tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/universidad-de-los-andes-2757/articlesUniversidad de los Andes 2023-11-17T13:19:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178472023-11-17T13:19:07Z2023-11-17T13:19:07ZBlack November: remembering Uganda’s massacre of the opposition three years on<p>November marks a sombre anniversary in Uganda’s recent political history. In 2020, the east African country’s leading opposition politician, Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine, was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">arrested</a>. He was on the campaign trail ahead of the 2021 presidential elections. </p>
<p>Mass demonstrations demanding the release of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">popular musician-turned-presidential-candidate</a> broke out in and around the capital, Kampala. Over two days, security agents of the regime of Yoweri Museveni – in power since 1986 – cracked down on the protests. </p>
<p>They fired <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-57286419">live ammunition</a> into crowds of protesters, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/18/one-year-later-no-justice-victims-ugandas-lethal-clampdown">killing at least 54 people</a> and injuring many more. The regime <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/elections/bobi-wine-s-lonely-walk-to-election-day-3251966">arrested</a> over <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/govt-lists-1-300-missing-people-3364558">a thousand</a> people. <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/3-years-on-still-no-closure-for-nov-protests-victims-families-4430210">Hundreds more</a> have since been reported <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/05/mass-abductions-in-uganda-what-we-know-and-dont-know/">disappeared</a>.</p>
<p>Three years on, the effects of the massacre loom large over Uganda’s contemporary politics. </p>
<p>The Ugandan Human Rights Commission recently announced it was <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/uhrc-fails-to-trace-18-missing-nup-supporters-4397058">closing the files</a> of 18 opposition supporters who remain missing. This has renewed demands for justice and government accountability in connection with the 2020 killings.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2023.2245729">research</a>, I have charted Kyagulanyi’s <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/05/our-liberation-is-a-matter-of-now-an-interview-with-bobi-wine/">unlikely political rise</a> from his landslide victory as an independent candidate in a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/bobi-wine-wins-kyadondo-east-by-election-1708132">2017 parliamentary by-election</a> to his 2021 run for the presidency against Museveni. </p>
<p>Kyagulanyi and his supporters have been subject to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/05/africa/bobi-wine-airport-arrest-intl/index.html">arrest</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/08/no-justice-victims-forced-disappearances-uganda">abduction</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/uganda-hundreds-disappeared-tortured">unlawful detention</a>. They have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/3/bobi-wine-recounts-torture-by-ugandan-soldiers">tortured</a> and some have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">killed</a>.</p>
<p>Given this history, it’s not surprising that the Kyagulanyi-led opposition party, the National Unity Platform, has been at the centre of calls for justice. </p>
<p>Over the last month, the party has spearheaded a boycott of parliament in protest of the Museveni regime’s worsening human rights violations. The opposition has demanded that the state take <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-storm-out-of-parliament-for-third-time-4407578">full accountability</a> for the November 2020 killings and inform Ugandans of the whereabouts of those who remain missing.</p>
<p>With just a little over two years to the next presidential election in 2026, I trace the fallout from the November 2020 massacre to highlight its implications for both the Museveni regime and the Kyagulanyi-led opposition. </p>
<h2>Calls for accountability</h2>
<p>The initial impetus for a parliamentary boycott came on Uganda’s independence day on 9 October 2023. This followed security officers <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/opposition-to-boycott-plenary-sittings-over-security-raid-of-nup-offices/">storming</a> the National Unity Platform’s headquarters. They broke up a prayer meeting of party leaders and families whose loved ones have either died or been disappeared. In the raid, <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/police-release-14-nup-members-arrested-on-ind-NV_172254">14 people</a> were arrested.</p>
<p>In addition to the boycott, the National Unity Platform has released a list of <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/3-years-on-still-no-closure-for-nov-protests-victims-families-4430210">20 Ugandans</a> who have been disappeared, 19 of them since the November 2020 protests. The party routinely posts briefs of the missing on its social media platforms in commemoration of what it calls “<a href="https://twitter.com/NUP_Ug/status/1724043617709298076?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet">Black November</a>”. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime hasn’t budged. However, this pressure has led to some action. According to the leader of the opposition in parliament, Mathias Mpuuga, the human rights commission has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-sticks-to-parliament-boycott-as-balaalo-issue-festers-4426386">started to re-contact</a> the families of the missing to get statements.</p>
<h2>International repercussions</h2>
<p>The 2020 killings and subsequent arrests and disappearances have had recent international repercussions. At the end of October 2023, for example, US president Joe Biden announced his intention to end Uganda’s participation in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-end-participation-gabon-niger-uganda-central-african-republic-trade-program-2023-10-30/">African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa)</a> trade programme. Agoa gives exports from qualifying African countries duty-free access to the US market. </p>
<p>In justifying this decision, the White House pointed to the Museveni regime’s “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/letters-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-intent-to-terminate-the-designation-of-the-central-african-republic-the-gabonese-republic-niger-and-the-republic-of-uganda-as-bene/">gross violations of internationally recognised human rights</a>”.</p>
<p>This official censure was additionally inspired by Uganda’s recently passed <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/sites/default/files/The%20Anti-Homosexuality%20Act%2C%202023.pdf">anti-homosexuality law</a>. The White House branded it in May 2023 “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/29/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-enactment-of-ugandas-anti-homosexuality-act/">a tragic violation of universal human rights</a>”. </p>
<p>There had also been <a href="https://twitter.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/1342277259374321664?s=20">earlier warnings</a> from the US Bureau of African Affairs amid rising levels of state repression during the 2021 election campaign. The bureau said </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there will be consequences for those who are continuing to undermine democracy (in Uganda).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Museveni is considered one of the United States’ <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/01/museveni-and-the-west-relationship-status-its-complicated/">closest and most reliable military allies</a> in Africa. He has been a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24522050">donor darling</a>” of the west for decades. In a New York Times op-ed in 2020, Kyagulanyi labelled Museveni “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">America’s Favorite African Strongman</a>”. </p>
<p>Indeed, despite the Museveni regime’s worsening human rights record, the US has provided Uganda with <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-uganda/">hundreds of millions of dollars</a> in development and military aid. This has helped fund the Museveni state’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-america-has-funded-updf-4371002">robust militarisation</a>.</p>
<p>Time will tell if the Biden administration’s Agoa decision is anything more than a slap on the wrist. There are <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/06/29/uganda-lgbtq-law-us-military-aid/#:%7E:text=The%20Defense%20Department%20has%20spent,be%20doled%20out%20this%20year.">certainly reasons to be sceptical</a> that it is. But given that Uganda currently trades approximately <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/us-to-remove-uganda-from-agoa-trade-deal-4419004">US$200 million</a> in exported goods to the US annually, the decision will have real economic impact.</p>
<h2>The Museveni succession</h2>
<p>So where does all this leave Kyagulanyi’s party, with just over two years until the country’s next presidential election? </p>
<p>Political rumours about a possible <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/uganda-president-museveni-kainerugaba-succession-crisis-political-dynasty/">Museveni succession</a> are rife. Some suggest that <a href="https://theconversation.com/musevenis-first-son-muhoozi-clear-signals-of-a-succession-plan-in-uganda-181863">his son</a> is being groomed to be his political heir. </p>
<p>Despite the Ugandan president <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/museveni-must-be-older-than-75-years-1916126">“officially” turning 80 next year</a>, opposing him presents the opposition with familiar obstacles.</p>
<p>First, they must contend with unceasing state repression. In September 2023, for instance, Kyagulanyi was received warmly <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/bobi-wine-in-rallies-to-activate-support-4355788">by massive crowds</a> during his tour of Uganda to drum up grassroots support. This campaign, however, was cut short by the government, which accused him of using the rallies to “<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-police-ban-bobi-wine-mobilisation-activities-4368488">incite violence (and) promote sectarianism</a>”.</p>
<p>Second, since securing a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-declared-winner-of-presidential-election">sixth consecutive victory</a> in elections in 2021, Museveni’s government has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-appoints-mao-justice-minister-3887380">co-opted, infiltrated and divided</a> the country’s fragmented opposition. </p>
<p>The country’s second-largest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, for instance, has been mired in <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/10/autumn-of-an-african-patriarch/">a political scandal</a>. It’s been alleged that some of its top leadership accepted campaign funds from Museveni to foil a possible electoral alliance with the National Unity Platform in 2021. Kyagulanyi recently conceded that his party isn’t “<a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/politics/nup-is-not-safe-from-museveni-says-kyagulanyi-NV_168302">really safe from Museveni’s infiltration</a>”.</p>
<p>Finally, Museveni’s grip over Uganda’s military <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ugandan-state-outsources-the-use-of-violence-to-stay-in-power-180447">remains strong</a>. This means that any transfer of power through electoral means from Museveni to a Kyagulanyi-led opposition seems unlikely – regardless of how Ugandans actually vote in 2026. Indeed, Kyagulanyi has <a href="https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/the-museveni-succession?r=1xc3o9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web">little connection</a> to Uganda’s powerful military establishment.</p>
<p>All this suggests that as Ugandans memorialise a tragic part of their recent past, their post-Museveni political future remains deeply uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>State security agents violently quashed protests following the 2020 arrest of musician-turned-politician Bobi Wine.Luke Melchiorre, Associate Professor, Political Science and Global Studies, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1574762021-04-07T17:04:55Z2021-04-07T17:04:55ZComment la Colombie utilise la xénophobie comme bouclier politique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391506/original/file-20210324-21-8p9xd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C4%2C3106%2C2069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">La mairesse de Bogotá, Claudia López, que l'on voit ici lors de sa cérémonie d'investiture le 1er janvier 2020, a alimenté les discours haineux envers les migrants vénézuéliens par ses déclarations récentes. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo AP/Ivan Valencia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>En Colombie, la xénophobie contre les ressortissants du Venezuela a atteint des proportions sans précédent dans les dernières semaines. Le 10 mars, <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/policia-muerto-en-bogota-revelan-video-del-asesinato-de-edwin-caro-572692">un policier a été assassiné dans la capitale du pays</a>, Bogotá. Mais ce que la presse ainsi que les politiciens et politiciennes en ont retenu, c’est la nationalité de celui qui a commis le crime : un Vénézuélien. </p>
<p>Les propos de la mairesse de Bogotá, Claudia López, n’ont pas manqué de susciter de vives critiques. Elle a affirmé qu’une <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/claudia-lopez-habla-sobre-delincuencia-venezolana-en-homenaje-a-patrullero-572606">« minorité de Vénézuéliens, violents, sont un facteur d’insécurité »</a>. Conséquemment, et en dépit <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/claudia-lopez-se-disculpa-por-senalamientos-a-migrantes-venezolanos-574638">du fait qu’elle ait exprimé des excuses postérieures</a>, elle a légitimé et alimenté les discours haineux déjà forts présents dans la société colombienne.</p>
<p>En Colombie comme ailleurs, l’utilisation des minorités comme bouclier politique afin de contrer les perceptions citoyennes sur la détérioration de l’efficacité gouvernementale est monnaie courante. La situation migratoire entre le Venezuela et la Colombie a servi la rhétorique populiste de la classe dirigeante colombienne, qui tente d’associer l’insécurité à la migration vénézuélienne, tandis que le pays continue de faire face à un <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2021/01/15/an-intersectional-approach-to-colombian-transitional-justice-and-covid-19/">conflit armé interne, des déplacements forcés de population et des assassinats systématiques d’activistes des droits de la personne</a>.</p>
<p>Une fois de plus, la mairesse de Bogotá emploie un discours dangereux contre les personnes vénézuéliennes afin de masquer l’incapacité institutionnelle à résoudre les problèmes de sécurité dans la capitale colombienne.</p>
<p>Nos recherches portent sur les enjeux politiques entourant à la fois la situation du conflit armé colombien et la situation migratoire des populations vénézuéliennes, plus particulièrement depuis l’augmentation des mouvements de population depuis 2016. La complexité des manifestations de la violence et l’instrumentalisation politique de la crise migratoire nous amènent à faire une réflexion critique sur la montée des discours xénophobes en Colombie.</p>
<h2>La rhétorique de l’insécurité</h2>
<p>L’histoire commune forte et les migrations massives de part et d’autre entre le Venezuela et la Colombie n’ont pas empêché l’émergence des discours associant la migration à la menace « communiste » (castro-chavisme) et à l’équation directe faite entre migration et insécurité.</p>
