tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/g-40-46518/articlesG-40 – The Conversation2017-12-29T08:23:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/891772017-12-29T08:23:21Z2017-12-29T08:23:21ZThe three barriers blocking Zimbabwe’s progress: Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the military<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199889/original/file-20171219-27557-8tx029.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=206%2C577%2C5544%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s new President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> has been cautiously welcomed with the hope that he will place Zimbabwe on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">more democratic trajectory</a>. He has spoken of a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">new democracy “unfolding”</a> in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>But this is wishful thinking.</p>
<p>There are three major barriers to a decisive break from the corrupt and dysfunctional political system that has been playing out in Zimbabwe: the ruling <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>, its president and what’s been their main sustainer – the military. </p>
<p>None would want to oversee real change because facilitating democratic rule with real contestation for power would mean running the risk of electoral defeat. This would endanger the networks of self enrichment that have been put in place over decades. </p>
<p>Instead, the next few months will see Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">military</a> continue to block democracy as they seek to hold onto the power. </p>
<h2>The nature of Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF presents a formidable obstacle to democratic progress in the country. Zimbabwe has maintained the outward appearance of a multiparty democracy since <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm">independence in 1980</a>. But it’s effectively been a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/towards-the-oneparty-state-in-zimbabwe-a-study-in-african-political-thought/BD356807617492EBE85877DB6CD815C7">one-party dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>The party brings a zero-sum game mindset to politics: it must always prevail, and its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">opponents must be crushed</a> rather than accommodated. Opposition parties formally exist but they have not been allowed to win an election. Should such a possibility arise – as it did in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">2002, 2008 and 2013</a> – elections will be rigged to preserve the status quo. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF provides the most egregious example of the culture of exceptionalism which has characterised the liberation party in power. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the belief that its entitled to rule indefinitely, </p></li>
<li><p>its refusal to view itself as an ordinary political party, </p></li>
<li><p>its conflating of party and state, and </p></li>
<li><p>its demonising of other parties as ‘enemies of liberation’ seeking to restore colonialism or white minority rule. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The way in which Zanu-PF has colonised the state over almost four decades means that there is a vast web of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2013.862100?src=recsys">patronage networks</a> that have been entrenched to facilitate the looting of the state’s resources. Democratic change and clean government pose a mortal threat to these networks and such privileges are unlikely to be surrendered without intense resistance.</p>
<h2>The new president</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s ominous record makes it difficult to build a persuasive case that he represents a new beginning. </p>
<p>He served as <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">Mugabe’s “chief enforcer”</a> until November 2017. He was pivotal to the collapse of the rule of law and the implosion of the Zimbabwean economy. And he has been a central player in the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20161116-Zimbabwe-Early-Warning-Report.pdf">gross human rights abuses</a> that have characterised Zanu-PF rule. This includes the killings in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland killings</a> in the 1980s. This is a past for which he has refused to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/#.WjFR4Ux2trQ">acknowledge any responsibility</a>. </p>
<p>His more conciliatory language has not matched his actions. After becoming president he appointed an administration of cronies, <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-40875-Chiwenga+appointed+defence+minister/news.aspx">military hardliners</a> and ‘war veterans’. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at his inauguration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The appointments appeared to consolidate the power of the now dominant faction of Zanu-PF: the old guard securocrats who routed Grace Mugabe’s equally malign <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G40 faction</a> through the barrel of a gun rather than democratic processes. </p>
<p>Having waited such a seemingly interminable length of time to land the top job, it is difficult to envisage Mnangagwa now placing his hard earned spoils at the mercy of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-11-20-justice-malala-dont-fool-yourself-zimbabwe-wont-be-fixed-by-mugabes-ex-cronies/">a programme of democratisation</a>.</p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The Zimbabwean Defence Force’s role in the removal of the president means that it has secured a place for itself as a privileged political actor and overseer of the entire political system. </p>
