tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/khalifa-university-1103/articlesKhalifa University2024-03-07T12:22:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250232024-03-07T12:22:10Z2024-03-07T12:22:10ZSomalia-Turkey maritime deal is a win for both countries, and not a power play for the Horn of Africa<p>A recent <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095">defence deal</a> between Somalia and Turkey has great significance for Somalia and the region’s security. The agreement, which covers both land and sea, aims to enhance defence cooperation between Turkey and Somalia. It includes the possibility of Turkey providing both training and equipment for a Somali navy.</p>
<p>Its near-term impact should, however, not be exaggerated.</p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a good-faith agreement signed between asymmetric powers whose interests overlap a little, at present. My <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Iuj4hHMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research</a> on the geopolitics and security agreements over the past few decades covering Turkey, Somalia and the wider east African region leads to my analysis that Mogadishu and Ankara entered into the agreement for different reasons. </p>
<p>Turkey, the more powerful partner, signed the agreement to bolster its <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">reputation</a> as a security partner and important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. It wants to cement its role as a critical player in Somalia’s future, and improve its international visibility and prestige domestically. </p>
<p>Turkey plans to expand its training role to the maritime realm in Somalia and complement its terrestrial <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776053">military training facility</a> in Mogadishu. It may also provide – but is unlikely to sell (given Somalia’s <a href="https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/files/Publications/Budget%20strategy%20for%20fy2023%20V3%20PDF.pdf#page=3">severe budgetary constraints</a>) – arms to Somalia now that the arms embargo has been <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15511.doc.htm#:%7E:text=Recognizing%20the%20benchmarks%20reached%20on,the%20Federal%20Government%20of%20Somalia.">lifted</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia, as the less powerful partner, signed the agreement to build its defence capacities, particularly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-provide-maritime-security-support-somalia-official-2024-02-22/">offshore</a>. It entered into the deal eventually to gain the capabilities to project force throughout the territories it claims.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">Red Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters</a>
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<p>Mogadishu’s means to project force in its territorial waters are currently <a href="https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-helps-increase-maritime-security-somalia-2022-04-06_en">limited</a>. Hence, the illegal, unreported and unregulated <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/tackling-illegal--unreported--and-unregulated-fishing-in-somalia.html#:%7E:text=In%20fact%2C%20reports%20suggest%20that,away%20from%20Somalia's%20economic%20development.">fishing</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia’s leaders likely hope that Turkey will be able to train and equip Somali soldiers and sailors. This would give Mogadishu the capability to project limited <a href="https://theconversation.com/red-sea-politics-why-turkey-is-helping-somalia-defend-its-waters-224377">force</a> and thus better police its territories, both maritime and terrestrial. In doing so, it hopes to eventually gain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, including semi-autonomous regions such as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200614-somalia-recognizes-contested-leader-in-semi-autonomous-border-state">Jubaland</a> and the de facto independent state of <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland</a>.</p>
<h2>Limited scope</h2>
<p>In my view, there are limitations to what Turkey can achieve through this agreement in terms of its ambitions in the region. Even if the agreement were fully implemented, Ankara would not be involved in confronting Mogadishu’s rivals (including Ethiopia) within the region. </p>
<p>In short, the agreement is limited in scope and in terms of capabilities being offered. It will need to be long term to accomplish anything close to affecting political and military outcomes on the ground – inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<p>It does not, in my view, represent the beginning of a new system of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/beyond-ethiopia-somaliland-turkey-somalia-defense-deal-fuels-uae-rivalry">regional alliances</a> that will pit Turkey and Somalia along with Egypt against Ethiopia, Somaliland and possibly other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>The background</h2>
<p>The Turkey-Somalia agreement should be seen in the light of what the deal gives each signatory. Not as part of a new system of regional alliances that are adjusting to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">deal</a> signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of 2024.</p>
<p>Under this agreement, Ethiopia will get a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use, and access to the Berbera port. In return, Addis Ababa would <a href="https://interregional.com/article/Addis-Ababa-Ambitions/2221/en">recognise</a> Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.</p>
<p>This deal has set off a <a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics-221131">diplomatic storm</a> in the region. It has been opposed by Somalia and Turkey, as well as the US, China and Egypt. The agreement is certainly important. It has the potential to make an impact on the political and security fabric of the region as Ethiopia may eventually have a maritime security and commercial footprint in the Gulf of Aden.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502">Somaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia</a>
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<p>These two recent deals in the Horn of Africa, however, are driven by the national interests of Somalia, Ethiopia and Somaliland. They speak to their primary interests – territory and sovereignty.</p>
<p>The genesis of engagement and agreements with external actors has come from one or more of these Horn of Africa states. This was similarly the case with the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107475">2017 Berbera Port deal</a> between Ethiopia, Somaliland and Dubai’s DP World. It was the case with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355243">Qatar’s</a> engagement with Somalia on electoral politics, also in 2017.</p>
<p>It should come as little surprise that the region’s states – like others in the international state system – work to further their interests in their own back yard.</p>
<p>For its part, Turkey’s interests, like those of other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, are generally opportunistic. Their intent is short-term gains. In my view, Turkey doesn’t have military interests in the Horn of Africa, and Ankara has limited capabilities even if it did.</p>
<p>This isn’t a criticism of Turkey. All states have limited capabilities and they generally prioritise them – especially when it comes to security architecture – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1976573">close</a> to home, where it matters. Turkey is no different.</p>
<h2>No gunboat diplomacy</h2>
<p>Turkey will be a good partner for Somalia and vice versa. They have a decade of history together and the agreement gives both Ankara and Mogadishu something of value. </p>
<p>In Turkey, Somalia has found a capable <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872980">partner</a> that can offer training, expertise and some arms. And this means that the context was only partially about the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. </p>
<p>Mogadishu’s leaders are under no illusion. </p>
<p>They know their own projection of limited power against what they see as encroachments on Somalia’s terrestrial and maritime territories is years in the future. But so is Ethiopia’s floating of a navy off the coast of Somaliland. </p>
<p>We should, therefore, not expect Turkish-trained and equipped Somali troops to be invading Somaliland, or Turkish ships crewed by Somali sailors to be skirmishing with Ethiopia in the Gulf of Aden any time soon. Instead, we should understand the agreement as one among many that may become embodied as something of strategic value only much later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All states have limited security capabilities and they generally prioritise them close to home. where it matters.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187732023-11-29T18:46:11Z2023-11-29T18:46:11ZThe path to net-zero emissions runs through industry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562291/original/file-20231128-23-zrg8sr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C49%2C6636%2C4357&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Steel factories, like this one in China, are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/smoke-billows-from-a-large-steel-plant-as-a-chinese-news-photo/625667906">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As government leaders and climate negotiators gather in Dubai for the COP28 United Nations climate conference, an enormous challenge looms over the proceedings: decarbonizing the global industrial sector.</p>
<p>Industry has accounted for <a href="https://www.weforum.org/press/2023/11/net-zero-industry-tracker-13-5-trillion-investment-needed-to-fast-track-decarbonization-of-key-hard-to-abate-industry-sectors">over 30% of total greenhouse gas emissions</a> in recent years. It is the single largest emitting sector when accounting for its electricity use and heat generation.</p>
<p>For countries to meet their goals to cut greenhouse gas emissions, stopping emissions from carbon-intensive industries like <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102565">steel</a>, <a href="https://www.iea.org/energy-system/industry/cement">cement</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.102955">chemicals</a> is imperative.</p>
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<p>There are promising technologies and innovations that can drive decarbonization in industry: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102208">green hydrogen</a> fuel made from clean electricity and water, energy efficiency measures across supply chains, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2023.113215">carbon capture, use and storage</a> to name a few.</p>
<p>However, these solutions have yet to be deployed at the speed and scale required to slow global warming. </p>
<p>Global industrial emissions will need to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103067">fall by 25% by 2030</a> for the world to be on track to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 – a target espoused by many of the world’s largest economies. That’s an extremely steep decline of 3% per year, and it will require a massive mobilization of money, technology and political will.</p>
<p>The positive news is that many countries are taking steps in the right direction. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/big-new-incentives-for-clean-energy-arent-enough-the-inflation-reduction-act-was-just-the-first-step-now-the-hard-work-begins-188693">U.S. Inflation Reduction Act</a>, signed in 2022, includes approximately US$80 billion per year for climate initiatives from 2022-27, with provisions to spur clean technology deployment and incentivize emissions reductions across industrial sectors. </p>
<p>But efforts in developed countries, while commendable, are insufficient to drive global decarbonization at the <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2023">pace needed to keep global warming in check</a>. Developing countries face enormous barriers to adopting low-carbon technologies, from lack of infrastructure to insufficient skills and capacity.</p>
<p>In a recent paper in the journal Energy Research & Social Science, drawing from a series of deep dives on specific industries, we set out <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103067">a comprehensive road map for decarbonizing industry</a> around the globe. Here are some of the key points.</p>
<h2>Scaling up finance</h2>
