tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/zambia-elections-30457/articlesZambia elections – The Conversation2021-08-09T14:04:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657602021-08-09T14:04:29Z2021-08-09T14:04:29ZFour priorities for Zambia after the 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415101/original/file-20210808-17-1mt4xmk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Might the 2021 Zambian elections usher in another period of economic growth?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whoever wins Zambia’s 2021 general elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. To achieve this, the new administration must have at least four priorities. These are regaining credibility with the international financiers, fighting corruption, curtailing the dominance of the executive branch of government, and ending the reign of terror by political party vigilantes, known as “cadres”.</p>
<p>On 12 August, Zambians <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3600/">will elect</a> the president, 156 members of parliament and 117 district council leaders. The elections take place in an increasingly contentious environment.</p>
<p><a href="https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Edgar_Lungu/">Edgar Lungu</a>, who has been president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">since 2015</a> after his predecessor Michael Sata died in office, has shown <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/zambia-killings-and-brutal-crackdown-against-dissent-set-the-tone-for-august-election/">increasingly autocratic tendencies</a>. He is running for a controversial <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">third term</a> that opponents argue is unconstitutional since he already has been elected twice, in the 2015 and 2016 general elections. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">Constitutional Court dismissed</a> the claim since Lungu’s first term was only one year.</p>
<p>The run-up to the polls has been characterised by <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">accusations</a> that the voters’ register has been manipulated to disadvantage strongholds of the main opposition party, the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/taxonomy/term/165">United Party for National Development (UPND)</a>, led by veteran politician <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/58535_hh_profile.pdf">Hakainde Hichilema</a>. He lost in 2016 by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zambia-post-elections-president-lungu-has-his-work-cut-out-for-him-64058">only just over 100,000 votes</a> in an election deemed unfair by <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/zambia-091516.html">international observers</a>. </p>
<p>The military has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zambia-election-idAFL8N2P80RH">deployed on the streets</a> due to excessive pre-election violence that underscores how competitive the election is. </p>
<p>Following a tactic used by Sata in the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2011/03/13/pf-pvt-system/">2011 elections</a>, Hichilema has mobilised <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">20,000 election agents</a> from his party to assist a <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">parallel vote tabulation</a> process to help monitor fraud. Such a tabulation is a <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">common methodology</a> based on observing a random sample of polling stations to independently verify election results. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a recently passed Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Bill is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/02/23/csos-demand-for-withdrawal-of-cyber-security-and-cybercrimes-bill/">making citizens wary</a> of how internet and digital communications could be <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/as-contentious-election-nears-rights-groups-urge-zambia-to-keepiton/">interrupted</a> as election results roll in. </p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">A repeat</a> of the aftermath of the 2016 elections could occur. Specifically, if Lungu claims an outright victory – passing the 50% threshold, thus avoiding the need for a second round of voting – Hichilema will likely contest the elections in the courts. This may result in clashes in the cities.</p>
<p>Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. This will require the new administration to focus on four priorities.</p>
<h2>Regaining trust of financiers</h2>
<p>Economic debt is Zambia’s biggest challenge. Under Lungu, the debt ballooned from <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/08/05/zambia-heads-towards-a-pivotal-election">36% to 110% of GDP</a>. Zambia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/25/zambias-default-fuels-fears-of-african-debt-tsunami-as-covid-impact-bites">defaulted</a> on repaying $42.5 million in interest on a Eurobond in November 2020.</p>
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<p>The negative impacts of debt servicing have been <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">deeply felt across Zambian households</a>. Multiple factors <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/11/14/zambia-is-starting-to-look-like-zimbabwe-the-failure-next-door">contributed</a> to the rising debt – including volatile copper prices, drought in 2019, and COVID-19.</p>
<p>The shift by the government towards sovereign financing and Chinese loans since 2012 severely compounded the debt crisis. There has been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame.pdf">a lack of transparency</a> about the Chinese loans. This has been made worse by concerns about <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/782221512459934813/zambia-economic-brief-how-zambia-can-borrow-without-sorrow">corruption</a> in the use of Eurobond funding for large-scale infrastructure projects. These two factors have <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/zambia-default-test-case-for-africa-debt-relief-01614247805">undermined efforts by the IMF</a> to negotiate debt relief on behalf of commercial creditors.</p>
