tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/chr-michelsen-institute-3056/articlesChr. Michelsen Institute2024-01-21T07:07:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207932024-01-21T07:07:01Z2024-01-21T07:07:01ZLes jeunes africains pourraient perturber les États autoritaires, mais ils ne le font pas : voici pourquoi<p>L'Afrique a la <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20the%20best%20potential.">plus population jeune la plus importante au monde</a>. D'ici 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> de la population africaine aura moins de 35 ans. Le nombre de jeunes Africains âgés de 15 à 24 ans devrait atteindre <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 millions</a> en 2080. </p>
<p>Bien que la dynamique démographique varie sur le continent, la plupart des pays subsahariens ont un <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">âge médian inférieur à 19 ans</a>. Le Niger est le pays le plus jeune du monde avec un âge médian de 14,5 ans, tandis que l'Afrique du Sud, les Seychelles, la Tunisie et l'Algérie ont des âges médians supérieurs à 27 ans. </p>
<p>Ces données démographiques constituent une <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force de croissance potentielle</a>. Toutefois, le potentiel du dividende démographique de l'Afrique a été éclipsé par les préoccupations des gouvernements et des donateurs internationaux concernant la relation entre les fortes populations de jeunes, les taux de chômage et l'instabilité politique. </p>
<p>De nombreux pays ayant une forte population de jeunes et des taux élevés de chômage et de sous-emploi des jeunes <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">vivent dans la paix</a>. Mais le discours politique dominant soutient que les jeunes chômeurs constituent une menace pour la stabilité. </p>
<p>En outre, le rôle des jeunes dans les manifestations populaires - comme au <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Soudan en 2019</a> - a suscité de grandes attentes quant à leur rôle dans la lutte contre les gouvernements autocratiques et la contribution à la démocratie. </p>
<p>En tant que politologue et sociologue, nous souhaitons comprendre l'interaction entre les jeunes et les régimes autocratiques, d'autant plus que les autocraties élues <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">s'imposent</a> en Afrique. </p>
<p>Les autocraties électorales sont des régimes élus au pouvoir en utilisant des stratégies autoritaires. Celles-ci comprennent la manipulation des élections et la répression de l'opposition, des médias indépendants et de la société civile.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Notre recherche</a> se concentre sur les interactions entre les jeunes et les régimes en Éthiopie, au Mozambique, en Ouganda et au Zimbabwe. Il s'agit dans tous les cas d'autocraties électorales.</p>
<p>Ces régimes sont conscients de l'importance de leur population de jeunes qui les défient parfois. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Bobi Wine</a>, musicien populaire devenu candidat à la présidence, en est un exemple. </p>
<p>Les quatre pays étudiés ont également connu des guerres civiles, au cours desquelles les groupes armés victorieux ont pris le pouvoir et y sont restés depuis la fin de la guerre. Cela a créé une dynamique particulière entre les gouvernements rebelles vieillissants et la majorité des jeunes.</p>
<p>Dans des contextes autocratiques comme ceux-ci, les efforts visant à responsabiliser les jeunes peuvent facilement être manipulés pour servir les intérêts du régime. Certains jeunes peuvent décider de jouer le jeu et de saisir les opportunités offertes par les acteurs du régime. D'autres peuvent y résister. Certains saisissent les opportunités en espérant qu'elles servent leurs propres intérêts et non ceux du régime. Cependant, cela pourrait reproduire des formes de clientélisme. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>Tout cela est important parce que l'avenir de la démocratie est en jeu et que l'utilisation des opportunités offertes par l'État pourrait contribuer à la reproduction de l'autoritarisme.</p>
<p>Nos équipes de recherche dans chaque pays ont <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">étudié</a> la panoplie de politiques mises en place par les gouvernements pour “s'occuper” des jeunes. Elles ont notamment accordé des prêts aux jeunes entrepreneurs et mis en place des conseils de jeunes et des quotas de jeunes dans les institutions politiques. </p>
<p>Nous avons constaté que les stratégies ciblées sur les jeunes - qui visent essentiellement à promouvoir l'emploi et la participation politique - font partie des règles du jeu dans les quatre pays que nous avons étudiés. Les programmes d'emploi et d'entreprenariat sont suscpetibles de faire l'objet d'abus par le biais des réseaux clientélistes du parti au pouvoir et ont été orientés vers les partisans du régime. </p>
<h2>Les jeunes ne parviennet pas à sauver la démocratie</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Notre recherche</a> a révélé que les jeunes d'Éthiopie, du Mozambique, d'Ouganda et du Zimbabwe se sentaient lésés par le fait que ces opportunités étaient canalisées vers les partisans du régime. Ils ont également une restriction des opportunités pour s'exprimer de manière significative. Les institutions mises en place pour permettre la participation des jeunes ont été cooptées et ont manqué d'indépendance par rapport aux gouvernements. </p>
<p>Certains jeunes expriment leurs griefs par des manifestations en faveur de la démocratie, comme au <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique en octobre 2023</a>. Mais dans l'ensemble, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">la jeunesse africaine n'est pas en train de sauver la démocratie</a>. </p>
<p>Ils ne sont pas plus en train de contrer la tendance <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">croissante</a> de l'autocratisation sur le continent, où les gouvernements en place de plus en plus <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrent le pouvoir</a> entre les mains de l'exécutif. Nos recherches l'ont confirmé au Zimbabwe, au Mozambique, en Éthiopie et en Ouganda.</p>
<h2>Études de cas par pays</h2>
<p>Au <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, le Zanu-PF est au pouvoir depuis l'indépendance du pays en 1980. Le parti au pouvoir et bon nombre de ses dirigeants, aujourd'hui vieillissants, se servent de leur passé de vétérans de la guerre de libération des années 1970 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">pour conserver leur emprise sur le pouvoir</a>. </p>
<p>Pour ce faire, ils créent des récits autour de l'histoire de la libération du pays et du patriotisme, et accusent la génération “née libre” (ceux qui sont nés après l'indépendance) d'avoir trahi la guerre de libération. Cela délégitime tout mécontentement que les jeunes pourraient ressentir. Le Zanu-PF cible les jeunes parmi ses <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">larges variétés d'options stratégiques</a> pour se maintenir au pouvoir.</p>
<p>Au <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, le Frelimo, le parti au pouvoir, a remporté toutes les élections depuis 1992. Le parti a concentré le pouvoir et les ressources entre les mains de l'élite politique. Les jeunes continuent d'être sous-représentés et ont de grandes difficultés à accéder aux ressources. Cette situation, qui s'ajoute à d'autres dynamiques de conflit, a contribué à une insurrection dans la région septentrionale de <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado à partir de 2017</a>. Elle est dirigée par un groupe religieux radical appelé localement Al-Shabaab, ou parfois “machababo” (les jeunes).</p>
<p>Les manifestations organisées par les jeunes en <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Éthiopie</a> ont contribué à la chute en 2018 du parti au pouvoir depuis 1991. Elles ont également conduit à <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">l'arrivée au pouvoir</a> d'Abiy Ahmed cette année-là. </p>
<p>La mobilisation des jeunes a depuis <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">été réduite au silence</a>. Seuls les loyalistes ont accès aux programmes de création d'emplois. On a également assisté à une militarisation des mouvements ethniques dominés par les jeunes. On l'a vu, par exemple, avec le <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">groupe Fano Amhara</a> dans la guerre du Tigré en <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">L'Ouganda</a> a été un pionnier dans l'institutionnalisation de la participation des jeunes à la prise de décision. L'engagement des jeunes dans les structures politiques est considéré comme un outil de contrôle du gouvernement. Nous avons constaté que les jeunes politiciens estimaient que ce système de représentation imparfait offrait des opportunités de mobilisation à la fois contre et en faveur du régime actuel. Les jeunes candidats qui se présentent à l'un des sièges du parlement réservés aux jeunes, par exemple, ne peuvent pas facilement se soustraire à la tutelle du parti au pouvoir.</p>
<h2>La voie à suivre</h2>
<p>La jeunesse africaine est très diversifiée. Cependant, elle a souvent été caractérisée comme étant soit <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violente</a>, soit comme <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">des artisans du changement et militants de la paix</a>. Ces caractérisations représentent les extrémités opposées d'un spectre. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Notre projet de recherche</a> a impliqué une diversité de jeunes dans différentes positions et en mouvement constant entre les différentes parties du spectre. Cela nous a permis de mieux comprendre la façon dont ils se comportent et réagissent face à la manière dont les régimes cherchent à les gérer.</p>
<p>Selon nous, la recherche et les initiatives politiques en faveur des jeunes dans les États autoritaires doivent reconnaître que les interventions bien intentionnées en faveur des jeunes peuvent reproduire les politiques autoritaires lorsqu'elles sont canalisées vers les militants du parti. </p>