<p>La population vénézuélienne en Colombie représente 3,6 % de la population totale. Cependant, en décembre 2020, les <a href="https://colombiacheck.com/chequeos/venezolanos-no-son-responsables-del-aumento-del-crimen-en-colombia">données du bureau du procureur général (fiscalía) montrent qu’un dossier judiciaire avait été ouvert pour seulement 0,4 % des personnes vénézuéliennes</a>, principalement pour des crimes reliés au trafic de drogue, au vol et, dans une moindre mesure, à des homicides. En termes absolus, cela signifie que plus de 96 % des crimes sont commis par des personnes de nationalité colombienne.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391265/original/file-20210323-22-1nj8fu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">La population vénézuélienne est aujourd’hui disséminée dans plus de 90 pays dans le monde. 80 % des Vénézuéliens qui ont quitté leur pays se trouvent en Amérique latine, dont plus de 1,7 million en Colombie. Cela représente 3.6 % de la population.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luis Robayo/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bogotá ne fait pas exception. Entre 2018 et 2020, les personnes vénézuéliennes arrêtées pour un crime ne représentaient que <a href="https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/03/12/11800-migrantes-venezolanos-fueron-capturados-entre-2018-y-2020-delinquiendo-en-bogota/">3,46 % du total</a>, et cela ne signifie pas qu’elles étaient coupables. La participation de personnes du Venezuela dans les structures criminelles et la formation de groupes binationaux est indéniable. Cependant, les chiffres ne soutiennent aucunement les affirmations de la mairesse de Bogotá. Il convient donc de réfléchir sur les vraies causes, profondes et structurelles, de l’insécurité à Bogotá et en Colombie.</p>
<p>En réalité, l’insécurité touche également les personnes migrantes du Venezuela. Des études montrent que le <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27620/w27620.pdf">nombre de victimes de crimes violents d’origine vénézuélienne a augmenté</a>.</p>
<p>Les preuves empiriques et les avertissements du procureur général de la République montrent le double risque vécu par les personnes migrantes et réfugiées en tant que <a href="https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/iemp/media/file/ejecucion/Recomendaciones%20poblacio%CC%81n%20vulnerable%20y%20COVID-19%20IEMP.pdf">population vulnérable et victimes de violences</a>, en particulier les femmes, les enfants et les adolescent-es.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-en-colombie-recrudescence-des-violences-et-des-inegalites-135651">Covid-19 en Colombie : recrudescence des violences et des inégalités</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>À cela s’ajoute les graves <a href="https://oig.cepal.org/sites/default/files/mujeres_y_hombres_brechas_de_genero.pdf">inégalités de genre en Colombie</a> qui affectent considérablement les femmes et les jeunes filles du pays. <a href="https://www.profamilia.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Desigualdades-en-salud-de-la-poblacion-migrante-y-refugiada-venezolana-en-Colombia-Como-manejar-la-respuesta-local-dentro-de-la-emergencia-humanitaria.pdf">Un récent rapport</a> a montré que les femmes et jeunes filles en situation de migration étaient exposées à de nombreuses insécurités, notamment l’exploitation sexuelle, la traite de personne et plusieurs violations à leurs droits sexuels et reproductifs.</p>
<p>L’arrivée massive de personnes migrantes du Venezuela opère donc dans un contexte complexe de mobilité humaine forcée en Colombie. En effet, plus de <a href="https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394">9 millions de personnes</a> sont victimes du conflit armé et, jusqu’à la fin de 2019, la <a href="https://news.un.org/es/story/2020/06/1476202">Colombie est restée le pays au monde avec le plus grand nombre de personnes déplacées</a> à l’intérieur du pays.</p>
<p>Par conséquent, même si la migration apporte son lot d’enjeux sociopolitiques, affirmer que les personnes migrantes sont un facteur déterminant des <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/migration-crime-latam-eng-final.pdf">niveaux de criminalité dans les villes colombiennes</a> ne tient pas la route. Les conséquences économiques de la <a href="https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/iemp/media/file/ejecucion/Recomendaciones%20poblacio%CC%81n%20vulnerable%20y%20COVID-19%20IEMP.pdf">pandémie, les multiples formes de violence armée et les hauts taux de précarité et d’inégalités sociales</a> constituent plutôt les véritables éléments qui favorisent l’insécurité. Par contre, politiquement, ce n’est pas commode pour la classe dirigeante de le reconnaître.</p>
<h2>Le renforcement des imaginaires xénophobes</h2>
<p>Même sans chiffres pour étayer ses affirmations, Claudia López renforce la construction d’imaginaires sociaux qui alimentent l’aporophobie – ou l’hostilité envers la pauvreté – et la xénophobie à travers un discours systématiquement discriminatoire et profondément populiste. </p>
<p>Cette stratégie lui permet de regagner la sympathie des citoyens et citoyennes qui subissent quotidiennement les assauts de sa politique sécuritaire infructueuse. C’est le cas de ses déclarations du 11 mars 2021, <a href="http://barometrodexenofobia.org/2021/03/11/comunicado-barometro-de-xenofobia-declaraciones-alcaldes/">qui ont augmenté de plus de 500 % les discours de haine envers les personnes provenant du Venezuela</a> dans les conversations numériques en Colombie.</p>
<p>Comment ces stratégies opèrent-elles pour détourner l’attention de la population colombienne de l’inefficacité gouvernementale ?</p>
<p>En effet, tout cela survient à un moment crucial de l’évolution de la politique migratoire en Colombie, en raison de la mise en œuvre prochaine du <a href="https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/presidente-duque-firmo-el-estatuto-de-proteccion-temporal-a-migrantes-venezolanos-3132859">Statut de protection temporaire des migrants vénézuéliens (ETPMV)</a> décrété le 1<sup>er</sup> mars dernier par le président Iván Duque.</p>
<p>Cette politique migratoire reconnaît la volonté des personnes migrantes du Venezuela de rester au pays et leur permet d’accéder à des mesures de protection, sous la condition qu’elles remplissent les exigences établies pour bénéficier d’un permis de protection temporaire. L’ETPMV devrait entraîner un changement substantiel dans l’égalisation des chances d’intégration socio-économique et d’accès aux droits fondamentaux pour la population vénézuélienne. En effet, la politique migratoire reconnaît la nécessité de régulariser le statut politique de cette population afin d’atténuer les vulnérabilités découlant de la migration qualifiée « d’irrégulière ».</p>
<p>Malheureusement, Claudia López a profité de l’occasion pour préciser sa position sur l’ETPMV, qu’elle critique comme des mesures qui « privilégient » uniquement les personnes vénézuéliennes et qui favorisent la « concurrence déloyale » pour l’accès à l’emploi, « portant atteinte » aux <a href="https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/los-colombianos-necesitamos-garantias-no-es-la-primera-vez-que-esto-ocurre-3137711">garanties constitutionnelles des colombiens et colombiennes</a>.</p>
<p>Une fois de plus, les <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/udld8y6oh58fq8r/Wages_Col_Immigration_LADP_2020.pdf">données empiriques réfutent ces affirmations</a>, puisqu’il n’y a aucune preuve d’impact négatif de la migration sur l’emploi formel. De fait, la population vénézuélienne en Colombie est principalement engagée dans des activités économiques informelles, gagnant des revenus inférieurs à la moyenne nationale.</p>
<p>Les femmes migrantes sont particulièrement touchées, <a href="https://migravenezuela.com/web/articulo/brechas-de-genero-de-los-migrantes-venezolanos-en-colombia/2514">recevant de moins bons revenus</a> et étant souvent responsables des enfants. </p>
<p>Ainsi, affirmer qu’un mécanisme de régularisation du statut encourage la concurrence déloyale fait partie intégrante du discours visant à promouvoir délibérément la discrimination contre la population vénézuélienne. D’autant plus qu'avec <a href="https://www.lapresse.ca/international/amerique-latine/2021-04-05/venezuela/deux-autres-soldats-tues-lors-de-combats-pres-de-la-colombie.php">les récents événements à la frontière</a>, les relations colombo-vénézuéliennes ne cessent de s’envenimer, avec plus de 5000 personnes forcées de se déplacer pour éviter les affrontements entre les forces armées vénézuéliennes et des groupes armés, notamment les dissidences des FARC-EP (Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie – Armée du peuple). </p>
<p>Claudia López a été élue sous un programme politique « progressiste ». Elle a voulu insuffler un vent de changement à la mairie de Bogotá en affirmant à la fois son identité de femme et lesbienne, tout en se positionnant fortement face au gouvernement d’Iván Duque et sa gestion lente des mesures sanitaires pour lutter contre la pandémie, <a href="https://www.colombia.com/actualidad/politica/claudia-lopez-culpa-situacion-coronavirus-bogota-gobierno-ivan-duque-272103">par exemple en menaçant de fermer l’aéroport El Dorado de Bogota</a>.</p>
<p>Or elle semble avoir ainsi oublié <a href="https://mspgh.unimelb.edu.au/news-and-events/beyond-sex-and-gender-analysis-an-intersectional-view-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-outbreak-and-response">l’analyse intersectionnelle en politique publique</a>. Une telle analyse permettrait de voir l’imbrication entre les différents vécus des personnes migrantes, qui vivent des situations d’insécurité croissante et de xénophobie dans plusieurs pays d’Amérique latine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157476/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les recherches doctorales de Priscyll Anctil Avoine ont été financées par les bourses d'études supérieures du Canada Vanier. Elle est membre de la Fondation Lüvo, une ONG colombo-canadienne.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mairene Tobón Ospino receives funding from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología e Innovación. Project: Territorial dynamics of Venezuelan migration in Colombia.</span></em></p>En Colombie comme ailleurs, l’utilisation des minorités comme bouclier politique afin de contrer les perceptions citoyennes sur la détérioration de l’efficacité gouvernementale est monnaie courante.Priscyll Anctil Avoine, Candidate au doctorat en science politique - spécialiste en études féministes de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Mairene Tobón Ospino, Postdoctoral assistant, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532052021-01-13T14:02:54Z2021-01-13T14:02:54ZBobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378503/original/file-20210113-13-dmiay0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, addresses supporters in Uganda's capital Kampala. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Regardless of how Ugandans decide to vote in the January 14 presidential elections, the incumbent Yoweri Museveni will most likely be declared the winner. Museveni has ruled the country for five consecutive terms. He has historically been able to <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/16/uganda-cost-of-fake-democracy/">manipulate</a> elections in his favour, because he controls Uganda’s military, judiciary, and Electoral Commission with an iron fist.</p>
<p>Throughout this electoral campaign, however, the long-standing Ugandan president has been upstaged by a formidable young challenger: popular musician-turned-parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine. Since being elected as a Member of Parliament in 2017, the 38-year-old leader of the National Unity Platform has become the new face of Uganda’s opposition.</p>
<p>There are four things worth knowing about Bobi Wine and Uganda’s politics.</p>
<h2>Building a movement, defying expectations</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament. He was forced to run as an independent after the two major opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party, turned him away.</p>
<p>He nevertheless easily won the by-election in the Kyandondo East constituency within Kampala with <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/53602-kyadondo-east-bobi-wine-headed-for-landslide-victory">78%</a> of the vote. Since then, he has proved himself to be a skilled politician who has successfully built a strong political movement – from scratch.</p>
<p>Within his first two years in office, he forged a reputation as a principled and fearless opponent of Museveni’s policies. He was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLDMrbk5VIU">leading voice</a> against the president’s ultimately successful effort to remove <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/us-turns-blind-eye-ugandas-assault-democracy/">presidential age limits</a> from the constitution. He also led protests against the government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627">proposed tax on social media</a> in July 2018.</p>
<p>Over the course of that same year, he endorsed opposition candidates who went on to <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/bobi-wine-beats-besigye-in-bugiri/">win</a> four consecutive parliamentary by-elections. </p>
<p>By 2018, he had created a political pressure group called <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">People Power, Our Power</a>. When the government blocked its registration as a formal political party, Bobi Wine outmanoeuvred the Electoral Commission by aligning himself with a smaller, pre-existing one, which he <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-bobi-wine-nup-deal-was-negotiated-1908714">re-christened</a> as the National Unity Platform. Almost immediately more than 20 MPs left more established opposition parties to <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/21-mps-join-bobi-wine-1921682">join</a> his party.</p>
<h2>A target of unprecedented state repression</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has been a regular target of state <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/besigye-lauds-opposition-presidential-candidates-for-bracing-security-brutality-3254412">repression</a>. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime responded to his early successes by repeatedly <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62237-police-cancels-another-bobi-wine-concert">blocking</a> him from holding concerts and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/30/uganda-bans-red-beret-bobi-wines-signature-headgear">banning</a> the public from wearing People Power’s trademark red berets.</p>
<p>Since being elected, Bobi Wine has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-presidential-candidate-bobi-wine-arrested-reports-3243652">arrested</a> countless times. He has never been convicted on any of the charges. Some of his movement’s members and supporters have been <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/63683-one-shot-dead-as-police-battles-bobi-wine-supporters-in-nansana">killed</a>, sometimes in <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ziggy-wyne-death-bobi-wine-speaks-out-1841472">suspicious</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/police-accused-of-killing-people-power-movement-supporter-1876952">circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>Many have been arrested. Perhaps most notoriously, in August 2018, as he campaigned for a fellow independent candidate in a by-election in Arua in northwestern Uganda, Bobi Wine and at least 35 of his political associates were <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/uganda-bobi-wine-arrested/568549/">arrested</a> following dubious <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">reports</a> that Museveni’s motorcade had been stoned. That same night the opposition leader’s driver, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">Yasin Kawuma</a>, was murdered with a bullet that Bobi Wine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">believes</a> was intended for him.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these arrests, the Kyadondo East MP was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-museveni-critic-bobi-wine-charged-in-military-trial/a-45082938">charged with treason</a> and possession of illegal firearms. Over his next ten days in custody, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/bobi-wine-ugandan-pop-star-politician-describes-torture-by-soldiers">beaten so brutally</a> by government security forces that he could not stand, sit or walk. He eventually sought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/1/bobi-wine-arrives-in-us-for-medical-treatment">treatment for his injuries</a> in the US.</p>
<p>International <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/chris-martin-and-damon-albarn-join-campaign-to-free-uganda-star-bobi-wine">outrage</a> at this incident has not stopped the Museveni regime from escalating its tactics of repression during this election cycle.</p>
