tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/us-iran-70837/articlesUS-Iran – The Conversation2024-02-03T13:35:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226952024-02-03T13:35:03Z2024-02-03T13:35:03ZUS launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria − a national security expert explains the message they send<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573164/original/file-20240202-17-gyzhww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden attends the arrival of the remains of three U.S. service members killed in a drone attack in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-attends-the-dignified-transfer-of-the-news-photo/1973658835?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States mounted more than 125 retaliatory strikes against Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias at seven military sites in Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, after a drone strike <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">killed three U.S. soldiers</a> and injured 34 more in Jordan on Jan. 28.</em> </p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes, <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">which U.S. military officials say hit 85 targets, including command</a> and control operations centers, intelligence centers and munition supply chain facilities, are the latest chapter in the Middle East conflict, which President Joe Biden has tried to avoid escalating.</em></p>
<p><em>Biden announced on Jan. 30 that he had decided how to respond to the drone strike that killed the soldiers and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75WsnYkuTlI">said</a>, “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68063741">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, while Iran denied any direct involvement in it.</em> </p>
<p><em>The U.S. retaliatory strikes happened hours after the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-witness-return-remains-us-soldiers-killed-jordan-2024-02-02/">remains of the American soldiers</a> were returned to the U.S.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to understand the strategic thinking behind this retaliatory attack.</em> </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A satellite image shows a cleared area in a desert with beige and grey buildings, seen from high in the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A satellite image from 2022 shows Tower 22, the U.S. military base where three U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more were wounded on Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike by an Iranian-backed militia group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-of-tower-22-which-houses-a-small-news-photo/1963648340?adppopup=true">Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies</a></span>
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<h2>What are some of the factors that likely played a role in the US deciding to launch a retaliatory strike and when to launch it?</h2>
<p>Regarding timing, the president may have wanted to get the bodies of the service people who were killed in Jordan back home and give some time for everyone to think. In the last few days, we saw that Iran and Iraq did put pressure on some of the proxy groups to wind down their operations. In one case, one of these Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/kataib-hezbollah-suspend-military-ops-us-intl/index.html">agreed to cease operations</a> this last week. Iran also said that they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news">do not want a wider war</a> with the U.S. </p>
<p>With the time it took Biden to authorize the strike, it also gave the Iranian soldiers and others time to move out of harm’s way, if they wanted to leave the military bases. </p>
<p>More strategically, Biden already committed earlier this week to make some kind of response, and he was under all kinds of political pressure to do something. But he still appears to be trying to avoid further escalating the conflict.</p>
<p>Biden, for example, avoided striking Iranian territory directly, though some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-pressure-biden-to-strike-iran-directly-after-deadly-drone-strike/">Republicans had pressured</a> him to do so. </p>
<h2>Iran says it wants to avoid a war with the US. But its proxy group just struck a US military base. Does that imply some sort of internal friction there?</h2>
<p>In our own country’s experience with proxy groups, we know that they have their own interests, and there are also the interests that we share. Sometimes, proxy groups that the U.S. has backed act in a way we don’t like and are just in their own interest. These proxy relationships are always complicated, in that sense. </p>
<p>Even if Iran wants to avoid further escalation with the U.S., my guess is that many of these groups would not mind a broader conflict happening, if their goals are more apocalyptic, such as destroying Israel. </p>
<h2>What do these retaliatory strikes accomplish?</h2>
<p>I think they accomplish fulfilling the Biden administration’s commitment to do something significant and respond to the drone strike killing U.S. soldiers. The response itself is measured enough so far that it is unlikely to escalate the conflict dramatically, though we could be surprised by that. </p>
<p>Overall, it is a calibrated measure that plainly is not going to entirely degrade the military capacity of any of these groups. But it should still have a pretty significant effect and weaken their military capabilities, at least to some extent. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms carry a casket draped in an American flag on a grey day. President Joe Biden stands nearby in a dark jacket." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">On Feb. 2, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden watches as U.S. Army soldiers carry the remains of Army Sgt. Kennedy Sanders, who was killed in a drone strike in Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-carry-team-moves-a-flagged-draped-transfer-case-news-photo/1980832024?adppopup=true">Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>What else is most important to understand about these retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The wider context here is that the U.S. strikes make it all the more important to get to some cease-fire in Gaza. At least then, these proxy forces would lose that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">rationale – of Israel’s attacks</a> on Gaza – to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bolsters-defenses-around-jordan-base-as-it-readies-response-to-drone-attack/7468786.html">justify what they are doing</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to me we are still seeing no real sign from the Israelis of a sense of an endgame in this war. We presume that the Israeli government is thinking about some way to reform the Palestinian Authority or consider some coalition of Arab states, maybe the U.S. and European countries, to govern Gaza once the war ends. But we have not seen any sign of that publicly. </p>
<p>So, as long as the war continues in Gaza and as long as Palestinians are being killed, these proxy groups see this as their only way to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US attacks on military sites in Iraq and Syria are unlikely to further escalate conflict in the Middle East, he writes.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158522023-10-23T18:35:09Z2023-10-23T18:35:09ZThe Israel-Hamas war deepens the struggle between US and Iran for influence in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554866/original/file-20231019-22-45pt1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians stage a rally outside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-regime-iranians-stage-a-rally-outside-the-former-us-news-photo/1244484898?adppopup=true">Contributor#072019/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israel readies for a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">ground invasion of Gaza</a>, and Palestinian and Israeli civilian deaths continue to mount, a broader struggle for influence continues in the Middle East between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has long played an important leadership role in the Middle East. American influence has hinged on <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-one">maintaining close ties</a> to diverse allies, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>And since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, Iran’s leaders have sought to boost their regional influence and secure their domestic position in power by <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">undermining America’s relationships</a> in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/">built its own regional network</a>, composed largely of Shia Muslim entities, including Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Iran also has long <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">supported Hamas</a>, a Sunni Islamist movement and U.S.-designated terrorist group that controls Gaza. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/iran-israel-and-war-in-the-middle-east/">Like Iran</a>, Hamas is committed to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/john-ciorciari">scholar of international politics</a>, I am interested in how this rivalry between the U.S. and Iran has evolved and how this war may affect it. </p>
<p>The long-standing Israel-Palestinian dispute is central to Iran’s regional strategy, which aims to drive a wedge between Israel and its neighbors and complicate U.S. relations throughout the Arab world. So far, the Israel-Hamas war appears to be having precisely those effects.</p>
<h2>Iran’s role in the Gaza war</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hamas-attacks.html">denied direct involvement</a> in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in Israel, in which Hamas fighters <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed about 1,400 people</a> and kidnapped more than 200. </p>
<p>U.S. officials and others have said that it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/">is too soon to determine</a> Iran’s exact role in the violence. </p>
<p>Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/18/israel-hamas-war-how-iran-could-spread-gaza-conflict-through-middle-east/76d4e006-6dcf-11ee-b01a-f593caa04363_story.html">applauded the attacks</a>. </p>
<p>He has called Israel’s ensuing assault on Gaza “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israeli-officials-should-face-trial-their-crimes-2023-10-17/">a genocide</a>,” as <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">Palestinian casualties</a> generate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/gaza-hospital-al-ahli-al-arabi-blast-explosion-protests-demonstrations-middle-east">large protests</a> against the Israeli offensive throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israeli strikes on Gaza since Oct. 7 have <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed more than 3,780 people</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Iran has also threatened “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/iran-warns-of-preemptive-action-against-israel-amid-gaza-war">preemptive</a>” action against Israel if it continues its offensive. </p>
<p>Israel and Hezbollah are now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/hezbollah-lebanon-israel-explained.html">exchanging daily artillery and rocket fire</a>. Israel has drawn a buffer zone near its border with Lebanon and has begun <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiEn_Ga_4SCAxVwlokEHVVMCQ4QvOMEKAB6BAgREAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fisrael-evacuate-residents-town-near-lebanon-border-after-flare-up-2023-10-20%2F&usg=AOvVaw1k3eGVpjw_jNIskM4HpFmI&opi=89978449">evacuating its citizens</a> there. </p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67093081">bombed key airports</a> in Syria, its longtime adversary, which also has strong ties to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>These actions bring Israel, one of America’s closest allies, perilously closer to a wider war with a coalition backed by Iran. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men stand on a city street with a police car nearby and burn a drawn Israeli flag. Behind them is a large billboard of a man with a white beard and black hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn an Israeli flag in Tehran on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tehran-iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-bombing-of-gazas-al-news-photo/1734088645?adppopup=true">Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Iran’s push for regional clout</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, Iran has looked to grow its regional influence while exploiting the differences between the U.S. and Israel.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">helped build Hezbollah</a> in the early 1980s, backing deadly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1696242955-iranian-official-admitting-tie-to-beirut-1983-attack-breaks-decades-of-denial">1983 attacks</a> on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. </p>
<p>In Iraq, Tehran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq">built influence</a> by affiliating itself with friendly Shiite groups following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was one of Iran’s top rivals. </p>
<p>In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have helped the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/">Assad regime gain an upper hand</a> in the country’s ongoing civil war by giving the government weapons, intelligence and troops.</p>
<p>And in Yemen, Iran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">backed Shiite rebel groups</a> that are fighting the government, which is in turn supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>Iran’s support for Palestinian militants</h2>
<p>In the Palestinian territories, meanwhile, Iran has supported militant groups since the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Iranian forces and Hezbollah were <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism">training Hamas fighters</a> in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Iran boosted aid to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjI4vOj_4SCAxWSl4kEHZ58DCkQFnoECCUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Firanprimer.usip.org%2Fresource%2Firan-and-palestinians&usg=AOvVaw2tFw0DL41km7oV3K1act-j&opi=89978449">Hamas during the Second Intifada</a>, a violent Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, and again after a 2006 election victory brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Iran <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GazaCrisis_ENG-151-157.pdf">also gave weapons and money</a> to Hamas during its 2008-09 and 2014 armed conflicts with Israel. </p>
<p>Recurrent fighting in Gaza has helped keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict salient in Middle Eastern politics. This fighting and tension has advanced Iran’s aims of undermining U.S. and Israeli ties with Iran’s Arab rivals, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The United States therefore scored a major diplomatic victory by brokering the 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to have diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Iran announced it made a deal to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">restore diplomatic relations</a> with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, seven years after they broke ties. </p>
<p>After this announcement, U.S. officials tried to make a deal to formalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/">Gaza war has put on ice</a>. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-is-the-only-one-likely-to-benefit-from-hamas-attack-on-israel/">speculated that Iran</a> may have encouraged Hamas to attack Israel precisely for this reason. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden sits next to Benjamin Netanyahu, behind a row of Israel and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-listens-to-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/1730656163?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The diplomatic challenge ahead</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war poses serious diplomatic challenges for the U.S. </p>
<p>Israel’s bombing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/israel-security-officials-signal-readiness-for-ground-offensive-into-gaza">threatened ground invasion</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/israel-says-it-wont-block-humanitarian-aid-entering-gaza-from-egypt">restrictions of aid to Gaza</a> have energized its enemies and created additional tensions with its partners. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-siege-and-bombing-of-gaza-a-massacre">massacre</a>.” Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/">blamed Israel</a> for the violence, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Israel’s campaign amounts to “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sissi-says-israeli-gaza-campaign-has-gone-beyond-right-to-self-defense/">collective punishment</a>” of the people of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Preventing a wider war</h2>
<p>Fraying diplomatic ties among some partners became even more apparent after Hamas accused Israel of the Oct. 17 explosion outside a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/middleeast/gaza-hospital-israel-hamas-explained.html">Gaza hospital</a>. Although Israel and the U.S. have maintained that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-blast-what-we-know-about-explosion-2023-10-18/">Palestinians caused the explosion,</a>, possibly in error, anti-Israel demonstrations quickly swept across the Middle East. </p>
<p>Shortly before President Joe Biden arrived in Israel for a regional visit on Oct. 18, Jordan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-cancels-summit-with-biden-egyptian-leader-amman-2023-10-17/">canceled his planned summit</a> with el-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has tried to balance strong support for Israel with a message of restraint.</p>
<p>During his visit to Israel, Biden defended Israel’s right to respond to protect its borders and people and tried to deter Iran and others from expanding the war. At the same time, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/joe-biden-urges-israel-not-be-consumed-by-rage-pledges-support-netanyahu-gaza-hamas">pressed Israel</a> to follow the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwir-5vN_4SCAxUUvokEHTspDo0QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fhow-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493&usg=AOvVaw2gJZ_OA0_IsqEijkwTksSG&opi=89978449">laws of war</a>, and he secured an Israeli agreement to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207370235/israel-rafah-border-crossing-gaza-humanitarian-aid">allow some aid</a> into Gaza through Egypt. The Egypt-Gaza border crossing opened to allowed some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">bottled war and medical supplies in to Gaza</a> on Oct. 21. </p>
<p>Despite tension and anger across the region, the Biden administration’s effort to deter Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67128900">prevent a wider war</a> aligns with the priorities of most Arab governments, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-arabs-forlorn-envy-of-iranians.html">fear Tehran</a> and its allies are deeply wary about domestic and regional stability. </p>
<p>Perceptions that Tehran is causing escalation and regional instability could push other nations back toward Washington. Pressing for Israeli restraint may be the key both to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and to preventing Iran from emerging a winner from the war in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Ciorciari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s long-term strategy includes eradicating Israel and driving a wedge between Israel and its regional neighbors. So far, the war seems to be accomplishing that goal.John Ciorciari, Professor of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1983952023-01-30T13:13:37Z2023-01-30T13:13:37ZUS debt default could trigger dollar’s collapse – and severely erode America’s political and economic might<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525410/original/file-20230510-12317-tw7ct7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=79%2C70%2C5832%2C3864&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kevin McCarthy., left, Chuck Schumer, right, and President Joe Biden meet at the White House on May 9, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Biden/bd4ffc74fe4e4646a58a1be1324ae5df/photo?Query=mccarthy&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=now-24h&totalCount=57&currentItemNo=42">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-09/joe-biden-kevin-mccarthy-meet-on-debt-limit-as-threat-of-first-us-default-looms?sref=Hjm5biAW">Congressional leaders</a> at loggerheads over a debt ceiling impasse sat down with President Joe Biden on May 9, 2023, as the clock ticks down to a potentially catastrophic default if nothing is done <a href="https://apnews.com/article/x-date-debt-ceiling-yellen-treasury-borrowing-f726fd88a9bb7f72e50f0b948731ac57">by the end of the month</a>.</p>
<p>Republicans, who <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/16/house-control-midterm-elections-results-2022-00066546">regained control of the House of Representatives</a> in November 2022, are <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/politics/debt-ceiling-house-vote-negotiations/index.html">threatening not to allow an increase in the debt limit</a> unless they get spending cuts and regulatory rollbacks in return, which they outlined in a bill passed in April 2023. In so doing, they risk pushing the U.S. government into default.</p>
<p>It feels a lot like a case of déjà vu all over again.</p>
<p>Brinkmanship over the debt ceiling has <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2023-01-17/the-u-s-economy-is-again-being-held-hostage-to-our-ridiculous-federal-debt-ceiling">become a regular ritual</a> – it <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/93043/obama-clinton-debt-ceiling-crisis">happened under the Clinton administration</a> in 1995, then again <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-politics-united-states-government-national-debt-us-republican-party-d6bfc59aa623c8c972c44e1aced85d9c">with Barack Obama as president in 2011</a>, and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11702#:%7E:text=The%20new%20limit%20stands%20just,pace%20of%20federal%20debt%20accumulation.">more recently in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://tci.touro.edu/academics/faculty/">an economist</a>, I know that defaulting on the national debt would have real-life consequences. Even the threat of pushing the U.S. into default has an economic impact. In August 2021, the mere prospect of a potential default led to an <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903454504576492724028210348">unprecedented downgrade</a> of the the nation’s credit rating, hurting America’s financial prestige as well as countless individuals, including retirees.</p>
<p>And that was caused by the mere specter of default. An actual default would be far more damaging. </p>
<h2>Dollar’s collapse</h2>
<p>Possibly the most serious consequence would be the collapse of the U.S. dollar and its replacement as global trade’s “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DollarInGlobalFinance.final_.9.20.pdf">unit of account</a>.” That essentially means that it is widely used in global finance and trade.</p>
<p>Day to day, most Americans are likely unaware of the economic and political power that goes with being the world’s unit of account. Currently, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/08/03/watch-the-us-dollar-is-the-mightiest-of-all-world-currencies-but-is-its-position-under-thr">more than half of world trade</a> – from oil and gold to cars and smartphones – is in U.S. dollars, with the <a href="https://www.swift.com/news-events/news/new-research-highlights-currency-usage-and-trends-global-payments">euro accounting for around 30%</a> and all other currencies making up the balance.</p>
<p>As a result of this dominance, the U.S. is the only country on the planet that can <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dollar-worlds-currency">pay its foreign debt in its own currency</a>. This gives both the U.S. government and American companies tremendous leeway in international trade and finance. </p>
<p>No matter how much debt the U.S. government owes foreign investors, it can simply print the money needed to pay them back – although for economic reasons, it may not be wise to do so. Other countries <a href="https://www.twincities.com/2022/08/21/real-world-economics-why-other-countries-need-our-dollars/">must buy either the dollar or the euro</a> to pay their foreign debt. And the only way for them to do so is to either to export more than they import or borrow more dollars or euros on the international market.</p>
<p>The U.S. is free from such constraints and can <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trade-deficits-consequences-policy-implications/">run up large trade deficits</a> – that is, import more than it exports – for decades without the same consequences.</p>
<p>For American companies, the dominance of the dollar means they’re <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/01/07/the-dollars-international-role-an-exorbitant-privilege-2/">not as subject to the exchange rate risk</a> as are their foreign competitors. Exchange rate risk refers to how changes in the relative value of currencies may affect a company’s profitability.</p>
<p>Since international trade is generally denominated in dollars, U.S. businesses can buy and sell in their own currency, something their foreign competitors cannot do as easily. As simple as this sounds, it gives American companies a tremendous competitive advantage. </p>
<p>If Republicans push the U.S. into default, the dollar would likely <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-us-defaults-on-debt-expect-the-dollar-to-fall-and-with-it-americans-standard-of-living-169079">lose its position as the international unit of account</a>, forcing the government and companies to pay their international bills in another currency.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A mincer shows dollars being inserted in the top and shredded underneath." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C3903%2C2872&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506839/original/file-20230127-23-j6o3xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.S. debt default would mangle the dollar’s international reputation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/destroying-dollars-with-a-grinder-royalty-free-image/154934035?phrase=dollar%20ripped&adppopup=true">photovideostock/E+ via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Loss of political power too</h2>
<p>The dollar’s dominance means trade must go through an American bank at some point. This is one important way it gives the U.S. tremendous political power, especially to punish economic rivals and unfriendly governments.</p>
<p>For example, when former President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-to-impose-crushing-sanctions-on-iran-in-defiance-of-european-humanitarian-concerns/2020/10/07/f29c052c-08f4-11eb-991c-be6ead8c4018_story.html">imposed economic sanctions on Iran</a>, he <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/dollar-and-the-united-states-exorbitant-power-to-sanction/419F2FDF5BF6E052258DEE592853D6C3">denied the country access to American banks and to the dollar</a>. He also imposed secondary sanctions, which means that non-American companies trading with Iran were also sanctioned. Given a choice of access to the dollar or trading with Iran, <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-u-s-secondary-sanctions">most of the world economies</a> chose access to the dollar and complied with the sanctions. As a result, Iran entered a deep recession, and <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=IRR&view=10Y">its currency plummeted</a> about 30%.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden did something similar <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/28/biden-administration-expands-russia-sanctions-cuts-off-us-transactions-with-central-bank.html">against Russia</a> in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Limiting Russia’s access to the dollar has helped <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-economy-end-2022-deeper-troubles">push the country into a recession</a> that’s bordering on a depression.</p>
<p>No other country today could unilaterally impose this level of economic pain on another country. And all an American president currently needs is a pen. </p>
<h2>Rivals rewarded</h2>
<p>Another consequence of the dollar’s collapse would be enhancing the position of the U.S.’s top rival for global influence: China.</p>
<p>While the euro would likely replace the dollar as the world’s primary unit of account, the <a href="https://financialpost.com/moneywise/could-chinas-yuan-replace-the-u-s-dollar-as-the-worlds-dominant-currency#:%7E:text=The%20researchers%20argue%20that%20replacing,in%20a%20%E2%80%9Cmultipolar%E2%80%9D%20world.">Chinese yuan</a> would move into second place.</p>
<p>If the yuan were to become a significant international unit of account, this would enhance China’s international position both economically and politically. As it is, China has been working with the other BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia and India – to accept the yuan as a unit of account. With the other three already <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/can-brics-dedollarize-the-global-financial-system/0AEF98D2F232072409E9556620AE09B0">resentful of U.S. economic and political dominance</a>, a U.S. default would support that effort. </p>
<p>They may not be alone: Recently, Saudi Arabia suggested it was open to <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/saudi-arabia-just-said-now-213200817.html">trading some of its oil in currencies other than the dollar</a> – something that would change long-standing policy.</p>
<h2>Severe consequences</h2>
<p>Beyond the impact on the dollar and the economic and political clout of the U.S., a default would be profoundly felt in many other ways and by countless people. </p>
<p>In the U.S., tens of millions of Americans and thousands of companies that depend on government support <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/10/06/life-after-default/">could suffer</a>, and the economy would most likely sink into recession – or worse, given the U.S. is already expected to soon suffer a downturn. In addition, retirees could see the worth of their pensions dwindle.</p>
<p>The truth is, we really don’t know what will happen or how bad it will get. The scale of the damage caused by a U.S. default is hard to calculate in advance because it has never happened before. </p>