<p>Les interventions visant à promouvoir la création d'emplois et l'autonomisation des jeunes devraient exercer un contrôle sur la manière dont les jeunes bénéficiaires sont sélectionnés et les fonds déboursés afin d'éviter toute interférence de la part d'acteurs partisans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen est financée par le programme Norglobal du Conseil norvégien de la recherche (subvention n° 288489).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom a reçu un financement du Conseil de la recherche économique et sociale (ESRC).</span></em></p>La jeunesse africaine ne s'oppose pas à l'aggravation de l'autocratie sur le continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956012022-12-08T13:38:39Z2022-12-08T13:38:39ZAbiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he’s silencing them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498761/original/file-20221203-16-gyawnf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopians celebrate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Abiy Ahmed took power as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, he was the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-ethiopian-leader-abiy-ahmed-youngest-in-africa-sparks-hope-of/">youngest head of government</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>At 42, he represented a stark contrast to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-has-been-cameroons-president-for-40-years-and-he-might-win-office-yet-again-194856">many ageing African leaders</a> who had been in position for decades. These leaders often stake their claim to power by referring to their victories in revolutionary wars many decades back. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by the same party for 27 years – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a coalition of parties established by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1991. The party claimed legitimacy by pointing to its victory in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">civil war in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>It took mass protests from the youth – and an elite split within the government – to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">overthrow this regime</a>.</p>
<p>After rising to power, Abiy replaced the old ruling party with the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/12/ethiopian-pm-abiy-calls-for-peace-at-launch-of-party-s-first-congress//">Prosperity Party</a>. This, along with his relative youthfulness, was seen as a break with the past. </p>
<p>The hope was that this change would bring the political and economic inclusion of young people in Ethiopia. This category includes those aged 15 to 29, who make up <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact_Sheet_Developing_Ethiopias_Youth_Jul_2017.pdf">28%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">122 million</a>. </p>
<p>This group at the time experienced high unemployment levels and political marginalisation. Little has changed since then.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<p>My co-researchers and I have been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">investigating</a> regime-youth interactions in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe since 2019. By exploring these interactions and the major policies addressing young people, we aim to see whether state policies empower the youth or keep them on the margins.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, we <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">identified</a> two major policy responses to the youth. The first was job creation. The second was political representation through youth-specific representative bodies. </p>
<p>We found that while these responses are officially meant to address economic and political marginalisation, they have instead been used to repress or co-opt the youth. </p>
<p>We argue that regime strategies towards the youth in Ethiopia – as in the other countries in our study – are part of the “menu” of authoritarian strategies for incumbents to hold on to power. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our research in the four countries started with the question: are youth agency and regime policy leading to empowerment, or to suppression and old patterns of subordination? </p>
<p>The question was particularly intriguing in the context of Ethiopia, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">youth-dominated protests</a> were instrumental in bringing Abiy to power. </p>
<p>Recognising this, Abiy and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics">promised to address</a> the demands of the youth for inclusion. This naturally created high expectations. </p>
<p>But more than four years after this promise, the situation for Ethiopia’s large youth population looks bleak. It’s <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-fractured-after-two-years-of-war-4007368">arguably even more so</a> than before. A two-year war in the country’s northern region of Tigray reinforced ethnic divisions and created a humanitarian crisis. Unemployment rates are still high and the youth are still being mobilised for political ends.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Employment schemes, such as the <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/995_2017-ethiopian-youth-revolving-fund-establishment.pdf">Youth Revolving Fund</a> and <a href="https://jobscommission.gov.et/who-we-are/">Job Creation Commission</a>, have been used as mechanisms to silence and co-opt the youth. Youth protest movements have either been co-opted into the established party machinery or turned into militarised vigilante groups. These became instrumental in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">2020 war in Tigray</a>. </p>
<h2>Co-option</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">case study of the Youth Revolving Fund</a> shows that this government scheme failed to create sustainable job opportunities and improve livelihoods. </p>
<p>Introduced at the height of the youth-dominated protest in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dj-EKYZ8AA">2017</a>, the scheme was used to pacify the youth. Consequently, it lacked sufficient capacity and skills training components. Loans were made without proper guarantees for repayment, preventing money from revolving and becoming available to fund new youth projects. </p>
<p>Our study of regime-youth interactions in Oromia and Amhara – the most populous regional states in Ethiopia and home to the youth protests – revealed that the government resorted to co-opting and repressing young people. </p>
<p>In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, material co-option was seen in the distribution of credit, land, rights over resources and even condominium housing. </p>
<p>In Amhara, in north-west Ethiopia, rhetorical co-option was used. The worldview dominant among protesters was ostensibly adopted so as to get their support. Abiy appeared to castigate the country’s federal system and emphasise “national unity”. </p>
<p>We also observed institutional co-option: bringing activists and opposition leaders into government. </p>
<h2>Repression</h2>
<p>While the immediate post-2018 period saw a decline in repressive tactics, it resumed as the youth <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">started to challenge</a> the Abiy regime. </p>
<p>The Prosperity Party considers Oromia its home base – Abiy is considered an Oromo leader. The party was, therefore, less likely to tolerate dissent in the region. This, coupled with an active insurgency from the Oromo Liberation Army, made Oromia youth exceptionally vulnerable to repression. Arbitrary mass arrests and a crude counter-insurgency resulted in severe human rights violations. </p>
<p>In Amhara, the government resorted to repression as youth protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/villagers-massacred-western-ethiopia-says-state-appointed-body">returned</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>The government relaxed the use of force as it needed the Amhara youth following the outbreak of war in Tigray in 2020. Repression resumed when the government felt the initial threat from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been reversed.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Co-option and repression weakened and fragmented the youth movements responsible for the anti-government protests of 2014-2018 in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war in Tigray – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cease-fire-agreed-to-stop-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/a-63640781">currently on pause</a> – also resulted in the heavy militarisation of the youth, especially in the Amhara region. </p>
<p>Our research demonstrates that governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can nonetheless resort to authoritarian tactics to neutralise dissent from the same movements. In authoritarian contexts, translating protest gains into genuine political (and economic) gains is an uphill battle. </p>
<p>The alternative is to think strategically about young people’s potential to achieve the “prosperity” the ruling party promises. </p>
<p>We also found that youth employment schemes can be turned into instruments to silence the youth.</p>
<p>Deeper analyses of youth-specific policies should be contextually grounded to reveal possible authoritarian uses beyond official objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Norglobal programme at Research Council of Norway (project no. 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanuel Tesfaye is an associate researcher under the Youth in Africa project, currently writing on regime-youth interactions in post-2018 Ethiopia.</span></em></p>Governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can employ authoritarian tactics to silence dissent from the same movements.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteAmanuel Tesfaye, Lecturer, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1859062022-07-11T14:31:18Z2022-07-11T14:31:18ZWhy factory jobs for Ethiopian women haven’t translated into greater participation in politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471871/original/file-20220630-20-jzjz6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian women at a garment factory at the Hawassa Industrial Park in the country's southern region. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eyerusalem Jiregna/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Until the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">war in Tigray</a> started in November 2020, Ethiopia was a favoured investment destination. It had experienced strong <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview">economic growth</a> for the previous decade.</p>
