a safeguard against institutional discrimination and racism. Instead, it leads to the issue being intentionally overlooked. France <a href="https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol31/iss2/7/">does not collect</a> data on race. It has never critically reflected on its colonial past. And <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/04/01/race-a-never-ending-taboo-in-france/">it sees no problem</a> in having a <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EMTEL/Minorities/papers/franceminorepres.pdf">disproportionately low representation</a> of ethnic minorities in the media, politics, <a href="https://theconversation.com/quand-le-racisme-est-devenu-une-question-politique-dans-le-cinema-francais-155189">culture</a> or business.</p>
<h2>Republican values</h2>
<p>French republicanism seeks to promote a specific, yet diffuse national culture. <a href="https://www.cairn.info/racismes-de-france--9782348046247-page-339.htm">I call it</a> <em>catho-laïque</em>, a blend of catholic, Christian values and militant atheism. It is a type of partisan patriotism based on an authoritarian communitarianism.</p>
<p>While purporting to defend universal values, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230590960">classic republicans</a> are in fact defending the interests of a predominantly male, bourgeois and white population. They do not want to share political and economic power with women, young people and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/02/15/91-of-black-people-in-metropolitan-france-say-they-are-victims-of-racist-discrimination_6015940_7.html">racialised minorities</a>.</p>
<p>In his 1988 study, Le Creuset Français (The French Melting Pot), French historian Gérard Noiriel showed how <a href="https://theconversation.com/macaronis-ritals-quand-les-migrants-italiens-etaient-eux-aussi-victimes-de-racisme-196990">Italian</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-france-est-elle-vraiment-un-pays-assimilationniste-51145">Polish</a> immigrants during the interwar period were made to integrate in a rather brutal manner. French workers saw their Italian counterparts as competitors and “scabs”; the public in general labelled them “dirty” and “dangerous enemies of the Republic”. The fact that Polish workers were openly demonstrative of their Catholic faith only made things worse, particularly in the mining areas of north-east France.</p>
<p>In 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing’s centre-right government closed the nation’s borders and suspended all immigration, in an effort to protect French workers. An exception was made for family-based immigration, also known as <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-de-demographie-historique-2014-2-page-187.htm"><em>le regroupement familial</em></a> (family reunion). This particularly affected people in former French colonies – Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco – in north Africa.</p>
<p>Nearly two decades later, in 1993, Jacques Chirac’s government voted in the “<a href="https://www.histoire-immigration.fr/les-50-ans-de-la-revue-hommes-migrations/1993-reforme-du-code-de-la-nationalite">Pasqua law</a>” on immigration. Until then, children born on French soil to foreign parents were automatically granted French citizenship. The new law now required them to apply. </p>
<p>New laws governing public life began to appear, from the late 1980s, which were rooted in partisan patriotism. In 1989, three Muslim schoolgirls refused to take off their headscarves at their college in Creil, near Paris, and <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/07/27/01016-20180727ARTFIG00053-l-affaire-des-foulards-de-creil-la-republique-laique-face-au-voile-islamique.php">were sent home</a>. Subsequently, politicians from the left and the right passed a law in 2004 banning the wearing of religious symbols in schools. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/after-charlie-hebdo-terror-racism-and-free-speech/ch2-the-meaning-of-charlie-the-debate-on-the-troubled-french-identity">I have argued</a> that, in the context of the 2015 terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo, the slogan “Je Suis Charlie” initially expressed solidarity with the victims of the attacks. However, it was quickly co-opted by the government as an injunction to support Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons and humour. </p>
<h2>Multicultural republicanism</h2>
<p>The concept of French citizenship could be expanded to include reference to ethnic or cultural backgrounds. It should be possible to present yourself as Franco-Algerian, Franco-Italian, Franco-Senegalese or Franco-Guadeloupean without being suspected of conspiring against republican universalism. </p>
<p>Similarly, in schools, the priority should be that pupils attend classes and receive an education. <a href="https://theconversation.com/de-la-mauvaise-defense-de-l-islamophobie-125780">Religious symbols</a> that do not hamper the curriculum being taught should be tolerated in school. Educational materials in history or philosophy, say, should recognise the existence of minority identities. The <a href="https://www.education.gouv.fr/bo/2004/21/MENG0401138C.htm#:%7E:text=141%2D5%2D1%20du%20code,une%20appartenance%20religieuse%20est%20interdit%E2%80%9D.">2004 law banning religious signs in schools</a> should be abolished on the grounds that it is teaching that emancipates, not the forced removal of a religious symbol or the expulsion of a student who does not want to comply.</p>
<p>A multicultural republic would guarantee, in practice, that everyone, including people from ethnic minorities, has access to management positions in business, in public services, in universities or in politics. A policy that actively promotes minorities in these areas would enable minorities to acquire the social visibility which they still so often lack.</p>
<p>In its fight for equality, however, France should not fall in the trap of identity politics. The glorified and exclusive defence of an identity, which would be more important than alliances between classes, genders and races, would prove classic republicans right. A multicultural republic should not despise universal rights. On the contrary, it should fight for all to have access to them.</p>
<p>What is at stake here is not the recognition of minorities or the withdrawal into stigmatised or invisible identities. Even if well intended, this approach would only serve to further exclude minorities from the nation.</p>
<p>Instead, it is a question of making the presence of diversity in the public sphere the norm. This would be the sign that the French Republic is no longer a “white”, but a universal community; one that is aware of its racial prejudices. Only then will minorities become full citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philippe Marlière does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saying the state upholds universal principles does not act as a safeguard against institutional discrimination and racism.Philippe Marlière, Professor in French and European Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1952302022-11-25T10:40:41Z2022-11-25T10:40:41ZWhy France, Germany and the UK relate to their Muslim communities so differently<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497073/original/file-20221123-26-vbvv1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C34%2C7747%2C5091&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French president Emmanuel Macron greets the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris Chems-Eddine Hafiz in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ludovic Marin/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The way we perceive and talk about Islam varies greatly from one European country to the next. While this may be easy enough to intuit by glancing over different national headlines, I backed this up with hard data in my PhD research on <a href="https://www.theses.fr/s263315">public discourses on Islam in Germany, France and the United Kingdom</a>.</p>
<h2>The pursuit of German identity</h2>
<p>In Germany, how you approach Islam hinges onto which side of the political debate you stand. On the one hand, the majority of the political elite defends a German identity that is no longer based on traditional culture but on support toward the constitution (<em><a href="https://www.suhrkamp.de/buch/jan-werner-mueller-verfassungspatriotismus-t-9783518126127">Verfassungspatriotismus</a></em>). On the other hand, a media and political minority defends the return of a monocultural vision of German identity (<em><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-german-leitkultur/a-38684973">Leitkultur</a></em>).</p>
<p>In this narrative struggle, elites see the country’s far right, led by the AfD (<em>Alternative für Deutschland</em>) party, as <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik">enemy number one</a>, far more than they do radical Islam. Security concerns over Muslims are therefore limited to <a href="https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/07/2017-07-20_afd-btw_faltblatt_islam-nicht-zu-deutschland.pdf">the former players</a> and to a handful of figures in the media such as <a href="https://www.emma.de/artikel/islam-und-islamismus-eine-brisante-umfrage-338749">Alice Schwarzer</a> or <a href="https://www.focus.de/politik/experten/gastbeitrag-von-birgit-kelle-es-gibt-keine-islamophobie-aber-sicher-einen-terror-im-namen-des-islam_id_12601630.html">Birgit Kelle</a>.</p>
