tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/abdel-fattah-el-sisi-19481/articlesAbdel Fattah el-Sisi – The Conversation2023-11-07T17:29:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2167732023-11-07T17:29:05Z2023-11-07T17:29:05ZEgypt’s strongman president faces election amid economic slump and popular anger over inaction on Gaza<p>The bitter conflict between Israel and Hamas could not have come at a worse time for Egypt. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former military strongman who <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-circle-in-egypt-as-failed-revolution-lets-the-military-strengthen-its-grip-22501">seized power in 2013</a> amid the turbulent fallout of the Arab Spring, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-president-sisi-confirms-candidacy-december-presidential-election-2023-10-02/">faces a general election in December</a>. </p>
<p>Beset by economic woes and with a political and humanitarian catastrophe unfolding on his country’s border, it will be an election fraught with risks.</p>
<p>Sisi effectively took power in July 2013, after decades of military dictatorship under Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak’s 30-year reign, which ended in April 2011 during the Arab Spring, was followed by a brief and turbulent interregnum in which a Muslim Brotherhood-backed government led by academic Mohamed Morsi struggled to maintain order. </p>
<p>In July 2013, Sisi removed Morsi from power and <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-counter-revolution-won-out-in-a-year-of-epochal-change-35799">won 96% of the vote</a> the following year in an election which drew <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/international-observers-find-fault-with-egypt-vote.html">widespread international criticism</a>. He has not really faced significant political opposition since, but this can’t hide his deep unpopularity with many Egyptians.</p>
<p>At present, Sisi presides over what most experts would say is a contender for the region’s worst performing economy. Annual inflation hit a historic high of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-inflation-quickens-record-380-september-2023-10-10/#">38% in September</a> and the <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/youth-unemployment-rate#">youth unemployment rate is currently running at 17%</a>. </p>
<p>Compounding this economic crisis have been several rounds of currency devaluation and an incoming mandated International Monetary Fund bailout. A harsh <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/egypt-imf-bailout-highlights-risks-austerity-corruption">IMF-imposed austerity programme</a> will push struggling Egyptians to a level of destitution not seen since the Egyptian bread riots of 1977.</p>
<p>It’s against this unstable background that Sisi will have to fight for reelection. You could be excused for assuming it would be a mere box-ticking exercise, as Sisi has ruled Egypt with an iron fist since ousting the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013’s brutal coup. </p>
<p>No election has been free and fair since then and Egypt’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/journalists-go-on-trial-in-egypt-for-offending-mps">independent media has been all but crushed</a> in the interceding years. Opposition parties have either been suppressed or co-opted, while civil society – previously a lively political sphere – now looks back at Mubarak’s dictatorship with a degree of nostalgia.</p>
<p>Initially – and for the first time since Sisi took power – it looked as if he would face a credible opposition. Former MP <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/67601/egypts-ahmed-tantawi-the-last-major-opposition-leader-standing-up-to-sisi/">Ahmed Tantawi</a>, a candidate for the Civil Democratic Movement, made a name for himself as an MP by openly criticising Sisi in parliament and not taking part in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-launches-national-dialogue-amid-ongoing-security-crackdown-2023-05-03/">National Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>This was a Sisi-sponsored initiative which was launched in May 2023. It was presented by the government as an inclusive forum for addressing Egypt’s economic and political challenges – but has been dismissed by critics as merely a vehicle for Sisi’s own agenda.</p>
<p>Tantawi’s campaign gained momentum with support from prominent left-wingers, secularists and even some Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile, attracted by Tantawi’s stance on releasing political prisoners. There are currently an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-brotherhood-prisons-specialrepo-idUSKCN0R30Y420150903">40,000 political prisoners in Egypt’s jails</a>, many of them Muslim Brotherhood members. </p>
<p>But Tantawi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">withdrew his candidacy on October 13</a>, saying that pro-government “thugs” were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egyptian-opposition-candidate-ends-campaign-presidential-poll-2023-10-13/">preventing people from registering their support</a> for his candidacy. </p>
<p>If his abortive campaign wasn’t a direct threat to Sisi, Tantawi’s popularity represents a structural shift in Egyptian politics. Sisi has dealt so badly with Egypt’s economic problems in recent years it has left him vulnerable. </p>
<p>And his habit of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220523-sisi-suggests-egyptians-eat-tree-leaves-as-prices-soar/">incautious statements</a> hasn’t helped – at one point when questioned about the soaring price of okra, an Egyptian staple, he suggested they emulate the followers of the prophet Muhammad and “eat leaves”.</p>
<h2>War on the doorstep</h2>
<p>With the war in Gaza on Sisi’s doorstep, the regime faces a difficult balancing act. Israel is bent on securing its border no matter the consequences for Egypt. Yet the fallout for Sisi at home could antagonise domestic vulnerabilities. The image of thousands of Gazans dying while Egypt’s Rafah border stays closed could be very harmful for the regime.</p>
<p>Sisi needs to be cautious, given his <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-israels-war-hamas-spells-trouble-egypts-sisi#:%7E:text=Indeed%2C%20ever%20since%20Sisi%20came,a%20decade%20of%20Sisi's%20tenure.">close relationship with the Israeli government</a>. Egypt has been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/egypt-cauldron-gaza">party to the 16-year-long Israeli blockade</a> of Gaza, enforcing tight controls on the border crossing at Rafah. </p>
<p>But with an election looming he now needs to appease an Egyptian public who are far more sympathetic to the Gazan’s plight than the Israelis. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/exploiting-our-anger-egyptians-denounce-staged-pro-palestine-protests">attracted widespread criticism</a> from opponents who say his administration has been organising staged protests to piggyback on public sympathy for Palestinians as the death toll from Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip rises.</p>
<p>But the real risk to his administration lies at home with the ever-present threat of Egypt’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/egypt-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-history-repression-nationalism-democracy-opposition/">well-established Islamist movements</a>. It was a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored popular uprising at Tahrir Square that toppled Mubarak and handed government to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. </p>
<p>That history now acts as a serious warning for Egypt’s military to never be complacent about the potential threat of Islamist movements. Sisi’s regime has done its utmost to destroy the Brotherhood. </p>
<p>In the ten years since his security forces <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">massacred more than 900 people</a> while violently breaking up mass anti-government sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares in August 2013, tens of thousands have been subject to arbitrary detention without trial or have been sentenced in military courts to lengthy prison terms for dissent. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most shameful exhibition of corrupt use of power was his regime’s treatment of Morsi. The former president died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egypt-collapses-after-court-session">collapsing inside the defendants “cage” in a Cairo courtroom</a> following six years in solitary confinement. </p>
<p>It is one thing for an incumbent to deal with the failings of a collapsing economy. It is quite another to accommodate an aggrieved public watching a human rights massacre right on its border. If the Sisi regime continues to let this happen on its watch, the opposition will have more ammunition than they have had for years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Gillian Kennedy received previously funding from the Leverhulme Foundation.</span></em></p>Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has held Egypt in an iron grip for a decade, but his regime’s close relations with Israel might prove a problem with voters.Gillian Kennedy, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1965432022-12-16T13:13:27Z2022-12-16T13:13:27ZMuslim Brotherhood at the crossroads: Where now for Egypt’s once-powerful group following leader’s death in exile, repression at home?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501383/original/file-20221215-22-5t8yv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C3994%2C2604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Muslim Brotherhood protest at a rally in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-supporters-of-ousted-news-photo/173509620?phrase=Muslim%20Brotherhood%20flag%20Egypt&adppopup=true">Carsten Koall/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ibrahim Munir, the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-ibrahim-munir-muslim-brotherhood-acting-leader-dies">died on Nov. 4, 2022</a>, in exile in London. While the news generated few headlines around the world, Munir’s death marks a critical moment in the evolution of a group founded nearly 100 years ago, as a social and religious movement.</p>
<p>Over the years, the Brotherhood grew into the most significant social movement and political opposition in Egypt. Its Islamist ideology – which calls for public policies in line with its interpretation of Islam – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/">became widely influential</a> around the world.</p>
<p>But since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">2013 military coup</a> that removed the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi from power, the group has been all but destroyed, with most of its leaders either imprisoned, killed or in exile.</p>
<p>For now, the group has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221107-muslim-brotherhood-assigns-temporary-acting-guide/">a new temporary leader</a> in Muhyeddine al-Zayet, a 70-year-old senior figure in the movement.</p>
<p>But the stark reality is that the Brotherhood is at a turning point: The movement either will have to reinvent itself or face the prospect of gradually fading into irrelevance.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wesleyan.edu/academics/faculty/imatesan/profile.html">scholar of social movements</a> who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">studied the evolution of the Brotherhood</a> and interviewed both members and defectors, I believe its fate hangs on three issues: how it responds to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s repression of opposition groups including the Brotherhood; which leaders guide the movement during its crisis; and how the group rebuilds in exile. </p>
<h2>Has the Brotherhood run its course?</h2>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood was <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood">established in 1928</a> by Hassan al-Banna, a primary school teacher with a vision that piety and Islamic values can help transform the individual, reform society and ultimately bring about an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Appealing to Egyptians disillusioned with the country’s existing religious institutions, critical of its political system and angered by the Western interference in the Muslim world, the Brotherhood <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html">grew into a grassroots movement</a> with an intricate network of schools, newspapers and social services.</p>
<p>By the end of the 20th century, the Brotherhood dominated civil society in Egypt and became a prominent source of political opposition. It also established branches and affiliates throughout the Muslim world. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">2011 Arab Spring</a>, which saw popular uprisings in a number of countries across the Middle East, the Brotherhood came to power in Egypt’s first free and fair elections. Its affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, won the largest parliamentary block, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president. By June 2013, however, disillusionment with the lack of political progress and the poor economic performance of the country led to widespread popular mobilization against the Brotherhood. A month later the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military ousted Morsi</a> from power. </p>
<h2>Emergence of two Brotherhoods</h2>
<p>When Brotherhood supporters took to the streets and demanded that the democratically elected president be reinstalled, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/egypt-clashes-morsi-muslim-brotherhood-military">police and army forces opened fire on demonstrators</a>. On Aug. 14, 2013, security forces brutally put down the sit-in in Rab’a Square in eastern Cairo, killing over 800 people, in what Human Rights Watch said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">likely amounted to crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>For some Brotherhood members, the brutality of the security forces sparked a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2016.1273903?journalCode=fdem20">desire for revenge and justified a violent response</a>.</p>
<p>For the most senior Brotherhood leaders, however, violence was neither politically pragmatic nor ideologically justified. In the absence of a clear vision for how to respond to the political crisis, many young members became <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">disillusioned with the organization</a>. </p>
<p>By 2014, the Brotherhood was not just losing members. Two additional fault lines emerged: the question of leadership and the question of exile. Mass arrests caused a leadership vacuum that led to a <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/13510347.2019.1630610">new cadres of midranking members</a> taking over activities inside Egypt. </p>
<p>These new leaders adopted a more revolutionary tone and started operating independently of the older leadership. The parallel claims to authority and divergent visions over how to respond to the political repression <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">led to a split</a> between the so-called “historical leaders” and the new leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Photo of an elderly man in a black blazer and blue shift." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501384/original/file-20221215-15-i1ei6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Ibrahim Munir in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-general-of-the-international-organization-of-the-news-photo/173448728?phrase=Ibrahim%20Munir%20Muslim%20Brotherhood&adppopup=true">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By 2016 there were in effect two Muslim Brotherhoods: the original group, under the leadership of Ibrahim Munir as the deputy guide operating out of the U.K., and the <a href="https://research.sharqforum.org/2018/09/07/iran-and-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-heading-towards-development-or-simply-repair/">so-called “General Office,” under the new leadership</a>. The General Office attracted many young revolutionaries, including women, but the group had significantly fewer resources, which led it eventually to dissipate.</p>
<p>I learned from interviews with Brotherhood members that with Munir operating as leader in exile, a deeply contested internal debate emerged over whether to restructure the movement and shift the strategic decision-making to the leaders abroad. Outside of Egypt, the organization established regional consultative councils in most host states with a significant Brotherhood presence, most notably in Turkey.</p>
<p>While this allowed for some semblance of organizational rebuilding, some leaders still insisted that all major decisions about the direction, tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood be made inside Egypt. </p>
<h2>Can the Brotherhood rise again?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that the Muslim Brotherhood has been nearly destroyed by government repression. In 1954 a militant faction of the Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, prompting <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-violence-pendulum-9780197510087?cc=us&lang=en&">a severe crackdown on the group</a>. The torture and abuse that Brotherhood members faced in prison inspired a new militant vision for activism and led a small group of Brotherhood members to start plotting attacks on government officials. The government discovered these cells before any plans came to fruition, leading to a <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167886/making-the-arab-world">second major wave of repression in 1965</a>.</p>
<p>But the circumstances in which the Brotherhood finds itself today are different from these past periods of repression. It is more deeply divided than before. And importantly, the current repression comes after the movement came to power and had a chance to rule but ultimately failed.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Egypt_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf">Arab Barometer</a>, a nonpartisan research network, shows that since 2013 Egyptians have been consistently skeptical of political Islam as expressed by the Brotherhood, even as the population remains largely religious. For for many of Egypt’s young people the Brotherhood cannot offer any solutions to the economic hardships facing the country, or the growing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Faced with these internal divisions and challenging political circumstances, the road ahead will not be easy for the Brotherhood. As some of its former members have admitted, there is a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/rethinking-political-islam-9780190649197?cc=us&lang=en&">tension between being a social movement and being a political party</a>.</p>
<p>The Brotherhood knows that many Egyptians agree with the group’s religious values at the same time that they are deeply critical of its political ambitions.</p>
<p>If the Brotherhood seeks to become a force of change again and attract a new generation of Islamist activists, I believe it needs to develop a new vision and theory of political agency that inspires both the youth in exile, who speak the language of inclusion, diversity and revolution, and Egypt’s young people, who hunger for freedom and economic opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioana Emy Matesan has previously received funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>The Muslim Brotherhood once held the reins of power in Egypt. Now it faces internal splits, government repression and dwindling support.Ioana Emy Matesan, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1944072022-11-13T05:32:26Z2022-11-13T05:32:26ZCOP27 shines light on civil liberties in Egypt, but it’ll take work to achieve real freedom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494822/original/file-20221111-2705-ixuiuc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists gather in front of Tel Aviv's Embassy of Egypt to demonstrate in support of activist Alaa Abdel Fattah.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ability to speak freely in Egypt is currently very constrained. Individuals, groups and NGOs face significant barriers to participation in the political process. And the same holds for the exchange of opinions in the everyday public sphere. </p>
<p>But promising signs have emerged during the COP27 international climate change talks in the country. <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2022/11/09/human-rights-watch-and-mada-masr-websites-unblocked-in-egypt/?fbclid=IwAR1-1krMRWyRNs2KK7JHSl2qU_UfC8mIIoMQwDkhkWvVIIVew2ZCLTKnuqM">Egyptian Streets</a>, a grassroots online media outlet, has reported that the independent newspaper <a href="https://www.facebook.com/mada.masr/">Mada Masr</a> has been de-censored, along with <a href="https://medium.com/">Medium</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/">Human Rights Watch</a>, for the first time in five years. </p>
<p>Other outlets, however, such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/">Al Jazeera</a> and <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/">Huffington Post</a>, remain censored and unavailable online.</p>
<p>Back <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/08/opinion/sunday/egypt-censorship-crowdsourcing.html">in 2018</a>, journalist Yasmine El Rashidi called attention to the “novel” degree of censorship of political and social speech in Egypt. She labelled this a “moment of crisis” and alleged that the divided, antagonistic state of civil society in Egypt was part of the problem. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/02/20/news/culture/appeals-court-sentences-novelist-ahmed-naji-to-2-years-prison/">graphic novels</a> to <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/update-lebanese-tourist-who-insulted-egypt-is-released-from-arrest-deported/">Facebook</a> rants and now <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/375471/Egypt/-Egyptian-influencers-sentenced-to--years-in-priso.aspx">TikTok</a> dance videos, social speech and expression have been subject to significant governmental intervention. Young people have been imprisoned for multi-year terms for holding up <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/american-student-released-after-486-days-in-egyptian-prison/2020/07/06/e68c60f4-bfdb-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html">signs</a>, making <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2018/11/02/the-sherine-incident-a-tale-of-two-niles/">jokes</a>, producing <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2018/11/02/the-sherine-incident-a-tale-of-two-niles/">satirical songs</a>, eating <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/egyptian-pop-singer-sent-to-prison-for-video-that-incited-debauchery?CMP=gu_com">fruit</a> suggestively, or laying down <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-some-governments-fear-even-teens-on-tiktok-140389">dance moves</a>. Professors have <a href="https://www.egyptindependent.com/egypt-court-dismisses-university-professor-over-posting-videos-of-her-dancing/">lost their jobs</a> for posting dance videos to their personal social media.</p>
<p>So do the decisions taken during <a href="https://cop27.eg/#/">COP27</a> in Egypt suggest a change of heart? That the government is considering relinquishing the control of everyday space? And that it’s decided to fulfil its post-revolutionary republican promise?</p>
<p>The jury is still out, but much depends on swift correction of deficits in the judicial system, coupled with a broader and permanent opening of Egyptian society.</p>
<h2>Deep, internal tension</h2>
<p>The problem for the country is that the degree and scope of governmental intervention is countenanced by many stakeholders, for a variety of conflicting reasons. Feminists and hijabi women, human rights groups and progressives, parents and their children, do not necessarily agree on what it is permissible to regulate, or why.</p>
