tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/soft-power-8119/articlesSoft power – The Conversation2024-03-11T20:05:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253042024-03-11T20:05:54Z2024-03-11T20:05:54ZAs ‘Oppenheimer’ triumphs at the Oscars, we should ask how historical films frame our shared future<p><a href="https://variety.com/2024/film/news/christopher-nolan-oppenheimer-post-franchise-movie-era-1235894688/">Box office</a> receipts for Christopher Nolan’s <em>Oppenheimer</em> had already approached the billion-dollar mark worldwide before the 2024 Oscars ceremony.</p>
<p>To this financial success, along with film awards for Best Director, Cinematography, Editing, Sound, Best Actor and Best Supporting Actor, <em>Oppenheimer</em> garnered Nolan his first Academy Award for Best Picture. </p>
<p>In larger Academy Award history, this raises the tally for historical film wins to 52 over 96 competitions, according to research by <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/historical-film-9781847884978">film scholar Jonathan Stubbs</a> and records at the <a href="https://www.oscars.org/oscars/ceremonies">Oscars website</a>. There is a reason why people call big-budget historical <a href="https://collider.com/oscar-bait-movies/">films “Oscar bait</a>.” </p>
<p>The glossy spectacle of this genre often brings attention to its makers. And yet, as I argue in my new book, <em><a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/making-history-move/9781978829770">Making History Move: Five Principles of the Historical Film</a></em>,
because the genre has such an outsized effect on spectators and their sense of historical reality, it’s important to think about and understand how historical films are constructed.</p>
<p>With <em>Oppenheimer</em> having received so much commercial, critical and Academy success, we have an opportunity to think about critical criteria for viewing historical film — and what we are owed by historical filmmakers. </p>
<h2>Highly influential medium</h2>
<p>This genre of film represents much more than a bold quest to win the most sought-after prize at the most celebrated labour union awards in history. These films look to the past to offer us a story and argument in an effort to see ourselves in the present — and to make decisions toward the future. </p>
<p>The genre combines a bookish status, conveying data and the sense of learning about the real world. Facts are served up with a wallop of emotion, excitement, adventure, terror and tears, to large and diverse audiences. </p>
<p>Although far from the most trusted medium for history, a recent <a href="https://www.historians.org/history-culture-survey">large-scale survey</a> of Americans published by the American Historical Association found that historical documentaries and films are the top two sources for information about the past for the public.</p>
<p>Unlike with pure fiction, when we watch a historical film (such as other 2024 Best Picture nominees, <em>The Zone of Interest</em> and <em>Killers of the Flower Moon</em>) we have the sense that we are seeing and hearing the past as we learn details about historical people and events. </p>
<p>These films speak to shared intergenerational and foundational experiences and legacies. We interpret historical films in ways that feel personal. </p>
<h2>Partisan cultural bubbles</h2>
<p>We are well into the experiment of the internet age when social media platforms sort people into tribes. </p>
<p>In the words of Renée DiResta, a researcher at the Stanford Internet Observatory, people are living in discrete spheres operating with distinct media, norms and frameworks of facts — their own <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/opinion/political-reality-algorithms.html">“bespoke realities</a>.”
These information silos spawn political convictions and perspectives that reinforce separate interpretations of present and past. </p>
<p>The result creates multiverses of meaning. We exist in partisan cultural bubbles, abandoning the tussle over an objective sense of the past in favour of
ever-expanding and contradictory subjective narratives. </p>
<p>As this happens, mass media platforms, like feature films, gain precedence. They cross boundaries impermeable to history books, museums, university lectures and social networks, speaking to a shared sense of identity at vast communal scales.</p>
<h2>Just a movie?</h2>
<p>Our ability to keep what we are watching at a critical distance is less robust than we may assume. Neuroscience illuminates a central aspect of film’s power to captivate, enchant and convince. </p>
<p>As professor of psychological and brain science Jeffrey Zacks writes in his book <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/flicker-9780199982875?q=jeff%20zacks&lang=en&cc=ca"><em>Flicker: Your Brain on the Movies</em></a>, our brains operate by building neural models to understand our direct experience: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[W]hether we experience events in real life, watch them in a movie or hear about them in a story, we build perceptual and memory representations in the same format [in our brains].” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He further explains that “it does not take extra work to put together experiences from a film with experiences from our lives to draw inferences. On the contrary, what takes extra work is to keep these different event representations separate.”</p>
<p>Now consider what happens when we make models of the past that we code as historical and non-fiction.</p>
<h2>5 principles of historical films</h2>
<p>For these reasons it is critical that we engage these films as more than mere diversion and amusement. Drawing on philosophy of history, literary and film theory, I have isolated five key principles to grasp and understand their construction, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>narration, the stories they choose to tell and how they tell them;</p></li>
<li><p>evidence, the sources and use of data that represents the past;</p></li>
<li><p>reflexivity, the use of <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/engaging-the-past/9780231165754">rupture techniques</a> that pull the audience out of their immersion in the story, reminding them of the structuring process of history;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674008212">foreignness</a>, the extent to which a film shows the richness of differences in ideas, beliefs, and material realities of the past, rather than creating a pantomime of contemporary people in fancy dress;</p></li>
<li><p>plurality, whether a film presents us a range or new perspectives on the meaning of events through their selection of people as characters.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These principles help us consider the creation, role and impact of historical films. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/visiting-the-trinity-site-featured-in-oppenheimer-is-a-sobering-reminder-of-the-horror-of-nuclear-weapons-210248">Visiting the Trinity Site featured in 'Oppenheimer' is a sobering reminder of the horror of nuclear weapons</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>About envisioning futures</h2>
<p>What makes historical films so compelling and so difficult is they have to fictionalize and imagine narratives around real people and events.</p>
<p>Filmmakers working with realities of the past are charged with making an interpretation of historical data — and a judgment about what it means to us today, in a way that engages and entertains us as spectators. </p>
<p>To be true to that contract, such films should not simply make things up. They need to strive for accuracy and objectivity, while performing a deft sleight of hand to enthrall and captivate. </p>
<p>On top of box office success and critical success, <em>Oppenheimer</em> does an impressive job of translating <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/lifestyle/shopping/oppenheimer-movie-book-read-american-prometheus-online-1235539040/">biographical source material</a> into an engaging and thought-provoking feature film. As such, this functions as a clarion call in the present, <a href="https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/annie-lennox-stars-sign-open-letter-warning-nuclear-threat-1235623118">sparking real questions about the meaning of the nuclear age today</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kim Nelson receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and Canadian Heritage under their Initiative for Digital Citizen Research.</span></em></p>The success of ‘Oppenheimer’ at the Academy Awards presents an opportunity to think about critical criteria for viewing historical film — and what we are owed by historical filmmakers.Kim Nelson, Associate Professor. Cinema Arts, School of Creative Arts, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137682023-11-05T19:13:10Z2023-11-05T19:13:10ZHow are global powers engaging with the Pacific? And who is most effective? These 5 maps provide a glimpse<p>After years of neglect, there’s a reason why Pacific leaders now describe the Pacific Islands’ geopolitical landscape as “<a href="https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/">crowded and complex</a>”. Many democratic powers have recently refocused their attention on the region, including Australia, the United States, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom and Japan. </p>
<p>One after another, they are rolling out big-ticket initiatives to improve their reputations and relationships in the region. While some of these projects make good developmental sense – for instance, Australia’s A$4 billion <a href="https://www.aiffp.gov.au/">infrastructure financing agency for the region</a> (although <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/pacific-aid-map-2023-key-findings-report">questions are being asked</a> about debt sustainability, given how quickly it has ramped up) – the rationale for others is <a href="https://devpolicy.org/australia-buys-digicel-pacific-pngs-mobile-monopoly-20211026/">less clear</a>. </p>
<p>But what all these initiatives have in common is that they are being formulated with a sense of urgency – as a reaction to Chinese offers of assistance. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>As the Pacific Islands Forum is holding its annual summit this week, we’ve asked experts on the Pacific to examine the great power competition in the region. How are countries like the US, Australia, China and others attempting to wield power and influence in the Pacific? And how effective has it been? This is the first story in a four-piece series.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>There’s a risk to all this urgent energy: it’s difficult to know who is doing what, and where. To help meet this challenge, our <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/our-research/security-in-the-pacific-islands/statecraftiness">Statecraftiness mapping project</a> shows how all of these outside powers are seeking to engage with and influence the region. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/b047ee4be82e47a8a6f3e580cf688d40">StoryMap</a> shows that the US, Australia and their partners do a lot in the region. Given the depth of this engagement, they should now shift their priorities from reacting to every Chinese announcement towards a more considered approach. This could better anticipate and respond to their interests and those of Pacific Island countries. </p>
<p>There are signs they are beginning to do this: <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/joint-statement-announcement-partners-blue-pacific-initiative">the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative</a> announced in 2022 by the US, Australia and other partners may help to improve the coordination of their assistance. </p>
<p>Based on our analysis, we make five recommendations about how these partners could further implement proactive “statecraft” in the region.</p>
<h2>1. Understand that all influence is relative</h2>
<p>In 2018, a rumour of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/11/baseless-rumours-why-talk-of-a-chinese-military-installation-in-vanuatu-misses-the-point">potential Chinese military base in Vanuatu</a> triggered a wave of concern in Western capitals. Four years later, news of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/20/the-deal-that-shocked-the-world-inside-the-china-solomons-security-pact">security agreement</a> between China and Solomon Islands amplified these <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/chinas-search-permanent-military-presence-pacific-islands">anxieties</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Scroll down the images to show military installation locations.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/23f232279d474967bad0289e03554136?&forcemobile" width="100%" height="600px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>But despite all the discussion about a potential Chinese military presence in the region, what is often overlooked is the existing presence of Australian, American and French forces (although such militarisation is <a href="https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/8484/wp-20231-navigating-flexible-responsive-and-respectful">contested by many islanders</a>).</p>
<p>Similarly, there are concerns the China-Solomon Islands agreement could pave the way for a Chinese police presence in the region. This, too, led to reactive policymaking. After China provided police training in Solomon Islands, Australia countered by donating rifles and police vehicles, and then China <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-04/china-to-gift-solomon-islands-police-tucks-vehicles/101614464">donated water cannons, motorbikes and vehicles</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Scroll down the map to reveal policing assistance in the region.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/5606ec7567964d82aa7a1ac85ece5b72?&forcemobile" width="100%" height="600px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>But our StoryMap shows that China’s rather nascent policing activities are nowhere near as broad-reaching as the assistance provided by Australia and New Zealand. </p>
<h2>2. Acknowledge the difference between quantity and quality</h2>
<p>As our StoryMap below shows, Australia is the only partner state with diplomatic posts in all Pacific island countries, followed closely by New Zealand. The US, Japan, France, Taiwan, India and Indonesia also have a diplomatic presence, and others are looking to open embassies.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Scroll down the timeline to show diplomatic posts in the region.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/e8684000c4f54a248c182e721ad7aad0?&forcemobile" width="100%" height="600px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>But the number of diplomatic posts does not necessarily equate to <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/what-is-statecraft-episode-1/id1675420291?i=1000602575764">quality or effectiveness</a>. This is because individuals, not policies, are the <a href="https://theconversation.com/penny-wong-said-this-week-national-power-comes-from-our-people-are-we-ignoring-this-most-vital-resource-203145">most important determinants</a> of whether a country’s “statecraft” efforts succeed. </p>
<p>And diplomatic presence is not always reciprocated. Niue, Tuvalu, Micronesia, Cook Islands, Palau and Kiribati <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/ua/media/683/ua30631-stretton-centre-paper-3-digital_0.pdf">do not have diplomatic missions in Australia</a>. Instead, they have missions in cities where international institutions are, such as New York and Geneva. This reflects how Pacific countries prioritise where they place their limited number of diplomats. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Scroll down the timeline to show diplomatic visits.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/13e34580ab06464aac11dfca72e87576?forceMobile" width="100%" height="600px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>High-level visits to the Pacific by foreign leaders and officials have also increased dramatically in the past 18 months. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, French President Emmanuel Macron, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, British Foreign Minister James Cleverly and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have all made appearances. </p>
<p>But, again, the quantity of diplomatic engagement does not necessarily lead to quality relationships, which are “<a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/relationships-are-the-enduring-currency-of-influence-for-the-pacific-islands/">the enduring currency of influence</a>” in the Pacific.</p>
<p>Social media, for instance, has greater reach and can impact countries’ <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nejo.12353">diplomatic negotiations</a> and shape their influence outside formal meetings. </p>
<p>To try to understand the effectiveness of social media as a diplomatic tool, we analysed social media followings of diplomatic missions in the region. As expected, countries with close relationships tended to have high numbers of followers.</p>
<hr>
<p><iframe id="isYGU" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/isYGU/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<hr>
<p>However, social media engagement does not necessarily indicate that people agree with – or even think favourably of – a country. For example, the large following of the US embassy in Papua New Guinea could be due to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/png-activists-speak-out-after-us-embassy-raises-pride-flag/102468388">recent controversies</a> involving the mission there.</p>
<p>Some diplomatic missions also pay for extended social media reach through boosted posts. We also found examples of automated bots commenting on posts. </p>
<h2>3. Focus on long-term, rather than short-term, engagement</h2>
<p>The value of long-term <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629823001099">engagement</a> was illustrated in the US response to the Solomon Islands-China security agreement.</p>
<p>Senior US officials immediately flew to Honiara, without having had a diplomatic presence there for 29 years. Sudden, overtly self-serving engagement is <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s-engagement-in-micronesia-lessons-from-australia-and-new-zealand/">seldom effective</a>. </p>
<p>Soft power comes in many forms, such as media broadcasts, <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/ua/media/681/ua30629-stretton-centre-paper-2-digital.pdf">scholarships</a>, church networks, sports tournaments, language training and cultural exchanges. Many of these are often overlooked by analysts, who tend to focus on more quantifiable tools of “statecraft”, such as <a href="https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/">aid, loans</a>, infrastructure projects and security assistance. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Scroll down and click on scholarship initiatives to show locations.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/889d5b5e168b4c52a9da51f29c616caa?forceMobile" width="100%" height="600px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>But this misses the long-term value of soft power initiatives. These have the potential to shape the beliefs, attitudes and opinions of communities in ways that are harder to immediately identify, but often more influential. </p>
<h2>4. Distinguish between announcement and implementation</h2>
<p>In 2020, news broke that China had agreed to a A$204 million deal with Papua New Guinea to establish a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/27/chinese-fishing-plant-in-torres-strait-raises-alarm-for-australian-industry-and-islanders">fishery industrial park</a> project on Daru Island. </p>
<p>Concerned the facility would <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-to-build-200-million-fishery-project-on-australias-doorstep/">give China a foothold</a> only a few kilometres from its shores, Australia quickly signed a A$30 million agreement with PNG for an “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/australia-and-png-sign-agreement-for-remote-daru/13337030">economic empowerment program</a>” on Daru. </p>
<p>Since 2020, there has been no substantive progress on the Chinese project. But it’s unlikely Australia’s reaction influenced this. While the pandemic may have delayed things, the more plausible explanation is that the project was an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/why-chinas-island-city-in-papua-new-guinea-is-a-mirage/">“outlandishly ambitious” “mirage” that will “never eventuate”</a>.</p>
<p>Any development initiative on Daru Island — long a neglected region — is welcome. But the speed of Australia’s reaction exemplified how the significance of such an announcement can be misinterpreted. </p>
<h2>5. Make sure the right country gets the credit</h2>
<p>The US, Australia and its partners frequently subcontract the delivery of their programs in the Pacific to nongovernmental organisations and private contractors. Even Australian policing and justice assistance is increasingly <a href="https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/292288/4/The%20Vanuatu-Australia%20Policing%20and%20Justice%20Services%20Study_Judy%20Putt_Sinclair%20Dinnen_Department%20of%20Pacific%20Affairs_Research%20Report.pdf">coordinated by private contractors</a>. </p>
<p>But as some Pacific islanders have told us, with so much American and Australian assistance provided by other organisations, it’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct33ny">often unclear</a> where it comes from. </p>
<p>And sometimes credit goes to the wrong party. Many infrastructure projects are funded by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank. Though much of the bank’s funding comes from Australia (<a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/australia-fact-sheet">A$11.31 billion</a>) and the US (<a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27810/usa-2022.pdf">US$26.9 billion</a>), the projects themselves are often built by Chinese state-owned enterprises.</p>
<p>So, China receives the credit – and the reputational and relationship boosts that come with it.</p>
<p>More proactive statecraft can help in this regard. But whether these influence attempts succeed <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/ua/media/665/statecraftiness.pdf">will be determined by Pacific countries</a> themselves. And these countries aren’t passive: they are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2023.2253377">attempting to influence</a> their <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/ua/media/683/ua30631-stretton-centre-paper-3-digital_0.pdf">partners in return</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence. This activity is supported by the Australian Government through a grant by the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henrietta McNeill receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Rose is a research associate at the University of Adelaide working on a project that is funded by the Australian Department of Defense.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Tidwell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a crowded region, it’s hard to know who is doing what, and where. Effective statecraft, though, is not always measured by quantity over quality.Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of AdelaideAlan Tidwell, Director, Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, Georgetown UniversityHenrietta McNeill, PhD candidate, Australian National UniversityMichael Rose, Research Associate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090882023-07-06T20:50:54Z2023-07-06T20:50:54ZWhat Vietnam’s ban of the Barbie movie tells us about China’s politics of persuasion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536099/original/file-20230706-16210-k7hkwr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4874%2C3378&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Actor Margot Robbie blows out a candle on the cake to celebrate her birthday during the pink carpet event for the movie 'Barbie' in Seoul, South Korea, in July 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Barbie has always had some degree of notoriety. She is at once <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/cultural-history-barbie-180982115/">a symbol of female empowerment, ridicule and consumerism</a>. People might suspect that the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/barbie-movie-vietnam-china-ninedash-df593a95b5826b03429d28ab855081a8">ban of the <em>Barbie</em> movie by the Vietnamese government</a> is motivated by these concerns. Instead, international political intrigue provides a better explanation. </p>
<p>Territorial disputes run deep in Southeast Asia, having both real and symbolic value. Claims by both Korea and Japan of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/islands-ire-south-korea-japan-dispute">the Dokdo (Takeshima) Islands are more than three centuries old</a>, while Japan, Taiwan and China each claim ownership of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/asia/japan-china-senkaku-islands-ships-intl-hnk-mic-ml/index.html">the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands</a>.</p>
<p>Amid the frothy <em>Barbie</em> plot, the attentive viewer might notice a map depicting a broad area claimed by China in international waters that <a href="http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/SOUTHCHINASEA-RULING/010020QR1SG/index.html">buffer the Philippines, Malaysia/Indonesia, Vietnam and China</a>. The Chinese claim of the vast swath of territory, known as the “nine-dash line” because this symbol demarcates China’s claims in the region, ignores both international law and the counterclaims of other countries.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1677020203819884546"}"></div></p>
<p>One map in one movie might seem innocuous. But the Chinese Communist Party revels in the persuasive power of pop culture, going so far as to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/">purchase radio stations to broadcast its messages in other countries</a>. </p>
<h2>Appropriating culture</h2>
<p>While critical viewers might discount the <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/china-propaganda-censorship-control/">overt propaganda</a> of many Chinese movies, they are likely less aware of the <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Display/Article/3267338/mapping-chinese-influence-in-hollywood">increasing influence China has in Hollywood</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond movies, China has made more overt claims to the cultures of other countries. Korea is an example. </p>
<p>China has claimed traditional Korean songs (<em>arirang</em>), <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3166389/hanbok-years-kimchi-china-denies-cultural-appropriation-over">dress (<em>hanbok</em>)</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/01/stealing-our-culture-south-koreans-upset-after-china-claims-kimchi-as-its-own">the quintessential culinary staple, <em>kimchi</em></a>. </p>
<p>In the case of kimchi, Chinese <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/pao-cai-v-kimchi-chinese-south-koreans-clash-on-social-media">state media claimed</a> that the International Organization for Standardization’s recognition of <a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/78112.html"><em>pao kai</em></a>, a Chinese fermented vegetable dish, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55129805">extends to kimchi</a>. Yet such assertions ignore international recognition of <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/tradition-of-kimchi-making-in-the-democratic-people-s-republic-of-korea-01063">kimchi-making</a> and <a href="https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FStandards%252FCXS%2B223-2001%252FCXS_223e.pdf">kimchi as uniquely Korean</a>.</p>
<p>Posts on Weibo, China’s popular social media platform, show the hashtag <a href="https://www.koreaboo.com/news/china-south-korea-thief-country-kimchi-hanbok-stolen/">#小偷国# (thief country)</a> when referring to Korean’s cultural products as China’s own.</p>
<p>Online debates over fermented cabbage, dresses and songs might seem trivial. But on a psychological level, <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1991-97016-000">culture and physical territory are central to group identities</a>. The attempted slow erosion of independent cultural identities can pose future threats.</p>
<p>Vietnam’s concerns about a momentary glimpse of a map in a movie must be viewed in these terms. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People in scrubs wearing masks and gloves handle mounds of fermented cabbage with red chilis colouring them red." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536101/original/file-20230706-7970-lnc31a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Employees of a South Korean financial institution make kimchi to donate to needy neighbours at the organization’s headquarters in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2022. Even kimchi has been subject to cultural appropriation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cultures evolve</h2>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/13/china-s-influence-in-south-asia-vulnerabilities-and-resilience-in-four-countries-pub-85552">Imperial China’s former sphere of influence</a> included countries like Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan. Known as the “Middle Kingdom,” it framed itself as a <a href="https://www.chinasource.org/resource-library/blog-entries/from-the-middle-east-to-the-middle-kingdom-7/">parent culture</a>. But this is not how cultural evolution works.</p>
