tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/pakistan-511/articlesPakistan – The Conversation2024-03-26T18:35:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248412024-03-26T18:35:25Z2024-03-26T18:35:25ZPakistan’s blasphemy laws continue to cause violence<p>The Supreme Court of Pakistan recently <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1160999-mubarak-sani-case-sc-accepts-plea-for-verdict-revision-issues-notices-for-26th">drew the ire</a> of religious parties and anti-blasphemy groups for granting bail to a man accused of blasphemy. The court ruled against the retroactive implementation of a law that bans the distribution of an <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/ahmadiyya-movement-pakistan">Ahmadiyya exegesis of the Qur'an</a>.</p>
<p>Mubarik Ahmad Sani was arrested on Jan. 7, 2023 and charged with distributing the book in 2019. However, the ban on its distribution was imposed in 2021. The court granted relief to Sani, who had been incarcerated for 13 months. <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1812607">The court observed</a> that Sani should not have been arrested for an act which was not an offence at the time. </p>
<p>The court’s decision did not go down well with some religious conservatives. The government of Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province, submitted a <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1816694">review petition against the decision</a>, and a man in the city of Rawalpindi was <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2457292/man-arrested-for-launching-threatening-campaign-against-cjp-isa">arrested for inciting violence</a> against the chief justice on social media. </p>
<h2>History of blasphemy laws</h2>
<p>Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210521170530id_/https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4219/1/THE-INDIAN-PENAL-CODE-1860.pdf">built on the foundations</a> laid in the Indian Penal Code of 1860 during <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/British-raj">British colonial rule</a>. These laws were revised over time in Pakistan, with significant amendments introduced during the dictatorship of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Zia-ul-Haq">General Zia-ul-Haq</a> in the 1970s and ‘80s. In efforts to strengthen his unconstitutional rule, Zia-ul-Haq instrumentalized Islam and introduced several laws that promoted radical forms of Islam, stifled religious freedom and contributed to the spread of religious and sectarian violence. </p>
<p>Anti-blasphemy laws in Pakistan revolve primarily around remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. <a href="https://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html">The law states</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While various people have been charged with blasphemy, Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya community in particular has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/26/ahmadi-persecution-pakistan-blasphemy-islam">repeatedly been targeted</a>. Sections 298-B and 298-C of the <a href="https://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html">Pakistan Penal Code</a> specifically prohibit the Ahmadiyya community from representing themselves as Muslims, calling their places of worship mosques and reciting the call to prayer.</p>
<p>Exonerating people charged with blasphemy, especially members of minority communities, has historically faced tough resistance. In 1997, a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/pakistans-blasphemy-laws-a-history-of-violence/">Lahore High Court judge</a> was shot dead in his office for acquitting three Christians in a blasphemy case. In 2011, a Christian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/02/pakistan-minister-shot-dead-islamabad">federal minister</a> and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12111831">provincial governor</a> were killed for demanding a review of the controversial blasphemy laws.</p>
<p>In 2018, violence erupted when a Christian woman, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/31/asia-bibi-verdict-pakistan-court-overturns-blasphemy-death-sentence">Asia Bibi</a>, was acquitted by the Supreme Court. Bibi had been given a death sentence by the Lahore High Court on blasphemy charges. Fearing harm from anti-blasphemy activists, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/8/aasia-bibi-christian-acquitted-of-blasphemy-leaves-pakistan">she fled to Canada in 2019</a>. </p>
<h2>Encouraging violence</h2>
<p>The promotion of anti-blasphemy laws and harsh sentences has resulted in <a href="https://crss.pk/blasphemy-cases-in-pakistan-1947-2021/">hundreds of arrests</a> and the killing of at least 90 people in vigilante violence since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.</p>
<p><a href="https://pewrsr.ch/2Y7MO44">A 2019 Pew Research Centre report</a> on religious restrictions placed Pakistan among the countries with the highest levels of restrictions on religion. The strict social restrictions have often manifested in <a href="https://aje.io/6hkbez">vigilante violence</a>.</p>
<p>The glorification of violence towards alleged acts of blasphemy appears to have become a norm in Pakistan. The graves of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/salmaan-taseer-case-harks-back-to-1929-killing-of-hindu-publisher">Ilm Deen</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2006-05-13-voa19/312718.html">Amir Cheema</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/funeral-pakistani-mumtaz-qadri-executed-salmaan-taseer">Mumtaz Qadri</a>, for example, have become regularly visited shrines.
Deen was hanged in 1929 for murdering the Hindu publisher of a controversial book about Muhammad. His story is included in school textbooks. </p>
<p>Cheema attempted to murder a German newspaper editor in 2006 for publishing cartoons of Muhammad and died in the custody of German police. Qadri was executed for killing the governor of Punjab in 2011 because the governor had spoken in defense of Bibi.</p>
<p>Although the Qur'an does not command Muslims to punish blasphemy, the supporters of anti-blasphemy laws rely on rigid interpretations by scholars to justify their acts. </p>
<p>The petition by the Punjab provincial government for the Supreme Court to review its decision, and the continued threat of violence, all highlight the complicated challenges faced in Pakistan regarding the freedom of religion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Azmat Abbas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pakistan’s laws against blasphemy have been used to bring cases against numerous people over the years, and in particular, the country’s religious minorities.Azmat Abbas, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262832024-03-26T17:01:32Z2024-03-26T17:01:32ZHow central Asian Jews and Muslims worked together in London’s 20th-century fur and carpet trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583728/original/file-20240322-20-wzxojh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The praying hall in Bukhara Synagogue, in the Uzbek capital.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bukhara_synagogue_%28south%29_praying_hall.jpg">Ymblanter|Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the late 1920s, London was home to a lively, if small, community of Jewish merchants from Afghanistan and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-eurasias-tianshan-mountains-set-a-stage-that-changed-the-world-102772">central Asia</a>. Most spoke Judaeo-Persian, popularly known as <em>Bukharian Tajik</em>. Many were fluent in Russian.</p>
<p>Hailing from established merchant families in Bukhara, Samarkand, Kabul and Herat, these immigrants <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/A_Political_and_Economic_History_of_the.html?id=BOh5DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">traded</a> in furs, carpets, cotton and wool. They maintained commercial relationships with their Muslim counterparts back home, especially Turkmen sheep farmers. </p>
<p>The many poorer Jews living in the region <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4464446.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A23aa1b755d344264427660c7a59eb3bd&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">worked</a> as distillers, builders, tailors, carpenters, itinerant peddlers and druggists. </p>
<p>In the years following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-was-russias-october-revolution-for-and-does-it-matter-any-more-84533">1917 Bolshevik revolution</a>, many Jewish merchants in central Asia crossed into Afghanistan and travelled on to <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-ordinary-diamond-how-the-koh-i-noor-became-an-imperial-possession-200473">British India</a>. “I am a cloth merchant of Bokhara”, Sewai Hafaiz, aged 35, told the British official who interviewed him in the border city of Peshawar in November 1926, according to the <a href="https://archive.org/stream/dli.pahar.3776/2010%20Guide%20to%20India%20Office%20Records%20relating%20to%20Central%20Asia%20by%20Bond%20s_djvu.txt">India Office records</a>. “I and Abraham have brought 24,000 karakul [lamb] skins for sale. We will sell them here or Bombay, or else take them to London.” </p>
<p>I have interviewed the descendants of these Jewish merchants, who have shared memories of life in post-war London. As I show in a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02757206.2023.2288649">recent article</a>, their knowledge of furs – and close ties with Muslim contacts in Afghanistan and Pakistan – sustained a vibrant international trade for the better part of the 20th century. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An early colour photograph of a group of children and an old man around a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583692/original/file-20240322-28-ncp9aw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish children with their teacher in early 1900s Samarkand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukharan_Jews#/media/File:Jewish_Children_with_their_Teacher_in_Samarkand.jpg">Sergei Mikhailovich Prokudin-Gorskii | Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Central Asian trading routes</h2>
<p>Among the most valuable commodities in the post-first world war fur trade were Karakul lamb furs. Flocks grazed in the pastures of central Asia and northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>As Afghanistan’s foreign reserves came increasingly to depend upon this trade, the government sought a monopoly from the 1930s. Jewish merchants were barred from travelling to the settlements in the north of the country, where they had long conducted business.</p>
<p>In this increasingly antisemitic environment, Jews in Afghanistan, including those who had fled there from Soviet central Asia, became impoverished. </p>
<p>The wealthier, including Hafaiz, left. Some joined relatives in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725886.2022.2090236?casa_token=jZ7pSmWRU4MAAAAA:vZ8QzYJLh3jNbJCl196OyZNacd_I3wBhDQLCBwjrGSmIFbpWp-dBuncHMmSK9sVKkxgjOZK9OG0V">Bukharian quarter of Jerusalem</a>. Jerusalem offered few trade opportunities however and many moved further afield, establishing new offices for family firms in London, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/From_Tashkent_to_Paris.html?id=6EBlxwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Paris, New York, Montreal and Berlin</a>.</p>
<p>A lively Bukharian community in London was subsequently established. The son of one merchant told me he remembered his parents regularly playing cards with other families. In the 1930s, the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/A_Political_and_Economic_History_of_the.html?id=BOh5DwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Association of Bukharian Jews</a> was established in the City of London, providing financial support to Jewish refugees from central Asia living in Iran, India and Afghanistan. It also raised the plight of Afghan Jews in Kabul with British officials in India and London. </p>
<p>After 1945, the UK government worked hard to re-establish London’s status within the fur, carpet and precious stones trades. It was eager to capitalise on the foreign currency that traders could earn through re-exporting their wares to buyers in the US and Europe.</p>
<p>By the late 1940s, Bukharian families had inaugurated a synagogue in Amhurst Park, north London. The daughter of a founding member of the community told me the congregation met in a small house: “Sometime in the mid-1950s I remember being given a gift of sweets on the occasion of the festival of <a href="https://theconversation.com/purims-original-queen-how-studying-the-book-of-esther-as-fan-fiction-can-teach-us-about-the-roots-of-an-unruly-jewish-festival-218677">Purim</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An archival photograph of people in front of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583724/original/file-20240322-30-6iiru6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish refugees from Kurdistan in Tehran, Iran, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/magnesmuseum/">MagnesMuseum|Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Close Jewish-Muslim ties</h2>
<p>These <a href="https://spitalfieldslife.com/2014/10/02/at-s-festenstein-sons-furriers/">Jewish merchants</a> maintained decades-long connections with Afghan officials and counterparts, who would visit with them in London. “I remember watching with amazement as my father ate the central Asian dish of <em>plov</em> [rice steamed with meat, sesame oil, cumin and carrots] while sitting in the traditional manner around a cloth placed on the floor with a Muslim from Afghanistan,” the son of a merchant from Samarkand told me.</p>
<p>In his 2011 memoir, <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Rumi_Tomato/CgCCZwEACAAJ?hl=en">Rumi Tomato</a>, Muhammad Khan Jalallar, who served as minister of finance in Afghanistan in the early 1970s, recalls how merchants frequently travelled to Kabul and Peshawar. He mentions being visited by several Jewish “friends”, including “a chap by the name of Gabriel, who was a trader dealing in imports, working under another trader’s license”.</p>
<p>Jewish merchants also established close ties to Muslim intermediaries in Pakistan, who completed customs procedures for shipments to the UK. The daughter of a fur merchant in London told me that her father was friends with a “Muslim from Multan”. Her husband too remembered the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Caravans.html?id=-uviBQAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Multani</a> trader, who in turn invited them to Pakistan. “He told us we would be treated like kings,” he said, “because his family held ours in such high respect”.</p>
<p>Until the 1980s, Kabul was home to a small but lively Jewish community, approximately 700 people strong. My research shows they led a <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/global/research/researchprojects/afterlivesofurbanmuslimasia">rich social life</a>, picnicking in the mountains and dining in the city’s restaurants.</p>
<p>This ended with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Most Jewish families departed because of insecurity and economic collapse. Only a few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/08/afghanistans-last-jew-leaves-country">men</a> remained. London-based carpet merchants from Afghanistan sent items for Jewish rites to their co-religionists in Kabul. </p>
<p>One Muslim carpet dealer I interviewed in London, who travelled regularly between the UK and Afghanistan in the 1990s, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the first period of government of the Taliban [1996-2001], a Jewish carpet dealer from Afghanistan in London who was my friend asked me to take matzah bread and kosher wine to the remaining Jewish men in Kabul. I was happy to take the bread, but told him I couldn’t risk travelling in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan with a bottle of wine, even if it didn’t contain any alcohol.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the 1960s, increasing hostility in the west toward the fur trade led to its demise. Traders in London shifted to gemstones and diamonds. Others dealt in carpets designed with central Asian motifs and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76392801.pdf">woven in Afghanistan</a>. Some families left the city altogether, to join relatives in the US and Israel.</p>
<p>Those who remained mostly encouraged their children to focus on getting a good education. A merchant’s son told me that all he knew of his father’s trading activities was that he “did his calculations on the back of envelopes”. As a result, the institutions established in the early 20th century have largely been forgotten.</p>
<p>Central Asian heritage continuess to inform this community’s cultural life. People visit Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to <a href="https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/6783/7233">identify ancestral graves</a>. Their rich culinary traditions – as is evident in cookbooks including <a href="https://www.thebukhariancookbook.com/">Miriam’s Table</a> by London-based author Lilian Cordell – actively preserve the community’s past.</p>
<p>This hidden history of connection and commerce between Britain, Afghanistan, and central Asia serves as a reminder of the possibility of inter-religious coexistence in even the most fraught of times.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magnus Marsden receives funding from the AHRC and Research England. </span></em></p>A hidden history of connection and commerce between Britain, Afghanistan, and central Asia serves as a reminder of the possibility of inter-religious co-existence in even the most fraught of times.Magnus Marsden, Professor Of Social Anthropology, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247072024-03-05T16:30:30Z2024-03-05T16:30:30ZHow countries in conflict zones can recover from floods – lessons from Pakistan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578963/original/file-20240229-20-88ie0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A family crosses the flooded streets of Pakistan in 2010. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://climatevisuals.org/search/?searchQuery=flood%20pakistan">Gerhard JˆrÈn/Climate Visuals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 6,000 people died and at least 11,000 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/18/libya-floods-conflicting-death-tolls-greek-aid-workers-die-in-crash#:%7E:text=Confusion%20has%20emerged%20over%20the,killed%20elsewhere%20in%20eastern%20Libya">reportedly disappeared</a> in the aftermath of the destructive flood that hit Libya on <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/devastating-flooding-libya">September 10 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Infrastructure in north-eastern Libya has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/libya-floods-the-drowning-of-derna-was-a-man-made-disaster-decades-in-the-making-213797">seriously damaged</a>. The economy continues to suffer and companies that are crucial partners for reconstruction and development have been forced to close due to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90695">flood damage</a>. With more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-update-libya-september-2023-enar">40,000 people</a> still displaced, labour shortages continue and essential services, including healthcare, remain disrupted. </p>
<p>This severe flooding highlighted the vulnerability of Libya – a country already grappling with political instability, <a href="https://www.rulac.org/publications/libya-a-short-guide-to-the-conflict">ongoing conflict</a> and a deteriorating economy – to climate-related threats. </p>
<p>Libya and other flood-hit countries, especially in conflict zones, could learn a lot from Pakistan, where the plans for recovery from similar floods in 2022 differ in some significant ways. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s response to its floods included a comprehensive <a href="https://www.undp.org/pakistan/publications/pakistan-floods-2022-post-disaster-needs-assessment-pdna">post-disaster needs assessment</a>, a strategy that outlines clear priorities for rebuilding livelihoods, agriculture and public infrastructure over the coming five years. </p>
<p>Libya’s approach lacks this forward planning. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment of what a country needs, meaningful recovery efforts cannot be effectively carried out.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework">United Nations Sendai framework</a>, a global agreement that guides countries in reducing the risks of natural disasters, emphasises the importance of “building back better” in recovery to reduce vulnerabilities of a place and its people. </p>
<p>However, most disaster management doesn’t focus on long-term recovery. My research in disaster recovery and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=c5aWJIsAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">climate change adaptation</a> indicates that the best route for the development of comprehensive and sustainable plans is for the government and relevant organisations to rebuild affected communities, repair damaged infrastructure and provide ongoing social, economic and health support. </p>
<p>Now that initial response and relief efforts have been rolled out across Libya’s affected regions, the focus needs to shift to consider the long-term recovery of these communities. </p>
<h2>The damage of debt</h2>
<p>The country also needs to consider how it funds its recovery. Developing countries tend to rely heavily on loans to <a href="https://floodresilience.net/resources/item/2020-floods-in-tabasco-lessons-learned-for-strengthening-social-capital/">fund recovery programmes</a>. Countries, including Pakistan, are often forced to continue paying existing loans in the aftermath of disasters instead of spending new funds on recovery. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s journey towards recovery from the major floods of <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/news/pakistan-flooding-one-year-later">2010 and 2011</a> is a stark example of the challenges countries face when burdened with heavy debt. In order to rebuild and rehabilitate, Pakistan borrowed a staggering estimated <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/filling-the-gap-addressing-climate-driven-crises-pakistan/">US$20 billion to US$40 billion</a>. This came at a significant cost.</p>
<p>In 2021, the burden of repaying debts amounted to <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/filling-the-gap-addressing-climate-driven-crises-pakistan/">US$11.9 billion annually</a> accounting for 32% of the Pakistan government’s revenue. Consequently, Pakistan’s capacity to effectively respond to the 2022 floods was severely restricted. Ironically, the country accumulated more debt in addressing the aftermath of these floods than it received in humanitarian support in 2022.</p>
<p>Countries like Libya need to carefully manage their borrowing to avoid long-term economic challenges and debt burdens. Pakistan’s experience showed that <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistan-floods/">private donations</a> from within the country can be a significant source of funds, alongside the international giving that is more common.</p>
<p>Libya could explore alternative funding sources such as international grants, loans from international financial institutions, redirecting existing budget allocations and generating additional revenue domestically through stimulating economic growth.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Close up shot of boy drinking clean fresh water from outside tap" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578964/original/file-20240229-28-op0abw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010 Pakistan was hit by one of the largest natural disasters the world has ever seen. Ten years’ worth of rain falling in just two weeks resulted in extreme flooding across much of the country. Access to clean drinking water became a huge issue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://climatevisuals.org/search/?searchQuery=flood%20pakistan">Vicki Francis/DFID/Climate Visuals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Road to recovery</h2>
<p>There is also a more literal question of how to rebuild. In Pakistan, the reconstruction of damaged roads, bridges, power stations, schools, hospitals and homes involved a collaborative approach. Inspired by the self-resilience housing model developed by Yasmeen Lari, <a href="https://www.arct.cam.ac.uk/staff/professor-yasmeen-lari">Pakistan’s first female architect</a>, local community involvement was key. </p>
<p>This model also promotes sustainability and generates local employment by using locally sourced materials, such as mud bricks. Instead of relying on conventional and expensive building materials like cement blocks, local people make mud bricks using locally sourced clay and other natural materials that are easily replaceable in the future. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s self-resilience housing approach taps into the benefits of short supply chains and creates local jobs in the process. Libya needs to draw lessons from this strategy for rebuilding infrastructure. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Looking down over sandy ground, brown mud bricks drying in vast rows on the ground, a few trees in background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578967/original/file-20240229-24-rzo7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mud bricks are made by local communities in Pakistan as part of efforts to improve resilience.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bricks-made-mud-putting-row-2404684131">nadeemshahzad/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recovery efforts should not only focus on rebuilding physical infrastructure. Strengthening economic, social and environmental resilience must be prioritised too. As seen in Pakistan, millions of people are <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/news/pakistan-flood-victims-crises-collide-fuel-growing-hunger">still struggling</a> to find a sustainable means of livelihood and <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/climate-change-and-pakistan-flooding-affecting-millions">clean water</a> remains a pressing issue in many affected areas. </p>
<p>Social and psychological support is just as important. That includes counselling services and mental health systems to address trauma, grief and loss. </p>
<p>A 2022 <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.890671">study</a> by Iranian researchers revealed that post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms were particularly prevalent after extreme flood events. Another <a href="https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/2022-pakistan-floods/">2022 report</a> showed that Pakistan flood survivors who were given professional psychological support recovered more rapidly and completely.</p>
<p>To pave the way for recovery in Libya, additional support will be needed, particularly in terms of temporary shelters, medicine and access to health facilities and sanitation services. </p>
<p>Coordinated local action and stable governance will help fragile regions like Libya and Pakistan to strengthen communities and prepare for more inevitable climate shocks. Peace building needs to be an integral part of climate crisis recovery, prevention and readiness.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. He is grateful to have received grants supporting his research on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.</span></em></p>Our expert in disaster recovery and climate change adaptation calls for a longer-term response to conflict zones affected by severe flooding, such as Libya and Pakistan.Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Visiting Scientist, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247112024-03-04T20:47:47Z2024-03-04T20:47:47ZSelf-immolation and other ‘spectacular’ protests: How impactful are they?<p>On Feb. 25, United States Air Force member Aaron Bushnell <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-airman-self-immolation-israel-embassy-1.7126137">set himself on fire outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C.</a>. The 25-year-old, who was in uniform, live-streamed what he called his “extreme act of protest against the genocide of the Palestinian people.” </p>
<p>His startling and fatal act quickly went viral on social media <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13127485/Air-Force-engineer-Aaron-Bushnell-set-fire-outside-Israeli-embassy-pro-Palestine-protest-belonged-Christian-cult-SUPPORTS-airstrikes.html">while the public</a>, and his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68455401">friends and family have struggled to make sense</a> of Bushnell’s painful sacrifice. How can we begin to make sense of such an extreme act? And, will his actions have any impact on public opinion?</p>
<p>While undeniably remarkable, Bushnell’s actions begin to make a little more sense when seen in broader context. Self-immolation, the act of setting oneself on fire, can be seen as an extreme form of a modern repertoire of protest that is both common and familiar, not just in the U.S. but in many parts of the globe.</p>
<p>For example, in <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=35102">my research with frontline women workers in Pakistan</a>, I found self-immolation was part of a broader set of attention-grabbing tools women used in an effort to attract both attention and allies for what they saw as an otherwise lost cause. I call this broad set of publicity seeking efforts “spectacular agency,” a set of stunning dramas people stage to publicize abuse, critique injustice, censure abusers and protect the vulnerable. </p>
<h2>Spectacular agency</h2>
<p>Spectacular agency, including extreme forms like self-immolation, is not new. Many people from the 1960s generation will be familiar with the <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/the-burning-monk-1963/">photograph of Thich Quang Duc, the Buddhist monk</a> who self-immolated to protest the South Vietnamese government’s persecution of Buddhists. His unthinkable gesture <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176056.003.0013">brought international attention to the plight of Buddhists</a> in South Vietnam.</p>
<p>Now, since the advent of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/27/1233985097/self-immolation-political-protesters-history-aaron-bushnell">globalized broadcast media,</a> such actions can quickly gain attention across the globe. Indeed, with the wider availability of social media and the possibility of going viral, such protests have become more common than you would think. </p>