<h2>Fighting corruption</h2>
<p>Regaining trust, especially with Western donors, requires fighting corruption that has <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf">become endemic under Lungu</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, it was uncovered that the government procured <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/11/11/procurement-corruption-from-fire-tenders-to-ambulances/">42 fire trucks for US$42 million</a>. In the same year, the country’s <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2018/06/01/zambia-lost-k4-5bn-to-financial-crimes-in-2017-fic/">Financial Intelligence Centre</a> revealed that billions of Zambian kwacha had been laundered through high level corruption and tax evasion. In 2018, several bilateral donors <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption/zambia-says-donors-withholding-nearly-34-million-over-mismanagement-idUSKCN1M02TD">halted US$34 million in funding</a> for education and social welfare programmes due to mismanagement. </p>
<p>And, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, US$17 million in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/cpi-2020-zambia-medical-supply-scandal-anti-corruption-key-electoral-issue">procurement irregularities</a> by the Ministry of Health were uncovered.</p>
<h2>Curbing executive dominance</h2>
<p>Lungu’s government attempted to remove legislative oversight over <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-effect-of-the-constitution-of-zambia-amendment-bill-10-2019-on-public-financial-management-and-debt-management.pdf">contracting public debt</a> via a failed constitutional reform known as <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/The%20Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%28Ameement%29%20Bill%202019.pdf">Bill Number 10</a>. </p>
<p>First introduced in mid-2019, the bill’s other provisions included reducing the National Assembly’s powers to impeach the president. It also allowed for judges to be removed through a tribunal appointed by the president, rather than through the extant <a href="https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/An-Analysis-of-Zambias-Proposed-Constiutional-Amendments-Relating-to-the-Judiciary.pdf">Judicial Complaints Commission</a>. Established in 2006, the commission receives complaints against judicial officers and submits recommendation for action to the independent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3758963">Director of Public Prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>Civil society organisations and legal experts <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/06/03/reject-bill-10-in-zambians-interest-csos-urge-mps/">opposed</a> the attempt to create a “<a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>”. </p>
<p>In October 2020, UPND members of parliament walked out of the National Assembly to prevent the bill from being passed. But Lungu’s party has <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/11/17/pf-makes-tabling-of-bill-10-in-2021-an-election-issue/">vowed to reintroduce</a> the bill after the elections.</p>
<p>Other forms of executive interference include using the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2021">Independent Broadcasting Authority</a> to shut down privately owned news outlets that are critical of the government. This contributes to an already biased media environment.</p>
<h2>Tackling party cadres</h2>
<p>Finally, there is <a href="http://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/433/IDCPPA.WP27SeekingsSiachiwena.pdf">mounting disenchantment</a> with the Patriotic Front in the party’s traditional strongholds of Lusaka and cities in the <a href="https://www.cbt.gov.zm/?page_id=4454">Copperbelt Province</a>. </p>
<p>This is due to the party having <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/107675/zambia-young-urban-and-disgruntled-pf-supporters-can-lungu-woo-them-back/">alienated the urban youth</a> and middle classes because of its repression of civil society, and <a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_136_hinfelaar_resnick_sishuwa.pdf">surveillance on the University of Zambia</a> campus. But the Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">cadres</a> – typically unemployed men hired to extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events – are a particular nuisance for urban market traders, minibus and taxi operators. </p>
<p>For instance, they charge extra fees to allow minibuses to pick up customers in particular areas, or threaten violence against traders who refuse to pay them <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">illegal fees to sell from market stalls</a>. </p>
<p>Although they <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">have existed for decades in Zambia</a>, cadres have become <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343319884990">increasingly violent and extortionary</a> under the Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>The extortion deprives the city councils of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">revenue from the markets and bus stations</a>. It has generated a culture of fear and frustration among the urban poor. </p>
<p>But the opposition United Party for National Development <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">has its own cadres</a> who are equally violent. If elected, Hichilema should enable the police to better regulate the cadres. He must also hold councillors elected on his party ticket accountable if they condone cadre activity.</p>
<h2>Back to the future or a new beginning?</h2>
<p>These four priorities are not new. In 2001, Zambia was massively indebted, politically polarised, and led by a deeply corrupt president – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-late-zambian-president-fredrick-chiluba-a-legacy-of-failed-democratic-transition/">Frederick Chiluba</a>. He tried (and failed) to change the constitution to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/07/chrismcgreal">run for a third term</a> as leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. </p>