<p>People innovate, ideas are adopted within a group, they spread beyond the boundaries and borders of groups and are adapted by others. The Vietnamese, for example, <a href="https://ethnomed.org/resource/traditional-vietnamese-medicine-historical-perspective-and-current-usage/">developed their own folk medicine</a>, often appropriated by the Chinese as <a href="http://www.joaat.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=57&id=356">“southern medicine (<em>Thuốc Nam</em>).”</a></p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-us-should-pay-attention-to-the-china-south-korea-culture-clash/">By making claims on other cultures in the region, China is attempting to legitimize its influence</a> as it seeks global superpower status.</p>
<p>Understandably, when China makes claims on regional cultural traditions — and territory — <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/south-koreans-are-rethinking-what-china-means-their-nation">its neighbours fear for their autonomy</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A plane flies over a hilly island." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536104/original/file-20230706-21-602cul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Japanese maritime defence plane flies over disputed islands, called the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kyodo News)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Eyeing territory</h2>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party has set its sights on what it calls the South China Sea, ignoring <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html#:%7E:text=BEIJING%20%E2%80%94%20An%20international%20tribunal%20in,waters%20had%20no%20legal%20basis.">a 2016 international ruling</a> on the illegitimacy of its claims to the area.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A combo photo shows an artificial island with just a few structures on it, and the same island almost 25 years later with what appears to be a military base on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473621/original/file-20220712-31833-2bvded.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This combo photo shows the same Chinese structures on an man-made island in February 1999, top, and March 2022 in a disputed area of the South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photos/Aaron Favila)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The party has dedicated considerable effort to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/yes-china-has-the-worlds-largest-navy-that-matters-less-than-you-might-think/">building up a powerful navy</a> and constructing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says">artificial islands atop coral reefs to place military bases</a>.</p>
<p>If not in form, then in spirit, the Chinese government’s actions are similar to Imperial Japan’s notion of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299608405994">“sphere of co-prosperity”</a> in the Pacific from 1931 to 1945. During this time, parts of Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and other countries were subjected to brutal colonial rule.</p>
<p>While an arms build-up is underway, China’s main weapon is its <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/tools-foreign-policy/what-soft-power">soft power</a>, a persuasive approach to international relations that involves the use of economic or cultural influence.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007">Belt and Road Initiative</a> represents an explicit, direct means to influence countries with financial support. Shaping the content of movies presents a more implicit, indirect means that often goes unnoticed.</p>
<h2>Persuasion through media, messages</h2>
<p>A key strategy in persuasion is to flood information ecosystems with desired messages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/344428">If we fail to critically reflect on their content, our acceptance increases</a>. This is the same rationale behind <a href="https://doi.org/10.1362/146934712X13286274424271">product placement</a>.</p>
<p>When presented in ubiquitous media, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.547065/full?source=Snapzu">such as memes</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/caj.1985.22.2.125">or postage stamps</a>, an audience can begin to lose track of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3">the credibility of the source</a>. While a map in a fluffy movie can be discounted, the repeated presentation of images, dialogue and values that support the goals of the Chinese regime is concerning.</p>
<p>Beyond film, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00377990903221905">history textbooks</a> and classrooms are the latest battleground for wars that continue to live in collective memory. Studies of Japanese textbooks, for example, have noted shifts in how the horrific crimes of Imperial Japan, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140802269021">including the Nanjing massacre, are represented</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000485">Publishers appear to engage in self-censorship to ensure a favourable position within the market</a>. </p>
<p>Hollywood also seems to have willingly adopted <a href="https://pen.org/report/made-in-hollywood-censored-by-beijing/">self-censorship</a>, with some <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/general-news/quentin-tarantino-wont-recut-once-a-time-china-1248720/">notable exceptions</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://pen.org/report/made-in-hollywood-censored-by-beijing/">A 2020 PEN America report entitled “Made in Hollywood, Censored in Beijing</a>,” details how Hollywood decision-makers are increasingly making decisions about their films “based on an effort to avoid antagonizing Chinese officials who control whether their films gain access to the booming Chinese market.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-bakery-to-wagashiya-a-textbook-case-of-moral-education-in-japan-75626">From bakery to wagashiya: a textbook case of 'moral education' in Japan</a>
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<h2>The power of pink persuasion</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjb/e2004-00382-7">many movies</a>, <em>Barbie</em> is unlikely to have any lasting impact on society. Its brief moment in the spotlight will likely amuse audiences, but it also adds another small brick to the wall being built by China to expand its influence.</p>
<p>Once the context of cultural and territorial appropriation is appreciated, the action of Vietnam’s National Film Evaluation Council to ban the film shouldn’t be surprising. While a total ban might be excessive, the appearance of the map in the film disregards Vietnam’s autonomy and international agreements.</p>
<p>Hollywood — and other hubs of popular media and social media — are ultimately subject to the demands of <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/feature/movie-theaters-box-office-historical-data-trend-1235354702/">viewers</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/technology/2023/4/15/23683554/twitter-dying-elon-musk-x-company">users</a>. Regulations aimed at preventing Chinese influence won’t be sufficient as they might replicate the kind of censorship seen in China. </p>
<p>Instead, education systems need to teach <a href="https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1046525">media literacy that will help consumers be more critical about the content they’re watching and reading</a>, providing them with an understanding of history and the intellectual tools to challenge persuasion campaigns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Richard Schoenherr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Once the context of cultural and territorial appropriation by China in Southeast Asia are understood, Vietnam’s ban of the Barbie movie isn’t surprising.Jordan Richard Schoenherr, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016792023-03-20T13:03:50Z2023-03-20T13:03:50ZUS-China tensions: how Africa can avoid being caught in a new Cold War<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515740/original/file-20230316-24-i50sjb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) and then U.S Vice President Joe Biden shakes hands in Beijing on December 4, 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lintao Zhang/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s foreign ministry published a 4,000-word analysis entitled <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">US Hegemony and its Perils</a> on 20 February. It’s an indictment of alleged US foreign interference, intimidation and interventions that began 200 years ago. </p>
<p>This was followed by President Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/07/economy/china-two-sessions-xi-jinping-speech-us-challenges-intl-hnk/index.html">accusation</a> at the Communist Party National Congress in March that the US was pursuing an <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/03/07/china-s-xi-condemns-us-led-suppression-of-china_6018440_4.html">unprecedented</a> global policy to contain and suppress Chinese development. </p>
<p>US official reaction to the Chinese accusations has been muted. But the recent US shooting down of an alleged Chinese spy balloon <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-united-states-government-china-antony-blinken-51e49202f2a0a50541cde059934c4cfb">escalated tensions</a>. There are fears that escalating US-Chinese tensions <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">might threaten the independence</a> of African and other nonaligned nations.</p>
<p>This essay seeks to contribute to an overdue debate among Africans about how to avoid being entangled in US-China global rivalry, while maintaining productive partnerships with both nations. It draws on my <a href="https://saiia.org.za/people/john-stremlau/">many years of teaching and research </a>on Africa’s changing international relations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-can-use-great-power-rivalry-to-its-benefit-here-is-how-172662">Africa can use great power rivalry to its benefit: Here is how</a>
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<p>I hope it will encourage other scholars and policy makers across Africa to assess the hegemony statement in the light of their own interests and values. Finally, this essay is intended to encourage debate about what each topic realistically implies for Africa continent. </p>
<p>The topics in the statement are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>political hegemony – (America) throwing its weight around</p></li>
<li><p>military hegemony – wanton use of force</p></li>
<li><p>economic hegemony – looting and exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>technological hegemony – monopoly and suppression</p></li>
<li><p>cultural hegemony – spreading false narratives.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Although Chinese rhetoric is harsh, the initiatives and interactions of China and the US in Africa under each heading illustrate my general belief that their competition in Africa has been – and can be – both peaceful and productive. </p>
<h2>Political hegemony</h2>
<p>China’s indictment ranges from US efforts at hemispheric domination <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/monroe-doctrine-declared">beginning in the early 19th century</a> to fomenting the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Colour-Revolutions-in-the-Former-Soviet-Republics-Successes-and-Failures/Beachain-Polese/p/book/9780415625470">“colour revolutions”</a> – non-violent protests that overthrew autocratic regimes in the three post-Soviet republics Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.</p>
<p>But, China’s vision of the US glosses over the volatility of US <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/iraq-war-vietnam-syndrome-leaders?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Strange%20Case%20of%20Iraq%20Syndrome&utm_content=20230315&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017">domestic politics</a>. Domestic concerns can alter foreign policy, a leader’s ideology, and political and historical circumstances.</p>
<p>Domestically, China too has undergone several political upheavals since the civil war that brought the Communist Party to power in <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/">1949</a>. If China underestimates US domestic swings, US analysts may exaggerate the global impact of Chinese <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-yuen-yuen-ang.html">internal pressures</a>. During my election work for the Carter Centre in Africa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carter-the-american-president-whose-commitment-to-africa-went-beyond-his-term-200745">from 2006-2015</a>, I was impressed by Chinese and American representatives able to seek common ground and learn from each other. </p>
<p>At higher levels of diplomacy, China and the US have used summits with African leaders to set broad guidelines of cooperation in trade and investment, climate, public health, building infrastructure and other areas. These should help African leaders decide areas of comparative advantage for them, in dealing with the two major powers. The <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</a> differs from US initiatives, the most recent being the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/fact-sheet-u-s-africa-partnership-in-promoting-peace-security-and-democratic-governance/">US-Africa Partnership in Promoting Peace, Security, and Democratic Governance</a>. Neither major power appears to me to harbour hegemonic presumptions, as African leaders test their abilities to be productively nonaligned. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-africa-summit-four-things-african-leaders-should-try-to-get-out-of-it-196429">US-Africa summit: four things African leaders should try to get out of it</a>
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<p>These high-level channels to both superpowers might yield more if African regional economic communities and the African Union made more concerted efforts to develop complementary and cumulative strategies for pressing African priorities. Extending the US <a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> to ensure favourable access to US markets is one example. Managing debt obligations for China’s important <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-africa-fits-into-chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative-78016">“Belt and Road”</a> investments in African infrastructure is another. </p>
<h2>Military and economic hegemony</h2>
<p>The differences in what Africa had to contend with during the US-Soviet <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a> and today’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">US-China rivalry</a> are most pronounced in areas of military and economic hegemony.</p>
<p>Neither China nor the US seem poised to use Africa to test political military resolve, as the US and Soviets did when they fought <a href="https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/proxy-wars-during-cold-war-africa/">proxy wars in Angola</a> during the 1970s, for example.</p>
<p>African national and multilateral bodies should lobby China and America to back <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-peacekeeping-africa">African-led peace operations</a> within African states.</p>
<p>Globally, economic interdependence between China and the US will remain <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/12/the-new-normal-in-us-china-relations-hardening-competition-and-deep-interdependence/">vital</a> for sustained growth and prosperity for both nations. Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping are committed to reviving their domestic economies. They both want greater equality, less corruption, and sustained growth. Neither appears to want or need to foment conflicts in Africa.</p>
<p>African governments rightly pursue support from both China and the US for regional integration and cooperation, such as the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>. Greater Chinese and US economic engagement in response to African collective appeals could also become a confidence building measure between China and the US. This rarely happened during the Cold War. Back then, the US was aligned with European colonial powers and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Soviets <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">backed liberation forces</a>. Today, such polarisation doesn’t exist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219">Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses</a>
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<p>The Chinese statement on US hegemony rightly notes the US is plagued by <a href="https://time.com/guns-in-america/">domestic violence</a> and has a history of failures in military interventions. [<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-use-and-abuse-of-military-force/">US analysts acknowledge</a>] this. </p>
<p>But US domestic resistance to new foreign military adventures <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/new-poll-shows-public-overwhelmingly-opposed-to-endless-us-military-interventions/">became bipartisan and popular for the past decade</a>. </p>
<p>African nations should hold America and China to account for their avowed commitments to respecting core <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN principles</a> of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Equally, they must hold Russia to account for blatantly violating those principles <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-biden-eu-when-diplomacy-fails/">by invading Ukraine</a>.</p>
<h2>Technological hegemony</h2>
<p>Benefits and risks of new technologies are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/emerging-technologies-and-the-future-of-work-in-africa/">well known</a>. Communication, data retrieval and collection, and artificial intelligence bring both <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-promises-and-perils-of-africas-digital-revolution/">promise and peril</a> that Africa must navigate carefully. This is becoming all the more pressing as progress in artificial intelligence <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/how-do-ai-models-like-gpt-4-work-and-how-can-you-start-using-it">accelerates</a>. Neither China nor the US need to be hegemonic in making available technologies that spur Africa’s development. </p>
<p>More issues of contention need to be resolved with the help of scientists and scholars from China, US, and Africa. The availability of Huawei 5G is a <a>particularly contentious issue</a>. Perhaps interested scientists and members of the <a href="https://arua.org.za/about/#:%7E:text=The%20African%20Research%20Universities%20Alliance%20(ARUA)%20was%20inaugurated%20in%20Dakar,but%20with%20a%20common%20vision">African Research Universities Alliance</a> could work with their Chinese and US counterparts to establish guidelines and mediation capabilities. </p>
<h2>Cultural hegemony</h2>
<p>US crimes against Africans began in earnest in <a href="https://time.com/5653369/august-1619-jamestown-history/">1619</a> with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-west-is-morally-bound-to-offer-reparations-for-slavery-153544">trans-Atlantic slave trade</a>. Its sediments persist <a href="https://blacklivesmatter.com/">today</a>. </p>
<p>But? The African diaspora has become a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/ideas/why-are-blacks-democrats">key political constituency</a> of the Democratic Party. It is a fast growing <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/facts-about-the-us-black-population/#:%7E:text=In%202021%2C%20there%20were%20an,Black%20Americans%20are%20div">demographic</a>. In music, sports, arts, these Americans are invaluable conveyors of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africa-is-americas-greatest-geopolitical-opportunity-does-the-us-know-it/">soft power in Africa</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-china-us-rivalry-is-not-a-new-cold-war-it-is-way-more-complex-and-could-last-much-longer-144912">The China-US rivalry is not a new Cold War. It is way more complex and could last much longer</a>
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<p>China does not have similar ties with Africa. But, it has recently become more active culturally across the continent, as evident in its network of <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/26/c_1310334064.htm#:%7E:text=61%20Confucius%20Institutes%2C%2048%20Confucius%20Classrooms%20established%20in%20Africa%3A%20white%20paper,-Source%3A%20Xinhua%7C%202021">Confucius Institutes</a>. China has also become the biggest donor of <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2020112410303875">foreign scholarships</a>, enabling future African leaders to study in China. Graduates enrich African universities and, interacting with graduates of US institutions of higher education, represent potential channels to explore options for three way, useful collaboration in their fields of applied research. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>This essay reflects my belief in the value and prospects for greater African agency in response to rising tensions between China and America. I have used China’s indictment of alleged US hegemony only to debunk fear of Africa becoming a pawn in another Cold War. There is no evidence I have seen to suggest that will happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are fears that escalating US-Chinese tensions could threaten the independence of African and other nonaligned nations.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984302023-02-01T12:36:54Z2023-02-01T12:36:54ZSouth Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa’s foreign policy explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507115/original/file-20230130-6879-11w5zo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>January was a busy diplomatic month for South Africa. The country <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russias-lavrov-visits-ally-south-africa-amid-western-rivalry-2023-01-23/">hosted</a> Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and US treasury secretary <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-treasury-secretary-yellen-meet-president-ramaphosa-south-africa-trip-2023-01-24/">Janet Yellen</a>. Josep Borrell, vice-president of the European Commission, was also <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/media-advisory-high-representative-josep-borrell-travels-south-africa-and-botswana_en">in town</a>.</p>
<p>The biggest talking point, though, has been Lavrov’s visit, which met with criticism in the west. Similarly, the South African-Russian-Chinese joint maritime exercise, <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/sandf-on-ex-mosi/">Operation Mosi</a>, scheduled for February off the South African Indian Ocean coast. Critics have slammed South Africa’s hosting of the war games in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/">in February 2022</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa has been reticent to criticise Russia openly for invading Ukraine. The country <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">abstained during each vote</a> criticising Russia at the United Nations. Some have read this as tacit support of Russia.</p>
<p>The visits and South Africa’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put the spotlight on the country’s foreign policy.</p>
<p>I follow, study and have published extensively on South Africa’s foreign policy. In a recent publication, <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">Ramaphosa and a New Dawn for South African Foreign Policy</a>, my co-editors and I point out that South Africa’s voting pattern in these instances should be read in the context of its <a href="https://pmg.org.za/briefing/28596/">declared foreign policy</a> under the stewardship of President Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>Like his predecessors, Ramaphosa’s policy encompasses at least five principles:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>pan-Africanism </p></li>
<li><p>South-South solidarity </p></li>
<li><p>non-alignment </p></li>
<li><p>independence </p></li>
<li><p>progressive internationalism. The governing ANC <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/anc-npc-discussion-document-on-foreign-policy">defines</a> this as</p></li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>an approach to global relations anchored in the pursuit of global solidarity, social justice, common development and human security, etc. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Evolution of South Africa’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>In the era of Nelson Mandela, the first president of democratic South Africa, the country, once a pariah state, returned to the international community. Under him, the country saw a significant increase in its <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC88112">bilateral and multilateral relations</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">History may explain South Africa's refusal to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine</a>
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<p>It enjoyed global goodwill and Mandela was recognised for his <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-russian-visit-says-about-south-africas-commitment-to-human-rights-in-the-world-188993">outspoken views</a> on international human rights abuses. His involvement in conflict resolution efforts in, for example, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/22/mandela-indonesia-and-liberation-timor-leste.html">Timor Leste</a> (East Timor) and Africa also received <a href="https://www.un.org/en/exhibits/page/building-legacy-nelson-mandela">international acclaim</a>. The UN declared 18 July <a href="https://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/">Nelson Mandela International Day</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s tenure was followed by the aspirational era of President Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="https://journals.co.za/journal/aa.afren">African renaissance</a>. Mbeki’s foreign policy aspired to reposition Africa as a global force as well as to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330614094_Mbeki_on_African_Renaissance_a_vehicle_for_Africa_development">rekindle</a> pan-Africanism and African unity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man wearing a suit and tie shakes hands with a woman wearing a dress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, (left), with South African foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, in Pretoria on 23 January 23.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phill Magakoe/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26976626#metadata_info_tab_contents">Jacob Zuma’s era</a> could be described as indigenisation of South Africa’s foreign policy, driven by the values of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-archbishop-tutus-ubuntu-credo-teaches-the-world-about-justice-and-harmony-84730">ubuntu</a> (humanness). In giving effect to ubuntu – equality, peace and cooperation – as a foreign policy principle, South Africa gravitated towards the global south, rather than just Africa. Yet the continent remained a focus of South Africa’s foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">foreign policy</a> under President Cyril Ramaphosa has shifted to a strong emphasis on economic diplomacy. This is joined by a commitment to <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/National-Policy-Conference-2017-International-Relations.pdf">“progressive internationalism”</a>.</p>
<p>Progressive internationalism formed the basis for South Africa’s vocal position on UN reform, global equity and ending the dominance of the global north. The global north could view this as challenging to its hegemonic power and dominance in the UN. </p>
<p>This has challenged South Africa’s declared foreign policy principles. It maintains strong economic and political relations with the global north. But it also maintains strong relations with the global south (including Cuba, Venezuela and Russia). For this, it has been <a href="https://gga.org/south-africas-foreign-policy-decisions-ambiguous-or-misunderstood/#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%20has%20been%20criticised,means%20deployment%20is%20more%20rapid">criticised</a> by the west.</p>
<p>South Africa’s quest for global status in line with its declared foreign policy principles continues under Ramaphosa. It has adopted several roles to achieve this: balancer, spoiler and good international citizenship. </p>