<p>Not all spectacular actions include the extreme act of self-immolation, but many examples exist within its realm. They have included the use of hashtags like <a href="https://canadianwomen.org/the-facts/the-metoo-movement-in-canada/">#metoo,</a> the circulation of leaked <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/you-dont-belong-here-canadian-teacher-lambastes-muslim-student-for-eschewing-pride">videos</a>, the practice of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/mcmaster-divestment-project-hunger-strike-ends-1.6793248">hunger strikes</a>, the use of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/pro-palestinian-protesters-return-to-union-station-for-rush-hour-sit-in/article_21490aa0-93ee-11ee-bb99-032a49e54b60.html">inflammatory posters</a>, the burning of effigies (for example when U.S. protestors <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/draft-card-protest/">burnt their draft cards</a> in 1965) and also attempted <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/366731/lhws-protest-pushed-to-limits-man-sets-himself-on-fire">self-immolation</a>. </p>
<p>And as I found in Pakistan, this also includes the organization of <a href="https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/21/lady-health-workers-protest/">dharnas</a> (sit-ins). Sit-ins have also been recently used as a protest technique to call for a ceasefire in Gaza <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/pro-palestinian-protesters-return-to-union-station-for-rush-hour-sit-in/article_21490aa0-93ee-11ee-bb99-032a49e54b60.html">at Toronto’s Union Station</a> and in Washington, D.C. in October.</p>
<p>While such acts may generate attention, this kind of agency is often costly, requiring the protesters involved to make considerable personal investments of time, money, comfort, privacy, dignity and even life. </p>
<p>Yet, despite the costs, the outcomes of spectacular agency are frequently uncertain. </p>
<p>This is because spectacular agency requires recruiting others, such as audiences, who need to buy into a message, an idea or a point of view. But no matter how carefully they stage their dramatic contention, protesters have limited control over the way their vivid efforts will be read and interpreted by others.</p>
<h2>How audiences interpret protests</h2>
<p>When the public sees spectacular acts, they may focus on the symbols protesters use, such as military uniforms, that may be both symbolically loaded and multivocal. People invest a lot of meaning into military uniforms and they may read their use in many different ways depending on their different points of view. While symbols like uniforms can be arresting, their use may not always produce the interpretation the protester desired. Instead, the use of a loaded symbol may be taken by spectators as sacrilegious, and their use, therefore, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/29/aaron-bushnell-suicide-protest/">can lead audiences to question the protester’s sanity</a>.</p>
<p>The meanings audiences draw from spectacular performance, moreover, often interact with broader currents of inequality in society. An actor’s race, gender or age can be important factors that determine whether they have the authority, in an audience’s eyes, to use a particular symbol or to spectacularly tell a story that is important to them. </p>
<p>Women engaging in spectacular agency to draw attention to sexual assault, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/columbia-student-brings-rape-protest-mattress-to-graduation-1.3079582">like the Columbia student who carried a mattress</a> around campus to draw attention to sexual abuse, may find audiences either blame the victim or <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/columbia-university-mattress-girl-emmas-sulkowicz-paul-nungesser-lawsuit-rape-accusation-exonerated/">refuse to believe her account</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HRaw1A7REzs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Emma Sulkowicz, walks across the stage at Columbia College, 2015, with her mattress as audience members cheered and clapped. Two years later, the accused was cleared of any wrongdoing in a settled lawsuit.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Selflessly fighting for a better future</h2>
<p>In Pakistan, women frontline workers’ spectacular actions also brought mixed results. When I say frontline workers, I mean people who provide face-to-face service to citizens. One airline attendant <a href="https://www.edition.pk/news/1006210/pia-air-hostess-sabira-rizvi-talks-age-and-being-internet-famous">took to social media in an effort to protest against the ageism and sexism of some passengers</a> and found supportive and allies <a href="https://twitter.com/ammarawrites/status/882899735690039296?lang=en">among other social media users</a>. </p>
<p>But other women workers were not so fortunate.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/10/the-plight-of-pakistans-lady-health-workers">Pakistani Lady Health Workers</a>, who travelled from city to city across Pakistan engaging in long running spectacular efforts to grab attention for their poor working conditions, succeeded in getting the Pakistani Supreme Court’s attention and intervention. </p>
<p>However, the women then had to confront a slowly moving bureaucratic administration that found ways to delay or limit the women’s gains. Some of these women said the reforms they had worked so hard for would not benefit them directly. They were on the verge of retirement and were told by their bosses that their hard-won gains in wages and pensions would not apply to them.</p>
<p>Yet, most of these women said they did not regret having made the effort. </p>
<p>Speaking about her own inability to reap the rewards of spectacular agency, Nuzhat, a frontline health worker said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It doesn’t matter. The next generation will get it. One person grows a tree so that the next generation can sit in its shade…What is important is that you plant it.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Spectacular agency is costly, requiring the surrender of money, time, comfort and also, at times privacy and dignity. Therefore, people who engage in it, often see it as an altruistic sacrifice made in the name of others. </p>
<p>Rehana, a health worker said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I don’t feel sad that I derived little benefit from that effort…I feel that you should do whatever you can do. Whatever we can do for the next generation, we do it. You can’t control the outcome, but you can say: ‘O Allah, I have fulfilled my obligations. I spared no effort to create a better world for the next people who will take my place. Now it’s up to them and you.’</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fauzia Husain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Aaron Bushnell’s self-immolation is an example of ‘spectacular agency,’ a form of attention-grabbing but costly protest. And, it is uncertain how the public will perceive such protests.Fauzia Husain, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229512024-02-14T14:44:14Z2024-02-14T14:44:14ZNo party won a majority in Pakistan’s contentious election. What happens now?<p>Pakistan’s recent general election has intensified the country’s tumultuous politics. The hotly contested election period <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/7/pakistan-election-2024-one-day-out-live">left 24 people dead following attacks on political offices and the suspension of cellular and internet services nationwide</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/asia/pakistan-election-nawaz-sharif-intl/index.html">With 98 of 264 seats, independents in Pakistan</a> — who are backed by the imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party — won the most seats.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/11/pakistan-election-results-put-imran-khans-independents-in-lead">The Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN), with 76 seats, trailed behind PTI while the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won 54 seats</a>. But with no clear majority and amid widespread concerns about vote tampering and election engineering, there is further uncertainty about Pakistan’s political future.</p>
<p><a href="https://ca.news.yahoo.com/world-leaders-urge-probe-pakistan-072723654.html">Both PTI and former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s PMLN have declared victory.</a> But it’s not clear who will become Pakistan’s next prime minister as none of the three major parties will be able to secure the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/asia/pakistan-election-results-released-intl-hnk/index.html">169 seats required to establish a majority in parliament and form a government on their own.</a></p>
<h2>Coalition speculation</h2>
<p>Other smaller parties also won representation, including a surprise comeback by the Karachi-based <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/11/pakistan-election-results-put-imran-khans-independents-in-lead">Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) with 17 seats, while multiple other parties secured a total of 20 seats among them</a>, including the <a href="https://www.samaa.tv/208739595-elections-2024-independents-grab-101-na-seats-pml-n-75-as-ecp-finally-completes-vote-count">Pakistan Muslim League — an offshoot of PMLN — the Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Party</a>.</p>
<p>There is speculation about a coalition between PMLN and the PPP, with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-will-pakistan-form-its-next-government-2024-02-12/">PTI-backed independents joining either party or a smaller party to gain a share of the parliament’s remaining 70 seats</a>.</p>
<p>Out of the National Assembly’s 336 total seats, there are 264 seats that each party hoping to form a majority government are likely vying for. There are also 70 reserved seats, 60 for women and 10 for non-Muslim candidates. </p>
<p>Khan’s PTI leadership is reportedly convening to discuss the results, <a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Feb-2024/pti-convenes-meeting-to-discuss-alliances-with-other-parties">though it’s signalling it has no intention of forming a coalition government with the PPP and PMLN. It claims to have won 150 seats, not 98,</a> and can form a centrist government. However, these claims are unsubstantiated by official results. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.timesnownews.com/world/pakistan-elections-2024-nawaz-sharifs-pml-n-bilawal-bhuttos-ppp-agree-to-form-coalition-government-check-latest-party-position-article-107597000#:%7E:text=With%20this%2C%20now%20the%20Pakistan%20Muslim%20League-Nawaz%20%28PML-N%29,Zardari%2C%20inviting%20them%20to%20work%20together%20for%20Pakistan.">PPP and PMLN, meanwhile, have reportedly agreed to form a coalition government in Punjab</a>.</p>
<p>This will result in a cautious power-sharing exercise between two longtime fixtures of Pakistani politics.</p>
<p>On the one hand, there’s the PLMN’s Sharif — a three-time former prime minister — his brother Shabaz Sharif (also a former prime minister), Nawaz’s daughter Maryam Nawaz and Shabaz Sharif’s son Hamza (former chief minister of Punjab). </p>
<p>On the other hand, there’s the PPP’s Asif Ali Zardari and Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (husband and son of the late Benazir Bhutto, respectively). </p>
<p>Each of them could possibly become the prime minister of a coalition government if an agreement is reached.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/11-Feb-2024/newly-elected-pti-backed-mna-waseem-qadir-joins-pml-n">Some newly elected PTI-backed candidates have reportedly already joined PMLN</a>, with more independent candidates expected to swing in the coming days.</p>
<h2>Crackdowns cause outrage</h2>
<p>Pakistan’s crackdown on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/23/pakistan-ex-pms-party-loses-election-symbol-will-it-hurt-its-prospects">PTI, including the loss of its election symbol and the imprisonment of its chairman</a>, angered party workers and supporters on the eve of the election.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/asia/pakistan-election-nawaz-sharif-intl/index.html">The unrest continues as citizens hold widespread protests across the country</a> over allegations of vote rigging and vote counts that took as long as <a href="https://ca.news.yahoo.com/imran-khan-supporters-win-most-122600451.html">three days.</a></p>
<p>PTI’s interim leadership has also called for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/11/protests-pakistan-election-vote-rigging-allegations-imran-khan">peaceful nationwide protests, alleging stolen votes.</a> With a hung parliament, intensifying political instability and a scramble to attain power are in full force in Pakistan.</p>
<h2>Military as the puppet-master</h2>
<p>The role of the military in Pakistan’s politics was widely criticized in the months leading up to the 2024 elections.</p>
<p><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-2024-national-elections-nawaz-sharif-imran-khan-and-pti-army-chief-bilawal-bhutto/articleshow/107480119.cms">Dubbed the “mother of all selections,”</a> the election results are widely believed to have been engineered by the most powerful political entity in the country — its military. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pakistani-election-looms-the-military-maintains-its-grip-on-the-countrys-politics-221395">As Pakistani election looms, the military maintains its grip on the country's politics</a>
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<p>Using political repression, military generals have controlled the democratic process and electoral outcomes since Pakistan’s foundation in 1947. Khan blamed the military for the overthrow of his democratically elected government in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61055210">2022 through a no-confidence vote</a>.</p>
<p>Sharif — who <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2024/2/4/how-much-influence-is-pakistans-army-having-on-upcoming-elections">has reconciled with the military since being ousted three times as prime minister, most recently in 2017</a> — was heavily favoured by the generals to win the 2024 election. His potential return to power for a fourth time following a self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/05/pakistan-election-nawaz-sharif#:%7E:text=It%20was%20an%20alleged%20backroom,making%20him%20a%20clear%20frontrunner.">based on a backroom deal with the military</a> that sidelined Khan and the PTI.</p>
<p>Despite the military’s intervention, PTI-backed independents have gained significant ground. In a country where the military reigns supreme, PTI’s performance upended most political predictions that anyone who crosses the military cannot win.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, despite its strong showing, PTI is not likely to form a government.</p>
<p>As such, PTI-backed independents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/11/world/asia/pakistan-election.html">must join a smaller party and form a coalition government, or be wooed by PMLN, a strategy that is already underway.</a> Sharif is reportedly partaking in horse-trading to court enough PTI-backed independents to form a government without the PPP or MQM. </p>
<h2>Will the military stand down?</h2>
<p>Experts believe <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-imran-khans-party-outperformed-expectations-what-will-this-mean-for-pakistans-next-government/">the military must now seek reconciliation with Khan rather than support an unsustainable coalition against the PTI</a>. Given the growing wave of discontent against the Pakistan army, it would be wise to protect itself against further accusations of political meddling.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s political uncertainty comes at a time when the country is dealing with several pressing issues, including negotiating a new <a href="https://www.timesnownews.com/world/pakistan-elections-2024-nawaz-sharifs-pml-n-bilawal-bhuttos-ppp-agree-to-form-coalition-government-check-latest-party-position-article-107597000">International Monetary Fund program to support a faltering economy</a>, a sharp increase in government corruption and mismanagement, soaring inflation, <a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/11-Feb-2024/financial-issues-serious-economic-challenges-await-new-govt-apbf">economic challenges arising from the IMF bailout and subsequent debt restructuring, external debt of more than US$120 billion and rampant youth unemployment</a>.</p>
<p>The PTI and PPP have already ruled out <a href="https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/pakistan-election-results-shehbaz-sharif-may-become-next-pm-nawaz-sharif-temperament-will-not-suit-coalition-govt-imran-khan-pmln-ppp-bilawal-bhutto-2024-02-13-916619">post-election alliances with each other, while Nawaz has a reputation for being unsuitable to lead coalitions because of his temperment</a>. Some observers are even <a href="https://ca.news.yahoo.com/happens-next-pakistanis-wait-next-121138432.html">suggesting an outside candidate serve as prime minister to maintain peace</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/pakistans-post-election-crisis-how-anti-army-vote-may-deliver-an-unstable-government-that-falls-into-the-militarys-hands-223287">Pakistan's post-election crisis – how anti-army vote may deliver an unstable government that falls into the military's hands</a>
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<p>Three weeks after a national election, the president is required by law to convene the national assembly. This means the parties have until Feb. 29 to unite into a coalition. </p>
<p>During that session, new legislators are sworn in. They file nomination papers for several important positions, such as leader of the house and speaker of the house. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/pakistan-election-can-imran-khans-winning-candidates-form-a-government#:%7E:text=What's%20needed%20for%20a%20government,independents%20who%20won%20their%20seats.">A simple majority of 134 members is needed to elect a new prime minister</a> in a parliamentary vote held once these slots are filled.</p>
<p>It’s now up to Pakistan’s major political players to figure out who’s going to lead the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noor Mirza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a hung parliament and uncertain election results, further political instability and a scramble to attain power is in full force in Pakistan.Noor Mirza, Researcher, Balsillie School of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230302024-02-12T15:58:31Z2024-02-12T15:58:31ZPakistan election results in political instability when the country needed it least<p>Shock results in Pakistan’s national election threaten to see the country free-fall into political crisis. Days after the election, it remains unclear which party (or parties) will form a government and who the next prime minister will be.</p>
<p>Independent candidates affiliated to Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice/PTI), the party of former prime minister, Imran Khan, won 95 of 264 seats. This puts it in the lead, ahead of Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) in second place. However, with 75 seats, PML-N is the largest single party in the national assembly.</p>
<p>It’s fair to say Pakistan doesn’t have a brilliant track record when it comes to putting democracy into action. No elected prime minister has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/9/factbox-no-pakistani-prime-minister-has-completed-a-full-tenure">completed</a> a full term in office. The country has been under military rule for nearly as much time as it has been under a civilian government. And the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-a-historical-trail-of-pakistans-powerful-military-enterprise-205749">military</a> has long directed the country’s politics from behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Allegations that the election was likely to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/election-engineering-is-pakistans-february-vote-already-rigged">rigged</a> were rife months before voters headed to the polls on February 8. Khan, who remains widely popular, was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20231231-imprisoned-former-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-barred-from-election-candidacy">barred from running</a> in the election and is currently in prison having been sentenced on three separate occasions in recent weeks. Many candidates for his party were imprisoned or otherwise <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/07/harassed-constantly-imran-khans-party-fights-state-pressure-in-pakistan-election#:%7E:text=Dozens%20of%20senior%20PTI%20leaders,posters%20are%20systematically%20torn%20down.">harassed</a> and hounded out of politics. </p>
<p>The Election Commission of Pakistan also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-imran-khans-party-loses-cricket-bat-electoral-symbol-2024-01-14/">banned</a> PTI candidates from using the electoral symbol of a cricket bat. They had to stand as independents with individual symbols, a sure impediment in a country of large rural constituencies where high numbers of voters <a href="https://mofept.gov.pk/ProjectDetail/NjQ4ZTg2NjItOWM2NC00Y2IxLTkzMDgtMjU2OTFhMjA4NzNh#:%7E:text=The%20current%20literacy%20rate%20of,is%20illiterate%20in%20the%20country.">cannot read</a>.</p>
<p>As voting got underway, the interior ministry <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68226228">suspended</a> mobile calls and data services – a move it said was essential to “maintain law and order” after a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68226516">string of terrorist attacks</a> in the days leading up to the election. The internet blackout meant it was not possible for many urban voters to book taxis to go and cast their vote or coordinate plans with other family members. Violence on election day itself left <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-vote-counts-drags-after-election-marred-by-attacks-outages-2024-02-09/">28 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Close contest</h2>
<p>Once the results started trickling in, independent candidates aligned to PTI were out ahead. There were then significant delays in the processing and announcing of further results, leading to fears that the outcome would be <a href="https://twitter.com/MichaelKugelman/status/1755704058155765903">manipulated by the military</a> who PTI supporters feared were intent on suppressing Khan’s party. </p>
<p>Despite the military’s interference, the elections have resulted in political uncertainty. Behind the scenes, Sharif and his PML-N is negotiating power-sharing with Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan People Party (PPP). He is also hoping to co-opt some of Khan’s PTI-backed candidates, and is showing some <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2456138/pti-backed-independent-defects-to-pml-n">success</a>.</p>
<p>If he manages to put together a coalition, Sharif will come to power with much baggage. He was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/28/pakistani-court-disqualifies-pm-nawaz-sharif-from-office">dismissed as prime minister</a> in 2017 over corruption allegations – and accusations of nepotism have, in the past, landed both he and his daughter Maryam in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/06/former-pakistani-leader-nawaz-sharif-sentenced-to-10-years-in-jail">prison</a>. </p>
<p>The army, who many believe selected Sharif as their man, seem to have weighed the baggage and decided to hedge their bet – a wager they may be coming to regret. The Pakistan military is often referred to as the army that has never won a war and never lost an election: 2024 may have disrupted that.</p>
<h2>Stability is unlikely</h2>
<p>Pakistan has precedence for not honouring the will of the electorate. In December 1970, at the country’s first direct national election, the Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan, while The PPP won 87 out of 138 seats in West Pakistan. These results meant the Awami League had won an outright majority to govern the whole of Pakistan. </p>
<p>However, the national assembly was postponed, leading to protests, a civil war and eventually to a national split and the end of the bifurcated era. East Pakistan became Bangladesh and West Pakistan simply became Pakistan. </p>
<p>Over half a century later, it is unlikely that Khan will stay quiet if his party is denied power. He enjoys, for now, the enduring popular support of Pakistan’s 128 million voters. And Khan has managed to shift the zeitgeist, leading to the unprecedented open criticism of Pakistan’s all-powerful military. </p>
<p>But the country’s political uncertainty comes at a time of severe economic crisis. Strong and stable leadership is required to steer Pakistan’s struggling economy. </p>
<h2>Pakistan’s economy is in crisis</h2>
<p>Figures released by Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.pbs.gov.pk/">Bureau of Statistics</a> in January 2024 revealed that inflation was nearly 30% higher than at the same point the previous year. The <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1797445">cost of essentials</a> such as wheat, sugar and vegetables are now unaffordable for many ordinary people whose wages are being stretched to breaking point. </p>
<p>The number of people living in poverty in Pakistan has climbed to <a href="https://pakistanaffairs.pk/2023/10/03/the-world-bank-estimates-that-the-poverty-rate-in-pakistan-will-reach-39-4-in-fy23/">nearly 40%</a>. And price hikes for electricity and fuel in September 2023 led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/sep/05/pakistan-uproar-violent-protests-soaring-fuel-electricity-prices">protests</a>, with thousands taking to the streets and burning their electricity bills. </p>
<p>On top of this, Pakistan will have to repay its <a href="https://indiafirstepaper.com/2023/04/07/pakistan-must-repay-external-debt-of-us77-5-billion-within-3-years/">substantial external debt</a> – US$77.5 billion (£61.4 billion) over the next three years, with a currency that is depleted of value. In August 2023, Pakistan’s rupee fell to a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-22/pakistan-rupee-slumps-to-record-low-amid-growing-headwinds">record low</a> of 299 to the dollar.</p>
<p>With increased economic hardship and little opportunity at home, many Pakistanis are making perilous journeys out of Pakistan. Young people especially are being driven to find a better life elsewhere, sometimes with deadly consequences. In June 2023, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/18/pakistanis-were-forced-below-deck-on-refugee-boat-in-greece-disaster">more than 300</a> Pakistani migrants died when an overcrowded fishing vessel sank off the coast of Greece.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s new leader will need new ideas on how to get their country out of economic trouble and improve the lives of his countrymen. Whoever it may be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223030/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parveen Akhtar has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy.</span></em></p>Days after the election, it remains unclear who the the next prime minister will be.Parveen Akhtar, Senior Lecturer: Politics, History and International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232872024-02-11T23:38:54Z2024-02-11T23:38:54ZPakistan’s post-election crisis – how anti-army vote may deliver an unstable government that falls into the military’s hands<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574783/original/file-20240211-22-hgfmzj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C567%2C5459%2C3083&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Like at this pro-PTI protest, the smoke has yet to clear following Pakistan's election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-khans-pakistan-tehreek-e-insaf-party-run-from-news-photo/1995105733?adppopup=true">M Asim Khan/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68226228">Pakistan’s heavily anticipated general election</a> took place on Feb. 8, 2024, with citizens of the South Asian country hoping that it might prove a step toward ending the nation’s political uncertainty.</em></p>
<p><em>But several days later, it remains unclear what the result of the vote will yield. Both of the leading contenders <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/10/pakistans-khan-sharif-claim-election-win-despite-no-clear-majority">have claimed victory</a>, amid allegations of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/be2925f4-8cb6-41fc-ae07-b00a6493014d">vote rigging and disputed ballots</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation spoke with <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/ayesha-jalal">Ayesha Jalal, an expert on Pakistan’s political history</a> who teaches at Tufts University, about what the results of the election mean and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Is it clear who will govern Pakistan next?</h2>
<p>The results as they stand mean that no party is in a position to form a government on its own. So a coalition government at the federal level is unavoidable.</p>
<p>And this is where things get tricky. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or PTI – headed by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-19844270">jailed former prime minister and Pakistani cricket hero Imran Khan</a> – has emerged as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/10/what-comes-next-2">largest party in the national assembly</a>, with around 93 candidates winning seats as “independents.” They had to run as independents because the party was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-s-pti-barred-from-using-cricket-bat-electoral-symbol-/7439552.html">barred from using its electoral symbol</a>, a cricket bat, after a three-member bench of the supreme court ruled that PTI had failed to hold intraparty elections in line with its constitution.</p>
<p>But with a total of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-vote-counts-drags-after-election-marred-by-attacks-outages-2024-02-09/">265 seats in parliament</a>, that means the PTI is still well short of the number needed to form a government on its own.</p>
<p>The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PMLN, came in second with 78 seats, a tally that is likely to be boosted by the addition of PMLN-aligned independent members of parliament. The party – headed by Shahbaz Sharif, who took over from Khan as prime minister in 2022, and his brother, former three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif – is thought to have the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-army-chief-backs-ex-pm-nawaz-sharifs-call-to-form-coalition-government/articleshow/107587628.cms?from=mdr">backing of the powerful Pakistani army</a>, but it did not perform as well as expected in the election.</p>
<p>The Pakistan People’s Party, or PPP, secured 54 seats, placing it third. This puts it in a position to help another party form a coalition at the federal level.</p>
<h2>With the most seats, is the PTI the front-runner to lead a coalition?</h2>
<p>The PTI has made it clear that it wants to form a government on its own and believes that its mandate was stolen. </p>
<p>Even before the final election results became known, the <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/imran-khans-party-claims-victory-in-170-seats-vows-to-form-government-report-5032101">PTI claimed it had won 170 or so seats</a> – enough for it to be able to form a government. But that appears to be without evidence.</p>
