tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/university-of-groningen-1055/articlesThe University of Groningen2023-10-02T19:44:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140442023-10-02T19:44:18Z2023-10-02T19:44:18ZBeing told where their blood ends up encourages donors to give again – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551065/original/file-20230928-15-mqdgaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=139%2C101%2C6043%2C3772&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What's a good way to get people to participate in blood drives?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/phlebotomist-tends-to-a-blood-donor-at-the-kfc-yum-center-news-photo/1233854784?adppopup=true">Jon Cherry/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Telling people who have donated blood when and where the blood was used <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/10946705231202244">makes them more likely to do it again</a>, according to our new study. Donors who got details like the date and the hospital were 10% more likely to donate again than people who were just thanked.</p>
<p>Together with University of Hamburg marketing scholars <a href="https://www.bwl.uni-hamburg.de/en/mm/team/besarta-veseli.html">Besarta Veseli</a> and <a href="https://www.bwl.uni-hamburg.de/mm/team/prof-dr-michel-clement.html">Michel Clement</a>, we conducted real-world studies, backed by an online experiment.</p>
<p>Working with the Austrian Red Cross, we looked at whether nearly 75,000 people who had donated in the prior two years would return to give blood. They were either simply thanked or they also were given specific information about the date their blood was used and the name of the hospital where that happened. Those receiving specific information were 10% more likely to donate again than the thanks-only group. </p>
<p>The Austrian Red Cross also helped us see the role of timing in another study. The organization sent people a short text message, including the date when a donation was used and the hospital name, either three weeks after their donation or 10 days before they could donate again – roughly one month apart. Getting those details 10 days before they could donate again made them 63% less likely to give blood again compared to people who received the same message three weeks after their last donation.</p>
<p>In an additional study, we worked with the German Red Cross, which sent information to over 16,000 people who had not donated blood for over two years. They were either thanked for their previous donation, thanked and told how their blood was used, or thanked and told how their next donation would be used. These former blood donors were 11% more likely to donate again when they were told how their blood was used in the past compared to those who were just thanked or told how their future donation could be used.</p>
<p>To understand what drives this effect, we conducted an online experiment with nearly 500 people who had previously donated blood through the German Red Cross. When these people were prompted to imagine they had received a text message with details about the use of blood they had donated in the past, they felt like the organization cared about them more. Consequently, they said they’d be more likely to donate again.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Based on our initial findings, the Austrian Red Cross replaced its traditional thank-you message with information about when and where the blood was used. While we did not work with the American Red Cross, <a href="https://whnt.com/news/red-cross-blood-donor-app-lets-people-track-what-hospital-their-blood-goes-to/">its app notifies people of the hospital where their blood is used</a>. </p>
<p>If giving donors more information about how their blood was used boosts blood donations, it can save lives.</p>
<p>Although nearly half of the U.S. population is eligible to give blood, <a href="https://givingblood.org/about-blood/blood-facts.aspx">less than 10% donate at least once a year</a>. Among those who give blood, there are some restrictions in place, such as requiring that donors <a href="https://www.mayoclinic.org/blood-donor-program/faq">wait at least 56 days</a> before they do it again.</p>
<p>And blood is in constant demand. Every two seconds, someone in the U.S. needs <a href="https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/how-to-donate/how-blood-donations-help/blood-needs-blood-supply.html">blood, platelets or both</a>, according to the American Red Cross, a nonprofit that <a href="https://www.wrdw.com/2023/09/11/american-red-cross-declares-national-blood-shortage-2/">collects 40% of the country’s blood donations</a>. </p>
<p>Because not everyone who is eligible to give blood ever donates, there are periodic shortages, which have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jan/13/blood-donation-crisis-us-red-cross">become more frequent</a>. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/09/11/blood-shortage-american-red-cross/">Red Cross declared one on Sept. 11, 2023</a>, <a href="https://www.redcross.org/about-us/news-and-events/press-release/2023/red-cross-announces-national-blood-shortage.html">which it attributed</a> to “back-to-back months of almost constant climate-driven disasters” that made it harder for people who might otherwise have donated blood to be able to do so.</p>
<p>Chronic shortfalls can lead hospitals to <a href="https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/dlp/coronavirus--covid-19--and-blood-donation.html">postpone transfusions and surgeries</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A white trailer with the words 'Please give blood' emblazoned on it in bold red letters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551064/original/file-20230928-29-9nn73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The American Red Cross stationed this bloodmobile in Fullerton, Calif., on Jan. 20, 2022, amid a shortage of donated blood.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wrdw.com/2023/09/11/american-red-cross-declares-national-blood-shortage-2/">Paul Bersebach/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, <a href="https://scroll.in/pulse/835642/why-some-stored-blood-is-always-discarded-and-why-that-should-not-deter-blood-donors">some donated blood is discarded</a> rather than used in transfusions and other medical procedures. We plan to discover whether and how organizations that collect donated blood should tell donors when that happens with their blood. </p>
<p>We also aim to analyze whether telling regular donors repeatedly about their blood’s use will make more or less of a difference over time. </p>
<p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/research-brief-83231">Research Brief</a> is a short take on interesting academic work.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Because not everyone who is eligible to give blood donates at least once a year, there are periodic shortages, like the one the American Red Cross declared on Sept. 11, 2023.Edlira Shehu, Professor of Digital Marketing, University of GroningenKaren Winterich, Susman Professor in Sustainability and Professor of Marketing, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101052023-09-17T12:07:27Z2023-09-17T12:07:27ZOlder Canadians’ savings are shaped by their long-term care preferences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547630/original/file-20230911-8406-rbs70z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C38%2C5160%2C3406&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A recent study has found that Canadians are highly motivated to save money in preparation of long-term care.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/older-canadians-savings-are-shaped-by-their-long-term-care-preferences" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Canada’s aging population is growing. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the proportion of Canadians aged 80 and older <a href="https://www.oecd.org/health/health-at-a-glance/">will surpass nine per cent by 2050</a>, up from 4.3 per cent in 2021. </p>
<p>This demographic shift is happening in most developed nations, and will result in a greater demand for long-term care. Québec, for instance, anticipates that <a href="https://creei.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/cahier_21_01_financement_soutien_autonomie_personnes_agees_croisee_chemins.pdf">600,000 people will need long-term care by 2050</a> — nearly double the current number.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, escalated care expenses in recent years, <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/o1/en/plus/4165-nurses-working-harder-more-hours-amid-increased-labour-shortage">attributed to labour shortages and exacerbated by COVID-19</a>, are a pressing concern.</p>
<h2>The costs of long-term care</h2>
<p>In Québec, <a href="https://bonjourresidences.com/blogue/couts-hebergement-chsld/">the rates (before any income-based subsidy) for public nursing home accommodations are around $2,000 a month</a>. But since public nursing homes have such long waiting lists, some choose private nursing homes instead. The costs of private nursing homes are estimated to be between $5,000 and $8,000 a month.</p>
<p>Home care — <a href="https://theconversation.com/canadians-want-home-care-not-long-term-care-facilities-after-covid-19-170620">a preferred option for many</a> — costs around $5,550 a month, excluding additional expenses like maintenance and food. Consequently, long-term care expenses present a substantial financial risk in old age, potentially motivating people to save for it ahead of time.</p>
<p>While both nursing homes and home care impose financial burdens, their distinct cost structures can influence precautionary savings in different ways. </p>
<p>Nursing homes bundle accommodation and food, offering limited additional services. In contrast, home care recipients can allocate savings for quality-of-life improvements like better food, home maintenance, etc. Additionally, people may inherently value spending more while at home.</p>
<h2>Long-term care and savings</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://economie.esg.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2023/05/2023_02_docdt_eco.pdf">recent research project</a> aimed to understand how preferences for home-based care versus nursing homes affect people’s savings, using both survey responses and a simulation study.</p>
<p>Our research is crucial for two reasons. First, even before the pandemic, a reluctance to be institutionalized — known as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2017.10.001">institutionalization aversion</a> — was documented. Second, COVID-19 has further <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.034">discouraged nursing home entry</a>, possibly due to excess mortality in nursing homes, as has been <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4613">documented in many countries</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inquiry-into-coronavirus-nursing-home-deaths-needs-to-include-discussion-of-workers-and-race-139017">Inquiry into coronavirus nursing home deaths needs to include discussion of workers and race</a>
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<p>To model savings in different care settings effectively, we needed to understand how individuals allocated their resources in those settings. To accomplish this, we developed a set of survey questions aimed at uncovering these preferences.</p>
<p>These survey questions were designed to prompt respondents to consider how they would allocate their resources depending on the long-term care setting in a well-defined, hypothetical scenario.</p>
<p>Survey respondents were randomly assigned to different long-term care settings (home care, semi-private room in a nursing home or a private room in a nursing home). Their resource allocation choices allowed us to examine how their preferences for savings varied based on the type of long-term care setting.</p>
<p>Our analysis of 3,000 survey responses shows that Canadians are highly motivated to save money to be better prepared for long-term care. This willingness to save was much larger when respondents expected to use home care; respondents anticipating home care allocated 38 per cent more resources to savings. This reflects the greater financial needs associated with home care.</p>
<h2>Long-term care insurance</h2>
<p>We used the results from our survey to calibrate a simulation study — a computer-based experiment using a combination of economic theories and survey evidence — to simulate how households and individuals make financial decisions.</p>
<p>Our simulation study examined two scenarios: one based on the Canadian system, which includes a universal subsidy that lowers nursing home costs, and one based on the U.S. Medicaid system, which features a purely means-tested subsidy that provides free long-term care and ensures a minimum standard of living for those without sufficient income.</p>
<p>Differences in individual preferences for various care settings largely explain the savings disparities. In the Canada-like system, the prospect of receiving long-term care at home substantially boosts savings. On average, individuals planning to use home care saved $25,000 (8.3 per cent) more by the age of 66, compared to those planning to use private nursing home rooms, and $29,000 (9.8 per cent) more compared to those opting for semi-private rooms. </p>
<p>Under the U.S.-like system, the impacts on savings of different care settings were much smaller. This is because, in the absence of public subsidies, the minimum costs of a room in a nursing home are much higher than those of home care. When comparing the savings of individuals opting for home care versus a private room in a nursing home, the difference in savings was almost null. </p>
<p>However, when comparing savings between those opting for home care versus a semi-private room in a nursing home, we found that the former saved 3.7 per cent more.</p>
<h2>Policy implications</h2>
<p>Assessing how individuals value additional public subsidies for each type of long-term care setting can provide policymakers with valuable insights about how to expand public long-term care insurance effectively. </p>
<p>Our research found that all subsidies are valued well beyond costs, with home care subsidies being more valued than nursing home subsidies. Under the Canada-like system, the average valuation for a home care subsidy was $2.98 per $1 spent, surpassing private ($2.72) and semi-private ($2.35) nursing home subsidies.</p>
<p>Middle-income individuals who aren’t eligible for means-tested programs, but who have limited savings, placed the highest value on these subsidies. This shows that expanding subsidies for home care can be an effective way to protect Canadians from long-term care risks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marie-Louise Leroux receives funding from FRQSC and SSHRC-CRSH. She is affiliated with CIRANO (Montreal) and CESifo (Munich). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franca Glenzer receives funding from SSHRC-CRSH. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Achou, Minjoon Lee, and Philippe De Donder do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While both nursing homes and home care impose financial burdens, their differing structures can influence how older Canadians save money.Marie-Louise Leroux, Professeure titulaire en Sciences Economiques, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Bertrand Achou, Assistant Professor, Economics, University of GroningenFranca Glenzer, Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, HEC MontréalMinjoon Lee, Assistant Professor, Economics, Carleton UniversityPhilippe De Donder, Research director (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics – École d'Économie de ToulouseLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2028572023-04-17T14:24:32Z2023-04-17T14:24:32ZPredicting epidemics isn’t easy. We’ve created a global dataset to help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520280/original/file-20230411-20-k6ve92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Countries around the world were not prepared to respond to COVID-19.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Wasike Shimanyula/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world has recently seen a number of high-profile cross-border disease outbreaks and pandemics. The COVID pandemic and multi-country Mpox (monkeypox) outbreaks are just two examples. </p>
<p>But there is very little scientific evidence that would give a clear picture of how fast and how often infectious diseases spread across countries. A key challenge for creating global disease data is the scattering of information. Low-income countries have limited statistical capacity to keep track of disease outbreaks. And datasets from various countries are difficult to combine due to different reporting standards.</p>
<p>To get a better global picture of infectious disease patterns, our team of economists and statisticians set out to create <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-022-01797-2">a global dataset</a>. We collected data from the World Health Organization’s <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news">“Disease Outbreak News”</a> and <a href="https://covid19.who.int/">Coronavirus Dashboard</a>. </p>
<p>Disease Outbreak News contains information from health authorities and research networks about confirmed acute public health events or events of concern. They include any outbreak or rapidly evolving situation that may have negative consequences for human health and requires immediate assessment and action. Unfortunately, this information is mostly unstructured and is not produced for statistical purposes. It can’t be directly used for systematic analysis. To make such structured statistical information available, we relied on <a href="https://www.parsehub.com/blog/what-is-web-scraping/">web-scraping</a> techniques to extract when and where a particular infectious disease occurred. </p>
<p>Statistical restructuring of this data allowed us to paint a systematic picture of the spread of infectious diseases. Our findings are based on the statistical probabilities of disease outbreak, not the virulence. We found that most disease outbreaks were reported in African countries. High-income countries were significantly affected too – particularly during pandemics like the 2009 “swine flu” outbreak and COVID-19.</p>
<p>The presence of such pandemic events highlights the need for policy preparedness. By analysing how disease outbreaks spread across countries, health authorities can develop targeted measures to contain future outbreaks.</p>
<h2>What the data shows</h2>
<p>Our dataset contains information on over 2,000 public health events that have occurred in 233 countries and territories since 1996. These outbreaks involve 70 different infectious diseases. The figure below shows when those occurred. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=643&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=643&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520313/original/file-20230411-26-9f5d14.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=643&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Total frequency of outbreaks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Juan Armando Torres Munguía</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>No clear trend over time is visible: there are around 50 public health events that trigger a Disease Outbreak News announcement each year. Instead of an increase over time, temporary surges are visible in the context of the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html">2009 “swine flu” influenza A(H1N1) pandemic</a> and COVID-19. These diseases were essentially global and accordingly triggered Disease Outbreak News in many countries. </p>
<p>Our data recorded only one disease outbreak announcement per country, year and disease. For example, COVID-19 in China is recorded once in 2019, once in 2020, and once in 2021. This means the data doesn’t show how serious a disease outbreak was, nor how many people were affected in one country. Instead, the data for each year reflects how many different diseases were recorded, and how many different countries were affected. This is useful from a policy perspective since all recorded outbreaks call for immediate action.</p>
<p>COVID-19 is the most prominent disease in the outbreak news announcements. Almost one third of the 2,227 health events recorded in our dataset concern COVID-19, closely followed by influenza cases of zoonotic nature. Cholera is the third-most recorded infectious disease, but much less frequent than COVID-19 or influenza (about 170 recorded outbreak news).</p>
<p>Countries with the highest records of infectious disease outbreaks are mostly large (in terms of size and population), close to the Equator, and have low or modest income levels. Africa accounts for almost 40% of recorded cases of outbreaks. And it’s home to the two most outbreak-prone countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria each recorded over 40 disease outbreaks since 1996. </p>
<p>High income levels don’t prevent outbreaks. Wealthier countries were affected despite their substantial financial means for public health measures. The US recorded the third highest number of disease outbreaks. France and the UK had over 20 unique disease outbreaks each. </p>
<h2>How the data is useful</h2>
<p>Our analysis shows that there is no clear global increase of infectious disease outbreaks over time. We rather observe temporary waves of single diseases that affect many countries. Public health systems hence need to quickly assess how threatening a disease outbreak in another country is and what measures should be taken to prevent their spreading across and within countries. </p>
<p>Effective public health responses will depend on how diseases usually spread geographically. And our dataset offers rich potential to analyse such spatial disease transmission. </p>
<p>Disease outbreaks are geographically related. Our statisticians tested whether disease outbreaks are randomly scattered around the globe or not. The results are depicted in the map below. A country that is coloured in a darker shade of green is more likely to contribute to cross-country spreading of diseases. Outbreaks are clustered geographically. These clusters – Northern America, Africa and South-/East Asia – provide a first glimpse of international disease transmission patterns. </p>
<p>But more research will be needed to better understand pandemic contagion pathways, which likely differ by disease. Our dataset will be a valuable resource for such analysis.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=236&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520315/original/file-20230411-16-mflczf.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Disease transmission map.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Juan Armando Torres Munguía</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Policy preparedness</h2>
<p>A better understanding of how different infectious diseases spread across countries can help establish early warning mechanisms and response protocols. One could estimate how likely it is that an outbreak of a disease in one country will spread to another country and over what time period. </p>
<p>Policymakers could even put protocols in place where a certain disease transmission likelihood triggers a response measure (such as rolling out vaccines, or travel warnings). </p>
<p>Similarly, international organisations could use such spatial pandemic models to infer which other countries would most likely be affected by an outbreak, and focus resources accordingly. Chaotic health resource allocations, as was the case of the COVID-19 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/28/face-masks-coveted-commodity-coronavirus-pandemic">masks</a> and <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/ga12367.doc.htm">vaccines</a>, could thus be avoided.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Konstantin M. Wacker collaborates in a research group that received funding from the ENLIGHT network. His investment portfolio includes minor shares of health companies (details under "disclosure" on his private website).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and Juan Armando Torres Munguía do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new global dataset shows there is no clear global increase of infectious disease outbreaks over time. And it can suggest which countries would most likely be affected by an outbreak.Konstantin M. Wacker, Assistant professor of economics, University of GroningenInmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Professor in Economics, Universitat Jaume IJuan Armando Torres Munguía, Research assistant, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992642023-02-20T10:25:32Z2023-02-20T10:25:32ZDebate: ChatGPT offers unseen opportunities to sharpen students’ critical skills<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510987/original/file-20230219-20-kcqh39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6709%2C4466&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A savvy ChatGPT user needs to master two sciences: prompting and evaluating the software's response. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/team-young-college-students-working-on-2111421299">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As gloomy predictions foretell the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/12/29/essay-writing-chatbot-could-mean-end-homework-schools-warn/">end of homework</a>, education institutions are hastily revising their policies and curricula to address the challenges posed by AI chatbots. It is true that the emergence of chatbots does raise <a href="https://researcher.life/blog/article/chatgpt-for-research-writing-game-changer-or-ethical-risk/">ethical</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/opinion/chatgpt-education-ai-technology.html">philosophical</a> questions. Yet, through their interactions with AI, people will inevitably enhance skills that are crucial in our day and age: language awareness and critical thinking.</p>
<p>We are aware that this claim contradicts the widespread worries about the loss of creativity, individual and critical thinking. However, as we will demonstrate, a shift in perspective from the ‘output’ to the ‘user’ may allow for some optimism.</p>
<h2>Sophisticated parroting</h2>
<p>It is not surprising that the success of ChatGPT <a href="https://mackinstitute.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Christian-Terwiesch-Chat-GTP.pdf">passing an MBA</a> and producing <a href="https://theconversation.com/chatgpt-our-study-shows-ai-can-produce-academic-papers-good-enough-for-journals-just-as-some-ban-it-197762">credible academic papers</a> has sparked worry among educators about how students will learn to form an opinion and articulate it. This is indeed a scary prospect: from the smallest everyday decisions to large-scale, high-stakes societal issues, we form our opinions through gathering information, (preferably) doing some research, thinking critically while we evaluate the evidence and reasoning, and then make our own judgement. Now cue in ChatGPT: it will evaluate the vast dataset it has been trained on, and save you the hard work of researching, thinking and evaluating.
