tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/asio-1755/articlesASIO – The Conversation2024-03-05T06:13:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250872024-03-05T06:13:03Z2024-03-05T06:13:03ZPaul Keating lets fly at Foreign Minister Penny Wong and ASIO chief Mike Burgess<p>Former Prime Minister Paul Keating has accused Foreign Minister Penny Wong of rattling “the China can” and declared the chief of ASIO, Mike Burgess, runs “a goon show”. </p>
<p>In a fresh assault on Wong, and one of his repeated denunciations of the national security establishment, Keating also said this week’s special ASEAN summit in Melbourne “makes it clear Australia and Australian policy is at odds with the general tenor of ASEAN’s perceived strategic interests. That is, interests which relate to China and the United States and relations between them.” </p>
<p>Wong told a summit event on Monday the region faced “the most confronting circumstances […] in decades”.</p>
<p>“We face destabilising, provocative and coercive actions, including unsafe conduct at sea and in the air and militarisation of disputed features,” she said.</p>
<p>In a Tuesday statement Keating, who has <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">previously criticised Wong </a>over her China stand, said: “It doesn’t take much to encourage Penny Wong, sporting her ‘deeply concerned’ frown, to rattle the China can – a can she gave a good shake to yesterday”.</p>
<p>But, he said, before she did so, “the resident conjurer, Mike Burgess, who runs ASIO, gave us a week’s worth of spy mysteries – only for us to find via a leak to the [Sydney Morning] Herald and the Age that the mysterious state running the spying was, you guessed it, China”. </p>
<p>Burgess said last week that a former politician, whom he declined to name,
had “sold out their country, party and former colleagues to advance the interests” of a foreign country, which he also would not name. He has argued to name the person would compromise ASIO’s sources and methods. </p>
<p>Keating said: “The kabuki show runs thus: Burgess drops the claim, then out of nowhere, the Herald and The Age miraculously appear to solve the mystery - the villain, as it turns out, is China after all.</p>
<p>"The anti-China Australian strategic policy establishment was feeling some slippage in its mindless pro-American stance and decided some new China rattling was overdue.” </p>
<p>Keating said when the Albanese government came in, it should have dismissed Burgess, the director-general of the Office of National Intelligence, Andrew Shearer and then-head of the Home Affairs Department, Mike Pezzullo.</p>
<p>“In the event, Pezzullo [dismissed last year over breaching the public service code of conduct] shot himself but, unbelievably, Burgess and Shearer still remain at the centre of a Labor government’s security apparatus. This says more about the government than it says about them. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pezzullo-story-points-to-serious-systemic-problems-in-the-australian-public-service-214253">Pezzullo story points to serious systemic problems in the Australian Public Service</a>
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<p>"These people display utter contempt for the so-called stabilisation process that the Prime Minister had decided upon and has progressed with China. And will do anything to destabilise any meaningful rapprochement. Burgess runs the primary goon show while Shearer does all in his power to encourage Australia into becoming the 51st state of the United States.”</p>
<p>Keating said that on Monday the Malaysia prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, had “dropped a huge rock into Wong’s pond by telling Australia not to piggyback Australia’s problems with China onto ASEAN.</p>
<p>"Anwar is making it clear, Malaysia for its part, is not buying United States hegemony in East Asia – with states being lobbied to ringfence China on the way through.</p>
<p>"That difficult task, the maintenance of US strategic hegemony, is being left to supplicants like us.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a fresh assault on Wong Former Prime Minister Paul Keating has accused Foreign Minister Penny Wong of rattling “the China can” and declared the chief of ASIO, Mike Burgess, runs “a goon show”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248502024-03-04T02:54:09Z2024-03-04T02:54:09ZOver-emphasising some things, underplaying others: ASIO’s threat assessment is underpinned by confusing logic<p>Recently, Australia’s internal security agency <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2024">declared</a> there is a greater threat to Australian security than new terrorist attacks. Instead, it’s systemic and existential. The report read:</p>
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<p>In 2024, threats to our way of life have surpassed terrorism as Australia’s principle security concern.</p>
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<p>So, what is the principle security concern? It’s foreign interference.</p>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.transparency.gov.au/publications/home-affairs/australian-security-intelligence-organisation/asio-annual-report-2022-23/asio-annual-report-2022-23">last annual report</a>, the agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), reported 2016 was its busiest year in the past decade for disrupting terrorist attacks. 2022 was its peak year for disrupting foreign spies. </p>
<p>Amid ongoing worldwide conflicts and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/28/australian-politician-sold-out-to-foreign-regime-after-being-recruited-by-spies-asio-boss-says">former politician</a> collaborating with a foreign country, is this assessment adequately capturing what Australians need to know about all the possible threats?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-sabotage-and-why-is-the-asio-chief-worried-about-it-224731">Explainer: what is sabotage and why is the ASIO chief worried about it?</a>
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<h2>Terrorism only ‘possible’</h2>
<p>In the latest annual threat assessment, ASIO is still assessing the terror threat as lower than in earlier years. In 2022, it was changed from a “probable” likelihood (where it sat for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/nov/28/australias-terrorism-threat-level-changes-to-possible-after-eight-years-as-probable">eight years</a>), and it’s now rated as “possible”. </p>
<p>This is against the backdrop of growing community unrest since October 7 last year, when Hamas launched the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">third-deadliest</a> terrorist attack in the world since 1970, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p>
<p>Israel’s response has been a war on Hamas in Gaza, which has resulted in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-30000-with-no-let-up-in-israeli-bombardment">tens of thousands</a> of Palestinian fatalities, many of them women and children, though it’s difficult to verify the exact figure. Regardless of the precise numbers, the rage and hatred prompted by these deaths can fuel extremism, both here and overseas.</p>
<p>Two leading US Middle East security specialists have flagged the danger of <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/anticipating-the-gaza-driven-terrorism-surge">new attacks</a> both in the Middle East and beyond in response to these events. They also outlined the actual incidents that have happened since October 7, attesting to the new heightened risk. In ASIO’s view, we should not discount the risk at home even while keeping the terrorist threat level unchanged.</p>
<h2>Threat concern reveals mixed logic</h2>
<p>The most pertinent threat to Australia is foreign espionage and foreign interference. The agency says it’s “deeper and broader than you may think”. </p>
<p>Moreover, ASIO says, the threat level is “certain” (not merely “possible” or “probable”, as the terrorist threat had been).</p>
<p>This latest threat assessment, issued personally by the director general, Mike Burgess, calls out one country in particular, but doesn’t name it. He sketches a foreign espionage and influence-seeking campaign that is pervasive and well-resourced. He mentioned the specific case of an Australian politician (way back before 2018) who was, he says, collaborating with the foreign spies and selling out Australia in the process. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-warnings-of-spy-hives-why-isnt-australia-using-its-tough-counter-espionage-laws-more-200440">Amid warnings of 'spy hives', why isn't Australia using its tough counter-espionage laws more?</a>
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<p>Interestingly, Burgess says that ASIO foiled the plans of the foreign county and neutralised the threat from this politician.</p>
<p>In fact, Burgess went on to say the tradecraft of this adversary (how its spies do their business) has been good, but not good enough to defeat ASIO, supported by its intelligence partners.</p>
<p>This is just one of several points where the logic of the 2024 threat assessment begins to break down. Can the unnamed foreign country really be an existential threat if ASIO has cracked its espionage operations and disrupted its efforts at political influence? Is Australia’s security more threatened by these failed spies than by terrorists who may achieve a mass casualty attack involving Australian victims? </p>
<h2>Far-right extremism downplayed</h2>
<p>We don’t know which country is the source of this alleged threat to Australia’s way of life, but if it is China, there is room to question the ASIO line of thinking. </p>
<p>In the decade of its expansion of espionage and covert influence operations, China’s overall level of influence in major liberal democracies has <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/09/28/how-global-public-opinion-of-china-has-shifted-in-the-xi-era/">radically declined</a>, not increased. This is largely because of China’s anti-democratic or aggressive actions on the world stage.</p>
<p>In fact, as Burgess notes, ASIO faces dilemmas in prioritising the threats it follows and how to present them publicly. He’s limited by what can be revealed publicly, so omission may be distorting how the general public understands what he is saying.</p>
<p>He says terrorism remains a pervasive threat “even with a lower national threat level”. Well at that point, while we can agree with him, we might be forgiven for being a little confused. </p>
<p>The confusion is compounded by the way in which the annual threat assessment and other ASIO reporting appear to downplay right-wing extremism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asios-language-shift-on-terrorism-is-a-welcome-acknowledgment-of-the-power-of-words-157400">ASIO's language shift on terrorism is a welcome acknowledgment of the power of words</a>
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<p>The language on this issue in the 2024 threat assessment is defensible to a point (it says “the threat persists”), but the significance of this appears to be softened. Now, ASIO says right-wing extremists are “primarily focused on recruitment and radicalistaion”. </p>
<p>The future threats to internal security implied by the intimidating behaviour of neo-Nazis on Australia Day in Sydney this year, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/jan/26/balaclava-clad-neo-nazis-held-by-police-after-swarming-sydney-train">condemned by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese</a>, do not appear to be adequately captured by the assessment of focusing on recruitment and radicalisation, even if that is true. </p>
<p>We can commend ASIO for its transparency under the directorship of Burgess and for its obvious operational successes. </p>
<p>On the other hand, we have now had five annual threat assessments from him. As a body of work meant to inform, reassure and even alert Australians, there are several reasons to question the effectiveness of its current format and guiding logic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Austin is a co-founder of the Social Cyber Institute.</span></em></p>ASIO is effective in defeating threats and being transparent in reporting on them, but its latest annual threat assessment leaves room to question its strategic priorities.Greg Austin, Adjunct Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247312024-02-29T05:42:43Z2024-02-29T05:42:43ZExplainer: what is sabotage and why is the ASIO chief worried about it?<p>Last night, ASIO boss Mike Burgess made another powerful public statement in delivering the <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2024">Annual Threat Assessment for 2024</a>. Burgess stated that ASIO has seen “terrorists and spies […] talking about sabotage, researching sabotage, sometimes conducting reconnaissance for sabotage”.</p>
<p>He also highlighted the increasing focus on cyber (online methods) as a way that sabotage might be conducted. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-28/asio-reveals-plot-by-retired-politician/103513926">He said</a>:</p>
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<p>ASIO is aware of one nation state conducting multiple attempts to scan critical infrastructure in Australia and other countries, targeting water, transport and energy networks.</p>
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<p>This would seem to align with recent reports of <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/chinese-attackers-camped-on-us-networks-for-five-years-604887">Chinese hackers spending up to five years in US computer networks</a> before being detected.</p>
<p>But what exactly is sabotage, and should we be worried?</p>
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<h2>The legal definition</h2>
<p>“Sabotage” is a French term originally used to refer to <a href="https://www.etymonline.com/word/sabotage">deliberate acts by workmen to destroy machinery</a> during the Industrial Revolution. Since then, “sabotage” has been used to describe acts that undermine military power without a battle – <a href="https://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/wartime-acts-of-sabotage/">such as</a> destroying train lines, cutting telephone wires, or setting fuel dumps on fire.</p>
<p>However, the legal definition is a bit bigger than that.</p>
<p>In Australia, sabotage is both a <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">federal crime</a> under the Criminal Code and also a crime under state and territory laws. At the federal level, sabotage has three key elements:</p>
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<li> engaging in conduct that results in “damage to public infrastructure”</li>
<li>intending to or risking the act will “prejudice Australia’s national security” or “advantage the national security of a foreign country”</li>
<li> an act on behalf of, in collaboration with, or with funding from a “foreign principal” (that is, a foreign government or one of its authorities, such as their intelligence service).</li>
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<p>“Public infrastructure” is a broad concept, and includes anything belonging to the Commonwealth, defence and military bases and equipment, and telecommunications. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/research-espionage-is-a-real-threat-but-a-drastic-crackdown-could-stifle-vital-international-collaboration-223555">Research espionage is a real threat – but a drastic crackdown could stifle vital international collaboration</a>
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<p>In some circumstances, it could also include banks, supermarkets, food, farms and other services provided to the public. Essentially, pretty much anything needed to run the country could be “public infrastructure”. </p>
<p>These are already <a href="https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/2023-03/demystifying-australias-recent-security-of-critical-infrastructure-act-reforms">considered “critical infrastructure”</a>, and must meet strict physical security and cybersecurity guidelines.</p>
<p>New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, the ACT and the Northern Territory also have specific sabotage offences. Those offences capture deliberate acts to damage or destroy public facilities, where the person intends to cause <a href="https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/criminal/legislation/crimes-act/sabotage/">major disruption</a> to “government functions”, major disruption to the “use of services by the public” or major “economic loss”. </p>
<h2>So what is ASIO doing?</h2>
<p>ASIO’s annual threat assessment mentioned that sabotage has increasingly been discussed between <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asio-boss-warns-of-crack-cyber-teams-scanning-critical-networks-605594">agents of foreign countries, spies and would-be terrorists</a>. While Burgess did not name which countries have been involved, ASIO has been watching China, perhaps because a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-disabled-chinese-hacking-network-targeting-critical-infrastructure-sources-2024-01-29/">hacking group called “Volt Typhoon”</a> has been named as allegedly working on behalf of the Chinese government. </p>
<p>It also appears ASIO is watching “nationalist and racist violent extremists advocating sabotage”. This would also fit with recent increases in <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australian-far-right-terrorism-investigations-have-increased-by-750-per-cent-in-18-months/rsowz6fnt">counter-extremist investigations by the AFP</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/nov/01/australian-defence-force-strengthens-vetting-procedures-to-prevent-extremists-from-joining">changes to Defence vetting procedures</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, there have been very few cases of sabotage pursued in the courts. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, <a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-warnings-of-spy-hives-why-isnt-australia-using-its-tough-counter-espionage-laws-more-200440">there can be several barriers to prosecuting foreign agents</a> who engage in espionage, foreign interference and/or sabotage. These include gathering the necessary evidence that might reveal how the spies were detected, in turn potentially compromising ASIO’s ability to operate in the future. </p>
<p>However, foreign agents can still be deterred from engaging in this kind of activity. Just last year, Burgess <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/fake-russian-diplomats-revealed-as-heart-of-hive-spy-ring-in-australia-20230223-p5cmxz.html">detailed how a Russian spy ring was expelled rather than prosecuted</a>. In this year’s threat assessment, Burgess also said ASIO often puts foreign agents on notice – that ASIO knows what they’re up to – or it shines a “disinfecting light” on Australia’s adversaries so the public is aware of what they’re up to.</p>
<p>However, one of the cases mentioned by Burgess in the assessment – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68420795">a politician alleged to have “sold out Australia” for a foreign nation</a> – probably won’t be identified. That’s strange on its own, as Burgess’ usual approach in these cases seems to be to “name names” – in going public, ASIO removes the one thing foreign agents need to operate: anonymity.</p>
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<h2>What more is needed?</h2>
<p>ASIO will need to continue (and possibly even ramp up) its surveillance operations in Australia. That in turn will require the attorney-general <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/crime/telecommunications-interception-and-surveillance/reform-australias-electronic-surveillance-framework">to step up the review of Australia’s surveillance laws</a>, which is yet to get started. </p>
<p>That said, the Albanese government has started consultation on its <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy">2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy</a>, which will make sure our cybersecurity laws are up to scratch. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has also already put boards and chief executives on notice that they will <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/asic-to-target-boards-execs-for-cyber-failures-20230913-p5e4bf">prosecute companies for cybersecurity failures</a>. </p>
<p>There are some niche areas in the law that might need some tweaking. Last year, we <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4257292">published research</a> that demonstrated Australia’s laws might not protect an act of sabotage that was aimed at our natural environmental assets such as the Great Barrier Reef. </p>
<p>However, we may not need more laws – we just need to better use the ones we have. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">Keiran Hardy argues</a> in the context of counter-terrorism laws: </p>
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<p>Australia’s counter-terrorism laws are already extensive […] If a criminal offence or power is needed to combat terrorism, Australia already has it and more. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">Does Australia need new laws to combat right-wing extremism?</a>
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<p>More broadly, Australia needs to confront its “this won’t happen to us” attitude to national security. Chris Taylor, head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Statecraft and Intelligence Program, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-evolution-of-australian-intelligence-revisiting-harvey-barnetts-tale-of-the-scorpion/">recently revived the words of Harvey Barnett</a> (a former boss of ASIO) when he said:</p>
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<p>With the simple self-confidence which living in an island state breeds, Australians are sometimes doubtful that their country might be of interest to foreign intelligence services. “It can’t really happen here” is a stock attitude. It has, it does, it will.</p>
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<p>Those words should resonate with us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views contained in this article are those of the individual author, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation, department or agency with which the author may be affiliated.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written in Sarah Kendall's personal capacity as a PhD candidate at the University of Queensland School of Law. It does not reflect the views of any organisation with which the author is affiliated.</span></em></p>In its annual threat assessment, the spy agency has named sabotage by foreign actors as an increasing concern - and we too, should take it seriously.Brendan Walker-Munro, Senior Lecturer (Law), Southern Cross UniversitySarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2045482023-05-04T04:20:34Z2023-05-04T04:20:34ZCould using open-source information online get you arrested for foreign interference?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523751/original/file-20230502-265-t0wg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=181%2C0%2C5544%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks ago, 55-year-old Sydney businessman Alexander Csergo was arrested on charges of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-17/sydney-businessman-alexander-csergo-accused-foreign-interference/102230648">“recklessly” engaging in foreign interference</a>. </p>
<p>Csergo’s case reads like a spy novel. He allegedly met two Chinese people he knew as “Ken” and “Evelyn” in empty cafes in Shanghai, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-15/alexander-csergo-charged-national-security-information/102227128">taking cash and agreeing to write reports</a> for them about Australian defence, economic and security arrangements.</p>
<p>Csergo’s barrister, Bernard Collaery, has <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/nothing-sinister-about-sydney-businessman-selling-public-documents-to-china-court/news-story/eabd8b15e837ee4d975d60160fed9b52">argued</a> that he is innocent. </p>
<p>Collaery has some skin in the national security game. In 2018, he was charged with conspiring to release classified information after he allegedly asked a client (an ex-spy known only as Witness K) for information regarding an Australian spying operation. It wasn’t until last year that Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-07/attorney-general-orders-charges-dropped-against-bernard-collaery/101217272">dropped those charges</a>.</p>
<p>Csergo’s defence is that he <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/man-accused-of-foreign-interference-used-public-documents-court-hears-20230417-p5d126">only accessed publicly available material</a>. He claims he cooperated with police, and even turned over his devices to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to prove his innocence. </p>
<p>Putting aside Csergo’s guilt or innocence, his case does raise an interesting question: what does Australia’s raft of new foreign interference laws mean for people who deal in open-source information, for example, academics, analysts or journalists? </p>
<p>Could you be breaking the law by doing the “wrong” Google search and posting your results online?</p>
<h2>What does the law say?</h2>