<p>This suggests the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/11/pakistan-election-results-live-wait-for-final-tally-three-days-after-vote">PTI isn’t ready to accept</a> that it did not get enough votes to form a government outright. The party instead is challenging the results, claiming that its vote was suppressed illegally, and the PTI has already formally registered complaints in 18 constituencies. </p>
<p>I believe it is more likely that a coalition will emerge between the other parties, led by the PMLN. But the question is whether that will satisfy an electorate that voted the PTI as the largest party in parliament.</p>
<h2>That doesn’t sound very stable. Is it?</h2>
<p>It isn’t. Pakistan is now entering an uncertain scenario, which is, in effect, a post-election political crisis.</p>
<p>Coalitions are not uncommon in Pakistan’s politics, but they are not easy to manage. They can <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/pakistans-new-government-struggles-consolidate-control">become unwieldy</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/AtlanticCouncil/status/1756069234101133713">weak</a> and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/10/military-disrupts-pakistan-s-democracy-once-again-pub-89724">prone to manipulation</a>.</p>
<p>It also makes it far harder for any government to push through the kind of bold economic packages needed for the country to move forward and escape the deep structural problems that are ailing the economy, such as a <a href="https://www.theigc.org/blogs/taxing-effectively/why-does-pakistan-tax-so-little">limited tax base</a> and reliance on handouts from other countries. Tackling that requires hard, potentially unpopular decisions, which are more difficult when a government is split and has a limited popular mandate.</p>
<p>The country may need another national vote before too long to secure a more stable and workable government.</p>
<h2>The election has been called flawed in the West. Is that fair?</h2>
<p>By Pakistan’s standards, the actual polling went off relatively peacefully. There was a terrible attack in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240118-baluchistan-explosive-region-on-iran-pakistan-borderland">restive province of Baluchistan</a> on the eve of the election that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68226516">killed 28 people</a>. But fears of widespread violence on the day of the election did not materialize.</p>
<p>And while there were undue <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-election-human-rights-commission-khan-3258e2131ac83e89c2c376b476caccec">curbs on political activity</a> in the <a href="https://www.apstylebook.com/search?query=runup&button=">run-up</a> to the elections, the election itself appears to be largely credible by Pakistani standards, as the country’s foreign ministry has been <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-10/pakistan-hits-back-at-criticism-of-election-conduct-and-insists-cellphone-curbs-were-necessary">quick to attest</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that the PTI, a party that is out of favor with Pakistan’s current senior military leadership, has done so well suggests there was no straightforward rigging across the board. There was harassment of PTI voters in some places, but it clearly wasn’t sufficient to make huge inroads into their overall vote.</p>
<p>One can’t compare Pakistan’s democracy with that of the U.S. or any other country. The problem with many outside observers of Pakistan’s politics is that they talk normatively – that is, they see Pakistan’s elections through the eyes of what is generally seen as the norm elsewhere.</p>
<p>But Pakistani politics are unique. The country is a military-dominated state, with generals that have long been involved in the country’s politics – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/04/world/asia/pakistan-election-imran-khan.html">and elections</a>.</p>
<p>But the alternative to managed elections, no matter how messy, is martial law. And a flawed democracy is better than the military jackboot.</p>
<p>More than that, the election itself took place relatively peacefully. There has been a great deal of criticism in the West about <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/8/inherently-undemocratic-pakistan-suspends-mobile-services-on-voting-day">cellphones and mobile internet services being blocked</a> on election day. That may seem like unacceptable interference in the electoral process to outside observers. But in Pakistan, there was <a href="https://france24.com/en/20121123-pakistan-suspends-mobile-phone-service-security-ashura-shiite-terrorism">real concern about cellphones</a> being used to detonate explosive devices.</p>
<h2>Will anyone be pleased with the election result?</h2>
<p>Ironically, while the PTI’s strong showing represents an anti-establishment vote – and, more specifically, an anti-army vote – the divided national mandate means the army high command has reason to be satisfied with the outcome.</p>
<p>A split national assembly and weak government plays into the military’s hands. Should the PMLN govern as the major party in a coalition, it will be in a position of relative weakness and will need the army’s support, especially if the PTI engages in widespread protests against the election results. </p>
<h2>Are there any positives from the election?</h2>
<p>Yes, insofar as the process of seeking the peoples’ support has been allowed to continue. But the negatives are seen by most to outweigh the positives and the 2024 elections are being viewed as equally – if not more – manipulated and controlled than the 2018 exercise. </p>
<p>The turnout this time around is <a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Feb-2024/voters-turnout-remain-48-percent-in-election-fafen-report">estimated to be around 48%</a>, which is lower than in 2018 when it was 51%. The demographic breakdown is encouraging. The youth played a crucial role; 44% of voters were under the age of 35. And women, too, played a larger role in the vote – more women contested and also won seats.</p>
<p>And party politics aside, the result suggests that old tactics to intimidate and suppress voters largely didn’t work. The expectation was that the spate of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-criminal-cases-against-pakistans-imran-khan-2024-01-31/">legal verdicts against Khan</a> just weeks before the election and his continued imprisonment might curb his popularity and mean PTI supporters would stay home. That clearly didn’t happen.</p>
<p>But what they helped deliver may only help continue Pakistan’s political malaise as it heads into a new, uncertain period.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayesha Jalal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The PTI, the party of jailed former prime minister Imran Khan, won the most seats of any one party – but fell short of reaching the threshold for a majority government.Ayesha Jalal, Professor of History, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221472024-02-07T00:33:45Z2024-02-07T00:33:45ZWith Pakistan’s most popular politician in jail and cynicism running high, can a new leader unite the country?<p>Pakistanis headed to the polls on Thursday to elect a new parliament and prime minister at a time of renewed political turbulence in the country.</p>
<p>The country’s popular former leader, Imran Khan, has been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/asia/imran-khan-convicted-fraudulent-marriage-pakistan-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Jailed%20Pakistani%20former%20Prime%20Minister%20Imran%20Khan%20and%20his%20wife,2018%20marriage%20violated%20the%20law.">sentenced</a> three separate times in recent weeks to lengthy jail terms. The timing before this week’s election is intended to send a message: the military wants him out of politics using a judicial pathway. </p>
<p>The military, which has directly and indirectly controlled Pakistan’s politics for seven decades, appears determined to reopen the political space for two other parties in the lead-up to the vote. </p>
<p>These are the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistans-comeback-king-nawaz-sharif-seeks-fourth-term-as-pm/articleshow/107418610.cms?from=mdr">Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz</a> (PML-N) party, led by three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, and the <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/bilawal-bhutto-launches-pakistan-peoples-party-electoral-rally-in-karachi-ahead-of-general-elections20240206045549/">Pakistan People’s Party</a>, led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the son of former president Asif Ali Zardari and assassinated former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.</p>
<p>So, with Khan in prison and barred from running, which party is likely to win the election and what challenges lie ahead for the new government?</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pakistan-election-the-military-has-long-meddled-in-the-countrys-politics-this-year-will-be-no-different-222443">Pakistan election: the military has long meddled in the country's politics – this year will be no different</a>
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<h2>Khan’s downfall</h2>
<p>Khan, a former cricket star, led the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/26/imran-khan-claims-victory-in-pakistan-elections">victory</a> in the 2018 elections. But he lost the support of the military and was ousted in April 2022 through a no confidence vote in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Since then, his party, PTI, has remained immensely popular. It <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/17/former-pm-imran-khan-dominates-pakistan-by-elections">dominated</a> byelections in late 2022 to fill seats in the National Assembly that had been left vacant when PTI lawmakers resigned en masse to protest his ouster.</p>
<p>Last year, Khan was barred from politics for five years after being convicted on corruption charges. He maintains the charges were politically motivated. Then came the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/asia/imran-khan-convicted-fraudulent-marriage-pakistan-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Jailed%20Pakistani%20former%20Prime%20Minister%20Imran%20Khan%20and%20his%20wife,2018%20marriage%20violated%20the%20law.">sentences</a> handed down this year (it’s unclear if they will be served concurrently):</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ten years in prison for breaching the Official Secrets Act</p></li>
<li><p>14 years in prison for failing to disclose gifts received from foreign leaders, selling them and then not disclosing the amounts earned</p></li>
<li><p>seven years in prison for being in an un-Islamic marriage.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>With Khan barred from standing for office and no support from the military, PTI seems very unlikely to secure enough seats to return to power.</p>
<p>The electoral commission made things even more difficult by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-s-pti-barred-from-using-cricket-bat-electoral-symbol-/7439552.html">blocking</a> the party’s use of the cricket bat symbol to identify its candidates. In a country with low levels of literacy, many people <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1806320/why-electoral-symbols-are-important-for-political-parties">rely on these symbols</a> when they cast their ballots. </p>
<p>The commission has instead allocated individual symbols to PTI’s candidates. This will create confusion among PTI’s supporters, who will need to know which symbols have been given to which candidates in their specific electorates. </p>
<p>Given the support among the youth for Khan and the PTI leadership urging its supporters to vote in the elections, the party’s candidates may still secure seats in the national and provincial assemblies. Their chances of forming a government, though, are virtually nil.</p>
<h2>The return of an exiled former leader</h2>
<p>Sharif, now 74 years old, is considered the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/05/pakistan-election-nawaz-sharif">frontrunner</a> to be prime minister again – for a fourth time.</p>
<p>Sharif owes his initial entry into politics to the military regime led by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. His relationship with the military since the 1990s, however, has vacillated between being cordial and antagonistic. </p>
<p>In fact, Sharif blamed former military and spy chiefs for <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/from-london-pakistans-former-prime-minister-nawaz-sharif-blames-ex-army-chief-for-his-2017-ouster/articleshow/103782275.cms?from=mdr">orchestrating</a> his ouster from power in 2017 when he was convicted of corruption. He was subsequently disqualified for life from participating in Pakistan’s politics. </p>
<p>Now he has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-s-former-pm-cleared-of-all-graft-charges-/7395239.html">returned</a> from self-imposed exile to stage another political comeback. With his relationship with the military back in a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-three-time-premier-nawaz-sharif-expected-home-exile-2023-10-21/">cordial</a>” phase, the courts immediately overturned his corruption convictions when he returned to Pakistan late last year, paving his way to run in the election. </p>
<p>Sharif has since introduced the slogan “<em><a href="https://www.geo.tv/latest/528679-pakistan-ko-nawaz-do-pml-n-unveils-much-awaited-election-manifesto">Pakistan ko Nawaz do</a></em>”, with the dual meaning of “Give Nawaz to Pakistan” and “Be Generous to Pakistan”. </p>
<p>Bhutto, just 35 years old, hails from a political dynasty, which has laid the groundwork for his rise to power. As the foreign minister in the coalition government that ousted Khan, he has made his mark and is presenting himself as a symbol of new thinking (<em>nai soch</em>) in Pakistan. </p>
<p>Both candidates have been holding rallies across the country, but it remains unclear if either will be able to win a national election. PML-N is strong in Punjab in the east and PPP’s support comes mostly in Sindh in the far south-east.</p>
<p>As such, Pakistan appears to be heading for a coalition government, which will have to address several challenges facing the country. </p>
<h2>A struggling economy and spiralling inflation</h2>
<p>The most pressing issue for the new government will be to prevent further economic decline and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/pakistan">improve the living conditions of ordinary citizens</a>. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s GDP growth rate has fallen from <a href="https://www.adb.org/where-we-work/pakistan/economy">5.8% in 2021 to about 0.3% in 2023</a>. At the same time, inflation has spiked against the backdrop of devastating floods in 2022, the rise in oil prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the demands of the International Monetary Fund for more sensible economic planning and the removal of unrealistic subsidies. Rates increased from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-rampant-inflation-piles-on-the-pressure/a-59823980">8.9% in 2021</a> to a <a href="https://www.brecorder.com/news/40281508/pakistans-headline-inflation-reading-clocks-in-at-297-in-december">whopping 29.7%</a> in December 2023. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the rate of people living in poverty in Pakistan has climbed <a href="https://pakistanaffairs.pk/2023/10/03/the-world-bank-estimates-that-the-poverty-rate-in-pakistan-will-reach-39-4-in-fy23/">to nearly 40%</a>, more than five percentage points higher than fiscal year 2022. </p>
<p>The new government will also need to revisit Pakistan’s foreign policy. Khan’s allegations of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/27/asia/pakistan-imran-khan-us-conspiracy-intl-hnk/index.html">US meddling in Pakistan’s politics</a> soured the country’s relations with Washington, while his less-than-enthusiastic approach to Chinese investment projects <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/china-was-uncomfortable-with-pakistan-under-imran-khan-reports/articleshow/93251831.cms?from=mdr">strained relations</a> with Beijing. </p>
<p>Even the Gulf states that traditionally had good relations with Pakistan began to recalibrate their south Asian strategies, with a clear tilt towards India. </p>
<p>The new government will also have to devise a new approach to Afghanistan. Despite the euphoria shared by some, particularly Khan, upon the return of the Taliban to government, Islamabad’s relations with Kabul have been affected by the new regime’s reluctance to address the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/21/what-explains-the-dramatic-rise-in-armed-attacks-in-pakistan">rise in attacks</a> by the Pakistani Taliban (often referred to as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) and other groups. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-terrorism-returning-to-pakistan-198995">Is terrorism returning to Pakistan?</a>
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<p>But the most significant challenge for the new government will be the growing cynicism among Pakistanis around the legitimacy of the electoral process. </p>
<p>Khan’s downfall has drawn attention to the military’s ever-present need to control the government. And this has led to ordinary citizens openly criticising the military, a phenomenon unheard of before. A small minority of people in private gatherings are even questioning the legitimacy of the idea of Pakistan. </p>
<p>The new government will need to work hard to cement its legitimacy in such circumstances. Failing to do that would plunge Pakistan into yet another round of instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samina Yasmeen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the military back on his side and his convictions quashed, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif could return to power in this week’s election.Samina Yasmeen, Director of Centre for Muslim States and Societies, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224432024-02-05T15:15:01Z2024-02-05T15:15:01ZPakistan election: the military has long meddled in the country’s politics – this year will be no different<p>Pakistan’s former prime minister, Imran Khan, has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68192196">sentenced</a> to seven years in prison after a Pakistani court ruled his marriage un-Islamic and illegal. Khan had already been sentenced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/31/imran-khan-pakistan-former-pm-sentenced-prison-14-years-corruption-charges">14 years</a> in jail for corruption and barred from holding public office for ten years a week earlier and, a day before that, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/imran-khan-pm-sentenced-prison-pakistan">ten years</a> in prison for leaking official state secrets.</p>
<p>Khan claims that the cases against him are politically motivated. Since being <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-61055210">deposed</a> in 2022, Khan has taken aim at the country’s powerful military, which has a long history of interfering in politics. He has accused the army chief, the military establishment and the US government of conspiring against him. </p>
<p>Now he argues that military leadership have orchestrated his imprisonment so he cannot run in the upcoming general election on February 8. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1810143">Members</a> of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have also been imprisoned or pressured into leaving their positions, and workers have been prevented from holding political rallies in the run up to the election. </p>
<p>The relentless harassment and intimidation of the PTI and its supporters, and the favour shown to Nawaz Sharif of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, has led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/can-pakistans-politicians-break-the-militarys-stranglehold">muted election campaign</a>. Sharif has been prime minister three times, but was ousted in 2017.</p>
<p>Khan will appeal his convictions and is likely to get some relief from the courts. But one thing is clear: the military has no intention of allowing a free and fair election on February 8.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A child at a demonstration holding aloft a picture of Nawaz Sharif." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573128/original/file-20240202-15-hgtsqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nawaz Sharif is expected to be all but escorted into an election win.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/karachi-pakistan-feb-22-pmln-holding-1031149930">Asianet-Pakistan/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Military dominance</h2>
<p>The military’s organisation, structures and practices were developed under the British (who ruled what is now Pakistan until independence in 1947). But its expansion into politics is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/pakistans-military-still-runs-show-imran-khan">rooted</a> in the persistent fear of war with India, its desire to control foreign policy, and its wish to protect its budgetary allocations and fiscal interests.</p>
<p>In 2022, military <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?locations=PK">expenditure</a> accounted for nearly 18% of government spending in Pakistan, making the military the best-resourced institution in the country. It is also a business conglomerate and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/31/books.pakistan">owns</a> millions of acres of public land. And it has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan">received</a> considerable military assistance as a frontline ally of the US during its engagements in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The military has long looked to prevent the election of anyone who might try to influence policies that diverge from its entrenched interests. In 2017, Sharif, who was then prime minister, fell out of favour with the military following <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44239582">disagreements</a> about normalising relations with India. Sharif was <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/06/21/pakistans-army-is-using-every-trick-to-sideline-nawaz-sharif">arrested</a> on charges of corruption and sentenced to ten years in jail less than two weeks before the 2018 general election.</p>
<p>Khan won that election with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pakistan-elections-weak-government-will-allow-army-to-keep-pulling-the-strings-98503">backing of the military</a>. But, despite starting his time in office by being on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/why-are-imran-khans-supporters-angry-with-pakistans-military">“one page”</a> with the military and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/ex-pakistan-pm-warns-of-deepening-crisis-as-fears-of-new-election-delay-grow">ceding</a> alarming amounts of political space to them, Khan’s relationship with the military soon turned sour. Tensions exploded when Khan tried to retain Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed as the military spy chief, rejecting the nominee of army chief General Qamar Bajwa. </p>
<p>In April 2022, Khan was ousted from power in a vote of no-confidence. He accused the US of <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1682104">engineering</a> his removal and made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/14/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan-military">numerous claims</a> that challenged the military directly. He alleged that the then army chief held a grudge against him, that the military had arrested and tried to assassinate him, and that the military was “above the law”. </p>
<p>Khan’s accusations culminated in his arrest on corruption charges on May 9 2023. His imprisonment has resulted in an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-65711385">unprecedented</a> public backlash against the military. Khan’s supporters attacked state institutions and military installations, even breaching the army’s headquarters.</p>
<p>Hundreds of PTI supporters were arrested and the military <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/7/pakistan-military-says-will-punish-planners-of-may-9-violence">vowed</a> to “punish” them, handing many over to military courts in violation of international law. Three military officials were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-66016331">sacked</a> for their role in the unrest. Since then, the military has by all <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/can-pakistans-politicians-break-the-militarys-stranglehold">accounts</a> tightened its grip over Pakistan’s politics, even <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/23/pakistans-army-chief-vows-to-keep-military-out-of-politics">publicly admitting</a> to meddling in politics.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protestors on a road kicking away tear gas shells fired by police." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573127/original/file-20240202-29-80u70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Imran Khan protesting in Lahore, Pakistan, against his arrest. May 10, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/supporters-pakistans-former-prime-minister-imran-2304142187">Murtaza.Ali/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Overdue polls</h2>
<p>Pakistan’s national elections were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/pakistan-to-hold-delayed-elections-on-february-8-electoral-commission-says">supposed to be held</a> in November 2023. But they were delayed due to the need to redraw constituency boundaries following a census. Many are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-66446957">sceptical</a> of this claim and have questioned the ability of Pakistan’s electoral commission to conduct fair polls.</p>
<p>The lead up to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/ex-pakistan-pm-warns-of-deepening-crisis-as-fears-of-new-election-delay-grow">delayed</a> polls has been marred by <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/01/asia/pakistan-election-candidate-killed-intl-hnk/index.html">violence</a>. And, though the polls are expected to go ahead, the electoral commission has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-election-panel-summons-meeting-rising-poll-violence-2024-02-01/">asked</a> for security support from the military.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the PTI has faced persistent harassment. Its website is <a href="https://www.brecorder.com/news/40285928/ptis-website-blocked-countrywide">blocked</a> in Pakistan and the party has faced legal setbacks such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/23/pakistan-ex-pms-party-loses-election-symbol-will-it-hurt-its-prospects">losing</a> its electoral symbol – the cricket bat – for not holding intra-party elections. The continuing harassment and intimidation of PTI supporters may also have a chilling effect on voters.</p>
<p>No election in Pakistan can be called free and fair for as long as the military establishment continues to play kingmaker. The election on February 8 is no different. </p>
<p>The military’s political engineering has ensured that it is impossible for there to be a level playing field for the parties on election day. It only remains to be seen if citizens will turn out to exercise their right to vote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222443/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sameen Mohsin Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pakistan’s citizens will vote in a lopsided poll on February 8.Sameen Mohsin Ali, Lecturer in International Development, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220262024-01-30T10:53:31Z2024-01-30T10:53:31ZIndia: visa problems for English cricketer reflect a longstanding security rift with neighbouring Pakistan<p>Young England cricketer Shoaib Bashir arrived in Hyderabad just in time to see the team triumph in style, inflicting a rare and unexpected victory against an Indian side considered nigh on unbeatable on its home turf. Bashir, a 20-year-old spin bowler who had been a surprise selection when the team was announced at the beginning of January, missed the first Test match because his Indian visa had been delayed.</p>
<p>This is not the first time a visiting cricketer has had visa problems in India. The same has happened to English cricketers Moeen Ali and Saqib Mahmood, while Australian opening batsman Usman Khawaja was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2023/feb/01/usman-khawaja-stranded-in-australia-with-visa-issues-ahead-of-india-tour">forced to wait 24 hours</a> before joining his teammates for a tour of India in February 2023. These are all cricketers with Pakistani heritage. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, during the cricket World Cup hosted by India in October 2023, visas for the Pakistan team were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/25/india-visa-delay-disrupts-pakistans-cricket-world-cup-2023-preparations#:%7E:text=Pakistan%20cricket%20team's%20preparations%20for,under%20way%20in%2010%20days.">subject to delays</a> while Pakistani fans and journalists were <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2023/10/14/pakistan-fans-glaring-absence-india-match-icc-cricket-world-cup-2023#:%7E:text=Cricket%20World%20Cup-,Pakistan%20fans%20a%20glaring%20absence%20at%20India%20Cricket%20World%20Cup,Cup's%20marquee%20clash%20in%20Ahmedabad.">effectively barred</a> from the tournament completely.</p>
<p>The World Cup ban for journalists and fans appears to be a reflection of the current acrimonious state of relations between India and Pakistan. But the difficulties experienced by overseas players of Pakistani origin reflects a longer-term Indian suspicion towards visitors with Pakistani roots and has a degree of justification.</p>
<p>Terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008, which claimed the lives of 166 people, were orchestrated by terrorists of the Pakistan-based <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-lashkar-e-taiba">Lashkar-e-Taiba</a> (LeT) in collusion with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). But one operative responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the targets for attack was an American national of Pakistani origin named David Headley. Headley, in his visa application, had <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/RTI_IS-Idiv_130814_00002_1.PDF">concealed his Pakistani roots</a> and managed to visit India multiple times to reconnoitre the targets. </p>
<p>As a result, the Indian Home Ministry (MHA), which is in charge of internal security, decided to tighten the visa requirements. Since 2009, all visa applications made by people with Pakistani roots were to be vetted and cleared by the MHA – a process that can take up to 90 days.</p>
<p>Some observers have called this a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/14/india-visa-rule-persecutes-pakistanis">“racist”</a> move directed squarely at Pakistanis that violates UK, European, and international human rights law. Others, meanwhile, have termed it “collective punishment” of the kind that is <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/as-if-we-are-all-david-headley-news-288058">often seen in South Asia</a>.</p>