<p>The arrests have continued unabated throughout the current campaign. In addition, campaign rallies have been restricted and the government has met opposition supporters with deadly force on multiple occasions. Most tragically, following Bobi Wine’s arrest in mid-November, nationwide protests erupted during which state security forces killed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">at least 54 people</a>.</p>
<p>In response to these abuses, in early January, Bobi Wine and two other co-claimants filed a 47-page complaint to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/world/africa/uganda-election-bobi-wine-icc.html">International Criminal Court</a> against Museveni and nine of his regime’s security officials, accusing them of gross human rights violations dating back to 2018.</p>
<h2>Generational dimension</h2>
<p>Uganda’s changing demographics have a great deal to do with Bobi Wine’s electoral appeal. The East African country of 46.5 million people has one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uganda-population/">16.7</a>. Just over one in five Ugandans are between the ages of 15 and 24 and 77% of the country’s population is <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf">under the age of 30</a>.</p>
<p>Although these young people have benefited from reforms to public education introduced by the Museveni regime, they see little hope for the future. By some estimates, youth unemployment in Uganda is as <a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-into-why-ugandas-strategy-to-create-jobs-for-young-people-hasnt-fully-worked-149576">high</a> as 70%. Frustrated young people can, therefore, easily identify with Bobi Wine, who grew up in the Kampala ghetto of Kamwokya. Like him, they have only known life under Museveni. He was not even four when Museveni first came to power in 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine has skilfully appealed to this demographic. He frames his political movement in generational terms: the “Facebook generation”, which he represents against the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/uganda-if-we-do-not-take-risks-we-risk-everything/">“entrenched interests of the ‘Facelift generation’”</a> of the Museveni regime. He has been able to speak to – and articulate – the deep sense of anger and grievance that young Ugandans feel towards the Museveni regime. In so doing, Uganda’s “Ghetto President” has come to be the face and voice of young people’s collective desire for generational political change.</p>
<h2>Populism</h2>
<p>In the final weeks of the campaign, Museveni derided Bobi Wine as a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/some-countries-have-voted-for-change-out-of-excitement-museveni--3250376">populist</a> politician. While this adjective was intended to dismiss his young adversary, there is some truth to this label. In my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44894954/_Politics_Unusual_Generational_Populism_and_the_Making_of_People_Power_in_Uganda">research</a>, I argue that Bobi Wine’s inclusionary brand of populism has also been a key to his political success.</p>
<p>His use of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372">populist rhetoric</a> has effectively forged a new collective sense of identity among his mostly youthful supporters around the nodal point of “the people” and in antagonistic opposition to the country’s political elite .</p>
<p>But Bobi Wine’s brand of populism is novel because his conception of “the people” is defined not in ethno-nationalist terms (as with right-wing politicians in the US or Western Europe). Rather it’s defined largely in generational ones. This has helped him to build a burgeoning political coalition across ethno-regional lines.</p>
<p>If Bobi Wine’s brand of generational populism proves successful, its repercussions could be felt across Africa. It could serve as a model for opposition politicians who are operating in countries with similar demographic characteristics and facing many of the same political obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyangulanyi has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464902020-09-22T14:50:08Z2020-09-22T14:50:08ZA contested legacy: Julius Nyerere and the 2020 Tanzanian election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358840/original/file-20200918-22-zar446.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Nyerere's ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzanians will head to the polls on 28 October in which the incumbent, John Magufuli, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c0repynkl22t/john-magufuli">faces</a> a determined opposition. Elected to a first term in 2015, Magufuli’s time in office has lived up to his nickname <em>tinga tinga</em>, Kiswahili for “the bulldozer”. He has been applauded by some for advancing a series of <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/President-Magufuli-out-to-leave-mega-projects-legacy/1840340-4838814-dbnbu0z/index.html">major developmental projects</a>. Others have denounced him for his arguably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/29/tanzania-president-magufuli-condemned-for-authoritarian-stance">more autocratic, repressive rule</a> </p>
<p>Magufuli leads <a href="https://www.ccmtz.org/history-chama-cha-mapinduzi-party-tanzania/">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a>, one of the longest serving ruling parties in Africa. It is also the party of Tanzania’s socialist founding father, <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/about">Julius Nyerere</a>, who looms large over the country’s politics more than 20 years after his death.</p>
<p>As the French anthropologist Marie-Aude Fouéré has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/julius-nyerere-ujamaa-and-political-morality-in-contemporary-tanzania/E3E68E60A9DE29197F82B230E8EA3CEB">noted</a>, Nyerere remains </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a political metaphor for debating and acting upon the present. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Magufuli has repeatedly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223">played up</a> the similarities between himself and Nyerere. His supporters cite his attacks on corruption among the ruling political class and his enthusiasm for completing infrastructural projects as evidence that he is the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5303282-9raarh/index.html">“Nyerere of our time”</a>.</p>
<p>Others are less reverent. They include Tundu Lissu, the presidential candidate for the main opposition party, Chadema. His family was forcibly relocated under Nyerere’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1975.tb00439.x">villagisation scheme</a> of the 1970s. He brands Nyerere an autocrat who built an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/the-standard-insider/article/2001386054/magufuli-vs-lissu-what-it-takes-to-stop-a-political-bulldozer">“imperial presidency”</a>. </p>
<p>There is ample evidence of the ruling party’s tightening grip on power under Magufuli. In the lead up to the 2020 election, opposition rallies have been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies--1351138">blocked</a>. The press has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-tanzanias-media-law-muzzles-free-speech/a-54532521">muzzled</a>, and prominent opposition politicians have been violently <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-opposition-cries-foul-over-attacks-on-leaders-as-election-looms/a-53764518">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>In August, the Magufuli-controlled National Electoral Commission’s registration of candidates was marked by <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/08/26/tanzania-elections-opposition-report-widespread-nomination-interference/">irregularities</a>. Many opposition politicians were disqualified from contesting in October. </p>
<p>Lissu himself only <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-the-edge-of-democracy-what-the-upcoming-general-election-holds-in-store-for-tanzania-144601">returned from exile in July</a> after surviving an assassination attempt in 2017. For him, Magufuli’s brand of authoritarianism has its <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/former-tanzania-mp-magufuli-and-nyerere-era/5118744.html">roots</a> in the Nyerere era.</p>
<p>As these contrasting depictions of Nyerere attest, his ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2020.1799158?forwardService=showFullText&tokenAccess=T6GPRITEAJQZSX8FQJIP&tokenDomain=eprints&target=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&journalCode=cjss20">research</a>, I explore the political history of the Nyerere era. I examine his socialist project through the prism of Tanzania’s first and most prestigious national university, the <a href="https://www.udsm.ac.tz/">University of Dar es Salaam</a>.</p>
<p>Charting the rise and fall of leftist student activism at the university throughout the 1970s and 1980s allows us to better understand the aspirations of Nyerere’s socialist project and its ultimate limits and legacy.</p>
<h2>The Arusha Declaration</h2>
<p>African universities were <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-student-movements-history-sheds-light-on-modern-activism-111003">key</a> to processes of decolonising and developing post-colonial states at independence. The young nations relied on them to produce new professional classes and state bureaucrats. Given their national importance, African presidents were commonly appointed as chancellors. </p>
<p>As both president and chancellor of the university, Nyerere’s idea was that it should produce “servants” committed to building the Tanzanian nation. As he put it, its <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">role</a> was not to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>build sky-scrapers here at the university so that a few very fortunate individuals can develop their own minds and live in comfort. We tax the people to build these places only so that young men and women may become efficient servants to them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was partly for this reason that he was deeply <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">disappointed</a> by the student protests of late 1966. In October of that year, students marched on the streets of Dar es Salaam against mandatory induction into the government-run National Service scheme. They were expected to spend their first two years after graduation working in nation-building programmes on 40% of their normal stipend. </p>
<p>Worried that the university was producing a generation of self-centred elitists, Nyerere decided to take dramatic measures. All the protesters were expelled from the university. To demonstrate the value of personal sacrifice for the Tanzanian nation, he cut his own salary by 20%.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these protests, in February 1967, Nyerere released the <a href="http://library.fes.de/fulltext/bibliothek/2-tanzania-s0019634.pdf">Arusha Declaration</a>. This explicitly committed his government to socialist policies, including nationalisation and rural collectivisation. </p>
<p>Soon after, he vowed to transform the university into a socialist institution. The ruling party created a youth wing branch on campus. A general course on the political economy of development was made mandatory for all students.</p>
<p>These reforms and the Arusha Declaration inspired the emergence of a small, but vocal group of leftist students on campus. These notably included the Yoweri Museveni-led University Students’ African Revolutionary Front. It started a student journal, organised public lectures and teach-ins, and raised money for African liberation movements.</p>
<p>But, over time, the government became increasingly concerned by the prominence and independence of these leftist student groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, student politics came to be marked by an unmistakable irony: in the years following the supposed socialist transformation, leftist student activism at the university actually declined.</p>
<p>This is largely because the government exercised increasing control over university activities. Ruling party loyalists were appointed to high-ranking positions in the university administration. Following public displays of student dissent in 1970 and 1978, independent student bodies were dissolved. </p>
<p>Slowly, but surely, the university was brought more squarely under the control of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>Political order over independence</h2>
<p>This approach to public dissent was the rule rather the exception in Nyerere’s Tanzania. Trade unions, rural development collectives and party youth organisations were banned or brought under party control if they displayed too much independence. Faced with increasing <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/12/21/tanzania-at-50-does-nyerere-deserve-the-blame-and-praise-for-the-countrys-economic-failure-and-political-success/">economic challenges</a>, Nyerere regularly felt the need to prioritise political order and obedience over desires for mass-driven socialist transformation.</p>
<p>But to label Nyerere as merely an authoritarian, as Lissu suggests, is to gloss over the complexity of his years in power. As chancellor, he distinguished himself from the vast majority of his African counterparts. All too often, he sought to win students over through argument, rather than coercion.</p>
<p>His legitimacy among the student community did not rest on patronage or intimidation. Rather, many were committed to his socialist ideology, which he called <em>ujamaa</em>. It emphasised equality, self-reliance, national unity, and African liberation.</p>
<p>They respected the fact that Nyerere consistently communicated these ideas to them directly. His frequent visits and candid exchanges with students on campus helped maintain his popularity among them.</p>
<p>This legitimacy is reflected in the fact that on the rare occasions when students took to the streets to protest post-1966, it was never against Nyerere’s socialist project. Rather, it was to rail over its perceived betrayal by the political elite.</p>
<p>Examining Nyerere’s legacy through this prism, therefore, complicates characterisations of his domestic legacy as singularly autocratic. It is true that his regime did stifle leftist student activism. But many students believed in and were inspired by his socialist ideals and his sense of political morality.</p>
<p>Nyerere’s legacy still looms large over the country’s politics, and not just within Chama Cha Mapinduzi. The upstart opposition party, Alliance for Change and Transparency has <a href="https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/economic-justice-and-african-socialism-interview-zitto-kabwe">declared</a> its desire to revive and update the Arusha Declaration if elected to power in October. They explicitly <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/04/zitto-kabwe-chadema-act-julius-nyerere">commit</a> themselves to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>building a socialist society with equality as its basic principle. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resonance of this message with young Tanzanians suggests Nyerere’s legacy is far more complex than either Magufuli or Lissu recognise.</p>
<p>For all his shortcomings, Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre received funding from International Development Research Council (IDRC) for this project.</span></em></p>For all of the shortcomings of Nyerere’s regime, his ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future, over 20 years after his death.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1310552020-02-05T23:06:59Z2020-02-05T23:06:59ZTecnología al servicio de las Humanidades: Una mirada latinoamericana<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313345/original/file-20200203-41532-1qcbmqh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C0%2C1197%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://anagalvan.com/">Ana Galvañ / Telos</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Las tecnologías digitales han abierto puertas y ventanas antes impensables para el estudio de la humanidad. Pero, ¿de qué manera han sido utilizadas por los humanistas para estudiar y divulgar sus objetos de estudio? Comencemos por comprender qué son las Humanidades y cuáles son las características y usos de algunas de las tecnologías que están transformando su quehacer.</p>