<p>As a balancer, it has attempted to rationalise its relations with both the north and south in accordance with the principles of non-alignment and independence. As a spoiler, it has failed to condemn, for example, China for its poor human rights record, claiming it is an internal Chinese matter. This could be read as an expression of its south-south solidarity with China. Its role as a good international citizen has made it an approachable international actor. It has promoted the rule of international law and upholding international norms. This speaks to its progressive internationalism principle.</p>
<h2>At home and abroad</h2>
<p>The Ramaphosa era set off in 2018 with less emphasis on foreign policy. But by the time the COVID pandemic broke out <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30211-7/fulltext">in December 2019</a>, his foreign policy really came to the fore as he led both the South African and African pandemic responses.</p>
<p>South Africa has been attempting to capitalise on the geostrategic changes in the balance of forces on the world stage. Blatant realpolitik has returned. During the past year, for example, the country has conducted joint multilateral military exercises with several states, most notably with France (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/ex-oxide-2022-will-be-west-coast-based/">Operation Oxide</a>), a permanent member of the UN Security Council.</p>
<p>South Africa’s soft diplomacy has <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-09-22-jerusalemadancechallenge-south-africas-display-of-soft-power-amid-covid-19/">made some inroads</a> at UN agencies and through its cultural diplomacy. But this has not necessarily resulted in material gains – such as more leadership in multilateral organisations.</p>
<p>Moreover, its gravitation towards strong non-western military powers such as Russia, China and India has met with western disappointment. Its foreign policy position of solidarity, independence, non-alignment and <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-african-heads-mission-conference-7-apr-2022-0000">progressive internationalism</a> has not translated into material foreign policy benefits either, such as increased foreign direct investment as envisaged by Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-african-heads-mission-conference-7-apr-2022-0000">economic diplomacy</a>.</p>
<p>Trade with states such as China, Turkey, Russia and India has <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/06/20/cyril-ramaphosa-brics-partnership-has-great-value-for-south-africa">increased</a>. But it is not enough as the country requires massive investment to update infrastructure and start new development projects in line with Ramaphosa’s vision of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-dawn-should-be-built-on-evidence-based-policy-118129">“new dawn” </a> for South Africa.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man and a woman smile for the camera while sitting. Miniature South African and America flags are on the table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African finance minister, Enoch Godongwana, meets his American counterpart, Janet Yellen, in Pretoria on 26 January.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The post-pandemic international political economy has also adversely affected the country. This has been amplified by the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bloomberg/news/2022-08-05-donor-fatigue-could-mean-starvation-for-900000-in-west-africa/">economic impact of the Ukraine crisis </a>. Massive Western financial commitments are <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/10/council-adopts-18-billion-assistance-to-ukraine/#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20reached%20agreement%20on,its%20possible%20adoption%20next%20week">directed towards Ukraine</a>. This leaves South Africa in a vulnerable economic position as it <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZA">needs foreign development assistance</a>.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>As our South African Foreign Policy Review volume 4 has shown, Ramaphosa’s “new dawn” <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">has been deferred</a>. This as his party and government jump from crisis to crisis. This kind of instability often seeps into the diplomatic landscape. Investors are aware of the investment risks posed by <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-power-crisis-five-essential-reads-187111">power</a> crises.</p>
<p>Globally, the age of soft power has somewhat waned since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. South Africa needs to be proactive – not only reactive – to emerging international geostrategic conditions. </p>
<hr>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-can-it-offer-an-alternative-to-the-us-and-china-117764">Russia in Africa: can it offer an alternative to the US and China?</a>
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<p>Besides its current leadership of the <a href="https://infobrics.org/">BRICS bloc</a> (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the country needs to be bolder. It should, for example, campaign for a fourth term <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2022.2144250?journalCode=finp20">on the UN Security Council</a>, and for leadership in multilateral organisations. In these, it can actively achieve its foreign policy objectives in support of the country’s national interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jo-Ansie van Wyk has taught at the Diplomatic Academy of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. </span></em></p>South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa emphasises economic diplomacy and ‘progressive internationalism’, which promotes global equity and ending the dominance of the global north.Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Professor in International Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1958672022-12-19T10:54:59Z2022-12-19T10:54:59ZWorld Cup 2022: who won the prize for ‘soft power’?<p>After four weeks, 64 games and more than a <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-cup-2022-qatars-frantic-countdown-to-a-football-tournament-full-of-controversy-1919187">decade of controversy</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/64019023">Argentina has won</a> the Fifa men’s World Cup in Qatar. And as Lionel Messi and his teammates celebrate victory over France, another competition has also reached its conclusion – the battle for “soft power”. </p>
<p>Soft power is a <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">foreign policy tool</a>. It’s about shaping global perceptions and attitudes using things like music, fashion and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/fellows/events/online-how-soft-is-the-power-of-sport/">sport</a>. The Fifa World Cup is perhaps the ultimate soft power platform, with 32 countries <a href="https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/2018russia/media-releases/more-than-half-the-world-watched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup">on show to billions</a> of people. </p>
<p>During the event, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1032656.pdf">three types</a> of soft power could be observed: “brilliant” soft power, which comes from high performance levels and generates feelings of admiration; “beautiful” soft power, which inspires hope and a sense of togetherness; and “benign” soft power, which is found in positive attitudes and altruism. </p>
<p>Using these categories we have determined the following national placings for the 2022 “World Cup of Soft Power”.</p>
<h2>Winners: France</h2>
<p>In global <a href="https://softpower30.com/country/france/">soft power rankings</a>, France was lifted by its win at the 2018 Fifa World Cup in Russia. In 2022, the football team’s performances have only strengthened the national image and reputation. The squad is the epitome of “brilliant” soft power, combining style and elegance with acute competitiveness, and projecting an image that is cosmopolitan, diverse and united. </p>
<p>One player (arguably the world’s best right now) is instrumental in this: Kylian Mbappé. His club side, Paris Saint Germain (PSG), is a big part of France’s soft power story, helping to build its credentials through a carefully managed combination of <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/155771-soft-power-songs-psg-rap-and-the-state-of-qatar/">football, fashion and music</a>. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, French president Emmanuel Macron reportedly stepped in to <a href="https://www.marca.com/en/football/psg/2022/11/11/636e19cae2704eed1e8b45b6.html">persuade Mbappé not to leave PSG</a> for Real Madrid, such is his importance to France. Macron fully understands the need for charm, style and confidence in global affairs. When he flew to Doha after France had made it to the semi-finals, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/macron-defends-qatar-visit-amid-eu-qatar-corruption-scandal-543272">he met the Emir of Qatar</a>. At full time in the final, he <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/emmanuel-macron-final-france-argentina-b2247589.html">repeatedly consoled Mbappé</a>. </p>
<h2>Runner up: South Korea</h2>
<p>Masters of “inspirational” soft power, South Korea’s <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220811000854">star continues to rise</a>. This is partly a result of government policy, but also the private sector’s enthusiastic patriotism. </p>
<p>South Korea’s first match at the tournament came after an appearance by the singer Jung Kook at the opening ceremony. Jung Kook is a singer with BTS, a band that has been at the forefront of what has become known as the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/this-is-south-koreas-k-pop-soft-power-moment/">“Korean wave”</a> (or K-wave), which put the country centre stage globally in cinema, television, and music. In tandem with Jung Kook came the <a href="https://dohanews.co/k-pops-bts-world-cup-sponsorships-are-as-much-politics-as-they-are-business/">car maker Hyundai-Kia</a>, which has an endorsement deal with BTS and is also a key Fifa sponsor. </p>
<p>South Korea was also lucky to have its biggest player – <a href="https://hypebeast.com/2022/8/son-heung-min-calvin-klein-brand-ambassador">Tottenham Hotspur’s Son Heung-min</a> – back from injury, bringing global recognition to the squad. The Koreans’ swashbuckling style of play, matched by exuberant fans, tapped perfectly into a national energy which has seen it become a juggernaut of 21st-century popular culture.</p>
<h2>Third place: Morocco</h2>
<p>With a pre-competition football ranking below the top 20, a history of underperformance in big tournaments and no big-name players, expectations were not high. But this World Cup has turned out to be a triumph for Morocco, on and off the pitch. </p>
<p>The joyous, uninhibited way in which the team competed generated considerable soft power value – as did some of the individual players. The sight of midfielder Sofiane Boufal dancing on the <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2022/12/14/why-the-recognition-of-moroccan-players-parents-matters/">pitch with his mother</a> after his side’s victory over Portugal was a compelling act of family and togetherness that has resonated with people around the world. Many subsequently adopted the Atlas Lions as their second <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/dec/10/we-are-rocky-regragui-hails-morocco-as-worlds-favourites-after-portugal-win">favourite team</a>. </p>
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<p>Nowhere was this more evident than <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/14/football/morocco-fifa-soccer-world-cup-mime-spt-intl/index.html">across the Arab world</a>, Morocco having progressed further than any other previous team from the Middle East or North Africa. The Moroccan players’ <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/07/football/morocco-palestine-world-cup-spt-intl/index.html">public support for Palestine</a> also helped the team bond with fans from across the region.</p>
<h2>Fourth place: Japan</h2>
<p>Japan won plenty of new fans in Qatar. Just like at the 2018 tournament, Japanese supporters arrived in huge numbers, and again took it upon themselves to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2022/11/24/japanese-fans-win-praise-for-stadium-cleaning-at-world-cup-2022">undertake post-match tidy-ups</a> of the stadiums. Adding to their position as champions of “benign” soft power, the Japanese national team also <a href="https://japantoday.com/category/fifa-world-cup-2022/Japan-World-Cup-team-manners-awesome-as-locker-room-pics-show">cleaned their changing rooms</a> after their matches. </p>
<p>Tidying up has history in Japan. Long before Marie Kondo arrived on the scene, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-long-history-of-japans-tidying-up">de-cluttering and cleaning</a> was part of the national cultural fabric. Tidying up in Qatar reinforced this popular convention and harnessed its soft power potential. </p>
<p>But the tournament wasn’t just about acts of altruism. The team celebrated stunning victories against two of Europe’s football superpowers, Germany and Spain. </p>
<h2>Fifth place: Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>The Green Falcons headed to Qatar as representatives of a nation widely <a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/democratic-debate-joe-biden-saudi-arabia/">viewed as a pariah</a>. And although the team went out at the group stage, it won many hearts and minds in the process. </p>
<p>A huge number of fans made it to Doha, their congregation before matches <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/27/saudi-fan-culture-arrives-at-world-cup-2">highlighting their appeal</a>. This was further enhanced with a viral social media post showing <a href="https://variety.com/2022/music/news/world-cup-anthem-gala-freed-from-desire-1235455653/">large numbers of supporters dancing</a> to a 1996 pop song after Saudi Arabia beat the eventual champions Argentina. </p>
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<p>And while legitimate concerns remain about Saudi Arabia’s political machinations (not least accusations of sportswashing), events in Qatar showed Saudi citizens in a different and positive light. The travelling fans were humanised by their national passion for football.</p>
<h2>Special mention: Qatar</h2>
<p>From the very moment it submitted its bid to host the World Cup, Qatar has <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/10/26/the-qatar-world-cup-footballing-for-soft-power/">sought to project soft power</a>. The country’s hospitality, the absence of hooligan violence and the vibrant fan zones appear to have worked in its favour. </p>
<p>But it may also find itself disempowered, as concerns about <a href="https://www.sportingnews.com/my/soccer/news/protests-qatar-world-cup-2022-migrant-workers-lgbtq-rights/sldz8luazxfdfglvmm9a2p5m">migrant workers and LGBTQ+ rights</a> remain. The test will be how Qatar – the nation and the event it hosted – are talked about in the years to come. For now though, although it may not feel like it for the players and fans, the big soft power win belongs to France.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some key winners have emerged off the field.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolPaul Widdop, Researcher of Sport Business, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1951402022-11-28T10:03:34Z2022-11-28T10:03:34ZWorld Cup 2022: how sponsorship has become less about selling drinks and more about geopolitics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497222/original/file-20221124-23-a02m09.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=74%2C47%2C4412%2C2916&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spotlight on Qatar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/karachi-pakistan-17-august-fifa-world-2210663797">Shutterstock/Nomi2626</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Fifa men’s World Cup 2022 in Qatar is arguably the most <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-cup-2022-qatars-frantic-countdown-to-a-football-tournament-full-of-controversy-191918">political in history</a>.</p>
<p>Even during the seemingly innocuous performance of <a href="https://www.billboard.com/music/pop/bts-jung-kook-world-cup-song-dreamers-opening-ceremony-performance-qatar-1235174156/">South Korean pop star Jung Kook</a> at the tournament’s opening ceremony, geopolitics were centre stage. For Kook, 25, is not just a good looking young man with a global fan base and a multi-million dollar fortune. In addition, he has a <a href="https://dohanews.co/k-pops-bts-world-cup-sponsorships-are-as-much-politics-as-they-are-business/">lucrative endorsement deal</a> with the South Korean car maker Hyundai-Kia, which also happens to be a major Fifa sponsor. </p>
<p>This kind of relationship is neither an accident nor a simple business arrangement. For years, the South Korean government has been pursuing a strategy aimed at <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2022/09/18/is-south-korea-the-new-quintessential-soft-power/">building and projecting “soft power”</a>, developing its engagement with target audiences around the world. This has happened not just through football, music and cars, but also through <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/15/how-south-korean-pop-culture-can-be-source-of-soft-power-pub-83411">Oscar winning films like Parasite and the massively popular TV series Squid Games</a>.</p>
<p>And it’s not just South Korea taking advantage of the audiences that Fifa can provide. For while sellers of soft drinks and burgers are still part of the sponsorship roster, Fifa’s key partners are increasingly big corporations from <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Why-Asia-Inc.-is-rushing-to-sponsor-the-Qatar-World-Cup">countries keen to benefit</a> from the global reach of football. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellore/2022/10/20/qatar-airways-ready-to-shine-at-2022-world-cup-as-official-airline-of-fifa/">State-owned Qatar Airways</a> for example, is busy selling plane tickets as Fifa’s official airline partner, but also plays a pivotal role in attempts by the Qatari government to establish <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/hamad-international-airport-qatar/index.html">Hamad International Airport</a> as a major hub of global travel.</p>
<p>The award winning airline is an effective <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15377857.2020.1723781">instrument of soft power</a>, transmitting signals to global audiences about what Qatar is and what it aspires to be. In turn, the airline, and the very act of hosting the 2022 World Cup, are both illustrations of a nation intent on <a href="https://medium.com/@simonchadwick_15086/brand-qatars-quest-to-become-the-best-faces-turbulence-as-world-cup-gets-underway-4fd1b4e6fcb4">telling the world a particular story</a> about itself – that it is a legitimate, trustworthy and important member of the <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/10/20/the-2022-world-cup-qatars-make-or-break-moment/">international community</a>.</p>
<p>The same applies to China, even though sporting and industrial progress have stalled somewhat since the pandemic. Its roster of four key World Cup sponsors featuring electronics (Hisense), mobile phones (Vivo), dairy products (Mengiu) and everything from property to media (Wanda) remains significant for a country hopeful of one day <a href="https://scroll.in/field/960115/china-signals-ambition-to-host-2030-world-cup-with-multibillion-dollar-splurge-on-football-stadiums">staging the tournament</a> itself and a government keen to spread China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/euro-2020-a-football-tournament-where-the-big-players-come-from-china-and-the-us-162622">influence around the world</a>.</p>
<h2>Rebels with a cause</h2>
<p>Alongside the World Cup’s main sponsors, a tradition has emerged of business competitors during tournament engaging in <a href="https://theconversation.com/models-messi-and-wacky-races-the-art-of-ambush-marketing-22622">“ambush” marketing</a>. This involves brands using the mega-event as a marketing tool without the considerable expense of an official link (Fifa is reportedly <a href="https://www.sportbusiness.com/2022/04/fifa-seeks-massive-increase-from-sponsors-on-the-back-of-fifa-launch/">charging around US$100 million</a> (£82 million) for a four-year sponsorship deal).</p>
<p>One notably successful ambush was perpetrated by Bavaria Beer’s provocative campaigns at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/jun/19/marketingandpr.worldcup2006">2006 World Cup in Germany</a> and again in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8743881.stm">2010 in South Africa</a>. These stunts involved equipping spectators with branded clothing, which was smuggled into stadiums. This gained huge global attention which was no doubt frustrating for the tournaments’ “official” beer, Budweiser.</p>
<p>Yet even ambush marketing now appears to have become geopoliticised. For instance, during this World Cup, the authorities in nearby Dubai have been trying to draw attention away from Qatar with a tourism campaign featuring international <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCjq3FOoB3A">football stars</a>. The rival emirate will also be staging its own <a href="https://www.timeoutdubai.com/news/dubai-super-cup-liverpool-arsenal-ac-milan">football tournament</a> at the same time as the World Cup, featuring the likes of Liverpool, AC Milan and Arsenal.</p>
<p>And while in 2010, Bavaria Beer used women wearing orange dresses in its ambush, the UK-based brewer and pub chain BrewDog is trying to get in on this year’s action with its strident <a href="https://www.thedrum.com/news/2022/11/07/brewdog-unveils-anti-sponsorship-qatar-world-cup">anti-World Cup marketing campaign</a>.</p>
<p>Through a series of provocative billboards (in the UK), BrewDog is using references to autocracy, human rights abuses and corruption, all targeted at beer drinkers perturbed about Qatar’s staging of football’s biggest global event. While the bottom-line remains the same for BrewDog – to make a profit by selling beer – it is nevertheless contributing to the transformation of advertising and sponsorship from simple marketing to geopolitical posturing.</p>
<p>In a similar way, apparel brand Hummel has decided to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/hummel-stance-qatar-human-rights-is-strategic-decision-say-industry-experts-2022-09-29/">hide its name and logos</a> and the Danish football association’s badge from its kit. This is in protest against the treatment of migrant workers in Qatar and in support of LGBTQ+ communities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-cup-2022-qatars-frantic-countdown-to-a-football-tournament-full-of-controversy-191918">World Cup 2022: Qatar's frantic countdown to a football tournament full of controversy</a>
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<p>In the company’s mission statement, Hummel emphasises its commitment to “Danishness” – and indeed, Denmark has been highly vocal in its condemnation of Qatar. Whenever the national team takes to the field, it will be in shirts that directly challenge the World Cup hosts. </p>
<p>So Qatar’s expensive ambitions in staging this tournament have come up against criticism and protest from countries and corporations alike. In 2022 it seems that football sponsorship is no longer just for kicks, or even customers. Everywhere you look, there are geopolitical points to be scored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195140/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mighty power of football across the globe.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1934852022-11-21T06:51:11Z2022-11-21T06:51:11ZWorld Cup 2022: Qatar is accused of ‘sportswashing’ but do the fans really care?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496140/original/file-20221118-24-76vlzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=130%2C106%2C7798%2C5171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Doha. All clean?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/doha-qatar-december-27-2021-fifa-2140295303">Shutterstock/HasanZaidi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fifa’s choice of Qatar as host of the 2022 men’s football World Cup has been controversial since day one. Questions continue to be raised about the nation’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/henryflynn/2022/09/17/sponsors-can-stand-up-to-fifa-and-qatar-world-cup-some-have-not/?sh=73587f9153a2">attitude to human rights</a>, and its treatment of migrant workers.</p>
<p>To some, the entire event exemplifies the concept of “sportswashing” – using sport as a tool of soft power, to clean up (and distract from) a murky political or humanitarian reputation. And as a PR exercise, the men’s World Cup is a massive deal. The last one, hosted by another controversial host nation, Russia, <a href="https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/2018russia/media-releases/more-than-half-the-world-watched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup">attracted 3.5 billion</a> viewers across the world. </p>
<p>The use of sport as a means to improve perceptions is not a new phenomenon. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0965254X.2022.2059774">Brand management through sport</a> has long been high on the agenda of many of the world’s best known companies.</p>
<p>This is partly because sport is able to evoke such powerful emotions from fans. Supporters often form strong bonds with teams and individual athletes – and those bonds can be used to great effect by corporations (as major sponsors) and nations (as event hosts) to improve their public image and popularity.</p>
<p>And of course, it’s not just football which is susceptible to accusations of sportswashing. There <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/boxing/50683816">was criticism</a> recently of major boxing events in Saudi Arabia, and the 2022 Winter Olympic Games being held in Beijing. Meanwhile British Cycling was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/oct/31/british-cycling-chief-brian-facer-steps-down-three-weeks-after-controversial-shell-deal">accused of “greenwashing”</a> – similar to sportswashing but with a particular focus on the environment – after it announced a new sponsorship deal with Shell. </p>
<p>But while critics rail against the tactic of using sporting events to try and alter public perceptions, what do the fans themselves make of it? Do accusations of sportswashing and greenwashing really matter to them?</p>
<p>Our recent <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJSMS-09-2021-0188/full/html?casa_token=kjNI1y6mUAUAAAAA:EVTY-iBYVHkJZ_3WCdlmrJJJTiR4B2GmKoSFo_VXcsUhU9KbMVeB4wawydmgmsIdjvsUeL5lTjjzwB_GrEPltDJWd1AtznUDkxw47fvotlcHk3-Y">study</a>, which looked at sports fans and the relationship they have with a team, suggests that allegations of being involved with sportswashing (or any other questionable behaviour from the team) do not really matter.</p>
<p>This is because fans who enjoy a strong connection with a team (and with their fellow fans) will usually choose to avoid criticising the team they support. It is a way of protecting the strong sense of identification that comes from being a loyal member of a fan base.</p>
<p>This finding suggests that sports clubs should in fact not feel particularly motivated to act in a socially or environmentally responsible way – since their actions may well be indulged or ignored. </p>
<p>In another <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0965254X.2020.1795912?casa_token=nQSISG_renwAAAAA%3Ah5jpXvxNkUp01KRB5XxG0lNFfbDcthgaQ8Es6P53OmbLIRWXS5BQ9ACx3mgbAGfvH1b13hTTQg">study</a> focusing on fans’ perceptions and sport teams’ brands, we found no direct link between corporate social responsibility and brand equity (the value of the club brand) from the fans’ point of view. </p>
<h2>Social irresponsibility</h2>
<p>This means that being considered a socially responsible organisation does not automatically lead to a higher value for the organisation’s brand. It also gives sport organisations little motivation to change their practices and improve their approach to social issues. </p>
<p>These (rather alarming) findings suggest that even though attempts to clean up a nation’s or organisation’s image through sport might be increasing (and increasingly called out), to many fans they may be of little importance. </p>
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<img alt="Fans clapping and waving." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C50%2C3722%2C2473&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496138/original/file-20221118-16-rkylub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Wave your hands in the air like you just don’t care.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/football-fans-clapping-on-podium-stadium-622698743">Shutterstock/Paparacy</a></span>