<p>The US and UK governments <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/21/britain-us-protest-india-tourism">lodged diplomatic protests</a> against India’s decision to tighten its visa rules, but the Indian government resisted the pressure. US citizens who complained to the US State Department were simply told that <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/as-if-we-are-all-david-headley-news-288058">India had a right to deny visas</a> as it chooses. </p>
<p>One reason for the western weakness in being able to press this issue with the Indian government was arguably because of their the west’s consistent failure in accommodating India’s counter-terrorism concerns over the years. Headley, for instance, was not only an LeT operative but <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/david-headley-homegrown-terrorist">also an agent</a> of the US government’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Indian security agencies believe US intelligence could have done more <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/did-the-u-s-know-more-than-it-let-on-about-mumbai-attacks-suspect/">to help prevent the attack</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the UK had an unsympathetic attitude towards India’s security concerns about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-india-mumbai-attacks">British Pakistanis</a>. Several requests by Indian intelligence officials to monitor suspected British Pakistanis had failed to elicit serious responses from their British counterparts.</p>
<p>Mindful of international pressure to <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57cHDAloqUf2uJOHM/Why-India-didnt-attack-Pakistan-after-2611-Mumbai-attacks.html">exercise restraint</a> in the aftermath of the attacks, the then Manmohan Singh government instituted several defensive counter-terrorism measures, including the new visa rules. But <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Pakistan_April2014.pdf">India-Pakistan relations</a> remained active, despite the problem of cross-border terrorism. </p>
<h2>Modi’s neighbourhood policy</h2>
<p>After Modi came to power in 2014, despite his Hindu nationalist image, his government made peaceful overtures over the next couple of years in pursuit of what India called its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Narendra_Modi_government">“neighbourhood-first policy”</a>. This aimed to encourage cross-border cooperation and business enterprise across South Asia and focused on building deeper people-to-people ties.</p>
<p>But as terrorist attacks from Pakistan continued, India changed its tack to more forceful measures targeting terrorist bases within Pakistan. As a result, a new mantra became popular in Indian government circles: <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/home-minister-rajnath-singh-appeals-to-kashmiris-not-to-visit-gunfight-sites/articleshow/66334471.cms?from=mdr">“terror and talks cannot go together”</a>.</p>
<p>In August 2019, India overturned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/whats-article-370-what-to-know-about-india-top-court-verdict-on-kashmir">Article 370</a>, which allowed it to split the contested state of Kashmir into two centrally administered provinces: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. This angered the Pakistan government which felt it should have been consulted. Pakistan then announced any further security cooperation would be conditional on <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-pmo-no-talks-unless-india-revokes-art-370-move/articleshow/97072776.cms?from=mdr">India’s restoration of Article 370</a>. Since then there has been a total standstill in bilateral relations.</p>
<h2>Focus on counter-terrorism</h2>
<p>Meanwhile a focus on regional counter-terrorism has become something of a mantra for Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Consistent with this, the Modi government declared <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/india-pro-israel-narendra-modi-bjp-government">support to Israel</a> following the October 7 attacks and to the recent Iranian air strikes against Pakistan, claiming <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37515/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_media_queries_regarding_Irans_air_strikes_in_Pakistan">“zero tolerance towards terrorism”</a>.</p>
<p>Seen within this paradigm, India’s approach towards Pakistan is unlikely to change as the country expects its general elections in April. Recent speeches by Indian officials <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37514/Remarks_by_MoS_Dr_Rajkumar_Ranjan_Singh_at_the_19th_NAM_Summit__Ministerial_Meeting">further indicate</a> that, while the neighbourhood continues to remain a high priority for Modi, it is <a href="https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/34940/Remarks_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_Inaugural_Session_of_the_Training_Module_on_Indias_Neighbourhood_Lal_Bahadur_Shastri_National_Academy_of_Administr">“with the exception of Pakistan”</a>. </p>
<p>A poll taken in India in August 2023 reflected a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/08/29/indians-views-of-other-countries/#:%7E:text=Indians'%20views%20of%20Pakistan,-Strained%20bilateral%20relations&text=About%20seven%2Din%2Dten%20Indians,view%20of%20the%20neighboring%20country.">growing public negativity</a> towards Pakistan. The Pew Foundation poll found that 73% were unfavourable towards Pakistan (57% very unfavourable). In light of this, in the run-up to the April election, Modi is likely to feel that any positive gestures towards Pakistan might by politically unviable. </p>
<p>It’s a similar situation in Pakistan in the run-up to the general election there in February. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pakistani-election-looms-the-military-maintains-its-grip-on-the-countrys-politics-221395">hostile military</a> in control of domestic politics combined with <a href="https://www.samaa.tv/20873539-evolving-pakistani-views-on-india-kashmir-dispute-terrorism-and-diplomacy">strong anti-India public opinion</a> invalidate any prospects for reestablishing ties with India. This is despite the obvious need for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/india-pakistan-imf-trade-border-kashmir-debt/">stronger economic cooperation with India</a> to ease its current domestic crisis.</p>
<p>So, given the strong likelihood of a <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/politics/story/a-hattrick-for-pm-modi-in-2024-lok-sabha-elections-almost-inevitable-says-this-british-paper-411430-2024-01-01">Modi victory</a> in April and Pakistan’s intransigence in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/03/pakistan-terrorism-crisis-inconsistent-policy-military-economy/">sponsorship of terror outfits</a>, the visa hassles for Pakistanis or westerners with Pakistani roots are unlikely to stop any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dheeraj Paramesha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India changed its visa rules after the 2008 Mumbai massacre to make it more difficult for Pakistanis to visit.Dheeraj Paramesha, Lecturer in Intelligence, Security and Policing, School of Criminology, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213952024-01-24T19:01:50Z2024-01-24T19:01:50ZAs Pakistani election looms, the military maintains its grip on the country’s politics<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/as-pakistani-election-looms-the-military-maintains-its-grip-on-the-countrys-politics" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In the lead-up to upcoming general elections in Pakistan, the country’s Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/pakistan-human-rights-body-concerned-over-lack-of-level-playing-field-in-february-8-polls-13567652.html">has voiced significant concerns</a> about “pre-poll rigging” and the “blatant manipulation” of the electoral process. </p>
<p>The Feb. 8 elections are apparently unlikely to be conducted in a fair and free manner. </p>
<p>Pakistan has a history of electoral engineering, with the military often <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-65630664">playing a pivotal role as a “kingmaker</a>.” This consistent military interference in Pakistani politics explains current fears about the integrity of the democratic process in the upcoming elections and beyond.</p>
<h2>The military’s hold</h2>
<p>For more than three decades in Pakistan’s 76-year history as an independent nation, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc">the powerful military establishment has wielded significant influence</a>.</p>
<p>Even during periods when the military was not officially in power, it’s been accused of extensive interference in political affairs. The military seized direct control of the country through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-history-coups-assassinations-2022-11-03/">coups d'état</a> by Gen. Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Gen. Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and Gen. Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). </p>
<p>When the military isn’t directly governing, it exerts influence on the political landscape by engaging in political engineering, shaping the selection and rise to power of specific political parties. In his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/23/pakistans-army-chief-vows-to-keep-military-out-of-politics">farewell address</a> in November 2022, the former army chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, openly acknowledged the military’s pivotal role in facilitating the ascent of former prime minister Imran Khan to power following the removal of Nawaz Sharif.</p>
<p>The military’s influence is at play in all facets of politics and security matters in Pakistan. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2023.103846">It actively restricts the powers of politicians</a>, preferring puppet-like figures who refrain from challenging its prevailing interests. </p>
<h2>Nawaz Sharif</h2>
<p>This pattern became evident in 2013 when Sharif won the election and subsequently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/7/29/pakistans-democracy-reels-from-nawaz-sharifs-removal">fell out</a> of favour with the military. His attempt to pursue <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-ousted-pakistani-pm-nawaz-sharif-turned-against-the-powerful-military/a-42953631">foreign and security policies</a> independent of the army’s influence ultimately ended his years in office a few years later.</p>
<p>Sharif’s experiences illustrate the military’s firm grip on decision-making processes and its resistance to allowing politicians to shape policies that might deviate from its established interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/why-pakistan-army-responsible-for-nawaz-sharifs-ouster-and-heres-what-may-happen/articleshow/59837753.cms">The military opposed</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/military-block-pakistan-india-trade-deal-sharif">Sharif’s efforts to build ties with India</a> due to its apparent need to maintain simmering tensions with New Delhi to hold onto its domestic dominance. Ongoing conflict with India serves as justification for the military’s indispensable role in the nation.</p>
<p>In 2014, Sharif extended a significant olive branch to India by accepting its invitation to <a href="https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/nawaz-sharif-arrives-in-india-for-modis-swearing-in-ceremony/article64223119.ece">attend the swearing-in</a> ceremony of the newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi. </p>
<p>Modi returned the favour in 2015 with a <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-modi-lands-in-lahore-on-a-surprise-visit-meets-pak-pm-nawaz-sharif/">brief stopover</a> in Lahore, raising hopes for improved relations. However, this thaw was short-lived primarily due to the influence of the military.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/13/pakistani-court-bans-ex-pm-nawaz-sharif-from-parliament-for-life">In 2017, Sharif was removed</a> from office on corruption charges after serving three terms. The military <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/17/imran-khan-elected-as-pakistans-prime-minister">then supported</a> Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party during the 2018 elections. </p>
<h2>Imran Khan</h2>
<p>This support proved instrumental in propelling Khan to victory. The formidable military and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) meticulously crafted Khan’s <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/article/62201/sadiq-and-ameen-imran-khan-is-the-cleanest-politician-in-pakistan-and-an-evident-choice-for-the-2018-election">public image</a> as an upright individual untainted by financial scandals while concurrently portraying his opponents as corrupt politicians. </p>
<p>This deliberate effort instilled hope among the people for a transformative change in the country.</p>
<p>But soon after Khan’s ascension to power, he and the military began to butt heads, in part due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2023/may/10/imran-khan-pakistan-arrest-army">differences</a> over the selection of the head of the ISI.</p>
<p>Tensions escalated, ultimately resulting in Khan’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/9/analysis-end-of-imran-khans-term">orchestrated removal</a> from office on a vote of non-confidence in April 2022.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of his ouster, Khan openly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/19/how-imran-khan-removal-civil-military-ties-pakistan">criticized the military</a>. In response, the army took a series of measures to disqualify him from running in the upcoming elections. Khan was arrested on multiple corruption charges and has vehemently denied any wrongdoing. </p>
<p>In a sweeping crackdown, members of his PTI party <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/24/ex-pm-imran-khans-pti-hit-by-more-resignations-in-pakistan">were coerced to defect and join opposition parties</a>. </p>
<p>Khan and his party’s candidates continue to encounter obstacles, including <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/30/pakistan-poll-body-rejects-ex-pm-imran-khans-nomination-for-2024-elections">being denied nominations</a> to run in the election and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/internet-disrupted-in-pakistan-as-khan-s-party-launches-virtual-election-campaign/7430174.html">being blocked</a> from holding online rallies and fundraisers.</p>
<p>The PTI <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-pti-supporters-decry-pre-election-crackdown/a-67999734">alleges</a> the military is actively working to exclude it from the electoral race, underscoring the profound challenges to uphold democracy and political diversity in Pakistan.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/imran-khans-arrest-what-it-means-for-the-former-prime-minister-and-pakistans-upcoming-election-205340">Imran Khan's arrest: What it means for the former prime minister and Pakistan's upcoming election</a>
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<p>In a significant turn of events, the military has cleared the path for the ousted Sharif to contest the upcoming election by quashing all <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-court-overturns-ex-pm-nawaz-sharifs-graft-conviction-lawyer-2023-11-29/">legal cases</a> against him, positioning him as the favoured candidate against Khan. </p>
<p>The prime objectives are apparently to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67167601.amp">sideline Khan</a> and to ensure Sharif will refrain from challenging military interests in the future.</p>
<h2>Escalating regional tensions</h2>
<p>Pakistan is currently facing <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2024/01/06/military-influence-and-political-peril-in-pakistan/">significant security and economic challenges</a>. Iran <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/17/iran-says-attack-in-pakistan-targeted-iranian-terrorist-group">recently launched</a> missile and drone attacks on the Pakistani-Iranian border to target terrorist group Jaish-Al-Adl, which the Iranians claim is responsible for terrorist attacks in their country.</p>
<p>Pakistan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/17/a-recap-of-violence-pak-iran-border">condemned the attack</a> as a violation of its sovereignty but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68014882">soon retaliated</a> with its own military strikes in Iran as tensions escalate between the two countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
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<p>Pakistan is also facing terrorist attacks from Afghanistan, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) aims to establish Taliban rule in Pakistan. </p>
<p>Last year, nearly 1,000 Pakistanis <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/report-terrorist-attacks-kill-nearly-1-000-pakistanis-in-2023-/7419344.html">were killed</a> in terrorist attacks, prompting the government <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-concerned-adverse-effects-pakistan-orders-undocumented-foreigners-leave">to undertake a sweeping expulsion of Afghan refugees categorized as undocumented</a>.</p>
<p>Inflation has also soared to approximately <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/8/how-skyrocketing-inflation-has-hit-pakistan-most-vulnerable">30 per cent in Pakistan</a>, exacerbating <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67494013">economic challenges</a> that include frequent power shortages and diminishing exports, remittances and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Pakistan is the world’s <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-surpasses-brazil-to-become-worlds-5th-most-populous-country-1.72557051">fifth most populous country</a> and a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-agonizing-problem-of-pakistans-nukes/">nuclear-armed nation</a> grappling with economic challenges and political instability. </p>
<p>Sustained political stability in Pakistan is imperative, and yet remains elusive until the military restrains itself within its constitutional role and refrains from unwarranted interference in politics. The military’s increasing power has seemingly taken precedence over the needs of the Pakistani people. </p>
<p>As the Feb. 8 elections loom, reining in the military is crucial for fostering a political environment that prioritizes stability and democratic principles in South Asia, as well as the overall well-being of Pakistanis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sustained political stability in Pakistan is imperative but remains elusive until the military restrains itself within its constitutional role and refrains from unwarranted interference in politics.Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209022024-01-17T19:24:20Z2024-01-17T19:24:20ZIndia seeks stronger ties with South Asian governments, snubbing ethnic minorities again<p>India’s regional politics are shifting. It is seeking to strengthen ties with South Asian ruling elites, including in Nepal and Sri Lanka, while ignoring ongoing ethnic uprisings in those countries in the hopes of securing its geopolitical interests. </p>
<p>The Indian government’s opposition to ethnic rights within its own borders is well-documented. In 2019, for example, Narendra Modi’s government decided to revoke Jammu and Kashmir’s special status as an autonomous region, a move <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/whats-article-370-what-to-know-about-india-top-court-verdict-on-kashmir">recently upheld by India’s Supreme Court</a>.</p>
<p>Jammu and Kashmir lost their constitution, flag and criminal code, and has been turned into <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/what-led-kashmir-decision-by-indias-top-court-2023-12-11/">two federally administered territories</a>. India <a href="https://minorityrights.org/2006/12/14/india-has-failed-to-replicate-success-in-tamil-nadu-to-halt-other-ethnic-conflicts/">has also failed</a> to manage ethnic conflicts in other territories, including Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Nagaland. </p>
<h2>Indian hypocrisy</h2>
<p>Ironically, the Indian government backs ethnic movements in other South Asian countries. It supports or has supported the <a href="https://elibrary.tucl.edu.np/handle/123456789/19418">Madheshi movement</a> in Nepal, the <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA624018">Bengali liberation war</a> in Pakistan and <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/indira-gandhi-helped-train-tamil-rebels-and-reaped-whirlwind-13913.html">Tamils in Sri Lanka</a>.</p>
<p>Because of its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/us-report-lists-significant-human-rights-abuses-india-2023-03-20/">domestic record on ethnic rights</a>, however, India lacks any moral authority to support them elsewhere. Instead, it’s now pursuing a policy of pleasing the ruling elites in its neighbourhood, which it hopes will serve its national aspirations to become a regional powerhouse like China.</p>
<p>So far, that policy has had a limited payoff.</p>
<p>India has been making amends to Nepal since 2015, when it imposed a blockade and obstructed the transportation of petroleum products to Nepal. It wanted to force the Nepalese government to incorporate Madheshi demands in the Nepali constitution. </p>
<p>Nepal refused and, instead, tabled its constitution without addressing Madheshi concerns. It also signed trade and transit agreements with China to minimize Nepal’s dependence on India. </p>
<p>In response, India quietly withdrew its sanctions, and has <a href="https://thewire.in/external-affairs/madhes-violence-nepal-india">since
refrained</a> from pressuring Nepalese authorities. The ruling elites and Madheshi leaders <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.576099">were critical</a> of India’s interference.</p>
<p>In short, India paid a high <a href="https://elibrary.tucl.edu.np/handle/123456789/11340">strategic price</a> for the blockade.</p>
<h2>Past Indian missteps</h2>
<p>India has had similar missteps in the past. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/15718060120849189">It involved itself</a> in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, irritating both government officials and insurgents. India ultimately stepped aside, and Sri Lanka overcame its ethnic strife with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445514523646">Chinese military and financial assistance</a>. </p>
<p>In 1971, India intervened in the ethnic conflict in Pakistan when Bengali Muslims pursued <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909609340062">independent statehood</a> to become modern-day Bangladesh. This support escalated already tense Indian-Pakistani relations. </p>
<p>Even after Bangladesh’s independence, ethnic tensions persisted. Jumma peoples fought against the Bangladesh government’s decision <a href="https://jnu.ac.bd/journal/assets/pdf/3_2_34.pdf">to transfer</a> Bengali Muslims to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the contested homeland of Indigenous minorities. India supported their struggle by <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/refugees-chittagong-hill-tracts-peace-accord-cht#:%7E:text=Approximately%2070%2C000%20indigenous%20people%20fled,internally%20displaced%20persons%20within%20Bangladesh.">providing refuge</a> to the displaced Jumma people in its Tripura state. </p>
<p>All of these efforts — past and present — to support ethnic movements in neighbouring countries have failed to help India achieve major player status in the region. Instead, they resulted in tense relations with ruling governments for years.</p>
<h2>Appeasement efforts</h2>
<p>That’s why India is in the process of mending ties with the ruling elites in South Asia. Its support for the governments of Sri Lanka and Nepal gives some hints about its future direction. </p>
<p>Sri Lanka has been facing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887119000182">global criticism</a> for failing to prosecute war crimes and human rights violations that occurred during 25 years of ethnic conflict. <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2023-0217/#:%7E:text=A%20report%20of%20the%20United,%2C%20reconciliation%20and%20human%20rights%E2%80%9D.">The United Nations Human Rights Council demanded</a> in 2023 that the government act promptly to address gross human rights violations. </p>
<p>While India supported previous UN resolutions on this issue in 2012 and 2013, it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284211068161">consecutively abstained</a> from supporting the last two resolutions, indicating a shift in the Indian approach towards Sri Lanka’s ethnic tensions.</p>
<p>Likewise, India has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968221135943">stayed silent</a> about the Madheshi demands in Nepal since 2015, and <a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-nepal-kalapani-dialogue-ultra-nationalism">Indian parliament has passed resolutions that focus on mending ties with Nepal</a>. </p>
<p>These gestures are part of an Indian policy to <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/what_does_india_think/analysis/modis_approach_to_india_and_pakistan">prioritize the neighbourhood</a> in its foreign relations. Based on this policy, India can be expected to seek stronger ties with other neighbouring countries too.</p>
<h2>India’s gains, minorities’ losses?</h2>
<p>These initiatives may help India minimize China’s influence in the region, but minorities will lose global backing.</p>
<p>South Asian ethnic movements have not received significant international attention and support. </p>
<p>In the past, most of the support was coming from India. In the absence of Indian backing, ethnic minorities lack substantive global allies, which their governments can capitalize upon to further ignore or oppress them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220902/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hari Har Jnawali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India is pursuing a policy of pleasing the ruling elites in its neighbourhood, which it hopes will serve its national aspirations to become a regional powerhouse like China.Hari Har Jnawali, Instructor, Global Governance, Wilfrid Laurier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205862024-01-11T13:25:21Z2024-01-11T13:25:21ZIran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568725/original/file-20240110-15-hzt6wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C160%2C6720%2C4285&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in the blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-people-disperse-near-the-scene-where-explosions-news-photo/1898126156?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-taliban-is-crucial-in-understanding-their-success-now-and-also-what-might-happen-next-166630">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan</a> in 2021, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">terror group Islamic State Khorasan Province</a>, or ISIS-K, has sought to internationalize its operational and recruitment campaign. Utilizing a sweeping propaganda campaign to appeal to audiences across South and Central Asia, the group has tried to position itself as the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-and-south-asia">dominant regional challenger</a> to what it perceives to be repressive regimes.</p>
<p>On Jan. 3, 2024, ISIS-K demonstrated just how far it had progressed toward these goals. In a brutal demonstration of its capability to align actions with extreme rhetoric, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-vow-revenge-funeral-bomb-attack-victims-state-media-2024-01-05/">over 100 people</a>.</p>
<p>The blast, which was reportedly carried out by two <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1743236790591324604">Tajik ISIS-K members</a>, occurred during a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/iran-kerman-attack-islamic-state-suspicion-border-afghanistan-pakistan">memorial service</a> for Qassem Soleimani, a Lieutenant General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">killed in a U.S. drone strike</a> in 2020. ISIS-K claimed the attack as an <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1742948108697252211">act of revenge</a> against Soleimani, who <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">spearheaded</a> Iran’s fight against the Islamic State group and its affiliates prior to his death.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">experts in ISIS-K</a> <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/team/dr-nakissa-jahanbani/">and Iran</a>, we believe the attack highlights the success of ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies and its growing ability to strike declared enemies and undermine regional stability.</p>
<h2>A growing threat</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran was not completely unexpected to those monitoring ISIS-K. A paper <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">one of us co-wrote</a> in 2023 noted that that despite setbacks, including <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-envoy-taliban-kill-8-key-islamic-state-leaders-in-afghanistan/7266218.html">the loss of key personnel</a>, ISIS-K was expanding and intensifying its regional influence. It was achieving this by leveraging its ethnically and nationally diverse membership base and <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">ties to other militant groups</a>.</p>
<p>The Kerman blast <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/iran-blames-isil-for-shrine-attack-arrests-foreign-nationals">follows two other recent</a> attacks on the <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308146240">Shahcheragh shrine in Shiraz</a>, Iran, in October 2022 and August 2023 – both purportedly involving Tajik perpetrators.</p>
<p><iframe id="CNUqY" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/CNUqY/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The involvement of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-national-attack-iran-shrine/32547498.html">Tajik</a> nationals in the Kerman attack underscores Iran’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/irans-isis-challenge-afghanistan">long-standing concerns</a> over ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies, which have seen the group swell its members by reaching out to discontented Muslim populations across South and Central Asian countries and consolidating diverse grievances into a single narrative.</p>
<h2>Strategic diversity</h2>
<p>This strategy of “<a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a>” ISIS-K’s agenda – its aim is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">establishment of an Islamic caliphate</a> in Central and South Asia – has been pursued with <a href="https://eurasianet.org/islamic-state-threatens-central-asian-and-chinese-ventures-in-afghanistan">renewed</a> vigor since 2021. This is in part due to a more permissive environment following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government.</p>