<p>But there’s one thing we can be certain of. If Republicans take their threat of default too far, the U.S. and Americans will suffer tremendously.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on Jan. 30, 2023</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Humphries does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As President Biden begins meeting with congressional leaders to resolve the debt ceiling showdown, an economist warns the consequences of a default could be dire.Michael Humphries, Deputy Chair of Business Administration, Touro UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837662022-09-27T12:27:49Z2022-09-27T12:27:49ZUnrest across Iran continues under state’s extreme gender apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486562/original/file-20220926-4427-sp0ee8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=610%2C277%2C2475%2C1799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Sept. 21, 2022, photo, Iranian demonstrators gather along a street in Tehran.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-obtained-by-afp-outside-iran-on-september-21-shows-news-photo/1243408188?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-death-widespread-protests-intl-hnk/index.html">Unrest continues to erupt across Iran</a> following the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, who died after being arrested and reportedly beaten by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">Iran’s morality police</a>. </p>
<p>The Iranian force took Mahsa (Zhina) Amini into detention on Sept. 16, 2022, for not wearing her hijab according to the rules. </p>
<p>As of Oct. 26, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63397159">at least 234 people have been confirmed killed</a> and hundreds have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/iran-deadly-crackdown-on-protests-against-mahsa-aminis-death-in-custody-needs-urgent-global-action/?fbclid=IwAR3lh8TLZ8Nyxhx0hMA9WPyg0ZmLmSqkAJQ0qFjvFI7UIIZhxlcHWmD5Gcc">arrested and wounded</a> in protests that erupted after Amini’s death. </p>
<p>As a Kurdish-born scholar and <a href="https://cah.ucf.edu/languages/faculty-staff/profile/414">a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Central Florida</a>, I have previously written about <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100">gender in Middle Eastern cultures</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">Iranian protests</a>.</p>
<p>With the exception of bland condemnations, the discrimination against women in Iran is often overlooked while the world focuses on <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578024/EXPO_IDA(2017)578024_EN.pdf">limiting the country’s nuclear capabilities</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">Some scholars and activists</a> have criticized international law for its lack of initiative and public action in recognizing Iran’s systematic discrimination against women as gender apartheid and acting to prevent it.</p>
<p>But many discriminatory laws, including those forcing women to cover their head and face with a hijab, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/there-are-two-types-of-hijabs-the-difference-is-huge/2019/04/07/50a44574-57f0-11e9-814f-e2f46684196e_story.html">honor neither tradition nor religion</a> and are applied to women of all ethnicities and faiths.</p>
<p>After all, Amini was not a Shiite woman by ethnicity or religion. </p>
<h2>Iran’s gender apartheid</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Islamic Revolution</a> established a republic that implements similar inhumane policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/apartheid">South Africa under the government’s former brutal apartheid regime</a>. </p>
<p>The laws and policies in Iran establish and maintain domination by men and the state over women and their right to choose their own clothing or obtain a divorce. Systematic gender inequalities are prescribed legally and enforced by the regime to deny the women the “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">right to life and liberty</a>” and “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">basic human rights and freedoms</a>,” which according to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Article II of the United Nations’ Apartheid Convention in 1973</a>, are considered “the crime of apartheid.”</p>
<p>For example, according to <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2017/07/married-women-in-iran-still-need-permission-to-travel-abroad-under-amendment-to-passport-law/">Article 18 of Iran’s Passport Law</a>, a married woman still needs written permission from her male guardian to travel abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several cars are unable to move through thousands of demonstrators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of demonstrators stop traffic in Iran on Sept. 19, 2022, to protest the death of Mahsa Amini while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-in-protest-against-the-death-of-mahsa-amini-news-photo/1426271257?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women in Iran are unable to hold any positions within the judicial, religious and military systems, nor are they able to serve as members of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/09/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/">Assembly of Experts</a>, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-institutions/the-expediency-council">Expediency Discernment Council</a> or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Guardians">Guardian Council</a>, the three highest councils in the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>Women under law cannot be president or supreme leader of
Iran. <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">According to Article 115</a>, the president of the Islamic Republic must be elected from among the “religious and political men.”</p>
<p>In addition, the Iranian state <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">has added discriminatory features to the criminal code</a> – one such feature is the principle that the value of a woman is one-half of the value of a man. </p>
<p>That principle applies in matters involving compensation for a killing and in what a son or daughter receives from a family inheritance. They also apply in the weight given to legal testimony or in obtaining a divorce.</p>
<p>Such laws, policies and practices continue to mark women as lesser citizens, legally and socially unequal.</p>
<h2>Segregation in daily life</h2>
<p>The state also has imposed <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202209012125">systematic segregation</a> in schools, hospitals, universities, transportation, sports and other major areas of day-to-day life.</p>
<p>For many decades, Iran’s gender apartheid had relegated women to the back of the bus with <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/women-place-politics-gender-segregation-iran">a metal bar segregating</a> them from men.</p>
<p>Under the government’s direction, universities <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/middleeast/20iht-educbriefs20.html">have set limits on women’s options</a> and have banned them from many fields of study. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/31/iran-women-blocked-entering-stadium#:%7E:text=Over%20the%20past%2040%20years,detention%2C%20and%20abuses%20against%20women.">generally barred female spectators</a> from soccer and other sports stadiums since the 1979 revolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protestor in California holds a sign with the image of the 22-year-old Iranian woman who died in Iranian police custody." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in California hold signs at a protest over the death of Mahsa Amini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-hold-signs-at-a-protest-over-the-death-last-news-photo/1427444152?adppopup=true">Rodin Eckenroth/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clerics play a major role in decision-making and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220330-iran-again-bans-women-from-football-stadium">have argued that women must be shielded</a> from the masculine atmosphere and sight of semi-clad men during sporting events.</p>
<p>Under such discriminatory policies, the Persian terms such as za'ifeh, meaning weak and incapable, has found its way into <a href="https://vajehyab.com/dehkhoda/%D8%B6%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%A9">Persian dictionaries</a> as synonyms for “woman” and “wife.”</p>
<h2>‘Women, life, freedom’</h2>
<p>Iran’s notorious extrajudicial morality police <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">have terrorized women for decades</a>. </p>
<p>Like the articles of the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en">Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran</a>, principles of the morality police are founded on an interpretation of <a href="https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/hadith-collection">canonical Shiite texts</a> and are implemented through modern tools of control and prosecution.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A fire is blazing in the middle of a street in Iran as hundreds of people gather." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather in Tehran on Sept. 19, 2022, during a protest for 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-during-a-protest-for-mahsa-amini-who-died-news-photo/1243377054?adppopup=true">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In international criminal law, specific unlawful acts that are committed within a system of oppression and domination are considered crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>As set out in the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Apartheid Convention</a>, these crimes include denial of basic rights that prevent a racial group or groups from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country. </p>
<p>Most known for the brutal regime in South Africa, apartheid comes from the Afrikaans word meaning “apartness.” It <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">was the ideology</a> that was introduced in South Africa in 1948 and supported by the National Party government. </p>
<p>The compulsory hijab is at the center of what I call Iran’s extreme gender apartheid, where a misplaced headscarf can result in up to <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/anti-hijab-activist-in-iran-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison/30133081.html">15 years in prison</a>, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/04/iran.stoning/index.html">lashing</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-women-fined-260-bad-hijabs">fines</a> and inhumane and unlawful arrest and death.</p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/middleeast/iran-hijab-law-report-intl/index.html">anti-compulsory hijab movements</a> emerge every few years in Iran, such as in the case of Zhina Amini.</p>
<p>In the Kurdish language, her name originates from “jin,” the word for woman and shares a root with the word for life, “jiyan.”</p>
<p>Those Kurdish words are at the heart of the most used slogan by
the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-small-but-powerful-band-of-women-led-the-fight-against-isis">Kurdish Female Fighters against the Islamic State</a> in Iraq and Syria, and by women across Iran today against the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<p>Add in “azadi” – the Kurdish word for freedom – and the slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” means “Women, Life, Freedom” and is resounding among protesters in streets throughout Iran and the world to dismantle the state’s gender apartheid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, women in Iran have been forced to accept second-class citizenship, as Shiite religious leaders control most aspects of women’s lives.Haidar Khezri, Assistant Professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901002022-09-12T12:14:26Z2022-09-12T12:14:26ZIran and the US appear unlikely to reach a new nuclear deal – leaving everyone more unsafe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483764/original/file-20220909-22-qg7ha0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=335%2C73%2C5111%2C3456&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man reads an Iranian newspaper with a headline in Farsi that says, 'The night of the end of the JCPOA,' or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/man-reads-the-iranian-newspaper-etemad-with-the-front-page-title-in-picture-id1242542718">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s standoff with the United States over its potential nuclear weapons program is unlikely to ease anytime soon. </p>
<p>The U.S. and Iran launched talks in 2021 to renew a <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran">now-defunct political deal</a> that would curb Iran’s nuclear program. </p>
<p>But the window for Iran and the U.S. to rejoin and return to compliance of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">lapsed 2015 nuclear deal</a>, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is quickly closing. China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. all agreed to the plan with Iran in 2015. The U.S. pulled out of the deal in 2018, effectively derailing it.</p>
<p>But U.S. officials told Israel’s Prime Minister Yair Lapid <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-07/us-told-israel-that-iran-nuclear-deal-unlikely-soon-report-says">on Sept. 7, 2022</a>, that despite ongoing talks in Vienna, it was unlikely the group of countries would sign a deal anytime soon. </p>
<p>European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell previously emphasized <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/004f0d5a-0eca-4ea0-a423-0184481d033c">on Sept. 5, 2022</a>, that efforts to reach a new agreement are “in danger” due to recent divergences between the U.S. and Iranian positions. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nina-srinivasan-rathbun-1333993">worked</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/price-of-peace-motivated-reasoning-and-costly-signaling-in-international-relations/931AC830FEB7D24D26800E22558D9F9D">researched</a> nuclear nonproliferation and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-90978-3">U.S. national security</a> for two decades. When diplomacy fails to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly by a state like Iran that engages in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/regional-perspectives-iran-0">malicious acts</a> throughout the region, everyone in the world is less safe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A middle aged man with salt and pepper hair and a beard wears a dark suit and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483763/original/file-20220909-20-libduz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, waves in Vienna on Aug. 4, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/irans-chief-nuclear-negotiator-ali-bagheri-kani-waves-as-he-leaves-picture-id1242298742">Alex Halada/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US and Iran reach a deal – temporarily</h2>
<p>The U.S. and its allies have been concerned about Iran’s possible pursuit of nuclear weapons since intelligence uncovered its covert nuclear program, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/world/middleeast/04intel.html">suspended since 2003</a>. Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. and its allies’ security and destabilize the Middle East, likely encouraging more Middle Eastern countries to try to develop the weapons themselves.</p>
<p>After decades of disagreement, the U.S. and Iran signed <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm">a deal in 2015</a> that halted Iran’s development of nuclear technology and stockpiling of nuclear material in exchange for lifting multiple <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1737-%282006%29">international economic</a> sanctions <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1929-%282010%29">placed on</a> Iran.</p>
<p>This was significant because it lengthened the amount of time it would take Iran to stockpile the nuclear material to build a nuclear bomb to over a year. It halted Iran’s development of more advanced enrichment capabilities.</p>
<p>It also gave the <a href="https://www.iaea.org">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, a nuclear watchdog organization that is part of the United Nations, more oversight over Iranian nuclear activity, letting U.N. inspectors regularly observe all of Iran’s nuclear sites. </p>
<p>But the deal <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/new-iran-deal-means-old-chaos">fell through in 2018</a> when the U.S. withdrew from the agreement under former President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">Donald Trump</a> and reimposed hundreds of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/11/05/664275967/new-u-s-sanctions-against-iran-go-into-effect">economic sanctions</a> on Iran. </p>
<p>Iran waited until 2019 before it officially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-has-gone-beyond-nuclear-deals-uranium-enrichment-limit-iaea-idUSKCN1U31Y1">broke the 2015 agreement</a> by enriching uranium enrichment above the permitted 3.67% purity levels set by the deal. This alone did not substantially rule out eventually returning to the 2015 agreement. </p>
<p>Since then, however, Iran has developed its nuclear technology – but has <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jan/27/bill-burns-iran">not developed actual nuclear bombs</a>. </p>
<h2>Returning to the 2015 deal</h2>
<p>If Iran rejoined a nuclear agreement with the U.S., it would need to export its stockpile of enriched uranium, allow the U.N. nuclear watchdogs to oversee all of its nuclear facilities and stop research into nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>It is extremely difficult to return to a diplomatic agreement in which one side has to make additional concessions and return to a previous status quo.</p>
<p>When I worked in multilateral nuclear diplomacy for the U.S. State Department, we saw talks fail regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks">2009, after six years</a> of on-and-off progress. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, Iran seems to be on a similar path. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html">an explosion</a> that caused a blackout occurred in Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facilities. Iran then began enriching uranium to its highest level of purity ever documented, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-uranium-enrichment-60-percent-ed89e322595004fddc65fd4e31c1131b">above 60%</a> – a level that is very close to what is required to get weapons-grade uranium.</p>
<p>Iran’s decision <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events">over the past few years</a> to reduce access to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring equipment and to begin research into uranium metals, necessary for weaponization, also moved it further away from the possibility of returning to the 2015 deal.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The backs of two men in suits are shown as they have their arms around each other. The European Union and Iran flags are on either side of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483767/original/file-20220909-12282-fhiptf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, left, welcomes Josep Borell, the European Union’s foreign affairs and security representative, in Tehran in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/irans-foreign-minister-hossein-amirabdollahian-welcomes-josep-borell-picture-id1241518184">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran today</h2>
<p>Iran currently has the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-nuclear-bomb-claims-technical-ability-to-build-israel-us/">technical ability</a> to produce a nuclear bomb within a few weeks, though not the weaponization knowledge necessary to build it. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00254-7">A different kind of technology</a> is needed to actually design and manufacture a bomb, which may take Iran about two years to develop.</p>
<p>Iran’s technical ability to develop a nuclear weapon <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-fran-eizenstat-and-eizenstat-family-memorial-lecture-series/">reduces the value</a> for the U.S. government of returning to the 2015 deal since Iran’s knowledge cannot be put back into Pandora’s box. </p>
<p>A return to the agreement, however, could help the U.S. and Iran step back from the edge, build trust and perhaps develop better political relations. Both sides would benefit from this stabilization: Iran economically from being reintegrated into the international system, and the U.S. from a verifiable lengthening of the time it would take Iran to break out.</p>
<p>None of this is guaranteed.</p>
<p>While both sides <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/report_iranians-americans-support-mutual-JCPOA-return.pdf">expressed support</a> for a return to the 2015 deal in early 2021, and continue to do so, there remain a number of sticking points that prevent progress. </p>
<p>Priorities for Iran include the U.S. removing the Iranian paramilitary group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a> from its list of foreign terrorist organizations and getting a guarantee that no future U.S. president would renege on the renewed nuclear deal. </p>
<p>The main issues for the U.S. center around the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/17/iran-still-has-three-american-hostages-so-far-trump-has-done-little-free-them/">American hostages</a> currently held in Iran and the desire to lengthen the time it would take Iran to stockpile material for a nuclear bomb. </p>
<p>The European Union’s <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-nuclear-deal-eu-text-responses/31980637.html">final text for the proposed agreement</a> from August 2022 presents a last-ditch attempt to map out a return to the advantages of the nuclear deal. </p>
<p>Unless Iran accepts European reassurances, a deal seems increasingly unlikely. Unfortunately, Iran is then likely to increase its nuclear capabilities toward weaponization and further undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring of its program. Such escalations would precipitate increasingly confrontational responses, making any new agreement extremely unlikely, while heightening tensions and increasing the possibility of regional conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Srinivasan Rathbun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A nuclear nonproliferation expert explains why Iran was always unlikely to return to the 2015 international agreement that limited its nuclear weapon development.Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of international relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1874042022-07-21T15:10:09Z2022-07-21T15:10:09ZRussia and Iran’s growing friendship shows their weakness not their strength<p>Facing economic and military difficulties in his invasion of Ukraine, the Russian president Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62234183">popped up this week</a> in Iran’s capital Tehran. His plan was to show the world that, despite sanctions on Moscow and international aid for Ukraine’s resistance, he was not isolated.</p>
<p>Putin got his photo opportunity with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who bashed the US and Nato, insisting: “If you [Russia] had not taken the initiative, the other side would have caused the war with its own initiative.” There were more pictures with the Iranian and Turkish presidents, Ebrahim Raisi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>For “anti-imperialist” — and thus pro-Kremlin — news sites such as <a href="https://thecradle.co/Article/Columns/13034">The Cradle</a>, this was proof of a new emerging bloc. The Biden administration also saw a potential axis, declaring that Iran is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/17/us/politics/drones-ukraine-russia-iran.html">preparing to</a> send hundreds of armed drones to Moscow amid Russia’s military deficiencies and losses.</p>
<p>But, beyond the pictures and posturing, the reality is more mundane. Russia’s relationship with Iran is not an alliance, but a convergence of interests at a time of crisis for each country. And the driver for this convergence is not strength but weakness: both Putin and the supreme leader are thumping their chests as a vaingloriously defiant response to international sanctions, political blowback over their ventures and the limits of their armed forces.</p>
<p>This is a pact of the isolated.</p>
<h2>The Syria catalyst</h2>
<p>Iran’s post-1979 relations with Moscow have fluctuated. Despite recognising the Islamic Republic, <a href="https://merip.org/1987/09/the-ussr-and-the-gulf-war/">the Soviets supplied Saddam Hussein</a> with weapons throughout the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The end of this conflict, soon followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought reconciliation with economic links, <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_frr01.html">arms deals</a>, and an agreement for Russia to build Iran’s first nuclear reactor at Bushehr.</p>
<p>But amid the post-9/11 Middle East and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Putin – still consolidating his own power in Russia – played a cautious hand. Russia let the US tangle itself in knots in the region, but shared US and European concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. </p>
<p>Moscow was <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/10/getting-new-iran-deal/2-road-jcpoa-brief-history">part of the P5+1 powers</a> (Russia, US, UK, France, Germany, China) negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran. It supported UN sanctions and suspended a deal with Iran to deliver advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. Iranians chided the Russians over delays in the completion of the Bushehr reactor.</p>
<p>The catalyst for a closer relationship was the Syrian uprising of March 2011. Both Russia and Iran <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">provided logistical, intelligence and propaganda support</a> for the Assad regime from the outset of its repression of mass protests. With Assad’s military at risk of dissolution, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2020/07/iran-military-agreement-syria-assad-regime/">Tehran committed itself</a> in September 2012 to establish a 50,000-strong Syrian militia, and brought in Iranian personnel fighters from Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Opposition factions, Kurdish groups and the Islamic State still took most of Syria. So in September 2015, Russia launched its massive military intervention with special forces, sieges and bombardment of the opposition territory. Bashar al-Assad was propped up, and Syria fractured into three parts: Turkish-backed opposition in the northwest, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, and Russian and Iranian-backed regime territory elsewhere.</p>
<p>Linked by their calculations that Assad was the flawed but preferred vehicle for their positions, Russia and Iran had established a short-term “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/4/510/5532519">tacit security arrangement</a>” – “tacit” meaning the relationship is limited, informal and based on mutual interests</p>
<p>Russia has increasingly spoken out against US sanctions on Tehran, but it is still part of the P5+1 process to bring the US back into the deal — and to ensure Iranian compliance. It has maintained a cautious approach to conflicts between the US, Iran and other parties from Iraq to Lebanon to Yemen to Israel and Palestine. Moscow may seek benefit from its relationship with Iran, but Putin is also seeking this with Iranian rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p>
<h2>The Ukraine catalyst</h2>
<p>On February 24 2022, Putin sent most of Russia’s armed forces into neighbouring Ukraine.</p>
<p>Iran-related complications were immediately evident. With the negotiations on a renewed Iranian nuclear deal close to completion, Russia threatened to derail them by demanding that sanctions — imposed over the invasion — be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/iran-nuclear-talks-rocked-by-russian-demand-for-sanctions-exemption">lifted on Moscow as well on Tehran</a>.</p>
<p>The Russians soon backed down amid Iranian objections. But another difficulty ensued: with Moscow failing to seize Kyiv and topple the Zelenskiy government quickly — and taking heavy losses in its operations — Russia had to <a href="https://syriadirect.org/amid-war-in-ukraine-russia-withdraws-and-iran-expands-in-syria/">draw down on its military positions</a> in Syria. That raised questions about Iran’s deployment, including whether it takes over those positions, and opened the space for Turkey’s Erdoğan to threaten renewed military operations into northern Syria.</p>
<p>Most significantly, the international response put more pressure on a Russian economy that was already struggling. Moscow has never fulfilled repeated declarations that it would provide billions of dollars in loans to help Tehran in the face of international sanctions. Now it finds itself in the same boat.</p>
<p>Salvation is unlikely to be forthcoming any time soon. China and India are happy to take advantage of heavily discounted oil from both Russia and Iran, but both are maintaining a cautious line over any bailout of Moscow with either economic or military assistance. Biden patched up the US position with Saudi Arabia and the UAE during his trip to the region, and both still treat Iran as a rival – even if the Emirates are talking of an expanded diplomatic presence in Tehran.</p>
<h2>Putin left alone</h2>
<p>The most dramatic image from Tehran was not of Putin with the supreme leader, or of him with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts. It was a minute-long video of Putin waiting alone to meet the Turkish president. In March 2020, he tried to humiliate Erdoğan by leaving him for <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/putin-upsets-erdogan-by-making-him-wait-for-meeting-report-84002">several minutes in a hallway</a>. Now Erdoğan got payback by making the Russian wait, pacing and puffing out his cheeks as cameras rolled.</p>
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<p>It was a powerful reminder that no PR visit could substitute for the consequences of an invasion entering its sixth month. And it was a marker of where Putin finds himself that his only solace — as he looked small in a chair beside a tiny side table as the supreme leader addressed him from a distance — was the Iranian leadership finds itself just as isolated internationally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is not so much an alliance as a coalition of the isolated.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1848612022-06-16T13:29:45Z2022-06-16T13:29:45ZHello Commander: new pop song aims to steer Iranian youth away from the temptations of American culture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469068/original/file-20220615-21-oyvyhc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C174%2C1017%2C748&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Give me the child: Iranian children on their first day at kindergarten.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sonia Sevilla via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Tehran Times <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/473059/Hello-Commander">recently hailed</a> what it referred to as: “A new epic song themed with generational support for the Islamic Revolution…” Hello Commander, which is being sung by schoolchildren across the country, is an attempt by the current conservative government of Iran to unify the youth around their particular interpretation of Islam and Iran. </p>
<p>This is nothing but a cultural war against ideas perceived to be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8cbe0df0-bd55-49c9-b574-e84236a743b5">dangerous to the power of the conservative establishment</a> espoused by many Iranians within the country and those who were educated abroad, including in Europe and North America.</p>