<p>In 2018, the federal government overhauled Australia’s <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00506">national security laws</a> in an attempt to address the growing threat posed by foreign actors. This overhaul included the introduction of nine novel offences for foreign interference. </p>
<p>The new offences include a crime of “<a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">reckless foreign interference</a>” - the crime Csergo has been charged with. Csergo is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/28/world/australia/di-sanh-duong-chinese-austrailia.html">only the second person</a> to be charged since the new laws were introduced in 2018. He faces up to 15 years in prison if convicted.</p>
<p>Reckless foreign interference prohibits covert, deceptive or threatening conduct on behalf of, or in collaboration with, a “foreign principal”. The person must also have been reckless as to whether the conduct will:</p>
<ul>
<li>influence a political or governmental process or right, </li>
<li>support intelligence activities of a foreign principal, or</li>
<li>prejudice Australia’s national security. </li>
</ul>
<p>Many of the terms used in this offence are wide-reaching or have not been clearly defined. This means the offence has the capacity to capture innocent people. </p>
<p>For example, covert or deceptive conduct could arise in relation to <em>any</em> part of a person’s actions, even if it only plays a minor role. So, for instance, an <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1037969X221095915">investigative journalist</a> who uses hidden cameras or goes undercover to investigate a public interest story could be deemed as having acted covertly under the law. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australias-tough-national-security-laws-cannot-stop-foreign-interference-in-our-elections-177451">Why Australia’s tough national security laws cannot stop foreign interference in our elections</a>
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<p>And a “foreign principal” could not only include foreign governments, but also entities that are owned, directed or controlled by foreign governments (such as <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3898598/01-Ananian-Welsh,-Kendall-and-Murray-764.pdf">media organisations</a>, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370445039_The_Erosion_of_Academic_Freedom_How_Australian_Espionage_Law_Impacts_Higher_Education_and_Research">public universities</a> or businesses). This means the offence has the capacity to capture, for example, Australian journalists, academics, researchers and businesspeople who work for or collaborate with an entity like this or its staff.</p>
<p>Lastly, the “recklessness” part of the law makes it extremely broad, criminalising people with a much lower level of personal culpability compared to offences that require an “intention” to commit a crime. </p>
<p>It is this element of the reckless foreign interference offence that could catch out people using open-source information online. </p>
<h2>Could I inadvertently break the law?</h2>
<p>It’s not a simple question to answer, but you might.</p>
<p>Ostensibly, this offence could be applied to anyone using open-source research to write an academic paper or policy report, provided it satisfies the other requirements under the law. </p>
<p>Even more at risk is “<a href="https://www.upguard.com/blog/open-source-intelligence">open source intelligence</a>”, or the use of public information for intelligence assessments (think “market research” for spies). This is being used everywhere from the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-11/how-countries-spy-espionage-china-balloon-ukraine-war/101950650">war in the Ukraine</a> to <a href="https://www.upguard.com/blog/open-source-intelligence">combating hackers and identity thieves</a>. Csergo’s case could set a precedent here. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-warnings-of-spy-hives-why-isnt-australia-using-its-tough-counter-espionage-laws-more-200440">Amid warnings of 'spy hives', why isn't Australia using its tough counter-espionage laws more?</a>
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<p>One of the biggest pieces missing from Australia’s <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference/cfi-strategy">counter foreign interference strategy</a> is an awareness and education effort on how these laws work in practice, as well as the “red flags” we should all look out for.</p>
<p>Individually, Australians also need to wake up to the reality that foreign interference is happening more often than we think. </p>
<p>Foreign interference, espionage and covert action aren’t abstract concepts. They’re real, and they’re happening in Australia. It is no coincidence the head of ASIO said our spy agencies are in “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-21/mike-burgess-asio-annual-threat-assessment/102003692">hand-to-hand combat</a>”. </p>
<p>To be better protected, Australians should be alert, but not alarmed, and be more careful who they share information with. Just think like a spy: if I wanted to do something illegal with this information, what could I do?</p>
<p>The government also needs to consider whether these laws need to be clarified, reformed or even replaced. We will continue to need laws that prohibit other countries from interfering in our affairs. However, in doing so, we need to be careful we aren’t undermining the very freedoms Australia is known for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Walker-Munro receives funding from the Australian Government through Trusted Autonomous Systems, a Defence Cooperative Research Centre funded through the Next Generation Technologies Fund. This article reflects the author's view, and not those of any organisation, agency, or government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written in the author's personal capacity as a PhD Candidate at The University of Queensland School of Law. It does not reflect the views of any organisation with which the author is affiliated.</span></em></p>A Sydney man has been arrested under Australia’s foreign interference laws for sharing what he claims was open-source information. It could be a test case for the new laws.Brendan Walker-Munro, Senior Research Fellow, The University of QueenslandSarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2004402023-02-22T05:17:32Z2023-02-22T05:17:32ZAmid warnings of ‘spy hives’, why isn’t Australia using its tough counter-espionage laws more?<p>Australia is facing an <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2023">unprecedented threat</a> of espionage and foreign interference. According to ASIO chief <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2023">Mike Burgess</a> in his annual threat assessment this week, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>More Australians are being targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia’s history.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To drive home just how serious the threat is, Burgess also said <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2023">ASIO</a> had identified a “hive of spies” seeking to steal sensitive information in the past year. This major spy network was disrupted and the spies involved were removed from the country. </p>
<p>But why weren’t the spies prosecuted? Australia has some of the most robust <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">counter-espionage laws</a> in the world, so why aren’t they being used more often to target actual incidents when they happen?</p>
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<h2>The espionage threat</h2>
<p>Burgess said in his threat assessment that intelligence and government officials are no longer the only ones being targeted. </p>
<p>Foreign spies from multiple nations are seeking to glean information from judicial figures, journalists, academics, bank workers, doctors, police, defence contractors, and former members of the defence force. They do this by fostering relationships with these people, which they can later try to exploit.</p>
<p>Foreign spies today want more than just intelligence and defence information, too. For example, Burgess said they also want information on </p>
<blockquote>
<p>our defence capabilities, government decision-making, political parties, foreign policy, critical infrastructure, space technologies, academic and think tank research, medical advances, key export industries and personal information, especially bulk data.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No matter who or what is being targeted, espionage is extremely damaging. It can undermine our security, sovereignty, economy, democracy and social fabric.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australias-tough-national-security-laws-cannot-stop-foreign-interference-in-our-elections-177451">Why Australia’s tough national security laws cannot stop foreign interference in our elections</a>
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<h2>The legal response to espionage</h2>
<p>In 2018, the Coalition government made <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-24/explainer-foreign-interference-laws/9356050">targeting</a> the growing threat of espionage and foreign interference a top priority, pushing through a complete overhaul of the country’s security laws.</p>
<p>It replaced the <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">four existing espionage offences</a> with a complex scheme of 27 different <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">offences</a>, with penalties of up to life in prison. It also introduced nine new crimes of foreign interference. These offences apply both within and outside Australia.</p>
<p>This suite of new laws has been used sparingly to date. No one has been charged with an espionage offence and only <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/trial-ordered-on-chinese-influence-charge-20220728-p5b5gg.html">one person</a> has been charged with a foreign interference offence.</p>
<p>The laws have also been criticised as another example of <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">hyper-legislation</a>, which refers to the large number of laws. Additionally, concerns have been raised that the laws are <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">overly broad</a> and have the potential to <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2021/1.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20%20espionage;mask_path=">criminalise innocent conduct</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">Australia has enacted 82 anti-terror laws since 2001. But tough laws alone can't eliminate terrorism</a>
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<p>The aim of the reforms, the government maintained, was to <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">modernise our espionage laws</a> so they would be able to capture the type of spying our adversaries engage in today. This includes spying that occurs online – cyber espionage.</p>
<p>For example, one of the espionage offences makes it a crime for a person to deal with national security or classified information where this will be communicated to a foreign government. The person must also intend for their conduct to prejudice Australia’s national security or provide an advantage to the national security of another country.</p>
<p>This offence would certainly capture the conduct of the hive of spies described by Burgess, which was ultimately removed from Australia. </p>
<h2>So why weren’t the spies prosecuted?</h2>
<p>While the espionage offences are <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.html?context=1;query=sarah%20kendall%20espionage;mask_path=">sufficient to target those engaging in modern espionage</a>, prosecuting spies is challenging in practice. Here are four potential reasons why:</p>
<p><strong>1) Identifying the spy</strong></p>
<p>Traditionally, espionage is a covert endeavour. As such, it can be difficult to identify who the spy actually is. This is especially so if the espionage occurs online, as foreign spies can use anonymising technologies to hide their identity. If spies can’t be identified, they can’t be prosecuted.</p>
<p>This apparently wasn’t an issue in the case of the hive of spies, as ASIO had identified who was involved.</p>
<p><strong>2) Extraditing the spy</strong></p>
<p>If the foreign spy engaged in cyber espionage, they could have done so from the comfort of their home country. If this person was identified, they would then have to be extradited back to Australia to face prosecution. This can be a challenging process that does not always succeed. </p>
<p>Because the hive of spies was located in Australia, extradition was not an issue.</p>
<p><strong>3) Collecting evidence</strong></p>
<p>To prosecute a foreign spy for a specific crime, evidence must be collected that proves each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Sometimes, this evidence may be difficult to obtain – for example, in cases where data is located on foreign servers. Other times, prosecutors might not think their evidence is sufficient to meet the threshold of “beyond a reasonable doubt”.</p>
<p>We don’t know what kind of evidence was available to prove the hive of spies committed an espionage offence, so it is possible this influenced the decision not to prosecute.</p>
<p><strong>4) Disclosing national security information</strong></p>
<p>Because espionage offences are concerned with national security, this could require disclosure of the specific information a foreign spy was trying to obtain. And to prove the spy “intended to prejudice Australia’s national security”, a court might need to hear about intelligence gathered by ASIO through surveillance. This could reveal ASIO’s methods of intelligence collection.</p>
<p>Disclosing information like this in court – a public forum – could have serious consequences for our national security. </p>
<p>In fact, Burgess <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2023">warned</a> this week foreign spies are “seeking to use litigation as an intelligence collection tool”. He further <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2023">cautioned</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is a narrow set of circumstances where particularly sensitive information cannot be publicly disclosed in parliament, court or the media.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the <a href="http://www6.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdb/au/legis/cth/consol_act/nsiacpa2004575/">National Security Information Act</a> can be used to protect national security information by ensuring it is not disclosed to the defendant or revealed in open court. </p>
<p>In fact, this law was even used – controversially – to conduct an entirely secret trial of a former Australian spy, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/witness-j-secret-prosecution-should-never-have-happened-national-security-watchdog-20220728-p5b5hy.html">Witness J</a>.</p>
<p>Because of this, this probably wasn’t a reason why the hive of spies was not prosecuted. </p>
<p>Ultimately, it’s not possible to say exactly why suspected espionage cases are not pursued. Diplomatic considerations may play a role in some cases, as well as limitations in how the espionage offences operate in practice. </p>
<p>Because of these limitations, additional measures are necessary to combat the growing threat of espionage. Not only does this include adequate cyber security measures, it requires every Australian to be aware of what the threat can look like and ensure they do not hand over information sought by foreign actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Kendall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia has a complex scheme of 27 new espionage offences, but prosecuting spies is challenging in practice. Here’s whySarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999642023-02-16T06:34:00Z2023-02-16T06:34:00ZCOVID wasn’t a ‘bumper campaign’ for right-wing extremists. But the threat from terror remains<p>Violent extremism remains a persistent and resilient threat, constantly adapting and evolving. It is an endlessly demanding problem and we can neither afford to ignore it nor allow it to disproportionately consume our finite resources.</p>
<p>This is the hard reality of terrorism. But it is not hopelessly grim. While the threat can’t be eliminated, it can be contained and managed.</p>
<p>This week, Mike Burgess, the head of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/feb/13/asio-will-go-wherever-terrorism-threat-is-despite-low-number-of-listed-rightwing-groups">told Senate Estimates</a> the threat of a terror attack from a right-wing extremist group had receded after COVID restrictions had been lifted. </p>
<p>This followed the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/nov/28/australias-terrorism-threat-level-changes-to-possible-after-eight-years-as-probable">downgrading of Australia’s terror threat level</a> at the end of November. Both developments give reason for hope.</p>
<p>Our systems are working and our investments in mitigating the threat of terrorism are paying off, both in terms of security agencies and community responses. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, as the environmental factors that exacerbate the problem of extremism recede, so too does the threat. Another wave will come, but for now the respite is welcome, as it allows us to repair and rebuild.</p>
<p>In February 2020, when Burgess gave his first ASIO annual threat assessment, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/24/rightwing-extremism-a-real-and-growing-threat-asio-chief-says-in-annual-assessment">warned</a> that rightwing extremism had been brought into “sharp terrible focus” by the March 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-not-guilty-pleas-mean-for-the-trial-of-alleged-christchurch-mosque-gunman-118917">Christchurch mosque massacre</a>. He added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Burgess astutely predicted that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We expect such groups will remain an enduring threat, making more use of online
propaganda to spread their messages of hate. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is likely that even Burgess, Australia’s most senior intelligence chief, did not then have a clear picture of the scale and impact of the global COVID pandemic that was to come.</p>
<p>Three years on, with the pandemic restrictions now gone, Burgess <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/feeling-still-out-there-australias-top-spy-boss-reveals-details-on-covid-driven-extremism/f21duudl9">observed</a> that the impact of the collective anxiety, frustration and lock downs was sharply receding.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some of that feeling does live on, but the number of cases we’ve been looking at, they’ve reduced significantly … There are less people in this country who want to conduct active violence in the name of their cause.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not only has the tide now turned against those who would exploit anger and confusion to recruit new members to extremist groups, their impact was less than they had hoped for at the height of the pandemic. As Burgess said, it was not a “bumper campaign” for right-wing extremists.</p>
<p>Contrary to our worst fears, the reality is violent extremists struggle to persuade people to join their cause, whether it’s a well-organised group linked to the likes of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State movement, or a more ambiguous network linked to far-right extremism and conspiracy paranoia.</p>
<p>In crises and temporary, disruptive circumstances such as wars, pandemics and lockdowns, we can see violent extremists and groups make far-reaching gains. But even then, they only succeed in small sections of communities. We naturally fixate on their limited successes, of which the extremists loudly boast.</p>
<p>On one hand, it is good to be alarmed and roused to action. A couple of hundred young Australians were <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/saturdayextra/is-in-australia/101958888">recruited</a> by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to fight in Syria and Iraq a decade ago. But after we became aware of the scale and extent of the problem – reflected in the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ViolentExtremism">national terror threat level being raised in September 2014</a> – good work by community groups and security agencies successfully prevented many more from departing Australia.</p>
<p>Similarly, the awareness of a rising threat from far-right extremists in the four years since the Christchurch attack saw security agencies, families, communities and broader society take action to prevent even more people from being radicalised.</p>
<p>These efforts bore fruit, mitigating the harm these extremists could pose and substantially containing the threat.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, as Burgess <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-13/right-wing-terror-threat-declines-says-asio/101965964">reminded us</a> this week, the most likely threat we now face comes from a “lone-wolf” actor:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] an individual who goes to violence with little or no warning and they’re acting on their own because something has set them off […] including maybe the group they’re in is not satisfying their need.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-16/wieambilla-police-shooting-religious-terrorist-attack/101983612">tragically fatal extremist attacks</a> on two young police officers and a helpful neighbour in Wieambilla, on the plains of southern Queensland, in December speak to the enduring threat of lone-actor attacks.</p>
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<p>It is precisely because violent extremists are only able to recruit a small number of people to join their causes that they have to work so hard to intimidate others through their actions and cast a long shadow.</p>
<p>After all, the very essence of their chosen method of using violence – or the threat of violence – to bring about social and political change is intended to terrorise society and channel and inflame hate. This, in turn, provokes angry, disproportionate and counterproductive responses from governments?.</p>
<p>We cannot afford to dismiss the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-terrorism-threat-over-195706">resilient and enduring threat</a> posed by violent extremism, just as we cannot allow ourselves to be overcome by terror or provoked into angry responses. </p>
<p>At the same time, we must not succumb to either cynicism or despair. It is foolish to speak about “winning” a “war on terrorism”. But it is equally foolish not to recognise that by working together against the efforts of those who would use hate and violence, we can reduce and contain the threat and build something better.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-terrorism-threat-over-195706">Is the terrorism threat over?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>The terror threat level has receded for now, but another wave will surely come.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1774512022-02-22T19:10:31Z2022-02-22T19:10:31ZWhy Australia’s tough national security laws cannot stop foreign interference in our elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447734/original/file-20220222-27-1s18k3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=94%2C44%2C3616%2C2431&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">James Ross/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>ASIO chief Mike Burgess recently <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">revealed</a> the security agency had detected and disrupted a foreign interference plot in the lead-up to an Australian election. He warned Australia was seeing foreign interference attempts “at all levels of government, in all states and territories”.</p>
<p>These types of threats have long been anticipated. In fact, in 2018, the federal government took the unprecedented step of passing nine new laws to counter <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">foreign interference</a> in politics. These serious national security crimes carry penalties ranging from ten to 20 years in jail. Similar crimes are not found in many other countries.</p>
<p>But are tough national security laws what we need? Will these do enough – or anything at all – to deter the threat of electoral interference in Australia?</p>
<h2>What is foreign electoral interference?</h2>
<p>First, it helps to define exactly what electoral interference is. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202020-21%20WEB.pdf">[ASIO]</a> defines this as a covert or threatening action on behalf of a foreign power which aims to affect political processes or is detrimental to Australia’s interests. </p>
<p>So, when foreign individuals or powers covertly seek to influence our politics and this has a detrimental impact on our interests (or benefits the interests of the foreign power), this is foreign interference. </p>
<hr>
<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stronger-laws-on-foreign-election-influence-were-rushed-through-this-week-limiting-speech-but-ignoring-our-billionaire-problem-177147">Stronger laws on 'foreign' election influence were rushed through this week – limiting speech but ignoring our billionaire problem</a>
