tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/isis-11012/articlesISIS – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:58:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265702024-03-28T12:58:02Z2024-03-28T12:58:02ZMoscow terror attack showed growing reach of ISIS-K – could the US be next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584987/original/file-20240328-18-qt434b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C270%2C5115%2C3160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 140 people died in the Crocus City Hall assualt in Moscow on March 22, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-shows-the-burning-crocus-city-hall-concert-hall-news-photo/2097708778?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">deadly attack in Moscow</a> on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/isis-k-moscow-attack/">terror experts to ponder</a>: Could a U.S. city be next?</p>
<p>There has not been a mass casualty assault in the U.S. carried out in the name of the Islamic State group since 2017, when a truck <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sayfullo-saipov-be-sentenced-life-prison-2017-truck-attack-isis">mowed down cyclists and pedestrians on a New York City bikeway</a>, leaving eight dead.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options/">five years after the Islamic State group’s territorial defeat</a> in Baghuz, Syria, had prompted hopes that the terrorist network was in terminal decline, a recent spate of attacks has thrust the group back into the spotlight. On the same day as the Moscow atrocity, an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/at-least-three-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-afghan-city-of-kandahar">ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan</a>, resulted in the deaths of at least 21 people.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">terrorism expert and a scholar</a> specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale. </p>
<h2>Amplifying influence</h2>
<p>A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">bolster its position among jihadist factions</a> by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man sits looking at screens with Tome, Madrid and London on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image released by pro-Islamic State media outlet Al Battar Foundation reads ‘After Moscow, who is next?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/posters-pro-islamic-state-isis-media-groups-celebrate-moscow-attack-threaten-and-incite-further">Al-Battar Foundation</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.</p>
<p>By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/25/the-strange-story-behind-the-khorasan-groups-name/">Khorasan region</a> it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s ambition <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/moscow-concert-hall-attack-will-have-far-reaching-impact">extends</a> beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.</p>
<h2>An expanding threat</h2>
<p>This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.</p>
<p>These include a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c">suicide bombing in Iran</a> in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/4418496-germany-netherlands-arrest-9-over-alleged-plan-attacks-line-isis">the foiled plots</a> in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.</p>
<p>And without a doubt, a successful attack in the United States is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-could-be-first-afghan-terror-group-to-put-us-in-its-sights/6241617.html">seen within ISIS-K’s hierarchy as a major goal</a>.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat">officials in the Biden administration have repeatedly</a> warned of ISIS-K’s escalating danger to American interests, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria">propaganda has persistently framed</a> the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s <a href="https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/">extensive</a> military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.</p>
<p>The United States’ involvement, especially in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">collaboration</a> with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108344/text">placed America firmly</a> in the group’s crosshairs. </p>
<p>Employing <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CTC-Beyond-the-Caliphate-Belgium.pdf">tactics refined during</a> the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.</p>
<p>The 2015 mass shooting in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html">San Bernardino</a>, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/index.html">Orlando</a>, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.</p>
<h2>Targeting major powers</h2>
<p>Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/09/islamic-state-afghanistan-khorasan-propaganda-russia-ukraine-war/">publicly condemned</a> America, calling it an enemy of Islam.</p>
<p>Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/us-to-conduct-new-interviews-into-the-deadly-2021-bombing-at-kabul-airport">2021 Kabul airport attack</a> in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.</p>
<p>ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.</p>
<p>Russia became a prime target due in part to its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">partnering with the Bashar al-Assad government</a> in Syria in operations against Islamic State group affiliates. Similarly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/">Washington has worked with the Taliban</a> in Afghanistan in countering ISIS-K operations.</p>
<p>While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/islamic-state-recruiting-militants-from-tajikistan-and-other-central-asian-countries">Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan</a>, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant. </p>
<p>In 2023, U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/politics/migrants-us-southern-border-smuggler-isis-ties/index.html">investigated</a> a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The wreckage of a truck under a blue sheet is seen being towed away." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2314%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eight people died in a truck attack in New York City in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BikePathAttack/c09a4360d6b74c0c968a3897dbfa37f0/photo?Query=hudson%20bike%20%20attack&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38&currentItemNo=27">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.</p>
<p>It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden">notably Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<h2>Countering a persistent threat</h2>
<p>In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf">adopted a comprehensive strategy</a> combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts. </p>
<p>Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-uzbekistan-relations/">partners such as Uzbekistan</a> continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities. </p>
<p>On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-03-28%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Mayorkas.pdf">working to identify</a> and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-cia-terrorism-government-and-politics-87fb25aa94f4e4a8a46d82368f907be9">many experts had warned</a>, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-qaeda-a-defeated-threat-think-again/">inadvertently transforming</a> that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">retreat has also resulted</a> in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">doubts</a> over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">Taliban are struggling</a> to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.</p>
<p>The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-k-allowed-slipped-into-moscow-massacre-because-war-zelenskyy-2024-3#:%7E:text=The%20war%20in%20Ukraine%20distracted,in%20his%20Saturday%20night%20address.">preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts</a>, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-sees-islamic-state-effectiveness-decreasing-but-analysts-warn-resurgence-still-possible-/7238289.html">conclude</a> that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of terror operations carried out by the Islamic State group affiliate has raised concerns over a potential attack on US soil.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265492024-03-25T18:23:54Z2024-03-25T18:23:54ZMoscow attacks: why the Kremlin may have ignored any terrorist warnings from the CIA<p>The attack on the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68645755">Crocus City concert hall</a> in the Moscow suburbs, which left 137 people dead, has again raised questions about the effectiveness of intelligence in identifying and preventing massive acts of terrorism. </p>
<p>Intelligence about such events is rarely precise. Often it is made up of fragments of information or hearsay, spread across policing and intelligence agencies and across international boundaries. Intelligence <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/36899483/9781136680489_sample_832079.pdf">analysis</a> is how agencies bring all of these threads together into a picture that makes sense and that allows officials to respond. </p>
<p>Intelligence analysis relies on good and timely information, open minds and officials using it in the right way. As such, it should be surprising that more attacks do not occur. </p>
<p>At the start of March, the <a href="https://ru.usembassy.gov/security-alert-avoid-large-gatherings-over-the-next-48-hours/">US issued a warning</a> about the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">imminent threat of a mass casualty terrorist attack</a> against large gatherings including concerts, and warned its citizens to avoid such places for the following 48 hours. US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said information about such a planned attack <a href="https://twitter.com/NSC_Spox/status/1771379865222320610">had also been shared</a> with Russian authorities.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1771379865222320610"}"></div></p>
<p>A warning from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with its extensive access to communications and human intelligence, is highly credible. While it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68646375">not for exactly the same date</a>, the warning that the US issued is close enough to the date of the Crocus City attack to be considered relevant. It also mentioned Moscow and an entertainment venue as targets.</p>
<p><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">CNN also said</a> it had reports from two sources that since November there had been a steady stream of intelligence that Isis-K was determined to attack Russia.</p>
<p>But the Russian government currently feels like it is in a <a href="https://aif.ru/politics/world/peskov-rossiya-nahoditsya-v-sostoyanii-voyny-kazhdyy-dolzhen-eto-ponimat">state of war</a> with the west. They also know that the CIA is heavily involved in providing the Ukrainians with military intelligence. </p>
<p>In this context it is difficult for the Kremlin to take US warnings seriously, and even to admit to having received them. Dimitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, argued that Russia does not need American <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/25/russia-refuses-to-blame-is-for-concert-hall-attack-despite-growing-evidence">intelligence</a>. He told a press conference: “Our security services are working on their own, no assistance is currently on the table.”</p>
<h2>Five eyes better than one</h2>
<p>Given that intelligence is all about gathering and keeping secrets, it might sound odd to learn that intelligence agencies routinely share secrets. Within a country, policing and intelligence agencies share intelligence about individuals, threats and risks. </p>
<p>The main frictions in doing so are incompatible systems and processes, secrecy laws, the protection of tradecraft (how the information was arrived at), the protection of sources and the risks of secret information being surfaced in court (known as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZB3oEAAAQBAJ&oi">disclosure</a>). </p>
<p>Friendly countries also share intelligence, through established processes and procedures. The best known of these is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186?casa_token=U4FPh-kYTiAAAAAA:UpkBLoTAbRNSnDAfFwDVl_hYyf6pqBPCILLx04d9VXkRrS_5qISgvSIbx1yH2mcrFHsdT-FAzzI">Five Eyes alliance</a>, made up of the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. These are the core members, but there are now associate members, who enjoy restricted access to shared intelligence. </p>
<p>These sorts of alliances work because of established and sound protocols, some shared training, operational experience and ultimately trust. But the recent conviction of Canadian spy chief <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/07/canada-police-cameron-ortis-sentenced-leak">Cameron Ortis</a> for selling secrets to suspected criminals, highlights the vulnerability of systems dependent upon trust. </p>
<p>Countries who do not enjoy wholly friendly relations also share secrets, on a selective basis. There is – for example – a long history of western intelligence liaison (the term used for intelligence sharing) by the UK and US with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/18335330.2017.1351035?casa_token=a41oYd3UvkQAAAAA:IEjbJa1oal-6bMVqwnRVZPkRb1ZV61xve4NR3zt1zIHU5EqYjgTbyaKvmQeekRfC9HcBrYJgMEI">Pakistan</a> and Saudi Arabia, for example. </p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-14-17_Stephen_Hall_Intelligence_Sharing.pdf">Russia</a> and the west have also shared intelligence around terrorist groups – at least they did prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>International intelligence has often formed a kind of parallel diplomatic system of nations being able to talk more openly free from public gaze and public diplomacy. Sharing important intelligence has also helped to improve relationships between hostile nations or helped to open up a back channel to begin talking more openly and cordially about <a href="https://salford-repository.worktribe.com/preview/1488030/FINAL%20-%20Intelligence%20and%20Diplomacy.pdf">tensions</a>. </p>
<p>The CIA might well have shared a warning about the theatre plot as a means by which to show a desire to start to normalise their relationship with Russia again. They probably would have wanted to avoid having Ukraine blamed for the attack, which has subsequently happened. </p>
<p>So, what possible motives does the Kremlin have for rejecting the evidence, at least at first, that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-did-isis-k-attack-moscow-theater-2024-03-23/">a regional Islamic State (IS) group</a> (known as Isis-K) committed this atrocity? The key context is the ongoing war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>It will be politically convenient for Moscow to claim that Ukraine played a helping hand in this attack. The deputy head of the Russian Security Council, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">Dmitry Medvedev</a>, has said that all those implicated in the plot “must be tracked down and killed without mercy, including officials of the state that committed such outrage”. </p>
<p>The idea that the attack was sponsored or assisted by Ukraine helps to fuel the dominant anti-Kyiv narratives being produced by the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/russia-ukraine-latest-concert-attack-suspects-with-black-eyes-charged-in-court-france-raises-terror-threat-to-highest-emergency-level-12541713">Kremlin</a>.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/mar/25/russia-ukraine-us-islamic-state-concert-hall-attack-live-latest-news">has accepted IS’s role</a> in the attack but also accused Ukraine of being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2024/mar/23/putin-tells-russians-ukraine-linked-to-attack-on-moscow-concert-hall-without-evidence-video">involved</a> or even ultimately responsible. </p>
<p>A golden lesson of intelligence is to focus on what is there, not what you would like to be there. The simplest and most plausible explanation that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">IS</a> terrorists, who appear fixated by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/23/moscow-concert-hall-attack-why-is-isil-targeting">Russia</a>, have mounted a high-risk, low probability of success attack on Moscow, and evaded Moscow’s surveillance state through arriving and attacking quickly. </p>
<p>That Moscow’s security apparatus may have ignored any warnings from the CIA is explicable and unsurprising in the context of the war. It remains the case, however, that a city’s chances of avoiding large-scale terrorist attacks partly rest on the effective coordination and sharing of timely and accurate intelligence. The sad case of Crocus City concert hall, is the most recent case in point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert M. Dover has previously received funding from the AHRC and ESRC for research projects concerning the lessons that can be learned from intelligence failures, and successes. </span></em></p>The US said it shared information about a potential attack weeks before the Crocus City massacre.Robert M. Dover, Professor of Intelligence and National Security, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264692024-03-24T22:20:44Z2024-03-24T22:20:44ZHow Moscow terror attack fits ISIS-K strategy to widen agenda, take fight to its perceived enemies<p><em>Russia is reeling from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">worst terror strike on its soil in a generation</a> following an attack on March 22, 2024, that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">killed at least 137 concertgoers</a> in Moscow.</em></p>
<p><em>The attack has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/23/islamic-state-khorasan-isis-moscow-explainer/">claimed by the Islamic State group</a>. And <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/24/vladimir-putin-terror-attack-russia/">despite Russian authorities expressing doubt</a> over the claim, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">U.S. officials told The Associated Press</a> that they believed ISIS-K, a South and Central Asian affiliate of the terrorist organization, was behind the assault.</em></p>
<p><em>It comes amid heightened concern over the scope of ISIS-K activities following recent terrorist operations in countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">including Iran</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">and Pakistan</a>. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">Clemson University’s Amira Jadoon</a> and <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch of American University</a> – terrorism experts who have tracked the activities of ISIS-K – to explain what this latest deadly attack tells us about the organization’s strengths and agenda.</em></p>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K, short for Islamic State Khorasan Province, is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">regional affiliate</a> of the larger Islamic State group.</p>
<p>The affiliate group <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region</a>, although it has presence throughout the historical “Khorasan” – a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, along with other Central Asian countries. </p>
<p>Established in 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K aims to establish</a> a physical “caliphate” – a system of governing a society under strict Islamic Sharia law and under religious leadership – in the South and Central Asian region.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s beliefs follow the ideology of its parent organization, the Islamic State group, which promotes an extreme interpretation of Islam and sees secular government actors, as well as non-Muslim and Muslim minority civilian populations, as legitimate targets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
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<p>The group is known for its extreme brutality and for targeting both government institutions and civilians, including mosques, educational institutions and public spaces.</p>
<p>Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K’s key objectives <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-k-resurgence">have been to diminish</a> the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">now-ruling Taliban’s legitimacy</a> in the war-ravaged nation, assert itself as the rightful leader of the Muslim community and emerge as the principal regional adversary to regimes it deems oppressive. </p>