<p>First and foremost, there needs to be a radical scale-up of financing for industrial decarbonization in the developing world. Annual investments will have to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103067">increase at least sevenfold by 2030</a> to get the world on track to reach net-zero emissions by mid-century.</p>
<p>Grants, loans, risk guarantees and equity investments provided through public and private institutions can help mobilize both public and private investments to meet that goal. That funding can start with developed countries meeting and exceeding their commitment to provide $100 billion in climate finance for developing countries every year. Developed countries bear the <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co-emissions-by-region">bulk of responsibility for past emissions</a> that have fueled climate change.</p>
<h2>More technology transfer</h2>
<p>Decarbonization will move faster if developed countries accelerate their technology transfer to the Global South. That is, making sure that developing economies receive the advanced technologies needed and are included in global value chains. </p>
<p>With the majority of industrial emissions expected to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103067">come from emerging economies by mid-century</a>, spreading knowledge and expertise will be critical. Partnerships between countries and companies can facilitate demonstration projects for new technologies like green hydrogen and carbon capture in developing nations.</p>
<h2>Improved job training</h2>
<p>The net-zero transition will also require a massive workforce with new capabilities, so investing in human capital and skills training is essential.</p>
<p>Companies and governments can collaborate to develop curriculums and apprenticeship programs focused on green technologies. Building this pipeline of talent to build and install renewable energy such as solar panels and appliances like heat pumps needs to start now. While demand for these technologies is high, <a href="https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2023/9/growing-the-economy-of-the-future-job-training-for-the-clean-energy-transition">one of the key constraints to their rapid growth</a> is workforce development – across geographies and technology types. </p>
<h2>Ensuring a just transition</h2>
<p>Another priority is a just transition for communities that have relied on fossil fuels for generations. As industries transform, some jobs will be lost while new ones are created. Ensuring that the economic and environmental benefits spread across economies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102245">will require robust government and industry programs</a> to assist displaced workers.</p>
<h2>Establishing a global treaty</h2>
<p>Finally, a new global treaty to coordinate industrial decarbonization <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103067">will likely be necessary</a> to move fast enough. The treaty could establish standards, incentivize coordination on policies and avoid unfair competition as countries shift to net-zero industries.</p>
<p>“Climate clubs” – groups of developed and developing countries working together to reduce emissions from specific industrial sectors – may also foster progress and technology sharing as they jointly implement decarbonization goals.</p>
<p>In our view, the path to net-zero emissions industries will be challenging but not impossible.</p>
<p>With smart policy, investments in technology and human capital, and bold leadership from countries in the Global North and Global South, we believe that decarbonizing heavy industry could become the next big climate and economic development success story.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Morgan Bazilian is a member of the Irish Climate Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin K. Sovacool and Steven Griffiths do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Industry is a leading climate polluter: Our road map shows what’s needed to cut industrial emissions in fast-growing countries.Morgan Bazilian, Professor of Public Policy and Director, Payne Institute, Colorado School of MinesBenjamin K. Sovacool, Professor of Energy Policy, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexSteven Griffiths, Senior Vice President, Research and Development and Professor, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049752023-05-04T14:25:46Z2023-05-04T14:25:46ZCloud seeding can increase rain and snow, and new techniques may make it a lot more effective – podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524204/original/file-20230503-19-bx8o26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=418%2C594%2C6930%2C4308&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cloud seeding can increase rainfall and reduce hail damage to crops, but its use is limited.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/colorado-supercell-royalty-free-image/1303884216?phrase=Rain+storm&adppopup=true">John Finney Photography/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When an unexpected rainstorm leaves you soaking wet, it is an annoyance. When a drought leads to fires, crop failures and water shortages, the significance of weather becomes vitally important.</p>
<p>If you could control the weather, would you?</p>
<p>Small amounts of rain can mean the difference between struggle and success. For <a href="https://climateviewer.com/2014/03/25/history-cloud-seeding-pluviculture-hurricane-hacking/">nearly 80 years</a>, an approach called cloud seeding has, in theory, given people the ability to get more rain and snow from storms and make hailstorms less severe. But only recently have scientists been able to peer into clouds and begin to understand how effective cloud seeding really is.</p>
<p>In this episode of “The Conversation Weekly,” we speak with three researchers about the simple yet murky science of cloud seeding, the economic effects it can have on agriculture, and research that may allow governments to use cloud seeding in more places.</p>
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<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BSQl42wAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Katja Friedrich</a>, a professor of atmospheric and oceanic sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder in the U.S., is a leading researcher on cloud seeding. “When we do cloud seeding, we are looking for clouds that have tiny super-cooled liquid droplets,” she explains. Silver iodide is very similar in structure to an ice crystal. When the droplets touch a particle of silver iodide, “they freeze, then they can start merging with other ice crystals, become snowflakes and fall out of the cloud.”</p>
<p>While the process is fairly straightforward, measuring how effective it is in the real world is not, according to Friedrich. “The problem is that once we modify a cloud, it’s really difficult to say what would’ve happened if you hadn’t cloud-seeded.” It’s hard enough to predict weather without messing with it artificially. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A plane wing with a cylindrical device attached." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524222/original/file-20230503-1294-7b7p2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Cloud seeding is usually done by planes equipped with devices – like the one attached to the wing of this plane – that spray silver iodide into the atmosphere.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_seeding#/media/File:Hagelflieger-EDTD.jpg">Zuckerle/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>In 2017, Friedrich’s research group had a breakthrough in measuring the effect of cloud seeding. “We flew some aircraft, released silver iodide and generated these clouds that were like these six exact lines that were downstream of where the aircraft were seeding,” she says. They then had a second aircraft fly through the clouds. “We could actually <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716995115">quantify how much snow we could produce</a> by two hours of cloud seeding.” That effect, according to research on cloud seeding, is an increase in precipitation of somewhere around 5% to 20% or 30%, depending on conditions.</p>
<p>Measuring the effect on precipitation – whether rain or snow – directly may have taken complex science and a bit of luck, but in places that have been using cloud seeding for long periods of time, the economic benefits are shockingly clear. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ndsu.edu/agriculture/ag-home/directory/dean-bangsund">Dean Bangsund</a> is a researcher at North Dakota State University who studies the economics of agriculture. “We have a high amount of hail damage in North Dakota,” said Bangsund. For decades, the state government has been using cloud seeding to reduce hail damage, as cloud seeding leads to the formation of more pieces of smaller hail compared to fewer pieces of larger hail. “It doesn’t 100% eliminate hail; it’s designed to soften the impact.”</p>
<p>Every 10 years, the state of North Dakota does an <a href="https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/20193399635">analysis on the economic impacts of the cloud seeding</a> program, measuring both reduction in hail damage and benefits from increased rain. Bangsund led the last report and says that for every dollar spent on the cloud seeding program, “we are looking at something that is anywhere from $8 or $9 in benefit on the really lowest scale, up to probably $20 of impact per acre.” With millions of acres of agricultural fields in the cloud seeding area, that is a massive economic benefit.</p>
<p>Both Freidrich and Bangsund emphasized that cloud seeding, while effective in some cases, cannot be used everywhere. There is also a lot of uncertainty in how much of an effect it has. One way to improve the effectiveness and applicability of cloud seeding is by improving the seed. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=list_works&hl=en&hl=en&user=OxrNpiEAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate">Linda Zou</a> is a professor of civil infrastructure and environmental engineering at Khalifa University in the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Her work has focused on developing a replacement for silver iodide, and her lab has <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/03/28/1048275/scientists-advance-cloud-seeding-capabilities-with-nanotechnology/">developed what she calls a nanopowder</a>. “I start with table salt, which is sodium chloride,” says Zou. “This desirable-sized crystal is then coated with a thin nanomaterial layer of titanium dioxide.” When salt gets wet, it melts and forms a droplet that can efficiently merge with other droplets and fall from a cloud. Titanium dioxide attracts water. Put the two together and you get a very effective cloud-seeding material. </p>
<p>From indoor experiments, Zou found that “with the nanopowders, there are 2.9 times the formation of larger-size water droplets.” These nanopowders can also form ice crystals at warmer temperatures and less humidity than silver iodide. </p>
<p>As Zou says, “if the material you are releasing is more reactive and can work in a much wider range of conditions, that means no matter when you decide to use it, the chance of success will be greater.”</p>
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<p>This episode was written and produced by Katie Flood. Mend Mariwany is the executive producer of The Conversation Weekly. Eloise Stevens does our sound design, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>None of the interviewees work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> </span></em></p>Cloud seeding – spraying materials into clouds to increase precipitation – has been around for nearly 80 years. But only recently have scientists been able to measure how effective it really is.Daniel Merino, Associate Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationNehal El-Hadi, Science + Technology Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099582019-01-16T11:30:45Z2019-01-16T11:30:45ZWhy al-Shabaab targets Kenya, and what can be done to stop attacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254056/original/file-20190116-163265-zgegik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Al-Shabaab’s first attack on Kenyan soil was in 2008. Since then the Kenyan government has responded with force.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">United Nations Photo/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Al-Shabaab <a href="http://time.com/5503175/terrorists-attack-upscale-hotel-kenya-nairobi/">has claimed</a> responsibility for the <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1PA0Q3-OZATP">terror attack</a> in Nairobi in which scores of people were killed and injured. The question the terror attack raises is why the group continues to target Kenya. The Conversation Africa’s Moina Spooner and Julius Maina spoke to Brendon Cannon and Martin Plaut.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is Al-Shabaab?</strong> </p>