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<p>Those people, who regularly pay for tickets and buy merchandise, are one of the most important stakeholders in the financial ecosystem of sport. But our research suggests that some of them do not particularly value social responsibility. And even if they do, it seems that many are willing to turn a blind eye to their club’s behaviour, prioritising their own loyalty to the team and other fans. </p>
<p>As a result, sports clubs appear to be presented with little (or even zero) motivation to improve the way they behave as businesses. Even if they receive criticism from campaigners and on social media, their fan base will probably remain loyal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Argyro Elisavet Manoli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research shows the strength of team loyalty.Argyro Elisavet Manoli, Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer) in Sports Marketing and Communications, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916712022-10-25T19:03:11Z2022-10-25T19:03:11ZThe popularity of the Korean ‘oegugin’ (foreign) influencer is on the rise. But there is a dark side to this pop-nationalism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489717/original/file-20221014-27-p3r3cz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2866%2C1302&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The YouTube channel Korean Englishman has over five million subscribers. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">YouTube/Screenshot</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you’ve been scrolling through YouTube, TikTok or Instagram it would be no surprise to chance upon calming minimalist aesthetics of Korean cafe decor; pilgrimages to the locations of popular K-dramas; and even the polite decorum of Korean public transport commuters. </p>
<p>In South Korea, <em>oegugin</em> (foreign-national) influencers often produce social media content focused on the global interest in K-pop, K-drama and K-film for audiences inside and out of Korea. </p>
<p>These influencers are most prominent <a href="https://www.allkpop.com/article/2017/11/foreign-youtubers-that-are-livin-the-dream-in-korea">on YouTube</a>, where the most popular trends include binge-eating <em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssXksgbZseM&ab_channel=%EC%98%81%EA%B5%AD%EB%82%A8%EC%9E%90KoreanEnglishman">mukbang</a></em>, lifestyle vlogging of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ltMH3eE_F5c&ab_channel=MsMandy_Tourer">fancy cafe cultures</a> and K-pop fandom homages like visits to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5V1kCfLSlHo&t=75s&ab_channel=MajidMushtaq">pop-up stores</a> by idol groups.</p>
<p>On platforms like TikTok and Instagram, content is shared with hashtags like <a href="https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8/">#외국인</a> (#<em>oegugin</em>) and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/tag/%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8%EB%B0%98%EC%9D%91">#외국인반응</a> (<em>#oegugin-baneung</em>, or foreigner reaction). </p>
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<p>Many <em>oegugin</em> influencers have risen to stardom. The duo <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/koreanenglishman">Korean Englishman</a> have over five million subscribers, and now regularly appear on Korean television talk shows and variety shows.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/poi3.319">our new research</a>, we found <em>oegugin</em> influencers are predominantly white-presenting non-Koreans who often adopt nationalist tones to endorse the “excellence” of Korean culture. </p>
<p>The discourse is often celebratory, leverages on exoticism and promotes “pop nationalism”: a new form of soft power marketed in the form of pop culture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bts-take-a-break-worlds-biggest-k-pop-group-is-caught-between-koreas-soft-power-ambitions-and-national-security-185433">BTS take a break: world’s biggest K-pop group is caught between Korea’s soft power ambitions and national security</a>
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<h2>Government incubation</h2>
<p>The <em>oegugin</em> influencer ecology is on the rise. As K-cultures have become globally popular, Korea is an attractive destination for aspiring influencers. </p>
<p>Our study found most of these expats and migrants were English teachers, students or gig economy workers who work multiple day jobs to sustain their influencer aspirations.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487744/original/file-20221003-20-dxh6qo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1132&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">‘Apply to K-influencer Academy’ flyer posted to Korean Cultural Center NY.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Korean Cultural Center NY</span></span>
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<p>Many South Korean government bodies have launched projects to incubate and groom aspiring <em>oegugin</em> influencers, specifically to promote tourism and enhance cultural knowledge about the country. </p>
<p>A prime example is the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/Kinfluencer">K-influencer Academy</a>, sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. </p>
<p>Designed to cultivate “K-influencers” from all around the world, the academy is a YouTube training program for “Korea lovers”, offering free lectures on content creation and mentorship opportunities with established YouTubers. </p>
<p>Once these influencers have been developed, the Korean government can also outsource its nation branding campaign. Capitalising upon the free labour of K-influencers, the government reposts and shares their content on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/GatewayToKorea">official YouTube channels</a>.</p>
<h2>A certain type of ambassador</h2>
<p>South Korea is branded as a “new cool” by the international media, as seen in the global popularity of K-pop. </p>
<p><em>Oegugin</em> influencers take this digital Korean cool and reproduce it on YouTube.</p>
<p>These influencers are important conduits of inter-cultural knowledge. They act as both “nodes” where interested audiences cluster, and “mediators” of the values and norms propagated through digital Korean content.</p>
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<p>Projects like the K-influencer Academy can enhance intercultural knowledge between different cultures and countries, emphasising racial and cultural diversity. </p>
<p>However, many <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrUlr7YZoVM&ab_channel=Koreanet">campaigns and projects</a> led by small government bodies are also heavily reliant on racial norms and stereotypes. </p>
<p>In our research, we found the videos shared on these platforms are frequently only of white-passing <em>oegugin</em>.</p>
<p>In fact, there is even a subgenre of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_w6jyuxHE3o&ab_channel=%EB%94%A9%EA%B8%80Dinggle"><em>oegugin</em> reaction videos</a> catering to domestic audiences’ preferences for white beauty.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tall-pale-and-handsome-why-more-asian-men-are-using-skin-whitening-products-67580">Tall, pale and handsome: why more Asian men are using skin-whitening products</a>
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<h2>The dark underbelly</h2>
<p>It is not all K-pop and cafe culture. Public interest in <em>oegugin</em> influencers can place them in the vulnerable position of receiving hateful commentary. </p>
<p>People we spoke to reported a strong tendency to self-censor and self-regulate.</p>
<p>Influencers who are overtly celebratory about Korea saw growth in viewership and positive audience feedback, leading to further paid opportunities with government bodies. </p>
<p>However, when <em>oegugin</em> influencers share criticism about Korea they are perceived to be “threatening” the pop nationalist brand of the country. These influencers quickly receive <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/14614448211061829">online hate and trolling</a> for sharing their thoughts. </p>
<p>This online hate is exacerbated if the influencers are people of colour, as the vitriol expands to racist and xenophobic trolling. </p>
<p>While government partnerships are prestigious and sought-after, the reality of the working conditions leave <em>oegugin</em> influencers with little agency and creative control. Their work is under-compensated by government bodies, or may be used by government-related parties without permission. </p>
<h2>A careful balance</h2>
<p>Within this ecology, only a select few <em>oegugin</em> influencers successfully navigate away from the pop nationalist script to showcase their own interests. </p>
<p>The most savvy might go on to cultivate their own storytelling niche.</p>
<p>The YouTube duo Dan and Joel are originally from the UK and known for their documentary style <em>mukbang</em>. While they mostly feature other <em>oegugins</em> in their collaborative videos, their popular videos shed light on social minorities in Korea.</p>
<p>Viral videos from the pair have seen the influencers showcasing a feminist tattooist and older homeless people, stimulating conversations on feminism or shedding light on poverty. </p>
<p>In this, they give viewers a glimpse into the less polished aspects of <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/art/2022/07/398_296204.html">“real” Korea</a>.</p>
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<p>In the predominantly white ecology, such a distinctive strategy is not a privilege accorded to all influencers. To maintain viewer traffic (which they aspire to translate into revenue) we found many influencers still abide by the convenient racial stereotypes which play up white exotica and privilege.</p>
<p>Although more <em>oegugins</em> are entering the industry and contributing to its diverse ecology, in reality, the <em>oegugin</em> influencer economy is still dominated by only a select crop who adhere to Korea’s normative racial hierarchy. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/parasites-win-is-the-perfect-excuse-to-get-stuck-into-genre-bending-and-exciting-korean-cinema-131548">Parasite's win is the perfect excuse to get stuck into genre-bending and exciting Korean cinema</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jin Lee receives funding from MCASI and the Faculty of Humanities at Curtin University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Crystal Abidin receives funding from the Australian Research Council (DE190100789). She has previously consulted for Influencer agencies and incubators as an independent researcher on best practices regarding the wellbeing and sustainability of influencers, but is not otherwise affiliated with the companies.</span></em></p>Korea is an attractive destination for aspiring influencers, and the government supports these budding stars.Jin Lee, Research Fellow, Curtin UniversityCrystal Abidin, Associate Professor & ARC DECRA Fellow, Internet Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1919182022-10-11T13:11:20Z2022-10-11T13:11:20ZWorld Cup 2022: Qatar’s frantic countdown to a football tournament full of controversy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489142/original/file-20221011-26-pwbiz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=89%2C80%2C5892%2C3889&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Al Janoub Stadium in Doha.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/view-al-janoub-stadium-fifa-2022-1409989406">Shutterstock/Photo Play</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Denmark play at the men’s Fifa World Cup in Qatar this winter, their shirts will <a href="https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095/12707138/hummel-tones-down-branding-on-denmarks-world-cup-kit-in-qatar-protest">mask the name and logo</a> of their sponsor, the sportswear brand Hummel. One of the strips is all black, which Hummel described as the “colour of mourning”. </p>
<p>The company explained the unusual design by directly referencing migrant <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022">construction worker deaths</a> in Qatar, as well as the state’s much questioned <a href="https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1854355-qatar-accused-of-human-rights-violations-in-preparation-for-2022-world-cup">human rights record</a>. A social media post said: “We don’t wish to be visible during a tournament that has cost thousands of people their lives.”</p>
<p>It added: “We support the Danish national team all the way, but that isn’t the same as supporting Qatar as a host nation.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/CjDEvi3KxVm/?utm_source=ig_embed\u0026ig_rid=d59b6226-a03b-42c2-b03e-f97590ff9c7c","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>Hummel’s criticism of Qatar was not the first, and as the tournament gets closer, there will be more to come. Former Manchester United star Eric Cantona <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/eric-cantona-qatar-2022-world-cup-b1991535.html">has said</a> he won’t be watching the competition, and some French cities have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/04/paris-joins-other-french-cities-in-world-cup-tv-boycott-qatar">banned screenings of matches</a> in their public spaces. </p>
<p>But the response from Qatar to Hummel’s view seemed to demonstrate a change in tactics. In the past, the Qataris have often been slow in reacting to such criticisms. Yet within hours of Hummel voicing their concerns, the organisation responsible for organising the event had issued <a href="https://www.qatar-tribune.com/article/22356/front/we-dispute-hummels-claim-on-world-cup-sc">a robust statement</a>. </p>
<p>In it, the country’s Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy claimed that Qatar had implemented significant labour market reforms, adding that all countries, Denmark included, should focus on promoting human rights.</p>
<p>Such a strident response was noteworthy, appearing to mark a development in the nature, tone and speed of communications coming out of Qatar. Officials have clearly been readying themselves for an intense period of scrutiny and activism at one of the most controversial World Cups in football’s history. </p>
<p>They have also been preparing for the possibility of the event being disrupted, <a href="https://www.sportico.com/business/tech/2022/qatar-world-cup-security-spending-cyber-threats-1234690532/">buying in everything</a> from Moroccan police officers and American surveillance equipment, to Turkish drones and Italian frigates. It remains to be seen how these resources will be deployed, or whether they might be linked to the <a href="https://talksport.com/football/983856/world-cup-2022-fans-qatar-alcohol-stadiums-cost/">recent announcement</a> that alcohol will be sold for up to 19 hours a day.</p>
<p>When it comes to logistics too, Qatar has been practising. It has hosted several high-profile, mass-attendance events to establish its level of preparedness, including the Fifa Club World Cup in 2019 and the Fifa Arab Cup in 2021. Both tournaments were staged without major incidents. But a recent test event at the Lusail Iconic Stadium (which is due to stage the final match on December 18) <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-world-cup-test-event-widespread-issues">was less encouraging</a>, with water shortages, faulty air conditioning, and the need for hour-long walks to the stadium in 35°C heat.</p>
<p>Such obstacles are not insurmountable before November’s opening game between Qatar and Ecuador. But there is little margin for error in staging sports events of this nature. In March, the F1 Grand Prix in Saudi Arabia was almost cancelled after a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/mar/25/saudi-arabian-grand-prix-at-risk-of-cancellation-after-houthi-missile-attack">Houthi drone attack</a>, while in May, crowd management issues caused serious problems at the Uefa Champions League Final in France.</p>
<h2>Game on</h2>
<p>A major challenge could simply be the volume of visitors, with some suggesting <a href="https://www.latimes.com/sports/newsletter/2022-07-05/soccer-newsletter-qatar-soccer">over 1.2 million people</a> will travel to Qatar over the period November to December.</p>
<p>For a country with a population of 3 million, this is a huge influx which will test the resilience of critical infrastructure, including roads, public transport, <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/international/doha-in-race-to-fix-its-drainage-before-fifa-world-cup-2022-1052677.html">water supply and sewage capacity</a>. Already, some immigrant workers have been told to leave Qatar and only return once the tournament is over. Government workers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/qatari-government-workers-work-home-during-world-cup-2022-10-06/">have been told</a> to work from home during the World Cup, and schools, colleges and universities will be closed.</p>
<p>Fearful of congestion, the Qatari government will stop traffic from entering Doha on a Friday (often the busiest day of the week) and is currently testing 700 <a href="https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/25/04/2022/qatar-receives-final-batch-of-electric-buses-to-ferry-fans-for-world-cup">World Cup branded electric buses</a> in anticipation of potential transport issues. And, as I discovered on a visit in September, with just weeks to go before kick-off, significant sections of Doha’s streets are inaccessible as the country belatedly seeks to upgrade its water and sewerage system.</p>
<p>During that trip, I was struck by the scale of infrastructural development that has taken place since I was last in Qatar before the pandemic. The city seemed a lot quieter than before, which a taxi driver told me was because local people have been instructed to either leave the country or stay away from the capital as final preparations take place.</p>
<p>In some places, roads were still unfinished, as were several areas where football fans are expected to congregate. Among some migrant workers I spoke to, issues remained of long working hours and low pay. But both they and others talked, almost without exception, of their excitement about the tournament.</p>
<p>That many of them will be unable to afford match tickets will not concern the Qatari authorities. Its 12 years of planning for the World Cup have been about <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/160117-small-nation-big-games-qatar-gets-ready-for-2022/">nation-building ambitions</a>, projecting <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/other-sport/article/2123791/soft-power-sponsorships-how-qatar-uses-sport-promote-positive">soft power</a> and changing international perceptions. </p>
<p>As it races ahead with final preparations, there is not long to go before the Doha government decides whether its massive gamble has paid off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chadwick was recently invited to speak about the World Cup at an event organised by the Gulf Studies Institute at Qatar University. Travel and subsistence costs were covered by the university. No payments were otherwise received.</span></em></p>The stakes are high.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1893322022-09-01T14:36:25Z2022-09-01T14:36:25ZWolf Warrior II: what the blockbuster movie tells us about China’s views on Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482037/original/file-20220831-14-55nu1g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Action flick Wolf Warrior II is one of China's most commercially successful films ever.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Publicity still courtesy Wolf Warrior II/The H Collective/Well Go USA Entertainment</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt7131870/">Wolf Warrior II</a> (2017) has been a runaway success – even though it contains controversial expressions of Chinese nationalism and racist stereotypes of Africans. It is one of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/robcain/2017/08/27/chinas-wolf-warrior-2-becomes-2nd-film-in-history-to-reach-800m-in-a-single-territory/?sh=1c0150483460">most commercially successful Chinese movies</a>, having grossed over US$800 million at the Chinese box office. Only Star Wars: The Force Awakens has performed better at the box office in a single territory. </p>
<p>The film tells the story of an exiled elite Chinese soldier who travels to an unnamed African country on a personal matter. He gets caught in the middle of a civil war between government troops and mercenaries. The hero rescues African and Chinese civilians and defeats the mercenaries.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10304312.2022.2110567?journalCode=ccon20">recent analysis</a>, we argue that the movie does more than reproduce clichés from Hollywood action cinema. It is also an expression of how China sees its global status today, a status developed across its post-revolutionary and post-socialist periods from the mid 1970s. </p>
<p>Our study of the film identifies the historical precedents and ideological shifts within the nationalist discourse of “China in Africa”. We also provide contemporary contexts for the power dynamics between China and African nations.</p>
<h2>A new discourse on China and Africa</h2>
<p>The tide of westernisation sweeping China since the 1980s weakened its focus on African countries once considered allies. Media coverage of Africa dwindled in China. State media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily diminished their focus on Africa and the commercial ones found the continent “<a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/v16a10_Li.pdf">not attractive enough to make a huge investment</a>”.</p>
<p>At the same time, the influx of western and Hollywood films filled the gap in the public perception of Africa. African countries, once portrayed as beacons of modernity, began to be shown as having poor, lagging economies. This is evident in the scenes of slums and the plots of war and plague in the fictional Africa in Wolf Warrior II. </p>
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<p>Since 2010, China’s Africa engagement has entered a new phase. It is centred on the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, which promotes infrastructure development in more than 150 countries in the world. The historical narrative of friendship between China and Africa has reappeared in mainstream national media in China. It’s getting renewed attention due to economic incentives in the form of the <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-1-introduction-focac-and-africa">Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</a>, a platform established by the Chinese government to strengthen its multilateral economic relations with African countries.</p>
<p>The caricatured representations of Africa in Wolf Warrior II comprise a patchwork of memories from different historical periods. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Africa was commonly represented in China as a close “third world” brother. The 1980s to the 2000s presented Africa as a poor stranger. Finally, in the 2010s Africa is a business partner of the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<h2>China in Africa</h2>
<p>These different narratives can sometimes overlap. The movie brings together a montage of elements like Somali pirates, Ebola, impoverished townships in South Africa, and the Libyan Civil War. This creates a pan-African stereotype that serves mainly to support China’s nationalistic imagination of the rise of the country as a global leader. </p>
<p>Similarly, elements of China-Africa relations from different historical periods are used to create a benevolent role for China in Africa. The film depicts friendship and aid, poverty-stricken Africa, and the leadership of China in the global south. Such depictions of a “generous” China cloud the unequal power relations embedded in the Belt and Road Initiative relationship. </p>
<p>In Wolf Warrior II, China is a beacon of hope, development and peace in Africa. A lead female character, for example, discovers the cure for a fatal disease. A Chinese owned factory provides jobs and asylum during scenes of conflict. In the film, the Chinese government exercises diplomatic generosity by accepting an official request for military assistance from the local government to fight the rebels.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A movie poster showing a collage of action and explosions, a Chinese man holds a gun at the centre of the image." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=843&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482027/original/file-20220831-22-pzawkk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1059&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wolf Warrior II/The H Collective/Well Go USA Entertainment</span></span>
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<p>This benevolence is presented in contrast to absentee American and bloodthirsty European mercenaries. As academics have <a href="https://u.osu.edu/mclc/online-series/liu-rofel/">observed</a>, Wolf Warrior II appears to present “a new master race that has arrived to displace the whites as the new saviour of an ‘Africa’ ravaged by civil war, political chaos, starvation, and deadly disease”. As the representative of this “master race”, the lead character, Feng, becomes a messianic figure. Speaking about incarcerated Chinese and African workers, he claims, “I was born for them.” The film closes with Feng holding up the Chinese flag, leading survivors of conflict on a truck to a UN sanctuary.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>It has been five years since the release of Wolf Warrior II. Yet the nationalism and racism seen in the film have not faded within China. Indeed they have grown stronger, especially on social media in China. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the “China in Africa” shown in Wolf Warrior II seems to fall back once again on the Third World Alliance of the Maoist era. But the regional inequality between China and African countries goes well beyond Cold War-era relations. </p>
<p>Rather, Wolf Warrior II dramatises emerging political and economic relations within the global south that are likely to generate new variations of the “China in Africa” narrative. These answer to a much more complicated political and economic role for China in the post-pandemic era that foresees a new divided world order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is seen as Africa’s saviour and friend in the film - which is still full of racist stereotypes.Yu Xiang, Assistant Professor, Shanghai UniversityJinpu Wang, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Sociology, Syracuse UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875682022-07-22T14:57:34Z2022-07-22T14:57:34ZFive essential reads on Russia-Africa relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475656/original/file-20220722-26-p1kof8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (L).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sean Gallup - Pool /Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, <a href="https://addisstandard.com/asdailyscoop-lavrov-set-for-africa-tour-ahead-of-russia-africa-summit/">will visit four African nations</a> – Ethiopia, Egypt, Uganda and Congo-Brazzaville – from Sunday 24 July. The visit comes ahead of the second Russia-Africa summit, expected to be held in Addis Ababa in October-November.</p>
<p>The first <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-steps-up-efforts-to-fill-gaps-left-by-americas-waning-interest-in-africa-125945">Russia-Africa Summit</a> was held in Sochi, Russia in 2019 and attended by several African heads of state and government. </p>
<p>During his visit, Lavrov will meet heads of state and business, in what has been billed as a “working visit”.</p>
<p>The Conversation Africa has published numerous articles by experts on Russia’s relationship with Africa. Here we present five essential reads.</p>
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<p>Russia’s war in Ukraine has not attracted universal condemnation in Africa. So the visit is likely to be viewed as much more than a precursor for the upcoming summit and more as a charm offensive by Moscow. Theo Neethling sets out how Moscow has been growing its strategic influence in Africa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">How Russia is growing its strategic influence in Africa</a>
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<p>For a while now, competition among the world powers for influence in Africa has been seen as primarily between the United States and China. But research shows that President Vladimir Putin is intent on tilting the global balance of power in Russia’s favour, in line with his vision of restoring Moscow’s Soviet era status as a super power. On this view, Putin is determined to counter America’s influence and match China’s large economic footprint on the continent. János Besenyő examines whether Russia can offer an alternative to the US and China in Africa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-can-it-offer-an-alternative-to-the-us-and-china-117764">Russia in Africa: can it offer an alternative to the US and China?</a>