The glitch, as the bot itself admits, is that its answers are not based on independent research:<em>“I generate text based on patterns I have seen in the data. I present the most likely text based on my training, but I don’t have the ability to critically evaluate or form my own opinions.”</em></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=215&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=215&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508165/original/file-20230204-14522-xlg2dk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=215&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ChatGPT responds.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Don’t be fooled by the logic of this answer: the AI application does not explain its actions and their consequences (and as we will see later, there is a big difference between the two). The world ChatGPT presents to us is based on <em>argumentum ad populum</em> – it considers to be true what is repeated the most. Of course, it’s not: if you go down the rabbit hole of reports on AI ‘hallucinations’, you are bound to find many stories. Our favourite is how the chatbot dreamed up the <a href="https://twitter.com/dsmerdon/status/1618816703923912704">most widely cited economics paper</a>. </p>
<p>This is why we agree with those who <a href="https://intellectualtakeout.org/2023/01/writing-the-coming-of-chatgpt/">doubt that ChatGPT will take over</a> our content creating, creative, fact-checking jobs any time soon. However convincing they are, AI-generated texts sit in a vacuum: a chatbot does not communicate the way humans do, it does not know the actual purpose of the text, the intended audience or the context in which it will be used – unless specifically told so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="ChatGPT on mobile and computer" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510989/original/file-20230219-457-qqw58c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Learning to better grasp the nuances of language, context and intended purpose could help future generations to combat misinformation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/portland-usa-jan-17-2023-webpages-2250721589">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A chance to sharpen our critical skills</h2>
<p>Users need to be savvy in both <em>prompting</em> and <em>evaluating</em> the output. Prompting is a skill that requires precise vocabulary and an understanding of how language, style or genres work. Evaluation is the ability to assess the output. </p>
<p>Let us give an example. Imagine your task is to respond to a corporate crisis. You reach out to ChatGPT to create a corporate apology. You prompt it: Assume some responsibility. Use formal language. Should be short. </p>
<p>And this is where the magic happens.</p>
<p>You have done your prompting, but now you need to check: does this text look and sound like a corporate apology? How do people normally use language to assume or shift blame? Is the text easy to read or does it hide its true meaning behind complex language? Whose voice are we hearing in the apology? </p>
<p>To check if your text is right, you must know what the typical genre or style features are. You must know about crisis management strategies. Readability levels. Or how we encode agency in language (as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2329490619828367?casa_token=a0Z3UK3jMIsAAAAA:E3VRAa_DQVv81lRxeoa7cEMdrA-7LSDCtFdXj7VxoXmre4m06MvAg-KAXlAcgv96dXN2spNieHPyrw">this study found</a>). </p>
<p>In academic scholarship this kind of knowledge is called <em>language awareness</em>. Language awareness has several levels: the first one is simply noticing language(s) and its elements. The second level is when we can identify and label the various elements, and creatively manipulate them. </p>
<p>Consider for example the beginning of two versions of corporate apologies ChatGPT created: </p>
<p><em>“We would like to deeply apologize for the actions of our company…”<br>
“We would like to deeply apologize for the inconvenience our actions caused…</em>”</p>
<p>A cursory read of these two may look as if both messages were apologetic, but the difference is what they apologize for. One apologizes for their actions. The other for the consequences of their actions. This small difference affects legal liability: in the second case, the company does not explicitly accept responsibility. After all, they are only sorry for the inconvenience. </p>
<p>Such examples like the one above can make people think about small linguistic differences and their meaning for communication. The beauty of it is that the more often we look closely at language, the more we notice what it does in communication. Once you see how a ‘fauxpology’ works, you can never unsee it.</p>
<h2>A potential weapon against misinformation</h2>
<p>Back to ChatGPT: as we can see, for the best results, users need to prompt it right, and then check the produced text against the prompt criteria. For this they need to understand the nuances of language, context and intended purpose. </p>
<p>Why is this knowledge such a big deal? Because of a third level of awareness that we have not mentioned before. This is when people realize how language creates, affects and manipulates their perceptions of reality. This knowledge is invaluable in our age of misinformation and populism when the issues society grapples with are mostly abstract and intangible. The more people know about how language works, the more they start to notice how <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-circus-became-the-metaphor-of-choice-in-political-rhetoric-197973">politicians</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trolling-ourselves-to-death-in-the-age-of-trump-80524">media</a> create versions of the world for them through their communications. </p>
<p>Language awareness makes people sensitive to questionable corporate communication practices, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/employees-want-genuine-corporate-social-responsibility-not-greenwashing-130435">greenwashing</a> to… you know, non-apologies. What is more, language awareness may help people better understand why society (doesn’t) respond to actions targeting the climate crisis. Dubbed as <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/climate-change-science-communication-failure-1.3345524">the largest communication failure in history</a>, almost every aspect of the climate crisis – and how people act as a result – depends on <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/3709795-climate-change-a-communications-failure/">how we talk about it</a>. </p>
<p>It is impossible to predict the extent to which AI applications like ChatGPT will disrupt the world of education and work. For now, society can both prepare for the dangers of AIs and <a href="https://oneusefulthing.substack.com/p/the-practical-guide-to-using-ai-to">embrace their potential</a>. In the process of learning how to interact with them well, however, people are bound to become “prompt savvy”, and with that more aware of how language works. With such <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/language-awareness-in-business-and-the-professions/A84AD6006218C1D97203E49FB376E260">language awareness</a> comes the power to consume texts with a critical eye. A glimmer of optimism for a sustainable future is that critical reading leaves less room to manipulation and misinformation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Many view ChatGPT as a death sentence for homework. But beyond all the alarm, could it be the software offers students unprecedented chances to hone their language awareness skills?Erika Darics, University of GroningenLotte van Poppel, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2001042023-02-16T16:06:38Z2023-02-16T16:06:38ZRussia–Ukraine war has nearly doubled household energy costs worldwide – new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510579/original/file-20230216-16-p4midv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5472%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sodel Vladyslav/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Russia–Ukraine war has exacerbated an energy crisis that directly affects the costs of heating, cooling, lighting and mobility, and indirectly pushed up the costs of other goods and services throughout global supply chains. While all households are affected, they are affected in different ways depending on their income, how they spend their money, and how and where the products that they are buying were produced. Targeted energy assistance can help vulnerable households during this crisis but for that we need to know who is affected, to what degree and why.</p>
<p>To investigate this, we have modelled the direct and indirect impacts of increased energy prices in 116 countries, covering 87.4% of the global population, with a focus on developing countries. Our results are now published in <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-023-01209-8">Nature Energy</a>. </p>
<h2>Unequal surge in household burden</h2>
<p>Since the conflict began almost exactly a year ago, energy prices have increased sharply but to varying degrees depending on the type of fuel. The following graph shows the price fluctuations:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph with lines representing price of fuels over past year" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510580/original/file-20230216-20-hfbl2b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Price increases for fossil fuels compared with the 2021 average.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-023-01209-8">Guan and Yan et al (2023), Nature Energy</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We used a computer program to simulate the impact these energy price increases would have for households around the world. On the basis of a set of energy price scenarios, we show that total energy costs (direct and indirect) for households have increased by at least 63% and possibly as much as 113% (that is, more than doubled). This contributes to an increase in global household expenditure of between 2.7% and 4.8%. This is a huge shift, equivalent to a massive economic shock: households around the world have suddenly been required to find a few percent of extra income just to maintain their pre-2022 living standards. </p>
<p>The wide uncertainty is because such a big part of the increase in household expenditure is for indirect energy consumption – energy used to produce the stuff or food that we consume. So for instance if someone in South Africa eats imported beef, the price of that beef might be affected by the cost of energy for the fertilizer (from Germany, perhaps) that is used to produce soybeans in Brazil which then feed the cows, along with the associated costs of fuel for transport. Factoring in lots of things like this means we cannot be too precise.</p>
<p>We do know that wealthier groups tend to have higher energy costs on goods and services, while poorer households tend to spend more on meeting daily needs such as food and direct energy. More vulnerable households tend to be more reliant on purchasing energy-intensive, processed goods and services.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Shaded world map" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510581/original/file-20230216-22-mg1hvx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Total impacts of rising energy prices on 116 countries. The colour of countries shows the per capita energy cost increase (grey countries are missing from our database). The size of the circle refers to the additional energy cost as a percentage of total household expenditure.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-023-01209-8">Guan and Yan et al (2023), Nature Energy</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, household energy costs increased by up to three times the global average. In Rwanda, for instance, it increased by 11%. Residential energy use in these countries is less dependent on fossil fuels (<a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30101">99.6% of households</a> in Rwanda cooked with wood and other biomass in 2018, for example), but there are huge indirect costs through the supply chain especially for food.</p>
<h2>Additional poverty caused by the energy crisis</h2>
<p>Rising energy prices are making households more vulnerable to energy poverty, particularly during the cold season. People in energy poverty do not have access to adequate heating, cooling, lighting, and energy to power appliances. The global energy price spikes would increase the number of energy-poor households, that is their energy costs account for more than 10% of total expenditures somewhere between 166 million and 538 million people (2.4% to 7.9% of the global population). </p>
<p>Also, under these cost-of-living pressures, somewhere between 78 million and 141 million people could be pushed below <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2022/05/02/fact-sheet-an-adjustment-to-global-poverty-lines">the World Bank’s extreme poverty line</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Food market in Rwanda" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510597/original/file-20230216-24-car9oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Countries like Rwanda have been hit by more expensive goods such as food.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oscar Espinosa / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Missed opportunities</h2>
<p>The energy price increases due to the Russian-Ukraine war would not have had such an extreme impact if better policy decisions had been made before. Take, for example, the quite recent COVID crisis that provided a great opportunity to redirect investments toward the energy transition and loosening the dependence on fossil fuel imports given the huge amounts of money used to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-00977-5">kick-start the economy</a>. Yet a large share of the public funds was invested in fossil fuel infrastructure. </p>
<p>A similar picture emerges today as governments extend brown coal extraction (in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/energy-crisis-fuels-coal-comeback-germany-2022-12-16/">Germany</a>), build new coal infrastructure (for instance, in <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-coal-mine-in-cumbria-makes-no-sense-for-the-climate-or-britains-energy-security-181973">the UK</a> and many developing countries such as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452292922000042">Pakistan</a>), or invest in liquid natural gas terminals all of which are highly carbon intensive or hugely inefficient. These kinds of solutions lock us into a very expensive infrastructure that we shouldn’t have in the first place if we take climate change seriously. </p>
<p>Despite multiple global treaties and agreements to reduce carbon emissions, the slow and hesitant progress in the energy transition is reflected in the dependency on fossil fuel imports and has amplified the severity of the cost-of-living crisis. This crisis has pushed a number of economies into recession, caused higher inflation, and put painful cost-of-living pressures on vulnerable households around the world. This unprecedented global energy crisis should come as a reminder that an energy system highly reliant on fossil fuels perpetuates energy-security risks and accelerates climate change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200104/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jin Yan receives funding from China Scholarship Council PhD Program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuli Shan receives funding from UKRI Research England and NSFC. He is affiliated with the University of Birmingham and the University of Groningen. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuru Guan receives funding from China Scholarship Council PhD program. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus Hubacek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>116 country assessment shows huge direct and indirect impacts of expensive energy.Klaus Hubacek, Professor of Science, Technology and Society , University of GroningenJin Yan, PhD Candidate, Integrated Research on Energy, Environment and Society (IREES), University of GroningenYuli Shan, Associate Professor in Sustainable Transitions, University of BirminghamYuru Guan, PhD Candidate, Integrated Research on Energy, Environment and Society (IREES), University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979252023-01-17T06:08:51Z2023-01-17T06:08:51ZL'exploitation minière et le conflit armé menacent la biodiversité de l'est de la RDC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504647/original/file-20230116-24-dn9nej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Getty Images</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Les provinces orientales de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), touchées par le conflit, abritent de nombreuses aires protégées. Ces zones abritent une biodiversité unique et plusieures espèces menacées, comme l'okapi, l'éléphant de forêt et le gorille de montagne. Elles font également partie de la forêt tropicale du bassin du Congo, qui constitue une ligne de <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000126494_fre">défense cruciale</a> contre le changement climatique.</p>
<p>Ces mêmes zones protégées regorgent de gisements de minerais d'importance mondiale, notamment d'or, de coltan et de cassitérite.</p>
<p>L’<a href="https://medd.gouv.cd/les-enjeux-de-lexploitation-miniere-en-rdc-tous-ensemble-pour-un-developpement-durable-a-la-fois-propre-et-createur-de-valeur-pour-tous-les-citoyens/">exploitation minière</a> est très répandue dans ces zones, y compris dans la réserve naturelle d'Itombwe, le parc national de Maiko et la réserve de faune à okapis.</p>
<p>La plupart de ces mines sont des mines artisanales à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre, qui utilisent des technologies de base. Toutefois, ces dernières années, on a constaté une forte augmentation de l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, qui nécessite un capital de départ important pour l'achat de technologies intermédiaires, telles que des dragues et des pompes.</p>
<p>Les deux formes d'exploitation minière ont des <a href="https://www.justicepaix.be/les-etudes-d-impact-environnemental-en-rd-congo-outil-pour-qui-pour-quoi-1202/?pdf=14225">impacts négatifs</a> sur la conservation de la biodiversité. Les effets directs comprennent la déforestation, la dégradation des sols et la pollution de l'eau.</p>
<p>Des effets plus indirects découlent de la construction de nouvelles routes pour rendre les sites miniers accessibles, et de la croissance de la population à proximité des mines. Cela entraîne une exploitation accrue des ressources naturelles, comme l'extraction de bois de chauffage et de construction, la chasse à la viande de brousse et l'agriculture itinérante.</p>
<p>Cette exploitation minière destructrice dans les zones protégées se déroule souvent avec la complicité d'acteurs armés étatiques et non étatiques, qui s'approprient une partie des revenus. Des milliers de personnes dépendent également de ces activités minières pour leur subsistance.</p>
<p>L'importance économique de l'exploitation minière rend difficile l'arrêt de l'extraction dans les zones protégées. Elle est également au cœur des liens complexes entre l'exploitation minière, les conflits armés et la protection de l'environnement dans l'est de la RDC. Notre <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">étude</a> a cherché à saisir ces liens, ce qui est crucial pour concevoir des mesures efficaces de sauvegarde des aires protégées.</p>
<p>Sur la base de recherches dans les réserves d'Okapi et d'Itombwe, nous avons constaté que l'exploitation minière suscite des conflits entre les différents démembrements de l'État, entre les entrepreneurs et les populations locales, et entre les mineurs artisanaux et semi-industriels. Dans un environnement militarisé, ces conflits peuvent déclencher des violences.</p>
<p><strong>Moyens de subsistance et enrichissement</strong></p>
<p>L'exploitation minière est très répandue dans les zones protégées car elle génère des revenus pour les citoyens, les fonctionnaires et les acteurs armés.</p>
<p>Les barrières d'entrée sont faibles et les <a href="https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/enfants-mineurs-la-face-cachee-de-labondance-du-coltan-en-rdc">revenus des mineurs</a> sont plus élevés que ceux de groupes comparables de la population. Pour de nombreuses familles, l'exploitation minière est l'une des rares opportunités de mobilité sociale.</p>
<p>Les revenus miniers permettent également de compléter les maigres salaires de nombreux administrateurs, soldats et autres fonctionnaires de l'État. En RDC, <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2022/04/20/actualite/politique/rdc-le-gouvernement-augmente-de-30-le-salaire-de-base-des">les salaires officiels</a> des agents de l'État sont faibles ou restent impayés. La plupart de ces travailleurs gagnent de l'argent à côté et soutirent des revenus aux citoyens par le biais de diverses formes de taxes, de frais de protection et d'extorsion. Ils subissent également des pressions de la part de leur hiérarchie, qui attend une part de ces revenus.</p>
<p>Les fonctionnaires du Service d'assistance et d'encadrement de l'exploitation minière artisanale et à petite échelle (<a href="https://saemape.cd/">SAEMAPE</a>) et le ministère provincial des Mines taxent souvent les activités minières dans les aires protégées. Les forces armées congolaises s'enrichissent aussi considérablement en protégeant cette exploitation minière, qui est interdite dans la plupart des zones de conservation. Les groupes armés en <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/accompanying-note-interactive-map-militarised-mining-areas-kivus/">profitent</a> également en imposant des taxes sur les sites miniers et aux barrages routiers.</p>
<p>L'augmentation récente de l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, souvent dirigée par des <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/sino-congolese-scandal-illegal-exploitation-minerals-and-forests-chinese">entrepreneurs chinois</a>, a considérablement profité à l'armée congolaise. Les officiers supérieurs qui protègent ces opérations minières déploient des unités de l'armée pour garder les installations et interdirent l'accès à la zone aux visiteurs indésirables.</p>
<p>L'administration minière a également profité de cette évolution. Par exemple, le Cadastre minier, l'agence responsable de l'émission et de la gestion des titres miniers, a commencé à faire circuler <a href="http://www.faapa.info/blog/le-ministere-de-mines-et-liccn-se-contredisent-sur-la-provenance-de-31-lingots-dor-saisis-a-mambasa/">une nouvelle carte</a> de la réserve de faune à okapis avec un périmètre différent. Cela a permis à l'agence de délivrer des concessions à l'intérieur des limites de la réserve, tout en soutenant qu'elles sont situées à l'extérieur de celle-ci.</p>
<p><strong>Provoquer le conflit</strong></p>
<p>L'exploitation minière étant lucrative pour de nombreuses personnes, <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">nos recherches</a> montrent qu'elle a des effets d'entraînement considérables sur la dynamique des conflits.</p>
<p>Tout d'abord, l'exploitation minière crée des frictions entre les différents services de l'État et les différents niveaux administratifs. Le ministère de l'Environnement a contesté la nouvelle carte de la réserve de faune à okapis diffusée par le Cadastre minier. Le gouverneur et le ministère des mines de la province du Sud-Kivu ont pris des mesures pour réglementer l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle par des sociétés chinoises autour de la réserve d'Itombwe. Ces mesures ont cependant été <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/mwetaminwa_vircoulon_scandale_sino_congolais_2022.pdf">stoppées </a>par les autorités nationales qui ont affirmé que celles au niveau provincial n'avaient pas les attributions pour le faire. </p>
<p>Sur le terrain, l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle a déclenché des conflits en provoquant <a href="https://actu7.cd/2022/04/12/ituri-kimya-mining-accusee-dordonner-le-deguerpissement-des-creuseurs-artisanaux-dans-deux-sites-miniers-pres-de-badengaido/">le déplacement</a> parfois violent des mineurs artisanaux. Cela a conduit certains d'entre eux à rejoindre des groupes armés, ou à une recrudescence du banditisme violent.</p>
<p>L'exploitation minière semi-industrielle a également entraîné des <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/10/15/rdc-fizi-la-societe-chinoise-beyond-mining-et-une-cooperative-locale-exploitant-lor-au">désaccords</a> entre les sociétés minières et les populations locales concernant les investissements sociaux, l'emploi et les compensations pour la destruction des champs agricoles.</p>