<p><em>Brendon Cannon</em>: Al-Shabaab is an Islamist terror group formed in Somalia in the first decade of this century. Its original leadership was <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab">affiliated</a> with Al-Qaeda, having trained and fought in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-al-shabaab">was originally</a> dedicated to removing foreign influence from Somalia and bringing a strict form of Islamic governance to the country. At the height of its power, <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-withdrawal-from-mogadishu">around</a> 2008-2010, it controlled the capital, Mogadishu, and a sizeable territory south and west of the capital, including the ports of Merca and Kismayo.</p>
<p>Initially, al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560970?journalCode=uafs20">was a</a> fairly hierarchical organisation and one, that despite ideological and tactical differences, was largely consolidated under Ahmed Abdi Godane aka Mukhtar Abu Zubair, the leader of the group when it attacked Westgate in 2013. </p>
<p>After his death in 2014, al-Shabaab has reportedly fragmented. This may partially explain the atomised group’s twin focus of attacks on both Somalia and Kenya. That is, Kenyan fighters trained by and loosely affiliated with al-Shabaab appear to be responsible for at least some of the attacks perpetrated in Kenya, particularly in the country’s northeast.</p>
<p><strong>What’s its motive for attacking Kenya?</strong></p>
<p><em>Brendon Cannon</em>: The group began attacking <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560970?journalCode=uafs20">targets outside Somalia</a> in 2007. Its first attack on Kenyan soil was in 2008. The Kenyan government responded with force. In 2011, to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001309571/kenya-s-10-year-battle-to-defeat-al-shabaab">“protect national security”</a>, the country’s defence forces entered southern Somalia to create a buffer zone between al-Shabaab held territories and Kenya. In the process, the Kenyan forces captured the port of Kismayo and quickly joined troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia in battling al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15342091">publicly states</a> its attacks are in retaliation to the Kenya Defence Force’s incursion in Somalia. It also justifies them for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUn2o4Q528c">nebulous reasons</a> associated with international jihad. </p>
<p>But it’s also motivated to attack Kenya because of the benefits vis-à-vis recruitment and fundraising that are a partial byproduct of international press coverage. That is, front page news of the group’s attacks in Kenya inadvertently provides an outlet for al-Shabaab to showcase its attacks with few filters and to exploit such media stories in its own propaganda. The results of the deadly carnage often serve as prime recruiting tools in terms of foot soldiers and funding. </p>
<p>It also launches attacks because it can. The group has been able to exploit the absence of a strong government in Somalia and the <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kgeography.htm">682 kilometre long</a> porous border between it and Kenya for a number of years.</p>
<p>Since 2011 the group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab">has lost</a> territory in Somalia. Nevertheless, it continues to maintain the capabilities and is intent on inflicting significant damage in Somalia and Kenya. The attacks in Somalia have <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-shabab">typically</a> been small-scale, targeting the military and police. There have been some large incidents. For example in 2017 <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-al-shabaab">at least</a> 300 people were killed when a truck packed with explosives detonated in the centre of Mogadishu. </p>
<p><em>Martin Plaut:</em> The Kenyan invasion of Somalia in 2011 was undertaken for understandable reasons. But the decision to go ahead was taken against the advice of its international friends – including the US and its neighbour Ethiopia. The Kenyan army <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110408090127/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-04-04/former-somali-defense-minister-named-president-of-jubaland.html">has attempted</a> to establish Jubaland, partitioning the regions of Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba from the rest of Somalia. It has met with little success. </p>
<p>This attempt to prevent al-Shabaab from establishing itself on the Kenyan border has become a mission too far, posing questions about how long it can be sustained and at what cost. </p>
<p><strong>Why Kenya more than other frontline states?</strong></p>
<p><em>Brendon Cannon</em>: As highlighted in one of my recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560970?journalCode=uafs20">articles</a>, Kenya is attacked far more than Ethiopia or other eastern African states. This is because of highly rational reasons that are based on cost-benefit analyses and the presence of ample opportunities. </p>
<p>Kenya has high international visibility and its relatively free and independent media widely publicises terrorist attacks. Another factor is that Kenya has developed a lucrative tourist sector which provides soft targets. </p>
<p>Additional advantages are that there are a high number of Kenyan-born fighters within the group’s ranks that possess local knowledge. This has helped al-Shabaab perform attacks and maintain terror cells in Kenya. An expanding democratic space and high levels of corruption also mean that the group is able to exploit the country’s governance weaknesses when it comes to security. </p>
<p>All these variables help al-Shabaab plan and execute terrorist acts while fulfilling the group’s quest to survive by maintaining relevance. </p>
<p><strong>What is your assessment of Kenya’s immediate response?</strong></p>
<p><em>Brendon Cannon</em> Reports on the latest incident are <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Tenants-of-14-Riverside-office-park/1056-4937004-wiuaruz/index.html">still fragmented</a>. But, it seems that in terms of security there has been some progress since the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080">Garissa University</a> attack in 2015 and the attack on the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/sunday-review/making-sense-of-kenyas-westgate-mall-massacre.html">Westgate Mall</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>The response of Kenyan security forces, particularly the General Service Unit – a paramilitary wing in the National Police Service of Kenya – seem to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ktnnews/video/2000166387/latest-report-kenya-s-elite-squad-recce-go-right-after-riverside-attackers">have been</a> timely and relatively effective. </p>
<p>The sad truth is that coordinated attacks – replete with suicide bombers, as well as heavily armed and motivated terrorists against relatively soft targets – are extremely difficult to thwart. No matter how professional and robust the security. </p>
<p><em>Martin Plaut:</em> As Murithi Mutiga, of the International Crisis Group, has pointed out, previous attacks have seen Kenyan reprisals against its Muslim population. The authorities responded with blanket arrests of Muslims and indiscriminate crackdowns aimed at ethnic Somalis. This inflamed tensions and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/5-years-after-mall-kenya-attack-al-shabaabs-threat-grows-20180921">made matters worse</a>. It’s vitally important that this mistake isn’t repeated. Only by uniting can Kenyans defeat the threat posed by these terrorist attacks.</p>
<p><strong>What can Kenya do to address this menace?</strong></p>
<p><em>Brendon Cannon</em>: As terrible as this attack is, it’s worth noting that major commercial areas and tourist hubs have largely avoided attacks by al-Shabaab since 2013 –- until yesterday. This is all the more surprising because elements within al-Shabaab remain motivated and possess the capabilities to continue attacking Kenya.</p>
<p>I question the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Raila-calls-for-KDF-exit-from-Somalia/1064-2339284-2w1wou/index.html">rationale of some</a> politicians who advocate the Kenyan Defence Force’s withdrawal from Somalia as a way for Kenya to avoid attacks. After all, al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560970?journalCode=uafs20">attacked Kenya multiple times</a> prior to 2011 when the KDF entered Somalia. </p>
<p>Moving forward, Kenya must attempt to tighten border control mechanisms, broadcast state power throughout the entire Kenyan landmass and re-energise its fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia: a fight that has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560970?journalCode=uafs20">slowed significantly since 2015</a>. </p>
<p>This is a Herculean task and one that Kenya’s government and security professionals, given the nature and type of threat, should be commended for doing quite well since 2013. </p>
<p><em>Martin Plaut:</em> Kenyans need to be patient and tolerant – to build links between their communities and to face the threat together. At the same time there needs to be a serious reassessment of Kenya’s role inside Somalia. There is little indication that al-Shabaab can be defeated by outside powers, even if it can be weakened. </p>
<p>The Somali government has failed repeatedly, most recently in preventing Mukhtar Robow, the former spokesman for al-Shabaab, from <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-al-shabab-spokesman-mukhtar-robow-running-office-somalia-n939266">participating in elections</a>. When the manner in which Robow was treated and was raised by the United Nation’s chief representative, Nicholas Haysom, he was <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-diplomat-to-un-don-t-interfere-in-our-internal-affairs/4727799.html">declared persona non-grata</a>, effectively expelling him from Somalia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya is attacked far more than Ethiopia or other eastern African states by al-Shabaab militants.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa UniversityMartin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973472018-05-30T13:28:43Z2018-05-30T13:28:43ZKenya may never close Dadaab, but its threat has exposed system failures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220746/original/file-20180529-80620-1ivyw1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the refugee camps in Dadaab, northern Kenya, where more than 300,000 call home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Boris Roessler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Kenya announced it would close the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2016, the world reacted with <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/04/495812-un-urges-kenya-reconsider-dadaab-camp-closure-displacing-some-350000-refugees">shock and recriminations</a>. Some <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/crisis-looms-for-somali-refugees-as-kenya-orders-closure-of-dadaab-refugee-camp-1/">pointed</a> to its commitments as a signatory to conventions protecting refugees. Others argued that Kenya must not close the camp <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/09/kenya-says-it-will-close-all-refugee-camps-displacing-600000-people/?utm_term=.b309570c0836">under any circumstances</a>.</p>
<p>Dadaab was opened in 1991 in north eastern Kenya and is made up of five camps. It’s home to more than 300,000 refugees, <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/05/28/from-here-to-eternity">95% of whom are from Somalia</a>. The camp was in fact never closed largely due to a Kenya High Court <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/africa/kenyan-court-blocks-plan-to-close-dadaab-refugee-camp.html">decision</a>. The court ruled that Kenya’s plan to close Dadaab was “illegal” and “discriminatory,” and that the refugees could not be forcefully relocated.</p>
<p>But we point out in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">analysis</a> that the negative reactions Kenya got weren’t justified, and obscured a number of fundamental issues. We also argue that Kenya had valid reasons for wishing to close Dadaab. </p>