<p>Chiluba’s successor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a>, also from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, reversed Zambia’s decline. From 2001 until 2008, the country enjoyed a period of <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131180/filename/131391.pdf">economic growth</a>. This was mostly due to good macroeconomic management that involved <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/90774">fighting corruption</a>. But, when Mwanawasa died in 2008, his successor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rupiah-Banda">Rupiah Banda</a>, created a more restrictive political environment. This <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414012437166">contributed to the popularity of the Patriotic Front</a>.</p>
<p>If this year’s election results in a new leader, the onus will be on Hichilema to do a better job than his predecessors at stopping the cycle from repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danielle Resnick receives funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). </span></em></p>Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy.Danielle Resnick, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597302021-05-04T13:24:14Z2021-05-04T13:24:14ZWhy Zambia’s upcoming poll risks tipping the balance against democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397557/original/file-20210428-13-1thnp7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Image of a polling station sign in Kasama, Northern Province, in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nicole Beardsworth</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia is one of the fastest eroding democracies in the world. This is according to the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-dem), one of the most trusted sources of information on indicators of democratic progress or regression. The project’s 2020 <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">report</a> notes that Zambia has registered a remarkably rapid decline in the quality of democracy since the last election in 2016. </p>
<p>Nor is there great optimism about the next set of elections, due to take place in less than four months. Observers have serious concerns ahead of the polls. One of the main ones is about the quality of the <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/27/2021-elections-a-scam-voter-numbers-inflated-in-provinces-likely-to-vote-for-pf-sishuwa/">voters’ roll</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission decided in 2020 to <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/08/sadc-elections-monitoring-body-objects-to-new-voters-register/">scrap</a> the voters’ roll that had been in use for over a decade. It then allocated just 38 days to register more than 8 million people in the middle of the rainy season. </p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">has refused</a> to make the roll available for an independent audit, ignoring widespread calls to do so. Such an audit of the roll was allowed in 2016.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/">Christian Churches Monitoring Group</a> – the most reputable local election observation organisation – set about trying to verify the existence of voters and check them against the new roll. But it had to abandon its efforts after the <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-cancellation-of-the-people-to-list-test/">electoral commission warned</a> that this contravened local legislation. </p>
<p>The limited information available in the public domain suggests that the registration process has indeed been skewed towards regions that vote for the ruling party.</p>
<h2>2016 voting patterns and the 2021 register</h2>
<p>Zambia appears to have become more politically polarised along ethnic lines since 2016. This is in part due to regional voting patterns which appeared – on the surface at least – to have split cleanly along ethno-regional lines. </p>
<p>In 2016, support for the ruling Patriotic Front and President Edgar Lungu was drawn predominantly from the largely Bemba-speaking north and Nyanja-speaking east of the country. The Patriotic Front’s support has traditionally come from Bemba-speakers. But Nyanja-speaking easterners have rallied around the Patriotic Front following Lungu’s rise. He originates from the east, has backing from prominent Nyanja-speakers and has elevated easterners in cabinet and government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: The ruling Patriotic Front party’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In comparison, the main opposition party’s support was drawn substantially from the Tonga-speaking southern and Lozi-speaking western regions. The so-called Bantu Botatwe (affiliated groups from the south and west) have long supported political parties that represent their economic and political interests, but these parties have never come to power or sponsored a president. </p>
<p>These regional patterns of support have not gone unnoticed in Lusaka. Since the 2016 elections, there has been a growing rhetoric of distrust from the ruling party towards the south and west of the country. <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/08/06/katuba-voted-for-a-tribe-i-feel-sad-to-be-tonga-says-pfs-moonga/">Senior</a> members of the ruling party have increasingly made <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/29/lungu-must-act-on-dora-before-tribalism-triggers-violence-tiz/">disparaging remarks</a> against citizens from those regions. </p>
<p>In addition, the cabinet and senior positions in the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/02/04/mwenye-condemns-segregative-appointments-explains-his-legal-opinion-against-lungu-musa/">civil service</a> and <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2021/04/15/president-lungu-swears-7-judges-3-courts/?">judiciary</a> appear to have been skewed towards people who come from the north and east. </p>