<p>The defence force has never been a neutral custodian of constitutional rule. Instead it has always been a highly politicised extension of the ruling party, a party militia in effect. </p>
<p>Previously its role was confined to repressing the ruling party’s opponents and maintaining the party’s dominance. The principle of civilian rule was respected even if this model of civil-military relations failed to meet any reasonable democratic standards. But with the coup, the military crossed a line. They determined the outcome of power struggles within the ruling party itself. </p>
<p>In the same way that the military has been politicised, the political system has been heavily militarised. This can be seen in the several key military veterans who have been appointed to the cabinet as well as Mnangagwa being the military’s candidate for the presidency. Essentially this is the civilian face of quasi-military rule in Zimbabwe. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing a press conference in Harare, in November.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What this points to is an effective “barracks democracy” emerging in Zimbabwe. The military has secured a veto over the leadership of the ruling party and over the wider political process. It also reserves the right to reject election results that it does not approve of, or to take action that could prevent such results materialising in the first place. </p>
<p>To see the military’s removal of Mugabe as an overriding good ignores the fact that it has no concept of the national interest, or that it views that national interest as synonymous with its own and Zanu-PF’s. </p>
<p>It is dangerously naïve to expect such a force to help facilitate genuine democratic transition when its entire raison d’etre has been to preserve one-party rule (under a leadership of its choosing), to disable meaningful opposition and to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/09/15/military-looted-diamonds-report/">preserve its own corruption networks</a>.</p>
<h2>Unsettling prospects</h2>
<p>True democratisation – as opposed to merely maintaining the procedural forms of democratic government – is anathema to Zimbabwe’s ruling party, its president and the military. </p>
<p>It is evident that their task is threefold over the next few months. They have to secure support for a measure of liberalisation; arrest political enemies for corruption rather than tackling corruption <em>per se</em>; and provide a smokescreen of a largely vacuous democratic rhetoric. </p>
<p>The hope is that this will be sufficient to secure aid, investment and an endorsement by external donors while virtually nothing changes in the actual power relations inside the country. </p>
<p>Anyone committed to democracy in Zimbabwe -– whether inside or outside the country – should begin mobilising against this project sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe is over. But the country’s road to democracy remains a bumpy one as Zanu-PF, the new president and the military go about entrenching power.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879612017-11-22T16:19:07Z2017-11-22T16:19:07ZZimbabweans must draw on years of democratic struggle to stop a repeat of Mugabe’s militarism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195860/original/file-20171122-6013-1nxg72y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C229%2C2977%2C1711&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans at home and abroad celebrated gloriously from the moment Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s belated resignation ended his 37 years of misrule. But University of South Africa doctoral candidate Enock Mudzamiri’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403+CID_ea6d76bea35a7c7889437092f5c5d958&utm_source=campaign_monitor_africa&utm_term=cautions">cautionary note</a> bears heeding: don’t trust the military replacement for the 93-year old Machiavellian; don’t forget that intra-party fighting for the spoils instigated the end of Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<p>There is an even more comprehensive way to examine Mugabe’s legacy and to think about how to work beyond it. Historian and decolonial theorist Professor Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s take on <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">“Mugabeism”</a> can help. </p>
<p>Mugabeism is a system of ideology and practice finely honed during almost four decades of Mugabe’s reign over Zimbabwe’s party-state complex. It constitutes a constant combination of <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/T84_Part7.pdf">coercion and consent</a>, from force and fraud to <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717">chicanery and compulsion</a>. </p>
<p>It is all-embracing and insidious, running through the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">military and the media</a> and even the songs and dances of Zimbabwean society. Mugabeism is almost a culture, imbricated deeply in the multifaceted and <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2295">deep crisis</a> in the kitchen coup that almost escaped the <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-best-of-night-talk/who-is-the-zanu-pf-generation-40-g40">confines of Zanu-PF itself</a>.</p>
<p>Yet there is a small dimension to Mugabeism that has positive attributes. The words that evoke this dimension include liberation and freedom – positive attributes that need buttressing by democratic forces outside Mugabeism’s closed circle.</p>