<p>The international community, and particularly the UNHCR and affiliated aid organisations, have failed to offer effective solutions for Dadaab’s refugees and their host country Kenya for decades. Whether or not Kenya actually closes the camp remains to be seen, but its decision to do so is novel and important for a number of reasons. It serves to highlight the failure or unwillingness to seek durable solutions for refugees. </p>
<p>Kenya’s threat certainly uncovered numerous defects in the planning, preparation and modus operandi of the UNHCR and other organisations. </p>
<p>In this scenario, various international organisations and states conveniently carried on with business as usual at the expense of refugees, well-meaning donors and particularly Kenyans. Kenya suffered from terrorism and instability, a drop in tourism and a bad reputation as a result of that status quo. Equally as important, Dadaab’s refugees suffered the indignities of statelessness and an utter lack of options.</p>
<h2>Explaining reactions</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">research</a> highlighted five variables that influenced the reactions from states, international organisations such as the UNHCR, and the plethora of NGOs involved in Dadaab. </p>
<p><strong>Path dependence and increasing returns:</strong> The prospect of the closure of Dadaab by Kenya – or even other alternatives – have been stoutly resisted by a number of organisations. This can be explained under what William H. Sewell Jr., professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">defines</a> as path dependence or dependency. The longer the camp complex remains open, the more entrenched the interests become as the costs of exit rise.</p>
<p>As such, a combination of increasing returns and job security <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/vajint54&div=13&id=&page=">all form a mix</a> that keeps Dadaab running. </p>
<p><strong>Refugee discourse:</strong> Debates about refugees that have developed since the UN’s inception have had a real, physical effect on the way in which states and individuals react to – and deal – with refugees. It has developed into a system replete with laws, institutions, and camps requiring the requisite professions and jobs. </p>
<p><strong>Funding and budgets:</strong> Opponents of Kenya’s decision have argued that Kenya stands to lose close to <a href="https://abacus.co.ke/newsfeed/kenya-at-risk-of-sh10bn-loss-from-dadaab-shutdown/">USD$100 million in revenue</a> associated with housing refugees in Dadaab. But these economic benefits have come at a steep cost. And Kenya maintains that the long-term benefits of Dadaab’s closure outweigh the short-term costs.</p>
<p><strong>Organisational perpetuation:</strong> Organisations seek to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/35/2/79/2223325">perpetuate</a> their existence. Because financial sustainability is critical for the survival and effectiveness of all organisations – the UNHCR for example – priority is given to attracting charitable contributions by being seen to be active in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049362">high-visibility situations</a>. The mission of providing succour to refugees allows the UNHCR and others to advertise their indispensability to donors, fill their coffers and maintain relevance. It also reifies path dependency. </p>
<p><strong>5. Corruption:</strong> Many of the protests levelled by the UN and others at Kenya <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/kenya-close-worlds-biggest-refugee-camp-dadaab">focused on corruption</a>. For example, some argued that Kenya’s politicians were using the threat of closing Dadaab as a <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/05/19/will-kenya-really-close-dadaab">ploy to extort </a> more money from the European Union. Yet this may be a case of the pot calling the kettle black. While the Kenyan body politic can be <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/115/459/246/2195223">classified as largely corrupt</a>, this is also the case for <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107918">much of the UN</a>, including the UNHCR. </p>
<p>Allegations of grand corruption at the UNHCR in Kenya <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/201738">date back to 2002</a>. In their “Nairobi bubble” <a href="http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/forwa37&section=17">far removed</a> from parallel world of Dadaab, UNHCR officials have reportedly extorted <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/">bribes</a> from Dadaab’s refugees as part of a resettlement process that never comes to fruition. </p>
<p>Kenyan journalist Rasna Warah – formerly at UN-Habitat in Nairobi – <a href="https://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/item/24524-unsilenced-whistleblower-exposes-un-culture-of-corruption">documented</a> the deliberate exaggeration or underestimation of problems by UN agencies in order to keep donor funding flowing in. This thereby sustained the political economy of Dadaab and extending the run of the corruption gravy train.</p>
<h2>Ending a cycle</h2>
<p>Kenya may never close Dadaab, but it had good reasons for wishing to do so. The threat has demonstrated path dependence and how ill-prepared the refugee regime is for a situation in which a sovereign state decides its security may trump international treaty obligations. </p>
<p>It further demonstrates a double standard whereby European states can shutter refugee camps for ostensible security reasons but Kenya cannot. This is not only disingenuous but callous.</p>
<p>While calls for a continuation of the status quo in Dadaab have inundated Nairobi, what is noticeably absent are offers to resettle Dadaab’s refugees outside of Kenya. Kenya’s closure of Dadaab could eventually be positive, ending a cycle wherein the international community – not Kenya – continues to fail Dadaab’s refugees.</p>
<p><em>Hirotaka Fujibayashi, a graduate student at University of Tokyo, contributed to the research.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97347/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya may never close Dadaab, but it has good reasons for wishing to do soBrendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/933082018-03-18T11:06:59Z2018-03-18T11:06:59ZHow an Ethiopia-backed port is changing power dynamics in the Horn of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210647/original/file-20180315-104639-1r71q2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shipping vessels seen off the Djibouti port in the Gulf of Aden.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mazen Mahdi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and therefore dependent on its neighbours – especially Djibouti – for access to international markets. This dependency has hampered Ethiopia’s aspiration to emerge as the uncontested regional power in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Recently, however, the ground has been shifting. As we point out in a <a href="http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shifting-balance-power-horn-africa/">recent article</a>, Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti’s port. The <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Ethiopia-to-trade-using-regional-ports/2558-2682324-11idtdp/index.html">port currently accounts</a> for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports. It has done so by actively trying to interest partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. </p>
<p>But it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. This is because a port deal involving Somaliland will challenge Djibouti’s virtual monopoly over maritime trade. In addition, it may entrench the de-facto Balkanization of Somalia and increase the prospects of Ethiopia becoming the regional hegemon. </p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s regional policy</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a strategic perspective. It is closest to Ethiopia and will connect the eastern, primarily Somali region of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. It will also provide a much needed outlet for trade, particularly the export of livestock and agriculture. </p>
<p>The development and expansion of the port at Berbera supports two primary pillars of Ethiopia’s regional policy. The first is maintaining <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajia/article/view/99572">Eritrea’s isolation</a>. The aim would be to weaken it to the point that it implodes and is formally reunited to Ethiopia. Or it becomes a <a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=539285">pliant, client state</a>. </p>
<p>The second pillar rests on maintaining the <a href="https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627402">status quo in post-civil war Somalia</a>. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia enables Ethiopia to focus on quelling persistent internal security difficulties. It also keeps up pressure on Eritrea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210784/original/file-20180316-104642-llphfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Horn of Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ethiopia’s ambitions for Berbera have been hampered by two problems. Firstly the Republic of Somaliland – a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698249.2017.1343411">de-facto independent state</a> since 1991 – still isn’t recognised internationally. This makes engagement a political and legal headache. Secondly, Ethiopia, doesn’t have the critical resources needed to invest and build a port.</p>
<p>Ethiopia had been trying to get Abu Dhabi and Dubai interested in the Berbera Port for years. It’s latest push was assisted by a number of factors. These included <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-coalition-operations-in-yemen-part-3-maritime-and-aerial-blockade">a shift in the UAE’s military focus</a> in Yemen and Ethiopian assurances of more trade and some financing to upgrade the port. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s diplomatic push – which coincided with developments across the Gulf of Aden – finally got it the result it craved. In May 2016, DP World, a global mega-ports operator, signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/dubais-dp-world-agrees-to-manage-port-in-somaliland-for-30-years-1464549937">for 30 years</a>.</p>
<h2>The Berbera Port deal</h2>
<p>It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal if it didn’t see some <a href="http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shifting-balance-power-horn-africa/">long-term commercial benefit</a>. The deal also includes economic, military and political dimensions. </p>
<p>Economically, for example, there will be investments in Somaliland’s fisheries, transportation and hospitality industry. The UAE will also establish a <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/75758/uae-base-in-somaliland-under-construction">military installation</a> in Berbera. The base is intended to help the UAE tighten its blockade against Yemen and stop weapons being smuggled from Iran.</p>
<p>Politically, the Berbera Port deal has provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland. There has been some popular anger aimed at Somaliland’s former president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka “Silanyo”, and his family who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-official-says-somaliland-deal-with-uae-corrupt-illegal/3724682.html">reportedly benefited personally</a> from it. Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area. </p>
<p>But the anger in Somaliland pales in comparison to the reaction in Mogadishu. This is because the Somaliland government has remained largely isolated internationally – until the port deal.</p>
<p>Somalia Federal Government ministers have <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/02/15/510655/Somalia-UAE-military-base-Somaliland-Nur-Jimale-Farah-Berbera-Yemeni-conflict">publicly challenged</a> the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating <a href="http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shifting-balance-power-horn-africa/">on the global stage</a>. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa. </p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s wins</h2>
<p>The bottom line is that Ethiopia has engineered access to another port and enhanced its security and strategic economic interests. With the growth in annual volumes of transit cargo, Ethiopia has, for a long time, needed <a href="http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/insight-and-opinion/post-script/The-Berbera-option">alternative routes</a> from Djibouti. </p>
<p>In addition, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port by acquiring a <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/ethiopia-acquires-19-stake-in-dp-world-berbera-port">19% share</a> in the deal.</p>
