tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/thammasat-university-2754/articlesThammasat University2017-07-26T06:52:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/809112017-07-26T06:52:37Z2017-07-26T06:52:37ZAs Thailand restricts internet freedom, cyber activists work to keep an open web<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179532/original/file-20170724-7881-1ffe3b9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ssoosay/6235232281/in/photolist-auZcjR-4CMph-axXBgp-8K6FrG-6dVM1r-kJUif-dt86zM-oG813n-fGack-bQtarn-bRgAe2-fKGnnb-dPZnm3-59uS3M-ec5C8u-ec5C7S-atjh22-9jde2L-qCdGtw-fMBJ71-fFFSA-dBnfyK-ATott-dh5GdM-jb2yxo-JgwEi-8sZN7n-h99nbb-ezcEwe-6eakuc-8sNph9-atmVyE-atjgXg-6MFCQ7-atmVD1-atmVHS-atmVJU-atmVGb-6MBryp-j36r6k-azHxif-7ZC6Bc-ajgTk8-bCmRJf-qysLGw-8cwvBn-8sMHtA-JgyKf-nWYhR7-bTkNUR">ssoosay/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On June 9 2017, a Thai man was sentenced to 35 years in jail for sharing Facebook posts. The crime: he allegedly <a href="http://time.com/4812376/thailandlesemajestefacebookroyaldefamation">defamed</a> the king. </p>
<p>This harsh sentence is just one example of Thailand’s increasing repression in the digital sphere. Since the 2014 coup, the Thai military junta has take a hard stance toward online critics and dissidence.</p>
<p>In May, authorities threatened to shut down Facebook if the company failed to remove content deemed “<a href="https://coconuts.co/bangkok/news/failthaigovernmentwantsfacebookcomplylesemajestelawssocialmediagiantsaysnah/">inappropriate</a>”. Facebook, which did not comply, has not been shut down. At least, not yet. </p>
<h2>Cyber repression in Thailand</h2>
<p>Thailand’s cyber repression seems to be linked to its troubled history of military coups. </p>
<p>At the advent of the 2006 military coup, the <a href="http://www.tsu.ac.th/files/Computer_Crimes_Act_B.E._2550_Thai.pdf">Computer Crime Act</a> was passed, authorising state agencies to block internet content deemed a threat to national security. It encouraged “<a href="https://news.vice.com/article/thailands-royal-family-is-using-child-cyber-scouts-to-monitor-dissent">netizens</a>” (web users, many of them young) to monitor and report transgressive internet behaviours.</p>
<p>This early effort emerged from alarm about the fact that the country’s two main factions, <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/31/thailands-elemental-political-conflict/">the red shirts and the yellow shirts</a>, had taken their fight to cyberspace, with the red shirts vocally opposing the coup and questioning the country’s monarchy. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179093/original/file-20170720-32541-1unikra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Red shirts in Bangkok.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/franciuii/4521407737/in/photolist-7TxoZP-7SwgYw-7SwhBf-7Swgz7-7SsZgi-7LZYB4-8bEqyZ-7St18v-7St1JX-7SwgSC-7Swgoo-7Swh3L-7St1ur-93PjdU-7SwgD5-7Swgu7-7St1oP-7SwgMY-7Swhhy-7SsZH8-nAPrzR-7St1dt-93LeSk-kMu5VZ-8nWWVS-93Pjgo-8UxSMt-8UAWLC-8UAXuC-8UAXqC-6fBmqj-8UxTJR-6fBmdN-6fxbmv-8UAXbY-8UxSHV-9jVgn6-6fxb6x-8UAWNQ-6fBmy1-6fBmzY-8UAX3U-6fBmiS-8UxTCT-nRuTn5-84Yo9d-iujUXu-7YyrCy-6fxbpP-8UAX6Y">Francesca Castelli</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Internet control increased tremendously after the May 2014 coup, staged to facilitate royal secession and preserve <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/22/the-strange-elite-politics-behind-thailands-military-coup/">elite</a> status quo in Thailand. </p>
<p>Hundreds of websites were blocked during May 2014 alone, and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/thailand">working groups</a> were set up to monitor and analyse internet content. </p>
<p>This heightened control was accompanied by a dramatic increase in <em>lèse majesté</em> charges against critics, dissidents and ordinary citizens. Non-criminal acts such as sharing or “liking” a Facebook post or chat message that insulted the monarchy became punishable by long <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016/thailand">jail sentences</a>.</p>
<p>And in 2015, the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.th/article/334074">Single Gateway</a> proposal sought to monitor internet content by reducing the existing 12 internet gateways to a single, state-controlled portal.</p>
<h2>The Single Gateway policy under attack</h2>
<p>Against these continuing encroachments on digital privacy, Thai pro-democracy activists and civic groups have <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/17/global-civic-activism-in-flux-pub-68301#thailand">waged a courageous battle</a>.</p>
<p>Opposition to the Single Gateway plan cleverly centred not on digital rights and freedom of expression (though those concerns were evident in the debate), but on more universal issues, such as e-commerce and the economy. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"651321029156052992"}"></div></p>
<p>Some business groups, <a href="https://ilaw.or.th/node/3862">concerned</a> that the proposal would slow internet connectivity in Thailand, raised alarm that the Single Gateway would discourage foreign investment in the country. Ordinary people, too, resented the <a href="https://hilight.kapook.com/view/126924?utm_source=change_org&utm_medium=petition">attempt to limit internet access</a>. </p>
<p>Thailand’s <a href="http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/thailand/">internet-penetration rate is 42%</a>, and over 29 million citizens go online for entertainment, communication, public transport and food delivery. </p>
<p><a href="http://game.sanook.com/964561/">Online game players</a> and techies were worried that the policy would affect the speed of online games and expose their personal data.</p>
<p>Amid these diverse concerns, three forms of activism emerged. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://thaigiving.org/en/organization/detail/321/info">Internet Foundation for the Development of Thailand </a> and <a href="https://thainetizen.org/">the Thai Netizen Network</a> created a Change.org petition online to gather signatures against Single Gateway, providing information to citizens about the effects of the proposed legislation. </p>
<p>Alternative discussion forums also cropped up on Facebook and elsewhere. In groups like The Single Gateway: Thailand Internet Firewall, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/antisinglegatewayth/">Anti Single Gateway</a>, and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/OpSingleGateway/">OpSingleGatway</a>, people from across Thai society braved criminalisation to join the debate on internet control.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179094/original/file-20170720-8687-34heri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Civic groups are concerned about digital rights in Thailand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kengz/2617858426/in/photolist-4Zkd77-hFbWN8-4Zkdk9-9hEqQA-4Zke2b-4Zg1dD-4Zkdsh-4ZkdEq-641dLc-4Mr8dE-7dgBE6-fJqnTN-hFayR6-4PPwwp-wNH6F1-6zoNn6-hFavuX-fDDYdM-4Mr8V9-hFaTam-fJhaB1-sSz8dZ-8eRosr-8eRs34-8eRqKv-8eUDyL-8eUBSd-8eUz2Q-8eUzSj-8eRmxi-4Mr83w-8eUHBE-8eUwZf-8eUEcw-8eUyx7-8eRj6X-8eRg2T-8eUFgw-eN7eZ-8eUFWU-rVKx3v-szYkTs-rVKEez-sAhHsz-sSmHoW-szYx21-sSm32j-szYAEG-sSyotv-sA7aYH">Keng Susumpow</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An anonymous group calling itself the <a href="http://www.bangkokpost.com/tech/local-news/733396/activists-threaten-full-scale-cyber-war-on-government">Thailand F5 Cyber Army</a> utilised a so-called “<a href="https://www.facebook.com/ThailandF5CyberArmy/">distributed denial of services</a>” (DDoS) system to wage cyber war on the Thai government. It <a href="http://www.bangkokpost.com/tech/localnews/739884/anonymousstepsupsinglegatewayprotest">demanded</a> that the junta completely cancel its Single Gateway policy. </p>
<p>They encouraged netizens to visit official websites (among them the Ministry of Defense, the National Legislative Assembly and the Internal Security Operation Centre) and to repeatedly press the F5 key, which causes the webpage to refresh constantly, overwhelming servers.</p>
<p>The attacks <a href="http://www.bangkokpost.com/tech/localnews/739884/anonymousstepsupsinglegatewayprotest">caused many government web pages</a> to shut down temporarily, in part because the sites were technologically outdated. </p>
<p>Coupled with other forms of resistance, this <a href="http://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2015/10/01/1443677010/">virtual civil disobedience</a> worked. On October 15 2015, the junta announced that it <a href="http://news.voicetv.co.th/business/272250.html">had scrapped</a> the plan.</p>
<h2>The Computer Crime Act campaign</h2>
<p>But the victory was short-lived. In April 2016, the junta proposed to modify the 2007 Computer Crime Act to better tackle cyber threats to <a href="http://www.posttoday.com/analysis/politic/428973">national security</a>, claiming it would help develop Thailand’s digital economy. </p>
<p>Activists again geared up for a fight. This time, given the law-and-order frame of the proposed amendment, public criticism of it took a different shape. </p>
<iframe src="https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fcartooneggcat%2Fposts%2F281404048928988%3A0&width=500" width="100%" height="497" style="border:none;overflow:hidden" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true"></iframe>