<p>The country gave foreign investors preferential access to American and European markets, favourable customs and tax policies, and relative political stability. Labour costs were also low – around half of what they were in China. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian government had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2018.1443211">invested US$1 billion annually</a> in industrial parks since 2010 – almost one-third of its total net <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180112102846/http://www.oecd.org:80/statistics/datalab/oda-recipient-sector.htm">foreign aid</a>. </p>
<p>Investors from across the world, including China, India, the US and South Korea, started industrial production in these parks, creating job opportunities for thousands of citizens.</p>
<p>And most of them were women who entered the labour force as never before. Before the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, firms in the new industrial parks in Ethiopia employed about 86,000 workers – around <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X20303065#fn1">80%</a> of them women. They were hired for light manufacturing, making products like shoes, textiles and garments. Employers saw women as diligent and disciplined. </p>
<p>The entry of women into Ethiopia’s work force provided a rare opportunity to study the impact of jobs on women’s empowerment, especially participation in politics. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sp/article-abstract/26/2/299/5480423">study</a> I conducted with colleagues yielded unexpected results that have implications for the understanding of political agency in a non-democratic and developing context. </p>
<h2>Work and political activity</h2>
<p>Research in democratic and developed countries shows a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0049089X16300667">strong correlation</a> between increased female labour force participation and women’s political participation.</p>
<p>Wage labour tends to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141499">boost the status of women</a>. This influences their effectiveness in getting power in other realms of society, including politics. It also increases the number of women with professional experience and resources to mount credible campaigns and challenge negative voter attitudes towards women.</p>
<p>We wanted to know whether this trend would be the same in a developing country but also one as authoritarian as Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The 2020 <a href="https://www.undp.org/ethiopia/gender-equality">Human Development Report</a> shows that gender inequalities persist in Ethiopia, denying women the opportunity to participate in development projects. A lot more needs to be done to increase women’s empowerment in the country. </p>
<p>Starting in 2017, we collected data from 27 large factories that make shoes and garments across five industrial parks in Ethiopia. The firms agreed to randomly assign 1,498 applicant women to two groups. One group of women was offered jobs and a control group was not offered jobs. </p>
<p>This unique research design made it possible to compare groups and identify the impact of employment. We asked both groups of women the same questions to measure a variety of indicators of women’s empowerment. These questions were around economic decision making (bargaining power), their influence on number of children they would have, and their levels of political interest and participation. </p>
<p>The study followed up with participants at intervals of six, 12, 18 and 36 months after they had applied for the job. We combined this with extensive qualitative data and phone surveys conducted with women’s partners.</p>
<p>Our study investigated if women’s status as workers made them more interested in politics – and more likely to participate in politics – than women who did not work. </p>
<p>Contrary to expectations, our research found no evidence to suggest that the job offers had any positive effect on political participation. We saw no effect of employment on women’s bargaining power or gender equality norms. We even found a reduction in women’s participation in community meetings.</p>
<p>We see this as an outcome of female factory workers’ long working hours, poor working conditions and lack of labour rights. A gendered division of labour in factories, and the belittling and derogatory attitudes of factory owners and supervisors towards women, further limits their political agency.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-19-how-seeing-women-in-power-can-inspire-ethiopias-girls-117126">Pasha 19: How seeing women in power can inspire Ethiopia's girls</a>
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<p>In our interviews, women said they had no time to attend political meetings. They often had to work long hours to reach production targets. There was no minimum wage and attendance bonuses were lost on the first day of an absence. </p>
<p>Almost all women had experienced abusive behaviour from their supervisors. This included being shouted at, insulted or subjected to physical force to get them to work faster or as a punishment for mistakes. </p>
<p>The opportunity to unionise was nearly non-existent. Out of the 27 companies in our study, only two had labour unions. The investors and factory owners we interviewed expressed their resistance to such unions. </p>
<p>Government officials and representatives of the national labour union told us that labour laws were not enforced for fear of investors leaving the country. Most factories were in practice exempted from basic labour regulations. Even if inspectors uncovered health and security violations, for instance, they would be unlikely to take these cases to court. </p>
<h2>Authoritarian settings</h2>
<p>Our findings correspond with studies of women’s political participation in other African autocracies, such as <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/107/428/361/12456">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Manipulating-Political-Decentralisation-Africas-Inclusive-Autocrats/Aalen-Muriaas/p/book/9781138203037">Uganda</a>. </p>
<p>Income and job status have less of an impact on women in authoritarian contexts than in advanced democracies. Having an income and a job, especially if the job does not come with labour rights, doesn’t give an individual the kind of power it would in an advanced democracy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/many-african-countries-had-a-surprise-manufacturing-surge-in-2010s-it-bodes-well-for-the-years-ahead-155405">Many African countries had a surprise manufacturing surge in 2010s – it bodes well for the years ahead</a>
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<p>The Ethiopian government and the investors creating employment have a long way to go to offer Ethiopian women what the International Labour Organisation terms <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm">decent work</a>.</p>
<p>Our research shows that the main actors determining labour conditions in Ethiopian factories have little concern for the potential damage that poor working conditions can have on their reputations. </p>
<p>But recent developments may support a change. In <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/15941-us-president-terminates-agoa-preferences-for-ethiopia-mali-and-guinea.html">2021</a>, Ethiopia’s preferential access to American markets through the <a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> was terminated. This has been a big blow for investors and the government. Investors have left the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-conflict-could-unravel-ethiopias-valuable-garment-industry-152844">Ethnic conflict could unravel Ethiopia's valuable garment industry</a>
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<p>Being more open to unionisation could have benefits for industries. Better working conditions might improve manufacturers’ image among western consumers. The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions told us in research interviews that unionising would facilitate more peaceful industrial relations. It is already <a href="https://addisfortune.news/industrial-parks-finally-see-labour-unions-emerge/">seeing progress</a> in industrial parks. </p>
<p>If this leads to better working conditions for female factory workers, the country may see positive changes in women’s political interest and participation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from Research Council of Norway: the Young Research Talent scheme (2015-2018) and the Norglobal programme for development research (2019-2022). </span></em></p>In democratic contexts, getting women into work empowers them. In autocracies like Ethiopia’s, this doesn’t hold. We found out why.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1765682022-02-09T14:02:29Z2022-02-09T14:02:29ZSudan’s protestors aren’t giving up despite heavy odds: here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445051/original/file-20220208-21-4nr1ag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese protesters clash with security forces during an anti-coup protest in Khartoum, Sudan in December 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudanese have been going out on the streets for non-violent, peaceful protests for more than three months since the military coup on October 25, 2021.</p>
<p>Thousands of demonstrators have been defying a ban on protests and have marched in Khartoum and other cities denouncing the military takeover. They are <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211225-thousands-of-protesters-in-sudan-call-for-transition-to-civilian-rule">calling for</a> a fully civilian government to lead the country’s now-stalled transition to democracy.</p>
<p>Since the October coup, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220207-sudan-security-forces-fire-tear-gas-at-anti-coup-protesters">at least 79 people</a> have been killed. The internet has been blocked for long periods, preventing the protesters from telling the world about what goes on. </p>
<p>But the main protest organisers – the neighbourhood resistance committees and the Sudanese Professionals Association – say that they will not leave the streets until the fall of the coup regime, and until the military leaders are held to account for the atrocities they have committed.</p>
<p>The protests have remained peaceful, and people have not stopped coming, despite the military’s use of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/7/sudan-security-forces-fire-tear-gas-at-anti-coup-protesters-2">excessive force</a>. When the military leaders have responded so harshly and have not given in on any demands, why do the protests still continue?</p>