<h2>Shades of liberalism</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom it is liberalism that calls the shots, with two strands of thought. On the one hand, ideological liberalism aims to protect the British way of life in the face of terrorism and “preachers of hatred”. In 2011, then–Prime Minister David Cameron put forward his brand of <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130102224134/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/">“muscular liberalism”</a> that “actively promoted… certain values… [such as] freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality”. But that current of thought is also claimed by hard Brexiteers such as Nigel Farage, who’s ardently opposed to what he portrays as a pro-immigration EU led by Germany.</p>
<p>Inherited from the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2017.1398443">British empire</a>, the other liberal current, multiculturalism, seeks to manage differences and face off both populist and nationalist threats. Advocates of “muscular liberalism” view this approach as passive and neutral, merely contenting itself with demanding citizens obey the law. Here again, champions of multicultural liberalism in Westminster and the media tend to focus their energies on the European Union – albeit this time to defend it – rather than on Islam.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Muslims pray in a mosque" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497332/original/file-20221125-16-k2d5y3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslims pray at the central mosque in Cologne-Ehrenfeld, western Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.afpforum.com/AFPForum/Search/Results.aspx?pn=1&smd=8&mui=3&q=6562230975996011826_0&fst=muslims+germany+mosque&fto=3&t=2#pn=1&smd=8&mui=3&q=6562230975996011826_0&fst=muslims+germany+mosque&fto=3&t=2">Rainer Jensen/AFP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Islam and <em>laïcité</em></h2>
<p>In France, narratives about Islam are articulated in relation to religion, opposing two conceptions of French secularism, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/frances-la-cite-why-the-rest-of-the-world-struggles-to-understand-it-149943"><em>laïcité</em></a>: on the one hand, what other academics and I refer to as <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/rdr/435">axiological laïcité</a>, or values-based laïcité, frames secularism as a refuge against a real or perceived “Islamic threat”. <a href="https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/la-constitution/comment-la-constitution-protege-t-elle-la-laicite">Constitutional secularism</a>, by contrast, aims to regulate all religions, the French Muslims of the Republic included.</p>
<p>Although it is not based on any legal text, axiological secularism has managed to become the <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-cite-lexception-nest-pas-la-ou-les-francais-la-voient-128338">dominant force</a> in French secularism since concerns over headscarves at school <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/12/world/arab-girls-veils-at-issue-in-france.html">first erupted in 1989</a>. Paradoxically, constitutional secularism, which is based on the 1905 law on the separation of church and state and on the preamble of the 1946 constitution, is struggling to make itself heard in the public debate.</p>
<p>In sum, the way Islam is represented across Germany, the UK and France reveals a struggle between two interpretations of <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/two-faces-of-liberalism">political liberalism</a>. The proponents of <em>Leitkultur</em>, muscular liberalism, and axiological secularism understand political liberalism as a set of “common values”, to which the newcomers have to assimilate.</p>
<p>By contrast, proponents of <em>Verfassungspatriotismus</em>, <em>multiculturalism</em> or constitutional secularism, insist on <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/RAWPL">“common rules of the game”</a> for <em>de facto</em> multicultural societies.</p>
<p>These European narrative battlefields show what is politically acceptable or costly in the national public debate.</p>
<h2>Did you say “islamophobia”?</h2>
<p>In Germany and the United Kingdom, pointing out (Muslim) culture as a threat is more acceptable than it is in France, where political players rarely venture to explicitly target a culture. On the contrary, denouncing (Muslim) religion as a threat is more acceptable in the French context, where religion is seen as an opinion. Doing so carries a high political cost in the UK and Germany, where religion is seen as part of one’s identity.</p>
<p>For example, there is no consensus across countries on the use of the term of <em>Islamophobia</em>, which is not officially recognised in France. This is partly because Islam is not protected by the Constitution or the law as a religion. On the other, many would argue against the concept of phobia on the grounds that it is legitimate to oppose Islam amid <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-nouvelle-2020-1-page-9.htm">increased fundamentalism</a>.</p>
<p>In Germany, the phenomenon is well recognised, but there is an ongoing<a href="https://www.kreisgg.de/fileadmin/Buero_Landrat/Integration/Antirassismus_und_Integrationsmanagement/Fachstelle_gegen_Rassismus/Publikationen/Islamfeindlichkeit_Begriffe_.pdf">debate</a> over whether the term ought to be used in official language. Since the <a href="https://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DE/Startseite/startseite_node.html">German Islam Conference</a> in 2011-2012, the state has favoured the word <a href="https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/36/2017/07/2017.07.26-WS1-Germany-Final.pdf"><em>Muslimfeindligkeit</em></a> (hostility toward Muslims), while academics and journalists refer to Islamophobia and its Germanic version, <em>Islamfeindligkeit</em>.</p>
<p>However, UK residents have extensively referred to the concept ever since the <a href="https://assets.website-files.com/61488f992b58e687f1108c7c/617bfd6cf1456219c2c4bc5c_islamophobia.pdf">“Report on Islamophobia”</a> by Runnymede Trust was published in 1997. And, since 2017, an <a href="https://appgbritishmuslims.org/">All Party Parliamentary Group</a> has been working toward the adoption of a <a href="https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/impact/all-party-parliamentary-group-on-british-muslims(e8c74de4-dec2-4ef7-b5b6-bcae59ccacbf).html">legal definition of Islamophobia</a>.</p>
<p>These narrative and conceptual variations from one European context to another reveal country-specific historical traumas.</p>
<h2>The weight of national history in contemporary discourses</h2>
<p>In the United Kingdom, continental Europe is more polarising than Islam for two historical reasons. On the one hand, continental Europe, sometimes <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/reinvention/archive/volume5issue2/mayblinsmith/">Catholic, sometimes absolutist, sometimes imperialist</a>, has always been perceived as the main threat to the country’s elites. On the other hand, Islam has been part of UK history since the colonisation of India through its trading posts in 1600, and all Muslim subjects of the Empire became full citizens through the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/56/introduction/enacted">Nationality Act 1948</a>. Designating Islam as a threat is therefore of little value, at least from an electoral point of view, even on the far right of the political spectrum. This is evidenced by the defeat of the UKIP party in the 2019 European parliamentary elections after Eurosceptic Nigel Farage was replaced by the aggressively Islamophobic Gerard Batten as party leader in 2018, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/07/ukip-to-hold-leadership-election-later-this-year-gerard-batten">triggering the departure of some of its founding members</a>.</p>
<p>The ambivalence of German public discourse toward Islam is linked to the traumatic legacy of Nazism and Germany’s division during the Cold War. This dual legacy shaped the emergence of a unified, democratic and liberal state around <a href="https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/6/1/67/669061">constitutional patriotism</a>. The former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to welcome more than one million refugees (<a href="https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenzen/sommerpressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-848300">“Wir Schaffen Das”</a>) in 2015, however, has precipitated the return of an authoritarian and nationalist movement German <a href="https://www.zvab.com/9783442755929/Europa-Identit%8At-Krise-multikulturellen-Gesellschaft-3442755921/plp"><em>Leitkultur</em></a>, with cracks increasingly appearing within the consensus.</p>