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<p>Iran occupies a special place in the imagination of the world. It is an ancient country. It is Persia, Cyrus the Great, the seat of some of the most mesmerising empires of world history. It is also a country that is on the cusp of nuclear weapons capability. Therefore, it is crucial to understand Iran and to do so without falling for platitudes.</p>
<p>Before the revolution of 1979, Iran had in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090506815000822">Mohammad Reza Pahlavi</a> a bon vivant, self-indulgent shah who loved his glass of vintage Moët & Chandon champagne, while many Iranians considered him a US puppet. After the revolution, Iran was ruled by an ascetic, stern and incredibly stoic cleric, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini">Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini</a>. He quickly banned many ancient Persian indulgences in the name of his puritanical interpretation of Shia Islam.</p>
<p>Today, the residues of this paradoxical historical set-up continue to drive Iranian culture. This is true within the country and outside, among the vastly successful Iranian diaspora who are equally caught up in this battle for Iran’s “real” identity. </p>
<p>Hello Commander has to be analysed against that backdrop. It is a state-sponsored effort to unify a beautifully diverse culture. The song portrays a version of Iran from the perspective of the religious conservatives. This is how Iran should be, they tell everyone: vigilant, religiously conservative, ready to sacrifice for a higher cause. The problem is of course, that this is not how Iran really is – and this explains the ongoing dissent against this restrictive version of the country.</p>
<h2>Conservative viewpoint</h2>
<p>Many Iranians simply object to being moulded into one ideological corpus.</p>
<p>This is being driven by hardline religious conservatives whose candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, took power at <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/19/world-reacts-to-election-of-irans-new-hardline-president-raisi">the 2021 presidential election</a>. Their Iran is righteous, combative, always on the outlook for the evil enemy. They feed on the paranoia that real imperial intrusions into Iranian sovereignty brought about until the revolution of 1979 and in many ways thereafter, especially by the US. </p>
<p>In 1980, the country was invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – one of the cruellest dictators in the modern history of the region. And yet Saddam was supported by the US and Europe during the devastating Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 – even when he used chemical weapons. </p>
<p>For the religious conservatives, these are literally God-given themes. They are incredibly useful for their effort to freeze their Iran in an eternal struggle with the world. As such, the song Hello Commander is an ode to the “martyrs” of that horrible conflict during which tens of thousands of young Iranians and Iraqis perished. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_mQtgHxzWM">official video</a> of the song, Iranian children hold up the pictures of their loved ones who were killed in the trenches. At the same time, Hello Commander is a “hopeful” song as it is meant to pronounce the willingness of this Iranian youth to fight for justice. </p>
<p>With its mildly martial yet strongly ritualistic melody that speaks to emotive religious themes, the song targets a youth culture that is as diverse as the aforementioned Iranian experience with the world. Within a cultural environment where Iranian rap music dominates and where most middle-class Iranians listen to pop songs produced in diasporic hubs such as Los Angeles, Hello Commander seems a rather clumsy effort to switch such worldly preferences to the conservative establishment’s extremely particular and restrictive interpretation of Iran. </p>
<p>The ideal youth that the song envisages has long been socialised into adulthood and the tough social realities that the US sanctions regime exacerbates for ordinary Iranians. There is no time for ideological indulgence. The lyrics of Hello Commander summon the Imam Mahdi, the eternal commander of the faithful. Imam Mahdi plays a major part in the doctrines of the pious <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Twelver-Shia">Twelver Shia</a>, the minority Islamic sect that dominates in Iran, Iraq, southern Lebanon and elsewhere. </p>
<p>The song also pays particular tribute to <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">General Qassem Soleimani</a>, who was assassinated in 2020 at the behest of Donald Trump. It rails against the eternal harassment of the faithful by external enemies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">Qassem Soleimani air strike: why this is a dangerous escalation of US assassination policy</a>
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<h2>Denying diversity</h2>
<p>But Hello Commander preaches to the converted. Its narrow script does not capture the vastness of the cultural repository that emanates from Iran. Iranian youth, like young people all over the world, is diverse and not readily subsumed under one narrative. </p>
<p>Iran has a highly educated population and successful universities. It is also a country that is besieged by US sanctions. Most Iranians are busy trying to make ends meet. The hopeful tenor of the song may boost the morale of the converted, but it must seem rather cynical to many Iranian workers who suffer under the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/iran-sanctions-regime">yoke of sanctions</a> and the harsh conservative focus of the establishment. </p>
<p>In light of this complexity of contemporary Persia, I asked what Iran “is” in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/what-is-iran/DEF09087AF82337BFF9EF22C13DE75B3">my most recent book under the same title</a>, making reference to five pieces of Iranian music. The answer could only be captured in vast open-ended parentheses. Iran is the love poetry of Rumi, the architecture of Persepolis – Shia Islam too. The ancient historical diversity of the country can’t be reduced to platitudes. Whenever this happens, history has shown, Persia breaks free.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arshin Adib-Moghaddam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iranian children are being encouraged to sing and dance to a new ‘pop’ song, which reflects the conservative values of the country’s religious hardliners.Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Professor in Global Thought and Comparative Philosophies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1770942022-02-15T13:40:19Z2022-02-15T13:40:19ZIran nuclear deal: to reset relations with Tehran, Biden must overcome a long legacy of mistrust at home<p>As officials from Washington and Tehran <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/nuclear-talks-with-iran-enter-the-endgame/21807592">return to Vienna</a> for talks that aim to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran hawks in the US Congress are determined to prevent that happening. In <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/593392-republican-senators-threaten-to-block-iran-deal">a letter sent to</a> the US president Joe Biden on February 7, Republican US senator Ted Cruz and 31 of his colleagues threatened to block any attempt to revive the agreement.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a> (JCPOA) signed in 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) was seen internationally as a major coup for the Obama administration. But Barack Obama was followed into the White House by Donald Trump, who pulled the US out of the agreement in 2018 and reimposed severe sanctions, under a policy of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-10-15/michael-pompeo-secretary-of-state-on-confronting-iran">“maximum pressure”</a>. </p>
<p>This set relations between the US and Iran firmly back on a hostile path. A string of bellicose incidents by both sides resulted, including the assassination of Iran’s most powerful security and intelligence commander, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/suleimani-dead.html">General Qassem Soleimani</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>This isn’t the first time domestic political forces have sought to undo glimmers of rapprochement between these two countries which have been at loggerheads for so many years. As <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">our latest research</a> demonstrates, conditions at the international and domestic levels have rarely aligned in a way that would be favourable to attempts to ease tension. US-Iran relations have become “stuck”, with potentially damaging consequences for regional and international order.</p>
<p>This logjam is not irreversible. The underlying geopolitical sources of tension are real, but should not be overhyped by the US and its allies. A cold war with Iran is neither necessary nor inevitable. Biden may just have one last chance to avert new dangers and set this turbulent relationship on a more normal path before domestic forces once again slam the door shut.</p>
<h2>The shadow of geopolitics</h2>
<p>A quick review of US-Iran relations within the wider ebbs and flows of geopolitics provides a superficially compelling picture, revealing half a century of deep tensions, in which Iran’s nuclear aspirations are inextricably entangled.</p>
<p>The revolution of 1979 stripped the US of a vital regional ally in the cold war and, since then, events have often conspired to set relations on opposing paths. These include the hostage crisis during the early post-revolutionary years and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, in which the US mostly supported Iraq. </p>
<p>More recently, with the events surrounding 9/11, the Iraq war, the Arab spring uprisings and beyond, US-Iran relations have become embedded in a complex landscape of regional conflicts and rivalries. These have often involved shifting alliances between states and non-state actors, for example <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/07/21/Biden-slams-Iran-s-support-for-Hezbollah-US-extends-national-emergency-for-Lebanon">Iran’s support of Hezbollah</a> in Lebanon or <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/24/yemen-houthi-uae-israel-iran-abraham-accords/">the Houthis</a> in Yemen’s ongoing war.</p>
<p>In attempting a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/index.html">reset on the nuclear deal</a>, Biden and his European allies believe that negotiations are desirable and that peaceful coexistence is possible. And some commentators have argued that the threat from Iran – at least in military terms – has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">been inflated</a>. Iran may have a large army and significant military capabilities in some areas, but in others they are ageing and stretched. Arab Gulf states are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29333.pdf">spending more</a> and modernising faster. This situation is exacerbated by the impact of US sanctions and the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-covid-19-pandemic-response-mission-critical">fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic</a>.</p>
<p>After decades of misunderstanding and resentment, the stakes are high on both sides, and geopolitics are just <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">one side of the story</a>.</p>
<h2>False starts and missed opportunities</h2>
<p>To seize any geopolitical window of opportunity, US policymakers must overcome serious domestic obstacles. Public enmity towards Iran has proved <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx">remarkably durable</a> in the US – partly due to pressure from powerful interest groups, including the <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby">pro-Israel lobby</a>. As one former official <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">put it</a>: “From a political standpoint, nobody pays a price to be tough on Iran.”</p>
<p>Time and again, presidents have sought to engage constructively (if tentatively) with Iran in their first year, only for political forces – including the simple need to win elections – to extinguish hopes of establishing a lasting rapprochement.</p>
<p>Biden need look no further than his experience in the Obama administration for a cautionary tale. Obama came into office committed to easing four decades of mistrust. This was part of a broader effort to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/us/politics/12prexy.html">“reset” US policy in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>A series of gestures were initiated, including a conciliatory <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HY_utC-hrjI.">statement</a> marking the Iranian New Year and a private exchange of letters with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, expressing interest in dialogue. But under pressure from the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu – and with sanctions legislation gaining traction in Congress – the White House switched track, instead embracing an open-ended policy of economic coercion for the remainder of Obama’s first term. “Opposing sanctions might have been good policy,” policymakers privately <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">conceded</a>, “but it was bad politics.”</p>
<p>The crucial diplomatic breakthroughs leading to the JCPOA came during Obama’s second term. Only after the president was safely re-elected was he able and willing to absorb the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/iran-nuclear-deal-congress-fight-looms">ferocious</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html">backlash</a> from political opponents that followed.</p>
<h2>A decisive moment</h2>
<p>In Vienna, time is running out to save the 2015 nuclear deal. With talks reaching a “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-nuclear-talks-iran-decisive-moment-82374261">decisive moment</a>”, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-mary-louise-kelley-of-nprs-all-things-considered/">has warned that</a> the US is willing to consider ramping up pressure on Iran if no breakthrough is reached within “a few weeks”. But for Iran, any successful deal must include the removal of punitive US sanctions.</p>
<p>As pressure from Congress increases and Biden’s domestic political standing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/10/bidens-approval-rating-continues-erode-including-with-vital-parts-his-base/">continues to weaken</a>, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-why-russia-might-invade-ukraine-and-why-the-us-is-involved-175371">other issues</a> crowding the security agenda, the current administration’s best chance of resolving 40 years of enmity hangs in the balance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To revive the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, Biden must face down his political opponents in the US.Andrew Payne, Hedley Bull Research Fellow in International Relations, University of OxfordLouise Fawcett, Professor of International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1719372021-11-28T19:09:38Z2021-11-28T19:09:38ZThe Iran nuclear talks are resuming, but is there any trust left to strike a deal?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432769/original/file-20211118-24-jc1vmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=126%2C0%2C5516%2C3680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With nuclear talks between Iran, the US, and the other members of the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)</a> resuming on November 29, one question looms large. Is engagement with Iran likely to bear diplomatic fruit, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/no-plan-b-biden-iran-nuclear-talks-fail-experts-warn-2021-11?r=US&IR=T">or be squandered</a>? </p>
<p>Negotiated in 2015 by the Obama administration (alongside Germany, France, Britain, China and Russia), the JCPOA represented a major effort to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm">159-page agreement</a> committed the US and its European partners to lift longstanding sanctions to allow Iran to bring back foreign investment and sell its natural resources globally without restriction. </p>
<p>In exchange, Iran agreed to put a wide array of dampers on its nuclear program for 15 years. These <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/files/images/Pg_34.png">included</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>keeping uranium enrichment levels below 3.67% (the level used to produce fuel for commercial nuclear plants)</p></li>
<li><p>limit centrifuge numbers and the amount of stockpiled uranium </p></li>
<li><p>allow for greater monitoring, verification and transparency of its nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</p></li>
<li><p>and shut down several facilities. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These steps would allow limited civilian activities to remain, but potential military applications would, for the time being, be neutralised.</p>
<p>Importantly, the JCPOA avoided addressing other Iranian actions viewed as destabilising by the US and its partners. These included Tehran’s support of insurgents like <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and various Iraqi and Syrian militias</a>, as well as its ever-expanding <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/">ballistic missile and drone programs</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement explicitly noted that sanctions for these activities would remain in place and be treated as separate issues.</p>
<p>Beyond addressing the immediate crisis of possible nuclear proliferation, the agreement was intended to act as a trust-building exercise. US leaders believed that by offering an olive branch to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and acting in good faith, they could pave the way for a broader US-Iranian rapprochement. The deal would demonstrate the US could be a reliable partner for future negotiations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Iran nuclear talks in 2015." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432774/original/file-20211118-18-1ddf8fo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the high point of the nuclear talks in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Smialowski/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Confidence not built</h2>
<p>Of course, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and the US once again failed to anticipate arguably its biggest foil in foreign affairs: itself. </p>
<p>The surprise upset election of Donald Trump in 2016 threw the JCPOA into disarray. Whereas Obama had separated the issues of Iran’s nuclear program from its other destabilising acts, Trump viewed both through the same lens. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-decertification-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-may-prove-a-costly-mistake-85594">led</a> Washington to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">unilaterally withdraw</a> from the agreement in May 2018 and implement the so-called “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2020.1841099?journalCode=rsan20">maximum pressure</a>” campaign that sought to bully Iran into wider concessions.</p>
<p>This jarring shift occurred despite Iranian compliance with the JCPOA framework. The agreement actually continued for a year after the US withdrew in hopes the other signatories could guide Washington back to the table. </p>
<p>Such hopes proved fruitless, however, as Trump scorned the Europeans, levied new sanctions against Tehran, and engaged in other provocative behaviours. This included the assassination of <a href="https://theconversation.com/political-assassinations-were-once-unthinkable-why-the-us-killing-of-soleimani-sets-a-worrying-precedent-129622">General Qassem Soleimani</a>, a greatly respected figure in Iran.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-assassinations-were-once-unthinkable-why-the-us-killing-of-soleimani-sets-a-worrying-precedent-129622">Political assassinations were once unthinkable. Why the US killing of Soleimani sets a worrying precedent</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Trump’s about-face confirmed longstanding elite Iranian views about American duplicity and sullied Obama’s uncharacteristically liberal attempt at building a working relationship with Tehran. </p>
<p>Feeling betrayed, Iran began <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-likely-is-conflict-between-the-us-and-iran-123714">escalating tensions</a> in the Middle East – including strikes on Saudi oil processing facilities – and resumed enriching uranium <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/atomic-watchdog-iran-raising-nuclear-stockpile-81223715">well beyond</a> the levels agreed to in the JCPOA.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1421864559959281664"}"></div></p>
<h2>Heels dug in</h2>
<p>Many hoped that with Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 US presidential election, Washington would rapidly move to reengage Tehran and return to the JCPOA agreement. Time was of the essence with Rouhani, the chief proponent of the deal in Iran, due to finish his term this August. (He was replaced by the more conservative and hawkish President Ebrahim Raisi.) </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Biden was not Obama, and despite sharing many of the same staff, his administration quickly displayed more <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-is-already-carving-out-a-different-middle-east-policy-from-trump-and-even-obama-156206">conservative and bullish foreign policy chops</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1454190856404193281"}"></div></p>
<p>Rather than offer an act of good faith to clear the bad air, Biden signalled he expected Iran to resume adherence to the JCPOA before any US concessions would be made. At the G20 meeting last month, the US, Germany, France and Britain reaffirmed this message in a joint statement, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/30/joint-statement-by-the-president-of-france-emmanuel-macron-chancellor-of-germany-angela-merkel-prime-minister-of-the-united-kingdom-and-northern-ireland-boris-johnson-and-president-of-the-united-st/">saying</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Return to JCPOA compliance will provide sanctions lifting with long-lasting implications for Iran’s economic growth. This will only be possible if Iran changes course. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Iranian diplomats, however, want the US to right its betrayal and remove sanctions before Tehran begins to comply with the agreement again.</p>
<p>These two intractable and incompatible positions have so far scuttled any efforts to make meaningful headway in negotiations.</p>
<p>For both parties, it is clear the previous terms of the JCPOA simply won’t cut it – especially now that demands from both ends are no longer limited to the nuclear discussions and the wider strategic conditions in the region have changed. </p>
<p>Under Biden, the US focus has shifted towards <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html">confronting China</a> in the Asia-Pacific and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/biden-signs-1t-infrastructure-bill-with-bipartisan-audience">recovering domestically from COVID-19</a>. This has meant a slow <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/us-middle-east-disengagement-shape-how">disengagement from the Middle East</a>, placing the Iran issue on somewhat of a backburner (at least compared to 2015). </p>
<p>Iran may also be apprehensive due to the significant possibility of Biden as a one-term president (with a chance, however slim, he could be succeeded by Trump). Iran is also aware the US commitment to the region may not be what it once was, and that biding its time may be the best course of action. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-is-already-carving-out-a-different-middle-east-policy-from-trump-and-even-obama-156206">Biden is already carving out a different Middle East policy from Trump — and even Obama</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Flickers of hope?</h2>
<p>Despite such gloom, there is cause for limited optimism through subtle gestures on both sides. </p>
<p>Iran has agreed to return to negotiations on November 29 without the lifting of US sanctions first. This can be considered a mild olive branch.</p>
<p>And US officials <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-gcc-iran-working-group-statement/">recently met</a> with representatives from Persian Gulf states in Saudi Arabia to discuss potential channels of diplomacy with Tehran. They also discussed deeper economic ties once sanctions are lifted under the JCPOA. </p>
<p>Such an optimistic declaration suggests US policymakers are at least entertaining the possibility of a positive outcome and path forward from negotiations – despite significant pressure from Republicans in the US and Israel to the contrary. </p>
<p>But making predictions in the current muck of diplomatic negotiations is difficult. There may be a path towards resuscitating the JCPOA. If possible, however, it will require reestablishing a level of trust that neither side seems open to embracing, nor fostering in the current frosty diplomatic climate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Much has changed since the Trump administration pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and good will is seriously lacking.Ben Rich, Senior lecturer in History and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLeena Adel, PhD student, Political Science and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657742021-08-10T13:18:30Z2021-08-10T13:18:30ZIran nuclear capability is more likely bluff than bombs<p>The likelihood of Iran imminently developing a nuclear arsenal has been the subject of a great deal of speculation recently after Israeli defence minister, Benny Gantz, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-iran-10-weeks-away-from-amassing-enough-material-for-nuke/">told the UN Security Council on August 4</a> that “Iran … is only around ten weeks away from acquiring weapons-grade materials necessary for a nuclear weapon”. </p>
<p>“Now is the time for deeds – words are not enough,” he said, adding: “The Iranian regime is threatening us and sparking a regional arms race.”</p>
<p>Gantz’s is not the first such warning about the imminent prospect of an Iranian nuclear capability. Antony Blinken, in his first official interview as US secretary of state in February 2021, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-breakout-time-will-fall-weeks-if-not-constrained-blinken-2021-06-07/">claimed that</a> Iran was “months” away from building a nuclear bomb. He forecast that if all the restraints of the nuclear deal were abandoned, it could have enough fissile material “within weeks”. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, the political aims that prompted Blinken’s stark warning were exactly the opposite of those of the Israeli government’s recent statement. The current warnings from the Israeli government are designed to put an end to nuclear negotiations. Iran itself appears to be <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/28/iran-biden-nuclear-deal-weapons-jcpoa-bluffing-enriched-uranium-stockpile-sanctions/">overstating its stockpiles</a> of fissile materials in order to pressure the US.</p>
<p>For the incoming Biden administration, the potential for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons constituted one of the key issues in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Improving relations with Iran was an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">important foreign policy</a> goal on Biden’s election platform. In this context, to find a path to return to the “nuclear deal” (JCPOA) with Iran has been an important priority. </p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the only path to effectively prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb is a return to an enhanced nuclear agreement with Iran. The Iranian government tried to <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran">set conditions</a> for a return to negotiations, such as the lifting of sanctions. The Biden administration, however, not only refused to relax the Trump policy of “maximum pressure”, but <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-forces-launch-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-militias-n1272489">launched airstrikes</a> against Iranian militias in Syria.</p>
<p>Negotiations involving the signatories of the original nuclear deal (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, or JCPOA) were conducted in Geneva and, in six rounds of negotiations, a great deal of progress was made, resulting in four different texts involving 1,520 pages of agreement. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">A historic deal for Iran and the world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But negotiations have stalled after <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-election-what-ebrahim-raisis-victory-will-mean-for-his-country-and-the-rest-of-the-world-163106">Raisi’s election in June 2021</a>. Iran <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-warns-un-nuclear-agency-over-enrichment-plans/a-58181744">has since reported</a> further departures from the agreement. Talks are now stalled as Iran insists on guarantees that the US will not abandon the agreement in future.</p>
<h2>A developing threat?</h2>
<p>But how valid are the concerns about <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/BuildingNuclearWeapons.pdf">Iran’s progress in nuclear technology</a>? There is no evidence that Iran has enriched material to the point of 90% – the level needed for nuclear explosive devices. Independent analysts believe that Iran is not in a crash programme to develop nukes and that, thus far, the enrichment has been a pressure tool for political and economic concessions. </p>
<p>That may be changing, however. According <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-iaea-uranium-nuclear-deal/31283165.html">to the IAEA</a> Iran has 62.8 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% purity and 2.4 kilograms enriched to 63% purity. But there are many other steps in constructing a nuclear device beyond accumulating fissile material.</p>
<p>Iran has indicated that it may build a plant to forge uranium into metal, something that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572">would be needed</a> to build a core for a weapon. Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/documents/BuildingNuclearWeapons.pdf">technical challenges</a>, many of which Iran isn’t believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand reentry through Earth’s atmosphere as it descends to its target.</p>
<p>The recent warnings are nothing new. In 2015, before the implementation of the JCPOA, a Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control report by directors, Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, used IAEA data <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable">to claim</a> that Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear warhead within 1.7 months. It is possible that Iran’s goal is to maintain a state of “<a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/06/why-iran-may-be-in-no-hurry-to-get-nuclear-weapons.html">nuclear latency</a>”, which means having a capability without fully developing it to the point of assembling nuclear warheads. This is what former CIA chief Leon Panetta <a href="https://www.niacouncil.org/niac-round-up/iran-news-roundup-0109/">has argued</a>.</p>