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<p>This kind of conduct could take many forms. <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">For example</a>, it could mean a person who has connections with a foreign government (let’s say China) identifies Australian candidates who might support the interests of China or be vulnerable to inducements. </p>
<p>This person then seeks to advance the candidates’ political prospects without disclosing his or her links to the Chinese government.</p>
<p>This could occur through generous monetary support, placing favourable stories in foreign language media platforms, or providing other forms of assistance (such as hiring political consultants and advertising agencies).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">aim</a> of political interference is to get candidates into positions of power and generate a sense of obligation and indebtedness that could subsequently be exploited by the foreign government. </p>
<p>Going back to our example, this could mean a person with links to the Chinese government encouraging candidates to hire certain people as political staffers, vote in a certain way, or pass on information about a party’s position on defence policy, human rights or foreign investment.</p>
<p>This kind of conduct can seriously damage our sovereignty and undermine our democracy. Burgess warns the threat is emanating from <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">various countries</a> – it should be noted, he didn’t specify China – and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/7.30/mike-burgess,-director-general-at-asio-speaks-on/13757788">both sides of politics</a> are being targeted.</p>
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<h2>Crimes of foreign interference</h2>
<p>Australia’s <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">new laws</a> make it a crime to engage in covert, deceptive or threatening conduct on behalf of a foreign government or entity with the intention of: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>influencing an Australian political or democratic process </p></li>
<li><p>supporting a foreign intelligence agency </p></li>
<li><p>prejudicing Australia’s national security.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These offences capture all kinds of foreign interference in our electoral process (as well as any preparations for this kind of conduct). This gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies the power to intervene before any interference actually occurs, and to prosecute those people responsible.</p>
<p>While these crimes are similar to laws passed in the US and UK following the September 11 terrorist attacks, they are more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-security-laws-foreign-interference.html">far-reaching</a>. And because Australia does not have a federal bill of rights, the laws have limited checks and balances.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/government-needs-to-slow-down-on-changes-to-spying-and-foreign-interference-laws-98002">Government needs to slow down on changes to spying and foreign interference laws</a>
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<h2>Prosecuting (and deterring) perpetrators</h2>
<p>But how easy would it be to actually prosecute offenders? </p>
<p>The foreign interference crimes apply to conduct that <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">occurs in Australia</a>. So, if the perpetrator was in Australia at the time they engaged in interference, then prosecuting them would be relatively straightforward, provided there was sufficient evidence. </p>
<p>This occurred with former Liberal candidate Duong Di Sanh, who was the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-05/first-person-charged-foreign-interference-laws/12852974">first person charged</a> with a foreign interference offence in Australia. He is still <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/former-liberal-candidate-will-contest-foreign-interference-charges-20210907-p58ph2.html">awaiting trial</a> and the nature of his alleged interference has not been disclosed.</p>
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<p>But a person does not have to be physically in Australia to hire a political consultant for a potential candidate, for example. If an offender is <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">outside Australia</a> at the time of the interference, they could still be charged with a crime. However, prosecuting them would be challenging.</p>
<p>The person would first have to be extradited back to Australia. Some countries do not have an extradition treaty with Australia (or it is not yet in force), such as <a href="https://www.info.dfat.gov.au/treaties">China</a>. And even if the country is an ally, extradition may be difficult. The attempted extradition of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/world/europe/assange-extradition-denied.html">Julian Assange</a> from the UK to the US for espionage crimes is one example of this.</p>
<p>Another problem is the anonymity of the internet and covert nature of foreign interference, which mean it might not even be possible to identify who was responsible for the interference – and therefore who to prosecute. </p>
<h2>So, how can we counter the threat?</h2>
<p>These examples show why our criminal laws are inadequate to counter the threat of foreign interference. </p>
<p>Not everyone who engages in interference will be prosecuted and punished. And the failure to punish offenders might undermine the deterrence effect of the laws, as others may continue to attempt interference without fear of being caught.</p>
<p>So, what can we do to protect ourselves and our nation?</p>
<p>Reforming the laws will not be very helpful because the problems of extradition and identification of perpetrators will arise no matter how the offences are worded. These problems will also arise even if our allies (and other countries) enact similar foreign interference crimes.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">Burgess</a>, awareness is the most effective defence against foreign interference. Interference attempts are much less likely to succeed if we understand the tactics being used to undermine our sovereignty and democracy.</p>
<p>We must all be aware of what foreign interference looks like. But politicians have a special role to play – they must <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2022.html">be aware</a> who they are dealing with, and why. </p>
<p>They must understand the risks of foreign interference, ask the right questions of supporters (including querying what their motives are), be transparent about what type of support they have received, and stay alert to favours being asked of them that conflict with Australia’s interests. </p>
<p>Because of how wide-reaching the threat of foreign interference is, security can no longer be the sole responsibility of agencies like ASIO. It is something we are now all responsible for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177451/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Kendall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia is seeing foreign interference attempts ‘at all levels of government’. But awareness is key to stopping it, not unenforceable laws.Sarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1773682022-02-17T11:00:11Z2022-02-17T11:00:11ZGrattan on Friday: Morrison has sown the seeds for a scare campaign, and Albanese doesn’t know whether they’ll grow<p>If you were to believe the Morrison government, you’d think Anthony Albanese as prime minister would sell out Australia’s interests to China, give criminals a break, and perhaps sneak in a death tax. </p>
<p>You’d question whether this man, who held senior positions in the Labor years, including briefly being deputy PM, could run a competent government. Because, you see, he didn’t have an economic or national security portfolio.</p>
<p>Scott Morrison is determined to do what Malcolm Turnbull refused to do in the 2016 election – run a ferocious, no-holds-barred negative campaign to try to trash his opponent. </p>
<p>The trouble with being a small target, which has been Albanese’s strategy all this term but especially recently, is that your opponent will still seek to turn you into a big target, indeed a scary risk to the nation. </p>
<p>The government’s campaign over the past fortnight’s parliamentary sitting has been full of gross exaggeration and, on the issue of policy on China, it has been outrageous and irresponsible. It’s a mark of Morrison’s desperation, and it carries risks of backfiring. </p>
<p>The question remains, however, whether the assault will be effective. Or will the government just harm itself by going over the top?</p>
<p>We’ve seen many scare campaigns through the years that have had little regard for the truth. Labor’s “Mediscare” claims in 2016 about an alleged Coalition threat to Medicare was potent, despite lacking substance. But the Morrison government’s effort is among the most brazen.</p>
<p>Without a compelling positive agenda of its own, the government believes – or hopes – that Albanese, who is still not well defined in the public’s mind, is potentially a soft target in the two key policy areas where the Coalition usually has an advantage – national security and economics. </p>
<p>It has gambled that in our fast-moving media cycle it can get away with extraordinary claims, helped by sections of the media. </p>
<p>But in its national security attack on Labor, the government this week ran into some heavy counter fire it would not have expected, from impeccable sources. The current and a former chief of ASIO weighed in against the Coalition’s crude attempt to wedge Labor over China.</p>
<p>The saga started when Defence Minister Peter Dutton declared last week that “the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government” had picked Albanese as “their candidate” in the coming election. </p>
<p>Dutton led with his chin, saying he was reflecting on what had been reported and commented on by the ASIO director-general, Mike Burgess.</p>
<p>Burgess, in his “Annual Threat Assessment” speech the previous evening, had said ASIO recently disrupted “a foreign interference plot in the lead-up to an election in Australia”. He didn’t name the country or the jurisdiction. Burgess related how a wealthy “puppeteer” had hired an employee to identify potential target candidates. </p>
<p>This week Morrison dipped back into the China well. </p>
<p>On Wednesday, he told parliament the Chinese government “have picked their horse” (Albanese) and labelled Labor’s deputy leader, Richard Marles, a “Manchurian candidate” for remarks Marles made some years ago. (“Manchurian candidate” is a reference from a political thriller to someone brainwashed and manipulated by an enemy power.) </p>
<p>The stakes were raised for the government when, in a rare TV appearance on Wednesday night, Burgess made it clear he was less than impressed with ASIO, which was “apolitical”, being drawn into political infighting. </p>
<p>Then on Thursday the government received a massive whack from Dennis Richardson, who is not only a former ASIO head but also a former secretary of the defence and foreign affairs departments and was Australia’s ambassador in Washington. </p>
<p>Richardson denounced the government’s “attempt to create an artificial division where one in practice does not exist”, saying that only served “the interests of one country. And that’s China.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/elections-are-rarely-decided-by-security-and-defence-issues-but-china-could-make-2022-different-176973">Elections are rarely decided by security and defence issues, but China could make 2022 different</a>
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<p>He described the tactic as “grubby beyond belief”.</p>
<p>Morrison was not put off, later that day saying Albanese “is the Chinese government’s pick at this election”.</p>
<p>The government’s sledges against Albanese on the economic and law-and-order fronts were less spectacular but equally stretched. </p>
<p>Treasurer Josh Frydenberg last week delved into the archives, back to when Albanese, as a Labor Party official from the left in the early 1990s, moved a motion at a conference calling for consideration of an inheritance tax. From this, Frydenberg asserted, “he stands for death duties”. </p>
<p>In promoting legislation to make it easier to deport visa holders convicted of serious crimes, Morrison accused Albanese of being “clearly on the side of criminals”.</p>
<p>In defensive tactics, Albanese has been extremely surefooted. </p>
<p>Thus, after Burgess’s revelation about foreign interference, the opposition leader immediately contacted him and was able to report that ASIO has no problem with any of Labor’s federal candidates. </p>
<p>As Morrison attacked Labor’s credentials on national security, Albanese tabled a letter from the PM last year thanking him for supporting the government on the AUKUS agreement. </p>
<p>Albanese met the “scare” around his one-time backing for an inheritance tax three decades ago with ridicule, waving around an economics essay he’d written four decades ago. </p>
<p>Efforts by the government to wedge Labor on the visa legislation and legislation on guns fell in a heap. The opposition waved the bills through the House of Representatives with little prospect of them being considered in the Senate before the election. </p>
<p>The government’s effort last week to wedge Labor on the religious discrimination legislation ended with it being wedged by its own rebel backbenchers. </p>
<p>Albanese has covered off every angle that’s come up. </p>
<p>For instance, on Thursday he told parliament in a personal explanation that he had consulted Burgess before attending the opening of the Chau Chak Wing Museum at Sydney University in 2020. He added that he had obtained Burgess’s permission to say this to parliament. </p>
<p>Earlier this week a Labor senator named, under parliamentary privilege, businessman and political donor Chau as the “puppeteer” referred to in the Burgess speech, something Burgess declined to be drawn on. </p>
<p>In his statement to parliament, Albanese said he did “regularly consult with our national security agencies, because I take their role seriously as leader of the opposition”. </p>
<p>However neat Albanese’s moves, however reprehensible the government’s, Labor doesn’t fool itself. Morrison and his ministers have sown the seeds for a national security scare, and it’s too early to know whether they will germinate. </p>
<p>What we do know is that the Chinese government must be enjoying this spectacle immensely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If you were to believe the Morrison government, you’d think Anthony Albanese as prime minister would sell out Australia’s interests to China, give criminals a break, and perhaps sneak in a death tax.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1704622021-12-08T00:47:59Z2021-12-08T00:47:59ZEspionage is set to overtake terrorism as Australia’s top security concern – are our anti-spy laws good enough?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433058/original/file-20211122-23-ksl4to.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism has been one of Australia’s most significant threats to national security since the September 11 terrorist attacks. But this is set to change. </p>
<p>Australia’s domestic spy agency ASIO anticipates espionage – spying – will supplant terrorism as Australia’s principal security threat over the next <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202020-21%20WEB.pdf">five years</a>. They do not explicitly say why, but note this is “based on current trends” and that “espionage attempts by multiple countries remain unacceptably high”. </p>
<p>Espionage can harm our independence, economy and national security. For example, stealing trade secrets would give a foreign country an advantage on the international market, which would undermine Australian businesses. Or stealing information about military weapons would give our enemies the chance to develop their own technology to obstruct our use of these assets.</p>
<p>But what exactly is the nature of this espionage threat? And are our laws enough to protect us?</p>
<h2>The espionage threat</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/counter-espionage.html">ASIO</a>, foreign espionage is: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the theft of Australian information or capabilities for passage to another country, which undermines Australia’s national interest or advantages a foreign country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unlike the world wars or Cold War, <a href="https://journal.law.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqlj/article/view/1549/1283">foreign spies today</a> do not just want to steal military or intelligence information. They seek any kind of sensitive or valuable information or things, including proprietary and commercial information, new technologies, and information about our relations with other countries.</p>
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<img alt="ASIO head Mike Burgess" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433061/original/file-20211122-27-1cbpeob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ASIO head Mike Burgess has warned of a growing espionage threat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Foreign spies steal this information by developing relationships with people working in sectors such as government, academia, business, science and technology. </p>
<p>They also engage in cyber espionage – today’s spies can steal large amounts of data in seconds. They can also do this anonymously and from outside Australia. The cyber espionage threat has been amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen a drastic increase in the use and availability of cybertechnologies.</p>
<p>Espionage attempts are by no means a rare occurrence. ASIO warns they occur every day, in <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202020-21%20WEB.pdf">every Australian state and territory</a>. And they are not just by China. A wide range of countries are attempting espionage against Australia.</p>
<p>The threat is real, sophisticated and wide-ranging. And ASIO warns that it will increase during times of “heightened tension”, like during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<h2>Australia’s espionage laws</h2>
<p>To combat the growing threat of espionage, in 2018 the federal government introduced a complex scheme of 27 different <a href="https://journal.law.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqlj/article/view/1549/1283">espionage offences</a>. These include a suite of underlying offences, plus a preparatory offence and a solicitation offence.</p>
<p>Foreign spies – and those who assist them – face life in prison if they break one of these serious national security laws.</p>
<p>All of Australia’s espionage crimes apply to people within Australia. They also apply to people in other countries too. This means they can capture spies who engage in cyber espionage from beyond Australia’s borders.</p>
<h2>The underlying espionage offences</h2>
<p>The underlying espionage offences criminalise dealing with information on behalf of, or to communicate to, a “<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html?context=1;query=%22Criminal%20Code%20Act%201995%22;mask_path=">foreign principal</a>”, which includes foreign governments as well as entities they control, such as foreign intelligence agencies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asio-chief-mike-burgess-says-there-are-more-spies-in-australia-than-at-the-height-of-the-cold-war-132384">ASIO chief Mike Burgess says there are more spies in Australia 'than at the height of the cold war'</a>
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<p>Here, “<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html?context=1;query=%22Criminal%20Code%20Act%201995%22;mask_path=">information</a>” means any information or thing. This means the laws apply no matter what kind of information is taken, from classified government information and sensitive samples of new products (like vaccines) to seemingly innocuous information about Australia’s relations with other countries. They also apply no matter how that information is taken – it could be in person or via cybertechnologies.</p>
<p>Some of the offences require the person to have intended to (or been reckless as to whether) they would prejudice Australia’s national security or advantage the national security of a foreign country. Here, “<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html?context=1;query=%22Criminal%20Code%20Act%201995%22;mask_path=">national security</a>” means traditional defence and intelligence matters. It also extends to Australia’s political and economic relations with other countries. So, the underlying offences would capture those who take information on behalf of another country and seek to harm our security, economy, or international relations – exactly what foreign spies do.</p>
<h2>The preparatory offence</h2>
<p>The aim of counterespionage is not to wait until espionage has happened, but to prevent espionage from occurring in the first place. With this in mind, the 2018 espionage reforms introduced a novel “preparatory offence”, which was modelled on similar terrorism offences.</p>
<p>The preparatory offence criminalises any act done to prepare or plan for espionage. It captures conduct far before the commission of any espionage offence, such as purchasing a laptop or googling the type of encryption used by the Australian Defence Force. </p>
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<img alt="Google homepage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433062/original/file-20211122-13-10dgftn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Googling certain terms could amount to planning for espionage, in the eyes of the law.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
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<p>To amount to espionage, though, a person doing these kinds of things would need to intend to commit espionage at some time in the future.</p>
<p>Where foreign spies or their associates are concerned, this offence might be easier to prove than the underlying offences. It also gives law enforcement the power to intervene before the spies take anything.</p>
<h2>The solicitation offence</h2>
<p>The espionage offences take aim at the earliest stages of espionage in another way. The “solicitation offence” makes it a crime to do any act, intending to obtain someone else to commit espionage. The offence can be committed even if the other person never engages in espionage.</p>
<p>The solicitation offence would apply to foreign spies who try to develop relationships with Australians to get them to hand over valuable information. </p>
<h2>Are our laws enough?</h2>
<p>Australia’s revamped espionage laws are <a href="https://journal.law.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqlj/article/view/1549/1283">broad enough</a> to capture modern – including cyber – espionage. But they are not enough to protect us from espionage.</p>
<p>One problem with the laws is that people who commit cyber espionage from outside Australia must be extradited here to face prosecution. This could be a significant impediment to prosecutions, especially where the spy is in a country that does not have an extradition treaty with Australia (or the treaty is not yet in force), such as China or Pakistan.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/you-could-break-espionage-laws-on-social-media-without-realising-it-151665">You could break espionage laws on social media without realising it</a>
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<p>Another problem is identifying who the spy is, and therefore who to charge. This is a big issue where a person engages in cyber espionage because they can use things like anonymous proxy servers to hide their identity.</p>
<p>These problems mean that our espionage laws may not be as effective as they could be, and other measures may be necessary to prevent espionage from occurring in the first place. These measures include robust and effective cyber security - not just for government agencies, but in our <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/easy-steps-secure-your-devices-and-accounts">homes</a> and <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/small-business-cyber-security-guide">workplaces</a> too. They also include <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/TBYL.html">public awareness campaigns</a> about the nature of modern espionage. Every Australian must know what to look out for so that they do not inadvertently hand valuable information over to a spy. </p>
<p>Our espionage laws serve as a warning that broader does not necessarily mean better. </p>
<p>In addition to their questionable effectiveness, the breadth of the laws means they can capture entirely innocent conduct too, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/you-could-break-espionage-laws-on-social-media-without-realising-it-151665">social networking</a>, <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3898598/01-Ananian-Welsh,-Kendall-and-Murray-764.pdf">media reporting</a>, and academic research. </p>
