tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/gadaffi-1286/articlesGadaffi – The Conversation2017-02-26T16:59:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/728932017-02-26T16:59:36Z2017-02-26T16:59:36ZMorocco’s membership of the AU: has unity finally been achieved?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158091/original/image-20170223-24090-19d4wxb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morocco's return to the African Union raises questions about the body's continued commitment to anti-colonialism and its pan-Africanism. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) has always considered Morocco <a href="https://www.au.int/web/en/AU_Member_States">the only country missing</a> from its fold. After a 33-year absence, it was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-170131084926023.html">recently admitted </a> to the continental body to become its 55th member. </p>
<p>With this last piece of the jigsaw now in place, does it mean that African unity has finally been achieved? Or is the current picture of the AU likely to be ephemeral?</p>
<p>The criteria to become a member of the African Union are simple. The organisation is open to all African states and accession requires approval by a <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">simple majority of the existing members</a>. Though being an African state seems a straightforward requisite, there is ample room for interpretation. </p>
<p>Take for example efforts by Haiti, a Caribbean state, to accede to the union. This would require the AU review its reading of pan-Africanism. Other possible new members are states that could be formed as result of secession as well as European overseas territories that are part of Africa but represent the last vestiges of imperialism. </p>
<h2>Beyond Africa</h2>
<p>The dominant view of the AU reduces Africa to its continental definition. Accordingly, the objective is the political union of the African landmass and the adjacent islands.</p>
<p>This view has been used in relation to Haiti. The country has sought membership <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0229/Long-distance-relationship-Haiti-s-bid-to-join-the-African-Union">since 2012</a> on the grounds that it was the first black republic in history. Though perceived by many as belonging to Africa culturally, the AU rejected the island’s application in 2016 on the grounds that it was <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/30342/haiti-will-not-be-admitted-african-union-member-state-next-summit-kigali-rwanda">not an African country</a>.</p>
<p>But there are other interpretations of pan-Africanism. One view, for example, is that the <a href="http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-pan-africanism.html">African diaspora is an integral part of the continent</a>, another is that racial identity – in the sense of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negritude/">négritude</a> – or cultural identity makes people eligible for African citizenship.</p>
<h2>Breakaway states</h2>
<p>Even within the narrow continental vision of pan-Africanism, there is still room for new members. Somaliland is one potential future candidate. It broke away from Somalia in 1991 and has acquired <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-explains">state-like functions</a>, such as the autonomous provision of public goods, and is a potential candidate for membership. But, for the time being all AU member states view it as a part of Somalia. None recognises it as a state. </p>
<p>Other secessionist movements, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17546620">Barotseland kingdom</a> that transcends Zambia, could also gain independence from current nation states. New states based on the geographic imagination of <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-border-disputes-are-set-to-rise-but-there-are-ways-to-stop-them-44264">pre-colonial borders</a> could form and eventually request accession to the AU.</p>
<p>There is a precedent for this: South Sudan broke away from Sudan in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">2011</a>, to become an independent state, followed by <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00013730.html">accession to the AU the same year</a>. </p>
<h2>Africa’s “last colonies”</h2>
<p>The AU understands Africa as a sealed off geographic entity. Yet it remains remarkably quiet about the many bits that are geographically part of the continent but do not consider the AU their home. Take the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/octs_en">European overseas territories</a> which include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Spain’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14114627">Ceuta</a>, <a href="http://www.melilla.es/melillaPortal/index.jsp">Melilla</a> and the <a href="http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/canary.htm">Canary Islands</a>, </p></li>
<li><p>France’s <a href="http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/re.htm">Réunion</a>, </p></li>
<li><p>Portugal’s <a href="http://www.madeira.gov.pt/">Madeira</a>, and </p></li>
<li><p>the UK’s <a href="http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/">St Helena</a> and the <a href="http://www.chagos-trust.org/">Chagos Archipelago</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>And there’s one more: in 2011 France <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150925-video-mayotte-revisited-island-indian-ocean-islandfrench-department-comoros">reintegrated</a> Mayotte as one of its territories. While the AU <a href="https://www.au.int/web/en/newsevents/25583/highlights-meetings-auc-chairperson-during-68th-unga">“hopes”</a> that Mayotte will return to the Comoros, it shies away from taking concrete action. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780511880223">“last colonies”</a> could in principle exercise self determination and join the AU after successful independence. Yet, that seems highly unlikely in the near future given the overwhelming sense of belonging to a European country. </p>