<p>In France, the narrative victory of <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-humanisme-2017-1-page-17.htm">axiological secularism</a> over constitutional secularism also expresses a double legacy. On the one hand, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08898480.2018.1553410">secular tradition</a>, either through anticlericalism or attachment to a Catholic secular tradition, expresses a reluctance to the visibility of Islam in the public space. On the other hand, the colonisation of North Africa, and with it the trauma of the decolonisation of Algeria, made <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45110512_L%27islam_comme_contre-identification_francaise_Trois_moments">the Muslim Other</a> the figure that still structures French identity to a large extent today.</p>
<p>French identity thus continues to be constructed in opposition to Islam, while British identity hangs in opposition to continental Europe, and German identity, against Nazi Germany. If the future of the European Union rests, in part, on a greater convergence of interest and vision, acknowledging the weight of national histories in contemporary discourses is a necessary precondition for the construction of a European <a href="https://livre.fnac.com/a2572516/Benedict-Anderson-Imagined-communities">imagined community</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeanne Prades works as Senior Consultant at Technopolis Group where she evaluates public policies. </span></em></p>Liberal schools of thought largely inform how Muslims are viewed across Europe, research finds.Jeanne Prades, Docteure en Science politique - Chercheure associée au Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de Polytechnique (LinX), École polytechniqueLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1499432020-11-20T13:44:41Z2020-11-20T13:44:41ZFrance’s laïcité: why the rest of the world struggles to understand it<p>A wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/teachers-in-france-on-the-front-line-of-defending-the-values-of-the-republic-148363">knife attacks</a> in France has come amid a government crackdown on what President Emmanuel Macron has described as “Islamist separatism”. The killings, in particular the killing of history teacher Samuel Paty <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-communaute-educative-face-a-la-radicalisation-des-jeunes-148790">in the Paris suburbs</a>, sparked demonstrations in France, but in some Muslim countries, there have been calls for a boycott of French goods in retaliation for Macron’s perceived attack on Islam.</p>
<p>In the English-speaking world, there is confusion over the debate about French society that has followed these attacks. The common factor is that the government and the demonstrators see themselves as defending France’s principle of “laïcité”. So why do people outside France struggle to understand what laïcité is? And why are the French so attached to it?</p>
<p>One problem for English speakers is that we have no satisfactory equivalent for the word laïcité. It is usually translated as “secularism”, though this tends to imply scepticism or hostility rather than neutrality towards religion. The “lay principle” may be a better equivalent, but laïcité has so much history behind it that you need to know something about France to understand its nuances.</p>
<p>Every country has to find a balance between the authority of the state and the influence of religion, arising from its particular history. The French Republic in its modern form was established in the late 19th century, after long struggles by republicans against royalist and authoritarian movements that were supported by the Catholic church. The religious differences were settled in 1905, when the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france-63815/article/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france">church and the state were legally separated</a>. The state was declared neutral with respect to religion, and people were free to believe and practice any religion or none. In French, this became known as laïcité (lay-ness).</p>
<p>After the separation, laïcité faded into the background. Few people had a problem with it, including the main religious organisations. And there were pragmatic exceptions to the principle. For example, the state funds historic religious buildings (not just Notre-Dame in Paris). It funds Catholic schools and it has kept earlier arrangements with the Catholic Church in some of the former colonies and in <a href="https://www.secularism.org.uk/opinion/2013/02/french-challenge-to-exception-of-alsace-moselle-from-separation-law-fails">Alsace-Moselle</a>, which was under German administration at the time of the separation. The lay principle was eventually embraced by all religious groupings, as well as by France’s large minority of non-believers. It has been included in the constitution since 1946.</p>
<h2>Tensions arise</h2>
<p>What brought laïcité back to prominence was the large-scale migration from North Africa after decolonisation in the 1960s, and the emergence of new generations of French-born Muslims. In 1989, disputes began over whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear headscarves in state schools. Politicians from right and left piled in, and it rapidly escalated from there. The boundaries of the lay principle were tested to the limits, focusing mainly on religious symbols: what they were, where they could be worn or displayed, and by whom. New laws were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/world/french-assembly-votes-to-ban-religious-symbols-in-schools.html">passed in 2004</a> banning people from wearing conspicuous religious symbols in state schools and 2010 banning face coverings in public spaces.</p>
<p>Every dispute and every round of national elections has produced new debates and has increased the range of interpretations of the lay principle, taking in questions of women’s rights, civil liberties, freedom of speech and many other issues. One <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/sept-la%C3%AFcit%C3%A9s-fran%C3%A7aises-fran%C3%A7ais-Interventions-ebook/dp/B078YYZ3YR">prominent analyst</a> has identified seven distinct meanings of laïcité, which may now be an underestimate. With more political groupings claiming it as their core value, it has increasingly been accepted as an important marker of French identity – part of the national DNA, as former Prime Minister <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/04/12/manuel-valls-depuis-plus-de-trente-ans-on-me-demande-si-je-suis-de-gauche_1445774">Manuel Valls</a> put it.</p>
<h2>Islam and laïcité</h2>
<p>Although the lay principle applies to all religions, the debate around it has become increasingly focused on Muslim practices. Tensions were raised by right-wing movements hostile to immigration and have been raised further by the terrorist attacks carried out by supporters of al-Qaida, Islamic State and other extremist groups. In January 2015, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/charlie-hebdo-attack-14299">shooting of journalists at Charlie Hebdo</a> and the murder of Jewish hostages at a supermarket sparked mass demonstrations. In November that year, 130 people were killed in a spate of attacks, including at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris. Attacks of different kinds have taken place many times since then, most recently the murder of Paty and of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54729957">three Christian worshippers in Nice</a> in October 2020.</p>
<p>These attacks have intensified the feeling among many people in France that they are embattled. At the same time, French Muslims are put under pressure to disavow the extremists or to accept guilt by association with them. In either case, Muslims’ place in the nation is in question.</p>
<p>What is at stake in these debates is not just the secular state, but also the wider framework of rights and responsibilities, and ultimately the very identity of the French Republic. So, from being the basis of a religious settlement, laïcité has increasingly become an expression of French identity. It now acts as a touchstone for le vivre-ensemble: how French people can live together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Kelly is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>Why are Emmanuel Macron’s reform plans so controversial and why are people protesting about freedom after another spate of violent attacks?Michael Kelly, Emeritus Professor of French in Modern Languages and Linguistics, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1480702020-10-20T19:40:32Z2020-10-20T19:40:32ZBeheading in France could bolster president’s claim that Islam is in ‘crisis’ – but so is French secularism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364353/original/file-20201019-21-1qrz6hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=69%2C0%2C5749%2C3882&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An homage to Samuel Paty, a teacher murdered after showing caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed from the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, Oct. 18, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gathered-in-place-de-la-republique-in-paris-france-news-photo/1229165233?adppopup=true">Adnan Farzat/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A French high school teacher who had shown caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad to his class <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/france/2020/10/16/terrorisme-un-enseignant-decapite-dans-les-yvelines_1802673">was beheaded on Oct. 16 by an 18-year-old Muslim refugee</a> in what <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54579403">France’s President Emmanuel Macron characterized as an “Islamist terrorist attack.”</a></p>