<p>By comparison, there is almost no representation of people from the south and west of the country.</p>
<p>Crucially, an analysis of the new 2021 voters’ roll by Zambian academic Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa – recently <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/irony-and-panic-as-zambias-authoritarianism-turns-to-intellectuals/">threatened</a> with arrest for sedition by a key ruling party figure – suggests that significantly more citizens have been registered for the next poll in regions that support the ruling party. Meanwhile, far fewer voters have been registered in opposition-supporting regions. </p>
<p>These dynamics are important, and worrying. For a long time Zambia has had a policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1959945">regional</a> balancing in key government appointments. This has largely held regional grievances <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610585">in check</a>. </p>
<p>But perceptions of persecution of groups who have historically supported the opposition are deepening, and may well become more entrenched with the elections.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Opposition UPND’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Credibility gap</h2>
<p>In 2016, Lungu cleared the 50% electoral threshold with just 13,000 votes, with Hakainde Hichilema <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">close</a> at his heels. Given the clear disparities in the recent registration numbers across regions, it is difficult to interpret them as anything but an attempt to pack the voters’ roll with ruling party supporters. This also serves to disenfranchise opposition voters. </p>
<p>The reluctance of the electoral commission to subject the roll to an independent audit – as it did in 2016 – increases these suspicions.</p>
<p>The Catholic Church, a key player in the country’s politics, has expressed <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2021-03/zambia-bishops-concerned-about-august-elections.html">deep reservations</a> about the registration process. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group has also <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-analysis-of-the-voters-register/">highlighted major gaps</a> and deficiencies with both the process and the registration rates. </p>
<p>Hichilema has <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">noted his serious concern</a> with the register. This distrust of the election commission runs deep within the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.</p>
<p>There are additional worries too. The government has used COVID-19 restrictions to curtail the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/26/chingola-police-nab-27-upnd-cadres-for-unlawful-assembly-on-independence-day/">opposition’s</a> ability to campaign. This includes <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/10/07/zambia-police-denies-upnd-and-ndc-permit-to-hold-a-protest-against-ecz/">demonstrations</a> or party meetings even in <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/02/ndola-police-nabs-3-upnd-officials-for-holding-private-meeting/">private homes</a>. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s January statement appeared to suggest that movement restrictions during campaigns would be <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">enforced</a>. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern about heavy-handed tactics by the police who have repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka late last year when police <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-23/zambian-police-fire-teargas-as-opposition-leader-questioned">opened fire on a crowd</a> of opposition supporters. </p>
<p>Arrests for insulting or defaming the president have increased. Since March 2020, at least six people, including a 15-year-old boy, have been <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/24/police-nab-kitwe-man-for-insulting-lungu/">arrested</a> over such offences. This has reduced space for dissent alongside <a href="https://rsf.org/en/zambia">shrinking</a> space for media and non-governmental organisations wary of running afoul of the government’s agenda.</p>
<p>In 2019 the government set about trying to change the constitution to further strengthen the presidency relative to the judiciary and legislature. It <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?cat=131">failed</a> in late 2020, catching the administration by surprise. </p>
<p>In the wake of this, the ruling party introduced a new Cyber Security and Cyber Crime law. It has been roundly <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/21/church-asks-lungu-not-to-sign-cyber-bill-into-law/">criticised</a> as failing to meet basic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-05-free-speech-zambias-new-internet-law-fails-basic-human-rights-scrutiny/">human rights</a> standards, further <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/01/cyber-insecurity-potential-impact-of-the-cyber-security-and-cyber-crimes-bill-of-2021-on-an-already-shrinking-civic-space-in-zambia/">shrinking civic space</a> and placing whistleblowers and journalists at unjustified risk. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>The divide between the opposition United Party for National Development and ruling Patriotic Front continues to widen, and distrust runs deep. Concerns with the electoral commission’s management of the process have most outside observers worried about the diminishing likelihood of a fair election.</p>
<p>The increasing <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/03/19/our-officers-fear-cadres-to-protect-their-jobs-police/">impunity</a> of ruling party-aligned “cadres” and their politicised accusations against <a href="https://twitter.com/2021Zambian/status/1382304037253550081">civil servants</a> and citizens is a growing concern, as much of the violence surrounding the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/11/13/kambwili-kampyongos-hate-speech-influenced-violence-in-2016-elections-reveals-report/">2016 election</a> was perpetrated by these groups of <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/05/2021-polls-could-be-marred-by-violence-if-govt-doesnt-act-on-inquiry-avap/">young men</a> who are sponsored by politicians. </p>