<h2>Quitters</h2>
<p>Inclusion is not the only issue facing the African Union. Some existing members could also withdraw. The union’s Constitutive Act makes provision for <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">cessation of membership</a> – a procedure that only requires a written request and a one year waiting period. </p>
<p>Countries seeking a binding federalist union, such as <a href="http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/African_Union.html#_edn27">Libya under Gaddafi</a>, unsuccessfully opposed this exit option, though in practice only Morocco ever left the organisation.</p>
<p>But others could consider doing so.</p>
<p>Take Cape Verde. In 2007 the European Union and the island nation off the coast of Senegal established a <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:r13018">special partnership</a> that prepares it to qualify for future accession talks with the EU. This would entail it exiting from the AU.</p>
<p>In the Comoros there have been movements to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0709comorospp.pdf">replicate the experience of Mayotte to join France</a>. Though these have been met with resistance by both the Comoros government – who fears secession – and France – who fears costs – an exit remains conceivable.</p>
<p>More perils for AU membership lurk where countries are part of competing regional organisations, such as the <a href="http://www.lasportal.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx">Arab League</a> or the <a href="https://www.cplp.org/">Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</a>. These offer identities transcending the continent and should they become more binding members will have to choose between them and the AU. In particular the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en">European Neighbourhood Policy</a> is designed to increase the magnetic pull of the EU for North Africa.</p>
<h2>Expelling members</h2>
<p>The AU Constitutive Act makes no provision for expelling members. Only suspension is foreseen in cases when a government has come to power trough <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">unconstitutional means</a>. However, with a two-thirds majority, AU members could vote to introduce a provision for expelling.</p>
<p>Should that happen, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic <a href="https://global.britannica.com/place/Saharan-Arab-Democratic-Republic">(SADR)</a> would be first on the list. In the past, most African states considered Moroccan occupation of the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html">Western Sahara</a> a form of colonisation. They legitimised the claim of the SADR to govern the Western Sahara, which triggered Morocco’s exit in 1984.</p>
<p>But the tide is turning.</p>
<p>The growing support within the AU for Morocco <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/morocco-the-aus-prodigal-son">despite its occupation of the Western Sahara</a> makes a dismissal of the SADR more likely. It also indicates that anti-colonialism has lost vigour, which reduces the likelihood of an assertive claim by the AU to the “last colonies”.</p>
<h2>Revisiting pan-Africanism</h2>
<p>The AU’s narrow geographic interpretation of Africa seems to have reached its zenith with the accession of Morocco. But important inconsistencies remain. The AU is likely to come under pressure in the future to review its reading of pan-Africanism, both from inside and outside the continent.</p>
<p>It took Morocco 33 years to rejoin. Over the coming 33 years, the AU’s shape is likely to continue changing. We have not seen the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/21/bring-back-ideology-fukuyama-end-history-25-years-on">end of history</a> yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union sees Africa as a sealed off geographic entity. Yet it remains remarkably quiet about the many bits of Africa that are geographically part of it but do not consider it their home.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/730882017-02-16T13:43:23Z2017-02-16T13:43:23ZBarack Obama: an enduring legacy for advocates of democracy in Africa?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157098/original/image-20170216-12953-1skfl1o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Neger</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>American President Donald Trump’s February 13 calls to Nigeria’s President <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/13/africa/buhari-zuma-trump-call-africa/">Muhammadu Buhari</a> and South Africa’s <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-02-14-trump-makes-first-official-telephone-call-to-president-jacob-zuma/">Jacob Zuma</a> are his first signals of interest in sub-Sahara Africa. </p>
<p>Trump reportedly raised two US priorities: <a href="https://qz.com/909542/Donald-trump-talked-trade-and-terrorism-with-south-africas-jacob-zuma-and-nigerias-buhari/">terrorism and trade</a>. We don’t know if his counterparts found his assertions to be credible or even accurate. What we do know is that mutual confidence is essential in successful international relations. And confidence in Trump appears to be rapidly waning at home and abroad amid the chaos, divisiveness and alarming decisions that have marked his <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/03/09/terrifying-trump/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NYR%20Drew%20Darnton&utm_content=NYR%20Drew%20Darnton+CID_5810f7df449bf7ac6177f3010decabdf&utm_source=Newsletter&utm_term=Terrifying%20Trump">first month in office</a>. </p>