<p>The killing is the latest high-profile attack by a Muslim extremist in France, coming after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-paris-50736">2015 massacre at Charlie Hebdo magazine</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671">2016 truck attack</a> in Nice. It also occurred two weeks after Macron gave <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/2/macron-announces-new-plan-to-regulate-islam-in-france">a controversial speech defining Islam</a> as “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/10/02/la-republique-en-actes-discours-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-theme-de-la-lutte-contre-les-separatismes">a religion that is in crisis today all over the world</a>.”</p>
<p>France, which colonized many Muslim-majority territories in Africa and the Levant in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Algeria and Mali, has Western Europe’s largest Muslim minority – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/">6 million people, or 9% of its population</a>. </p>
<p>Macron’s Oct. 2 speech outlined a legislative proposal to fight “Islamist separatism.” If passed in Parliament, it would essentially ban home-schooling of all children aged 3 and up and prevent foreign-trained imams from leading French mosques. The goal, said the president, is “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-16114-fr.pdf">to build an Islam in France that can be compatible with the Enlightenment</a>.” </p>
<p>Macron’s analysis concludes, simply, that Islam is somehow at odds with modern Western society. But my <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/sociology-religion/secularism-and-state-policies-toward-religion-united-states-france-and-turkey?format=PB">research on state secularism and religion</a> shows that the reality is much more complicated.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Macron speaks at a lectern with the French and EU flags behind him" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364504/original/file-20201020-19-1kpdj6t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-president-emmanuel-macron-delivers-a-speech-during-a-news-photo/1201691009?adppopup=true">Sebastien Bozon/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>French versus American secularism</h2>
<p>French secularism, which is embraced by both the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/alien-citizens-state-and-religious-minorities-turkey-and-france?format=HB&isbn=9781108476942">progressive left and the Islamophobic right</a>, goes well beyond the American democratic concept of <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/89">separating religion and state</a>. Called “laïcité,” it essentially excludes religious symbols from public institutions. France has <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-weaponization-of-laicite">banned Muslim women’s headscarves in schools and outlawed religious face coverings everywhere</a>. There are no such bans in the United States.</p>
<p>While both America and France have ongoing debates about “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Muslim terrorists” and <a href="http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20100830,00.html">views that can be defined as Islamophobic</a> have some popular support, American democracy generally provides better opportunities for <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-future-of-religious-freedom-9780199930913?lang=en&cc=us#">the integration of various religious groups</a>. </p>
<p>In France, <a href="http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp">the Constitution</a> defines the state only as secular, without delineating the boundaries of that secularism. In the United States, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment">the First Amendment</a> restricts the secular state’s engagement with religion, saying the government can neither establish a religion nor prohibit a religion’s free exercise. </p>
<p>It would be difficult for the U.S. to announce, as Macron did, a state-sponsored project to “<a href="https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-to-restore-the-Republic-to-fight-Islamist-separatism">forge a type of Enlightenment Islam</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Pupils in headscarves sit at desks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364501/original/file-20201020-21-1nfbrgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In France, Muslim girls may wear headscarves in Islamic private schools like the Alif school in Toulouse, but not in public schools.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/veiled-pupils-attend-a-lesson-in-a-classroom-on-may-11-2011-news-photo/114395069?adppopup=true">Eric Cabanis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, 11 years before Macron voiced his provocative view, U.S. President Barack Obama gave a <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09">famous speech on Islam</a> in Egypt in 2009, attempting to reset the relationship between America and the Muslim world.</p>
<p>Emphasizing Muslims’ contributions to American society, Obama said, “It is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practicing religion as they see fit – for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear.”</p>
<p>Obama’s speech reflected an idealized American melting pot, a place where hyphenated identities like <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199930890.001.0001/acprof-9780199930890-chapter-11">Muslim-American</a> are common. </p>
<p>French secularism sees no hyphenated identities – only French or Not French.</p>
<h2>Islam and the secular state</h2>
<p>Some in France also see this rigid secularism as unequal to the challenges of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/sociology-religion/secularism-religion-and-multicultural-citizenship?format=HB&isbn=9780521873604">multiculturalism</a> and <a href="http://grease.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/10/France-country-report.pdf">migration</a>. The eminent scholar <a href="https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/laicites-sans-frontieres-jean-bauberot/9782020996167">Jean Bauberot</a>, for example, defends a more “pluralistic secularism” – one that tolerates certain religious symbols in public institutions. </p>
<p>France has in fact made many exceptions for Catholics. The government provides substantial public funding to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691144214/the-emancipation-of-europes-muslims">private Catholic schools</a>, which educate about a quarter of all K-12 students, and six of 11 official holidays in France are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_holidays_in_France">Catholic holidays</a>. </p>
<p>Too often, laïcité translates into an unwillingness to accommodate the religiously based demands of Muslims. </p>
<p>In 2015, a Muslim advocacy organization sued a municipal authority in France’s Burgundy region for refusing to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/pork-school-dinners-france-secularism-children-religious-intolerance">offer an alternative to pork</a> in public school cafeterias. The court compelled the town to reverse its policy, but not because it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/non-pork-meals-must-be-available-for-school-lunch-rules-french-court">violated religious freedom</a>. The court found the menu <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/08/28/chalon-sur-saone-la-justice-annule-la-fin-des-menus-sans-porc-dans-les-cantines_5177551_3224.html">violated the children’s rights</a>.</p>
<p>France’s founding commitment to equality under the law likewise forestalls meaningful social debate on <a href="http://tupress.temple.edu/book/1122">racial discrimination</a>; its census does not even collect information on race. Although France’s biggest minority is mostly composed of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/world/europe/macron-radical-islam-france.html">nonwhite Muslim immigrants from its former colonies in Africa and their descendents</a>, Macron’s speech referenced only in passing to French colonialism.</p>
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<h2>Blasphemy</h2>
<p>That said, I find some truth in Macron’s speech. But the “crisis” facing Islam lies in the historical and political failings of the Muslim world, not in the religion itself.</p>
<p>As my 2019 book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB&isbn=9781108409476">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>,” documents, many Muslim countries like Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia have long-lasting authoritarian regimes and chronic underdevelopment. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">32 of the world’s 49 Muslim-majority countries</a>, blasphemy laws punish people who speak sacrilegiously about sacred things; in six countries, blasphemy is a capital offense. </p>