<p>We’ve carried out research into <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth.pdf">youth activism</a> in Sudan and <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8098-a-glimpse-of-hope-for-the-future-protests-and-emotion-in-sudans-mawkib">have insights into what drives people</a> to continue protesting. </p>
<p>We believe that the reasons for continued protests are a combination of; historical proof that demonstrations can bring change, previous experience in organising protests and because they’re driven by young people who have the tools and energy to keep pushing and who have little faith in others to make the change happen.</p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The first is the success that ordinary Sudanese had in toppling former president Omar al-Bashir. Resilient demonstrations from 2018 to 2019 against Bashir <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/12-defining-moments-in-sudans-12-month-uprising">contributed to</a> the fall of a president that had been in power for three decades. </p>
<p>These events showed Sudanese people that they could bring about change. Marching in the street, day after day, <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7201-blog-from-sudan-the-sudan-uprisings-the-revolution-of-the-youth">is seen</a> as something worthwhile, something rewarding, that will bring an outcome. </p>
<p>The main protest organisers are the neighbourhood or resistance committees and the Sudanese Professionals Association. </p>
<p>Initially <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7920-the-role-of-local-resistance-committees-in-sudans-transitional-period">established in</a> 2012, the neighbourhood committees were run by young volunteers to ensure essentials – such as bread, sugar and cooking gas – were distributed. They developed into underground resistance committees and, together with the Sudan Professional Association (an association of health workers, doctors and lawyers), organised people into marches throughout Khartoum and in other towns.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Young people</a> – Sudanese youth – were the backbone of the protests against Bashir. And continue to be today.</p>
<p>The generation of people, between the ages of 15 and 30, were all raised under the authoritarian rule of the Islamist party National Congress Party which ran the country from 1989 to 2019. Political activism was harshly repressed, making <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POLAF_158_0033--kayzan-in-the-neighbourhood.htm">voluntary charity work</a> one of the few arenas where young people could engage. As opposition to the regime increased, youth engagement <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-cahiers-d-etudes-africaines-2020-4-page-943.htm">gradually turned</a> from charity to political protests, seen in Khartoum and other cities from 2013. </p>
<p>The lessons learnt by young people from voluntary work and previous resistance and repression under Bashir became instrumental for the success of the uprising in 2019. </p>
<p>The volunteers had learnt how to organise supplies, and the politically experienced taught the others how to mobilise, and both groups knew how to crowdfund. <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/sudans-uprising-the-fall-of-a-dictator/">Underground organisation</a> and the use of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1547249?scroll=top&needAccess=true">social media</a> were key.</p>
<p>It’s allowed demonstrators to maintain stamina and continue to mobilise protests over and over again, regardless of the challenges. </p>
<p>The second driver is that young people are drawn to demonstrate out of a feeling of responsibility to change the situation. This is written based on observation and interviews from our ongoing <a href="https://www.ethnologie.uni-bayreuth.de/de/forschung/promotionsprojekte/akkordeon/akkordeon1.html">research project</a> which started in 2018. </p>
<p>These emotions are a key aspect of the Sudanese revolution and may explain why the protests continue even in the face of brutal violence from the military. This was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2019.1578017">also seen</a> in Tunisia and Egypt.</p>
<p>The act of going over and over again to the <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8098-a-glimpse-of-hope-for-the-future-protests-and-emotion-in-sudans-mawkib">Mawkib</a> is an act of resilience but also is part of encouragement that the fight is not over.</p>
<p>A third reason for the endurance of the protests is disappointment with formal political participation and channels. Previous protests proved that informal and clandestine organisation through neighbourhood committees worked. In addition, activists are also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-is-hamdoks-return-a-signal-of-democracy-or-military-victory/a-59901328">deeply disappointed</a> with the Forces for Freedom and Change, a coalition of civilian political forces which accepted a power sharing with the military in the transitional government from 2019, thereby allowing the army to get back in power. </p>
<p>The demonstrators also have <a href="https://roape.net/2021/10/27/it-hasnt-fallen-yet-the-rule-is-military-still-lessons-from-the-sudanese-revolution/">little faith</a> in the influence of the international community. This is due to the experience with the international community during Bashir’s regime. The <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/the-harmful-effect-of-us-sanctions-on-sudan/">economic sanctions</a> for example, that were imposed on Sudan in the early 1990s, did not directly affect the regime. But they had a heavy impact on the life of the citizens. </p>
<h2>A call for support</h2>
<p>The protesters recognise that the change has to come from within. In our interviews with activists, they also underline that it can be aided by well thought out support from the international community.</p>
<p>It could, for example, take direct action against the military itself, such as individuals, rather than the country as a whole. </p>
<p>It could also take the form of pressure on states in the region to withdraw their support for the coup makers. And it could involve finding ways to support civil society and activists instead of withdrawing aid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the ARUS-project (Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan) at Chr. Michelsen Institute, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the ARUS project or CMI. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mai Azzam received funding from Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) as a scholarship for her PhD. All data and opinions expressed in the article are the responsibility of the authors.
Mai works as a consultant for Royaa Center for Feminist studies in Khartoum, Sudan as well as for the Sudanese Solidarity for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (TASAMI), Khartoum, Sudan. Both organizations are independent and do not relate to the article or any opinion discussed in it. </span></em></p>When the military leaders have responded so harshly and have not given in on any demands, why do the protests still continue?Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMai Azzam, PhD candidate, Bayreuth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1511792021-02-03T13:11:09Z2021-02-03T13:11:09ZTo defuse political violence across US, conflict mediators apply lessons from gang disputes and foreign elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381429/original/file-20210129-19-1ayp7r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C34%2C3821%2C2509&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. isn't the first country to suffer election-related violence. Activists are learning from other countries how to keep the peace. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-us-president-donald-trump-fight-with-riot-news-photo/1230457964?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-activists-on-social-media-telegraphed-violence-weeks-in-advance-of-the-attack-on-the-us-capitol-152861">violent American election season</a>, activists are trying to keep the peace using technologies and techniques more often applied in unstable democracies.</p>
<p>As inflamed supporters of Donald Trump <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-capitol-mob-highlights-5-reasons-not-to-underestimate-far-right-extremists-148610">stormed the U.S. Capitol</a> on Jan. 6, attempting to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, members of the <a href="https://dcpeaceteam.com">DC Peace Team</a> – a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization that promotes nonviolent conflict resolution – were at Black Lives Matter Plaza, a few blocks from the Capitol, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DcPeaceTeam/posts/3969029706464572">monitoring the convergence of predominantly white pro-Trump supporters and mainly Black counterprotesters</a>. </p>
<p>When a white Trump supporter pulled a knife on a Black counterprotester, team members in bright vests approached the man, hands in the air, encouraging him to “slow down,” according to the group. Soon, he put away the knife, and friends pulled him away from the scene. </p>
<p>Five people died in the Capitol attack. But in this one incident, at least, violence was stopped before it could start.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man in reflective yellow vest" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381419/original/file-20210129-23-19cplua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A DC Peace Team activist at Black Lives Matter Plaza on Jan. 6.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">DC Peace Team</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From Kenya to Minnesota</h2>
<p>Interventions by volunteers trained in keeping the peace when tensions are high have long been used to reduce election-related violence in the developing world. </p>
<p>After Kenya’s bitterly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">contested 2007 presidential election</a>, which left over 1,000 people dead, Kenyan activists created an online map to monitor and try to prevent political violence. Their efforts inspired the development of <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/about">Ushahidi</a> – Swahili for “witness” – a crowdsourced mapping tool that shows peacekeepers exactly where a conflict is developing. </p>