<p>And by wangling a legally binding agreement between Somaliland and another state, Ethiopia has potentially paved the way for eventual international recognition of Hargeisa. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland through a combination of pressure and material incentives. By bringing significant outside investment and recognition, Ethiopia can also increasingly meddle in its internal affairs. This is a conundrum for Hargeisa. It finds itself increasingly emboldened to act independently. Yet it remains constrained by the need to get Addis Ababa’s approval. </p>
<p>As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services on Somaliland’s new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal. </p>
<p>But one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia’s rising power and influence over the entire region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A deal brokered by Ethiopia to develop the port at Berbera will have a ripple effect across the Horn of Africa.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa UniversityAsh Rossiter, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities & Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908682018-02-04T12:09:40Z2018-02-04T12:09:40ZTurkey’s foray into Somalia is a huge success, but there are risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204397/original/file-20180201-123843-vgpec9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish Airlines the first major international carrier to run a regular service to the Somali capital in more than two decades.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Ismail Taxta</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey’s engagement with Somalia is striking for its brevity and ostensible success. Turkey has been involved in Somalia since just 2011, yet Ankara can point to a string of reported <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/somalia-and-turkey-reap-rewards-from-mutually-beneficial-relationship-11296">accomplishments</a> and an arguably outsized presence in an often violent country regularly described as a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716214547002">failed state</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey’s presence in Somalia certainly embodies one of the most interesting regional geopolitical developments in the past decade. It also represents one of the most misunderstood and confusing. Why did Turkey choose Somalia? And, after its initial humanitarian intervention in 2011, what internal and external forces have shaped and expanded that involvement? Furthermore, what explains Turkey’s reported triumphs?</p>
<p>Some have pointed to a <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/why-turkey-coming-somalias-aid-214244">shared history and a common Sunni Muslim heritage</a>. This is questionable, at best, and alone cannot explain Turkey’s engagement with Somalia - let alone the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1981651">Others</a> have noted Turkey’s economic clout and its status as a mid-sized country interested in trade rather than extracting resources. </p>
<p>Genuine <a href="http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/32213/">humanitarian concerns</a> have also, at least initially, driven Turkey’s engagement as well as the prospect of <a href="https://www.yenisafak.com/en/economy/somalias-economy-thrives-with-turkeys-support-2931781">economic gain</a>. Scholar <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32761112/A_hybrid_actor_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_An_analysis_of_Turkeys_involvement_in_Somalia">Federico Donelli</a> notes its approach to Somalia </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“has made Turkey a regional actor different from the traditional western powers, as well as from the emerging non-western ones.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Turkey’s approach in Somalia has been largely welcomed inside and outside the African nation. However, a cautionary note is required. Allegations of <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/22/the-presidents-bank-corruption-allegations-tarnish-somalias-brave-new-world-by-jay-bahadur/">corruption</a> and bribery have surfaced. Turkey’s recent opening of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH">military training base</a> in Mogadishu to train the Somali National Army has also raised eyebrows across the wider Horn of Africa region. </p>
<h2>Keys to success</h2>
<p>Ankara has an understandable and deep seated <a href="http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol16/iss1/14/">desire</a> for international recognition as an emerging power and G20 member state. Its status in Somalia is part humanitarian and part financial, but is at its heart about influence and prestige. </p>
<p>Turkish money and aid – delivered directly to key stakeholders in the Somali Federal Government – ingratiated Turkey with local power brokers and provided Ankara with access and power in Mogadishu. What soon followed is Turkish control and management of Somalia’s most lucrative assets, the <a href="http://amisom-au.org/2014/10/rebuilding-of-mogadishu-airport-seaport-underway/">airport and seaport</a>.</p>
<p>Parallel to these were unilateral rebuilding efforts, offers of scholarships, renovations of hospitals, and the hosting of international <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/turkey-to-host-major-international-conference-on-somalia-78319">conferences</a> about Somalia. These have largely contributed positively to Somalia’s development and yielded the international acclaim and diplomatic clout craved by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his coterie. </p>
<p>For some parties inside and outside Somalia, Turkey is now viewed as <a href="http://www.researchturkey.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ResearchTurkey_Turkeys-Somalia-Adventure-the-Quest-for-Soft-Power-and-Regional-Recognition_Matthew-T.-Gullo.pdf">indispensable</a> to Somalia. The keys to Turkey’s reported success in Somalia - where so many other established powers have failed before - may revolve around four critical factors.</p>
<p>The first is approach. Most interventions in Somalia have been multilateral affairs by international and regional actors, such as the UN. Turkey’s approach, in contrast, has been largely unilateral and highly coordinated by the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60621-7_8">Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency</a>. In this way, the efforts of business, government and humanitarian staff either do not overlap or do so effectively.</p>
<p>Second is novelty. Turkey’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-erdogan-turkeys-rebranding-into-the-new-old-ottoman-empire/274724/">Ottoman past and Muslim identity</a> have been raised as major variables driving Turkey’s engagement with Somalia. But these assertions ignore or minimise one of its key strengths as a rising power: its distinct lack of a colonial past that devastated so much of the continent. </p>
<p>This approach is not only novel; it also represents Turkey’s first meaningful engagement with the continent. This contrasts sharply with that of the US, France, Russia and China, among others, which have a colonial or Cold War baggage.</p>
<p>The third factor is risk. Somalia has been the scene of thousands of capacity building and self-help experiments funded by a plethora of international organisations and states. Yet it is precisely where these efforts have failed that Turkey has <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-40736-4_11">found its niche</a>. </p>
<p>This required a big appetite for risk. Naturally, as the risks rise the potential for significant rewards does too. The economic rationale for risk among Turkish businesses is <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-014-2135-6">particularly high</a>, given experiences in difficult environments such as Iraq and Libya. This has contributed to <a href="http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol16/iss1/14/">sensible, if risky</a> actions in Somalia.</p>
<p>Fourth is soft power. Turkey has deployed an array of soft power approaches. These include diplomatic support for Somalia and direct flights on the Turkish national airline from Mogadishu to Istanbul. These pragmatic approaches have also led Turkish businesses to reap major financial rewards and lucrative contracts. </p>
<p>Turkey’s interest has shifted from being primarily humanitarian to one that also takes into account the political and security aspects of the country. Doing so, as stated in the Becoming Global Actor: The Turkish Agenda for the Global South <a href="http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/becoming-global-actor-turkish-agenda-global-south/">has made the country</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“a hybrid non-traditional actor because it combines the traditional political-stability perspective of western powers with the economic-trade perspective of emerging ones.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also has broken with the traditional development model for Somalia that has characterised the past three decades.</p>
<h2>Hybrid approach</h2>
<p>Turkey’s hybrid approach may yet lead to mission creep and draw the country into Somalia’s infamous clan politics. Its increasing role could also put it on a collision course with other states, regionally and internationally.</p>
<p>However, its actions have arguably improved the situation in Somalia over the past six years. This is because Ankara has actually attempted to assuage rather than solve Somalia’s long-standing problems outright. Investment is largely driven by profits and assistance is targeted, coordinated and based on needs. </p>
<p>These interventions rarely come with the types of strings attached that characterise other efforts seeking to restructure Somalia. This has been <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30447039">welcomed</a> by many Somalis for whom requirements for political reform or the creation of accountability mechanisms ring hollow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s actions have arguably improved the situation in Somalia over the past six years but its increasing role could bring it on a collision course with other states.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893132017-12-19T12:33:18Z2017-12-19T12:33:18ZWhy Kenya’s push for nuclear power rests on false or fanciful premises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199880/original/file-20171219-27607-6xp5go.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">High voltage electrical pylons on the outskirts of Kenya's capital Nairobi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya wants to go nuclear. Since 2012, Nairobi has been talking the talk and walking the walk. It has engaged the International Atomic Energy Agency and signed multilateral letters of intent in pursuit of nuclear power. </p>
<p>To date, Kenya reportedly has memoranda of understanding with <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">Russia, China, South Korea and Slovakia</a> which involve the building of four nuclear power plants with a total output of 4,000 MW. France is apparently also eyeing the potentially lucrative deals which would <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">nearly double</a> Kenya’s current electricity capacity. </p>
<p>Kenya’s Nuclear Electricity Board <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/news/iaea-approves-kenya-nuclear-power-application/">secured the global atomic energy agency’s approval</a> in 2016. It hopes to have the first plant online anywhere from <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">2022</a> to 2027, leading a new African push for nuclear power. The only country currently generating nuclear is South Africa.</p>
<p>Other African countries have signed agreements with foreign firms. These include Nigeria’s <a href="http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/energy/going-nuclear-africas-energy-future/">plans</a> to build plants with Rosatom, the Russian firm. South Africa is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-presidents-last-ditch-effort-to-ram-through-a-nuclear-power-deal-87018">also pursuing a deal</a> for new nuclear power plants with the company as is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/663f5dd6-af72-36b7-a002-c27ab5b13a66">Egypt</a>. </p>
<p>In January, the international nuclear agency <a href="http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/energy/going-nuclear-africas-energy-future/">concluded</a> that Ghana had made “considerable progress in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure.” Uganda is also <a href="http://ugbusiness.com/4217/russia-likely-to-win-bid-for-ugandas-nuclear-energy-plans">reportedly</a> pursuing nuclear energy.</p>