<p>Zambia’s status as a peaceful, democratic and free country is increasingly at risk. The 2021 election holds the potential to tip the balance if politicians aren’t careful and the international community pays little heed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth works for the University of Pretoria. She is also an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Warwick, where she receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Institute for Advanced Studies to conduct research on the Zambian elections.</span></em></p>Distrust of the electoral commission runs deep in the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1314052020-02-17T13:23:26Z2020-02-17T13:23:26ZHow history explains election violence: Kenya and Zambia tell the story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315230/original/file-20200213-11040-rgd0oz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Zambia's president-elect Edgar Lungu in 2016. The country is known for peaceful polls, but this one was marked by clashes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Dawood Salim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others?</p>
<p>That’s the question we set out to anwer in our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">research</a> on electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia.</p>
<p>We compared Zambia’s founding elections in 1991, which were largely peaceful, and Kenya’s in 1992. During these polls there was large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>What explains the divergent outcomes in electoral violence? One answer is that political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era. </p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that violence was a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia because of the type of authoritarian rule that existed in Kenya before the polls. This created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilisation during the first multiparty elections. </p>
<p>We concluded from this that, to understand why some countries are more prone to experience electoral violence, the impact of history and the longer-term processes of institutional development need to be considered.</p>
<h2>A comparison</h2>
<p>Most analysis on election-related violence is focused on factors that concern the immediate conditions of election. These include how fiercely contested a given election is, what formal electoral rules are in place, whether monitors and peacekeepers oversee the process, and how electoral management bodies work.</p>
<p>Our research sought to dig deeper into history. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319884983">It showed</a> how dynamics of governance during authoritarian eras have lasting effects on whether multi-party elections turn violent or not. </p>
<p>A historical lens on Kenya’s and Zambia’s transitions from single-party rule to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s helped us understand how pervasive the informal institutions that underpin electoral conduct can be. And how they carry over from an authoritarian period to a multi-party setting. </p>
<p>In both countries, the incumbents at the time of transition – <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=32WYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=moi+warns+multi-partyism+strife&source=bl&ots=m1CRl7upG_&sig=ACfU3U0L1bFOxDgKlNBwVM4AITpu5ncm0A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjXnoqzsc7nAhV8A2MBHZGCCs8Q6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=moi%20warns%20multi-partyism%20strife&f=false">Daniel arap Moi</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40396331?seq=1">Kenneth Kaunda</a> in Zambia – warned that a turn to multi-party election would usher in chaos, violence and inter-ethnic strife. </p>
<p>Yet, Zambia’s 1991 founding election remained largely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/05/world/zambia-s-democratic-shock-to-africa.html">free from violence</a>. Kaunda stepped down after 27 years at the helm and the presidency transferred to the opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba.</p>
<p>But in Kenya’s 1992 election state-instigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">electoral violence</a> along ethnic lines resulted in 1,500 people people being killed. A further 300,000 were displaced. And Moi and his ruling party, the Kenya African National Union remained in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">Kenya’s history of political violence: colonialism, vigilantes and militias</a>
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<h2>Authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>How rulers secure popular support – and who is included in governing coalitions – varies significantly across authoritarian regimes. So does the level of repression by which dictators control the majority excluded from power. These features are important for explaining electoral violence. The reason for this is that in ethnically divided societies more exclusionary governance strategies under authoritarian rule over time cultivate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game that last into the multi-party era.</p>
<p>In Kenya single-party rule rested on a relatively exclusive approach to maintain a ruling coalition. This was based on a narrow support base and active suppression of those who were not included in power. </p>
<p>In Zambia, single-party rule was more inclusive. It was based on a broader ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter ethnic divisions. When comparing post independence countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was not at the extreme end of the exclusionary spectrum. But it was significantly more exclusionary than Zambia.</p>