<p>Moreover, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency group to a governing entity left numerous militant factions in Afghanistan without a unifying force – a gap that ISIS-K has aimed to fill.</p>
<h2>Why was Russia targeted by ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K has <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-islamic-states-anti-russia-propaganda-campaign-and-criticism-of-taliban-russian-relations/">long framed</a> Russia as one of its main adversaries. It has heavily featured anti-Russian rhetoric in its propaganda and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">has attacked</a> Russia’s presence within Afghanistan. This includes a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">suicide attack</a> on Russia’s embassy in Kabul in 2022 that left two Russian Embassy staff and six Afghans dead.</p>
<p>The broader Islamic State group has targeted Russia for several reasons.</p>
<p>They include <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">long-standing grievances</a> relating to Moscow’s historical interventions in Muslim-majority regions like Chechnya and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s partnerships with regimes opposed by the Islamic State group, notably Syria and Iran, have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/09546553.2019.1657097?journalCode=ftpv20">positioned Russia as a primary adversary</a> in the eyes of the terrorist organization and its affiliates. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia has been a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">key ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad</a> since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, providing military support to the Assad regime against various opposition groups, including the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>This direct opposition to the terrorist group and its caliphate ambitions has rendered Russia as a prime target for retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90584">Russia’s cooperation</a> with the Taliban – ISIS-K’s key nemesis in Afghanistan – adds another layer of animosity. The Islamic State group views countries and groups that oppose its ideology or military objectives <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Criezis_CreateConnectDeceive_09222022_0.pdf">as enemies</a> of Islam, including actors who seek to establish relations with the Taliban.</p>
<p>By attacking Russian targets, ISIS-K in part seeks to deter further Russian involvement in the Middle East. But also, such attacks provide high publicity for its cause and aim to inspire its supporters worldwide.</p>
<p>As such, for the Islamic State brand, the Moscow attack serves as retribution for perceived grievances held against Russia, while also projecting global reach. This approach can provide significant dividends, especially for its South and Central Asian affiliate, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadist spectrum.</p>
<h2>What does the attack tell us about ISIS-K capabilities?</h2>
<p>The mere association of ISIS-K with this attack, whether it was directly or indirectly involved, bolsters the group’s reputation.</p>
<p>Overall, the attack signals ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">growing influence</a> and its determination to make its presence felt on the global stage.</p>
<p>Being linked to a high-profile attack in a major city far from its base in Afghanistan indicates that ISIS-K can extend its operational reach either directly or through collaboration with like-minded militant factions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People gather around a stretcher with an injured person lying on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in a blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-iranian-emergency-services-arrive-at-the-scene-news-photo/1898125916?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The scale and sophistication of the attack reflect advanced planning, coordination and execution capabilities. This only reaffirms unequivocally ISIS-K’s intent, adaptability and determination to internationalize its agenda. </p>
<p>Similar to ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">attack in Iran</a> in January 2024 that left over 100 dead, this latest atrocity serves to reinforce ISIS-K’s stated commitment to the broader global jihadist agenda of the Islamic State group, and helps broaden the appeal of its ideology and recruitment campaign.</p>
<h2>How does this fit ISIS-K’s strategy?</h2>
<p>The attack in Moscow serves as a powerful recruitment and propaganda tool by attracting international media attention to the group. This allows it to remain politically relevant to its audiences across South and Central Asia, and beyond. </p>
<p>But it also helps divert attention from local setbacks for ISIS-K. Like its parent organization Islamic State group, ISIS-K has been confronted with military defeats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/25/politics/isis-k-leader-killed-taliban-kabul-airport-bombing/index.html">loss of territory and leadership</a> and diminishing resources.</p>
<p>In the face of such challenges, ISIS-K’s potential links to the attack in Moscow remind observers of its persistent threat and adaptability.</p>
<p>By targeting a major power like Russia, ISIS-K aims to project a broader message of intimidation aimed at other states involved in anti-Islamic State group operations and undermine the public’s sense of security.</p>
<p>Additionally, operations such as the Moscow attack seek to solidify ISIS-K’s position within the broader Islamic State group network, potentially securing more support and resources.</p>
<p>More broadly, the strategy follows a process of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda</a> – something it has pursued with renewed vigor since 2021 by targeting the countries with a presence in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia, marking a deliberate expansion of its operational focus beyond local borders.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack, following the January assault in Iran, suggests that ISIS-K is intensifying efforts to export its ideological fight directly to the territories of sovereign nations.</p>
<p>It is a calculated strategy and, as the Moscow attack has exemplified, one that has the potential to strike fear in capitals far beyond ISIS-K’s traditional base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least 137 people were killed in the Moscow attack – the latest in a a series of ISIS-K operations outside its traditional stronghold.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264722024-03-24T12:06:44Z2024-03-24T12:06:44ZISIS-K’s attack in Moscow risks escalating the Russia-Ukraine war<p>A music concert in suburban Moscow became the scene of a bloody terrorist attack on March 22 as gunmen with automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/moscow-russia-shooting-03-23-24/index.html">killed more than 130 people</a> and injured dozens more. </p>
<p>Immediately after the attack, speculation emerged about who was responsible.</p>
<p>Although Ukraine was quick <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/ukraine-denies-involvement-in-moscow-terrorist-attack-as-putin-presses-upon-us-for-information/ar-BB1knhBz">to deny any involvement</a>, Russian President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">Vladimir Putin used a short televised statement</a> to his nation to suggest, without evidence, that Ukraine was prepared to help the terrorists escape.</p>
<p>However, ISIS — and specifically its Afghanistan subsidiary ISIS-K — later <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2024/03/22/isis-claims-responsibility-for-moscow-shooting-that-left-40-dead/?sh=1edfabbc7d0d">claimed credit</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>Russia has yet to acknowledge ISIS was responsible. But regardless of who the terrorists were representing, the Moscow attack demonstrates two key concerns.</p>
<p>First, terrorist organizations — meaning those who use violence for political purposes without the specific backing of a government — can use pre-existing conflicts and the resulting media attention to advance their interests. Second, the actions of these organizations have the potential to further exacerbate ongoing conflicts.</p>
<h2>The use of sub-state paramilitaries</h2>
<p>Many countries find it useful to employ sub-state entities and paramilitaries to achieve their objectives. <a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Both Russia and Ukraine have used and continue to employ such groups</a> to conduct acts their soldiers are ill-suited to carry out or where plausible deniability is needed. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Paramilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict</a>
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<p>While using these forces has certain <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003193227/serbian-paramilitaries-breakup-yugoslavia-iva-vuku%C5%A1i%C4%87">advantages for a country</a>, it’s simultaneously problematic because it leads to questions over who is actually behind the actions.</p>
<p>Attacks earlier this year by Yemen-based Houthi groups on ships in the Red Sea are an example of this issue. The Houthi are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know">commonly seen</a> as an Iranian proxy group. Even though there are close ties between the Houthi and the Iranian state, the Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">are not controlled by Iran</a>. Assuming Iran is directly behind the attack on Red Sea shipping is at best questionable and at worst outright false.</p>
<p>While assessing the role that a state has in <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/five-myths-about-sponsor-proxy-relationships">directing its proxies and paramilitaries</a> is difficult, this pales in comparison to the difficulty in linking states to international terrorist organizations. It is an ambiguity that terrorist groups can exploit.</p>
<h2>Media attention: Oxygen for terrorists</h2>
<p>Defining terrorism is an exercise fraught with peril. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/disciplining-terror/terrorism-fever-the-first-war-on-terror-and-the-politicization-of-expertise/12E123D58AA0437750CB882B066E2B6B">politicization of the term</a> since the post-9/11 war on terror has given new meaning to the expression that “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-one-mans-terrorist-another-mans-freedom-fighter/257245/">one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter</a>.”</p>
<p>Typically, however, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/defining-terrorism">policymakers</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/is-terrorism-necessarily-violent-public-perceptions-of-nonviolence-and-terrorism-in-conflict-settings/9BA6C161346EEE1563A7DC2639066A02">and academics</a> define terrorist groups as non-state organizations that seek to use violence or the threat of violence against civilians to achieve political objectives, with some ambiguity on which entities can perform it.</p>
<p>In the 21st century, the diffusion of <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/scales-dynamics-outsourcing/14566">communication technologies</a> and the <a href="https://archive.org/details/whatsnextproblem0000unse/page/82/mode/2up">24-hour news cycle</a> has provided terrorist groups with newfound means to capture international attention.</p>
<p>Video can be uploaded in real time by terrorist groups, and international attention can soon follow. The news media, however, is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/9/the-problem-is-not-negative-western-media-coverage-of-africa/">highly selective</a> in what it covers.</p>
<p>Due to media selectivity, terrorist organizations seek <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272717301214">to maximize their audience</a>. One way to do so is by linking their activities to ongoing events. ISIS-K’s attack in Moscow demonstrates this trend.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s decision to attack the Moscow music venue was not purely opportunistic. ISIS and its subsidiary organizations <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">blame Russia</a> for its role in destroying ISIS in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s strike against Moscow therefore fits its own agenda, while also advancing its goals. The problem is the potential for escalation.</p>
<h2>Escalating the Russia-Ukraine conflict</h2>
<p>There is still much that is unknown about the attack. One can, however, draw out some of the potential consequences.</p>
<p>American authorities had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">previously warned Russia</a> that an attack was imminent. The Russian authorities dismissed the warning.</p>
<p>Putin even stated before the attack that American <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-dismissed-us-warnings-about-a-potential-terror-incident-as-blackmail-just-3-days-before-concert-hall-attack/ar-BB1knpXu">warnings to that effect</a> were a form of blackmail. So even a genuine warning from the United States was seen by Russian authorities in the light of the broader Russia-Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>The aftermath of the attack has the potential to magnify these concerns. Putin claimed that four people involved in the conflict were captured <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/moscow-attackers-were-helped-ukraine-180044785.html?guccounter=1">attempting to flee</a> to Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>That seems questionable: the Russia-Ukraine border is one of the most militarized locations in the country due to the war. The result, however, is that the alleged escape attempt has allowed Russian politicians <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/prominent-russians-blame-ukraine-for-moscow-shooting-amid-fears-of-war-with-west/ar-BB1kpnj8">to link the attack</a> to Ukrainian authorities, despite Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-not-involved-moscow-attack-says-kyiv-military-intelligence-spokesman-2024-03-23/">protests to the contrary</a>.</p>
<p>Russian authorities will have to act; any state would in the aftermath of such an assault. But retaliation is all the more likely given <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/putin-russia-moscow-attack.html">Putin’s consistent messaging</a> as a protector of the Russian people.</p>
<p>Eliminating terrorism, however, is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">incredibly difficult if not impossible</a> task, as demonstrated by the American experience. The Russia-Ukraine war, however, is providing a convenient arena for Russian authorities to redirect the grief and outrage in the aftermath of the tragic attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack that killed dozens of people in Moscow, but that doesn’t mean Russia won’t try to use the event as a way to escalate its war with Ukraine.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264642024-03-23T23:29:15Z2024-03-23T23:29:15ZWhy would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?<p>It appears almost certain the brutal assault on a Russian crowd settling down to watch a rock concert in Moscow on Friday night was an Islamist terrorist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-attack-islamic-state-russia-terror-crocus/32874123.html">attack</a>. </p>
<p>At least 133 people were left dead and scores more were injured after gunmen with automatic weapons <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/moscow-concert-attack-live-updates-rcna144768">stormed</a> the Crocus City Hall in Moscow and opened fire, triggering a stampede.</p>
<p>Islamic State <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">initially</a> through its Amaq media channel and then directly. The modus operandi of the attack also fits with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">previous</a> Islamic State attacks. </p>
<p>It has been widely reported the attack was the work of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">Islamic State Khorasan</a> (ISIS-K), a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/gunmen-open-fire-on-moscow-concert-hall-crowd-set-building-on-fire-20240323-p5feng.html">branch</a> established in 2015 in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>So who is this group, why would they attack Russia and what does this mean for the broader terrorism threat?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">Iran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy</a>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K is the Islamic State branch that has most consistently and energetically attempted terrorist attacks across Europe, including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">Russia</a>. ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">planned</a> some 21 <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/one-year-islamic-state-worldwide-activity-map">attacks</a> in nine countries in the past year, up from eight the previous year. </p>
<p>ISIS-K had been under tremendous pressure from the Afghan Special Forces and American troops before the United States full withdrew from the country in 2021. Although that pressure has continued under Taliban rule, ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/isis-k-moscow-attack.html?action=click&pgtype=Article&module=&state=default&region=footer&context=breakout_link_back_to_briefing">grown in strength</a> in recent years, with several thousand fighters now operating in almost <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/islamic-state-khorasan-province-is-a-growing-threat-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/">every</a> one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. </p>
<p>If ISIS-K is indeed responsible for the Moscow attack, we should prepare for further attempted attacks – not just in Russia but across Europe.</p>
<p>European authorities have arrested ISIS-K operatives on multiple occasions. After years of warnings that Islamic State was rebuilding the capacity and resolve to resume an international terrorist campaign, Friday’s attack shows the threat is immediate and substantial.</p>
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<p>Earlier this month, the US, together with five other nations, had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">shared</a> intelligence they had of ISIS-K planning for attacks in Moscow. But these warnings were, as recently as last week, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">rejected</a> by President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin as being part of an attempt to discredit Russia. </p>
<p>The attack comes at the worst possible moment for Russia’s despotic leader, in the wake of his successful “election campaign” to claim a mandate for a further six years in power. </p>
<p>And it is perhaps for this reason that Putin’s five-minute televised <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">address</a> on Saturday, in which he directed blame toward Ukraine, came so late.</p>
<p>We don’t yet know whether the Kremlin will continue to <a href="https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1771461905053360366">blame</a> Ukraine or the West for the attack, or if it will pivot to accept Islamic State was responsible. </p>
<p>Either way, it’s likely to respond with a wave of violence, cracking down on Russia’s Muslim minority communities in the North Caucasus region and beyond.</p>
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<h2>Why would they target Russia?</h2>
<p>Both Islamic State in general, and ISIS-K in particular, have long proclaimed their intention of striking Russia. </p>
<p>They have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">cited</a> Russia’s earlier military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and its long history of crackdowns on Muslim communities in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus. They have also cited Russia’s role in providing a lifeline to the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</p>
<p>But it was also likely <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">opportunity and personnel</a> that led the group to select a soft target in Moscow, as much as anything else. </p>
<p>Islamic State carried out multiple <a href="https://twitter.com/azelin/status/1771276860237709441">attacks</a> in Russia from 2016–19, while several more plots were disrupted from 2021–23. </p>
<p>Many of the ISIS-K militants <a href="https://eurasianet.org/iran-attack-signals-growing-central-asian-role-in-iskps-external-ops">arrested</a> across Europe, including in Russia, over the past two years have been Russian nationals and people from Central Asia with links to Russia.</p>