<p>Here are some examples that illustrate this. Electro-folk festival music (mahraganat), deemed a corruption of republican values, has been <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/life-style/entertainment/2022/10/17/Egypt-temporarily-bans-hugely-popular-mahraganat-singers">banned from public performance</a>. Female entrepreneurship and social media influence have been discouraged as a breach of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-some-governments-fear-even-teens-on-tiktok-140389">family values</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/17/egypt-spate-morality-prosecutions-women">normalising gendered guardianship</a> over female chastity and morality. Feminists will invite the public prosecutor to punish harassment, but also protest when female dress is surveilled and punished.</p>
<p>As a result, youth speech, political activism about rights, and Islamist expression have all been subject to shifting prosecutions. </p>
<p>Arguably, civil society is the ultimate loser, subdued by a powerful state that enforces vague laws against a variety of groups and speakers almost willy-nilly. </p>
<p>Expressing their own doubts about the freedoms of Egyptians, the bipartisan Working Group on Egypt has <a href="https://pomed.org/working-group-on-egypt-letter-to-president-biden-ahead-of-cop27/">sent multiple letters</a> to US president Joe Biden and the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/30/working-group-on-egypt-letter-to-secretary-pompeo-on-escalating-rights-abuses-pub-82212">Trump administration</a> over the past three years.</p>
<p>A group of Democrats penned a bicameral letter to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/19/us-legislators-call-on-egypts-el-sisi-to-release-prisoners">on 19 October 2020</a>. More recently, a group of past <a href="https://twitter.com/MadaMasr/status/1587741407292391424?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">Nobel Prize recipients</a> have witheringly asked whether a future without rights is a future worth saving. Of particular concern is the Egyptian-British activist and thinker <a href="https://twitter.com/MadaMasr/status/1589324235134193670">Alaa Abd el-Fattah</a>, currently imprisoned and on a hunger strike.</p>
<p>The barriers to speech and debate are not just accidents or occasional governmental heavy-handedness. They indicate a deep, internal tension within and between the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf">2014 Egyptian constitution</a>, the current regime’s stated aim to advance civil society interests, and prevailing social and political practice.</p>
<p>The 2014 republican constitution guarantees substantial and conflicting freedoms. The preamble describes Egypt as a land of popular sovereignty. But Article 2 declares that Islamic sharia is the “principal source of legislation”.</p>
<p>Article 64 characterises freedom of belief as “absolute”, and freedom of thought, speech and expression are guaranteed to all in Article 65. But the liberal letter of constitutional law is hard to put into practice. </p>
<p>Take the Danish satirical cartoons published <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/charlie-hebdo-attack">in 2005</a>, and republished by Charlie Hebdo, as an example. My students routinely argue for the prosecution of religious blasphemy, citing freedom of religious belief, at the expense of freedom of expression. The tension between rights is hard to work out.</p>
<p>According to the close invigilation of independent media, legal practice clashes with constitutional commitments to a free civil society. Political and sometimes even apolitical speech is criminalised as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jul/27/fake-news-becomes-tool-of-repression-after-egypt-passes-new-law">“false news”</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/egypt">joining a terrorist organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://mada33.appspot.com/www.madamasr.com/en/2022/11/01/news/u/security-crackdown-sees-arrest-of-hundreds-amid-calls-for-protest-on-nov-11/">about 150 people were detained</a> over possible economic protests. This heavy-handed reaction to ongoing dissent is paradoxical in a post-revolutionary republic. </p>
<p>Social media is a particularly fraught landscape, where careless or non-political speech becomes a permanent written record that can be held against speakers.</p>
<p>Civil society groups also argue that the criminal justice system fails to protect individuals in the exercise of their rights. Delays in justice, lengthy pretrial detention and rotation – detaining, eventually releasing, and then rearresting people under new charges – is the norm, not the exception. </p>
<p>So what are the signs of change, if any?</p>
<h2>Straws in the wind?</h2>
<p>Egypt recently introduced two new criminal justice initiatives amid complaints that its commitment to human rights was <a href="https://cihrs.org/egypt-national-strategy-for-human-rights-a-ruse-to-show-international-community-and-donor-states-that-political-reform-is-underway/?lang=en">more show</a> than substance. The first is a <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/116884/Exclusive-Egyptian-MP-Khouli-Presidential-pardon-committee-seeks-to-integrate">newly revived</a> Presidential Pardoning Committee, first formed in 2016. It extends leniency to detained or sentenced offenders who have not committed violent acts. </p>
<p>The second, <a href="https://www.madamasr.com/en/2022/07/01/feature/politics/how-power-blind-accountability-mechanisms-failed-nayera-ashraf-and-countless-other-women/">“Immediate Justice”</a>, looks to increase the swiftness of justice. But this could compress death penalty trials to a matter of days, potentially compromising the <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/17279.aspx">rule of law</a>. </p>
<p>Thousands of prisoners have been released since April, and President el-Sisi has asked for the <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/115496/President-Sisi-directs-pardon-committee-to-reintegrate-released-prisoners-into">social reintegration</a> of those pardoned, not just their release. These statements suggest that the end-game of current judicial reforms is transformative: to <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/465613.aspx">“close”</a> the political prisoners file, complementing the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/egypt/egypt-ending-state-emergency-start-insufficient">official rollback</a> of the state of emergency in October 2021. </p>
<p>Arguably, Egypt in 2022 might be described as currently at a crossroads. It is a young, massively online country. Progress is in the air. And while policy change is needed, change is also needed in a deeper and more logically consistent register. </p>
<p>The regime recently called for a <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1201/467990/AlAhram-Weekly/Egypt/INTERVIEW-A-new-national-alignment.aspx">new national dialogue</a>, pointing towards a <a href="https://www.sis.gov.eg/UP/SIS%20English%20Publications/%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%89%20%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%89.pdf">“new republic”</a> grounded in dignity and a “comprehensive concept of human rights”. This year has been declared the <a href="https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/422813.aspx">“year of civil society”</a>. </p>
<p>How might a new civil society theory for a new republic look?</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>In my <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41296-018-0253-0">view</a> the desired outcome would be a liberal republic – with respect to the limits placed on speech, and with respect to the limits of governmental interference in civil society.</p>
<p>A liberal theory places quasi-absolutist rights of speech and expression at the heart of a tolerant republic, with equality under law. </p>
<p>In such a space, the ability to be wrong and to experiment with different ideas is respected. Violent contestation then can be distinguished from differences of opinion. Difference, as opposed to mere diversity, is respected.</p>
<p>In Egypt, that would mean tolerating self-expression by women, veiled and unveiled, and respecting the rights of the LGBTI community to be present in the public sphere. It also means accepting the inevitabilty of difference and dissent. </p>
<p>For liberty to work in Egypt, not just a national dialogue, but a clearer understanding of the normative politics – and power – of dialogue itself, should be the goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194407/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Barker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many people accept the Egyptian government’s restrictions on freedoms, for a variety of conflicting reasons.Chris Barker, Assistant Professor of Political Science, American University in CairoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1395672020-06-30T14:06:00Z2020-06-30T14:06:00ZWhy the African Union has failed to ‘silence the guns’. And some solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343988/original/file-20200625-33524-1mjaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier from Niger patrols near the border with Nigeria. Porous borders with Nigeria and Mali are hotbeds for Jihadists and marauding local militias.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Giles Clark/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seven years ago African leaders committed themselves to working towards an end to armed conflict. As they marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the African Union they swore to ensure lasting peace on the continent. They <a href="https://dppa.un.org/en/un-support-to-au-initiative-silencing-guns-africa">pledged</a> not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans.</p>
<p>The pledge was followed by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">adoption</a> in 2016 of the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">Lusaka Road Map</a> to end conflict by 2020. The document outlined <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/N-Instruments/2018-AU-Silencing-the-Guns-Roadmap-ENG.pdf">54 practical steps</a> that needed to be taken. They focused on political, economic, social, environmental and legal issues. They ranged from adequately funding the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> for deployment, to stopping rebels or insurgents and their backers from accessing weapons. Other steps included fighting human trafficking, corruption and illicit financial flows.</p>
<p>At the time of the declaration, Africa had disproportionately high levels of conflict. State and non-state actors in Africa waged about 630 armed conflicts between <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">1990 and 2015</a>. Conflicts orchestrated by non-state actors accounted for over 75% of conflicts globally. </p>
<p>The efforts to ‘silence the guns’ has been singularly ineffective. Since the pledge was signed conflict in Africa has <a href="https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1888&type=publicationfile">increased</a>.</p>
<p>One reason for the failure is that the 2020 goal was too ambitious given the number of conflicts on the continent. The second reason is that many are internal, arising from the grievances citizens have with their governments. This internal dynamic appears to have been ignored from the outset. </p>
<p>To make some headway the African Union needs to recognise this, and design solutions to conflicts that are informed by the need to protect human rights. The continental body should be empowered to act against any party that violates core values centred on human dignity.</p>
<h2>Theatre of conflict</h2>
<p>Prominent conflicts by non-state actors include the <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/">Tuareg separatist</a> and jihadist insurgencies in Mali, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/boko-haram.html">Boko Haram</a> in Northern Nigeria, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence">jihadist and militia</a> insurgencies in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/al-shabab.html">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia, and the <a href="https://institute.global/policy/ethno-religious-violence-central-african-republic">ethnic war</a> in the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>The most notable civil wars are those in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">South Sudan</a> and the one waged by Anglophone Ambazonia <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/02/06/Cameroon-elections-anglophone-separatist-insurgency-Ambazonia">separatists</a> in Cameroon.</p>
<p>Most conflicts are generally centred on these areas: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/sahel---the-worlds-most-neglected-and-conflict-ridden-region/index.html">Sahel region</a>, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://plan-international.org/emergencies/lake-chad-crisis">Lake Chad area</a>, including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://items.ssrc.org/category/crisis-in-the-horn-of-africa/">Horn of Africa</a>, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/">Great Lakes region</a>, notably Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Though domestic, most of these conflicts tend to be <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration-1st-Edition/Moyo-Changwe-Nshimbi/p/book/9780367174835">cross-border in form</a>. They threaten interstate and regional stability. For example, al-Shabaab in Somalia exploits <a href="https://www.foreignbrief.com/security-terrorism/al-shabaab-in-kenya-cross-border-attacks-and-recruitment/">porous borders</a> to carry out deadly attacks in Kenya.</p>
<p>Most of Africa’s conflicts are also increasingly characterised by violent extremism. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52532741">emerging conflict</a> in the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique falls into this category. </p>
<h2>Perennial conflict, elusive peace</h2>
<p>The African Union has put a great deal of emphasis on <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa</a>, including in its <a href="https://au.int/Agenda2063/popular_version">Agenda 2063</a> adopted in 2015. </p>
<p>But peace and security continue to elude the continent. Some conflicts have been raging for decades. These include fighting in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-western-sahara-remains-one-of-africas-most-divisive-political-issues-114373">Western Sahara</a>, conflict in the Maghreb region involving the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280">Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a>, the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/fighting-for-peace-somalia-history-and-analysis-the-african-union-mission-amisom-2007-2017">Somali civil war</a>, and the <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf">Allied Democratic Forces</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027795361730429X">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> insurgencies in Uganda and the DRC. </p>
<p>Eighteen years ago the African Union changed its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, allowing it to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Nevertheless, it’s been reluctant to do so. For example, it is conspicuously absent while bloody conflict escalated in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Cameroon</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya">Libya</a>.</p>
<p>There has been one notable exception: the organisation’s refusal to countenance the coup in Sudan, and <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">suspending</a> the country’s membership in June 2019. This should be the norm. </p>
<p>But this highlighted the AU’s double standards. It tacitly countenanced the coups in Egypt in 2013 and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">Zimbabwe</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>Although it did <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa/african-union-suspends-egypt-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">suspend</a> Egypt after the coup led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, it subsequently restored its membership in 2014, and went on to make President El-Sisi its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/egypt-sisi-takes-head-african-union-190210140131428.html">rotational chairman</a> in 2019. This went against its own <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1143/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20269%20%28XIV%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">rule</a> that bans coup leaders from occupying political office. </p>
<p>The organisation never suspended Zimbabwe over the coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s despotic presidency. Neither did it speak out against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42053753">General Constantino Chiwenga</a>, the coup leader, becoming the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-coup-general-appointed-vice-president/a-41918031">vice-president</a>.</p>
<p>Another example of failure has been in Libya, where the AU has been seen to be wringing its hands while deadly conflict escalates and external actors make it their war theatre. These include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya/turkey-signs-maritime-boundaries-deal-with-libya-amid-exploration-row-idUSKBN1Y213I">Turkey</a>, Egypt, Russia and United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>The presence of foreign military forces on the continent is of concern beyond the Libyan conflict. The increasing number has been <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-601th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-on-early-warning-and-horizon-scanning">recognised</a> by the the African Union Peace and Security Council as a problem.</p>
<p>The numbers are going up via bilateral agreements between African states and foreign governments. </p>
<p>African countries gain economically from hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti, for example, earns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html">$63 million annually</a> from the US and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-parting-the-red-sea-why-the-chinese-and-us-armies-are-fortifying/">$20 million annually</a> from China by leasing parts of its territory for their military bases. It also <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971605100107">hosts</a> British, French, German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish military bases. </p>
<p>The foreign actors establish themselves in Africa to protect their <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01091A000300050001-3.pdf">economic interests</a> and for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/90018134?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">strategic reasons</a>. Djibouti, for instance, is strategically close to the Middle East and the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Credible solutions</h2>
<p>The African Union should revisit its Constitutive Act to address principles that limit its ability to intervene in conflicts in member states’ territories. This will set the stage for crafting robust legislation, policies, institutions and mechanisms for long-term stability in such countries.</p>
<p>Following that, the organisation should work through regional economic communities and people at grassroots to end conflict. Its eight <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/recs">recognised regions</a> should emulate the successes of the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/">Economic Community of West African States</a>.</p>
<p>The regional bloc occasionally gives early warnings of brewing conflicts in member states. It has also provided military support and helped reform the security sector in <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137280794">Sierra Leone</a>, The Gambia and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-war-and-democracy-in-west-africa-9780857720740/">Liberia</a>. It has also helped with post-conflict reconstruction in these countries.</p>
<p>Notably, its military intervention in The Gambia <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-built-the-muscle-to-rout-dictators-and-keep-the-peace-71688">forced the despotic Yahya Jammeh to vacate office</a> in early 2017, after losing the presidential elections. </p>
<p>Ordinary people can also provide vital information to early warning systems. It’s thus imperative to set up long-term, people-centred, innovative and inclusive measures to promote peace. Such bottom-up solutions, based on intimate knowledge of local areas, are key to success.</p>
<p>Finally, the issue of foreign military forces on the continent. Here the African Union has no control over their growing presence because they come through bilateral agreements between member states and foreign powers. Nevertheless, the African Union should work through its regional organisations to play a role in these decisions. </p>
<p>There’s a precedent: the Southern African Development Community under the chairmanship of late Zambian President <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-49.pdf">Levy Mwanawasa</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-usa-africom/u-s-africa-command-aid-crusader-or-meddling-giant-idUSL3030068820070930">opposed</a> the establishment of an American base in the region. Southern Africa went on to establish its own regional military <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/zambia-mwanawasa-launch-of-the-sadc-brigade-17082007-2007-08-17">brigade</a> instead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi receives funding from the European Commission (Erasmus+), Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation (DST/NRF, South Africa), The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). </span></em></p>Leaders’ efforts to end conflict have been ineffective. Working through regional economic communities might be part of a better approach.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1325652020-02-28T12:22:18Z2020-02-28T12:22:18ZMubarak: a man who built on his talent for self-promotion while stifling opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317765/original/file-20200228-24668-5mn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hosni Mubarak, the late former President of Egypt.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Amel Pain</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 21-gun salute fired in eastern Cairo during <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/364225/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Sisi-attends-military-funeral-ceremony-for-.aspx">the burial</a> of the late president <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/hosni-mubarak-president-egypt-born">Hosni Mubarak</a> was an elegant end to the life of a man preoccupied with building his image and personality cult.</p>
<p>In my book, <a href="https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/10043339">The Arab Split</a>, I emphasised how Mubarak was keen to build his reputation as a gentleman president, beloved by his people and respected by leaders the world over.</p>
<p>His desire to be smart, well-presented and always liked was an impediment, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0mfCAcCKx4">according to</a> his Egyptian-British wife Suzanne. This desire for perfection led the modern <a href="https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/israel-mourns-death-of-a-modern-pharaoh/">pharaoh</a> to become head of the military aviation academy when he was still in his 30s. A few years later he became the commander of the air force. </p>
<p>The role Mubarak played in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War">the 1973 war with Israel</a> led president <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/al-sadat/facts/">Anwar el Sadat </a>to choose him as his vice-president. Mubarak was inches away from Sadat when the president was shot dead by army officers during a parade in 1981. At the time many analysts thought he would lead the country for an <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/a90e590240d1c3734e1dc131b43d74b5/1?cbl=31168&pq-origsite=gscholar">interim period</a> before a stronger leader could take over.</p>