<p>The political legacies from authoritarian rule worked through two main pathways. First, political legacies structure the options for building cross-ethnic coalitions and for cooperation. They thereby make electoral violence more or less likely. For instance, by emphasising ethnicity over other political cleavages, coalitions are built on an exclusionary basis. This engenders inter-ethnic relations that are fragmented and competitive. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the opposition in the first multiparty elections could draw support from all ethnic groups. But in Kenya the opposition was fragmented and polarised along ethnic lines. In addition, in Zambia, the legacy of more cooperative inter-ethnic elite relations reduced the perceived risks associated with the transition. This enabled bargaining between competing elites. For example, a series of meetings were held where the contenders solved contentious issues around the electoral process.</p>
<p>Political legacies also place constraints on how politicians go about mobilising support. For example, ruling coalitions that are more exclusionary use rhetoric to exploit ethnic cleavages. In Kenya, electoral rhetoric played on historical injustices and ethnic divisions. The violence served to solidify the incumbent’s support base and to punish opposition voters. </p>
<p>In Zambia, the use of an ethnically-hostile rhetoric was simply out of the question.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Varying historical experiences, thus, offer countries different baseline risks of facing large-scale electoral violence. </p>
<p>But we concluded in our paper that it’s possible to change the pattern. Kenya’s experience illustrates this. The level of violence has differed significantly in post-1992 elections. For instance there was <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">large scale post-election violence</a> after the 2007/8 poll. But elections in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/30/world/kenya-s-ruling-party-is-defeated-after-39-years.html">2002</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21723488">2013</a> were significantly more peaceful. </p>
<p>This suggests that specific circumstances tied to the immediate electoral contest can prevent violence from happening. We argue that policy efforts need to engage in a two-pronged approach. In the first instance measures need to be designed to address pervasive forms of mobilisation. The second part of the approach is that there needs to be an assessment of the risk tied to an impending election.</p>
<p>In Zambia, elections were largely free from violence after 1991 and until 2015. Yet, Zambian politics has become increasingly volatile, with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/zambia-suspends-election-campaigning-violence-160710141136702.html">instances of electoral violence</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>There has been a definite shift towards more authoritarianism. This is evident in the centralisation of political power in the hands of the president. There is also more intimidation of the opposition, and a breakdown of inter-party deliberation. As a result there are growing fears that the 2021 election will usher in violence. </p>
<p>Zambia seems to be treading a thin line. A turn to more violent electoral practices is a cause of great concern. Outbreaks of violence have profound and lasting effects that shape future electoral politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>Political legacies generated during authoritarian rule have a tendency to transcend into the multiparty era.Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityHanne Fjelde, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityKristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640582016-08-22T08:08:54Z2016-08-22T08:08:54ZZambia post elections: President Lungu has his work cut out for him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134772/original/image-20160819-30400-3ny64d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Edgar Lungu supporters at a pre-election rally. The level of polarisation before Zambia's polls was unprecedented.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stella Mapenzausw</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President <a href="http://www.zambiahighcomdelhi.org/news_detail.php?newsid=15">Edgar Lungu</a> of the Patriotic Front (PF) has been declared winner of the most closely fought election Zambia has witnessed since adopting a multiparty system in 1990. </p>
<p>Lungu polled <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/general_election_2016.php">50.35%</a> in the August 11 election. He had a 100,530 vote lead over his closest rival, <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/09/19/hhs-curriculum-vitae/">Hakainde Hichilema</a> of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Hichilema polled 47.63%.</p>
<p>Lungu’s victory bequeaths on him and his party the immense task of post-election socioeconomic management and governance.</p>
<p>It is now common for political contestants to spar on economic issues. In this election attention was focused on some of the major <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201210230768.html">infrastructure projects</a> rolled out by Lungu’s predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/29/michael-sata">Michael Sata</a>. While Lungu’s supporters could point to his accomplishments, few gave serious thought to the debt Zambia has accumulated to finance those projects. </p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/zambia-debt-costs-set-to-soar-after-terribly-wrong-budget-call">mountain of debt</a> must be serviced. For the president the big question is: how? Lungu should neither consider victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy nor an opportunity to waste or plunder. One need not look too closely to see the <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zambia/corruption-rank">corruption</a> and waste of public resources in the past five years of the PF’s rule.</p>
<p>A better way for Lungu to celebrate victory would be to seriously reflect on both the accomplishments and the misuse of the PF’s past term in office. He should also develop a concrete agenda to steer Zambia forward.</p>