<p>Las Humanidades se han ocupado históricamente del estudio del lenguaje, la música, el arte, la literatura, el teatro y también del estudio del pasado. Su trayectoria desde el pensamiento humanista renacentista del studia humanitatis, el estudio de la humanidad, es inseparable de la historia de la imprenta.</p>
<p>El libro se convirtió en el medio por excelencia a través del cual las disciplinas de Humanidades han transmitido, construido, interpretaciones sobre la experiencia, la cultura y la <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/digitalhumanities">historia de la humanidad</a>. En la era digital esto ha cambiando rápidamente, abriendo la posibilidad de que las Humanidades se renueven hacia nuevos modelos de producción y difusión de conocimiento que son posibles con el poder de la computación y en entornos digitales conectados en red.</p>
<h2>Interpretar la tecnología es cosa de humanistas</h2>
<p>Antes de la era de la World Wide Web y la web 2.0, la digitalización comenzó a transformar la investigación en las Humanidades. Al digitalizar convertimos formas tradicionales de almacenamiento de información como el papel y las fotografías, en códigos binarios –ceros y unos– para el almacenamiento en computadores. Esta transmutación ha traído consigo posibilidades de acceso a fuentes primarias digitalizadas, a los datos que las representan y, por ende, al uso de metodologías computacionales para analizarlos. Eso sí, la tarea de interpretación es, y seguirá siendo, potestad de los humanistas.</p>
<p>El otro desarrollo tecnológico es el computador cuya historia no se reduce al hardware y al software sino a una historia más grande sobre cultura y conocimiento. En esta historia el computador constituye un proyecto “para la producción de significado” y aparece como proveedor de una respuesta al problema de la <a href="https://monoskop.org/images/d/dd/Fiormonte_Numerico_Tomasi_The_Digital_Humanist_A_Critical_Inquiry_2015.pdf">presentación, organización y mejora del conocimiento</a>. En este desarrollo tecnológico, que se presume lejano de las Humanidades y las ciencias sociales, el aporte de la lingüística al “desarrollo de lenguajes computables formales es especialmente significativo”. Después de todo, las Humanidades y las ciencias sociales no han tenido trayectorias completamente separadas de las ciencias de la computación.</p>
<h2>Ser humanista ayer y hoy</h2>
<p>Los humanistas solemos basar nuestras investigaciones en el estudio de objetos culturales accesibles físicamente en instituciones de la memoria como archivos, bibliotecas y museos. Sin embargo, con el giro digital podemos acceder a millones de representaciones digitales de objetos culturales a un clic de distancia por medio de bibliotecas, archivos y museos digitales.</p>
<p>Además de tener acceso a la representación, los archivos digitales nos permiten acceder a los metadatos de los objetos para analizarlos. El concepto de metadatos, que es bien conocido en el mundo de las ciencias de la información, es central para las Humanidades digitales. Se trata de datos sobre datos, es decir, el objeto cultural tiene una serie de descriptores que suministran información ampliada y contextualizada del objeto. Por ejemplo, su fecha y lugar de producción y el autor del objeto —-si se conoce-—, por mencionar algunos ejemplos básicos. Hoy podemos agregar, analizar y visualizar los metadatos de aquellos repositorios de objetos culturales digitales que permitan la minería de datos.</p>
<p>Para poner algunos ejemplos, este ejercicio puede ser útil para organizar y analizar la colección de todas las obras de arte de un museo; o para analizar los lugares y fechas desde los cuales personajes importantes mantuvieron correspondencia en un archivo epistolar. </p>
<p>Estas nuevas formas de acceso y organización de los objetos de la cultura humana pueden ser útiles para formular nuevas preguntas de investigación sobre el pasado o indagar con mayor acceso a información viejas preguntas.</p>
<p>Además de la investigación basada en datos y la creación de esquemas de metadatos, las nuevas formas de pensamiento del giro digital posibilitan la programación de algoritmos que pueden llegar a ser fructíferos en la automatización de procesos que tardarían mucho tiempo. Por ejemplo, la transcripción automática de manuscritos de la temprana edad moderna, o el análisis de los patrones de color y trazo en obras de arte para determinar autoría.</p>
<p>Pero el giro digital conlleva no solamente un problema técnico, sino que presenta un <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326399129_Desarrollos_digitales_de_la_Historia_del_Arte_implicaciones_epistemicas_criticas_y_metodologicas">“horizonte crítico porque subvierte el orden de los regímenes epistemológicos y disciplinares en los que hasta ahora se había asentado el conocimiento</a>”. Es decir, nos enfrentamos a procesos de producción de conocimiento mediados por el pensamiento computacional, el <em>software</em> y las interfaces digitales.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313348/original/file-20200203-41541-1g3i4g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://anagalvan.com/">Ana Galvañ / Telos</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Datos y brechas digitales</h2>
<p>Lo anterior es solo posible si tenemos acceso a infraestructuras digitales para investigación. Las infraestructuras digitales son entonces ecosistemas básicos donde se puede acceder a los materiales y a los sistemas y procesos necesarios para la investigación, la enseñanza y la difusión de la cultura. Los gobiernos de América Latina han realizado esfuerzos notables para construir infraestructuras digitales públicas en las áreas de la ciudadanía digital. Pero esto no ha ocurrido en campos como las Humanidades.</p>
<p>En contraste, los países del Norte Global tienen políticas de infraestructura digital bien definidas para las Humanidades, a menudo denominadas “una capa integrada de instrumentos digitales” para tareas como la minería de textos y el análisis algorítmico de grandes cantidades de materiales culturales. Los instrumentos analíticos computacionales basados en datos para la investigación en Humanidades en Europa y Estados Unidos parecen estar convirtiéndose en una característica definitoria de la práctica de las Humanidades digitales en estos contextos.</p>
<p>La cuantificación del conocimiento, la conversión de textos y de la cultura material en datos estructurados para el análisis plantea la pregunta de qué tanto los sistemas le dan cabida a la ambigüedad que es inherente al ámbito de las Humanidades. Las Humanidades se enfocan en la crítica, en la interpretación, en reconstruir y explicar las ambigüedades, complejidades, las diferencias y las interacciones de la cultura humana. De esta forma, la cuantificación de la cultura humana para ser leída y procesada por la máquina nunca va a reemplazar la reflexión crítica, que es el corazón del trabajo de los humanistas.</p>
<h2>Una mirada desde el sur</h2>
<p>Debemos preguntarnos sobre los retos de construir infraestructuras digitales en países con brechas digitales profundas.</p>
<p>Lugares donde falta mucho por hacer en la gestión de archivos históricos patrimoniales, tanto en físico como en digital, o donde los archivos sobre temas sensibles sobre derechos humanos están en riesgo de desaparecer.</p>
<p>Contextos con un pasado colonial que luchan por proveer a sus poblaciones con conectividades, habilidades y competencias digitales para participar más democráticamente de los beneficios del giro digital.</p>
<p>Países con brechas en educación y acceso a medios digitales e Internet que no son desarrolladores sino consumidores de las tecnologías digitales que son ubicuas en el mundo de hoy.</p>
<p>Los contextos institucionales, culturales, económicos y culturales de Latinoamérica distan de los países del Norte Global. En este último es donde se producen las tecnologías, protocolos y estándares a partir de los cuales se están construyendo las prácticas reconocidas hoy como parte del campo de las Humanidades digitales. </p>
<p>Una mirada singular desde estos otros lugares puede ayudar a desarrollar una conciencia crítica y ética frente a las implicaciones del uso y abuso de tecnologías digitales. El humanista en la era digital deberá estar atento a las implicaciones en términos de desigualdades que en el Sur Global trae la adopción acrítica de la computación y de los sistemas de inteligencia artificial.</p>
<h2>Humanidades digitales latinoamericanas</h2>
<p>Pero ¿qué otras particularidades pueden desarrollarse para pensar unas humanidades digitales latinoamericanas más allá de la construcción de repositorios de datos accionables por computadores? Desarrollar proyectos alrededor de comunidades de aprendizaje con diferentes niveles de conectividad y acceso a tecnologías puede ser una oportunidad para avanzar en el reto de las alfabetizaciones digitales. </p>
<p>Incentivar las comunidades DiY (<em>Do it Yourself</em>, Hazlo tú mismo en español) para desarrollar propuestas creativas, improvisadas, de <em>software</em> libre y acceso abierto para las memorias colectivas, de narrativas históricas plurales, de miradas expansivas sobre el mundo de la cultura donde se reconozcan la diversidad de lenguas, historias, riquezas naturales, rituales y patrimoniales de la región.</p>
<p>Podemos proponer unas Humanidades digitales situadas no al servicio de la tecnología sino al servicio de la humanidad. Abramos una conversación donde se involucren públicos amplios, en algunos casos para avanzar en la digitalización y catalogación de la cultura y mejorar las formas en las que investigamos, en otros casos para apoyar causas de justicia social y activismo digital como parte constitutiva de una agenda expansiva de las Humanidades desde el sur.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>La <a href="https://telos.fundaciontelefonica.com/telos-112-cuaderno-central-humanidades-en-un-mundo-stem-maria-jose-afanadortecnologia-al-servicio-de-las-humanidades/">versión original de este artículo</a> aparece publicada en <a href="https://telos.fundaciontelefonica.com/revista/telos-112/">el número 112 de la Revista Telos</a>, de <a href="https://www.fundaciontelefonica.com/">Fundación Telefónica</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>María José Afanador Llach no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Las Humanidades digitales se forman en el diálogo entre las disciplinas de las humanidades, las ciencias sociales, los medios digitales y la computación. Prometen nuevas formas de acceder, estudiar y divulgar el pasado, la lengua y la cultura humana. Pero el desarrollo del campo implica variados retos en contextos de brechas digitales profundas como es el caso de América Latina.María José Afanador Llach, Profesora de Humanidades Digitales, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1110032019-02-18T14:20:47Z2019-02-18T14:20:47ZAfrica’s student movements: history sheds light on modern activism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259279/original/file-20190215-56243-e5ssa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African students at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1964 protesting against being called "savages" in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rhodesian Herald</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 9 March 2015, a student hurled faeces at a statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes. This act led to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-09-rhodes-statue-to-be-removed-after-uct-council-decision">the statue’s removal</a>. It also inspired <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-students-are-protesting-again-why-it-neednt-be-this-way-109964">the most significant period of student protest</a> in post-apartheid South Africa’s history. </p>
<p>Student protesters called for the decolonisation of universities and public life. They spurred similar actions by student activists in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-37430324">the Global North</a>. Students in other African countries like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/14/racist-gandhi-statue-removed-from-university-of-ghana">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2016/08/01/decolonising-makerere-on-mamdanis-failed-experiment/">Uganda</a> also got involved. But the debate about what the decolonisation agenda means and who has the authority to lead it is still wide open – and often acrimonious. </p>
<p>The lessons from older, non-South African experiences of student protests in post-colonial African politics are often missing from those debates. </p>
<p>After independence, generations of university students in countries like Uganda, Kenya, Angola and Zimbabwe mobilised for change. They wanted politics and education to be decolonised, transformed and Africanised. These cases, and others, are explored in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/issue/450ED9F309972E6B034AEB155590EA9A">a special edition</a> of the journal <em>Africa</em>.</p>
<p>Today’s student activism and that which came before it share two common traits. One is student protestors’ belief in their own political agency. The other is the fear state authorities have that these groups may, in the words of Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani, act as a “<a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/13489">catalytic force</a>”. They have the power to spur other groups into action.</p>
<p>By looking back, scholars can understand the potential that such activism has for emancipating people from the legacies of colonialism. It’s also a useful way to identify the limits that student decolonisation projects can hold for both broader politics and society, as well as for the activists themselves. </p>
<h2>Looking back</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/introduction-student-activism-in-an-era-of-decolonization/05CE1FD0D1C81EC17EA829DBC5F3095E">our introduction</a> to the journal, we point out that African students in the 1960s and 1970s believed themselves to be emergent political elites and intellectuals. </p>
<p>They questioned political leaders’ assumed role as the agents of decolonisation. They agitated for radical alternative projects of political change. These projects commonly incorporated socialist or pan-African ideological frameworks.</p>
<p>African universities were key actors in developing post-colonial and decolonised societies. They trained an entire new class of doctors, economists, lawyers, and other professionals. </p>
<p>This was happening in countries with low levels of formal schooling. And so, university students’ education was seen to give them the knowledge and skills to both understand and challenge state authority in a way that few other social groups could. These challenges led to frequent clashes between university students and the states that funded their education.</p>
<h2>Historical protests</h2>
<p>There was no single decolonisation project during this era. Students’ challenges to state authority looked very different in different countries. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/shama-will-not-dance-university-of-khartoum-politics-196469/B00518BA4D475318B38013962A77FC92">fatal contests</a> between radical Islamist and secular Leftist students at the University of Khartoum in Sudan in the late 1960s offer one example. </p>
<p>These two factions debated and violently fought over whether a decolonised Sudan should be secular and socialist, or bound by Islamic customs and values. Women’s public performances of their femininity became a lightning rod for these tensions. This boiled over into tragedy after <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/shama-will-not-dance-university-of-khartoum-politics-196469/B00518BA4D475318B38013962A77FC92">the <em>Adjako</em> women’s dance</a> was controversially performed in front of a campus crowd of men and women. The Islamic movement denounced this. Riots ensued, and a student was trampled to death. </p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/political-life-of-the-dead-lumumba-cold-war-histories-and-the-congolese-student-left/5CAB511BE7B085E0E9D138D93B350BB8#fndtn-metrics">example</a> was how the 1961 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassination</a> of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba influenced students in the Democratic Republic of Congo. His death pushed young educated Congolese to revisit the meaning of decolonisation. They turned ideologically to the Left. This shaped the ideas and practices of a generation who challenged President Mobutu Sese Seko’s authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>New understandings</h2>