<p>Instead, Mubarak became the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/egypt-president-hosni-mubarak-dies-91-200225105344417.html">longest-serving president of Egypt</a>, staying almost 30 years in power. He survived by building on his talents for self-promotion while controlling or stifling political opposition. Even his strongest critics have noted that it took some skill to die a “normal, natural death” while all the other presidents; <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/7/3/egypts-history-of-erasing-presidents-from-naguib-to-morsi">Mohamed Naguib</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2014/sep/29/egypt-president-nasser-dies-archive-1970">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>, <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/the-assassination-of-anwar-sadat-1981/">Sadat</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Mohamed Morsi</a> died in controversial circumstances. </p>
<p>My research on Mubarak’s personality in 2015 found that his long stay in power was founded upon building a personality cult. Professor of politics at the University of East Anglia <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00149.x">John Street</a> has argued that politicians and celebrities share a common identity. To succeed in the new globalised celebrity culture, politicians – much like celebrities – have to rely on self-promotion, advertising, targeting and branding. </p>
<p>According to Street, modern politics has become more a matter of marketing than of science – challenging the concepts of traditional marketing and classical political leadership. Mubarak managed to do that very well. </p>
<h2>Image-making</h2>
<p>Mubarak hired a top journalist, Makram Mohamed Ahmed, to write his speeches. He was very keen to have extensive coverage in the media for all his activities. He also sponsored annual extravagant musicals to commemorate the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/yom-kippur-war">6 October 1973 war</a>, pouring praise on the many singers who performed for him and who sang songs in his name. </p>
<p>Propaganda was one of his main tools in building his image, and the widespread brainwashing of the masses reverberates back to French psychologist Gustave le Bon’s notion of the <a href="https://exploringyourmind.com/gustave-le-bon-psychology-of-the-masses/">psychology of the masses</a>.</p>
<p>When he came into office Mubarak promised to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ihcpCSjpzzIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Sullivan+egypt&ots=86cbnXDcR8&sig=g5V3sc4h-k3YyDcNwa48sBjQDw0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=mubarak&f=false">defend democracy</a> in Egypt. Nevertheless, the political system he adopted in practice was authoritarian and very restrictive. Universal rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were trampled upon. </p>
<p>An authoritarian system is the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hamdy_Hassan/publication/228628363_State_versus_society_in_Egypt_Consolidating_democracy_or_upgrading_autocracy/links/00b7d52626d844c1f2000000/State-versus-society-in-Egypt-Consolidating-democracy-or-upgrading-autocracy.pdf">basis</a> of a strong personality cult. </p>
<p>His international image was particularly important to Mubarak. </p>
<p>He became a leading voice in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, promoting aggressively the idea of a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Mubarak-Determine-Palestines-borders">two-state solution</a>. In 1989, Mubarak’s image was given a major boost when he raised the Egyptian flag on Taba, the resort that Israel kept under its authority even after Camp David. When Israel withdrew from Sinai it insisted that Taba, which borders the Israeli port of Eilat, was not part of Egypt and keeping it under the Israeli authority did not contradict the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/03/on-this-day-36-years-ago-the-signing-of-the-egyptisrael-peace-treaty/388781/">Camp David Egypt-Israeli peace treaty</a>. <a href="https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_xx/1-118.pdf">The arbitration</a> ruling on September 1988 proved that Israel was wrong.</p>
<p>Another moment of international limelight for Mubarak was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Egyptians fought alongside the Americans to facilitate the Kuwait “liberation” and subsequent invasion of Iraq. On the back of this, Mubarak managed to return the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/12/world/arab-league-headquarters-to-return-to-cairo.html">Arab League headquarters</a> to Cairo after 10 years of boycott following the Camp David peace agreement with Israel in 1978. </p>
<p>Back at home, Mubarak did less well. His relationship with the opposition grew steadily worse, reaching its all-time low in 2010 when he decided to exclude all opposition from the parliament. The emergency laws were in effect for the almost three decades of his rule. Last but not least, Mubarak was grooming his son <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/egypts-mubarak-grooming-son-presidency">Gamal to succeed him as a president</a>. These efforts were silently opposed by the army but they had the chance to have their say during the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html">January 2011 uprising</a>, when they refused to support Mubarak over the demonstrators. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/317767/original/file-20200228-24690-1q4st8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Officers escort the flag-draped coffin former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Khaled Elfiqi</span></span>
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<p>When it came to the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjbpC5nqNlk">allowed</a> the organisation a level of freedom for activism. He allowed it to grow and control student unions and most of the professional organisations – such as those for doctors, engineers and teachers – and to build its wealth. But his regime made sure it was always under control. </p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The fact that Mubarak’s military funeral with full honours was attended by the Egyptian president and former <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373112752442652.html">Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el Sisi</a> will keep future Egyptian generations in utter confusion for years to come. Was this the president who drove millions of Egyptians onto the streets for 18 days in January and February 2011, begging him to stand down, face justice and even face execution?</p>
<p>What were the feelings of thousands of Egyptian families who lost a loved one, or have a family member living with an injury or who were tortured during that “revolution”? Many have not yet heard an answer about who killed or injured their loved ones. </p>
<p>The highly formal full military funeral held one solid truth; those military men in Egypt, no matter what they do, are held in awe. The military is still in charge as it has been for the last 70 years. The image of the funeral was the image of the military and both the dead body of Mubarak in his coffin and the live body of Abdel Fattah el Sisi who was following the coffin grew from the same root: the “military institution” which has been ruling Egypt for decades. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-after-death-of-mohamed-morsi-119134">Where next for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood after death of Mohamed Morsi</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Taha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mubarak held power for three decades, on the foundation of a personality cult.Mohamed Taha, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1190312019-06-18T20:58:14Z2019-06-18T20:58:14ZMohamed Morsi: death of Egypt’s former president shows deep state was always going to triumph<p>Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48668941">died on June 17</a> in court in Cairo where he was on trial facing charges of espionage. He will be remembered for a short and divisive presidency and his failure to deliver the hopeful visions of Egypt’s “Arab Spring”. His legacy: the unprecedented consolidation of authoritarian rule by Egypt’s current military regime.</p>
<p>In the summer of 2012, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201262412445190400.html">Morsi’s narrow victory</a> was hailed by the West in the wake of the uprising that saw the ouster of his predecessor Hosni Mubarak. But within a year, even Egyptians who had cast their votes for Morsi were clamouring for his removal, in what some described as the largest public protests in world history.</p>
<p>Morsi was not a popular president. His electoral triumph against Mubarak lackey Ahmad Shafik was so close that it aroused suspicions of a deal with the army. Neither of the two candidates represented Egypt’s liberal voice, whose votes were <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012.pdf">split between a plethora of candidates</a> and who failed to consolidate as an effective “third way” during the first round of voting.</p>
<p>An engineer by training, Morsi in fact had little experience in politics before his rapid rise to power in 2012. Within months of his inauguration it seemed clear that he was unable to command the support of the Egyptian people. On the international stage, a series of embarrassing blunders intensified the wave of domestic criticism that culminated in his downfall in 2013.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/morsis-authority-ebbed-away-but-egypt-is-dangerously-divided-15774">Morsi's authority ebbed away, but Egypt is dangerously divided</a>
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<h2>The balance sheet</h2>
<p>Initially, Morsi showed promise. His first speech to the Egyptian people deployed the language of national unity and reform of the security state, clearly appealing to the sentiments expressed in the 2011 revolution of “bread, freedom and social justice.” In November 2012, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html">brokered a ceasefire</a> between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, reassuring the international community that Egypt would continue to play the role of mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.</p>
<p>Just one day after this success, however, Morsi announced a presidential decree that marked the beginning of the end of his rule. On November 22, 2012 he issued a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/protests-egypt-presidential-decree">constitutional declaration</a>, appointed a new public prosecutor, and gave himself what many saw as dictatorial powers – making presidential decrees immune to judicial oversight. While Morsi claimed that these measures were necessary to protect the revolution and transition to a constitutional democracy, he was accused of appointing himself as “Egypt’s new pharaoh”. </p>
<p>In response to widespread protests, Morsi annulled the declaration but insisted on proceeding with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/world/middleeast/egypt-draft-constitution-vote.html?module=inline">snap referendum</a> on the new constitution which <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20829911">passed with a 63% majority</a> but a low voter turnout of only 33%.</p>
<p>The constitutional crisis was a critical turning point and provided the army with a window of opportunity to present itself as “the saviour” of the Egyptian people. In late April 2013, the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20130623-egypt-morsi-opposition-tamarod-revolt">Tamarod</a> (meaning “rebel”) campaign was officially launched with the goal of collecting 15m signatures by June 30 – the anniversary of Morsi’s presidential victory – to call for early elections. Evidence has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/03/how-egypts-generals-used-street-protests-to-stage-a-coup/?utm_term=.f233c3bf2828">since emerged</a> suggesting that the movement operated with the approval and support of the military and security agencies as well as supporters of the former Mubarak regime. Leaked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html">recordings of conversations</a> between Egyptian military figures revealed that the group drew funds from a bank account administered by the Ministry of Defence and replenished by the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>Millions of Egyptians heeded Tamarod’s call and on July 3, the defence minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared that the army had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jul/03/egypt-countdown-army-deadline-live">suspended the constitution</a> and deposed the president in order to “end the state of conflict and division” that had marked Morsi’s presidency.</p>
<h2>Sisi clampdown</h2>
<p>In retrospect, Morsi’s brief time in power looks relatively benign when compared to the authoritarianism that followed Sisi’s military coup. The Muslim Brotherhood has long been demonised by the political elite since the founding of Egypt’s republic in 1952. In fact, Morsi’s brief presidency clearly demonstrated that the interests of the “deep state” would ultimately triumph. The Muslim Brotherhood could never have dominated Egypt in the way that many feared because they simply had too many enemies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-hopes-for-democratic-future-die-as-al-sisi-marches-country-towards-dictatorship-with-parliaments-blessing-113491">Egypt: hopes for democratic future die as al-Sisi marches country towards dictatorship – with parliament's blessing</a>
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<p>Today, the Muslim Brotherhood is regarded as a terrorist group and an existential threat to the Egyptian people. Not only is it a crime to be associated with the organisation, but the Egyptian regime has made it clear that any dissent whatsoever will be crushed.</p>
<p>The Muslim Brotherhood no doubt sees Morsi as the latest martyr in an ongoing battle with the Sisi government. He was <a href="https://theconversation.com/morsi-death-penalty-completes-military-takeover-of-egypt-41948">sentenced to death</a> in 2015 in a ruling that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/15/mohamed-morsi-death-sentence-overturned">was subsequently overturned</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>The inhumanity of Morsi’s treatment in prison, where he was kept predominantly in solitary confinement, will evoke previous acts of brutality against the group, not least the public massacre of over 1,000 supporters of the Brotherhood in August 2013, described by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">Human Rights Watch</a> as the worst mass killing in Egypt’s history. The UN has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48680603">called for an investigation</a> into Morsi’s death. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, while high profile, Morsi’s fate is by no means exceptional. He is simply the latest and most visible victim of a regime committed to imposing its will on the nation without concern for the human cost. Nonetheless, the vast majority of Egyptians will not be mourning the death of their first democratically elected president.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dina Rezk receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for her research.</span></em></p>An obituary of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, who died in court in Cairo.Dina Rezk, Lecturer in Middle Eastern History, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170392019-05-17T09:31:48Z2019-05-17T09:31:48ZWhy the African Union shouldn’t ease up on Sudan’s coup leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275111/original/file-20190517-69199-17ourk2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters outside the army headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks after a transitional military council came to power in Sudan through a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/after-coup-sudan-faces-fragile-transition-to-democracy/ar-BBVYiZ3">coup</a> in April, African heads of state <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN1RZ191-OZATP">decided</a> to ease the pressure on the new rulers. </p>
<p>This decision was a big mistake.</p>
<p>President Omar al-Bashir governed Sudan through military force, repression and divide-and-rule tactics for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/profile-omar-al-bashir-sudan-longtime-ruler-190411083628141.html">three decades</a>. Years of rebellions and popular protests culminated in the mid-April coup. On taking power, the military council suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and said it planned to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudans-military-expected-to-announce-overthrow-of-president-following-months-of-popular-protests/2019/04/11/bedcc28e-5c2b-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html?utm_term=.99b4d08fbdae">rule Sudan for two years</a>.</p>
<p>The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) immediately <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67375">condemned</a> the unconstitutional seizure of power. It demanded that the military council step down and transfer power to a civilian transitional government. The Peace and Security Council warned that the AU would suspend Sudan if the generals did not comply with this demand <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/african-union-and-un-back-civilian-led-sudan-transition-20190507">within 15 days</a>.</p>
<p>But as this deadline approached, the African heads of state countermanded the Peace and Security Council’s position. They extended the deadline and gave the generals three months to <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/04/24/African-Union-extends-deadline-for-Sudanese-military-to-relinquish-state-power/6371556094467/">hand the reins</a> to a civilian interim government. Driving this decision was Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the current chairperson of the AU. Sisi is a former general who participated in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/16/egypt-coup-catastrophe-mohamed-morsi">coup in his own country</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>The military has engaged in tense negotiations with the protest leaders over the composition of the interim government. If the current deadlock is overcome, a new supreme council will be formed with a mix of civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48276764">military officers</a>. The interim regime will thus not be purely civilian government. </p>
<p>The AU has a “zero tolerance” <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">policy</a> on coups. If it does not apply this policy strictly in the case of Sudan, there is the distinct danger that the army will continue to meet the protests with violence. Already, over 70 protesters have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/sudanese-security-forces-open-fire-khartoum-sit-190515160917339.html">killed</a> by government forces .</p>
<p>Sudan could become increasingly unstable, with negative spillovers for neighbouring states. In addition, the AU’s failure to adhere strictly to its policy will weaken the credibility of that policy and reduce its potential to deter future coups.</p>
<h2>The policy</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lomé Declaration</a>, coup perpetrators shall be given six months to restore constitutional order. During this period, the country shall be suspended from the AU. The <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Peace and Security Council Protocol</a> adds that the Peace and Security Council shall institute sanctions following an unconstitutional change of government.</p>
<p>The policy emphasis on “shall” and “zero tolerance” offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups. Coups are a scourge that destroy the constitutional order and preclude the emergence and consolidation of democracy.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt about the tyrannical way in which al-Bashir ruled Sudan. His war crimes were set out in the <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2019/04/12/turn-over-al-bashir-international-criminal-court-amnesty-international-tells-sudan">indictment</a> against him by the International Criminal Court. There’s therefore every reason to share the Sudanese people’s joy at his downfall. But if the AU does not adopt a tough posture, there may be no progress in Sudan towards real democracy.</p>
<h2>Precedents</h2>
<p>Since the introduction of the anti-coup policy in 2000, there have been 16 coups in Africa - <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">14 between 2000 and 2014</a>, then in Zimbabwe and Sudan. In most cases, the Peace and Security Council has indeed been tough. <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">Research</a> shows that suspension and sanctions have been effective: within an average period of 20 months, the targeted country reestablished constitutional order through elections.</p>
<p>In all these cases, the African pressure was intensified through sanctions imposed by the US, the European Union and other providers of financial aid. It was also accompanied by mediation undertaken by African organisations, which facilitated the return to constitutional rule.</p>
<p>The message from the AU and its international partners was thus clear: unlike the widespread tolerance of African coups in the 1970s and 1980s, a coup is no longer a viable means to retaining power. It is a cul de sac. The only exit for the coup regime is to step down and permit free and fair elections.</p>
<p>In short, pressure shuts the door to sustained military rule, and mediation opens the door to restoring constitutional order in a legitimate manner.</p>
<p>The positive outcomes of African and international pressure can be contrasted with cases where the AU failed to apply its policy. For example, the AU turned a blind eye to the de facto <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">coup</a> in Zimbabwe in 2017. This allowed the army and ruling party to get away with forcibly deposing President Robert Mugabe and installing another brutal hardliner, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe, as well as Egypt, a coup leader contested presidential elections and won. This was a violation of the AU policy, which <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/">bans</a> the perpetrators of unconstitutional action from running for office. The ban is meant to prevent coup leaders from whitewashing their offence and staying in power via the ballot box.</p>
<h2>No ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’</h2>
<p>There should be no debate about the main thrust of the continental and international response to the coup in Sudan. Suspension and sanctions should be imposed immediately, and should be lifted only when constitutional rule is restored through free and fair elections have been held.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Nathan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s policy offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups, a scourge that imperils the consolidation of democracy.Laurie Nathan, Professor of the Practice of Mediation, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158552019-04-24T13:50:58Z2019-04-24T13:50:58ZThe internal – and external – factors that will shape Sudan’s political transition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270432/original/file-20190423-175535-1vd9kxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese protesters outside of the military headquarters in Khartoum.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48006015">stamina</a> exhibited by mainly young protesters in Sudan is a clear reflection of the depth of their grievance and frustration. Their persistence was critical in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">ousting</a> the dictator Omar al-Bashir. But it will also be required to provide the desired quality of the post uprising government and political environment.</p>
<p>In the coming days, weeks and months, I have no doubt that the Sudanese people will be shocked by the evidence of atrocities and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47997729">corruption</a> during the 30 years of misrule by the National Congress Party in the name of political Islam. </p>