<h2>Changing the balance</h2>
<p>Full nuclear status would in principle give Iran a significant deterrent against attack, but could have undesirable consequences. Leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would also curtail the existing nuclear cooperation with Russia on which Iran <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-29/iran-says-sanctions-could-force-shutdown-of-nuclear-power-plant">relies for its Bushehr power plant</a> because Russia would otherwise violate the NPT. </p>
<p>Iran is involved in military conflict with at least two nuclear powers (Israel and the US) in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and at sea. But it limits escalation by relying on proxies and avoiding over confrontation with its adversaries. While the US has been involved both on the side of Israel and Saudi Arabia in regional conflicts, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could have the consequence of reducing the restraints on the side of it’s adversaries, in particular Israel and the US.</p>
<p>Also, it could set up a spiral of escalation if regional players such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia no longer believe they can rely on an extended deterrence from the US and decide to develop their own nuclear arsenals. </p>
<p>A status of nuclear ambiguity based on a latent capability gives Iran strategic advantages by both establishing coercive power while limiting the response. At the same time, it can be used to obtain economic and political concessions – which is what Iran seeks in the nuclear negotiations. The US is only prepared to go so far in its concessions to Iran but at the same time sees an agreement as the only effective means to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme. This is why a return to a modified JCPOA remains the most likely outcome in the near term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US and Israel are warning that Iran could build a nuclear bomb very soon. But is it that simple?Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642092021-07-19T12:11:22Z2021-07-19T12:11:22ZEvangelical support for Israel is neither permanent nor inevitable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411528/original/file-20210715-32900-1hrwmn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C3%2C1007%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Trump's evangelical supporters cheered the 2018 move of of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastUSEmbassyToJerusalem/b6ce96595ae2499cbbc86872bc51ffdf">Ariel Schalit/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s former ambassador to the U.S., Ron Dermer, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/dermer-suggests-israel-should-prioritize-support-of-evangelicals-over-us-jews/">made waves</a> in May 2021 when he publicly suggested that Israel should prioritize its relationship with American evangelicals over American Jews. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AmbDermer">Dermer described</a> evangelicals as the “backbone of Israel’s support in the United States.” By contrast, he described American Jews as “disproportionately among [Israel’s] critics.” </p>
<p>Dermer’s comments seemed shocking to many because he stated them in public to a reporter. But as <a href="https://walkerrobins.com/">a historian of the evangelical-Israeli relationship</a>, I didn’t find them surprising. The Israeli right’s preference for working with conservative American evangelicals over more politically variable American Jews has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/world/middleeast/netanyahu-evangelicals-embassy.html">evident for years</a>. And this preference has in many ways paid off. </p>
<h2>Christian Zionism in the Trump era</h2>
<p>American Christian Zionists are evangelicals who believe that Christians have a duty to support the Jewish state because the Jews remain God’s chosen people.</p>
<p>During the Trump years, Christian Zionists were crucial allies for former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. They helped Netanyahu lobby Trump for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/world/middleeast/netanyahu-evangelicals-embassy.html">relocation of</a> the U.S. embassy <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/18/the-biggest-fans-of-president-trumps-israel-policy-evangelical-christians/">to Jerusalem</a>, as well as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/08/the-withdrawal-from-the-iran-deal-signals-a-new-power-player-in-washington-christian-zionists/">withdrawal of the U.S.</a> from the “Iran Deal” – the international nuclear arms control agreement with Iran.</p>
<p>These evangelicals also backed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-endorses-israeli-control-of-the-disputed-golan-heights/2019/03/21/7cfc0554-4bfb-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html">Trump’s recognition</a> of Israel’s 1981 annexation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-recognition-of-the-golan-heights-as-israeli-territory-matters-114132">the Golan Heights</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-cuts-more-than-200-million-in-aid-to-the-palestinians/2018/08/24/5bd7d58e-a7db-11e8-97ce-cc9042272f07_story.html">cuts of more than US$200 million to American funding for the Palestinian Authority</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>Coming after this string of policy victories for the Israeli-evangelical alliance, Dermer’s comments made sense.</p>
<p>However, the alliance’s future may be in doubt. <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/evangelical-youth-losing-love-for-israel-by-35-percent-study-shows-671178">Recent polling shows dramatic declines</a> in support for Israel among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/26/as-israel-increasingly-relies-on-us-evangelicals-for-support-younger-ones-are-walking-away-what-polls-show/">young American evangelicals</a>. Scholars <a href="https://uncp.academia.edu/MottiInbari">Motti Inbari</a> and <a href="https://www.uncp.edu/profile/dr-kirill-bumin">Kirill Bumin</a> found that between 2018 and 2021, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/support-for-israel-among-young-us-evangelicals-drops-sharply-survey/">rates of support fell</a> from 69% to 33.6% among evangelicals ages 18-29.</p>
<p>While these polls speak most immediately to the current context, they also underline a larger historical point: Evangelical support for Israel is neither permanent nor inevitable.</p>
<h2>Southern Baptists and Israel</h2>
<p>The Southern Baptist Convention – long the denominational avatar of white American evangelicalism – offers an example of how these beliefs have shifted over time, which I examine in my book “<a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Between-Dixie-and-Zion,7406.aspx">Between Dixie and Zion: Southern Baptists and Palestine before Israel</a>.” </p>
<p>Southern Baptists are broadly supportive of Israel, and have been for much of the past half-century. Baptist leaders like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/20/archives/evangelists-meet-in-the-holy-land-1000-from-32-countries-confer-on.html">W.A. Criswell</a> and <a href="https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-library/news/ed-mcateer-pioneer-for-faith-in-public-policy-dies-at-78/">Ed McAteer</a> helped organize Christian Zionism in the U.S. The Southern Baptist Convention itself has passed a number of <a href="https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/?fwp_resolution_search=israel">pro-Israel resolutions</a> in recent decades.</p>
<p>More recently, Southern Baptist support for Israel was highlighted when the Trump administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/15/mitt-romney-may-not-like-it-but-robert-jeffress-was-a-natural-choice-to-deliver-the-invocation-at-the-new-u-s-embassy-in-jerusalem/">invited Robert Jeffress</a>, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Dallas, to lead a prayer at the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem in 2018.</p>
<p>However, Southern Baptists were not always so unified in support for Israel, or the Zionist movement that led to its creation. This was evident only days after the establishment of Israel in 1948, when messengers to the convention’s annual meeting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1948/05/20/archives/baptists-criticize-truman-on-israel-refuse-commendation-consider.html?searchResultPosition=1">repeatedly and overwhelmingly voted down resolutions</a> calling for the convention to send a congratulatory telegram to U.S. President – and fellow Southern Baptist – Harry Truman for being the first foreign leader to recognize the Jewish state. </p>
<h2>Zionism was ‘God’s plan’ – unless it wasn’t</h2>
<p>This seems shocking today, after years of seemingly unanimous evangelical support for Israel. However, as I document in <a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Between-Dixie-and-Zion,7406.aspx">my book</a>, Southern Baptists had diverse views on Zionism and “the Palestine question” in the decades leading up to Israel’s birth. While some did argue that support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was a Christian duty, others defended the Arab majority’s rights in the Holy Land. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="U.S. President Harry S. Truman holds a copy of the Torah, presented to him by Chaim Weizman, right, in Washington on May 25, 1948." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411331/original/file-20210714-13-hcy588.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=614&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Southern Baptist Convention refused to congratulate President Harry Truman for being the first world leader to officially recognize the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, even though he was one of their own. At right is Chaim Weizman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TrumanandWeizman/ae37ce7d442f4f5388d28efdb8b9938d">ASSOCIATED PRESS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During this era, the Southern Baptist Convention published books, pamphlets and other materials reflecting both sides. In 1936, its press <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9963436">published a work by missionary Jacob Gartenhaus</a>, a convert from Judaism to evangelical Christianity, arguing that to be against Zionism was “to oppose God’s plan.” The following year, however, the press published <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/7962317">a mission study manual by J. McKee Adams</a> contending that “by every canon of justice and fair-play, the Arab is the man of first importance.” </p>
<p>Adams was one among a coterie of professors at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary who spoke out against what they sometimes derided as “Christian Zionism” – then an unusual term.</p>
<p>Even evangelicals who believed the Bible anticipated the return of Jews to Palestine disagreed on whether the Zionist movement was part of God’s plan. </p>
<p>The influential Baptist leader J. Frank Norris of Fort Worth, Texas, who broke away from the mainstream Southern Baptist Convention in the 1920s, argued in the 1930s and 1940s that Christians had a duty to God and civilization <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/432608001">to support the Zionists</a>. </p>
<p>But there was no widespread sense that being a Baptist – or an evangelical Protestant – entailed support for Zionism. John R. Rice, a prominent disciple of Norris’, rejected his mentor’s arguments outright. “The Zionist movement is not a fulfillment of the prophecies about Israel being restored,” Rice <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31748240">wrote in 1945</a>. “Preachers who think so are mistaken.” </p>
<p>Regarding the political question of whether Arabs or Jews should control Palestine, most evangelicals were unconcerned. The Southern Baptists focused on other priorities in the Holy Land, such as the growth of their missions in Jerusalem and Nazareth. Even those Baptists who supported the establishment of a Jewish state did not organize politically around the issue.</p>
<h2>The future of Christian Zionism</h2>
<p>In the decades after the establishment of Israel, however, <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15966.html">motivated evangelical and Jewish activists – as well as the Israeli government – </a> worked to stitch together the interfaith relationships, build the institutions and spread the ideas underpinning today’s Christian Zionist movement. These efforts have been remarkably effective in making support for Israel <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15966.html">a defining element</a> of many evangelicals’ religious and political identities.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://religionnews.com/2021/05/26/survey-young-evangelicals-largely-backed-biden-and-have-shifting-views-on-israel/">as the latest polling of young evangelicals shows</a>, there is no guarantee this will be permanent. This diverse and globally connected generation of evangelicals has <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-gen-x-and-millennial-evangelicals-are-losing-faith-in-the-conservative-culture-wars-162407">its own ideas and priorities</a>. It is more interested in social justice, less invested in the culture wars and increasingly weary of conservative politics.</p>
<p>Young evangelicals remain to be convinced of Christian Zionism. And they very well may not be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Walker Robins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The political alliance between American evangelicals and Israel’s right wing may have peaked during the Trump administration.Walker Robins, Lecturer in History, Merrimack CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628352021-06-17T19:58:19Z2021-06-17T19:58:19ZConservative hard-liner elected as Iran’s next president – what that means for the West and the nuclear deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407109/original/file-20210617-19-rurnrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ebrahim Raisi, seen here during a 2017 rally, is expected to win Iran's presidential election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Iran/0ac72fd2552e431d81abf5a4ff94e9df/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20raisi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=204&currentItemNo=100">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">Iran’s conservative rulers’ effort to orchestrate</a> the outcome of the June 18 presidential election triggered a voter boycott – but the result may still bode well for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/world/middleeast/biden-iran-nuclear.htm">ongoing negotiations over the lapsed 2015 nuclear deal</a>. </p>
<p>Iran’s Interior Ministry on June 19 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/world/middleeast/iran-election-president-raisi.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">announced that the winner</a> is Ebrahim Raisi, chief of Iran’s judiciary and close ally of the supreme leader. He was all but assured of victory after the candidates who could have posed a serious challenge to him – including three reformists – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">were disqualified</a> and prevented from participating in the election.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/council-of-despair-irans-uncompetitive-presidential-election/">unprecedented</a> disqualifications <a href="https://www.iranfocus.com/en/iran-general/47115-apathy-in-presidential-election-is-not-because-of-disqualifications-iranian-officials-say/">outraged</a> large groups of liberal and moderate voters, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-iranians-wont-vote-new-survey-reveals-massive-political-disenchantment-162374">many boycotted the election</a>. As a result, the turnout <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-iran-judiciary-4d60554fd608a5dea2c76a303ec352d8">was just 49%</a>. </p>
<p>But who is Ebrahim Raisi, and how will his presidency alter Iran’s domestic and foreign policies? As an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ErTIYroAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">economist and close observer of Iran</a>, I believe we can start to answer these questions by exploring his past.</p>
<h2>Loyal insider</h2>
<p>Raisi is a loyal regime insider with a long career in Iran’s judicial branch, which goes back <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">more than four decades</a>.</p>
<p>He was only 19 when the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">Islamic revolution</a> deposed the shah in 1979. As a young Islamic activist, he caught the attention of several top revolutionary clerics, including Ali Khamenei, who became Iran’s <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader">supreme leader</a> a decade later. </p>
<p>Named the general-prosecutor of Kataj – a small city near Tehran – at age 20, Raisi quickly rose to more prominent positions. In 1989, when Khamenei replaced Ruhollah Khomeini as supreme leader, Raisi was promoted to chief prosecutor-general of Tehran.</p>
<p>This promotion reflected the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">high level</a> of trust that Khamenei had in him. While serving in these positions, Raisi also attended seminary and religious studies under Khamenei and other influential religious leaders.</p>
<h2>Executing dissidents and fighting corruption</h2>
<p>During the first decade of his career, Raisi convicted a large number of dissidents and political opponents of the Islamic regime and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ali-khamenei-donald-trump-ap-top-news-elections-judiciary-ee0e777abf19424281c363ef1978ac7f">sentenced many of them to death</a>. </p>
<p>Regime critics and his political opponents <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2021/06/iran-election-dont-ignore-ebrahim-raisis-gross-rights-violations/">have condemned</a> his direct role in these executions, particularly the large number of political prisoners who were executed in 1988.</p>
<p>From 1994 to 2004, Raisi served as head of Iran’s general inspector office, which is responsible for preventing abuse of power and corruption in government institutions. It was in this position that he developed a <a href="https://www.fr24news.com/a/2021/06/iranian-ultra-conservative-raisi-favorite-in-anti-graft-polls.html">reputation as a crusader against government corruption</a>. Even as he was appointed as the first deputy chief justice in 2004 and finally promoted to chief justice in March 2019, he continued his fight <a href="https://lobelog.com/irans-goals-in-the-fight-against-economic-corruption/">against corruption</a> by prosecuting many government officials. </p>
<p>His critics have argued, however, that his fight against corruption has been highly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/fighting-corruption-or-just-more-political-infighting-in-iran/">politicized and selective</a>. They claimed that he targeted individuals who were affiliated with his political rivals such as President Hassan Rouhani.</p>
<p>Raisi first ran for president in 2017 but <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/20/hassan-rouhani-wins-irans-presidential-election">was defeated</a> by Iran’s current President Hassan Rouhani, who after two terms is ineligible to run again.</p>
<p>In this year’s election, Raisi was the favorite candidate of the conservative right wing of the Islamic ruling elite and also enjoys the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, who has absolute power over all branches of government. Khamenei also directly appoints half of the 12-member <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/the-guardian-council">Council of Guardians</a>, which oversees all political elections and has the power to disqualify candidates without any public explanation. Khamenei <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/khamenei-defends-disqualification-key-presidential-candidates">publicly endorsed and defended the disqualifications</a>.</p>
<h2>Likely return to the nuclear deal</h2>
<p>One of the institutional weaknesses of Iran’s political system since the 1979 Islamic revolution is the potential for tension and disagreement between the elected presidents and the supreme leader.</p>
<p>That is, unlike in the U.S. system of government, the <a href="https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/02/The-Relationship-Between-the-Supreme-Leadership-and-Presidency-and-Its-Impact-on-the-Political-System-in-Iran-rasanah.pdf">Iranian president’s powers are extremely limited</a>. For example, a reformist president may want to engage more with the West or stay out of a foreign conflict, but the supreme leader could overrule or simply ignore him.</p>
<p>As a protege and close ally of the supreme leader, Raisi is expected to support Khamenei’s policies on both domestic and foreign policy – which means more coordination between the various branches of government. With the Parliament also dominated by Khamenei supporters, it also means that the conservatives will control all three branches of the government once again after eight years.</p>
<p>This harmony means Raisi will be a lot more effective as president because whatever policies he pursues will most likely be supported by the supreme leader. </p>
<p>And perhaps ironically, his victory could pave the way for a more compromising attitude on the side of Iran in the negotiations that are currently underway in Vienna for restoration of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">which was derailed</a> by former U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018. </p>
<p>The reason for this unconventional prediction is that both reformist and conservative factions in Iran are fully aware that a new nuclear agreement, which could end the severe economic sanctions imposed on the country, is <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/1623526450-iran-s-leading-presidential-candidate-voices-support-for-nuclear-deal">highly popular</a>. The team that signs the agreement will receive credit for ending the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html">economic hardship</a> the country is currently enduring. For example, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi">inflation is over 50%</a>, exports have plunged due to the sanctions and <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/poverty-grows-iran-some-suggest-redistribution-wealth-taxation">over 60% of the population is now in poverty</a>, up from 48% just two years ago.</p>
<p>With Raisi president, the conservatives and the supreme leader have greater incentives to reach an agreement with the United States for lifting the sanctions as they can no longer blame a reformist president for the economic hardships.</p>
<p>The success of this strategy, however, is far from guaranteed.</p>
<p>First, if Khamenei, Raisi and their hard-line supporters insist on maintaining Iran’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569">confrontational foreign policy</a>, it seems unlikely to me that the economic sanctions against Iran will ease. Not all of them are tied directly to the nuclear deal, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/front-runner-iran-presidency-is-hardline-judge-sanctioned-by-us-2021-06-15/">sanctions against Raisi himself</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the growing alienation and frustration of large segments of Iran’s population – especially after reformists were banned from running for president – may still lead to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/latest-irans-evolving-protests">mass unrest</a> and political instability. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Iranian woman holds out her hand, which has the name 'Raisi' on it written in Persian script" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian woman shows her support for Raisi by writing his name, in Persian, on her hand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIranElections/0318ab4f5253434582aed21829149655/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20president&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=12133&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Supreme Leader Raisi?</h2>
<p>Raisi’s victory may have an even more significant impact on Iran’s politics in the long run because it might pave the way for him to become Iran’s next supreme leader. </p>
<p>Ayatollah Khamenei is in his 80s, and a succession to a new supreme leader is considered probable in the next four years. According to many regime insiders, Raisi became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55257059">the most likely</a> person to replace Khamenei by winning the presidential election. </p>
<p>If Raisi eventually becomes Iran’s supreme leader, he would have far more powers to shape all types of policies. Based on his background and values, he is likely to resist political and social reforms and try to gain legitimacy for the Islamic regime by focusing on economic development in <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/irans-hard-liners-take-page-chinas-election-playbook">a similar fashion</a> to the authoritarian regimes in Asia, such as China, by focusing on economic growth while curtailing political and social freedoms. </p>
<p>Raisi – and eventually as the supreme leader – is unlikely to abandon Iran’s anti-Western foreign policy, but he has the potential to lower the tensions to a more manageable level in order to improve Iran’s economy.</p>
<p>In my view, he seems to have recognized that the continuation of current economic hardships poses the largest threat to the Islamic regime in the long run.</p>
<p>[<em>Explore the intersection of faith, politics, arts and culture.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-explore">Sign up for This Week in Religion.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ebrahim Raisi was declared the winner of Iran’s June 18 presidential election, which critics called rigged after his top opponents were disqualified.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1588292021-04-14T16:10:13Z2021-04-14T16:10:13ZIran: how attack on nuclear facility will affect negotiations with US<p>The Iranian authorities have insisted that a power failure that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html">shut down</a> the country’s important Natanz uranium enrichment site, 250 miles south of Tehran, on April 11 was caused by a deliberately planned explosion. Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56708778">has alleged</a> – and it is widely believed – that Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad was behind the attack.</p>
<p>This incident comes at a time when the Biden administration has sought to engage with Iran’s leaders to <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-to-expect-from-the-negotiations-155695">revive the so-called “nuclear deal”</a> (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA). The JCPOA was designed to constrain Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, keep all nuclear facilities under international monitoring and thereby forestall the development of a nuclear weapons capability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-to-expect-from-the-negotiations-155695">Biden and the Iran nuclear deal: what to expect from the negotiations</a>
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<p>The Trump administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">had abandoned</a> the JCPOA negotiated during the Obama administration and imposed sanctions on Iran as part of a policy of “maximum pressure”. In response, Iran has gradually departed from the commitments under the agreement by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-actions-idUSKCN1SC1FP">restarting the enrichment of uranium</a> and restricting the access of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) to its nuclear facilities. For the Biden administration, the reactivation of the agreement is a high-priority commitment.</p>
<p>Iran has indicated a willingness to discuss the renewal of the JCPOA. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has said on various occasions that the dropping of sanctions would be a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-idUSKBN2BQ08I">first step</a> before Iran would consider any steps of its own. </p>
<p>The country has been <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-02/iran-installs-advanced-centrifuges">installing new high-performance centrifuges</a> to step up uranium enrichment, presumably as a means for increasing its leverage in any forthcoming negotiations. According to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-enrichment-idUSKBN2BU15N">Behrouz Kamalvandi</a>, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation spokesperson, Iran has produced 55kg of uranium enriched to 20%. </p>
<p>Iran will seek more substantial rewards for accepting the constraints of JCPOA than just a lifting of sanctions. But the attack on Natanz has put a temporary halt of perhaps nine months to the enrichment programme.</p>
<p>As a result of Iran’s stance, the efforts by the Biden administration to revive the JCPOA have been slow to start. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/06/us-and-iran-hold-indirect-talks-over-nuclear-deal">Indirect talks</a> with the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China started in Vienna just before the Natanz incident, intended to map out the steps required by Iran to curtail enrichment and the reciprocal steps by the US to alleviate sanctions.</p>
<h2>Shifting Middle East landscape</h2>
<p>Since the JCPOA first came into force, the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/winners-losers/616364/">Abraham Accords</a> between Israel and multiple Sunni Arab states have manifested the fact that the principal division in the Middle East is now not between Israel and the rest, but Iran and all other powers in the region (except for Iraq). The Gulf States and Israel are opposed to a revival of the JCPOA because they doubt its capacity to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. They also oppose any financial or other concessions made to Iran. </p>
<p>There is a powerful argument that favours the aims of the Biden administration, namely that Israel and other opponents of the JCPOA have no plausible instruments to prevent a nuclear Iran. Although the sabotage of Iranian centrifuges with the <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet">Stuxnet malware in 2010</a> and the assassinations of Iranian nuclear specialists (including <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55214359">Mohsen Fakhrizadeh</a> in November 2020) have temporarily slowed the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme, such actions cannot prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>Moreover, the US military understands that air power is not sufficient to destroy facilities that are now well protected and buried deep underground. And, given that scientific knowledge cannot be destroyed with military attacks, there is no effective military option short of an all-out invasion and regime change. This means a diplomatic solution is the only viable option.</p>
<h2>Iran’s modern arsenal</h2>
<p>At the same time, nobody negotiating the original JCPOA anticipated the speed with which Iran could develop a family of precision-strike, conventionally armed missiles and UCAVs. These can attack military and civil targets in Israel and the Arab Gulf states, including air bases and other critical infrastructure, some of which take years to repair and are worth up to billions of dollars.</p>