<p>Ushahidi has since been used worldwide to document countless political problems and humanitarian crises, from violent incidents in the <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/case-studies/syria-tracker">Syrian Civil War</a> to <a href="https://harassmap.org/en/">sexual harassment in Egypt</a>. In 2013 and 2017 Kenyan activists once again used this technology to predict and defuse potential violence before, during and after their <a href="https://www.ushahidi.com/blog/2017/11/08/uchaguzi-2017-october-26th-elections-report">presidential election</a>. </p>
<p>Now, political violence is <a href="https://theconversation.com/was-it-a-coup-no-but-siege-on-us-capitol-was-the-election-violence-of-a-fragile-democracy-152803">threatening democracy in the United States</a>. The Jan. 6 Capitol insurrection was the culmination of a violent year that saw <a href="https://theconversation.com/federal-agents-sent-to-kenosha-but-history-shows-militarized-policing-in-cities-can-escalate-violence-and-trigger-conflict-143579">clashes between police and racial justice protesters</a>, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/plot-to-kidnap-michigans-governor-grew-from-the-militia-movements-toxic-mix-of-constitutional-falsehoods-and-half-truths-147825">right-wing plot to kidnap Michigan’s Democratic governor</a> and death threats against election officials. </p>
<p>For humanitarian workers and crisis responders who, like us, have worked abroad in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IZkoGEEAAAAJ&hl=en">conflict zones</a>, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02681102.2014.903894">scenes looked terribly familiar</a>. In late 2020 we joined with other conflict experts – including both local community groups and global nonprofit organizations – to found the <a href="https://mediatorsbeyondborders.org/trust/">Trust Network</a>, a nonpartisan group dedicated to detecting and trying to prevent political violence. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four young Kenyans sit at a table with computers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381379/original/file-20210129-20464-h17aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leaders of Ushahidi in their offices in 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/juliana-rotich-executive-director-of-ushahidi-a-non-profit-news-photo/160097055?adppopup=true">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conflict mapping in action</h2>
<p>Online teams at the Trust Network gather intelligence on the activities and stated intentions of extremist groups gleaned from both <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org">think tanks</a> and research institutes that <a href="https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/">monitor the violent fringes of U.S. society</a>. Based on that information, we identify potentially violent outbreaks – whether at protests or political rallies – then mark the site on a digital map. </p>
<p>The map is shared with member organizations, among them the local conflict mediators that work on the ground to de-escalate violence at marches, demonstrations and the like. Physically inserting themselves between opposing groups, they talk to each side and attempt to persuade people to step back from violence. This strategy, also called “violence interruption,” is often used <a href="https://theconversation.com/faith-based-violence-interrupters-stop-gang-shootings-with-promise-of-redemption-for-at-risk-youth-not-threats-of-jail-142449">in gang disputes</a>.</p>
<p>From October to December 2020, the Trust Network mapped 193 incidents of <a href="https://eirusa.ushahidi.io/views/map">violence and harassment related to the U.S. general election on Nov. 3</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="US map with pins dropped nationwide" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=307&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381393/original/file-20210129-19857-1devh9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A crisis map of the United States, documenting violent incidents between October and December 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trust Network</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sometimes, just mapping a crisis draws enough attention to deter violence. When instigators know they are being watched – and potentially recorded with smartphones – they may withdraw.</p>
<p>On Election Day, Nov. 3, three vehicles filled with people wearing camouflage, their license plates covered, started <a href="https://eirusa.ushahidi.io/posts/137">circling polling stations in Minneapolis</a>. On-the-ground volunteers from Nonviolent Peaceforce alerted the Trust Network. The incident was mapped, and an alert went out to police, government officials and community members about the potential danger at voting sites. </p>
<p>The vehicles soon left, apparently deterred by seeing Nonviolent Peaceforce volunteers in <a href="https://www.facebook.com/nonvpf/posts/-questions-about-the-orange-vests-in-the-twincities-todayread-more-about-our-tea/10157275736925458/">semi-official-looking orange vests</a> wielding smartphone cameras.</p>
<h2>Twitter time</h2>
<p>Over time, however, it has become clear that digitally mapping election violence is not the game changer in modern America that it was in Kenya in 2007. People are so plugged in to smartphones that conflict-mediating groups can quickly and easily find out when and where violent events are unfolding. </p>
<p>What their street mediators need, the groups told us, is real-time information about potential violence at protests and rallies to better navigate chaotic conditions. </p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s election newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>This year, we’ve begun using Twitter, local news sites and other digital platforms to track the size, location and movements of extremist groups like the Proud Boys. Collating the posts of credible journalists and independent videographers, we send up-to-the-minute information about emerging hot spots to street teams using <a href="https://signal.org/en/">Signal</a>, an encrypted text-messaging app. </p>
<p>The Trust Network also seeks to deter violence between protesters and police at such events, using a combination of de-escalation strategies.</p>
<p>Before a Nov. 6 “Stop the Steal” protest <a href="https://www.clickondetroit.com/decision-2020/2020/11/06/protesters-gather-at-tcf-center-to-spar-over-election-results/">planned at Detroit’s TCF Center over vote counting</a>, for example, the <a href="https://wcdrc.org">Wayne County Dispute Resolution Center</a> suggested local police wear baseball caps instead of riot gear to avoid escalating tensions. The officers complied. </p>
<p>On the scene, Trust Network representatives wearing bright green vests introduced themselves to police, protesters and counterprotesters, signaling to all their intention to keep the protest peaceful. An unrelated group called the <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/03/nuns-defend-metro-detroit-voters/6146385002/">Election Defenders was also working</a> to prevent violence between opposing groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People in orange and yellow sweatshirts labeled 'Defenders' talk in a circle at night" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381395/original/file-20210129-19594-i9daep.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defenders were on hand to keep the peace while votes were counted in downtown Detroit on Nov. 4.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/defenders-who-keep-the-peace-between-protesters-of-news-photo/1229466179?adppopup=true">Seth Herald/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The combination of pre-event communication with police and dialogue at the scene helped lower the temperature of a potentially explosive situation. <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/06/protesters-rally-tcf-center-detroit-biden-ballots/6186881002/">Several Detroit protesters were carrying weapons</a>, according to the Detroit Free Press. But that “Stop the Steal” protest stayed calm. </p>
<p><em>Brendan O’Hanrahan, media-monitoring lead of the Election Incident Reporting Project, contributed to this story</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph G. Bock received funding from the American Arbitration Association-International Centre for Dispute Resolution Foundation for related field research. He is a Co-Convener of the Trust Network. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marta Poblet is a volunteer member of the 2020 Election Incident Reporting Project (EIRUSA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Per Aarvik is a volunteer member of the 2020 Election Incident Reporting Project (EIRUSA).</span></em></p>Civilian peacekeepers are trying to stop violence before it starts.Joseph G. Bock, Director, School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development, Kennesaw State UniversityMarta Poblet, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT UniversityPer Aarvik, Affiliated writer on Contemporary Technology , Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1216392019-08-20T12:55:31Z2019-08-20T12:55:31ZMozambique case study shows that poverty is about much more than income<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288190/original/file-20190815-136176-1xt0bni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique uses income as a measure of poverty. On this basis, poverty has declined over the past two decades</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ANTONIO SILVA/epa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does it mean to be poor? On the face of it, this may not sound like a very difficult question. In developed countries, almost all official and everyday definitions refer to poverty in income terms. In this sense, low consumption power (income) and poverty are essentially synonymous.</p>
<p>Outside of developed countries, a similar view of poverty frequently gets headlines. In its global comparisons, the World Bank has adopted the (in)famous poverty line of <a href="https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/746163-what-is-the-1-90-poverty-line-and-based-on-this">US$1.90 a day</a>. So, people with daily real incomes below this amount form part of the global poor – thankfully, now a diminishing group. </p>