<p>The unprecedented drama of al-Bashir’s ouster and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/africa/sudan-omar-hassan-al-bashir.html">stepping down</a> after only one day of Lt. Gen. Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Auf, who ousted him, shows the extent of breakdown in the National Congress Party. This political drama has been influenced and shaped by the resilience and determination of the Sudanese protesters. </p>
<p>Amid public pressure, the new Sudanese military ruler, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/04/14/new-military-council-leader-promises-civilian-government-for-sudan">ordered</a> the arrest of National Congress Party leaders, including al-Bashir. He has also amalgamated the Sudanese military forces. Above all he has shown willingness and commitment to give way to civilian rule.</p>
<p>But there is lingering suspicion that Burhan may favour the military junta managing the transition. This would be a repeat of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/academics-have-shaped-sudans-political-history-and-may-do-it-again-115232">1985 transition</a>. This time around, protesters are determined to break that cycle of repeated civilian uprisings followed by military takeovers. </p>
<p>Their demand for civilian rule is backed by the recent <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2019/04/22/au-steps-up-pressure-for-a-transition-to-civilian-rule-in-sudan/">unequivocal resolution </a>by the AU Peace and Security Council. This is also the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/19/sudan-protest-hub-africanews-updates/">stance of the US</a>. The real challenge now is whether the Sudanese professionals association and political parties can agree on a civilian transitional government. </p>
<p>Equally important is the role played by outsiders. Sudan has undoubtedly become the battlefield of the politics of the Gulf. And of political Islam and moderate Islam. The Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain bloc supports – and has leverage over – the military council. Its aim is to isolate the political Islam bloc of Qatar, Turkey and Iran. </p>
<p>While the Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain bloc agrees with the Sudanese protesters that political Islam has failed to deliver during the past 30 years, they don’t agree that the military council is unfit to manage the transition. Or that a civilian transition government would be ideal to put Sudan on a solid path of sustainable democracy. </p>
<h2>Dangers ahead</h2>
<p>The professionals association and political parties <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48006015">haven’t been able to jointly agree</a> on a list of the candidates for the transitional government. </p>
<p>The professionals association appeared ready with its list of candidates. But the political parties are yet to agree and reconcile their list with that of the professional association.</p>
<p>If they fail to agree on a list the military council could seize the opportunity to directly appoint a handpicked government headed by prime minister under its direct supervision. This is what happened in 1985. </p>
<p>The failure to reach consensus on the civilian transitional government could lead to a rift between the protesters and professionals association and political parties on one hand and protesters and the military junta on other hand. It could also widen cracks between the professional association and political parties. </p>
<p>These divisions could be avoided if the political parties could support the professionals association to manage the civilian transitional government. This could create a conducive political environment for fair and transparent national elections. </p>
<p>This critical moment is not about sharing the political cake. Rather it’s about creating an environment for democracy to prosper. In my view the professional association rather than political parties are best suited for this task.</p>
<h2>External actors</h2>
<p>The external actors with interests in Sudan will influence the final outcome of this uprising. </p>
<p>In my view the political position of neighbouring countries should be guided by the resolution of the AU Peace and Security Council. This has called for the military junta to immediately hand over power to civilian transition government. </p>
<p>So far the reaction has been mixed. For example Ethiopia has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/15/ethiopia-stands-with-resilient-sudanese-protesters-pm-abiy//">made it clear that it backs</a> the choice of people of Sudan . On the other hand Egypt <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/middleeast/top-stories/egypt-foreign-minister-spy-chief-visit-protest-hit-sudan/ar-BBRu8kq">sent its chief spy</a> to Khartoum in support of military junta – and as part of the politics of the Gulf. </p>
<p>The reaction of countries further afield has also been mixed. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent a <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-uae-delegation-meets-sudan-military-council">high powered delegation</a> to Khartoum. </p>
<p>Turkey, Qatar and Iran are anxious that the change in Sudan is targeting their political Islam agenda and have tried to reverse the trend. <a href="https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/18/04/2019/Sudan-denies-reports-that-Khartoum-rejected-to-meet-Qatari-delegation">The minister of foreign affairs of Qatar</a> tried to visit Khartoum through some remnants of the National Congress Party in the ministry of foreign affairs. His visit was blocked in a fiasco that <a href="https://www.hawarnews.com/en/haber/sudanese-undersecretary-of-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-dismissed-because-of-qatar-h8426.html">resulted</a> in the sacking of the undersecretary of the ministry.</p>
<p>The Sudanese populace is determined to provide a new political path. For this reason, external actors should be guided by the will of the people of Sudan rather than their narrow political interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115855/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luka Kuol does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>People in Sudan are determined to provide a new political path and need to guide candidates who want to lead the country.Luka Kuol, Professor of Practice for Security Studies, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1134912019-03-13T10:52:25Z2019-03-13T10:52:25ZEgypt: hopes for democratic future die as al-Sisi marches country towards dictatorship – with parliament’s blessing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263601/original/file-20190313-123522-f1g505.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Al-Sisi: more Mubarak than Mubarak.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/diplomacy-photos/egypt-s-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-in-paris-photos-53852502">EPA Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the 2013 coup which ousted Egypt’s elected president Mohammed Morsi, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23175529">military leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The armed forces have realised that the Egyptian people, who are calling on us to come to their support, are not in fact calling on us to assume power. Rather, they have called on us to perform public service and to secure essential protection of the demands of their revolution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Six years on, Sisi is still president and the Egyptian parliament is <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-parliament-votes-favour-allowing-sisi-rule-until-2034">on the verge of</a> endorsing his rule until 2034, losing sight of the revolutionary demands which prompted millions of Egyptians to end the 29-year rule of Hosni Mubarak in January 2011.</p>
<p>Contrary to the hopes of 2011 and 2013, <a href="https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Ausland/Afrika/Infografik_Aegypten_2013-2018_A4-en.pdf">Egypt is sliding even further towards authoritarianism</a>. Tens of thousands of citizens are languishing in overcrowded prisons. Freedom of expression, media independence and opposition movements are curbed in the name of state stability. Torture, unjustified detentions, police assaults and <a href="https://afteegypt.org/wp-content/uploads/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D9%8A-2017.pdf">death sentences are</a> the state’s strategic tools to silence protesters.</p>
<h2>A new phenomenon</h2>
<p>On February 14, <a href="https://madamasr.com/en/2019/02/14/feature/politics/parliament-advances-constitutional-amendments-by-overwhelming-majority-opposition-speaks-out/">485 of 596 Egyptian MPs</a> approved sweeping constitutional amendments to allow Sisi’s extension of power. The modifications to the national charter will lengthen the current four-year presidential term to six years, expand the role of the army as a state supervisory body, and give the president the constitutional right to appoint judges and the prosecutor general.</p>
<p>Although the new constitution still limits the president to two terms, Sisi – who was elected for a second term in March 2018 – will be granted a personal exception. The proposed amendments will now be reviewed by the parliament’s legislative and constitutional committee within 60 days before another House of Representatives vote, followed by a national referendum.</p>
<p>“This is totally a new phenomenon,” Ahmed Samih, the director of the Egyptian NGO Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies, told me. “Neither Nasser nor the other presidents who followed him have been able to manipulate the state and the army to such a point as al-Sisi has done in the last five years.” He added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While Nasser, and in part Sadat [both former Egyptian leaders], addressed public opinion attention toward the fight against Israel, Sisi does not have an external enemy and his struggle is thoroughly focused on repressing the Egyptian people.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Rule through repression</h2>
<p>Throughout his time in power, <a href="https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMed-Rights-Report-on-Counter-terrorism-and-Human-Rights.pdf">Sisi has</a> <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/104697.aspx">endorsed</a> widespread draconian laws. He has trampled on human and civil rights by detaining thousands of activists, journalists, students and political opponents, including the former army chief of staff, Sami Anan. He has curbed the independence of the judiciary by stressing its pivotal role in fighting terrorists, Islamists and any hint of opposition. He has hindered academic autonomy by reintroducing the direct appointment of university heads.</p>
<p><a href="https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EuroMed-Rights-Report-on-Counter-terrorism-and-Human-Rights.pdf">New legal dispositions</a>, such as the anti-protest law (2013), the counter-terrorism law (2015), the NGOs law (2017), and the cybercrime law (2018), have substantially increased the authorities’ power to surveil, repress, silence and detain political opponents. Amendments to the nationality law proposed in 2017 may revoke the Egyptian nationality of citizens living abroad and working with a foreign agency deemed to undermine the social or economic order of the state.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-and-amal-fathy-one-womans-story-highlights-national-wave-of-repression-and-sexual-violence-106890">Egypt and Amal Fathy: one woman's story highlights national wave of repression and sexual violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These laws have been harshly criticised for being excessively vague in defining what constitutes a danger for the Egyptian socioeconomic order. Moreover, legal and extra-legal measures – including torture, unfair trials and forced disappearances – have been actively implemented by Egyptian police, intelligence services and the military to ensure no one will obstruct Sisi from keeping his grip on power and militarising Egyptian life.</p>
<h2>Removing the judiciary</h2>
<p>Sisi’s power has been further enhanced by the approval of the recent constitutional amendments. <a href="https://cihrs.org/egypt-proposed-amendments-threaten-stability-and-sanction-lifelong-presidency/?lang=en">A statement</a> signed by at least 11 Egyptian civil society organisations explains:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The amendments eliminate all remnants of judicial independence by immunising exceptional legislation from judicial review while constitutionalising the president’s unilateral authority to appoint judicial leadership … and annul the judiciary’s financial independence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through these amendments, the constitutional separation of power will be destroyed, leading to an excessive concentration of authority in the president’s hands. Sisi has <a href="https://madamasr.com/en/2015/09/15/feature/politics/why-is-sisi-afraid-of-the-constitution-and-parliament/">proved several times</a> his reluctance to follow constitutional precepts – as in Egypt’s sale of the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia without calling a popular referendum as required by the constitution. </p>
<p>The recent parliamentary vote crystallised this authoritarianism and repression in Egypt. Far from checking power, legislators gave away their responsibility as a democratic mechanism of the system. Only 16 MPs stood against the modifications.</p>
<p>Among them was Ahmed Tantawy, who emphasised how it dangerously concentrated power in one man’s hands and represented “a setback and a return to what is worse than the pre-25 January [2011] system”. Other opponents, such as Khaled Youssef and Haitham al-Hariri, were subjected to harsh defamatory media campaigns – in both cases, an alleged sexual affair was used as a pretext to whip up a public scandal over “moral indecency”.</p>
<p>Sisi still relies on the support of many Egyptians who see him as the last bastion against the spread of political and economic instability. But, according to Samih, even staunch Sisi supporters are fading away amid the repression and a stagnant economy. Samih said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Many Egyptian families involved in specific economic sectors, such as fishing, have been kicked out from the business, as the army has now gained an upper hand in their activities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the likelihood that disillusionment will lead to Sisi’s departure – or even a check on his ambitions – is slim. Even the military, often seen as the repository of power, is neutered by one of its own. During the past three years, Sisi has implemented a series of reshuffles within the executive and a purge among army generals, buttressing his undisputed authority. </p>
<p>The detention of the former army chief of staff, Sami Anan; the replacement of the once-powerful head of the Egyptian intelligence service, Khaled Fawzi, with a Sisi ally, and the appointment of Sisi’s sons – Mahmoud and Hassan – to key positions within the general intelligence directorate are all clear signs of Sisi’s intention to out-Mubarak Mubarak, transforming his presidency into a full-blown dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As civil rights are trampled on, the Egyptian parliament is on the verge of endorsing his rule until 2034.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamGiovanni Piazzese, Doctoral Researcher, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1113902019-02-13T12:58:50Z2019-02-13T12:58:50ZWomen politicians in Africa face huge odds but can make a real difference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258195/original/file-20190211-174894-bu2wsw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moves are afoot to ensure 25% of Egyptian MPs are women. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Khaled Elfiqi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women are gaining ground in politics around the world. Last year, the so-called “pink wave” saw a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinavuleta/2018/11/07/a-pink-wave-the-record-number-of-women-heading-to-congress-include-fighters-founders-and-first-timers/">record number of women elected to Congress</a> in the US’s mid-term elections. There are signs of progress in Africa, too. </p>
<p>Last October, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was praised for his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/power-ethiopia-gender-balanced-cabinet-181019110930577.html">“transformative leadership”</a> after appointing a new set of ministers – half of whom were women. Earlier in February, Egyptian lawmakers <a href="http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/64337/Proposed-bill-sets-highest-quota-for-women-in-Egypt-s">proposed amending the constitution</a> to guarantee women 25% of the seats in the national parliament. If it’s approved, this change would significantly increase the political representation of Egyptian women. At present they make up just 15% of the legislature.</p>
<p>There’s a huge amount of variation in women’s political representation across Africa, a fact shown by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and UN Women’s <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/4/women-in-politics-2017-map">map of Women in Politics</a>. In some countries, including Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, they make up a substantial portion of the legislature. However, women remain poorly represented in many others.</p>
<h2>Doubtful intentions</h2>
<p><a href="https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/journal/2018/12/18/feminist-utopia-in-post-genocide-rwanda-dismantling-the-narrative-around-womens-political-representation">Some question</a> whether the increased political representation of women is necessarily a good thing, particularly in the context of Africa. They argue that it’s not entirely coincidental that many of the countries making the greatest progress in including women in politics are making far less progress in terms of democracy. </p>
<p>As others have argued, high profile efforts to promote women’s rights can help authoritarian leaders to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-myth-of-the-modernizing-dictator/2018/10/19/5f4bef0c-d30a-11e8-b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.html?utm_term=.da3b8e1746f1">present themselves as modernisers</a>. This, they hope, will attract the interest of both investors and lenders. </p>
<p>Including more women in positions of power <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/23/sometimes-autocrats-strengthen-their-power-by-expanding-womens-rights-heres-how-that-works/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f76fac8ce3a4">can also be useful domestically</a>. It allows leaders with authoritarian leanings, or dubious democratic credentials, to expand their support base and bolster political stability. The recent reforms in both <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiys-big-steps-shouldnt-obscure-undercurrents-in-ethiopia-106788">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/24/security-human-rights-and-reform-in-egypt-pub-76943">Egypt</a> could well be the product of such strategies, rather than a genuine commitment to promoting gender equality. </p>
<p>Does this mean that there’s nothing to be gained by including more women in politics? There may be no guarantee it promotes democracy. But there are reasons to believe it might pay off in terms of development.</p>
<h2>Impact on development</h2>
<p>It’s <a href="https://womendeliver.org/2018/why-women-in-politics/">often said</a> that opening up positions of political power to women will lead to development policies that are more effective and better implemented. Now, we’re starting to see evidence that this is in fact the case.</p>
<p>For example, several recent studies show that improving the representation of women in parliament has a positive impact on the health sector. Political scientists Amanda Clayton and Pär Zetterberg have shown that <a href="https://amandaclayton.weebly.com/uploads/2/5/7/1/25717216/claytonzetterbergjop2018.pdf">“quota shocks”</a> – large increases in women’s parliamentary representation after the introduction of a gender quota – tend to be followed by rises in government spending on public health.</p>
<p>Other researchers have shown that increases in the number of women in parliament are associated with a variety of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/political-cure-gender-quotas-and-womens-health/4015C9B9E943CA63F4A2606EA17606D4">positive health outcomes</a>. These include improvements in women’s life expectancy and reductions in both maternal and infant mortality.</p>
<p>These positive impacts are notable, and make sense. There’s plenty of debate about exactly <a href="https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2018/lets-talk-about-womens-issues">what constitutes a “women’s issue”</a>, but there’s good reason to put health in that category. Surveys from sub-Saharan Africa show that both women citizens, and women parliamentarians, are more likely to <a href="https://amandaclayton.weebly.com/uploads/2/5/7/1/25717216/claytonetal2018cps.pdf">identify health as a priority issue</a> than their male counterparts.</p>
<p>Moreover, this “gender gap” in priorities is greater between male and female legislators than between male and female citizens. In short, if expanding the political representation of women is to have an effect anywhere, it ought to be in the health sector (and, of course, in women’s rights).</p>
<h2>Lingering questions</h2>
<p>There is, however, some bad news. It’s still not clear exactly how these positive impacts on development come about. In the case of research showing the link between “quota shocks” and health spending, for instance, there is a correlation – but claims about causal effects remain questionable. </p>
<p>New research is desperately needed that untangles exactly how women in politics make a difference. This is important to help justify the continuing campaign to increase women’s political representation around the world. It will also allow international donors to help women in politics make a positive difference. It’s hard to help someone achieve their goals if you don’t understand the tactics they have at their disposal.</p>
<p>With this in mind, an <a href="https://www.wfd.org/research/political-economy-of-democracy-promotion/">ongoing collaboration</a> between the University of Birmingham and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy – supported by the <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/global-goals/igi/index.aspx">Institute for Global Innovation</a> – has started to ask some important questions about women in African parliaments. These include whether women in parliament have an impact even where they lack “critical mass” and, if so, what strategies and tactics they employ to overcome their lack of numbers. </p>
<p>Our ongoing research suggests that parliamentary institutions – including parliamentary committees and women’s caucuses – play an important role in helping female politicians in Africa to shape development outcomes. At the moment, we’re looking into how women in Malawi used these institutions to push for some <a href="http://www.mw.undp.org/content/malawi/en/home/presscenter/articles/2017/12/12/malawi-hiv-law-amended-to-remove-rights-infringing-provisions.html">important changes to the HIV and AIDS Act</a>. </p>
<p>Generating the knowledge needed will require a lot more research, including research by experts within Africa. Some of this knowledge already exists within the region. Putting African experts at the forefront of new research will help the international community to develop programmes that go beyond “just adding women” to politics. It will also help female politicians in Africa to make a difference against the odds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Dodsworth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opening up positions of political power to women will lead to effective and better implemented development policies.Susan Dodsworth, Research Fellow at the International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1095222019-01-09T07:25:45Z2019-01-09T07:25:45ZHow foreign backing is keeping Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252847/original/file-20190108-32145-3r0bzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at the 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Day after day Sudanese are <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article66878&utm_source=Media+Review+for+January+7%2C+2019&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+January+7%2C+2019&utm_medium=email">taking to the streets to protest</a> against the rule of Omar al-Bashir. The president, who himself seized power in 1989 when he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-warcrimes-sudan-bashir-profile/factbox-sudans-president-omar-hassan-al-bashir-idUKL1435274220080714">led a coup</a>, is facing the most serious challenge in his three decades in power. Fury at sharp rises in the cost of bread and fuel, and allegations of corruption, have fuelled the protests.</p>