<p>Combinés à la concurrence pour l'accès aux revenus, ces conflits ont contribué à une vague d'attaques de groupes armés contre les opérations minières chinoises.</p>
<p><strong>Pas de solutions faciles</strong></p>
<p>L'implication de hauts fonctionnaires et l'importance des revenus miniers font qu'il est difficile d'empêcher l'exploitation minière destructrice dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>En outre, la fermeture par la force des exploitations minières artisanales sans offrir d'autres possibilités de gagner sa vie s'est souvent avérée <a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">contre-productive</a>. Les mineurs déplacés peuvent tout simplement retourner sur les sites miniers, obtenant parfois l'aide de groupes armés pour ce faire, parfois avec l'aide de groupes armés.</p>
<p>Lorsque les groupes armés et les unités de l'armée perdent les revenus qu'ils tirent de l'exploitation minière, ils peuvent recourir à d'autres moyens pour se procurer de l'argent, comme le banditisme violent.</p>
<p>Le fait que différents services de l'État soient en désaccord les uns avec les autres pose d'autres difficultés. Il est impossible de freiner ou de mieux réglementer l'exploitation minière dans les zones protégées lorsque les autorités nationales et provinciales ne suivent pas la même politique ou lorsque les militaires violent les restrictions imposées par les autorités civiles.</p>
<p>L'Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN), qui est responsable de la gestion des aires protégées, n'a pas le poids politique et les <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2017/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/">ressources</a> nécessaires pour faire la différence.</p>
<p>Par exemple, la réserve de faune à okapis couvre plus de 13 000 kilomètres carrés, mais l'ICCN ne dispose pas de suffisamment de gardes forestiers. Ils n'effectuent des patrouilles régulières que dans 15 % de cette zone. Dans certaines zones, il a été constaté que le personnel de l'ICCN était <a href="https://24sur24.cd/parc-de-lupemba-face-au-presume-braconnage-entretenu-par-certains-gardes-parcs-de-liccn-long-tprdc-exige-des-enquetes-sur-terrain/">complice</a> de l'exploitation illégale des ressources.</p>
<p><strong>Prochaines étapes</strong></p>
<p>Que peut-on faire alors pour améliorer cette situation ?</p>
<p>Pour commencer, il est important de faire la différence entre l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle et artisanale. L'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, en particulier le dragage de l'or, est plus destructrice pour l'environnement et profite à moins de personnes. Il est plus urgent et plus facile de l'interdire dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>Il semble difficile d'interdire l'exploitation minière artisanale, par conséquent une meilleure réglementation et un meilleur contrôle serait une stratégie plus efficace à court terme. C'est ce qui s'est passé dans la réserve naturelle d'Itombwe, où les activités minières artisanales sont encore autorisées dans certaines parties.</p>
<p>Il est également crucial que les différentes agences et services de l'État coopèrent. Pour promouvoir cette collaboration, les donateurs internationaux qui soutiennent la réforme de l'administration et du secteur de la sécurité doivent faire passer le message selon lequel il est inacceptable de tirer profit de l'exploitation minière dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>Toutefois, c'est au gouvernement congolais qu'il incombe en dernier ressort de veiller à ce que les fonctionnaires soient correctement payés et respectent la loi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Judith Verweijen receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus O'Leary Simpson and Peer Schouten do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Les activités minières destructrices dans les zones protégées du RD Congo sont monnaie courante car elles génèrent de l'argent pour les citoyens, les fonctionnaires et les groupes armés.Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, University of GroningenFergus O'Leary Simpson, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of AntwerpPeer Schouten, Senior researcher, Danish Institute for International StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945652023-01-13T09:16:00Z2023-01-13T09:16:00ZMining and armed conflict threaten eastern DRC’s biodiversity in a complex web<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504421/original/file-20230113-24-h4zyhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GettyImages</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict-affected eastern provinces are home to numerous protected areas. These areas host unique biodiversity and a range of threatened species, such as the okapi, forest elephant and mountain gorilla. They are also part of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is a crucial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/02/carbon-timebomb-climate-crisis-threatens-to-destroy-congo-peatlands">line of defence</a> against climate change. </p>
<p>The same protected areas overlap with globally significant deposits of minerals – including gold, coltan and cassiterite.</p>
<p>Mining is <a href="https://www.levinsources.com/assets/pages/Global-Solutions-Study.pdf">rampant</a> in these areas, including in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, Maiko National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve. </p>
<p>Most of this mining is labour-intensive artisanal mining, which makes use of basic technologies. However, in recent years, there has been a sharp increase in semi-industrial mining, which requires significant start-up capital for the purchase of intermediate technologies, such as dredges and pumps.</p>
<p>Both forms of mining have <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rspb.2018.1926">negative impacts</a> on biodiversity conservation. Direct impacts include deforestation, soil degradation and water pollution. </p>
<p>More indirect effects stem from the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-019-0310-6">construction of new roads</a> to make mining sites accessible, and population growth in the vicinity of mines. This leads to further natural resource exploitation, such as fuel and construction wood extraction, bushmeat hunting and shifting agriculture. </p>
<p>This destructive mining in conservation areas often happens under the protection of state and non-state armed actors, who take a portion of the revenues. Thousands of people also depend on such mining for their livelihoods. </p>
<p>The economic importance of mining makes it difficult to stop extraction in protected areas. It’s also at the heart of the complex linkages between mining, armed conflict and conservation in eastern DRC. <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">Our study</a> set out to grasp these linkages, which is crucial for designing effective measures to safeguard protected areas. </p>
<p>Based on research in the Okapi and Itombwe reserves, we found that mining sparks conflict between different branches of the state, between entrepreneurs and local populations, and between artisanal and semi-industrial miners. In a militarised environment, these conflicts can spark violence.</p>
<h2>Livelihoods and enrichment</h2>
<p>Mining is rampant in protected areas because it generates incomes for citizens, officials and armed actors. </p>
<p>Entry barriers are low, and miners’ earnings are <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/much-miner-earn-assessment-miners-revenue-basic-needs-study-drc/">higher</a> than those of comparable groups in the population. For many families, mining is one of the few opportunities for <a href="https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy-ub.rug.nl/science/article/pii/S0301420720309247#sec6">social mobility</a>.</p>
<p>Mining revenue also tops up the meagre wages of numerous administrators, soldiers and other state officials. In the DRC, the official salaries of state workers are low or remain unpaid. Most of these workers make money on the side and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240902863587">extract revenue from citizens</a> through various forms of taxation, protection fees and extortion. They are also under pressure to do so from their hierarchy, which expects a share of the income. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-extractive-industries-manage-to-carry-on-harming-the-planet-155323">How extractive industries manage to carry on harming the planet</a>
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<p>Officials from the agency responsible for regulating artisanal and small-scale mining (SAEMAPE), and the provincial ministry of mines often tax mining activities in protected areas. The Congolese armed forces also substantially enrich themselves by protecting this mining, which is forbidden in most conservation areas. Armed groups also <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/accompanying-note-interactive-map-militarised-mining-areas-kivus/">benefit</a> by imposing taxes in mining sites and at roadblocks.</p>
<p>The recent increase in semi-industrial mining, often run by <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/sino-congolese-scandal-illegal-exploitation-minerals-and-forests-chinese">Chinese entrepreneurs</a>, has substantially benefited the Congolese army. The senior officers who protect these mining operations deploy army units to guard the installations and seal off the area from unwanted visitors. </p>
<p>The mining administration, too, has benefited from this development. For instance, the Mining Cadastre, the agency responsible for issuing and managing mining titles, has started to <a href="http://www.faapa.info/blog/le-ministere-de-mines-et-liccn-se-contredisent-sur-la-provenance-de-31-lingots-dor-saisis-a-mambasa/">circulate a new map</a> of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve with a different perimeter. This has allowed the agency to issue concessions inside the boundaries of the reserve, while arguing that they are located outside it. </p>
<h2>Sparking conflict</h2>
<p>Because mining is lucrative for many people, <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">our research shows</a> it has considerable knock-on effects on conflict dynamics. </p>
<p>To start with, mining creates friction between different branches of the state and different administrative levels. The environment ministry has contested the new map of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve circulated by the Mining Cadastre. The governor and mining ministry of South Kivu province took measures to regulate semi-industrial mining by Chinese companies around the Itombwe Reserve. These, however, were <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/mwetaminwa_vircoulon_scandale_sino_congolais_2022.pdf">halted</a> by national authorities who claimed the provincial level didn’t have the authority to do so.</p>
<p>On the ground, semi-industrial mining has sparked conflict by prompting the sometimes violent <a href="https://actu7.cd/2022/04/12/ituri-kimya-mining-accusee-dordonner-le-deguerpissement-des-creuseurs-artisanaux-dans-deux-sites-miniers-pres-de-badengaido/">displacement</a> of artisanal miners. This has led some of them to join armed groups, or to an upsurge in violent banditry. </p>
<p>Semi-industrial mining has also led to <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/10/15/rdc-fizi-la-societe-chinoise-beyond-mining-et-une-cooperative-locale-exploitant-lor-au">disagreements</a> between mining companies and local populations around social investments, employment and compensation for the destruction of agricultural fields. </p>
<p>Combined with competition around accessing revenues, these conflicts have contributed to a spate of armed group attacks on Chinese mining operations. </p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>The involvement of high-level officials and the importance of mining income make it difficult to stop destructive mining from taking place in protected areas. </p>
<p>Moreover, closing down artisanal mining operations by force without offering other opportunities to make a living has often proven to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">counterproductive</a>. Displaced miners may simply return to mining sites, sometimes getting the help of armed groups to do this. </p>
<p>Where armed groups and army units lose their income from mining, they may resort to other ways to get money, such as violent banditry.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">Shedding light on why mining companies in eastern Congo are under attack</a>
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<p>The fact that different branches of the state are at odds with each other poses further difficulties. It’s impossible to curb or better regulate mining in protected areas when national and provincial authorities toe a different line or when the military violates restrictions imposed by civilian authorities. </p>
<p>The Congolese agency for nature conservation (ICCN), which is responsible for protected area management, lacks the political clout and <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2017/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/">resources</a> to make a difference. </p>
<p>For instance, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve covers over 13,000 square kilometres, but the ICCN has only enough rangers to conduct regular patrols in 15% of this area. In some areas, ICCN staff have been found to be <a href="https://24sur24.cd/parc-de-lupemba-face-au-presume-braconnage-entretenu-par-certains-gardes-parcs-de-liccn-long-tprdc-exige-des-enquetes-sur-terrain/">complicit</a> in authorising illegal resource exploitation.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>What can be done to improve this situation? </p>
<p>To start with, it’s important to differentiate between semi-industrial and artisanal mining. Semi-industrial mining, in particular gold dredging, is more destructive for the environment and benefits comparatively fewer people. Banning it from protected areas is more urgent and more feasible.</p>
<p>Banning artisanal mining appears difficult, so better regulating and containing it may be a more successful strategy in the short term. This is what has happened in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, where artisanal mining activities are still permitted in certain parts.</p>
<p>It is also crucial that different agencies and layers of the state cooperate. To promote such collaboration, international donors supporting administrative and security sector reform need to get the message across that profiting from mining in protected areas is not acceptable. </p>
<p>However, it is ultimately up to the Congolese government to ensure that state servants are properly paid and respect the law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Judith Verweijen receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus Simpson receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peer Schouten receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Destructive mining in Congo’s protected areas is rampant because it generates money for citizens, officials and armed groups.Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, University of GroningenFergus O'Leary Simpson, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of AntwerpPeer Schouten, Senior researcher, Danish Institute for International StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1946832022-11-30T16:35:31Z2022-11-30T16:35:31ZCould the Netherlands crack the secret of language learning using this approach?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497700/original/file-20221128-20-kjjanz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1000%2C627&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">file okebk</span> </figcaption></figure><p>From the UK government’s latest <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/reforms-to-encourage-more-students-to-take-up-language-gcses">post-Brexit language-learning reforms</a> to France’s eternal debates over the <a href="https://www.slate.fr/story/179265/reforme-enseignement-langues-vivantes-etrangeres-lycee">supposed linguistic inadequacy of its youth</a>, governments regularly scratch their heads over how to improve how languages are taught.</p>
<p>While the Netherlands carried out a <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/eujal-2020-0020/html">major reform</a> to its modern foreign language education as early as 1968, the current courses are seen by many as no longer preparing students well enough for the modern world. The baccalaureate exams do not test students’ actual skills and knowledge so much as their ability to strategically answer multiple-choice questions.</p>
<p>This is particularly true for modern languages, where the final exam – a reading-comprehension exercise – receives hundreds of complaints from students who find it either <a href="https://nos.nl/artikel/2236117-opnieuw-ophef-over-niveau-vwo-examen-frans-verdrietig-de-zaal-uit">too difficult or too ambiguous</a>.</p>
<p>In the Netherlands, French is compulsory for students from age 11 to 15, yet a declining number continue to study it beyond that age. In such a context, educators in the Netherlands are asking how other methods might better meet the needs of students. Supported by many teacher trainers in the
country and the <a href="http://etc-languagelearning.web.rug.nl/">language learning team</a> at the University of Groningen, a <a href="https://prezi.com/view/DvEQLkR9O8wZP4Ev4qPY/">usage-based approach</a> to French has gained ground.</p>
<h2>The Dutch and French</h2>
<p>As in many European countries, Dutch students are frequently exposed to English, but that’s not the case with French. The language is spoken by 70 million people in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Monaco, Franco-Dutch firms do <a href="https://platformfrans.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Het-economisch-belang-van-het-Frans-2022.pdf">40 million euros in business annually</a>, and organisations such as the <a href="https://institutfrancais.nl/">French Institute</a> and <a href="https://www.cfci.nl/la-chambre/roles-et-missions.html">CCI France Netherlands</a> provide support, yet for students there are few situations outside the classroom that <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/eujal-2020-0020/html">afford the opportunity to practice</a> the language informally.</p>
<p>Researcher Marjolijn Voogel indicates the perceived <a href="https://lt-tijdschriften.nl/ojs/index.php/ltm/article/view/1550">importance of speaking French</a> in the Netherlands is declining. Despite studying French for six years at school, the students’ overall level is not proportional to the work they put in, according to <a href="https://projectfrans.nl/storage/Informatie/Publicaties/Hoe_Frans_terrein_kan_terugwinnen.pdf">Wim Gombert</a>, a researcher in applied linguistics.</p>
<p>These results are similar to those found in France, which also suffers from an environment with limited opportunities for regular use of foreign languages and teaching methods based on <a href="https://lt-tijdschriften.nl/ojs/index.php/ltt/article/view/1631">grammar and translation</a>. And this despite the fact that teachers regularly look to modernise their courses, organise trips and use digital technologies, as Lynne West and Marjolijn Verspoor note.</p>
<p>In response to this situation, one of the initiatives has been the development and implementation of several usage-based inspired methodologies such as the <a href="https://www.aimlanguagelearning.com/">Accelerative Integrated Method (AIM)</a> invented by Wendy Maxwell in Canada. They’re found most often in primary and secondary schools (about 100) but also in <a href="https://projectfrans.nl/aim-voor-de-bovenbouw">secondary schools</a> (about four schools) and finally at the <a href="https://taalwijs.nu/2022/10/24/hoe-kan-taalonderwijs-leerlingen-en-studenten-helpen-om-zelfstandig-te-worden/">University of Groningen</a>.</p>
<h2>Access to the language outside the classroom</h2>
<p>AIM methods are inspired by research on <a href="https://benjamins.com/catalog/lllt.29">dynamic usage theory</a>, which considers languages to be a collection of words shaped first and foremost by socialisation. Language learning happens through repeated exposure via creative activities and real-life tasks, rather than grammar rules and vocabulary lists.</p>
<p>Stories (in primary and middle school), creative and non-fiction texts, or videos (in high school) and films (in university) are central to the approach. In addition, high school and university students use learning software such as <a href="https://www.fluentu.com/">Fluent U</a> or <a href="https://www.slimstampen.nl/">SlimStampen</a>. </p>
<p>Students take quizzes several times a week and the software remembers words that are not acquired. They’re then reintroduced into the following work sessions until they’re firmly embedded. The idea is that students <a href="https://webtv.univ-rouen.fr/videos/conference-dylis-daudrey-rousse-malpat-du-18102021-decoupage/">learn vocabulary in context</a> rather than simply memorise it. </p>
<p>In the classroom, the activities are varied and focus on listening and speaking. The aim is first to reduce the anxiety linked to speaking by de-dramatising what are typically seen as errors. Repetition is emphasised until responses are integrated and become automatic. The activities are mostly done in groups so that the learners develop a certain self-confidence. Individual language development happens throughout, and mutual aid is encouraged.</p>
<p>By focusing on the meaning of language and not its form, each learner can use their own linguistic repertoire and learn from the repertoire of others. At the same time, each learner can work individually on linguistic weaknesses. </p>
<h2>The decentred role of the teacher</h2>
<p>This way of working gives a new role to teachers. Instead of being the only transmitters of knowledge, language models and evaluators in the classroom, they provide resources, organise activities that encourage repetition and language automation, and create an environment conducive to practice. Collaboration takes place between learners in the target language, ensuring it is used most of the time. The teacher is also the one who determines learners’ individual or collective needs and offers activities to meet them.</p>
<p>Teachers also play a key role in organising peer feedback, testing language skills and assessing the learners’ state of development – the strengths and the elements that each one needs to work on. The method moves away from counting students’ “errors”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Webinar “Innovative language teaching methods”, with Audrey Rousse-Malpat.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this regard, teachers need to <a href="https://www.multilingual-matters.com/page/detail/Language-Learning-and-Teaching-in-a-Multilingual-World/?k=9781788927611">move away from the way they learned the language</a> – and sometimes even from their personal beliefs. Their actions will be all the more relevant if they understand how language develops from a <a href="https://eboutique.didierfle.com/fr/FR/products/cognition-et-personnalite-dans-l-apprentissage-de-langues-2019-livre-numerique">social and psycho-cognitive point of view</a>, and consider how and when to intervene.</p>
<p>Several studies have shown the benefits of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3AmZRkdXSA">usage-based inspired methodologies</a> on learners’ listening, speaking, and writing skills. These methods are underpinned by the idea that the language speaker is a <a href="https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/05/26/kesku-se-een-nieuw-soort-franse-les-a3961620">social agent</a> rather than a grammarian.</p>
<p>What is happening in the Netherlands shows the relevance of the research and education communities working together to experiment with and implement methods that are based on contemporary scientific knowledge about language and languages.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Audrey Rousse-Malpat has received funding from NWO (the national research organisation in the Netherlands). She works as a professor of language and language didactics at the University of Groningen and is a teacher trainer at Project Frans.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grégory Miras ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Language-learning research in the Netherlands has determined that using a foreign language rather than just memorizing its grammar can transform how students progress.Grégory Miras, Professeur des Universités en didactique des langues, Université de LorraineAudrey Rousse-Malpat, Assistant Professor of language learning at the program European Languages and Cultures, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1938962022-11-21T19:31:24Z2022-11-21T19:31:24ZEnseigner les langues autrement : ce que l’exemple des Pays-Bas nous apprend<p>S’il est régulièrement question, en France, de transformer l’enseignement pour mieux répondre aux enjeux actuels, cette préoccupation, dans un monde en plein mouvement, ne se cantonne pas à l’Hexagone, loin de là.</p>