<p>Iran’s modern arsenal means it would no longer have to rely on its antiquated air force to deploy nuclear warheads (if it acquired them), so the country has new strategic options. What’s more, Iran has already transferred some of these missile systems to the Hezbollah party in Lebanon and the Houthi armed movement in Yemen. It might also deploy them to Syria or some areas in Iraq where Iranian-backed militias are active. </p>
<p>The potential risks were demonstrated when, on September 14 2019, drones were used by Houthis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html">to attack</a> state-owned Aramco oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia. Many elements of Saudi and Israeli infrastructure are similarly vulnerable. This means that Iran has options for power projection short of a nuclear weapons capability. Consequently there is a strong argument for the inclusion of restraints on the development or deployment of at least some missile capabilities as part of a renewed nuclear deal.</p>
<p>The Iranian regime seems to believe that the Biden administration is more eager to come to a deal and is therefore waiting for a first step. The attack on the Natanz facility may have reduced the space for negotiations for the Iranian leadership, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/13/natanz-nuclear-site-attack-iran-accuses-israel-of-bad-gamble">announced in response</a> that it would now produce uranium enriched to 60%. </p>
<p>The Biden administration, on the other hand, is taking a tough approach. Biden’s first military action was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56205056">a strike</a> against Iran-backed fighters in Syria – and the US president has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/07/biden-iran-sanctions-negotiating-table-nuclear-deal">flat-out rejected</a> the demand to lift sanctions as a first step. So the chances of progress at this time are low. </p>
<p>The US and Iran are positioning themselves to get the most out of a renewal of the JCPOA. While it may take quite some time and effort, a return to a nuclear deal that is compatible with Iran’s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most observers believe Israel was behind the a cyberattack on Iran. But what was the thinking behind it?Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1530112021-01-13T14:26:05Z2021-01-13T14:26:05ZIran: US policy of ‘maximum pressure’ has failed – why the west needs to re-engage Tehran<p>Amid all the sound and fury accompanying US domestic politics – and particularly the recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/01/06/us/washington-dc-protests">attack on the Capitol</a> in Washington, two developments in the Persian Gulf have highlighted one of the major foreign policy issues facing president-elect, Joe Biden, when he takes office on January 20: how to deal with Iran.</p>
<p>The Pentagon’s recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/07/politics/us-b52-bombers-iran-deterrence/index.html">deployment</a> of two additional B-52 bombers to the Persian Gulf on January 7 was followed a day later by the inauguration by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-unveils-underground-strategic-missile-base-on-shores-of-persian-gulf/">new strategic missile base</a> capable of “resisting against enemies’ electronic warfare equipment”.</p>
<p>The insistence of US foreign policy officials that Iran is an <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">implacable foe</a> is of course not new: as former State Department and National Security Council officials David Benjamin and Steven Simon <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-15/americas-great-satan">point out</a>, successive post-Cold War national security strategies have consistently depicted Iran, above all others, as the archetypal enemy.</p>
<p>As such, policymakers have consistently implemented strategies entailing stringent unilateral sanctions, diplomatic isolation and belligerent rhetoric in order to curb its behaviour, but perhaps more broadly, as part of a wider quest for regime change.</p>
<p>Most recently, we have seen this through Donald Trump’s “<a href="https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/trump-applies-more-maximum-pressure-iran">maximum pressure</a>”, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists is about helping the Iranian people “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-mike-pompeo-talks-with-michael-morell-on-intelligence-matters/">change course</a>”.</p>
<p>By equating the threat posed by Iran to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States continues <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/world/middleeast/bombers-iran-deterrence.html">to waste</a> superfluous material resource and diplomatic capital which could otherwise be expended on more salient foreign policy issues.</p>
<p>Over the past few decades, Iran has proved its capacity to survive intense diplomatic and economic strangulation. So why does Washington still insist on wasteful, expensive measures in the hope of breaking the theocracy? The policies it has chosen and continues to choose are curious, not because of unconventionality, but because they persist despite repeated failures.</p>
<h2>Maximum pressure, minimal gain</h2>
<p>Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – better known as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Counucil’s five permanent members plus China) – rested on the <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy">assumption</a> that the agreement “failed to guarantee the safety of the American people from the risks created by the leaders of the Islamic Republic”. </p>
<p>Instead, Trump’s maximum pressure campaign aimed to force Iran to the negotiating table as it faced the risk of going bankrupt or capitulating to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/trumps-maximum-pressure-strategy-against-iran-isnt-working-its-time-change-105057">Washington’s demands</a>. Unfortunately, this assumption also refused to acknowledge Iran’s ability to resist sanctions measures and retaliate with pressures of its own.</p>
<p>Iran’s answer to Trump comes in the form of <a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/us-maximum-pressure-and-iranian-maximum-resistance-will-come-head-2020">maximum resistance</a>. Leadership in Tehran is swayed by the idea that regional escalation and nuclear non-compliance are more profitable than compliance and restraint. Rather than render itself bankrupt, Iran has sought to capture America’s attention with new military escalations, managing the threat to oil flow in the Gulf and gradually moving away from the JCPOA by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55530366">resuming uranium enrichment</a>.</p>
<p>Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, has stated that the solution to western pressure was to develop an “economy of resistance” to lessen the country’s reliance on oil revenues. While this has not protected Iran from external shocks such as oil price fluctuations and sanctions, the country’s economy has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700161.2020.1841099?needAccess=true">some modest gains</a>. Production of steel, aluminium, copper and electricity has hugely expanded. Iranian tactics aim to promote self-reliance – in a nutshell, it’s business as usual.</p>
<p>Not only has Trump’s strategy failed to bring Iran to the negotiating table, the Pentagon’s deployment of nearly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-middleeast/pentagon-to-deploy-thousands-of-additional-troops-to-middle-east-idUSKBN1Z21U4?edition-redirect=uk">3,000 additional troops</a> to the region as well as an <a href="https://quincyinst.org/2020/12/31/iran-attack-may-be-next-in-trumps-farewell-bag-of-tricks/">extra squadron</a> of fighter planes to Saudi Arabia puts American personnel at risk. </p>
<p>Tehran continues to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-admin-warns-iraq-it-plans-shut-u-s-embassy-n1241226">launch attacks</a> on American diplomatic missions and Iraqi military bases, as seen in the Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-security/rockets-fired-at-u-s-embassy-land-inside-baghdads-green-zone-damaging-compound-idUKKBN28U0PY?edition-redirect=uk">rocket attack</a> on the US embassy compound in Baghdad in December. It is precisely this that makes Iran a threat to the United States.</p>
<h2>Time for a sensible policy shift</h2>
<p>Washington risks standing alone in its view that Iran is an irrational “rogue” state and it’s increasingly evident that many of America’s allies – namely those in Europe – are unhappy about unilateral action from the US. There is a growing sense that America is seen as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/europe/war-iran-europe-iraq.html">the provocateur</a> and they rightly worry that its strident reactions could provide a pretext for unnecessary conflict.</p>
<p>This deeply rooted mantra that Iran poses an existential threat to international security is one that must be firmly hauled out. Washington must seek to engage Tehran through rigorous multilateral diplomacy by rejoining the JCPOA in exchange for sanctions relief so as not to damage the relationship or destabilise the region even more. It must work collaboratively on areas of mutual interest such as regional crises in Syria and Yemen as well as the threat posed by ISIS. Iran must also be engaged on transnational issues such as climate change, public health and disease surveillance.</p>
<p>The future path of US-Iranian relations will not be a linear process, and obstacles will persist, but a gradual transition to a more cooperative relationship would almost certainly better serve US <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-new-strategy-for-us-iran-relations-in-transition/">interests</a>. While Iranian actions currently demonstrate a clear breach of the nuclear deal, this is only a reminder of what will likely be the new trajectory if the JCPOA is not restored.</p>
<p>This is not to say that all fears are unjustified or that all threats foster irrationality, but overreactions to insignificant threats more often than not result in serious strategic consequences.</p>
<p>The recent turmoil in Washington demonstrates that perhaps the most prominent threat to the United States is closer to home than we think. It’s time to start thinking about contemporary global challenges without using archaic paradigms of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ellis Mallett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America’s hardline policy towards Iran has failed. The incoming US president has an opportunity to change course.Ellis Mallett, Doctoral Researcher in International Relations, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1526062021-01-04T03:55:09Z2021-01-04T03:55:09ZAre the US and Iran headed for a military showdown before Trump leaves office?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376940/original/file-20210104-21-1vx6wkr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MURTAJA LATEEF/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tensions are running high in the Middle East in the waning days of the Trump administration. </p>
<p>Over the weekend, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, claimed Israeli agents were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-israel-zarif-idUSKBN2970E9">planning to attack US forces in Iraq</a> to provide US President Donald Trump with a pretext for striking Iran. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1345370089063915523"}"></div></p>
<p>Just ahead of the one-year anniversary of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-vows-revenge-for-soleimanis-killing-but-heres-why-it-wont-seek-direct-confrontation-with-the-us-129440">US assassination of Iran’s charismatic General Qassem Soleimani</a>, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also warned his country would <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-general-warns-us-military-ready-to-respond-to-pressure/2021/01/01/dd3e76fe-4c30-11eb-97b6-4eb9f72ff46b_story.html?outputType=amp">respond forcefully to any provocations</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Today, we have no problem, concern or apprehension toward encountering any powers. We will give our final words to our enemies on the battlefield.</p>
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<p>Israeli military leaders are likewise <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-warns-iran-against-attack-says-retaliation-plans-already-drawn-up/">preparing for potential Iranian retaliation</a> over the November assassination of senior Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh — an act Tehran blames on the Jewish state.</p>
<p>Both the US and Israel have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-israel-fakhrizadeh-nuclear-assassination/2020/12/23/fca9e0fe-44e8-11eb-ac2a-3ac0f2b8ceeb_story.html">reportedly deployed submarines</a> to the Persian Gulf in recent days. (The USS Georgia is <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/submarine-movements-irans-doorstep-military-and-legal-implications">notably armed</a> with 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles.) The US has also <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/12/30/politics/us-b52s-gulf-iran/index.html">flown nuclear-capable B-52 bombers</a> to the region in a show of force.</p>
<p>And in another worrying sign, the acting US defence secretary, Christopher Miller, announced over the weekend the <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/01/03/reversal-carrier-nimitz-ordered-stay-mideast-amid-iranian-threats-of-revenge.html">US would not withdraw the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz</a> and its strike group from the Middle East — a swift reversal from the Pentagon’s earlier decision to send the ship home.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376939/original/file-20210104-21-kuhef3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The United States flew strategic bombers over the Persian Gulf twice in December in a show of force.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">U.S. Air Force/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Israel’s priorities under a new US administration</h2>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would like nothing more than action by Iran that would draw in US forces before Trump leaves office this month and President-elect Joe Biden takes over. It would not only give him the opportunity to become a tough wartime leader, but also help to distract the media from his corruption charges.</p>
<p>Any American military response against Iran would also make it much more difficult for Biden to establish a working relationship with Iran and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/18/biden-iran-nuclear-deal-jcpoa-sanctions-weapons-trump/">potentially resurrect the 2015 Iran nuclear deal</a>. </p>
<p>It’s likely in any case the Biden administration will have less interest in getting much involved in the Middle East — this is not high on the list of priorities for the incoming administration. However, a restoration of the Iranian nuclear agreement in return for the lifting of US sanctions would be welcomed by Washington’s European allies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-approach-to-the-middle-east-will-be-very-different-from-trumps-especially-on-iran-151987">Joe Biden's approach to the Middle East will be very different from Trump's, especially on Iran</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This suggests Israel could be left to run its own agenda in the Middle East during the Biden administration. </p>
<p>Israel sees Iran as its major ongoing security threat because of its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">support for Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-israel-khamenei-idUSKBN22Y10L">Palestinian militants in Gaza</a>. </p>
<p>One of Israel’s key strategic policies is also to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapon state. Israel is the only nuclear weapon power in the Middle East and is determined to keep it that way.</p>
<p>While Iran claims its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes, Tehran probably believes realistically (like North Korea) that its national security can only be safeguarded by possession of a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>In recent days, Tehran <a href="https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-dubai-iran-iran-nuclear-united-arab-emirates-384717b592f8a7012b02d8627f36763a">announced it would begin enriching uranium to 20%</a> as quickly as possible, exceeding the limits agreed to in the 2015 nuclear deal.</p>
<p>This is a significant step and could prompt an Israeli strike on Iran’s underground Fordo nuclear facility. Jerusalem <a href="https://www.axios.com/iran-resume-nuclear-uranium-enrichment-95e4ffb0-4982-4e7d-b18a-263d0931268e.html">contemplated doing so nearly a decade ago</a> when Iran previously began enriching uranium to 20%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376942/original/file-20210104-21-b5zw2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A satellite photo shows construction at Iran’s Fordo nuclear facility.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maxar Technologies/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How the Iran nuclear deal fell apart</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150713-timeline-history-iranian-nuclear-diplomacy">Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s</a>, ironically with US assistance as part of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/18/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/#:%7E:text=The%20Atoms%20for%20Peace%20program%20provided%20the%20foundations%20for%20Iran's,key%20nuclear%20technology%20and%20education.&text=In%201967%2C%20the%20United%20States,reactor%2C%20housed%20at%20the%20TRNC.">“Atoms for Peace” program</a>. Western cooperation continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution toppled the pro-Western shah of Iran. International nuclear cooperation with Iran was then suspended, but the Iranian program resumed in the 1980s.</p>
<p>After years of negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">was signed in 2015</a> by Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (known as the P5+1), together with the European Union. </p>
<p>The JCPOA tightly restricted Iran’s nuclear activities in return for the lifting of sanctions. However, this breakthrough soon fell apart with Trump’s election. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-nuclear-program-breaches-limits-for-uranium-enrichment-4-key-questions-answered-119992">Iran's nuclear program breaches limits for uranium enrichment: 4 key questions answered</a>
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<p>In April 2018, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-01/israel-netanyahu-says-iran-lied-about-nuclear-program/9713346">Netanyahu revealed Iranian nuclear program documents</a> obtained by Mossad, claiming Iran had been maintaining a covert weapons program. The following month, Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">announced the US withdrawal</a> from the JCPOA and a re-imposition of American sanctions.</p>
<p>Iran initially said it would continue to abide by the nuclear deal, but after the Soleimani assassination last January, Tehran <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793814276/iran-abandons-nuclear-deal-limitations-in-wake-of-soleimani-killing">abandoned its commitments</a>, including any restrictions on uranium enrichment.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376943/original/file-20210104-19-1ikeay8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranians burn US and Israel flags during a funeral ceremony for Qassem Soleimani last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Israel’s history of preventive strikes</h2>
<p>Israel, meanwhile, has long sought to disrupt its adversaries’ nuclear programs through its “preventative strike” policy, also known as the “<a href="https://yale.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.12987/yale/9780300162356.001.0001/upso-9780300162356-chapter-16">Begin Doctrine</a>”. </p>
<p>In 1981, Israeli aircraft <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html">struck and destroyed</a> Iraq’s atomic reactor at Osirak, believing it was being constructed for nuclear weapons purposes. And in 2007, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43481803">Israeli aircraft struck the al-Kibar nuclear facility</a> in Syria for the same reason.</p>
<p>Starting in 2007, Mossad also apparently conducted an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/history-assassinations-irans-top-nuclear-scientists">assassination program</a> to impede Iranian nuclear research. Between January 2010 and January 2012, Mossad is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/sunday-review/the-secret-war-with-iran.html">believed to have organised</a> the assassinations of four nuclear scientists in Iran. Another scientist was wounded in an attempted killing.</p>
<p>Israel has neither confirmed nor denied its involvement in the killings.</p>
<p>Iran is suspected to have responded to the assassinations with an unsuccessful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/thai-court-convicts-iranians-bomb-plot">bomb attack against Israeli diplomats in Bangkok</a> in February 2012. The three Iranians convicted for that attack were the ones <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/kylie-moore-gilbert-detained-by-iran-over-baseless-israeli-spy-claims-20201126-p56i7f.html">recently exchanged</a> for the release of Australian academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert from an Iranian prison.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376944/original/file-20210104-19-98n1mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bomb suspect Mohammad Kharzei, one of the men released by Thailand in November in exchange for Kylie Moore-Gilbert.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sakchai Lalit/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Mossad assassination program was reportedly suspended under <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-pressure-to-halt-hits-on-iran-scientists-1.5327888">pressure from the Obama administration</a> to facilitate the Iran nuclear deal. But there seems little doubt <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/assassination-of-iran-nuclear-scientist-mohsen-fakhrizadeh-was-mossads-finest-work-grgr3kq6g">the assassination of Fakhrizadeh was organised by Mossad</a> as part of its ongoing efforts to undermine the Iranian nuclear program. </p>
<p>Fakhrizadeh is believed to have been the driving force behind covert elements of Iran’s nuclear program for many decades.</p>
<p>The timing of his killing was perfect from an Israeli perspective. It put the Iranian regime under domestic pressure to retaliate. If it did, however, it risked a military strike by the truculent outgoing Trump administration. </p>
<p>It’s fortunate Moore-Gilbert was whisked out of Iran just before the killing, as there’s little likelihood Iran would have released a prisoner accused of spying for Israel (<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/kylie-moore-gilbert-detained-by-iran-over-baseless-israeli-spy-claims-20201126-p56i7f.html">even if such charges were baseless</a>) after such a blatant assassination had taken place in Iran.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kylie-moore-gilbert-has-been-released-but-will-a-prisoner-swap-with-australia-encourage-more-hostage-taking-by-iran-150942">Kylie Moore-Gilbert has been released. But will a prisoner swap with Australia encourage more hostage-taking by Iran?</a>
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</p>
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<h2>What’s likely to happen next?</h2>
<p>Where does all this leave us now? Much will depend on Iran’s response to what it sees (with some justification) as Israeli and US provocation. </p>
<p>The best outcome would be for no obvious Iranian retaliation or military action despite strong domestic pressure for the leadership to act forcefully. This would leave the door open for Biden to resume the nuclear deal, with US sanctions lifted under strict safeguards to ensure Iran is not able to maintain a covert weapons program.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clive Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Much will depend on Iran’s response to what it sees as Israeli and US provocation, including the November assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist.Clive Williams, Campus visitor, ANU Centre for Military and Security Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1509422020-11-26T05:21:27Z2020-11-26T05:21:27ZKylie Moore-Gilbert has been released. But will a prisoner swap with Australia encourage more hostage-taking by Iran?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371433/original/file-20201126-23-bvomw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iranian State Television/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian-British academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55077744">release from an Iranian prison</a> after more than two years’ detention is certainly a welcome development. </p>
<p>However, the circumstances raise some uncomfortable questions for Australian and Western diplomats related to Iran’s penchant for using hostage-taking as a bargaining chip for the release of its own citizens detained abroad for suspected or proven crimes, including terrorism.</p>
<p>There seems little doubt Moore-Gilbert was released as part of a prisoner exchange. Iranian state media has <a href="https://twitter.com/stephendziedzic/status/1331725864174723073">shown pictures</a> of the academic with Australian embassy officials in Tehran, juxtaposed with film of three Iranian men being welcomed by Iranian officials, apparently at Tehran’s airport.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1331696814777503744"}"></div></p>
<p>The Iranian media <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/iran-exchange-kylie-moore-gilbert-three-iranians-jailed-abroad">says</a> she was exchanged for an Iranian “economic activist” and two Iranian citizens, who had been detained “abroad on trumped-up charges”. The report does not name the men.</p>
<p>Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has given a <a href="https://twitter.com/stephendziedzic/status/1331753481565212672">carefully worded</a> statement in response to questions about a prisoner swap.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If other people have been released in other places, they are the decisions of the sovereign governments. There are no people who have been held in Australia who have been released.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371468/original/file-20201126-23-1n5dkkx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Morrison would not speak directly about the prisoner swap to ensure the safety of any other Australians detained overseas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That may be true as far as Australia is concerned. But a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/world/middleeast/iran-prisoner-exchange.html">report by The New York Times</a>, quoting Iranian social media channels associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), identifies the three Iranians as Saeed Moradi, Mohammad Khazaei and Masoud Sedaghat Zadeh. </p>
<p>The three had been detained in Thailand since 2012 on charges of planning to plant bombs in Bangkok and assassinate Israeli diplomats there. One of those men had reportedly lost his legs when a bomb he was carrying exploded prematurely.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-kept-silent-to-protect-my-colleague-and-friend-kylie-moore-gilbert-but-australias-quiet-diplomatic-approach-is-not-working-143597">I kept silent to protect my colleague and friend, Kylie Moore-Gilbert. But Australia's quiet diplomatic approach is not working</a>
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<p>In a similar context, the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-05/australians-released-from-iran/11576776">release last year of two Australians</a> being held in Iran, Jolie King and Mark Firkin, coincided with an Iranian research student at the University of Queensland, Reza Dehbashi Kivi, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-06/who-is-iranian-scientist-reza-dehbashi-kivi/11577482">being permitted by Australian officials to return</a> to his home country.</p>
<p>Dehbashi Kivi had allegedly been seeking to export radar equipment for detecting stealth planes in contravention of US sanctions. The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-06/who-is-iranian-scientist-reza-dehbashi-kivi/11577482">ABC reported</a> at the time the US was seeking his extradition.</p>
<h2>Quiet diplomacy usually works best</h2>
<p>The Australian government is depicting Moore-Gilbert’s release as a win for quiet diplomacy in assisting Australians arrested abroad. </p>
<p>There is no doubt a calm and measured approach is the most effective way of resolving knotty consular cases – even when the charges levelled against our citizens seem highly doubtful, as was the case with Moore-Gilbert.</p>
<p>This approach worked with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31087040">release of journalist Peter Greste</a> from detention in Egypt in 2015, although there is no evidence of any prisoner exchange or other quid pro quo in that case.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371471/original/file-20201126-21-kcru8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peter Greste waves to supporters after arriving in Australia following his release from an Egyptian prison.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tertius Pickard/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the Moore-Gilbert case, the apparent prisoner exchange would have required the agreement of the Thai government, and possibly clearing the arrangement with Israel as well, given the Iranians held in Thailand had reportedly been plotting attacks against Israeli interests. Quite an effort for “quiet diplomacy”.</p>
<p>Australians travelling abroad are constantly reminded they are subject to the laws of the country they are visiting. If an Australian is detained abroad, the most consular officials can usually do is ensure that person is treated fairly and humanely in accordance with local laws.</p>
<p>Thumping the table and making demands, even if the charges seem totally outrageous, is usually totally counter-productive.</p>
<h2>A fraught relationship</h2>
<p>The situation for Australians who get into trouble in Iran is particularly fraught. Australia’s relations with Iran are tense at normal times. The Iranian security authorities see Australia as close not only to the US, but to Israel, and are therefore suspicious of Australians. </p>
<p>If an Australian is a dual-Iranian national, Iranian law treats him or her as an Iranian citizen, further complicating the task of consular officials when individuals are detained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australian-government-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-to-free-kylie-moore-gilbert-from-prison-in-iran-130591">The Australian government needs to step up its fight to free Kylie Moore-Gilbert from prison in Iran</a>
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<p>Iran has reason to be particularly suspicious of US and Israeli hostility at the moment.</p>