<p>The most recent arrests occurred this month when Russian authorities claimed they prevented a planned attack on a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-neutralized-isis-cell-plotting-attack-moscow-synagogue-2024-03-07/">synagogue</a> in Moscow.</p>
<p>And last month, a Russian national accused of having Islamic State links was arrested in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-detains-russian-citizen-accused-being-member-islamic-state-2024-02-29/">Poland</a>, while another was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-arrests-russian-nuclear-plant-islamic-state-probe-sources-say-2024-02-13/">arrested</a> working at a nuclear facility under construction in Turkey. </p>
<p>In recent years, the vast majority of successful ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html">attacks</a> have been in Afghanistan, with many targeting the minority Shia Muslim Hazara community. </p>
<p>For instance, the group launched a massive suicide bombing outside the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kabul-bombings-a-dark-day-for-afghanistan-and-joe-biden-and-a-harbinger-of-worse-to-come-166883">Kabul airport</a> in August 2021, in the midst of the chaotic evacuation of Kabul, which resulted in around 170 civilians and 13 US military personnel being killed. </p>
<p>ISIS-K also carried out a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">bombing of the Russian Embassy</a> in Kabul in September 2022, killing at least six.</p>
<p>In January of this year, ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-explosions-soleimani-death-anniversary/32758522.html">launched</a> a massive suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, killing nearly 100 people at a ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. </p>
<h2>What next for Putin and the broader terrorism threat?</h2>
<p>Terrorist attacks, including those in brutal regimes like Iran or Russia, are tragic assaults on ordinary people who are not to blame for the politics of policies of the governments they are forced to live under.</p>
<p>When attacked, authoritarian regimes tend to respond with brutal reprisals that are likely to lead to cycles of violence, with less restraint and accountability than is typically the case with counter-terrorism operations in open societies. </p>
<p>Friday night’s attack in Moscow was nightmarish, but sadly the horror is likely to be just the beginning.</p>
<p>Regardless of how Putin and the Kremlin choose to respond, the attack comes as a reminder that the threat of terrorism posed by groups like Islamic State and al-Qaeda is now on the rise again. After five years of mostly operating in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, these groups now pose a renewed threat to the West.</p>
<p>The continued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">growth</a> of both ISIS-K and al-Qaeda under Taliban rule in Afghanistan should concern us much more than we have been acknowledging.</p>
<p>Friday’s attack is a clear reminder we should not look away and continue to wash our hands of any attempt to improve things in Afghanistan. There are no easy answers, but turning away and doing nothing will only make the situation worse.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is engaged in a range of projects funded by the Australian government that aim to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa.</span></em></p>After five years of operating mostly in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Islamist terror groups are again growing in strength in the West.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Scholar -In-Residence Asia Society Australia, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194542023-12-14T13:11:40Z2023-12-14T13:11:40ZIs Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565012/original/file-20231211-25-msxpy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C0%2C4644%2C3070&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Palestinian militant rides on the back of a motorcycle near a crossing between Israel and the northern Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-at-the-erez-crossing-also-known-as-the-beit-news-photo/1713407740">Ahmed Zakot/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of Hamas’ bloody raid into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, many Israelis and people around the world equated the newly ultraviolent and audacious Palestinian militant organization with the world’s deadliest terrorist group, ISIS – the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, linked the two groups directly on Oct. 25, 2023, stating: “<a href="https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/1717233019876966485">Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas</a>.” President Joe Biden and <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4254371-lloyd-austin-hamas-israel-atrocities-isis/">Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin</a> made similar comparisons. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Hamas killing families “<a href="https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/war-in-israel/idf-isis-flag-hamas-massacre/">brings to mind the worst of ISIS</a>.”</p>
<p>There are plenty of reasons for Israel to want the world to think Hamas is ISIS – including the hope of marshaling the sort of overseas support that led to the 2014 creation of the 86-member <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-counterterrorism/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/">Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-really-defeated-the-islamic-state-obama-or-trump-148066">fighting between 2014 and 2019</a>, the coalition reclaimed all the territory the Islamic State group had seized in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>And it is true that the Oct. 7 attack displayed tactics that are remarkably similar to those of the Islamic State group. But as <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/">a scholar</a> of ISIS specifically, and Middle Eastern militants in general, I am inclined to agree with those who say the comparison between the two terrorist groups overlooks their underlying differences. The similarities are on the surface, in methods and tactics – but their goals and ideologies remain vastly different.</p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/11/21/hamas-isis-are-not-the-same-00128107">various news articles</a> have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/hamas-isis-islamic-state-israel-terrorism-analogy/">pointed out</a>, the Islamic State is a Sunni group <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">militantly opposed to the Shia branch of Islam</a> and calls Shiites “<a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">rafida</a>,” which means “rejecter of Allah.” While it is true that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/11/1218145466/israel-hamas-war-shia-sunni-iran-backed-militants">most Palestinians in Gaza are Sunni</a>, Shia-led <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-needed-a-new-way-to-get-money-from-iran-it-turned-to-crypto-739619aa">Iran is Hamas’ primary benefactor</a>.</p>
<p>And Hamas and ISIS have even met in battle. Bloody <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">clashes between ISIS and Hamas</a> in 2015 resulted from efforts by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-supporters-throw-down-gauntlet-hamas-gaza-n385006">Islamic State supporters to establish ISIS affiliates in the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip</a> and the neighboring Sinai Peninsula.</p>
<p>In January 2018, leaders of the Islamic State group in the Sinai declared war on the “Hamas tyrants” via a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/world/middleeast/isis-hamas-sinai.html">lengthy online video</a> that included the execution of a Hamas member.</p>
<p>The two groups’ differences also include their divergent goals. The Islamic State group aims to create a global theocracy based on the principles of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, <a href="https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/isis-rejection-nation-state">with no national or territorial borders</a>.</p>
<p>Hamas, by contrast, is narrowly focused on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group">constructing a Palestinian national state</a> by “<a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3416">armed resistance to the occupation</a>” of the Palestinian territories by Israel.</p>
<p>So it’s pretty clear that Hamas is not ISIS. But it’s not that simple either.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Smoke trails in the sky over an urban scene show where rockets have been fired." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565013/original/file-20231211-29-yuy1hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Hamas fired rockets into Israel as part of the Oct. 7, 2023, attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/006937a3e5424b1cad4cd35b853349c5/photo">AP Photo/Hatem Moussa</a></span>
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<h2>Interconnections and exchanges</h2>
<p>Despite their differences, there are several similarities, including the fact that both groups are on the <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations</a>. The two organizations have on occasion also shared common strategic, if not necessarily ideological, goals. And, as became obvious on Oct. 7, their tactics have become similar, though in service of different objectives.</p>
<p>My long study of Islamic State fighting tactics, including <a href="https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/iraqi_kurdistan/field_iraqi_kurdistan.html">field research</a> in Iraq, leads me to believe Hamas has recently undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention. Prior to its Oct. 7 blitz, Hamas’ actions were limited to lobbing imprecise rockets and digging tunnels into Israel to kidnap or kill small numbers of Israelis.</p>
<p>But as University of Miami professor and expert in the study of jihadism Nathan S. French has noted in El Pais, “Hamas operatives – like other Islamist and jihadist groups – <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-22/the-weak-points-of-israels-thesis-why-hamas-is-not-the-same-as-isis.html">borrow, steal and appropriate tactics and strategies</a> from other similar political, guerrilla, or militant movements.” And it seems that Hamas has borrowed tactics from ISIS.</p>
<p>It’s likely that Hamas learned from the hundreds of Palestinians who <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/2015-11-19/ty-article/isis-in-israel-and-the-palestinian-territories/0000017f-e2cc-d568-ad7f-f3efca2d0000?lts=1699816485685">joined both the core ISIS caliphate</a> in Syria and Iraq and the ISIS affiliate in the Sinai. </p>
<p>And despite their differences, Hamas officials have in the past <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-islamic-state-growing-cooperation-sinai">met directly with leaders of the Islamic State in the Sinai</a>. Those meetings were likely linked to <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-affiliates-press-hamas/">collaboration between the two groups</a> for specific actions that benefited their respective goals, such as weapons smuggling, undermining Egyptian government influence in the Sinai and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/elite-hamas-fighters-defecting-to-islamic-state/">transporting injured Islamic State fighters to Gaza</a> for medical treatment. </p>
<p>In October 2023, an article in the U.K. newspaper The Times cited an intelligence official who said, “<a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/what-are-the-connections-between-hamas-and-isis-0db9rnlg3">It’s clear that the two movements have worked together</a> close enough over the past few years to copy each other’s methods, learn tactics and train on weapons they have procured together.”</p>
<h2>Tactical similarities</h2>
<p>In many ways, Hamas’ Oct. 7 surprise attack <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/fact-why-toyota-yes-toyota-dominates-today%E2%80%99s-battlefields-158581">resembled ISIS attacks</a>, such as a June 2014 blitz in which Islamic State group fighters burst out of secret desert bases to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112">conquer much of northern Iraq</a>, including the country’s second-largest city, Mosul.</p>
<p>Both groups’ attacks took their opponents by complete surprise, indicating a high degree of secrecy and advanced preparation. And both assaults utilized “technicals” – pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in their cargo beds and carrying squads of fighters. Both attacking forces <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-publishes-new-report-islamic-state-drones/">used commercial drones</a> to provide air support for their troop movements. And both organizations deployed <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hamas-fighters-bodies-israel-toll-gaza-ground-invasion-rcna119640">suicide-attack fighters</a> known as “inghimasi,” Arabic for “plungers into battle.” </p>
<p>On Oct. 7, Hamas fighters reportedly left <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">black ISIS war banners</a> at the scene of several attacks. There were also videos posted online that appeared to show Hamas fighters <a href="https://talk.tv/news/38068/hamas-video-fighters-singing-isis-songs-october-7">singing popular ISIS war songs as they stormed into Israel</a>.</p>
<h2>Made for the media</h2>
<p>An additional notable similarity is that Hamas released ISIS-style videos of the horrific atrocities it inflicted on Israelis. The Islamic State group’s media approach involved disseminating videos of <a href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2015/7/6/8886461/isis-videos-burning">mutilation, rape, amputation, slavery, suicide warfare, torture and mass murder</a>.</p>
<p>On and after Oct. 7, Hamas fighters similarly uploaded videos and images of their <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/israel/palestine-videos-hamas-led-attacks-verified">executions of cowering Israeli civilians</a> and other atrocities to a Telegram channel. These visuals made their way to X – formerly known as Twitter – and TikTok and other platforms. </p>
<p>Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari has specifically said those videos are part of why Israel has been <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-shows-foreign-press-raw-hamas-bodycam-videos-of-murder-torture-decapitation/">equating Hamas with the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Times of Israel came to a similar conclusion, noting: “<a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hamas-and-islamic-state-two-faces-of-jihadi-terror-same-contempt-for-human-life/ar-AA1ifNoR">Looking at images of the Hamas assault</a>, it is fair to assume that Hamas learned a lesson from the ISIS terror playbook.”</p>
<h2>Rape as a weapon</h2>
<p>Another tactic new to Hamas, but not to ISIS, was the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/17/world/israel-investigates-sexual-violence-hamas/index.html">alleged rape and mutilation of girls and women</a>. Hamas has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sexual-assault-hamas-oct-7-attack-rape-bb06b950bb6794affb8d468cd283bc51">denied the allegations</a>. Islamic State religious scholars have previously <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1711590">sanctioned violence against women</a> and told fighters to rape non-Muslim women “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/middleeast/isis-rape-theology-soldiers-rape-women-to-make-them-muslim/index.html">to make them Muslim</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, Israel Defense Forces officials have said the Hamas religious leaders gave their fighters ISIS-like religious texts based on extremist interpretations of traditional Islamic jurisprudence telling them <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/10/israel-womens-groups-warn-of-failure-to-keep-evidence-of-sexual-violence-in-hamas-attacks">captives were “the spoils of war</a>.”</p>
<p>All these developments indicate that ISIS has had an influence on Hamas, even if their goals remain quite different – or in direct opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Glyn Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the Islamic State group says Hamas has undergone a radical ISIS-inspired transformation that has not yet gotten widespread public attention.Brian Glyn Williams, Professor of Islamic History, UMass DartmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186282023-12-07T14:15:45Z2023-12-07T14:15:45ZTerror in Uganda: what’s driving the Islamic State-linked rebels<p>The Islamic State Central Africa Province recently <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/suspected-adf-rebels-kill-foreign-tourists-in-western-uganda-4404976">attacked</a> and killed two foreign tourists and a citizen in a Ugandan nature park. Located in the country’s west near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Queen Elizabeth National Park is about 400km from the Ugandan capital Kampala. </p>
<p>The attack was aimed at Uganda’s most important source of foreign currency, the tourism sector. The sector generated <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-targets-52b-earnings-from-tourism-annu-NV_163086">7.7% of Uganda’s gross national product</a> before a slump linked to the Covid pandemic. </p>
<p>The attack highlights a departure from previous attacks by the armed group towards new targets: western tourists in Uganda. It also highlights how regional rivalries in the border areas of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">Congo-Uganda-Rwanda</a> function as oxygen that has enabled the organisation to survive and grow. </p>
<h2>The evolution</h2>
<p>The group, originally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">formed and financed</a> by the rulers of the DRC (then Zaire) Mobutu Sese Seko, and Sudan Omar al Bashir to launch insurgent attacks on their common enemy in the mid-1990s – Uganda. The ADF was thus initially used by Mobutu and Bashir as a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">weapon</a> in regional rivalries to check Yoweri Museveni’s influence. </p>
<p>At the time of its formation in 1995, ADF was a rather weird merger of <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">two vastly different organisations</a>. </p>
<p>The first consisted of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda that had been based around the mainly Christian Bakonjo-Baamba people of the Rwenzori region in western Uganda, and near the border with DRC. </p>
<p>The second part of the organisation consisted of fighters from the Ugandan Islamic Salafi Foundation, an organisation with roots going back to protests against Uganda’s <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=14">attempts to control</a> its Muslim congregations in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Uganda forced the new group into the eastern provinces of Congo where it was supported by the Mobutu regime before its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">overthrow in 1997</a>. It survived the fall of Mobutu by withdrawing deep into the forests and mountains in the border areas between Uganda and Congo.</p>
<p>Over time, ADF grew more Islamic, partly due to Ugandan amnesties that convinced several of the more moderate leaders of the ADF to defect. Signs of a more radical organisation emerging could be seen from 2011. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant">Islamic State</a> accepted the organisation as a province in 2019. When the ADF leader <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=22">swore allegiance to the Islamic State</a>, there were some defections from the few remaining commanders who had National Army roots. </p>
<h2>Change in strategy</h2>
<p>Since 2021, the Islamic State Central Africa Province has launched two different types of attacks against Uganda. First, terror attacks and assassinations far from the Congolese border in places like Kampala. Second, heavy, more military-style attacks against civilians in Uganda’s border with the DRC. </p>
<p>It’s increasingly using more <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch/">traditional terror tools</a> and has introduced new propaganda material, such as videos with beheadings. Suicide bombings have also become part of its repertoire. The group even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-links-islamist-rebels-attempted-murder-minister-2021-07-01/">attempted to assassinate</a> Ugandan government leaders. </p>