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<p>The vision of the African Union is for the continent to act in concert on global issues. But there wasn’t much evidence of this pan-Africanist approach in the way the continent voted on United Nations resolutions to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. John J Stremlau shows how some African nations voted either for or against Russia, while others, notably South Africa, abstained.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">African countries showed disunity in UN votes on Russia: South Africa's role was pivotal</a>
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<p>Political and security analyst Joseph Siegle argues that Russia’s approach to Africa involves an <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/russia-in-africa-undermining-democracy-through-elite-capture/">elite cooption strategy</a>, with the aim of serving Russia’s strategic objectives. Siegle explains that the interests of African citizens and nations give way to Russian priorities, with destabilising effects. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
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<p>Military equipment is a key factor in the relationship between Russia and several African countries. In fact, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russian-arms-exports-to-africa-moscows-long-term-strategy/a-53596471">almost half</a> of Africa’s imports of military equipment (49%) come from Russia. These include major arms (battle tanks, warships, fighter aircraft and combat helicopters) and small arms (pistols and assault rifles, such as the new Kalashnikov AK-200 series rifle). Defence analyst Moses Khanyile reveals how the sanctions imposed on Russia by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance will disrupt sales. This will bring both risks and opportunities for the continent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities</a>
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Five essential reads on Russia’s relationship with Africa.Thabo Leshilo, Politics + SocietyMoina Spooner, Assistant EditorLyrr Thurston, Copy EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854332022-06-20T14:14:07Z2022-06-20T14:14:07ZBTS take a break: world’s biggest K-pop group is caught between Korea’s soft power ambitions and national security<p>The decision by K-pop sensations, BTS, to take a hiatus is breaking hearts globally. But, unlike <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/why-the-beatles-broke-up-113403/">the Beatles</a> or <a href="https://www.capitalfm.com/news/why-did-direction-end-break-up-hiatus/">One Direction</a>, their decision is tied to Korean peninsula politics and the challenge of balancing national security and Korea’s soft power ambitions.</p>
<p>The seven members of BTS broke the news during their annual dinner, which was <a href="https://youtu.be/1t0iJ7F_k9Q">streamed live to fans worldwide</a> on June 15, citing exhaustion and a desire to pursue solo projects. Some confusion arose afterwards when, in a bid to slow their tumbling stock price, the band’s entertainment company, Hybe, said BTS would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2022/jun/15/k-pop-band-bts-to-take-a-break-as-members-pursue-solo-work">continue to work both together and individually</a>.</p>
<p>However, discerning fans suspect the decision is more calculated than suggested, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/15/bts-members-hiatus-kpop-army/">speculating that some BTS members</a> will soon be fulfilling their military service duties. The split comes just weeks after an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/15/bts-members-hiatus-kpop-army/">intense political debate in South Korea</a> over whether the group’s members should be exempt from South Korea’s compulsory military service requirement.</p>
<h2>No exemptions</h2>
<p>Typically, exemptions are only allowed for medical reasons, although the exemption system has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713767489?casa_token=vupFkgIU5tgAAAAA:3LXv9Pr8mGCulJsF3kB3wQCSuG0bNxTcLEwS-18QyHS0IxGE7jgBp2gUSu4WD15zVoWl0LbYBeI">subject to abuse over the years</a>. Major international competition winners may do forms of community service instead, such as that completed by <a href="https://www.spurs-web.com/spurs-news/report-heung-min-son-completes-544-hours-of-special-military-service/">Tottenham Hotspur’s Son Heung-min</a> in 2022. This involved a few weeks of basic military training and volunteer football coaching for school children in London.</p>
<p>There had been <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220410000117">some speculation that winning a Grammy</a> in 2022 might secure BTS an exemption, but they left empty-handed – despite being one of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-60505910">world’s top-selling acts</a>.</p>
<p>The debate around military service has not been limited to K-pop stars. It has also been the subject of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debating-south-korea-s-mandatory-military-service">wider public discussion in recent years</a>. These debates have mostly be driven by disaffected young men who feel increasingly frustrated at having to pause study and work to bolster South Korea’s defences, primarily against <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/16/infographic-missile-programmes-north-korea-v-south-korea-interactive">North Korea</a>.</p>
<h2>Military culture</h2>
<p>Military service was introduced at the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1750635217694122?casa_token=sgK1WqTaFsgAAAAA:V3vVZu-W5MMKVLlBubgN9XcPRINHcIxIQ2_dFi-cOPK9_-aVyZP96H55_TddU1yZTajjQTJaOiA">founding of the South Korean state in 1948</a>. It proved necessary after the Korean War (1950-53) to ensure South Korea could defend itself against another attack from North Korea. </p>
<p>The military then remained <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1750635217694122?casa_token=sgK1WqTaFsgAAAAA:V3vVZu-W5MMKVLlBubgN9XcPRINHcIxIQ2_dFi-cOPK9_-aVyZP96H55_TddU1yZTajjQTJaOiA">front and centre of Korean nation-building</a> throughout the country’s rapid industrialisation under a succession of military dictatorships, from the 1960s until democratisation in the late 1980s. </p>
<p>Even though Korea has had a series of non-military, civilian presidents since 1993, serving in the military continues to be a central part of men’s qualifications for work and life, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713767489?casa_token=GFyC0eTq7MgAAAAA:lvjxHiwh6R41E1HQBD9OrDvHhBY7PnEgbENOPpbfMkp324sYsQY_pXWtV-1FTiBXk1Kw7WG7xFc">binding them to the nation-state’s persisting culture of militarism</a>. For example, completing national service is still considered proof a man is a committed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713767489?casa_token=GFyC0eTq7MgAAAAA:lvjxHiwh6R41E1HQBD9OrDvHhBY7PnEgbENOPpbfMkp324sYsQY_pXWtV-1FTiBXk1Kw7WG7xFc">South Korean citizen</a>. It is a prerequisite for many civil service and corporate jobs, and military alumni networks <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2016.1269264?casa_token=985C6_Ud3zYAAAAA:WcBzzChlrbgAVctLihq6cAji9i1etC9AC1UA63xiF694uugnJcfM5NkYbbWfilr9B0WerONUGEQ">continue to influence a man’s opportunities</a> throughout his life.</p>
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<p>While young men no longer need to serve the three years’ conscription demanded of their fathers and grandfathers, the current <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180503000809">18 months</a> required before they turn 28 is regularly cited as a top complaint among South Korea’s youth in recent years.</p>
<p>In 2015, young people began describing life in South Korea’s hyper-competitive society as <a href="https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/191332210/KimY2020EJKSMirroringMisogynyInHell.pdf">“<em>Hell Joseon</em>”</a>. This is, they argue, a reincarnation of the feudal and hierarchical Joseon Dynasty society (1392-1897), which was marred by extreme social and economic inequality. Military service is seen as one of a long list of demands on an already <a href="https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/191332210/KimY2020EJKSMirroringMisogynyInHell.pdf">overburdened male demographic</a> fighting for access to a <a href="https://asiafoundation.org/2017/05/31/koreas-n-po-generation-looks-new-administration-jobs/">reputable education, a secure job and a good marriage</a> in system that is stacked against them.</p>
<h2>Competing national interests</h2>
<p>In this contentious environment, allowing seven seemingly healthy, young, male citizens to skip military service might not be a good decision for South Korea’s newly elected president, Yoon Suk-Yeol. Yoon has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/11/south-korea-gender-equality-anti-feminist-president-yoon-suk-yeol">keen to win over young male voters</a>, the leading voices of discontent in the “<em>Hell Joseon</em>” debate. But Yoon also knows the need to maintain a credible defence capacity against the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test-by-north-korea-g7-foreign-ministers-statement-30-may-2022">threat posed by North Korea</a>.</p>
<p>The South Korean government faces another pressure though: the need to continue promoting and exploiting the success of its popular culture industries. </p>
<p>The “Korean Wave”, which refers to the global popularity of Korean music, film, television and other aspects of popular culture, is a major source of <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200414009800315#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20report%20on,up%2022.4%20percent%20from%202018.">export income</a> that also generates considerable <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003102489-10/bts-highest-stage-pop-john-lie?context=ubx&refId=25e7e2e2-bd9b-4937-875f-c6f47f5f7af0">soft power gains</a> for Korea. <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003102489-10/bts-highest-stage-pop-john-lie?context=ubx&refId=25e7e2e2-bd9b-4937-875f-c6f47f5f7af0">BTS has been at the top of the wave</a> for years, alongside Korea’s global success in film (<a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003102489-1/introduction-youna-kim?context=ubx&refId=80f47673-8094-4651-b207-4609487e3b73">Parasite, 2020</a>) and <a href="https://preprint.press.jhu.edu/anp/content/k-drama-narrates-national-korean-identities-crash-landing-you">television dramas</a> (<a href="https://theconversation.com/squid-game-the-real-debt-crisis-shaking-south-korea-that-inspired-the-hit-tv-show-169401">Squid Game, 2021</a>). BTS was the first Korean pop group to <a href="https://kj.accesson.kr/v.60/1/100/8511">“break America” and the world</a>, thanks to English lyrics, catchy tunes, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0163443720986029">digital fan networking</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/bts-coldplay-my-universe-video-b1926119.html">high-profile international collaborations</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond the music, BTS’s influence over legions of Korean and international fans won them a place on the podium at the opening of the 76th session of the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/09/21/1035280006/bts-spoke-at-the-unga-and-thats-not-the-only-surprise-at-the-u-n-event">UN General Assembly</a> alongside then president Moon Jae-In in 2021. More recently, they appeared at a White House summit on anti-Asian hate. They are <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/BTS-LoveMyself">Unicef Ambassadors</a> and have travelled the world spreading their message of love. With their success has come considerable gains for <a href="https://preprint.press.jhu.edu/anp/content/k-drama-narrates-national-korean-identities-crash-landing-you">South Korea’s international standing</a>.</p>
<p>So there is a tension between South Korea’s soft power imperatives and its need to maintain conscription. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1750635217694122?casa_token=sgK1WqTaFsgAAAAA:V3vVZu-W5MMKVLlBubgN9XcPRINHcIxIQ2_dFi-cOPK9_-aVyZP96H55_TddU1yZTajjQTJaOiA">K-pop groups since the 1990s</a> have given up lucrative success to serve their country’s national security needs. Members of the K-pop groups <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/life/entertainment/shinees-taemin-changes-military-service-role-due-to-worsening-mental-health#:%7E:text=SEOUL%20%2D%20South%20Korean%20boy%20band,his%20worsening%20depression%20and%20anxiety.">SHINee</a>, <a href="https://www.soompi.com/article/1507117wpp/vixxs-ken-officially-discharged-from-the-military-today#:%7E:text=VIXX's%20Ken%20is%20officially,Yeon%20(N)%20and%20Leo.">VIXX</a> and <a href="https://www.soompi.com/article/1300081wpp/2ams-jeong-jinwoon-confirms-military-enlistment-date-shares-plans-for-concert">2AM</a> have all announced a hiatus to complete their military service. </p>
<p>BTS’s global fame, however, may make them an exception. It might be possible that the members fulfil their national service duty and return to the K-Wave fold, either individually, in twos or threes, or all together. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-61812575">Judging by the outpouring of love</a> for them online at present, they would be welcome on any stage, anywhere, if the opportunity to reunite emerges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185433/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah A. Son does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Military service is compulsory in South Korea and many deem it unfair that the band’s members have been allowed to put it off.Sarah A. Son, Lecturer in Korean Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1763832022-03-17T14:29:01Z2022-03-17T14:29:01ZHow China is using scholarships to shape Indonesian Muslim students’ views<p>China has expanded its soft-power clout in Indonesia in recent years to accompany its growing economic and political foothold in Indonesia. One of these endeavours is courting Muslim students, known as “Santri”, with scholarships. </p>
<p>This is part of China’s ongoing efforts to maintain its positive image, while ensuring its policies on religion, including its <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-independent-tribunal-came-to-rule-that-china-is-guilty-of-genocide-against-the-uyghurs-173604">mistreatment of the Uyghurs</a> in Xinjiang, is seen from the perspective of China alone.</p>
<p>China has been offering scholarships to Indonesians for years. However, the more active targeting of the Santri community is very recent. It follows the implementation of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/where-is-indonesia-on-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/">China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)</a> and <a href="https://theaseanpost.com/article/rising-anti-chinese-sentiment-indonesia">news about China’s discrimination against the Uyghurs</a>, which has drawn criticism from many Indonesians.</p>
<p>Many of these students are now <a href="https://radarmadura.jawapos.com/features/22/05/2021/kuliah-ke-tiongkok-tak-otomatis-jadi-komunis">writing</a> in local media to promote the idea that “religious freedom” is ensured in China. They are associating the Xinjiang region, home to the Uyghurs, with insurgency as China does.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-ways-china-is-growing-its-media-influence-in-indonesia-174339">3 ways China is growing its media influence in Indonesia</a>
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<p>They now also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5hWcQCi9RY&list=PLnzjO2sF1s6Bi6G6cYHKwqbkwqh74Vf9P">speak</a> about China in a positive way in the country’s mainstream media. Some have even <a href="https://tajukonline.com/2018/12/23/surat-terbuka-untuk-hmi-yang-unjuk-rasa-bela-muslim-uighur-di-cina/">condemned</a> Muslim students who <a href="https://www.thinkchina.sg/chinas-islamic-diplomacy-indonesia-seeing-results">called for a boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics</a> or who protest against China’s policy towards Xinjiang.</p>
<p>A recent peer-reviewed study <a href="https://journal.uny.ac.id/index.php/jss/article/view/34604">reveals</a> a shifting of views among members of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organisation, who reside in China, the majority of them students. Their social media activities have begun to present a more positive image of China.</p>
<h2>China is targeting Indonesia’s Muslim students</h2>
<p>Although precise data are difficult to find, it is reported that China is the second top destination for Indonesian students. The latest data in 2019 from the Indonesian embassy in Beijing <a href="https://siarilmu.com/2020/01/17/china-tambah-kuota-beasiswa-indonesia-menjadi-3-000-mahasiswa/">recorded</a> 15,780 Indonesians studying in China.</p>
<p>These scholarships have taken many forms, although most students receive the Chinese Government Scholarship (CGS).</p>
<p>The most important is the one <a href="https://nu.or.id/nasional/lptnu-kembali-buka-beasiswa-studi-master-dan-doktor-di-tiongkok-LUiEi">provided to the largest Islamic organisation</a> in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), to allow NU-affiliated students to pursue education in China.</p>
<p>These students are spread across several Chinese universities. As their number increased, they even founded the NU China chapter (<a href="https://www.instagram.com/pcinu_tiongkok/?hl=en"><em>PCINU Tiongkok</em></a>).</p>
<p>The scholarship holders also organise various events in China such as webinars and <a href="https://www.laduni.id/post/read/63347/pergumulan-santri-indonesia-di-tiongkok-pcinu-tiongkok-bedah-buku">book launches</a>. One example was on Santri Day in 2020, when NU China <a href="https://www.ngopibareng.id/read/nu-kuatkan-relasi-indonesia-tiongkok-ini-model-diplomasi-santri-365652">held</a> a webinar on the roles of Santri in strengthening China-Indonesia relations.</p>
<p>Students also frequently attend Beijing-orchestrated events such as <a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/391853/diplomasi-santri-melihat-islam-dan-kemajuan-tiongkok">the Xinjiang Brief Forum</a>. The forum was specifically designed to invite Muslims outside China and advise them on how to communicate the Xinjiang issue to their respective communities. </p>
<p>During the events, students <a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/391853/diplomasi-santri-melihat-islam-dan-kemajuan-tiongkok">agreed</a> that the Xinjiang issue needs to be seen “comprehensively”, choosing not to believe Western media reports.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Indonesian Muslim students who went to study in China are actively engaged in Indonesian mainstream media to present China in a positive light.</span></figcaption>
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<p>NU China was also <a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/391853/diplomasi-santri-melihat-islam-dan-kemajuan-tiongkok">invited</a> to the China-Indonesia Symposium on Islamic Culture in Quanzhou in Wuhan in 2019 and 2020. The event is hosted by the Fujian government together with Huaqiao University and the China-Indonesia People-to-People Exchange Development Forum. It has become a forum for sharing the views of academics, practitioners and officials on Indonesia-China relations.</p>
<p>The NU-led news website, NU Online, <a href="https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/105921/tak-sulit-menemukan-makanan-halal-untuk-berbuka-puasa-di-china">publishes</a> articles that seem to paint a picture of a peaceful and comfortable life for Muslims living in China.</p>
<p>As well as NU, China has also <a href="https://siarilmu.com/2020/06/08/ini-peluang-beasiswa-kuliah-di-china/">offered</a> scholarships to Muhammadiyah. Even though the precise number is not reported, this effort appears to have borne fruit. These scholarship holders are <a href="https://journal.uny.ac.id/index.php/jss/article/view/34604">starting to sing the praises of Beijing</a>. </p>
<p>There are even short-term scholarships. In 2019, for instance, Beijing <a href="https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20191128/79/1175333/pemerintah-china-menawarkan-beasiswa-untuk-santri-indonesia">offered</a> scholarships to Santris to visit the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region to see the lives of Muslims in the area.</p>
<p>China has also <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/824/berita/delegasi-santri-indonesia-goes-to-china-untuk-terus-menyemai-benih-perdamaian-dunia">collaborated</a> with Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send several Indonesian students to visit China in the “Santri For World Peace, Goes to China” program.</p>
<p>These students met representatives of various state-led institutions, including the China Islamic Association (CIA), to hear the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) version of the “Islam in China” story. </p>
<p>On a visit in 2019, for example, CIA’s leading figure claimed the relationship between Chinese Muslims and the Chinese government was very good. </p>
<p>Earlier in 2013, around 60 Santris from <a href="https://pmarrisalah.ac.id">Ar-Risalah Islamic boarding school</a> in East Java were invited to attend a summer school in Hangzhou. Nurul Jadid Islamic boarding school in Central Java also <a href="http://psdr.lipi.go.id/news-and-events/opinions/dari-pondok-ke-tiongkok-diaspora-santri-nurul-jadid-ke-negeri-tirai-bambu.html">reported</a> that a number of its students had received scholarships to study in China.</p>
<p>Over the years, China has <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/139848/china-increases-scholarship-quota-to-3000-for-indonesian-students">said</a> it will continue to provide scholarships to Indonesian Muslim students. </p>
<p>Last year, for instance, the Ningxia Autonomous Region <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2252670/ningxia-tawarkan-beasiswa-untuk-santri-indonesia">promoted</a> its scholarship program to the Indonesian Santri community under the banner “Graduates from Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia can study technology and business at Ningxia University”.</p>
<p>These scholarships are not only being promoted by Chinese representatives, but also by alumni through seminars and conferences. Many of these are <a href="https://majt.or.id/tag/majt/">held</a> in mosques and Islamic universities.</p>
<h2>Countering Beijing’s narrative</h2>
<p>These Santri, who are well-versed in Islam’s concept of brotherhood, should speak out more about the plight of Xinjiang Uyghurs. They should not believe Beijing’s narrative, given that many <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting">human rights organisations</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-independent-tribunal-came-to-rule-that-china-is-guilty-of-genocide-against-the-uyghurs-173604">independent panels</a> and even <a href="https://www.mepanews.com/exclusive-interview-with-uyghur-activist-arslan-hidayat-about-east-turkistan-41797h.htm">survivors</a> from Xinjiang have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">confirmed</a> China’s discrimination against the Uyghurs.</p>
<p>To date, it is difficult to find reports of these Santri ever confronting Beijing about the Uyghur issue. </p>
<p>The Santri community should use their time in China to learn more about the Uyghur struggle and the community’s actual living conditions, as well as lobbying the Indonesian government and leading figures to issue a strong statement on China’s Xinjiang policy.</p>
<p>One alternative is to write an open letter to China, urging it to halt its Xinjiang policies, as well as to Jakarta, to put pressure on China. This message can also be sent to other Santris around the world as well as relevant non-governmental organisations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176383/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>In recent years, the Chinese government has used scholarships to shape the views of Indonesian Muslim students on controversial issues such as the mistreatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, Assistant Professor in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785862022-03-09T15:48:57Z2022-03-09T15:48:57ZThe BBC’s Ukraine coverage may be changing government attitudes to the public service broadcaster<p>As Russian tanks rolled into a foreign capital city, a BBC commentator captured the anguish of the moment: “And now must we stand by impotent and guilty watching the destruction of a nation … I think the feeling must be one of shame at this.” The year was 1956, the country Hungary.</p>
<p>It marked the start of a new era for Europe - much as many suggest the invasion of Ukraine does now – and it clarified the purpose of the BBC’s international services in the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-27082-8_10">wake of the Suez crisis</a>. The events in Hungary resolved, for a time, disagreement between the British government and the BBC about the nature of its external broadcasts. </p>
<p>In 1956 the UK Foreign Office had been arguing the BBC’s services should assertively push a British perspective. The BBC’s executives argued that engaging listeners relied on a more subtle approach through cultural programmes as well as politics. In the face of the Soviet crackdown it was obvious to both that impartial news was the priority. The formidable reputation of the BBC’s World Service was built in the years that followed. </p>
<p>Might a new war in Europe again resolve tensions over the purpose and value of the BBC? As ever these days, it’s complicated. </p>
<p>In January this year, Culture Secretary <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvlogLdqhIs">Nadine Dorries told the House of Commons</a>, “The BBC needs to address issues around impartiality and group think,” and announced a freeze to the licence fee saying it would be the last such settlement. </p>
<p>Yet in March, her voice catching with emotion, she <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nadine-dorries-bbc-ukraine-russia-b2027695.html">praised the performance</a> of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian">BBC Russian</a> service (which <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2022/millions-of-russians-turn-to-bbc-news">tripled its audience in a week</a>) and thanked British journalists – including those at Sky and ITN - risking their lives to bring unbiased news from Ukraine.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/intelligence-information-warfare-cyber-warfare-electronic-warfare-what-they-are-and-how-russia-is-using-them-in-ukraine-177899">Intelligence, information warfare, cyber warfare, electronic warfare – what they are and how Russia is using them in Ukraine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>In the face of massive <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/19401612211045221">Russian disinformation</a>, the government is recognising the importance of trusted news and the value of the BBC World Service and the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/">soft power”</a> it confers on the UK.</p>
<p>General Sir Nick Carter, former chief of the defence staff, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/be9cd012-9d46-489d-8f05-972ab2379037">told the Financial Times</a> recently that the most important way to regain the initiative over Putin was an information manoeuvre reaching out to the Russian people. “The BBC World Service has always managed to reach people the world over,” he said.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">BBC coverage of the war in Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The BBC’s international role has not always been so clearly recognised. </p>
<p>Until 2014, the World Service was funded directly by the Foreign Office through grant in aid. The Conservative-led coalition government, seeking public spending savings, determined that cost (some £250 million per year) should in future <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77800/Lyons_BBC.pdf">be borne by UK licence fee payers</a> – in effect imposing cuts on the domestic BBC to fund international services. </p>
<p>One consequence of this was that the Foreign Office lost some of its influence over service priorities as the BBC determined funding choices. In 2015, the government provided an <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-invests-ps85m-in-bbc-world-service-in-soft-power-uturn-a6745736.html">additional £85 million</a> for the World Service. This was a U-turn brought about by the recognition of the BBC’s value in the growing battle for information set against greater investment by Russia and China in international broadcasting and information.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A sign with the BBC's name on it, outside their headquarters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/450949/original/file-20220309-1729-84hjhm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The BBC is now advising viewers in countries where the news may be blocked how to access its news on the dark web via Tor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Barton/Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>However, it means the strength of the World Service is now inherently tied into the strength of the BBC’s core funding – which has been cut by <a href="https://www.vlv.org.uk/news/vlv-research-shows-a-30-decline-in-bbc-public-funding-since-2010/">30% in real terms</a> over the last decade. With integrated newsrooms and newsgathering, as a consequence of the 2014 agreement, it is no longer coherent to praise the international arm of the BBC while decrying its UK news services.</p>