<p>Aux Pays-Bas, par exemple, même s’il a déjà été question en 1968 d’une <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/eujal-2020-0020/html">grande réforme sur l’éducation</a> touchant aussi bien au contenu des programmes qu’aux examens, les cours actuels sont considérés comme ne préparant plus assez bien les élèves au monde moderne. Les épreuves du baccalauréat ne testeraient pas les compétences et connaissances réelles des élèves mais plutôt leur capacité à stratégiquement répondre à des QCM.</p>
<p>C’est particulièrement vrai pour les langues vivantes comme le français où l’examen final – un exercice de compréhension écrite – fait l’objet tous les ans de centaines de plaintes des élèves qui le trouvent <a href="https://nos.nl/artikel/2236117-opnieuw-ophef-over-niveau-vwo-examen-frans-verdrietig-de-zaal-uit">trop difficile ou trop ambigu</a>.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/apprentissage-des-langues-une-methode-innovante-venue-dargentine-186271">Apprentissage des langues : une méthode innovante venue d’Argentine</a>
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<p>L’enseignement du français aux Pays-Bas, obligatoire de la sixième à la troisième, est actuellement sous pression : de moins en moins d’élèves choisissent cette matière au lycée et de moins en moins de jeunes s’orientent vers cette spécialité universitaire peu importe leurs objectifs professionnels. C’est dans ce contexte que les acteurs de l’éducation aux Pays-Bas se demandent si certaines méthodes sont plus efficaces que d’autres, ou, du moins, comment certaines méthodes permettent de mieux répondre aux besoins des élèves, avec l’aide des chercheurs. Soutenue par l’équipe <a href="http://etc-languagelearning.web.rug.nl/">Language Learning</a> à l’Université de Groningen – au nord-est du pays – une <a href="https://prezi.com/view/DvEQLkR9O8wZP4Ev4qPY/">approche basée sur l’usage</a> a fait son chemin.</p>
<h2>Le cas spécifique des Pays-Bas</h2>
<p>Si, comme dans beaucoup d’autres pays, l’anglais prend une place importante dans l’environnement des élèves, avec des occasions presque quotidiennes de le pratiquer, la présence du français dans le paysage néerlandais est limitée. Peu de situations en dehors de la salle de classe <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/eujal-2020-0020/html">permettent des pratiques sociales</a> dans cette langue comme le soulignent Marije Michel, Christine Vidon, Rick de Graaff et Wander Lowie, quatre chercheurs et chercheuses néerlandaises.</p>
<p>[<em>Près de 80 000 lecteurs font confiance à la newsletter de The Conversation pour mieux comprendre les grands enjeux du monde</em>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/newsletters/la-newsletter-quotidienne-5?utm_source=inline-70ksignup">Abonnez-vous aujourd’hui</a>]</p>
<p>Cette situation est en contraste fort avec le fait que le français dispose d’un statut de langue voisine impliquant des intérêts économiques majeurs, <a href="https://platformfrans.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Het-economisch-belang-van-het-Frans-2022.pdf">40 millions d’euros par an</a> pour les affaires franco-néerlandaises, soutenus par de nombreuses institutions (<a href="https://institutfrancais.nl/">Institut français</a>, <a href="https://www.cfci.nl/la-chambre/roles-et-missions.html">CCI France Pays-Bas</a>, etc.). Néanmoins, malgré cette situation favorable sur le plan professionnel à l’étude de cette langue, Marjolijn Voogel signale que la perception de <a href="https://lt-tijdschriften.nl/ojs/index.php/ltm/article/view/1550">l’importance de parler français</a> aux Pays-Bas est toujours en déclin, surtout suite aux réformes à la fin des années 1990. Aussi, moins d’élèves choisissent le français au lycée et le niveau global n’est plus satisfaisant au regard du faible niveau atteint <a href="https://projectfrans.nl/storage/Informatie/Publicaties/Hoe_Frans_terrein_kan_terugwinnen.pdf">au bout de 6 ans de français à l’école</a> pour Wim Gombert, chercheur en linguistique appliquée.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-autoriser-le-melange-des-langues-a-lecole-182919">Pourquoi autoriser le mélange des langues à l’école ?</a>
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<p>Ces résultats, similaires à ce que l’on retrouve en France dans l’enseignement des langues étrangères, sont à rapprocher d’un environnement pauvre en occasions de se confronter régulièrement à la langue et de méthodes pédagogiques surtout basées sur les structures de la langue, la grammaire et la traduction plutôt que sur l’usage. Même en classe de langues, <a href="https://lt-tijdschriften.nl/ojs/index.php/ltt/article/view/1631">on parle peu la langue cible</a> comme le remarquent Lynne West et Marjolijn Verspoor alors même que les enseignants se mobilisent régulièrement pour moderniser leurs cours, organiser des voyages ou utiliser les technologies numériques.</p>
<p>Face à cette situation, une des initiatives a été le développement et surtout la mise en œuvre de plusieurs méthodes <a href="https://www.aimlanguagelearning.com/">(AIM</a>) en primaire et au collègue (dans environ 100 établissements) mais également au lycée (<a href="https://projectfrans.nl/aim-voor-de-bovenbouw">AIMe</a>) (environ quatre établissements) et enfin à l’<a href="https://taalwijs.nu/2022/10/24/hoe-kan-taalonderwijs-leerlingen-en-studenten-helpen-om-zelfstandig-te-worden/">Université de Groningue</a> (une université).</p>
<h2>Un accès à la langue en dehors de la classe</h2>
<p>Les méthodes utilisées sont toutes inspirées de recherches scientifiques (sur la <a href="https://benjamins.com/catalog/lllt.29">théorie dynamique de l’usage</a>, la didactique basée sur le film et approche par tâches) qui considèrent que le langage est un assemblage de mots fréquemment utilisés par des locuteurs dont c’est la langue de socialisation, auxquels les apprenants doivent être exposés de façon répétée à travers des activités créatives et des tâches réelles de la vie.</p>
<p>Ce n’est donc pas une approche où l’on se focalise sur l’analyse de la langue (la compréhension et pratique de règles de grammaire et listes de vocabulaire) mais plutôt une approche où on passe de la reproduction de constructions à la production de celles-ci d’abord de façon implicite, puis inductive et, enfin, parfois explicite aux niveaux avancés.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Des exemples d’activités au lycée (Project Frans).</span></figcaption>
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<p>Afin d’exposer le plus possible les apprenants à ces constructions, du matériel différent est utilisé selon le niveau et l’âge : des contes (au primaire et au collège), des textes ou vidéos créatives et réelles (au lycée) et des films (à l’université). En plus de cette exposition, les apprenants utilisent au lycée et à l’université des logiciels d’apprentissage de mots en combinaison comme <a href="https://www.fluentu.com/">Fluent U</a> ou <a href="https://www.slimstampen.nl/">SlimStampen</a>.</p>
<p>L’idée est que les apprenants <a href="https://webtv.univ-rouen.fr/videos/conference-dylis-daudrey-rousse-malpat-du-18102021-decoupage/">repèrent le vocabulaire en contexte</a> et fassent des quiz plusieurs fois par semaine jusqu’à ce que ce vocabulaire en combinaison soit ancré cognitivement. Le logiciel se souvient des mots qui ne sont pas acquis et les réintègre dans les exercices lors des prochaines sessions de travail jusqu’à ce qu’ils soient acquis.</p>
<p>En classe, les <a href="https://prezi.com/view/DvEQLkR9O8wZP4Ev4qPY/">activités</a> sont variées et surtout axées sur la production orale. Le but de ces activités est d’abord de diminuer l’anxiété liée à la prise de parole en dédramatisant les productions non-conformes aux attendus et en travaillant sur la répétition et l’automatisation. Les activités sont surtout faites en groupe, au début même en chorale, pour que les apprenants développent une certaine confiance en eux. Il y a alors beaucoup de place donnée au développement individuel de la langue chez l’apprenant.</p>
<p>En effet, en se concentrant sur le sens du langage et non pas sur sa forme, chaque apprenant peut utiliser son propre répertoire linguistique et apprendre du répertoire des autres. En même temps, chacun peut travailler individuellement sur l’aspect linguistique qui lui manque pour s’exprimer. Cela demande des compétences d’<a href="http://epc.univ-lorraine.fr/EPCT_F/pdf/Autonomie.pdf">autonomie guidée</a> et de réflexion personnelle – compétences qui sont travaillées dans ces programmes.</p>
<h2>Le rôle décentré de l’enseignant</h2>
<p>Cette façon de travailler confirme que l’enseignant de langues n’est pas celui qui transmet ou évalue la connaissance, pas plus qu’il n’est un modèle. Il est celui qui propose des ressources, organise des activités motivantes et itératives (qui favorisant la répétition, l’automatisation du langage), qui crée un environnement propice à la pratique, à la collaboration entre les apprenants, s’assure que la langue cible est utilisée la plupart du temps. Il est aussi celui qui détecte les besoins individuels ou collectifs des apprenants et qui offre des activités pour les combler.</p>
<p>Enfin, il est celui qui organise des moments de retours entre les pairs, qui teste les compétences langagières dans une tâche et qui prend en compte l’étape de développement dans laquelle les apprenants se trouvent – les points forts et les éléments à travailler pour chaque individu. En clair, il se détache du comptage des « erreurs » dans la production des apprenants pour prendre en compte le système langagier dans son ensemble.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Webinaire « Innovative language teaching methods », avec Audrey Rousse-Malpat.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Cette façon de voir le rôle du professeur demande un <a href="https://www.multilingual-matters.com/page/detail/Language-Learning-and-Teaching-in-a-Multilingual-World/?k=9781788927611">degré de professionnalisation assez fort</a>. Elle nécessite que l’enseignant se détache de la manière dont il a appris une langue étrangère et parfois aussi de ses croyances personnelles. Son action sera d’autant plus pertinente qu’il sait comment se développe le langage <a href="https://eboutique.didierfle.com/fr/FR/products/cognition-et-personnalite-dans-l-apprentissage-de-langues-2019-livre-numerique">d’un point de vue social et psychocognitif</a>, comment et quand intervenir, prend confiance dans le processus complexe de l’apprentissage de la langue et lâche prise sur le fait que chaque apprenant ait sa propre trajectoire de développement langagier.</p>
<p>Plusieurs études ont montré les bénéfices d’<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3AmZRkdXSA">AIM</a> et AIMe sur les compétences orales et écrites des apprenants. Cette façon d’enseigner participe à l’idée que le locuteur d’une langue est un <a href="https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/05/26/kesku-se-een-nieuw-soort-franse-les-a3961620">agent social</a> plutôt qu’un grammairien. Il n’y a pour le moment pas assez de recul pour observer un lien de causalité entre ce type de méthode et le choix du français aux Pays-Bas. Cependant, ce qui se passe aux Pays-Bas est le témoin de la pertinence de faire travailler ensemble le monde de la recherche et de l’éducation pour expérimenter et implanter des méthodes qui s’appuient sur l’état des connaissances scientifiques contemporaines sur le langage et les langues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Audrey Rousse-Malpat a reçu des financements de NWO (l'organisation nationale pour la recherche aux Pays-Bas). Elle travaille en tant que professeure de langue et didactique des langues à l'université de Groningue et est formatrice pour enseignants à Project Frans. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grégory Miras ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Mettre l’accent sur l’usage d’une langue étrangère plutôt que sa grammaire : c’est l’objectif de méthodes fondées sur les apports de la recherche et expérimentées aux Pays-Bas.Grégory Miras, Professeur des Universités en didactique des langues, Université de LorraineAudrey Rousse-Malpat, Assistant Professor of language learning at the program European Languages and Cultures, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1831732022-05-20T13:18:32Z2022-05-20T13:18:32ZWhether you followed lockdown rules may have been influenced by your genetics – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463700/original/file-20220517-13-a9nka9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C44%2C5973%2C3943&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Everyone had a different experience of the pandemic</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/solo-woman-drink-coffee-relax-wellbeing-1975069022">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>All over the world, people suffered the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on their wellbeing. However, the impact was not the same for everyone. We know physical health and mental health are affected partly by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41380-019-0546-6">environmental factors</a>, for example the COVID-19 pandemic, but partly by nature (genetics).</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic was an unique opportunity for researchers and the scientific community came together to form the <a href="https://www.covid19hg.org/about/">COVID-19 host genetics initiative</a> collaborating on research. Whole communities were suddenly and simultaneously exposed to both the virus and the social changes needed to adapt to government lockdowns. </p>
<p><a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgen.1010135">We have investigated</a> the interaction between genetics and the impact of the pandemic on individuals’ wellbeing over time. We found that people’s trust in authority over lockdown was linked to their genetics, and that it also steadily became more important for their happiness over the course of the pandemic in 2020.</p>
<p>The data was collected from <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/3/e044474">27,537 participants</a> from the <a href="https://www.lifelines.nl/researcher/cohort-and-biobank">Lifelines</a> study, which has followed 167,000 individuals from multiple generations in the three northern provinces of the Netherlands (Drenthe, Friesland, Groningen) since 2006. </p>
<p>The study collects detailed information and biological samples from its participants. We sent questionnaires asking participants whether they have had COVID-19, about their general health and medication use, social demographics such as income and education, wellbeing and lifestyle.</p>
<h2>Genetics and COVID</h2>
<p>Many behavioural and psychiatric traits are known to be influenced by parts of our DNA. For instance, there are <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41593-018-0326-7">102 known ways</a> different arrangements of DNA can increase the risk of depression. For our analyses, we gave each participant a so-called polygenic score that reflected how likely they were to have a specific trait, based on their DNA (their genetic predisposition), and compared this to their responses in the questionnaire.</p>
<p>Scores like this can’t predict behaviour of individuals, but they can be used to see if groups of people with different genetic predispositions respond differently when faced with <a href="https://genomemedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13073-020-00742-5">adversity</a>. For example, people who were genetically more likely to be have high life satisfaction, reported a higher quality of life in the questionnaires, as expected. </p>
<p>In total, we found 288 questionnaire responses could be linked to the participants’ genetics. In particular, we found trust in government and willingness to comply with COVID-19 lockdown rules were closely connected with participants’ genetic predispositions. </p>
<h2>How the influence of genetics changed</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Woman wearing a face mask partially covering her jaw with a positive expression" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/463702/original/file-20220517-2769-hp8vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Researchers investigated the link between genetics and wellbeing during the pandemic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/female-nurse-hospital-removing-protective-face-1952684239">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>We first sent out the questionnaire weeks after COVID-19 was first detected in the Netherlands and kept sending the same questions throughout the pandemic at least once a month. This allowed us to compare the influences of the polygenic scores at different time points. </p>
<p>We found that the genetic contribution towards wellbeing was not static but could change over time. </p>
<p>The most pronounced effect of participants’ genetics was for the trait of high life satisfaction. Here we found that over the course of the pandemic genetics became more important and the impact of external factors decreased. </p>
<p>There are multiple explanations for this effect. The social isolation imposed by the COVID-19 containment measures meant people had less control over environmental factors that could affect their quality of life. Alternatively, it might also be the case that some genetic factors result in a resilience to stress allowing some people to better handle the prolonged psychological effects of the pandemic. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the importance of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1047279721003458">incorporating longitudinal data</a> to study
psychiatric diseases and other psychological traits so we can better understand how to help people with these conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lude Franke receives funding from ZonMW, ERC, Oncode and EU</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Deelen receives funding from Dutch Research Council (NWO). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pauline Lanting does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If you found the COVID pandemic affected you differently to your friends, it could be down to your DNA.Lude Franke, Professor of Functional Genomics, Utrecht UniversityPatrick Deelen, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of GroningenPauline Lanting, PhD-candidate, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1821812022-05-05T19:00:12Z2022-05-05T19:00:12ZExcessive mortality of young adults: a natural trait?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460322/original/file-20220428-18-up9sna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C1920%2C1238&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The mortality rate among young adults is higher than it should be, statistically.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sammie Chaffin/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The risk of death is high at birth and during the first years of life, but it decreases through childhood until approximately the age of 10. It then begins a steady, exponential increase that continues throughout adult life. This U-shaped curve of age-specific death rates suggests that the risk of dying for young adults should be relatively low.</p>
<h2>Mortality can be high between ages 15 and 30</h2>
<p>It is not rare, however, to observe relatively high levels of mortality during a period in early adulthood between the ages of 15 and 30. This is called “excess mortality” because it exceeds the levels that would be expected due to biological factors and epidemiological circumstances.</p>
<p>The relative scale of this excess mortality appears to be independent of the general level of mortality, as illustrated by the age-specific mortality curves based on data from the <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POPSOC_590_0001--is-young-adult-excess-mortality-a.htm">Human Mortality Database</a> (Figure 1). They show situations for different periods between 1900 and 2018 in 45 countries with exhaustive vital statistics, mainly in Europe or other continents with populations of European origin, as well as a few Asian countries such as Japan.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Age-specific mortality rates in 45 countries between 1900 and 2018" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461249/original/file-20220504-11-u6dgt8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The absolute level of young adult mortality can be surprising. For example, <a href="https://www.google.fr/books/edition/Journal_of_the_Institute_of_Actuaries_an/v0UDAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Thiele+T.+N.,+1871,+On+a+mathematical+formula+to+express+the+rate+of+mortality+throughout+the+whole+of+life,+tested+by+a+series+of+observations+made+use+of+by+the+Danish+Life+Insurance+Company+of+1871,+_Journal+of+the+Institute+of+Actuaries+and+Assurance+Magazine_&pg=PP12">in 1900–1904</a>, the mortality of Danish men was generally similar to or even lower than that of Norwegian men, but with practically none of the excess mortality between ages 15 and 40 observed in Norway. Starting from a much lower level of overall mortality, the curve of American men in 1990–1994 displays pronounced excess mortality, placing them above the absolute level in Australia in 1940–1944, despite a much higher level of overall mortality in the latter country.</p>
<p>Similar observations can be made for women, although they are generally less affected by this excess mortality than men. For example, in the immediate post-war period, while the overall mortality of Japanese and Portuguese women is identical up to age 15, their excess mortality is much higher in Japan above that age. Forty years later, while the absolute mortality rate of French and Ukrainian women was similar between ages 15 and 25, its level reflected high excess mortality in France but not in Ukraine, which has a strong female mortality disadvantage at all other ages. So, it is logical to conclude that for each country pair considered here, young adults are intrinsically more vulnerable in Denmark than in Norway, in the United States than in Australia, in Japan than in Portugal, and in France than in Ukraine, whatever the absolute mortality levels between ages 15 and 30.</p>
<p>Young adult excess mortality seems to be a distinct component of human mortality that stands alongside the other processes governing overall mortality. While called the “excess-mortality hump” because of the bulge it creates in the mortality curve, like that observed for Norwegian males in 1900, it may also resemble a plateau, as observed for American males in 1990 and for French females in 1980. Let us examine the possible causes of this phenomenon.</p>
<h2>Historically universal excess mortality?</h2>
<p>Young adult excess mortality is considered a <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POPSOC_590_0001--is-young-adult-excess-mortality-a.htm">worldwide phenomenon</a> particularly prevalent <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0014826">among men</a>. This is because we tend to view adolescence as a naturally tumultuous period, marked by the psychological upheavals associated with puberty*<em>, such as the production of sex hormones or the asynchronous development of different parts of the brain</em>*. It is believed these hallmarks of the “adolescent brain”, as it is sometimes called in the neuropsychological literature, are reflected in a lack of inhibition, excessive risk-taking, impulsiveness, and a general struggle to foresee the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2892678/">consequences of one’s behaviour</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Age-specific mortality rates in selected male populations showing little or no evidence of young adult excess mortality" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461250/original/file-20220504-16-kl250i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>These assumptions are only partially borne out by fact, however. Analysis of several thousand curves similar to those presented in Figure 1 shows that while excess mortality is a frequent reality for men, it is <a href="https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:73525">very limited or non-existent in certain cases</a> (Figure 2). Exceptions of this kind were especially common in the 1950s and 1960s, in both Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal) and Northern Europe (Ireland and Finland).</p>