<p>Bear in mind that countries – including many in Africa – have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes <a href="http://www.socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597#.WhUzeXlx0d">regressed</a>. Not all of this activity can be dismissed as window-dressing.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s coup, or non coup, should be seen in this light. The question is: at the core of Mugabeism, can one see contradictions that can spell transformation out of today’s militaristic morass? </p>
<p>The answer is mostly no - due to its inextricable intertwining with the man himself. But those elements tied to more conventional ideas of democracy and reconciliation have been relevant during the past tumultuous days.</p>
<p>At one level, we cannot forget that a level of democratic discourse has infiltrated the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Many years of dealing with coups and their consequences have taught these organisations – shambolic as they are – that coups should not be encouraged. A “real” and very bloody coup would not have been recognised, and Mugabe knew this. The military men had to feint their way to regain their position at Zanu-PF’s head. They came very close to <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">blowing it</a>.</p>
<p>At a more local level, it was the humiliation of a parliamentary impeachment that forced Mugabe’s hand. This dovetailed with the neighbours’ constraints. The crafters of the 2013 constitution with rules for impeachment in <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013._pdf">Section 97</a>, should take a bow. Without it, worse would have happened to the <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">democrats</a> in parliament and civil society on the streets. </p>
<p>Mugabe probably thought he could foil Zanu-PF’s rather messy <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/19/BSR---Implications-of-Mugabes-removal-from-ZANU-PF-presidency">attempt</a> to dump him, but the next step was too hard to fathom. Could it have been, too, that the friendly guitarist from north of the Zambesi had a big role to play: Kenneth Kaunda had accepted his denouement by election as long ago as 1991.</p>
<h2>The issue of unity</h2>
<p>A problematic element of “Mugabeism” is the question of “unity”. It’s not an easy one in a society riven by <a href="https://oldsite.issafrica.org/country-file-zimbabwe/society">ethnic</a>, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=MR8EiMlHw-YC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=class+in+zimbabwe&source=bl&ots=YcFGc-CX-g&sig=bf_qiwKK21AAzM0_2gRSwk5jCAo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJv7aAq9LXAhVXF8AKHZZkDJ4Q6AEIYDAK#v=onepage&q=class%20in%20zimbabwe&f=false">class</a>, and <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/harare/about-this-office/single-view/news/calls_to_bridge_intergenerational_divide_in_africa/">generational</a> divides. </p>
<p>Perhaps we can give Mugabe the last word on this given his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">utterances made in near desperation</a> after his party threw him to the wolves. While he studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s mind – resigning – he invoked “comradeship and collegiality”. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The party must go “back to the guiding principles … of traditions … served by successive generations who have shared ideals and values which must continue to reign supreme in our nation”. A “new ethos” too, could be “nourished by an abiding sense of camaraderie” that just might override the recent “era of victimisation and arbitrary decisions”. He zoomed in on one that had created the tensions between the <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G-40</a> – his wife Grace Mugabe’s faction – and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, the faction behind the man chosen to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>our inter-generation conflict must be resolved through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Therein is buried a nutshell of tensions: old traditions of suppression jostled with the ways in which new political pretenders could be accommodated. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s key problem was thus revealed: he had wrapped up the party and state on his own person to the extent that he thought neither would survive without him. On the cusp of recall over the weekend, Mugabe was not going anywhere. He felt that after him the storms would be unleashed. This of course is the conundrum of a politics wherein the man appears to be the state and vice versa. Mugabe thought only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<p>If, he said, in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with “those who oppressed us … surely this cannot be unavailable to our own … we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.” </p>
<p>Yet he forgot that the spirits of reconciliation and revenge at the heart of Mugabeism, and his incarnation of these, were never resolved.</p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books;%20https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. But this time, axes were not invoked as directly as before.</p>