<p>As was obvious from the first two weeks of coverage of Ukraine, the BBC’s UK and language services have never been <a href="https://www.instagram.com/bbc_ua/?hl=en">more integrated</a>. And the internet has collapsed many of the differences between international and domestic audiences.</p>
<h2>Russian blockades</h2>
<p>As Russia stepped in to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/mar/04/bbc-website-blocked-in-russia-as-shortwave-radio-brought-back-to-cover-ukraine-war">block BBC broadcasts</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-60667770?fbclid=IwAR1KfXT6LLV801KFmac6SNqLyr7YY7xXIGasyiVNJ0vEm_3JrtuDLlBz2u0">undermine journalists</a>, the BBC revived shortwave broadcasting and offered international audiences advice on how to circumvent online blocks <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-50150981">via the dark web</a>. For UK audiences, the expertise of the BBC’s language services and its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/60554910">monitoring</a> of news sources globally were front and centre, not marginalised as they often have been in the past. </p>
<p>The BBC’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jan/25/a-giant-what-other-countries-make-of-the-bbc-and-how-their-media-compare">reputation and expertise</a>, in digital as well as in broadcasting, remains the UK’s greatest strength in the information war. This matters as a new iron curtain descends. </p>
<p>In today’s digital age, information is more important than ever in managing public opinion, whether it is the plethora of international channels, online news sites, or the darker arts of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43093390">Russian troll farms</a> (where teams spin out false information) and social media manipulation. </p>
<p>As Putin’s aggression forces European leaders to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/germany-hike-defense-spending-scholz-says-further-policy-shift-2022-02-27/">reassess priorities</a>, the UK government may find – as they did in 1956 – that for all their reservations about the BBC it is one of their most powerful tools in the new cold war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Sambrook is a former Director of BBC Global News and the World Service.</span></em></p>A cold war - and the importance of trusted information - is pushing the UK government to revise its attitude to the BBC.Richard Sambrook, Emeritus Professor of Journalism, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1782552022-03-04T14:39:12Z2022-03-04T14:39:12ZBanning Russia from world events will help to alienate Putin<p>A world fair is currently being held in Dubai, with delegations from 192 countries celebrating and promoting their nation’s place in the global community. Among the attractions at Expo 2020 is Russia’s intricately designed pavilion, where visitors are <a href="https://www.expo2020dubai.com/en/understanding-expo/participants/country-pavilions/russia">invited to consider</a> two pertinent questions: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>How do we find our place in an interconnected world, and how can we better understand each other despite our differences? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Meanwhile, as missiles land on Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has completely disconnected his country, and shown no interest at all in understanding difference. </p>
<p>Perhaps then, Russia will not be invited to Japan’s <a href="https://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/2025-osaka">2025 World Expo</a>, in the same way that it is now being excluded from many of the world’s major events. Formula One, for example, has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/60601632">terminated</a> its long-term contract to hold races in the country. This was announced shortly after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/disability-sport/60599739">Russia was banned</a> from taking part in the Winter Paralympics in Beijing. </p>
<p>The 2022 Champions League final was also <a href="https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095/12551034/champions-league-final-moved-to-paris-from-st-petersburg-after-russian-invasion-of-ukraine">moved from St Petersburg</a> to Paris, and Russia’s football teams <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/sport/winter-olympics/fifa-and-uefa-suspend-all-russian-football-teams-from-competition-after-invasion-of-ukraine/ar-AAUqtJ1?ocid=uxbndlbing">were suspended</a> from all Uefa and Fifa competitions. Such moves may seem trivial as Ukranian lives are lost and ruined, but they do matter – and are key to a county’s economic and political success.</p>
<p>In peaceful times, major sporting and cultural events are important tools of “<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-981-13-7952-9_3">soft power</a>”. They provide an international spotlight on a country for a fixed period of time, when a carefully curated image can be projected to a global audience. </p>
<p>They are also moments when countries come together to celebrate national identity and make international friends. Russia could find itself alienated indefinitely if it continues to be excluded from these social and political spaces. </p>
<p>It is likely even Putin himself understands this. He is thought to have been <a href="https://www.thesun.ie/sport/8440970/f1-russian-gp-putin-ukraine-ben-hunt-column/">personally involved</a> in getting Formula One into Russia, while hosting the men’s football World Cup in 2018 and the Winter Olympics in 2014 connected him to the international community. </p>
<p>Those same events, which Putin repeatedly used to legitimise his foreign and domestic policy agendas, are now being used to isolate him. And in a globalised society, with a globalised economy, this is a more powerful tool than it has ever been before. </p>
<p>So while political coalitions (the EU, Nato) squeeze Russia’s economy, powerful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/mar/03/ikea-closes-all-stores-and-factories-in-russia-amid-exodus-of-western-firms">multinational organisations</a> (Ikea, Apple, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/exxon-is-quitting-its-last-russian-project/ar-AAUuv0J?ocid=BingNewsSearch">Exxon</a>) and an entire global sports industry can also land powerful blows. </p>
<p>And these are blows which will last, as <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/human-rights#:%7E:text=At%20all%20times%2C%20the%20IOC%20recognises%20and%20upholds,Olympic%20Charter%20and%20the%20IOC%20Code%20of%20Ethics">hosting privileges</a> for many of the biggest world events will be denied to a president responsible for invading a country and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-04/putin-ukraine-accused-war-crimes-international-criminal-court/100879230">accused of committing</a> war crimes. </p>
<h2>Travel and tourism</h2>
<p>Then there is the economic fallout. Hosts of an Olympic Games or a World Cup often embark on ambitious infrastructural projects, attracting international investment. The economic damage of not hosting major sports events can be significant and long-lasting.</p>
<p>For example, last year the Dutch Grand Prix Formula One race saw €44.5 million (£36.7 million) of additional spending <a href="https://corp.formula1.com/positive-economic-and-social-impact-of-2021-f1-heineken-dutch-grand-prix/">around Amsterdam</a>. Hosting the Uefa Champions League final is a lucrative opportunity too, with an estimated €80 million injected into Porto’s <a href="https://www.sportsvalue.com.br/en/estudos/champions-league-economic-impact/">local economy</a> last year. The 2018 Russia World Cup attracted more than a million tourists who spent more than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/884506/international-visitor-spending-habits-during-russian-world-cup/">40 billion roubles</a> (£27 million).</p>
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<p>These sums are primarily generated by a significant flow of spectators, fans and tourists visiting the event destination – and a central objective of hosting events in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdmm.2020.100486">the last decade</a>. This is important to Russia, where until recently, the tourism sector <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/tourism/business-portal/getting-know-potential-clients/emerging-markets_en#:%7E:text=Russia%20is%20the%20fastest-growing%20tourism%20market%20in%20Europe%2C,to%20grow%20by%209%25%20per%20year%20until%202020">was growing fast</a>, worth approximately <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/895110/travel-tourism-total-gdp-contribution-russia/">3 trillion roubles</a> (£20 billion) a year.</p>
<p>But no events mean no spectators, no fans and fewer tourists. Depending on how long Russia is banned from hosting major events will determine how deep the negative impact will be. In the meantime, tourist numbers will fall dramatically in response to the current political instability and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/02/27/aeroflot-forced-divert-flights-eu-bans-russian-jets-airspace/">banning of Aeroflot</a> flights over EU airspace. If the war is prolonged, this will have serious implications for sectors like hospitality which are reliant on a buoyant tourism industry. </p>
<p>It is entirely possible that Putin considered all of this before he chose to invade Ukraine. Perhaps he decided that attempting to expand his sphere of influence through brute force was more important to him than tourists, football tournaments or good international relations. Yet having previously enjoyed the soft power benefits that sport and other events can bring, it is encouraging to the rest of the world to see those powers united – and turned against him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178255/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Mike Duignan has previously received funding from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), but for a topic unrelated to this article. Mike is also the Director of the Observatory for Human Rights and Major Events which is the UK's official Olympic Studies Centre, which is affiliated to the IOC's academic Olympic Studies Centre. However, the nature of this relationship is academic with the view to disseminate good social science concerning how we can enhance the social and economic benefits of hosting the Olympic Games for the host country, city and its citizens. This article was based on work funded by 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, Research and Innovation grant agreement no. 823815</span></em></p>It may be soft power, but it still packs a punch.Mike Duignan, Head of Department, Reader in Events, and Director of the Observatory for Human Rights and Major Events, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1781502022-03-02T19:41:11Z2022-03-02T19:41:11ZWhy the ‘Putinisation’ of sport must no longer fool the world<p>At the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, there were <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/world-cup-2018-china-viewing-fugures-russia-who-support-which-country-a8417241.html">sixty-thousand Chinese fans in attendance</a> even though their national team hadn’t qualified for the tournament. By comparison, there were only fifteen-thousand England fans, who eventually saw their team make the Semi-Final stage.</p>
<p>One reason for this can be traced back to events at the 2016 UEFA European Championship in France, when a group of well organised <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/12/russian-hooligans-savage-organised-england-fans-marseille-euro-2016">Russian football hooligans attacked England fans in Marseille</a>. Some observers speculated that these Russians had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/18/whitehall-suspects-kremlin-links-to-russian-euro-2016-hooligans-vladimir-putin">links to the Kremlin</a> hence many English fans subsequently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/08/world-cup-england-gay-lgbt-fans-safety-risk-russia-say-mps">feared for their safety</a> should they head to the 2018 World Cup.</p>
<h2>Shock and awe</h2>
<p>Yet for the relatively small number of English who visited Russia, indeed for many other people from around the world, they left and headed for home in 2018 with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/england-belgium-world-cup-score-russia-kaliningrad-stadium-fans-adnan-januzaj-a8422161.html">very positive views</a> of the country. Many extolled Russia’s virtues as a hospitable, safe country that had organised a very successful event.</p>
<p>Therein lay a number of important lessons about Russia, one of which is that the country has a very different relationship with China and with other countries from outside the Western alliance. However, it was the way in which Vladimir Putin’s government deployed sport that was more striking, seemingly a duplicitous cocktail of shock and awe combined with charm and seduction.</p>
<p>This template has been apparent for years indeed it has been evident even during the last couple of months. Back in 2014, Russia staged the Winter Olympics in Sochi, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2015.1040432">spending $60 billion</a> on the stage-managed event. As the world looked on at the event’s magnitude, a matter of weeks later <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/26/crimea-putins-olympic-diversion/">Putin ordered the annexation of Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>At this year’s Winter Olympics, most sport fans spent the first week marvelling at the performances of teenage Russian skater Kamila Valieva, then the second week snarling at and berating Russia for <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/olympics/news/winter-olympics-explaining-the-kamila-valieva-doping-scandal-that-is-clouding-the-russian-figure-skater/">yet another episode</a> of the cynical way in which the Kremlin has weaponised sport, particularly through its <a href="https://time.com/5746344/russia-banned-olympics-2019/">state-sponsored doping programme</a>.</p>
<h2>Sport washing?</h2>
<p>The DNA of this cynicism has also been evident across, for example, sponsorship deals in which Russian state-owned corporations have been engaged. For example, UEFA has had <a href="https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/news/0253-0d7ed218e698-bbe914af9c5e-1000--gazprom-becomes-champions-league-official-partner/">a deal with Gazprom</a> since 2013 which extends to 2024. While the gas giant has helped boost UEFA revenues and became a feature of Champions League football, the organisation has been <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/99026745/gazprom-and-russia-s-foreign-policy">involved in more insidious activities</a>.</p>
<p>Government in Moscow long since took the decision to <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gas-pipeline-nord-stream-2-links-germany-russia-splits-europe">route Gazprom’s supply pipelines under the Baltic Sea to Germany</a> so that Ukraine and Poland would have no influence or control over Russia’s European gas supplies. Similarly, by not crossing their territories, Russia has also avoided paying valuable gas supply transit fees to Kyiv and Warsaw.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">EXPLAINER: Russia’s grip on UEFA | Gazprom, Champions League, Putin, Ukraine, Off The Ball, 25 February 2022.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Some observers have referred to Russia’s activities as <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-14/world-cup-dream-sportswashing-russia-appalling-record/9867166">sport washing</a>, a practice associated either with cleansing a country’s image and reputation or with deceiving people into believing an aggressor is something other than who or what we might think they are. But for the people of Ukraine, Poland and elsewhere, there have never been any doubts about Putin’s intentions. The strategy and the stains were always clear to see.</p>
<p>Other people take the view that Russia’s use of sport has been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283840572_The_Sochi_Winter_Olympics_and_Russia%E2%80%99s_unique_soft_power_strategy">a form of soft power</a>, whereby it has sought to attract overseas audiences by seducing them through the allure of sport. While there are some grounds for concluding that this is what Kremlin strategists have been seeking to achieve, the predisposition of Putin’s regime toward <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8">deception, divisiveness and destruction</a> indicates that use of the word ‘soft’ is misplaced.</p>
<h2>Putinisation</h2>
<p>If neither sport washing nor soft power appropriately or sufficiently explain how the Russian government has deployed the likes of football and athletics, then surely a better explanation is that global sport has been ‘Putinised’. At its heart, this ‘Putinisation’ has seen state-led strategy focused on building power and exerting control across the world, executed through the divisive deployment of sport. But now, the tipping point has come and global sport must respond.</p>
<p>Short-term, many of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/sports-bodies-move-isolate-condemn-russia-83154354">measures now being implemented by sport to sanction Russia</a> are to be applauded. Yet ‘Putinisation’, demands that clubs, governing bodies, event owners and others more fundamentally change their ways. The Kremlin clearly doesn’t engage with sport on the basis of sport or rational economics, its decisions are much more <a href="https://lookcharms.com/moscow-sees-sport-as-an-instrument-of-power/">geopolitically charged</a> than this. As such, those sport organisations that have taken money from Russian sponsors or investors need to start thinking less about their financial coffers and more about the risks when associating with Putin and his ilk.</p>
<p>As for Russia, events in recent days have proved one thing: that Putin can’t be trusted nor, for the time being at least, can Russian sport. For the country to be reintegrated back into the system of global sport will require measures to be put in place that not only reassure us but also provide tangible evidence that sport is not being manipulated or exploited for geopolitical purposes.</p>
<p>What this means and whether it can be achieved are complex matters, though sport simply cannot afford to be fooled any longer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has built a state-led strategy focused on building power and exerting control across the world, through the use of sport.Simon Chadwick, Global Professor of Sport | Director of Eurasian Sport, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1733922022-01-24T11:31:43Z2022-01-24T11:31:43ZJames Bond: the spy who loved Europe – and inspired scores of copycat European movies in return<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440263/original/file-20220111-23-1zonc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5196%2C3329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Last year’s James Bond blockbuster, No Time to Die, is permeated by a sense of closure. For one thing, the ironically titled movie brings closure to Daniel Craig’s portrayal of the famous fictional spy. By having Bond finally forgive his double-agent former lover Vesper Lynd for her betrayal in the 2006 Bond film, Casino Royale, No Time to Die brings closure to the character’s story arc that began 15 years ago. But it also reverses the misogynistic conclusion of Ian Fleming’s very first Bond book – with its infamous final line (“The bitch is dead now”), and 007’s commitment to never letting any woman take advantage of him again.</p>
<p>There is another type of closure reverberating throughout the movie. Although No Time to Die is the first Bond picture of the Brexit era, its visual, musical and thematic winks to the past serve as a reminder of this franchise’s historical ties to a cosmopolitan – and therefore also European – idea of Britain. </p>
<p>The Bond movies have often been not only blatantly imperialist and chauvinistic, but deeply nostalgic and aspirational in their attempt to create a world in which Britain remains a central piece on the global chessboard. This was encapsulated by the poised, righteous and unshakeable agent single-handedly saving the day against impossible odds. </p>
<p>And yet, even such an Anglo-centric bastion of patriotic pride has a rich history with the rest of the continent. For six decades the films that brought us this quintessentially British character found their place at the core of European popular culture, joyfully integrating the UK’s national identity into continental dynamics: Bond’s soft power was perhaps one of Britain’s greatest cultural influences on the rest of Europe – and Europe, in turn, provided the perfect backdrop to his exploits.</p>
<h2>Serving Her Majesty (not so secretly)</h2>
<p>The first handful of Bond adaptations (starring Sean Connery and George Lazenby) were made before the UK formally joined what was then the European Economic Community (EEC). But the celebrated British film critic <a href="https://www2.bfi.org.uk/people/kim-newman">Kim Newman</a> noted in a 1986 article in Monthly Film Bulletin (not available online) how those early entries were aimed at an international market from the outset. They cast stars from French, German and Italian popular cinema to play seductresses and/or villains taking up much of the screen time. </p>
<p>On Her Majesty’s Secret Service was shot in Switzerland (ski chases!) and on Portuguese beaches, to name just two locations. It gave viewers in and outside the UK the chance to vicariously visit different European landscapes, promoting holiday destinations at a time when the expansion of commercial air travel was ushering in a <a href="http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-on-the-road/the-history-of-tourism#section_7">touristic boom</a>.</p>
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<p>The series became a massive success both at home and across the English Channel. In France alone, Dr No grossed almost five times its original cost and Goldfinger sold <a href="https://www.cbo-boxoffice.com/v4/page000.php3?inc=fichemov.php3&fid=1514&t1=2">over 6 million tickets</a>. In West Germany, Bond movies were <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Light_Motives/AQmducGXm1MC?hl=en">so popular</a> that their distributor re-released older entries along with each new production.</p>
<p>In turn, the 007 series inspired a flood of imitations and variations. Richard Rhys Davies’ The <a href="https://www.kisskisskillkillarchive.com/book-shop/">International Film Guide</a> identifies almost 300 spy films produced in France, Italy, Spain and West Germany just between 1964 and 1968. Most of these so-called “Eurospy” films were co-productions involving companies and crews from multiple countries, shot on location across the continent and widely distributed (sometimes even across the Iron Curtain). </p>
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<p>The proliferation of the Bond archetype in western European cinema and its role in shaping a set of references recognisable across the continent (a pan-European imagination) was like a lowbrow counterpart to the efforts – admittedly more deliberate and sophisticated – by formal EEC institutions such as the European Commission and the European parliament <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/contemporary-european-history/article/abs/enlargement-and-the-historical-origins-of-the-european-communitys-democratic-identity-19611978/8EC9F6FBCBEA560526C27508B603A0FC">to foster a common European identity</a>. </p>
<p>And, while in the early decades of European integration – set against a backdrop of the cold war – these efforts tended to focus on the shared political and social values of western European democracies, it was a cultural identity that acted as a bridge to transcend ideological borders and appeal to those European countries on the eastern side of the cold war divide.</p>
<p>Britain was a central player not only in those early efforts, but also in the push to bring central and later eastern European countries into the EU fold as the Soviet bloc crumbled. Popular culture and “high politics” were never far apart – but culture could reach more freely across the boundaries that constrained political and institutional efforts.</p>
<h2>From Europe with Love?</h2>
<p>Just as Bond contributed to an anglicising of European culture, so Eurospies also participated in a sort of Europeanisation of British culture. Film historian Adrian Smith <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13619462.2021.1925547">has reconstructed</a> the largely forgotten circuit of distributors and cinema chains that used to routinely supply the UK with continental knock-offs of 007 – and not just in the big cities, but provincial cinemas as well. </p>
<p>European vistas and bodies were regularly presented as targets of desire, associating the rest of the continent with exciting adventure and luxury, as seen, for example, in the scenic sequences in Paris, Barcelona and Athens from 1965’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_077:_Mission_Bloody_Mary">Agent 077: Mission Bloody Mary</a>.</p>
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<p>Given James Bond’s historical role as a link between the UK and continental Europe, it seems appropriate that, in No Time to Die, we first find him back in Italy, a country that Daniel Craig has visited in every one of his instalments except for Skyfall, his mind on past and current lovers (both played by French actresses). Cultural entanglement is stronger even than top-level diplomacy. </p>
<p>But if 007 has achieved closure by making peace with his past, the aftershocks of Brexit suggest that it will still take Britain a while to accommodate to its new, post-EU reality. If, as traditionally promised by the end of the film’s credits, “James Bond will return”, it remains uncertain what form the character will take in the future. It’s an uncertainty that uncannily mirrors the UK’s relationship with Europe – and its search for a role in today’s world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rui Lopes has received funding from Portugal's research council Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia. Emma De Angelis of the Royal United Services Institute collaborated in the writing of this article.</span></em></p>For six decades, this quintessentially British character has forged a strong relationship with the continent.Rui Lopes, Lecturer in Contemporary History, Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659822021-08-11T15:10:15Z2021-08-11T15:10:15ZLionel Messi: why his arrival in Paris is a key part of Qatar’s game plan<p>Lionel Messi’s <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/lionel-messi-in-tears-as-he-confirms-hes-leaving-barcelona-12376385">emotional</a> though <a href="https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11833/12373952/lionel-messi-agrees-to-join-paris-saint-germain-on-two-year-contract-after-leaving-barcelona">lucrative</a> move to Paris Saint-Germain is now complete. After scoring <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/lionel-messi-barcelona-goals-record-b1897701.html">672 goals for Barcelona</a>, the football world eagerly awaits what he can bring to the French league.</p>
<p>His new club’s owners, meanwhile, will be looking slightly further ahead, with a focus on 2022. Since Qatar Sports Investments (QSI) first <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/14393012">bought a majority stake</a> in Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in 2011, they have spent <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-ie/lists/how-much-have-psg-spent-on-transfers-since-qatar-takeover/hz1zvwykh4mv11vep6qdtygex">large amounts of money</a> seeking domestic dominance and European success. </p>
<p>The former has since become routine — save for an upset last season, when they were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/may/23/european-roundup-lille-win-at-angers-to-seal-first-ligue-1-title-in-10-years">runners up to Lille</a>. But the Uefa Champions League trophy has so far proved elusive.</p>
<p>Messi’s arrival brings a sense that the coming season is crunch time. Having already signed the likes of Italian goalkeeper (and Euro 2020 winner) <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/57390443">Gianluigi Donnarumma</a> from AC Milan, and former Real Madrid defender <a href="https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11820/12351017/sergio-ramos-paris-saint-germain-sign-former-real-madrid-captain-on-two-year-deal">Sergio Ramos</a>, anything short of lifting the Champions League trophy next May will widely be considered a failure.</p>