<p>Excess mortality among young women is systematically lower than that of young men, if not non-existent. It is nonetheless widely observed in different contexts, not only in the past, when maternal mortality was still high, but also more recently (Figure 3).</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Age-specific mortality rates in selected female populations showing clear evidence of young adult excess mortality" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/461253/original/file-20220504-27-81mfwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>It was especially high in the interwar period, both in Northern Europe (Finland and Norway) and in Southern Europe (Italy), perhaps due to the high incidence of tuberculosis (see below), a common disease after the Second World War in countries such as Japan and Bulgaria. More recently, pronounced excess female mortality among young adults has been observed in several industrialized countries including France, the United States, and New Zealand; only the 1950s and 1960s were free of this phenomenon. The excess mortality hump is thus not universal, and neither is it specific to males.</p>
<h2>Live fast, die young?</h2>
<p>Another common belief is that youths tend to die in higher numbers because of a greater inclination to take risks in the years after puberty. In the literature, the term “accident hump” is often used, with some authors seeing an explicit link between excess mortality and adolescent risk-taking resulting in <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0014826">more frequent accidental or violent deaths</a>. Here again, this explanation is only partially borne out by fact.</p>
<p>First, regarding the age range concerned, while the hump starts to form in early adolescence, it continues up to age 30 at least – well beyond the end of puberty. In the United States, young adult excess mortality in the 1960s disappeared at around <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29869068/">age 35 for men and age 25 for women</a>. This limit then shifted to later ages for both sexes, reaching 45–50 years in the early 1990s, partly because of the HIV epidemic which causes deaths at later ages, on average, than accidents do. Since then, the age limit of the US accident hump has fluctuated between 30 and 40 years, partly because of the current epidemic of <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29869068/">opioid overdose deaths</a>. Given the extensive age range covered by the hump, it cannot be attributed to a purely biological factor that leads to high-risk behaviour in adolescence.</p>
<p>Secondly, the breakdown of causes of death linked to the excess mortality hump is more complex than it appears, and while accidents have played an important role in recent decades, they are not always the leading cause of excess mortality at young ages. For example, in the United States, road traffic accidents, which accounted for around 60% of excess mortality in the 1960s, now only explain a quarter of young men’s deaths, on a par with <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29869068/">suicides and homicides</a>. For both sexes, the contribution of overdoses to excess mortality has risen from practically 0% to 20% in the last decade.</p>
<h2>The role of tuberculosis</h2>
<p>Historically, deaths from external causes have not always reached the levels seen in recent years. In the 22 countries, pulmonary tuberculosis was the main cause of excess mortality among youths <a href="https://books.google.fr/books/about/Causes_of_Death_Life_Tables_for_National.html?id=4nRqAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">until the mid-19th century</a>. In the interwar period, the disease still accounted for around 50% of male excess mortality on average, with proportions of up to 90% in Portugal, and ranging from 70% to 90% in Sweden, Spain, France, England, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway.</p>
<p>In the same period, maternal mortality accounted for less than 10% of female young adult excess mortality, excepting certain non-European countries (United States, Chile, New Zealand, and Taiwan), where it still represented 30% to 40% before the 1940s. Deaths from external causes (suicides, homicides, accidents including road traffic accidents) overtook tuberculosis deaths between 1940 and 1960, with varying patterns across countries. This turnaround coincides with the development of antibiotics (streptomycin, effective against tuberculosis, was discovered in 1944) and the boom in car ownership. In historical terms, the major role of violent and accidental deaths in young adult excess mortality is a relatively recent phenomenon.</p>
<hr>
<p>While the young adult excess mortality hump was <a href="https://www.google.fr/books/edition/Journal_of_the_Institute_of_Actuaries_an/v0UDAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Thiele+T.+N.,+1871,+On+a+mathematical+formula+to+express+the+rate+of+mortality+throughout+the+whole+of+life,+tested+by+a+series+of+observations+made+use+of+by+the+Danish+Life+Insurance+Company+of+1871,+_Journal+of+the+Institute+of+Actuaries+and+Assurance+Magazine_&pg=PP12">first spotted 150 years ago</a>, it remains imperfectly understood. It is sometimes the object of misconceptions based on a purely biological conception of adolescence as a universal, gendered phenomenon linked to high-risk behaviour of young adults.</p>
<p>In reality, the hump evolves independently of overall mortality levels, is more pronounced for men than women, and is not universal. It often extends beyond puberty and fluctuates with changes in causes of death not necessarily linked to accidents or violence. While biological factors cannot be excluded, the historical context of the transition to adulthood plays a key role by placing young adults at heightened risk.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This text is adapted from an article by the authors published in Population & Societies, no. 590, <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POPSOC_590_0001--is-young-adult-excess-mortality-a.htm">“Is young adult excess mortality a natural phenomenon?”</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrien Remund received an Early Postdoc.Mobility Fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation and a Eugène Choisy and Charles Borgeaud Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Société Académique de Genève.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Riffe has received funding from the Basque Foundation for Science.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Giovanni Camarda ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The risk of dying changes over the course of a lifetime. Very high at birth, it falls and then gradually rises again… except for a peak after adolescence. Why such a statistical anomaly?Carlo Giovanni Camarda, Docteur, spécialiste des méthodes de prévision (mortalité, longévité, etc.), Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED)Adrien Remund, Docteur, spécialiste des migrations et en démographie historique, University of GroningenTimothy Riffe, Docteur, spécialiste en santé des populations, Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko UnibertsitateaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808052022-04-06T21:23:40Z2022-04-06T21:23:40ZDépenses, manque de transparence… pourquoi le recours aux cabinets de conseil est si impopulaire ?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456589/original/file-20220406-16-7bkbpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Le gouvernement d'Emmanuel Macron est sous le feu des critiques pour avoir fait appel à des cabinets de conseil. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ludovic Marin/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Il est notoire que les grands cabinets de conseil comme McKinsey, BCG ou EY ont les faveurs des entreprises privées. La raison principale de ce succès tient au partage des responsabilités : face à des décisions cruciales, les PDG préfèrent disposer d’un rapport crédible sur la base duquel appuyer <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-les-etats-et-les-entreprises-depensent-ils-autant-pour-des-prestations-de-conseil-180102">leurs décisions</a> au cas où celles-ci <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-les-etats-et-les-entreprises-depensent-ils-autant-pour-des-prestations-de-conseil-180102">s’avèreraient catastrophiques</a>. Une manière de rappeler, en cas d’échec, que toutes les diligences nécessaires à la réalisation d’une issue plus heureuse ont été mises en œuvre.</p>
<p>Ce mécanisme contribue aussi à expliquer pourquoi les gouvernements ont beaucoup moins recours aux cabinets de conseil. Lorsqu’on est jugé par des électeurs, le fait d’avoir dépensé beaucoup d’argent public pour commander des rapports auprès de cabinets privés n’est pas, en cas d’échec, une circonstance atténuante. C’est plutôt généralement une circonstance aggravante, comme le montre le scandale actuel du <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220331-mckinsey-l-affaire-qui-ranime-la-campagne-pr%C3%A9sidentielle">« McKinsey Gate »</a> qui vient de rebondir avec la décision du Parquet national financier d’ouvrir une <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/04/06/affaire-mckinsey-le-parquet-national-financier-a-ouvert-une-enquete-preliminaire-pour-blanchiment-aggrave-de-fraude-fiscale_6120839_823448.html">enquête préliminaire</a>.</p>
<p>D’ailleurs le gouvernement actuel ne s’en vante pas : il ne rend pas publics les rapports qu’il a commandés au cabinet privé, au point que, <a href="https://www.senat.fr/rap/r21-578-1/r21-578-1-syn.pdf">dans le rapport</a> que le Sénat lui adresse, est mentionné le principe selon lequel </p>
<blockquote>
<p>« l’intervention des consultants doit rester discrète : lors de la crise sanitaire, McKinsey indique qu’il restera “behind the scene”, en accord avec le ministère. Le cabinet n’utilise pas son propre logo pour rédiger ses livrables mais celui de l’administration ».</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Le recours aussi massif aux cabinets privés de consultants par notre gouvernement actuel pose donc une question. Pourquoi suscite-t-il la défiance ?</p>
<h2>Économie et efficacité de l’État</h2>
<p>La première raison pour expliquer l’impopularité de l’usage gouvernemental des cabinets privés est financière.</p>
<p>L’État français dépense <a href="https://www.campusfrance.org/fr/importance-recherche-France">presque 50 milliards d’euros dans la recherche publique</a>. On peut s’attendre à ce prix qu’il dispose en interne des expertises nécessaires pour traiter les problèmes et justifier l’action publique.</p>
<p>Il dispose, en outre, de ressources supplémentaires, puisqu’il forme en interne une haute fonction publique, issue des grandes écoles comme l’ENA et dont la mission première est le <a href="https://www.academia.edu/35704403/Civil_Servants_and_Policy_Analysis_in_Central_Government">conseil aux fonctions d’État</a>. Par rapport à cette catégorie d’expertise, même l’expertise universitaire est traditionnellement marginale tout comme le <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-administration-publique-2018-4-page-875.htm">recours à l’expertise privée</a>.</p>
<p>Face à cette armée d’experts formés et employés sur fonds publics, un milliard d’euros supplémentaires dépensés en cabinets privés de conseil produisent deux types principaux de messages. Premièrement, cela signale potentiellement un gaspillage de ressources, puisque de nombreux experts sont disponibles et ne sont pas sollicités. On peut donc légitimement se demander à quoi ils servent. Deuxièmement, le choix de cabinets privés suggère qu’il y a un problème de compétence au sein de l’État. Sinon pourquoi nos fonctionnaires hautement qualifiés et dans l’ensemble coûteux ne sont pas utilisés pour fournir des avis sur la base de rapports et autres études ?</p>
<p>C’est en réponse à ces questions que le rapport du Sénat propose un plan de « réinternalisation » des activités de conseil. Cette internalisation est d’ailleurs le modèle privilégié dans les pays dits « frugaux » particulièrement attachés au contrôle des dépenses publiques. Prenons l’exemple représentant par excellence ce groupe d’états volontiers décrits comme <a href="https://www.challenges.fr/monde/europe/europe-pays-bas-autriche-suede-le-club-des-radins-fait-de-la-resistance_714187">radins</a> : les Pays-Bas.</p>
<p>Pendant la crise sanitaire, l’essentiel des recommandations officielles au gouvernement a été le fait d’une équipe de gestion des épidémies (OMT pour <em>outbreak management team</em>) rassemblant exclusivement des <a href="https://www.rivm.nl/coronavirus-covid-19/omt">employés de grands centres hospitaliers universitaires, de l’équivalent des agences régionales de santé ou d’unions syndicales de soignants spécialisés</a>. Par ailleurs, lorsqu’il s’est agi d’étendre les recommandations au-delà du champ purement sanitaire, les Pays-Bas ont, une fois de plus, sollicité les universitaires via des appels à <a href="https://www.zonmw.nl/nl/over-zonmw/coronavirus/programmas/programma-detail/covid-19-programma/">projets dédiés</a>. Finalement, l’expertise sur la gestion de crise a été exclusivement le fait d’instituts publics.</p>
<p>Face à la crise sanitaire, la stratégie du gouvernement français a été bien plus dispendieuse. D’après le <a href="https://www.senat.fr/rap/r21-578-1/r21-578-1-syn.pdf">rapport du Sénat</a>, le cabinet McKinsey est mandaté en novembre 2020 et pendant un an pour travailler sur la campagne vaccinale, pour un montant de plus de 12 millions d’euros. En tout, pas moins de 10 cabinets privés ont été mobilisés sur la gestion de la crise sanitaire, pour un budget global estimé à 33 millions.</p>
<h2>Conflits d’intérêts</h2>
<p>Un deuxième problème est lié aux potentiels conflits d’intérêts. Tout expert peut avoir des liens plus ou moins avoués avec des intérêts privés et étrangers qu’il favorise dans ses avis. Ce risque est particulièrement grand quand le recours à l’expertise est externalisé.</p>
<p>Une entreprise privée peut avoir des parts, des partenariats, ou des membres liés avec d’autres entreprises privées qu’elle pourrait favoriser lors de ses recommandations. L’État, lui, se doit d’être neutre et garant de la concurrence équitable entre entreprises. Sans une très forte transparence, les risques que ces recommandations ne remplissent pas le critère de neutralité sont très forts. Cela ne vaut pas seulement pendant l’activité de conseil en lui-même, mais pour la suite également. En effet, pour pouvoir bien conseiller, un consultant doit avoir accès à une série de données confidentielles qu’il pourra, par la suite, conserver et, potentiellement, mobiliser à l’avantage de ses clients.</p>
<p>Ces risques de conflits d’intérêts peuvent produire d’autant plus de soupçons que plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales travaillant pour la transparence dans la vie publique ont pointé lors de la campagne de 2017 un <a href="https://actions.sumofus.org/a/conflits-d-interets">nombre de conflits d’intérêts anormalement élevé</a> dans l’équipe de campagne d’Emmanuel Macron.</p>
<p>C’est sur ce point que le rapport du Sénat porte la plus grande attention, en constatant que ces contrats de consultance ne sont pas associés à de bonnes pratiques telles l’obligation d’une déclaration d’intérêts aux consultants, exclure des marchés publics les cabinets qui n’ont pas respecté leurs obligations déontologiques ou encore prévoir la destruction systématique des données confiées aux cabinets de conseil à l’issue de leur mission, sous le contrôle de la CNIL.</p>
<p>Ces pratiques sont, pourtant, courantes dans d’autres pays. Pour reprendre la comparaison initiée plus haut, aux Pays-Bas, les déclarations d’intérêts de tous les membres de l’OMT conseillant le gouvernement sont <a href="https://www.rivm.nl/coronavirus-covid-19/omt">publiques</a> (voir l’onglet « Belangenverklaring » pour « déclarations d’intérêts ») tout comme leurs avis et les délibérations du cabinet en matière de gestion du Covid. Par ailleurs, l’ensemble des personnes universitaires est soumis <a href="https://www.universiteitenvannederland.nl/files/documents/Netherlands%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20for%20Research%20Integrity%202018.pdf">au code de conduite néerlandais pour l’intégrité de la recherche</a>. Un tel code n’existant pas en France, le Haut Conseil de l’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur fait référence <a href="https://www.hceres.fr/fr/lintegrite-scientifique-en-pratique">aux textes européens</a> en la matière.</p>
<h2>Clarté des objectifs</h2>
<p>Aux messages d’inefficience et aux risques de conflits d’intérêts s’ajoutent, pour finir, des problèmes de clarté d’objectifs. Nos systèmes politiques reposent sur un principe idéal : si les partis au gouvernement souhaitent être réélus, ils doivent mener les meilleures politiques pour le pays.</p>
<p>En réalité, si ce principe est en partie correct, il existe beaucoup d’autres manières de se faire réélire au détriment de l’intérêt du pays, telle que la mise en place de réseaux clientélistes, l’obtention de financements pour les campagnes futures en échange d’avantages procurés sur fonds publics, la collecte d’informations sur les électeurs cachées aux concurrents, etc.</p>
<p>Pour cette raison, une certaine transparence est importante en politique. Elle permet d’assurer que la compétition entre les partis se fasse au bénéfice des électeurs, et non à leur désavantage.</p>
<p>Or, lorsque les expertises sont publiques, elles sont aussi plus facilement traçables par les partis concurrents, ce qui permet de s’assurer que l’intérêt du pays, et non uniquement l’intérêt du parti, a été visé. C’est dans le but de retrouver cette traçabilité que le Sénat recommande de « publier chaque année, en données ouvertes, la liste des prestations de conseil de l’État et de ses opérateurs ».</p>
<p>Cette thématique de l’accessibilité des données et les problèmes liés à son respect n’est pas nouvelle. Il y a en France, comme un peu partout dans le monde, un <a href="https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/fr/science-ouverte-50360">plan</a> pour rendre les données scientifiques disponibles au public. Grâce à cette publicité, nous pouvons garantir qu’une partie, fût-elle le parti au gouvernement, ne peut en tirer meilleur profit qu’une autre partie.</p>
<p>Malgré ces précautions, certaines données importantes ne sont pas toutes disponibles. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enquêtes électorales françaises (EnEF) du CEVIPOF. Financées par le ministère de l’Intérieur, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/lenquete-electorale-francaise-2017.html">25 000 répondants</a> ont été interrogés 16 fois durant vingt mois avant la présidentielle de 2017, puis <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/lenquete-electorale-francase-2022-enef-2022.html">16 000</a> actuellement. Compte tenu du fait que la plupart des enquêtes se contentent de 1 500 à 3 000 répondants faute de moyens, celles-ci représentent des mines d’or pour les partis qui voudraient faire campagne.</p>
<p>Pourtant, l’accès aux données de ces enquêtes est inaccessible, non seulement par le public, mais aussi <a href="https://politbistro.hypotheses.org/7133">par les chercheurs</a>, échappant ainsi à la déontologie habituelle promouvant la science ouverte. De ce fait, seul le ministère de l’intérieur a un accès à ces données, ce qui confère au parti au gouvernement un avantage électoral considérable. Cet exemple illustre comment l’expertise externe commandée par le gouvernement pourrait ne bénéficier qu’à lui tant que les procédures restent opaques.</p>
<p>Contrairement aux entreprises, les gouvernements ne tirent pas beaucoup d’avantages politiques de l’utilisation de cabinets extérieurs. Ils paraissent ainsi inutilement dépensiers, empêtrés dans des conflits d’intérêts et visant leur avantage personnel. La question qui reste à éclaircir est donc : pourquoi, alors, ce recours massif ? C’est à cette question que nous attendons toujours une réponse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180805/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Raul Magni-Berton est membre du mouvement Espoir Ric, qui promeut la démocratie directe en France. Il a reçu des financements de l'Université de Grenoble-Alpes pour co-diriger le projet international EXCEPTIUS sur les politiques de gestion de la pandémie. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clara Egger est membre de d'ESPOIR RIC, mouvement citoyen visant à introduire la démocratie directe en France et du Collectif Transdisciplinaire d'Enseignement et de Recherche Esprit Critique et Sciences (CORTECS). Elle a reçu des financements de l'organisation publique néerlandaise pour la recherche et le développement en santé (ZonMw) pour le projet EXCEPTIUS analysant les modalités, déterminants et impacts des politiques de lutte contre le Covid-19 en Europe. Elle conseille les l'orgainsation de promotion de la démocratie aux Pays-Bas (Meer Democratie).</span></em></p>Le recours à des cabinets de conseil privés par les gouvernements publics pose de nombreuses questions.Raul Magni-Berton, Professeur de sciences politiques, Sciences Po Grenoble, UMR Pacte, Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)Clara Egger, Assistant professor in Globalisation Studies and Humanitarian Action, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1783882022-03-31T16:39:29Z2022-03-31T16:39:29ZGuerra en Ucrania: ¿necesitamos regular el uso de las ciberarmas?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455625/original/file-20220331-19-fjhtcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C0%2C5097%2C2874&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/military-operation-action-soldiers-using-grade-761940757">Shutterstock / Gorodenkoff</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Internet ha creado una nueva encrucijada para la seguridad global. La proliferación de un conjunto de actores –ciberdelincuentes, ciberterroristas y ciberejércitos– dispuestos a usar ciberarmas (habitualmente programas maliciosos –<em>malware</em>– y ataques de denegación distribuida de servicio –DDoS–) con propósitos destructivos ha transformado los parámetros de guerra convencionales. </p>
<p>Además, las redes sociales parecen haberse convertido en el espacio idóneo para, mediante el uso de estrategias de combate no tradicionales (difusión de informaciones falsas, propaganda y provocaciones, entre muchas otras), minar la estabilidad y seguridad de un país. </p>
<p>Abundan ya los ciberataques perpetrados con el fin de destruir estructuras clave o desestabilizar políticamente países, por ejemplo, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2017/12/04/actualidad/1512389091_690459.html">la legión de cuentas automatizadas</a> (4,800 bots) que viralizó noticias de <em>Rusia Today</em> (RT) y <em>Sputnik</em>, dos medios estatales rusos, durante los días más intensos del <em>procés</em> en Cataluña. </p>
<p>Sin embargo, nunca anteriormente estos ataques habían tomado la dimensión que ha adquirido el actual conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania. Nos encontramos ante la primera ciberguerra global. </p>
<h2>Desde Rusia con “amor”</h2>
<p>Ucrania ha sufrido ya varios ciberataques que Estados Unidos ha atribuido a la <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/ucrania-crisis_eeuu-acusa-a-rusia-de-los-ciberataques-que-ucrania-sufri%C3%B3-esta-semana/47361154">agencia de inteligencia militar</a> (GRU) rusa, aunque <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-60508957">el Kremlin ha negado la participación en estos ataques</a> y ha calificado estas acusaciones de “rusofóbicas”.</p>
<p>En 2017, por ejemplo, expertos informáticos relacionados con la GRU fueron acusados de estar detrás del apagón en Ucrania de 2015, que afectó a 230.000 personas y fue considerado como el <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002717737138">primer ciberataque contra una red eléctrica reconocido públicamente</a>. </p>
<p>Más recientemente, el pasado 14 de enero, numerosos bancos e instituciones ucranianas fueron atacados y algunos sitios web fueron reemplazados por una advertencia que rezaba: “<a href="https://twitter.com/Sara__Firth/status/1481878053336887296?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1481878053336887296%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.newtral.es%2Fciberataques-ucrania-rusia-ciberguerra-internet%2F20220223%2F">Preparaos para lo peor</a>”. </p>
<p>Y ya durante la actual invasión rusa, <a href="https://cybernews.com/news/meta-bans-ghostwriter-hacker-group/">Meta, la empresa matriz de Facebook, reveló</a> que <em>hackers</em> afiliados al grupo <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-brash-hackers-turn-to-german-election/"><em>Ghostwriter</em></a>, muy probablemente asociado con Rusia y Bielorrusia, se habían apoderado de cuentas de autoridades militares y figuras públicas de Ucrania, y YouTube informó de que <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2022/03/01/espanol/rusia-ucrania-microsoft.html">había eliminado cinco canales que distribuían vídeos con fines desinformativos</a>. </p>