<p>These laws, which block freedom of expression, are more rooted in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">interests of the conservative clergy and authoritarian rulers</a> than in the Islamic faith, my research shows. They actually contradict several Quranic verses that urge Muslims not to coerce or retaliate against people of other faiths. </p>
<p>Still, in Western countries where Muslims are a minority, extremists occasionally take it upon themselves to punish those who, in their view, mock the Prophet Muhammad. That has <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300124729/cartoons-shook-world">caused global controversies</a> over <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-theres-opposition-to-images-of-muhammad-36402">cartoons and movies</a>. At times, in France and beyond, it has led to an unacceptable outcome: murder.</p>
<p>Such killings, whether perpetrated by the state or by individuals, are tragedies. But to frame them as a purely religious problem ignores the socioeconomic and political origins of Islamic blasphemy laws, and the anti-democratic cultural consequences of authoritarianism in many Muslim countries. </p>
<p>It also overlooks the difficult reality that social alienation is an underlying factor in the <a href="https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BSP_vol1is2_-Lyons-Padilla.pdf">radicalization of some young Muslims in the West</a>.</p>
<h2>Multiple secularisms, multiple Islams</h2>
<p>Macron’s speech made some gestures toward greater inclusion. </p>
<p>“I want France to become a country where we can teach the thoughts of Averreos and Ibn Khaldun,” he said, referencing two eminent Muslim thinkers of the 12th and 14th centuries, and envisioned “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/10/02/la-republique-en-actes-discours-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-theme-de-la-lutte-contre-les-separatismes">a country that excels in the study of Muslim civilizations</a>.” </p>
<p>That plural in “civilizations” is meaningful. It acknowledges that Islam is not monolithic. Neither is French secularism. Both are complex systems with varied interpretations. </p>
<p>In truth, Macron doesn’t need to “build an Islam in France that can be compatible with the Enlightenment,” because that already exists. Whether French secularism can adapt to Islam is another question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Macron wants to ‘build an Islam in France that can be compatible with the Enlightenment.’ But that goal assumes France is compatible with Islam, says a Muslim scholar of religion and politics.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483632020-10-19T13:03:42Z2020-10-19T13:03:42ZTeachers in France, on the front line of defending the values of the Republic<p>On October 16, 2020, <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/faits-divers/attentat/portrait-samuel-paty-professeur-assassine-pour-avoir-defendu-la-liberte-d-expression-7018937">Samuel Paty</a>, a history and geography teacher at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, was murdered outside his school a few days after showing his students caricatures of Mohammed as part of a class on freedom of expression.</p>
<p>I didn’t know him personally but I would like to say here how much his horrible death highlights the magnitude of the struggle teachers face today, more than ever.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1317470613766836224"}"></div></p>
<p>As a history teacher, it was Paty’s responsibility to deliver a moral and civic education aligned with <a href="https://www.education.gouv.fr/au-bo-du-26-juillet-2018-programmes-d-enseignement-vacances-scolaires-2019-2020-bourses-nationales-6566">three official goals</a>, as set out by the government. These are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>to respect others;</p></li>
<li><p>to acquire and share the values of the Republic;</p></li>
<li><p>to build a civic culture.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Before these goals were introduced in <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-carrefours-de-l-education-2015-1-page-185.htm?contenu=article">2015</a>, some people <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/ecole-primaire-et-secondaire/article/2014/07/05/la-morale-laique-arrive-dans-les-programmes-scolaires_4451589_1473688.html">questioned</a> their validity. Do these goals really sit in the domain of schooling, which is largely based around knowledge? Is there any difference between teaching faith in the Republic and teaching faith in God, Allah, or any other deity or supreme being?</p>
<p>Specifically, the French Republic does not teach a particular faith. Its values, as expressed in its laws, are not in the same order as religious conviction. They organise society and make life within it possible, assuring each person the total freedom to live his or her faith on the simple condition that they respect the faith of others – and also the choice of those who do not live any particular faith.</p>
<p>Samuel Paty represented this republican law, which holds that faith is an option (to be defended), not an obligation (to be imposed). He wanted to make people grasp its meaning and relevance. He wanted to make people understand that faith cannot muzzle freedom of thought.</p>
<p>It was too much for the fanatic who brutally killed him.</p>
<h2>Talking to advance knowledge</h2>
<p>Could Paty be blamed for not respecting his <a href="https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F530">duty of impartiality</a> as a public servant? Could he be considered as having taken sides, using content that may offend certain religious sensitivities? Did not the freedom of expression exercised in his teaching come into direct conflict with the opportunity that should be offered to students and their parents to hold and freely express certain religious beliefs?</p>
<p>The answer is unequivocally no, because he did what every teacher should do. “No one can renounce the freedom to judge and opine as he wishes”, as Spinoza pointed out in his <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/spinozas-theologicalpolitical-treatise/F44C8F0EA7402357FDA89BA79FDF3A9E#">Theological-Political Treatise</a>. “In a free state it is possible for everyone to think what he wants and to say what he thinks”.</p>
<p>However, this in no way gives the “right to act by one’s own decree”. When it comes to actions, the law of the Republic prevails and is imposed on all, even the most zealous servants of a religion.</p>
<p>The freedom to which Spinoza refers applies to the expression of one’s opinions. The basis of the teacher’s speech and what they teach is different, however: it is not opinion but knowledge. What legitimises the teacher’s speech is its capacity to help students build knowledge that will be at the service of their freedom of thought, by helping them move beyond mere opinion.</p>
<p>It is this freedom of thought <a href="https://www.education.gouv.fr/les-valeurs-de-la-republique-l-ecole-1109">that the teachers of the Republic</a> must promote and defend – and that was intended to be destroyed in the assassination of Samuel Paty.</p>
<h2>The virus of hate</h2>
<p>One could wonder if the coronavirus will make happy days disappear forever. The death of Samuel Paty shows us that humanity is facing an even more destructive virus – that of hate. For Spinoza, hatred “can never be good”. It is only a sadness, which marks the passage to state less than perfection. It must be “overcome by love, (or generosity) and not compensated by mutual hatred”.</p>
<p>Why should we feel hatred for those who do not share our faith? Basically, it was the generosity of the teacher that his murderer hated. He was the living proof that a teacher’s task is not to convert adolescents to his own opinions, but to accompany them in the construction of their freedom of thought.</p>
<p>For, if a teacher must love his students, it is as human persons capable of developing free thought, and in this respect, absolutely worthy of respect.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/eDA8E0jD-ws?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Astonishment and silence in front of the school in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine after the murder of Samuel Paty (CNews, October 17, 2020).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The difficulty of being a teacher today</h2>
<p>The violence of this assassination shows the essential importance and the immense difficulty of the teaching profession today.</p>
<p>Essential importance, because to teach is to accompany all the children of the Republic on the path of knowledge – to guarantee and provide the means for true freedom of thought.</p>
<p>Immense difficulty, because this work comes up against obscurantism, sectarianism, and the most reductive fanaticisms at a time when faith runs the risk of stifling doubt, and when barbarism could believe itself stronger than humanism.</p>