<p>The business sector abandoned its concern over the economic effects of internet control to focus on the proposed law’s broad threat of <a href="https://ilaw.or.th/node/4312">legal sanction</a> against violators, anticipating that fear would lead to <a href="http://themomentum.co/momentum-feature-cybercrime-act-2016-from-citizen%2520(">self-censorship</a> online. </p>
<p>Netizens used online forums to discuss the impacts of the cyber law, including the fact that it was gearing toward <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/21/thailand-cyber-crime-act-tightens-internet-control">increasing sentences</a> against loosely-defined cyber law “offenders”, whose crimes could merely be sharing a Facebook post deemed a threat to the nation’s moral integrity or considered distorted information.</p>
<p>Rights groups such as iLaw and Thai Network of Netizens took to <a href="https://prachatai.com/journal/2016/12/69250">Twitter</a> and engaged with progressive online magazines to raise public awareness of the issue. They also worked with environmental activists who had already experienced local authorities’ abuse of the Computer Crime Act. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.geocities.ws/f5lessonbasic/%7EOpSingleGateway/%7EDdos/">F5 Cyber Army</a> continued its attacks on government websites, providing manuals so ordinary citizens could wage cyberwar. And an online petition, which received more than <a href="https://coconuts.co/bangkok/news/thai-netizens-say-no-restrictive-computer-crime-act/">300,000 signatures</a>, was submitted to members of the National Legislative Assembly. </p>
<p>This time, though, popular discontent went unheeded. On December 16 2016, the revised Computer Crime Act <a href="https://www.thairath.co.th/content/812662">passed in the Assembly</a>.</p>
<h2>Cyber activism and political messages</h2>
<p>There are lessons to be learned from the very different outcomes of these two similar campaigns against internet regulation.</p>
<p>Opposition to the Single Gateway plan concentrated on its likelihood to slow internet speed. The consequences for the economy and everyday conveniences were obvious, even to apolitical citizens and junta sympathisers.</p>
<p>This was a critical breakthrough, because these are vulnerable policy areas for the junta. Thailand’s military leadership derives its legitimacy partly from <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2014/08/vertigo-of-change/">Bangkok’s middle class</a>, whose livelihood and everyday convenience depends on the country’s continued economic growth and <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2003.43.2.253?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">global connection</a>. </p>
<p>The junta had more success in its second attempt to limit internet freedom by changing its framing of the issue. By invoking a law-and-order rationale, which has constituted the junta’s source of legitimacy since its <a href="http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/ajp_pdf/201706/AJP_Vol%205%20No%201_07_Janjira%20Sombatpoonsiri_final.pdf">seizure of power</a>, the government could argue that the impact of the proposed law would be finely honed: only “wrongdoers”, not regular netizens, would be punished.</p>
<p>This sleight of hand ultimately enabled the government to criminalise an array of online activities, handing privacy-rights advocates a major defeat. Next time the junta seeks to obfuscate its agenda with a law-and-order rhetoric, Thai activists will be better prepared.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Citizens and digital-rights advocates are pushing back against growing cyber repression in Thailand, where sharing the wrong Facebook post can land you in jail.Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/773052017-05-08T06:58:34Z2017-05-08T06:58:34ZEmmanuel Macron has a difficult task ahead say international experts<p>Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the May 7 French presidential election was a relief for many in France and around the world who feared the prospect of the far-right National Front candidate Marine Le Pen leading the country. </p>
<p>But Macron’s victory is only the first step. The novice politician has no parliamentary support and his plan for reforming the European Union <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/07/french-presidency-macron-reprieve-france-eu?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=GU+Today+main+NEW+H+categories&utm_term=224951&subid=2689150&CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2">may be out of his reach</a>.</p>
<p>The Conversation Global asked scholars from around the world what they thought of Emmanuel Macron’s victory, and what means for their country.</p>
<h2>Donatella Della Porta - The end of the “republican monarchy”</h2>
<p>France is a <a href="http://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works">semi-presidential system</a>. The “semi” is most important part as it means that the actual powers of the president are strongly affected by the results of the legislative elections which have, at times, given a parliamentary majority to the president. But, at other times, it has imposed what the French call “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">cohabitation</a>” - when the president and the prime minister belong to opposing parties . </p>
<p>This uncertainty is all the more important now as:</p>
<p>1) Macron is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/macron-french-presidential-election-2017-future-govern-effective">a president without a party</a>. It is very unluckily that he can count on a strong and stable majority in parliament.</p>
<p>2) Macron is president in a situation in which it will be quite difficult to negotiate a compromise with mainstream parties, which have been <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-04-24/france-shuns-mainstream-parties-in-presidential-election">the main victims</a> of these elections. </p>
<p>3) Macron has been voted, by many, as the lesser evil to the face to the xenophobic radical right.</p>
<p>4) Notwithstanding the perceived risk of a victory of the radical right, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-president-elections-le-pen-macron.html?_r=0">the abstention rate</a> in this election has been extremely high.</p>
<p>5) With his image <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-times/french-election-macron-a-prodigy-who-always-impressed-elders/news-story/813397e92f0294b8a924e3f3ed7f9795">as a banker</a> and his support for neoliberal reform, Macron is likely to face strong opposition by a radical Left that has found energy in the protests of the citizen-led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/08/nuit-debout-protesters-occupy-french-cities-in-a-revolutionary-call-for-change">“Nuit Debout” movement</a>. Its power was demonstrated last year against a far-reaching reform of the labour code in France - as well as in the extremely successful electoral campaign of the far-left firebrand Jean Luc Melenchon.</p>
<p>In a sense, the Macron’s presidency is a signal of the end of the “republican monarchy” in France.</p>
<h2>Luis Gómez Romero - From fraternity into effective legislation and policy</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron’s victory with <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/05/07/emmanuel-macron-est-elu-president-de-la-republique-avec-65-1-des-voix-estimation-ipsos_5123779_4854003.html">66.06% of the votes</a> in the second round of the French presidential election has been met with relief across Europe and much of the rest of the world – including Mexico. </p>
<p>French voters have thrown Mexicans a lifeline in their own struggle over the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/mexicos-revenge/521451/">North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA</a>) with the Trump administration.</p>
<p>President Enrique Peña Nieto tweeted that Mexico is keen to “strengthen its strategic alliance with France, now under President Emmanuel Macron”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"861300664751632384"}"></div></p>
<p>It will be easier for Mexico to diversify and boost its international trade by <a href="http://expansion.mx/economia/2017/02/15/europa-una-luz-para-mexico-en-la-era-trump">renegotiating</a> its free trade agreement with the European Union having Macron – who saluted the nations of the world in the name of “<a href="http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Politique/Le-premier-discours-d-Emmanuel-Macron-president-de-la-Republique-1250729">fraternal France</a>” in his victory speech – in the Élysée, rather than Marine Le Pen – who has vowed to reform the Front National into a political force <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/05/07/marine-le-pen-annonce-une-transformation-profonde-du-front-national_5123818_4854003.html">representing</a> French “patriots” against cosmopolitan “globalisers”.</p>
<p>But there are still many reasons for concern. Over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-election-results-maps.html?_r=0">10 million French voters</a> favoured Le Pen. And almost a third <a href="http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/05/07/actualidad/1494169129_398773.html">chose neither Macron nor Le Pen</a> – 12 million abstained and 4.2 million spoiled their ballot papers. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-presidency-marine-le-pen">Voter turnout</a> was the lowest recorded since 1969.</p>