<p>Thus far the president has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bashir-will-not-budge-nationwide-protests-in-sudan-take-aim-at-the-president/2019/01/06/550ebf9a-0fac-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_campaign=Media%20Review%20for%20January%207%2C%202019&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Media%20Review%20for%20January%207%2C%202019&utm_term=.34a805320c64">managed to resist the anger of his people</a>. But Sudanese have a long history of overthrowing unpopular regimes. Twice before – in 1964 and then again in 1985 – revolts led to changes of government. On each occasion the armed forces abandoned the regime and sided with the people. This has not occurred during the current protests for good reasons, as university lecturer and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-uprisings-in-modern-sudan-9781472574015/">author of Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan</a> Willow Berridge <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/07/sudan-protests-learn-1964-1985/">points out</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Al-Bashir’s regime clearly learnt from the mistakes of its predecessors. It has created a much stronger National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) as well as a host of other parallel security organisations and armed militias that it uses to police Khartoum instead of the regular army. This set up, combined with various commanders’ mutual fears of being held to account for war crimes if the regime falls, means an army intervention will not occur easily as in 1964 or 1985. This is one reason the current uprising has already lasted longer than its precedents.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the regime’s survival cannot simply be seen as a domestic issue. He has strong international allies. The West once reviled Omar al-Bashir as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant">indicted war criminal</a>. However, more recently they have begun to view him as a source of stability and intelligence in a troubled region. The president also has the backing – both political and financial – of key Arab allies.</p>
<h2>Arab support</h2>
<p>Sudanese have traditionally been said to look North to Cairo for support. This crisis is no exception. In December Egypt’s foreign minister and intelligence chief visited Khartoum, <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/egypt-backs-sudan-government-amid-deadly-protests-1.807138">pledging their support for Al-Bashir</a>. </p>
<p>Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, who flew to Sudan with intelligence chief General Abbas Kamel, confidently stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Egypt is confident that Sudan will overcome the present situation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was followed earlier this month during a reciprocal trip to Cairo by the Sudanese president at which President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/sudan-fresh-protests-planned-bashir-sacks-health-minister-190106061946232.html">commented</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Egypt fully supports the security and stability of Sudan, which is integral to Egypt’s national security.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But political support alone wouldn’t be enough to keep the Sudanese regime in power. There is also financial backing from across the Red Sea. In return for Sudan entering the Yemeni war Khartoum is <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html">reported to have received investments worth US$2.2 billion</a>. More than 10,000 Sudanese troops are fighting on the Yemeni frontline. Some are said to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html">child soldiers</a> who were recruited by the Saudis, with offers of US$10,000 for each recruit.</p>
<h2>Other allies</h2>
<p>The rehabilitation of al-Bashir in the US goes back to President Barack Obama’s era. As one of the last acts of his office, he <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41531855">lifted a range of US sanctions against the Sudanese regime</a>. The CIA’s large office in Khartoum was cited as <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/10/10/why-america-has-lifted-sanctions-on-sudan">one of the key reasons for his policy shift</a>.</p>
<p>Nor is Washington alone in this view. As Europe battles to restrict the number of Africans crossing the Mediterranean it has seen the Sudanese government as an ally. The <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoum-process">“Khartoum Process”</a>, signed in the Sudanese capital, is critical to this relationship. In November 2015 European leaders met their African counterparts in the Maltese capital, Valletta, to try to put flesh on the bones of this agreement. The aim was made clear in the accompanying EU press release which <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4832_en.htm">concluded that</a>;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The number of migrants arriving to the European Union is unprecedented, and this increased flow is likely to continue. The EU, together with the member states, is taking a wide range of measures to address the challenges, and to establish an effective, humanitarian and safe European migration policy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The summit led to the drafting of an <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf">Action Plan</a> which has guided the EU’s policy objectives on migration and mobility ever since.</p>
<p>The plan detailed how European institutions would cooperate with their African partners to fight</p>
<blockquote>
<p>irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Europe promised to offer training to “law enforcement and judicial authorities” in new methods of investigation and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>assisting in setting up specialised anti-trafficking and smuggling police units.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These commitments were an explicit pledge to support and strengthen elements of the Sudanese state. A Regional Operational Centre (ROCK) has been <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/regional-operational-centre-support-khartoum-process-and-au-horn-africa_en">established in Khartoum</a> whose <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html">chief aim</a> it to halt people smuggling and refugee flows by allowing European officials to work directly with their Sudanese opposite numbers. The counter-trafficking coordination centre in Khartoum — staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy — will partly rely on information sourced by the Sudanese national intelligence service.</p>
<p>Finally there is some evidence of Russian involvement in the Sudanese crisis. Russian troops, working for a private contractor, are <a href="https://defence-blog.com/army/russian-private-military-contractors-spotted-in-sudan.html">reported to have been seen on the streets of Khartoum, suppressing the uprising</a>.</p>
<p>Given the range of support for al-Bashir it isn’t surprising that he’s managed to resist popular pressure to step down. Much depends on how long demonstrations can be maintained, and how much force the regime is prepared to deploy to crush its opponents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>Given the range of support for President Omar al-Bashir it isn’t surprising that he’s managed to resist pressure to step down.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1033532018-11-04T08:49:30Z2018-11-04T08:49:30ZAgreements that favour Egypt’s rights to Nile waters are an anachronism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243213/original/file-20181031-76390-ln4mz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Nile River during sunset in Luxor, Egypt.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Khaled Elfiqi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Egypt has historically adopted an aggressive approach to the flow of the River Nile. Cairo considers the Nile a national security matter and statements continue to include <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/11/19/egypts-sisi-warns-ethiopia-over-dam-construction-project">threats of military action</a> against Ethiopia should it interfere with the flow as set out in agreements signed in <a href="http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1929/TS0017.pdf">1929</a> and another in <a href="https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/UAR_Sudan1959_and_Protocol1960.pdf">1959</a>. </p>
<p>The first agreement was made between Great Britain, as the colonial power in eastern African, and Egypt. Cairo was favoured over other riparian countries as an important agricultural asset. In addition, the Egyptian-run Suez Canal was vital for British imperial ambitions.</p>
<p>The British riparian colonies – Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) – as well as Ethiopia had no say. </p>
<p>Under the terms, Egypt would receive 48 billion cubic metres water annually and Sudan 4 billion cubic metres. Egypt would not need the consent of upstream states to undertake water projects in its own territories but could veto projects on any tributaries of the Nile in the upstream countries, including the 43,130 square kilometre Lake Victoria. The world’s second largest fresh water lake is fed by direct precipitation and by thousands of streams from Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya, all located in the central east of Africa. </p>
<p>To this day Egypt argues that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its modified version, the 1959 Agreement, are still <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130266337">valid</a>. The 1959 agreement, signed by Egypt and an independent Sudan, increased Egypt’s share to 55.5 billion cubic metres and Sudan’s to 18.5 billion. </p>
<p>These bilateral agreements totally ignored the needs of other riparian countries including Ethiopia which <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Egypt-Ethiopia-and-the-Nile-447910">supplies 70% to 80% of the Nile waters</a>. Consequently, none of the other Nile basin countries has ever approved the <a href="https://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v4n3p108">agreements</a>. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the <a href="http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/nbi/cooperative-framework-agreement">Cooperative Framework Agreement</a> signed by four Nile basin countries in 2010 was strongly <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8682387.stm">rejected by both Egypt and Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2018.1509564">my argument</a> that the strength of past agreements in modern times and Egypt’s threats to use military force are questionable for two reasons. First, the former colonies are now independent nations and should be part of negotiating a new deal. Secondly, environmental circumstances have changed: precipitation is becoming more intermittent and periods of drought are getting longer. </p>
<h2>Egypt’s security approach</h2>
<p>The threat to use force to defend Egypt’s right to water from the Nile has been a common theme through successive governments.</p>
<p>The current president of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has described the flow of Nile to Egypt as <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/281712/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Nile-water-share-a-matter-of-life-or-death,.aspx">a matter of life and death</a>. Badr Abdelatty, Egypt’s ambassador to Germany and former spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, has described the Nile as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26679225">“a national security issue that can never be compromised on</a>”.</p>
<p>Even Anwar el-Sadat, the president of Egypt in the 1980s, threatened the use of force. He <a href="https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-nile-water-dispute-1597589">stated that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>if Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force. Tampering with the rights of a nation to water is tampering with its life, and a decision to go to war on this score is indisputable in the international community. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He believed that after signing the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1979, no other problem could again take Egypt to war except water. </p>
<p>The threat of using force has continued. But a security mindset is not going to guarantee Egypt its past share of the waters.</p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26679225">Grand Renaissance Dam</a> constitutes a recent but probably the biggest challenge to Egypt’s militaristic approach to the Nile flow. The dam is a huge project on the headwaters of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia in Benishangul-Gumuz region, 500 km North West of the capital Addis Ababa and about 32 km east of the border of Sudan. </p>
<p>The dam is considered to be the largest hydropower project in Africa and 8th-largest in the world. It’s designed to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. The reservoir can hold <a href="https://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2016/09/contract-awarded-for-studies-of-6-000-mw-grand-renaissance-dam-in-ethiopia.html">more than 70 billion cu metres of water</a> which is <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/an530e/an530e.pdf">nearly equal to the flow of the Nile in one year</a>.</p>
<p>The Ethiopian government intends to fill the dam’s immense reservoir in five years. This will have considerable impact on the downstream countries. Even after the reservoir is filled there will not be too much hope for the normalisation of the flow of the Nile because Ethiopia will hold the key to the dam. Normalisation is also not expected because of <a href="https://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v4n3p108">evaporation in the reservoir</a>. </p>
<p>Another challenge to the Nile is the fact that the river is shrinking due to less and more <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-drought-floods-starvation-malnourished-crisis-catastrophe-east-africa-a7901156.html">intermittent precipitation in Ethiopia</a> and in other upstream countries. In addition, Lake Victoria, the source of 20%-30% of the Nile waters, is <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/1190-126958-gjok4nz/index.html">shrinking at an alarming rate</a>. </p>
<p>What these developments mean is that Egypt’s insistence that the old agreements should remain untouched is no longer practical. </p>
<h2>Normal bargaining process</h2>
<p>Egypt needs to stop issuing threats and turn its attention to normal bargaining processes as the first step towards equitable and reasonable sharing for all the riparian states. </p>
<p>Egypt’s threatening stance doesn’t allow compromise because security is directly connected to people’s lives and their survival. But the growing challenges are unlikely to be met with force.</p>
<p>In addition, Ethiopia needs to recognise Egypt’s need for water too and use its large dam for the regulation of the Nile – not its blockage. And all the Nile basin states must cooperate for the peace and prosperity of Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salam Abdulqadir Abdulrahman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The threat to use force to defend Egypt’s right to water from the Nile has been a common theme through successive governments.Salam Abdulqadir Abdulrahman, Head of Political Science Department, College of Law and Politics, University of Human Development, IraqLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/951282018-05-14T09:17:02Z2018-05-14T09:17:02ZAre dictators on the way out – or on the way up?<p>All around the world, democracy is looking shaky. While consolidated democracies are struggling to stay healthy, many flawed ones have turned into outright authoritarian regimes – most notably Russia under <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-how-western-condemnation-lets-putin-off-the-hook-94595">Vladimir Putin</a> and Turkey under <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-subjected-turkey-to-a-year-of-cynical-doublespeak-89112">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>. But the news isn’t all bad: on several continents over the last decade, longstanding dictators have resigned, lost elections, or been deposed. </p>
<p>As the table below indicates, the number of dictators who’ve fallen in recent years for all sorts of reasons is a cause for optimism.</p>
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<p>But has their demise led to any kind of democratic reform? It’s a mixed picture to say the least. While a handful of promising cases deserve praise, only a few of the dictatorships that have fallen in recent years have given way to lasting, stable democracies.</p>
<p>The 2010s began with tremendous optimism for the future of global democracy, reaching an apogee with the Arab Spring protests in 2011. Across the Middle East and North Africa, several dictators fell in a row: after Tunisia’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12196679">Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a> of Tunisia and Egypt’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/02/hosni-mubarak-rule-downfall-timeline">Hosni Mubarak</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12688033">Muammar Gaddafi</a> of Libya was toppled in a civil war. Fighting also erupted in Yemen, leading to the eventual flight of longtime strongman <a href="https://theconversation.com/ignoble-end-for-yemeni-strong-man-ali-abdullah-saleh-who-left-a-country-in-tatters-88716">Ali Abdullah Saleh</a>.</p>
<p>It seemed for a moment that in one fell swoop, a clutch of countries were suddenly shaking off authoritarianism at last. But with the exception of Tunisia – whose situation is <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/tunisian-fm-we-are-not-yet-a-democracy/a-42685662">still somewhat fragile</a> – none of them have developed into democracies.</p>
<p>Egypt’s brief spell under the elected Muslim Brotherhood came to an end in 2013, when a military intervention brought General Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi to power. He remains president today, legitimised by <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-sisi-dashed-his-countrys-hopes-and-what-support-he-has-is-eroding-92227">largely meaningless elections</a>. Libya is still a weak state beset by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/libya-impunity-drives-violence">instability and violence</a>; Yemen has slipped into <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/03/middleeast/yemen-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-un-intl/index.html">devastating conflict and humanitarian crisis</a>. Though protests exploded throughout the Middle East, only modest reforms took place elsewhere. And in Syria, the Assad regime’s crackdown on the 2011 protests <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-whos-involved-and-what-do-they-want-95002">helped spark a nightmarish conflict</a> that has torn the country apart. </p>
<p>Iraq and Afghanistan, meanwhile, saw a change in leadership with the elections that forced Nouri al-Maliki and Hamid Karzai out of power. But neither country’s democracy has notably improved. Afghanistan is still authoritarian and unstable, and in Iraq, Maliki is still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-politics-analysis/ex-pm-maliki-making-comeback-as-iraqs-most-powerful-man-idUSKCN12B1V7">very powerful behind the scenes</a>.</p>
<h2>Mixed bag</h2>
<p>Latin America was home to a clutter of military dictatorships for decades, but since the mid-to-late 1980s, most of its countries have been flawed but functioning democracies. </p>
<p>The two notable holdouts were Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Cuba under Fidel Castro – and in the last decade, the two have diverged considerably. While Cuba has reformed a little under the rule of Fidel’s brother Raúl, who has now handed over to <a href="https://theconversation.com/cubas-new-president-what-to-expect-of-miguel-diaz-canel-95187">Miguel Díaz-Canal</a>, Venezuela is falling apart under the dictatorial leadership of Chavez’s hand-picked successor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/03/maduro-torture-democracy-venezuela-failed-state">Nicolás Maduro</a>. Other regimes in Latin America continue to hold free and fair elections, but struggle to uphold the rule of law.</p>
<p>In Asia, meanwhile, a few less-than-democratic countries have made strides towards reform, but most authoritarian regimes have stayed the same. Still, some reforms and resignations are noteworthy. In the Caucasus, Armenia’s Serzh Sargsyan was recently <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/armenia-president-populism/558773/">forced to resign</a> after mass protests against his rule. Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41594816">stepped down</a> after elections, the first peaceful handover of power in the country’s history.</p>
<p>In South-East Asia, most of the attention since 2015 has been on surprising events in Myanmar, when the military regime that ran the country for decades allowed open elections for the first time since 1990. Myanmar’s military government was oppressive even by authoritarian standards, so it was quite something to see it holding elections, releasing political prisoners and allowing more press freedom. The regime’s leader, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35916555">Thein Sein</a>, stepped down to make way for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. </p>
<p>But the democratic transformation was short-lived. The regime has continued to violate the human rights of its minority groups, most notably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/eyewitness-the-rohingya-horrors-and-aung-san-suu-kyis-whitewash-84750">Rohingya minority</a>, and civil liberties and press freedoms are in <a href="http://time.com/5100337/reuters-journalists-press-freedom-myanmar/">serious jeopardy</a>.</p>
<h2>Turfed out</h2>
<p>One place where things are looking up for democracy is Sub-Saharan Africa. The last decade has seen the overall standing of democracy in Africa <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/01/10/foresight-africa-viewpoint-democracy-in-africa-in-2017/">improve</a>. In the early 1980s, only five countries in Africa could be considered democratic: Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe. The end of the Cold War saw the expansion of elections and civil liberties. But more recent years has seen the fall or peaceful resignation of important authoritarian figures, many of them old men who had <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-elderly-leaders-get-no-prizes-for-hanging-on-73868">clung on to power for decades</a>.</p>
<p>Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia eventually fled the country in 2017 after he lost the presidential elections to the opposition. Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso resigned after political protests broke out in 2014, following nearly three decades in power. José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola resigned after nearly 40 years in power (though he remains influential in Angolan politics). All three countries have become slightly more democratic as a result. </p>