<p>The cost of the Kenya plant is estimated at <a href="http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Four-countries-sign-on-Kenya-s-nuclear-energy-plans/539546-3850138-jhb47lz/index.html">Sh500 billion</a>. This is costly and, given the current energy consumption patterns in Kenya, would be a massive waste of money.</p>
<p>Kenya’s industrial and consumer demand, economic growth, relative poverty as well as the current grid and distribution network simply do not support this magnitude of power generation at such exorbitant costs. </p>
<h2>Myths about Kenya’s power situation</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/powering-africa">popular narrative</a>, Kenya suffers from the twin evils of electricity that is overly expensive and in short supply. Yet there is <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">strong evidence</a> that Kenya’s power is relatively cheap and that successive governments have exaggerated both it’s economic growth trajectory and its need for a massive increase in power generation. </p>
<p>For example, Kenya has an installed capacity of just over <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000229172/demand-setback-now-puts-kenya-s-mega-power-plan-on-the-back-burner">2,400MW, against a peak demand of just over 1,600MW</a>. This is 800MW above peak hours demand.</p>
<p>While economies are required to have surplus power capacity, excess capacity can lead to higher power bills as consumers are often charged for idle power plants.</p>
<p>Thus the government, while promising ever cheaper power to consumers may actually be undercutting this promise in its pursuit of nuclear power plants and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312529345_Pipelines_Diplomacy_and_Power_An_Analysis_of_East_Africa%27s_Oil">other costly projects</a> that fail to reflect both industrial and private consumer demand.</p>
<h2>Note of caution</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.lahmeyer.de/en/item/article/masterplan-for-power-generation-and-transmission-in-kenya-lahmeyer-advises-the-government.html">study</a> by a German engineering consultancy further confirmed how exaggerated government figures about demand have been. It noted that Kenya’s maximum power demand would </p>
<blockquote>
<p>grow 72% to 2,259MW by 2020 from the current 1,620MW, when projects such as the standard gauge railway start operating fully. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Government <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">estimates</a>, on the other hand, project peak demand will jump threefold to 4,755 megawatts in the three-year period. This is twice as much as the consultant’s estimates. </p>
<p>On top of this, Kenya’s problem isn’t that it needs more energy. Rather it needs to address distribution issues. </p>
<p>Any project involving the generation of more power needs to pay equal attention to Kenya’s grid and distribution system which currently can’t <a href="https://qz.com/702604/it-wasnt-just-a-monkey-that-brought-down-kenyas-entire-electricity-grid/">handle additional power</a>. This includes corresponding efforts at regular, systematic maintenance work. Without these, any extra power generated from renewable and other energy sources will remain costly and wasted.</p>
<p>Yet another note of caution is in order. Demand from Kenya’s domestic consumers remains low even though a <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">total of 5.8 million customers</a> now have connections to power – a <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">five-fold increase</a> in the past seven years.</p>
<p>Why is this the case?</p>
<p>Neither a lack of connectivity nor an unreliable supply is to blame for the low consumption of electricity by the vast majority of Kenyan consumers. Nor is it because of reportedly <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">relatively high electricity tariffs</a>. </p>
<p>Rather, it is simply because the majority of Kenyans still have low income levels. Many Kenyans simply <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235272851530035X">cannot afford</a> the luxury of modern appliances for cooking, heating or refrigerating. </p>
<p>This simple fact has neither been figured into government prognostications nor donor-driven last-mile connectivity scenarios. </p>
<h2>Grappling with reality</h2>
<p>Over two years ago, after Kenya signed an MOU with China to explore building a nuclear power plant, <a href="http://www.kenyaengineer.co.ke/2016-05-27-10-44-22/political-engineering/item/2093-why-kenya-should-avoid-the-nuclear-option">I argued</a> that sober analysis was required prior to walking further down that path. The situation remains the same today. </p>
<p>This is not a question of whether or not Kenya would be a responsible nuclear power producer. Indeed, all indications are that national nuclear electricity board (KNEB) and other relevant government agencies have acted scrupulously and responsibly. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, both the board as well as the international nuclear agency, the IAEA, should honestly conclude – and then publicly announce – that Kenya does not have a need for nuclear power. </p>
<p>Adding extremely expensive nuclear power to Kenya’s energy mix along with power from <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-the-new-government-should-do-to-help-kenya-meet-its-energy-needs-85436">other inadvisable projects</a> such as the Lamu coal power plant is arguably inexcusable as well as profligate. Lamu is expected to produce 5,000MW of power within a period of three years. </p>
<p>As such, Kenya needs to work overtime to set a power generation agenda that identifies real versus perceived needs. The country’s electricity agenda must not be driven by estimated consumption figures that fail to correspond to the true energy needs. <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-in-the-dark-over-perfect-power-mix/996-3830352-v7gyra/index.html">In the words of</a> a former Kenyan energy official, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It does not take much effort to notice the gap between what is on paper and the economic reality.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s government, while promising cheaper power to consumers may actually be undercutting this promise in its pursuit of nuclear power plants and other costly projects.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/873712017-11-15T13:28:05Z2017-11-15T13:28:05ZWhy Al-Shabaab targets Kenya – and what the country can do about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194320/original/file-20171113-27622-47lgx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An armed policeman searches for Al-Shabaab gunmen during the deadly Westgate shopping mall terrorist attack in Nairobi in 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has suffered the far-reaching effects of repeated attacks by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terrorist group for years. Tourism has <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/africa/kenya/articles/Kenya-visitor-numbers-fall-25-per-cent-as-terrorism-hits-tourism/">declined</a>. Jobs have been lost and foreign direct investment has <a href="http://sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/ijba/article/view/4772">withered</a>. The greater Horn of Africa region bordering Somalia has also suffered, but statistics indicate that Kenya experiences an inordinate <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2008&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&country=104&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20036&perpetrator=20037&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=">number of attacks</a> by the terror group.</p>
<p>This trend cannot be explained by geography alone. Granted, Kenya’s porous and ill-guarded borders does make it easier for terrorists to infiltrate the country. But Ethiopia has a much longer border with Somalia than Kenya does.</p>
<p>Between 2006 and 2007 Al-Shabaab conducted few attacks outside of Somalia. There was only one terrorist attack in Ethiopia; there were none in Kenya. In contrast, between 2008 and 2015, the group executed <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1290607">a total of 272 attacks</a> in Kenya and only five in Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Some scholars have focused on Al-Shabaab’s retaliation for Nairobi’s armed <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/114/454/1/2195212">intervention</a> in Somalia, beginning in late 2011, as the reason for Kenya’s woes. Yet Ethiopian forces have been <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Somalia_Feb_09_2009.pdf">in Somalia</a> for more than a decade and both Burundi and Uganda contribute heavily to the African Union Mission In Somalia <a href="http://amisom-au.org/">(AMISOM)</a>. </p>
<p>It is also worth remembering that the incursion by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) was itself a reaction to Al-Shabaab <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/04/kenya-kidnap-attacks-tourism-hit">attacks</a> within Kenya that date back to 2008. </p>
<p>So what explains Al-Shabaab’s focus on Kenya? <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1290607">Our research</a> indicates that Al-Shabaab attacks critical Kenyan targets for both logical and opportunistic reasons. They are based on geographical proximity to Al-Shabaab’s bases in southern Somalia and reinforced by other variables that play into terrorist groups’ general <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism/html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter">modus operandi</a>. </p>
<p>For example, attacks such as those perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya exploit existing opportunity spaces and can be referred to as “propaganda by deed”. In this, they seek to raise attention to the group’s existence and viability, thereby enticing recruits to its ranks and spreading fear. In essence, the larger and more brutal the attack, the more the group is perceived as potentially more relevant and powerful than it possibly is. </p>
<p>Indeed, Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya have been characterised by their gruesome effect and have attracted critical news coverage internationally. This gives Al-Shabaab a level of publicity, notoriety and international relevance that often belies its increasing isolation in Somalia.</p>
<h2>Why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s current – though shrunken – stronghold is in southern Somalia. The geographic proximity of southern Somalia to targets in Kenya makes it easier to plan and launch terrorist attacks. The terror group has attacked not only Nairobi, but Mandera and Garissa in the north-east, as well as Kenya’s tourist-filled coastline. In contrast, potential targets such as Addis Ababa, Djibouti or Kampala are geographically distant and logistically difficult to reach.</p>
<p>Kenya is also one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most important states and East Africa’s hub. Its international visibility and status lead Al-Shabaab to make conscious decisions and efforts to attack it. Attacking targets in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi or on the coast, guarantees Al-Shabaab a level of international coverage that a similar attack in Ethiopia, for example, would not.</p>
<p>Most international media operate freely in Kenya. Many outlets, such as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/africa/chinas-news-media-make-inroads-in-africa.html?_r=0">Xinhua</a>, <a href="http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact-sheet/">CNN</a> and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/e">Al-Jazeera</a> base their Africa operations in Nairobi. The media coverage given to horrific attacks here presents presents Al-Shabaab the “oxygen” it needs to survive and, potentially, thrive.</p>
<p>Kenya’s highly-developed tourism sector is another target. The cumulative result of attacks and terrorism related travel advisories has been a marked decline in the number of tourists visiting the country since 2013. This has also <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Kenya-loses-Ksh40bn-as-hotels-hit-by-tourism-drop/1840360-2426240-qaqalgz/index.html">led</a> to hotel closures and job losses along the entire tourism supply chain. </p>