<p>If they do manage to win it, the symbolism of such a victory will be striking, as just five months later the small Gulf state will play host to the <a href="https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022">2022 Fifa World Cup</a>. It would be quite a year for Qatar and its investments in football, which will be seen as a big win off the pitch as well as on it. </p>
<p>For ever since 1971, when Qatar <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar/History">ceased to be a British protectorate</a>, the country’s ruling family has been working out how best to use its wealth of natural resources. Faced with the need to diversify its economy away from a dependence on gas and oil, in 2008 the country launched its <a href="https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/">2030 national vision</a>.</p>
<p>The aim was to “transform Qatar into an advanced society capable of achieving sustainable development”. This gave rise to a development strategy of which sport and football are important elements. </p>
<p>Staging the World Cup is as much about promoting infrastructural development and long-term tourism as it is a four-week tournament. Acquiring PSG also became part of the plan – it makes money and extends Qatari influence across the world.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-world-cup-in-qatar-in-winter-it-might-not-be-all-bad-38005">The World Cup in Qatar, in winter – it might not be all bad</a>
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<p>This means that, rather than being the main event, Lionel Messi is essentially incidental to the broader ambitions of Qatar. That said, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/11/messi-psg-president-says-world-will-be-shocked-by-revenues.html">shirt sales, sponsorships and other commercial deals</a> the Argentinian helps to secure will still count as important revenue streams.</p>
<p>Yet Qatar is not simply in the business of national strategic development, it also retains grand political ambitions. Indeed, its government is not afraid to use football as the means to achieving other political ends, of which PSG’s signing of Messi’s former Barcelona teammate Neymar is a prime example.</p>
<h2>Scoring opportunity</h2>
<p>Qatar used that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/01/neymar-transfer-barcelona-soft-power-asian-governments">record breaking £198 million deal</a> in 2017 to show the world (and its immediate neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) its financial muscle and independence. It also symbolised how the government in Doha sees football as part of its soft power armoury, a way of engaging global audiences intrigued by the signing of football’s best talent.</p>
<p>Some will view Lionel Messi signing for PSG in the same way. His expected contribution to the club’s success will ensure that Qatar’s projection of soft power continues, while the status, image and reputation of “brand Qatar” are further burnished.</p>
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<p>Even so, there is already debate about how PSG appear able to stay one step ahead of Uefa’s financial fair-play regulations. Yet here, too, the political and economic planning and power of Qatar is evident. QSI’s chairman and PSG’s president, Nasser Al-Khelaifi, is also <a href="https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/structure/executive-board/nasser-al-khelaifi/">chairman of the European Club’s Association</a>, a position which gives him a place on <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/soccer/news/psgs-al-khelaifi-re-elected-to-uefa-executive-committee-rebuffs-super-league-and-mbappe-to-real-rumors/">Uefa’s Executive Council</a>.</p>
<p>Al-Khelaifi is therefore someone who knows how to navigate a world of crunching tackles, most notably in ensuring that PSG remains onside with Uefa’s rules. He’s also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/sports/20210420-psg-president-al-khelaifi-takes-uefa-s-side-in-war-over-european-super-league-football-sport">a man who stood by Uefa</a> during the Super League debacle, as he refused to ally PSG with <a href="https://www.marca.com/en/football/ligue-1/2021/05/30/60b3b921e2704e6b878b4568.html">its European rivals</a>, another soft power win for Doha. </p>
<p>As we approach 2022, Al-Khelaifi will stand alongside Messi and the World Cup in Qatar’s starting line-up. But while Messi’s move to France has grabbed the spotlight, for once he is not the main event. The government in Doha wants 2022 to be all about Qatar, and the Argentinian has been enlisted to play his part in their highly tactical game plan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Chadwick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s all about winning in 2022.Simon Chadwick, Global Professor of Eurasian Sport | Director of Eurasian Sport, EM Lyon Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1649702021-07-27T15:23:47Z2021-07-27T15:23:47ZHow the Bui Dam set up China’s future engagement strategy with Ghana<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413130/original/file-20210726-15-d5my2e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Bui Dam is a tangible reminder of China's influence in Ghana</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Aid, trade and foreign direct investments typify China’s global rise and its African activities. Central to China’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704810?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">expanding relationship</a> with African countries is infrastructure, including fibre optics, transport networks and energy-generating projects. In addition, China supports African projects on <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704810?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">less stringent terms</a> than western countries, thus endearing China to African leaders.</p>
<p>Contemporary China-Ghana relations follow a similar script with the Bui Dam playing a crucial role in the narrative. The magnitude of the Bui Dam and the amount involved set it apart from previous China-funded projects, including the <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/china-writes-off-cost-of-national-theatre/">National Theatre</a> which was built in 1993.</p>
<p>The 400-megawatt dam was completed by China’s Sinohydro Corporation in 2013. It was part of the <a href="https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/volta.htm">Volta River Project</a> which delivered the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-about-housing-from-ghanas-volta-river-project-50-years-on-123920">Akosombo</a> and Kpong dams in 1965 and 1982. The US government and World Bank funded the Akosombo and Kpong dams. The Bui Dam was erected about 200km upstream of Akosombo and Kpong across the Black Volta river, in the Bono region. </p>
<p>Before China’s involvement, the World Bank and European Investment Bank had rejected the dam proposal due to environmental sustainability fears. This followed <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-bui-dam-raises-concerns-again-about-hydro-power-projects-155788">investigations</a> by the World Commission on Dams and fears about Ghana’s inadequate handling of socio-economic issues resulting from the Akosombo and Kpong dams.</p>
<p>When sod for the Bui project was cut in 2007, it represented China’s most significant investment in Ghana. It was also the second highest foreign direct investment in Ghana after the Akosombo Dam. At the cost of <a href="http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FS-25.pdf">$790 million</a>, the dam had the trappings of everything China needed to build a positive image. </p>
<p>When construction started in 2006, Ghana wasn’t producing enough electricity. Shortfalls led to rationing. The government touted the dam as a solution to this problem. The construction also <a href="http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FS-25.pdf">promised</a> to create 4,000 jobs and socio-economic transformation.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2021.1929360#b0001">research</a>
I examined the dam’s significance to relations between the two countries. I looked at how China used the project to cultivate soft power. The American political scientist <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/">Joseph Nye</a> describes soft power as a country’s ability to persuade others to want what it wants. A country’s soft power can derive from its culture, political values and foreign policies. </p>
<p>I concluded that indeed the project facilitated market expansion by Chinese companies in the intervening decades. These included Sinohydro, Shanghai Corporation and China International Water and Electric Corporation. I also found that soft power was productive at the macro level such as increased government-to-government interactions. But it was limited at lower levels involving people-to-people relations. </p>
<h2>Beyond soft power</h2>
<p>The arrangement between China and Ghana that enabled the completion of the dam was done under a <a href="https://negotiationsupport.org/glossary/resource-infrastructure-deals">resource-for-infrastructure framework</a>. This approach involved the exchange of African resources for China-funded infrastructure. The Bui Dam was secured by exporting 40,000 tons of cocoa beans from Ghana to China until the power sale arrangement kicked in when the project was completed.</p>
<p>There are actors in Ghana’s administration who were deeply enthusiastic about China’s involvement. As one ministry of finance official told me: Bui wouldn’t have materialised without China’s help.</p>
<p>But my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2021.1929360">research</a> shows that, like other actors in Africa, China is a self-interested player. It used its soft power to facilitate its broader foreign policy goals, especially the market expansion of its companies and goods, employment of its citizens, and its companies’ long-term stays.</p>
<p>This was achieved in a number of ways.</p>
<p>The first was through the structure China uses for all mega water projects. It involves government agencies as well as private corporations working in China that manage water. Members interact with each other – and outside networks – to get dams built. </p>
<p>Overseas the structure also uses its influence and power to facilitate other investments, and the creation of other businesses. </p>
<p>The Bui Dam project was an example of this. It involved China providing labour, engineering and financing opportunities for its members. The role played by Sinohydro illustrates this. Even though the company handed over the dam to Ghanaian authorities in 2013, it stayed in the country, diversifying from dam to road and bridge construction. </p>
<p>The project was approved by Ghana’s Parliament, which also established the Bui Power Authority to coordinate and manage the dam’s construction. The contract with the Chinese company had a quota for how many Chinese could be employed on the project. This was never made public but I learnt it in several interviews with Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Energy officials. </p>
<p>The goodwill engendered by the project also allowed private Chinese citizens to visit Ghana and prospect for business opportunities. State investment data show that the number of Chinese projects and investments in Ghana has rapidly accelerated over the past two decades. Today, China is not only Ghana’s primary source of foreign direct investment, but principal trading partner and infrastructure financier. </p>
<p>Another conspicuous dimension of growing China-Ghana relations is the surge in Chinese migrants to Ghana and vice versa. Although the Ghana Immigration Service does not make public the number of Chinese migrants, some <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/china-ghana/#:%7E:text=Recent%20estimates%20suggest%20that%20the,is%20between%2010%2C000%20and%2030%2C000.">academics</a> have pegged the numbers at about 30,000, a number that’s much larger than the estimates of two decades ago.</p>
<p>Ghana has emerged as the African country with the <a href="https://www.africanexponent.com/post/10464-ghanaian-students-in-china">most students in China</a>.</p>
<p>These commercial and associated activities and exchanges will continue to deepen with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. Ghana signed on to the initiative in 2018 and has already <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3037993/ghana-goes-ahead-us2-billion-chinese-bauxite-barter-deal-has">negotiated a $2 billion deal</a> enabling Sinohydro to provide infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, across the country in exchange for refined bauxite. </p>
<h2>Future lessons</h2>
<p>The outcomes of the Bui Dam offer crucial lessons for future engagements between China and Ghana. </p>
<p>Ghana must see beyond China’s do-good narratives and try to engage on equal terms. The Belt and Road Initiative brings new opportunities and challenges that require a proactive and effective state strategy to optimise the gains. </p>
<p>It’s commendable that the government has formed an advisory committee to formulate strategies to engage China productively. Hopefully, its recommendations will help shape China-Ghana relations for the better and eliminate the prevailing asymmetries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164970/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kwame Adovor Tsikudo receives funding from the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change at the University of Minnesota for part of this study. He is affiliated with Afro-Sino Center for International Relations. </span></em></p>China’s engagement with Ghana was solidified by its willingness to undertake an expensive project Western partners had run away from.Kwame Adovor Tsikudo, Visiting Assistant Professor,, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647912021-07-23T03:20:47Z2021-07-23T03:20:47ZForget the medals, the real game of the Olympics is soft power — and the opening ceremony is key<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412952/original/file-20210724-13-yzs6jc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C3968%2C2643&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo via AP Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Olympic Games are often hailed as a neutral celebration of athletic achievement. “The Olympic Games are not about politics,” wrote the International Olympic Committee president, Thomas Bach, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2020/oct/24/the-olympics-are-about-diversity-and-unity-not-politics-and-profit-boycotts-dont-work-thomas-bach">in the Guardian</a> last year. </p>
<p>In reality, the games have long been a platform for soft power: the use of culture and values to shape people’s opinions in order to achieve political outcomes — particularly internationally. </p>
<p>Regardless of how many medals are won or lost, this is the real game of the Olympics. </p>
<p>And for the host country, the opening ceremony offers an unparalleled platform for building soft power. </p>
<h2>The biggest artistic event in the world</h2>
<p>Included in the Olympic Games since 1906, the opening ceremony combines pageantry, ritual and performance. With key components <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/faq/games-ceremonies-and-protocol/how-do-the-olympic-games-opening-and-closing-ceremonies-take-place">mandated by the Olympic Charter</a>, including an artistic program and a parade of nations, the ceremony offers a unique opportunity for the host country to frame a cultural narrative about itself. </p>
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<p>No other artistic event in the world offers immediate access to such a large audience of global viewers. In 2016, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/287966/olympic-games-tv-viewership-worldwide/">3.6 billion viewers</a> watched Rio de Janeiro’s opening ceremony on television.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the opening ceremony has increased in size, scope and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-01/rising-costs-force-olympic-rethink-over-value-for-money/9494894">expense</a> in recent years. Demonstrations of dance, music and theatre are explicitly designed to dazzle spectators while also presenting a politically strategic image to the world. </p>
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<p>Beijing’s opening ceremony in 2008 framed China as a model of spectacle and national collaboration. Directed by filmmaker Zhang Yimou at a cost of <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/beijings-perfect-opening-20080808-gdspu3.html">US$100 million</a> (A$135 million), the event lasted over four hours and featured 15,000 performers. In one jaw-dropping sequence, 2,008 Chinese drummers performed in perfect unison. </p>
<p>For the 2004 opening ceremony in Athens, Greece endeavoured to highlight its heritage and connection to the Olympic Games of antiquity. The program included projections of the stadium used in the original games, a blazing comet that outlined the Olympic rings in fire, and an abstract reenactment of the progression of Greek civilisation. </p>
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<p>At the opening of the 2012 London Games, Britain elected to emphasise its national musical legacy, with performances by Paul McCartney, the Sex Pistols and Arctic Monkeys. In a further nod to British popular culture, Queen Elizabeth II and James Bond actor Daniel Craig appeared to jump from a helicopter. </p>
<h2>Broadcasting the perfect image</h2>
<p>The last time Japan hosted the Summer Olympics was in 1964, and the stakes were unusually high. After the shame of the second world war and Japan’s subsequent exclusion from the 1948 games, Tokyo 1964 was key to its efforts to re-establish a positive international reputation. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Japanese athletes march at National Stadium during the Tokyo Olympics opening ceremony" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=658&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=658&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412770/original/file-20210723-13-oi15po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=658&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The opening ceremony of the 1964 Olympic Games was the first to be live-broadcast around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo via AP Images</span></span>
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<p>With the development of satellite technology, the 1964 games were also the first to be live broadcast. The opening ceremony was suddenly a chance to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jul/17/legacy-of-1964-how-the-first-tokyo-olympics-changed-japan-for-ever">showcase Japan at its best</a> to a worldwide audience. </p>
<p>Symbolising Japan’s new era, the Olympic torch was carried into the ceremony by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-JRTB-14858">Yoshinori Sakai</a>, born in Hiroshima on the day the city was bombed in 1945. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tokyo-olympiad-kon-ichikawas-documentary-of-the-1964-games-is-still-a-masterpiece-163800">Tokyo Olympiad, Kon Ichikawa’s documentary of the 1964 Games, is still a masterpiece</a>
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<p>Because of the opportunity to access millions of international viewers at once, opening ceremonies have become a powerful tool of cultural diplomacy. </p>
<p>But such a public platform also has its risks, and the diplomatic cost of any incident that contradicts a country’s carefully curated image can be extreme. </p>
<p>Consider the dove debacle of Seoul’s opening ceremony in 1988, when dozens of doves were <a href="https://olympics.com/ioc/legacy/antwerp-1920/a-symbol-of-peace">accidentally incinerated</a> by the Olympic flame on live television. </p>
<h2>Counting losses</h2>
<p>Japan has already faced difficulties that threaten to tarnish its Olympic image. After a one-year postponement, the costs of this year’s games <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/cost-olympics-tokyo-2020-summer-2021-2?r=US&IR=T">may exceed US$26 billion</a> (A$35 billion).</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57760883">significant restrictions</a> on spectators, Japan will not benefit from the typical boost from international tourists. This makes the country’s potential soft power gains from the televised opening ceremony all the more crucial in order to justify the financial investment. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-tokyo-games-begin-the-stakes-could-not-be-higher-for-japan-and-the-olympics-themselves-164389">As the Tokyo Games begin, the stakes could not be higher for Japan — and the Olympics themselves</a>
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<p>But even the televised spectacle will be taking place amid controversy. Only a day before the Opening Ceremony, the event’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jul/22/tokyo-2020-director-of-opening-ceremony-sacked-over-1998-holocaust-joke">director Kentaro Kobayashi was fired</a> over a 1998 video in which he joked about the Holocaust. </p>
<p>Kobayashi is the third high-profile artist associated with the Ceremony to leave. Creative Director Hiroshi Sasaki resigned in March after calling a plus-sized celebrity an “Olympig,” while composer Keigo Oyamada left on Monday over historic bullying.</p>
<p>Japan’s success at building soft power will also be unavoidably lessened by the pandemic. The Opening Ceremony’s artistic program will take place in a largely empty arena — a reminder of the cost of the pandemic in terms of both lives and our ability to come together. </p>
<p>Each smiling team of internationally competitive athletes during the Parade of Nations will similarly be viewed against their nation’s efforts (and failures) to manage COVID-19.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Olympic Committee is maintaining a running list of athletes and staff <a href="https://olympics.com/tokyo-2020/en/notices/covid-19-positive-case-list">who have been infected</a> while in Japan. Even before the Opening Ceremony, the list stands at over 100.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The competition for soft power is at the heart of the Olympics. This year, the opening ceremony will be crucial for Japan.Caitlin Vincent, Lecturer in Creative Industries, The University of MelbourneKatya Johanson, Professor of Audience Research, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1641732021-07-20T12:52:53Z2021-07-20T12:52:53ZTokyo 2020 – how Japan’s bid for soft power victory has been roundly defeated by the pandemic<p>Even before it begins, holding the Olympic Games in Tokyo has felt like an energy-sapping endurance event. Originally scheduled for last summer and postponed due to the pandemic, the decision to go ahead <a href="https://theconversation.com/anger-in-tokyo-over-the-summer-olympics-is-just-the-latest-example-of-how-unpopular-hosting-the-games-has-become-161396">has been widely questioned</a>. </p>
<p>As the action unfolds, Japan’s capital city will be under <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/07/12/national/fourth-coronavirus-emergency-tokyo/">a state of emergency</a>. The whole world will be watching a government seeking to manage the most prestigious sport mega-event against the backdrop of a global public-health crisis.</p>
<p>Officials will be anxious to ensure the Games do not become widely remembered as <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2021/07/14/will-tokyo-olympics-become-covid-19-coronavirus-superspreader-event/">a superspreading event</a>. At the same time, they will be desperate to salvage something from an event that was supposed to engage sport as a means to bring about economic, social and political change in Japan.</p>
<p>The decision to bid for <a href="https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2021/06/the-fukushima-nuclear-disaster-and-the-tokyo-olympics/">hosting rights was made</a> shortly after the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56252695">Fukushima tsunami</a> in 2011. An Olympic Games was seen as being a positive step in helping the country recover from the tragedy. </p>
<p>Around the same time, Japan’s government <a href="https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/sports/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/08/08/1319359_5_2_1.pdf">passed laws</a> designed to promote national happiness and prosperity through sport. Seen from this vantage point, the Games have always been intended to leave the country more prosperous. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, when Shinzo Abe became <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/16/japanese-election-shinzo-aide-redemption">prime minister in 2012</a>, Japan’s hosting of the Olympics took on a different complexion. Abe saw it as a way to fundamentally change his country’s image and world standing, while also <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/26/national/politics-diplomacy/tokyo-2020-abe/">sustaining his time in office</a>. </p>
<p>Japan, like many developed countries, faces public health issues, with <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/09/b723dd958d34-40-of-japanese-physically-inactive-in-2016-above-world-average.html">40% of its population</a> considered physically inactive. At the same time, its athletes have often under-performed at previous Olympic Games. </p>
<p>In 2016 it sent 338 athletes to the Rio de Janeiro Games but secured only <a href="https://www.joc.or.jp/english/riodejaneiroolympics/medalists.html">twelve gold medals</a>. By comparison, Great Britain, which has roughly half the population of Japan, won <a href="https://www.eurosport.co.uk/olympics/rio/2016/olympics-rio-2016-all-great-britain-s-66-medals-which-sports-were-most-successful_sto5733313/story.shtml">27 golds that year</a>.</p>
<p>Abe believed that staging the Olympics could help address these issues. He also saw opportunities for the Games to address some of the country’s <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/03/national/tokyo-olympics-fueling-expectations-economic-boom-fear-bubble/">political and economic challenges</a>. Over the last three decades, Japan’s former industrial pre-eminence has suffered following <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/japans-shrinking-economy/">years of economic stagnation</a>, which has been compounded by the rise of its neighbours and competitors.</p>
<p>While China has become a global economic powerhouse and South Korea a world leader in electronics, Japan has been left behind with a rather <a href="https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20190610-did-manga-shape-how-the-world-sees-japan">stale image as the home of manga</a>, console games and sushi. In the 21st century, nation branding and soft power matter, and Japan hasn’t been winning any prizes recently. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://softpower30.com/country/japan/">one ranking of soft power</a>, Japan’s global standing has taken a hit amid international concerns about trust in government, gender inequality and cultural inaccessibility. Abe understood the soft power challenges that Japan has faced, resulting in him introducing, for example, his <a href="https://www.sport4tomorrow.jpnsport.go.jp">2016 Sport for Tomorrow</a> programme, aimed at providing 10 million children in 100 countries with opportunities to engage in sport. This has apparently been <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1097876/sport-for-tomorrow-project-tokyo-2020">a success</a>.</p>
<h2>A podium of power</h2>
<p>We have seen similar attempts being made by both Russia and Qatar, hosts of the 2018 and 2022 Fifa World Cups respectively. Evidence suggests that <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-world-cup-widely-hailed-as-success-but-will-the-good-vibes-last-for-putin-99208">attitudes towards Russia improved</a>, as its soft power was projected throughout the tournament. In Qatar, projects such as “<a href="https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/opportunities/generation-amazing">Generation Amazing</a>” (which establishes community football schemes across the world) have been designed to promote the country’s <a href="https://en.as.com/en/2020/10/28/football/1603912564_526772.html">cultural and diplomatic influence</a> overseas.</p>
<p>The staging of this Olympic Games was supposed to be Japan’s big opportunity to do the same. As such, the local organising committee compiled a large portfolio of sponsors and commercial partners (shown below), designed to showcase Japanese expertise, engage audiences worldwide and drive the country’s renewal by projecting an outward-looking, more modern Japan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Diagram showing various sponsors of Tokyo 2020." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410807/original/file-20210712-70680-1v9i7z4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Japanese sponsors of the 2020 Olympic Games.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Widdop and Simon Chadwick</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Then along came the pandemic. Almost a decade of planning began to unravel, with overseas spectators unable to visit and restrictions on attendance. The oxygen that was supposed to breathe new life into “Brand Japan” has rapidly been disappearing.</p>