<p>One might dispute exactly how and where such a poverty line should be set. But the idea that being poor means not having an adequate income often seems uncontroversial.</p>
<p>Of course, among academics things are rarely so settled. Between economists, there is <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5432">disagreement</a> about whether poverty should be measured only in monetary terms. In other areas of social science, there is a tradition of scepticism that suggests standard quantitative definitions of poverty can be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220380600884068">misleading</a>. </p>
<p>Representing poverty as a kind of well-defined objective condition, like an infectious disease, focuses attention on the symptoms and immediate consequences of poverty. It risks diverting attention away from the underlying structural causes and diverse experiences of the poor.</p>
<h2>Challenging official narratives</h2>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X19300117">recent paper</a> we explore contrasting views of well-being in Mozambique. Our interest reflects the country’s controversial track record. From the early 1990s until recently, Mozambique achieved one of the strongest sustained periods of aggregate economic growth of any country. Yet <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2012.707791">some</a> argue this growth has largely not trickled down, leaving many behind. </p>
<p>Official poverty estimates undertaken by the government are of the classic quantitative or economic kind. Here a set of basic needs is identified and costed. Households consuming goods worth less than the cost of a minimal basket are deemed to be “poor”. Applying this definition, data from national surveys shows consumption poverty has declined over the past two decades at a steady, but not especially rapid, pace. </p>
<p>Today, almost half of all Mozambicans continue to live in absolute poverty. There are also large spatial gaps in well-being. For example, there is much lower poverty in the south of the country, around the capital city, reflecting widening levels of consumption inequality.</p>
<p>To provide perspective on this official narrative, a range of <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/6161-reality-checks-mozambique-final-report-2011-2015">bottom-up studies of poverty</a>, including our own, have been conducted by anthropologists in different parts of the country. These diverge in both form and content from the economic approach. </p>
<p>Indeed, the very starting point of this research has been distinctive. The intention was not to apply a pre-given or conceptually static definition of poverty, from which a count of the poor could proceed. Instead it was to probe local perspectives on well-being, the diverse forms of disadvantage, and the kinds of social relations in which disadvantage arises.</p>
<p>A main finding that emerges from the anthropological work is that we cannot see the poor without seeing the better-off. Local grammars of poverty – namely, the terms used to describe who are better- or worse-off – consistently distinguish between socially marginalised individuals and those with strong local social connections. </p>
<p>Perceptions of deprivation do highlight material deficiencies, such as a lack of food or clothes. But social relationships are vital to cope with vulnerability (shocks) and to facilitate social mobility. Being poor is intimately connected to one’s perceived “position” in a wider society and, through this, one’s scope for upward movement.</p>
<h2>Self-reinforcing disadvantage</h2>
<p>The anthropological view highlights the complex and often fairly localised ways in which the powerful, sometimes politically-connected, hoard opportunities for development. This reinforces existing divides and limits the social and economic mobility of the most disadvantaged. </p>
<p>For instance, the National District Development Fund in Niassa, Mozambique’s northern province, was seen as a main source of money for investment in (rural) economic activities. Formally, in allocating the funds, priority was to be given to agriculture rather than businesses, women rather than men, and associations rather than individuals. </p>
<p>But we found that the funds had been systematically co-opted by local <em>influentes</em>. These included traditional authorities, male entrepreneurs and the governing party elite through an intricate system of social relations of exclusion and bribes.</p>
<p>Other vignettes from the lives of the poor point to the diverse mechanisms through which disadvantage is reproduced. This is often linked to specific cultural practices that empower certain groups above others. They also point to the self-reinforcing nature of social and economic disadvantage. </p>
<p>For example, we met a single mother who had lost large parts of her harvest to drought two years in a row. She had struggled hard to put all her three children to school, but with no crops to sell and no well-placed family to support her, she could no longer pay the bribes necessary for her children to move up classes. We also encountered instances where people cut themselves off from vital relationships to avoid exposing themselves to the embarrassment of having failed and so as to preserve their dignity.</p>
<h2>Making sense of disciplinary divides</h2>
<p>How can we make sense of different disciplinary perspectives on poverty? On the one hand, it is tempting to seek some reconciliation. Surely, metrics of social capital or even subjective well-being can be added to existing measures of consumption power to provide a more complete characterisation of the poor? Or perhaps qualitative follow-ups among the consumption poor could be used to add local context? </p>
<p>Certainly, combined qualitative-quantitative approaches to poverty research have become popular and often yield richer insights than any one method on its own. Yet, as we elaborate in our paper, this somewhat misses the point. </p>
<p>There are fundamental philosophical differences between standard quantitative (economic) and qualitative (anthropological) traditions, which do not admit any easy fusion. These include differences in understandings about the form of social reality, what can be known about poverty, and how poverty is produced and reproduced.</p>
<p>For this reason, it is vital to allow separate and diverse perspectives on poverty to flourish. Each methodological approach has distinct strengths, limitations and policy uses. </p>
<p>The economic approach is essential to track economic progress over time on a consistent basis and identify households at greatest risk of consumption poverty (for example, to target social policy). But to uncover – and even resist – the inherently relational and often political ways in which poverty emerges and is reproduced requires a deeper, local, ethnographic touch. </p>
<p>Bringing these different perspectives into a meaningful dialogue with each other remains the next challenge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121639/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Income is a useful measure for tracking economic progress over time. But a broader lens is needed to understand the relational and often political ways in which poverty emerges and is reproduced.Sam Jones, Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations UniversityInge Tvedten, Anthropologist and senior researcher, Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1193532019-07-02T14:33:00Z2019-07-02T14:33:00ZZambian teens can’t talk about sex or contraception, even with their friends<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282017/original/file-20190701-105187-1094yis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Teenage girls who fall pregnant in Zambia are often mocked and feel isolated.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">DFID/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Becoming pregnant constitutes a threat to young girls’ health. That’s because they have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(13)70179-7">a higher risk</a> of maternal complications than adult women. </p>
<p>In fact, these complications were the <a href="https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/data/causes-death-adolescents/en/">leading causes of death</a> among 15 - 19 year old girls in 2016. And national data from 2012-2013 reveals that almost one third of women aged between 20 and 24 in Zambia had given birth before they turned 18. This trend continues. Child marriage has historically been an important factor but even if that practice has declined over the past few decades, high rates of adolescent pregnancy persist.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2015.302740">A range of factors</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jadohealth.2013.07.018">is associated</a> with these high rates. Using contraception is not seen as important, and young people struggle to access it. Condoms have a bad reputation for reducing men’s pleasure; some believe they have holes that allow the HIV virus to slip through. So they are not often used. There is a low level of knowledge about the risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections. Married girls are expected to become pregnant within a year after marriage. And, finally, young women rely on – and are to a large extent expected to engage in – transactional sex to cover basic material needs.</p>
<p>We set out <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13691058.2019.1621379">to study</a> and better understand how social norms concerning adolescents’ sexual behaviour make girls vulnerable to unintended pregnancy in a specific context. The study formed part of the <a href="https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02709967">Research Initiative to Support the Empowerment of Girls</a> (RISE), a randomised controlled trial that aims to measure the effect of economic support, community discussions and youth clubs on early childbearing rates in a rural Zambian context that has high rates of child marriage and adolescent pregnancy. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13691058.2019.1621379">We found</a> that adolescents were operating in an environment where they couldn’t admit to others that they were sexually active. There wasn’t much space for open, judgement-free communication with friends and parents about sexual matters. So the teens didn’t know about contraception or how to avoid pregnancies – the only message they received was “abstinence”.</p>