<p>So, in attempting to capture spies, the laws may also catch innocent Australians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170462/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Kendall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Spies have changed since the days of the Cold War. The sort of information they seek is much broader than just military or intelligence secrets.Sarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599312021-04-28T08:49:27Z2021-04-28T08:49:27ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: former ASIO head David Irvine on the cyber threats Australia faces<p>“The warfare of the 21st century” is going to be “fought in cyberspace before kinetic shots are fired” says leading national security expert David Irvine. </p>
<p>And perhaps the fight has already begun, with Australia’s institutions, businesses, and citizens subject to a near constant barrage of cyber attacks.</p>
<p>Previously chair and now a board member of the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, Irvine has a deep knowledge of the cyber risks posed to Australia and Australians by both nation states and criminals. </p>
<p>His career has included heading both ASIS, which manages Australia’s overseas spying activities, and ASIO, responsible for domestic protection.</p>
<p>Irvine describes cybercrime as a “massive issue”, and say that compared to countries like “China, Russia,[…]Iran, and North Korea” the West is lagging behind in its defensive cyber capability. </p>
<p>“I think almost every Western country is probably behind the game in its defences.”</p>
<p>Part of this is the nature of cyber incursions. “One of the rules in cybercrime is that the criminal is always half a step ahead of the protector.”</p>
<p>What can be done? Last year the government committed $1.67 billion over 10 years to combating cybercrime, but Irvine calls in particular for a “public awareness campaign” to get the message through strongly.</p>
<p>“I think back to the old days of HIV and the Grim Reaper, and my sense is that we actually need a very hard hitting campaign that brings home to individuals and businesses[…] the threat that they are under and the sort of resilience that they need to develop as individuals, as companies, and as a nation.”</p>
<p>Irvine is also chair of the Foreign Investment Review Board, and is a former ambassador to China. He says of the current tensions with China, and warnings about <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/the-drums-of-war-are-growing-louder/news-story/bf29fb3cf94b89f84eaeb22fd32d9724">“the drums of war”</a>: </p>
<p>“Ultimately, I think we depend on China and the United States to develop a modus vivendi which concedes some interests but protects others. Because the alternative is really too horrendous to contemplate.”</p>
<p><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/au/podcast/politics-with-michelle-grattan/id703425900?mt=2"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233721/original/file-20180827-75984-1gfuvlr.png" alt="Listen on Apple Podcasts" width="268" height="68"></a> <a href="https://www.google.com/podcasts?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly90aGVjb252ZXJzYXRpb24uY29tL2F1L3BvZGNhc3RzL3BvbGl0aWNzLXdpdGgtbWljaGVsbGUtZ3JhdHRhbi5yc3M"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233720/original/file-20180827-75978-3mdxcf.png" alt="" width="268" height="68"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-conversation-4/politics-with-michelle-grattan"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233716/original/file-20180827-75981-pdp50i.png" alt="Stitcher" width="300" height="88"></a> <a href="https://tunein.com/podcasts/News--Politics-Podcasts/Politics-with-Michelle-Grattan-p227852/"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233723/original/file-20180827-75984-f0y2gb.png" alt="Listen on TuneIn" width="318" height="125"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://radiopublic.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-WRElBZ"><img class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-152" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233717/original/file-20180827-75990-86y5tg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" alt="Listen on RadioPublic" width="268" height="87"></a> <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/5NkaSQoUERalaLBQAqUOcC"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237984/original/file-20180925-149976-1ks72uy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" width="268" height="82"></a> </p>
<h2>Additional audio</h2>
<p><a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/Lee_Rosevere/The_Big_Loop_-_FML_original_podcast_score/Lee_Rosevere_-_The_Big_Loop_-_FML_original_podcast_score_-_10_A_List_of_Ways_to_Die">A List of Ways to Die</a>, Lee Rosevere, from Free Music Archive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan discusses cyber security with former chairman of the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, David IrvineMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1574002021-03-21T18:50:16Z2021-03-21T18:50:16ZASIO’s language shift on terrorism is a welcome acknowledgment of the power of words<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390517/original/file-20210318-17-qe7rc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Words matter. And when you are the director-general of ASIO, and one of the few people in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation that can talk to the public about what you do at work without being in breach of the law, then your words really matter. To his credit, Mike Burgess has made it his mission to “to make ASIO more open and transparent”. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2021.html">second annual threat assessment</a>, for all its droll, candid delivery, was provocative and revealing in its <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/asio-unearths-foreign-nest-of-spies-mike-burgess/news-story/02a81a772804542f5c385548ebe801fd">carefully chosen words</a>. And yet, on one point, it was also unexpectedly perplexing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asio-to-avoid-left-right-and-islamic-in-an-overhaul-of-its-descriptions-of-extremism-157345">ASIO to avoid 'left', 'right' and 'Islamic' in an overhaul of its descriptions of extremism</a>
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<p>When Burgess delivered his <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-general-annual-threat-assessment-0.html">first annual threat assessment</a> in February last year, shortly after assuming the leadership of ASIO, he spoke with refreshing frankness about the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/audio/2021/mar/20/asio-chief-no-direct-lessons-from-christchurch-but-this-can-happen-to-us">rising threat</a> posed by right-wing extremism:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Right-wing extremism has been in ASIO’s sights for some time, but obviously this threat came into sharp, terrible focus last year in New Zealand.</p>
<p>In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real and it is growing. In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His deputy director, Helen Cook, continued this pattern of plain speaking when she <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/asio-s-case-load-jumps-as-pandemic-fuels-far-right-extremism-20200922-p55y4d.html">addressed a parliamentary inquiry</a> last September. She pointed out the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/threats-from-far-right-extremists-have-skyrocketed-in-australia-with-asio-comparing-tactics-to-is">parallels between</a> the ways in which right-wing extremists were recruiting online and the methods used by Islamic State.</p>
<p>By September 2020, violent right-wing extremism accounted for around one-third of ASIO’s counterterrorism case load, Cook said, tripling since 2016. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/390537/original/file-20210319-16-140m8hn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The rise of right-wing violent extremism came into terrible focus during the Christchurch terror attacks in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Last week, Burgess said that proportion <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-17/asio-director-intelligence-language-change-islamic-extremism/13256828">was now 40%</a>. Internet recruitment had spiked during during pandemic lockdowns:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For those intent on violence, more time at home online meant more time in the echo chamber of the internet on the pathway to radicalisation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Given the recent spate of right-wing extremist incidents, and a spike in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/australia-urged-to-adopt-plan-to-fight-resurgence-of-racism">anti-Asian racism</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/amp/graffiti-arson-death-threats-new-research-finds-widespread-violence-against-australian-mosques-156843">Islamaphobia</a>, this was not particularly surprising. As Burgess said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The online environment is a force multiplier for extremism; fertile ground for sharing ideology and spreading propaganda.</p>
<p>Ideological extremists are now more reactive to world events, such as COVID, the Black Lives Matter movement and the recent American presidential election.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What was unexpected, however, on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/16/the-christchurch-massacre-continues-to-haunt-muslims-across-the-world-online-and-offline">second anniversary of the Christchurch terror attack</a>, was a radical pivot in ASIO’s official terminology for terrorist threats.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>From today, ASIO will be changing the language we use to talk about the violent threats we counter. We will now refer to two categories: religiously motivated violent extremism, and ideologically motivated violent extremism.</p>
<p>Why are we making a change? </p>
<p>Put simply, it’s because the current labels are no longer fit for purpose; they no longer adequately describe the phenomena we’re seeing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That “our language needs to evolve” makes sense. There are very clearly some threats that we need to do a much better job of recognising, such as “the violent misogynists who adhere to the involuntary celibate or ‘incel’ ideology”. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-shut-down-far-right-extremism-in-australia-we-must-confront-the-ecosystem-of-hate-154269">To shut down far-right extremism in Australia, we must confront the ecosystem of hate</a>
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<p>And clearly many extremists are, as Burgess said, “motivated by a fear of societal collapse or a specific social or economic grievance or conspiracy”. But the argument that they “don’t fit on the left–right spectrum at all” is much less convincing. What he is describing very much does fit with what is <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism_JULY.pdf">well recognised as far-right extremism</a>. Despite being eclectic and variegated, it nevertheless coheres around a central <a href="https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2020#exploring-the-numbers">core of victimhood and conspiratorial fear</a> of replacement by dangerous, unclean outsiders.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/mar/19/hectoring-from-conservatives-behind-asio-move-to-dump-term-rightwing-extremism">Some are concerned</a> this shift in language reflects pressure from political conservatives who have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/mar/02/liberal-senator-tells-asio-chief-his-use-of-term-rightwing-can-offend-conservatives">been vocal</a> in their rejection of the term “right-wing extremism”. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/two-years-on-from-the-christchurch-terror-attack-how-much-has-really-changed-156850">Two years on from the Christchurch terror attack, how much has really changed?</a>
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<p>It is also possible Burgess wishes to shine a light on this and subject the issue to greater scrutiny. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there is a clear and welcome case for taking greater care to avoid burdening the Muslim community with prejudicial language when so many are working so hard to counter extremism. As Burgess said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Understandably, some Muslim groups — and others — see this term as damaging and misrepresentative of Islam, and consider that it stigmatises them by encouraging stereotyping and stoking division.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also needs to be recognised that the shift in terminology that Burgess introduced relates to “umbrella terms – and there may be circumstances where we need to call out a specific threat that sits underneath them”.</p>
<p>This willingness to speak about specific threats was very much in evidence when Burgess spoke about the fact that IS had </p>
<blockquote>
<p>released a video last year referencing the Australian bushfire crisis to encourage arson attacks in the West.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This specific reference came on the same day that two brothers, just 19 and 20 years old, and a 16-year-old relative, were <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/brothers-accused-of-trying-to-plan-a-terrorist-act-front-court-20210318-p57btq.html">arrested in connection</a> with an arson incident in bushland north of Melbourne in mid-February, and a violent assault in the Melbourne CBD weeks later. </p>
<p>Police had responded to these incidents as regular crimes but subsequently found evidence of links with IS and engaged the joint counter-terrorism task force. The brothers have <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/brothers-accused-of-trying-to-plan-a-terrorist-act-front-court-20210318-p57btq.html">since been charged</a> with trying to plan a terrorist act. </p>
<p>It is important that the director-general and others in positions of power and influence continue to speak clearly about the threats they are dealing with every day. </p>
<p>We should welcome the statement that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>At ASIO, we’re conscious that the names and labels we use are important.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Informing and educating the public, and building trust and fostering social cohesion, are vitally important aspects of their work. </p>
<p>To be effective, this needs to be done without fear or favour and with respect and sensitivity. Words have a significant effect on how we think about, and respond, to issues. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/journalists-and-security-agencies-dont-need-to-be-friends-but-can-they-at-least-talk-to-each-other-156751">Journalists and security agencies don't need to be friends. But can they at least talk to each other?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157400/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>
Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>Our intelligence agencies need to speak clearly, without fear or favour, but also without inflaming prejudice.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1573452021-03-17T12:00:36Z2021-03-17T12:00:36ZASIO to avoid ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘Islamic’ in an overhaul of its descriptions of extremism<p>ASIO is changing the language it uses to describe violent threats, because it says the current labels are “no longer fit for purpose.”</p>
<p>This means terms including “left”, “right”, and “Islamic extremism” will be avoided.</p>
<p>Announcing the update in his annual threat assessment, the security organisation’s head, Mike Burgess, said it would now employ two categories: “religiously motivated violent extremism"and "ideologically motivated violent extremism”.</p>
<p>Burgess said the terms in use now did not “adequately describe the phenomena we’re seeing”.</p>
<p>It was unhelpful to categorise the many violent groups of various political ideologies as simply “extreme left wing” and “extreme right wing”.</p>
<p>“ASIO does not investigate people solely because of their political views, so labels like ‘left’ and ‘right’ often distract from the real nature of the threat,” Burgess said.</p>
<p>“While the views advocated by many extremist groups are appalling, as a security service, ASIO’s focus is on the threat of violence.</p>
<p>"In the same way, we don’t investigate people because of their religious views – again, it’s violence that is relevant to our powers – but that’s not always clear when we use the term ‘Islamic extremism’.”</p>
<p>He said some Muslim groups understandably saw the term as “damaging and misrepresentative of Islam”, and stigmatising them “by encouraging stereotyping and stoking division”.</p>
<p>Language was needed that matched the evolving threat environment and could accommodate groups outside traditional categories.</p>
<p>An increasing number of individuals and groups didn’t fit on a left-right spectrum, Burgess said. Rather, “they’re motivated by a fear of societal collapse or a specific social or economic grievance or conspiracy.”</p>
<p>He instanced the violent misogynists who followed “incel” (involuntary celibate) ideology.</p>
<p>Burgess said many of Australia’s Five Eyes partners had updated their language.</p>
<p>But he inserted the qualification that the new labels were umbrella terms and in certain cases ASIO might “need to call out a specific threat that sits beneath them”.</p>
<p>Burgess said ideological extremists “are now more reactive to world events, such as COVID, the Black Lives Matter movement, and the recent American Presidential election”.</p>
<p>COVID had reinforced extremist beliefs about the collapse of society and race war.</p>
<p>“As a consequence, we are seeing extremists seeking to acquire weapons for self-defence, as well as stockpiling ammunition and provisions.”</p>
<p>Australia faced threats from both religiously motivated violent extremists and “a growing assortment of individuals with ideological grievances”. </p>
<p>Burgess said that last year he had called out “so-called right-wing extremism”. </p>
<p>“Since then, ideological extremism investigations have grown from around one-third of our priority counter-terrorism caseload, to around 40%. This reflects a growing international trend, as well as our decision to dedicate more resources to the emerging domestic threat. </p>
<p>"The face of the threat is also evolving, and this poses challenges as we seek to identify and monitor it.</p>
<p>"People often think we’re talking about skinheads with swastika tattoos and jackboots roaming the backstreets like extras from Romper Stomper, but it’s no longer that obvious.</p>
<p>"Today’s ideological extremist is more likely to be motivated by a social or economic grievance than national socialism. More often than not, they are young, well-educated, articulate, and middle class – and not easily identified. </p>
<p>"The average age of these investigative subjects is 25, and I’m particularly concerned by the number of 15 and 16 year olds who are being radicalised. They are overwhelmingly male.”</p>
<p>He said “compared with other forms of extremism”, ideological extremism “is more widely dispersed across the country, including in regional and rural areas”.</p>
<p>“ASIO anticipates that the threat from this form of extremism will not diminish any time soon – and may well grow.” </p>
<p>Burgess noted that in his first threat assessment, delivered last year, he had warned adversaries that ASIO would hunt those conducting espionage or foreign interference against Australia.</p>
<p>It had made good on this promise. “We have dealt with multiple attempts – from multiple countries – to steal Australia’s secrets and undermine its sovereignty.”</p>
<p>Last year ASIO investigated a “nest of spies, from a foreign intelligence service, that was operating in Australia.</p>
<p>"The spies developed targeted relationships with current and former politicians, a foreign embassy and a state police service.</p>
<p>"They monitored their country’s diaspora community.</p>
<p>"They tried to obtain classified information about Australia’s trade relationships.</p>
<p>"They asked a public servant to provide information on security protocols at a major airport.</p>
<p>"They successfully cultivated and recruited an Australian Government security clearance holder who had access to sensitive details of defence technology.”</p>
<p>ASIO confronted the spies “and quietly and professionally removed them from Australia”.</p>
<p>He said the foreign intelligence service in question was not from a country in Australia’s region.</p>
<p>Burgess warned that as we came out of the pandemic crisis, “some of our adversaries are seeking to undermine and exploit Australia’s recovery. We have already seen extremists trying to stoke social divisions, and foreign intelligence services wanting intelligence about Australia’s key export, technology and research industries.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ASIO is changing the language it uses to describe violent threats, because it says the current labels, such as “left”, “right” and “Islamic” are no longer fit for purpose.“Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1567512021-03-17T03:33:42Z2021-03-17T03:33:42ZJournalists and security agencies don’t need to be friends. But can they at least talk to each other?<p>Like dogs and cats, snakes and rats, journalists and the government are not supposed to be friends. </p>
<p>It is always going to be a fractious, difficult relationship. We, the voters and taxpayers, grant politicians enormous power and resources to run the government on our behalf. The media’s job is to make sure they do it responsibly and ethically. </p>
<p>As the American newspaper baron William Randolph Hearst <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/77244-news-is-something-somebody-doesn-t-want-printed-all-else-is#:%7E:text=Quotes%20%3E%20Quotable%20Quote-,%E2%80%9CNews%20is%20something%20somebody%20doesn't%20want%20printed,%3B%20all%20else%20is%20advertising.%E2%80%9D">reportedly once said</a>, “news is whatever someone doesn’t want printed; all else is advertising”. </p>
<p>The natural order of things <em>requires</em> there to be a necessary tension between those two institutions. But mutual hostility isn’t necessarily always a good thing. </p>
<h2>Why the media’s role is vital</h2>
<p>A toothy media is particularly important when it comes to monitoring the instruments of government power. </p>
<p>Over the years, our state and federal governments have amassed an <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">awesome array</a> of tools ostensibly designed to keep us safe from those who would do us harm. There are the usual agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, ASIO and the Australian Defence Forces. </p>
<p>But there are many more that work largely out of public view, with yawn-inducing names like the <a href="https://www.oni.gov.au/">Office of National Intelligence</a> (responsible for collating and assessing intelligence reports from abroad), <a href="https://www.austrac.gov.au/">AUSTRAC</a> (which monitors our financial system for clues about organised crime), the <a href="https://www.asd.gov.au/">Australian Signals Directorate</a> (which eavesdrops on electronic communications), and the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/ago/">Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation</a> (another of our international spy agencies). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">Australia has enacted 82 anti-terror laws since 2001. But tough laws alone can't eliminate terrorism</a>
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<p>Nobody is denying the need to give our security services the means to track and stop people like terrorists, criminals and foreign agents, but even the most disciplined agencies can abuse that power. </p>
<p>While there are institutional checks and balances designed to keep them under control, painful recent history tells us they don’t always work. That is why the whistle of last resort — the one most directly engaged with the public — is the media. </p>
<h2>Recent examples of journalist arrests</h2>
<p>In 2019, the AFP infamously raided journalists from two news organisations over their reporting of two separate stories that exposed abuses or potential abuses of power. </p>
<p>Dan Oakes and Sam Clark from the ABC had been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-02/federal-police-seek-charges-abc-investigation-afghan-files-dpp/12415930">covering allegations</a> of war crimes by Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan, while News Corp’s Annika Smethurst had <a href="https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/spying-shock-shades-of-big-brother-as-cybersecurity-vision-comes-to-light/news-story/bc02f35f23fa104b139160906f2ae709">revealed</a> quiet government plans to expand the ASD’s authority, allowing it to snoop on the domestic communications of ordinary Australians. </p>