<p>This process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s agenda involves the group <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">targeting</a> regional countries directly, or their presence within Afghanistan. To date, this has seen interests from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/20/indias-cautious-return-to-afghanistan/">India</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ISIS-K-threat-to-Uzbek-railway-dream-opens-doors-for-Taliban">Uzbekistan</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/tajikistan/">Tajikistan</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/China-s-mining-ambitions-in-Afghanistan-haunted-by-militants#:%7E:text=In%20December%2C%20ISIS%2DK%20claimed,independent%20verification%20of%20this%20claim.">China</a> <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/Russia-s-ISIS-K-problem-intensifies-after-Kabul-embassy-bombing">and Russia</a> targeted by terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, strikes against <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-promises">Iran</a> have long been foreshadowed in ISIS-K propaganda.</p>
<p>In parallel, the group’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/islamic-state-khorasans-expanded-vision-in-south-and-central-asia/">multilingual propaganda campaign</a> interwove a tapestry of local, regional and global grievances to recruit and mobilize supporters from a vast demographic spectrum, and potentially <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-66113791">inspire supporters from afar</a>.</p>
<p>In other instances, this has seen the terror group <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.clemson.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581">partnering with</a> anti-government and sectarian militant networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, collaborating with groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. </p>
<p>But moreover, ISIS-K is attempting to capture <a href="https://gnet-research.org/2023/05/22/the-state-of-play-islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-anti-india-propaganda-efforts/">the South</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-looks-to-recruit-regional-tajiks-inflict-violence-against-tajikistan/">Central Asian</a> militant market for itself. By utilizing fighters representative of regional religious and ethnic populations and publicizing their attacks, ISIS-K is signaling its commitment to a comprehensive jihadist agenda.</p>
<h2>The Tajik connection</h2>
<p>The involvement of Tajik recruits in the Kerman attack can be understood within this broader context of ISIS-K’s intentional strategic diversification.</p>
<p>Concerns around Tajik nationals’ recruitment into ISIS-K have <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">existed</a> for a while, with the Taliban’s draconian treatment of Afghanistan’s minorities, including Tajiks, likely creating an unwitting <a href="https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2022/11/17/human-rights-defenders-and-the-future-of-multi-ethnic-democracy-in-afghanistan/">recruitment boon</a> for the terror group.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">Several Tajik nationals</a> were arrested in relation to a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-april-2020-islamic-state-terror-plot-against-u-s-and-nato-military-bases-in-germany-the-tajik-connection/">plot against U.S. and NATO</a> targets in Germany in April 2020. More Tajik ISIS-K members were arrested by German and Dutch authorities in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/german-dutch-authorities-arrest-9-suspected-of-planning-terror-attacks/7169306.html">July 2023</a> as part of an operation to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-netherlands-terror-group-arrests-20856495d2f7530df8cf4635b26d3fb6">disrupt a plot and ISIS-K fundraising</a>.</p>
<p>The attack in Iran represents a continuation of this process of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a> ISIS-K’s violent campaign.</p>
<p>But the bombing is significant for another reason: It takes ISIS-K’s fight directly to a symbol of Shia leadership.</p>
<p>A deadly attack against Iran, a formidable Shia state, lends ideological credence to ISIS-K’s words in the eyes of its followers. It also potentially facilitates the recruitment of individuals who are proponents of anti-Shia ideologies in the Muslim world.</p>
<p>More than any other Islamic State affiliate, ISIS-K is uniquely positioned to <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/terrorism-and-counterterrorism/islamic-state-in-khorasan-attempting-to-absorb-rival-groups/">exploit the vestiges</a> of the deeply embedded, decades-old Sunni-Shia divide in the region. </p>
<h2>Iran’s proxies and the Taliban</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that the attack on Iran was purely opportunistic. ISIS-K has deep-rooted antipathy toward Iran due to Tehran’s religious, social and political involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. </p>
<p>Iran’s involvement has been multifold, from <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/sectarian-violence-and-intolerance-pakistan">supporting political and militant groups</a> such as <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/marriage-of-convenience-the-evolution-of-iran-and-al-qaidas-tactical-cooperation/">al-Qaida</a> and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/06/iran-and-afghanistans-long-complicated-history">Taliban</a> to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/fatemiyoun-army-reintegration-afghan-society">recruiting fighters</a> from <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-syria-and-beyond">Afghanistan and Pakistan</a> for operations against Sunni militants.</p>
<p>Additionally, during the two decades of war in Afghanistan, several Taliban factions reportedly <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">received weapons and funding</a> through Iran’s Quds Force, which carries out missions outside Iran as an arm of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards/">paramilitary security institution</a> Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. By 2018, leaders in Tehran <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/12/16/1667788/">viewed the Taliban</a> as a buffer against ISIS-K.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
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<p>Iran’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is also reflected in the career trajectories of the Quds Force’s top brass. Soleimani was the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/beyond-soleimani-implications-irans-proxy-network-iraq-syria/">chief architect</a> behind Iran’s network of proxies, some of which were leveraged against ISIS.</p>
<p>His successor, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, spent part of <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">his career</a> managing proxies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia.</p>
<p>Iran’s recruitment and encouragement of Shia proxies has exacerbated tensions with ISIS-K.</p>
<p>During the Syrian civil war, the Quds Force <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">recruited, trained and deployed</a> the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/how-the-return-of-iranian-backed-militias-from-syria-complicates-u-s-strategy/">Fatemiyoun and</a> <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Zeynabiyoun.pdf">Zeinabiyoun brigades</a>, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, respectively. There were <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan">concerns</a> among international observers that the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/afghans-fear-irgc-may-deploy-fatemiyoun-fighters-afghanistan">Fatemiyoun Brigade</a> may be deployed to Afghanistan after the U.S.’s withdrawal. Thus far, Iran appears to leverage the two brigades to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">stabilize its partners</a> in areas <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">outside of Iran’s immediate vicinity</a>. Nevertheless, the Fatemiyoun Brigade retains the potential to be mobilized as a mobile force within Afghanistan, contingent upon Iran’s evolving strategic calculus.</p>
<h2>The perfect storm?</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran raises two critical issues with grave security implications: the growing regional reputation and capability of ISIS-K, and the extent to which Iran’s use of militant proxies in Afghanistan may encourage a regional backlash among Sunni extremists.</p>
<p>Improving <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/looking-legitimacy-taliban-diplomacy-fall-kabul">relations</a> between the Taliban and Tehran suggests that a collaborative stance against ISIS-K may be possible, driven by a mutual desire for stability.</p>
<p>But intervention in Afghanistan, or Iranian deployment of proxy militant forces in the region, could have widespread security repercussions, the type of which we have seen play out in the Iranian attack.</p>
<p>For Pakistan, too, it may fester a renewed cycle of <a href="https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1743275054119497797">sectarian violence</a>, creating opportunities for militant groups active in the country like ISIS-K, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-after-the-talibans-afghanistan-takeover/">Tehrik-e-Taliban</a> and fighters involved in <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/pakistan-faces-rising-separatist-insurgency-in-balochistan/">the Baloch insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>For the U.S., Iran’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and the violent attack by ISIS-K likewise poses a strategic concern. It risks destabilizing the region and undermining <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/27/isis-islamic-state-al-qaeda-terrorism-strength-threat-afghanistan-africa-syria-iraq-biden/">efforts to constrain transnational</a> terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amira Jadoon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorist attack in Iran follows a concerted effort by the Islamic State affiliate to ‘internationalize’ its strategy.Amira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178072023-12-28T20:38:22Z2023-12-28T20:38:22ZWill the world see more wars or unrest in 2024? Here are 5 hotspots to watch<p>Sadly, 2023 has been a violent one on the global stage. War broke out between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, leading to the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of Israelis, including many children on both sides. And the bitter war between Russia and Ukraine continued with no end in sight. </p>
<p>As a result of the focus on these two conflicts, other countries have dropped off the radar for many people. Some of these nations have been dealing with simmering unrest, however, which could erupt in 2024 and seize the global spotlight. </p>
<p>So, where should we be watching in the coming year? Here are five places where I believe civil conflicts or unrest could worsen and potentially lead to violence.</p>
<h2>Myanmar</h2>
<p>Myanmar descended into chaos in 2021 when a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and sparked widespread civil protests that eventually morphed into an armed resistance. </p>
<p>The country, home to <a href="https://www.embassyofmyanmar.be/ABOUT/ethnicgroups.htm">135 ethnic groups</a>, has rarely known peace. For years before the coup, there was a ongoing, low-grade civil conflict between the military and several minority ethnic groups who have long sought control over natural resources in their regions and independence from the state.</p>
<p>This exploded after the coup as ethnic militia groups joined forces with pro-democracy fighters from the Bamar majority protesting the junta.</p>
<p>Their resistance <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-myanmar-military-is-facing-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/">escalated in late 2023</a> with a coordinated northern offensive dealing the military its most significant losses in many years. </p>
<p>Insurgents won control of towns and villages on the northeastern border with China, including control over key trade routes. This led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/22/myanmar-fighting-at-its-worst-since-2021-coup-says-united-nations">renewed fighting</a> in western Rakhine state, as well as in other areas.</p>
<p>The tenacity of the resistance of these minority groups, paired with the refusal of the military to compromise, suggests the country’s civil war may worsen considerably in 2024 and regain international attention. </p>
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<h2>Mali</h2>
<p>In Mali, a nation in the turbulent Sahel region of Africa, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur">tensions escalated throughout 2023</a> and now threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. </p>
<p>Mali has long battled insurgent activity. In 2012, Mali’s government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">fell in a coup</a> and Tuareg rebels, backed by Islamist militants, seized power in the north. </p>
<p>A United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 2013 to bring stability to Mali. Then, in 2015, key rebel groups <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150620-rebels-mali-tuareg-peace-deal-algiers-accord">signed a peace agreement</a> with the Mali government. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-crisis-un-peacekeepers-are-leaving-after-10-years-whats-needed-for-a-smooth-transition-210210">Mali crisis: UN peacekeepers are leaving after 10 years – what's needed for a smooth transition</a>
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<p>After two more coups in 2020 and 2021, military officers consolidated their power and said they would restore the state’s full territorial control over all of Mali. The regime insisted the UN peacekeeping mission <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2023/un-mali-we-respect-government%E2%80%99s-decision-mission-withdrawal">withdraw</a> from the country, which it did in June 2023. Subsequently, violence broke out between the military and rebel forces over future use of the UN bases. </p>
<p>In November, the military, reportedly backed by Russia’s Wagner Group, took control of the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-tuareg-rebels-kidal-azawad-d1184c497265601de5d18d306fc398e3">strategic northern town of Kidal</a> which had been held by Tuareg forces since 2012. This undermines the fragile peace that has held since 2015. </p>
<p>It is unlikely the military will regain complete control over all rebel-held areas in the north. At the same time, insurgents are emboldened. With the 2015 peace agreement now all but dead, we can expect increased volatility in 2024. </p>
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<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>In 2019, widespread civil protest broke out in Lebanon against leaders who were perceived not to be addressing the day-to-day needs of the population. </p>
<p>The situation <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanons-crisis-has-gone-from-bad-to-worse-but-is-anyone-listening-169645">continued to deteriorate</a>, with a reshuffled government, escalating economic crisis and a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-port-blast-beirut-blocked-investigation-d4606d6f28e3eb56510eac923611a03c">massive port explosion</a> that exposed corrupt practices. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/14/pr23315-lebanon-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-lebanon">criticised Lebanon in September</a> for a lack of economic reform. The Lebanese government has also failed to reach agreement on appointing a president, a post that has been vacant for <a href="https://www.state.gov/one-year-anniversary-of-lebanons-presidential-vacancy/">more than a year</a>. </p>
<p>This risks undermining the fragile power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon in which the key political posts of prime minister, speaker and president are allocated to a Sunni-Muslim, Shia-Muslim and Christian Maronite, respectively. </p>
<p>Most recently, the war between Israel and Hamas has threatened to spill over to Lebanon, home to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67307858">Hezbollah</a> militant group, which claims to have an army of 100,000 fighters. Importantly, this jeopardises tourism as a key hope for Lebanon’s economic recovery. </p>
<p>These factors may precipitate a more serious economic and political collapse in 2024. </p>
<h2>Pakistan</h2>
<p>Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has played an <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-a-historical-trail-of-pakistans-powerful-military-enterprise-205749">interventionist role in politics</a>. Though Pakistani leaders are popularly elected, military officials have at times removed them from power. </p>
<p>In 2022, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan fell out of favour with Pakistan’s militant leaders. He was subsequently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/09/asia/imran-khan-voted-out-pakistan-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html">ousted from power</a> in a parliament vote and later arrested on charges that his supporters claim are politically motivated. </p>
<p>Violent demonstrations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/asia/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan.html">broke out</a> nationwide after his arrest – a display of anger against the military that was once unthinkable. </p>
<p>Pakistan also faces spillover from instability in neighbouring Afghanistan and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141712">increased terror attacks</a>. These security challenges have been compounded by a struggling economy and ongoing costs from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/05/a-year-on-the-devastating-long-term-effects-of-pakistans-floods-are-revealed">devastating 2022 floods</a>.</p>
<p>Pakistan is expected to hold <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/pakistan-to-hold-delayed-elections-on-february-8-electoral-commission-says">parliamentary elections</a> in February 2024, after which the current military caretaker government is expected to transfer power back to civilian rule. Many are watching the military closely. If this transfer of power does not take place, or there are delays, civil unrest may result.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-imran-khans-populism-has-divided-pakistan-and-put-it-on-a-knifes-edge-205392">How Imran Khan's populism has divided Pakistan and put it on a knife's edge</a>
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<h2>Sri Lanka</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-sri-lanka-run-out-of-money-5-graphs-that-explain-its-economic-crisis-187352">Sri Lanka faced a debilitating economic crisis in 2022</a> that led to critical fuel, food and medical shortages. Civil protests caused then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. He was quickly replaced by current President Ranil Wickremesingh. </p>
<p>Stability returned in 2023 as Sri Lanka began implementing economic reforms as part of a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund. However, widespread dissatisfaction with political elites and the underlying drivers of the country’s economic hardship have not been addressed. </p>
<p>Elections are also due in Sri Lanka by late 2024. While Wickremesingh, the incumbent, is likely to run for a second term, he has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/unpopular-sri-lankan-president-consolidates-power-after-victory">low trust</a> with the public. He is viewed as too close to corrupt political elites. </p>
<p>This dissatisfaction could lead to renewed protests – particularly if the economy stumbles again – in a repeat of the situation that led to Rajapaksa’s ousting in 2022.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From Myanmar to Pakistan, these countries have long-simmering conflicts or increasingly dissatisfied publics that could worsen in the new year.Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181232023-11-21T04:53:44Z2023-11-21T04:53:44ZA year after Pakistan’s floods, 44% of children have stunted growth. What can be done about it?<p>The extensive <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/devastating-floods-pakistan-2022">flooding in Pakistan</a> in August 2022 submerged one-third of the country. This affected 33 million people, half of them children. Some <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/09/19/pakistan-flood-victims-emerging-hunger-hotspots#:%7E:text=More%20than%201%2C700%20people%20died%2C%2033%20million%20were,a%20key%20crop%2C%20resumed%20in%20much%20of%20Sindh.">9.4 million acres of crops</a> were destroyed, and more than 1.1 million farm animals perished. </p>
<p>One year later, the rate of <a href="https://www.rescue.org/uk/press-release/one-year-devastating-flooding-pakistan-irc-calls-crisis-affected-countries-be-centre">child undernutrition</a> has increased by 50% and an estimated <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/382/bmj.p1818">44% of children</a> under five are now stunted, meaning they have a low height for their age.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156396/?iso3=PAK">recent assessment</a> of 43 rural districts in the three provinces most affected by floods found 29% of the population was experiencing high levels of hunger and weren’t consuming enough energy.</p>
<p>Food prices remain high in both urban and rural areas of Pakistan and achieving food security will remain a challenge for many families. So what’s being done to address this crisis?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/pakistans-floods-are-a-disaster-but-they-didnt-have-to-be-190027">Pakistan’s floods are a disaster – but they didn't have to be</a>
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<h2>What is undernutrition?</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition">three types</a> of child undernutrition: wasting, which reflects recent weight loss and greatly increases the risk of early death; stunting, which reflects long-term food deprivation; and underweight, which is a combination of the two. The type most common in Pakistan is stunting.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/19-11-2015-stunting-in-a-nutshell">Stunting</a> is irreversible – you cannot regain lost height. It leads to more illness, premature death, poor school outcomes, lower employment opportunities and may increase the risk of chronic diseases. </p>
<p>A girl who is stunted is also more likely to give birth to a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7817059/">low birth weight baby</a> when she grows into an adult.</p>
<h2>How big is the problem, worldwide?</h2>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/state-food-security-and-nutrition-world-report-2023-urbanization-agrifood-systems-transformation-and-healthy-diets-across-rural-urban-continuum#:%7E:text=Global%20hunger%2C%20measured%20by%20the,with%207.9%20percent%20in%202019">9.2% of the world’s population</a> experienced what is called undernourishment, or low energy intake, compared to 7.9% in 2019. </p>
<p>Almost 600 million people are <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/19-11-2015-stunting-in-a-nutshell">projected</a> to be chronically undernourished in 2030. </p>
<p>Worldwide, food insecurity is more likely to affect women and people living in rural areas. Food insecurity affected 33.3% of adults living in rural areas in 2022 compared with 26% in urban areas. </p>
<p>Globally in 2022, an estimated 148.1 million children under five years of age (22.3%) were stunted and 45 million (6.8%) were wasted. </p>
<p>The stunting rate has <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/malnutrition/">declined</a> from 33% in 2000 but the pace of decline has slowed. </p>
<p>Only about one-third of all countries are on track to halve the number of children affected by stunting by 2030, a goal of the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">Sustainable Development Goals</a>. </p>
<h2>Who is most at risk?</h2>
<p>A large <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953615302227">population study in India</a> looked at the contribution of 15 known risk factors. The five leading factors were: the mother’s short stature, the mother having no education, the household being in the lowest wealth quintile, poor dietary diversity, and the mother being underweight. These five were causal factors in two-thirds of stunted children.</p>
<p>Other studies have found the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/childhood-stunting-context-causes-and-consequences-framework">critical age of vulnerability</a> to stunting is six to 24 months and is associated with poor breastfeeding practices, nutritionally poor food (given in addition to breast milk after the age of six months) and repeated infections, which may be due to poor water quality and sanitation. </p>
<h2>What’s being done to address undernutrition?</h2>
<p>The main global initiative to address child undernutrition is the <a href="https://www.ennonline.net/page/renderforpdf/4225">Scaling Up Nutrition</a> movement, which was launched in 2010 and has 66 member countries, including Australia. </p>
<p>The Scaling Up Nutrition movement strategy and roadmap is the product of a collaborative dialogue between member countries, the UN and donor agencies and other international and national non-governmental organisations and businesses. It promotes a focus on the first 1,000 days of a child’s life when they are most likely to develop stunting. </p>
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<p>It also encourages a dual approach of nutrition-specific interventions (which address the immediate causes of undernutrition) and nutrition-sensitive interventions, such as agriculture, water and sanitation, and gender equality.</p>
<p>Australia was initially an <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/-/media/02_Parliamentary_Business/24_Committees/244_Joint_Committees/JFADT/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Development_Agriculture/chapter5.pdf?la=en&hash=57874F32131A56DAA526ABA068749A7AACA1BDA6">enthusiastic supporter</a> of Scaling Up Nutrition and during the previous decade (2010-2019) made nutrition a priority in its international aid program. The Australian government’s 2014 development policy <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/operational-guidance-note-nutrition-sensitive-agriculture.pdf">identified</a> early childhood nutrition as “a critical driver of better development outcomes”.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/nutrition-and-health-in-australias-aid-program.pdf">nutrition strategy</a> was developed in 2015 and a broad-ranging <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/a-window-of-opportunity-australian-aid-and-child-undernutrition-2015-ode-brief.pdf">evaluation</a> of the aid program’s impact on nutrition was commissioned by the now-defunct Office of Development Effectiveness. </p>
<p>However, that enthusiasm has disappeared since 2020. </p>
<h2>How can Australia help?</h2>
<p>So far in 2023, <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/photos-extreme-weather-events-2023-climate-change">record floods</a> have been recorded in Libya, Somalia, Kenya, India, Italy, Rwanda and South Sudan. Deadly storms have raged in western Europe. We’ve seen cyclones in Myanmar and southern Africa, devastating landslides in Cameroon and a powerful hurricane in Mexico. <a href="https://www.rescue.org/uk/press-release/one-year-devastating-flooding-pakistan-irc-calls-crisis-affected-countries-be-centre">Wildfires</a> have spread in Greece, Argentina, Canada and Hawaii, and Asia has experienced a stifling heatwave.</p>
<p><a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/influence-climate-change-extreme-environmental-events/">Computer modelling of real data</a> shows the frequency and intensity of these events are influenced by climate change. </p>
<p>The most obvious long-term strategy is to accelerate efforts to control carbon emissions and decelerate the momentum towards global warming. </p>
<p>In the short-term, the government must reinstate nutrition as a priority in the Australian aid program.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pakistan-floods-ancient-grains-like-millet-could-be-key-to-rebuilding-food-systems-190184">Pakistan floods: ancient grains like millet could be key to rebuilding food systems</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Toole receives grant funding from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council.</span></em></p>Food prices remain high in both urban and rural areas of Pakistan and achieving food security will remain a challenge for many families.Michael Toole, Associate Principal Research Fellow, Burnet InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175322023-11-13T23:40:48Z2023-11-13T23:40:48ZWhy Western countries share the blame for the plight of 1.7 million Afghans being deported from Pakistan<p>On November 1, Pakistan began a nationwide operation to deport over 1.7 million Afghans it says are living in the country illegally. There are now an estimated <a href="https://www.rescue.org/press-release/afghans-returning-pakistan-after-expulsion-order-have-nowhere-go-warn-aid-agencies#:%7E:text=The%20daily%20number%20of%20arrivals,million%20people%20could%20be%20affected.">10,000 people returning to Afghanistan</a> each day.</p>
<p>Pakistan has indicated the deportations are designed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/asia/pakistan-deport-afghan-refugees.html">reduce cross-border incursions from Taliban fighters</a> based in Afghanistan. But it is more likely the interim military government is succumbing to populist politics around inflation, housing shortages and cost of living pressures in the country. </p>
<p>There were already over a million Afghans living in Pakistan before the Taliban came back into power in Afghanistan in August 2021. But the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been unable to process all of the estimated 600,000 to 800,000 Afghans who have fled to Pakistan since then. It is estimated only about a third of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/pakistan-government-must-not-deport-afghan-refugees/">registered with the refugee agency</a>. </p>
<p>The level of documentation that Afghans in Pakistan have varies extensively. Some entered the country without visas and passports. Some entered on visas and have been waiting indefinitely for renewal, others are on expired visas. </p>
<p>The UNHCR has subcontracted much of the registration of refugees to <a href="https://sharp-pakistan.org/">other organisations in Pakistan</a>. Often, payment to a local broker is the only way refugees are able to get an appointment. This is entirely unreasonable when countries like Australia require UNHCR registration of refugees to <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">facilitate priority processing</a>.</p>
<p>Many refugees experience lengthy waiting periods to be registered, formally recognised as refugees and then issued an ID card, let alone referred for onward resettlement. Shelter, food and medical assistance are not even considered. </p>