<p>The roots of the faction fight that led to a very old <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">crocodile</a> taking the throne were not resolved by Zanu-PF’s old guard embracing and welcoming the new contenders for power. The forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance did not happen within his discourse. It took the democratic phase – in this case parliament, augmented by civil society on the streets – to push the progressive elements within Mugabeism. It bears noting that these elements had to leave the party’s shell. If anything is clear at this moment, it is that Zimbabwe’s problems cannot be handled within the confines of a single political party. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF cannot pull off the unfulfilled dimensions of Mugabeism. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, it is all too possible that the new man will take all. The problems of absolute power loom. Yet Zimbabwean society has become more complex as years of democratic struggle have left their trace. This is the moment to push them into the era that began with Mugabe’s <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">fall</a>. If they are not at the forefront now, the old patterns of militaristic Mugabeism will win once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries - including many in Africa - have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes regressed. Events in Zimbabwe should be seen in this light.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877122017-11-21T14:04:31Z2017-11-21T14:04:31ZZimbabwe beware: the military is looking after its own interests, not democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195615/original/file-20171121-6031-14lazje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing the media.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 2017 will go down in the history of Zimbabwe as the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/">37 year tyranny</a>. A tumultuous week finally culminated in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">his resignation</a> on November 21st. One cannot understate the widespread jubilation at the demise of Mugabe and his desire to create a dynasty for himself <a href="https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/660122/Zimbabwe-news-Robert-Mugabe-Grace-Zanu-PF-Twitter-latest-situation-coup-Emmerson-Mnangagwa">through his wife Grace</a>. </p>
<p>But the optimism is misplaced because it doesn’t deal directly with the dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>First, contrary to popular sentiment that the coup was meant to usher in a new era of political <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42035981">liberalisation and democracy</a>, the takeover is actually meant to deal with a succession crisis in Zanu-PF. The military made this clear when it said that it was dealing with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-military-statement-seizing-power-171115061457199.html">criminals around Mugabe</a>. And the party’s secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa indicated that removing Mugabe from the party’s Central Committee was an <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">internal party matter</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, I would argue that the military resorted to a “smart coup” only after its preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was fired from the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">party and government</a>. </p>
<p>The way in which the military has gone about executing its plan upends any conventional understanding of what <a href="http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/powell_and_thyne_2011jpr_-_global_instances_of_coups_from_1950_to_2010.pdf">constitutes a coup d'etat</a>. It’s a “smart coup” in the sense that the military combined the frustrations of a restive population, internal party structures and international sympathy to remove a sitting president. It thereby gained legitimacy for an otherwise partisan and unconstitutional political act – toppling an elected government. </p>
<p>This begs the question: Is the military now intervening for the collective good or for its own interests?</p>
<h2>Why the military intervened</h2>
<p>It is baffling to imagine how the military has suddenly become the champion of democracy and regime change in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>It’s clear that what motivated the military commanders was a fear of losing their jobs and influence after their preferred successor was purged. They launched a preemptive strike against Mugabe to safeguard their own selfish interests as a military class and the future of their careers. </p>
<p>Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military and the <a href="https://rusi.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf">ruling Zanu-PF party</a>, it was inevitable that the top commanders would be embroiled in the party’s succession crisis. After all, the military has been the key lever behind the power of both Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF since 1980. </p>
<p>In the past they have acted as part of the Zanu-PF machinery, openly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">campaigning for Mugabe</a> alongside other security agencies.</p>
<p>And they have played a key role in neutralising political opponents. Back in the 1980s the military was responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians and Zapu supporters in <a href="https://archive.org/stream/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport_djvu.txt.">Matebeleland</a>. More than two decades later in 2008 they were responsible for the torture, death and disappearance of 200 opposition activists and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">maiming of hundreds more</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf">the UN</a> has implicated Mnangagwa and the generals in the illegal plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also been fingered in the disappearance of diamond revenues from Zimbabwe’s Marange <a>diamond fields</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this the military and Zanu-PF share a special relationship that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) was the political wing of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) during the liberation war. They therefore have vested interests in the survival of the party.</p>