<p>This is not what Abe initially had in mind, especially when he foresaw his post-Olympics re-election as prime minister. Anticipating a national feelgood factor and an <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-tokyo-olympics-impact-japans-global-businesses-chetwynd/">economic bounce</a>, he believed the Games would be key to securing a further term in office.</p>
<p>Here too, plans have gone awry. In August 2020, <a href="https://theconversation.com/shinzo-abe-japans-longest-serving-leader-leaves-office-a-diminished-figure-with-an-unfulfilled-legacy-145250">Abe had to step down</a> from his position due to poor health. Later, one of his key appointments, Yoshiro Mori, was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/12/tokyo-2020-chief-yoshiro-mori-resigns-over-sexist-comments">forced to quit</a> as head of the Games’ organising committee, following statements he made about women “talking too much”. </p>
<p>Although he was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56109579">replaced by Seiko Hashimoto</a>, a female politician and former speed skater and track cyclist, the damage had already been done. The words of Mori, who was 84, laid bare the <a href="https://workinprogress.oowsection.org/2017/10/03/why-gender-inequality-persists-in-corporate-japan/">gender disparities, misogyny and age-based hierarchies</a> that are too often seen to characterise Japanese society.</p>
<p>What started out for Japan as a grand vision and major soft power play, has turned into crisis management and damage limitation. The intention may have been for a new era of global influence and domestic prosperity. But as things stand, it looks like these Games will not turn out to be the victory parade the Japanese government had hoped for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>But it’s the taking part that counts.Simon Chadwick, Global Professor of Eurasian Sport | Director of Eurasian Sport, EM Lyon Business SchoolPaul Widdop, Senior Lecturer in Sport Business, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1556972021-02-22T14:24:25Z2021-02-22T14:24:25ZVaccine diplomacy: how some countries are using COVID to enhance their soft power<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to various new, repurposed or newly popular <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-has-led-to-an-explosion-of-new-words-and-phrases-and-that-helps-us-cope-136909">terms</a>. The newest entry to the pandemic lexicon might be “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/world/asia/vaccine-diplomacy-india-china.html">vaccine diplomacy</a>”, with some countries using their jabs to strengthen regional ties and enhance their own power and global status.</p>
<p>In early February, half a million doses of the Chinese Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine arrived in Pakistan, before soon also reaching 13 other countries including Cambodia, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. The Chinese ambassador to Pakistan declared it a “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/china-gifts-pakistan-1-2-million-covid-19-vaccine-doses/">manifestation of our brotherhood</a>”, a sentiment echoed by the Pakistani government. Russia has similarly used its own Sputnik V vaccine to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/europe/russia-coronavirus-vaccine-soft-power.html">win friends and support</a>, providing access to countries as yet unable to start their own vaccination programmes.</p>
<p>India has been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-starts-covid-19-vaccine-drive-to-neighboring-countries-11611234933">donating supplies</a> of the AstraZeneca/Oxford jabs produced in the country to regional neighbours including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal, bolstering not only its reputation as a supplier of cheap and accessible vaccines to the global south, but also challenging China’s efforts at regional dominance at a time of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53062484">heightened tensions</a> between the two countries. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/world/middleeast/israel-syria-prisoner-swap-vaccines.html">Israel</a> has reportedly agreed to pay Russia to send the Russian-made Sputnik V vaccine to the Syrian government as part of a prisoner exchange deal.</p>
<p>Vaccine diplomacy has also involved efforts to undermine trust in the intentions and efficacy of rival powers. China and Russia have both been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/sep/30/russia-spreading-lies-about-covid-vaccines-says-uk-military-chief">accused</a> by governments in Europe and North America of state-backed disinformation campaigns seeking to undermine trust in vaccines produced in those regions. And Russia sent supplies of Sputnik V to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c20b92f0-d670-47ea-a217-add1d6ef2fbd">Hungary</a>, in a move seen by some as designed to <a href="https://euobserver.com/political/150878">undermine EU unity</a> and credibility.</p>
<p>Europe and North America have been late to the game in providing vaccines to poorer countries and regions. Calls from leaders such as France’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56121062">Emmanuel Macron</a> to donate vaccines to poorer countries, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56121062">pledges from the UK</a> to donate surplus supplies have only emerged in recent days. </p>
<h2>Strings attached?</h2>
<p>In the absence of providing vaccine supplies to poorer countries, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/covid-vaccine-share-developing-countries-russia-china-b1804277.html">some in the west sought</a> to cast doubt on the credibility of Chinese and Russian efforts, presenting them as cynical ploys for diplomatic advantage. You may be getting vaccines, they have been telling the world, but at what cost in your obligations to Russia and China – even as western countries wrap their own international aid in conditions, often involving <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/covid_20nov20_e.htm">aspirations for trade deals</a>. </p>
<p>The response to the virus has been embedded in global power and diplomatic wrangles <a href="https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/covid-19-and-facemask-diplomacy/">from the very start</a> – from the Trump administration referring to “the Chinese virus” at every turn as part of its wider political and economic struggles with China, to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/world/asia/china-coronavirus-response-propaganda.html">Chinese efforts</a> to use its own success to enhance the legitimacy of strict measures and curbs on political and social freedoms.</p>
<p>Fighting disease has in fact long been used as a means for extending soft power and winning friends. Superpower rivalries for influence through the needle have sometimes even been positive: the success of the smallpox eradication campaign was in part fuelled by the <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190456818.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190456818-e-34">rivalry between</a> the Soviet Union and US. Responding to the Sars epidemic in 2002, China provided assistance and support to affected countries to bolster its global power status, <a href="https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/covid-19-and-facemask-diplomacy/">including to Taiwan</a>. This stands in stark contrast to its more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/17/taiwan-china-pressure-covid-vaccine-deal-biontech">tense relationship with Taiwan</a> in this latest epidemic.</p>
<p>Such assistance has tended to accrue the most soft-power influence when aid has been seen as impartial and free from naked self-interest. Before being <a href="https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/blogs/2020/government-dfid-decision-reduces-impact-uk-aid">merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office</a>, for example, the reputation of the UK’s former Department for International Development (DfID) was in part enhanced by its legally enshrined focus on poverty and its autonomous status. The current round of vaccine diplomacy on all sides is neither.</p>
<p>The prospect of global health becoming a new arena for global power competition and rivalry should worry us all. Whatever benefits may have emerged from such rivalries in the past, they did so through cooperative rivalry. The global response to COVID-19 has thus far tended to be uncooperative and divisive, casting blame or seeking to spread distrust. </p>
<p>The complexities of global health, and the needs of the billions excluded from the benefits of vaccine science and innovation, demand a truly global response. Whether responding to COVID-19 will lead to a more equal partnership for health for all, or reinforce some of the worst instincts displayed during the past year, will determine not only the course of COVID-19, but the impact of the next epidemic to threaten global health, and the ones that follow that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155697/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jennings is affiliated with the Fabian Society. </span></em></p>The global vaccine rollout has not been free from geopolitical rivalries and point-scoring.Michael Jennings, Reader in International Development, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1534532021-01-19T19:24:15Z2021-01-19T19:24:15ZJanet Yellen as US Treasury secretary can move the needle on climate change – here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379328/original/file-20210118-13-1k71gvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5014%2C3337&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Senate voted 84-15 to confirm former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen as the next U.S. Treasury secretary.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FederalReserve/82e3c5eb8ac543dda3726db9ab3c6a0c/photo">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s in-box will need every ounce of her vast experience to pilot the economy through a daunting confluence of challenges.</p>
<p>How the U.S. manages the economic recovery from COVID-19, the financial risks from climate change and inequality will determine the chances of American prosperity over the coming decades. </p>
<p>First, Yellen will need to ensure that economic stimulus packages produce a job-rich recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. She can help guide the U.S. to <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/how-a-post-pandemic-stimulus-can-both-create-jobs-and-help-the-climate">the sweet spot</a> of immediate growth that also puts the country on the path toward a cleaner, more resilient future. This means measures that steer investment and job creation in the sectors of the future, including clean energy, energy efficiency, clean transport and resilient agriculture.</p>
<p>Second, she will have a crucial role in orchestrating <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-plans-to-fight-climate-change-in-a-way-no-u-s-president-has-done-before-152419">a total government approach</a> to climate risk and resilience. That includes working across every department and agency involved in the regulation, policy and management of financial markets and the economy.</p>
<p>Third, COVID-19 has revealed the extent of the nation’s lack of resilience. With climate shocks only expected to intensify, Yellen’s role in the nation’s recovery also means <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp012313">confronting inequality</a>.</p>
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<p>Yellen, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/experts/janet-l-yellen/">a former Federal Reserve chair and professor of economics</a>, is respected by her peers and international financial institutions, and she will be in a position to persuade banks and businesses to take climate change seriously. But there will be no honeymoon. </p>
<p>I have been involved in international sustainable development and climate diplomacy for years as <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/rachel-kyte">a former World Bank vice president and senior U.N. official</a>, and I see several ways <a href="https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=117&session=1&vote=00006">Yellen</a> can use the power of the U.S. Treasury to lay the foundation for real and lasting progress on climate change.</p>
<h2>Finding a way to put a price on carbon</h2>
<p>The good news is that Yellen has a keen understanding of the issues surrounding climate change and their interplay, and the roles that financial regulators and economic leaders can play.</p>
<p>For example, she is sensitive to the need to put a <a href="https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/what">price on carbon</a> pollution to help curb emissions. The cost of that pollution today is borne by the public, from bad air quality to extreme weather and sea level rise. A carbon price, coupled with incentives and standards, will speed up the drive to clean technologies by making polluting expensive for companies and risky for their investors.</p>
<p>During her <a href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-to-consider-the-anticipated-nomination-of-to-be-the-honorable-janet-l-yellen-to-secretary-of-the-treasury">confirmation hearing</a>, Yellen talked about climate change as a priority, describing it as an existential threat and a risk to the financial system. In response to senators’ questions, <a href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dr%20Janet%20Yellen%20Senate%20Finance%20Committee%20QFRs%2001%2021%202021.pdf">she wrote</a> that she believes “we cannot solve the climate crisis without effective carbon pricing” and that President Joe Biden “supports an enforcement mechanism that requires polluters to bear the full cost of the carbon pollution they are emitting.” </p>
<p>Last year, she said that she could see a way forward with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climate-tax/u-s-could-adopt-carbon-tax-under-a-biden-presidency-ex-fed-chair-yellen-says-idUSKBN26T23L">bipartisan support for a carbon tax</a> that charges polluters for their carbon emissions and redistributes the proceeds to Americans in quarterly payments, a move that would help low-income residents in particular as the world shifts to cleaner energy. After years leading the <a href="https://clc.fi/">Climate Leadership Coalition</a>, a bipartisan platform advocating for effective carbon pricing, she has the credibility to engineer progress on such a hot-button issue.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379197/original/file-20210118-19-16h0it6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Global carbon emissions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions">Our World in Data</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>More of her views can be seen in the recommendations of a task force Yellen co-chaired in 2020 with Mark Carney, the former head of the Bank of England, for the economic think tank the G30. The <a href="https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Mainstreaming_the_Transition_to_a_Net-Zero_Economy.pdf">task force recommended</a> that to achieve net-zero emissions, all countries need to price carbon appropriately; shift incentives for companies and their executives so sustainability is a priority; and harness markets to speed up the rate of transition away from fossil fuels.</p>
<p>The task force also recommended that countries set up <a href="https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Mainstreaming_the_Transition_to_a_Net-Zero_Economy.pdf">Carbon Councils</a>, independent government bodies that would “supervise and oversee markets to ensure the delivery of real, positive planetary outcomes and dramatically lowered greenhouse gas emissions.</p>
<p>That advice may be redundant with the appointment of <a href="https://twitter.com/dfarber/status/1351222442275065859">Gina McCarthy</a> in the new role of national climate advisor.</p>
<h2>Bringing climate risk awareness to the financial system</h2>
<p>Yellen has an important role to play and a mechanism already at hand: the <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FAQ%20-%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf">Federal Stability Oversight Council</a>. It was created by the 2010 <a href="https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm">Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act</a> to identify risks to U.S. financial stability and respond to emerging threats. The council is chaired by the Treasury secretary and comprises all major federal financial regulators. This is a place where Yellen can insert climate risk awareness into the U.S. finance’s central nervous system.</p>
<p>In the past few years, other countries’ central banks have both introduced <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2019/biennial-exploratory-scenario-climate-change-discussion-paper">climate-risk stress tests</a> to determine financial institutions’ vulnerability to climate change and imposed rules around exposure to fossil fuels. The U.S. lags, but there is momentum for Yellen and the FSOC to build on.</p>
<p>The Federal Reserve has already <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20201109.pdf">identified climate change as a risk</a> to financial stability, and in December, it joined the <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201215a.htm">Network for Greening the Financial System</a>, a global leadership group of central banks and financial regulators.</p>
<h2>Using international aid to rebuild soft power</h2>
<p>Yellen will also be coordinating efforts across the government to most effectively manage U.S. global financial engagement on climate change and other risks.</p>
<p>She has unique reach through international finance. The Treasury Department can influence <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/">USAID</a>, which provides aid to countries in need; the <a href="https://www.mcc.gov/">Millennium Challenge Corp.</a>, which supports economic development to reduce poverty; the <a href="https://www.exim.gov/">Export-Import Bank</a>, which provides financing to boost U.S. exports; the <a href="https://ustda.gov/">U.S. Trade and Development Agency</a>, which helps connect U.S. companies with infrastructure projects overseas; and the potentially powerful <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/">International Development Finance Corp.</a> In the right hands, the tools of the DFC can help channel funding to green and resilient infrastructure in low-income countries.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Financing climate-friendly projects could help the U.S. reclaim both <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">soft power</a> overseas and its international climate leadership. However, support for pandemic recovery and climate resilience cannot mire low- and middle-income countries in more debt. The debt crisis, worsened by COVID-19, demands careful choreography among international financial institutions, European allies, China, central banks and private financiers. And it will need some fresh thinking. </p>
<p>The Treasury secretary’s in tray is daunting in its complexity. There’s a lot riding on <a href="https://soundcloud.com/doomtree/whos-yellen-now">Janet Yellen’s</a> shoulders, head and heart.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated with the Senate <a href="https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=117&session=1&vote=00006">voting 84-15</a> to confirm Yellen as U.S. Treasury secretary.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Kyte does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former Federal Reserve chair has the experience and broad respect to get businesses to move on climate change and to lay the foundation for real and lasting progress.Rachel Kyte, Dean of the Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1507012020-11-30T13:43:11Z2020-11-30T13:43:11ZPolice should prioritise negotiation over routine force to win back trust<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371952/original/file-20201130-15-19nubpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=226%2C238%2C3954%2C2150&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Riot police block a road entrance during a rally in London in 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-march-26-riot-police-block-77053276">Shutterstock/1000 words</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As a young researcher in 1979, I was out on patrol with two Strathclyde constables in a rough Glasgow housing estate. We drew up alongside half-a-dozen teenagers, who were sitting chatting on a wall – doing nothing illegal whatsoever. One officer told them, “move along, lads”, and they grudgingly shuffled off. When I asked why he had done this, he said: “It’s just what we do.” What they were actually doing was demonstrating that they controlled the streets.</p>
<p>Fast-forward to 2020. The Black Lives Matter movement in the US and <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news/anti-racism-protests-reveal-europes-own-problems-85082">protests</a> on this side of the Atlantic have shown how tensions between the police and parts of the community are unresolved and, in some cases, simmering. Black Lives Matter erupted in the US in response to a tragic and seemingly unending series of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52905408">police killings of black suspects</a>. How American police continue to commit such outrages is a question that remains unanswered. </p>
<p>But this problem is not uniquely American. In the UK, ethnic minority groups are over-represented in <a href="https://fullfact.org/law/bame-deaths-police-uk/">deaths in police custody</a> and black suspects are heavily over-represented in <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/stop-and-search/latest">stop-and-searches</a>. There were four stop-and-searches for every 1,000 white people last year, compared with 38 for every 1,000 black people.</p>
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<h2>Control tactics</h2>
<p>The incident in Glasgow and the death of black men such as George Floyd while in police custody, represent two ends of a continuum of policing tactics involving the “performance of street control”. The tactics range from simply moving people on to stop-and-seach. This can be followed by arrest and – occasionally – death. The fatal <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2020/jun/10/mark-duggan-shooting-can-forensic-tech-cast-doubt-on-official-report">shooting of Mark Duggan</a> in 2011 and the death of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/nov/29/what-really-happened-to-edson-da-costa">Edson Da Costa</a> in 2017 both led to riots in London. </p>
<p>In public order policing, <a href="https://netpol.org/guide-to-kettles/">kettling</a> (where demonstrations are corralled in tight areas) is another tactic of street control. In mainland Europe, requiring people to produce their identity cards is another. The outcome of all these performances of control can range from the anodyne (as in my Glasgow incident) to the tragic, where resistance leads to death.</p>
<p>But why don’t police forces stop overusing these tactics that seemingly do more harm than good, that alienate people and can have tragic consequences? My new book, <a href="https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/good-policing#:%7E:text=Renowned%20criminologist%20Mike%20Hough%20illuminates,public%20trust%2C%20that%20drive%20it.">Good Policing</a>, examines why police sometimes appear to be locked into a vicious cycle of worsening relations between them and the public – especially those from ethnic minority groups. But it is possible for the police to navigate their way out of these traps.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mark-duggan-lawful-killing-verdict-leaves-questions-over-police-use-of-lethal-force-21697">Mark Duggan lawful killing verdict leaves questions over police use of lethal force</a>
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<p>Half an answer is found in long running tensions between traditions of policing by consent and the more “common sense view” that policing is about keeping criminals in check. To borrow a term from political scientists, police are often faced with a choice between <a href="https://softpower30.com/what-is-soft-power/">hard power and soft power</a>. Hard power involves the deployment of deterrent strategies and coercive force that keep a tight grip on unruly behaviour. Soft power, by contrast, requires supporting people’s commitment to obey the law by winning hearts and minds. But too often, advocates of hard power simply win the argument.</p>
<h2>Hard power traps</h2>
<p>Police fall into these traps when they overuse their power so much that there is no longer scope for the kind of soft power tactics which motivate consent to the rule of law. When people are routinely treated with disrespect, they lose trust in the police and no longer feel that the cops are on their side. When this happens, police often respond with a policing style that helps them maintain a tight grip on the public. This will involve routinely demonstrating that they are in control (as I saw in Glasgow) and overwhelming any resistance to this control with force, if it is challenged.</p>
<p>I believe that police departments in multi-racial cities in the US are stuck in these hard power traps. With intense mutual distrust between cops and people of colour, the opportunities for deploying soft power policing may have been squandered over the years – if they ever existed in the first place. The police may believe that coercive hard power tactics are, realistically, all that are available to them. Predictably, this leads to too many encounters between police and suspects which are characterised by mutual fear and hostility. It is this erosion of trust which all too often <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52861726">ends in tragedy</a>.</p>
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<img alt="Woman taking a selfie with two police officers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371956/original/file-20201130-21-ahb0j5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A woman taking a selfie with two police officers at an official Pride Street Party event in Brighton, UK, in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/brighton-east-sussex-uk-august-03-1471071371">Shutterstock/starry-sky-visual</a></span>
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<p>Escaping from hard power traps is one of the hardest challenges facing policing. Reform in US cities may prove a real uphill struggle but the stronger UK tradition of policing by consent may provide firmer foundations for policing styles based on trust. There needs to be strong leadership and better training to sell policing principles that value the building of trust, alongside fair and respectful treatment of the people being policed.</p>
<p>Much more effort needs to go into ensuring that frontline officers are equipped with <a href="https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/principles_of_procedurally_just_policing_report.pdf">de-escalation techniques</a> – which can be as simple as listening and explaining – when it comes to handling conflict. Meanwhile, there still needs to be much more scrutiny over the use of stop-and-search. The police obviously need powers to investigate suspicious activity but the extent of stop-and-search use needs to be curbed and the way that suspects are treated needs to be greatly improved.</p>
<p>All this will take time and effort. But the hard power alternatives just add to the erosion of police legitimacy in some communities. And that – ultimately – leads to more deaths in police encounters, more riots and more urban unrest.</p>
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<header>Mike Hough is the author of:</header>
<p><a href="https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/good-policing#:~:text=Renowned%20criminologist%20Mike%20Hough%20illuminates,public%20trust%2C%20that%20drive%20it">Good Policing: Trust, Legitimacy and Authority.</a></p>
<footer>Bristol University Press provides funding as a content partner of The Conversation UK</footer>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Hough has received funding from the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Equalities and Human Rights Commisson, the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and several charitable trusts. The ideas reported here reflect most closely work funded by the EU and the ESRC. He is also the the author of Good Policing: Trust, Legitimacy and Authority published by Bristol University Press.</span></em></p>Police forces need to negotiate with communities to win back trust or risk getting trapped in a cycle of violence.Mike Hough, Emeritus Professor, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.