<p>In the last presidential debate, Le Pen <a href="http://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/presidentielle-debat-macron-resiste-a-la-charge-de-le-pen-04-05-2017-2124628_3121.php">labelled</a> Macron the candidate “of globalisation gone wild, of Uberisation, of precariousness” and “social brutality.” These accusations may be exaggerated, but Macron himself acknowledged in his victory speech the legitimacy of the <a href="http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Politique/Le-premier-discours-d-Emmanuel-Macron-president-de-la-Republique-1250729">anger and anxiety</a> over the waning of the welfare state that has pushed millions of voters to embrace the Front National.</p>
<p>We are yet to see if Macron – a <a href="https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron">former investment banker</a> – will actually transform his call to fraternity into effective legislation and policy. There is too much at stake both in France and the rest of the world for him to neglect the outrage of those who have been forgotten by the very globalisation whose <a href="http://bfmbusiness.bfmtv.com/france/macron-la-mondialisation-est-une-formidable-opportunite-1060176.html">continuity</a> he advocates.</p>
<h2>Simon Watmough - What about EU-Turkey relations?</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the May 7 presidential election is unlikely to dramatically shift French–Turkish relations in the immediate future. The vote itself has attracted little media or popular interest in Turkey in the final week of the race, with <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/e-newspaper.aspx?pageID=430">Turkish news headlines</a> dominated by fractious domestic politics and the Syria conflict. </p>
<p>At the same time, while the Franco–Turkish minority in France is significant, there has been no reporting in French media to suggest that this group has polled any differently to the overwhelming majority of French voters on Sunday: namely, against Le Pen.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that in the run-up to the all-important French parliamentary elections in June, Macron will offer some conciliatory gestures towards Turkey. </p>
<p>The new president’s new and politically untested <em>En Marche!</em> movement faces an uphill climb in the National Assembly. He will be keen to do all he can to win support from France’s generally conservative, AKP- and Erdogan-supporting French–Turkish electorate, which, like the French–Muslim electorate more generally, is highly diverse but generally united in opposition to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/muslim-vote-sway-french-elections-170419151717924.html">Islamaphobia</a>.</p>
<p>The key issue now is how Macron’s victory will affect the broader EU–Turkey relationship, which is at a low point in the wake of Turkey’s April 16 constitutional referendum. German chancellor Angela Merkel has signalled a renewed Franco–German partnership in the wake of Macron’s win in support of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-germany-idUSKBN1830W5">an open, tolerant Europe</a> and this may portend a reset in relations with Turkey. </p>
<p>In the end, EU–Turkish relations seem hostage to broader forces – including the ambitions of Turkey’s truculent president and concern in Brussels over Turkey’s slide into authoritarianism and declining human rights record – that neither Macron nor Merkel are capable of meeting.</p>
<h2>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri - French civil society needs to be proactive</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron’s presidential victory does not necessarily imply a defeat of right-wing populist party such as the National Front. </p>
<p>Recent research shows that <a href="https://issuu.com/centreforeuropeanstudies/docs/kas-populism_-_final">right-wing populist parties in Europe have increasingly gained parliamentary seats since the 1970s,</a> and the latest elections in France confirm this steady growth. </p>
<p>Right-wing populism is premised on two narratives: economic grievances perpetuated by neo-liberal policies conducive to social insecurity, and cultural anxiety generated by a generational gap, rapid technological transformation, and open borders. </p>
<p>Macron projects himself as a liberal beacon, supporting the European project and free market. Despite his image as a political outsider, Macron’s economic position can be interpreted as a “flirt” with the “establishment” which has sought to consolidate its power through sustained economic disparity. Particularly for those identified as the “right”, Macron’s stance <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-macron-idUSKBN14Y0S8">towards the European Union and open borders</a> can be perceived as a source of threat to French identity and national security. </p>
<p>Accordingly, Macron’s electoral victory is unlikely to disrupt these populist narratives. If he would carry out policies as he campaigned, as “timorist centrist” <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c1bbec3c-25e6-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025">writes the Financial Times,</a> without addressing economic grievances and cultural anxiety France is experiencing, right-wing populist insurgency is potentially strengthened. </p>
<p>It will return to haunt French politics in years to come. To turn the tide, French civil society will have to be more proactive than before. It has to pressure Macron and his liberal followers to tap into causes underpinning the increased popularity of rightwing populism. Economic precariousness and fears of change should be discussed publicly. Any alternative to right-wing populism should offer a way out of neo-liberal trap, while assuring the French public of a safe passage through a cultural transformation.</p>
<h2>Balveer Arora - France Shining</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron’s convincing victory shines like a beacon of hope for liberals around the world struggling to reinvent social democracy while reeling under the onslaught of nationalist authoritarian regimes. </p>
<p>His achievement is outstanding, but even more than squarely defeating the extreme-right is the promise of a new élan to French democracy, tired after so many reverses and misfortunes of the last decade. </p>
<p>His youth gives hope too of a new leadership which will break with the ghosts of the past and provide direction to a new world order where Europe will assume a more proactive role.</p>
<p>A role all the more essential as the globalisation discourse derails towards isolationism in the Anglo-Saxon world and has therefore to be reinvented elsewhere to survive. </p>
<p>His decisive victory gives <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/macron-germany-france-relations-by-harold-james-2017-04">Macron the necessary authority to push for a new post-Brexit Europe, in concert with Germany</a>. A Europe more generous with its members struggling to make democracy work, and sterner with those who violate its basic foundation values. A Europe closer to its people, shunning the excesses of neoliberal hyper-globalisation to provide the lead for a new and more equitable world economic order. </p>
<p>Beyond the relief at the outcome of this historic contest is the prospect of competing logics: will the French electorate create a new majority for the president to implement his programme in the legislative elections ? Or will they vote to power an assembly which would act as a check on the many contested features of his agenda ?</p>
<p>The result may well be a combination of both, and in fractured times coalitions are often the only viable solution. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/03/frances-critical-election-happens-in-june-not-in-may/?utm_term=.e81278c8795b">What will be tested in June</a> is the founding logic of the Fifth Republic system, based on the postulate that political parties divide while presidents elected by universal suffrage unite and reassemble the people. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">In one of his first discourse, Emmanuel Macron has promised to make the extremes irrelevant and to unite all citizens whatever were their choices. May 7 2017.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Governing above the head of political parties was a Gaullist vision that may be difficult to recreate sixty years later. Political parties represent durable social realities and while the <a href="https://theconversation.com/2016-the-year-the-establishment-met-its-match-68777">current clutch of leaders has lost credibility</a> it would be difficult to ignore the social forces they represent.</p>
<p>Setting the fringes aside, there is a massive agenda of reconstruction that lies ahead for the party system. The significant number of abstention votes - <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/elections-presidentielle-legislatives-2017/2017/05/07/que-dit-l-abstention-de-cette-election_1567879">the highest number since 1969 for a second round of presidential elections</a>- and <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-blank-and-invalid-votes-change-the-result-of-the-french-election-77182">invalid and blank ones</a> is a measure of the alienation from the system. </p>
<p>The extreme right and far left may well be the biggest losers in this election despite the apparent increase in their vote share. Much will depend on how those who gravitated towards them from a sense of alienation and economic discontent are wooed back. Have they lost faith in democracy itself? There is nothing to indicate that they can’t be won back.</p>