<p>Africa’s democrats fear Trump’s autocratic leadership traits will give political cover, comfort and confidence to the continent’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-leadership-traits-are-bad-for-democrats-in-africa-69745?u%E2%80%A6">remaining strongmen</a>. It remains unclear whether this will in fact be the case. But it is a safe bet his leadership will not inspire the confidence of Africans that his predecessor Barack Obama enjoyed throughout his two terms.</p>
<p>In a survey of nine sub-Sahara African countries in 2015 the Pew Research Centre found that 74% had <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/24/7-charts-on-how-the-world-views-president-obama/">confidence </a> in Obama to “do the right thing regarding world affairs”. Racial identity may be one explanation. But Obama also scored high or higher in predominantly white, Western Europe, Canada and <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/24/7-charts-on-how-the-world-views-president-obama/">Australia</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, his high standing in sub-Sahara Africa persisted despite grumbling that he never delivered American largess to the degree many initially expected. Nor did his use of the US military in Africa, including his support for the NATO-led 2011 <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/libya-s-collapse-is-not-the-west-s-fault-10094741.html">overthrow</a> of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, appear to dent his standing. This, despite the fact that he had many critics on the continent. Among them were prominent pundits and professors in <a href="http://guardian.ng/opinion/columnists/adebajo-obama-s-africa-legacy/">South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In Kenya, the country of his father, his popularity remained high despite slipping from 94% in 2009 to <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/6/survey/10/">80% in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond the numbers, Obama’s most lasting legacy may be his leadership traits. These were rooted in a commitment to sustainable democracy, no less than his hero,<a href="https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1CHWA_enZA634ZA634&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Obama+inspired+by+Mandela"> Nelson Mandela</a>.</p>
<h2>Pillars of Obama’s approach</h2>
<p>Obama spent his political career building and benefiting from diverse coalitions, identifying with three civilisations through his own family: <a href="http://www.a-id.org/pdf/africa-s-peacemakers-nobel-peace-laureates-of-african-descent.pdf">America, Africa and Islam</a>. He advocated civic nationalism as an essential part of sustaining pluralistic democracy, and rejected the divisiveness of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/15/in-athens-obama-warns-against-a-crude-sort-of-nationalism-or-tribalism-taking-root-in-the-u-s/?utm_term=.f0428978af5a">ethnic nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>Obama is also an accomplished constitutional lawyer, whose respect for due process marked his presidency. Unlike Trump, Obama criticised court rulings <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/obama-slams-supreme-court-immigration-decision-224728">against his policies</a> but never the authority behind <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/04/donald-trump-slams-so-called-judge-blocked-ban-vows-overturn/">those rulings</a>. Facts and evidence were essential to Obama and abetted confidence in his leadership at home and abroad. False news and repeated lying by Trump, or any elected leader, are among the most egregious threats to sustainable democracy. This is true in both America and Africa. </p>
<p>Obama also demonstrated a <a href="https://thetruth24.net/2016/09/20/obama-reiterates-commitment-to-multilateralism-in-final-un-address/">commitment to multilateralism</a>. It was qualified, however, in a way that advocates of the <a href="http://www.unisa.ac.za/sites/corporate/default/Contact-us/This-website-was-recently-revamped">African Renaissance</a> and a more effective AU can appreciate. Regional and global order requires agreement to respect sovereign rights – as well as sovereign obligations. This is now reflected in the growing willingness of the African Union to engage in the internal affairs of its <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/eisa2016Stremlau.pdf">member states</a>. </p>
<p>Obama’s most notable multilateral efforts all reflect this dual responsibility. These included the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">nuclear agreement with Iran</a> and, most importantly for Africa, his leadership in advancing the agreement on shared sovereign obligations in addressing <a href="http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php">climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Obama was also exceptionally respectful of constitutional due process and limited unilateral use of force in reprisal for terrorist and other hostile acts against the US. The same applied to his partnership with other nations that sought US military assistance in their <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Power-Wars-Inside-Obamas-Presidency/dp/0316286575">counter-terrorist operations</a>. </p>
<h2>Criticisms and failures</h2>
<p>Obama <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-is-expanding-its-fightagainst-extremism-inafrica-48184">made a number of decisions</a> that led to military assistance being given to African governments, including authoritarian regimes. Even though the assistance was limited, critics complained that it contradicted his democratic rhetoric and polices. </p>
<p>But in my view such assistance is legitimate, with two provisos. That it is proportionate to the threat to innocent civilians. And that it is provided at the request of a recognised sovereign government. </p>