<p>Refugee identity documents are not even enough to protect people from deportation. There have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-expels-afghan-refugees-concerns-uscirf/32675032.html">reports of police detaining and threatening people with valid Pakistani visas</a>. Activists told me of incidents in which police have torn up valid visas and Afghan passports.</p>
<p>Many Afghans have applied for resettlement in countries that were members of the NATO-led force that maintained security in Afghanistan, such as the US, Canada, Australia and countries in the European Union. But as the world has turned its eye to other conflicts, those countries have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/15/international-community-still-hasnt-fulfilled-its-promises-afghan-refugees">fallen drastically short</a> of their promises to Afghan refugees. It is estimated only <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/pakistan-drop-threat-deport-afghans#:%7E:text=While%20200%2C000%20have%20been%20resettled,contributed%20to%20their%20military%20efforts.">200,000 Afghans have been resettled globally</a> since August 2021.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-feel-suffocated-afghans-are-increasingly-hopeless-but-theres-still-a-chance-to-preserve-some-rights-166171">'I feel suffocated': Afghans are increasingly hopeless, but there's still a chance to preserve some rights</a>
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<h2>A trickle of visas approved for Afghans</h2>
<p>Human Rights Watch has also highlighted the unreasonably slow processing times for Afghan refugees in resettlement countries, such as the US, UK, Germany, Australia and other EU countries. This is particularly true for women and girls, the organisation <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/12/pakistan-drop-threat-deport-afghans">says</a>: </p>
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<p>Afghan women and girls have often faced greater barriers to obtaining asylum, as destination countries have often prioritised assisting Afghans – overwhelmingly men – who contributed to their military efforts. </p>
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<p>Since the Taliban returned to power, only 12,200 Afghan applicants <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/language/dari/en/podcast-episode/why-hasnt-australia-announced-its-refugee-quota-for-fy-2023-24/wbir7ft5q">have received a humanitarian visa</a> to enter Australia. During the 2022 federal election campaign, Labor promised to increase the total refugee and humanitarian intake to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.au/campaigns/raising-the-humanitarian-intake/">27,000 people annually</a>. But this hasn’t happened. </p>
<p>Australia has <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-23-Budget-summary-1.pdf">promised</a> just 26,500 humanitarian and 5,000 family places for Afghans from 2021-26.</p>
<p>Yet, there are more than 147,000 Afghan applicants still <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">in the queue</a> waiting to be processed from the 189,000 applications received since August 2021. And earlier this year, the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/help-and-support/afghanistan-update">Department of Home Affairs</a> quietly removed human rights defenders from its list of groups to receive priority visa processing from Afghanistan.</p>
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<h2>A dire situation for women and girls</h2>
<p>Former US President George W. Bush said in the early 2000s that the US went to Afghanistan to <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/20040708.html">liberate the country’s women</a>, but those women have been forgotten now. </p>
<p>Today, Afghanistan remains in one of the world’s most <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2023">dire humanitarian crises</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations has described a system of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/07/experts-taliban-treatment-women-may-be-gender-apartheid">gender apartheid</a> under Taliban rule, in which women are prevented from participating in any public life, education or economic activity outside the home. </p>
<p>Infant and maternal mortality rates have skyrocketed because women are not allowed to travel to seek medical attention, female doctors are not allowed to work and male doctors are not allowed to treat female patients. </p>
<p>Leaders of NGOs that work on women’s education and other women’s rights continue to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/24/afghan-womens-rights-activists-forcibly-disappeared#:%7E:text=The%20Taliban's%20response%20to%20the,through%20unlawful%20use%20of%20force.">disappeared</a>. Women who are brave enough to protest on the street are beaten. Journalists are routinely detained for covering such issues.</p>
<p>Last year, the UN Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund <a href="https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1t/k1tuye65yb">launched</a> a new program dedicated to supporting women’s human rights defenders around the world. However, I’ve been told this program is now facing a US$14 million (A$22 million) funding shortfall.</p>
<p>This fund provides small grants to a number of Afghan women’s human rights defenders to fund their ongoing advocacy work and relocate them or help them flee when their lives are in danger. Often, these women need this money to pay exorbitant prices for visa extensions to stay in Pakistan, or for exit permits to leave the country if they are given a resettlement place elsewhere. </p>
<p>If countries like Australia and the US help make up this shortfall, more women will have access to these grants and be able to escape extreme security risks.</p>
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<h2>What now for Afghans living in limbo?</h2>
<p>Western countries must keep their promises to process refugee visa applications for Afghans in a timely fashion. </p>
<p>Australia <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/estimate/26889/&sid=0001">refuses</a> to grant refugee visas to people currently in Afghanistan. Yet, the government is still taking years to process the claims of incredibly high risk individuals outside the country who meet several priority processing criteria. Those people fled to countries like Pakistan and Iran and are now being deported because the process has taken so long. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-returns-20-years-of-progress-for-women-looks-set-to-disappear-overnight-165012">As the Taliban returns, 20 years of progress for women looks set to disappear overnight</a>
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<p>Similarly, Afghans who are eligible for special immigrant visas to the US can also wait for years. Even if they get an appointment with the US embassy in Islamabad, there is no guarantee of a timeline when they will be sent to the US. </p>
<p>These timelines have to change. Globally, poorer countries shoulder the burden as the hosts of the overwhelming majority of refugees. Pakistan is now deporting Afghans. Iran, host to more than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan">three million Afghan refugees</a>, will likely <a href="https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-185910">follow soon</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217532/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Hutchinson is executive director of Azadi-e Zan, an NGO dedicated to helping Afghan women's human rights defenders. This is an unpaid role. She is also a member of the Australian Civil Society Coalition for Women, Peace and Security.</span></em></p>Some 189,000 Afghans have applied for visas to Australia, but the government has only approved 31,500 refugee spots for the next four years. Women face the biggest hurdles to resettlement.Susan Hutchinson, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2135242023-09-27T12:27:58Z2023-09-27T12:27:58ZWhy some Indians want to change the country’s name to ‘Bharat’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550340/original/file-20230926-15-ivocio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C23%2C7774%2C5171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomes delegates to the G20 leaders summit in front of a placard reading 'Bharat,' the Hindi word for 'India.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/british-prime-minister-rishi-sunak-and-us-president-joe-news-photo/1669134258?adppopup=true">Dan Kitwood/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When India invited delegates attending the G20 summit in September 2023 to dinner with “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66716541">the President of Bharat</a>,” rather than “the President of India,” it may have looked to the world like a simple case of postcolonial course correction. </p>
<p>The word “India” is, after all, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-turkey-want-other-countries-to-start-spelling-its-name-turkiye-199390">an exonym</a> – a placename given by outsiders. In this case, the name came from the British, who ruled the subcontinent from 1858 to 1947, <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonialism-in-india-was-traumatic-including-for-some-of-the-british-officials-who-ruled-the-raj-77068">a violent period of colonialism</a> that later came to be called “the British Raj.” </p>
<p>“Bharat,” on the other hand, is the word for “India” in Hindi, by far <a href="https://www.forbesindia.com/article/news-by-numbers/hindi-day-2020-indias-mostspoken-languages-are/62577/1">the most spoken language in the nation</a>. Alongside English, Hindi is one of two languages used in <a href="https://qz.com/india/1712711/indias-constitution-is-over-30-times-as-long-as-the-us">the Indian Constitution</a>, with versions written in each language.</p>
<p>“Bharat” may, therefore, look like a well-reasoned and uncontroversial replacement for a term anointed long ago by outsiders – something akin to how <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43821512">Eswatini</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/08/26/archives/zimbabwe-is-welcomed-into-un-independence-achieved-in-april.html">Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13072774">Burkina Faso</a> updated their countries’ names from the colonial designations “Swaziland,” “Rhodesia” and “Upper Volta,” respectively. </p>
<p>But the use of “Bharat” has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/6/india-or-bharat-whats-behind-the-dispute-over-the-countrys-name">elicited outcry</a> from the political opposition, some Muslims, and Hindu conservatives in the south, reflecting ongoing tensions in India between language, religion and politics. </p>
<h2>Two different language families</h2>
<p>My book with fellow linguist <a href="https://julietetelandresen.com/">Julie Tetel Andresen</a>, “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Languages+In+The+World%3A+How+History%2C+Culture%2C+and+Politics+Shape+Language+-p-9781118531280">Languages in the World: How History, Culture, and Politics Shape Language</a>,” covers the language history and politics of India.</p>
<p>Hindi is the most-spoken language in India, but its use is largely relegated to a part of the country that linguists refer to as “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hindi-language">the Hindi belt</a>,” a massive region in northern, central and eastern India where Hindi is the official or primary language.</p>
<p>Around 1500 B.C.E., a group of outsiders from Central Asia – known now as the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/society/history-and-culture/theres-no-confusion-the-new-reports-clearly-confirm-arya-migration-into-india/article61986135.ece">Indo-Aryans</a> – began migrating and settling in what is now northern India. They spoke a language that would eventually become <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sanskrit-language">Sanskrit</a>. As groups of these speakers separated from one another and spread out over northern India, their spoken Sanskrit changed over time, becoming distinctive.</p>
<p>Most of the languages spoken in northern India today – Hindi, Punjabi, Bengali and Gujarati, among many others – derive from this history. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of India highlighting predominant languages spoken in various regions." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550428/original/file-20230926-21-ur64w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Different languages are predominantly spoken in different parts of India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/indian-map-with-official-languages-of-indian-royalty-free-illustration/1490281073?phrase=map+of+indian+languages&adppopup=true">Venkatesh Selvarajan/iStock via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But the Aryans were not the first group to inhabit the Indian subcontinent. Another group, the Dravidians, was already living in the region at the time of the Aryan migrations. They may have been <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00868-w">the original inhabitants of the Indus-Valley Civilization in northern India</a>. Over the millennia, the Dravidians migrated to the southern part of the subcontinent, while the Aryans fanned out across the north. </p>
<p>Today, Dravidians number <a href="https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Dravidian_peoples">about 250 million people</a>. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dravidian-languages">Dravidian languages</a>, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tamil-language">Tamil</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Telugu-language">Telugu</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Malayalam-language">Malayalam</a>, have no historical relationship and virtually no linguistic similarities to the Indo-Aryan languages of the north. </p>
<h2>Dravidians spurn Hindi</h2>
<p>By the time the Raj ended in 1947, English had been established as the language of the elites and was used in education and government. As the new nation of India took shape, Mahatma Gandhi advocated for a single Indian language to unite the diverse regions and for many years championed Hindi, <a href="https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/fact-check-did-gandhi-want-hindi-as-national-language/cid/1705408">which was already widely spoken in the north</a>.</p>
<p>But after independence, opposition to Hindi grew in the Dravidian-speaking south, where English was the favored lingua franca. For Tamils and other Dravidian groups, Hindi was associated with the Brahmin caste, whom many felt <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/why-periyar-is-still-an-influencer-in-the-political-landscape-of-tamil-nadu/periyars-movements/slideshow/63215382.cms">marginalized Dravidian languages and culture</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Portrait of a woman smiling, wearing a blue and white shawl." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550332/original/file-20230926-21-sf77gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1039&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Indira Gandhi pushed to codify English, alongside Hindi, as an official language in the constitution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-politician-indira-gandhi-news-photo/639614209?adppopup=true">Henri Bureau/Sygma/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>For many people in the south, Hindi came to be seen as a language as foreign as English. To keep tensions from spilling over, the first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, supported verbiage in the constitution adopted in 1950 <a href="https://www.uottawa.ca/clmc/language-provisions-constitution-indian-union#:%7E:text=The%20Constitution%20adopted%20in%201950,official%20language%20of%20the%20Union.">allowing for the continued use of English in government</a> for a limited period.</p>
<p>Violence nevertheless continued in the south for years around what was seen as the <a href="https://www.thenewsminute.com/tamil-nadu/history-anti-hindi-imposition-movements-tamil-nadu-102983">unfair promotion of Hindi</a>. It abated only when Indira Gandhi – Nehru’s daughter and the third prime minister of India – <a href="https://www.impriindia.com/insights/linguistic-diversity-language-policy/">pushed to codify English</a>, alongside Hindi, as an official language in the constitution.</p>
<p>Today, the Indian Constitution <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/EighthSchedule_19052017.pdf">recognizes 22 official languages</a>.</p>
<h2>Nationalists push for one official language</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/75-years-ago-britains-plan-for-pakistani-and-indian-independence-left-unresolved-conflicts-on-both-sides-especially-when-it-comes-to-kashmir-185932">The Partition of India in 1947</a> – corresponding to the dissolution of the Raj – led to the creation of Pakistan, which was set up to aggregate the majority Muslim regions from the colonial state. An independent India was set up to include the majority non-Muslim regions. </p>
<p>Today, roughly <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Pakistan.pdf">97% of Pakistan’s population is Muslim</a>. In India, Hindus make up about 80% of the population, while <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-58595040">Muslims make up about 14%</a> – more than 200 million people.</p>
<p>This is where modern domestic politics come into play. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/20/what-is-hindu-nationalism-and-who-are-the-rss">Hindutva</a>” is a brand of far-right Hindu nationalism that emerged in the 20th century in response to colonial rule but gained its biggest following under the leadership of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Narendra-Modi">Prime Minister Narendra Modi</a> and his <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bharatiya-Janata-Party">Bharatiya Janta Party</a>, or the BJP. </p>
<p>As a political ideology, Hindu nationalism should be distinguished from Hinduism, a religion. It advances policies that seek to promote Hindu supremacy and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/05/11/modi-india-muslims-hatred-incitement/">are widely considered anti-Muslim</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/25/threat-unity-anger-over-push-make-hindi-national-language-of-india">One such policy</a> is the promotion of Hindi as the sole official language of India. Speaking in 2022 at a Parliamentary Official Language Committee meeting, <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/linguistic-imperialism-bjp-pronouncements-on-promoting-hindi-spark-outrage/article38492154.ece">BJP Home Minister Amit Shah said</a>, “When citizens of states speak other languages, communicate with each other, it should be in the language of India.”</p>
<p>To Shah, the “language of India” and Hindi were one and the same.</p>
<h2>Suppressing Urdu</h2>
<p>Muslims in India speak the languages of their communities – Hindi among them – as do Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Christians. </p>
<p>However, making Hindi the national language could be viewed as one part of a broader political project that can be characterized as anti-Muslim. That’s why the political opposition is against using “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/6/india-or-bharat-whats-behind-the-dispute-over-the-countrys-name">Bharat</a>,” even though many Muslims are themselves Hindi speakers. </p>
<p>These politics become even clearer in the context of the BJP’s attempts <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Urdu-language">to limit the use of Urdu</a> – a language with a high degree of <a href="https://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/%7Eharoldfs/540/langdial/node2.html">mutual intelligibility</a> to Hindi – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61199753">in Indian public life</a>. </p>
<p>Although Urdu and Hindi are remarkably similar, their differences take on outsized religious and national significance. </p>
<p>Whereas Hindi is written in the Devanagari script, which has strong cultural associations with Hinduism, Urdu is written in the Perso-Arabic script, which has strong associations with Islam. Whereas Hindi draws on Sanskrit for new words, Urdu draws on Persian and Arabic, again emphasizing associations to Islam. And whereas Hindi predominates in India, <a href="https://www.sprachcaffe.com/english/magazine-article/what-language-is-spoken-in-pakistan.htm">Urdu is the official language of Pakistan</a>, along with English. </p>
<p>Thus the appearance of “Bharat” in official government correspondence may reopen old wounds for Muslims – and even for conservative Hindus in the Dravidian-speaking south who might otherwise support Modi and the BJP. </p>
<p>Although an official name change is unlikely in the immediate future, “Bharat” will likely continue to serve as a rallying cry for right-wing nationalists. </p>
<p>To them, the conciliatory language politics of Nehru and Indira Gandhi <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/15/india-nehru-history-myths-modi-bjp-politics-review/">are a thing of the past</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phillip M. Carter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government’s use of the Hindi word for ‘India’ revives debates over whether Hindi should be the national language – and reopens some old wounds.Phillip M. Carter, Professor of Linguistics and English, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105492023-09-13T02:12:08Z2023-09-13T02:12:08ZFemale genital cutting remains a taboo subject in Pakistan, preventing real progress from being made<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547151/original/file-20230908-15-8gkxww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=291%2C50%2C5834%2C4416&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Female genital cutting is a <a href="https://www.jogc.com/article/S1701-2163(17)30691-6/fulltext">secretive</a> and largely invisible practice in Pakistan. </p>
<p>The experiences of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htp-s8QvToE">survivors</a> are the only sources of information we have to understand its prevalence. There are no national statistics or governmental efforts to counter the practice or this <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f0ac6bc2.html">lack of awareness</a>. Open conversations are difficult because women’s bodies are treated as a source of <a href="https://broadview.org/fgm-canada-dawoodi-bohra/">shame or taboo</a>. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol24/iss1/18/">research</a> has found we must understand female genital cutting from a Pakistani perspective and work towards bridging the knowledge gap through increased data collection and encouraging greater dialogue with survivors. </p>
<p>Otherwise, Pakistan risks being left behind in achieving one of the United Nations’ <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/node/36060#:%7E:text=Eliminate%20all%20harmful%20practices%2C%20such,marriage%20and%20female%20genital%20mutilation">sustainable development goals</a>, the elimination of female genital cutting by 2030.</p>
<h2>What is female genital cutting?</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation">four types</a> of female genital cutting, but generally speaking, it involves
the <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-research-(srh)/areas-of-work/female-genital-mutilation/types-of-female-genital-mutilation">partial or total removal</a> of the external female genitalia. This can be through pricking, scraping, stitching and burning. </p>
<p>At least <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/female-genital-mutilation/">200 million girls and women</a> globally have experienced different forms of female genital cutting, according to the United Nations. It is practised on <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/resources/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-frequently-asked-questions#where_practiced">every continent</a>, except <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/10/5/fgm-a-native-affliction-on-every-inhabitable-continent">Antarctica</a>. </p>
<p>A small minority of <a href="https://www.thedawoodibohras.com/about-the-bohras/">Dawoodi Bohra Muslims</a> from the Shiite Ismaili sect practice female genital cutting in Pakistan (as well as in India). </p>
<p>The practice also occurs within the Dawoodi Bohra <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/02/28/589173639/a-secretive-sect-opens-a-debate-on-female-genital-mutilation">diaspora</a>. In 2015, a mother, nurse and spiritual leader were found guilty in Australia’s first genital mutilation <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/nov/13/female-genital-mutilation-trial-young-girl-convinced-jury-australia">trial</a>. Even though the practice is illegal in Australia, it is <a href="https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/how-covid-19-borders-drove-perth-family-to-seek-female-genital-mutilation-on-home-soil-20211117-p599tv.html">still carried out in secret</a>.</p>
<p>Dawoodi Bohras generally practice a type of cutting called <em>khatna</em>, or the removal of the clitoral hood. Young girls usually undergo this practice at <a href="https://www.orchidproject.org/about-fgc/where-does-fgc-happen/pakistan/">seven years old</a>. This is ostensibly done to curb a <a href="https://sahiyo.org/images/D16.pdf">woman’s sexual desire</a>, to promote <a href="https://sahiyo.org/sahiyo-blog/why-do-dawoodi-bohras-practice-khatna.html">genital hygiene</a> and to follow the Islamic <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/De-linking%20FGM%20from%20Islam%20final%20report.pdf"><em>sunnah</em></a>, or the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zj36gwx/revision/2">sayings and practices</a> of the Prophet Muhammad. </p>
<p>Religious <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Islam-does-not-support-female-circumcision-Expert-77396">scholars</a>, medical <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8260090/">practitioners</a> and <a href="https://sahiyo.org/sahiyo-blog/what-islam-says-part-1.html">activist organisations</a> argue, however, that it is a harmful practice and not a religious duty. </p>
<p>According to World Health Organization, there are short-term and long-term health <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-research-(srh)/areas-of-work/female-genital-mutilation/health-risks-of-female-genital-mutilation">risks</a> from the practice. These include severe pain, bleeding, infections, urination problems, obstetric fistulas, perinatal risk, trauma and other mental health problems. <a href="https://www.news18.com/news/india/with-no-laws-india-a-hub-for-female-genital-mutilation-on-expats-foreigners-report-1651551.html">A study in India</a> also reported side effects such as low sex drive, oversensitivity in the clitoral area and problems with sexual pleasure and trusting partners. </p>
<p>While there are members of the Dawoodi Bohra community who speak out against the practice, some also defend it as a <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/gd/12/1/article-p9.xml">cultural right</a>. Most Dawoodi Bohras are secretive about it due to a fear of potential backlash, since acts of violence against minorities are common in Pakistan. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-so-difficult-to-end-female-genital-mutilation-131162">Why it's so difficult to end female genital mutilation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Not just an African problem</h2>
<p>Most international efforts to eliminate female genital cutting focus on Africa. As a result, it is believed to be an African practice. </p>
<p>Somalia has one of the <a href="https://africa.unwomen.org/en/stories/news/2022/05/from-knowledge-to-action-ending-female-genital-mutilation-in-somalia">highest prevalence rates</a> of female genital mutilation in the world, with 99% of women aged 15-49 having been cut. Sudan also saw an increase in the practice during COVID lockdowns, despite it being <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/eighty-cent-fgm-cases-happen-africa">criminalised in 2020</a>. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.FGMS.ZS?locations=ZG">statistical data</a> is available to us because African countries are able to measure its prevalence through nationally representative household surveys. <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0238782">Self-reporting</a> is also used to acquire data from mothers and daughters. </p>
<p>Although these data collection efforts are not always <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0238782">reliable</a>, the general level of awareness in some African countries gives activists and policymakers a platform to organise more targeted <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/5-activists-fighting-fgm-in-africa/">campaigns</a> to bring social change. </p>
<p>Research shows the practice is also <a href="https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-govt-in-denial-about-female-genital-mutilation-in-india-collect-data-let-states-ban-it/1230724/">widespread</a> among the Dawoodi Bohra community in India. The Indian government, however, has <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2023/0209/Is-there-female-genital-mutilation-in-India-Delhi-says-no-survivors-say-yes">denied</a> the existence of female genital cutting in the country, meaning there is no official data collection there, either. </p>
<p>However, in 2017, a <a href="https://lawschoolpolicyreview.com/2022/12/21/examining-the-constitutionality-of-female-genital-mutilation-in-india/">human rights advocate</a> and lawyer filed a petition before the Supreme Court to <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181206322/">ban the practice</a>. Although a decision is still <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2022/05/06/female-genital-mutilation-cutting-in-india-an-urgent-need-for-intervention/">pending</a>, <a href="https://www.mid-day.com/mumbai/mumbai-news/article/sunita-tiwari-lawyer-pil-female-genital-mutilation-interview-bohra-community-khatna-18300161">non-profit organisations</a> continue to speak out against the practice. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1285856996139380736"}"></div></p>
<h2>What can be done in Pakistan?</h2>
<p>Pakistan ranks as <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1760949#:%7E:text=Pakistan%20ranks%20142%20out%20of%20146%20countries%20in%20WEF's%20global%20gender%20gap%20report,-Amin%20Ahmed%20Published&text=Screengrab%20taken%20from%20WEF's%20report.&text=In%20the%20World%20Economic%20Foru">142nd out of 146 countries</a> in the <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf">Global Gender Gap report 2023</a> by the World Economic Forum. It is frequently criticised by human rights activists for its high rates of <a href="https://unwatch.org/pakistan-claims-stellar-human-rights-record-ahead-of-mondays-un-review/">violence against women and mistreatment of minorities</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1671443746691645440"}"></div></p>