<p>But Samuel Paty’s death also means the defeat of hatred. For if, as Alain wrote, “spring always has the same winter to overcome”, the harshness of winter is not enough to prevent spring from coming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hadji ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The horrific death of Samuel Paty, a history and geography teacher, highlights the importance of the work of educators who are, more than ever, on the front lines of the fight for freedom of expression.Charles Hadji, Professeur honoraire (Sciences de l’éducation), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1198512019-07-04T15:09:40Z2019-07-04T15:09:40ZHow Senegal keeps unique balance between religion and a secular state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282664/original/file-20190704-51284-14xgfda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Senegalese nun prays during a service at the St. Peters church in Dakar, Senegal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 1 May this year the principal of a catholic high school in Dakar sent out an email informing parents that students would only, as of next year, be allowed to wear</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the usual uniform, with no headwear either for girls or boys. This sparked lively controversy over headscarves in Senegalese catholic schools. Some people openly voiced support and others condemnation for the stance taken by the sisters of Saint-Joseph de Cluny.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The controversy raised fundamental questions about the Senegalese model of secularism.</p>
<p>There’s no single model to secularism. At its core, however, is that religious and governmental institutions are separated. These institutions can be kept distinct in various ways, depending on the history of their relationship. </p>
<p>One of the reasons secularism is a sensitive issue is that some of its proponents, wishing to exclude religion from the public sphere, uphold it as a value, polarising public opinion. Yet secularism is <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/spira_0994-3722_2007_num_39_1_1251">not an ideological value</a>. Rather it’s a political principle. </p>
<p>Yet some secularists want to enforce secularism with bans in the same way that Islamists practice Sharia law. Common to both of these prohibitionist attitudes is that they infringe our most basic human rights: the right to education for female students wearing hijabs in France or for female students – period – in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>This is because secularism has been made sacred. It has been elevated to the status of a value used to both allow and prohibit. But secularism is not sacred. It is a political choice.</p>
<h2>Secularism and right to education</h2>
<p>There are several different ways to understand secularism at school. This depends on the history of relations between school institutions (both public and private) and the State, which protects the fundamental, universal right to education. A right which, as we can see, has <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/771857/societe/senegal-linterdiction-du-voile-par-linstitution-sainte-jeanne-darc-de-dakar-fait-polemique/">elicited little passionate debate</a>.</p>
<p>But a school’s mission is to educate without discrimination. It has the duty to accept students, no matter how they choose to dress, as long as they show respect for human dignity.</p>
<p>In reality, secularism requires public and private schools funded by the State (and therefore by the people) to provide quality education to all students. This should also be in an equitable fashion, regardless of the religion they do, or do not, practice. This is not only a question of secularism, but also of democracy.</p>
<h2>When secularism impedes freedom</h2>
<p>This is why laïcité, the French concept of secularism, <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/528342/societe/en-afrique-la-laicite-a-la-croisee-des-chemins/">which has influenced many African countries, Senegal included</a>, could not legally target hijabs.</p>
<p>French schools exclude students wearing ‘conspicuous religious symbols’ in accordance with a 2004 law. Bikramjit Singh, a young high school student, was <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/Monde/La-France-epinglee-a-l-ONU-sur-l-interdiction-du-turban-sikh-sur-les-photos-d-identite-2012-01-12-756978">excluded</a> from his school for refusing to remove his turban. But the UN Human Rights Committee <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx">found</a> that the French government’s legitimate attachment to the principle of secularism was not limitless. It could not, therefore, justify excluding students on the basis of their faith – in other words, for wearing religious symbols.</p>
<p>The Human Rights Committee also called on the French government to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2018/10/23/une-instance-de-l-onu-demande-a-la-france-de-reviser-sa-loi-contre-le-voile-integral_5373395_1653130.html">revise its legislation against the full-face veil</a>.</p>
<p>Several academic authorities and scientific reports by a <a href="https://vfouka.people.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj4871/f/abdelgadirfoukajan2019.pdf">team of researchers</a> have shown that this ban has had real, lasting, stigmatising and detrimental effects on the independence, emancipation and integration of young Muslim women.</p>
<h2>Senegalese secularism</h2>
<p>Senegal is a secular State with a predominantly Muslim population, and a democratic regime with a <a href="https://www.globalpartnership.org/fr/blog/la-societe-civile-senegalaise-obtient-un-meilleur-siege-la-table-de-leducation">remarkably strong civil society</a>. This sets it apart from historically Christian countries, where the fight for secularism was linked with more democracy. It also differs from other Muslim countries where secularism was favoured by authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>In Senegal, religious institutions and the State maintain an <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-charia-aujourd-hui--9782707169969-page-209.htm">ambivalent relationship</a>. This means secularism can be used as a political instrument for the social control of religion. It could be said that this is the exact opposite of secularism in Europe, where religion imposed its views and rules for centuries. It was gradually excluded from the arts, science, politics, law and, today, culture. </p>
<p>It is from this perspective that we can talk about the political power of religion and its institutionalisation. In Islamic countries, religion has been embodied only by various religious bodies in the service of political power. The exception is Shia clergy and Islamic brotherhoods.</p>
<p>In Senegal, religious orders grew independently from the State and never saw themselves as political institutions. Religious and political authorities have, therefore, benefited from each other, never seeking to replace one another.</p>
<p>Because of this socio-historical background, and aside from its relationship with France, Senegal is a religious country with a secular State. In contrast, the US has a different brand of secularism. It does not reject the social, cultural and even political influence of religion.</p>
<p>Senegalese secularism stands midway between the French and American models. Political secularism in Senegal includes religion in the governing of the country: religious and anti-religious lobbies try to influence the government, without ever threatening the nation’s ability to live together as a community.</p>
<h2>Senegalese family law</h2>
<p>The country’s family law was developed in consultation with religious guides. This in no way undermines its secularism in which political and religious institutions remain separate.</p>
<p>As long as religious figures contribute to developing the laws of the country as part of a democratic framework, reasonable secularism is not under threat. It would not be secular, however, to systematically entrust political decision-making to a particular religious order. But the country’s family law was established by the Senegalese legislature, which can also change it as it sees fit. And, every citizen, religious or not, is free to try and persuade it to do so.</p>
<p>Secularisation is not the loss of religious influence in society, but the loss of religious certainty. In other words, it was by no means certain that the Senegalese family law would align with values held by Muslims, Christians and Tiedos (historically, warriors from the ancient West-African kingdoms, with traditional beliefs), and with secularism.</p>
<p>If the reverse were true, secularism would become a religious value, like atheism and a-religiosity. Then both religious and secular fundamentalist values would inevitably clash and “religious wars” would be fought in the name of various gods – including Secularism.</p>