<p>While both stories involved sensitive, classified documents, they also revealed things that every Australian ought to have been concerned about. Put simply, they were fine examples of journalists doing their jobs. (The AFP has since <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/may/27/afp-rules-out-charges-against-news-corp-journalist-annika-smethurst-after-raid">dropped</a> the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/dan-oakes-afghan-files-prosecution-decision/12771304">cases</a> against all three journalists.) </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-governments-have-long-been-hostile-to-media-freedom-thats-unlikely-to-change-any-time-soon-125565">Australian governments have long been hostile to media freedom. That's unlikely to change any time soon</a>
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<p>Most recently, Victorian police <a href="https://www.heraldsun.com.au/coronavirus/sunday-herald-sun-journalist-photographer-arrested-at-antivax-protest-in-fawkner-park/news-story/8d4f1fa2f973d084d01b18667ca573f0">arrested</a> two journalists from the Herald Sun — a reporter and a photographer — who were covering an anti-vaccination protest in Melbourne. </p>
<p>They were initially told they would be fined for failing to comply with the state government’s lockdown policies, but the police later apologised and confirmed they would not be. While this was not a national security issue, it is an example of the type of misunderstanding that is becoming more prevalent between the media and police. </p>
<h2>A new working group to bridge the divide</h2>
<p>To be clear, while there is an undeniable risk that journalists will either deliberately or inadvertently damage national security with their reporting, there are very few (if any) examples in recent Australian history. </p>
<p>The AFP raids and Melbourne arrests expose a critical problem — a deep and widening gulf in trust and communication between the agencies and the media that can - and clearly have - boiled over in ways that damage both institutions. In the process, it also undermines our democracy. </p>
<p>The raids, in particular, undermined public confidence in the integrity of the police, while sending a deeply threatening message to other journalists and whistleblowers involved in similar public interest stories. </p>
<p>Legislation is important. The <a href="https://www.journalistsfreedom.com/">Alliance for Journalists’ Freedom</a>, which I helped set up and now represent as a spokesman, believes Australia needs a <a href="https://www.journalistsfreedom.com/ajf-white-paper-plots-law-reform-pathway-for-press-freedom/">Media Freedom Act</a> to entrench press freedom in law. </p>
<p>But we also believe another mechanism is necessary — something that creates lines of communication between the media and security agencies. The idea is to protect the media’s freedom and independence, while helping the two sides understand one another — and avoid either damaging reporting or unnecessary police action. </p>
<p>The best way to do that is a working group of senior news editors and officials from the security agencies. They should not be the agency heads or editors-in-chief, but their senior deputies, who have the authority to represent their organisations without getting bogged down in formalities. </p>
<p>By meeting and discussing issues regularly, the working group should be able to develop both trust and lines of informal communication to head off any potential problems before they erupt. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-protect-press-freedom-we-need-more-public-outrage-and-an-overhaul-of-our-laws-118457">To protect press freedom, we need more public outrage – and an overhaul of our laws</a>
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<h2>Discussions without the threat of investigation</h2>
<p>The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security appears to agree with the AJF. </p>
<p>In the wake of the AFP raids, it held an inquiry into press freedom and national security and came up with an undeveloped <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/FreedomofthePress/Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024411%2F72438">recommendation</a> remarkably similar to what the AJF has been proposing: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the formulation of a mechanism to allow for journalists and media organisations, in the act of public interest journalism, to consult with the originating agency of national security classified information without the threat of investigation or prosecution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That last phrase is key. News organisations doing their jobs will often uncover classified information. They should be allowed to discuss it with the relevant agencies, “without the threat of investigation or prosecution”, so they can flag stories to avoid exposing damaging information. Similarly, the security agencies should be allowed to raise issues of concern to them. </p>
<p>One of the reasons Australia’s democracy is among the safest and most prosperous in the world is because we have had a vigorous, independent free press capable of holding the system to account. If in trying to keep us safe, the security agencies end up undermining one of the key pillars of that system, national security is ultimately undermined. </p>
<p>The AJF’s idea for a National Working Group is designed to help maintain the integrity of Australia’s security, while protecting press freedom.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Peter Greste is the UNESCO Chair in Journalism and Communication at the University of Queensland. He is also a founding director and spokesman for the Alliance for Journalists Freedom. </span></em></p>There is a deep and widening gulf in trust and communications between the agencies and the media that has clearly boiled over in ways that damage both institutions.Peter Greste, Professor of Journalism and Communications, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1542692021-02-07T19:05:51Z2021-02-07T19:05:51ZTo shut down far-right extremism in Australia, we must confront the ecosystem of hate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382668/original/file-20210205-14-eg1rd4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C30%2C4657%2C3187&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A member of the Proud Boys at a rally in Melbourne in January 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">James Ross/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The worst ever terrorist attack <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/brenton-tarrant-when-the-terrorist-is-one-of-us/12618384">by an Australian</a> didn’t take place in Australia, but it was very much made in Australia. </p>
<p>The Australian man who shot dead 51 people and injured 40 in Christchurch in 2019 arrived in New Zealand two years earlier, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html">fully radicalised</a> and consumed with hate. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-groups-have-used-covid-to-expand-their-footprint-in-australia-here-are-the-ones-you-need-to-know-about-151203">Far-right groups have used COVID to expand their footprint in Australia. Here are the ones you need to know about</a>
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<p>He had been expressing racist hatred <a href="https://apnews.com/article/intelligence-agencies-shootings-brenton-tarrant-new-zealand-new-zealand-mosque-attacks-d8217fa30fe4eeba45fb001b77857385">from his youth</a>, and from the age of 14 was active on extremist chat forums like the notorious <a href="https://theconversation.com/4chan-raids-how-one-dark-corner-of-the-internet-is-spreading-its-shadows-68394">4Chan</a>. </p>
<p>In his twenties he <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/world/brenton-tarrant-how-christchurch-terrorist-spent-final-months-before-attack/ca366435-03c8-4981-b382-051abec79f56">travelled extensively</a> overseas, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-european-journeys-of-the-alleged-christchurch-mass-murderer-20190322-p516k3.html">developing</a> his white supremacist views. He connected with like-minded individuals, such as Austrian Identitarian leader, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/16/christchurch-shooters-links-to-austrian-far-right-more-extensive-than-thought">Martin Sellner</a>.</p>
<p>And while he carried out his mass-shooting attack alone, he saw himself as a belonging to a global community of white supremacists. He was a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-23/christchurch-shooting-accused-praised-blair-cottrell/10930632">vocal supporter</a> of the notorious Australian extremist Blair Cottrell. He was very much a part of Australia’s far-right <a href="https://tacklinghate.org/about-us/">ecosystem of hate</a>.</p>
<p>Last month, a group of far-right extremists <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/neo-nazis-go-bush-grampians-gathering-highlights-rise-of-australia-s-far-right-20210127-p56xbf.html">made headlines</a> with a public and childishly provocative camping trip to the Grampians. </p>
<p>It is easy to dismiss them as being a bunch of attention-seeking fantasists, but the danger is greater than it appears.</p>
<h2>A pyramid of hate</h2>
<p>Far-right extremism is the ugly face of a much larger system of toxic synergies. Former race discrimination commissioner and author of <a href="https://www.hachette.com.au/tim-soutphommasane/on-hate">On Hate</a>, Tim Soutphommasane, refers to a “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-05/why-are-so-few-hate-crimes/11078972">pyramid of hate crime</a>”: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The history of hate and racism tells us that any kind of violence or hatred cannot be separated from banal or low levels of prejudice and discrimination […] Hate speech leads to political violence if you allow it to escalate. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In its <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-report-on-the-christchurch-atrocity-is-a-beginning-not-an-end-151663">final report</a> released last December, the Christchurch royal commission was critical of multiple shortcomings and failures in New Zealand, but found no evidence of an intelligence failure. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/impeachment-trial-research-spanning-decades-shows-language-can-incite-violence-154615">Impeachment trial: Research spanning decades shows language can incite violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While pointing out far-right extremism in New Zealand in general should have received more attention, there were few, if any, opportunities to have spotted the Australian terrorist in advance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201208-no-plausible-way-christchurch-mosque-shooter-could-have-been-detected">commissioners concluded</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There was no plausible way that he could have been detected, except by chance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With no comparable investigation in Australia it remains unclear, even in hindsight, whether Australian authorities could have interrupted the vocal extremist before he become a mass murderer. </p>
<h2>Far-right extremism is growing in Australia</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the Christchurch attack certainly focused the attention of Australian authorities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="ASIO chief Mike Burgess" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382663/original/file-20210205-16-dlfuxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ASIO chief Mike Burgess has warned about an increase in far-right extremism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren England/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In February 2020, ASIO director-general Mike Burgess <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-24/asio-director-general-mike-burgess-neo-nazi-threat-rising/11994178">gave a rare briefing</a>in which he spoke of far-right extremist groups regularly gathering in the suburbs to salute Nazi flags and promote their “hateful ideology”. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real and it is growing. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>As of 2020, investigating far-right extremism now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter-terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism">takes up 30-40%</a> of ASIO’s counter-terrorism caseload, up from 10-15% before 2016. </p>
<p>Although worryingly, efforts to explicitly condemn far-right extremism in federal parliament, such as last week’s neutered Senate motion, continue to be stymied by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/04/coalition-deletes-references-to-far-right-extremism-in-senate-motion">partisan politicking</a>.</p>
<h2>The warning signs</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/asia/new-zealand-shooting-brenton-tarrant.html">Christchurch shooter</a> did not go from hateful extremism to violent extremism overnight — it only looks that way. He had been cold-bloodedly <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/christchurch-terrorist-could-only-have-been-stopped-by-chance-20201208-p56ljh.html">preparing for</a> and planning his terrorist attack for years. </p>
<p>The warning signs were there in his <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-23/christchurch-shooting-accused-praised-blair-cottrell/10930632">hateful social media posts</a>, but they were lost in a cacophony of extremist noise. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Worshippers outside the Al Noor mosque in Christchurch." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382664/original/file-20210205-18-ggdhxp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Christchurch shooter had been expressing racist hatred since his youth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark Baker/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is possible that, with more attention, his deadly trajectory could have been identified and interrupted. But even if that is not specifically the case, it is clear in general that limiting space for hateful extremism reduces the likelihood of violent extremism. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism_JULY.pdf">United States</a>, far-right extremism has accounted for the <a href="https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2020#exploring-the-numbers">vast majority</a> of terrorist attacks over the past decade. This points to what happens when the ecosystem of white supremacist hate is allowed to flourish unchecked. </p>
<h2>Not as illegal as you think</h2>
<p>In Australia, like the US, violent extremism makes enormous demands on law enforcement resources. But hateful extremism is not, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-28/anger-over-neo-nazis-chanting-camping-in-the-grampians/13097654">for the most part, illegal</a>. Violent extremism represents but the tip of the iceberg. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-boogaloo-and-who-are-the-rioters-who-stormed-the-capitol-5-essential-reads-153337">What is the 'boogaloo' and who are the rioters who stormed the Capitol? 5 essential reads</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As we saw recently in Victoria, neo-Nazis are free to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/neo-nazis-go-bush-grampians-gathering-highlights-rise-of-australia-s-far-right-20210127-p56xbf.html">parade through national parks</a>, burning crosses and yelling things like “heil Hitler” and “Ku Klux Klan” in public places, certain of securing media attention and the infamy they desperately seek. </p>
<p>And while fascists were prancing around the Grampians, supporters of the Proud Boys — one of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-far-right-rioters-at-the-capitol-were-not-antifa-but-violent-groups-often-blame-rivals-for-unpopular-attacks-153193">far-right militia</a> behind the storming of the US Capitol — were <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-27/far-right-proud-boys-symbols-in-melbourne-frightening-frydenberg/13094492">marching in Melbourne</a>. </p>
<p>Canada has just moved to declare The Proud Boys a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-proud-boys-terrorist-capitol-siege/2021/02/03/546b1d5c-6628-11eb-8468-21bc48f07fe5_story.html">terrorist group</a>. It would help if we <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-04/proud-boys-right-wing-terrorist-organisations/13123000">followed suit</a>. </p>
<h2>Deadly inspiration</h2>
<p>It is true most of these neo-Nazi bullies, moving in packs and hiding behind balaclavas, will not cross the line and become violent extremists. </p>
<p>But the danger is they will inspire lone actors to launch violent attacks in the toxic-narcissistic hope of going from “zero to hero”, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-17/christchurch-shootings-brenton-tarrant-social-media-strategies/10908692">competing for attention</a> with avidly-consumed manifestos, live-streamed bodycam footage, and a sick obsession with “body counts”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Grampians National Park, Victoria." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382665/original/file-20210205-24-te7wdj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In January, a group of white supremicists were heard chanting in the Grampians.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pablo Mena/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The details of far-right extremism vary. But running through its cocktail of toxic nationalism, nativism, white supremacy, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigrant, misogynist propaganda and fascism is a river of hate. </p>
<p>Swirling around the edges of this vast ecosystem is a discourse of racism and bigotry, poisoning political rhetoric and public culture from <a href="https://www.news.com.au/sport/afl/eddie-mcguire-couldnt-say-sorry-but-collingwood-players-can/news-story/f35c61e80866afe30c831eb03b34ba3e">organised sport</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/dec/12/channel-seven-settles-defamation-case-with-aboriginal-community-over-sunrise-segment">media comment</a>. And, like a killer rip at the beach, powerful undercurrents of conspiracy theory movements <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/qanon-nothing-can-stop-what-is-coming/610567/">like QAnon</a> drag <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/health-and-wellness/playing-with-fire-the-curious-marriage-of-qanon-and-wellness-20200924-p55yu7.html">otherwise ordinary citizens</a> at the edges into dark places with frightening force and swiftness. </p>
<p>For the most part, this results in more noise than fury. But both the violent storming of the US Capitol and the gunning-down of 91 worshippers in Christchurch are reminders of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/boogaloo-bois-military-training-overthrow-government/?utm_campaign=frontline&utm_content=1612196341&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter">where this hate can lead</a>. </p>
<h2>A public register for hate crimes</h2>
<p>The time has come to deal with hateful extremism before it manifests as violent extremism. </p>
<p>Australia needs to constrain the space available for the ecosystem of hate to poison public spaces and discourse. This requires both <a href="https://www.adl.org/what-we-do/combat-hate/hate-crimes">tighter legal constraints</a> on hate speech and the incitement of hatred and investment in, and listening to and acknowledging, victims of hate. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Rioters storm the US Capitol in January 2021." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382669/original/file-20210205-20-1drmpis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The mob that strormed the US Capitol included members of far-right groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mihoko Owada/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also a pressing need for a properly resourced and maintained open registry of hate crimes and incidents, rather than the shambolic, haphazard, disconnected, array of incomplete collections that currently exist. </p>
<p>Four out of five <a href="https://tacklinghate.org/blogs/tackling-hate-in-australia-stocktake-report-2019-2020/">organisations</a> tackling hate in Australia are non-government and largely focus on raising awareness. Police forces are tasked with addressing hate crime, but they need to be empowered to do this more thoroughly, with clearer guidelines and resources. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz">Christchurch royal commission</a> points the way to what is required in Australia. This includes police revising the way they record complaints. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>to capture systematically hate-motivations for offending and train frontline staff […] [to] identify potential hate crimes when they perceive that an offence is hate-motivated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also recommends police to better understand the perceptions of victims and witnesses and to record “hate-motivations”. </p>
<p>We also need to recognise the <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/20200318/frequently-asked-questions-about-hate-groups#hate%20group">many significant incidents</a> and groups that do not reach the threshold of criminality. There is much to be gained from carefully recording all incidents even if prosecution is unlikely (<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-05/why-are-so-few-hate-crimes/11078972">only 21 people</a> have ever been convicted of hate crime in Australia). </p>
<p>Listening to victims <a href="https://tacklinghate.org/blogs/comparing-different-sources-of-data-to-examine-trends-of-hate-crime-in-absence-of-official-registers/">is also important</a>, not just for their sake but so we have more <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map">complete evidence</a> to guide us. </p>
<h2>A healthier, happier society</h2>
<p>Doing this does not guarantee the next violent extremist attack could be stopped. But it would go a long way to making it less likely. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-far-right-and-white-supremacists-have-embraced-the-middle-ages-and-their-symbols-152968">Why the far-right and white supremacists have embraced the Middle Ages and their symbols</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>At the same time, a society with less space for hateful extremism would a healthier and happier one for all, whether at the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2021/02/02/racism-issue-much-bigger-collingwood-heritier-lumumba">football</a>, taking <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/news/woman-arrested-charged-after-racist-incident-involving-two-women-and-a-child/news-story/73d2194ab1888debf5dba50fec7e9ccd">the train</a>, using <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/08/youtube-radicalized-christchurch-shooter-new-zealand-report-finds.html">social media</a> or <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/national-socialist-network-melbourne-neonazi-group-seen-in-grampians-uncovered/news-story/d6cee39c9d2b0d6e565cf7e339491a5a">picnicking</a> in a national park.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>The time has come to deal with hateful extremism before it manifests as violent extremism. This includes having a public register of hate incidents.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1516652021-01-12T19:09:14Z2021-01-12T19:09:14ZYou could break espionage laws on social media without realising it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375594/original/file-20201217-21-l5nikk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Did you know you could be <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/TBYL%20-%20For%20staff%20-%20Case%20study%20booklet.pdf">charged with spying</a> if you connect with someone who turns out to be a foreign spy on LinkedIn?</p>
<p>Apparently, not enough of us do. Australia’s domestic spy agency ASIO recently launched its first <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-17/asio-warns-foreign-spies-grooming-australians-on-social-media/12889228">public awareness campaign</a>, warning foreign spies are using social media and professional networking sites to recruit Australians as unwitting agents. </p>
<p>So, how easy is it to commit espionage by simply making connections on social media? How do we know when a line has been crossed between innocent social networking and a national security offence?</p>
<h2>Who is at risk?</h2>
<p>ASIO warns foreign spies are targeting Australians who have access to <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/TBYL%20-%20For%20staff%20-%20Online%20networking%20guide%20booklet%20HQP.pdf">sensitive or valuable information</a>, such as national security, government, intellectual property and commercial information.</p>
<p>This could potentially involve public servants, or others with a government security clearance, <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7071516/researchers-targeted-by-foreign-actors-asio/">academics and researchers</a>, and those in sectors like banking and commerce.</p>
<p>If you have access to this kind of information and/or work in one of these professions, then you are at greater risk of committing an espionage offence. But ASIO warns it is not just these professions at risk — everyone must be cautious about what they share online. </p>