<p>But the biggest tree felled in Africa was undoubtedly Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. In his capacity as president since 1980, Mugabe had become increasingly dictatorial and brutal, and his misguided leadership plunged the country into chaos. When he unceremoniously fired his vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa at the end of 2017, his previous backers in the military decided they <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-house-of-mugabe-crumbles-but-its-too-soon-to-celebrate-in-zimbabwe-87695">had finally had enough</a>. With parliamentary impeachment hearings in the offing, Mugabe eventually resigned, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwas-zimbabwe-inches-forward-but-where-is-it-headed-95798">new elections are scheduled</a> for July 2018.</p>
<p>The bloodless Zimbabwean transition was a heartening spectacle, but there are nonetheless plenty of other countries to worry about. Hungary’s Viktor Orban is threatening to constrict his country’s democracy by clamping down on civil liberties, even as he wins <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/hungarys-viktor-orban-secures-another-term-with-resounding-win">landslide election victores</a>. China’s Xi Jinping recently orchestrated the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-xi-jinpings-lifetime-presidency-could-change-china-for-better-or-worse-92472">removal of term limits</a>, giving him power to rule indefinitely. Thailand’s military is heading the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/thailand">most repressive government</a> the country has seen in years. Still, while many countries have taken an authoritarian turn, others have made a success of their escape from dictatorship. </p>
<p>As recent events in Armenia attest, citizens the world over are becoming more involved in politics and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/multiple-meanings-global-protest">taking their displeasure to the streets</a>. And while it’s true that most dictators who fall are replaced by another dictator, there are enough examples to the contrary to give the defenders of democracy some hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95128/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At first, the 2010s seemed full of hope for democracy. The picture today is rather more complicated.Natasha Lindstaedt, Senior Lecturer, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/922272018-03-28T14:57:09Z2018-03-28T14:57:09ZEgypt’s Sisi dashed his country’s hopes – and what support he has is eroding<p>“Will you be voting for Sisi?” I asked a waiter in St John’s Wood, London as he brought me a steaming bowl of Kosheri, an Egyptian street food. He nodded apathetically, shrugging his shoulders, and replied “Who else is there?”</p>
<p>The outcome of this year’s Egyptian elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-sisi-poised-for-empty-victory-in-egypt-as-signs-of-unrest-grow-across-the-region-93518">is a foregone conclusion</a>. Even many of President Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi’s supporters would concede that the so-called “opposition” candidate, Moussa Mustafa Moussa, was merely a prop to allow the vote to be called a multi-candidate election rather than an empty referendum on a president who’s here to stay.</p>
<p>Strange to think that four years ago, Sisi was riding a wave of genuine popularity. Back then, many Egyptians had run out of patience with their first civilian head of state, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, who had presided over a rapidly deteriorating economy, a constitutional crisis, and unprecedented public protests. The discontent and chaos culminated in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military intervention</a> in July 2013 that put Sisi at the helm. The move was decried by Western observers as a “coup”, but heralded by many Egyptians as a salvation of the popular revolution of January 25, 2011.</p>
<p>At the time, a discernible sense of relief, perhaps even euphoria, coalesced around Sisi’s 2014 presidential campaign. This manifested in a curious mélange expressing the people’s support for the incumbent leader: from Sisi chocolates and underwear, to a mandate from the daughter of popular nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser that the military strongman was the legitimate heir of her father’s legacy.</p>
<p>Today, both Sisi and the Egyptian people are in a considerably less jubilant mood. The always-suspect narrative that Sisi and his military regime would sustain the revolutionary impetus of the January 25 revolution has long since dissipated.</p>
<h2>Justice denied</h2>
<p>The principal goals of the 2011 protests, “bread, freedom and social justice”, are nowhere in sight. Food is more expensive than ever, with unprecedented price hikes and inflation <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-10/egypt-urban-inflation-rate-drops-as-currency-float-shock-eases">still running at more than 20%</a>. As for freedom, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/egypt-untamed-repression">according to Human Rights Watch</a>, Sisi’s primary accomplishment in 2017 was “applying violence and repression to decimate the rule of law and peaceful opposition”. In a recent speech, Sisi himself <a href="http://www.icanpeacework.org/2018/02/07/egyptian-revolution-continues/">claimed</a> that “calling for social justice results in the destruction of our country”.</p>
<p>Instead of improving the Egyptian people’s standard of living, the Sisi government’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/09/egyptian-military-offensive-targets-islamic-militants-sinai">overriding concern</a> is an indiscriminate “war on terror”, a term that extends to violent crackdowns on political opponents.</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/arab-spring-rabaa-massacre/536847/">public massacre</a> of more than 800 Muslim Brotherhood supporters in August 2013, the Egyptian government declared the group a terrorist organisation. Claiming that the nation faces an existential threat from political Islam backed by foreign conspirators who want to see Egypt’s demise, the regime has spent years rounding up both Islamists and secular political opponents under the pretext of protecting Egyptians from “terrorism”. </p>
<p>As a recent spate of attacks has shown, Egypt does face very real security risks – but the government’s actions are only exacerbating them. </p>
<h2>Countermeasures</h2>
<p>Conflating and repressing opposition groups who express any political dissent not only radicalises individuals and groups but also detracts from the country’s principal terrorist stronghold: the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/24/africa/egypt-sinai-mosque-attack/index.html">northern Sinai</a>. </p>
<p>There, the Islamic State-affiliated <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25882504">Ansar Beyt al-Maqdis</a> (or Sinai Province), capitalises on the ungoverned space in which such insurgencies typically thrive. The group strives to fan sectarian violence as it did in Iraq and Syria, most notably with an <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-mosque-attack-new-level-of-horror-in-decades-long-struggle-to-control-sinai-87642">attack on a Sufi mosque</a> in November 2017 which killed more than 300 people.</p>
<p>Northern Sinai has been designated a closed military zone which journalists cannot access. But with more than 100 “covert” Israeli airstrikes recorded since 2015, it is an open secret that Egypt is becoming <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Whats-behind-the-Egyptian-Israeli-cooperation-in-Sinai-540688">increasingly reliant on Israel</a> to secure this territory. </p>
<p>So despite his inevitable “win”, Sisi is also genuinely vulnerable. The electoral jostling of the past few weeks has shown that the strongman has not succeeded in dominating Egyptian politics to the degree he might have hoped. The (withdrawn) campaign of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/24/khaled-ali-withdraws-egyptian-presidential-race-abdel-fatah-al-sissi">human rights lawyer Khaled Ali</a> breathed a little life back into the spirit of the January 25 revolution, and subsequent calls for a boycott among the liberal opposition reveal an enduring desire for political protest of sorts. More worryingly for Sisi, was the emergence of hopeful candidates from the military, notably <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-election/opposition-withdraws-giving-egypts-sisi-clear-run-to-presidency-idUKKBN1FD1BC">General Sami Anan</a>, who was arrested for daring to stand. </p>
<p>While the net result wasn’t much affected, for the first time, there was a real possibility of challenges from within Sisi’s principal power base. So while his “success” is assured, Sisi comes out of the election with less support than ever and monumental challenges ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92227/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dina Rezk receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Egyptians’ revolutionary demands for ‘bread, freedom and social justice’ are a distant memory.Dina Rezk, Lecturer in Middle Eastern History, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/935182018-03-26T12:57:35Z2018-03-26T12:57:35ZAl-Sisi poised for empty victory in Egypt as signs of unrest grow across the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211353/original/file-20180321-165568-19ehdkk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protester mocking President al-Sisi. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/22422195819">Alisdare Hickson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Egyptians are voting in presidential elections on March 26-28. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who grabbed power in 2013, is set to win another term by a landslide. Yet this is far from a sign of strength: opposition candidates <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-sisi/sisi-says-he-wanted-more-challengers-in-egyptian-election-idUSKBN1GW33P">have been</a> silenced, and even pro-government media <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/18/egypt-muffles-press-with-fake-news-charges">are being</a> purged of the slightest undertone of dissent. </p>
<p>Al-Sisi’s grip on power may appear firm, but his country’s <a href="http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Teti-and-Gervasio.pdf">problems</a> can’t be thrown into jail like his opponents. His predecessors <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12301713">Hosni Mubarak</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhu-YgCyPz4">Anwar Sadat</a> learned this the hard way.</p>
<p>Yet don’t expect much hand-wringing from the West about Egypt’s stability in the coming days – despite its having been through <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution">a revolution</a> and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/23/egypt-spring-2014-counter-revolution">coup</a> already this decade. Governments and other strategists only appear to worry about countries in this region once discontent turns “hot” – like in Syria, Yemen, Libya or Iraq. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320170921_Sinkholes_of_Insecurity_The_Structural_Causes_of_Weaknesses_in_Six_Arab_Countries_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_11">shows that</a> this may be a serious and costly mistake. The whole region is suffering from exactly the same deep-seated problems as before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/recovery-from-the-arab-spring-will-take-a-generation-or-more-20522">Arab Spring</a> of 2010-11. In Egypt and various other apparently stable countries, there are very high levels of discontent that could easily boil over. </p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>The uprisings earlier in the decade were not simply demands for Western-style democracy. Protesters may have been disillusioned by all the election rhetoric from these authoritarian regimes in democratic clothing, but they were primarily disgusted by corruption, abuse of power and economic inequality. They wanted governments that would <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">address these concerns</a> rather than lining their own pockets and those of their cronies. </p>
<p>Unfortunately little has changed, as newly released <a href="http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files">opinion polls show</a> for Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia – with upwards of 1,000 people surveyed in each country. While citizens worry about issues their governments prioritise, such as security, terrorism and religious extremism, their main concerns are the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">same as</a> in 2010 – decent jobs, inflation, inequality and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315713451_The_Integrity_of_States_Corruption_in_the_EU%27s_Southern_Neighbourhood_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_6">corruption</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Top two challenges by country</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>People don’t believe their governments are responsive to their <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">priorities</a>. Fewer than one third of Egyptians think so, while in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan that figure drops to a quarter or less. In Lebanon it is a mere 7%. </p>
<p>Across all six countries an astonishing 85% or more think their governments are not making a serious effort to tackle corruption. Meanwhile, 75% or more are not satisfied with their governments’ efforts to create jobs or fight inflation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on economy, corruption and terrorism</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The discontent is worst in Lebanon, where fewer than 5% of people approve of the government’s work. Even the performance on internal security – the one area where citizens in the other five countries are relatively satisfied – was considered adequate by only a quarter of Lebanese respondents. </p>
<p>This region-wide disenchantment translates into low confidence in parliaments and political parties, the key institutions which ought to be representing citizens’ interests. Confidence varies from country to country: Lebanon again scores poorly. Egypt fares better than others, but this owes more to intense government propaganda than any real effectiveness. </p>
<p><strong>Trust in state institutions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Citizens also don’t feel they have the civil and political rights necessary to legitimately express their grievances and push their governments for reforms. When people are unable to adequately express their unhappiness, it inevitably increases the potential for radicalisation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on civil rights</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Little changed</h2>
<p>As a result of the Arab uprisings, governments fell in <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">Tunisia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-the-spirit-of-tahrir-square-has-been-all-but-crushed-53461">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-how-the-arab-spring-led-to-an-increasingly-vicious-civil-war-in-yemen-55968">Yemen</a> and eventually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/gaddafi-last-words-begged-mercy">Libya</a>, while there were more limited political changes in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482679">Jordan</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19401680">Kuwait</a>. Governments in other countries announced political concessions, including <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-d-hirst/morocco-constitution_b_884430.html">Morocco</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-algeria-really-spring-cleaning-its-deep-state-51615">Algeria</a>, <a href="http://www.mepc.org/oman-forgotten-corner-arab-spring">Oman</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-executions-business-as-usual-in-a-post-arab-spring-world-52690">Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>Yet since the issues which drove many of these protesters to the streets have not been addressed, their governments remain vulnerable both to mass mobilisation and to less obvious forms of radicalisation – as recent protests <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">in Tunisia</a> show. </p>
<p>Western policymakers and academics concerned with security are at risk of missing this. They do not seem to have learned the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1370559/Lessons_from_the_Arab_Uprisings">lessons</a> of the Arab uprisings. Absent armed conflict, they <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315836965_From_Ring_of_Friends_to_Ring_of_Fire_Challenges_to_Stability_and_Legitimacy_in_MENA_States_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_4">still tend</a> to dismiss the importance to stability of social cohesion, inequality and poor political representation.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sisi or Sisiphus?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg#/media/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We must therefore <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061014">reassess the stability</a> of countries like Egypt. We must stop assuming their leaders will forever be able to simply repress dissent, and stop assuming that such repression doesn’t come with costs and risks, both human and political. </p>
<p>These countries are in fact security “sinkholes”: regimes whose foundations erode while apparently seeming stable, often to the point of collapse. Far from being a sign of strength or stability, remaining deaf to the needs of the people make things worse in the long run. </p>
<p>As al-Sisi makes his inevitable victory speech, we would be wise not to ignore these warning signs. Until we learn that conflict must be dealt with at its roots, history is liable to just keep repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European Commission 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. He is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. </span></em></p>Public disaffection in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries betrays deep-seated tensions beneath the surface.Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/920702018-02-28T15:30:21Z2018-02-28T15:30:21ZScramble for gas in eastern Mediterranean is stoking old tensions in the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207889/original/file-20180226-120129-1mwwwzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish ships on patrol. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Turkish navy <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180224/turkey-navy-forces-back-italian-drillship-cyprus">blocking a drilling ship</a> from exploring for gas off Cyprus ought to make international headlines, but it has gone almost unnoticed at a time of such conflict in the region. The ship has been marooned while diplomats from several European countries try to broker a solution between Turkey and Cyprus. </p>
<p>The blockade relates to claims and counter claims over the rights to explore the waters off this troubled island. It is just one of a number of conflicts between Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon that have arisen since huge reserves of gas <a href="https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/timeline-game-changing-gas-discoveries-eastern-mediterranean/">began to be</a> discovered in the eastern Mediterranean in 2009. What started as a promising opportunity for cooperation is instead fuelling existing tensions. </p>
<p>Peaceful and cooperative gas exploration should have been attractive to these countries. Conventional wisdom suggested natural gas would be in high demand because it is cheaper than renewable energy but with lower carbon emissions than oil and coal. </p>
<p>Yet despite these countries rushing to explore their waters, historic animosities have prevented them from reaching a multilateral agreement with each other demarcating the boundaries or exclusive economic zones in their respective waters. Instead, they have signed various bilateral agreements, clarifying positions between some countries but not with others. </p>
<p>Global enthusiasm for gas has since <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-golden-age-of-gas-is-over-1510257145">waned somewhat</a>. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar have become drastically cheaper, while coal has had enough political clout to stay in business. Consequently, a gas glut made prices weaker than the industry had hoped. Arguably, this should still incentivise these Mediterranean countries to cooperate to share the costs of exploration and export infrastructure. It is not playing out that way, however. </p>
<h2>The Cyprus problem</h2>
<p>The Republic of Cyprus has reached demarcation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. Yet drilling has been complicated by relations with the Turkish Cypriot community’s administration, which is recognised only by Turkey. After talks to reunify the island <a href="https://theconversation.com/cypriot-hopes-for-unification-are-on-life-support-but-not-doomed-90121">collapsed</a> last July, mutual distrust is on a high.</p>
<p>The Turkish Cypriots are concerned about being cut out of the gas bonanza, but their main interest is reunification. They believe that if the two sides on the island were jointly exploring and taking the gas to market, the majority of the Greek Cypriot community would agree to a reunification deal they have opposed in the past. This, they argue, would redress the historic mistake of the EU granting the south exclusive membership in 2004 without insisting on a solution to the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866000/3866521.stm">1974 division conflict</a>. </p>
<p>The Turkish Cypriots have been using their claims over the territorial waters to try and force cooperation. The Turkish Cypriot deputy prime minister, Kudret Özersay, <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/cyprus-turkey/turkish-cold-blooded-stance-stops-cyprus-gas-clash">said recently</a> that exploration would no longer be permitted by the north without either a north-south agreement over gas or a <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/showdown-drilling-vessel-off-cyprus-spur-talks">full settlement</a> of the wider island issue. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208247/original/file-20180228-36689-1bvxgzr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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<p>Turkey <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-43_-gkrynin-dogu-akdenizdeki-hidrokarbon-faaliyetleri-hk.en.mfa">followed up</a> with a statement saying it would not tolerate unilateral exploration by Nicosia, whose authority it doesn’t recognise. Besides wanting to shore up the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey sees the eastern Mediterranean as a “<a href="https://sigmaturkey.com/2018/02/23/cyprus-natural-resources-vital-part-blue-homeland/">blue homeland</a>” for its own growth ambitions – and related <a href="http://ceftus.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CEFTUS_Turkey-Energy-Security-and-Foreign-Policy_White-Paper.pdf">concerns about</a> domestic energy security. Worse, Turkey watches the tighter cooperation between Nicosia and more powerful neighbours like Israel, Egypt and Greece in matters as sensitive as energy with growing unease. </p>
<p>Relations between Turkey and Greece, the region’s oldest maritime rivalry, have also started being affected by gas politics – together with a row over <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-security-greece/greek-court-suspends-asylum-granted-to-turkish-soldier-idUKKBN1EX0TF">Greece granting asylum</a> to officers suspected of aiding the attempted coup in Turkey in 2015. In a separate incident to the blocking of the drilling ship, a Turkish vessel <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkish-patrol-boat-accused-of-ramming-greek-ship-jmxj0lwl6">rammed</a> a Greek ship in the Aegean earlier this month. Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/226143/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-is-neither-iraq-nor-syria-fm-tells-turkey">vowed to defend</a> its maritime borders, linking the matter to Turkish activities in Cypriot waters. </p>