<p>M. Macron has promised to govern in such a manner that he makes the extremes irrelevant. France may yet set the trend for a revival of the values it proudly proclaimed to the world after the fall of the Bastille.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balveer Arora is Chairman Centre for Multilevel Federalism at the Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association (APPRA).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donatella Della Porta, Luis Gómez Romero, and Simon P. Watmough do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Conversation Global asked scholars from around the world what they thought of Emmanuel Macron’s victory, and what means for their country.Donatella Della Porta, Dean, Institute of Human and Social sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence Balveer Arora, Emeritus professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityLuis Gómez Romero, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory, University of WollongongSimon P. Watmough, Postdoctoral research associate, European University InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/736292017-03-02T22:21:46Z2017-03-02T22:21:46ZRethinking nonviolent resistance in the face of right-wing populism<p>From Brexit to the Trump presidency and Marine le Pen’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/02/economist-explains-12?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2Fbl%2Fed%2Fhowmarinelepencouldwinthefrenchpresidency">campaign-trail successes</a> in France, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-03/rise-populism-europe">right-wing populism</a> is sweeping across the West. </p>
<p>Analysts and scholars have expressed concerns that this movement could threaten the fate of liberal democracy, and its hard-fought triumph over other contesting political ideologies since the end the Cold War. </p>
<p>In other words, the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/09/the-man-who-declared-the-end-of-history-fears-for-democracys-future/">End of History</a>”, as described by the American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama, may come to an end. </p>
<p>The rise of right-wing populism may also open a Pandora’s box for demagogues to promote a xenophobic agenda, as evident in Donald Trump’s controversial <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&referer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2Fr73Crj3OkO">travel ban</a>. </p>
<h2>Calls for civil resistance</h2>
<p>There is deep fear that populist leaders such as Donald Trump – advised by the right-wing ideologue <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/trump-and-bannon-pursue-a-vision-of-american-autocracy-a-1133313.html">Steve Bannon</a> – will eviscerate democratic checks and balances in the pursuit of <a href="https://medium.com/@yonatanzunger/trial-balloon-for-a-coup-e024990891d5">consolidated power</a>.</p>
<p>As a response, activists are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/01/worried-american-democracy-study-activist-techniques">calling for civil resistance</a> against authoritarianism, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/protests-continue-against-trumps-executive-order-banning-some-from-u-s-1485735672">street protests</a> are being staged to remind the enthroned populists of people power. </p>
<p>Safeguarding democracy through civil resistance is necesary. But it is important to acknowledge the fact that many of these leaders are democratically elected and supported by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37922587">large segments of society</a>. </p>
<p>We may choose to believe that voters for right-wing populist parties share chauvinistic and nationalistic opinions with their <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-inauguration-ushers-in-2017-the-year-of-the-strongman-70846">strongmen</a>. However, the popular appeal of these leaders has much to do with the socio-economic decline that some constituents in the West have experienced, and this needs to be addressed if we want to efficiently counter authoritarian regimes.</p>
<h2>Dignity deficit</h2>
<p>The increasing “<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-moment">oligarchisation</a>” of liberal democratic societies set a stage for a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/dignity-deficit">dignity deficit</a>, especially among white, non-urban and working-class population.</p>
<p>In recent decades, the middle class in the West found their lives unprecedentedly precarious due to increasing unemployment and a lack of social security. The post-Cold War era ushered into force <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/21/death-of-neoliberalism-crisis-in-western-politics">neoliberal dominance</a>. </p>
<p>The speed of economic globalisation means that manufacturing jobs have been lost to countries offering cheap labour, while austerity policies – resulting in cutback in social expenditure – imply that most of the time, individuals are left on their own to finance their increasingly expensive healthcare and education, to name a few necessities.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21700758-will-smarter-machines-cause-mass-unemployment-automation-and-anxiety">Automation</a> and immigrants looking for high- and low-skilled jobs in economically advanced countries have raised many questions about the future of employment for the American and European middle classes. These were left unanswered. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2017/02/global-inequality-populism-future-democracy/">well-off have reaped the benefit</a> of globalisation. So have the cosmopolitan urbanites who have caught up with changing socio-economic landscape.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, political elites in Washington, Paris and London are perceived as having ignored this crisis of surging inequality, as they continue neoliberal policies that hurt the working class – people who often consider themselves the backbone of their societies. </p>
<p>For instance, a series of free trade deals have been advocated by governments to be a brainchild of liberal democracy. However, rather than improving work conditions and life chances for <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/brexit-as-working-class-rebellion-against-neoliberalism-and-free-trade/5532860">common people</a>, many of these deals have strengthened global corporations, contributing to <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/05/economist-explains">greater inequality</a>. </p>
<p>A good example is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>, which potentially radicalises corporate deregulation, challenging states’ judicial sovereignty, and “<a href="http://www.salon.com/2014/01/13/chomsky_tpp_is_a_neoliberal_assault/">imposes fiercer standards of intellectual property</a>”. </p>
<p>Think tanks also point out that the signed and ratified TPP can result in <a href="http://cepr.net/publications/reports/net-effect-of-the-tpp-on-us-wages">job losses and declining wages</a>.</p>
<h2>Anti-establishment rhethoric</h2>
<p>Right-wing populism is a symptom of society polarised by economic injustice and the collapse of <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-challenge">liberal democracy</a>, which has enhanced the distance between political elites and their constituents. </p>
<p>Populist figures such as Trump and le Pen can mobilise popular support sufficiently to contest other liberal or centrist candidates because of their <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2050-5876.2015.00842.x/abstract">anti-establishment rhetoric</a>. </p>
<p>They acknowledge the injustice and humiliation inflicted on their constituents through the loss of jobs and neglect of the political class. </p>
<p>Often popular anger is being diverted toward immigrants, who are portrayed as a threat to economic and cultural security, resulting in the proliferation of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/europe/germany-attacks-on-migrants/">xenophobic attacks</a>. Scapegoating <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-asylum-seekers-europe-terrorism-terror-threat-brexit-immigration-migrants-a7132256.html">immigrants</a> becomes the expression of fear and vulnerability. </p>
<p>The increasingly precarious livelihood of this section of the population has led to a general perception that their idea of a great nation is in danger. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2017/01/ten-theses-fight-right-wing-populism/">Populist slogans</a> – such as “Make America Great Again” or “<a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/730834/US-election-Donald-Trump-Marine-Le-Pen-can-win-French-presidency">Take back our Country</a>” – respond to this perception and collective emotion attached to it. </p>
<p>Lacking other political alternatives, people find hope in right-wing populist discourse, even when the candidates push forward radical agendas. </p>
<p>In this sense, the social divide runs parallel to the crisis of liberal democracy. Tackling right-wing populism requires not only resistance against leaders with authoritarian traits but also comprehension of why a vast number of people view populism as a hopeful alternative to <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/11/opinions/populism-american-economy-marshall/">the existing system</a>. </p>
<h2>Addressing social bifurcation</h2>
<p>Resistance in the form of street demonstrations and boycotts remains an important tool for defending democracy. Nevertheless, it does little to address ongoing social bifurcation. </p>
<p>It is difficult to imagine that supporters of right wing-populism, who despise the so-called “political correctness” and see the liberal agenda as irrelevant to their livelihood, would participate in progressive demonstrations such as the <a href="https://www.womensmarch.com/">Women’s March</a>. </p>