<p>That Africa has faced a growing threat from terrorism is beyond dispute. According to the UN’s conflict prevention specialist Mohamed Yahya <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/africa-poverty-terrorism-by-mohamed-yahya-2017-01">33,000 people have died</a> in terrorism-related violence in Africa over the past five years. The worst civilian losses occurred in the conflict prone countries of <a href="http://www.acleddata.com">Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia</a>.</p>
<p>One particularly controversial aspect of Obama’s policy was his willingness to deploy drone weapons to combat the scourge. Most deaths from drones occurred in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/">Somalia</a>. In 2016 US drone attacks killed around 2,000 in those countries, including about <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2017/01/17/obamas-covert-drone-war-numbers-ten-times-strikes-bush/">100 civilians</a>. </p>
<p>But Obama’s most controversial use of force was in Libya. </p>
<p>In March 2011 the UN Security Council approved collective intervention under a new doctrine, the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml">Responsibility to Protect</a>. As the civil war escalated the NATO-led coalition of 19 states also escalated their airstrikes. This led to the overthrow of the government, and eventual capture and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/gaddafi-killed/">killing of Qaddafi</a> by rebel forces.</p>
<p>Obama admitted later that not providing adequate state building assistance to Libya was among his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/12/barack-obama-says-libya-was-worst-mistake-of-his-presidency">greatest failures</a>. Whether the use of military force violated international law or was to the long-term detriment of the Libyan people is less clear. A 2016 Brookings study by Shadi Hamid makes a convincing defence for the intervention despite the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-thelibya-intervention-was-a-failure-there-wrong/">continuing chaos and conflict</a>. </p>
<h2>Enduring inspiration</h2>
<p>Few leaders – whether in America or Africa – leave office with Obama’s record of public service unblemished by scandal, accusations of lying, defying or circumventing laws, or actions of self-enrichment. Leaders that eschew these traits are easily discernible and their behaviour adds authority and endurance to their legacies. </p>
<p>Obama no longer holds office but his voice is bound to resonate, especially when his leadership traits are compared with the reckless, bigoted and uniformed actions of his successor. Obama’s approval rating among Americans <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/18/obama-climbs-to-60-percent-approval-in-final-presidential-approval-rating-post-abc-poll-finds/?utm_term=.cf9be160a4ed">remains high</a> lending strength to those resisting Trump’s executive actions. His Africa legacy will be harder to measure but should be of enduring inspiration to advocates of sustainable democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Barack Obama’s high standing in sub-Sahara Africa persisted despite grumbling that he never delivered American largess to the degree many initially expected.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/721452017-01-31T16:37:20Z2017-01-31T16:37:20ZTrump’s strategy on immigration comes straight from the Middle East playbook<p>It is easy to ascribe Donald Trump’s recent policy decisions on immigration to his temperament. The US president’s executive order temporarily halting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-order-barring-refugees-flies-in-the-face-of-logic-and-humanity-72061?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#link_time=1485773157">country’s refugee programme</a> and <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-refugees-idUKKBN15B2HN">suspending visas</a> for citizens of seven, Muslim-majority countries, are in line with his xenophobic rhetoric on the campaign trail. </p>
<p>The pressure on Mexico to finance the construction of a wall on the US-Mexican border is also a direct follow-up to his vitriolic statements on “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/20/what-we-learned-final-presidential-debate">bad hombres</a>”. </p>
<p>It is equally tempting to blame the new administration’s immigration policy on Trump’s lack of respect for the rule-of-law and <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-dangerous-to-flatter-trumps-narcissism-with-too-much-attention-71854">his need</a> for continuing media and public attention. Particularly so as Trump has proposed policies that are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/a-sweeping-order-unlikely-to-reduce-terrorist-threat.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">unlikely to reduce any terrorist threat</a> and can be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-ab-top-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">easily overturned by federal courts</a>.</p>
<p>But the history of Middle Eastern politics teaches us to approach immigration policies less as consequences of elites’ personalities, and more as instruments in the quest for political power. Both Trump’s policy on Mexico and his recent executive orders are reminiscent of measures adopted by Middle Eastern elites as bilateral strategies of coercion.</p>
<h2>Remittance and visa restrictions</h2>
<p>In early 2016, Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c8252d98-e200-11e5-9217-6ae3733a2cd1">threatened to impose limits</a> on the amount of money Lebanese migrants could send back home as a way of pressuring Lebanon into clamping down on Hezbollah. The Saudis, and other Gulf states, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/gcc-declares-lebanon-hezbollah-terrorist-group-160302090712744.html">having declared</a> Hezbollah a terrorist organisation in March 2016, realised that they possessed an effective, and relatively cost-free, mechanism of exerting pressure on Lebanon, which relies on migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council states for <a href="http://newsweekme.com/lebanon-strained-ties/">70% of its remittance income</a>.</p>