<p>Scholars of African student activism have typically devoted more time to analysing earlier historical periods. These include the early anti-colonial activism of nationalist leaders such as Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7d3qBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=mark+matera+london+africa&ots=CY_XVWWIzX&sig=xvPJHSwbxuRR6P9-xurnpD9C4u8#v=onepage&q=mark%20matera%20london%20africa&f=false">London</a>, or Senegal’s Leopold Senghor in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=LNMmCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=goebel+paris+book+anti-colonial&ots=AeCaUKHRip&sig=kjvg-lUyWyYPaPyCTBrA_cDVZHU#v=onepage&q=goebel%20paris%20book%20anti-colonial&f=false">Paris</a>. </p>
<p>By focusing on the 1960s and 1970s, the research that appears in the special edition opens up new ways of thinking about the significance of African student activism. Some students took their political ideas and behaviour into subsequent careers as opposition political leaders in Kenya, Niger and Uganda. In Zimbabwe and Angola, on the other hand, student activism opened the way into high-status careers as state leaders. These former protesters’ uncomfortable association with authoritarian governance forced them to defend the meaning of their past activism. </p>
<p>The articles show how decolonisation in this period shaped a generation of university students’ aspirations to challenge post-colonial forms of governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African universities were key actors in developing post-colonial and decolonised societies.Dan Hodgkinson, Departmental Lecturer in African History and Politics, University of OxfordLuke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1050222018-12-14T11:45:33Z2018-12-14T11:45:33ZWe train Colombian woolly monkeys to be wild again – and maybe save them from extinction<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250378/original/file-20181213-110249-jx43g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Woolly monkeys are hard to miss in Colombia's jungles. Now, they face extinction. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mónica Ramírez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Colombia’s Andes Mountains used to be loaded with wildlife, including South America’s sole bear species, the spectacle bear, and the mountain tapir, which lives only in the world’s highest altitudes. </p>
<p>You couldn’t walk a mile in the jungle without seeing a woolly monkey – big, agile and charismatic primates with powerful long tails. </p>
<p>Now the species is <a href="http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/39926/0">hard to spot</a>. Over the past 50 years, habitat loss, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2007.00272.x">poaching</a> and <a href="http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/27073/1/24790-86981-1-PB.pdf">smuggling for adoption as pets</a> have all decimated Colombia’s woolly monkey populations. Andean woolly monkeys are at risk of extinction in the next century, scientists say. They have already <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10764-007-9177-x">disappeared entirely in some parts of Colombia</a>.</p>
<h2>Restoring Colombia’s jungles</h2>
<p>To save the woolly monkey, Colombian <a href="http://www.cormacarena.gov.co/">wildlife</a> and <a href="https://www.cam.gov.co/">environmental agencies</a> teamed up with scientists like <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=NRb_QsIAAAAJ">us</a> from the <a href="https://ecologia.uniandes.edu.co/">Laboratory of Tropical Forest Ecology and Primatology</a> at Colombia’s University of the Andes.</p>
<p>In August 2017, we released six captive woolly monkeys into the forests of southern Huila, about a 12-hour drive south of Bogota, the capital. This jungle-covered region was once home to many troops of these lovely primates. Now they’re conspicuously absent. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250346/original/file-20181212-110240-gzects.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Colombian woolly monkey in captivity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tatiana Novoa</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We wanted to see if animals born in the wild, captured by traffickers and confiscated by Colombian authorities could learn to live there again.</p>
<p>Releasing animals who’ve spent time in captivity is risky. Often, they lack the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-0697-0_14">behaviors necessary to survive in the wild</a>, such as self-defense and bonding strategies.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320700000483">a comprehensive review of wildlife reintroduction programs worldwide</a>, only 26 percent are successful. Most either fail outright – the animals die – or do not last enough to evaluate the fate of the released animals.</p>
<p>To help us develop a training plan for <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17391180">promoting natural behaviors</a>, we first spent over a year observing dozens of captive woolly monkeys at zoos and sanctuaries across Colombia. </p>
<p>We saw that many woolly monkeys had become comparatively clumsy climbers, and rather than seek out food they tended to wait for their caretakers to feed them. They had also lost the ability to spot and flee predators. </p>
<h2>Hope for woolly monkeys</h2>
<p>After a year of assessing their behavior, we chose 11 candidates for possible reintegration into the wild based on their reproductive viability, strength, health and non-attachment to humans. </p>
<p>During the six-month rehabilitation process, we used what we call “environmental enrichment” to instill survival skills among these woolly monkeys.</p>
<p>To reduce time spent lolling on the ground and encourage climbing, we placed the monkeys’ food high up on platforms simulated trees. We also promoted bonding by putting pairs of woolly monkeys together in “socialization cages,” which encourages them to groom each other and interact one-on-one.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250483/original/file-20181213-178555-qyzo2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A scientist from the University of the Andes observing captive woolly monkeys as part of Colombia’s wildlife reintegration program.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Monica Ramirez</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To boost predator response, we played sounds made by predators like eagles and jaguars, followed by other monkeys’ alarm cries, so that the captive woolly monkeys would learn to recognize them as a threat.</p>
<p>After the training period, the six fittest monkeys were released into the Huila forest reserve, an area with ample food and protection from hunters. Two were juveniles. Four were adults.</p>
<p>All wore collars that tracked their location and recorded their behavior to evaluate the monkeys’ adaptation process. </p>
<p>At first, we provided some food for the newly reintroduced monkeys. After five months they were weaned off entirely.</p>
<h2>Cautious optimism</h2>
<p>A year after the six monkeys were released, two had been recaptured because they were struggling to adapt, spending too much time on the forest floor and unwilling to bond with their troopmates. </p>
<p>Two had gone missing. And two died within months – one after falling from a tree and another of mysterious causes. </p>
<p>Admittedly, those aren’t great results. </p>
<p>We think the problem may have been the location. The Huila nature reserve has enough fruit to feed the monkeys, but it gets quite cold there. In low temperatures, your body uses a lot of energy to heat itself. Perhaps their self-feeding skills weren’t sufficiently developed for them to consume enough calories. </p>
<p>Group cohesion was also low in this cohort, causing some individuals to break away from their group – a dangerous thing to do in the jungle. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250384/original/file-20181213-110243-3mumtk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The forests of Huila, Colombia, where the first cohort of rehabilitated woolly monkeys were released into the wild in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jhduarte/5529720469">Jaime Hernando Duarte/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Worth the effort</h2>
<p>Our project shows how difficult it is to restore endangered primate populations.</p>
<p>But we need to keep trying. Over half of all Colombia’s <a href="https://tropicalconservationscience.mongabay.com/content/v3/10-03-29_45-62_stevenson_et_al.pdf">30 or so primates species</a> are in danger of going extinct, according to <a href="http://latinamericanpost.com/index.php/es/banking-3/125-global-issues/environment/8528-90-of-our-primates-are-threatened">Diana Guzman</a>, president of the Colombian Primatology Association.</p>
<p>Their demise would have severe environmental consequences. South American primates have been shown to eat, digest and disperse each day about <a href="https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/estimates-number-seeds-dispersed-population-primates-lowland-forest-western-amazonia/">2 million seeds per square mile of habitat</a> – an important <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2010.00708.x">ecological service</a> for Colombia’s tropical forests.</p>
<p>Colombia does not have enough animal sanctuaries and zoos to house <a href="https://zslpublications.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1748-1090.2009.00106.x">the thousands of primates recaptured from smugglers</a> every year. Many are <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/animals/what-happens-to-smuggled-animals-after-theyre-seized.aspx">euthanized, “reintroduced” into inappropriate habitats or even returned to the black market</a>. The lucky few that are taken into captivity often suffer from heart disease, obesity, behavioral disruptions and <a href="https://zslpublications.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1748-1090.2009.00106.x">psychological damage</a> – disorders linked to a sedentary lifestyle and inadequate diet.</p>
<p>Comprehensive, long-term <a href="https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/2013-009.pdf">primate rehabilitation and reintroduction programs</a> like ours – which is funded by the Colombian government and the nonprofit Primate Conservation, Inc. – are costly. We spend about $5,000 per monkey resettled. </p>
<p>But rehabilitating and releasing seized animals is far cheaper, and way more environmentally appropriate, than <a href="https://greengarageblog.org/list-of-11-biggest-pros-and-cons-of-zoos">keeping them behind bars for a lifetime</a>. And ours is one of the few primate reintegration programs of its kind in Latin America.</p>
<h2>The next generation of woolly monkeys</h2>
<p>In November 2018, we released our second cohort of six rehabilitated monkeys, including one female monkey recaptured last time. </p>
<p>This time, we chose the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/reyzamuromatarredonda.reservasnaturales">Rey Zamuro</a> nature reserve, in the Meta Colombia region. The jungle there has warmer weather and likely a greater food supply, and we are hopeful they can establish themselves there. </p>
<p>So far, the Meta Colombia troop seems to be doing well, particularly in group bonding.</p>
<p>We’ll keep checking in on them all year, learning from their experiences to help generations of rewilded woolly monkeys to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mónica Alejandra Ramírez receives funding for this study from Colciencias, a Colombian government agency that supports fundamental and applied research in Colombia, and from Primate Conservation, Inc.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manuel Laquerica does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pablo Stevenson receives funding for this study from Colciencias, a Colombian government agency that supports fundamental and applied research in Colombia, and from Primate Conservation, Inc.</span></em></p>Colombian researchers hope to revive an endangered species by rehabilitating monkeys confiscated from smugglers. The captive animals’ struggles show that survival is not guaranteed.Mónica Alejandra Ramírez, PhD Candidate on Primate Ecology, Universidad de los Andes Manuel Lequerica Tamara, Doctoral candidate, University of SydneyPablo Stevenson, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Sciences, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/839492017-09-29T02:37:31Z2017-09-29T02:37:31ZWho are the real targets of Bogota’s crackdown on crime?<p>It was just before rush hour on Aug. 23, 2017, when the Bogota, Colombia, district police and SWAT squad <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/el-balance-del-distrito-tras-la-toma-de-el-cartuchito-en-kennedy-articulo-709781">came for the gangs of El Cartuchito</a>, an area with a potent illicit drug trade and open consumption of <a href="https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/bazuco-cheapest-drug-colombian-streets">bazuco</a>, a cocaine derivative similar to crack. Clad in anti-riot gear and armed with batons and tear gas, <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/despues-del-bronx-distrito-va-olla-cerca-de-corabastos-articulo-676337">police were sent in</a>, the city’s Department of Security later tweeted, to “reclaim” the area “for the citizens.” </p>
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<p>That was the spin. In practice, the police actually vacated not just the drug gangs but also people guilty of nothing illegal, namely homeless people, <a href="http://caracol.com.co/radio/2012/06/28/judicial/1340891520_713837.html">people who use bazuco</a> and garbage pickers. These activities, if socially frowned upon, are not crimes in Colombia, including <a href="http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/1994/C-221-94.htm">the possession of drugs for personal consumption</a>.</p>
<p>After forcibly removing everyone from El Cartuchito, the police gave residents a plastic snap-on bracelet, allowing them to return to the neighborhood.</p>
<p>The raid was just the latest aggressive operation to “clean up” Bogota. According to the city’s Department of Security, in 2016 there were <a href="https://twitter.com/SeguridadBOG/status/812102007876157443">15 such raids on three “ollas</a>,” or open-air drug scenes. Mayor Enrique Peñalosa, who entered office in 2016, <a href="https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/enrique-penalosa-organized-crime-police/505208/">insists</a> that the crackdowns are a <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/penalosa-sostiene-operativo-el-bronx-no-fue-improvisado-articulo-653059">public safety necessity</a> because Bogota’s ollas have become “operating centers for organized crime” where children are subject to “massive sexual exploitation.” </p>
<p>It’s true that Bogota faces a real security challenge in places like El Cartuchito, where <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1135">homicide rates are acutely high</a>. Alongside other researchers, I’ve been talking with people in the ollas for years about <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7721/chilyoutenvi.23.1.0064?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">how the city could keep residents, including homeless children, safer</a>. But it’s clear to me that a strategy of violent displacement followed by <a href="https://twitter.com/SeguridadBOG/status/900463936214110210">investment and gentrification</a> is not the answer. </p>
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<h2>Uncovering the ‘olla’</h2>
<p>The El Cartuchito raid was mild compared to what Peñalosa’s administration unleashed last year in an area called El Bronx. In May 2016, <a href="https://apnews.com/34eb341149b1442d926628b397b6f10e/police-raid-drug-infested-bronx-colombias-capital">SWAT teams raided the downtown streets</a> in the middle of the night, joined by child protective services and other city agencies. </p>
<p>Rousing sleeping homeless residents, often violently, police rounded up at least <a href="https://www.vice.com/es_co/article/4wzy8j/dos-meses-intervencion-bronx-estanzuela-pealosa-olla-ambulante-balance-habitantes-calle-demolicion-efectos-bogota">2,000 people</a> (estimates <a href="https://www.kienyke.com/historias/donde-estan-los-habitantes-del-bronx">vary widely</a>) and herded them into trucks, headed to an undisclosed location.</p>