<p>From 2022, the group has carried out heavier raids into Uganda, including attacking a school in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65937484">June 2023</a> in a town near the Uganda-Congolese border. It has also launched several attacks against <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/un-adf-backed-by-islamic-state/7143149.html">businesses in the border zone</a>. </p>
<h2>Uganda’s response</h2>
<p>The increase in the Islamic State Central Africa Province attacks led to a Congolese-approved <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/deal-devil-heart-great-lakes">Ugandan intervention in Congo</a> that began in December 2021. The rebel group initially withdrew into the deep forests of the Rwenzori mountains and the Ituri rainforest in the north-eastern parts of Congo. These are close to the DRC’s Virunga National Park, another large area of wilderness and mountains that’s perfect to hide in. </p>
<p>This renewed pressure might have led parts of the rebel group into Ugandan territory in the Rwenzori Mountains National Park. This isn’t too far from Queen Elizabeth National Park where the recent terror attacks occurred. </p>
<p>This latest intervention continues a pattern of Ugandan and Congolese offensives that lead to temporary withdrawals of the rebel group into the forest and mountains around the Uganda-Congo border. These offensives usually end with the rebels returning into towns and cities upon Ugandan and Congolese withdrawals. </p>
<p>Importantly, the current offensive has failed to end terror attacks inside Uganda.</p>
<p>Adding to the complexity of the intervention are ongoing attacks from the largest guerilla group in eastern Congo, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement</a> (M23). M23 has had <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/14/drc-m23-rebels-recapture-kishishe-where-they-are-accused-of-a-massacre-in-2022/">recent success</a> on the battlefield, recapturing towns from government forces. </p>
<p>The M23 offensive takes place to the south and west of the area where the Islamic State in Central Africa Province is operating, but has repercussions for the group. First, the recent round of warfare in eastern DRC has created a record <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/renewed-fighting-raises-fears-for-peace-in-dr-congo-wider-region/3051713">6.9 million</a> refugees due to escalating violence, creating chaos that the group can take advantage of. </p>
<p>Second, the ongoing fighting has drawn the Congolese army away from its campaign against the Islamic State in Central Africa Province, and hinders Congolese-Rwandese cooperation against it. This is due to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Rwandan support for the M23</a>, which Kigali officially denies providing. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The Islamic State in Central Africa Province thrives on <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Congolese-Rwandese</a> rivalry, as well as regional mistrust dating back decades. Creating real regional cooperation and trust would be the first step toward ensuring that the Islamic State’s local outfit is stopped. It would also help address nearly three decades of fighting in the Congo. </p>
<p>For this to happen, however, African – as well as other international actors – need to stay focused on the conflict in Congo and the unrest in the Uganda-Rwanda-DRC border areas. It’s also important to actively strive for dialogue, especially <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/us-pressure-on-drc-rwanda-paying-off-4445108">between Rwanda and Congo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I would like to thank journalist Adolph Basengezi for his comments on the situation in Congo's north-east, aiding my analysis on the current conflict.</span></em></p>Regional rivalries have functioned as oxygen, allowing the rebel group to survive and grow.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178802023-11-16T15:59:21Z2023-11-16T15:59:21ZHamas isn’t the first military group to hide behind civilians as a way to wage war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559809/original/file-20231116-19-swoqzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The exterior of Shifa hospital in Gaza City is seen on Nov. 10, 2023, amid ongoing battles between Israel and Hamas near the facility. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-a-view-of-the-exterior-of-al-shifa-hospital-news-photo/1775224453?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Israeli military said on Nov. 15, 2023, that it had found weapons and a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raids-gazas-al-shifa-hospital-2023-11-15/">Hamas command center</a> at Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, after sending troops into the medical facility.</em> </p>
<p><em>Shifa has become the epicenter of Israel’s ground invasion into Gaza, as the Israeli military says that Hamas has strategically placed its fighters and weapons in a broad tunnel system that connects to the hospital, and that Hamas is using hospital workers and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/15/israel-gaza-al-shifa-hospital-hamas-map/">patients as human shields</a>. The U.S. says its intelligence shows that Hamas, as The New York Times wrote, “has been using hospitals in Gaza, including Al-Shifa, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/us/politics/hamas-hospitals-gaza-israel.html">as command centers and ammunitions depots</a>.” Hamas <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-hamas-refused-israeli-fuel-offer-gazas-shifa-hospital-2023-11-12/">has denied the allegations</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The hospital complex now houses about 700 patients, 400 health workers and 3,000 Palestinians who are displaced from their homes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/15/israel-gaza-al-shifa-hospital-hamas-map/">according to United Nations figures</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>This is far from the first time that a military group has allegedly used civilians to shield themselves and their weapons, says <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=7sjhifoAAAAJ&hl=en">Benjamin Jensen</a>, a war strategy expert from American University School of International Service who served 20 years in the military.</em></p>
<p><em>Jensen explained that civilians often become pawns in war when one side does not have a military advantage against a stronger adversary – and looks for other ways to weaken their opponent.</em></p>
<h2>1. What purpose does using civilians to shield fighters serve in a conflict?</h2>
<p>Using places and things civilians need, like hospitals, as a means to fight a war is considered a weapon of the weak. It is a way to use another side’s values against it. </p>
<p>I think it is clear that Hamas has – in this war <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/17/5912189/yes-gaza-militants-hide-rockets-in-schools-but-israel-doesnt-have-to">and historically</a> – tried to embed <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3578196/defense-department-continues-to-stress-law-of-war-with-israel/">themselves and weapons in places civilians</a> <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2023/11/06/what-blinken-confirmed-in-the-middle-east-00125599">live or visit,</a> in order to make it more difficult for the Israelis to target them. </p>
<p>One question in war is, “How do I raise the cost that my adversary has to incur in order to attack me?” Your goal is to gain a relative advantage at the lowest possible cost to yourself, and with the lowest possible benefit for your adversary. </p>
<p>And in this case, the costs to Israel are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-generation-gap-in-opinions-toward-israel/">damage to its reputation</a> and legitimacy, among some people, because of the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-39-enarhe">civilians it is killing</a> in Gaza while targeting Hamas. </p>
<h2>2. Are fighters hiding behind or among civilians a new way of waging a war?</h2>
<p>Using civilians to further a military advantage is not a new phenomenon.</p>
<p>We still have this ridiculous image of war looking like people lined up in neat rows, meeting each other in defined fields of battle. But that flies in the face of the actual history of warfare historically, and especially in the 21st century. </p>
<p>In the Japanese attack on the British stronghold of Singapore in 1942, during World War II, for example, one of the key features of Japan’s approach was to bomb <a href="https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=f1afa0d2-8b3c-40fd-bf33-269a7e40bbfd">people’s water sources</a>, in order to more rapidly compel the British surrender. </p>
<p>We’ve seen adversaries in <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-872-bouchie-de-belle.pdf">multiple modern conflicts</a> hide behind or among civilians. It’s sad, because it means the only truth in war is that there will be tragedy, and civilians will pay the heaviest price.</p>
<h2>3. Where else has this happened?</h2>
<p>Even if you go back to the Vietnam War, you can find <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA032423.pdf">examples of the Viet Cong</a> sometimes using the same routes or vehicles that were used for aid delivery to civilians. Wars dating back to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/29/bosnian-serbs-seize-more-un-troops/991628ef-8469-436d-8759-470fe4ab11d4/">Bosnian civil war</a> in the early 1990s are really where you start to see more examples of fighters trying to shield themselves with civilians or with U.N. peacekeepers, as happened in Bosnia.</p>
<p>We’ve seen the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/17/taliban-human-shields">Taliban in Afghanistan hiding in civilians’ homes</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/4ae0135dc5fd4cf4b7619c647ddfa873">in hospitals</a>, as well as storing <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/53795/taliban-use-mosque-hide-weapons-cache">weapons in mosques</a>. The Taliban were very good at being fluid and moving in and out of civilian areas that would make it difficult to strike them.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-2-battle-of-mosul/#:%7E:text=The%20battle%20occurred%20between%20fighters,to%20twelve%20thousand%20ISIS%20fighters.">battle of Mosul</a>, between the Islamic State group and the Iraqi government from 2016 through 2017, was another example of this. The Islamic State fighters herded an estimated 100,000 civilians together and used them as <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/civilians-living-penury-and-panic-mosul-battle-rages-unhcr">civilian shields</a>. </p>
<p>Even in the case of the Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has openly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/22/europe/putin-uses-word-war-fighting-ukraine-russia-intl-hnk/index.html">declared war</a> on the entire society of Ukraine. But it’s possible that some of Russia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/26/world/europe/russia-ukraine-hospital-missile.html">strikes against hospitals</a> in Ukraine happened because Russian intelligence received information that Ukraine may or may not have been moving soldiers or items in and out of the hospital. </p>
<h2>4. Do civilians sometimes willingly play the role of human shields?</h2>
<p>It varies. Based on my experience, do I think it’s possible that the lead hospital administrators in Gaza know the full landscape of the labyrinth of tunnels underneath? No. Do I think one or two officials or a couple of janitors or part-time workers do? Yes. Do I also think that it’s possible that most people in a war zone are just trying to survive and they look the other way? Yes. </p>
<p>There’s this weird phenomenon for civilians in situations like this, in which they often know something’s going on. But also if you’re smart enough, you might not ask anything. Hamas was known to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/middleeast/hamas-is-accused-of-killing-and-torturing-palestinians.html">mistreat Palestinians</a> before this war started. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman with a headscarf holds a small baby and sits amid a large pile of rubble." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/559794/original/file-20231115-25-3xod7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Palestinian woman holds her baby at her home destroyed by Israeli air strikes in a central area of the Gaza Strip on Nov. 15, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-woman-holds-her-baby-at-her-home-destroyed-news-photo/1783907050?adppopup=true">Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>5. How does Hamas allegedly using civilian shields complicate this war?</h2>
<p>The answer depends on what your military is trying to achieve. If your idea is that you have to move faster than your adversary, then you are willing to probably assume a higher risk of civilian casualties and lose the information war – meaning the war of people’s public opinion – in order to rapidly destroy your adversary. </p>
<p>But with Hamas locating themselves alongside important places like hospitals, Hamas has actually made Israel fight them in places Israel wouldn’t want to target them, because of the potential loss of civilian life. And in doing so, look at how fast Israel lost momentum in its <a href="https://sg.news.yahoo.com/could-killed-information-war-inflates-052107912.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAL_mlwp9w4aQ6CbhWlw6T-Hfq-ERRNfp6eN2VA8Geo-1Cyyt68gkcZHEGzlBHypM7uEktJbAReSN6mKMtzDW7CU4TI1u84_cv87AKUl2JJW6_Mjuw8SntF_3UQ25m-y7nwufO4bCMeno-lkwO3zwa8H7XfXYfWiAU3f41Sz77u3Y">information war</a>. Israel is taking a huge amount of criticism for its killing of civilians as it goes after Hamas.</p>
<p>Despite what some protesters are saying, I can say that the Israeli military does care about civilian casualties. Israel still is a democracy. And they respect, even if not to the exact standards that many people would like to see, the laws of war – certainly more than Hamas does. For example, Israel limits how it <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4285905-obvious-to-us-israel-trying-to-minimize-civilian-casualties-kirby-says/">targets military strikes</a>. </p>
<p>And even with that, the information blowback against Israel is real. I fought for 20 years. It’s hard to get images of infants killed and hurt in this war out of your head. Social media accelerates the circulation of images that pull on our emotions and make it difficult to have objective conversations about the conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Jensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban and the Islamic State group are among the militant groups that have been known to use civilians as human shields in the past, in order to try to shift their opponents’ war calculations.Benjamin Jensen, Professor of Strategic Studies, Marine Corps University; Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163172023-10-24T23:11:48Z2023-10-24T23:11:48ZIsraeli invasion of Gaza likely to resemble past difficult battles in Iraq and Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555661/original/file-20231024-29-q1jiq8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C12%2C8256%2C5475&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armored Israeli military vehicles maneuver near Israel's border with Gaza.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-military-armoured-vehicles-and-tanks-deploy-along-news-photo/1742240506">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel appears to be preparing for the next phase of its military operation: a ground campaign to “<a href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/2023/10/11/23913488/israel-hamas-attack-gaza-netanyahu-middle-east-war-netanyahu">crush and destroy</a>” Hamas, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has put it. </p>
<p>Israel has signaled that it might be <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/24/israel-hostages-delay-invasion-gaza-hamas">willing to delay an invasion</a> – but not call it off entirely – if Hamas releases more hostages. But that means an invasion is still very likely, which raises questions about how Hamas has prepared for a ground invasion and whether Israel is prepared for what could be a long, drawn-out fight.</p>
<p>Prior ground attacks from Israel into the Gaza Strip have been dangerous, deadly and costly for both sides. </p>
<p>The most recent significant ground campaign, known in Israel as <a href="https://imeu.org/article/operation-cast-lead">Operation Cast Lead</a>, occurred over a three-week period from December 2008 to January 2009. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-cast-lead/">According to the Israeli military</a>, that operation was launched to strike the Hamas infrastructure that enabled its terrorist and rocket attacks against Israel. In that battle, thousands of Israeli troops fought Hamas fighters, with an Israeli cease-fire declared on Jan. 17, 2009. <a href="https://time.com/3035937/gaza-israel-hamas-palestinian-casualties/">According to some accounts</a>, losses in that operation totaled at least 13 Israeli military fatalities, 600 to 700 Hamas deaths and over 1,400 dead Palestinian civilians in Gaza.</p>
<p>Since that conflict, up until the horrific Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties">Israeli operations in Gaza</a> have mostly involved airstrikes against Hamas, hitting targets in the Gaza Strip. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel has stepped up airstrikes, but also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/israels-ground-war-against-hamas-what-know">massed troops, tanks and other equipment</a> on its border with Gaza. </p>
<p>The international community also expects a ground invasion. Former <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/23/obama-israeli-operation-in-gaza-may-backfire-if-civilians-arent-protected">U.S. President Barack Obama has said an Israeli ground operation could “backfire”</a> if civilians aren’t adequately protected. </p>
<p>Hamas has been guarded about its own details, but says it has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">prepared, with Iranian support</a>, not only for the Oct. 7 attacks but also to respond to an Israeli ground campaign – including taking action outside the Gaza Strip if there is an invasion.</p>
<p>As a former U.S. government intelligence and counterterrorism senior official, who now <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">teaches about those topics and national security</a>, I expect that once combat begins, fighting will be intense. The conflict will likely resemble heavy urban fighting similar to other battles over the past 20 years elsewhere in the Middle East against Iraqi militants and the Islamic State group – and very different from the more limited engagements Israel has attempted in Gaza up until now.</p>
<p>Combat operations in densely packed urban environments are <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-eight-rules-of-urban-warfare-and-why-we-must-work-to-change-them/">among the most complex</a> for military planners and the troops who have to fight in them for a variety of reasons. The physical space is dense, with above-ground structures or subterranean networks that provide ample environments for fighters to attack, remain concealed or move without detection. There are narrow channels like alleyways or roads that military units have to navigate through. Large numbers of noncombatant civilians are also around. These factors can <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/defending-the-city-an-overview-of-defensive-tactics-from-the-modern-history-of-urban-warfare/">complicate the ability of even the best-trained troops</a> to accomplish their objectives while also minimizing their risk. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers in camouflage move through a cityscape." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555663/original/file-20231024-27-yl856u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Marines try to push into the center of Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004, in what became known as the second battle of Fallujah.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IRAQFALLUJAH/a20dca3eade4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo/Anja Niedringhaus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Nowhere for Hamas to go</h2>