<p>To solve this problem, interventions will be needed at multiple levels: with adolescents, families, communities, and in society generally. Young people need access to comprehensive sexuality education and life skills training. Parents, teacher, health workers and community leaders need to be involved in encouraging open discussions about sexuality and contraception.</p>
<h2>Pressure and shame</h2>
<p>The research involved individual interviews and focus group discussions with girls and boys aged between 13 and 18 and the parents of other young people of this same age. The researchers interviewed girls aged between 13 and 20 at four rural sites in Zambia’s southern province. Fieldwork was conducted in two stages in 2017.</p>
<p>Girls reported that both their peers and parents would react negatively if it became known they had a boyfriend. Girls mostly advised each other not to date boys and not to have sexual relationships. But, quite a few claimed that girls can feel under pressure to have a boyfriend. That pressure is generally not directly about dating boys or men and having sex. It was about accessing certain commodities that boyfriends can pay for: basic things, such as snacks to bring to school, lotions or washing powder for clothes, or, more rarely, expensive items like mobile phones or fashionable clothes.</p>
<p>Participants recognised that girls who look for economic support may come from poor families that cannot afford to cover basic needs – “they have hunger at home”, as one participant put it. </p>
<p>When asked whether a pregnant girl or a girl with a baby brings shame to her family, some agreed – although others did not. Those who felt an early pregnancy was shameful for the family explained that it indicated the girl’s parents had not supported or guided her. However, this concept of shame did not seem to relate primarily to morality.</p>
<p>In general, pregnant young women were not judged for not respecting religion or for having committed a sin, but for the burden they put on their families and the consequences in terms of discontinued education and future possibilities. </p>
<p>Both girls and boys stated that getting pregnant or making a girl pregnant could “destroy their future”. Girls who had given birth told us they had lost friends because of their pregnancy. They said that their friends no longer came to see them, avoided their company, and some laughed at them.</p>
<h2>Boys’ experiences</h2>
<p>Norms for sexual behaviour are strongly gendered. The social sanctions against pregnant girls are stronger than against the men and boys who make them pregnant. </p>
<p>Unlike girls, boys may boast about their relationships with girls among friends. Nevertheless, boys risk being held economically responsible and taken out of school. In many reported cases, the boy or man either denied responsibility or disappeared when he learned about a girlfriend’s pregnancy. This is presumably because they are afraid of being held accountable.</p>
<p>No participants mentioned boys pressuring girls for sex or the use of violence as contributing factors. But at least two of the eight girls with a baby had become pregnant because of rape.</p>
<h2>Contraception frowned on</h2>
<p>Interestingly, not one participant told us that early pregnancies occurred because young people do not use contraception or because they don’t know enough about the risks of having unprotected sex.</p>
<p>Social norms in Zambia consistently indicate that unmarried girls should not use contraception. Young people themselves said that they cannot ask for contraception because that would mean revealing they were having sex. </p>
<p>Parents were strongly opposed to the idea that their girls could avoid unwanted pregnancies by using contraception. Even just talking about contraception and condoms could encourage girls to “experiment” or to become “prostitutes” – which meant having many partners or going after men for money. It was also commonly believed that hormonal contraception could be harmful to young women and might result in infertility, disabled babies or even cancer.</p>
<p>All these findings suggest that it will take interventions at every level to address the issues of sex, contraception, pregnancy and associated risks in Zambia. Just talking to adolescents won’t suffice; parents, teachers, communities and society at large also need to be involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joar Svanemyr receives funding from University of Bergen and The Research Council of Norway. </span></em></p>There isn’t much space in Zambia’s rural areas for open, judgement-free communication with friends and parents about sexual matters.Joar Svanemyr, Post doc researcher, Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1057042018-10-30T14:09:22Z2018-10-30T14:09:22ZWomen in positions of power could mark a turning point for Ethiopia’s girls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242432/original/file-20181026-7041-ad1gwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Having women in power may keep Ethiopia's girls in school.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jazzmany/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within the last month Ethiopia has downsized its cabinet, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/10/16/world/africa/ap-af-ethiopia-women-in-cabinet.html">named</a> women to half the positions and, for the first time, appointed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/sahle-work-zewde-named-ethiopia-woman-president-181025084046138.html">a woman</a> as president. </p>
<p>These are huge milestones in Ethiopian politics. They could also mark a turning point for the country’s girls as the women ministers are perhaps more likely to pursue policies that benefit girls. In addition, having women in positions of power will mean that girls have role models they can look up to, something that’s not common in the country. </p>
<p>Girls in Ethiopia <a href="http://info.moe.gov.et/emdocs/esaa01.pdf">lag</a> behind boys in school enrollment and academic achievement, especially at higher levels. Female students make up 48% of all primary students, but only a <a href="http://info.moe.gov.et/emdocs/esaa01.pdf">third</a> of students in higher education.</p>
<p>One reason for this are structural constraints – like access to school and poverty – though cultural practices, such as child marriage, also play a significant role.</p>
<p>Another reason girls don’t complete their studies is a lack of role models. <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-fr328-dhs-final-reports.cfm">Most Ethiopian</a> women, particularly in rural areas, have little education, are seldom in wage-paying jobs and have limited socio-economic status. In schools, <a href="http://info.moe.gov.et/emdocs/esaa01.pdf">only</a> 17% of teachers are women, and only 10% of school leadership positions are occupied by women – adults in positions of power are usually men. </p>
<p>The appointment of many women into positions of power can break stereotypes and inspire girls – potentially influencing their choices and actions.</p>
<h2>Aspirations</h2>
<p>There is increasing recognition among <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195305191.001.0001/acprof-9780195305197-chapter-28">economists</a> and other <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/extra/?id=5765&i=Table%20of%20Contents.htm">social science researchers</a> that an individual’s aspirations influence their choices, behaviour and life outcome. If they don’t feel they’ll improve their position by additional effort or investment, they may <a href="https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/documents/TannerLectures_EstherDuflo_draft.pdf">choose to</a> hold back. But if they see one of their own in positions of power, this can give them hope that some targets are achievable – encouraging more effort and investment. </p>
<p>This has been well documented when it comes to female role models at school and the impact on girls’ education. Studies from <a href="http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/51/2/269.short">India</a>, <a href="http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2017/02/01/jhr.52.4.1215-7585R1.abstract">South Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775713001684">Chile</a> and the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/125/3/1101/1903648">US</a> show that the presence of female teachers significantly improved the performance of female students. </p>
<p>A study from the US also showed how teachers can influence attitudes towards certain careers – increased <a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2010-25580-001">exposure</a> to female experts in the field of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics motivated more girls to pursue careers within these fields.</p>
<h2>Neglected girls</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades, Ethiopia has achieved <a href="http://info.moe.gov.et/emdocs/esaa01.pdf">significant progress</a> in getting all children into school. Between 2000 and 2016, net enrollment in primary school <a href="http://info.moe.gov.et/emdocs/esaa01.pdf">increased </a> from 49% to 100%, mostly due to improved physical access to school. </p>
<p>But the gender gap persisted. The dropout rate among girls is high, partly due to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pauline_Rose4/publication/237731351_Can_gender_equality_in_education_be_attained_Evidence_from_Ethiopia/links/5484a72b0cf283750c3708f4/Can-gender-equality-in-education-be-attained-Evidence-from-Ethiopia.pdf">early marriage</a> but also because education is not always prioritised. </p>
<p>Children in rural Ethiopia are <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environment-and-development-economics/article/environmental-resource-collection-implications-for-childrens-schooling-in-tigray-northern-ethiopia/12DB933C0414E197650F091EFC50E4AC">expected to</a> spend hours fetching water, collecting firewood or tending to livestock every day. On top of this, girls have additional household chores like cooking, cleaning and child care. These tasks affects their ability <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jae/article/20/1/90/723642">to enrol</a> and their <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:30b96517-0c60-44a4-9f65-0dff4144f22a">academic performance</a> at school. </p>