<p>Does this mean that protests end up constituting an echo chamber where the progressive agenda circulates among those already convinced by the progressive ideas? Does it imply that while liberals resist Trump with various methods of nonviolent action, they have so far failed to understand the underpinning causes of populist trajectory, and have thereby missed the chance to communicate with those electing populist leaders? </p>
<p>Is it possible that protests can contribute to dividing society even more as protesters at times claim to hold higher moral ground than their populist opponents?</p>
<h2>Rethinking resistance</h2>
<p>It is high time to rethink how nonviolent resistance can help counter right-wing populism. </p>
<p>Nonviolent resistance is more than taking to the street. It is political activism in the sense that it offers analytic tools to understand <a href="https://books.google.co.in/books?id=XHPneXFzTeMC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=civil+resistance+pillar+of+support&source=bl&ots=z_b15T4bKN&sig=Ngxba5K05Jqs20meAdVSPxU_Oo4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjj9t-R_KfSAhWGuY8KHZRtAhwQ6AEIRzAI">pillars of support</a> of the ruling government, which normally include electoral constituents, bureaucratic bodies and the media. </p>
<p>Well crafted messages should convey to the general public the elites’ legitimacy deficit, and at the same time show the availability to political alternatives. </p>
<p>The messages amplified through persistent campaigns should be conducive to the eventual realignment of allies. Shifting alliances – especially the defection of electoral supporters of the government – wil allow activists to increase political momentum in the pursuit of social and political change. </p>
<p>The implication is that those committing to nonviolent resistance not only resist the powers that be – they also analyse how the ruling power’s discourses resonate with popular resentment, which in effect helps galvanise support to sustain its ruling legitimacy. </p>
<p>This understanding allows activists to design campaigns that show empathy to groups across political affiliations. </p>
<p>In the wake of right-wing populism, these campaigns need to address the structural underpinnings of a collapsing political establishment and offer a genuine platform for debating alternatives based on economic redistribution, reconfiguration of power relations between the political class and the people, and political reconciliation of groups with different aspirations.</p>
<p>Communicating with those you disagree with – instead of reinforcing an echo chamber – is the key to achieving all this.</p>
<h2>Communicating across the aisle</h2>
<p>The ideas laid out above are not completely novel. </p>
<p>Examples of communicating across the aisle appeared during US Civil Rights campaigns where African American leaders tried to appeal to “<a href="http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/minmov.html">white consciousness</a>”, extending their political messages to convince white priests and white constituents to endorse the course of the black struggle.</p>
<p>In ousting the Slobodan Milošević, the “Butcher of the Balkans”, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-milosevic.html">Serbia’s pro-democracy movements</a> launched campaigns in Milošević’s rural footholds, areas that had initially endorsed his ethno-nationalism. </p>
<p>Their success lived in the campaign’s association of “healthy patriotism” with the downfall of Milošević, and the creation of peaceful and democratic Serbia. The campaign message sought to unite Serbians whose political opinions were once split along the fault line of pro- or anti-Milošević.</p>
<p>Beyond overthrowing a dictator, a well-run campaign can bridge the perception gaps that divide a nation, reminding us of the importance of constructing the future together based on the idea of dignity, justice and inclusiveness.</p>
<p><em>This article is adapted from a blog originally published <a href="https://cafedissensusblog.com/2017/02/24/beyond-bringing-down-a-dictator-rethinking-nonviolent-resistance-in-the-wake-of-right-wing-populism/comment-page-1/">on Cafe Dissensus</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>She is the co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association (APPRA).</span></em></p>Calls for civil resistance against the rise of right-wing populism have emerged. But political activism is more than taking to the streets.Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/682822016-11-09T08:28:07Z2016-11-09T08:28:07ZDonald Trump wins US election: scholars from around the world react<p>Donald J Trump has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/election-day-2016-highlights/index.html">declared victory</a> in the US presidential election. The candidate took the stage in New York just before 3am local time to announce that his rival, Hillary Clinton, had called him to concede the race.</p>
<p>“The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer,” the president-elect told a packed room of supporters at the Hilton hotel.</p>
<p>“We will get along with all nations willing to get along with us,” he added. </p>
<p>What does this stunning turnaround mean for the rest of the world? The Conversation Global asked a panel of international scholars to reflect on Trump’s election and assess its significance for their region. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Salvador Vazquez del Mercado: Mexico will face hardships under Trump</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has won the election against all expectations – except for those of his supporters. The Brexit-like failure to predict his victory will surely haunt pollsters and hurt public confidence in polls for a long time. </p>
<p>The consequences of his victory will, of course, be much graver than the crisis of prediction. Even if Trump comes through with only a fraction of his campaign promises – which seems more likely now that both chambers of Congress will be controlled by Republicans – <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-markets-tell-us-president-trump-is-worse-than-brexit-68501">markets will react quite negatively</a>, the Mexico peso, which has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDMXN:CUR">already suffered a significant depreciation</a>, may fall further. And these are only the short-term consequences of Trump’s victory. </p>
<p>The wall along the US-Mexico border may well be <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/trump-wall-impractical-impolitic-impossible-459802?rm=eu">impossible to build</a> and the millions of undocumented immigrants in the US may not be immediately deported. And, hopefully Trump will not use the nuclear codes at all. But his victory still spells severe trouble ahead for Mexicans, and many other minorities living in the US, who were continually vilified during his campaign. </p>
<p>For Mexico, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/upshot/donald-trump-trashes-nafta-but-unwinding-it-would-come-at-a-huge-cost.html">the end of NAFTA</a> would lead to a severe restriction of trade with the US, which, added to an expected increase in interest rates south of the border and a reduction in the remittances sent by Mexicans up north, will quite probably lead to a severe economic crisis. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the relationship between Mexico and the United States will undergo a severe reconfiguration because, come January, Trump will probably take a very aggressive stance against the country. The future is uncharted and, in the short term, quite complicated. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: the end of the liberal democracy project?</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s rise to power may put an end to liberal democracy as propagated by the US and its western allies in the post-Cold War era. Thailand is a good place to contemplate the trajectory and consequences of the end of this project.</p>
<p>Having been dominated by military governments, Thailand underwent democratisation in the early 1990s. It joined other countries in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the “<a href="http://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf">third wave of democracy</a>”. This period saw the proliferation of civil society groups and institutionalisation of progressive ideas, particularly rights and justice. Unfortunately, elected governments faced allegations of corruption and inefficiency. And Bangkok’s middle class eventually lost patience, demanding a return to strong military rule.</p>
<p>Trump’s presidency potentially hints to authoritarian governments in Thailand and other societies that certain norms attached to liberal democracies can now be suspended. It’s likely that the coming Trump administration could be more silent than previous administrations about the crackdown on rights groups and dissidents in Thailand, and elsewhere. American pressure on the incumbent Thai junta to hold an election soon could also lessen.</p>
<p>In the age of anti-liberal democracy, fighting for retaining its norms will be harder in Thailand and elsewhere. If liberal democracy is no longer defensible and authoritarianism is not an option, progressive forces around the world need to gather pace and create a new political alternative that goes beyond this dead-end street.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Jonathan Rynhold: for Israel, less tension but less security</strong></p>