<p>Though Israel estimates having killed more than <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hamas-fighters-bodies-israel-toll-gaza-ground-invasion-rcna119640">1,500 fighters</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/hamas-prepared-for-a-long-war-with-israel-as-concerns-for-hostages-in-gaza-grow">during and in the days immediately following</a> the Oct. 7 attacks, its military estimates that Hamas probably <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-idf-commander-says-hamas-has-7000-rockets-dozens-of-drones/">has tens of thousands more</a> well-armed fighters in Gaza. </p>
<p>Hamas fighters have nowhere to fall back to in the face of an attack by Israel. The strip’s borders with Israel remain sealed, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/desperately-needed-aid-trickles-into-besieged-gaza-as-egypts-border-crossing-opens">with only limited openings at the Rafah crossing</a> with Egypt to allow for humanitarian aid to enter. Recently, Cindy McCain, head of the United Nations World Food Program, warned that the continued Israeli blockade around Gaza has pushed the civilian population there <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gaza-humanitarian-catastrophe-united-nations-warn-israel-prepare-ground-invasion/">into a grave humanitarian crisis</a>. But Egypt has been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/13/middleeast/egypt-rafah-crossing-gaza-palestinians-mime-intl/index.html">reluctant to allow people through</a>, citing both <a href="https://apnews.com/article/palestinian-jordan-egypt-israel-refugee-502c06d004767d4b64848d878b66bd3d">humanitarian and foreign policy concerns</a>.</p>
<p>With nowhere to go, it is highly possible that Hamas will decide to stand and fight an Israeli invasion. At that point, Hamas will likely use suicide attackers and the weapons it has and can make – some combination of roadside bombs, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-north-korea-weapons-703e33663ea299f920d0d14039adfbb8">rocket-propelled grenades</a>, automatic weapons, mortars and snipers.</p>
<p>In addition, Hamas has built an <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/15/middleeast/hamas-tunnels-gaza-intl/index.html">extensive network of as many as 300 miles of underground tunnels</a> throughout Gaza, which its fighters will use to hide and travel in. The Israeli air campaign since Oct. 7 will also help Hamas, because it has destroyed buildings and created piles of rubble that have not yet been removed, making above-ground travel of Israeli forces difficult.</p>
<p>Israel will face further political and humanitarian risks because Hamas kidnapped <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-do-we-now-about-hamas-hostages-2023-10-19/">dozens of hostages</a> on Oct. 7, and their locations are unknown. Even if some are released before an invasion, Israeli attacks could injure or kill any who remain. And rescue operations would require precise intelligence and careful military planning to work in a very small physical area with widespread fighting. </p>
<p>Israeli forces have not faced these conditions often or for very long in the past, but other nations’ militaries have.</p>
<h2>The battles of Fallujah</h2>
<p>In 2004 and 2005, <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah">thousands of U.S. Marines and troops</a> from other nations in an international coalition <a href="https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/11/28/the-second-battle-of-fallujah-15-years-later/">fought Iraqi insurgents and members of al-Qaida in Iraq</a> in Fallujah, Iraq.</p>
<p>While they inflicted significant losses on those adversaries, U.S. and allied troops also took heavy casualties. </p>
<p><a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah/">In the first battle of Fallujah</a> in early 2004, 38 U.S. troops were killed and at least 90 injured, with at least 200 al-Qaida or Iraqi insurgents killed and an unknown number of civilians killed or injured. <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-7-second-battle-of-fallujah/">In the second battle of Fallujah, later in 2004</a>, U.S. troops suffered 38 fatalities and 275 injured, with upward of 1,000 to 1,500 insurgents killed and another 1,500 injured. Combined, these were the two biggest urban battles for U.S. forces during the Iraq War.</p>
<p>In addition, much of the <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/rebuilding-fallujah/">city of Fallujah, which once had a population of 250,000, was destroyed</a>, and required significant reconstruction efforts before residents could move back in – <a href="https://apnews.com/6c044247f6284a7d847ec8e846e82dc2">only to be displaced again</a> when the Islamic State group emerged and also fought there against the Iraqi government in the mid-2010s.</p>
<p>A decade later, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi military took on fighters from the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, commonly known as ISIS, in cities like <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/23/middleeast/isis-caliphate-end-intl/index.html">Baghouz</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/17/558271646/isis-makes-last-stand-at-a-stadium-in-raqqa-its-doomed-capital">Raaqa</a>, Syria, and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-makes-bloody-last-stand-in-remaining-mosul-neighborhoods-under-its-control/">Mosul</a>, Iraq. Those fights resulted in <a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/07/15/american-isis-podcast/">tens of thousands of ISIS fighters killed or captured</a>. The survivors, having lost control of any territory, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/04/1192245987/where-is-isis-today">went into hiding</a>.</p>
<p>In these urban ground offensives against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the losses for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/world/middleeast/iraq-tal-afar-isis-battle.html">Iraqi military</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201112020634/https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/1200-isis-fighters-neutralized-raqqa-65-city-seized-kurdish-forces/">the Syrian Democratic Forces</a> were heavy, totaling over 1,000 for each of these forces. And just like in the battles in Fallujah, <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/feature/mosul-largest-battle-decade-future-of-war/">civilian deaths and injuries</a> also occurred in high numbers due to the intensity of the urban combat and its proximity to regular people trying to live their lives. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People gather at the collapsed corner of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555664/original/file-20231024-29-rh3el8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraqis search through the rubble of a house destroyed in fighting in Fallujah in May 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IRAQ/c148ac9560e4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lessons for Israel?</h2>
<p>In late October 2023, the Pentagon dispatched <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-sends-senior-army-officers-to-israel-to-advise-idf-on-gaza-ground-operation-plans/">Marine Lt. Gen. James Glynn</a> and other military advisers to Israel to consult on plans for a ground operation in Gaza. </p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-iran-navy-gaza-1a906598be5baccc614897768b1824a8">Glynn fought in Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/23/israel-gaza-war-marine-general-ground-operation">advised the Iraqi military</a> in its fight against the Islamic State group in Mosul. He was expected to offer advice based on his experience in protracted urban combat, including <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-iran-navy-gaza-1a906598be5baccc614897768b1824a8">ways to minimize civilian casualties</a>.</p>
<p>No one knows precisely how events will unfold in the coming days. If Israel does indeed mount a ground campaign, the resulting fight between the Israeli military and Hamas will almost certainly be violent and difficult. </p>
<p>Casualties on all sides of the conflict will be high, and will include innocent Palestinians who have not left the northern part of Gaza for the southern end of the strip, where <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-aid-be-available-south-gaza-does-not-elaborate-2023-10-18/">humanitarian aid and relief</a> is beginning to arrive. The ensuing urban battles may resemble those in Fallujah in the mid-2000s or ISIS stand-offs a decade ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hamas and the international community expect Israel to invade the Gaza Strip. The battle will probably be more like recent Middle Eastern combat than Israel’s past fights with Palestinians.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098402023-07-27T20:35:02Z2023-07-27T20:35:02Z‘The Kerala Story’: How an Indian film ignited violence against Muslims and challenges to interfaith marriage<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/the-kerala-story-how-an-indian-propaganda-film-ignited-violence-against-muslims-and-challenges-to-interfaith-marriage" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>A controversial low-budget Indian feature film <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65481927"><em>The Kerala Story</em>,</a> about a <a href="https://time.com/6280955/kerala-story-movie-india/">discredited anti-Muslim conspiracy theory</a>, has been causing a political storm, going all the way to India’s Supreme Court. </p>
<p>The movie has helped circulate the idea of <a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-love-jihad-anti-conversion-laws-aim-to-further-oppress-minorities-and-its-working-166746">“love jihad,”</a> a right-wing conspiracy theory that Muslim men are predators and out to marry and steal Hindu women. These ideas date back to the British colonial era and have far-reaching implications for people’s everyday lives. </p>
<p>The trailer claimed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/4/kerala-story-film-on-alleged-indian-isil-recruits-gets-pushback">32,000 Hindu girls had been converted to Islam by Muslim men with the intent of recruiting them to ISIS.</a> </p>
<p>Once the film came out, citizens <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1048448/amid-row-the-kerala-story-trailer-changed-from-being-the-story-of-32000-women-to-that-of-3-girls">tried to get it banned by sending a petition to the India’s Supreme Court</a>. </p>
<p>“Love jihad” is a conspiracy theory that claims Muslim men are converting Hindu and Christian women to Islam. Allegedly, the men feign love, get the women pregnant and eventually traffic them. The motive? To increase the Muslim population of India, perpetuate fanaticism and ultimately establish an Islamic state. </p>
<p>According to a recent <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/06/29/religious-segregation/">Pew Report</a>, 99 per cent of married people in India share the same religion as their spouse. Muslims account for approximately <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/projected-population-of-muslims-in-2023-to-stand-at-1975-crore-govt-in-lok-sabha/article67106178.ece">14 per cent</a> of India’s population. </p>
<p>There is no such thing as a “love jihad” and an investigation by India’s National Investigation Agency has said there is <a href="https://thewire.in/politics/nia-love-jihad-kerala-hadiya">no evidence of “love jihad” taking place.</a></p>
<h2>Political fallout</h2>
<p>The figure of 32,000 women in the film’s trailer was immediately <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/entertainment/movies/movie-the-kerala-story-an-attempt-to-destroy-states-communal-harmony-ruling-cpim-opposition-congress/article66792442.ece">challenged by Indian political leaders</a> and also debunked by <a href="https://www.altnews.in/32000-kerala-women-in-isis-misquotes-flawed-math-imaginary-figures-behind-filmmakers-claim/">fact-checkers from the website, Alt News</a>. </p>
<p>The filmmakers agreed to change the number and a new trailer was released. <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1048448/amid-row-the-kerala-story-trailer-changed-from-being-the-story-of-32000-women-to-that-of-3-girls">It removed and replaced “32,000 girls” with “the true stories of three girls.”
</a> </p>
<p>And the movie went forward with its release, which according to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/23/india/indian-film-kerala-story-controversy-intl-hnk/index.html">some news reports, was successful at the box office</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539600/original/file-20230726-15-pfd09i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cinema in Bangalore, India. (CP)</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Challenges in the Indian Supreme Court</h2>
<p>Some politicians decried the propagandist nature of the movie and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65523873">in West Bengal, it was banned by the government</a>. Politicians there said the film <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/1049228/the-kerala-story-contains-manipulated-facts-and-hate-speech-west-bengal-tells-sc">“manipulated facts and contains hate speech in multiple scenes”</a> and they banned the film to <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/entertainment/bollywood/mamata-banerjee-announces-ban-on-the-kerala-story-in-west-bengal-film-producer-reacts-101683546969420.html">“avoid violence and hatred.”</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/prohibition-order-not-tenable-sc-stays-west-bengal-governments-ban-on-the-kerala-story/articleshow/100326856.cms">The Indian Supreme Court</a> lifted the state ban though agreed that a disclaimer on the film was necessary. The disclaimer indicated that the film provides “no authentic data” to support the 32,000 figure and that it presents fictionalized accounts.</p>
<p>Other politicians, including some from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, promoted the film. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65481927">Some of them even offered complimentary tickets or organized free screenings</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://thewire.in/film/kerala-story-prime-minister-modi-misleading-claim">Prime Minister Narendra Modi</a> endorsed the movie, assigning to it a distinct legitimacy. </p>
<h2>Islamophobia from the 19th century</h2>
<p>The idea of “love jihad” is both current and historical with notions coming from Indian and Hindu nationalism as well as 19th-century British colonial narratives. Both streams constructed Muslim men as hypersexual and hyperaggressive. </p>
<p>In the 19th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">Hindu scholars and new religious organisations (like Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha)</a> began producing a new Hindu-centric version of Indian history. This history grew in response to British colonialism but <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb88s">at the same time, shared similarities with British colonial ideas</a>.</p>
<p>The British portrayed themselves as just rulers, partly by contrasting themselves with their casting of Muslim kings as hypersexual fanatics. </p>
<p>They pointed to a medieval darkness marked by the lust and tyranny of Muslim rulers. Mughal rulers were <a href="https://dvkperiyar.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/We-or-Our-Nationhood-Defined-Shri-M-S-Golwalkar.pdf">portrayed as rapists attacking both Hindu women and “Mother India”</a>. This portrayal included the Muslim <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/5969?language=en">Prophet Muhammad who was portrayed in some places as sexually perverse</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.448955">These ideas became part of the curriculum</a> in certain Indian states and elite Hindu scholars, educated at colonial schools, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb88s">perpetuated these narratives in their writing</a>. And the idea of a type of “love jihad” became part of the discourse created through pamphlets, novels, newspapers and magazines — especially in North India.</p>
<p>By the late 19th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">India was constructed around Hindu heterosexual relationships and family values</a> in opposition to Muslim sexual deviance and rampant Muslim sexuality.</p>
<p>In 1923, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230108196">Madan Mohan Malaviya, the president of the Hindu Mahasabha</a> said in a speech, “hardly any day passes without our noticing a case or two of kidnapping of Hindu women and children by not only Muslim <em>badmashes</em> (rogues) and <em>goondas</em> (hooligans), but also men of standing and means.” </p>
<h2>Challenges to interfaith marriage</h2>
<p>Today, it’s not just <em>The Kerala Story</em> that has circulated the “love jihad” myth. Reportage in Hindu nationalist media continues to make headlines.</p>
<p><em>Organiser</em>, a magazine run by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a network of Hindu nationalist organizations, recently reported that <a href="https://organiser.org/2023/06/28/181109/bharat/madhya-pradesh-three-cases-of-love-jihad-following-same-pattern-like-film-the-kerala-story-reported-in-a-month/">three cases of love jihad following the same pattern as those in ‘The Kerala Story’ were reported in a month</a>.</p>
<p>Love jihad’s centrality to Hindu nationalist politics has led to specifically stringent laws <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1068">focused heavily on sexuality and marriage</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-love-jihad-anti-conversion-laws-aim-to-further-oppress-minorities-and-its-working-166746">India’s 'love jihad' anti-conversion laws aim to further oppress minorities, and it's working</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://theintercept.com/2021/07/03/love-jihad-law-india/">Hindu vigilantes, in partnership with the police,</a> launch missions to separate interfaith couples. Muslim men have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/21/they-cut-him-into-pieces-indias-love-jihad-conspiracy-theory-turns-lethal">brutalized, killed, forced into hiding and incarcerated</a> using <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2018298841/">historic anti-conversion laws</a>. </p>
<p>One response to the chatter about “love jihad,” is an Instagram channel called <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/countering-love-jihad-by-celebrating-indian-interfaith-couples">India Love Project</a> launched to celebrate stories of interfaith love and marriages. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539606/original/file-20230726-25-5qmkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This photo of a newlywed couple is from the Instagram account called the India Love Project. The groom is Muslim and the bride is Hindu-Punjabi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CptlucmPFgr/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA%3D%3Dhttps://www.instagram.com/p/CptlucmPFgr/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA%3D%3D">(India Love Project)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hopefully, such efforts continue to address Islamophobia and broaden to include a larger public discourse looking at transnational Islamophobic interlinkages, both past and present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wajiha Mehdi receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Public Scholars Initiative UBC, International Development Research Centre Canada and the University of British Columbia</span></em></p>A controversial low-budget Indian feature film about a discredited anti-Muslim conspiracy theory has been causing a political storm, going all the way to India’s Supreme Court.Wajiha Mehdi, PhD Candidate, Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2092942023-07-19T20:41:05Z2023-07-19T20:41:05ZHealing through witnessing: Documenting the stories of Yazidi refugees in Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537175/original/file-20230712-22-gost18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C0%2C5532%2C4023&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Yazidi refugee woman's upper body is tattooed with the names of her missing family members and fiancé.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Leah Hennel)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/healing-through-witnessing-documenting-the-stories-of-yazidi-refugees-in-canada" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Weeks after Yazidi refugees were rescued from horrific captivity and enslavement imposed by Daesh (also known as ISIS) and <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2021/03/canada-expands-efforts-to-welcome-more-yazidi-refugees-and-other-survivors-of-daesh.html">arrived in Canada</a>, we began to document the harm. </p>
<p>At the <a href="https://mosaicpcn.ca/programs/refugee-health/">Mosaic Refugee Health Clinic</a> in Calgary, we tallied the physical damage, mental trauma and how families were ripped apart. </p>