<p>Those who refused to go were gradually driven out of the area, first into a plaza, then into surrounding ollas and, eventually, into a canal bed on Sixth Street.</p>
<p>There, police kept hundreds of people contained for weeks. At night, Bronx exiles told me, the officers would form a cordon to keep them from leaving the canal. Every third night, according to testimonies, police forced this group to move up or down the canal, apparently arbitrarily. I spent a night in the canal and witnessed the containment-and-sleep-deprivation strategy firsthand.</p>
<p>During one big rainstorm, multiple homeless citizens <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/habitantes-de-calle-arrastrados-corriente-de-agua-cano-articulo-649714">were washed away</a>; one was <a href="http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2016/08/18/bogota/1471543447_193219.html">later found dead</a>. </p>
<p>Two local human rights organizations, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/cpatong.co/posts/">CPAT</a> and <a href="http://www.parces.org/">PARCES</a>, whose <a href="https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/destapando-la-olla-la-otra-cara-del-operativo-del-bronx/">May 2017 joint report</a> details the brutal treatment of El Bronx residents, filed a complaint against Peñalosa’s administration in the Inter-American Human Rights Court. The case is pending.</p>
<p>Just prior to the Bronx crackdown, in May 2016, the city had also cleared the Carrilera shantytown, <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/tras-desalojo-hasta-candela-le-prendieron-los-cambuches-articulo-630487">burning down cardboard homes and dismantling shacks</a>. “What are they doing? The government is trampling on poor people, on homeless people!” one witness said in an interview with El Espectador newspaper. “They gave us no alternatives, like a place to go, a place to live.” </p>
<p>Peñalosa’s slogan is “Bogotá, Better for All.” But <a href="https://colombiareports.com/bogota-mayors-crime-offensive-backfires-human-rights-violation-claims/">all these raids</a> have made <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/05/08/planeta_futuro/1494257631_771774.html">many</a> wonder: Is Bogota really for everyone?</p>
<h2>The right to the city</h2>
<p>This debate about who belongs in cities is longstanding. As the feminist geographer Melissa Wright has written, elite urbanites often equate progress with <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8306.2004.09402013.x/abstract">the disappearance of particular social groups</a> who, in their eyes, degrade public space. </p>
<p>In 1990s-era New York City, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/11/giul-n23.html">cracked down on “quality of life crimes” like prostitution</a>. More recently, the new mayor of São Paulo, Brazil, João Doria, <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-what-cost-gentrification-sao-paulo-expels-drug-users-and-razes-buildings-to-revitalise-crackland-78831">razed a major downtown crack scene and homeless encampment</a>.</p>
<p>Such efforts, sometimes called <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/historia/el-experimento-de-penalosa-para-reducir-homicidios-59007">broken windows policing</a>, reflect a <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/broken-windows-policing-and-the-origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong">belief</a> that, to improve safety and urban progress, “undesirable” people and low-level crimes must disappear. </p>
<p>In Brazil, the constitution recognizes the citizenry’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663907076529">right to the city</a>, so several city agencies have <a href="http://justificando.cartacapital.com.br/2017/05/25/em-nota-associacao-de-juizes-repudia-politica-higienista-de-doria-na-cracolandia/">questioned</a> the legality of Doria’s raids.</p>
<p>Colombians have no such constitutional right, and data measuring Bogota’s <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/multimedia/especiales/cifras-sobre-los-habitantes-de-calle-e-indigentes-en-colombia/16774657/1/index.html">homeless population</a> are out-of-date and <a href="http://www.bogota.gov.co/temas-de-ciudad/integracion-social/a-comienzos-de-2018-se-entregaran-resultados-del-censo-de-habitante-de-calle-en-bogot">incomplete</a> (a <a href="http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/actualidad-dane/4242-censo-de-habitantes-de-calle-en-bogota-iniciara-en-octubre">census of street dwellers</a> is scheduled to begin in October). </p>
<p>People living on the streets of the capital routinely face <a href="http://www.tandfebooks.com/action/showBook?doi=10.4324%2F9781315797915&">harassment and police aggression</a>. The Cartuchito and Bronx raids drove homeless residents and sex workers from the ollas, where most Bogota residents never saw them, and scattered them (as well as <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1467">the criminals who operated in the ollas</a>) throughout this city of eight million. </p>
<p>Many people <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/problemas-en-bogota-por-habitante-de-la-calle-38370">did not welcome their new neighbors</a>, the <a href="https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/dcede2017-53.pdf">majority of whom are active drug users</a>. Locals <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/intervencion-a-habitantes-de-calle-en-barrio-veraguas-34373">filed complaints</a>, and there were reports of <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/casos-de-envenenamiento-a-habitantes-de-calle-en-bogota-31916">“donated” food being poisoned</a>.</p>
<p>But urbanists and scholars have long recognized the right of every citizen to occupy public space. In a seminal <a href="https://newleftreview.org/II/53/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city">2008 article in the journal The New Left</a>, the geographer David Harvey wrote that this is “one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.” </p>
<p>The right to the city was also a theme of last year’s <a href="http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/news/2016/09/historic-consensus-reached-right-city-new-urban-agenda">United Nations Habitat III conference</a>, which focused on developing a “new urban agenda” for the world.</p>
<p>There’s no quick fix for urban inequality, but there are ways to promote progress in cities while respecting the rights of the most marginalized. Programs that offer social services, <a href="http://canadianharmreduction.com/readmore/facts_crack2.pdf">health care</a>, <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395911001332">housing</a> and employment can help transform the lives of drug users. In the meantime, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-cities-should-stop-arresting-crack-users-and-help-them-instead-67828">harm reduction services</a> like <a href="https://www.vice.com/es_co/article/vdawpa/as-es-el-centro-de-intercambio-de-jeringas-para-heroinmanos-en-bogot">needle exchange</a> and peer education can reduce risky behaviors.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/dcede2017-53.pdf">report on El Bronx</a> released on Sept. 27 by the University of the Andes’ <a href="https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/centros-de-investigacion/cesed">Center for the Study of Security and Drugs</a>, the researchers consider what state-sponsored treatment options would be legally viable in Colombia and recommend exploring experimental health strategies tailored to the needs of Bogota’s bazuco users.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/06/03/colombias_controversial_cure_for_coke_addicts_give_them_marijuana.html">Such efforts</a> were starting to get underway in prior mayoral administrations, and from 2012 to 2016 the city operated <a href="http://www.druglawreform.info/en/publications/legislative-reform-series-/item/4212-bogotas-medical-care-centres-for-drug-addicts-camad">mobile health centers for drug users</a> in El Bronx. But Peñalosa quickly <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/acabaran-los-centros-de-atencion-drogadictos-bogota-articulo-597353">phased out</a> these projects. </p>
<p>Everyone ousted from El Cartuchito, El Bronx, and other “reclaimed” areas share one thing: they are all <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17441692.2016.1141971?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rgph20">street-connected</a>, meaning that their daily activities take place largely in public. In denying such people their right to the city, Bogota officials are essentially denying them their right to exist.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Elizabeth Ritterbusch was a co-founder of the organization PARCES in Colombia, which in the past received funding from Open Society Foundations. </span></em></p>Bogota’s mayor wants to make the city ‘better for all,’ but repeated police crackdowns have displaced thousands of homeless Colombians. Are clean streets really more important than human rights?Amy Elizabeth Ritterbusch, Associate Professor, School of Government, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/771482017-07-03T06:01:17Z2017-07-03T06:01:17ZColombian militants have a new plan for the country, and it’s called ‘insurgent feminism’<p>When Victoria Sandino, a long-time fighter in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), joined the guerrilla organisation’s peace talks with her country’s government in 2014, she never imagined that she and her comrades would end up launching a new women’s movement.</p>
<p>It’s called “<a href="http://www.mujerfariana.org/vision/663-el-feminismo-en-las-farc-ep.html">insurgent feminism</a>”, and, while still nascent, this philosophy may turn out to be one of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-has-a-new-peace-agreement-but-will-it-stick-69535?sr=4">Colombian peace process’</a> most enduring – and least expected – political contributions.</p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, dozens of female FARC combatants travelled to Cuba’s capital Havana to participate in a gender subcommittee created to ensure that the peace accords would reflect women’s perspectives and needs. Sandino stayed in Havana, becoming an emblematic figure of the demilitarising Marxist insurgency.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombian-guerrillas-disarm-starting-their-risky-return-to-civilian-life-73947">completely disarmed</a> as of June 26, the FARC will reconstitute itself as a political party in the next few months. Insurgent feminism is part of its platform.</p>
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<h2>Betting on change</h2>
<p>Gender roles remain rather traditional in Colombia, where women are largely relegated to the domestic sphere, especially in rural areas. The country ranks 95th in the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI">UN’s gender equality index</a>, below neighbouring Brazil (79th), Peru (87th) and Ecuador (89th).</p>
<p>Since its founding in 1964 as the armed wing of the Communist Party, the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769">FARC</a> has sought to abolish hierarchies. For many Colombian women – particularly those from the countryside – joining the guerrillas offered an escape from poverty and sexual oppression. </p>
<p>Patricia, who joined the insurgent group when she was 17 years old, says that feminism wasn’t a theoretical debate within the FARC; it was a practice. “We always performed equality,” she told me. “Men and women have the same rights and the same duties, and we undertake the same missions.” </p>
<p>Combatant life necessarily induced a change in gender relations. Men and women shared quotidian tasks, such as cooking and cleaning, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder. And though the FARC’s forced abortions and contraception <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/24/women-in-the-farc-have-had-a-mixed-experience-you-wouldnt-know-that-from-the-new-york-times/?utm_term=.4fd753f59ac9">remain controversial</a>, female fighters have long enjoyed access to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/americas/colombia-farc-rebels.html">sexual and reproductive rights</a> that were – and many cases still are – <a href="https://www.reproductiverights.org/our-regions/latin-america-caribbean/colombia">legally denied</a> to other Colombian women.</p>
<p>Still, the FARC was no gender paradise. Women never reached its highest ranks, and the nine-member <a href="http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros/que-es-el-secretariado-de-las-farc-ep.html">leadership team</a> remains all male – and all white. </p>
<p>Women “weren’t protagonists” in the group, Sandino would assert when <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/estamos-creando-el-feminismo-en-las-farc-victoria-sandino">explaining</a> why the FARC was due for a feminist awakening.</p>
<p>The unconventional women of the FARC have spent part of their lives on the front lines in the jungle, and they are now returning to civilian life with great expectations.</p>
<p>After more than 50 years, the FARC became the world’s first Marxist insurgency to <a href="http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2017/06/20/colombia-el-papel-de-las-mujeres-guerrilleras-de-las-farc-ep-tesis-de-mujer-y-genero-para-el-congreso-constitutivo-del-partido/">declare itself an “anti-patriarchal” organisation</a>. </p>
<h2>Walking the talk</h2>
<p>In February, FARC female combatants from the gender subcommittee, including Patricia, participated in a feminism workshop at a demobilisation camp in <a href="http://www.globalrights.info/2017/03/open-letter-to-world-women-from-colombian-women/">La Elvira, in the Cauca Valley</a>. The event, organised with international support and participation, gathered <em>guerrilleras</em> from different camps across the country. </p>
<p>Afterwards, Patricia acknowledged that “there are concepts that we do not yet have a grasp of” but reaffirmed the FARC’s plans to continue building awareness about feminism within its rank-and-file soldiers. </p>
<p>“We’ll need them to build our arguments,” she said. </p>
<p>Since January, several such workshops have been held in other places across the country. According to Laura Cardoza, a 31-year-old Colombian helping to facilitate the program, the aim is to <a href="https://colombiaplural.com/la-paz-va-las-mujeres-no-va/">instil feminism within all the FARC’s troops</a>.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, Patricia took her turn at leadership, too, coordinating a gender session with the men and women of the centralisation zone where she lives, in remote Arauca, near the Venezuelan border.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176387/original/file-20170630-8210-nr63oz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A gender workshop at the FARC concentration zones.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Camille Boutron</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>What is insurgent feminism?</h2>
<p>In post-conflict countries, female combatants’ lack of visibility and exclusion during the reconstruction phase tends to make them vulnerable when they reintegrate. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/world/americas/colombia-farc-child-soldiers.html?_r=0">Colombia’s recent experience</a>, for instance, has shown that women returning to civilian life experience high rates of violence and social discrimination. </p>
<p>This was one of the issues that the gender subcommittee of the Havana peace talks was intended to tackle. But it soon became something more, a kind of feminism workshop in which FARC delegates, Colombian government representatives, international actors and women’s organisations shared their knowledge and experiences. </p>
<p>“For the first time in 24 years,” Sandino told <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/estamos-creando-el-feminismo-en-las-farc-victoria-sandino">El Espectador newspaper</a> in September 2016, “I’m seeing that women feel the need to rise to positions of power.” </p>
<p>Women began pushing the leadership to include feminism in its future political platform. They weren’t talking about <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/feminism/The-third-wave-of-feminism">traditional third-wave feminism</a> (sometimes dubbed White Women’s Feminism), nor had they exactly adopted the language of <a href="http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/why-our-feminism-must-be-intersectional/">intersectional feminism</a>, with its focus on race and privilege. </p>