<p>In July, there were <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-24/the-mysterious-explosions-that-keep-hitting-iran/12483494#:%7E:text=Most%20of%20the%20explosions%20and,and%20a%20mishandled%20coronavirus%20epidemic.&text=Devastating%20forest%20fires%20have%20occurred%20before%20as%20well.">reports</a> of a series of explosions at sites linked Iran’s missile and nuclear programs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371474/original/file-20201126-21-m0wuia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A satellite image shows a damaged building after a fire and explosion at Iran’s Natanz nuclear site in July.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Planet Labs Inc./AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Media reports <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/world/middleeast/iran-Natanz-nuclear-damage.html">suggested</a> Israel was responsible. Israel has a history of unattributed attacks on Iran’s nuclear program, including use of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html">Stuxnet computer virus</a>, which US officials have confirmed was developed in partnership with the US. </p>
<p>Moreover, under the Trump administration, the US has had a policy of “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/11/17/trump-iran-pressure-biden-nuclear/">maximum pressure</a>” on Iran’s economy, which has drastically curtailed Iran’s oil exports. Israel’s Defence Forces <a href="https://www.axios.com/israeli-military-prepares-trump-iran-0d0a5725-c410-4f5c-a0ea-9c6f9add4966.html">have also been instructed</a> to prepare for the possibility Trump may order a military strike against Iran in the final days of his presidency, according to Axios.</p>
<h2>Other Westerners still being detained</h2>
<p>Complicating Australia’s relationship with Iran even further are the different power centres in Iran. </p>
<p>Iran’s IRGC has the power to overrule all civilian authorities, including President Hassan Rouhani. It was significant that Moore-Gilbert was arrested when seeking to leave Iran after attending an academic conference to which she had been formally invited. This implied official approval to enter and leave the country.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/infographic-what-is-the-conflict-between-the-us-and-iran-about-and-how-is-australia-now-involved-121490">Infographic: what is the conflict between the US and Iran about and how is Australia now involved?</a>
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<p>Diplomatic and consular officials in Tehran must also deal with the Iranian Foreign Ministry in cases involving detained foreigners. The foreign ministry is often powerless in cases in which the IRGC has an interest.</p>
<p>So Moore-Gilbert’s release at this time is remarkably fortuitous, particularly as Iran <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/fears-mount-over-fate-15-britons-and-americans-detained-iran">currently holds</a> more than 10 Westerners or dual-national citizens captive. </p>
<p>However, if it is confirmed that the deal is a direct prisoner exchange, criticism here and among our allies that Australia has aided and abetted Iran’s hostage taking strategy is bound to grow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Parmeter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison gave a carefully worded statement in response to questions of a prisoner swap. This kind of deal could bring criticism from Australia’s allies.Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486222020-10-28T17:26:34Z2020-10-28T17:26:34ZA Biden presidency might be better for NZ, but the big foreign policy challenges won’t disappear with Trump<p>The presidency of Donald Trump has been challenging for New Zealand’s foreign policy. Our commitment to multilateral solutions to global problems has run into a new isolationism in the United States. </p>
<p>Infamously, Trump quit both the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52862588">World Health Organisation</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/04/donald-trump-climate-crisis-exit-paris-agreement">2015 Paris Agreement</a> on climate change. During a global pandemic and with a looming environmental crisis, US leadership has been missing.</p>
<p>If Joe Biden is elected on November 3, however, some kind of realignment may be possible. New Zealand policymakers will be closely watching several key areas.</p>
<h2>Climate and Health</h2>
<p>Trump’s exit from the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">Paris Agreement</a> was significant for the abandonment of the US’s emissions target, but possibly more so for the loss of leadership and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/06/02/trump-will-stop-paying-into-the-green-climate-fund-he-has-no-idea-what-it-is/">financial support</a> needed to encourage sustainability in the developing world. </p>
<p>New Zealand has <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/117244331/national-will-support-climate-change-zero-carbon-bill">committed</a> to net zero carbon emissions by 2050. This goal is <a href="https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/">shared</a> by Biden, who would also <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/24/joe-biden-climate-change-is-number-one-issue-facing-humanity.html">recommit to the Paris Agreement</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53332354">WHO</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-reform-a-call-for-an-early-warning-protocol-for-infectious-diseases-148078">WHO reform: a call for an early-warning protocol for infectious diseases</a>
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<p>Biden has even signalled he may <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/14/biden-trade-fight-global-warming-429495">use trade agreements</a> to combat global warming. This would be a major change to US trade policy and could have implications for agricultural countries such as New Zealand with methane-rich exports.</p>
<h2>Trade agreements</h2>
<p>New Zealand is committed to free trade and a rules-based international order, but Trump seemed intent on wrecking the World Trade Organisation (WTO), especially after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/trump-attacks-wto-after-it-says-us-tariffs-on-china-broke-global-trade-rules">it ruled</a> his ongoing spat with China over trade was wrongful.</p>
<p>Biden may show <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-trump-and-biden-stand-on-trade-11601121601">more restraint</a> on the WTO, but neither he nor Trump is likely to advance a long-desired free trade agreement (FTA), despite the US being New Zealand’s third-largest trading partner. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-mp-ibrahim-omers-election-highlights-the-challenges-refugees-from-africa-face-in-new-zealand-148621">New MP Ibrahim Omer's election highlights the challenges refugees from Africa face in New Zealand</a>
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<p>Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056">crushed</a> the previous nearest thing to an FTA, the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). But he did sign into law a new arrangement <a href="https://nz.usembassy.gov/signing-of-the-kiwi-act/">making it easier</a> for Kiwi entrepreneurs to work in America. </p>
<p>Although Biden is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/02/biden-trump-trade-wars-election-2020/">unlikely to differ</a> from Trump on some trade issues (such as with China), he may <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/he-s-no-milton-friedman-but-biden-will-back-the-trans-pacific-trade-partnership-20200825-p55oz1">revisit</a> the TPPA. </p>
<h2>Arms control</h2>
<p>The divisions between Trump, Biden and the interests of New Zealand are much greater over arms control treaties. New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat75/taking-a-nuclear-free-policy-to-the-world/">nuclear-free</a> commitments run counter to the global instability caused by recent US actions.</p>
<p>Trump quit the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/us/politics/trump-open-skies-treaty-arms-control.html">Open Skies Agreement</a> (designed to allow transparency and verification in monitoring arms buildups), as well as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565">Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement</a> (which kept European short-to-medium-range land-based nuclear missiles in check). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arderns-government-and-climate-policy-despite-a-zero-carbon-law-is-new-zealand-merely-a-follower-rather-than-a-leader-146402">Ardern's government and climate policy: despite a zero-carbon law, is New Zealand merely a follower rather than a leader?</a>
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<p>The so-called New START treaty, which controls the 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons held by the US and Russia, now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shultz-perry-nunn-new-start-nuclear-accord-us-russia/2020/10/22/6bc052e2-1466-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html">hangs by a thread</a>, with a possible one-year stay of execution beyond its planned expiration date at the beginning of 2021. </p>
<p>Trump also quit the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/08/trump-to-announce-he-will-withdraw-us-from-iran-nuclear-deal.html">2015 Iran nuclear accord</a>, despite the fact Iran was complying with its provisions. When the US <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51027619">assassinated</a> Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Iraq, Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html">responded</a> by firing missiles at American bases. </p>
<p>Trump opted to stop and not risk bloody regional conflict, but his reckless gamble put New Zealand soldiers stationed in the Middle East at high risk. </p>
<p>Biden would be less volatile. He wants to see if the nuclear deal <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/21/even-if-biden-wins-us-election-time-is-running-out-to-save-iran-nuclear-deal">can be revived</a>. He is also more likely to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-win-progressives-moderates-nuclear-weapons-disarmament-foreign-policy-election-2020-8?r=AU&IR=T">try to save</a> New START, despite misgivings about Russia.</p>
<p>Anything that prevents the international arms control architecture completely collapsing will benefit everyone. For New Zealand, it would mean the nuclear-free foreign policy was once more in step with global goals.</p>
<h2>War and peace</h2>
<p>Trump has moved three Middle East nations towards <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/world/middleeast/bahrain-israel-trump.html">normalising relations</a> with Israel, ended American involvement in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/trumps-green-light-moment-in-syria-shook-the-world/601963/">Syria</a> and has tried to get out of the quagmire of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/47861774">Afghanistan</a>. </p>
<p>He also obtained a promise of <a href="https://fr.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missiles-idUSL2N1QQ239">denuclearisation</a> from North Korea, although this is an empty <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-summit.html">promise</a>, more a pause than a sign of peace in an intergenerational problem. Biden may not do much better, but his approach to negotiation would probably differ, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3106688/us-policy-toward-north-korea-under-biden-pageantry-out">moving away</a> from Trump’s personality-driven approach. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-explained-does-a-delay-in-cop26-climate-talks-hit-our-efforts-to-reduce-carbon-emissions-146762">Climate explained: does a delay in COP26 climate talks hit our efforts to reduce carbon emissions?</a>
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<p>Biden <a href="https://time.com/5890577/biden-middle-east-special-operations-forces/">would avoid</a> a full exit from Afghanistan and Iraq, fearing the consequences of any resulting power vacuum. He also has a record of <a href="https://joebiden.com/joe-biden-and-the-jewish-community-a-record-and-a-plan-of-friendship-support-and-action/">strong support</a> for Israel, although he is probably more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause than Trump. </p>
<p>Overall, the military and strategic differences between the two White House candidates are not vast. Neither seriously undermines New Zealand’s own foreign policy settings. If there is tension it will probably be over China.</p>
<p>Neither Trump nor Biden is likely to improve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/25/us-china-relations-trump-or-biden-election">US-China relations</a>. If anything, Biden may by more hawkish and push harder for a multilateral approach to punishing China for everything from trade infractions to human rights abuses. </p>
<p>For New Zealand — which is slow to act against China, its biggest trading partner — some of the most difficult foreign policy challenges are yet to come, whoever is in the White House next.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Trump election loss would suit NZ’s trade, climate and arms control foreign policies. But there will still be the problem of China.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1473542020-10-05T19:14:27Z2020-10-05T19:14:27ZWhy (another) ‘October surprise’ may yet take place –
this time in the Persian Gulf<p>History tells us the month of October in a US presidential election year has a tendency to produce an unforeseen moment that may, or may not, have an impact on the election itself.</p>
<p>William Casey, Ronald Reagan’s campaign manager in 1980, is credited with coining the phrase “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/02/politics/october-surprise-what-is-trnd/index.html">October surprise</a>”. It referred to the concern Tehran would announce, on the cusp of the election, the release of American hostages seized after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-iranian-revolution-100453">overthrow of the shah of Iran</a>.</p>
<p>In 2020, it would be hard to top an “October surprise” that resulted in a president falling ill with a virus he frequently dismissed and downplayed, then did little about while it ravaged his country.</p>
<p>But if we speculate on a possible additional surprise, some sort of mishap in the Persian Gulf might figure.</p>
<p>This is far from saying an incident in the Gulf is foretold, but recent developments indicate the temperature is rising at a moment when America is preparing to impose unilateral economic sanctions on any party that sells armaments to Iran.</p>
<h2>Nuclear deal set to expire</h2>
<p>A United Nations arms embargo, imposed in 2006, is set to expire on October 18 under the terms of the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/IranNuclear">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a> (JCPOA), the nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. That is in less than a fortnight.</p>
<p>Washington had sought to extend the arms embargo via a UN Security Council resolution, but was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/middleeast/UN-Iran-embargo.html">rebuffed</a> by, among others, signatories to the JCPOA – Britain, France, Russia and China.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361537/original/file-20201005-24-u3o56t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An Iranian warship conducts military exercises in the Gulf.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iranian Army Office handout/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>The US now seems likely to fully impose unilateral sanctions on Iran as part of its “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/02/iran-united-states-maximum-pressure/">maximum pressure</a>” approach to dealing with the Islamic state. It is not clear whether Russia and China will fall into line.</p>
<p>Russia, for example, has extensive military-to-military ties to Iran. Along with China, it has conducted <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/27/asia/china-russia-iran-military-drills-intl-hnk/index.html">joint naval exercises</a> in the region with Iran’s navy.</p>
<p>Moscow also has its eyes on possible naval base facilities on Iran’s Indian Ocean coast, just as the Russians have used their relationship with Syria to secure <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-security-russia-grains-idUSL8N28R32J">a warm water port in the Mediterranean</a>.</p>
<p>So the Gulf region is emerging not simply as a flashpoint in US-Iran tensions, but a focus of big-power rivalry in an era in which Russia is seeking to extend its influence deep into the Middle East.</p>
<p>This is driven partly by President Vladimir Putin’s desire to restore Russia’s footprint in the region, after the former Soviet Union was effectively banished but for a few toeholds. It is also partly driven by a perception in Moscow that US domination is eroding.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-a-failing-economy-and-coronavirus-may-cause-iran-to-change-its-involvement-in-syria-132508">Sanctions, a failing economy and coronavirus may cause Iran to change its involvement in Syria</a>
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<h2>Oil-rich and fiercely contested</h2>
<p>The oil-rich Gulf has become a kaleidoscope of shifting ambitions and alliances. Recent announcements by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain they were moving towards <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/12/bahrain-follows-uae-to-normalise-ties-with-israel/?gb=true">normalising relations with Israel</a> are significant pieces in this kaleidoscope.</p>
<p>In this mix is Iran’s conspicuous efforts to increase its strategic leverage over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-strait-of-hormuz-is-the-most-important-oil-choke-point-in-the-world-use-our-interactive-map-to-explore-it-122257">Strait of Hormuz</a> at the entrance to the Gulf. On any day, 20% of the world’s tradeable oil passes through the area.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/infographic-what-is-the-conflict-between-the-us-and-iran-about-and-how-is-australia-now-involved-121490">Infographic: what is the conflict between the US and Iran about and how is Australia now involved?</a>
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<p>The conservative American Enterprise Institute <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-growing-iranian-threat-around-the-strait-of-hormuz">has this to say</a> about Iran’s efforts to strengthen its ability to apply a chokehold to what is arguably the most important and most vulnerable stretch of water globally:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Islamic Republic is laying the groundwork for greater Iranian influence around the strait […] by expanding its military footprint and building key infrastructure in the area. Tehran’s efforts reflect contingency planning for a larger potential conflict with the US and its Gulf partners since tensions have spiked in recent months.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the past few years, Iran has invested heavily in its ability to conduct an asymmetric naval campaign against a US naval presence in the region. <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/delivery-systems/">This includes</a> heavy investment in cruise missile technologies.</p>
<p>Iran is also building a <a href="http://en.otaghiranonline.ir/news/22449">1,000-kilometre pipeline</a> from oil-producing Bushehr province to its Bandar-e Jask naval base outside the Strait of Hormuz. This would enable it to export oil if tanker traffic through the strait is shut down.</p>
<p>The AEI report concludes that tensions may well rise after the UN arms embargo expires this month as the US seeks to maintain its “maximum pressure” campaign. This would extend to sanctions threats to countries like Russia and China that might be tempted to transfer military technology to Iran.</p>
<p>In all of this, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54356336">conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan</a> is more than a sideshow. Russia wants Iran to stay out of the conflict on its southern boundaries. A price for this might be greater Russian military assistance to Iran as it gears up for possible conflict with the US, Israel and Sunni Arab states.</p>
<h2>Surprise?</h2>
<p>Princeton University research fellow Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian ambassador to Germany and nuclear negotiator, speculated in September that if electoral prospects for the Republicans looked bad in the weeks before the November 3 election, Trump might be tempted to stage an “<a href="https://iranintl.com/en/world/former-iran-diplomat-warns-trump-october-surprise-might-be-war-against-iran">October surprise</a>” in the form of a military operation.</p>
<p>Mousavian reflected a view in Tehran that the US assassination of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Qassem Soleimani in January was part of a broader US plan to effect regime change in Iran.</p>
<p>In a region awash with all sorts of conspiracy theories, it matters less whether these theories have merit than that, in a hair-trigger environment, people believe them.</p>
<p>Adding to speculation about a possible game plan that might involve some sort of military confrontation, Washington has vastly increased its firepower in the Gulf.</p>
<p>In September, the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier <a href="https://news.usni.org/2020/09/18/uss-nimitz-now-operating-in-the-persian-gulf">transited the Strait of Hormuz</a> accompanied by guided-missile cruisers USS Princeton and USS Philippine Sea and the guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett.</p>
<p>This is the first time in about a year the US has deployed a carrier battle group in the Gulf at a time when tensions are on the rise.</p>
<p>The US now has enormous firepower in the Gulf on top of its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-presence-factbox-idUSKBN1Z72GF">existing deployments of 60,000-80,000 troops</a> in the region. It also has base facilities in Bahrain, headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, and Qatar, which houses the forward headquarters of the US Air Forces Central Command.</p>
<p>None of this is meant to suggest there is anything inevitable, or even likely, about conflict in the Gulf. On the other hand, these are tense moments in an American election season like few others.</p>
<p>In any threat scenario, an incident in the Gulf cannot be discounted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a nuclear deal set to expire, ongoing tensions in the region and an uncertain US presidential election, there may soon be an increase in hostilities in the Gulf region.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1448912020-08-26T13:03:57Z2020-08-26T13:03:57ZUS left isolated at UN after bid to reimpose sanctions on Iran – why did it even try?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354677/original/file-20200825-18-tuulju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=58%2C62%2C2937%2C1926&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mike Pompeo: on his own on Iran. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/us-secretary-state-mike-pompeo-delivers-1782468047">Ringo Chiu/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mike Pompeo was angry. The US secretary of state stood in the UN headquarters in New York on August 20 and <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-11/">proclaimed a new axis of evil</a> between former American allies – the UK, France and Germany – and the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They chose to side with ayatollahs. Their actions endanger the people of Iraq, of Yemen, of Lebanon, of Syria – and indeed, their own citizens as well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pompeo’s outburst was prompted by a very bad week for the US in the UN security council. On August 14, only the Dominican Republic <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2020/08/trump-humiliated-iran-arms-embargo/">supported</a> the Trump Administration’s resolution for an extension of the UN arms embargo on Iran, which is due to expire in October. Russia and China voted no. The other 11 members, including the Europeans singled out by Pompeo, abstained.</p>
<p>Then the following week, 13 of the 15 members of the security council objected to the US attempt to invoke “snapback” sanctions on Tehran. </p>
<p>The “snapback” provision was built into <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/background">Resolution 2231</a>, which underpinned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal. If any of the parties believes another had violated the terms, then a dispute resolution mechanism can be activated. If there is still no resolution, then UN sanctions on Iran dating from 2010 can be reimposed.</p>
<p>Pompeo claimed that Iran was in violation of the 2015 nuclear deal it had agreed with the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Germany, China and Russia). But everyone else – except for the representative of the Dominican Republic, who said nothing – countered that because the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in May 2018 it had no standing to demand UN sanctions. </p>
<p>On August 25, Indonesia, which currently holds the presidency of the UN security council, said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/25/iran-sanctions-trump-administration-un-security-council">no further action</a> would be taken to impose snapback sanctions, drawing further ire from the US.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1296413933235036160"}"></div></p>
<h2>Hoisted by their hard line</h2>
<p>When the US withdrew in May 2018 and then imposed unilateral, comprehensive sanctions in November that year, Iran was in compliance with the deal. The <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports">International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported</a> at quarterly intervals that Tehran remained within the agreed limits for production of low-grade uranium. </p>
<p>The Rouhani government, citing the US sanctions and <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2020/01/iran-daily-rouhani-to-europe-do-you-want-to-make-a-mistake/">failure to establish</a> a European economic link to bypass them, suspended adherence to some provisions from June 2019. In June, the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2020/06/05/un-agency-says-iran-is-violating-all-restrictions-of-nuclear-deal/">IAEA confirmed</a> that the Iranians are increasing uranium enrichment to 4.5%, breaking the 3.67% limit set in the 2015 deal. However, Tehran has not returned to its pre-2015 production of 20% uranium.</p>
<p>The Trump administration has no wish to return to what Donald Trump called the “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-cutting-off-funds-iranian-regime-uses-support-destructive-activities-around-world/">worst deal ever negotiated</a>” in American history. Instead, its strategy of maximum pressure on Tehran sought to condemn Iran’s regional operations in the Persian Gulf and in countries such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon. Then, in early January 2020, a US drone strike assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force responsible for Iranian military operations outside the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-next-for-irans-proxy-network-after-killing-of-qassem-soleimani-129303">What next for Iran's proxy network after killing of Qassem Soleimani</a>
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<p>Russia, China, the European powers, and almost all other security council members have reached a different conclusion on Iran. They concurred that the deal has to be maintained to prevent further confrontation throughout the Middle East and central Asia. In June, the UK, German and French foreign ministers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-europe/europe-tells-u-s-we-wont-back-unilateral-iran-sanctions-snapback-idUSKBN23Q1DB">were blunt</a> in their message to the Trump administration: snapback sanctions would have “serious adverse consequences” in the security council and they could not support it.</p>
<h2>Why go it alone?</h2>
<p>But this leaves the immediate question: why, given the inevitability of defeat on both the arms embargo and the snapback sanctions, did the Trump administration push so hard and so vociferously – and continue to do so?</p>
<p>A miscalculation of arrogance by Pompeo can’t be ruled out. And, of course, there is Trump’s relative ignorance of US-Iranian relations and the region – even as his camp were shaking a fist of fury, he was talking about the possibility of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/kushner-makes-peace-overture-iran-trump-seeks-negotiations-if-re-elected">a high-profile meeting</a> with an Iranian leader.</p>
<p>But career staff in Washington will know that these are fantasies. There is no chance of Trump shaking hands with Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, or of the security council agreeing to impose snapback sanctions. </p>
<p>Trump’s circle, having shredded the diplomatic work of the Obama administration, want to box in a future Biden presidency. Their rhetoric about Iranian duplicity, menace and support of “terrorism” seeks to raise the domestic political bar for any resumption of talks, let alone a revised nuclear agreement. </p>
<h2>After November</h2>
<p>Although it’s not being said openly, almost everyone except Trump’s inner circle is awaiting his departure in January 2021 and the arrival of a Biden administration. </p>
<p>That will not bring a simple return to the status quo before the 2015 deal. A Democratic administration, both because of domestic pressure and concerns over Iranian military plans, will want some revision of terms; so will the Europeans, including over Tehran’s missile programs. Tehran will seek assurances against another unilateral US withdrawal from a deal and for the removal of comprehensive sanctions. But a return to acceptance of mutual interest in a deal, and of discussions of regional matters, will shift the priority to negotiations rather than confrontation.</p>
<p>Still, a second Trump term <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-election-forecast/">cannot be ruled out</a>. If Trump is reelected in November, then his administration is likely to pile on more pressure with additional unilateral sanctions, attacks on Iranian infrastructure, and threats to knock out more of Tehran’s commanders. The message will be clear: concede or we will break you.</p>
<p>Tehran is likely to reply: try it. Even as the Trump administration pursues its quest in isolation, that will turn the regional kaleidoscope into more collision and fragmentation, and force Iranians to endure more sacrifice for their leaders’ “resistance” to the US.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144891/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US bid to impose so-called ‘snapback’ sanctions on Iran was roundly rejected by the UN security council.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447702020-08-19T21:47:39Z2020-08-19T21:47:39ZBefore ‘Coup 53,’ the US and Iran were old friends<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353669/original/file-20200819-24-1nurtzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=85%2C22%2C2910%2C2115&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The ouster of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh marked a turning point in U.S.-Iran relations.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-1953-Coup-Queen/0cd259f0ca654fa9801f16cbba9d2cc3/12/0">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The British- and American-backed plot to overthrow Iran’s prime minister in 1953 laid the groundwork for the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and decades of hostility with the U.S. A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/movies/coup-53-review.html">documentary</a> about the plot released on Aug. 19 offers new details of what happened.</p>