<p>Our new patients’ intent was clear: They wanted the world to know. They insisted that the atrocities of genocide should never be forgotten and the culprits face justice. Beyond holding the guilty accountable, they also wanted to restore fragments of the familial and communal societies from which they’d been uprooted.</p>
<p>After centuries of religious persecution, their community had been dealt a deadly blow in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/isis-genocide-yazidi-un.html">August 2014</a>. A massacre — <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14514.doc.htm">labelled a genocide by the United Nations</a> — resulted in approximately 200,000 displaced Yazidis, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-017-0965-7">7,000 murdered</a>, 7,000 women and children abducted into <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1002297">enslavement</a>, and the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/murad/lecture/#:%7E:text=Thank%20you%20very%20much%20for,solely%20because%20they%20were%20Yazidis">destruction of farms, villages, homes and places of worship</a>.</p>
<p>These are the narratives shared by Yazidi refugees who were resettled through Canada’s <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2017/02/helping_vulnerableyazidiwomenandchildrenandothersurvivorsofdaesh.html">Survivors of Daesh Program</a> in Calgary and three other major Canadian cities between 2017 and 2019. Although our clinic is one of the largest and longest-running specialized refugee health clinics in Canada, the rapid resettlement of 242 Yazidi refugees <a href="https://doi.org/10.7326/M20-0151">nearly broke us</a>. </p>
<p>Their stories were profoundly vivid, their trauma piercing. They gave horrific accounts of Daesh’s invasion and the ensuing genocide, recounting their enslavement, slaughter and forced indoctrination.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three women on a sofa in a room with a Canadian flag on the wall" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537174/original/file-20230712-23-q1est.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Three sisters, all of whom had been abducted and enslaved by ISIS, were reunited in Calgary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Leah Hennel)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We tried to listen empathetically, without judgement — unaware that doing so all but guaranteed a crippling <a href="https://doi.org/10.7326/M20-0151">vicarious trauma</a> that led to intense symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder among our physicians, nurses and other health-care staff.</p>
<p>Over time, with immense effort, patients and providers began to heal together. Our Yazidi patients have launched their <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/alberta/article-torn-apart-by-islamic-state-and-reunited-in-calgary-three-yazidi/">new lives</a>, and are chasing ambitious dreams.</p>
<p>As part of this healing, they tasked us with ensuring the world would not forget their plight. As co-directors of <a href="https://www.refugeehealthyyc.ca/">Refugee Health YYC</a> — a research, education, and innovation platform at the University of Calgary — we obeyed. With our research team and <a href="https://www.ucalgary.ca/news/academic-journey-connects-head-and-heart-bachelor-health-sciences-alumna">Nour Hassan</a>, an undergraduate student in the Health and Society program, we began the process of meticulously investigating and documenting the harm through research.</p>
<h2>Documenting genocide</h2>
<p>We reviewed the medical records of every Yazidi patient at the <a href="https://mosaicpcn.ca/programs/refugee-health/">Mosaic Refugee Health Clinic</a>. We recorded the direct exposure to Daesh and nearly universal family separations. We assembled a panel of expert clinicians to review almost 1,400 individual diagnoses and determine which were most likely caused by exposure to Daesh. We found, in addition to the psychological trauma, the physical consequences of violence, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2022.4782">starvation</a> and rape.</p>
<p>To ensure our findings were accurate and meaningful, we collaborated with the Yazidi community and their leaders, one of whom is still languishing in an internally displaced camp in northern Iraq. The group provided insights, offered recommendations and made edits. We listened and obeyed.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“When genocide is committed, it must be seen.” – Yazidi refugee, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights activist <a href="https://www.nadiasinitiative.org/">Nadia Murad</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resulting research is a community- and clinician-engaged cross-sectional study, which was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.23064">recently published</a> in the <em>JAMA Network Open</em>. Though our methodology was simple and the output inefficient from a research perspective — it took us nearly four years to summarize the ordeals of 242 Yazidi genocide survivors — this stands among the research we are most proud of.</p>
<p>We offer it as a testament to the world, documenting the depths of human depravity and its darkest impulses. The horrors of genocide defy comprehension, but in our ongoing struggle for human rights amid increasing global displacement, we must confront them. So far, we are failing. </p>
<p>Yazidi refugees are calling on the world to open its eyes to genocide, while indiscriminate killings and violence against women and children are, yet again, being used as weapons of war in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/afghanistan-talibans-cruel-attacks-in-panjshir-province-amount-to-war-crime-of-collective-punishment-new-report/">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-un-investigation-report-1.6780600">Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/05-07-2023-sudan-top-un-officials-sound-alarm-at-spike-in-violence-against-women-and-girls">Sudan</a>.</p>
<p>In Calgary, a city leading the country in per capita refugee resettlement among major urban centres, we’ve resettled approximately <a href="https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/4a1b260a-7ac4-4985-80a0-603bfe4aec11/resource/1938d8f2-177c-4f1b-8f6f-1fd7ea1acc78?inner_span=True">24,000 refugees since 2015</a>, surpassing the total for all of British Columbia, and nearly the number received by Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, P.E.I. and Newfoundland <a href="https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/4a1b260a-7ac4-4985-80a0-603bfe4aec11/resource/1938d8f2-177c-4f1b-8f6f-1fd7ea1acc78?inner_span=True">combined</a>. </p>
<p>We’re proud of this work, carried out largely behind the scenes by passionate coalitions across the settlement, health care, public health and education <a href="https://www.ccisab.ca/">sectors</a>. Our efforts are boosted by a welcoming and generous population that opens its doors to those in need, regardless of local challenges.</p>
<h2>Refugee health policy summit</h2>
<p>In the final act of healing, Refugee Health YYC will host Yazidi refugee, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights activist <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/murad/facts/">Nadia Murad</a> in Calgary, a <a href="https://www.refugeehealthyyc.ca/pre-conference">refugee health policy summit</a>, and for the first time, the <a href="https://refugeesociety.org/narhc-conference/">North American Refugee Health Conference</a> July 21-23. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a light blue jacket, wearing headphones, in front of a microphone" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537987/original/file-20230718-19-qf2dvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugee Health YYC will host Yazidi refugee, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights activist Nadia Murad in Calgary during the North American Refugee Health Conference July 21-23.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(The Associated Press/Kay Nietfeld)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These events will bring together health-care providers, researchers, policymakers and refugee leaders to learn from one another and develop new models to improve health care and well-being for the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends">108.3 million people forcibly displaced</a> around the world. Among these, only two per cent are resettled each year. The rest remain trapped in unstable and unsafe situations, often in countries that are not their homes.</p>
<p>These small offerings symbolize our commitment to work alongside refugees, as <a href="https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Seven-Decades-of-Refugee-Protection-In-Canada-14-December-2020.pdf">Canada</a> again led the world in the number of <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends">refugees resettled in 2022</a>. They underscore our dedication to ensuring the world never forgets the horrors of genocide and its devastating multi-generational impact on the communities targeted. </p>
<p>Our Yazidi patients arrived in Canada, courageously telling their stories. We need to listen. Otherwise, the crimes committed against them, and other refugees, will be repeated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209294/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel E. Fabreau MD, MPH, FRCPC receives research grants from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), Alberta Innovates, MSI Foundation, and the University of Calgary.
The work presented and the study it describes were unfunded.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annalee Coakley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Calgary refugee health clinic documented the stories of 242 Yazidi genocide survivors, recounting enslavement, slaughter and forced indoctrination.Gabriel Fabreau, Assistant Professor - General Internal Medicine; Depts. of Medicine and Community Health Sciences | Cumming School of Medicine, University of CalgaryAnnalee Coakley, Clinical Assistant Professor, Department of Family Medicine, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090422023-07-10T01:44:27Z2023-07-10T01:44:27ZThe Islamic State flag hijacks Muslim words of faith. Banning it could cause confusion and unfair targeting of Muslims<p>The Australian government may make the Muslim community a target through an ill-informed proposal.</p>
<p>New <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r7048_first-reps/toc_pdf/23077b01.PDF;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22legislation/bills/r7048_first-reps/0000%22">legislation</a> has been introduced to parliament to outlaw the public display of “prohibited symbols”. These include two Nazi symbols and the Islamic State flag.</p>
<p>The bill was initially introduced to ban the Nazi Hakenkreuz (swastika) symbol as Australia tries to deal with a rise in <a href="https://time.com/6286524/australia-ban-nazi-symbols/">Neo-Nazi activity</a>. Neo-Nazi groups are becoming a greater threat as they try to recruit new members and are becoming more brazen through <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/podcast-episode/neo-nazi-groups-becoming-more-brazen-says-asio-chief/f4ke3kbyv">public displays</a>, according to ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess.</p>
<p>The Islamic State flag was not in the initial <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/s1373_first-senate/toc_pdf/23S01020.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22legislation/bills/s1373_first-senate/0000%22">bill</a>. To justify its late addition, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus <a href="https://ministers.ag.gov.au/media-centre/speeches/second-reading-counter-terrorism-legislation-amendment-prohibited-hate-symbols-and-other-measures-bill-2023-14-06-2023">said</a> the IS flag symbolised the “abhorrent actions taken by one of the world’s deadliest and most active terrorist organisations”.</p>
<p>According to the proposed bill, the IS flag is to become a prohibited symbol. Anything that “so nearly resembles” the IS flag such that “it is likely to be confused with, or mistaken for” the IS flag, is also to be banned.</p>
<p>The bill then details what is meant by public display: “if it is capable of being seen by a member of the public who is in a public place”.</p>
<p>This can include documents such as newspapers or a magazine. Basically, anywhere in public where the “symbol” can be seen.</p>
<p>But this is problematic because the IS flag hijacks words which are sacred for all Muslims. The IS flag ban will likely create more problems than it solves and should be removed from the legislation. Or at the very least, the ban should be postponed until solid data is available about its problematic use.</p>
<p>There has been some backlash over the proposed wording already. In response, Dreyfus said the Labor government <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/well-listen-government-responds-to-concerns-over-proposed-is-flag-ban/y5xqk8wf5">would listen to such concerns</a> and that final changes to the wording are still possible, though it remains to be seen what form that would take. </p>
<p>The bill will now be looked at by a parliamentary committee.</p>
<h2>What is on the IS flag?</h2>
<p>The wording on the IS flag is of great significance for Muslims. The IS flag writes, “There is no God but God” in Arabic which is the fundamental tenet of Islam. It is the Islamic creed. It’s a phrase that Muslims declare at least once in their lifetime, while most Muslims would repeat it multiple times in a day.</p>
<p>The wording in the white circle of the flag reads “Allah, Messenger, Muhammad”. It is believed this is a <a href="https://time.com/3311665/isis-flag-iraq-syria/">seal</a> used by Prophet Muhammad in sealing letters that were sent to dignitaries. Historically, it was common to seal letters in such a way.</p>
<p>All Muslims embrace the wording found on the IS flag. IS adopted such a flag to claim they are acting in the name of God and following the way of Prophet Muhammad. </p>
<p>With such an approach, terrorists are claiming <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/essays/the-hoax-in-the-isis-flag/">legitimacy</a> – they are hijacking Islam.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Saudi Arabia flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535998/original/file-20230706-21-5t00of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Islamic creed is also on the Saudi Arabian flag: La ‘ilaha 'illa-llah ('there is no God but God’), muhammadun rasūlu-llāh (‘Muhammad is the Messenger of God’).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Confusion and unnecessary suspicion</h2>
<p>Banning the IS flag or anything that “so nearly resembles” it could potentially create many problems and confusion in everyday life for Muslims – a group of people who have already endured so much due to <a href="https://theconversation.com/lets-rip-it-off-her-head-new-research-shows-islamophobia-continues-at-disturbing-levels-in-australia-179106">Islamophobia</a>.</p>
<p>Many Muslims display the Islamic creed in its Arabic wording within their homes, as stickers on their cars, in mosques, or as artwork in various forms. Only last week, I was driving behind a car that had the Islamic creed written on its rear window, large and bold.</p>
<p>Even the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/flag-of-Saudi-Arabia">Saudi flag</a> has the Islamic creed written on it, though with a green background. Nevertheless, it is the exact wording found on the IS flag. </p>
<p>A law enforcer, politician or lay person may not know the nuanced differences between an IS flag and the use of the Islamic creed by a member of the Muslim community in their personal lives. This may result in unnecessary suspicion or even arrest.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1503599434319474688"}"></div></p>
<p>For Muslims and for those who understand Islam, the creed has been hijacked by a terrorist organisation. While the intent of the ban may have been good, going ahead with such a ban will create more problems than it solves.</p>
<p>The wording of this proposed bill may even strengthen the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48603170">narrative</a> of IS, that “Muslims and the Muslim identity is under attack in the West”.</p>
<p>What’s more, the impact of IS is significantly <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/syria-isis-terrorism/">dwindling</a> – it’s not the threat it was between 2014 and 2019.</p>
<p>New South Wales police data shows public displays of the IS flag have <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/islamic-state-flag-flown-over-300-times-in-nsw-in-last-six-years-20211130-p59dje.html">markedly declined</a> since their peak in 2015. As such, there’s no need to ban a flag for a <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/syria-isis-terrorism/">weakened organisation</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zuleyha Keskin is affilitated with ISRA Academy.</span></em></p>While the flag ban is well-intentioned, we must remember the creed of Islam has been hijacked by a terrorist organisation - and one which is dwindling anyway.Zuleyha Keskin, Associate Professor, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050512023-05-09T10:39:49Z2023-05-09T10:39:49ZKenya cult deaths: a new era in the battle against religious extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525114/original/file-20230509-19-9sk5c5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Worshippers gather at the New Life Prayer Centre and Church. The head of the Church was recently arrested.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by SIMON MAINA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/kenya-cult-deaths-a-new-era-in-the-battle-against-religious-extremism-205051&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>More than a hundred people in Kenya – among them children – have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/kilifi/shakahola-cult-number-of-bodies-from-mass-graves-hits-109-4214878">found dead</a> close to a small village in the south-east of the country. Most of the deceased were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/09/autopsies-missing-organs-kenya-cult-deaths-police">reportedly followers</a> of pastor Paul Nthenge Mackenzie. While starvation appears to be the main cause of death, some of the victims were strangled, beaten or suffocated, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/national/article/2001472118/children-in-shakahola-cult-were-strangled-johansen-oduor-says">according</a> to the chief government pathologist.</em></p>
<p><em>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, who has studied the drivers of religious extremism, particularly among violent extremist groups in the east African region, talks to The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina about the cults and religious extremism challenges in Kenya where freedom of religion or belief is protected by the constitution.</em> </p>
<h2>What do we know so far about the cult deaths in Kenya?</h2>
<p>No fewer than 109 men, women and children are known to have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/kenyan-cult-leader-accused-of-inciting-children-to-starve-to-death">died</a> after a Kenyan charismatic church pastor encouraged his followers to fast to death to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/amp/coast/article/2001470894/four-people-starve-to-death-while-fasting-to-meet-jesus">“meet Jesus”</a> in the afterlife. Bodies of the dead were recovered from numerous mass graves on a farm at Shakahola, a village on Kenya’s south-east coast, where Pastor Paul Mackenzie had his Good News International Church. Autopsies revealed that most had starved to death. But a small number, some children, had been strangled or suffocated to death.</p>
<p>Mackenzie now faces charges over the deaths. The victims came from all corners of the country, drawn to a man whose controversial teachings had come under government scrutiny as far back as <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/88517-ig-koome-how-pastor-mackenzie-countered-police-arrests-2017">2017</a>. Mackenzie’s apocalyptic narratives focused on the end of times, and were against the modern or western <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/people/family/503292-the-making-a-cult-rise-pastor-paul-mckenzies-good-news-international-empire/">ways of life</a> such as seeking medical services, education or music. His conspiracy theories emphasised the Catholic Church, the US and the United Nations as “<a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/people/503407-world-order-pastor-mc-kenzie-taught-catholic-church-usa-agents-satan/">agents of Satan</a>”.</p>