<p>A few decades ago, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi would frequently implement – or threaten to implement – controls on Egyptian workers’ remittances as a way of putting pressure on the Egyptian government. When Egyptian president Anwar Sadat announced the creation of a Unified Political Command with Syria and Sudan in 1977, Gaddafi announced that “Sadat, in his behaviour, intends to oblige us” to act against Egyptians. Libya duly ceased the issuance of new work visas as authorities <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031715">expelled thousands of Egyptian workers</a>.</p>
<p>If this strategy sounds familiar, it is because it featured prominently in Trump’s presidential campaign agenda. In March 2016, Trump sent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/politics/memo-explains-how-donald-trump-plans-to-pay-for-border-wall/2007/">a two-page memo to the Washington Post</a> detailing how he would threaten to halt illegal migrants’ money transfers to Mexico unless the country paid for the construction of the wall. “It’s an easy decision for Mexico,” Trump wrote. “Make a one-time payment of US$5-$10 billion to ensure that US$24 billion continues to flow into their country year after year.”</p>
<h2>Deportations, Saudi style</h2>
<p>Beyond remittance and migration restrictions, Middle East elites have also used deportation as a strategy of coercion amid neighbourhood tension. When Yemen failed to denounce the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait at the UN Security Council (where it was a non-permanent member) in September 1990, Saudi Arabia expelled around 800,000 Yemenis <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/30/world/mideast-tensions-yemenis-ousted-by-saudis-bring-new-burden-back-to-their-land.html">over the following two months</a>. Other Arab states followed Saudi’s example and deported more Yemenis. The domestic upheaval that ensued in Yemen and the collapse of migrant remittances had destabilising effects that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ROmOAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=van+hear+new+diasporas&ots=1hnaAyyFJy&sig=n-CtZ_w5Ts7VpfQWOT2VKZDq4_k#v=onepage&q=yemen&f=false">paved the way for the 1994 Yemeni Civil War</a>.</p>
<p>Palestinians in Kuwait had a similar fate, and the entire community <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/palestine-kuwait-relations-ice-started-melt-150805072107680.html">faced discrimination and, consequently, mass deportations</a> when Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat failed to denounce the Iraqi invasion in 1990.</p>
<p>Trump’s executive order <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-refugees-idUKKBN15B2HN">barring entry to citizen from seven Musim-majority countries</a> – Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen – needs to be understood through the lens of the US administration’s immigration strategy. This will undoubtedly become much clearer in the new few weeks, but the Washington Post has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/countries-where-trump-does-business-are-not-hit-by-new-travel-restrictions/2017/01/28/dd40535a-e56b-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.ddc0169c353b">already identified</a> how the ban excludes any country where the Trump Organisation has business interests. Though it’s worth pointing out that the seven countries were <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-trumps-travel-ban-differs-from-obamas-visa-restrictions-72125">initially singled out</a> for extra visa checks during the Obama administration. </p>
<p>Beyond the human cost involved in the use of immigration policy as a geopolitical strategy, the US administration should keep in mind a second lesson from the Middle East experience: target states often devise a retaliatory strategy. This may involve countermeasures or, in the case of Egypt and Libya, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716287489001003">a border war in 1977</a>. Iran has already declared it would <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/iran-bans-us-citizens-entry-retaliation-549537?rm=eu">ban entry to US citizens</a> in response to Trump’s actions, while the New York Times has begun talking of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/economy/trumps-mexico-china-tariff-trade.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur">the making of a trade war</a> with China. Not surprisingly, the number of voices criticising Trump’s strategy as <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-immigration-order-is-bad-foreign-policy-72053">bad foreign policy</a> is increasing daily.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerasimos Tsourapas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gulf countries have a history of using migrants’ rights as a tool in their geopolitical strategy.Gerasimos Tsourapas, Lecturer in Middle East Politics, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/29812011-08-22T20:54:38Z2011-08-22T20:54:38ZThe next big challenge for Libya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/3063/original/Libya.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The capture of Colonel Gadaffi's son was celebrated by crowds in Benghazi</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The effort to overthrow Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi appears to be reaching its climax with key elements of his military forces surrendering to the rebels and senior members of his regime* in rebel hands. </p>
<p>While the rebels may not yet fully control Tripoli, Gaddafi’s hold on this crucial city seems to have largely evaporated.</p>