<h2>Australia’s espionage laws</h2>
<p>The United Kingdom’s domestic spy agency, <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/counter-espionage">MI5</a>, provides a good explanation of espionage as,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the process of obtaining information that is not normally publicly available, using human sources (agents) or technical means (like hacking into computer systems). It may also involve seeking to influence decision-makers and opinion-formers to benefit the interests of a foreign power. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, following revelations by ASIO about an “<a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202016-17.pdf">unprecedented</a>” threat of espionage and foreign interference, the federal government introduced a complex scheme of <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/dsvs/industry/documents/EFI_Act_2018-Summary_of_Offences.pdf">27 espionage offences</a>. Penalties for these range from 15 years to life in jail. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/government-needs-to-slow-down-on-changes-to-spying-and-foreign-interference-laws-98002">Government needs to slow down on changes to spying and foreign interference laws</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia’s laws include an offence of “preparing for espionage” which makes it a crime to do something which could later result in espionage, such as <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.pdf">buying a laptop</a> that could be used for cyber hacking. So this offence could capture conduct with an innocent explanation, provided it could be shown from surrounding circumstances the person intends to later engage in espionage. </p>
<p>Attorney-General <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jun/29/sweeping-foreign-interference-and-spying-laws-pass-senate">Christian Porter</a> described the regime as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>strong new laws against those who seek to undermine our national security and our democratic institutions and processes. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But they have been criticised by academics for their <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UQLawJl/2019/6.pdf">complexity and over-reach</a>. For example, they can criminalise the legitimate conduct of <a href="https://law.uq.edu.au/files/64540/espionage.pdf">journalists</a> and whistleblowers, and rely on a definition of “national security” that not only includes traditional defence matters, but Australia’s diplomatic relations too.</p>
<h2>How could you commit an espionage offence?</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, you would commit espionage if you work for the government and knowingly revealed classified information to a foreign agent via a site such as LinkedIn. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man logging onto Linkedin" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/375595/original/file-20201217-19-1veuzfv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It can be hard to know who you are really talking to online.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>You would also be committing espionage if you shared your employer’s trade secrets with a foreign spy via Facebook or WeChat — even if you didn’t think the recipient was a foreign agent. </p>
<p>This is the kind of conduct former CIA officer <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/how-230-000-debt-linkedin-message-led-ex-cia-officer-n990691">Kevin Mallory</a> was convicted for in the United States in 2019. He was sentenced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/may/18/ex-cia-officer-kevin-mallory-sentenced-to-20-years-for-spying-for-china">20 years in prison</a> after selling classified US defence information to someone who messaged him on LinkedIn claiming to be a think tank representative. The representative was actually a Chinese intelligence officer.</p>
<h2>Less obvious acts are also a problem</h2>
<p>“Preparing for espionage” criminalises a much wider range of conduct. Its purpose is to give law enforcement the power to stop espionage before it occurs. This is the offence you are most likely to break unwittingly on social media.</p>
<p>Connecting with a foreign spy on any social media site opens the door for you to potentially reveal sensitive information to the spy in the future. This could be seen as doing an act in preparation for espionage. </p>
<p>This is especially the case if you:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>engage in conversation with the spy</p></li>
<li><p>have access to valuable information of any kind</p></li>
<li><p>think the person seems even remotely suspicious</p></li>
<li><p>hand over any sort of information, even if you don’t think it is sensitive.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>If charged with this offence, you could face up to 15 years in prison.</p>
<h2>How to spot a spy</h2>
<p>It is important to recognise the kinds of profiles that may be malicious.</p>
<p>Foreign agents use social media to pose as <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/TBYL%20-%20For%20staff%20-%20Online%20networking%20guide%20booklet%20HQP.pdf">fake employers or recruitment consultants</a> who offer you “unique” business or career opportunities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asio-chief-mike-burgess-says-there-are-more-spies-in-australia-than-at-the-height-of-the-cold-war-132384">ASIO chief Mike Burgess says there are more spies in Australia 'than at the height of the cold war'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These offers usually seem too good to be true, lack detail, and are emphasised as time sensitive or one-off opportunities. The “recruiter” may also be excessively flattering and focus on the role instead of scrutinising you as a candidate. This may involve emphasising perks of the job rather than asking for referees to check your background. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, their real purpose is to gain as much information from you as possible.</p>
<p>They do this by requesting further information about you and your experience, and asking seemingly benign questions. Then they escalate to requests for more sensitive information. They will usually attempt to move you to a different communication platform or set up face-to-face meetings.</p>
<p>As ASIO head <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/17/asio-warns-social-media-being-used-as-hunting-grounds-by-foreign-spies">Mike Burgess</a> warns, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If a stranger reaches out online, ask yourself if you really know who you are talking to.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>How can you protect yourself?</h2>
<p>To protect yourself from becoming a target in the first place, there are some <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/TBYL%20-%20For%20security%20personnel%20-%20Briefing%20pack%20for%20staff.pdf">simple steps</a> you can follow:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>include only the lowest level of detail necessary on your online profile</p></li>
<li><p>only share your CV or details of specific projects with trusted and verified contacts</p></li>
<li><p>use website settings to control who can view your profile</p></li>
<li><p>if you have access to sensitive information, don’t make details of your sensitive job roles or employers public.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>And if you are contacted by an online profile you suspect may be trying to get sensitive information from you, do not respond. Instead, <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/TBYL%20-%20For%20staff%20-%20Online%20networking%20guide%20booklet%20HQP.pdf">report</a> the contact to your company’s security adviser or ASIO, then remove them from your network. You cannot “prepare for espionage” if you are not connected to the spy and have not communicated with them.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the message is one of caution. Because the consequences of brief recklessness could include prosecution for a serious national security offence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Kendall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Amid increasingly sophisticated ploys online, it can be difficult to tell the difference between innocent social networking and a national security offence.Sarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1512032020-12-11T01:00:17Z2020-12-11T01:00:17ZFar-right groups have used COVID to expand their footprint in Australia. Here are the ones you need to know about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374124/original/file-20201210-21-1hf2nez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=724%2C67%2C3279%2C2658&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ERIK ANDERSON/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The threat of far-right terrorism has loomed large in Australia this week. An 18-year-old from NSW has been <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/teenager-charged-with-terrorism-offences-to-remain-behind-bars-20201210-p56mbm.html">arrested</a> on charges of advocating terrorism and inciting others to violence. According to police, he had not only been sharing white supremacist and neo-Nazi views online, but had expressed support for being involved in a “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-09/nsw-albury-man-18-expected-to-be-charged-with-terrorism/12966514">mass casualty</a>” event. </p>
<p>The arrest coincided with the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/parliamentary-inquiry-to-examine-extremism-in-australia-amid-increasing-far-right-threat">launch of an inquiry</a> into extremist movements in Australia by the parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security. Headed by Liberal MP Andrew Hastie, the inquiry will consider both right-wing and left-wing extremism.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=708&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=890&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=890&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374128/original/file-20201210-14-136kofe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=890&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The teenager from Albury arrested this week by the NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Also this week, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-report-on-the-christchurch-atrocity-is-a-beginning-not-an-end-151663">royal commission report into the Christchurch terrorist attack</a> reported that New Zealand security and intelligence services had mistakenly ignored the potential of far-right groups to commit acts of terrorism due to an overwhelming focus on Islamist threats. </p>
<p>The commissioners confirmed the convicted terrorist behind the attack that killed 51 people had been active in Australian extremist groups before moving to New Zealand. </p>
<h2>The far right becoming more visible during pandemic</h2>
<p>Far-right extremism is not a new phenomenon in Australia, but it has certainly been on the rise in the past year in response to federal and state governments’ handling of the coronavirus pandemic. </p>
<p>In September, ASIO revealed that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter-terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism">up to 40% of its counterterrorism efforts</a> were now directed at far-right extremist activities, an increase from 10-15% before 2016.</p>
<p>ASIO has also warned that far-right groups were <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-12/asio-briefing-warns-far-right-is-exploiting-coronavirus/12344472">exploiting the pandemic</a> to expand their operations. New groups have emerged and existing groups have become more radicalised and increased their memberships.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-recognises-the-threat-posted-by-far-right-groups-so-why-arent-they-listed-on-the-terror-register-134019">Australia recognises the threat posted by far-right groups. So, why aren't they listed on the terror register?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One such right-wing group is the Proud Boys. They received what seemed like an endorsement this year from US President Donald Trump when, after being asked to condemn white supremacist and militia groups during the first presidential election debate in September, he said they should “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/opinion/trump-proud-boys.html">stand back and stand by</a>”. </p>
<p>The group has also been growing in Australia this year. Its vetting channel on the encrypted app Telegram has been increasingly active, with a steady stream of new applicants. And members have participated in protests throughout the year.</p>
<p>At the Melbourne Invasion Day rally, a group of Proud Boys posed at Flinders Street Station wearing T-shirts that said “<a href="https://slackbastard.anarchobase.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/pissboysinvasion-1.jpg">Governor Arthur Phillip did nothing wrong</a>”. They dispersed before the rally commenced.</p>
<p>By November, however, they were bolder and appeared wearing their signature Fred Perry polo shirts at an <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/13093649/proud-boys-melbourne/">anti-lockdown protest</a> at Victoria’s Parliament House. They scuffled with police before being pepper-sprayed, arrested and fined. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374126/original/file-20201210-23-mx46hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Proud Boys became more of a visible presence at a November protest in Melbourne.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Anderson/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Proud Boys are a self-described “Western chauvinist” street-fighting gang for men. They claim to be non-racist, but members must take an oath upholding Western civilisation as supreme. Their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australia-should-be-wary-of-the-proud-boys-and-their-violent-alt-right-views-104945">process for becoming a member</a> also involves violence against each other and against antifascists or “<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-antifa-and-where-did-it-come-from-82977">antifa</a>”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australia-should-be-wary-of-the-proud-boys-and-their-violent-alt-right-views-104945">Why Australia should be wary of the Proud Boys and their violent, alt-right views</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This year, Proud Boys members in America have been <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/09/30/proud-boy-arrested-on-six-felony-charges-in-portland/?sh=5a3943a86e2f">arrested</a> for assault, street brawls and weapons offences. They are an increasingly visible presence on the streets there, frequently wearing military body armour and carrying high-powered weapons. </p>
<p>The increased visibility of Proud Boys at demonstrations is concerning if it signals a new strategy by the group to engage in street violence either with police or left-wing protesters. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374131/original/file-20201210-20-ru8yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Proud Boys members protesting the presidential election outcome in Washington. Note right Wing Death Squad badge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span>
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<h2>Other far-right groups emerging</h2>
<p>Other right-wing groups in Australia have benefited from public anger to the government’s coronavirus responses, as well. </p>
<p>Relatively new groups such as the <a href="https://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/news/townsville-free-corps-using-neonazi-symbols-in-posters-around-city/news-story/15ac758b6ed7f1fe7cb5e61318411526">Townsville Free Corps</a> and the <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/breaking-news/alarm-as-neonazi-group-national-socialist-network-expands-to-adelaide/news-story/a68c9d4aa39ce51120c7ab8e3fdf7035">National Socialist Network</a>, an offshoot of the Lads Society and incorporating ex-Antipodean Resistance members, have stepped up their recruitment and propaganda activities in Melbourne, Sydney and Queensland over the past year. </p>
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<p>The Southern Poverty Law Centre in the US, which tracks far-right extremist groups, <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/08/12/base-exporting-accelerationist-terror">revealed</a> in August that the white supremacist terror group The Base had also interviewed potential Australian members using its Perth-based recruiter to set up cells. By late 2019, at least a dozen Australian men had applied to join The Base. </p>
<p>One potential member had been a former political candidate for One Nation, the SPLC reported. </p>
<p>Many of these far-right groups are adherents to the same “great replacement theory” that motivated the Christchurch killer. According to this theory, white Europeans are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/05/great-replacement-theory-alt-right-killers-el-paso">threatened</a> by increasing non-white immigration and are therefore facing “white genocide”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-and-conspiracies-how-the-far-right-is-exploiting-the-pandemic-145968">Coronavirus and conspiracies: how the far right is exploiting the pandemic</a>
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<p>The Base follows an “accelerationist” ideology, which aims to bring about societal collapse as a way of “winning the race war” for whites. </p>
<p>The National Socialist Network, which has <a href="https://t.me/s/nationalsocialistnetwork?before=53">more than 2,000 members on Telegram</a>, uses the “great replacement theory” to recruit. Its leader, Thomas Sewell, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/12/australian-white-nationalists-reveal-plans-to-recruit-disgruntled-white-male-population">specifically targets</a> young, white, “disgruntled” men. </p>
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<h2>When hateful speech turns into violence</h2>
<p>Tyler Jakovac, the 18-year-old man arrested in Albury this week, fits this description. According to NSW police assistant commissioner Mark Walton, he <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/a-nsw-teenager-who-allegedly-holds-neo-nazi-views-is-expected-to-face-terrorism-charges">hated anyone who did not look like him</a> and was specifically opposed to Jews, Muslims and immigrants.</p>
<p>The National Socialist Network issued a statement via an encrypted app claiming that Jakovac applied to join six months ago, but didn’t pass the vetting process. The group claims that after being rejected, Jakovac abused it as being “too moderate”.</p>
<p>The Christchurch killer, meanwhile, had been invited to join an earlier version of Sewell’s group. He <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/threats-from-white-extremist-group-that-tried-to-recruit-tarrant-20190501-p51j5w.html">declined</a> and went on to act alone.</p>
<p>This raises a problem: extremist groups with a public propaganda strategy are easier to identify, but as the inquiry into the Christchurch attack noted, lone actors can be almost invisible to authorities.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-report-on-the-christchurch-atrocity-is-a-beginning-not-an-end-151663">The royal commission report on the Christchurch atrocity is a beginning, not an end</a>
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<p>There are communities on gaming platforms, message boards and in encrypted apps that share racist, anti-semitic and hateful material every day. By “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-humor-as-a-weapon-facism">"weaponising” irony</a>, users can hide behind plausible deniability (“it’s just a joke”) when challenged about the violence stated in their posts. But to outsiders, the language used can be confronting. </p>
<p>It is often insiders who have a more finely tuned sense of when someone is crossing over from sharing memes to something more sinister. We need to educate and support internet users to follow their hunches by identifying and reporting other users who are edging toward violent action. </p>
<p>The Christchurch murderer was reported to police in 2016 for threatening someone with retribution on the “<a href="https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/day-of-the-rope">day of the rope</a>”, according to the inquiry report. This is neo-Nazi shorthand for the mass murder of race traitors. Unfortunately, no police action was taken. </p>
<p>There are thousands of references to the “day of the rope” in online groups — knowing when to step in is the challenge. And, as the events of this week show, disruptive preemptive action is essential to reduce the risk of another mass murder.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaz Ross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New far-right groups have emerged during the pandemic and existing groups have become more radicalised and increased their memberships.Kaz Ross, Lecturer in Humanities (Asian Studies), University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1458732020-09-09T12:00:16Z2020-09-09T12:00:16ZChinese reveal their journalists in Australia were questioned in foreign interference investigation<p>Australian Federal Police and ASIO raided two Chinese journalists in June as part of an investigation into foreign interference in Australia.</p>
<p>The previously unpublicised action has come to light via Chinese media reports, in the same week that two Australian reporters fled China amid fears for their security and in a blaze of publicity.</p>
<p>The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese authorities, said ASIO had questioned the Chinese journalists, seized computers and smartphones, and asked them not to report the incident. </p>
<p>The raids, undertaken under a warrant, were connected to the investigation into allegations of attempted Chinese infiltration of the NSW parliament through the office of NSW Labor state MP Shaoquett Moselmane, and in particular his part-time staffer John Zhang. Both Moselmane and Zhang have denied any wrong doing.</p>
<p>Moselmane is on leave from the parliament and suspended from the ALP. </p>
<p>Part of the investigation was into a group Zhang had on WeChat, a Chinese social media platform, that included the journalists as well as Chinese scholars. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-09/chinese-scholars-have-visas-revoked-as-diplomatic-crisis-grows/12644022">The ABC reported on Wednesday</a> that two Chinese scholars on the chat group subsequently had their Australian visas cancelled.</p>
<p>The timing of the raids on the journalists coincided with raids on Moselmane and Zhang.</p>
<p>Asked about the Global Times claim, the Chinese embassy in Canberra said in a statement: “We have provided consular support to Chinese journalists in Australia and made representations with relevant Australian authorities to safeguard legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens.”</p>
<p>Citing a “source” the Global Times said: “Australia flagrantly infringed on the legitimate rights and interests of journalists from Chinese media and institutions in Australia in the name of a possible violation of Australia’s anti-foreign interference law”.</p>
<p>The Chinese have sat on the information about their journalists for more than two months.</p>
<p>This week the ABC’s Bill Birtles and the Australian Financial Review’s Michael Smith were rushed out of China after Australian government concern for their security.</p>
<p>Last week multiple Chinese security officials arrived after midnight at the homes of Birtles and Smith, in Beijing and Shanghai respectively. They were told they couldn’t leave the country without answering questions.</p>
<p>The men had been making arrangements to depart, on advice from the Australian foreign affairs department, after Australian journalist Cheng Lei, who worked for China’s English-language state broadcaster CGTN, was recently taken into custody.</p>
<p>The Chinese government says Cheng is suspected of activities endangering China’s national security.</p>
<p>Birtles and Smith contacted Australian officials following the late night visits, and were placed under diplomatic protection, with negotiations undertaken to enable them to return to Australia.</p>
<p>The Chinese made the journalists’ exit conditional on their being interviewed. Smith said the interview included some questions about Cheng whom he had only met once, in passing.</p>
<p>In a full-on attack, the Global Times wrote: “Freedom of the press has become political correctness for Australian authorities. When they spread fake information, smear and attack other countries, they call it ‘freedom of the press’, but when they see information they don’t want to see, they choose to crack down for political purposes, experts said. </p>
<p>"Chinese journalists in Australia strictly comply with Australian laws and have good professional conduct.”</p>
<p>The article said that in the past 20 years, “Australia has passed more than 60 rules restricting ‘press freedom’.</p>
<p>"Australia’s major media outlets launched a joint campaign on October 21, 2019 to protest government restrictions on press freedom, by blacking out copy on front pages. </p>