<p>His other brush with the law came in 2019, when he faced counts of incitement to disobedience of the law and <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/preacher-paul-mackenzie-freed-re-arrested-in-malindi-n319020">distributing unauthorised films</a> to the public.</p>
<p>That same year, he <a href="https://www.fox44news.com/news/world-news/kenyan-pastors-appear-in-court-over-deaths-of-parishioners/">closed the church</a>, sold his TV station and moved to a ranch in a forested area of Kilifi county, where hundreds of families built houses. The church and TV station were sold to Ezekiel Odero, another televangelist. Odero is well known for his so-called miracle healing crusades, which draw <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRuvtXIN6wA">tens of thousands</a>. He is also under <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyan-pastor-odero-faces-court-over-shakahola-cult-massacre-4222776">investigation</a> for offences associated with the Shakahola mass suicide.</p>
<p>Religious <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986">extremism</a> or religious movements with a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/commission-on-devil-worship-the-1995-cult-report-that-government-ignored-4217722">cultic flavour</a> are not new in Kenya.</p>
<h2>How will this change the way religious extremism is viewed in Kenya?</h2>
<p>New religious movements or individual preachers in Kenya rarely attract public scrutiny. There is also little public awareness of the social impact of such groups. Public debates in Kenya are more likely to focus on the occult – with <a href="https://www.globalsistersreport.org/column/religious-tackle-devil-worship-recruiting-phenomenon-45856">“devil worship”</a> as the popular catchphrase. </p>
<p>As far as religious extremism is concerned, Kenya’s focus has been on Islamic extremism, including what constitutes “terrorism”. These are highly politicised debates.</p>
<p>The president’s description of the Shakahola incident as “<a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/ruto-speaks-shakahola-cult-paul-mackenzie-belongs-in-jail-4210598">akin to terrorism</a>” opens up a new epoch in which Kenyans can begin to look at all religions as potential incubators of extremism. Preventive measures can therefore be designed to address not just Islamist extremism but all forms of religious extremism.</p>
<h2>In what ways is the cult similar to violent extremism?</h2>
<p>I would place the Shakahola cult deaths within the narrow confines of cultism and religiously inspired violent extremism. A cult is a group of people inspired – or brainwashed – by a charismatic leader to follow extreme religious beliefs or practices at any cost to themselves. Such beliefs and practices rarely resemble those of established faiths or groups.</p>
<p>This is very close to violent extremist groups such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2021.196392">Al-Shabaab</a>
or <a href="https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticlepdf/20/8/23/1326">Daesh</a> who follow rigid religious value systems and beliefs. Such groups may differ in their justification for using violence to achieve political, ideological or social change. But both religiously inspired cults and extremist groups do tend to reimagine or reinterpret traditional scripture.</p>
<p>Both cults and violent extremist movements have similar push and pull factors at the individual level. In the cult death case, followers came from all over Kenya to seek out Mackenzie. Many of those individuals and families abandoned all their comforts to join his church in a remote location without basic amenities. Recruits to extremist networks such as Al-Shabaab show similar tendencies. They pledge to give up their earthly comforts for a higher calling in the name of misinterpreted or imaginary versions of religious texts.</p>
<p>In each case, the victims are exposed to mind control by charismatic religious preachers. The only difference is in the mode and motive for death in the name of the chosen cause. In Shakahola, it was massive casualties through starvation. The alternative might be suicide bombings aimed mainly at political objectives.</p>
<h2>How have Kenya’s constitutional freedoms been misused by religious extremists?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/198-32-freedom-of-conscience-religion-belief-and-opinion#:%7E:text=(1)%20Every%20person%20has%20the,%2C%20thought%2C%20belief%20and%20opinion.">Freedom of religion or belief</a> is guaranteed by the Kenyan constitution: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The question that confronts Kenya is whether “fasting to death” falls within constitutional rights to freedom of religion. How does this sit with <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/192-26-right-to-life">the right to life</a> in the constitution? </p>
<h2>What needs to be done to prevent this from happening again?</h2>
<p>In Kenya, countermeasures dealing with Islamist extremism have shown us that religious institutions and activities can be scrutinised and regulated to prevent extremism and terrorism.</p>
<p>These can be extended to religious cultism without infringing the constitutional right to freedom of religion or belief. Kenya needs an honest discussion about how regulations can safeguard the right, to prevent fake religious leaders from misusing it. </p>
<p>President Ruto has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-05-05-shakahola-deaths-justice-lessit-to-chair-inquiry-commission/">commissioned a team</a> to investigate the Shakahola deaths. The team has the broader mandate of developing a legal framework for scrutiny and self-regulation of religious institutions. This is a complex task. What we can learn from Kenya’s previous attempts to curb religious radicalisation is that <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-33.pdf">public participation</a> is key in designing and putting legal frameworks to action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both cults and violent extremist movements have similar push and pull factors at the individual level.Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of MombasaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015422023-04-02T11:46:42Z2023-04-02T11:46:42ZHow a Canadian judge erred in ordering the repatriation of suspected ISIS members<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517997/original/file-20230328-2416-9jv03h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C6669%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman and a child stand in a detention camp in northeast Syria in 2022. Tens of thousands of ISIS-affiliated foreign nationals are in the camps, including four Canadian men. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a January 2023 <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/522819/index.do?q=boloh">Federal Court decision</a>, the government of Canada was ordered to request repatriation of four suspected ISIS members <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/canadians-accused-of-joining-isis-could-soon-come-home-1.6724477">currently being held</a> in Syria.</p>
<p>Lawrence Greenspon, who represents three of the detainees, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/government-appeal-court-order-repatriate-1.6744096">said the decision “covered all the bases and covered them well”</a> and that an appeal would therefore be difficult for the government to pursue. Similarly, <a href="https://socialistproject.ca/author/matthew-behrens/">socialist activist</a> Matthew Behrens <a href="http://homesnotbombs.blogspot.com/2023/01/federal-court-orders-repatriation-of.html?m=1">described the decision</a> as an “important ruling with global human rights implications.” </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the federal government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canadian-government-appeals-order-repatriate-canadians-syria-2023-02-10/">is appealing</a> the decision and oral arguments <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/one-day-federal-court-of-appeal-hearing-men-detained-syria-1.6792201">were recently held at the Federal Court of Appeal in Toronto. </a></p>
<p>With the appeal ongoing, what are the chances that Justice Henry Brown’s ruling is upheld? Does the decision actually cover all the bases, and does it truly have important global human rights implications?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1616562819750678539"}"></div></p>
<p>Not so fast.</p>
<p>In the process of interpreting Canada’s <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/resources-ressources.html#copy">Charter of Rights and Freedoms</a> through the lens of international law, Brown illegitimately expands Canada’s existing human rights obligations.</p>
<h2>Human rights obligations</h2>
<p>The precedent established by the decision threatens Canada’s national security now and into the future, and it sets up a potential showdown between the judiciary and the government. </p>
<p>Here’s why.</p>
<p>Brown <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=50">correctly notes</a> in the decision that subsection 6(1) of the Charter should be “presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection” as Canada’s international human rights obligations. </p>
<p><a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html#h-44">This Charter provision establishes</a> the right for citizens “to enter, remain in and leave Canada.” It makes sense to interpret the Charter, including the “right to enter” provision, in a manner that is consistent with existing human rights requirements.</p>
<p>The decision also <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=37">correctly relies</a> on the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a> as the primary instrument establishing Canada’s international law obligations. </p>
<p>The covenant, in turn, <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf#page=6">provides</a> that no person “shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-more-dangerous-to-let-islamic-state-foreign-fighters-from-the-west-return-or-prevent-them-from-coming-back-112588">Is it more dangerous to let Islamic State foreign fighters from the West return or prevent them from coming back?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>The heart of the covenant</h2>
<p>No issues so far. But Brown fails to consider the central jurisdictional clause of the covenant while interpreting the Charter in light of international law.</p>
<p>That provision of the covenant <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf#page=3">requires a country</a> to respect and ensure “to all individuals <em>within its territory</em> and <em>subject to its jurisdiction</em> the rights recognized” in the treaty. Suspected ISIS members being held in Syria, of course, are not on Canadian territory or subject to Canadian jurisdiction.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sign that says Federal Court in French and English" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Federal Court Justice Henry Brown’s ruling was inconsistent with Canada’s international legal obligations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This deficiency in Brown’s reasoning is not remedied by his reliance on <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2013/2013scc47/2013scc47.html">prior precedence</a> established by the Supreme Court of Canada <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2009/2009fca21/2009fca21.html">or other</a> <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2009/2009fc580/2009fc580.html">federal court decisions</a> — none of which imposed on the government an obligation to apply Charter rights as a matter of international law to people who are beyond Canadian territory and jurisdiction.</p>
<p>Brown does so in his decision, which is inconsistent with Canada’s international legal obligations. </p>
<h2>National security implications</h2>
<p>One especially concerning aspect of Brown’s decision is that the government has no obligation to implement it — even if the ruling survives the appeal. It is undoubtedly <a href="https://www.scc-csc.ca/court-cour/events-evenements/quebec2022/scc-csc-eng.html#role">the role</a> of the Supreme Court of Canada — and, by extension, lower courts as well — to “interpret and provide guidance on Canada’s laws.” </p>
<p>However, the judiciary has no authority to create international law obligations while interpreting the Charter or any other aspect of domestic law. Although a significant degree of political risk would be involved, the government may refuse to implement a judicial decision that creates a domestic legal obligation from a non-existent requirement in international law. </p>
<p>Even more concerning are the national security implications at stake. As suggested by my colleague, international affairs professor Leah West, <a href="https://globaljustice.queenslaw.ca/news/human-rights-and-citizenship-abandoned-in-ne-syria-a-special-issue-of-the-global-justice-journal#Shortsighted">there are several sensible options the government can take</a> to mitigate the potential public safety concerns associated with repatriating suspected ISIS fighters and their family members.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1617998175717019662"}"></div></p>
<p>The government has the resources needed to make these calculations and to act accordingly. The same cannot be said for Brown or any member of the judiciary or, for that matter, the general public. </p>
<p>Although West’s conclusion that “repatriation is in the best interests of Canadian national security” is certainly reasonable, the government is in the best position to make that determination in practice. </p>
<p>Aside from the potential public safety concerns involved with requiring the government to seek repatriation, it’s difficult to predict the full scope of national security implications inherent in expanding Canada’s human rights obligations across the globe as Brown’s decision mandates.</p>
<p>Such unconstrained territorial reach is inconsistent with the jurisdictional components of international human rights instruments — and for good reason.</p>
<h2>The world is watching</h2>
<p>For better or worse, Brown’s ruling set a global precedent. It was <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85049/repatriating-alleged-isis-linked-men-from-northeast-syria-the-start-of-judicial-responses-to-the-political-stalemate/">recently described</a> on the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/about-us/">progressive blog Just Security</a> as a “landmark decision” in large part because of the “rights-based perspective” implemented by Brown.</p>
<p>A co-author of that Just Security article is Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/ms-fionnuala-d-ni-aolain">a current</a> United Nations special rapporteur whose <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/2023-01-25/Letter-Canada-repatriations.pdf">representations</a> on this case <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=51">feature prominently</a> in Brown’s decision.</p>
<p>Because UN special rapporteurs bear no political responsibility for representations they make to governments, these positions have essentially <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input-listing?deadline_status%5Bstate%5D=all&field_coi_stage_value%5Bstage_1%5D=stage_1&field_coi_stage_value%5Bstage_2%5D=stage_2">taken on the role</a> of high-profile global social justice activists. But their assertions carry no actual legal authority. </p>
<p>Although Ní Aoláin invokes Canada’s international human rights obligations, she doesn’t address relevant jurisdictional limitations. This isn’t surprising given she’s advocating for a particular outcome, but it is not a basis for a policy approach that balances competing governmental interests.</p>
<p>Brown found her representations to be compelling, but judges considering the pending appeal should take a more balanced approach. The world is watching, and significant national security considerations are at stake both at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian L. Cox does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Federal Court justice ruled four men, suspected ISIS members, must be repatriated to Canada from a Syrian detention camp. Here’s why the decision is flawed and an ongoing appeal is justified.Brian L. Cox, Visiting scholar, uOttawa Faculty of Law; Doctoral candidate lecturer, Cornell Law School, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994152023-03-19T19:04:30Z2023-03-19T19:04:30Z‘We did it so badly … it’s now backfired’: women and minority US forces reflect on the invasion of Iraq – now 20 years ago<p>Twenty years ago, the United States led the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Iraq_war)#:%7E:text=The%20term%20coalition%20of%20the,led%20by%20the%20United%20States.">coalition of the willing</a>” in an invasion of Iraq, in the shadow of the September 11 2001 attacks on the US by militant Islamic network <a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-islamic-state-where-does-it-come-from-and-what-does-it-want-52155">al-Qaeda</a>. </p>
<p>Western forces justified the war by <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html">claiming</a> Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (which would never be found) and intended to help al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>A long, drawn-out war created a power vacuum in Iraq, leading to civil war between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis, and repeated insurgencies against occupying forces. Both were exploited by the emerging militant terror group Daesh, better known as ISIS, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story">whose leaders</a> met and radicalised in US detention camps. </p>
<p>While most Western forces finally withdrew in 2017, <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">Iraq faces</a> continued insurgency and political crises. </p>
<p>“The people that we chose – and the people we empowered – were leaders of ethnic or religious extremists,” reflected Lieutenant Heather Coyne, as early as 2004. “We made them, we put them in charge.”</p>
<p>Coyne was one of the US military members and contractors whose experiences of the invasion were captured by the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/10/oral-histories-iraq-experience-project">“Iraq Experience” Oral History Project</a>. It reveals a snapshot of Iraq at a key moment in time: just over a year after the war began.</p>
<h2>Culturally diverse armed forces</h2>
<p>The soldier-force Western militaries deployed to fight the War on Terror was the most diverse in history: providing language skills, cultural competencies and the ability to communicate with local women. It was also a <a href="https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/diversity-as-power/">representational device</a>, reflecting the invading forces’ rhetoric of pluralism, tolerance and equality. </p>
<p>Yet these soldiers waged a deeply racialised and gendered war. </p>
<p>Military policies around “collateral damage” and “enemy combatants” dehumanised enemies, allies, and civilians alike. Common threads of religious humiliation, sexual violence and racism run through reports of soldiers’ conduct. Allegations of war crimes by Western forces bear the hallmarks <a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-why-soldiers-commit-war-crimes-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-185391">of white male supremacy</a>. Women and minority soldiers faced <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/10/get-a-weapon/596677/">epidemics of sexual violence</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-29/racism2c-sexism-rife-on-adf-facebook-group/3860736">racism</a> within Western military institutions.</p>
<p>I’m researching the experiences of women and minority soldiers deployed with US, UK and Australian militaries in the war on terror. In the project’s first stage, I read through existing archives of interviews with veterans.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.usip.org/">Institute of Peace</a> think tank conducted <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/10/oral-histories-iraq-experience-project">interviews</a> with military and contractors between June and November 2004 for a “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/10/oral-histories-iraq-experience-project">lessons learned” project</a>.</p>
<p>Six of the 35 interviewees met my criteria: three women (all white) and three men: one Navajo, one African American, and one Iraqi expatriate. Half had military experience; the three civilians all had expertise in conflict management.</p>
<p>The interviewees were proud of their mission and buoyed by hopes for the <a href="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/b287848e17874c0a8d65849e64af4566">upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections</a>. </p>