<p>Insurgent feminism <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/el-feminismo-en-el-partido-politico-de-las-farc">draws on the FARC’s anti-capitalist ideology</a>, linking women’s emancipation to the class struggle. For these Leninist-inspired fighters, Colombia’s political and economic system can never fundamentally change if patriarchal culture continues to be reproduced in everyday life.</p>
<p>Insurgent feminism exhorts all people, including men, to seek a transformation of gender relations among people of all identities and sexual orientations, and promotes a non-hegemonic concept of masculinity that breaks with traditional Colombian machismo.</p>
<p>All of this together could end the social and political exclusion of minority groups, say Sandino and her comrades. In this way, the philosophy establishes continuity between a revolutionary past of armed struggle and a future of political fights.</p>
<h2>From paper into practice</h2>
<p>There was resistance to making this philosophy part of the FARC’s political agenda. The insurgent group may have practiced gender equality, but it never talked much about feminism.</p>
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<p>Sandino and her cohort kept up the pressure and, eventually, their higher-ups agreed. The FARC has now declared its commitment to feminism and, in its party literature, is explicitly linking women’s empowerment with the fight against capitalism.</p>
<p>FARC feminists are trying to build bridges with other women’s movements, both at home and abroad – a critical step if insurgent feminism is to gain traction. </p>
<p>On June 23 2017, Sandino and other FARC feminists <a href="http://marchapatriotica.org/index.php/noticias-marcha-patriotica-2/231-opinion-y-analisis/4278-estamos-comprometidas-hasta-los-tuetanos-con-el-feminismo-victoria-sandino-de-las-farc-ep">presented their policy proposals</a>, which included preventing violence against women, reconptualising parental roles and deconstructing the social construct of gender, to a group of Colombian feminists from various sectors.</p>
<p>A seven-member <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/mujeres-haran-seguimiento-al-enfoque-de-genero-en-el-acuerdo-de-paz">panel of women</a> – representatives of Colombian women’s organisations – will be in charge of supporting the implementation of gender-based components of the peace accords, which offers FARC women some useful networking opportunities. </p>
<p>But many feminists are likely to be reluctant about get involved with a group that many Colombians still <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-plebiscite-the-case-for-yes-and-the-case-for-no-66325?sr=2">revile</a>. Collaboration with pacifist organisations, such as the <a href="https://www.rutapacifica.org.co/">Pacific Route of Women</a>, which is avowedly anti-violence, is difficult to envision.</p>
<p>Nor is it yet clear how high on the party’s agenda central insurgent feminism will be. According to FARC documents, the new party will have a “gender department”. What is its mandate? Who will run the office, and how well funded will it be? </p>
<p>Some veteran Colombian feminists, such as Catalina Ruiz-Navarro, are <a href="http://pacifista.co/ahora-las-farc-quieren-dar-lecciones-de-feminismo/">coming around to the FARC’s new vision</a>. Their rhetoric “shows that the FARC understand that feminism is a decisive, critical issue in contemporaneous politics,” she told the news site Pacifista. </p>
<p>The coming months and years will determine whether the men in power are also true believers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camille Boutron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Demilitarised female guerrillas in Colombia are hoping to spark a new women’s movement based in the FARC’s revolutionary ideals.Camille Boutron, Research assistant professor, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/739472017-04-05T06:08:46Z2017-04-05T06:08:46ZColombian guerrillas disarm, starting their risky return to civilian life<p><em><strong>This article, originally published on April 5 2017 with the headline “For Colombian rebels, a risky shift from armed revolt to party politics”, has been updated to reflect the latest developments in Colombia’s peace process.</strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>As of today, the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces are armed no more. </p>
<p>After missing the initial May 31 deadline to hand over their weapons, the FARC guerrillas have now completed the disarmament process, closing (perhaps) the final chapter of a 50-year conflict with the government of Colombia.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://twitter.com/TimoFARC/status/877157611715612672">tweeted statement</a>, FARC leader Timochenko has called disarmament “an act of will, bravery and hope”.</p>
<p>The peace process, which officially began with an accord signed on November 30 2016, has run up against numerous obstacles – from the <a href="http://caracol.com.co/radio/2017/02/22/nacional/1487718984_248013.html">inadequate</a> FARC <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-colombia-actually-put-its-peace-plan-into-action-73895">centralisation zones</a> and a much-criticised <a href="https://noticias.terra.com.co/mundo/onu-amnistia-en-colombia-viola-estandar-internacional,c6fe27e35a0a54c19c5f8aa90c844df2bi1un5lo.html">amnesty law</a> to the alarmingly frequent assassinations of Colombian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/19/colombia-farc-activist-killings">human rights activists</a>.</p>
<p>Now the country – and the FARC – is asking how well the decommissioned fighters from this half-century-old Marxist insurgency will transition back into civilian life. </p>
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<p>For peace to stick, a violent rebel group must now successfully become a political actor, deeply transforming who it is, how it sees itself and what it does. And while commanders like Timochenko have a clearly political vision for the FARC’s future, the path there remains fraught, particularly for the now out-of-work rank-and-file soldiers. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombian-authorities-release-composites-of-men-implicated-in-andino-bombing/17393">a recent deadly bombing in Bogotá</a> confirmed, the end of one of the longest-standing guerrilla insurgencies in contemporary world history does not mean the end of violence in Colombia. </p>
<h2>Making friends, gaining influence</h2>
<p>As a political party, the FARC – consummate political outsiders – will have to establish dialogue with other parties and social movements. At the moment, this is difficult to envision. Negotiations with the the FARC <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">faced stiff opposition</a>, and the organisation <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm">still features on the US terrorist watchlist</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, no politician dares to suggest an alliance. But in the long run, such domestic relationship-building seems <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/partidos-politicos/posibles-coaliciones-de-partidos-con-organizacion-politica-de-farc-28589">both necessary and probable</a>. Most likely, the FARC will seek to build ties with Colombia’s leftist national parties and social movements, as it has done in the past. </p>
<p>In the 1980s, negotiations with the FARC and other rebels resulted in the <a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/Colombias-Patriotic-Union-A-Victim-of-Political-Genocide-20151023-0056.html">Patriotic Union</a>, a big-tent leftist political party. In the decade to come, more than 3,000 <a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/Colombias-Patriotic-Union-A-Victim-of-Political-Genocide-20151023-0056.html">party representatives</a> were assassinated, including presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. For the FARC’s leaders, this hardly feels like ancient history. </p>
<p>In addition to the threat of violence, the question of whether the reinvented FARC will be allowed access to the highest spheres of national political power is very much open one. Will Colombia’s political establishment accept these fighters-turned-politicians?</p>
<h2>Persistent social hierarchies</h2>
<p>One thing is certain about the FARC’s reinvention: not all members will benefit equally from the organisation’s shift from armed insurgency to political party. </p>
<p>The FARC is heterogeneous, with a relatively <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-peru-to-colombia-the-silenced-voices-of-women-fighters-65817">high female participation rate</a> (around 40% are women), a fact that has attracted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/sep/16/colombia-farc-female-fighters-in-pictures">the most public attention</a>. </p>
<p>It is also diverse in terms of ethnicity, age, education level and social origins. Like Colombian society at large, the FARC’s fighters are Afro-Colombian, indigenous, white and mixed-race. Some members are college graduates from <a href="http://www.semana.com/educacion/articulo/que-estudiaron-los-miembros-de-las-farc/491224">middle-class homes who have been in the group for decades</a>; others are poor teenagers who joined a few years back. </p>
<p>Its <a href="http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros/que-es-el-secretariado-de-las-farc-ep.html">leadership</a>, however, looks less varied. Like any social group, the FARC’s internal power relations reproduce the social hierarchy of the outside world: from lead peace negotiator Ivan Marquez to general Timochenko, the orgnisation’s highest-ranking, most publicly visible officials are mostly white men. </p>
<p>As a revolutionary movement, the FARC sought to abolish historical social power relations, or <a href="http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros.html">at least to reinvent</a> them. And, up to a point, the group was indeed able to overcome much of the social discrimination that is so deeply institutionalised in Colombian society.</p>
<p>FARC women have enjoyed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/24/women-in-the-farc-have-had-a-mixed-experience-you-wouldnt-know-that-from-the-new-york-times/?utm_term=.f39b32b9b7ed">(some) greater sexual freedoms</a> and reproductive rights, and poor <a href="http://colombiareports.com/farc-demands-reform-for-colombias-rural-education-system/">kids got a free education</a>.</p>
<p>The gender subcommittee of the peace negotiations, established in September 2014 after <a href="https://www.elheraldo.co/politica/la-participacion-de-las-mujeres-en-los-acuerdos-de-la-habana-288413">pressure from women’s groups and international organisations</a>, represented an opportunity for learning and leadership for female FARC fighters. </p>
<p>Victoria Sandino, the FARC delegation’s subcommittee chairwoman, stepped out of the shadows to become a prominent principal spokesperson of what the FARC is now calling “<a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/estamos-creando-el-feminismo-en-las-farc-victoria-sandino">insurgent feminism</a>” – a set of collective anti-patriarchal, anti-racist and anti-classist practices built from the lived experience of female FARC fighters. </p>
<p>The experience of negotiation with political actors from different countries and ideologies shows how exchanges might contribute to mutual learning and help guide the deep transformation underway within the guerrilla group. </p>
<h2>Facing inequality</h2>
<p>As a political party, the FARC will find itself compelled to create new opportunities for political participation of other minority members as well. </p>
<p>Colombia is <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-colombia-and-south-africa-reveal-link-between-inequality-and-popular-uprisings-78214?sr=1">highly unequal, with marginalisation based on race, class and gender</a>. As soldiers become civilians, the reintegration process is likely to highlight, and maybe reinforce, inequalities that were less visible when the FARC was a military organisation. </p>
<p>Now that the group is not the sole provider of material support to its members, for example, high-ranking former combatants with a diploma and family support are likely to be better able to navigate the postwar period than their less privileged peers. </p>
<p>As experience from <a href="https://theconversation.com/advice-for-colombia-from-countries-that-have-sought-peace-and-sometimes-found-it-67419">other countries’ transitions out of armed conflict</a> shows, decommissioned soldiers who are not well trained for a new career or supported sufficiently during their transition are more likely to rejoin armed militancy. </p>
<p>To date, there has been dangerously little attention paid to providing psychological support for ex-FARC fighters (and, more broadly, to the general <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/salud-mental-en-colombia-un-desafio-del-posconflicto/511266">mental health issues that arise in post-conflict nations</a>). </p>
<p>The <a href="http://colombiareports.com/colombias-largest-neo-paramilitary-group-agc-claims-8000-members/">persistence of</a> of paramilitary groups in Colombia suggests that some former fighters of the Colombian armed conflict may not be ready to actually disarm.</p>
<p>As the FARC lays down its weapons, officially entering an explicitly political stage of life, potential spoilers to peace – both those outside of the FARC’s control and those well within its mandate – remain pressing in Colombia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camille Boutron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have officially laid down their weapons. How will these former fighters fare in the group’s transition from Marxist rebellion to political party?Camille Boutron, Research assistant professor, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/663252016-09-30T18:52:09Z2016-09-30T18:52:09ZColombia’s peace plebiscite: the case for Yes and the case for No<p>On October 2, Colombians will go to the polls to answer a deceptively simple question with enormous implications for their country: <em>Do you support the final agreement for the conclusion of the armed conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace</em>? </p>
<p>The plebiscite will ratify – or disrupt – a four-year peace negotiation between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The possibility to put an end to five decades of armed conflict is controversial. There is strong political opposition to a Yes vote, not least because previous, half-finished peace processes with the FARC have failed to end the war. </p>
<p>While polls s<a href="http://www.eluniversal.com.co/colombia/colombianos-aprobarian-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc-segun-sondeos-236491">how a clear lead</a> for the pro-peace “<em>Sí</em>” side, the “<em>No</em>” camp is well-organised and <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-colombia-no-campaign-20160929-snap-story.html">led by the powerful former president Álvaro Uribe</a>.</p>
<h2>The case for Sí</h2>
<p>The civil war has claimed more than <a href="http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV">220,000 lives</a> and led to more than 7 million displacements, 25,000 forced disappearances, and 30,000 kidnappings. A Yes vote will ensure that confrontations between the government and the FARC cease, and that people displaced by violence have the opportunity to return to their communities. Beyond disarmament of the FARC, the peace agreement includes provisions that aim to rectify the historical factors that led to and perpetuated the war. <a href="http://blog.cerac.org.co/monitor-de-desescalamiento-del-conflicto-armado-interno-en-colombia-6">Violence in the country has plummeted</a> since the FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire in mid-2015.</p>
<p>The accords intend to legalise the FARC’s political participation, opening up democratic channels as the main form political expression, rather than armed resistance. The FARC will receive <a href="http://colombiareports.com/farc-take-part-colombias-2018-elections-guaranteed-seats/">five seats in the Senate and five seats in the House of Representatives</a> for two electoral cycles, after which time they will join normal electoral competition.</p>
<p>The accords mandate that Colombia invests heavily in rural economic development, to help close the gap between economic growth that has been principally concentrated in cities, and poverty that has plagued peasants in rural Colombia for generations – a key component of the FARC’s Marxist ideology. </p>