<p>Under Donald Trump, relations between US and Israel are likely to be smoother than under Obama. However, in an underlying sense Israel will be less secure.</p>
<p>There are three reasons for this: first, Trump’s erratic temperament, second his extensive <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/donald-trump-gop-israel/418737/">flip-flopping</a> on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/election-affect-middle-east-policy-161105125945727.html">Middle East policy</a>, and third, and most importantly, his isolationist instincts.</p>
<p>Although Trump has said contradictory things about Israeli-Palestinian relations, he is likely to pay less attention to the issue and thus allow Israel’s right-wing government greater leeway on issues of contention such as settlements. Paradoxically, this will encourage Obama to promote a UN Security Council resolution on the issue, the prospect of which very much concerns Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p>
<p>Israel benefits hugely from an internationalist America. When the US takes a step back, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">as it did under Obama</a>, the vacuum is filled by greater instability and hostile forces. Trump is more isolationist than Obama and he has openly questioned whether the US would stand behind its alliance commitments. This may embolden Israel’s enemies. Still, Israel can look after itself, and fears of American unreliability may push Egypt and Saudi Arabia to deepen their strategic co-operation with Israel. </p>
<p>Finally, Israel views Iran as the major strategic threat. Trump has said he would take a harder line on Iran, but in the interim his disengaged approach would allow Iran to increase its power, thereby multiplying the costs of confronting Iran in the future.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Rut Diamint: Trump doesn’t care about human rights</strong></p>
<p>Before Barack Obama’s election in 2008, largely due to the policies of George W Bush, some sectors of the American inteligentsia were suggesting that the US had abdicated world leadership. The Council on Foreign Relations specifically wrote on the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279">loss of American relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean</a>. </p>
<p>In truth, though, the US is and continues to be the single most determining nation for Latin America. Trump’s election will have particular impact in four areas.</p>
<p>First, the economy. Between January and August of 2016, the US-Mexico trade balance ran a deficit on the US side <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html">of US$ -41,568.1 million</a>. With Central and South America, on the other hand, the US shows a <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0009.html">positive trade balance</a> of US$20,199.0 million. Note that commercial exchange between Mexico and the US is four times that of the rest of the region. Trump’s promise to separate the two nations by building a wall, even if it never happens, will be profoundly damaging economically and politically.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean">High levels of violence</a>, organised crime and drug trafficking are top concerns for Latin America. Under Trump, Congress will continue to be influenced by the defence industry and invest heavily in a militarised drug war. And Trump has the <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/nra-endorse-donald-trump-president/story?id=39253893">support of the powerful NRA gun lobby</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has promised to undo recent advances in US policy toward Cuba, which under Obama had <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba">transitioned from isolation to diplomacy</a>. Where negotiation and economic bonds had begun to strengthen, he will reimpose the embargo and counterintelligence efforts. This will divide the region.</p>
<p>Finally, Trump’s <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration/?/positions/immigration-reform">proposed “task force”</a> to deport immigrants already in the US, block others from coming in and build a Mexico border wall (paid for by Mexico) is xenophobic, discriminatory and alienating. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Andrea Peto and Weronika Grzebalska: Trump a boost for illiberial regimes in Europe</strong></p>
<p>For Central Eastern Europe, Trump’s victory is a green light for the consolidation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights-66743">illiberal majoritarian regimes</a> which promise people a sense of existential security at the cost of individual freedoms, minority rights and checks and balances. </p>
<p>Trump’s election will definitely strengthen the neo-conservative, fundamentalist networks and shift the global political balance in the direction of familialism, nationalism and further away from human rights and an open society. Weak states such as Poland and Hungary in which democratic transition privileged free market measures over social and cultural ones are all the more vulnerable to the loss of a strong, democratic, pro-human rights voice. </p>
<p>Clinton’s defeat might also serve as a wake up call to the last of the hard-headed supporters of the neoliberal status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. Those who still believe illiberal turns in Poland and Hungary are just a local, provisional backlash, who think it is still possible to go back to the political solutions from the pre-illiberal era will have to rethink their position. </p>
<p>With the victory of Trump, human rights supporters are pushed into a doubly difficult situation. Not only do they have to protect the little provisions there are left and create a space of resistance but also at the same time reformulate their message. This message should be different from going back to the pre-Trump era, which has been the prison of technocratic, quasi-rational policy discourse for way too long. Instead it should revive great ideologies and offer an equally captivating political vision capable of re-enchanting voters.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Subarno Chattarji: Trump and India</strong></p>
<p>It is in some ways too early to think about the impact of a Donald Trump presidency on India-US relations. Some patterns between the 2014 elections in India and the current one in the US are, however, discernible.</p>
<p>Trump’s election represents the victory of a strong man – “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-rnc-speech-alone-fix-it/492557/">I alone can fix it</a>” – railing against media, political, and intellectual elites in whose favour the system is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-donald-trump-this-is-what-a-rigged-election-looks-like-67757">rigged</a>”. His victory is indicative of the insecurities and resentments of the majority and the desire to return to a purer, better, “original” America, which was largely white and where everyone knew their place.</p>
<p>While American isolationism, exceptionalism, and xenophobia are not new, they find unique expression in Trump. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was similarly elected on premises and promises of better days and the idea of a charismatic strong man leading the nation out of the morass of poverty, unemployment, secular politics, elites, minority appeasement etc.</p>
<p>Like Trump, the current political leadership in India is emblematic of an us-versus-them mentality, intolerant of dissent, critical thinking, or inconvenient institutions. Unsurprisingly, Trump has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-is-winning-over-many-american-hindus-67518">many fans in India and among Indian immigrants</a> in the US. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Richard Maher: the view from Europe</strong></p>
<p>In a stunning electoral upset, Donald Trump has defeated Hillary Clinton to become the 45th President of the United States. Virtually every <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/08/a-comprehensive-average-of-election-forecasts-points-to-a-decisive-clinton-victory/">pre-election forecast</a> suggested a comfortable or even decisive Clinton victory. Instead, Trump – a man that many European leaders and citizens view as <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-leaders-would-see-a-donald-trump-victory-as-total-calamity-67619">manifestly unqualified</a> and unprepared for the position – will become president of the world’s sole superpower in January.</p>
<p>Trump’s victory is almost certainly being met across European capitals this morning with alarm, shock, and dread. Trump has called the NATO alliance “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0f397616-f9b8-11e5-8e04-8600cef2ca75">obsolete</a>”, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37303057">spoken admiringly</a> of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and said the British vote in June 2016 to exit the European Union was “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-36606184">a great thing</a>”.</p>
<p>Unlike in the United States, the European public was solidly against the idea of a Trump presidency. In a poll published by the Economist on November 8 showing how other countries would vote in the US election, huge majorities <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/11/daily-chart-4">favoured Clinton</a>. According to a <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/29/2-obamas-international-image-remains-strong-in-europe-and-asia/">Pew Research survey</a> published in June, overwhelming majorities of Europeans polled said they had “no confidence” that Trump “would do the right thing regarding world affairs”.</p>