<p>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast ForWord</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachid Id Yassine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Neither French nor American, Senegalese secularism stands midway between these two modelsRachid Id Yassine, Maître de conférences en sciences sociales, Université Gaston BergerLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170872019-05-20T14:27:05Z2019-05-20T14:27:05ZA cautionary tale: The unintended consequences of Québec’s Bill 21<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275033/original/file-20190516-69178-1pgs0oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5472%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Honouring religious freedom and behaving faithfully in public not only protect the rights of individuals but also safeguard the integrity of democratic governments. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hershey/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) government has introduced what’s known as “<a href="http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-21-42-1.html">an Act respecting the laïcité of the State</a>.” This is the latest attempt by a Québec government to enact secularism legislation. The bill will prohibit civil servants in positions of authority from wearing religious symbols at work. </p>
<p>Québec’s historical concern about religion is understandable given the overwhelming presence of the Catholic Church in the past. However, religious institutions are no longer very dominant. In a recent <a href="https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/04/22/how-people-around-the-world-view-religions-role-in-their-countries/">Pew Research Center study</a>, 64 per cent of Canadians say religion plays a less important role today that it ever has.</p>
<p>Preserving French culture is also important. It enriches not only Québec but all of Canada. </p>
<p>But Bill 21 is a cautionary tale. The proposed law may have real unintended consequences. Rather than protecting French culture and safeguarding the public against religious coercion, it may enact a new dominant and coercive state-directed civil religion.</p>
<h2>Opposition to Bill 21</h2>
<p>Bill 21 has met with widespread opposition and protest. <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2019/making-democratic-case-quebecs-bill-21/">Constitutional scholars and legal experts</a> argue that it violates Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particularly the section regarding freedom of religion. Academics, teachers’ federations, the Canadian Bar Association’s Québec branch, women’s, Jewish, Christian and Muslim organizations are all opposed.</p>
<p>Bill 21 is based on <em>laïcité</em>, a French version of secularism. Laïcité is often equated with the concept of the separation of church and state. But French academic <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2304377/French_Secularism_or_La%C3%AFcit%C3%A9">Michael Troper</a> points out that freedom of religion in some countries is an inherent natural or civil right. This is how many Canadians understand it under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. </p>
<p>In France under laïcité, public freedom to practise religion is granted to citizens by the laws of the state. Religion is strictly a private matter. As in Bill 21, these public freedoms of separation, equality, conscience and religion are delivered by a secular and neutral state.</p>
<h2>Are states truly neutral?</h2>
<p>Secular state neutrality is a questionable assumption. Who still believes that even well-intentioned states are neutral on issues of identity and religion? We only need to recall the painful reminders of <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools">residential schools in Canada</a>, the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/the-sixties-scoop-explained">Sixties Scoop</a>, <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/chinese-head-tax-in-canada">the Chinese head tax</a>, the <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/internment-of-japanese-canadians">internment of Japanese Canadians in the Second World World</a>, <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/history/canada-was-warned-of-the-incoming-holocaust-we-turned-away-900-jewish-refugees-anyway/">the snubbing of Jewish refugees in 1939</a>, and the treatment of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/homosexual-offences-exunge-records-1.4422546">the LGBTQ2 community</a> to mention only a few examples.</p>
<p>Politics requires governments to exercise power and comes with inevitable human conflicts. Governments don’t like competition, particularly from faith communities that may challenge them. There is always temptation by political leaders to use domination and coercion to overcome particularly religious opposition, <a href="https://www.catholicregister.org/item/21666-liberals-closing-the-book-on-charity-political-audits">as the Canada Revenue Agency did in 2010</a> when it started to use political activity audits to threaten Canadian charities.</p>
<p>Taming and privatizing religious voices is not new for political leaders. Bill 21 is another attempt to restrict the public role of religious voices. With democracy in retreat and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/17/obama-criticises-strongman-politics-coded-attack-trump">strongmen politics</a> increasing globally, this may be even truer today.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-we-witnessing-the-death-of-liberal-democracy-117085">Are we witnessing the death of liberal democracy?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>So what does it mean to behave with faith in public?</p>
<p>This is a question not just being confronted by Québec. There are angry voices across Canada more than willing to use heavy-handed laws against religious and ethnic communities. But using domination and coercion in the public arena is unacceptable regardless of whether it’s by people of faith, business leaders, economists, politicians, leaders of charitable organizations or anyone else.</p>
<h2>Religions contribute to public life</h2>
<p>Religion cannot simply be banished from public life. </p>
<p>Faith and religious communities make useful contributions to society. They provide meaning, purpose and ultimately direction for citizens and politicians facing tough decisions. They mobilize help for people in need in our communities. They motivate people to make donations, volunteer in charitable organizations and even run for political office. They can help communities celebrate and grieve in public moments of joy and tragedy. </p>
<p>Faith is, in fact, unavoidably public.</p>
<p>Religious freedom is not freedom from responsibility. Rather, behaving faithfully in public is freedom to take responsibility for the rights and well-being of others. Religious freedom safeguards this public role for people of faith.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275034/original/file-20190516-69204-civ9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Faith communities can help others in ensuring no one community dominates society.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ben White/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Québec might lead the way with another approach based on equality. The province has a diverse and dynamic public life; it should build on that dynamic diversity by enlisting faith communities, business, labour and civil society to together protect the public arena. </p>
<p>In a positive way, people from these sectors can scrutinize and hold each other accountable against domination and coercion from any single group. The church-state relationship today has become <a href="https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0ByQ8-RCvYGFsfmFZbHhuLWdHWDdIaElJSG5yc2xyWmFrQU1HRnIxek9iamxDYlp5SHVUcnM">a diverse public commons</a> with many bodies, including religious ones, serving a public purpose.</p>
<p>Honouring religious freedom and behaving faithfully in public not only protects the rights of individuals but also safeguards the integrity of democratic governments. </p>
<p>In the 1940s, the renowned theologian <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo12091283.html">Reinhold Niebuhr</a> reminded us that humanity’s “capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but (its) inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Pfrimmer is an ordained pastor in the Evangelical Lutheran in Canada (ELCIC) and has worked with numerous ecumenical and multifaith social justice and human rights organizations.</span></em></p>Respecting religious freedom not only protects the rights of individuals, it safeguards the integrity and accountability of democratic governments.David Pfrimmer, Professor Emeritus for Public Ethics and Fellow at the Centre for Public Ethics, Martin Luther University College, Wilfrid Laurier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/642492016-08-24T08:57:18Z2016-08-24T08:57:18ZFrance’s burkini ban could not come at a worse time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135198/original/image-20160823-30238-1r0g2sp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/javinovo/1477807208/in/photolist-3fA9AC-75nUgs-9cGGcE-eqvBx-c4ksSb-9euhBN-9euhqC-eC13w-euMZFX-ac3M47-5vEFiw-4PjTK-eV9aKu-6JmGp8-6Cxmtj-uaejM-abZUvr-2MGbGX-eBZZm-EWqps-6eSAtp-s6d8h-GA7usk-njkq5j-8SEryW-eBZYk-9XMhuy-3gBRR3-79DQB6-H6Cko-uaewD-2bdov-uae6C-8F4RMb-6A4DT6-4YmBZP-57gtdt-7pNzPt-2bRi8-7dMAj5-nFKRSv-yvQXex-oZSWQG-eBZZM-7ZGRQK-7vVgmz-d5hq3s-7dMuDy-7ZGREx-fJ5cHw">Javier Novo Rodríguez</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of armed police <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach">confronting a woman</a> in Nice, apparently forcing her to remove some of her clothing, have added fuel to the already combustible debate over the prohibition against women wearing burkinis on many beaches around France.</p>