<p>Also, if parents have to ration schooling due to poverty, it’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pauline_Rose4/publication/237731351_Can_gender_equality_in_education_be_attained_Evidence_from_Ethiopia/links/5484a72b0cf283750c3708f4/Can-gender-equality-in-education-be-attained-Evidence-from-Ethiopia.pdf">more likely</a> that they will send the boys because they believe it will mean the greatest return on investment. This means girls miss out on their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02671520903350297">small window</a> of educational opportunity. </p>
<p>Many parents have <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jae/article/26/5/561/4096500">lower aspirations</a> for the higher educational and career achievements for girls than they do for boys. This is because of the <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8820.pdf">stereotype</a> that girls and women are primarily home makers or assistants, while boys and men are producers and leaders. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s women in power, may be socially removed from the girl in rural Ethiopia, but their appointment may have huge implications for their educational achievement and social empowerment. Experience <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2012/01/11/science.1212382">in India</a> show that bringing more women into leadership positions eliminated the large gender gap in education. Exposure to female leaders also led to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/124/4/1497/1917190">change in voter attitudes</a> encouraging more women to stand for, and win, elected positions. </p>
<p>It’s possible that the recent high level appointments of women in Ethiopia may have a snowball effect with further gender balance at lower levels of government and across sectors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sosina Bezu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The appointment of women into positions of power can break stereotypes and inspire girls.Sosina Bezu, Senior Researcher in Development Economics, Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/753122017-04-18T15:22:12Z2017-04-18T15:22:12ZEthiopia can convert its youth bulge from a political problem into an opportunity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163636/original/image-20170403-21983-1ydliou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopia's large young population could become an advantage if backed by appropriate policies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia’s youth has come under the spotlight recently for their role in a political protest that is seen to be threatening stability. But Ethiopia’s youth bulge doesn’t need to be a political problem. It can be converted to an economic muscle. </p>
<p>Over the past 12 years Ethiopia has been lauded as one of the fastest growing economies in the world with average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/ethiopia">10.8%</a>. It has also seen a significant <a href="http://et.one.un.org/content/unct/ethiopia/en/home/assistance-framework/growth-and-transformation-plan.html">decline in poverty</a>. In 2004 it had a poverty rate of 39% which had fallen to 23% by 2015.</p>
<p>But there’s a cloud hanging over the country. In 2016 it was hit by a drought that affected <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/drought-ethiopia-10-million-people-need">10 million people</a>. And a new drought has emerged <a href="http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/ethiopia-new-drought-puts-recovery-and-neighbouring-countries-risk">again this year</a>.</p>
<p>2016 also saw an outbreak of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">political protest</a>. Although things are relatively calmer now, the state of emergency that was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html">declared</a> in October 2016 has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-outward-calm-ethiopia-extends-state-of-emergency/2017/03/30/b5544098-1529-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.35df0f9c6b45">extended</a>. </p>
<p>But Ethiopia still has a lot going for it, including a large youth population – over 70% of the country’s population is under 30 years of age. This could be turned to a massive advantage if backed by <a href="http://www.demographicdividend.org/country_highlights/ethiopia/">appropriate policies</a>.</p>
<p>Ethiopia’s demographic profile mirrors China’s in the 1980s and of East Asian countries in the 1950s. The spectacular economic growth in East Asia in the second half of the 20th century is partly <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=1959">attributed</a> to the demographic transition that supplied the economies with a young work force. The <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/working-hard-working-poor-9780199794645?cc=no&lang=en&">key</a> to reaping this demographic dividend is, of course, that there are jobs for those joining the labour force.</p>
<p>While a young population can be a positive economic factor, it can also be a political risk in an economy that doesn’t create enough opportunities. </p>
<p>Until recently Ethiopia had avoided large scale political upheaval among young people. This was partly due to the government’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/113/452/409/78218/Do-not-cross-the-red-line-The-2010-general?redirectedFrom=fulltext">tight control</a> of youth groups and surveillance of their activities. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopia-imposes-state-of-emergency-as-unrest-intensifies/2016/10/10/7825391e-8ee9-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html?utm_term=.4c90400fa9f3">recent unrest</a> with youth at the helm signals huge problems, indicating that their livelihood and unemployment issues can no longer be suppressed or ignored. Addressing the problem head on is the smarter thing to do. </p>
<h2>The problem</h2>
<p>Every year more than a million young Ethiopian men and women join the labour market. But the economy produces far fewer new jobs and opportunities. This is partly due to the structural make up of the largely agrarian economy.</p>
<p>Over 80% of Ethiopians live in rural areas. While the agricultural sector in Ethiopia has declined significantly as a contributor to the economy in the past decade and now accounts for <a href="http://www.nbe.gov.et/pdf/annualbulletin/Annual%20Report%202014-2015/mac%20eco%20and%20social%20ind.pdf">less than 50% of the national product</a>, it still employs <a href="http://www.csa.gov.et/index.php/survey-report/category/34-nlfs-2013">more than 70% of the labour force</a>. </p>
<p>Historically, most people who were born in rural areas tended to settle there. But land scarcity and population growth, coupled with limited non-farm employment opportunities has started <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14001727">pushing</a> young people into the urban areas. </p>
<p>There aren’t enough jobs for them there either. Official statistics show that 30% of 20 to 24 year-olds in urban areas are <a href="http://www.csa.gov.et/index.php/survey-report/category/34-nlfs-2013">unemployed</a>. Some studies suggest that the actual rate is as high as <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00389.x/abstract">50%</a>. </p>
<p>National level labour surveys and other studies suggest that young people with secondary education or more are the ones missing out the most from the flourishing economy. Many – <a href="http://www.moe.gov.et/-/education-statistics-annual-abstract-2006-e-c-pdf-edit-education-statistics-annual-abstract-2006-e-c-pdf-edit-education-statistics-annual-abstract-200?inheritRedirect=true">about 70%</a> – join the labour market with little or no practical or specialised training past the general secondary education. </p>
<h2>High aspirations and expectations</h2>
<p>High levels of unemployment among educated young people is a troubling phenomenon. The country’s youth have increasingly higher aspirations and expectations due to the possibilities they see, given the country’s economic growth. They also have high expectations of what they believe they deserve as relatively educated people. </p>
<p>But not only are there no jobs, wages are often <a href="http://essp.ifpri.info/files/2012/07/ESSP_RN15_UrbanWages.pdf">not high enough</a> to support high living costs. </p>
<p>This gap between aspirations and economic reality is clearly becoming increasingly <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/ejdr.2011.33">frustrating</a>. </p>
<p>In focus groups of young people in different parts of southern Ethiopia we captured a deep sense of hopelessness and a fear that they would remain trapped in poverty.</p>
<p>For those living with their parents the main concern was that unemployment was “waiting for them” when they finished school. Many said that they previously thought that hard work at school was the way out of the life of poverty their parents had endured. Many were clearly itching to do something about their lives. </p>
<p>One sign of this pent up frustration is the surge in young people choosing to take the risk of <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-dangerous-route-of-ethiopian-migrants">irregular international migration</a> even when they’ve been warned about the risks.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s youth bulge can be an engine for growth as international companies look to set up operations where they can access low wage labour. On top of that, an increase in the number of young people working would boost demand and investment in the country. </p>
<p>But to transform young people into an engine of growth requires improving access to employment. </p>
<p>The government should create an enabling environment for the private sector by improving the country’s <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/ethiopia">dismal business environment</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, it should design effective employment programmes. It’s recent <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201701110292.html">effort</a> to increase job opportunities for unemployed young people is a step in the right direction. But policymakers, politicians and those implementing policies should resist the temptation to use access to jobs and employment as a political tool.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sosina Bezu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Over 70% of Ethiopia’s population is under 30 years of age. This can be converted to economic muscle if policies are introduced to tackle the high unemployment levels in the country.Sosina Bezu, Senior Researcher in Development Economics, Chr. Michelsen InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.