<p>"Australian authorities have not been satisfied with only extending their black hands to domestic media, and have blatantly raided the residences of Chinese journalists in Australia, regardless of the basic norms of international relations and China-Australia relations, analysts said. </p>
<p>"Analysts said what Australia did was not just driven by Australia’s traditional ideological bias, but also showed that it’s a follower of ‘Uncle Sam’”, the Global Times said.</p>
<p>It also accused Australia of having “hyped” the Cheng case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A raid undertaken by ASIO and AFP of two Chinese journalists in June as come to light.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1388272020-05-19T07:09:45Z2020-05-19T07:09:45ZAustralia doesn’t need more anti-terror laws that aren’t necessary – or even used<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335975/original/file-20200519-83375-4llefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/may/13/asio-could-question-children-and-more-easily-use-more-tracking-devices-under-new-powers">has introduced a new bill</a> that will amend the controversial questioning and detention powers held by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).</p>
<p>While some changes are welcome, others are a cause for concern. One major change is that the legislation will allow ASIO officers to coercively question children as young as 14. </p>
<p>For this bill to be passed, Home Affairs must offer a stronger justification as to why the expanded powers are needed in the current security climate.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">Australia has enacted 82 anti-terror laws since 2001. But tough laws alone can't eliminate terrorism</a>
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<p>Calls for new counter-terrorism powers have become commonplace in Australia, to the point where we now have <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-enacted-82-anti-terror-laws-since-2001-but-tough-laws-alone-cant-eliminate-terrorism-123521">more than 80 laws</a> directed at the threat of terrorism. </p>
<p>Any call for additional powers should be met with careful scrutiny, particularly when the rights of children are at stake.</p>
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<h2>Repealing controversial detention powers</h2>
<p>One of the biggest changes in the bill is that it would repeal ASIO’s power to detain people for questioning. Currently, ASIO has the power to seek a <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34g.html">questioning and detention warrant</a> (QDW) that allows people to be <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34s.html">detained for up to one week</a>. Detention can be approved if a person is likely to fail to appear for questioning, alert someone involved in terrorism, or tamper with evidence. </p>
<p>During that period, a person can be questioned in eight-hour blocks up to a <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34r.html">maximum of 24 hours</a>. This is purely an intelligence-gathering exercise, and is not related to any investigation for a criminal offence. The questioning can be <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34g.html">approved</a> if it would </p>
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<p>substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence</p>
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<p>The questioning is coercive, in that a person faces <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34l.html">five years in prison</a> for failing to answer any of ASIO’s questions. The powers are also highly secretive: it’s <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34zs.html">five years in prison</a> for anyone who reveals anything about a warrant.</p>
<p>These powers are some of Australia’s most controversial anti-terror laws, as <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2012/11.html">no democratic country</a> has granted its domestic intelligence agency the same power to detain people for questioning.</p>
<p>Reviews by the <a href="https://www.inslm.gov.au/reviews-reports/certain-questioning-and-detention-powers-relation-terorism">Independent National Security Legislation Monitor</a>, the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/ASIO/Report">Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security</a> and the <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/COAGCTReview/Final%20Report.PDF">COAG review</a> of counter-terrorism legislation have all recommended this power be repealed. Such a move would be welcome.</p>
<h2>Expanded powers to question minors</h2>
<p>At the same time, the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6554">bill</a> will expand ASIO’s power to seek questioning warrants (QWs). These trigger all the same questioning processes and criminal offences as QDWs, they just don’t allow ASIO to detain the person outside the questioning period.</p>
<p>If the bill passes, QWs will be split into “adult questioning warrants” and “minor questioning warrants”. Minor questioning warrants will be available for children as young as 14 who are “likely to engage in” politically motivated violence. </p>
<p>This significantly widens the current thresholds. QWs are currently available for 16-year-olds only when the attorney-general is satisfied the person “<a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34ze.html">will commit, is committing or has committed a terrorism offence</a>”.</p>
<p>Some additional safeguards will protect minors under the new measures. Before issuing a questioning warrant, for instance, the attorney-general will need to consider the “best interests” of the child. </p>
<p>This is consistent with international law requirements and <a href="https://theconversation.com/control-orders-for-kids-wont-make-us-any-safer-49074">Australia’s expanded control order regime</a>, which can include electronic tagging and curfews.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/control-orders-for-kids-wont-make-us-any-safer-49074">Control orders for kids won't make us any safer</a>
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<p>Under the proposed laws, a young person can only be questioned in blocks of two hours or less, and a lawyer must be present during all questioning.</p>
<p>However, restrictions currently placed on lawyers will be retained. Lawyers, whether acting for young people or adults, are <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s34zq.html">not allowed to intervene in questioning</a>, except to clarify an ambiguous question. They can even be kicked out of the room, and a new lawyer appointed, if they “unduly” disrupt the questioning.</p>
<p>These restrictions will significantly undermine the ability of lawyers to protect children from any forceful or inappropriate questioning by ASIO officers.</p>
<h2>Are the changes even needed?</h2>
<p>Dutton has justified the proposed changes by claiming Australia faces a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-14/peter-dutton-introduces-bill-giving-asio-powers-to-talk-to-teens/12246886">significant threat of terrorism from young people</a>. While we cannot know the intelligence on which this assessment is based, the urgent need for these changes is doubtful.</p>
<p>The statistics show that questioning warrants are used very rarely. The <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportjnt/024080/toc_pdf/ASIO'squestioninganddetentionpowers.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">last QW was issued in 2010</a>, and the last one before that in 2006. </p>
<p>Only 16 QWs have ever been issued since their introduction in 2003, and <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/2018-19-annual-report.html">none since the threat from Islamic State</a> emerged. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-quest-for-national-security-is-undermining-the-courts-and-could-lead-to-secretive-trials-122638">Australia's quest for national security is undermining the courts and could lead to secretive trials</a>
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<p>Given this record, it is difficult to see how QWs for 14-year-olds are suddenly needed to prevent acts of terrorism.</p>
<p>Indeed, in a <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportjnt/024080/toc_pdf/ASIO'squestioninganddetentionpowers.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">recent PJCIS inquiry</a>, ASIO explained their lack of use by saying the powers were difficult to approve on a short timeframe. This made them not very useful for the kinds of low-tech attacks seen in recent years, such as stabbings and shootings, which require little advance planning.</p>
<p>If the new powers are passed in the bill, they should at least be sunsetted to expire after three years, rather than the proposed ten. Without this amendment, more extraordinary counter-terrorism powers will be on Australia’s statute books for the foreseeable future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keiran Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some changes in the new security bill submitted to parliament last week are welcome, but others require careful scrutiny, especially when the rights of children are at stake.Keiran Hardy, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Griffith Criminology Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1330502020-03-10T18:01:15Z2020-03-10T18:01:15ZFar-right extremists still threaten New Zealand, a year on from the Christchurch attacks<p>In the hours after the Christchurch mosque attacks on March 15 last year, <a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-mosque-shootings-must-end-new-zealands-innocence-about-right-wing-terrorism-113655">I wrote</a> that I hoped New Zealand would finally stop believing it was immune to far-right extremist violence. A year on, I’m not sure enough has changed.</p>
<p>I’ve researched far-right extremism for decades – and I would argue it remains a high-level threat in New Zealand, not just <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/19/fastest-growing-uk-terrorist-threat-is-from-far-right-say-police">overseas</a>. </p>
<p>My assessment is that there are about 60 to 70 groups and somewhere between 150 and 300 core right-wing activists in New Zealand. </p>
<p>This sounds modest alongside the estimated 12,000 to 13,000 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/world/europe/germany-shooting-terrorism.html">violent far-right activists in Germany</a>. But proportionate to population size, the numbers are similar for both countries. And it only takes one activist to act out his extremism.</p>
<p>In the past year, there has certainly been greater investment by New Zealand’s security agencies in monitoring extremist groups and activists. There has been more media coverage. The government moved quickly to ban assault weapons and further <a href="https://www.parliament.nz/en/get-involved/topics/all-current-topics/bill-proposes-further-tightening-of-gun-controls/">controls on the use and possession of arms are underway</a>. Other initiatives, including a <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/">royal commission of inquiry</a>, are pending. </p>
<p>But I also feel there is a tendency to see the Christchurch attacks, which killed 51 people, as a one-off or an aberration – rather than something we still need to guard against. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-mosque-shootings-must-end-new-zealands-innocence-about-right-wing-terrorism-113655">Christchurch mosque shootings must end New Zealand's innocence about right-wing terrorism</a>
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<h2>New Zealand’s home-grown extremists</h2>
<p>New Zealanders should now be more aware than a year ago of the presence of local right-wing extremists. There has been plenty to remind them.</p>
<p>In June last year, Philip Arps, who has been involved in white supremacist activities in Christchurch for some time, was sentenced to 21 months in jail for sharing video of the Christchurch shootings. I am puzzled by the limited public awareness that the imagery on the side of his van – a <a href="https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/1488">reference to 14/88</a> and Nazi signage – was a clear indicator of his extremist views. </p>
<p>Arps was <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/01/white-supremacist-philip-arps-released-from-prison-banned-from-contact-with-muslims.html">released early in January this year</a> under strict conditions, including a GPS monitor that alerts authorities if he goes near a mosque. </p>
<p>Even though the white nationalist group Dominion Movement folded after the mosque attacks, one of its leaders, a soldier in the New Zealand defence force, was arrested in December last year for “<a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/119627639/whats-public-and-whats-secret-in-the-case-of-the-soldier-arrested-for-breaching-national-security?m=m">accessing a computer for a dishonest purpose</a>” and disclosing information that “<a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/118942709/soldier-with-farright-links-accused-of-disclosing-military-information">prejudiced the security and defence of New Zealand</a>”. He had been active since 2011 on the neo-Nazi site Stormfront and attended a free speech rally in Wellington in 2018 along with another extreme-right activist.</p>
<p>He also appears to be a member of Wargus Christi, a group formed in September last year by a self-described neo-Nazi, Daniel Waring. It is a “martial-monastic” group of body builders who are homophobic, anti-Semitic and Islamaphobic.</p>
<p>Another group new to New Zealand’s extreme right is <a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2020/03/09/1072195/action-zealandia-member-planned-terror-cell">Action Zealandia</a>. Their slogan is “building a community for European New Zealanders”. Apart from their online presence, their main public activity is placing stickers in public spaces highlighting their ultra-nationalism.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-overhauling-nzs-gun-and-terrorism-laws-alone-cant-stop-terrorist-attacks-113706">Why overhauling NZ's gun and terrorism laws alone can't stop terrorist attacks</a>
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<h2>Confronting NZ’s place in a global web of hate</h2>
<p>Information from agencies such as the <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/">Southern Poverty Law Center</a> or the <a href="https://www.adl.org/">Anti-Defamation League</a> in the US shows a significant <a href="https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-double-down-on-propaganda-in-2019">increase in extremist activity</a> since 2016. </p>
<p>What has been most concerning is that the rise in online hate speech has real-world implications. <a href="https://phys.org/news/2019-10-online-speech-crimes-minorities.html">Research</a> shows an increase in online hate speech will be accompanied by hate crimes in a region or locality. Internet outages reduce both.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-from-the-christchurch-terror-attacks-nz-intelligence-records-a-surge-in-reports-131895">A year from the Christchurch terror attacks, NZ intelligence records a surge in reports</a>
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<p>In the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks, it was good to see <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-bans-military-style-semi-automatics-and-assault-rifles">rapid action on limiting automatic weapons</a>. And the <a href="https://www.christchurchcall.com/">Christchurch Call</a> – Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-christchurch-call-is-just-a-start-now-we-need-to-push-for-systemic-change-117259">initiative</a> to stop people using social media to promote terrorism – certainly helped put pressure on online platforms such as Facebook to monitor and remove objectionable material.</p>
<p>But we could move to ban right-wing organisations and put restrictions on individuals who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/24/uk-ban-neo-nazi-sonnenkrieg-division-terrorist-group">breach agreed thresholds of speech and action</a>. We still do not have clear guidelines for what constitutes hate speech, apart from <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0082/latest/DLM304643.html">s61 of the Human Rights Act</a> and the <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2015/0063/latest/whole.html">Harmful Digital Communications Act</a>.</p>
<p>I do worry that we don’t have sufficient resources and skills locally to adequately monitor what is happening, even if agencies have been working together more closely internationally.</p>
<p>It would be good to know more from the agencies that have oversight. The New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service (<a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/">NZSIS</a>) refers to the threat value, but often in relation to international threats. </p>
<p>More openness about their concerns and the extent of local groups and activists would help: for instance, something like <a href="https://tellmamauk.org/">Tell MAMA</a> in the UK or the reports other security agencies provide. </p>
<p>It was refreshing to see the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (<a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/">ASIO</a>) provide its <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment.html">annual threat assessment</a> in February this year. It assessed the terrorist threat in Australia as probable but the possibility of a right-wing extremist attack as low in terms of capability.</p>
<p>But it acknowledged that advances in technology are “outstripping our technical capabilities”, which must be a concern everywhere.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asio-chiefs-assessment-shows-the-need-to-do-more-and-better-to-prevent-terrorism-132447">ASIO chief's assessment shows the need to do more, and better, to prevent terrorism</a>
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<p>One thing is certain. The Christchurch mosque attacks have become part of the lexicon whenever white supremacist terrorism is discussed. The events on March 15 have become something of a guide – and, unfortunately, an inspiration to other right-wing terrorists. </p>
<p>It is challenging that many of these extremists, the alleged Christchurch gunman included, are self-radicalised, ideologically motivated, and with a small or no digital footprint. Often there is no prior warning of an attack. </p>
<p>One year on from the attacks, my report card for New Zealand is that we’ve made progress on greater awareness and action. But we still need to do more, including on keeping the public better informed that the problem hasn’t gone away. Just ask those <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/403884/new-register-for-islamophobic-and-racist-incidents-created">who continue to be targeted</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Spoonley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>My assessment is that there are about 150 to 300 core right-wing activists in New Zealand. This might sound modest – but proportionate to population, it’s similar to extremist numbers in Germany.Paul Spoonley, Distinguished Professor, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Massey UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1326582020-02-28T00:39:55Z2020-02-28T00:39:55ZVIDEO: Michelle Grattan on the government’s emergency plan, climate change, and Bettina Arndt<p>Michelle Grattan talks with Assistant Professor Caroline Fisher about the week in politics, including the implementation of an emergency plan to tackle the spread of coronavirus, the major parties’ policies on climate change, national security and the Senate motion to strip Bettina Arndt of her Order of Australia.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan about the week in politics, including the implementation of an emergency plan to tackle the spread of coronavirus, climate change policy, national security and Bettina ArndtMichelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318952020-02-26T19:04:27Z2020-02-26T19:04:27ZA year from the Christchurch terror attacks, NZ intelligence records a surge in reports<p>The Christchurch mosque attacks on March 15 last year have prompted a significant rise in tip-offs about people expressing extremist views, according to a <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/NZSIS-Annual-Report-2019.pdf">report</a> by New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service (<a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/">NZSIS</a>).</p>
<p>During the three months following the terrorist attacks, NZSIS <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/nzsis-director-general-isc-opening-statement/">received 455 pieces of lead information</a> about people who expressed racist, Nazi or white supremacist views.</p>
<p>The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (<a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/">ASIO</a>) also released its <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment.html">annual threat assessment</a> this week, warning right-wing groups are more organised than in previous years.</p>
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<p>Right-wing extremism has been in ASIO’s sights for some time, but obviously this threat came into sharp, terrible focus last year in New Zealand. In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real and it is growing. In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-mosque-shootings-must-end-new-zealands-innocence-about-right-wing-terrorism-113655">Christchurch mosque shootings must end New Zealand's innocence about right-wing terrorism</a>
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<h2>Different approaches</h2>
<p>In New Zealand, a <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/">royal commission of inquiry</a> is expected to report back in April about what intelligence agencies knew about the alleged perpetrator before the Christchurch attack and how they should be reorganised to prevent such incidents in the future.</p>
<p>I believe the mosque attacks represent a serious failure of intelligence services and any reorganisation should involve greater transparency with the public, so that people see the scale of the threat and how intelligence services are responding.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-a-royal-commission-will-investigate-christchurch-shootings-116122">Explainer: how a royal commission will investigate Christchurch shootings</a>
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<p>Terrorism is a risk for most countries, but intelligence agencies differ in the way they present the risks, their understanding of it and how they report on it.</p>
<p>The European Union (EU) does not report a generic threat level, but individual countries do. For example, the UK’s intelligence agency MI5 records the <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels">risk of a terror attack</a> in England, Scotland and Wales as substantial (an attack is likely) and in Northern Ireland as severe (an attack is highly likely).</p>
<p>The Australian agency <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/">ASIO</a> has listed the <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-19%20Annual%20Report%20WEB2.pdf">national terrorism threat level as probable</a> since 2014. </p>
<p>In New Zealand, the threat level went from low to high following the Christchurch attacks, but is now medium, which means a <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/NZSIS-Annual-Report-2019.pdf">terrorist attack is assessed as feasible</a> and could well occur.</p>
<h2>Reporting terrorism risk</h2>
<p>In 2018, the NZSIS <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/2018-NZSIS-Annual-Report.pdf">reported</a> around 30 people of “particular interest”. Following the Christchurch attacks, “between 30 and 50 individuals have been <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/NZSIS-Annual-Report-2019.pdf">under active investigation</a> … in relation to violent extremism at any one time”.</p>
<p>Australian intelligence agencies do not report how many people are of particular interest. They report the number of attacks that have been disrupted (three in the past 12 months) and how many (12,478) counter-terrorism leads were resolved or investigated. The EU has a similar approach, recording the <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat">number of foiled, failed or completed attacks</a> (129 for 2018), and the number of arrests (1,056).</p>
<p>Australian agencies rank their risk groups. Currently Sunni Islamist extremism, primarily from small groups and individuals inspired by extremist groups overseas, is listed as the “<a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-19%20Annual%20Report%20WEB2.pdf">principal source of the terrorist threat</a>”. </p>
<p>In Europe, risk reporting currently shows most attacks come from “<a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat">ethno-nationalist and seperatist groups</a>” (83), followed by jihadist (24), left-wing (19) and other groups.</p>
<p>Although right-wing terrorism is not a primary risk factor in Australia, intelligence agencies are <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-19%20Annual%20Report%20WEB2.pdf">more aware</a> of it. </p>