<p><a href="https://isaw.nyu.edu/people/faculty/isaw-faculty/daniel-t-potts">I believe</a> it is worth recalling the time before the events chronicled in “Coup 53,” when the two countries had a distinctly different relationship.</p>
<p>In the 1800s, <a href="http://cardinalscholar.bsu.edu/handle/handle/178006">American missionaries journeyed</a> to what was then called Persia. </p>
<p>The missionaries <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597450?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">helped build important institutions</a> – schools, colleges, hospitals and medical schools – in Persia, many of which still exist. </p>
<p>Dr. <a href="http://www.ams.ac.ir/AIM/0252/0252127.htm">Joseph Plumb Cochran</a>, an American physician fluent in Persian, Turkish, Kurdish and Assyrian, founded <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29664317">a hospital in Urmia</a> in 1879, as well as Iran’s first medical school. When Cochran died at Urmia in northwestern Iran in 1905, over 10,000 people attended his funeral. </p>
<p>This image clashes with most American stereotypes of Iran and its people, and is at odds with decades of anti-Iranian sentiment <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40006734">emanating from Washington</a>. </p>
<p>Iran and the United States, in fact, have a deep history of mutual respect and friendship.</p>
<p>From 1834, when the first Protestant American mission was <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/protestantism-and-protestant-missions">established in Urmia</a>, until 1953, when the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/">CIA’s involvement in Iran’s internal affairs</a> set the United States on the road to conflict with Tehran, Americans <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/07/world/middleeast/iran-timeline.html">were the good guys</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229697/original/file-20180729-106524-n1orqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Joseph Plumb Cochran in his medical college at Urmia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Imperial bad guys</h2>
<p>My interest in the history of Iranian-American relations stems from 45 years as <a href="http://nyu.academia.edu/DTPotts">an archaeologist specializing in Iran</a>, and from research on Iranian history in the context of changes undergone by Iran’s nomadic <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/nomadism-in-iran-9780199330799?cc=us&lang=en&%5D(https://global.oup.com/academic/product/nomadism-in-iran-9780199330799?cc=us&lang=en&">population through time</a>.</p>
<p>For years, Americans have seen images of Iranians <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/18/the-history-of-death-to-america/">shouting “Death to America</a>.” Now it’s the country’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paMLn-VlX3U">lawmakers doing it</a>. President Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/23/politics/trump-iran-intl/index.html">returns the sentiment</a>, recently threatening Iran with death and destruction.</p>
<p>But before all that happened, when Americans were the good guys, there were <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=aWEBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA502&lpg=PA502&dq=persia+enemies+russia+and+great+britain&source=bl&ots=HOGOMQdqku&sig=VIwYftLeWw1uFCRuYwzPjAbNde8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiEzKqLtcfcAhVmUN8KHUNDDqQQ6AEwC3oECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=persia%20enemies%20russia%20and%20great%20britain&f=false">other countries who were instead reviled</a> by Iran. </p>
<p>The bad guys, at whose hands Iran suffered most, were <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-i-relations">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/opinion/sunday/irans-first-great-satan-was-england.html">Great Britain</a>. Those two nations – often at the invitation of Iran’s leaders – economically exploited Persia to further <a href="https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001604898">their own imperial ambitions</a>, using sustained diplomatic, military and economic pressure.</p>
<p>After two ill-judged wars fought against Russia – the First (1804-1813) and Second <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/russo-persian-wars">Russo-Persian Wars</a> (1826-1828) – Persia (the name Iran was officially adopted in 1935) lost large amounts of territory to the czar.</p>
<p>Much later, Russia found another means of exerting control over the Persian crown, <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-i-relations">loaning millions of rubles</a> to its rulers, like Mozaffar ed-Din Shah, who reigned from 1896-1902 and needed capital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mozaffar-od-Din-Shah">to fund his lavish lifestyle</a>.</p>
<p>With the exception of the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-war-1856-57">Anglo-Persian War (1856-1857)</a>, Persian relations with Great Britain were less openly hostile. But what they lacked in martial vigor was more than compensated for <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/09/iran-and-britain-the-politics-of-oil-and-coup-d%E2%80%99etat-before-the-fall-of-reza-shah/">by economic exploitation</a>. </p>
<p>Towards the end of the 19th century, the shah <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-iii">granted exclusive concessions</a> to the British for everything from telegraph lines to tobacco. Rights to Iran’s oil were given to the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company">Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company</a>. </p>
<p>So assured were Britain and Russia in their control of Persia that, in 1907, they signed the infamous <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angrusen.asp">Anglo-Russian Convention</a>. That agreement divided the country – unbeknownst to its Parliament, let alone its inhabitants – into Russian, British and “neutral” spheres of influence. After it became public it provoked the outrage of ordinary Persians and the international community at large. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229703/original/file-20180729-106514-16oeh8f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cartoon from 1907 satirizing Russia and England dividing up Persia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Punch/Pushkin House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>America the good</h2>
<p>Iran’s relations with the United States were completely different. </p>
<p>The 19th- and early 20th-century history of <a href="https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001604898">British and Russian imperial ambitions</a> and involvement in Iran put Iran in <a href="https://archive.org/details/stranglingofpers001925mbp">a dependent, exploited position</a> at the hands of the governments of these two countries. </p>
<p>But the presence in Iran of American missionaries and, later, invited government technocrats was of an entirely different quality. These were Americans offering aid, with no expectation of advantage to be gained officially for the United States government. </p>
<p>American Presbyterian missionary efforts in Iran <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/protestantism-and-protestant-missions">began in 1834</a> and focused on education, with <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4310827?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">117 schools established</a> around Urmia by 1895. Efforts were also directed at medical and social welfare. These were nongovernmental missions. The U.S. government was conspicuous by its absence in Iran and Iranian affairs. </p>
<p>By the late 19th century, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions had opened new stations <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/protestantism-and-protestant-missions">in cities across northern Iran</a>, from Tehran to Mashhad. American <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/iran">diplomatic relations with Persia</a> were established in 1883. A decade later the American Presbyterian Hospital was founded in <a href="https://archive.org/details/twentyyearsinpe00wishgoog">Tehran by John G. Wishard</a>.</p>
<p>After the First World War, Presbyterian <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4310827.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3ca2dc58895f5e7851ae40c7a661b6f1">schools for both boys and girls</a> proliferated, the most famous of which were the <a href="https://ajammc.com/2018/03/09/jordan-american-glamorous-tehran/">American College of Tehran</a> for boys, established in 1925, and <a href="https://www.history.pcusa.org/blog/2017/09/damavand-college-35mm">Iran Bethel School for girls</a>. </p>
<p>In 1910, the Persian Parliament, aware that their country’s finances were in disarray, invited the U.S. to identify a “disinterested American expert as Treasurer-general to <a href="https://archive.org/details/stranglingofpers001925mbp">reorganise and conduct collection and disbursement of revenue</a>.” </p>
<p>Despite Russian attempts <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/features/1930">to block the initiative</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Morgan-Shuster">W. Morgan Shuster</a>, a distinguished career civil servant, was appointed by Persia in February 1911. He arrived in Tehran in May, bringing with him four other Americans. The mission was a failure, lasting only eight months, and, unsurprisingly, was <a href="https://www.wdl.org/en/item/14411/">adroitly sabotaged</a> by the combined efforts of British and Russian diplomats in Tehran.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=911&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229704/original/file-20180729-106499-552kdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1144&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">American William Morgan Shuster, treasurer-general of Persia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The country’s financial situation after the First World War was still precarious. With none of the colonialist baggage associated with the two European superpowers, America was turned to, almost as a last resort, to fix what ailed Iran. Riza Shah (father of the last shah) appointed an American, <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/58235/MESV3-2.pdf">Arthur C. Millspaugh</a>, as the administrator-general of the finances of Persia. </p>
<p>When Millspaugh arrived in Tehran in 1922, a newspaper editorial addressed him <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.39961">with these words</a>: “You are the last doctor called to the death-bed of a sick person. If you fail, the patient will die. If you succeed, the patient will live.”</p>
<p>Despite his often testy relations with foreigners, Riza Shah acknowledged Millspaugh’s American Financial Mission was <a href="https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.39961/2015.39961.American-Task-In-Persia_djvu.txt">“the last hope of Persia</a>.” The fact that the mission was far from an unqualified success does not detract from its importance. Nor did it diminish America’s image as an honest broker in Iranian eyes, in contrast to that of Russia and Great Britain.</p>
<p>Of course, not every Iranian-American interaction during this period was positive. Robert Imbrie, the American consul in Tehran, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/163379.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A74a003b1e5dd07579782ee567deadcd7">was brutally murdered in 1924</a>, allegedly because a fanatical religious leader accused him of being a Baha’i and poisoning a well.
Riza Shah used the episode to crack down on dissidents and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/163379.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A74a003b1e5dd07579782ee567deadcd7">impose strict controls on public gatherings</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229702/original/file-20180729-106514-5clhnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Students at the American Memorial School, Tabriz, 1923.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shahrefarang.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>America the bad</h2>
<p>America’s benign image in Iran was forever shattered in 1953 when the CIA, working with Great Britain, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/">engineered a coup</a> against Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister, who had <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/iranian-oil-fields-are-nationalised">nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</a>. </p>
<p>Even though the overthrow of Mossadegh damaged Iranian trust in America, the years just prior to Iranian revolution in 1979 saw the number of Iranian students in the United States <a href="https://wenr.wes.org/2017/02/educating-iran-demographics-massification-and-missed-opportunities">steadily rise</a>. </p>
<p>Over one-third of the approximately 100,000 Iranian students pursuing university degrees abroad in 1977 were in the U.S. By the time of the Islamic revolution two years later, that number had climbed to 51,310, making Iran by far <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329755">the biggest single source of foreign students</a> in America, with 17% of the total foreign student population. The next-largest contributor of foreign students, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329755">Nigeria, accounted for only 6%</a>. </p>
<p>“Iranian students have been here for nearly a century … there are deep and abiding connections that reveal themselves when you look at the historical record,” <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iranians-have-studied-in-us-universities-for-decades-trumps-ban-has-left-many-stranded/2017/02/02/dae6ba00-e803-11e6-903d-9b11ed7d8d2a_story.html?utm_term=.687bf4082293">researcher Steven Ditto</a>, who wrote a <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus_133_Ditto3.pdf">report on Iranian students</a> in the U.S., told The Washington Post in 2017. </p>
<p>Even today, <a href="https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Places-of-Origin">some Iranians still manage to overcome the hurdles</a> they face in studying in America. Two of my current Ph.D. students in Near Eastern archaeology come from Iran. In 2019, there were <a href="https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Places-of-Origin">over 12,000 Iranian students in the U.S</a>. </p>
<p>The legacy of American goodwill, personal friendship and doing the right thing by Iran has not been completely lost, although scenes of anti-American demonstrations against the Great Satan on the streets of Tehran – <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-rallies-20180103-story.html">some organized by the government</a> – may make it seem as though America’s good relationship with Iran has been lost irretrievably. </p>
<p>Deep friendships dating back well over a century can withstand a great deal. A reservoir of goodwill and affection may lie dormant while political storms rage. Iran and America were good friends in the past, and for good reason. I believe that Americans would do well to remember that.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-and-america-a-forgotten-friendship-99350">article originally published</a> on July 31, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144770/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Daniel Thomas Potts is not currently in receipt of any external grants but received funding in former employment at the Univ. of Sydney (Australia) from the Australian Research Council, specifically for fieldwork in Iran, from 2003-2012.</span></em></p>The US and Iran had been friends for over a century before the British and American coup in 1953 eventually turned them into enemies.Daniel Thomas Potts, Professor of Ancient Near Eastern Archaeology and History, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296102020-02-10T13:56:21Z2020-02-10T13:56:21ZHow Iran’s millennials are grappling with crippling US sanctions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314336/original/file-20200209-27548-14r5cyp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Within Iran’s lower classes, there is a highly conformist youth culture.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farzin Mahmoudzadeh</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early January, after tensions between Iran and the United States escalated to the brink of war, President Donald Trump announced a detente of sorts, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/08/donald-trump-address-nation-iran-attacks/2842056001/">stating</a>, “The United States is ready to embrace peace with all who seek it.” </p>
<p>It may have sounded like a conciliatory gesture, but the Trump administration went on to levy <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dc897e76-33a3-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de">additional economic sanctions</a> against the country only two days later. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied the lives of Iran’s working classes, I know just how damaging <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/us-iran-sanctions-donald-trump-iran-deal-oil-banks">economic warfare has been</a>. It’s hit young Iranians, who comprise a <a href="https://iran.unfpa.org/en/node/15299">large portion of the population</a>, particularly hard. High rates of inflation – on the order of <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/444440/Inflation-rate-slides-1-4-SCI">38.6%</a> over the past 12 months – and a youth unemployment rate of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS">28.6%</a> have drastically reduced their ability to purchase basic goods and feel any semblance of financial security.</p>
<p>Over the past 12 years, I’ve studied various groups of lower-class young people and their families in their homes, neighborhoods and workplaces, in shops, and in parks. I’ve also interviewed 44 youth between the ages of 15 and 29 who have been sidelined to the socioeconomic margins. </p>
<p>I wanted to know how they cope with prolonged insecurity and the constant threat of crisis.</p>
<p>Interestingly – <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-faces-growing-criticism-at-home-abroad-over-downing-of-ukrainian-plane-11578836990">and despite what you might see on the news</a> – many don’t react by rebelling against authority or by regularly taking to the streets. </p>
<p>A central observation from my research and <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479881949/coming-of-age-in-iran/">forthcoming book</a> has been that, when faced with conditions of uncertainty, the young people I spoke with simply sought respect, acceptance and support from their communities. Life becomes a quest not for revolution, riches or vengeance, but for dignity. </p>
<h2>A highly conformist culture</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00210862.2013.810078">The desire for status and dignity</a> is an integral part of Iranian society. </p>
<p>Most of the poor, younger city dwellers I studied try to achieve this through both their conduct and their dress. They want to be seen as classy, diligent and moral. In communities that value prestige and look down on poverty, this becomes their ticket to a better life.</p>
<p>So in an attempt to conceal their poverty, they’ll spend their limited income on the latest trends so they can attain a “modern” appearance, from having the latest smartphones to wearing brand-name shoes and shirts – or at least knockoffs. </p>
<p>In order to avoid being seen as lazy or delinquent, the young people I interviewed work diligently and avoid being associated with petty criminals, like drug dealers. Even though there’s rarely enough work to go around, they get creative. They work in the informal economy as shop apprentices, street vendors and seamstresses. Those who can’t find work take up unpaid work babysitting for family members or helping with a family business in an effort to appear hardworking. By doing this, they can assume a moral high ground – regardless of how little money they’re actually making. </p>
<p>As one local, middle-aged woman told me, “There’s something wrong with a kid who doesn’t work.”</p>
<p>These young men and women are adhering to a set of values prized by their communities and promoted by society through <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33224168">billboards</a>, national television and official <a href="http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6657/We-should-promote-the-culture-of-work-production-and-diligence">speeches</a>. </p>
<p>The result is a relatively stable social order – and a youth culture that’s highly conformist.</p>
<p>This might come as a surprise to some, since some Western media outlets sometimes fixate on <a href="https://www.huckmag.com/perspectives/activism-2/iran-liberal-youth-grassroots-revolution-activism/">acts of rebellion</a>.</p>
<p>In reality, deviance – especially among the lower classes – is rare. Many simply can’t afford the consequences of being shunned by those around them. </p>
<h2>Rewards don’t need to be material</h2>
<p>The quest for dignity is only part of the story. Like many young people around the world, most youth in Iran have dreams of a better future. But for those dealing with daily economic hardship, there’s a chasm between their goals and what’s possible. </p>
<p>“I wanted to get my bachelor’s degree and have a job where I sat behind a desk,” said Babak, a street vendor, “but I had to drop out of ninth grade in order to meet my family’s expenses.”</p>
<p>That gap may never be fully breached. But many young Iranians I met still feel as if it’s possible to – in the words of a mechanic’s apprentice – “bring themselves up.”</p>
<p>The young people I interviewed do this not by trying to game the system, but by following the rules: diligence, self-sufficiency, a smart appearance, and moral and sexual cleanliness. For this, communities reward them with jobs, small promotions, or even just more deference. The material benefits might be minimal, but people nonetheless feel validated and included in the broader fabric of the nation. </p>
<p>In other contexts, researchers have found that “<a href="https://www.livescience.com/54829-income-attractiveness-men-women.html">looking the part</a>” – performing what’s deemed to be attractive to society – matters to people’s life prospects. The youth I knew in Iran do the same. They might not fully escape poverty, but they can escape stigma. </p>
<p>To them, that matters.</p>
<h2>The limits of virtue</h2>
<p>Of course, not everyone in Iran can maintain an appearance of industry, class and virtue.</p>
<p>There are young people who are desperately poor, who can’t even scrape together enough money for a new pair of shoes. There are drug addicts. There are young women who have been outed as prostitutes. </p>
<p>Focused on only helping those they deem “deserving,” communities do little to lift up people who have fallen through the cracks. Friends and acquaintances are unwilling to recommend them for jobs, neighbors avoid connecting with them, families view them with shame. </p>
<p>It can all seem a bit Darwinian, with those deemed unfit becoming social pariahs. </p>
<p>And yet, there are many youth who persevere, who believe that living by the rules, day in and day out, is the right way to live. As Ibrahim, a laborer, emphasized, “I try to live in a good way. If people remember you as good, this is reason to be proud.” To youth like Ibrahim, living a worthy life means not simply accumulating material goods, but staying true to a moral code. </p>
<p>In the face of rising prices, dwindling jobs, and few prospects for <a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/930061553672411223/Iran-MEU-April-2019-Eng.pdf">socioeconomic change</a>, the routines of daily life create space for those who have suffered most under the weight of suffocating sanctions to breathe – and, in many cases, grow. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manata Hashemi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite what you might see on the news, many of Iran’s young people are far from rebellious. Instead, they have dealt with dwindling job prospects by conforming to a strict code of morality.Manata Hashemi, Farzaneh Family Assistant Professor of Iranian Studies, University of OklahomaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304322020-01-23T19:24:38Z2020-01-23T19:24:38ZDespite shows of unity, Iran is more divided than ever after Soleimani killing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311670/original/file-20200123-162246-3xmom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=73%2C34%2C1037%2C582&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters hold flowers during protests at Amir Kabir University in Tehran, in tribute to the victims of the crash of Flight PS752. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The two major events that have shaken Iran in recent weeks have also had major internal repercussions. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/5597ff0f046a67805cc233d5933a53ed">assassination of Qassem Soleimani by an American</a> drone lit the fuse, sending shock waves around the world and increasing the risk of an escalation of armed conflict between Iran and the United States. Following this assassination, Iran was the scene of massive demonstrations to commemorate the Iranian general and denounce the Americans. </p>
<p>A few days later, as Iran launched a retaliatory raid on U.S. bases in Iraq, <a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">a Ukrainian civilian plane crashed near Tehran airport, killing 176 people, including 57 Canadians</a>. This tragedy provoked anti-regime demonstrations this time. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets, angry at their government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51073621">when it admitted responsibility for the crash</a> after three days of denial. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Debris from the plane crash near Tehran airport.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Canadian Press/AP-Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus, in the space of 10 days, Iran was the scene of pro- and anti-regime demonstrations. </p>
<p>During the pro-government demonstrations, some commentators claimed that <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/reza-marashi-interview-iran-soleimani-assassination-934852/">Iranians were rallying around the regime after the assassination of Soleimani</a>. Was this really the case? Did the assassination of the general really change Iranians’ perceptions of the regime? </p>
<p>To better understand the current context in Iran, it should be noted that Soleimani was assassinated a month and a half after <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/iran-anti-government-protests-us-support/">the largest anti-regime demonstrations</a>, which took place last November. These protests were so threatening to the regime that Supreme Leader Khamenei led the deadliest crackdown since 1979, saying: “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR">The Islamic Republic is in danger. Everything necessary must be done. This is an order</a>.” </p>
<p>As many as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/06/dont-believe-iranian-propaganda-about-mourning-soleimani/">1,500 protesters were reportedly killed</a> in November. The repression was so severe that the security forces even prevented mourning ceremonies for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/26/an-iranian-couple-wanted-mourn-son-killed-protests-now-they-are-jail/">some victims</a>.</p>
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<p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">Violent crackdown against Iraq protests exposes fallacy of the country's democracy</a>
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<hr>
<h2>Why did so many mourn Soleimani?</h2>
<p>How did the regime manage to bring so many people to the streets for Soleimani in a climate of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iran-shot-down-hopes-its-people/605158/">public discontent against both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime</a>? There are several factors that explain how Tehran managed to give <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/donald-trump-iran-congress/index.html">this illusion of unity by using Soleimani’s funeral</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstration near Tehran’s Great Mosque in honor of General Ghassem Soleimani. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini said in his sermon that U.S. President Donald Trump was a ‘clown.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>First of all, Soleimani was very popular among both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. His funeral received <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1215310781853642752">enormous media coverage</a> in Iran. This contrasted with the non-existent coverage surrounding the November anti-regime protests <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28376/after-protests-iran-may-be-locked-into-a-future-of-more-social-unrest">targeting both reformers and conservatives</a>. The authorities blocked internet access for more than seven days while they massacred protesters in the streets, according to a <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/20191224-iran-hidden-slaughter-video-investigation-protest">reporting by France 24</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the state deployed enormous resources to increase the number of participants in the pro-Soleimani demonstrations. <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1213682218033266688">Students, civil servants and shopkeepers were forced to go attend.</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51021854">Persian BBC journalist</a> so aptly said about the regime’s ability to orchestrate their own demonstrations: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The organizers are now experts in their work. From declaring national holidays to gathering university students to requiring military and civil servants to go out with their families, every means has been used to gather the crowds. Buses, trains and trucks are provided to transport people from villages and towns across Iran to the rallies that are constantly announced on state television.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That said, there are also citizens who are truly fascinated by Soleimani.</p>
<p>For several years now, there has been a certain craze for the general, who is very present on state television, in the sermons of the mosques and even with some celebrities. Soleimani is viewed in Iran as a hero who saved the Middle East from the influence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Because of his role in the fight against the terrorist organization, Soleimani embodies for some Iranians the image of a benevolent commander who is above the internal politics of the country. The presence of these admirers was also marked in these pro-Soleimani demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Demonstrations after the crash</h2>