<p>After independence, the relationship remained intact as the military became the <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-86814.html">guarantors of the revolution</a>. Some of the same surviving commanders of Zanla are still senior high ranking officials. The commanders are also bona fide members of the ruling party and <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">guarantors of Zanu-PF power</a>. </p>
<p>The same securocrats are also members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Liberation_War_Veterans_Association">War Veterans Association</a>. This quasi paramilitary group is an auxiliary association of the ruling party and has fiercely opposed Mugabe’s attempt to create a dynasty.</p>
<h2>Military must step aside</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe goes to the polls next July to choose a new president and parliament. The elections – if conducted in a credible way – will provide the next government with the legitimacy it needs to take the country out of its political and <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">economic crises</a>.</p>
<p>Now that Mugabe <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">has resigned</a> the hope is that the military will allow a genuinely democratic transition to take place. All political players, including opposition parties, would need to be incorporated into a broad-based transitional authority pending credible elections. </p>
<p>But for the elections to be credible, the transitional authority would need urgently to reform the electoral system. This would ensure Zimbabweans can freely and fairly choose their leaders. Without this, peace and prosperity will continue to elude Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In the long run, the military would do well to get out of politics instead of continuing to view itself as <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/14/chiwenga-warns-mugabe-zanu-pf">“stockholders”</a> in the country’s political affairs because of its liberation struggle credentials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, American Political Science Association and the National Endowment for the Humanities</span></em></p>Contrary to popular sentiment that the coup in Zimbabwe would usher in a new era of democracy, the military intervention is much more about a succession crisis in the ruling Zanu-PF.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/878682017-11-21T13:35:37Z2017-11-21T13:35:37ZWhen the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195591/original/file-20171121-6051-ntf8kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters at a rally outside parliament in preparation ahead of the proposed impeachment of President Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary impeachment of beleaguered President Robert Mugabe - in terms of section 97 of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> – could be the culminating moment of a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-11-17-hope-remains-that-the-soft-coup-in-zimbabwe-could-lead-to-nine-easy-victories/">soft coup</a> that staves off the indignity of slipshod regional interventions, while saving the legitimacy of a régime sans a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/is-zimbabwe-set-for-a-mugabe-dynasty-with-first-lady-grace-as-vp-20171113">disgraced Mugabe dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-in-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-era-ends/article37015276/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links">might just work</a>. But it might not.</p>
<p>Events have not transpired as the faction loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president of Zanu-PF and of the country who was deposed by Mugabe earlier this month, had planned. The aim of the faction – known as the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a> because of Mnangagwa’s nickname “The Crocodile” – was to get their leader back on the road to power. That was after his derailment by the Zanu-PF Generation 40 group <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_">(aka G-40)</a>
that ostensibly rallies younger, savvy party members to take the lead, but favours Grace Mugabe to succeed her husband.</p>
<p>A number of unintended developments have led to a situation in which, a week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place and a new avenue - parliamentary impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.</p>
<p>It is by no means certain that Zanu-PF’s crocodiles can pull off the next stage. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall.</p>
<h2>The plans that didn’t quite go to plan</h2>
<p>First, the army chiefs’ warning to Mugabe on the <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/13/BSR-General-Chiwenga%E2%80%99s-statement---all-bark-and-no-bite">night of November 13</a> that he vacate office, wasn’t met with the desired response. Rather than Mugabe taking the hint and welcoming Mnangagwa back, or telling G-40 to stop their shenanigans, Zanu-PF accused the Military Chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425">of treason</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the effect of this was to trigger a real coup. The military’s round-up and detention of their enemies in G-40 was not quite bloodless: at least one of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/17/mugabes-chief-security-battered/">security guards</a> protecting finance minister Ignatius Chombo was killed. The Central Intelligence Organisation’s security director Albert Ngulube came within a few inches of the same fate. And there was no ambiguity about the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had been detained by his underlings – albeit in his own chintzy <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/inside-robert-mugabes-lavish-blue-11552658?service=responsive">“Blue Roof” mansion</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the delight