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<p>This threat is not something new, but current extreme right‑wing networks are better organised and more sophisticated than those of the past … any future extreme right-wing inspired attack in Australia would most likely be low capability and conducted by a lone actor or small group, although a sophisticated weapons attack is possible. </p>
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<p>Similarly, in Europe, right-wing groups are not a dominant risk factor, but intelligence agencies <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat">note an increase</a>.</p>
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<p>The number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism remained relatively low but increased for the third year in a row. Right-wing extremists prey on fears of perceived attempts to Islamicise society and loss of national identity.</p>
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<h2>More transparency needed</h2>
<p>This month’s <a href="https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/NZSIS-Annual-Report-2019.pdf">national security report</a> notes the Christchurch attack made it clear that New Zealand is not immune to the threat of right-wing violent extremism. </p>
<p>But intelligence services do not gauge the scale of this domestic risk. Instead they paint the problem as “a growing threat internationally … that will … continue to be a challenge for security agencies around the world for the foreseeable future”. </p>
<p>Other countries’ agencies tell citizens more. Australian agencies reported seven terror attacks and 16 major counter-terrorism disruption operations since 2014, including where these incidents took place, what types of weapons were used and whether the targets were public spaces, military sites or infrastructure. </p>
<p>European agencies follow similar reporting, but provide their citizens with even more information. This covers everything from arrests, convictions and penalties, financing, weapons, use of propaganda and detail about people who travel to and return from war zones. </p>
<p>Australian agencies also map what they consider the most likely terror attacks in the future (low cost, locally financed, using readily acquired weapons and relatively simple tactics). They also note emerging themes, such as the risk of opportunistic violence or civil disobedience through counter protesters. </p>
<p>In contrast, New Zealand intelligence agencies don’t share any of these considerations with the public. Nor do they elaborate on the threat of right wing terrorism to the extent of their counterparts. The failure of the previous ten years <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/385173/no-mention-of-right-wing-extremist-threats-in-10-years-of-gcsb-and-sis-public-docs">not to mention the risk of right-wing terror</a> cannot be repeated. While we now know the risk of extreme right terrorism exists, it is the responsibility of the security agencies to better monitor, analyse, prevent, and report on this risk than ever before.</p>
<p>After last year’s mosque shooting, if the intelligence agencies want to regain the trust of the public, they will have to do much better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie has recieved funding for the New Zealand Law Foundation for the study of terrorism. </span></em></p>In the wake of last year’s Christchurch mosque attacks, New Zealand’s intelligence agencies must become more transparent in their reporting on the risk of right-wing terrorism.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1323842020-02-24T12:30:56Z2020-02-24T12:30:56ZASIO chief Mike Burgess says there are more spies in Australia ‘than at the height of the cold war’<p>A foreign intelligence service sent a “sleeper” agent to Australia, who provided logistical support for visiting spies, the head of ASIO, Mike Burgess, has revealed, in a speech pledging to intensify the fight against the threat posed by espionage and foreign interference.</p>
<p>Delivering his first “annual threat assessment”, Burgess, who took over ASIO last year, warned: “There are more foreign intelligence officers and their proxies operating in Australia now than at the height of the cold war and many of them have the requisite level of capability, the intent and the persistence to cause significant harm to our national security”.</p>
<p>He said the “sleeper” agent “lay dormant for many years, quietly building community and business links, all the while secretly maintaining contact with his offshore handlers.</p>
<p>"The agent started feeding his spymasters information about Australia-based expatriate dissidents, which directly led to harassment of the dissidents in Australia and their relatives overseas.</p>
<p>"In exchange for significant cash payments, the agent also provided on-the-ground logistical support for spies who travelled to Australia to conduct intelligence activities”.</p>
<p>Burgess did not specify any particular countries conducting hostile operations here and indicated a number were in ASIO’s sights. “Australia is currently the target of sophisticated and persistent espionage and foreign interference activities from a range of nations.”</p>
<p>But interference from China - including its cyber attacks - has increasingly become the primary worry for the Australian government and intelligence community. China’s activities were a major driving force behind the foreign interference legislation brought in by the Turnbull government.</p>
<p>“The level of threat we face from foreign espionage and interference activities is currently unprecedented. It is higher now than it was at the height of the cold war,” Burgess said.</p>
<p>“Espionage and foreign interference are affecting parts of the community that they did not touch during the cold war.</p>
<p>"And the intent is to engineer fundamental shifts in Australia’s position in the world, not just to collect intelligence or use us as a potential ‘back-door’ into our allies and partners,” he said.</p>
<p>“ASIO has uncovered cases where foreign spies have travelled to Australia with the intention of setting up sophisticated hacking infrastructure targeting computers containing sensitive and classified information.</p>
<p>"We’ve seen visiting scientists and academics ingratiating themselves into university life with the aim of conducting clandestine intelligence collection. This strikes at the very heart of our notions of free and fair academic exchange.</p>
<p>"And perhaps most disturbingly, hostile intelligence services have directly threatened and intimidated Australians in this country. In one particular case, the agents threatened the physical safety of an Australia-based individual as part of a foreign interference plot”.</p>
<p>Hostile foreign intelligence services were being directed to target Australia because of its strategic position and alliances, its leadership in science and technology, the expertise across the economy and because it was retooling its defence force and defence industrial base.</p>
<p>“Hostile foreign intelligence agencies have always sought access to personal information because they want to identify and cultivate potential human sources”, Burgess said. Now they were recognising the opportunities presented by the internet and social networking applications.</p>
<p>“In the past, attempted recruitment was time-intensive, expensive and risky … But now, they can use the internet to work from the safety of their overseas headquarters to launch cyber operations against Australian networks and to send thousands of friend and networking requests to unsuspecting targets with the click of a mouse”.</p>
<p>Burgess said in the last few years ASIO had consistently detected and regularly disrupted espionage in Australia.</p>
<p>He welcomed the current “robust public discussion” about the threats to Australia’s safety and prosperity from espionage and foreign interference, and foresaw the foreign interference legislation becoming more important.</p>
<p>The mere passage of the foreign interference law had discomforted foreign intelligence services. Any future prosecution would have a “further chilling effect”.</p>
<p>But ASIO sought to act before damage was done, and had recommended visa cancellations to stop foreign agents coming and had intercepted agents when they had arrived.</p>
<p>“As Director-General of Security, I intend to step up our actions to counter espionage and foreign interference”, Burgess said.</p>
<p>“We will actively support the prosecution of espionage and foreign interference before the courts,” he said.</p>
<p>“My message here is simple. If you intend to conduct espionage or foreign interference against Australia, ASIO and our partners will be hunting you”.</p>
<p>In his speech Burgess reiterated the “unacceptably high” threat of terrorism that Australia faced would remain for the foreseeable future, saying “the number of terrorism leads we are investigating right now has doubled since this time last year”.</p>
<p>While violent Islamic extremism would remain the principal concern, “the extreme right wing threat is real and it is growing”.</p>
<p>“In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology. These groups are more organised and security conscious than they were in previous years.”</p>
<p>He said earlier this year ASIO advice led to an Australian being stopped from leaving to fight with an extreme right wing group overseas.</p>
<p>“While these are small in number at this time in comparison to what we saw with foreign fighters heading to the Middle East, any development like this is very concerning”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mike Burgess, the head of ASIO, warns there are more foreign agents operating in Australia than at the height of the cold war - and many of them have the capability, intent, and persistence to cause significant harm.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1285452019-12-09T02:38:51Z2019-12-09T02:38:51ZPolitics with Michelle Grattan: Andrew Hastie on foreign influence, security and veteran mental health<p>Chinese government influence and interference has been a contentious issue in Australia politics in the past year. </p>
<p>Weighing up concerns about <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-27/labor-staffer-tells-icac-he-was-asked-to-count-bag-full-of-cash/11453344">foreign money in state and federal campaigns</a>, candidates’ direct relationships with <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/who-is-mp-gladys-liu/11528352">arms of the Chinese Communist Party</a> and the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/defecting-chinese-spy-offers-information-trove-to-australian-government-20191122-p53d1l.html">defection of a Chinese spy operating within Australia</a>, against the fragile trade relationship we have with our largest export market has been one of the more difficult topics for both major parties.</p>
<p>Andrew Hastie, Liberal member for the seat of Canning, is one of the most outspoken government members on the issue of foreign interference. </p>
<p>He’s used his position as a backbencher – and as chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security – to speak openly about his concerns and what he sees as the expansion of “revisionist” countries trying to “remake the world order … pushing out to secure their economic and strategic influence beyond their geographical borders”. </p>
<p>He also talks about why he thinks it would be untenable to have security clearance for every member of parliament, the role of the media in scrutinising candidates, and concerns about mental health among returned veterans.</p>
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<h2>New to podcasts?</h2>
<p>Podcasts are often best enjoyed using a podcast app. All iPhones come with the Apple Podcasts app already installed, or you may want to listen and subscribe on another app such as Pocket Casts (click <a href="http://pca.st/BVa3#t=3m34s">here</a> to listen to Politics with Michelle Grattan on Pocket Casts).</p>
<p>You can also hear it on Stitcher, Spotify or any of the apps below. Just pick a service from one of those listed below and click on the icon to find Politics with Michelle Grattan.</p>
<p><a href="https://itunes.apple.com/au/podcast/politics-with-michelle-grattan/id703425900?mt=2"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233721/original/file-20180827-75984-1gfuvlr.png" alt="Listen on Apple Podcasts" width="268" height="68"></a> <a href="https://www.google.com/podcasts?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly90aGVjb252ZXJzYXRpb24uY29tL2F1L3BvZGNhc3RzL3BvbGl0aWNzLXdpdGgtbWljaGVsbGUtZ3JhdHRhbi5yc3M"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233720/original/file-20180827-75978-3mdxcf.png" alt="" width="268" height="68"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-conversation-4/politics-with-michelle-grattan"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233716/original/file-20180827-75981-pdp50i.png" alt="Stitcher" width="300" height="88"></a> <a href="https://tunein.com/podcasts/News--Politics-Podcasts/Politics-with-Michelle-Grattan-p227852/"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233723/original/file-20180827-75984-f0y2gb.png" alt="Listen on TuneIn" width="318" height="125"></a></p>
<p><a href="https://radiopublic.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-WRElBZ"><img class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-152" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233717/original/file-20180827-75990-86y5tg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" alt="Listen on RadioPublic" width="268" height="87"></a> <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/5NkaSQoUERalaLBQAqUOcC"><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237984/original/file-20180925-149976-1ks72uy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=268&fit=clip" width="268" height="82"></a> </p>
<h2>Additional audio</h2>
<p><a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/Lee_Rosevere/The_Big_Loop_-_FML_original_podcast_score/Lee_Rosevere_-_The_Big_Loop_-_FML_original_podcast_score_-_10_A_List_of_Ways_to_Die">A List of Ways to Die</a>, Lee Rosevere, from Free Music Archive.</p>
<p><strong>Image:</strong></p>
<p>AAP/Lukas Coch</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In this podcast, Andrew Hastie speaks with Michelle Grattan about growing concerns over Chinese influence in Australian politics, security clearances for politicians and the mental health of veterans.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1277442019-11-25T11:08:40Z2019-11-25T11:08:40ZView from The Hill: ASIO investigating allegation China wanted a horse in the democratic race<p>ASIO boss Mike Burgess is known to be more open in his approach than many in the world of spooks. Even so, it was startling when late Sunday night he tweeted a pointer to his statement that ASIO is investigating a claim China had tried to put a plant in the federal parliament.</p>
<p>The Burgess statement is immediately important for two reasons.</p>
<p>By (very unusually) confirming the investigation, it gives credibility to the Nine story that made the claim.</p>
<p>And it puts some obligation on ASIO, or the government, to inform the public of the results of that investigation.</p>
<p>Nine newspapers and Sixty Minutes have reported two extraordinary spy stories in the past few days.</p>
<p>One is the bid for Australian protection by Wang Liqiang, who says he has been a spy for China. “Wang ‘William’ Liqiang is the first Chinese spy to ever publicly blow his cover in Australia,” Sixty Minutes said.</p>
<p>The government is examining whether his case stacks up. But it is in an awkward position – given Wang has spoken out, he’d be in serious danger if his claim were rejected.</p>
<p>But the other story in the Nine package – the alleged attempted penetration of federal parliament - is the more significant, given (if true) its deep implication for Australia’s democratic system.</p>
<p>It is reported that a Chinese espionage group offered a young Melbourne car dealer and Liberal party member, Bo “Nick” Zhao, A$1 million in campaign funding if he would run in the marginal seat of Chisholm, which has a high Chinese vote. Zhao declined, and went to ASIO. Later he was found dead in a motel room in March, with how he died a mystery.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-asking-questions-about-gladys-liu-is-not-racist-123445">Grattan on Friday: Asking questions about Gladys Liu is not racist</a>
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<p>At the May election Chisholm was won by Hong Kong-born Liberal Gladys Liu, whose past connections with organisations with links to the Chinese Communist Party and spectacular fund raising record became highly controversial.</p>
<p>Scott Morrison fended off questions about Liu, and denounced her detractors. He tabled a statement from her in parliament, which she declined to make personally.</p>
<p>Well placed security sources say there’s no problem with Liu. But there is every reason why she should speak for herself, and quite odd she won’t.</p>
<p>Burgess’s statement homes in on the Zhao case, and its wider context.</p>
<p>“I am committed to protecting Australia’s democracy and sovereignty. Australians can be reassured that ASIO was previously aware of matters that have been reported today, and has been actively investigating them.</p>
<p>"Given that the matter in question is subject to a coronial inquiry, and as not to prejudice our investigations, it would be inappropriate to comment further,” he said.</p>
<p>He added: “Hostile foreign intelligence activity continues to pose a real threat to our nation and its security. ASIO will continue to confront and counter foreign interference and espionage in Australia.”</p>
<p>ASIO has been putting itself out there in this debate for a while. Its former chief Duncan Lewis made frequent broad references to foreign interference (out of the job, he was more explicit in targeting China in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald’s Peter Hartcher published last week).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-chinas-vast-influence-network-how-it-works-and-the-extent-of-its-reach-in-australia-119174">Inside China's vast influence network – how it works, and the extent of its reach in Australia</a>
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<p>While cautioning against jumping to premature conclusions, Morrison on Monday said he found the allegation China had tried to infiltrate the Liberal party “disturbing and troubling”.</p>
<p>He shouldn’t have found it surprising, after the amazing evidence over recent years of China’s tentacles reaching deep into Australian politics.</p>
<p>Former Labor senator Sam Dastyari allowed himself to be cultivated to the extent he had to quit parliament when the scandal became too hot to handle.</p>
<p>Chinese billionaire Huang Xiangmo – ubiquitous until he was banned from the country on security grounds - had an apparently endless desire to pour money into the coffers of the major parties, whether delivered by Aldi bag or more conventional means.</p>
<p>The closed eyes of ALP officials in particular about Huang’s unexplained generosity was breathtaking, causing immense harm to the party and individuals.</p>
<p>It ranks as the most spectacular recent example of how the lure of the dollar can blind political players, who’d be expected to be more cautious.</p>
<p>The government has acted to combat the foreign threat to Australia’s democracy, notably with the foreign interference legislation and the ban on foreign donations.</p>
<p>But the parties were tardy in coming to grips with what was happening, because they wanted the money.</p>
<p>Alleged attempted infiltration of parliament takes concern to another level.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-attacks-media-for-pious-belchings-over-china-127222">Paul Keating attacks media for 'pious belchings' over China</a>
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<p>As the chair of parliament’s committee on intelligence and security Andrew Hastie said on Sixty Minutes, “this isn’t just cash in a bag, given for favours. This is a state sponsored attempt to infiltrate our parliament, using an Australian citizen and basically run them as an agent of foreign influence in our democratic system”.</p>
<p>This raises challenging issues for Australia’s multicultural society.</p>
<p>With large numbers of Chinese migrants and students coming here, and Chinese authorities active among this diaspora, the placing of “plants” into state and federal parliaments could become easier.</p>
<p>The flip side is aspiring politicians of Chinese heritage, whose loyalty to Australia is total, could be falsely tarred with the “foreign agent” suspicion.</p>
<p>The argument about China’s influence is not running in only one direction. Last week Paul Keating renewed his attack the intelligence chiefs, lashing out at what he identifies as their anti-China stand.</p>
<p>“The subtleties of foreign policy and the elasticity of diplomacy are being supplanted by the phobias of a group of national security agencies which are now effectively running the foreign policy of the country,” Keating said.</p>
<p>What Keating condemns as “phobias”, others see as alertness to a growing danger that’s become increasingly complicated to counter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By (very unusually) confirming the investigation, ASIO boss Mike Burgess gives credibility to the Nine story that made the claim.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229692019-09-04T11:12:48Z2019-09-04T11:12:48ZOutgoing ASIO head hopes for greater public preparedness to defend Australian sovereignty<p>The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has paved the way for increased public preparedness to defend Australia’s sovereignty against foreign interference, outgoing ASIO head Duncan Lewis has said.</p>
<p>In an address to the Lowy Institute, Lewis repeated his earlier warning about this interference. “The current scale and scope of foreign intelligence activity against Australian interests is unprecedented,” he said.</p>
<p>While the threat was not just from any one particular country, Lewis noted the scale and sophistication of threats varied greatly.</p>
<p>He did not mention China by name, but the government considers China poses by far the largest threat in terms of interference on a range of fronts.</p>
<p>Some years ago Lewis warned the major political parties of this attempted influence through political donations. In the current NSW ICAC inquiry attention has been centred on an alleged $100,000 donation to Labor in 2015 by Chinese property developer Huang Xiangmo, a banned donor. Huang later was prohibited from re-entering Australia, on ASIO advice that he had links with the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>Lewis warned that “unlike the immediacy of terrorism incidents, the harm from acts of espionage may not present for years, even decades, after the activity has occurred. These sorts of activities are typically quiet and insidious, with a long ‘tail’”.</p>
<p>“There has been a great deal of coverage recently in the Australian media regarding espionage and foreign interference, ascribing blame and describing vectors of attack and influence.</p>
<p>"It is not proper for me to dive into the detail of this coverage for a number of reasons.</p>
<p>"Suffice it to say I am satisfied that ASIO is following the ball closely and has seeded what is now a public consciousness and awareness of the matter and I hope in short-order there will come an increased public preparedness to better defend our country and its sovereignty,” Lewis said.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-asio-head-mike-burgess-is-moving-from-one-security-agency-to-another-121626">New ASIO head, Mike Burgess, is moving from one security agency to another</a>
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<p>On terrorism, he said the global threat from violent Islamist extremism was not eliminated by ISIL’s declining fortunes and loss of terititory.</p>
<p>“Increasingly, disillusioned ISIL supporters are turning to more egregious and desperate measures in and beyond the Middle-East.”</p>
<p>On the “complex” issue of returning foreign fighters, “we have worked to develop and implement effective and appropriate management strategies. We will be paying a lot of attention on a case by case basis to the security implications of any returnees with a range of responses”.</p>
<p>These varied, “depending on whether the returnee is an active foreign fighter, where a successful brief would see them in jail, or whether the case is of an infant who clearly would be approached in a completely different way,” Lewis said.</p>
<p>“At the other end of the spectrum, right wing or ethno-supremacist extremism is not being ignored by ASIO.</p>
<p>"Recent history around the world is peppered by acts of extreme right wing motivated attack”, including the horrific Christchurch massacre, Lewis said.</p>
<p>The new chief of ASIO is Mike Burgess, former head the Australian Signals Directorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In an address to the Lowy Institute, outgoing ASIO head Duncan Lewis warned that “the scale and scope of foreign intelligence activity against Australian interests is unprecedented”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.