<p>But the apparent unanimity that followed Soleimani’s assassination, <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/01/06/sea-endless-people-mourns-soleimani-across-iran-vowing-trump-will-be-held">commented on by many as a rally around the flag</a> and against the Americans, quickly collapsed in the face of popular demands and general discontent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator prepares to throw a tear gas cannister at police outside Amir Kabir University in Tehran during a demonstration in memory of the victims of Flight PS752. The apparent unanimity that followed the assassination of Soleimani quickly collapsed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As soon as the Iranian leaders announced, in the face of international pressure, that the Ukraine Airlines passenger jet had been shot down by an Iranian missile – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/21/iran-admits-it-fired-two-missiles-at-ukrainian-passenger-jet">it is now known that it was two missiles</a> – anti-regime demonstrations broke out in major cities such as Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan and Racht, as well as in several other regions.</p>
<p>Protesters chanted many of the same anti-regime slogans as they did in November: “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/12/iran-braces-for-protests-after-admitting-plane-shootdown.html">We were told that the enemy is the United States. Yet our enemy is here</a>.” The demonstrators were dispersed by force, which is the usual <em>modus operandi</em> of the Iranian republic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police take a stand as demonstrators gather in front of Amir Kabir University in Tehran to mourn the victims of Flight PS752. Police fired both live ammunition and tear gas to disperse the protesters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, Soleimani’s death didn’t weld the country together. It is still grappling with structural problems that cannot be solved overnight without a real willingness to change. The gap between the regime and the people will only grow if current trends persist. Among these trends is an expected increase in anti-regime demonstrations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130432/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vahid Yücesoy ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Despite apparent unity after the killing of an Iranian general by the U.S., deep divisions still mark the Middle Eastern country.Vahid Yücesoy, PhD Candidate in political science, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1302582020-01-22T17:28:57Z2020-01-22T17:28:57ZThe consequences of Qasem Suleimani’s death on the global energy market<p>UOn January 3, 2020, the decades-long conflict between the United States and Iran almost turned into a full-scale confrontation when a US drone <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">assassinated Iranian major general Qasem Suleimani</a> as well as Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. </p>
<p>Iran and its allies vowed revenge and global markets, fearing a military escalation, anxiously awaited their reprisals. On January 8, however, Iran’s military chose to target two American military bases located in Iraq with missiles that caused material damage rather than human losses. With the United States’ answer limited to imposing new sanctions rather that resorting to the military option, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-and-us-step-back-from-all-out-war-giving-trump-a-win-for-now-129615">situation cooled down</a> despite the continued exchange of fiery words.</p>
<p>In this article, we analyse the impact of this conflict on energy markets, especially should a military confrontation result in the closing of Hormuz strait. Who would be the economic winners and losers? What are Iran’s pressure options?</p>
<h2>The immediate effects of January’s skirmishes</h2>
<p>Up to 21% of the world’s oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, making it a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/oil-markets-oil-attacks-and-strategic-straits">strategic chokepoint</a> – over the course of 2018, an average of 20.7 million barrels of oil passed through it per day. The strait is also crucial for liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, as more than 25% of the world’s supply, mostly from Qatar, passes through it annually.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310915/original/file-20200120-69531-ecqydm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CSIS</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The short-term effect of January 3 strike was a rise in the price of oil, which was expected. Brent crude hit US$70.73 per barrel, its highest level since September 14, 2019, when it was US$72.</p>
<p>Goldman Sachs and UBS analysts <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/06/oil-prices-70-a-barrel-suleimani-retaliation-petrol-price">doubt whether oil prices will keep rallying beyond US$70</a> because of strong production from outside the Middle East – primarily the United States and Norway – which would prevent prices from surpassing US$70.</p>
<p>Following Iran’s strikes and US decision not to hit back, tensions eased, which resulted in a further drop in oil prices and by January 10, when fell to around US$65.</p>
<h2>Possible winners and losers</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/oil-price-latest-iran-us-war-trump-middle-east-a9272651.html">Capital Economics</a>, a war would lead to oil prices more than doubling.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“While the price of Brent could soar to as much as $150 per barrel, the rally may prove short-lived as supply networks adjust and demand falters in the wake of higher prices.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Defining the winners and losers from this conflict is directly based on their status as oil importers or exporters.</p>
<p><strong>Persian Gulf</strong>: Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain oil exports pass entirely through Strait of Hormuz, and Qatar also uses it to export LNG. Were the strait closed, they would be hit hard. As for Iraq, 90% of its oil transits through it. The UAE can send part of its production (1.5 million b/d) via a pipeline to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Arabia has the greatest ability to divert flows, by using a mega-pipeline to an export terminal on the Red Sea. Saudi Aramco said the capacity of that line would be increased to 6.2 million barrels per day by the end of 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Asia</strong>: China, India, Japan and South Korea rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil, as shown in the graph below and their economic performance would suffer in the short term.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310922/original/file-20200120-69563-12t7wd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Energy Information Administration</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, since the United States re-imposed sanctions on Iran, and the waivers the US administration provided to certain countries to continue importing Iranian oil ended in May 2019, Asian nations have been <a href="https://blogs.platts.com/2019/12/10/asia-crude-oil-buyers-pivot-us/">pivoting to US imports</a>. The graph below shows a spectacular increase.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310923/original/file-20200120-69555-q7qkwa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Energy Information Administration</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>European Union</strong>: Oil accounts for 35% of the EU’s energy mix. It imports only 20% of its oil needs from the Middle East and therefore its dependence on this source is limited. However, Qatar is Europe’s largest LNG exporter (35%), and any disruption of supplies could leave <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-oil-market-buffer-iran-crisis/">important consequences</a> for the EU.</p>
<p><strong>United States</strong>: According to <a href="https://moneyweek.com/520428/us-vs-iran-threat-of-war-shakes-the-world/">MoneyWeek Review</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The fracking revolution means that finding hydrocarbons and getting them out of the ground has never been easier, particularly in North America. When prices jump the frackers are happy to start pumping.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This being the case, the United States would be an obvious winner of such a crisis.</p>
<p><strong>Russia</strong>: The country’s commitment to the OPEC+ deal has allowed it to gain huge amounts of additional revenue. However, that deal resulted in Russia having a spare production capacity of up to half a million barrels per day. Should prices jump, Russia could be tempted to use such an opportunity to fill in its coffers and boost its GDP performance to match President Putin’s desired GDP growth rates.</p>
<h2>Iran’s options</h2>
<p>Tehran’s economic woes can still make its behaviour unpredictable especially if the harsh sanctions continue. So far, it seems to have used a fraction of the means at its disposal. A measured military response saved face and halted a potential escalation had they incurred human losses on the US military.</p>
<p>Iran still has the following ways that it can strengthen its position, among others:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Encouraging its allies to attack US interests, allowing Iran to avoid the blame. Attacks could spread to US allies such as Israel.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-real-is-the-threat-of-cyberwar-between-iran-and-the-us-129573">Cyber-attacks</a> against US and allied companies and administrations.</p></li>
<li><p>Attacks on or seizure of oil tankers (such as in 2019) or the use of drones against neighbours’ energy facilities.</p></li>
<li><p>Iran’s fleet can pursue commercial shipments in the Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean and elsewhere.</p></li>
<li><p>The country’s Houthi allies can target ships in the Red Sea, thus threatening the Suez Canal’s economic viability.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Despite significant loses since the waivers were terminated, Iran chose to not close the Hormuz strait. Why? Because Tehran noticed that relying on “precise, quick and short” actions, especially through allies, proved more profitable. It does not have the capacity for a full-scale war with the United States and finally it does not wish to be seen as an unreliable partner in the post-sanction times.</p>
<p>With the US presidential elections approaching, Iran’s internal troubles mean that both countries need the current “ceasefire”. Perhaps following the short-lived skirmishes, both sides could go back to the negotiation tables and find the necessary compromises to reinstate the nuclear deal. Only time will tell.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was written with Ahmad Ismail, an Abu Dhabi–based research consultant specialising in political-economy analysis and geopolitics.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hassan Obeid is a member of Ebs-Paris / INSEEC U Research Center. He's a professor of Finance at European Business School- Paris.</span></em></p>The assassination of the Iranian general could have lasting effects on energy markets. Which countries could benefit from it and which could be negatively affected?Hassan Obeid, Professor of Finance, European Business School, EBS Paris Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295362020-01-22T13:41:16Z2020-01-22T13:41:16ZHow Iran’s military outsources its cyberthreat forces<p>In the wake of the U.S. killing of a top Iranian general and Iran’s retaliatory missile strike, should the U.S. be concerned about the cyberthreat from Iran? Already, pro-Iranian hackers have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/us/politics/iran-attack-cyber.html">defaced several U.S. websites</a> to protest the killing of General Qassem Soleimani. One group wrote “This is only a small part of Iran’s cyber capability” on one of the hacked sites.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">Two years ago</a>, I wrote that Iran’s cyberwarfare capabilities lagged behind those of both Russia and China, but that it had become a major threat which will only get worse. It had already conducted several highly damaging cyberattacks. </p>
<p>Since then, Iran has continued to develop and deploy its cyberattacking capabilities. It carries out attacks through a network of intermediaries, allowing the regime to strike its foes while denying direct involvement. </p>
<h2>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-supported hackers</h2>
<p>Iran’s cyberwarfare capability lies primarily within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a branch of the country’s military. However, rather than employing its own cyberforce against foreign targets, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appears to mainly outsource these cyberattacks.</p>
<p>According to cyberthreat intelligence firm <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/iran-hacker-hierarchy/">Recorded Future</a>, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps uses trusted intermediaries to manage contracts with independent groups. These intermediaries are loyal to the regime but separate from it. They translate the Iranian military’s priorities into discrete tasks, which are then bid out to independent contractors. </p>
<p>Recorded Future estimates that as many as 50 organizations compete for these contracts. Several contractors may be involved in a single operation.</p>
<p>Iranian contractors communicate online to hire workers and exchange information. Ashiyane, the primary online security forum in Iran, was created by hackers in the mid-2000s in order to <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-cyber-war-hackers-service-regime-irgc-claims-iran-can-hack-enemys-advanced-weapons">disseminate hacking tools</a> and tutorials within the hacking community. <a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">The Ashiyane Digital Security Team was known for hacking websites</a> and replacing their home pages with pro-Iranian content. By May 2011, Zone-H, an archive of defaced websites, had recorded 23,532 defacements by that group alone. Its leader, Behrouz Kamalian, said his <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-cyber-war-hackers-service-regime-irgc-claims-iran-can-hack-enemys-advanced-weapons">group cooperated with the Iranian military</a>, but operated independently and spontaneously.</p>
<p>Iran had an active community of hackers at least by 2004, when a group calling itself <a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">Iran Hackers Sabotage</a> launched a succession of web attacks “with the aim of showing the world that Iranian hackers have something to say in the worldwide security.” It is likely that many of Iran’s cyber contractors come from this community.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of intermediaries and contractors makes it harder to attribute cyberattacks to the regime. Nevertheless, investigators have been able to trace many cyberattacks to persons inside Iran operating with the support of the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<h2>Cyber campaigns</h2>
<p>Iran engages in both espionage and sabotage operations. They employ both <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/REPORT_IranCEEW.pdf">off-the-shelf malware and custom-made software</a> tools, according to a 2018 report by the Foundation to Defend Democracy. They use spearfishing, or luring specific individuals with fraudulent messages, to gain initial access to target machines by enticing victims to click on links that lead to phony sites where they hand over usernames and passwords or open attachments that plant “backdoors” on their devices. Once in, they use various hacking tools to spread through networks and download or destroy data. </p>
<p>Iran’s cyber espionage campaigns gain access to networks in order to steal proprietary and sensitive data in areas of interest to the regime. Security companies that track these threats give them APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) names such as APT33, “kitten” names such as Magic Kitten and miscellaneous other names such as OilRig.</p>
<p>The group the security firm FireEye calls <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html">APT33</a> is especially noteworthy. It has conducted numerous espionage operations against oil and aviation industries in the U.S., Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. APT33 was recently reported to use small botnets (networks of compromised computers) to target <a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/more-than-a-dozen-obfuscated-apt33-botnets-used-for-extreme-narrow-targeting/">very specific sites</a> for their data collection.</p>
<p>Another group known as APT35 (aka Phosphoros) has attempted to gain access to email accounts belonging to individuals involved in a <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/04/microsoft-iran-phosphorous-attack/">2020 U.S. presidential campaign</a>. Were they to succeed, they might be able to use stolen information to influence the election by, for example, releasing information publicly that could be damaging to a candidate. </p>
<p>In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/nine-iranians-charged-conducting-massive-cyber-theft-campaign-behalf-islamic">charged nine Iranians with conducting a massive cyber theft campaign</a> on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. All were tied to the Mabna Institute, an Iranian company behind cyber intrusions since at least 2013. The defendants allegedly stole 31 terabytes of data from U.S. and foreign entities. The victims included over 300 universities, almost 50 companies and several government agencies.</p>
<h2>Cyber sabotage</h2>
<p>Iran’s sabotage operations have employed “wiper” malware to destroy data on hard drives. They have also employed botnets to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks, where a flood of traffic effectively disables a server. These operations are frequently hidden behind monikers that resemble those used by independent hacktivists who hack for a cause rather than money.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/j5m-s9E0k8I?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Hacking groups tied to the Iranian regime have successfully defaced websites, wiped data from PCs and have attempted to infiltrate industrial control systems.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In one highly damaging attack, a group calling themselves the Cutting Sword of Justice <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1">attacked the Saudi Aramco oil company</a> with wiper code in 2012. The hackers used a virus dubbed Shamoon to spread the code through the company’s network. The attack <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/REPORT_IranCEEW.pdf">destroyed data on 35,000 computers</a>, disrupting business processes for weeks.</p>
<p>The Shamoon software reappeared in 2016, wiping data from thousands of computers in Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation agency and other organizations. Then in 2018, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-shamoon-idUSKBN1OB2FA">variant of Shamoon hit</a> the Italian oil services firm Saipem, crippling more than 300 computers.</p>
<p>Iranian hackers have conducted massive distributed denial-of-service attacks. From 2012 to 2013, a group calling itself the Cyber Fighters of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam launched a series of <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/deconstructing-the-al-qassam-cyber-fighters-assault-on-us-banks/">relentless distributed denial-of-service attacks against major U.S. banks</a>. The attacks were said to have caused tens of millions of dollars in losses relating to mitigation and recovery costs and lost business.</p>
<p>In 2016 the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html">U.S. indicted seven Iranian hackers</a> for working on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to conduct the bank attacks. The motivation may have been retaliation for economic sanctions that had been imposed on Iran.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>So far, Iranian cyberattacks have been limited to desktop computers and servers running standard commercial software. They have not yet affected industrial controls systems running electrical power grids and other physical infrastructure. Were they to get into and take over these control systems, they could, for example, cause more serious damage such as the 2015 and 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-sources-of-todays-russian-cyberthreat-81593">power outages caused by the Russians</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>One of the Iranians indicted in the bank attacks <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html">did get into the computer control system for the Bowman Avenue Dam</a> in rural New York. According to the indictment, no damage was done, but the access would have allowed the dam’s gate to be manipulated if it not been manually disconnected for maintenance issues.</p>
<p>While there are no public reports of Iranian threat actors demonstrating a capability against industrial control systems, Microsoft recently reported that APT33 appears to have <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33">shifted its focus</a> to these systems. In particular, they have been attempting to guess passwords for the systems’ manufacturers, suppliers, and maintainers. The access and information that could be acquired from succeeding might help them get into an industrial control system.</p>
<p>Ned Moran, a security researcher with Microsoft, speculated that the group may be attempting to <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/11/a-notorious-iranian-hacking-crew-is-targeting-industrial-control-systems/">get access to industrial control systems</a> in order to produce physically disruptive effects. Although APT33 has not been directly implicated in any incidents of cyber sabotage, security researchers have found <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-hackers-apt33/">links between code</a> used by the group with code used in the Shamoon attacks to destroy data.</p>
<p>While it is impossible to know Iran’s intentions, they are likely to continue operating numerous cyber espionage campaigns while developing additional capabilities for cyber sabotage. If tensions between Iran and the United States mount, Iran may respond with additional cyberattacks, possibly ones that are more damaging than we’ve seen so far.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorothy Denning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iranian military operates cyber espionage and sabotage through a network of dozens of contractors, allowing the state to attack foes while denying involvement.Dorothy Denning, Emeritus Distinguished Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296212020-01-21T10:29:53Z2020-01-21T10:29:53ZThe US-Iran conflict and what it means for Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311073/original/file-20200121-117911-f8ujuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C22%2C4962%2C3320&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iranian boy walk past next to a wall painting of Iran’s national flag in a street of the capital city of Tehran, Iran, in early January.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The bitter US-Iran relationship <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">has been going on</a> for decades, but the tension between the two countries has started to escalate to a critical point after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50991810">the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani</a>, the head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (<a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/13/world/middleeast/the-quds-force-in-irans-national-security.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all"><em>Quds</em> Force</a>). </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/c7116313efdb56f4e928289faa1ad8cd">retaliated</a> against the assassination of Soleimani, considered one of its influential figures, with missile strikes on Iraqi bases housing US troops on January 8. The Muslim country also announced it <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-pulling-out-nuclear-deal-following-u-s-strike-killed-n1110636">ended</a> its commitment to limit the development of its nuclear programs. The conflict has even taken an unexpected turn with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/10/795252134/ukrainian-plane-crash-in-iran-heres-what-the-available-evidence-shows">the downing of a commercial plane</a> by an Iranian missile.</p>
<p>As tensions rise between the US and Iran, Indonesia, with the world’s largest Muslim population, is expected to face no political impacts from this conflict due to its minimal involvement in the region. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia needs to be prepared for the conflict’s impacts on oil prices and the national macro economy.</p>
<h2>Staying neutral in the Middle East</h2>
<p>Middle Eastern politics has been marked by the continued struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and and Iran. Most people tend to see the conflict as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/sunni-shia-why-conflict-more-political-than-religious-sectarian-middle-east">revolving</a> around both countries’ different religious values. Iran represents moderate Shia Muslims and Saudi Arabia Sunni Muslims. </p>
<p>But the conflict is more than that. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in various conflicts due to their different political stance on the US and the West’s influence over the region. </p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-persian-gulf-understanding-the-american-oil-strategy/">came</a> to the region for the oil. Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, both Iran and Saudi Arabia <a href="https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/history-us-iran-relations">were close allies</a> of the US. The US helped to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821">provide</a> national security facilities in both countries. </p>
<p>However, right after the revolution, the Iranian position changed dramatically to oppose the US presence in the region. The revolution <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution">was also</a> a response to economic inequality under the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was known for his westernised ideas. The result of the revolution was the birth of an anti-American and anti-Western Islamic republic. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia decided to strengthen its alliance with the West, mostly the US. This can be seen in its stance in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/The-Persian-Gulf-War-and-its-aftermath">the Gulf War</a> and <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/saudi-arabias-motives-syrian-civil-war">Syrian civil war</a>.</p>
<p>Amid conflicts and political rivalry in the Middle East, Indonesia always maintains a <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/121420/indonesia-to-not-join-imctc-but-shares-similar-spirit">neutral position</a>. Despite being the largest Muslim population, Indonesia manages to avoid any major confrontation and play safely between conflicting countries in the region. </p>
<p>Right after Saudi Arabia’s King Salman visited Indonesia in 2016 as part of his tour to Asian countries to promote Saudi Arabian investment, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo <a href="https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/16/12/13/oi4u9a354-presiden-jokowi-awali-kunjungan-kenegaraan-di-iran">visited</a> Tehran, Iran, in the same year in an attempt to stay neutral in the Iran-Saudi conflict. </p>
<h2>Indonesia’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>Indonesia’s minimal involvement in Middle Eastern politics follows the country’s free and active international relations policy. Under this policy, this largest archipelago nation makes domestic issues a priority while actively promoting peace to the world. Indonesia is part of the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/24/indonesia-committed-to-greater-peacekeeping-contribution-fm-retno.html">International Peacekeeping Force</a>.</p>
<p>Diplomacy and peace come first in Indonesian foreign policy. One example is Indonesia’s reaction to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Indonesia has shown solidarity with the Muslim world by supporting <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-domestically-focused-foreign-policy">a draft resolution</a> condemning Israel’s occupation of the West Bank rather than deploying armed forces. </p>
<p>Looking at the above precedents, Indonesia will most likely stay away from the US and Iran conflict. </p>
<p>Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi only <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/139240/indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi-summons-us-iranian-ambassadors">summoned</a> both ambassadors in Jakarta to encourage the two countries to ease the tensions. However, there will be no further coercive measures from Indonesia in response to this conflict.</p>
<p>Interfering in foreign conflicts is not one of Indonesia’s <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/01/03/construing-41-priorities-of-indonesias-diplomacy.html">2020 foreign policy priorities</a>.</p>
<p>When the country addresses international issues, it is mostly motivated <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-domestically-focused-foreign-policy">by national issues</a>. This is evident in Jokowi’s speeches in international forums. They are mostly rhetoric to attract foreign investment and avoid taking a stand on issues such as the South China Sea crisis or the repression of the Rohingya in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Indonesia has established good relations with both Iran and the US and has no interest in putting these at risk.</p>
<h2>Economic impacts</h2>
<p>One thing Indonesia should prepare for in relation to the Iran-US conflict is a rise in oil prices. </p>
<p>Oil-producing countries are mostly in the Middle East and when conflicts erupt in the region oil production may drop with production facilities being disrupted. </p>
<p>On January 8 2020, after Iranian ballistic missile strikes, oil prices <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50979492">rose</a> by 1.4% to US$69.21 per barrel. </p>
<p>If the price keeps rising, Indonesia will have to revise its annual budget. </p>
<p>The oil price rise will also affect Indonesia’s currency rate as dollars are used in crude oil transactions. </p>
<p>The weakened rupiah will later affect national expenditure. Finance Minister Sri Mulyani <a href="https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/01/08/103000826/sri-mulyani-awasi-dampak-konflik-iran-as-ke-ekonomi-ri">has warned</a> about the possible effects of the conflict on the archipelago’s economy. </p>
<p>Even though Indonesia will not be involved in the tension, Indonesia must anticipate the impact on its macro-economy. By minimising interference, Indonesia has been on the right path to secure stability in its own region along with enhancing a peaceful approach to the situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamad Rezky Utama tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population, is expected to face no political impacts from US-Iran conflict due to Indonesia’s minimal involvement in the region.Mohamad Rezky Utama, Lecturer, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.