displayed for the well-organised war vets’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/18/protesters-in-zimbabwe-call-for-mugabe-to-step-down-in-pictures">demonstrations</a> on Saturday was never going to last long. On Saturday it served the purpose of providing the army with a veneer of legitimacy. But by Monday the patience of the soldiers had begun to wear thin. They warned students <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-20-students-shut-down-university-of-zimbabwe/">who had closed down</a> the university to return to classes, encouraging them to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>be calm and to proceed with their <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122553.html">educational programmes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And when Christopher Mutsvangwa, head of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/organise-sit-in-as-calls-for-president-to-resign-intensify/">announced</a> that the war vets want “the whole population to descend upon Harare”, the putschists soon released a document entitling their project <a href="http://zimbabwedigitalnews.com/2017/11/20/calm-down-zimbabwe-operation-restore-legacy-is-on-track-mugabe-and-mnangagwa-now-talking/">“Operation Restore Legacy”</a>, as if to dampen the masses’ enthusiasm. </p>
<p>Yet Sunday’s setback – the fourth – was the most severe. Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">press conference</a> shocked just about <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-11-19-zimbabwes-mugabe-defies-expectations-of-immediate-resignation/">everybody</a>. He studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s minds: his resignation. Instead, Mugabe noted that the soldiers had raised the concerns causing all of the fuss with “comradeship and collegiality”. This issue was the, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>open public spurts [sic] between high ranking officials in party and government exacerbated by multiple conflicting messages from both the party and government [that] made the criticisms [of lack of unity] levelled against us inescapable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There we had it. The curse of Zanu-PF’s history: disunity. It was in our faces once again. “It has to stop,” Mugabe warned, and scoled: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zimbabweans must resolve their “inter-generation conflict … through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession”. The party must go “back to the guiding principles”, he said.</p>
<h2>Last-ditch attempt to repeat history</h2>
<p>Mugabe was not going anywhere. He was determined to preside over December’s extraordinary Zanu-PF conference that had hastened this crisis. In his view, he and only he could ensure the “processes that must not be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine [the congress] or to compromise the outcomes in the eyes of the public”. Only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe addressing the nation at the State House in Harare, on Sunday night.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/The Herald handout.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>those who oppressed us… surely this cannot be unavailable to our own… we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consciously or not, Mugabe was repeating a history of at least 40 years, albeit in almost mirror image. The coup makers had not forgotten: their Monday Manifesto referred clearly to the <a href="https://openparly.co.zw/2017/11/13/full-press-statement-general-chiwenga-there-is-instability-in-zanu-pf-today/">vashandi moment</a>. This was when in early 1977 Mugabe and others in the “old guard” squashed a group of young and rebellious “political soldiers” who were proving far too threatening to his liking. He sent them to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.1995.10804395">Mozambique’s prisons</a>. </p>
<p>This too was “inter-generation” conflict. But four decades ago he was on the dominant side, and dealt with the disunity somewhat differently than on November 19 2017. In 1977 he said that “we must negate” those who, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>arduously strive in any direction that militates against the party or who, in any way, seeks… to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party by maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks. This is… the negation of the negation… the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">that binds us all</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. Yet, with a Panglossian view, one could believe that Mugabe has learned something over the past four decades. Now he wants all the older generations in Zanu-PF to embrace and welcome the new contenders for power. Forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance, shall prevail – under his leadership of course.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this self-interested repentance is too late for most members of Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s rhetoric is falling on deaf ears. Impeachment through parliamentary means is not a hard landing, although many hitches could <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/20/BSR-presidential-impeachment-in-Zimbabwe">still arise</a>, including a messier militaristic denouement. </p>
<p>Yet, as political scientist Ralph Mathekga <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">puts it</a>, if we assume the impeachment’s success and a relatively smooth Zanu-PF congress, only fully free and fair elections can resolve the contradictions unleashed by the half-measured coup that started as even less than that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place, and a new avenue - impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.