<p>Now European leaders must anticipate how a Trump administration will affect transatlantic relations and the many common challenges the United States and Europe face, from an increasingly assertive Russia, a relentless migration crisis that threatens to tear Europe apart, and Britain’s future in the EU.</p>
<p>More broadly, Trump’s election questions the future of US global leadership. Since the end of World War II, the United States, along with key European partners, built and then sustained an open, rules-based international order defined by free trade, military alliances, and international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. With Trump’s victory, the very future of this liberal international order is in peril.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>William Case: what Trump’s victory means for Southeast Asia</strong> </p>
<p>With so many countries in the region already leaning toward China, does Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency matter for Southeast Asia? It does, at least a little. </p>
<p>To see understand how, imagine what the impact would have been if Hillary Clinton had won. She maintained a strong interest in trade, even if forced by voters during the election campaign to backtrack on the Trans Pacific Partnership. She vigorously denounced China’s takeover of the South China Sea, even as claimants in Southeast Asia have begun to cave in. And she might have retained some of the good will in Indonesia — and in Myanmar — that Barack Obama was able to generate. So Clinton might have slowed, though not reversed, China’s suffocating embrace of Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>After all, Southeast Asia is not a topmost concern for the US. But for China, it is. And China offers leaders in the region irresistible inducements, namely, near bottomless investment and lending for high speed railways, ports, and energy grids. To be sure, as the bills come due and exclusive economic zones are lost, citizens may rue the terms into which their leaders have entered. But by then, Hillary Clinton’s presidency would have passed.</p>
<p>By contrast, with Donald Trump in the White House, Southeast Asia’s entry into China’s orbit will quicken. Indeed, his repudiation of trading relations and security commitments seems to leave countries in the region with no alternative. And his anti-Muslim vitriol will add steam, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. </p>
<p>Trump’s presidency, then, will accelerate Southeast Asia’s progress along China’s new Silk Road. But interestingly, by doing so, the costs for Southeast Asia may grow apparent much sooner. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Jay Batongbacal: issues in the South China Sea will go on the back-burner</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump taking the reins of the US presidency could mark the sunset on Pax Americana in the Asia Pacific, and clear away any remaining resistance to China’s rise to regional preeminence. </p>
<p>A relatively isolationist and localised focus on the part of his administration as he attempts to fulfil his electoral promises would likely leave issues such as the South China Sea on the back-burner. ASEAN hedging patterns will cause member states to gravitate towards China even more. </p>
<p>The US rebalancing in Asia under President Barack Obama, and the country’s alliance commitments in the region could also be severely undermined given Trump’s lack of appreciation for the role played by America’s security relationships in US global political and economic leadership. The only hindrance to this lies in the fact that US geostrategic policy for the Asia-Pacific has been a largely bipartisan matter in the US Congress.</p>
<p>But Trump’s tenuous links to the Republican Party, lack of real leadership thereof, and non-attachment to Republican ideals, puts into question the responsiveness and effectiveness of that policy in the face of more solid and coordinated leadership within regional powers such as China and Russia, which will have an unparalleled opportunity to fill in any voids the US may leave. </p>
<p>For the Philippines and its President Rodrigo Duterte, this is a fortunate coincidence as it accommodates his oft-stated aversion to US influence and commentary on his domestic policy, and distrust of the US.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Miguel Angel Latouche: the triumph of anti-politics</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has proved something that we Venezuelans have known since the 1998 election that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9812/06/venezuela.results/index.html">catapulted Hugo Chávez to the presidency</a> of our country: when people perceive problems and feel politicians don’t represent society’s broad interests; when the demands of certain sectors are not satisfied, leading to a sense of exclusion; when people want change – then a “strong man” figure becomes really electorally attractive. </p>
<p>With Trump, we saw an aggressive campaign by a man who said what he thought without ever thinking it over much, who called things as he saw them and who proposed simple solutions to complex problems (whether they’re feasible responses or not). For the first time in a long time, the US has a president who genuinely does not belong to Washington, nor to the party logic of his country. It’s a triumph of anti-politics.</p>
<p>Beyond Trump’s business endeavours, television experience and some of his scandals, we know little about the new US president. Who is Donald Trump, really? What are his political ideas and proposals? </p>
<p>It’s interesting to observe, for example, the profound contradiction between the aggressive tone of his campaign and the conciliatory style he adopted for his <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/09/trump-declares-victory-thanks-clinton-for-hard-fought-battle.html">3 am acceptance speech</a>. But one can’t act against one’s own nature, and fundamentally Trump has shown himself to be a charismatic populist.</p>
<p>For Latin America, he’s promised to harden relations with Cuba and Venezuela, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37243269">build a wall</a> along the Mexico border, and <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/11/9/13572030/donald-trump-immigration">tighten immigrant policies</a>. We’re looking at a strong presidency here, perhaps too strong, with <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/500711970/republicans-keep-control-of-the-senate-as-democrats-largely-falter">Congress on his side</a>, and a leader who has espoused conservative positions but is also changeable when it comes to tough topics. This makes him hard to predict and susceptible to shifting with public opinion. </p>
<p>It’s quite possible that Trump will return the US to a modified version of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097396">Cold War power politics</a>. Only time will tell if Trump is leading us to a more orderly and secure world or on a march toward insanity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Batongbacal holds a Fulbright Visiting Fellowship.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Peto, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Jonathan Rynhold, Miguel Angel Latouche, Richard Maher, Rut Diamint, Subarno Chattarji, Weronika Grzebalska, and William Case do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald J Trump has emerged victorious in the historic, and historically acerbic, 2016 American presidential election. What does this outcome mean for the world?William Case, Professor of Comparative Politics, City University of Hong KongAndrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityJanjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityJay Batongbacal, Associate Professor of Law, University of the PhilippinesJonathan Rynhold, Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan UniversityMiguel Angel Latouche, Associate professor, Universidad Central de VenezuelaRichard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteRut Diamint, Profesora, Torcuato di Tella UniversitySalvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Subarno Chattarji, Associate Professor, University of DelhiWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/660962016-09-29T06:35:22Z2016-09-29T06:35:22ZDuterte’s war on drugs: bitter lessons from Thailand’s failed campaign<p>The body count from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” is growing by the day. While he’s not the first national leader to condone violence and extrajudicial killings in the name of controlling illicit drug use, Duterte would be wise to learn from Southeast Asian history on what works, and what doesn’t.</p>
<p>Duterte’s policy has already resulted in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-16/duterte-drug-war-overkill-creating-crisis-in-philippines/7850424">more than 3,000 casualties</a>, leading to broad international condemnation. </p>
<p>The deaths have resulted in either police operations where suspects have resisted arrest or summary executions by unknown perpetrators. Drug pushers and users are voluntarily surrendering to the police in <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/14/16/60000-drug-users-pushers-have-surrendered-palace">huge numbers</a>, exacting a toll in the country’s already <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/21/asia/philippines-overcrowded-jail-quezon-city/">overcrowded jail system</a>. Nor are there enough <a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/07/26/drug-rehab-program.html">drug rehabilitation centres</a> to absorb many of them.</p>