<p>This appears to bleed into arguments that posit Al-Shabaab attacks Kenya to bring it to its knees economically, influence foreign policy and force it to withdraw from Somalia. We argue that while this is partially true, it is not the only reason Al-Shabaab attacks Kenya’s tourist spots. Rather, it attacks Kenya because it’s a tourist hub and offers ample, opportune targets for terror.</p>
<p>Finally, Kenya’s security services are reportedly <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/96e8b0146e01e911cd5e09c582b56378/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=616415">riddled</a> with inefficiency and corruption. Al-Shabaab has exploited this fact. There have been strong allegations as well as <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Julius-Karangi-KDF-Corruption-Terrorism/-/1056/2831984/-/jrikx3/-/index.html">hard evidence</a> that Kenya’s police and military have occasionally colluded with Al-Shabaab.</p>
<h2>What Kenya can do</h2>
<p>Kenya needs to squarely face this reality and take appropriate measures to counter a persistent and therefore predictable threat. </p>
<p>This does not imply that the Kenyan government should anticipate the location or timing of attacks. But it should be aware of and take appropriate measures to counter this threat. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/strategic-logic-of-suicide-terrorism/A6F51C77E3DE644EBD20ADE176973547">Research has demonstrated</a> that the most promising way to reduce terrorism is to reduce the terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out attacks. Kenya needs to proactively address border security and revamp national security apparatuses. </p>
<p>But before shelling out money for the recruitment and training of more security and military personnel, Kenya must firmly deal with the omnipresent bugbear of corruption. <a href="https://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.1235/">Research on the proposed Kenya-Somalia border wall</a>, for example, demonstrated it will have little positive effect if the design and construction are simply vehicles for corruption. </p>
<p>Walls may stop some determined terrorists but they are largely useless if guards are susceptible to bribes and let attackers through. In 2014 two Al-Shabaab affiliated border guards bribed Kenyan border guards to escort them from Somalia to Mombasa. The two were later <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000153365/how-police-helped-al-shabaab-smuggle-their-arsenal">captured</a> in the city driving a vehicle stuffed with automatic weapons, rounds of ammunition and almost 50 kilograms of explosives. </p>
<p>The overall lack of training and professionalism in the security sector must also be addressed. Close attention should be paid to the well-being and quality of security personnel and equipment at installations ranging from shopping malls to private homes, government buildings and borders. </p>
<p>Third, the Kenyan government has been unable or unwilling to effectively counter negative news stories and Al-Shabaab propaganda that paint the country as a <a href="https://theforeignpolicyanalyst.wordpress.com/tag/terrorism/">“hotbed of terror”</a>. The fact remains that some states, including Kenya, appear to suffer more from the public perception of instability and danger from terrorism than others. These perceptions often correspond little to reality or statistics. </p>
<p>Terrorism is a region wide problem. It makes sense for Kenya to work with Somalia and Ethiopia on shared borders, refugees and the like. </p>
<p>Yet Kenya must also understand that it is the primary Al-Shabaab target outside of Somalia. No amount of regional cooperation will entirely alter that. As such, it must attempt to positively and consistently address the reasons why it is the target of attack largely on its own.</p>
<p><em>Dominic Ruto Pkalya contributed to this article and the research it cites.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya faces a serious threat of terrorist attacks given its strategic geopolitical position, its tourism and corruption. The country needs to squarely face this and take appropriate measures.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/256612014-04-15T06:57:37Z2014-04-15T06:57:37ZAbbott confirms Badgerys Creek for Sydney’s second airport<p>Sydney’s second airport could see its first flight in the next decade as prime minister Tony Abbott this afternoon confirmed construction will start at Badgerys Creek in 2016.</p>
<p>“Today’s decision recognises the growth of Western Sydney. Over the next 20 years, the region’s population is expected to grow from two million to three million people,” he said.</p>
<p>“A dedicated Western Sydney airport will service local aviation needs and be a much-needed relief valve for Sydney Airport. It will be a major catalyst for investment, jobs growth and tourism in the region for decades to come.”</p>
<p>The airport is expected to cost A$2.5 billion, and will be built with private sector funding. Sydney Airport has the right of first refusal to develop and operate the new airport.</p>
<p>Aviation experts welcomed the announcement, with the development expected to increase GDP by A$24 billion and create 60,000 jobs over time.</p>
<p>“My understanding is (Badgerys Creek) will operate as a second domestic airport and what I would expect initially is the movement of some limited east coast services to Melbourne and Brisbane to the new airport,” Ian Douglas, senior aviation lecturer at UNSW, said.</p>
<p>“This will stop people from Western Sydney having to take an hour to travel to Mascot to fly an hour to Melbourne. And the expectation is that this will lift constraints and free up valuable slots at Kingsford-Smith.”</p>
<p>“It makes a lot of sense on a number of levels,” he said. “The recent <a href="http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/sydney_av_cap/index.aspx">Joint Study on Aviation Capacity for the Sydney Region</a> identified that the current airport will be unable to service future demand, with both the airport and surrounding access roads already seriously congested.”</p>
<p>The new airport is expected to have a noise footprint the fraction the size of Kingsford-Smith, which affects 130,000.</p>
<p>But Marion Burgess, an acoustics and noise control expert at UNSW, said it was important to ensure there was a robust environmental assessment process.</p>
<p>“During the community consultation process there needs to be transparency on what the estimates of the noise impact may be,” she said. “And it’s important to ensure that any new residential housing near to the airport flight paths take the potential noise impact into consideration.”</p>
<p>Qantas immediately backed the plan, with CEO Alan Joyce labelling the airport “a vital piece of economic infrastructure for Australia”.</p>
<p>“Qantas has long supported the building of a second airport at Badgerys Creek, as have a number of detailed studies. After decades of debate, we applaud today’s announcement by the Prime Minister,” a statement read.</p>
<p>Rico Merkert, senior lecturer in aviation management at the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies at Sydney University, said freight operators would be the most keen on getting into Badgerys Creek.</p>
<p>“Badgerys Creek is most beneficial because it moves freight out of Kingsford-Smith and should allows for flights in the evening,” he said.</p>
<p>“During peak hour it will reduce some of the congestion in Mascot and will be very good for the efficiency of the Sydney airport system in general.”</p>
<p>“Still, international airlines make most of their money from business class and premium cabins. Their guests highly value the access to the CBD that comes with Kingsford-Smith and I don’t see them moving out,” Dr Merkert said.</p>
<p>“But Badgerys creek is the best choice in all the locations that have been discussed.”</p>
<p>Hamza Bendemra, an aerospace researcher at ANU said it was a decision “long overdue”. </p>
<p>“That earlier study commissioned by then-Minister Anthony Albanese clearly stated that the current Sydney airport was going to reach near-full capacity by 2030, so a decision just had to be made,” he said.</p>
<p>“Now questions remain around how the airport will be supported by nearby infrastructure and routes to and out of the new airport.”</p>
<p>The NSW state government is due to announce further infrastructure projects around the airport site in coming days.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Sydney’s second airport could see its first flight in the next decade as prime minister Tony Abbott this afternoon confirmed construction will start at Badgerys Creek in 2016. “Today’s decision recognises…Kylar Loussikian, Assistant editor for business and economy, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/194792013-11-08T03:04:29Z2013-11-08T03:04:29ZWhy ‘the boats’ are a national emergency and climate change isn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/33902/original/3vtkj83w-1382930955.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One is a national emergency, one isn't.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Courtesy; SBS Dateline, Supplied by Hussein Khoder & AAP Image/Dan Peled </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As anyone who has seen immigration minister Scott Morrison’s recent military-style press conferences knows, the Coalition has <a href="http://www.nationals.org.au/Portals/0/2013/policy/The%20Coalition%E2%80%99s%20Operation%20Sovereign%20Borders%20Policy.pdf">declared</a> asylum seeker boats arriving in Australia are a “national emergency”. What makes it so? And why haven’t other apparent emergencies earned the tag?</p>
<p>According to the Coalition’s policy statement on border security, the asylum seeker crisis cannot be solved by just bureaucratic management – it needs the “discipline and focus of a targeted military operation”. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/bn/2012-2013/boatarrivals">Between 2008 and mid-2013</a>, 744 boats carrying 44,317 asylum seekers have arrived. Of these, 862 people <a href="http://theconversation.com/factcheck-have-more-than-1000-asylum-seekers-died-at-sea-under-labor-16221">died</a> attempting to reach the Australian mainland.</p>
<h2>Does calling it a crisis make it one?</h2>
<p>The Coalition’s branding of the boat people issue as a “national emergency” surprised many. If the 4940 boat people arrivals in 2010-2011 constitutes a “national emergency,” then do the 6316 asylum seekers that <a href="https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/face-facts-2012/2012-face-facts-chapter-3#Heading1363">arrived by plane</a> in the same period receive this label? </p>
<p>Should the 1303 citizens who <a href="http://statistics.infrastructure.gov.au/atsb/login.do?guest=guest&tableId=user/atsbguest/Road%20Deaths%20by%20State%20and%20Territory.txd">died</a> on Australian roads in 2012 be regarded in the same vein? </p>
<p>What exactly constitutes a “national emergency?”</p>
<p>Put simply, a national emergency exists only when people believe it exists.</p>
<p>In Australia, the Attorney General’s Department is responsible for <a href="http://www.em.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx">emergency management</a>. However, the department currently <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/26/asylum-seekers-national-emergency-abbott">does not define</a> a “national emergency”. This means politicians and interest groups are able to use the term at will. </p>
<p>Issues that have attracted the national emergency label are wildly diverse: combating the child sexual abuse and neglect in Northern Territory Aboriginal communities (called the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Intervention), perceived decline in local production of food, housing shortages, damage in the Murray-Darling Basin and the lack of increase in national productivity.</p>
<p>While all of these issues are recognised as crises that require focused attention, only a few are accepted as actual national emergencies.</p>
<h2>If it feels like an emergency, maybe it’s an emergency</h2>
<p>There are two factors needed for a crisis to really earn the label of national emergency. First, the actual or potential impact of the crisis; second, peoples’ interpretations of its importance.</p>
<p>The impact of the crisis, either actual or potential, on Australians is obviously critical. The greater the impact’s size and reach, the more likely a crisis is to be deemed an emergency. </p>
<p>Acute crises, delivered over a short period, are more likely to be considered an emergency than those that unfold over months and years. This is because acute crises do not give people time to get used to and adjust to the impact. </p>
<p>The impact does not have to be physical to be considered an emergency. Impacts on values, beliefs and interests can be just as confronting as physical damage.</p>