<p>Yes voters expect to see <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/herramientas/Documents/Nuevo_enterese_version_6_Sep_final_web.pdf">an increase in social programs</a>, including health and education, as well as infrastructure development. Such investment will boost the government’s legitimacy, increase state capacity in long-neglected areas and deter illegal activity in the hinterlands.</p>
<p>Colombia’s repressive war on drugs has spurred violence, corruption, and instability, but Point 4 of the accords would change that. Rather than penalising coca-leaf cultivators, the country will invest in crop substitution (like cacao and coffee) in an effort to change economic incentives for peasant farmers. It would also reinforce the country’s move toward treating drug use as a public health issue. This means law enforcement resources will be concentrated more strategically on the criminal organisations that benefit from the drug trade.</p>
<p>The agreement places a premium on addressing the suffering of victims through <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/el-acuerdo-de-justicia-farc-el-mejor-de-historia-articulo-609602">restorative justice</a>. The severity of punishment for FARC members who have committed heinous crimes is based on their willingness to tell the truth. Those who come forward immediately and speak honestly about their actions will see restrictions on freedom of movement, but not prison. Those who don’t will face significant jail time. </p>
<p>Voting Yes in this plebiscite means saying no to another ongoing conflict with the country’s second-largest and still-active rebel group, the <a href="http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403300510.html">ELN</a>, providing a blueprint for another potential peace deal. </p>
<p>Public support for the FARC accords via the plebiscite could even convince the ELN <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/28/colombia-eln-rebels-peace-talks-farc">to resume stalled negotiations</a> with the government.</p>
<h2>The case for No</h2>
<p>Those pushing for No argue that the current peace agreement is perilously flawed. It provides too many concessions to the FARC, essentially rewarding terrorism and human rights violations. A No vote would force both sides to go back to the negotiating table to improve upon the most controversial parts of the agreement. Some victims of the conflict simply cannot conceive of making a deal with a terrorist organisation that has killed friends, family, and neighbours.</p>
<p>The FARC has caused lasting damage, which cannot be easily overcome with the signing of an agreement. Psychological trauma, massive <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/americas/colombia/">forced displacement</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/countries/colombia/">sexual violence</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/360&referer=/english/&Lang=E">recruitment of minors</a>, and a countryside filled with <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31831002">landmines</a> are all products of the FARC’s war. Some feel that respect for victims and their suffering demands more than what is included in the agreement.</p>
<p>The most controversial element of the peace deal, and perhaps the point that animates No supporters the most, concerns transitional justice provisions, which favour restorative justice principles (the right to truth and reparations) over punitive principles (sending perpetrators to jail for long stretches of time). Many FARC fighters who committed atrocities will never go to prison, instead facing relatively mild penalties, such as restrictions on travel, provided that they tell the truth about their war crimes. Many citizens find this notion appalling.</p>
<p>The peace agreement guarantees political representation for the FARC, which No voters say rewards the crimes of sedition and rebellion. Such representation may have a significant impact on Colombian politics, which could see FARC high commanders running for high office. Many fear that the Marxist FARC policies could have disastrous effect on the Colombian economy,should they be implemented.</p>
<p>The government will provide ex-combatants with a <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/herramientas/Documents/Nuevo_enterese_version_6_Sep_final_web.pdf">monthly allowance for investments in productive economic projects</a>, provided that they remain demobilised. Many poor people feel they’re effectively being penalised for following the law, since they won’t receive direct benefits through the deal.</p>
<p>No voters also have concerns about <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/economic-challenges-of-colombias-peace-plan-with-farc-rebels-2016-8">how the government will raise revenue</a> to pay for all the social programs set out in the peace deal, with higher taxes being nearly inevitable. Given a history of public-sector corruption, they fear these investments will not translate into improvements in quality of life and actual implementation of the more complex provisions of the agreement.</p>
<p>The accords specify that <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/silla-llena/red-rural/historia/el-acceso-la-tierra-propuesto-en-los-acuerdos-de-paz-es-una-idea">only land captured illegally during the conflict</a> will be seized and redistributed. But many in the No camp have concerns over how the process will actually work, citing <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/historia/los-temores-del-no-2la-expropiacion-de-tierras-58017">fear of expropriation</a> and violation of property rights.</p>
<p>Few in the No camp believe the FARC will comply with the agreement, given its history of failing to live up to its promises during <a href="http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2015/12/peace-in-colombia-lessons-from-the-failed-1999-2002-talks/">prior negotiations</a>. This mistrust stretches across many of the different points of the agreement. No voters not believe members of the FARC will accurately report on and forfeit resources gained illegally, which will be used to provide reparations to victims. Nor is there faith that ex-combatants will permanently demobilise and re-enter civilian life, or that the FARC will play by democratic rules by competing for votes through non-violent means.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Weintraub does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Colombians head to the polls for the October 2 referendum to permanently end the country’s civil war, everything from grief and hope to partisan politics will factor into their decision.Michael Weintraub, Associate Professor, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/658172016-09-30T06:31:31Z2016-09-30T06:31:31ZFrom Peru to Colombia: the silenced voices of women fighters<p>The October 2 referendum in Colombia is the country’s chance to end more than 50 years of civil war between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, better known as <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/89">FARC</a> - some <a>30 to 40% of which are women</a>. </p>
<p>Representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC have declared their commitment to <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/7/women-at-the-frontlines-building-peace-in-colombia">include a gender perspective</a> in the peace agreement, but the experiences of other female combatants throughout history show that women risk being left out of narratives of war. </p>
<p>So how will Colombia’s female fighters be <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/20/are-women-the-key-to-peace-in-colombia-farc-talks/">accounted for in the ongoing peace process</a>? </p>
<h2>Women in war</h2>
<p>Women have always appeared on the battlefield – from the female fighters in the Dahomey Kingdom (modern-day Benin) in the 19th century, to the hundreds of thousands of <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-the-west-ignores-women-as-actors-in-otherized-societies-a-sociological-unraveling-of-the-logos-of-the-soviet-amazons/5372529">Russian women soldiers who volunteered during the second world war</a>, whose testimonies have been magnificently gathered by Nobel prize laureate, <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/10/12/svetlana-alexievich-truth-many-voices/">Svetlana Alexievitch</a>. </p>
<p>As Alexievitch shows in her book, women’s contribution to war tends to be erased by history.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139475/original/image-20160927-30466-1pmppca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fon warriors also known as Mino in the Dahomey kingdom (now Benin) in the 19th century. They were called Amazones by Europeans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_c%C3%A9l%C3%A9bration_at_Abomey(1908)._-_The_veteran_amazones(_AHOSI_)_of_the_Fon_king_B%C3%A9hanzin,_Son_of_Roi_G%C3%A9l%C3%A9.jpg">Edmond Fortier</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women’s role in conflict has been traditionally associated with building peace, and the dynamic of male fighters versus women victims has historically dominated how we think about gender and war. Even today, the diversity and complexity of women’s war experiences is often silenced to conform with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/International-Organization-and-Global-Governance/Weiss-Wilkinson/p/book/9780415627603">the frames imposed by international organisations</a>, such as UN Women, which are the principal founders of peace-building projects. </p>
<p>It was striking to see, for instance, that the challenges faced by women ex-combatants were <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/es/news/stories/2016/9/announcement-second-national-summit-of-women-and-peace-in-bogota">barely mentioned</a> during the last summit of Women for Peace organised in Bogota.</p>
<p>The 2004 <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib">Abu Ghraib scandal</a>, which disclosed the participation of female US soldiers in torturing Iraqis prisoners, showed that women are not by nature inherently more peaceful than men. From suicide bombers in radicalised groups to <em>guerrilleras</em> in revolutionary movements like Colombia’s, women have participated in one way or another every struggle in contemporary history. </p>
<h2>The Shining Path</h2>
<p>When I first started my doctoral research on women’s participation in the Peruvian armed conflict 11 years ago, my primary goal was to overthrow the idea that women are victims, not combatants. The Peruvian case was emblematic, notably because of the high level of participation of women in the Shining Path, a revolutionary Maoist movement that rebelled against the state in 1980. Some <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3985659.stm">69,000 people</a> died in the conflict.</p>
<p>Like the FARC, women were thought to make up <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/22/world/lima-journal-shining-path-women-so-many-and-so-ferocious.html">40% of Shining Path militants</a>, and also to occupy executive positions. The role of women in the movement was set out in a document called <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/women/authors/adrianzen/1974.htm">Marxism, Mariategui and the Women’s Movement</a>, written by a group of female militants during the 1970s. </p>
<p>This document established the basis from which women’s issues would be treated within the Shining Path ideology. Several strategies were put in place in order to recruit female militants, peasants, students, and workers, and were coordinated by the <a href="http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20II/CAPITULO%201%20-%20Los%20actores%20armados%20del%20conflicto/1.1.%20PCP-SL/CAP%20I%20SL%20ORIGEN.pdf"><em>Comité Femenino Popular</em></a> (Popular Women’s Committee). </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1078&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1078&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139603/original/image-20160928-27042-1n376p5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1078&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shining Path electoral boycott poster.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Shining Path held an understandable attraction for young Peruvian women. During the 1970s, Peruvian society underwent <a href="https://vufind.carli.illinois.edu/vf-prc/Record/prc_47166">several dramatic social changes</a>, such as the democratisation of education and the emergence of the feminist movement, that considerably affected traditional social structures. Both occurred during a period of economic crisis and political instability.</p>
<p>The Shining Path provided an enticing alternative for young Peruvian women. Unlike other leftist parties such as <em><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/589278/summary">Vanguardia Roja</a></em> or <em><a href="http://perso.wanadoo.es/guerrillas/movguerrperumir.htm">el MIR</a></em> that were reluctant to address feminist issues, Shining Path insisted on the central role of women in the revolution. The movement’s success in recruiting women, in other words, was mainly due to the failure of other political movements to understand that women’s issues were eminently political. </p>
<p>When Abimael Guzman, founder of the Shining Path, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/14/world/fugitive-leader-of-maoist-rebels-is-captured-by-the-police-in-peru.html">was arrested in September 1992</a>, eight other militants were arrested with him. Four of these were women. Like female fighters who grab headlines today, the women got the most attention in the national press on the days following their capture. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qcaSFteIp6o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An archive of Guzman and members of Shining Path arrested in 1992.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women militants of the Shining Path became objects of shame, and their representations in the press were used to discredit their leader - and indeed the whole party. </p>
<h2>Writing women into the story</h2>
<p>Women’s motivations for joining the armed struggle were diverse, as were their social origins, ages, and occupations. On the other side of the conflict, women contributed to the self-defense committees that were formed in the early 1980s to support the Peruvian army in the struggle. </p>
<p>Despite being mentioned by the <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> in its 2003 final report, the contribution of peasant women to the war still remains neglected in histories of the conflict.</p>
<p>The physical and symbolic injuries caused by the armed conflict are tangible in Peru today. Thousands of men and women were incarcerated, mostly during the 1990s, some of them <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/shining-path-militant-leaders-given-life-sentences-in-peru-1.628864">facing life sentences</a>. Mass incarceration, then as now, had a particular effect on women and on their families. </p>
<p>It also raised new issues for reconciliation. For a peace process to be successful, the diversity of experiences that women had as combatants must be considered. </p>
<h2>Colombia’s next phase</h2>
<p>As I now begin a new research project in Colombia, I wonder how the question of women’s participation to that armed conflict is going to be treated by history.</p>
<p>I am working to understand how gender is understood in this specific context of war turning to peace, and it seems to me, for now, that women are still largely considered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/20/colombia-city-of-women-safe-haven-from-violence-conflict">victims</a> rather than political agents. </p>
<p>The Colombian peace process is different from that of Peru, mainly because Colombia is ending its conflict through negotiation. But there are lessons on inclusion to be learned. Women’s experiences as combatants must be visible in the post-conflict era. By escaping historical oblivion, women can find space for recognition and social action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65817/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camille Boutron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Women’s involvement in armed conflict in Peru and Colombia has a deep impact on societies. But peace processes and political aftermath rarely recognise their role.Camille Boutron, Research assistant professor, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.