<p>Recently, there has been more activism in Pakistan against <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2382670/civil-society-protest-against-honour-killing">honour killings of women</a>, the mistreatment of the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/activists-decry-pakistani-religious-court-s-transgender-law-decision-/7102005.html"><em>khwaja sira</em> (transgender) community</a> and <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1096140-speakers-at-seminar-express-zero-tolerance-for-child-labour">child labour</a>. Protests and community engagement make these issues more visible and put pressure on the government to respond.</p>
<p>This is not the case with female genital cutting. To curb the practice in Pakistan, it must be openly addressed and understood. </p>
<p>How can we do this? Through responsible data collection and consensual conversations with community members. </p>
<p>Dialogue should start in the Dawoodi Bohra community because <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2023.2178408">change from within</a> is more likely to be long-lasting and less contentious. Considering Pakistan’s fractious religious climate, it is important for communities to mobilise for change from within to avoid the Dawoodi Bohras being targeted in sectarian violence.</p>
<p>Religion and women’s bodies are sensitive topics in patriarchal societies. Pakistan’s history with women has long been marked by an urge to morally police their bodies. One discriminatory practice, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/asia/pakistan-virginity-tests.html">two-finger virginity testing</a> in sexual assault cases, for example, has only recently been abolished after a concerted push from activists.</p>
<p>This is why an issue like female genital cutting must be discussed with contextual care and caution. This approach, supported by activists and lawmakers within the community, will be transformative in ending this practice for good.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Huda Syyed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pakistan has no official indicators to measure female genital cutting and no laws against it. There are also rarely protests against it.Huda Syyed, PhD Candidate & Tutor, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112402023-08-16T11:15:32Z2023-08-16T11:15:32ZDespite domestic political turmoil, Pakistan is well placed to boost regional integration<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542129/original/file-20230810-23-200ert.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C17%2C2358%2C1587&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Karachi could channel exports from central Asia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/karachi-pakistan-jan-02-large-numbers-1885815538">Asianet-Pakistan/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pakistan is showing clear signs of economic and political crisis. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/2/pakistan-inflation-hits-record-for-second-consecutive-month">Inflation was recently</a> almost 38%, and the country faces a debt crunch as it tries to manage its trade deficit with the rest of the world. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/28/pakistan-imf-deal-economy-crisis-inflation-austerity/">Talks with the IMF</a> over emergency loans have dragged on for months. </p>
<p>On the political side, elections are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-66446957">being delayed</a> in the aftermath of the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/imran-khan-former-pakistani-prime-minister-detained-12876959">controversial arrest</a> of former prime minister Imran Khan, which led to widespread protests. </p>
<p>Some of these events coincided with <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1751679/south-central-asia-need-to-enhance-socioeconomic-ties">a conference</a> I attended recently in Pakistan, where there was actually much positive discussion of the country’s economic potential – particularly with regards to improved relations with central Asia. </p>
<p>Several countries in central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan) can provide what <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09584935.2020.1855112">Pakistan needs</a> – wheat, gas and oil – to help it cope with rampant food and energy price rises. </p>
<p>In return, Pakistan has what central Asia needs – the ability to transport central Asian goods south to large ports in Gwadar and Karachi, potentially transforming the region into one which is “land-linked” as opposed to land-locked.</p>
<p>But the state of Pakistan’s relationship with central Asia is complicated. The vast expanse of the Himalayas which separates them is not just a massive physical obstacle – it is also a metaphor for the many centuries of economic, political and <a href="https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S2377740019500179">cultural estrangement</a> between the two regions. And central Asia can seem disinclined to look southwards in its international ambitions.</p>
<p>In foreign policy, the gaze of central Asia is now resolutely north towards Russia. Earlier this year, all five presidents of central Asia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89741">visited Moscow</a> for the annual Victory Day holiday where they applauded Putin’s speech. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in economics, central Asia looks resolutely east towards China. In <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/02/20/chinas-2023-trade-and-investment-with-kazakhstan-development-trends/#:%7E:text=China's%20exports%20to%20Kazakhstan%20reached,staggering%20US%24%2431.2%20billion.">2022, Kazakhstan exported</a> US$13.2 billion (£10.3 billion) of goods and services to China. Two years earlier, by comparison, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/kazakhstan/exports/pakistan">it exported</a> less than US$20 million to Pakistan. </p>
<p>Yet there are signs of improvement. In 2021 Pakistan and Uzbekistan, together with Afghanistan, signed off on a US$5 billion project to build a <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2021/03/05/pakistan-afghanistan-uzbekistan-agree-573km-connecting-railway/">573km railway line</a> connecting their three capital cities, which still <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1765398">looks promising</a>. The <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/revival-of-tapi-pipeline-project-brings-serious-geopolitical-implications-for-russia/">Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline</a> has been under construction since 2015.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China is pouring more than US$60 billion into a network of road, rail, energy, energy pipelines and fibre optics to link it with Pakistan. And while the “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/dragon-from-the-mountains/90AB5FED65A409F5ACCAB5BC92C68555">China Pakistan Economic Corridor</a>” is expected to have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09584935.2020.1855112">positive implications</a> for trade, investment and technology transfer between the two countries, it is also likely to generate major benefits for the wider region, improving transport links between southern and central Asia. </p>
<h2>A second Singapore?</h2>
<p>With political and bureaucratic will, this could inspire a far better connection between Pakistan and central Asia, where Pakistan could seek to emulate the role that Singapore took on in the 1960s and 1970s. Acting as a link between east and west, Singapore <a href="https://www.harpercollins.com/products/from-third-world-to-first-lee-kuan-yew?variant=32118179135522">helped to drive globalisation</a> as well as its own soaring economic growth. </p>
<p>At the time, Singapore was perfectly placed to connect cheap labour in the east with investment and technology from the west. But it was not a wholly smooth transition. </p>
<p>For while Pakistan today faces the threat of Islamic extremism, in the 1960s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Singapore/History">Singapore faced</a> a local communist insurgency, and bombings were a regular part of a four-year long Indonesian state-backed campaign. Yet Singapore does show that such threats can be overcome. </p>
<p>The key will be gaining sufficient political stability to encourage investors that Pakistan is a good bet, something achieved by the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/opinion/international-world/singapore-autocracy-democracy.html%5D">benevolent autocracy</a>” of Lee Kuan Yew, under which Singaporeans arguably traded off certain social and political freedoms for stability and prosperity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Singapore skyline." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542290/original/file-20230811-15-9migfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Singapore reaped economic benefits.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/singapore-skyline-marina-during-twilight-313516310">Sean Pavone/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, Pakistan sits aside many of the principal crossroads of the global economy. It has long been a close partner of China, and has has unparalleled diplomatic and cultural reach into Afghanistan and the Middle East. It is already deeply embedded in the west through a well-established diaspora. </p>
<p>But we shouldn’t forget the elephant in the room when it comes to any discussion about regional connectivity – and that is India. Any historic or cultural connections Pakistan has with central Asia are dwarfed by those it retains with its next door neighbour.</p>
<p>The national languages of India (English and Hindi) are completely comprehensible to Pakistan (English and Urdu). The two countries share traditions in English law and parliamentary political systems, and both speak the cultural languages of cricket and Bollywood films. </p>
<p>Reconnecting India and Pakistan does not require new infrastructure – the roads and routes are already there; they just aren’t being used to their full potential. In fact, the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9f3f97ac-4007-5b30-9b2d-f1d1070c16b7/content">World Bank</a> estimates that untapped trade between India and Pakistan in 2015 was US$35 billion (compared to just over US$2 billion of existing annual trade). </p>
<p>Peace and openness with India would not just complete the reconnection of South Asia, but also offer Pakistan the chance to become a genuine regional hub – a Singapore for the 21st century. And if freedom to trade could take any of the nuclear heat out of Pakistan-India relations – what former US president Bill Clinton called “<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/687021.stm">the most dangerous place on earth</a>” – then regional endeavours would have globally transformational benefits.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew McCartney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Could Pakistan become a Singapore of the 21st century?Matthew McCartney, Senior Researcher, Charter Cities Institute; Research Associate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110522023-08-11T16:17:55Z2023-08-11T16:17:55ZTwo years after Taliban takeover: why Afghanistan still poses a threat to the region and beyond<p>The dramatic and rapid Taliban offensive in the spring of 2021 <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_talibans-afghanistan-takeover-timeline/6209678.html">culminated</a> in its takeover of Kabul on August 15. The chaos of the western withdrawal that surrounded the return of the Taliban represented a sad endpoint of two decades of failed US-led attempts to impose a liberal democratic system on a country that had hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and facilitated his masterminding of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>For Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban marked the beginning of a deeply illiberal regime that is particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-talibans-war-on-women-in-afghanistan-must-be-formally-recognized-as-gender-apartheid-210688">hostile to women</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-shiite-persecution-discrimination/32507042.html">minorities</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">swiftness</a> of the Taliban takeover <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/16/swift-taliban-takeover-proves-us-and-uk-analysis-badly-wrong">confounded</a> more optimistic US and UK predictions about the survival of the Afghan government. But most of its consequences were entirely predictable, and indeed predicted – from the worsening <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/afghanistan-taliban-takeover-worsens-rights-crisis">human rights</a> situation to an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58328246">economic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Five million Afghans fled the country and over three million were internally displaced, according to the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/102160">UN refugee agency’s update</a> in July 2023. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is now at an unprecedented critical level: more than 18 million people – just under half the Afghan population – face acute <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/afghanistan">food-insecurity</a>. </p>
<h2>Least peaceful country</h2>
<p>After an initial upsurge, violence <a href="https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard/0B428DC54C4FF4146CBB3EAE58256BCF">has significantly declined</a> in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Yet, Afghanistan remains “the least peaceful country in the world in 2023”, according to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects, in part, the ongoing rivalry between the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group. This branch of the Islamic State remains the most potent domestic challenger to the Taliban. It <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/125/36/PDF/N2312536.pdf?OpenElement">comprises</a> somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 fighters, including former regime officials and members of ethnic minorities opposed to the Taliban regime. IS-K has been <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/06/afghanistan-impact-improvised-explosive-devices-civilians">responsible</a> for the majority of civilian casualties in terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/32460999.html">has established itself</a> firmly in the northern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan.</p>
<p>From a regional perspective, IS-K poses an equally important security threat to Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-taliban-central-asia-attacks/31844898.html">northern neighbours in central Asia</a>. At the end of July 2023 it <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-bajaur-rally-blast/32526408.html">claimed</a> a suicide attack in northwest Pakistan that killed more than 50 people.</p>
<p>IS-K, however, is not the most significant security threat to Pakistan. Rather, the Taliban’s longstanding ally has been afflicted by an upsurge in violent attacks committed by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group allegedly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ap-afghanistan-islamabad-peshawar-shehbaz-sharif-b2385883.html">enjoying safe havens in Afghanistan</a>. According to a recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/189/74/PDF/N2318974.pdf?OpenElement">UN report</a>, the TTP has reabsorbed several splinter groups and seeks to regain a measure of territorial control along the Afghan-Pakistan border. </p>
<p>Since the Taliban takeover, other, more regionally oriented terrorist groups, such as the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement-uzbekistan">Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</a> and the <a href="https://www.hstoday.us/featured/understanding-the-turkistan-islamic-party-from-global-jihad-to-local-anti-chinese-resistance/">Turkestan Islamic Party</a> (formerly known as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement), have also benefited from a more permissive environment in which to operate. These and numerous other groups are smaller in size – numbering in their tens and hundreds, rather than thousands. But they tend to <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf?OpenElement">coordinate and cooperate</a> with each other and increasingly also with IS-K. </p>
<p>This is of particular concern to China. Beijing <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-china-taliban-uyghurs-security/32444038.html">is worried</a> that the Uyghur extremist Turkestan Islamic Party will eventually use Afghanistan as a base for attacks against China and Chinese interests in the wider region. </p>
<h2>Water wars</h2>
<p>Beyond terrorism, competition over scarce water resources is the other major source of conflict. The Taliban’s plan to build the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-canal-water-central-asia/32350996.html">Qosh Tepa Irrigation Canal</a> will <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/taliban-threaten-water-resources-of-uzbekistan-turkmenistan-and-tajikistan-273219/">decrease</a> water available to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan from the transboundary Amu Darya River by as much as 15%. This will have <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/what-afghanistans-qosh-tepa-canal-means-for-central-asia/">major</a> social, economic and public health consequences for both countries. </p>
<p>A similar crisis is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/a-compulsive-embrace-beneath-the-afghanistan-iran-water-conflict/">brewing between Tehran and Kabul</a>. The Taliban is reportedly <a href="https://time.com/6302192/taliban-suicide-bombers-water-dispute-iran/">preparing toops, including suicide bombers</a> for what looks certain to be a conflict with Iran over water shortages caused by the Taliban allegedly <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-taliban-water-dispute-/32435442.html">reneging</a> on a 1973 water treaty. </p>
<h2>Fear and intimidation at home and abroad</h2>
<p>After two years of Taliban rule, Afghanistan, is a different – but not a lesser – problem. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51689443">deal signed</a> between the Taliban and the US on February 29 2020, after two years of talks pushed by the then US president, Donald Trump, precipitated the withdrawal of western troops but did not bring about intra-Afghan reconciliation. </p>
<p>On the contrary, since the takeover in August 2021 the Taliban has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/afghanistan-one-year-of-the-talibans-broken-promises-draconian-restrictions-and-violence/">ruled with fear and intimidation</a>. And it has failed in its commitment to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. </p>
<p>This has not, however, stopped international efforts to engage with the Taliban regime. Central Asian states have been at the forefront of efforts <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/afghanistan-should-be-reintegrated-into-regional-trade-and-security-structures/">to integrate Afghanistan</a> into regional trade and security structures and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-trans-afghan-railway-line-back-on-track/">pushed the idea</a> of a trans-Afghan railway line. In early August, 2023, Kazakhstan hosted a Taliban delegation for a business forum. The two countries signed US$200 million (£157 million) worth of <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-signs-200-million-in-contracts-with-afghanistan">deals</a>, primarily to supply grain and flour to Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Afghanistan has vast <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/">mineral deposits</a>, including critical <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/rare-earth-afghanistan-sits-1-trillion-minerals-n196861">rare earth</a> minerals. These have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-investment-in-afghanistans-lithium-sector-a-long-shot-in-the-short-term/">attracted Chinese investment</a> in Afghanistan’s lithium sector. Beijing and Kabul also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/afghanistans-taliban-administration-oil-extraction-deal-with-chinese-company-2023-01-05/">agreed a deal</a> in January 2023, enabling a Chinese company to drill for oil in the Amu Darya basin.</p>
<p>While these efforts do not imply recognition of the Taliban regime – even by its closest neighbours – they suggest a slow but inevitable trend in that direction. This all the more likely now that even Washington has begun to re-engage with the Taliban. This has included <a href="https://www.state.gov/meeting-of-u-s-officials-with-taliban-representatives/">signalling</a>, at recent high-level talks in Doha, Qatar, an “openness to a technical dialogue regarding economic stabilisation issues”.</p>
<p>Washington is still <a href="https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-1-2023/#post-466596-AFGHANISTAN">ruling out</a> recognition “right now for a number of reasons, including the treatment of their own people, including their many flagrant human rights violations”. But this represents a significant shift in US policy. </p>
<p>Two years of Taliban rule have seen the regime in Kabul double down on its repressive domestic policies and do little to assuage its near and far neighbours’ concerns over new and old security <a href="https://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/Publications/OSCE-CA-2023.pdf">risks</a>. So this apparent willingness to re-engage with the Taliban will send all the wrong signals and is unlikely to bring about more security and stability for Afghans and their neighbours. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>When originally published, this article mistakenly carried a photograph of a Palestinian funeral procession instead of an image of girls being turned away from their school. This has now been rectified.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Two years on from taking control of Afghanistan the Taliban continues to rule through fear and threatens the stability of the whole region.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087342023-07-05T12:22:20Z2023-07-05T12:22:20ZChristians in Pakistan risk greater persecution from blasphemy laws, while living in poverty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534895/original/file-20230629-13286-eqhpah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C54%2C7176%2C4689&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pakistani Christians praying at a church.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanChristmas/1ed02288065d49d7850a31b29b43b6c5/photo?Query=christians%20pakistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2518&currentItemNo=40">AP Photo/Fareed Khan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two Christian Pakistani teenagers, one 18 and another 14, were <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/2-christian-teens-accused-of-blasphemy-in-pakistan.html">arrested in their homes</a> in Lahore in May 2023 on charges of blasphemy after a policeman claimed he heard them being disrespectful of the Prophet Muhammad. </p>
<p>Among Muslim-majority countries, Pakistan has the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26916355">strictest blasphemy laws</a>. People <a href="https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/pakistans-anti-blasphemy-laws/#:%7E:text=Section%20295C%20forbids%20insults%20to,death%20penalty%20should%20be%20mandatory.">jailed under these laws</a> risk <a href="http://www.federalshariatcourt.gov.pk/en/home/">a sentence of life in prison</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html">and worse still, even death</a>. Christians and other religious minorities make up a mere 4% of Pakistan’s population, but they account for <a href="https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/pakistans-anti-blasphemy-laws/#:%7E:text=Section%20295C%20forbids%20insults%20to,death%20penalty%20should%20be%20mandatory.">about half of blasphemy charges</a>. </p>
<p>As if navigating blasphemy laws weren’t hardship enough, Christians who live in major cities like Lahore are often relegated to poorly paid and hazardous jobs like sanitation work. The nation of Pakistan was created 76 years ago but during this time the lives of its Christian citizens have grown ever more difficult.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/myriam-renaud-343058">scholar of world religions</a>, I have studied how the evolution of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-madrasa-schools-and-what-skills-do-they-impart-99497">hard-line version of Islam in Pakistan</a> has come to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/is-pakistan-safe-for-christians/">shape this country’s national identity</a> and contributed to the persecution of its Christian minority.</p>
<h2>Hindu converts to Christianity</h2>
<p>Many Christians in Pakistan trace their religious affiliation to the activities of <a href="https://history.wisc.edu/publications/christianity-in-india-from-beginnings-to-the-present/">missionary societies</a> during the 19th and early 20th centuries in the Punjab region of what was then British-ruled India. </p>
<p>Early evangelization efforts by both the British and Americans in Hindu-majority India focused on upper-caste Hindus. The evangelizers assumed that these elites would use their influence to convert members of the lower castes. However, this approach led to few converts. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/caste-doesnt-just-exist-in-india-or-in-hinduism-it-is-pervasive-across-many-religions-in-south-asia-and-the-diaspora-180470">caste system</a> is a tiered socioeconomic system that consigns people to a particular group, or caste. In Hinduism, this system is part of its religious worldview. People are born into a particular caste. </p>
<p>There are some <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43052102">3,000 castes in India</a>, each associated with a range of occupations. People from the lowest castes are often expected to do work that is considered “polluting,” such as skinning animals, removing the bodies of the unclaimed dead and cleaning toilets. Because castes are rigid categories, their members are blocked from upward mobility.</p>
<p>In the late 19th century, American missionaries in India decided <a href="https://www.mqup.ca/nationalism-and-minority-identities-in-islamic-societies-products-9780773528482.php">to focus directly on the least advantaged</a> and began to <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Imperial_Fault_Lines.html?id=z9c3AcIDCKkC">baptize Hindus of low or no caste</a>. The missionaries’ new approach proved successful, in part because <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Christianity_in_India.html?id=mXgSDAAAQBAJ">conversion to Christianity</a> offered hope of escape from Hinduism’s caste system. By the 1930s, for example, many members of the largest menial caste in India’s Punjab region had converted to Protestant Christianity.</p>
<p>In 1947, the country of Pakistan was carved out of Indian territory to establish a homeland for Muslims, who were a minority in India. The section of the Punjab where most Christians lived became part of Pakistan. </p>
<p>The majority of those Christians chose to remain in the newly created Pakistan. They believed that they would fare better there because, in principle, Islam rejects social divisions like castes on theological grounds. </p>
<h2>Lower socioeconomic status</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women, with heads covered, seated in pews, inside a church with red hanging decorations." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534897/original/file-20230629-26782-wnno82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pakistani Christian women attend the Christmas Mass at a church in Peshawar, Pakistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanChristmas/331743ae23494157992442e1f9625446/photo?Query=church%20pakistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=930&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Mohammad Sajjad</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In practice, after the creation of Pakistan, not much changed economically or socially for the Christians who stayed: The <a href="https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/761014">caste system continued to exist</a> in the new country. </p>
<p>Even today, most Pakistani Christians living in major cities are <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/christians-upset-over-controversial-pilgrimage-advert/80233">consigned to poorly paid jobs in the sanitation industry</a>. Pakistan’s government has adopted a <a href="http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-077-2017/">systemic policy</a> of reserving sanitation posts for religious minorities. </p>
<p>Newspaper ads for sanitation workers, including by government agencies, explicitly call for non-Muslims. One of Asia’s Catholic news agencies, UCANews, reported that in May 2017, the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation issued a call for 450 sanitation workers, <a href="https://www.ucanews.com/news/children-of-a-lesser-god-pakistans-sanitation-workers/79884">offering contracts</a> that required employees to be non-Muslim and to take this oath: “I swear by my faith that I will only work in the position of a sanitary worker and not refuse any work.” </p>
<p>In Pakistan’s northwest city of Peshawar, as many as 80% of Christians are sanitation workers. According to the 2022 census, 3.27% of urban <a href="https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/population/POPULATION%20BY%20RELIGION.pdf">Pakistanis living in Punjab</a> province are Christian. However, in Lahore, Punjab’s capital city, Christians account for <a href="http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/christians-required-only-as-sweepers/">76% of sanitation workers</a>. </p>
<p>Subject to widespread discrimination, Christians are often refused other work. Confined to low-wage jobs, Christians experience widespread poverty, even in the relatively prosperous Punjab. A <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edinburgh-scholarship-online/book/37892/chapter-abstract/332392693?redirectedFrom=fulltext">2012 survey in Lahore</a> found that, for Christian families of five, the average monthly income was US$138 — a per capita daily income of 92 cents - which is well below the poverty line defined by the World Bank. In contrast, during the same year, the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/226956/average-world-wages-in-purchasing-power-parity-dollars/">average monthly income for all Pakistanis</a> was US$255.</p>
<h2>Blasphemy laws target minorities</h2>
<p>The condition of Christians only worsened when Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s dictatorial president from 1978 to 1988, started <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2759814?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">the Islamization of the country</a>. </p>