<p>Other countries have adopted similar policies in the past - only to see them <a href="http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/war-on-drugs/">fail</a>. </p>
<p>Colombia’s drug war resulted in the deaths of powerful members of drug cartels, for instance, but also in skyrocketing levels of violence, marginalisation, and human rights violations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Duterte wants to keep on his ‘bloody war’ against the drug dealers and takers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jorge Silva/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Thailand’s drug war</h2>
<p>The most salutary tale for Duterte comes from Thailand. The drug war waged in the early 2000s by former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra could hold important lessons for the Filipino government about the unforeseen political consequences of condoning violence in the name of controlling crime.</p>
<p>Launched in 2003, Thaksin’s war on drugs bears significant similarities to what’s happening in the Philippines. Like Duterte, Shinawatra was very popular, managing to lead a one-party administration in a country used to government by coalition. This strong electoral mandate allowed him to take on his country’s gargantuan and systemic drug problem.</p>
<p>As one of the world’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/WindleThailand-final.pdf">major transit points</a> for narcotics, drug-use had been common in Thailand since the 1950s. But in the 1990s, the use of methamphetamines (known in Thai as <a href="http://www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/drugs/yaba.asp"><em>ya ba</em></a>) started to cause concern among Thai political elites. </p>
<p>Most methamphetamines were produced on the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/world/asia/07thai.html?_r=0">Thailand-Myanmar border</a> by ethnic Burmese rebels, who used sales to finance their armed struggle. But the drug was largely consumed by the rural working class Thais, due to its affordable price.</p>
<p>When the media began reporting rising methamphetamine use among young people, <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thai-drug-war.htm">key political figures</a>, particularly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm">King Bhumibol Adulyadej</a> and his privy council, expressed grave concern. </p>
<p>A former police lieutenant colonel himself, Thaksin declared an all-out war against <em>ya ba</em>. Drug dealers were labelled enemies of the state, and after <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7260127.stm">three months and 2,500 deaths</a>, the prime minister proclaimed victory.</p>
<p>Thailand’s war on drugs was carried out through collaboration between local governors and police officers. Government officials compiled “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2008/02/07/thaila17993.htm">blacklists</a>” which led to arrests and, in many cases, extrajudicial killings. As the bodies piled up, the police claimed that most deaths resulted from rival drug cartels killing each other to avoid betrayal by their <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/21/thailand.drugs/">accomplices</a>.</p>
<p>The pressure on the police to measure their success was paramount, and it was defined by the body count. This metric reinforced the existing hierarchy, already prone to abuse, corruption and even complicity in the drug trade. </p>
<p>Police targets normally consisted of the “small fish” within the drug network (low-level dealers, for instance, and hill tribe villagers). Rarely did the lists contain drug lords themselves but every death in the war counted as a step toward success. </p>
<p>According to an <a href="http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeMost-of-those-killed-in-war-on-drug-not-involved-i-30057578.html">official investigation</a> launched after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/19/thailand">the 2006 military coup</a> that wrenched power from Thaksin, 1,400 people out of the 2,500 killed as part of the war on drugs had nothing to do with drugs. And profitable drug routes from Myanmar reportedly remained intact, protected by the Myanmar and Thai government bureaucracy and business <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/drug-trafficking-meth-cocaine-heroin-global-drug-smuggling">elites</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the violent and bloody crackdown, the Thai population <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/05/thai-m09.html">largely endorsed Thaksin’s war</a>. Prior to his downfall in 2006, the prime minister was admired by both his supporters and critics for his business-oriented efficiency, policy decisiveness and resilience in the face of harsh criticism. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thailand’s former premier Thaksin Shinawatra launched a failed campaign against drugs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yuriko Nakao/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The former prime minister successfully controlled the discourse of the war, even in the face of reports of human rights violations. He claimed the drug war was necessary, and that Thais should turn a blind eye to the inevitable “collateral damage” of his campaign. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm#_ftnref8">Public opinion</a> supported the campaign; some surveys showed support of 97.4%. </p>
<h2>Lessons for Duterte</h2>
<p>Thailand’s experience shows that the real culprits at the top of the drug pyramid often escape extralegal approaches to eradicating drug problems with impunity. After thousands of deaths, Colombia and Mexico discovered the same truth decades ago. </p>
<p>Networks of illegal drug supply go beyond any one country’s sovereign borders. The Philippines is a producer, a transit point, and a consumer of <a href="http://www.pctc.gov.ph/illicit-drug-trafficking.html">narcotics</a>. Each role requires specific policies that involve the entire state apparatus, as well as civil society. </p>
<p>The drug trade is a transnational threat; this means neighbouring states have to work together to fight. In this sense, Duterte’s plea for <a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/06/1620914/duterte-laos-seeks-asean-unity-vs-terror-drugs">regional cooperation</a> on illegal drugs is a step in the right direction and should be supported by other ASEAN countries.</p>
<h2>Drugs and democracy</h2>
<p>Political leaders who want to wage wars against illegal drugs also open the possibility of power abuse from the security sector. In places with rampant corruption, lack of police professionalism, a culture of impunity, and links between drug lords and political elites, governments are susceptible to declare “regimes of exception” where security forces are given extra-legal powers in order to succeed in their mission. </p>
<p>Duterte has already hinted at <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/146824-duterte-revive-philippine-constabulary">militarising the police</a> to combat illegal drugs, a move that will erode the gains made from security sector reform and democratisation in the Philippines after 1986.</p>
<p>Duterte still has the chance to turn away from his current approach and form a more sensible policy that uses less force, involves the participation of local communities, and looks at the issue of illicit drugs in all its dimensions. </p>
<p>Illicit drug use is a health issue that requires targeted, non-criminal, interventions starting with the individual. It’s also a systemic problem that requires sociopolitical measures that address poverty, corruption and social exclusion. </p>
<p>Unlike Thaksin, Duterte can pivot away from his current approach toward a more comprehensive anti-drug framework. Thaksin’s drug war dealt a double whammy to Thailand’s democracy – the scorched earth policy not only undermined state accountability, but it was also used as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2008/09/2008935491945127.html">ammunition</a> by the elite opposition in the military coup that toppled him in 2006.</p>
<p>Critics of Duterte should not merely provide strong condemnation. Instead, they should understand the underlying political context of human rights in the Philippines and constructively argue for policy to turn away from lethal strategies. Stubborn opposition with the goal of <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/817072/duterte-ouster-plots-wont-be-taken-lightly-palace">destabilising</a> a popular government will be met with an equally bitter reaction from the state. </p>
<p>The Philippines can avoid being dragged into a downward spiral of political polarisation, something Thailand is currently experiencing. If not, then the Philippines might also end up with a tragic democracy just like its neighbour to the west.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aries Arugay is also Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. a Manila-based policy think tank.</span></em></p>Can Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte learn anything from Thailand’s failed campaign against drugs in the early 2000s? Maybe to adopt a less bloody and more comprehensive approach.Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityAries Arugay, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of the PhilippinesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.