<p>These tensions threaten an additional problem for Turkey. The EU is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by-country/multi-country/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15">looking at</a> constructing a gas pipeline from the region to mainland Europe via Crete. Turkey already has the pipeline infrastructure to export the region’s gas to Europe easily and cheaply, but this new pipeline would bypass the country and turn Cyprus into a competing energy transfer hub – potentially including gas from Israel and Egypt. </p>
<p>This prospect has made no difference to the fate of the blockaded drill ship, however. The marooned vessel, which is owned by Italy’s Eni, <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180224/turkey-navy-forces-back-italian-drillship-cyprus">looks set</a> to sail elsewhere – albeit other exploration work by France’s Total and US giant MobilExxon remain on the schedule. </p>
<h2>Other wrangles</h2>
<p>Old conflicts are also complicating gas exploration elsewhere in the region, notably the one between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-israel-natgas/lebanon-to-begin-offshore-energy-search-in-block-disputed-by-israel-idUSKBN1FT218">Lebanon and Israel</a>. Like with Turkey/Cyprus, negotiations are made more difficult by these countries not recognising one another diplomatically. Lately, Israel <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-natgas-lebanon-israel/israel-lebanon-clash-over-offshore-energy-raising-tensions-idUSKBN1FK1J0">has been</a> making threats following Lebanon’s decision to launch an exploration tender in disputed waters. </p>
<p>Egypt is meanwhile sitting on the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-16/egypt-says-eni-s-giant-zohr-gas-field-starts-first-production">largest gas discovery</a> in the region. The Zohr field has an estimated 30 trillion cubic metres of gas, and Egypt is keen to use it to fuel a domestic development boom to stabilise the military regime. But President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
is having to contain <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/2/21/sisi-scores-own-goal-praising-israel-gas-deal">domestic opposition</a> to Egypt’s <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/21/curb-your-enthusiasm-gas-israel-egypt-cyprus-turkey-mediterranean-lebanon-leviathan/">expanding energy cooperation</a> with Israel, which has invited attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure in the past. </p>
<p>Tensions are also simmering with Turkey over <a href="https://www.thenationalherald.com/190551/egypt-cyprus-energy-alliance-rattling-turkey-tension-grows/">Egypt’s cooperation</a> with Cyprus. The mutual resentment between Turkey and Egypt has never really thawed since the ousting of the Turkey-friendly Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013. Most recently, Turkey declared the demarcation agreement between Egypt and Cyprus null and void for allegedly violating Turkish territorial waters. </p>
<p>Some countries that discover oil and gas turn into hydrocarbon-rich economies. For others it becomes a resource curse, leading to endless corruption, civil wars and domestic tensions. For the countries in the eastern Mediterranean, the promise of offshore wealth has made the region’s fragile geopolitics yet more complex. If they are going to turn their vast gas potential into economic and fiscal benefits, regional actors are going to have to find new solutions to old problems before tensions rise any further.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemens Hoffmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospect of gas wealth has been escalating old rivalries and disputes between Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Greece.Clemens Hoffmann, Lecturer in International Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916902018-02-13T13:16:18Z2018-02-13T13:16:18ZWith a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206165/original/file-20180213-44660-yvjtjz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Democratic Republic of Congo's President Joseph Kabila. Time to step aside.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kenny Katombe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.</p>
<p>The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples. </p>
<p>The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections. </p>
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
<p>In Pretoria President Jacob Zuma <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-finally-falls-on-his-sword-but-not-before-threatening-to-take-the-house-down-with-him-91910">resigned</a> on February 14. He had come under increasing pressure to do so following the December election of Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f727f130-e3e7-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da">as president of the African National Congress</a>, and the future president of the country. </p>
<p>And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html">ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a>, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.</p>
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
<p>The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/dr-congo-president-can-remain-in-office-without-a-vote-court">to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term</a>. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/31/congo-security-forces-shoot-two-dead-during-protest-against-president">mounting national protests</a>, which <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-protesters-killed-anti-kabila-protests-180121105558348.html">the regime has crushed</a>. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.</p>
<p>In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">reelection in October</a>. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171003-eye-africa-cameroon-anglophone-unrest-kenya-election-protest-oromo-festival-ethiopia">faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon</a> and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/Reviews%20&%20Outlooks/Cameroon---Risks-Will-Rise-On-Upcoming-Election/36227">leaves room for speculation and uncertainty</a>. </p>
<p>In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">election at the end of this year</a>, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13861843">with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001</a>. There are fears this will happen again.</p>
<p>Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">are expected to hold presidential elections this year</a>. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170928_sg_report_on_mali_september_eng.pdf">is not immune to terrorist attacks</a>.</p>
<p>No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/24/egypt-heading-towards-elections-president-sisis-name-ballot/">will certainly be reelected president of a country</a> he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/former-egyptian-general-arrested-by-military-after-announcing-presidential-bid-sami-anan">now controls unchallenged</a>.</p>
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
<p>In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">who had been in power for 38 years</a>. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">protests</a> demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigerias-president-warns-togo-about-political-instability-20180208">to restore calm</a>. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/04/togolese-president-faure-gnassingbe-is-new-ecowas-chairperson/">the organization until June 2018</a>. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.</p>
<p>Like Togo, Gabon experienced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">similar ‘transition’</a> from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-mulls-amnesty-for-post-election-violence-20170914">marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression</a>. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.</p>
<p>The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-president-defends-constitutional-change-after-parliament-gives-okay-20180111">‘monarchisation’ of power</a>. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.</p>
<p>In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/guinea-bissau-president-names-new-prime-minister-0">since 2014</a>. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-mission-to-guinea-bissau-to-assess-the-implementation-of-conakry-and-bissau-agreements/">under the aegis of the regional west African body</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ecowas-threatens-guinea-bissau-sanctions-as-crisis-drags-20171217">Vaz runs the risk of sanctions</a>, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/ecomib.htm">the regional troop deployment</a>. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012414125957785808.html">mostly known military coups and instability</a>. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.</p>
<p>In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/08/chad-suspends-10-parties-for-disturbing-public-order/">plagued the economy</a>. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr20/7045/2017/en/">his repressive methods</a>. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/civil-unrest-chad-idriss-deby/">is expected to hold legislative elections this year</a>.</p>
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.</p>
<p>What the continent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/africa/12prexy.html">needs most are strong institutions</a>, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTNk4q6zRw8">paradigm shift</a> as embodied with determination, class and panache by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PNJjpw-Qb4">Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed M Diatta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa needs strong institutions. But they can only be built if there’s a change in leadership.Mohamed M Diatta, Ph.D. Candidate & Lecturer in Political Science-International Relations, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799432017-07-02T08:36:35Z2017-07-02T08:36:35ZNews of Saif al-Islam’s release: regional politics fuels rumour mill in Libya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175848/original/file-20170627-24749-zt2h9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saif al-Islam, son of late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The release of Saif al-Islam son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi dominated the media for several days <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40236808">in early June</a>. But the saga of Saif’s unconfirmed release fits right into broader regional politics and the contest for power and influence by countries in the region. </p>
<p>Libya descended into chaos following the overthrow and killing of its long time leader Gaddafi in 2011 after <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838340/Libya-rebellion-timeline.html">a popular uprising</a>. Several militias and groups emerged after Gaddafi’s death seizing <a href="https://pure.abdn.ac.uk:8443/ws/files/68607751/The_rocky_road_ahead_to_peace_the_Arab_U.pdf">different regions of the country</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2011 conflict it was the NATO invasion that changed the balance of power in Libya. Today it’s the diplomatic, financial and material support that the local rival actors receive from external interests that’s shaping the power game in the country. The two main players are the eastern-based factional Tobruk government which is aligned with the self-styled Libya National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, and the UN-backed government in the capital, Tripoli.</p>
<p>Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have been very active in the Libyan conflict. Under the goal set by Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to eradicate terrorism, its military aligns with the Tobruk-based government and Haftar forces. Cairo has consistently violated the UN-imposed arms embargo in their efforts to support the Haftar forces with weapons among other things <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2017/466">as the latest</a> report by the UN panel of experts illustrates. </p>
<p>The powerful role played by Egypt and the UAE in Libya was also evident in the decision taken by Libya’s Tobruk government to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-libya-idUSKBN18W11M">cut diplomatic ties</a> with Qatar along with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. </p>
<p>Qatar has also been an important actor in the Libyan conflict. Like Turkey, it has been of accused of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11110931/How-Qatar-is-funding-the-rise-of-Islamist-extremists.html">supporting Islamist groups</a> in Libya. Qatar’s involvement in Libyan affairs was noticeable even during the last days of Gaddafi’s regime when it was <a href="http://acdemocracy.org/libya-ali-al-salabi-and-the-re-emerging-muslim-brotherhood/">pressing for the release</a>of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>Qatar’s involvement in the conflict violates the UN imposed embargo as it supplies weapons and provides <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-uae-libya-connection-170612080219306.html">financial support to Islamist-leaning factions</a>, mainly in the western part of the country. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that only a few days after the embargo on Qatar by its neighbours Saif was allegedly released. The Libyan conflict has long been considered as a proxy war of Gulf Arab rivalry with the UAE and Qatar backing competing militias in Libya. The timing and the particulars of the release of Saif could only benefit the anti-Qatar camp in Libya, as it could portray the Haftar as the sole conciliatory player in the Libyan conflict who could bring old rivals under his magnanimous protection.</p>
<h2>Complexities</h2>
<p>The Abubaker Sadiq brigade of Libya’s north western city of Zintan where Saif was captured during the uprising announced that it released the former Libyan heir to comply with a new amnesty law issued by the Tobruk government.</p>
<p>But Ibrahim Massud Ali, general prosecutor of the UN-backed and internationally recognised Tripoli-based government, <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/freed-saif-al-islam-qaddafi-still-wanted-by-libya-court-prosecutor">argues</a> that Saif doesn’t fulfil amnesty requirements and that the son of the late Libyan strongman is still wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The court issued <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/11-01/11-3">a warrant of arrest</a> for Saif in 2011 before his capture. </p>
<p>In addition, many would see Saif’s release as a huge injustice and a betrayal of the uprisings that sacked his father and put him in captivity since he was one of the most prominent figures in his father’s regime and was touted to be his preferred successor.</p>
<p>On learning of his release Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/15/libya-surrender-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-icc">issued a statement</a> asking that he surrender to the ICC.</p>
<p>It’s unclear how, if he came before the court, Saif’s case would evolve. The ICC may have lost the moral right to try him given the fact that many African governments view it as a <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/icc-now-instrument-imperialism">“tool of Western imperialism”</a>. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s indifference to the promotion of human rights as a foreign policy objective muddies the water further. And the US has shown more interest in the vast oil reserves of Libya than in the well being of a country that’s become a hotbed for extremists. </p>
<p>Added to this heady mix is Russia’s role with Moscow appearing to have a strong relationship with General Haftar. This only further delegitimises the UN-backed Government of National Accord. </p>
<h2>Propaganda and Information Warfare</h2>
<p>We need to take the news of Saif with a pinch of salt. The past six years of warfare in Libya has also been conducted on the news front too. The fabrication of news has become <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-libya-media-hoax-fabricated-scenes-of-jubilation-and-euphoria-on-green-square/26155">common practice</a>. In the light of this many have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_CllijYitA">questioned the veracity</a> of reports about Saif’s release. Last time he was seen by independent observers was in the summer of 2014 in Zintan. </p>
<p>So we need to wait to see some visual proof of his release and his status before taking the reports seriously. </p>
<p>Aeschylus, 25 centuries ago, noted that the first casualty of war is truth. This seems to be true of the situation in Libya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilia Xypolia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The news of Saif al-Islam’s release should be taken with a pinch of salt. During the past six years of warfare in Libya the fabrication of news has become common practice.Ilia Xypolia, Research fellow, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762732017-04-17T22:55:55Z2017-04-17T22:55:55ZWho are the Coptic Christians?<p>Coptic Christians in Egypt have been attacked while <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40059307">traveling on pilgrimages</a> and bombed while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/world/middleeast/explosion-egypt-coptic-christian-church.html">praying on Palm Sunday</a>, amid an accelerating <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches">series of attacks</a> over the last decade. The interrelated challenges of violence, economics and discrimination have led to the increasing departure of Christians from the Middle East. For centuries they have been part of the rich religious diversity of the region. </p>
<p>So who are these people that National Geographic has called <a href="http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/06/arab-christians/belt-text">“The Forgotten Faithful”?</a></p>
<h2>Coptic history</h2>
<p>Among the Christians of the Middle East, the largest number – some eight million or so – is made up of Egypt’s Copts. Since I first visited Egypt in the 1990s, I have been interested in this community and its contribution to pluralism. </p>
<p>Copts are the indigenous Christian population of Egypt, who date back to the first decades following the life of Jesus Christ. The biblical Book of Acts tells how <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Acts+2">Jews from Egypt came to Jerusalem</a> for the feast of Pentecost, a Jewish harvest festival that marked the birth of the Christian church merely weeks after Christ’s crucifixion. Many of these Egyptians took the message of Christianity back to their own country. Christian tradition holds that St. Mark, one of the early disciples of Jesus, became the <a href="http://www.copticchurch.net/synaxarium/08_30.html">first bishop of Egypt</a>.</p>
<p>By the <a href="http://www.aucpress.com/p-3247-the-early-coptic-papacy.aspx">fourth century</a>, the majority of Egyptians had embraced the Christian faith. Even after the Muslim conquest in the seventh century, the majority of Egyptians were still Christians. It was only during the <a href="http://www.aucpress.com/p-3249-the-coptic-papacy-in-islamic-egypt-6411517.aspx">Middle Ages</a> that greater and greater numbers embraced Islam, and the Christian population dwindled.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165409/original/image-20170414-25862-b7vavx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/aquistbe/2211802829/in/photolist-4ns4Vx-eSNHD-4HQv8W-eSPvp-atpewW-atpeyC-bWB9yw-heVLR-atmzQe-5jM41D-5UEZaR-hfapY-bWB9TY-hfapZ-6rZ5n1-razdFg-7i5VLg-4ns4Lp-hf8UA-a9XWxm-qMZMN9-T8FjK7-a9VxdP-kYUzbw-7tFnwJ-a9Ybk1-a9Vqsi-5UWMWT-kYUydQ-qvuMiG-sjwVw9-4HQvyY-qvuHHW-kYTb7Z-a9VeJi-4JJkc-4HQvcq-heYUX-61sz49-5WtB2d-7FMJUr-7i9Vhy-5Wphk8-aHY2iH-61sz4j-5Wp9XD-7i9SJh-7i9QQN-heVLT-aHY5bz">Alex Quistberg</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, Egyptian Christians make up approximately <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/02/16/how-many-christians-are-there-in-egypt/">5 to 10 percent of the Egyptian population</a>. The word “Copt” is used for all Egyptian Christians. It is derived from an ancient Greek word that simply means “Egyptian.” </p>
<p>Copts are fiercely proud of their Egyptian heritage that dates back to the age of the pyramids as early as 3000 B.C. The vast majority of Copts are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church, an independent church that <a href="http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-28/461-council-of-chalcedon.html">arose in A.D. 451</a>, long before the <a href="http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-28/1054-east-west-schism.html">divide</a> that created the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in 1054. </p>
<p>The language of the Coptic Orthodox church service (or <a href="http://www.coptic.net/prayers/stbasilliturgy.html">liturgy</a>) used in daily worship is also known as Coptic. It is the original Egyptian language written in Greek script.</p>
<p>Copts live throughout every corner of Egypt and at every socioeconomic level. One of Egypt’s richest men, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/naguib-sawiris/">Naguib Sawiris</a>, is a Copt, and so are most of Cairo’s garbage collectors, the <a href="http://www.orthodoxbookstore.org/marinaofthezabbaleen.aspx">zabellin</a>. Though Copts are largely indistinguishable from the Muslim majority, many are given <a href="https://cruxnow.com/faith/2015/06/27/tattoos-arent-just-a-fashion-statement-for-egypts-copts/">tattoos of a cross on their wrists</a> as children, signifying their permanent commitment to the community. In addition, Coptic women are unlikely to veil, making them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/29/egypt-women-cover-up-coptic">stand out</a> from Muslim women.</p>
<p>The head of the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the most significant Christian leader in Egypt, is the bishop of the See of St. Mark, known among Egyptians as the Coptic pope or patriarch. Today the Church is led by <a href="http://copticchurch.net/topics/pope/pope_tawadros_ii.html">Pope Tawadros II</a>, who studied pharmacy before deciding to pursue a religious career in the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Religious practice</h2>
<p>Copts practice a form of Christianity that hearkens back to the earliest traditions of the church.</p>
<p>Pope Tawadros and all of the bishops of the Coptic Orthodox Church begin their vocation as monks – celibate men living in seclusion in monasteries. The Coptic Orthodox Church is unique in its preference for placing monks in the highest positions of authority. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165406/original/image-20170414-25870-4gmuri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pope Tawadros II, the 118th pope of the Coptic Church of Egypt, leads a mass for the Egyptian Christians who were killed in Libya, at St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, Egypt, Feb. 17, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Amr Nabil</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In fact, the world’s first Christian monks, <a href="http://www.coptic.net/synexarion/anthony.txt">St. Anthony</a> and St. Paul, established their monasteries in the eastern desert of Egypt in the early fourth century. Both of these monasteries, and numerous others, continue to operate. </p>
<p>In his book <a href="http://www.shambhala.com/desert-father.html">“Desert Father</a>,” Australian author <a href="http://www.james-cowan.net/">James Cowan</a> describes how the monastic tradition became an important support for Egyptian Christians under persecution and helped to preserve culture throughout the Christian world. </p>
<p>Modern-day Copts often visit the monasteries for spiritual guidance, community retreats and to rediscover their heritage.</p>
<p>But while Copts may go to the deserts of Egypt for their religious practice, most live in the cities among their Muslim compatriots. Their churches and community service organizations – and even Coptic <a href="http://en.wataninet.com/">news sites</a> and <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Sectarian_Conflict_in_Egypt.html?id=9LinfigcDnwC&redir_esc=y">media</a> – contribute to the vibrancy of Egyptian social and intellectual life. </p>