<p>Originally, for example, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws were general in nature. They punished offenders who wounded the religious sensibilities of other people. Only a handful of charges were filed until Zia added several Islam-specific clauses to this nonsectarian code. These changes included making blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad punishable by a minimum sentence of life in prison, and possibly death. Since Zia’s rule, <a href="https://crss.pk/blasphemy-cases-in-pakistan-1947-2021/">hundreds of blasphemy cases</a> have been filed.</p>
<p>Anthropologist <a href="https://honorsandawards.iu.edu/awards/honoree/1333.html">Linda Walbridge</a>, writing about <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=z9c3AcIDCKkC&pg=PA1&vq=christian+colonies&dq=punjabi+presbyterian&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q=christian%20colonies&f=false%20https://books.google.com/books/about/Nationalism_and_Minority_Identities_in_I.html?id=82jaiJ48vZQC">Pakistani Christians</a>, notes that by the 1990s these “Christians certainly believed they were the targets of systematic oppression.” That oppression, she observed, came largely “in the form of laws that have increasingly been used against them.” </p>
<p>Indeed, laws intended to protect Islam have sometimes been used against Christians and other minorities to settle personal scores or business disputes. In one incident, a Christian couple refused to pay back their Muslim employer who had lent them money. A mob burned them alive after he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/world/asia/pakistani-christian-couple-accused-of-blasphemy-is-killed-by-angry-mob.html">accused them of blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>The father of one of the arrested teenagers <a href="https://www.christianpost.com/news/2-christian-teens-accused-of-blasphemy-in-pakistan.html">told the The Christian Post</a>, “Our Muslim neighbors have known us for years, and they know we would never indulge in anything that could hurt their religious sentiments.” Prosecuting authorities reviewing the teenagers’ case may lean in their favor, but if the past is any indication, the authorities themselves will <a href="https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pakistan-On-Trial-Blasphemy-Laws-Publications-Thematic-Reports-2015-ENG.pdf">face intimidation, threats and accusations</a>. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a piece <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-pope-francis-choice-of-a-pakistani-cardinal-means-for-christians-of-the-country-97604">first published on June 28, 2018.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Consigned to jobs in sanitation and other hazardous fields, Christians, the largest religious minority group in Pakistan, face a difficult time in the country.Myriam Renaud, Affiliated Faculty of Bioethics, Religion, and Society, Department of Religious Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083412023-07-03T11:15:29Z2023-07-03T11:15:29ZWhy schoolchildren are regularly being targeted by terrorist groups in many countries<p>An Islamic State-linked group in Uganda attacked a school in June, killing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/17/islamic-state-attack-uganda-school">more than 40 people</a>, mostly students, in what seems to be an escalating trend of terrorism against schools. The attackers set fire to school dormitories and used machetes to kill and maim students. </p>
<p>This was the latest in a cycle of shocking attacks on schools around the world. The Nigerian group Boko Haram infamously <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-62324294">kidnapped</a> more than 200 girls from a school in 2014, and it has attacked other schools throughout the country. </p>
<p>Many more attacks have occurred since then. In Afghanistan, IS affiliate IS-K has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/fatalities-confirmed-in-explosions-at-high-school-in-afghan-capital-/6535567.html">repeatedly</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/24/deadly-suicide-bombing-hit-kabul-education-centre">bombed</a> educational institutions in recent years, often killing dozens of children or teens. In 2020 in Cameroon, sources suggest that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201025-there-are-no-words-children-killed-in-attack-on-bilingual-cameroon-school">separatists</a> fighting for their own, independent state attacked a bilingual school, killing eight children.</p>
<p>Why would a group carry out such an attack, killing schoolchildren? These attacks are happening more frequently in recent years, and they also tend to be carried out by particular types of groups.</p>
<p>I recently co-wrote a book, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/41433/chapter-abstract/352767656?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Insurgent Terrorism: Intergroup Relations and the Killing of Civilians</a>, with political scientists Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, examining the use of terrorism (intentional civilian targeting) by rebel organisations in civil wars. We dedicated a chapter to understanding attacks on schools and discovered a few patterns. </p>
<p>First, attacks on schools are on the rise. In the years examined in our book, 1998-2012, we found a marked increase starting in the late 2000s during civil wars. In the 1990s and early 2000s, there fewer than 20 attacks per year on schools by rebel organisations. But between 2009 and 2012, there were more than 90 such attacks per year.</p>
<p>Examining more recent data on terrorism generally, and not only during civil wars, we see a similar increase starting in the late 2000s. The graphic below shows a massive increase in terrorist attacks on schools. </p>
<p><strong>Terrorist attacks on schools, 1970-2020</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A graph showing rising numbers of attacks on schools" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533737/original/file-20230623-23-8hi9yl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The annual average number of terrorist attacks on schools in the 1980s and 1990s, according to the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a>, was less than 60. In the 2000s, the average year saw nearly 80 school attacks. In the 2010s, there was an average of 250 terrorist attacks on schools per year. After the early 2010s peak, the number of attacks started to decrease, but numbers are still far above what they were in the 1990s or early 2000s. </p>
<p>The increase in terrorism against schools is in part because influential global networks such as al-Qaida and IS seem to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/05/26/their-war-against-education/armed-group-attacks-teachers-students-and-schools">encourage it</a>, but also because groups learn from others that this is a good way to bring attention to their cause, to force a government to give in, or to intimidate a rival community.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-new-national-security-bosses-5-burning-issues-they-need-to-focus-on-208505">Nigeria's new national security bosses: 5 burning issues they need to focus on</a>
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<p>A second pattern we noticed was that the organisations that carry out these kinds of attacks tend to have a few attributes in common. Groups that attack schools tend to be in alliances with other rebel or terrorist organisations. These alliances provide <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381608080419">extra</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073">resources</a> to groups, which are essential for large-scale attacks. For example, allies might provide explosives, vehicles or recruits. Cooperative relationships with other rebels can also contribute to heinous attacks because groups learn tactics from each other, and they might pressure each other to use extreme tactics.</p>
<p>This seems to be the case with the group behind the recent Uganda attack, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). It has been cooperating with IS since 2017 and has <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/fatal-transaction-final_0.pdf">received funding from it</a>. The funds and propaganda support seem to have enabled ADF to carry out increasingly vicious attacks. Additionally, other IS-affiliated groups have attacked schools, so it is possible that the main IS encourages this, or that the groups are learning from each other.</p>
<p>We found that groups that had recently been subjected to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718789748">government crackdowns</a> were more likely to subsequently target schools, while groups that had recently received government concessions didn’t attack schools the following year. This is consistent with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1700540">other research</a> finding that government repression of religious freedom seems to lead to terrorist attacks on school.</p>
<p>The Uganda school attack, where boys and girls were killed and buildings set alight with people inside, was apparently intended to send a message to the government and its president Yoweri Museveni. Victims <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65945814">reported</a> that the attackers said: “We have succeeded in destabilising Museveni’s country.”</p>
<p>Interestingly, in our research, we did not find that religiously oriented groups, such as Islamist groups, were more likely than other types of groups to attack schools. Certainly, some Islamist groups have carried out these attacks – such as the recent Uganda school killings.</p>
<p>IS-K’s attacks are intended to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/afghanistan-isis-group-targets-religious-minorities">intimidate</a> the mostly Shia Hazara minority community, consistent with IS-K’s extreme religious views. But non-religious groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Communist Party of India (Maoist), have also repeatedly <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be94312a.html">attacked</a> <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/55505d0015.html">schools</a>.</p>
<p>Overall, attacks on schools occur because militant organisations see that they bring a great deal of attention – including from international news media – to their cause. Terrorism is fundamentally violent propaganda, and groups that use terrorism constantly innovate, seeking new tactics to help them stand out. They also hope the increasingly extreme methods will <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12113">pressure governments</a> to give up.</p>
<p>It seems likely that terrorist attacks against schools are going to continue. Governments should prioritise safeguarding educational institutions, and the international community should work harder to prevent these kinds of attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian J. Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Deadly attacks on schoolchildren by terrorists groups have been growing around the world from 2009.Brian J. Phillips, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Relations, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2080132023-06-20T06:36:08Z2023-06-20T06:36:08ZDeadly tragedy off the coast of Greece exposes how human traffickers are exploiting Pakistan’s economic meltdown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532801/original/file-20230620-23-ho5s76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yannis Kolesidis/ AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pakistan is experiencing a confluence of crises attributed to a decline in governance standards. Security challenges, chiefly posed by terrorism, have exacerbated the country’s economic deterioration, which in turn has given rise to energy shortages, rampant unemployment and soaring inflation rates. </p>
<p>As the nation’s economic predicament worsens, unscrupulous human traffickers are capitalising on the vulnerabilities of thousands of aspiring migrants who hope for better prospects in Europe. It is in this context that the overloaded ship sank into the waters off Greece. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jv-czr5d4aE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The BBC has claimed Greek authorities failed to save the migrants’ vessel, which was not moving for at least seven hours before it capsized.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Initial estimates suggest that about 80 people died. It is too early to say how many of those were <a href="https://senate.gov.pk/en/news_content.php?id=4987">Pakistanis, but Pakistani authorities</a> are fearing the worst. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared June 19 a national mourning day. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-imran-khans-populism-has-divided-pakistan-and-put-it-on-a-knifes-edge-205392">How Imran Khan's populism has divided Pakistan and put it on a knife's edge</a>
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<h2>Economic meltdown driving Pakistanis towards the deadly journey</h2>
<p>As authorities move to act against human traffickers, there is a need to look at the push factors behind this exploitation of economic migrants from Pakistan. </p>
<p>Pakistan’s economy faces serious challenges. Its GDP growth rate is expected to drop to 0.5% in 2023, compared to 6% in 2022. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund has estimated the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/4/12/imf-forecasts-pakistans-economy-to-slump-inflation-to-rise">inflation rate might</a> rise to 27% in 2023. The unemployment rate has also increased from 6.6% in 2020 to 7% in April 2023. </p>
<p>These economic hardships have led to some unprecedented scenes. Free food distribution points in major cities, organised by charities, are inundated. Such is the desperation that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/stampede-for-food-aid-kills-11-in-pakistan-/7031075.html">several people died</a> earlier this year while fighting to receive free food. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532592/original/file-20230619-23-2ek9ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Migrants often walk miles for days on end through tough terrain to reach their destinations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Pakistani government has asked for economic help from the IMF and its close friends like China and the Gulf states. But it does not have enough resources to meet the needs of its growing population. </p>
<p>The traditional lenders like the IMF are also very careful dealing with Pakistan, where the endemic corruption of the elites has been a contributing factor to the economic crisis. With the IMF cautious to provide further loans to Pakistan, the government has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-cut-government-expenses-by-15-austerity-drive-2023-02-22/">imposed austerity measures</a> and increased the general sales tax on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/16/as-cash-runs-out-pakistan-introduces-bill-to-unlock-imf-funds">goods and services</a>.</p>
<p>Under such circumstances and with limited employment opportunities, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-survey-drivers-migration-regional-evidence-migration-analysis-and-policy">millions</a> of Pakistanis have been migrating from the country on a regular basis. Common destinations include the Middle East, Europe and North America. Most of the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@WEO/PAK">Pakistani migrant workforce</a> is in the Gulf region – this is where Pakistan receives most of the remittances that support the economy. </p>
<p>This trend has grown sharply in recent years due to Pakistan’s economic meltdown. Because of strict rules and lengthy procedures associated with legal migration, many are opting for illegal migration instead. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532593/original/file-20230619-21-l44kho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners console Raja Yousaf, right, whose son Raja Sajid is missing in the shipwreck off the Greek coast.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nasir Mehmood/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rackets of human traffickers mushrooming</h2>
<p>The desperate situation has led to the mushrooming growth of people smugglers in Pakistan. In exchange for large sums of money, they offer people transportation, fake documentation and other resources for a swift departure from the country. </p>
<p>Once they are on the dangerous journey, migrants can fall under the full control of the human smugglers, who subject them to all sorts of exploitation. In the tragic boat accident in the Mediterranean, the women and children were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/18/pakistanis-were-forced-below-deck-on-refugee-boat-in-greece-disaster">forced below deck</a> to make space for more migrants on the old and rusty fishing boat. </p>
<p>The Mediterranean Sea has been a major route for migrants attempting to reach Europe from various countries in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. But due to overcrowded and untrustworthy vessels, inadequate safety measures and harsh weather conditions, many of these endeavours end tragically, with sinking boats and loss of life. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532590/original/file-20230619-19-kr9gwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Greece has declared three days of mourning for the shipwreck that killed at least 78 people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Petros Giannakouris/ AP</span></span>
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<p>Efforts have been made by international organisations and governments to address these issues. They include enhancing border controls and surveillance, implementing rescue operations, providing humanitarian aid, improving legal pathways for migration and addressing the root causes of migration. </p>
<p>However, this might not be enough without addressing the underlying reasons millions are forced to leave their homelands. </p>
<p>While conflicts remain a major push factor, the grim economic situation in many countries continues to be another spur for people to leave their homelands.</p>
<p>With the latest boat tragedy, the government of Pakistan has only acted so far to crack down on people smuggling. However, it is imperative for the government to adopt a more proactive approach by formulating and implementing a comprehensive strategy that effectively addresses this complex problem. </p>
<p>Primarily, the government can prioritise the development of ample job opportunities at home. This can be achieved through enhanced investments in local industries and small scale enterprises, fostering economic growth and curtailing the allure of desperate measures to seek a life elsewhere.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-terrorism-returning-to-pakistan-198995">Is terrorism returning to Pakistan?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zahid Shahab Ahmed is a chief investigator in a research project called 'Religious populism, emotions and political mobilisation’, funded by the Australian Research Council (DP220100829).</span></em></p>Pakistan has launched a crackdown on human traffickers after hundreds of its citizens, mostly women and children, died when a fishing boat sunk off the coast of Greece.Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Senior Research Fellow, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071692023-06-08T20:37:01Z2023-06-08T20:37:01ZOvercrowded trains serve as metaphor for India in Western eyes – but they are a relic of colonialism and capitalism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531013/original/file-20230608-21-vya0qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C573%2C4532%2C3010&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">By the end of the 19th century, railways were being used by millions across India.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/en-gare-des-hommes-montent-jusque-sur-le-toit-des-wagons-news-photo/947835870?adppopup=true">Keystone-France/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A devastating <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/04/what-caused-the-india-train-crash-a-visual-guide-to-what-we-know">rail crash</a> that left <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/08/brothers-breadwinners-fathers-the-lives-lost-in-indias-train-disaster">almost 300 people dead</a> has refocused international attention on the importance of railways in the lives of Indians.</p>
<p>Indeed, to many Western observers, images of men and women crammed into overcrowded cars serve as a metaphor for modern India.</p>
<p>Take, for example, a report by German newspaper Der Spiegel on India’s population surpassing China’s. Published just weeks before the accident in Odisha province on June 2, the now <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/india/india-der-spiegel-racist-cartoon-population-b2327147.html">much-criticized cartoon</a> depicted a shabby Indian train <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65395860">crammed with passengers</a> rushing past a streamlined Chinese train with only two people in it.</p>
<p>Where does this enduring image in the West of Indian railways – and of India – come from? </p>
<p>As a scholar of Indian history and author of 2015 book “<a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/south-asian-history/tracks-change-railways-and-everyday-life-colonial-india?format=HB">Tracks of Change: Railways and Everyday Life in Colonial India</a>,” I believe the answers lie in the gigantic infrastructure projects of the 19th century – forged at the intersection of colonial dictates and capitalist demands.</p>
<h2>A carrier of freight, not people</h2>
<p>Railways remain the backbone of passenger traffic in India, transporting some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/3/25/in-pictures-railways-indias-lifeline-come-to-a-halt">23 million people daily</a>. In the pre-pandemic 2018-19 financial year, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/railways/three-years-on-indian-railways-passenger-traffic-remains-below-pre-pandemic-numbers/articleshow/99458137.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst">7.7 billion passenger</a> journeys in India. In comparison, even after a dramatic post-pandemic increase, airline passenger traffic was <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/domestic-airlines-flew-123m-passengers-in-2022-dgca/articleshow/97148274.cms?from=mdr">123.2 million in 2022</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People are seen on a platform and hanging out of doorways on a train car." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531016/original/file-20230608-19-suqccx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">People board an overcrowded train at a railway station on the outskirts of New Delhi, India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-board-an-overcrowded-train-at-a-railway-station-in-news-photo/1252255086?adppopup=true">Kabir Jhangiani/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Yet, when first planned in the 1840s, India’s railways were intended to primarily transport freight and livestock, not people.</p>
<p>Indians were thought <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tracks-of-change/2393A3B1B77CF7F2B23C8C00DDA18442#:%7E:text=Tracks%20of%20Change%20explores%20how,process%20has%20shaped%20India's%20history.">unlikely</a> to become railway passengers by directors of the English East India Co., a merchant monopoly that gradually annexed and administered large parts of India under U.K. crown control.</p>
<p>Many people at the time disagreed that Indians were immobile people, however, pointing out that the country had a long history of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/india-in-the-world-economy/9079E07A2697FB6A122BEBFE3CC6FA13">global trade</a> across vast oceanic networks.</p>
<p>However, early colonial railway policy was driven by pervasive <a href="https://theconversation.com/orientalism-edward-saids-groundbreaking-book-explained-197429">Orientalist</a> imaginings of a people rendered immobile by poverty, living in isolated villages and constrained by religious restrictions prohibiting travel.</p>
<p>The trope <a href="https://marxists.architexturez.net/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.htm">interlocked with colonial thinking</a> that railways would foster greater industrialization which in turn would further a capitalist economy.</p>
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<img alt="A modern high-speed train is seen in a station." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531017/original/file-20230608-19-5m7lin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Vande Bharat Express train as seen in Kolkata, India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vande-bharat-express-train-as-seen-at-howrah-station-in-news-photo/1245840303?adppopup=true">Debarchan Chatterjee/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>They also aligned with the practical needs of a colonial trading monopoly which needed raw materials for English industries, such as cotton, to be moved swiftly and efficiently from India’s interiors to port towns, from where they could be shipped.</p>
<h2>Relegated to cheap seats</h2>
<p>To <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tracks-of-change/2393A3B1B77CF7F2B23C8C00DDA18442#:%7E:text=Tracks%20of%20Change%20explores%20how,process%20has%20shaped%20India's%20history.">induce the “natives</a>,” as the British often referred to their colonial subjects, to use railways, the colonial government pitched low fares, especially in third-class cars – the lowest and cheapest category of rail travel.</p>
<p>The decision to introduce lower fares seems at odds with the profit-driven aims of a capitalist venture, with money raised by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2113695">private companies</a> incorporated in the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>However, British capitalists and shareholders in these private ventures did not have to fear for their profits, which were underwritten by the Indian taxpayer. The colonial government of India guaranteed these companies a 5% annual return on their investment whether or not the venture turned a profit. </p>
<p>Despite the doubters, the new Indian <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tracks-of-change/2393A3B1B77CF7F2B23C8C00DDA18442#:%7E:text=Tracks%20of%20Change%20explores%20how,process%20has%20shaped%20India's%20history.">railways attracted an increasing number of passengers</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/south-asian-history/tracks-change-railways-and-everyday-life-colonial-india?format=HB">half-million passengers recorded</a> in 1854 when tracks became operational increased to 26 million in 1875. By 1900, annual passenger figures stood at 175 million and then almost trebled to 520 million by 1919-20. By the time of the partition of India in 1947 it had risen to more than 1 billion passenger journeys annually. Indeed, images of overcrowded trains came to epitomize the upheaval of partition, with the rail system used to carry swaths of uprooted peoples across the soon-to-be Pakistan-India border.</p>
<p>Third-class passengers, overwhelmingly Indians, comprised almost 90% of this traffic.</p>
<p>These escalating figures did not, however, generate a lowering of fares. Nor did they result in any substantial improvements in the conditions of overcrowded, unsanitary third-class travel.</p>
<p>Instead, railway companies sought “the greatest economy of space and load,” as <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/south-asian-history/tracks-change-railways-and-everyday-life-colonial-india?format=HB">one rail manager put it</a>. Inadequate rolling stock, much of it imported, exacerbated matters.</p>
<h2>A tool for ‘self-composure’</h2>
<p>The generally British railway managers seemed disinclined to remedy systematic overcrowding, which included transporting passengers in wagons meant for livestock. Rather, they insisted that such overcrowding was caused by the peculiar habits and inclinations of Indian passengers: their alleged abhorrence of empty carriages and their inclination to follow one another “like sheep” into crowded carriages.</p>
<p>These attributes were soon rendered into a more public narrative, especially among Western mindsets. Journalist H. Sutherland Stark, writing for the industry publication <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tracks-of-change/2393A3B1B77CF7F2B23C8C00DDA18442#:%7E:text=Tracks%20of%20Change%20explores%20how,process%20has%20shaped%20India's%20history.">Indian State Railways Magazine</a> in 1929, stated that though “unversed” in railway administration and traffic control, he knew railway facilities were not the problem. Rather, Indian passengers lacked the mental preparedness, “self-possession” and “method” necessary to travel like “sane human beings.”</p>
<p>Stark suggested passenger education as a solution to the perceived problem, making railway travel a tool for “self-composure and mass orderliness.” He was not the only one to suggest a congruence between rational railway travel and reasonable public behavior. In the 1910s, though condemning railway management for perpetuating the indignities that third-class passengers faced, the nationalist leader <a href="https://www.gandhimedia.org/read_more/writings/books/books_by_gandhi/english/WRBOMGEN0510_rs.pdf">Mahatma Gandhi</a> also suggested educating railway passengers as a means to create a civic body of citizens.</p>
<h2>A continuing metaphor</h2>
<p>More than a century later, this depiction endures, though, ironically, it now serves as a foil to understanding contemporary India. In a piece published in <a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/318482381/DBAA8BBEEC8045B3PQ/1?accountid=14605&forcedol=true">The New York Times</a> on March 12, 2005, the author lauded the then-new Delhi metro, emphasizing that it had “none of the chaotic squalor of hawkers and beggars that characterizes mainline railroads in India, nor do desperate travelers hang from the sides of the trains.”</p>
<p>As the debate rages on whether safety has taken a back seat to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/03/modi-has-spent-billions-modernising-indias-trains-but-safety-is-biggest-need">glossy modernization projects</a>” in India – early analyses suggest <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65801807">signaling failure</a> might have caused June 2, 2023, accident – railways continue to represent India’s history.</p>
<p>In the heyday of empire, they were deemed the technology through which Britain would drag India into capitalist modernity. In 1947, they became a leitmotif for the trauma of the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32195/chapter-abstract/268346962?redirectedFrom=fulltext">partition</a> that accompanied the independence of India and Pakistan. As the coverage of Odisha accident reminds us, it continues to be a metaphor in the West for evaluating contemporary India.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ritika Prasad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A deadly crash in India that claimed the lives of around 300 people has refocused international attention on the importance of railways in the country.Ritika Prasad, Associate Professor of History, University of North Carolina – CharlotteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.