<p>Con todo, la autoría y la magnitud de los ciberataques son casi siempre difusas, lo que complica la atribución de responsabilidades y provoca dudas sobre la proporcionalidad de la respuesta. Dicho de otro modo, la identificación del atacante en el ciberespacio se hace mucho más complicada, especialmente cuando el ataque es cometido por ciberejércitos muy preparados, como los que poseen Rusia y China. </p>
<h2>La red, una pesadilla para Putin</h2>
<p>Si bien es cierto que poseer un ciberéjercito bien pertrechado ha otorgado una ventaja militar a Rusia en la presente guerra con Ucrania, también lo es el hecho de que la red, por su naturaleza global, el rol que confiere a los individuos, así como por su cultura libertaria, se ha convertido en una auténtica pesadilla para Putin.</p>
<p>Tan solo una horas después de la invasión rusa, el gobierno ucraniano, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-ukraine-calls-hacker-underground-defend-against-russia-2022-02-24/">hizo un llamado</a> a todos los ciberactivistas del país para que ayudasen en la defensa digital de Ucrania. Fruto de este llamamiento surgió la <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-it-army-russia-war-cyberattacks-ddos/"><em>IT Army</em></a>, un grupo de especialistas en ciberseguridad encargado de proteger infraestructuras estatales clave y llevar a cabo operaciones de espionaje. </p>
<p>El presidente Zelensky también ha usado las redes sociales para <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-60762022">pedir de forma reiterada ayuda a la comunidad internacional</a>, alentar a los ucranianos y negar informaciones falsas. El 26 de febrero, por ejemplo, en un mensaje en Instagram, negó que hubiese aceptado una posible evacuación de Estados Unidos del país y que hubiese ordenado al ejército deponer las armas: “<a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/Cabe-u9FUaf/">Ha aparecido mucha información falsa. Yo estoy aquí y no estamos deponiendo ningún arma</a>”, dijo. </p>
<p>Otros miembros del gobierno de Ucrania también han empleado las redes sociales con fines similares. El mismo 26 de febrero, el viceprimer ministro de Ucrania y ministro para la Transformación Digital, Mykhailo Fedorov, utilizó Twitter para pedirle a Elon Musk que mandase sus estaciones <em>Starlink</em> para proporcionar internet en los lugares del país que habían quedado sin cobertura debido a los ataques rusos. Horas más tarde,<a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317"> Musk anunció en Twitter que <em>Starlink</em> había sido activado en Ucrania</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451701/original/file-20220312-27-1lhadk4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Incluso el parlamento ucraniano ha recurrido a las redes sociales durante la guerra. El pasado 11 de marzo difundió vía Twitter un <a href="https://twitter.com/ua_parliament/status/1502402021386858504">vídeo montaje</a> en el que se observa como París es bombardeada por aviones de combate rusos. El vídeo termina con la frase que ha viralizado Zelensky “Si nosotros caemos, vosotros también”. </p>
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<p>Más allá del uso político-militar que le han dado el Gobierno y las instituciones políticas de Ucrania, han sido millones de individuos y entidades, en Ucrania y en todo el mundo, los que han utilizado las redes sociales para resistir a la invasión de Putin. </p>
<p>Ya sea en forma de humor, compartiendo <a href="https://twitter.com/olex_scherba/status/1498023662695419910?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1498023662695419910%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.elpais.com.uy%2Fmundo%2Fviral-video-granjero-ucraniano-roba-tanque-ruso-tractor-celebran-politicos.html">vídeos de tractores llevándose tanques rusos</a> o de una forma mucho más aterradora, compartiendo imágenes de heridos y muertos, lo que estamos viendo es cómo la red alberga la primera ciberguerra global. </p>
<p>Prueba de ello es la <a href="https://twitter.com/youranonone/status/1496965766435926039">declaración de guerra cibernética realizada por Anonymous al gobierno ruso</a>, así como el <em>hackeo</em> de los servicios rusos de <em>streaming</em> Wink y Ivi y de los canales de televisión estatales Russia 24, First Channel y Moscow 24, que llevó a cabo este colectivo el pasado 6 de marzo para <a href="https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/1500613013510008836">transmitir en vivo vídeos de la invasión</a>. </p>
<h2>Opciones para la ciberpaz</h2>
<p>A falta de una legislación internacional específica que regule la ciberguerra, son tres las opciones que los gobiernos pueden adoptar para velar por la ciberpaz: </p>
<p>En primer lugar, y con miras a aumentar la resiliencia democrática de los países, pueden crear programas educativos que fomenten el uso cívico de los nuevos medios de comunicación. </p>
<p>En segundo lugar, pueden, en detrimento quizás de otros gastos militares, aumentar el gasto en ciberdefensa. </p>
<p>Y, finalmente, deberían adoptar un acuerdo global que restrinja y controle el uso de las ciberarmas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc Esteve Del Valle no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Noticias falsas, propaganda, llamadas de auxilio, imágenes de muertos, de ataques a infraestructuras críticas… Aunque la ciberguerra ayude en ocasiones, también hace mucho daño y luchar contra un ciberejército como el ruso no es sencillo. Es necesaria la creación de una legislación internacional que la regule.Marc Esteve Del Valle, Profesor, Nuevos Medios de Comunicación y Periodismo, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778462022-02-24T10:29:42Z2022-02-24T10:29:42ZAsí transcurre la vida en las regiones separatistas ucranianas de Donetsk y Lugansk<p>El reconocimiento por parte de Rusia de las Repúblicas Populares de Donetsk y Lugansk, y el inicio de un ataque militar contra Ucrania, han atraído la atención del mundo hacia estas dos <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60468237">regiones separatistas controladas por los rebeldes</a>. Han estado fuera del control del Gobierno ucraniano desde que los separatistas respaldados por Rusia lucharon contra las fuerzas ucranianas hasta llegar a un punto muerto en 2014, un conflicto que ha causado la muerte de <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer">unas 14 000 personas</a>. </p>
<p>Se estima que dos millones de personas han huido de estos territorios –principalmente hacia Rusia o Ucrania– y unos tres millones se han quedado. En los últimos días, las mujeres y los niños de estas regiones han recibido la orden de <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/russian-backed-separatists-announce-evacuation-from-east-ukraine">evacuar a Rusia</a>, el primer indicio de que el conflicto armado volvía a trastocar sus vidas.</p>
<p>En julio de 2021, contratamos a un equipo de investigación con sede en Ucrania para que nos ayudara a realizar grupos de discusión con personas que vivían en los territorios separatistas sobre los <a href="https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/subsites/Institute/VID/PDF/Conferences/2021/Slides/S04-1_slides_Perelli-Harris_Hilevych.pdf">problemas cotidianos a los que se enfrentaban</a>. A diferencia de los periodistas, que tienden a buscar personas con historias especialmente interesantes para entrevistar, nosotros tratamos de reclutar a una selección de personas comunes y corrientes, incluyendo residentes urbanos y rurales, hombres y mujeres. En total, participaron 40 personas y, a pesar del formato virtual, parecían sentirse bastante cómodas hablando de aspectos de su vida cotidiana, normalmente desde el salón de su casa.</p>
<p>Nos llamó la atención, sobre todo, de lo que no hablaron: si querían formar parte de Rusia, de Ucrania o ser independientes de ambas. Mientras los Gobiernos ruso y ucraniano llevan ocho años disputándose estos territorios, estos residentes estaban más preocupados por los problemas cotidianos. Se enfrentaban a las cuarentenas de la covid-19, la alimentación de sus familias, la educación para sus hijos y luchaban por mantenerse en contacto con sus familiares al otro lado de la “línea de contacto”, la frontera entre las zonas controladas por el Gobierno ucraniano y los territorios separatistas.</p>
<h2>Una población sin trabajo y envejecida</h2>
<p>En 2015, el acuerdo de Minsk II condujo a un alto el fuego entre los separatistas de Donetsk y Lugansk y el Gobierno ucraniano. Desde entonces, estas regiones están controladas por gobiernos títeres respaldados por Rusia. El aislamiento ha pasado factura a sus habitantes. Algunos de nuestros participantes habían perdido sus empleos o negocios, y muchos se quejaban de la subida de los precios y la caída de los salarios. El sistema bancario quedó aislado del mundo exterior, el sistema de transporte se deterioró, las pensiones dejaron de pagarse y un toque de queda a las 10 de la noche restringió sus movimientos nocturnos. Los residentes fueron separados de sus familiares en Ucrania, de sus hermanos que se habían trasladado a Rusia, y sus hijos ya no podían visitar a sus abuelos.</p>
<p>Muchos lamentaron el fuerte descenso de la población de la región, señalando que la mayoría de los que se quedaron eran mayores de 40 años. Según <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_2021-eng_-_2021-02-09.pdf">las estimaciones oficiales</a>, el 41 % de la población de los territorios separatistas tiene más de 65 años, cifra superior a la del resto de Ucrania. Muchos jóvenes se habían marchado a Ucrania o a Rusia, “porque ¿qué perspectivas tienen? Ninguna”. La mayor parte de las infraestructuras se han roto o cerrado: minas, empresas y fábricas. Muchos de los mejores especialistas, personal médico y doctores se habían ido. Un padre relató con enfado cómo llevó a su hijo a ponerse una inyección y el técnico médico ni siquiera sabía cómo sacar la sangre al niño.</p>
<p>Al preguntarles cómo afecta el conflicto a sus vidas, respondieron con palabrotas, no con palabras. Aunque están atrapados en medio del conflicto, se sienten abandonados por ambas partes: “No nos necesitan allí, y no nos necesitan aquí”. Algunos señalaron que los disparos esporádicos que escuchaban por la noche hacían llorar a sus hijos y desencadenaban recuerdos traumáticos de los días de lucha que ahora han vuelto a sus vidas.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Un cartel azul marcado por agujeros de bala en el que se lee 'Donetsk' en ucraniano" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Las regiones separatistas de Donetsk y Lugansk son desde hace años escenario de conflictos armados.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/armed-conflict-east-ukraine-ukrainian-war-1247643613">rospoint / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Aunque la opinión predominante de nuestros participantes era la de ver los territorios separatistas como vacíos, aislados y aletargados, hubo algunas expresiones de optimismo. El centro de Donetsk –que antaño era una próspera ciudad, la quinta más grande de Ucrania– había mejorado recientemente, con nuevas carreteras y servicios. Algunos se habían mudado a casas vacías en el centro y describieron actividades para niños y eventos públicos. Sin embargo, la mayoría de nuestros participantes se mostraron profundamente pesimistas: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Al principio del conflicto, había dinero, ahorros y esperanza. Ahora los ahorros se han acabado y la esperanza también”.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Elegir quedarse</h2>
<p>¿Por qué se quedaron estas personas en unas condiciones que muchos de sus amigos y vecinos habían abandonado? No (como afirma el Gobierno ruso) porque quisieran formar parte de Rusia o por algún compromiso político, sino porque no tenían oportunidades de trabajo en otro lugar, ni fondos para trasladarse, ni redes que les ayudaran a empezar de nuevo. Responsabilidades como tener hijos pequeños o padres ancianos les ataban a la región. Y marcharse significaba abandonar sus hogares. Irse a lo desconocido les parecía peor que quedarse. Como dijo una de ellas:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Si no hay luz en el túnel, no hay a dónde ir”.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Con la acalorada retórica que rodea a estas regiones en el escenario geopolítico, nos sorprendió la falta de comentarios prorrusos o proucranianos en nuestros grupos de discusión. Es posible que los de ideología prorrusos se hayan negado a participar en los grupos organizados por una institución de investigación con sede en Kiev, y que los participantes se hayan autocensurado por miedo a las represalias. </p>
<p>Las conversaciones internacionales sobre estas regiones y otros conflictos “congelados” suelen tratar a los residentes de dichas regiones como peones políticos. Pero sus verdaderas preocupaciones suelen tener más que ver con la vida cotidiana en circunstancias inestables, caóticas y a menudo amenazantes, donde las infraestructuras han sido destruidas por los combates y el Gobierno los ha abandonado. Los territorios separatistas son lugares desolados y tristes, sin esperanza ni oportunidades. </p>
<p>Como dijo uno de los encuestados: “Nos estamos extinguiendo lentamente”. La nueva invasión rusa solo acelerará el proceso.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brienna Perelli-Harris recibe financiación del Consejo de Investigación Económica y Social del Reino Unido. La investigación fue financiada por el Fondo de Investigación para Retos Globales de la Universidad Southampton.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theodore Gerber y Yuliya Hilevych no reciben salarios, ni ejercen labores de consultoría, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del puesto académico citado.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin ha enviado tropas a las regiones del este de Ucrania conocidas como el Donbás. Así es la vida de los habitantes de los territorios separatistas.Brienna Perelli-Harris, Professor of Demography, University of SouthamptonTheodore Gerber, Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-MadisonYuliya Hilevych, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1776852022-02-23T14:39:44Z2022-02-23T14:39:44Z‘The hope is finished’: life in the Ukrainian separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk<p>Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and fears of a military attack on Ukraine, have once again drawn the world’s attention to these two <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60468237">rebel-held separatist regions</a>. They have been outside Ukrainian government control since Russian-backed separatists fought Ukrainian forces to a standstill in 2014, a conflict that has killed <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer">some 14,000 people</a>. While an estimated two million have fled these territories – mainly to either Russia or Ukraine – about three million have remained. In the past few days, women and children in these regions have been ordered to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/russian-backed-separatists-announce-evacuation-from-east-ukraine">evacuate to Russia</a>, indicating armed conflict is again upending their lives.</p>
<p>In July 2021, we hired a Ukraine-based research team to help us conduct focus groups with people living in the separatist territories about the <a href="https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/subsites/Institute/VID/PDF/Conferences/2021/Slides/S04-1_slides_Perelli-Harris_Hilevych.pdf">everyday problems they faced</a>. In contrast to journalists, who tend to seek out people with especially interesting stories to interview, we sought to recruit a selection of ordinary people, including both urban and rural residents, men and women. Overall, 40 people participated, and despite the virtual format they seemed quite comfortable discussing aspects of their daily lives, usually from their own living rooms.</p>
<p>We were struck above all by what they did not talk about: whether they wished to be part of Russia, part of Ukraine or independent of both. While the Russian and Ukrainian governments have jockeyed for eight years now over these territories, these residents were more concerned with daily problems. They struggled with COVID quarantines, feeding their families, obtaining education for their children, and staying in touch with relatives across the “line of contact” – the border between the areas controlled by the Ukrainian government and the separatist territories.</p>
<p>In 2015, the Minsk II agreement led to a ceasefire between the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk and the Ukrainian government. Since then, these regions have been controlled by Russian-backed puppet governments. The isolation has taken its toll on the people living there. Some of our participants had lost jobs or businesses, and many complained of rising prices and falling wages. The banking system was cut off from the outside world, the transport system deteriorated, pensions were no longer paid, and a 10 pm curfew restricted their evening movements. Residents were separated from relatives in Ukraine, from siblings who had moved to Russia, and their children could no longer visit their grandparents.</p>
<p>Many lamented the sharp decline in the region’s population, noting that most of those who remained were older than 40. According to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno_2021-eng_-_2021-02-09.pdf">official estimates</a>, 41% of the population in the separatist territories is over 65, higher than elsewhere in Ukraine. Many young people had left for Ukraine or Russia, “because what prospects do they have? None.” Most of the infrastructure has been broken or closed – mines, enterprises, and factories. Many of the best specialists, medical staff and doctors have left. One father angrily recounted how he took his child to get an injection and the medical technician didn’t even know how to get blood out of the child’s finger.</p>
<p>Asked how the conflict affects their lives, they responded with expletives, not words. Although caught in the middle of the conflict, they felt abandoned by both sides: “We are not needed there, and we are not needed here.” Some noted that the sporadic shooting they still hear at night makes their children cry and triggers traumatic memories of the days of fully fledged fighting.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A blue sign marked by bullet holes that reads 'Donetsk' in Ukrainian" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448067/original/file-20220223-21-vqvmvu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk have been a site of armed conflict for years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/armed-conflict-east-ukraine-ukrainian-war-1247643613">rospoint / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the predominant view of our participants was to see the separatist territories as empty, isolated and lethargic, there were some expressions of optimism. The centre of Donetsk – once a thriving city, Ukraine’s fifth largest – had recently improved, with new roads and amenities. Some had moved into empty houses in the centre and described activities for children and public events. Nonetheless, most of our participants were deeply pessimistic: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>At the beginning of the conflict, there was money, savings and hope. Now the savings are finished, and the hope is finished.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Choosing to stay</h2>
<p>Why did these people stay in conditions that so many of their friends and neighbours had left? Not (as the Russian government claims) because they wished to be part of Russia or because of any political commitments, but because they had no job opportunities elsewhere, funds for relocating, or networks to help them start over. Responsibilities such as small children or elderly parents tied them to the region. And departing would mean abandoning their homes. Leaving into the unknown felt worse than staying put. As one person put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If there is no light in the tunnel, then there is nowhere to go.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With the heated rhetoric surrounding these regions on the geopolitical stage, we were surprised by the lack of either pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian comments in our focus groups. Pro-Russian ideologues may have declined to participate in groups organised by a Kyiv-based research organisation, and participants may have self-censored for fear of reprisal. </p>
<p>International conversations about these regions and other “frozen” conflicts often treat the residents of such regions as political pawns. But their true concerns often have more to do with everyday life in unstable, chaotic and often threatening circumstances, where infrastructure has been destroyed by fighting and government has abandoned them. The separatist territories have become desolate, sad places, without hope or opportunity. </p>
<p>As one respondent said, “We are slowly dying out.” A new Russian invasion will only hasten the process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brienna Perelli-Harris receives funding from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council. The research was funded by University of Southampton Global Challenges Research Funding. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theodore Gerber and Yuliya Hilevych do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has sent troops into the eastern Ukraine regions known as the Donbas. Here’s what life has been like for people living in the separatist territories.Brienna Perelli-Harris, Professor of Demography, University of SouthamptonTheodore Gerber, Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-MadisonYuliya Hilevych, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1689882021-10-21T21:12:20Z2021-10-21T21:12:20ZLa surmortalité des jeunes adultes : un trait naturel ?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425886/original/file-20211012-15-kk11pw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C2%2C1905%2C1273&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Le taux de mortalité chez les jeunes adultes est supérieur à ce qu'il devrait, statistiquement, être.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sammie Chaffin/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>La mort peut survenir à tout âge, mais pas avec la même probabilité. Il est d’ailleurs possible d’établir la courbe des taux de décès par âge : celle-ci présente une forme caractéristique en « U », avec un risque de décès élevé à la naissance et durant les premières années de vie, puis qui diminue pendant l’enfance jusqu’à atteindre un minimum aux alentours de 10 ans. Elle remonte ensuite au cours de la vie de façon exponentielle. Selon cette courbe, les jeunes adultes devraient être relativement peu exposés au risque de mourir.</p>
<p>Voilà pour la théorie. Car les jeunes adultes font, en fait, souvent exception et montrent une <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-population-et-societes-2021-6-page-1.htm">mortalité plus élevée qu’attendue</a>. S’agit-il d’un trait naturel de l’espèce humaine, ou d’autres facteurs sont-ils en cause ?</p>
<h2>Une surmortalité anormale</h2>
<p>Une mortalité « de base » peut être estimée, qui découle des contraintes biologiques et des circonstances épidémiologiques.</p>
<p>L’excès de mortalité des jeunes adultes par rapport à cette mortalité de base semble, lui, indépendant des conditions générales de mortalité comme l’illustrent les courbes de taux de décès par âge de la <a href="https://www.mortality.org/">base de données sur la mortalité <em>Human Mortality Database</em></a> (voir ci-dessous). Il apparaît toutefois clairement qu’entre 15 ans et 30 ans environ, les jeunes adultes subissent souvent une mortalité relativement élevée. On peut parler de surmortalité, dans la mesure où elle s’additionne au niveau attendu.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Ces courbes du taux de mortalité sont en U : très hautes à la naissance, elles diminuent avant de remonter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425283/original/file-20211007-23-3xvufa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ces courbes du taux de mortalité ont été établies pour 45 pays disposant de statistiques d’état civil complètes (Ici AUS : Australie, DNK : Danemark, FRE : France, JPN : Japon, NOR : Norvège, PRT : Portugal, UKR : Ukraine).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">A. Remund/INED</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Le niveau absolu de la mortalité observé est parfois trompeur. Par exemple, en 1900-1904, les hommes danois connaissaient une mortalité globalement similaire, voire inférieure pour certains âges, à celle de leurs homologues norvégiens, mais contrairement à eux ne subissaient quasiment aucune surmortalité entre 15 et 40 ans.</p>