<p>Peter Makari, a church leader with extensive experience working with Coptic organizations, writes about the ways in which <a href="http://www.syracuseuniversitypress.syr.edu/fall-2007/conflict-cooperation.html">Copts have organized</a> community initiatives, development projects and solidarity movements with fellow Egyptians to promote national unity and peace. Copts regularly celebrate feasts with Muslim leaders and host public dialogues with Muslim intellectuals and leaders.</p>
<p>In particular, Copts participated alongside their Muslim compatriots in the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html">protests</a>that brought down the authoritarian rule of former President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. </p>
<h2>The condition of Copts today</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, Copts have faced systemic discrimination in employment and limitations on their ability to access public services and education ever since the establishment of the modern republic of Egypt in 1952. </p>
<p>Governing authorities made it very difficult for them to build or refurbish their churches. After the 2011 revolution, Copts initially <a href="https://www.convivium.ca/articles/christians-in-the-middle-east-more-than-leaseholders">enjoyed newfound freedoms</a> to organize and voice their concerns about these practices. </p>
<p>However, their aspirations were dashed when the Egyptian Armed Forces clashed with Coptic protesters in a <a href="https://timep.org/commentary/maspero-massacre-revisited/">deadly confrontation in October 2011</a>. When subsequently the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in 2012, there was an attempt to push through a constitution that gave special powers to Islamic authorities. These developments seemed to <a href="http://www.aucpress.com/p-4791-copts-at-the-crossroads.aspx">undermine Copts’ ability</a> to participate as equal citizens.</p>
<p>Most Copts were therefore content to see the restoration of authoritarian rule under Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, who in 2014 introduced a <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf">new constitution</a> that limits the role of Islam in Egyptian government. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the Coptic community has now become an easy target in the fight between al-Sisi and his Islamist enemies. Violent attacks on Copts have led them to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/12/egypt-horrific-palm-sunday-bombings">flee</a> certain areas of Egypt, such as Sinai, and there is a <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/war-terrorism-and-the-christian-exodus-from-the-middle-east">steady stream</a> of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15570274.2017.1284412?journalCode=rfia20">Coptic emigration</a> from Egypt. </p>
<p>This must concern all Egyptians, since the presence of Copts is essential to the health of intellectual, cultural and political life in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rowe has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for his research.</span></em></p>Among the Christians of the Middle East, the largest number – some eight million or so – is of Egypt’s Copts. Here’s their story.Paul Rowe, Professor and Coordinator of Political and International Studies, Trinity Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/503252015-11-12T11:53:18Z2015-11-12T11:53:18ZWhy Egypt is a case study for the West in how not to safeguard democracy<p>The recent tragedy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sinai-crash-what-do-we-really-know-50262">in which 224 passengers and crew died</a> in the skies over Sinai points to the contradiction in so many Western governments’ policies towards the Middle East. Their rhetoric trumpeting democracy and human rights is at odds with their de facto support for dictatorships and economic policies that benefit the few, not the many. This contradiction is dangerous because – far from promoting democracy and peace – it facilitates economic inequality, political polarisation, even violence.</p>
<p>The official visit of <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-al-sisi-in-london-visit-provides-glimpse-of-a-bitterly-divided-nation-50282">Egyptian president and former general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi</a> should have provided a useful opportunity for the UK to put pressure on Cairo’s military-led government to deliver on democratic promises. </p>
<p>Instead, Sisi has felt so free from political pressure that, just before he left for London, his security forces arrested one of the main figures of pro-democracy activism, the founder of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/news/update-hossam-bahgat-has-been-released-not-clear-if-charges-still-pending">Hossam Bahgat</a> and held the journalist for four days. It remains to be seen whether he’ll be prosecuted for “deliberately broadcasting false information that disturbs public security, incites public panic and harms the public interest”.</p>
<p>Meanhwhile, the regime continues to imprison activist Alaa Abdel Fattah – a prominent figure in Egypt’s 2011 revolution. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/egyptian-activist-alaa-abd-el-fattah-sentenced-five-years-jail">Sentenced under anti-terrorism legislation</a>, Alaa Abdel Fattah’s crimes were to peacefully protest against the military’s power grab, to protest the increasing use of military tribunals to try civilians, and to disagree with a draconian protest law that requires police authorisation for even the smallest gatherings, effectively <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/middleeast/egypt-law-street-protests.html">banning street protest</a>.</p>
<p>Far from the run-up to the Egyptian president’s visit to London being politically sensitive, human rights were barely mentioned. Sisi’s greatest embarrassment was Cameron’s awkward failure to notify him of the UK’s decision to suspend flights to Egypt. Instead, talk mainly focused on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-press-conference-david-cameron-and-president-sisi">trade relations and security issues</a>.</p>
<p>The public justification for this choice is that trade and security are vital foundation stones for democracy. Although this may be true in principle, the policies pursued by successive US and European governments have, in fact, <a href="http://www.madamasr.com/sections/economy/fighting-high-food-prices-retail-level-misses-deeper-causes-price-spikes">worsened economic conditions</a> for most Egyptians. Nor have they achieved much in the way of supporting popular demands for democracy. </p>
<p>This was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/02/tony-blair-mubarak-courageous-force-for-good-egypt">true before the “Arab Spring”</a> and it has remained so since. Western governments’ insistence that they have recognised their mistakes ring hollow as ordinary people in the region see their aspirations for greater economic fairness and better political representation trampled at every turn. </p>
<h2>Wasted opportunity</h2>
<p>In the wake of the Arab uprisings, Western governments were presented with an unprecedented opportunity: to respond to demands for democracy by supporting the freedom of individuals to take part in politics, and to act on a widespread desire for social justice with genuine commitment to economic reforms that favour more equitable distribution of wealth. Instead, there have been few significant changes in policy towards Egypt or the Middle East generally.</p>
<p>This is a dangerous path for Western governments to tread. Increasing poverty and political repression have rarely led to peaceful protest and smooth transitions towards democracy. On the contrary, they are much more likely to strain social cohesion, undermine a government’s legitimacy and create a <a href="http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/48/3/339.short">context</a> that makes <a href="http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/50/2/176.short">radicalisation and extremism more likely</a>, not less.</p>
<p>This is the backdrop against which we must approach the problem of political radicalisation and terrorism in Egypt. Given the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/egyptian-army-says-it-killed-59-militants-in-sinai-peninsula-1437331133">increasingly bold activity</a> of militant groups in and beyond northern Sinai, the British and Egyptian governments would do well not to ignore the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/egypt-successful-war-on-terror-human-cost-north-sinai">structural causes</a> of this radicalisation. The <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/134680/Egypt/Politics-/-terrorists-killed-in-North-Sinai-in--days-Militar.aspx">decade-long insurgency</a> should not be mistaken simply for the increasing appeal of Daesh/Islamic State. </p>
<p>Both Europe and Egypt seem to have forgotten the lessons of their own history in this respect. In the 1970s, European governments learned to their cost that while, in the short term, groups prepared to use violence pose a risk requiring sensible security measures, those measures alone will not deal with the long-term problem. Both Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” and Italy’s experience with left and right-wing terrorism provide recent reminders. </p>
<p>In January 1977, the Egyptian government <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egyptians-riot-in-the-streets-in-1977/">faced a massive, nationwide revolt</a> – which became known as the “Bread Riots” – when it tried to cut subsidies to essential goods, hitting the poorest hardest. Egypt’s then-military strongman, Anwar Sadat, was forced to repeal the cuts. Europe’s governments realised that security measures worked best if political reforms also addressed the concerns, not of extremists, but of the disenfranchised masses. Governments on both shores of the Mediterranean would do well to remember those lessons now.</p>
<p>The case for supporting a genuine transition to democracy in Egypt and throughout the Middle East is not just altruistic, it is also in the UK’s national interest. Shoring up authoritarian regimes and economic policies which result in increasing inequalities not only frustrates any hope of democracy, it creates the very conditions for instability and insecurity that Western governments claim they are so keen to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti receives funding from the European Union's Framework 7 Programme, grant number 320214. He is also Senior Fellow at the European Centre for International Affairs (ECIA).</span></em></p>Western leaders insist that engaging with authoritarian regimes promotes human rights. They are missing the point.Andrea Teti, Director, Centre for Global Security and Governance, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/460682015-08-14T05:01:18Z2015-08-14T05:01:18ZAs Morsi faces the gallows, where are the defenders of democracy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91843/original/image-20150813-21416-tpw2ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1396%2C463&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya Square before and after the August 14 massacre of more than 800 peaceful protesters in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre#/media/File:Rabaa_Square_before_and_after.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/Mazidan</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In mid-June, an Egyptian court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33147206">upheld the death sentence</a> against the country’s first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi, whom the military <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Egyptian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat">deposed</a> in July 2013. Death sentences against Morsi and 105 others were confirmed after Egypt’s grand mufti gave his approval. Many Islamic scholars (ulema) in the past spoke truth to power, for which they were jailed or executed. The mufti and the general who ousted Morsi, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, are instead sending democracy, freedom, justice and truth to the gallows. </p>
<p>Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/05/egypt-court-recommends-death-sentences-for-morsi-more-than-100-others/">described the trials</a> as “grossly unfair” and “charades”. <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/death-sentence-egypt-emad-shahin/393590/">Emmad Shahin</a>, an academic of international repute, was among 101 others sentenced to death in absentia. I contributed a chapter to a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-islam-and-politics-9780195395891?cc=au&lang=en&">volume</a> co-edited by John Esposito and Shahin.</p>
<h2>Why are the world’s democrats so quiet?</h2>
<p>We have long heard about Islam’s presumed inability to separate religion and politics. Do we hear those same voices ask now: why is the Egyptian government mixing religion and politics, sham judicial trails and sharia? Did anyone object to el-Sisi seeking sanction for a political legal ruling from a religious authority?</p>
<p>Instead, this month, the US has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/20176-after-6-year-hiatus-egypt-us-resume-strategic-talks">openly embraced</a> el-Sisi’s regime. We have yet to hear democratic leaders unite in saying: we oppose the death penalty for Morsi. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott condemned the execution in Indonesia of two Australians, so will he denounce the death sentences imposed in Egypt? If not, is it unfair to conclude that the death penalty is wrong only when applied to “our” people?</p>
<p>Can Egypt really be said to be “restoring democracy”? That is the phrase US Secretary of State John Kerry <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23543744">used to justify</a> the 2013 coup, which was followed by a deadly military crackdown against peaceful protesters in Cairo. The then-Middle East “peace envoy”, Tony Blair, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/06/egypt-middle-east-tony-blair">hoped for</a> a “rapid return to democratic rule” as he lent his backing to the regime and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/02/tony-blair-advise-egypt-president-sisi-economic-reform">became its adviser</a> on “economic reforms”. </p>
<p>What notion of peace condones – directly or otherwise – the killing of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2013_Rabaa_massacre">more than 800 peaceful protesters</a> within a few hours at Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adaweya square on August 14, 2013? As Egypt’s then-defence minister, el-Sisi had <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt">“overall responsibility for the army’s role”</a> in a slaughter <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/egypt-massacre-rabaa-intentional-human-rights-watch">comparable</a> to China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. </p>
<p>Why are most of the world’s otherwise eloquent, even roaring, democrats largely mute about the death of Egyptian democracy and its symbol, Morsi? Why does the democratic conscience of the so-called globalised and connected world appear so disconnectedly unshaken by the brutal crackdown?</p>
<h2>The brutal business of killing politics</h2>
<p>According to media reports and the Brookings Centre for Middle East Policy, it is <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806">“unlikely”</a> the death sentence will be implemented. Regardless, the purpose is clear: to frighten Egyptians into submission so they dare not ask again for democracy. Under a regime such as el-Sisi’s, there is barely a space for politics, and certainly not for democratic politics; the only permissible politics is acquiescence to the dictatorial regime.</p>
<p>This killing of politics is evident in the sheer numbers of people the regime has arrested and imprisoned – <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/egypt-terror-in-the-name-of-state-security_b_7306486.html">around 40,000</a> by one estimate. Dissident media have been <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21305/we-completely-agree_egyptian-television-media-in-t">shut down</a> and disobedient journalists fired and jailed. The imprisoned include not only members of Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party but anyone who defies el-Sisi’s dictatorship. In short, voices opposed to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232710543250236.html">de-democratisation</a> are treated as threatening.</p>
<p>Imprisoning people and passing death sentences on a virtual assembly line sends a message to Egyptians: abandon politics altogether. The increasing <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-been-an-escalation-of-torture-and-a-maintenance-of-impunity-in-egypt-2015-8?IR=T">use of torture</a>, including sexual abuse, reinforces this message. </p>
<p>Seen from the perspective of American philosopher-activist <a href="http://thoreau.library.ucsb.edu/thoreau_life.html">Henry Thoreau</a>, the repeated branding of the imprisoned as terrorists, or terrorist sympathisers, or enemies of the nation-state – a line echoed in national, regional and global media – hides the reality that the regime is terrorising the people and is arguably their most lethal enemy. In his landmark essay <a href="https://machetegroup.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/resistance.pdf">Resistance to Civil Government</a>, Thoreau observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Faith and freedom defy state violence</h2>
<p>The banning of political parties and sentencing to death of Morsi and others are, we are told, necessary to fight terrorism and threats to Egypt’s security. For more than a decade, security threats and terrorism have been mediatised as synonymous and both as Islamic. Whatever acceptability el-Sisi has to local and international elites is on account of his role as a “secular” warrior against what his spokesman has called <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013823142620812772.html">religious fascism</a> and terrorism. </p>
<p>This propaganda fits, as well as reproduces, the post-Cold War polarisation of international politics. The “evil” communist, according to anthropologist <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Self-Fulfilling-Prophecy-Joseba-Zulaika/dp/0226994163/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1432732473&sr=8-2&keywords=Joseba+Zulaika">Joseba Zulaika</a>, has been replaced with the new enemy baptised as terrorism (read Islamic). </p>
<p>We must puncture and resist, as Thoreau did, such a violent staging of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations">“clash of civilisations”</a> thesis in the form of terrorism versus democracy, Islam versus the West and so on. What is at stake in Egypt and elsewhere is the freedom and democracy routinely denied and suppressed by invoking the bogeymen of religion and terrorism. </p>
<p>A different understanding of religion actually connects Christians in the West and Muslims, in fact people of all faiths across the world. This is not the religion of Egypt’s grand mufti, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shawki_Allam">Shawki Allam</a>, and his predecessor, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Gomaa">Ali Gomaa</a>, nor the likes of Florida pastor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terry_Jones_(pastor)">Terry Jones</a>, nor the Buddhist monks <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/who-is-instigating-the-vi_b_7810972.html">inciting mass violence</a> against their fellow Burmese. It an understanding shared by thinkers such as Thoreau, his contemporary <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/ralph-waldo-emerson-9287153#american-transcendentalism">Ralph Waldo Emerson</a>, French Catholic philosopher <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maritain/">Jacques Maritain</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghaffar_Khan">Abdul Ghaffar Khan</a>, an Indian figure of monumental significance but unfortunately not well known.</p>
<p>Khan’s philosophy of peace, dear to people of many faiths organised under the banner of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khudai_Khidmatgar">Khudaai Khidmatgaar</a> (God’s Servants), flourished in the same place where, ironically, the Pakistani Taliban come from. People such as Khan harnessed religion for peace, justice and equality and to fight slavery, colonialism and humiliation. Theirs was a vision that transcended sectarian divides.</p>
<h2>Ugly geopolitics and the beauty of sun-bright Mecca</h2>
<p>The bravery with which peaceful democracy protesters confronted death in Cairo resonates with Khan’s philosophy of peace. He challenged the brutality of the British Empire as well as the injustices – including patriarchal and feudal – within his own society as <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Pathan-Unarmed-Opposition-Anthropology/dp/0933452691">follows</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I warn the English that we also have God who watches over us … I admit that they have got machine guns, army, guns and police, but we have got God. We [Indians] have also got patience [ṣabr].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resolve of Egypt’s political prisoners recalls the spirit of Khan, who spent decades in prisons, and Emerson. Unlike <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington">Samuel Huntington</a>, who would separate the West and Islam, Emerson connected them to <a href="http://liberalarts.iupui.edu/mpsg/Essays/Emerson%20-%20Experience.pdf">assert</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I clap my hands in … joy and amazement, before the first opening to me of this august magnificence, old with the love and homage of innumerable ages, young with the life of life, the sun-bright Mecca of the desert. And what a future it opens! I feel a new heart beating with the love of the new beauty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is this beauty Emerson spoke of that is concealed by merchants of the clash of civilisations – much of the mainstream media, thinktanks, policymakers, politicians, profiteering business conglomerates, the military-industrial complex – so as to sell the ugly shape of their geopolitics. The el-Sisi regime aims to block the way to the future that Emerson saw through cowardly devices such as death sentences and torture.</p>
<p>After the death sentence, Morsi <a href="http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/5/25/egypts-revolution-will-triumph-writes-morsi-from-jail-cell">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am not afraid … I promise the revolutionaries that I will not be less courageous and steadfast than they are, and I will stick to my principles and stances in confronting the coup … The coup leaders seek to break the will of the revolution. I call on everyone to complete the revolution without fear.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Morsi is hanged, will there be a Thoreau to write about the “Martyrdom of Mohammed Morsi”? The verse Thoreau <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=gfnQrgx3Yn4C&pg=PA60&lpg=PA60&dq=Tell+men+of+high+condition/That+rule+affairs+of+state&source=bl&ots=CNcEQJdPL0&sig=JM_jmmD4uH243rSfcdtwEeF6uW0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCkQ6AEwBWoVChMIy5DIlqmlxwIVQn2mCh0mFAv5#v=onepage&q=Tell%20men%20of%20high%20condition%2FThat%20rule%20affairs%20of%20state&f=false">quotes</a> in “Remarks After the Hanging of John Brown” remains completely apt. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tell men of high condition,</p>
<p>That rule affairs of state,</p>
<p>Their purpose is ambition,</p>
<p>Their practice only hate;</p>
<p>And if they once reply,</p>
<p>Then given them all the lie.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irfan Ahmad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years ago, on August 14, more than 800 protesters against a coup were massacred in Cairo. A court recently upheld the death sentence for Egypt’s ousted elected leader.Irfan Ahmad, Associate Professor of Political Anthropology, Institute for Religion, Politics & Society , Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.