<h2>Uniting a country fractured along regional lines</h2>
<p>Rallying supporters and opponents in the post-election period is a necessary task for the victor. However, the level of polarisation leading to Zambia’s 2016 polls was unprecedented. In addition to violence, divisive language in the media and by politicians, the voting patterns clearly reveal a country split between the south-west and north-east. Support for Lungu was largely concentrated in the north-east and for Hichilema in the south-west. </p>
<p>One of Zambia’s founding president Kenneth Kaunda’s nation-building strategies after independence was promoting social cohesion through internal migration. As a consequence, many of the country’s citizens from its 72 tribes and languages intermarried. Lungu can build on the foundation established by Kaunda’s <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2016/04/19/one-zambia-one-nation-the-legacy-of-kenneth-kaunda-by-derrick-m-muwina/">“One Zambia, One Nation”</a>. </p>
<p>But the onus of uniting Zambia is not solely the president’s. Apart from appealing to the population, he should extend the olive branch to his arch-rival Hichilema as well as to smaller parties’ presidents. In turn, they should also publicly appeal to constituents and the nation and prove that they are genuine in their aspiration to lead Zambia.</p>
<h2>Fixing the electoral system</h2>
<p>It took the Electoral Commission of Zambia four days after the polls had closed to announce the final results. Voters elected four categories of office bearers – from president to local government officials. They also voted in a referendum on a new Bill of Rights. The election was the first of its kind. Numerous malpractices and irregularities were reported. </p>
<p>The main opposition party alleged outright <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/15/hh-accuse-ecz-colluding-pf-rig-elections-pf-leads-24-constituencies-left/">rigging</a> claiming that the electoral commission had connived with PF to steal the vote. The UPND – and indeed any other party with reservations – has seven days to petition the results with Zambia’s <a href="http://www.judiciary.gov.zm/index.php/court-structure/constitutional-court">Constitutional Court</a>. </p>
<p>But whether they petition or not, the commission’s credibility is sullied. The African Union Election Observation Mission to Zambia, headed by former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, declared the polls <a href="http://www.au.int/en/pressreleases/31222/arrival-statement-african-union-election-observation-mission-republic-zambia%E2%80%99s">peaceful and satisfactory</a>. But other election observer missions from organisations such as the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa reported that the elections were conducted <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">“on an unlevelled playing field”</a>.</p>
<p>The August 2016 elections were held under a <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/legal_framework.php">legal framework</a> and electoral rules introduced just a few months earlier. This posed management challenges associated with new and untested provisions. </p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">the electoral institute</a> identified several other issues with the framework. These included high election registration fees and the requirement for all candidates to be holders of Grade 12 certificates. These have the potential to lock out young and female candidates. </p>
<p>The commission’s apparent lack of efficiency and transparency was exhibited in several ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Delays in releasing election results led some opposition parties to question the commission’s neutrality and its leadership</p></li>
<li><p>Even before the election, media reports suggested that there were foreigners on the voters’ roll and blamed this on the country’s electoral commission</p></li>
<li><p>The commission also delayed releasing the voters’ roll to stakeholders, raising doubts about the roll’s validity. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But clearly, Lungu will have to work on more than just the mechanics of the electoral system. He will also have to address the issue of the commission’s leadership. If there is any lesson he can learn from <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-protests-idUSKCN0Y01B2">Kenya</a>, it is that vacillating on changing the face of the commission only agitates discontented supporters of the losing party further. Reforming the electoral system should involve collaboration between all stakeholders.</p>
<h2>Ordinary Zambians show the way</h2>
<p>On the whole, Zambians have once again demonstrated commitment to preserving peace and nurturing the country’s nascent democracy. The turn was probably made at the death of an incumbent president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a> in 2008 and cemented after the death of another, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11194490/Zambia-president-Michael-Sata-dies-in-London.html">Sata</a>, in 2014. The peaceful conduct of Zambians through these trying times defies logic in an African country. The 2016 elections reportedly had a <a href="http://www.coastweek.com/3933-Zambia-vote-peaceful-amid-high-voter-turnout-reports-polls-body.htm">high voter turnout</a> too. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zambia’s general population thus suggests one thing. The national leadership should rise to the occasion and move the country in the right direction. To do this Lungu should build a team of selfless political, technocratic and civic leaders to steer Zambia for the next five years. Certainly, he will also need the support of the opposition parties, big and small.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zambia’s Edgar Lungu shouldn’t consider his presidential victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy; nor an opportunity to waste and plunder.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Research Fellow & Deputy Director, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.