<p>À un niveau de mortalité générale moindre, la courbe des hommes américains en 1990-1994 montre une surmortalité très marquée qui les place au niveau absolu de l’Australie en 1940-1944, où par ailleurs la mortalité générale était bien plus élevée.</p>
<p>Des constats similaires peuvent être faits pour les femmes, bien qu’elles soient généralement moins touchées. Ainsi, juste après-guerre, si les Japonaises et les Portugaises connaissent un niveau général de mortalité identique jusqu’à 15 ans, les premières subissent ensuite une surmortalité bien plus forte que les secondes.</p>
<p>Quarante ans plus tard, les Françaises et les Ukrainiennes connaissent une mortalité absolue semblable entre 15 et 25 ans, mais qui résulte d’une forte surmortalité chez les premières et non les secondes, qui ont par ailleurs un désavantage marqué à tous les autres âges.</p>
<p>Pour chacune des paires considérées ici, les jeunes adultes sont donc plus vulnérables au Danemark qu’en Norvège, aux États-Unis qu’en Australie, au Japon qu’au Portugal, et en France qu’en Ukraine. Et ce quels que soient les niveaux absolus de mortalité entre 15 et 30 ans.</p>
<p>La surmortalité des jeunes adultes semble être un élément distinct de la mortalité humaine qui s’ajoute aux autres processus dictant la mortalité générale. Si elle présente parfois une forme bombée (« bosse de surmortalité »), comme dans le cas des hommes norvégiens en 1900, elle peut également ressembler davantage à un plateau, comme on l’observe pour les hommes américains en 1990 ou les femmes françaises en 1980.</p>
<p>Quelles peuvent être les causes de ce phénomène ?</p>
<h2>Une surmortalité historiquement universelle ?</h2>
<p>Jusqu’à récemment, la surmortalité des jeunes adultes a été considérée comme un <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-institute-of-actuaries/article/abs/age-pattern-of-mortality/080CA48AF00A73CE4D2888A6E1AA7385">trait universel de la mortalité humaine</a> et <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0014826">propre aux individus de sexe masculin</a>. Ces deux postulats relèvent d’une conception biologique de l’adolescence en tant que période tumultueuse, faisant implicitement référence aux transformations psychologiques associées à la puberté (production d’hormones sexuelles, développement cérébral asynchrone, etc.). Ces spécificités du « cerveau adolescent » entraîneraient un <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2892678/">manque d’inhibition, une prise de risque excessive, une impulsivité, et une moindre capacité à considérer les conséquences de ses actes</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphique des taux de mortalité par âges masculins. Sélection avec faible surmortalité des jeunes adultes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428077/original/file-20211022-21-19ay9pm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-population-et-societes-2021-6-page-1.htm">Figure reprise de Adrien Remund, Carlo Giovanni Camarda et Tim Riffe, 2021, La surmortalité des jeunes adultes est-elle naturelle ?, Population et Sociétés n° 590, p. 1-4</a>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ces postulats ne résistent que partiellement à l’épreuve des faits. L’examen de plusieurs milliers de courbes telles que celles présentées ci-dessus montre en effet que si une surmortalité est certes très souvent présente chez les hommes, elle peut être <a href="https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:73525">absente ou peu marquée</a>. C’est le cas dans les années 1950 et 1960 tant en Europe du Sud (Espagne, Portugal) que du Nord (Irlande, Finlande).</p>
<h2>La bosse de surmortalité s’observe aussi chez les jeunes femmes</h2>
<p>La surmortalité des jeunes femmes est systématiquement plus faible que celle des jeunes hommes, jusqu’à être absente. Les cas présentant une surmortalité sont cependant majoritaires et correspondent à des contextes très variés, tant à l’époque où la mortalité maternelle était encore élevée que plus récemment.</p>
<p>L’entre-deux-guerres semble être marqué par une surmortalité féminine particulièrement forte, tant en Europe du Nord (Finlande, Norvège) que du Sud (Italie). Ce pourrait être lié à la tuberculose ; une situation qui perdure au-delà de la Seconde Guerre mondiale au Japon et en Bulgarie. Plus récemment, on observe une surmortalité aux premiers âges adultes particulièrement marquée dans plusieurs pays occidentaux (France, États-Unis ou Nouvelle-Zélande).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphique représentant le taux de mortalité par âges féminins. Sélection de cas avec forte surmortalité des jeunes adultes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=691&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/428078/original/file-20211022-21-1yxx4w7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-population-et-societes-2021-6-page-1.htm">Figure reprise de Adrien Remund, Carlo Giovanni Camarda et Tim Riffe, 2021, La surmortalité des jeunes adultes est-elle naturelle ?, Population et Sociétés n° 590, p. 1-4</a>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>En réalité, pour les femmes, seules les décennies 1950 et 1960 semblent exemptes de toute surmortalité. La bosse de surmortalité n’est donc pas un phénomène universel ni propre aux hommes.</p>
<h2>Une augmentation des morts violentes à la puberté ?</h2>
<p>Un autre corollaire de la conception biologique de l’adolescence est que la surmortalité des jeunes adultes serait due à une augmentation des comportements dangereux dans les années suivant la puberté. L’expression « bosse des accidents » (<em>accident hump</em>) est d’ailleurs souvent utilisée, certains auteurs faisant un lien explicite entre surmortalité et puberté, qui pousserait à des comportements « à risque » menant à une <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0014826">augmentation des décès violents</a>. Cette explication ne résiste, là aussi, qu’en partie à l’épreuve des faits.</p>
<p>D’abord, du point de vue des âges concernés, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-018-0680-9">si la bosse débute bien au début de l’adolescence, elle se manifeste jusque dans la trentaine</a>, soit bien après la fin de la puberté. Aux États-Unis, elle disparaît aux alentours de 35 ans pour les hommes et de 25 ans pour les femmes dans les années 1960. Cette limite a ensuite progressé pour les deux sexes jusqu’à atteindre 45 à 50 ans au début des années 1990, notamment sous l’influence du VIH qui tue plus tard que les accidents. Elle fluctue depuis entre 30 et 40 ans, en partie en raison de l’épidémie d’overdoses d’opioïdes.</p>
<p>Un tel étalement au-delà de l’adolescence n’est pas compatible avec une origine purement biologique.</p>
<p>Ensuite, le <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-018-0680-9">détail des causes de décès est plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît</a>. Par exemple, aux États-Unis, les accidents de la circulation, qui contribuaient à environ 60 % de la surmortalité dans les années 1960, n’en représentent plus aujourd’hui qu’un quart chez les hommes, soit autant que les suicides et les homicides. Et pour les deux sexes, la contribution des overdoses a progressé de presque 0 % à 20 % de la surmortalité durant la dernière décennie.</p>
<h2>Le rôle de la tuberculose</h2>
<p>Enfin, historiquement, les causes violentes n’ont pas toujours été les plus importantes. Dans les 22 pays pour lesquels on dispose des causes de décès pour des périodes anciennes, la tuberculose pulmonaire était, jusqu’au milieu du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, la <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-population-et-societes-2021-6-page-1.htm">principale source de surmortalité des jeunes adultes</a>. Dans l’entre-deux-guerres, elle contribuait encore à environ 50 % de la surmortalité chez les hommes. La proportion allant jusqu’à 90 % au Portugal, et de 70 % à 90 % en Suède, Espagne, France, Angleterre, Grèce, Italie, Pays-Bas et Norvège.</p>
<p>À la même époque, la mortalité maternelle n’était à l’origine que de moins de 10 % de la surmortalité des jeunes femmes, à l’exception de certains pays extra-européens (États-Unis, Canada, Chili, Nouvelle-Zélande et Taïwan) où elle en représentait encore de 30 % à 40 % avant les années 1940.</p>
<p>Les morts violentes (suicides, homicides, accidents) surpassent la tuberculose entre 1940 et 1960 selon les pays. Ce retournement coïncide avec d’une part la diffusion des antibiotiques (la streptomycine, qui permet de lutter contre la tuberculose, est découverte en 1944), et d’autre part la démocratisation des moyens de transports motorisés. L’importance des morts violentes est donc un phénomène relativement récent.</p>
<h2>Un phénomène encore mal compris</h2>
<p>La « bosse » de surmortalité des jeunes adultes est un <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41135308.pdf">phénomène démographique connu depuis un siècle et demi</a> mais imparfaitement compris. Son examen fait parfois l’objet d’idées reçues qui reposent sur une conception purement biologique de l’adolescence, supposant son caractère universel, sexué et lié aux comportements « à risque ».</p>
<p>Les études récentes permettent de mieux en cerner les principales caractéristiques : non universel et davantage masculin, sans pourtant que les femmes y échappent. Les morts violentes l’expliquent en partie seulement. Sans écarter complètement les facteurs biologiques, la transition à l’âge adulte joue un rôle essentiel en concentrant un nombre important de facteurs de risques socio-économiques dans une période courte et critique du parcours de vie.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Ce texte est adapté d’un article publié par les auteurs dans le journal Population et Sociétés n° 590, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-population-et-societes-2021-6-page-1.htm">« La surmortalité des jeunes adultes est-elle naturelle ? »</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrien Remund a reçu une Bourse Early Postdoc.Mobility du Fonds national suisse et une Bourse postdoctorale Eugène Choisy et Charles Borgeaud de la Société Académique de Genève. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Riffe a reçu des financements de la Basque Foundation for Science. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlo Giovanni Camarda ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Le risque de mourir évolue au fil de la vie. Très élevé à la naissance, il chute pour ensuite remonter graduellement… hormis un pic après l’adolescence. Pourquoi une telle anomalie statistique ?Carlo Giovanni Camarda, Docteur, spécialiste des méthodes de prévision (mortalité, longévité, etc.), Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED)Adrien Remund, Docteur, spécialiste des migrations et en démographie historique, University of GroningenTimothy Riffe, Docteur, spécialiste en santé des populations, Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko UnibertsitateaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1620582021-07-09T10:30:00Z2021-07-09T10:30:00ZBAME groups are underrepresented in polls of public opinion – here’s why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409309/original/file-20210701-23-af8r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Graphic farm / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The question of systemic racism in Britain has been impossible to avoid over the past year. But what about the more basic question of ensuring that ethnic minority voices are heard?</p>
<p>People from Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds make up <a href="https://diversityuk.org/diversity-in-the-uk/#:%7E:text=In%202018%20about%2013.8%25%20of,Minority%20Ethnic%20(BAME)%20background.">14%</a> of the UK. However, BAME participants are often hugely underrepresented in “nationally representative” polls, with BAME representation ranging <a href="https://www.icmunlimited.com/our-work/icm-voting-intentions-general-election-2019-poll-5/">below 10%</a>, and sometimes even <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-06/fault-lines-in-the-uks-culture-wars-kings-ipsos-mori-jun-2021.pdf">5%</a> or <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/covid-19-impact-lockdown-older-generations">lower</a>. </p>
<p>Even more common is the problem of non-reporting. Many UK polls that sample the general population also appear to exclude any mention of ethnicity. This is the case whether the topic is health (recent polls on coping with <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/loved-ones-struggle-keep-touch-during-latest-lockdown">lockdown</a>, vaccination <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/almost-half-britons-want-teachers-and-nursery-workers-be-vaccinated-next">priorities</a>, or NHS staff <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2021/02/24/covid-winter-months-see-increase-mental-health-pro">wellbeing</a>), politics (government approval <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/gb-voting-intention-22-february-2021/">ratings</a>, the <a href="https://comresglobal.com/polls/budget-2021-snap-poll/">budget</a> and <a href="https://www.opinium.com/resource-center/uk-voting-intention-11th-february-2021/">voting</a> intentions), and even <a href="http://www.deltapoll.co.uk/polls/immigration-priorities">attitudes</a> towards immigration or <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/majority-of-public-believes-protests-during-pandemic-are-not-defensible/">race</a> (including whether it’s acceptable to make <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/arts/trackers/do-brits-think-its-acceptable-to-make-jokes-about-black-people">jokes</a> about race). In these cases, it is not clear whether ethnic representation was adequate because there is no indication that ethnicity was measured at all.</p>
<p>Such polls are often reported widely in the media, and so provide important social cues for how we understand public opinion. In one recent example among many, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/may/30/tory-poll-lead-shrinks-following-cummings-broadside-against-johnson">The Guardian</a>, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1443246/boris-johnson-keir-starmer-labour-tories-poll-batley-and-spen-dominic-cummings-coronavirus">The Express</a>, and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-opinion-poll-tory-b1856461.html">The Independent</a> all reported a large drop in public approval for Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party, as well as figures such as “43% of the public want to postpone the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions”, based on a <a href="https://www.opinium.com/resource-center/uk-voting-intention-27th-may-2021/">report</a> that had no mention of ethnic representation. </p>
<p>An analysis including ethnicity might have revealed even higher support among some ethnic minorities for postponing lifting of restrictions, and differences in public approval. Or perhaps not – but the twin problems of underrepresentation and underreporting illustrates the way BAME perspectives and opinions can be marginalised, with far-reaching consequences for how we understand the “voice” of the nation.</p>
<h2>Nationally unrepresentative?</h2>
<p>A basic methodological requirement for an opinion poll is a “nationally representative” sample – that is, the people surveyed fairly reflect the national population. </p>
<p>Typically, this means a survey would be expected to match the population that participants are drawn from in terms of age, gender, socio-economic status, voting preferences and geographic spread. In other words, a survey wouldn’t be considered robust if it had half as many women as men, excluded certain age groups, counted only Conservative voters or canvassed only wealthy professionals. But many surveys of public opinion often do not even report ethnicity, and those that do often have far fewer ethnic minority respondents than they should.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children on a school trip" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">About a third of British school children are BAME.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Altosvic / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To account for low numbers, data is sometimes weighted for ethnicity. This makes sense when used to adjust for minor discrepancies, but is an inadequate approach for boosting a sample that is simply too small. Correcting larger disparities through weighting (for instance, pretending the answers of two respondents represent those of 20 respondents) adds error, and risks producing inaccurate results. </p>
<p>There are a few reasons why ethnic minorities may be more difficult to reach for polling. BAME groups are on average <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/age-groups/1.6">younger</a>, less likely to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/pms-race-disparity-audit-finds-work-and-home-ownership-divide">own their home</a>, and therefore potentially more transient and difficult to reach by post or telephone than white British groups. In recent years, response rates for telephone polls have <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/">declined steeply</a> to less than 10% in inner city areas, which often have more BAME people. Other factors such as <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/english-language-skills/latest#by-ethnicity">language barriers</a> and <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/document/read?vid=1149ab89-822b-4d60-9883-171e4f0e0502">mistrust</a> may also have a role. </p>
<p>However, these challenges are not insurmountable. Official census exercises have samples that reflect the ethnicity of the population, as do large longitudinal nationwide surveys such as the <a href="https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk">British Social Attitudes</a> survey, some government <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/996575/Climate_change_and_net_zero_public_awareness_and_perceptions_summary_report.pdf">research papers</a> on public opinion, and dedicated surveys that focus <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/16/ethnic-minority-feel-unsafe-voting-in-person">explicitly</a> on ethnic minorities. </p>
<p>Truly representative samples can be obtained when there is an imperative to do so, but this does not appear to be the default. The consequence is that BAME populations are underrepresented in polls which may then be used to inform decisions. The resulting mirror that we hold up to society is one that is distorted, and potentially blind to the opinions of key sections of British society.</p>
<h2>Polling on climate change</h2>
<p>Our backgrounds are in environmental psychology, and we have been involved in teams commissioning and analysing surveys of public opinion on climate change. Climate change is an issue that highlights the importance of BAME representation in surveys.</p>
<p>Climate change has a well-established racial justice dimension and people of colour are <a href="https://us.boell.org/en/2021/03/19/racism-and-climate-injustice-0">hardest hit</a> globally. Even in the UK, not everyone suffers <a href="https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/climate-change-and-social-justice-evidence-review">equally</a>. Although domestic data is difficult to find, there is clear evidence that many ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience <a href="https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/2020%20reports/The%20Colour%20of%20Money%20Report.pdf">social deprivation</a>, leaving them less able to respond to climate change, are more likely to live in areas exposed to dangerous <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110710192634/http:/www.endsreport.com/docs/20090820a.pdf">air pollution</a>, have inadequate access to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/828552/Monitor_Engagement_Natural_Environment_2018_2019_v2.pdf">green spaces</a> and increased risk of overheating.</p>
<p>For all of these reasons, BAME representation in opinion polls is not simply a question of whether people with different coloured skin would answer survey questions differently. The experiences of minority ethnic groups potentially provides a profoundly different set of perspectives, which surveys of public opinion on topics as critical as the climate crisis must aspire to capture.</p>
<p>The first step towards positive change is an acknowledgement that we have not been doing enough to ensure that survey samples are representative of British ethnicity. This is more than just a methodological oversight – it presents a moral challenge to the credibility of many social science surveys.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susie Wang receives funding from the European Climate Foundation, and has in the past received funding from the KR Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Corner has in the past received funding from the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC), Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the European Climate Foundation and the KR Foundation </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Ogunbode receives funding from the British Academy and UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy through the Global Challenges Research Fund.</span></em></p>14% of the UK population often make up a much smaller proportion of people of people polled.Susie Wang, Research Associate, University of GroningenAdam Corner, Honorary Research Fellow in Psychology, Affiliate of the centre for Climate Change & Social Transformations (CAST), Cardiff UniversityCharles Ogunbode, Assistant Professor in Applied Psychology, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1616072021-06-13T07:59:29Z2021-06-13T07:59:29ZHow African Union members came to share power despite themselves<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405869/original/file-20210611-15-1in80z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The establishment of the African Union shows how social context is important in international organisations.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">held its first summit</a> in 2002, establishing itself as a new international organisation. It also <a href="https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/what-a-difference-a-decade-makes-understanding-security-policy-re">launched</a> a new vision for African security cooperation. </p>
<p>Nearly two decades later, it is worth reflecting on the process that produced that vision. It may have something to teach us about international negotiations.</p>
<p>The vision is captured by the <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">African Peace and Security Architecture</a> – a framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It’s intended to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts. Although its effectiveness is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/89/1/89/2326623">debated</a>, it marked a major departure from how African states traditionally cooperated on security.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2020.1710915">research</a>
sought to understand how this switch happened. Most negotiation analyses emphasise economic or security-based leverage and narrowly defined material interests. I took a different approach. I looked at the social and organisational environment in which the AU negotiations took place and its effect on the peace and security framework’s form and function. </p>
<p>My analysis offers insights for negotiators and researchers about the significance of social context for the outcome of international negotiations.</p>
<h2>AU’s new approach to security</h2>
<p>From 1963 until <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/3870303.stm">the AU replaced it in 2002</a>, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) usually adopted a “hands off” approach to security. This had its roots in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4378141?casa_token=lxGmqH1I29AAAAAA%3ATQJOIBGo_AoMzCjzdwnXm4HYxBSMLsDQV6n0pA4EPfuDHKcyy73ELX1vcICrogAy7s-J5JsM_nvvBXZwg8Csv-bwo7uecvnAU1dCBWLpw5RZN80tBLg&seq=1">well-founded fears among leaders</a> that their recently acquired political autonomy would be violated by former colonial powers or other OAU members. Therefore, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">the OAU Charter</a> carefully protected the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>One consequence was shielding oppressive governments from reprimand for abuses against their citizens. The vast majority of Africa’s conflicts prompted <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC51414">little</a> reaction from the OAU. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/the-oau-and-human-rights-towards-a-new-definition/18D6D6363E1A00004FE2E5091F553531">several cases</a>, leaders even ruled out discussion. Ugandan president Idi Amin was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/the-oau-and-human-rights-towards-a-new-definition/18D6D6363E1A00004FE2E5091F553531">even</a> elected OAU chairman in 1975, at the height of his government’s human rights abuses.</p>