<p>A national emergency is also determined by how the event is perceived by people. Cognitive limitations play a large part in the perception of threats. </p>
<p>People tend to fear more when they are less informed about an issue, ultimately over-estimating the threat. In situations where the threat is invisible, such as cyber warfare or health epidemics like SARS, the public become more fearful than they would in the face of a physical, quantitative threat. Moreover, people fear more threats which they cannot control. In the case of asylum seeking boats, as Australians hear about but do not experience the threat, it is easy for the cognitive biases to imagine the scenario where asylum seekers overwhelm Australia.</p>
<h2>Treat it like an emergency, and it becomes an emergency</h2>
<p>Governments which claim an event is a national emergency actively seek to shape public opinion. They repeatedly detail the threat, over-emphasize the consequences, and most importantly, securitize the issue. </p>
<p>Securitization is an international relations concept in which an event or object is labeled as a security issue. Extraordinary measures must be taken in the name of security. Or as Ole Wæver, the coiner of the term, <a href="https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fconstructivismointegracion.wikispaces.com%2Ffile%2Fview%2FAberystwyth%2C%2BParis%2C%2BCopenhagen%2BNew%2B'Schools'%2Bin%2BSecurity.doc&ei=f_5VUpJVkKGIB-H1gfAH&usg=AFQjCNEjDVArs3x1AxKpH85j9N4TQSdnxQ&sig2=WbX9auE70-gtbhM66_2Ilg&bvm=bv.53760139,d.aGc">puts it</a>, “It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.” </p>
<p>Securitizing an issue elevates its importance above other national priorities, creating a link in peoples’ minds between the issue and the potential for devastation if left unchecked. It then allows policy makers to address the issue outside of the normal realm of politics and deal with it using emergency methods.</p>
<h2>What about climate change?</h2>
<p>Climate change is undoubtedly a serious issue. The most <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html">recent IPCC report</a> places it beyond doubt that climate change is real. It has the potential to bring extreme weather, affect Australia’s tourism industry, make certain islands uninhabitable, and result in increased migration. </p>
<p>But despite the enormous potential harm climate change poses, it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/rudd-and-the-failed-promise-of-climate-security-15460">not perceived</a> as a national emergency. And based on the discussion above, it is unlikely that climate change will be considered one in the near future. </p>
<p>Why? The impacts are slowly unfolding rather that developing rapidly. The impacts are global, so the pain is shared not localised. And people think they can adapt, so they still feel like they have control. </p>
<p>A well recognised cogitative limitation in disaster management is that peoples’ inaccurate perception of a risk does not evaporate in the presence of rational evidence. On the contrary, if the new evidence challenges existing beliefs, it is often dismissed as unreliable, erroneously or unrepresentative. This means that getting people to believe that climate change is worthy of the national emergency label will be a long and difficult process.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored by Blair Morris, a research assistant for Athol Yates.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/19479/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Athol Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As anyone who has seen immigration minister Scott Morrison’s recent military-style press conferences knows, the Coalition has declared asylum seeker boats arriving in Australia are a “national emergency…Athol Yates, Assistant Professor, Institute for International and Civil Security, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/131172013-03-27T02:05:30Z2013-03-27T02:05:30ZACCC approves Qantas-Emirates deal: the experts respond<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/21781/original/83skz29w-1364344703.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emirates CEO Tim Clark (left) and Qantas CEO Alan Joyce pose for photographs. The ACCC today approved for a period of five years an alliance between the two airlines.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission today granted conditional approval to an alliance between Qantas Airways Limited and Emirates, a move experts say will benefit Europe-bound passengers but may drive up some ticket prices.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-grants-conditional-authorisation-for-an-alliance-between-qantas-and-emirates">statement</a> on its website, the ACCC said the alliance had been granted until March 2018.</p>
<p>“The ACCC considers that the alliance is likely to result in public benefits through enhanced products and service offerings by the airlines, and improved operating efficiency,” ACCC Chairman Rod Sims said.</p>
<p>“In particular, the alliance is likely to provide Qantas and Emirates customers with increased access to a large number of existing frequencies and destinations under a single airline code, improved connectivity and scheduling, and access to each alliance partner’s frequent flyer programs. The alliance is also likely to provide the airlines with increased flexibility to manage their fleet.”</p>
<p>Mr Sims said there may be minimal detrimental effects on competition in most regions where Qantas and Emirates already operate except the trans-Tasman route, “where Qantas and Emirates compete on four routes which accounted for around 65% of total passenger capacity between Australia and New Zealand in the year to 30 June 2012.”</p>
<p>To address fears of rising ticket prices on these routes, the ACCC has said the alliance authorisation is conditional on a promise by Qantas and Emirates to maintain the same capacity on the four overlapping trans-Tasman routes that they had before the deal was struck.</p>
<p>The clause will be reviewed over time, the statement said.</p>
<p>Here are some expert responses to the news:</p>
<h2>Tony Webber, Associate Professor, University of Sydney Business School at University of Sydney and formerly chief economist at Qantas</h2>
<p>It’s very reasonable that the ACCC gave them the nod. There’s lots of competition between Australia and Europe.</p>
<p>There’s still plenty of competition and seats in the market. There will be some upward pressure on airfares but the passengers should be able to live with that.</p>
<p>Passengers have it pretty good in terms of international airfares for years. Ten years ago, flights to London were up around the $2000 mark and now they are around the $1200 mark. Sometimes the ACCC accepts that passengers may need to pay a bit more. It’s a give and take. It’s time some of the gains went back to the airlines because the international airlines are not making much money.</p>
<p>I think there’s still lots of competition in the Tasman as well.</p>
<p>It’s absolutely a good move for Qantas as a company. One, they weren’t making any money on their Europe services or their Tasman services. One of the ways you can turn around routes is to join up with a competitor and with one of their strongest competitors, which is what they have done.</p>
<p>The Australian carriers need to change their business model when it comes to international services. Airlines don’t make money when they operate on international services so one of the strategies is to let someone else operate the service and build up a relationship with them.</p>
<p>Operating the route Qantas uses their own planes, but marketing the route means you go onto the Qantas site and book a ticket but when you fly it’s on someone else’s plane. That’s what Virgin does a lot of the time. When you are operating you have all these costs to bear. It’s better to let someone else operate it and you feed onto their operations.</p>
<p>Qantas has hooked up with a really good carrier and one of the most profitable in the business.</p>
<p>Emirates flies to 33 places in Europe but Qantas only flew to two. So it’s opened up all of Europe to Qantas’ Australian passengers and the other way round too. It opens up Australia for Europeans as one-stop service rather than a two-stop service.</p>
<h2>David Beirman, Senior Lecturer in Tourism at the University of Technology, Sydney</h2>
<p>I’ve been following this deal closely. The biggest question mark is who is getting the most out of this deal. From Qantas’ point of view, there’s some benefits – the strong link to Emirates, which flies a lot of people from Dubai to many points in Europe. That is a benefit for Qantas passengers and also in the fact that if you are a Qantas frequent flier and you are taking those Emirates flights too, you accrue points.</p>
<p>My gut feeling is that for the first year it operates it’ll be a howling success because a lot of people who haven’t been through Dubai en-route to Europe will think this is interesting and novel.</p>
<p>What I have questions about is, because Dubai as a stopover point has a limited number of attractions for tourists, frequent travellers – especially business travellers – will say “Oh God, not Dubai again”. When you look at Singapore, Bangkok and other places, terms of tourist attractions they have it all over Dubai. Many of Dubai’s attractions are very artificial.</p>
<p>From the business side, because so many of our trade relations are based in Asia, particularly through China, Singapore and Hong Kong, by Qantas abandoning those points as a stopover, it may be viewed in some circles in Asia that we are dropping the ball on Asia and refocusing on the Middle East. I don’t think that issue has been thought through well at all.</p>
<p>Virgin, the other major Australian carrier has an alliance with Etihad. So our two major carriers now have alliances with Middle East carriers and their long haul routes are bypassing the traditional Southeast Asian stop over points.</p>
<p>The third thing, from the Qantas corporate point of view – and this has been part of the reason, as I understand it, for the friction between former CEO Geoff Dixon and current CEO Alan Joyce – is that Dixon had actually planned to make a very large order of Boeing 787s, the Dreamliner aircraft.</p>
<p>The idea behind that was to make direct runs on Qantas to a lot of places in Europe. The Dreamliner has the capacity to go Sydney-Athens, Sydney-Cairo, Sydney-Rome, and Perth-London. </p>
<p>If the Dixon plan had been followed, there wouldn’t be a need for a Qantas alliance with Emirates at all. But Alan Joyce has opted for the alliance instead.</p>
<p>Qantas seems to be reducing its international routes and giving a lot of that European traffic to Emirates. Emirates comes out of this deal very well.</p>
<p>Had Qantas taken on the Dixon strategy they would have had a lot more options.</p>
<p>But there had been a lot of problems with the Dreamliners so the likelihood of them getting any Dreamliners in the next few years was fairly small.</p>
<p>Because Virgin already has this relationship with Etihad, it may have been more savvy for Qantas to try to build its relationship with other carriers. Malaysia Airlines is a one world carrier and there could have been an option that Kuala Lumpur becomes a major stop over.</p>
<h2>Hamza Bendemra, Researcher (Engineering) at the Australian National University</h2>
<p>The approval from the ACCC was widely anticipated. However, the verdict from the ACCC showed a couple of interesting points.</p>
<p>The first one was about the routes to NZ. Emirates and Qantas cover 65% of traffic across the Tasman so the ACCC is simply looking preserving competition on those routes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the ACCC also makes the point that although it believes the partnership will be beneficial to both parties, it doesn’t believe the narrative - put forward by Qantas CEO Alan Joyce at multiple occasions - that Qantas International was simply going to die without it (Qantas International has been bleeding money for some time now though).</p>
<p>Finally, the partnership is only approved for five years, as opposed to the 10 years that were asked for. The ACCC is taking the right move by being cautious as this will be the first partnership of its kind. Overall it’s a very smart partnership and it will be interesting to see how it affects both airlines and the market in the next five years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/13117/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission today granted conditional approval to an alliance between Qantas Airways Limited and Emirates, a move experts say will benefit Europe-bound passengers…Sunanda Creagh, Senior EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.