<p>The performance of the rebel forces has been impressive. The general view of them has been that they are largely disorganised and untrained enthusiasts for the departure of Gaddafi. </p>
<h2>An organised revolt</h2>
<p>Reports of rebel infiltration into Tripoli and the rebels’ apparent success in overcoming logistical problems, however, suggest a higher degree of military organisation than might have been expected. </p>
<p>The, perhaps unexpected, rebel victory resolves one problem, the removal of Gaddafi at Libyan hands. This was not a victory won by others for the Libyans. It raises, however, new problems, which have always been in the background but have been ignored by the West and the rebels themselves. </p>
<h2>Where will Gadaffi go?</h2>
<p>The first of these is what to do with senior members of the regime when they fall into rebel hands. </p>
<p>From one perspective, the answer to this is clear. <a href="http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/157194.htm">UN Security Council resolutions 1970</a> and <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/un-security-council-resolution">1973</a> require all states to hand members of the regime who may have been implicated in human rights abuses, including Gaddafi and his sons, to the International Criminal Court. This obligation applies to all countries, including those that are not members of the Court.</p>
<p>The countries that included this provision in the Security Council resolutions may now be regretting their action as they confront the varying reactions to the possibility of Gaddafi’s capture. </p>
<p>Western allies might have liked to find an escape route for Gaddafi in the hope that his departure from the scene would end the violence and allow speedy reconciliation. </p>
<p>The citizens of Libya, however, have already shown that they might prefer to deal with Gaddafi themselves. </p>
<p>As we saw with the killing of Saddam Hussein, this might not necessarily accord with international legal standards.</p>
<h2>Who is in charge?</h2>
<p>Another problem relates to the question of what comes next. The interim national council is nominally in charge, but it is not clear how much power the council has. </p>
<p>The council chairman, <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/idINIndia-58900220110822">Mustafa Abd Al-Jalil</a>, does not cut a particularly impressive figure but he may be a man of hidden strengths as was Nuri Al Maliki in Iraq. </p>
<p>Many of the members of the council have ambiguous backgrounds. Jalil himself has been accused of involvement in human rights violations and there have been claims of summary executions of captured supporters of the regime committed by rebels. </p>
<p>A big question relates to the attitude of the people who command the rebels’ armed forces. </p>
<p>The killing of the former commander, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8671455/General-Abdel-Fattah-Younes.html">Abd Al-Fatteh Younis</a> some weeks ago suggests tensions within the military, which could bode ill for civilian control of the new political system.</p>
<p>It is difficult to evaluate the attitude of the military commanders but it is to be remembered that most revolutions in the Arab world since independence have been led by the military. The tradition dies hard.</p>
<p>Perhaps the greatest challenge to the establishment of a functioning, open and law-based government post-Gaddafi is to be found in the tribal nature of Libyan society. </p>
<h2>The importance of tribalism</h2>
<p>Tribalism is an immensely complex element in the make-up of Libya. After trying to destroy the tribes’ power, Gaddafi was forced to fall back on his own tribe, the Qadadfa, and a number of other large groups to secure his regime. Members of the Qadadfa and these trusted tribes were placed in key positions, including the security services. It is probably the desertion of some of these larger tribal groups that has precipitated the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime.</p>
<p>While the new government will welcome the support of the various tribes, it will know that loyalty of tribal groups is a precarious thing. They will be expecting rewards for their support and it can be expected that there will be intense rivalry among the tribes for benefits from the government. It may not be possible for the government to satisfy all the tribes’ demands.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>It is also not clear what the rebels’ objectives are besides the removal of Gaddafi. We will hear much about democracy in coming months but it is hard to imagine how a society that has had no experience of democracy and is riven by competing loyalties and enduring enmities can establish a workable democratic system in the short term.</p>
<p>The new government will be faced with immense challenges, which would be daunting for more experienced and better resourced people than those leading the Libyan rebels. </p>
<p>These challenges will be aggravated by the removal of the one unifying factor in the civil war – the desire to get rid of Gaddafi.</p>
<ul>
<li><em>The original version of this article stated that Saif al-Islam, Colonel Gaddafi’s son, had been detained. This claim was widely reported, and confirmed by the ICC. But he has <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/08/2011822235934828611.html">since appeared before journalists</a> in Tripoli.</em></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/2981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Billingsley is affiliated with the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>The effort to overthrow Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi appears to be reaching its climax with key elements of his military forces surrendering to the rebels and senior members of his regime* in rebel hands. While…Anthony Billingsley, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.