<p>Since mayor of Cannes David Lisnard banned the <a href="https://theconversation.com/banning-the-burkini-reinforces-a-single-story-about-muslim-women-they-need-saving-64180">full-body burkini</a> from his town’s beaches, as many as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/nice-becomes-latest-french-city-to-impose-burkini-ban">15</a> French resorts have followed suit. </p>
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<p>Arguments defending the bans fall into three main categories. First, it is about defending the French state’s secularism (laïcité). Second, that the costume represents a misogynistic doctrine that sees female bodies as shameful. And finally, that the burkini is cited as a threat to public order.</p>
<p>None of these arguments satisfactorily refute the <a href="http://www.alternet.org/grayzone-project/burkini-ban-frightening-new-stage-frances-descent-islamophobia-fanaticism">claims</a> of civil rights activists that the bans are fundamentally Islamophobic.</p>
<h2>The niceties of laïcité</h2>
<p>The Cannes decree explicitly invokes secular values. It prohibits anyone <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/world/europe/cannes-muslims-burkini-ban.html">“not dressed in a fashion respectful of laïcité”</a> from accessing public beaches. However, the French state has only banned “ostentatious” religious symbols <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006524456&dateTexte=20160818">in schools and for government employees</a> as part of laïcité (the strict separation between the state and religious society). And in public spaces, laïcité claims to <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;?idArticle=LEGIARTI000019240997&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071194">respect</a> religious plurality. Indeed, the Laïcité Commission has <a href="https://twitter.com/ObservLaicite/status/763848066319474688">tweeted</a> that the ban, therefore, “cannot be based upon the principle of laïcité”.</p>
<p>While veils covering the entire face such as the burqa or niqab are <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id">illegal</a>, this is not to protect laïcité; it is a security matter. The legal justification is that these clothes make it impossible to identify the person underneath – which is not the case for the burkini.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"763848066319474688"}"></div></p>
<p>By falling back on laïcité to police Muslim women in this way, the Cannes authorities are fuelling the argument that “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/the-battle-for-the-french-secular-soul-laicite-charlie-hebdo/">fundamentalist secularism</a>” has become a means of excluding Muslims from French society.</p>
<h2>Colonial attitudes</h2>
<p>Others, such as Laurence Rossignol, the minister for women’s rights, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-france-burkini-debate-snap-story.html">hold</a> that the burkini represents a “profoundly archaic view of a woman’s place in society”, disregarding Muslim women who claim to wear their burkini <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/16/se-baigner-en-robe-c-est-pas-pratique-ce-burkini-est-une-liberation_1472853">voluntarily</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/135200/original/image-20160823-30212-y3abm1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A burkini on sale.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/landahlauts/15121655242/in/photolist-6E1MdD-p3frgQ-6QgAHC-6QgBVG-5gBzWm-eQiE8w-8ighQ3-9RCvTK-9xqMhE-eQiDMs-pREb8b-eQiEp9-9VujT7-JVwpZE-LeetYR">Landahlauts</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This typifies an enduring colonial attitude among many non-Muslim French politicians, who feel entitled to dictate to Muslim women what is in their best interests. Rossignol has in the past compared women who wear headscarves through choice to American “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/french-womens-rights-minister-laurence-rossignol-accused-racism-negro">negroes</a>” who supported slavery.</p>
<p>Far from supporting women’s rights, banning the burkini will only leave the women who wear it feeling persecuted. Even those with no choice in the matter are not helped by the ban. This legal measure does nothing to challenge patriarchal authority over female bodies in the home. Instead, it further restricts the lives of veiled women by replacing it with state authority in public. </p>
<h2>Open Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Supporters of the ban have also claimed that, with racial tensions high after recent terrorist attacks, it is provocative to wear this form of Muslim clothing. Such an <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37082637">argument</a> was made by Pierre-Ange Vivoni, mayor of Sisco in Corsica, when he banned the burkini in his commune. Early reports suggested a <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/15/corse-le-maire-ps-de-sisco-prend-un-arrete-anti-burkini-apres-les-violences-de-samedi_1472502">violent clash</a> between local residents and non-locals of Moroccan origin was triggered when strangers photographed a burkini-wearing woman in the latter group, which angered her male companions. Vivoni claimed that banning the costume protected the security of local people, including those of North African descent.</p>
<p>Those reports have transpired to be <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/18/au-tribunal-l-affaire-lamentable-de-sisco-ramenee-aux-faits_1473281">false</a>: none of the women in question were even wearing a burkini at the time of the incident. Nonetheless, the ban has stood in Sisco and elsewhere.</p>
<p>To be “provoked” by the burkini is to be provoked by the visibility of Muslims. Banning it on this basis punishes Muslim women for other people’s prejudice. It also disregards the burkini’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/17/the-surprising-australian-origin-story-of-the-burkini/">potential</a> to promote social cohesion by giving veiled women access to the same spaces as their non-Muslim compatriots.</p>
<p>Appeals to public order have, occasionally, been openly Islamophobic. Thierry Migoule, head of municipal services in Cannes, claimed that the burkini “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/cannes-mayor-bans-burqinis-beachwear-must-respect-secularism">refers to an allegiance to terrorist movements</a>”, conveniently ignoring the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/nice-truck-attack-victims-muslims.html">Muslim victims</a> of recent attacks. Barely a month after Muslims paying their respects to friends and <a href="https://www.ajib.fr/2016/07/hanane-charrihi-mere-a-ete-tuee-a-nice-deux-agressions-lors-de-recueillement/">family</a> killed in Nice were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFGeJ2BKpRg">racially abused</a>, such comments are both distasteful and irresponsible.</p>
<h2>Increased divisions</h2>
<p>Feiza Ben Mohammed, spokesperson for the Federation of Southern Muslims, <a href="http://www.thelocal.fr/20160812/riviera-burqini-ban-absurd-and-a-gift-for-isis-recruiters">fears</a> that stigmatising Muslims in this way will play into the hands of IS recruiters. That fear seems well-founded: researchers cite a <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/daech-r-v-lateur-des-failles-et-crispations-de-la-soci-t-fran-aise-1699605917">sense of exclusion</a> as a factor behind the radicalisation of a minority of French Muslims. Measures like this can only exacerbate that problem. Indeed, provoking repressive measures against European Muslims to cultivate such a sentiment is part of the IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12002726/The-grey-zone-How-Isis-wants-to-divide-the-world-into-Muslims-and-crusaders.html">strategy</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the day after the incident in Sisco, riot police were needed in nearby Bastia to prevent a 200-strong crowd chanting “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/corsica-mayor-bans-burkini-violence-beach-protests-sisco-france">this is our home</a>” from entering a neighbourhood with many residents of North African descent. Given the recent warning from France’s head of internal security of the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/were-brink-civil-war-french-security-chiefs-chilling-warning-before-nice-terror-attack-1570820">risk</a> of a confrontation between “the extreme right and the Muslim world”, such scenes are equally concerning.</p>
<p>Now more than ever, France needs unity. Yet more legislation against veiled women can only further divide an already divided nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64249/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fraser McQueen receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council through the Scottish Graduate School of Arts and Humanities, and is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>With tensions already high, telling Muslim women not to dress a certain way at the beach will only make things worse.Fraser McQueen, PhD Candidate, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.