<p>By contrast, the AU’s approach - at least in treaty documents - is groundbreaking. It gives the Union a much greater security role. Most notable is the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/constitutive-act">right to intervene</a> in a member state </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Union also has a much <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf">broader range of security responsibilities</a>. These include peacekeeping, human rights protection, and promotion of democracy and good governance. Such shifts started in the 1990s but the new peace and security framework provided a legal foundation for AU involvement in activities like elections. The OAU had viewed these as the sole responsibility of governments.</p>
<p>The African Peace and Security Architecture is also notable for the rules of procedure used by its core decision-making organ, the Peace and Security Council. Like the UN Security Council it can deploy peace missions and apply sanctions. But unlike its UN counterpart, there are no veto holders or permanent seats (though <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-109-1.pdf">Nigeria has become a de facto permanent member</a>). </p>
<h2>What influences negotiations</h2>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800908001110">studies</a> of international negotiations assume that participants try to maximise their resources, power or influence. This isn’t what happened when African governments – traditionally very conscious of sovereignty – gave power to an organisation in which members held equal sway.</p>
<p>In trying to understand this outcome, my analysis examined negotiators’ loyalties, rivalries and shared understandings of the world. It also examined the use of informal diplomatic networks.</p>
<p>A strong sense of shared identity developed between the leaderships of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria and Mali. They were the most active proponents of the eventual security framework. They privately referred to themselves as the Like-Minded Five.</p>
<p>Their main “sparring partner” was Muammar Gaddafi, with his own alliance of smaller states and a very different vision for the future – a federal <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.2009.9725324?casa_token=5woIaABoy8sAAAAA:IxmqOrxjEpqPtCyOc-iqydHewgD19I1CuDgpVvCsb_pKE6VlREuuBVNcNZJjvWSm21cnq5NWL1Oa">“United States of Africa”</a>. The Libyan leader’s focus was much more on threats from outside the continent. And he aspired towards a standing army, led from Tripoli.</p>
<p>The Like-Minded Five produced a united front that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/411/249/28273">reaped</a> several negotiation successes over Gaddafi. Many governments shared a stronger sense of identity with them than with the Libyan leader. Gaddafi’s interest in Africa, many suspected, stemmed from his earlier <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/104/416/469/85283?login=true">rejection as a regional leader</a> by Arab countries. The Like-Minded Five capitalised upon this perception.</p>
<p>Another factor that influenced negotiation outcomes was the use of informal pathways of influence. The Like-Minded Five, particularly South Africa, shared a worldview and warm relations with Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU’s secretary general from 1989 until 2001, when most of new framework was negotiated. His informal engagement with other states helped secure a critical mass of members behind many of the group’s positions.</p>
<p>Also influential was a new but growing understanding among members of how to achieve continental stability and what responsibilities African governments should bear. The decade prior to the AU’s establishment was arguably the most violent in Africa’s history. It witnessed genocides in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://undocs.org/S/1996/682">Burundi</a>, and many major conflicts. These often originated from human rights abuses and repressive rule.</p>
<p>Many African leaders shared a sense of shame over not responding to humanitarian catastrophes, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html">particularly Rwanda’s</a>. That, combined with a sense that the non-African international community could not be relied upon for assistance, smoothed the pathway to reform. One of the drafters of the AU’s Vision and Mission Statement told me;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Rwanda loomed large as a reminder of just how horribly things could go. It is because of Rwanda in particular that genocide and crimes against humanity are a stated unequivocal pretext for intervention.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This combination of factors - group loyalties and rivalries, informal pathways of influence, and shared understandings of the world - helps explain the outcome of the negotiations. Without a strong core of like-minded leaders for reform, it is unlikely the AU would have given democracy, human rights and good governance such prominence. Without a strong ally in Salim, their ability to persuade at least some other members would have been very restricted. </p>
<p>This change in how many governments viewed their collective security role allows the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/09/future-peace-operations-african-demands-better-coordination/">AU to be active</a> in peacekeeping today.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>Although the impact of social context will vary across circumstances, this snapshot of how it influenced the African Peace and Security Architecture negotiations suggests it’s worth considering such variables when analysing international negotiations. In recent years, Brexit and Donald Trump have created an impression of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2019.1680604?casa_token=bpx21iUmcWMAAAAA%3Ayzv01-2OoGw3qmLw3m0TmpJSzOtV75RyZgeHZJArhbylG-HaCBSiJQMGLZhDSNihG9AGS0YHNQX4">“transactional diplomacy”</a> with negotiators motivated by little other than self-interested material considerations.</p>
<p>As the AU negotiations indicate, every diplomatic engagement takes place in a particular social context. Understanding that context can prove crucial to understanding what happens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J. Hogan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Formation of the African Union shows how social context is important in international negotiations.John J. Hogan, Lecturer, International relations, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1553902021-03-05T17:40:44Z2021-03-05T17:40:44ZSt James, ‘brother’ of Jesus: it turns out his ancient remains belong to someone else<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387995/original/file-20210305-23-hkz2ie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=113%2C5%2C1077%2C585&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saint James the Lesser is believed to have been martyred in AD 70.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_the_Less#/media/File:Saint_James_the_Less_(Menologion_of_Basil_II).jpg">Wikicommons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hunched innocuously in the shadow of Rome’s mighty Piazza Venezia, just a stone’s throw from one of the city’s busiest thoroughfares, the Santi Apostoli church might be forgiven for having more respect for the dead than for the living.</p>
<p>That’s because of the treasures that the church protects. As well as having briefly accommodated the tomb of Michelangelo, the church has, since the year 556, housed relics of particular significance to the Holy Catholic Church: the remains of two of Jesus’ contemporaries, Saint Philip and Saint James, the latter of whom is believed to have been Jesus’ brother. </p>
<p>Now, after <a href="https://heritagesciencejournal.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40494-021-00481-9">careful extraction and analysis</a>, a bone said to have belonged to Saint James has been radiocarbon-dated – and sadly de-authenticated. Despite being incredibly old, having died at some time between 214 and 340, the individual housed in the Santi Apostoli church for one and a half millennia turns out to have been a few generations off the real deal.</p>
<p>Yet the surprise finding that the wrong person’s remains were likely transported to Rome from the Middle East has prised open a fascinating history: of plundered tombs, holy men’s bones, and the remarkable relocation of saints from one ancient empire to another. </p>
<h2>Moving tombs</h2>
<p>In ancient Rome, families commemorated the birthdays of their ancestors by taking festive meals at their graves. This custom was <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747871.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198747871">later taken up</a> by early Christians, who came together around the tombs of their saints on their name days.</p>
<p>But there was a problem. As Christianity became more dominant, the tombs of saints became overcrowded. Plus, the tombs were often situated outside the city walls, which made the feasts potentially risky. In an effort to make them safer and more accessible, saints’ remains were exhumed and transferred into churches in a process called translation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A coffin is carried into a city in a painting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387845/original/file-20210304-13-10s9623.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The translation of saints’ remains into churches became increasingly common in the fourth century.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The practice of translation began in modern-day Turkey. The first known translation was of <a href="https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783322980229">Saint Babylas in AD 354</a>, who was moved from a cemetery outside the ancient city of Antioch (near the modern-day Turkish city of Antakya) to a purpose-built Byzantine church. There followed a boom in exhumations: Saint Timotheus, Saint Andre and Saint Lukas were all translated to churches in Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) the following year. </p>
<p>At its peak, the translation trend saw the Christian church <a href="https://www.fourthcentury.com/imperial-laws-364/">issue edicts</a> calling for order amid the energetic violation of sacred tombs. During this period, dozens of bodies were finding their way, by sea and on foot, from tombs into church crypts. The flow of saintly bones was eventually directed from the Middle East, where the saints had died, towards the centre of Rome: the seat of the Roman Catholic church.</p>
<h2>Skeletal relics</h2>
<p>The remains of Saint Philip and Saint James were assumed to have been caught up in this frenzy of translation. Unsurprisingly, their skeletons are far from complete today. Only fragments of a tibia, a femur and a mummified foot remain. </p>
<p>The tibia and foot are attributed to Saint Philip, who was one of the original twelve apostles, and was said to have been present at the miraculous <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%206%3A5-14&version=NIV">feeding of the 5,000</a>.</p>
<p>The femur, meanwhile, was said to belong to Saint James, an altogether more ambiguous figure. Saint Paul calls him “the pillar” of the first Christian church in Jerusalem. This position led to his death, claims the historian Josephus, after the Jewish high priest Ananus <a href="https://lexundria.com/j_aj/20.200/wst%20Antiquities%20of%20the%20Jews,%2020.200">had James stoned to death</a> in AD 70.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An old religious painting of a man hitting another man with a stick" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387840/original/file-20210304-15-l58hj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A manuscript dating from late tenth or early eleventh century depicts the martyrdom of Saint James in Jerusalem.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Paul also describes James as the “Lord’s brother”, something that seems to directly contradict Catholic dogma regarding Mary’s lifelong virginity. This has nonetheless led to speculation that James was either Jesus’ cousin, his half-brother, or <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/jude-and-the-relatives-of-jesus-in-the-early-church-9780567082978/">even his brother</a>.</p>
<h2>Feat of chemistry</h2>
<p>To authenticate the bones stored in the Santi Apostoli church, our research team needed to work out when the individuals died. That involved peeling back the layers of history that had accumulated on the bones over the course of their long and well-travelled past.</p>
<p>Doing so, we found mercury embedded deep within the pores and cracks of the bone: a common sign of past mummification. There was evidence of sporadic embalming over the centuries, too. We even found insecticide on the relics, which we dated to the 1950s.</p>
<p>During this process it became clear that only the femur was substantial enough to be radiocarbon dated. But we still couldn’t use its collagen in an Accelerator Mass Spectrometer, as we usually would, because we couldn’t be sure that all the contamination was removed from the sample. </p>
<p>Instead, we had a single amino acid within the collagen, called hydroxyproline, isolated and dated <a href="https://analyticalsciencejournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/rcm.8047">using equipment</a> at the University of Oxford. The unequivocal result was that the individual died sometime between 214 and 340, so the femur could not have belonged to Saint James. It originates from another person some 160 to 240 years younger.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A ring of bone, hollow in the middle" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388033/original/file-20210305-15-1xh0jxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=589&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cross-section of the femur attributed to Saint James.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Beyond the grave</h2>
<p>Our international research team also decided to radiocarbon-date some rapeseed oil, which we found, during excavation, at the very bottom of the original altar. The oil dated from between 267 and 539.</p>
<p>As the Santi Apostoli church was likely erected around 556, this oil is older than the church itself and could possibly have followed the relics on their translation from the Middle East to the yet-unbuilt church. </p>
<p>So, we can be sure that the long-protected femur did not belong to Saint James. But our findings have cast an unprecedented flicker of light into the dark period between the death of the apostles around AD 100, and the subsequent storing of Christian relics, centuries later, in the heart of Rome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mix-up might be explained by the rush to remove sacred remains to Rome some 1,700 years ago.Kaare Lund Rasmussen, Professor of Archaeometry, University of Southern DenmarkLautaro Roig Lanzillotta, Professor of New Testament and Early Christian Studies, University of GroningenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1554052021-02-17T15:25:05Z2021-02-17T15:25:05ZMany African countries had a surprise manufacturing surge in 2010s – it bodes well for the years ahead<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on the global economy, with world output <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/01/26/2021-world-economic-outlook-update">contracting at 3.5%</a> in 2020, and no recovery likely before the fourth quarter of 2021. Similar to other developing regions, <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/01/20/weo-update-january2020">sub-Saharan Africa recorded</a> a 2.6% decline, following strong growth of 3.2% in 2019. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, this comes at a time when the region has been experiencing a surprising and very welcome manufacturing renaissance. Historically, industrialisation has been associated with rapid technological improvements and sustained growth in the western world, and more recently east Asia, gainfully employing millions of workers and helping it to close the income gap with richer countries.</p>
<p>Until the 2000s, sub-Saharan Africa was actually de-industrialising: the mood was gloomy as the little manufacturing activity that did exist was disappearing, and with it the traditional route to development and poverty reduction. In northern Nigeria’s biggest city, Kano, for example, textile factories, leather tanneries and ceramics plants were visibly <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/04/14/not-making-it">falling into disrepair</a>. There were <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2013/03/02/doing-it-my-way">reports of</a> empty industrial parks in Ethiopia, while South Africa’s footwear industry <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d313b6b6-37bd-11e2-a97e-00144feabdc0">had collapsed</a>.</p>
<p>But recently the trend has reversed across the region. We have documented this in <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/manufacturing-renaissance-industrialization-trends-developing-world">new research</a> based on an in-depth investigation of national statistics in 51 countries, including 18 in sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from South Africa to Ethiopia to Nigeria to Kenya to Mauritius. These 18 countries <a href="https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Index">account for nearly</a> three-quarters of the GDP of the region, so they are a good representation of the overall picture. </p>
<p>The graph below shows how this industrial renaissance affected the share of manufacturing employment in three of the countries in the study, namely Nigeria, Ghana and Rwanda. Manufacturing in Ghana and Nigeria started to expand from around 2010 onwards, while in Rwanda it had been steadily increasing as a share of employment since the 2000s. Rwanda’s industrialisation includes the opening of its first car assembly plant <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/28/vw-opens-rwandas-first-car-assembly-plant">by Volkswagen in 2018</a>, for instance. </p>
<p><strong>Manufacturing as a % of employment, 1990–2018</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing manufacturing employment in Ghana, Rwanda and Nigeria" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384490/original/file-20210216-17-sqixlw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/etd-%E2%80%93-economic-transformation-database">GGDC/UNU-WIDER Economic Transformation Database</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We saw the same broad trends <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/etd-%E2%80%93-economic-transformation-database">across the region</a>, although in some – such as Mauritius – industrial capacity continued to decline. As you can see from the table below, the average percentage of employment in manufacturing in the African countries in our study remained static at 7.2% between 1990 and 2010 but had risen to 8.4% by 2018. This is still low in comparison with developing Asia and Latin America, but the trend is clear enough. </p>
<p><strong>Manufacturing in Africa, Latin America and east Asia</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Table comparing manufacturing performance in different developing regions" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=147&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=147&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=147&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384506/original/file-20210216-21-gn6dsb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=184&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Note that these are unweighted averages.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/etd-%E2%80%93-economic-transformation-database">GGDC-UNU WIDER Economic Transformation Database</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite this promising trend, another thing to note from the table is that the manufacturing in the region as a share of real value added (in other words GDP) actually decreased. What this tells us is that productivity growth in manufacturing was lower than in the economy as a whole. In fact, manufacturing productivity barely improved at all in the region in the 2010s. </p>
<p>To explain why manufacturing employment rose while productivity stayed the same, we need to make a distinction between small and large firms. Large modern firms tend to be more productive than smaller firms, partly because they benefit from economies of scale so that more goods can be produced on a larger scale but with lower input costs. </p>
<p>What seems to have been happening is that smaller firms have been mainly responsible for sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial resurgence, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poor-countries-technology-dilemma-by-dani-rodrik-2021-02">hiring workers</a> to make more low-quality goods such as processed food, clothing and wood products to meet rising demand from domestic consumers. This is different to manufacturing in east Asia, which was driven by exports. In sub-Saharan Africa, some manufacturing work moved from China to countries <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/03/05/migration-of-chinese-manufacturing-jobs-to-africa-myth-or-reality/">such as Ethiopia</a> in search of lower wages, but it’s debatable to what extent this has driven the overall trend towards increased industrialisation. </p>
<h2>The pandemic effect</h2>
<p>One major question that stems from our research is how this trend towards more industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to have been affected by COVID-19. Various economic activities have taken a hit, particularly <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-tourism-has-been-put-on-ice-by-coronavirus-heres-how-some-countries-are-reviving-it-140508">travel and tourism</a>, as lockdown policies have put a break on commerce and travelling. Fundamental drivers of long-term manufacturing growth have also been held back – especially education, with schools <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53325741">closed</a> in many countries for extended periods.</p>
<p>On the other hand, since the recent manufacturing growth has mainly been serving a domestic and not an export market, it is at least not primarily depending on demand from other countries. But as far as exports are concerned, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/02/06/africas-recovery-from-covid-19-will-be-slow">initial indications are</a> that commodity exports in sub-Saharan Africa were hit harder than manufacturing – vividly illustrated by the collapse in oil prices in 2020 (which has since bounced back). The recently created <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> might also boost regional trade in manufactured goods in the years to come. So all in all, the manufacturing renaissance in the region may be relatively resilient. </p>
<p>As Arthur Lewis, a Nobel-prize winning economist from St Lucia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1979.tb00625.x">noted back in 1979</a>, expanding small-scale activity in manufacturing is an important part of the development process. In sub-Saharan Africa, this has been made possible by an expanding market for domestic produce. Assuming the pandemic has not undermined this too badly, there is no reason why this trend should not continue in the decade to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaaitzen de Vries receives funding from The Economic Transformation Database, on which the findings presented in this article are based, and is supported by UNU-WIDER as part of the ETD – Economic Transformation Database project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel B Mensah, Hagen Kruse, and Kunal Sen do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Industrialisation was key to long-term economic growth in the west and Asia. After years of going in the wrong direction, new research suggests that many African countries have seen a turnaround.Gaaitzen de Vries, Associate Professor, University of Groningen, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations UniversityEmmanuel B Mensah, Postdoctoral Researcher in Development Economics, University of GroningenHagen Kruse, PhD Researcher in Development Economics, University of GroningenKunal Sen, Professor and Director, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.