<p>Yet underneath this confidence were deep anxieties.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-why-soldiers-commit-war-crimes-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-185391">Friday essay: why soldiers commit war crimes – and what we can do about it</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>Good guys or bad guys?</h2>
<p>Navajo marine veteran Eric Bauer connected with Iraqis similarly to how he’d connect with other Native Americans: talking about relationships, family and community rather than resumes. By doing this, he explained, “they knew who I was as a person, and vice versa”. </p>
<p>Bauer was tasked with the practical process of setting up councils in Baghdad. He had to figure out if those who wanted to serve as representatives were, in his words, “good guys or bad guys”. In practice, this was “just getting people to talk about themselves”, often for hours. </p>
<p>One major struggle for the occupying forces was the problem of governance: how to create a new Iraqi political system that was representative, cooperative, friendly to Western allies, and had popular support. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515033/original/file-20230313-2482-4q89zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eric Bauer was tasked with figuring out if potential council representatives were ‘good guys or bad guys’ – which involved talking to them for hours.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Delay/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first step in this process was “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/aug/30/internationaleducationnews.iraq">de-Ba’athification</a>”, a policy of removing any members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party from positions of power. The Iraqi Army was disbanded and public sector employees affiliated with the Ba’ath party were removed and banned from future employment. Once the old system was removed, the US attempted to build one anew. </p>
<p>Interviewing so many Iraqis helped Bauer understand the holes in the policy of de-Ba’athification:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>if you wanted a job that was, let’s say a teacher or a doctor within the government […] you would take active part in furthering the goals of the Baath party, or at least swear allegiance to them now […] technically then, we would have to dismiss all schoolteachers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this empathy for the struggle to survive clashed with his view that the Ba’ath party were fundamentally evil, and by extension those who cooperated were the same: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>for a lot of them it was a way to get by. If you didn’t have a moral conscience you would do it. Like I said, they weren’t loyal to the principles of it.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Failures of reconstruction</h2>
<p>Denise Dauphinais worked for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. As a civilian with foreign policy expertise, she was critical of how the US military handled – or neglected – seemingly obvious tasks such as clearing rubble, preventing looting, and making the cities feel safe and liveable.</p>
<p>Electricity supply was another major problem. The US administration had believed an oil-rich country would quickly become self-sufficient, providing energy supply throughout Iraq – along with the revenue to fund the ongoing US occupation. </p>
<p>In reality, years of prewar US sanctions had <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jqap.htm">crippled Iraqi infrastructure</a>, which was then bombarded in the invasion itself. Months into the occupation, the occupying forces were unable to provide electricity and other basic services.</p>
<p>Lieutenant Heather Coyne had worked on terrorism and conflict management for the White House and spoke Arabic proficiently. She worked in civil affairs in Iraq, for the Coalition Provisional Authority, where she used her language skills to connect with locals and hear their stories. By the summer of 2003, two months after the invasion,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…people were not only miserable because it was hot, but because food was spoiling. You could only buy a certain amount of food because they couldn’t count on their refrigerators working. It created such destruction in their lives.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515043/original/file-20230314-24-82uh3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US military neglected seemingly obvious tasks such as preventing looting. Here, a Baghdad shopkeeper bricks up his shop to protect it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Delay/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fifteen-years-after-looting-thousands-of-artefacts-are-still-missing-from-iraqs-national-museum-93949">Fifteen years after looting, thousands of artefacts are still missing from Iraq's national museum</a>
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<hr>
<h2>‘We put them in charge’</h2>
<p>The US was determined to prevent concentration of power by any one group, so they allocated different offices to the parties representing different ethnic and religious groups. But the result was a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/4/muhasasa-the-political-system-reviled-by-iraqi-protesters">system of quotas that fostered sectarian conflict between those groups</a>, as potential leaders traded on identity to consolidate their power bases. </p>
<p>Bauer, who worked on setting up these councils, was very defensive of the quota system: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we carefully structured the councils to ensure that there was diversity in the representation because otherwise there would not have been […] People say, “well, that’s not a democracy”. No, it’s a republic trying to get fair representation, not just mob rule.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But Coyne, who was lower down the ladder, pointed out that the occupying forces had empowered extremists.</p>
<p>The civil war between Shia and Sunni militias that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/28/iraq1">emerged in Iraq from 2006</a> was one legacy of the new sectarian political system. So were the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49960677">waves of protests</a> calling for political reform in 2019-2021.</p>
<p>Coyne found the emphasis on equality and representation ironic, even hypocritical. She remembered sneaking into a meeting with military commanders who were insisting more women be represented in local council: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the commanding general was pounding the table, “we absolutely need more women in these councils.” […] Around the table, nods of agreement, shaking heads, absolutely this is incredibly important. I looked around the room, of 40 people in the room I was the only female and I wasn’t really supposed to be there in the first place […] they’re going around telling the Iraqis you need to elect more women and the Iraqis look at [Americans] and see only men.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Loss of legitimacy and growing insurgency</h2>
<p>This ongoing US interference in supposedly Iraqi democratic institutions meant a loss of legitimacy. As a result, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/10/25/clerics-threaten-election-boycott">several moderate</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/28/iraq.michaelhoward">Sunni groups boycotted</a> the 2005 parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>Lack of trust in the new local authorities, combined with the effects of de-Ba’athification, propelled the growing insurgency. </p>
<p>Munthir Nalu was an Iraqi expatriate who fled Iraq in 1991 and was recruited into the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council, an advisory body of Iraqi experts assisting the US Defence Department. </p>
<p>Nalu was highly critical of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have many, many friends in the former Iraqi army, and they were crying. They said, please, find us a solution, we have nothing. We are sitting home with no salaries, nothing … those opposition, they are fighting against us and against United States Army and the coalition, most of them from the Iraqi army.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The thousands of newly unemployed men of fighting age were then attracted by sectarian militias, established by newly empowered leaders such <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/25/iraq">Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr</a>.</p>
<h2>Increasingly dangerous</h2>
<p>Iraq felt increasingly dangerous, the interviewees reported. Many were concerned about the influx of foreign fighters across the borders, and increased attacks on anyone associated with the occupying forces. </p>
<p>Bauer felt lucky he was still able to move freely, because of his Navajo looks: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>in Baghdad, the city is pretty diverse. I would go to the restaurants and shopping markets in the city and I never got a second look.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Still, he acknowledged </p>
<blockquote>
<p>pretty much everybody that was involved, I mean in any way involved with the Coalition […] you were a legitimate target.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The interviewees were aware the US had fostered the sense of insecurity within the country. But they still felt the Iraqis, not the US, were ultimately responsible for Iraqi security. They failed to see the links between the US presence and the lack of security. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515036/original/file-20230313-26-t4riys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US soldiers interviewed in 2004 failed to see the links between the US presence and the lack of security.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Nicoletti/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-a-patriot-and-black-man-colin-powell-embodied-the-two-ness-of-the-african-american-experience-170168">As a patriot and Black man, Colin Powell embodied the 'two-ness' of the African American experience</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What was the real goal?</h2>
<p>The weapons of mass destruction – the stated justification for the war – were almost absent from the Iraq Experience interviews, because in late 2004, it was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/07/usa.iraq1">already apparent</a> they didn’t exist.</p>
<p>Only Bauer mentioned them, and only briefly, stating: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>he had them. I met the people that said he had them and I believe them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Instead, the interviewees focused on two interlinked justifications for the war: removing a tyrant from power, and spreading democracy. </p>
<p>The Institute of Peace clearly selected interviewees that share the US government’s ideological views. In the next phase of my project, I aim to interview women and minorities with a much broader range of experiences, including those who have become critical of the War on Terror as <a href="https://aboutfaceveterans.org/who-we-are/">a result of their service</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, these interviews from 2004 foreshadow the next 20 years of Iraq’s history. The interviewees accurately predicted the US would remain involved in Iraq for the next few decades. Despite their belief in the mission, they were not convinced of their success.</p>
<p>“I still think it was the right thing to do,” Coyne admitted, “but we did it so badly that it’s now backfired.”</p>
<p>What should they have done differently? The answer seems to be: everything. These interviews call into question the entire concept of a foreign military undertaking the mission of “nation-building”.</p>
<p>Twenty years later, perhaps the most prescient warning comes from Dauphinais: “the best that we can hope for [is that] the Iraqis will forgive us.”</p>
<hr>
<p><em>All quotations are from the interview transcripts available on the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/10/oral-histories-iraq-experience-project">Institute of Peace “Iraq Experience” Oral History Project</a> website.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mia Martin Hobbs received funding for this research from the Freilich Project for the Study of Bigotry at ANU, and the Centre for Contemporary Histories at Deakin University</span></em></p>The beginnings of Iraq’s sectarian civil war, the failures of its US-built political system, and the struggle for civilians attempting to survive chaos and violence are here in these 2004 interviews.Mia Martin Hobbs, Research Fellow, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2005152023-02-23T13:15:19Z2023-02-23T13:15:19ZSupreme Court unlikely to ‘break the internet’ over Google, Twitter cases – rather, it is approaching with caution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511825/original/file-20230222-19-v0xg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C43%2C5857%2C3855&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will justices seek to hold social media firms to account for the postings of terrorists?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SupremeCourtSocialMediaLiability/5d5798ddc82d4eae88963f2d310a85f9/photo?Query=google%20twitter&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=241&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Patrick Semansky</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>“These are not, like, the nine greatest experts on the internet,” <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2022/21-1333_7l48.pdf#page=46">noted Justice Elena Kagan</a> – a reference to herself and fellow colleagues on the Supreme Court.</em></p>
<p><em>Depsite this, the justices are being asked to negotiate complex arguments that could have wide implications for online providers and ultimately everyone who uses the internet. Their rulings in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/21/1157683233/supreme-court-google-twitter-section-230">two cases argued before the court</a> on Feb. 21 and Feb. 22, 2023, could force social media companies to change the way they do business. So, will the <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/2023/2/21/23608851/supreme-court-gonzalez-google-section-230-internet-twitter-facebook">Supreme Court “break the internet,</a>” as some have suggested? The Conversation asked Michael W. Carroll, <a href="https://onlinelaw.wcl.american.edu/legal-studies/faculty/michael-carroll/">a cyberlaw expert at American University</a>, to explain what is at stake – and how the justices appear to be thinking about the cases.</em></p>
<h2>Can you talk us through the two cases?</h2>
<p>The justices are looking at two separate cases – <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-1333">Gonzalez vs. Google</a> and <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-1496">Twitter vs. Taamneh</a> – that arise out of the same lawsuit. They are being argued separately because they revolve around the interpretation of two different laws.</p>
<p>Both cases result from terrorist attacks. The Google case was brought by the family of Nohemi Gonzalez, an American woman killed in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/attacks-in-paris">2015 attack by the Islamic State group in Paris</a>. The death of a Jordanian man in a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38481521">2017 attack by the terrorist group in Istanbul</a> forms the basis of the Twitter case.</p>
<p>What both have in common is the claim that social media platforms played a role in the organizing of the attacks. In particular, it was argued by lawyers for the two families that Twitter and YouTube, owned by Google, amplified the Islamic State group’s recruiting and fundraising messages.</p>
<p>Central to this argument is that the social media platforms used algorithms that boosted content to those who may be interested in the Islamic State group’s content.</p>
<h2>How do the two cases differ?</h2>
<p>In the case of Google, the company is saying it cannot be held responsible because it is protected by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-section-230-an-expert-on-internet-law-and-regulation-explains-the-legislation-that-paved-the-way-for-facebook-google-and-twitter-164993">Section 230 of the Communications Act</a>. Section 230 holds that no provider of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party. Google’s lawyers argue that treating YouTube as the publisher of Islamic State group videos would contravene Section 230.</p>
<p>Complicating matters, however, is the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230">definition in the act</a> of what an information content provider is. It is defined as a person or entity responsible for creating or developing content “in whole or in part.” The plaintiff in Gonzalez is arguing that in promoting Islamic State group videos through thumbnails on the platform, YouTube is responsible for content creation and, as such, can be held responsible.</p>
<p>As law professor Eric Schnapper, representing the Gonzalez family, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2022/21-1333_7l48.pdf#page=46">argued to the justices</a>: “I type in ISIS video and they are sending me to a catalogue of thumbnails which they created.”</p>
<p>The Twitter case is not centered on Section 230. Rather, at question is whether social media platforms can be seen to be “aiding and abetting” terrorism by not doing enough to take down Islamic State group content and by recommending the terrorist organization videos through its algorithms. Doing so would represent a violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, as amended.</p>
<h2>What are the possible implications?</h2>
<p>Although I don’t subscribe to some of the hyperbole – no matter what the justices rule, they are not going to “break the internet” – the stakes are actually quite high for social media companies. And this is largely due to scale. </p>
<p>This could be a huge issue for social media providers because so many people use their products. At the moment, Section 230 provides social media firms <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-section-230-an-expert-on-internet-law-and-regulation-explains-the-legislation-that-paved-the-way-for-facebook-google-and-twitter-164993">broad, but not blanket, immunity</a> against prosecution for the actions of individuals using their services. It doesn’t protect platforms if they knowingly promote and circulate criminal content such as child pornography, but it does protect them from a lot of other lawsuits.</p>
<p>In fact, Congress specifically designed Section 230 in this way, knowing that the defamation laws that cover traditional media such as newspapers were unworkable on social media. Instead, under Section 230 social media platforms are treated more like phone services – and phone companies are not held accountable for what is said over their service.</p>
<p>If the justices interpret Section 230 in a similar fashion, then not much will change. But if they side with the plaintiff, that could open up social media providers to lawsuits regarding content posted by individuals and groups.</p>
<h2>How would that affect the way social media operates?</h2>
<p>That would depend on how tech companies respond – would they change the way their platforms work? And, if so, how?</p>
<p>It could change the relationship between users and content, as well as the usefulness of social media. Or it could just mean that social media companies need to tweak the way they present recommended content – so instead of a thumbnail of suggested videos, you just get a hyperlink.</p>
<p>But a big question went largely unanswered in the oral arguments: If you open up the door to litigation, where would it end? No one gave the justices an answer on that, which by my reading of the oral arguments appeared to make the justices a little nervous. The fear seemed to be they may make what seems to be a small tweak to the law that ends up having large consequences.</p>
<h2>What was your reading of where the justices are on the central questions?</h2>
<p>Judging by the way <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2022/21-1333_7l48.pdf#">the oral arguments</a> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2022/21-1496_3204.pdf">went down</a>, I got the impression that social media will win on the Section 230 issue – and I think they will win pretty clearly.</p>
<p>In part, this is because no one could articulate what a narrow interpretation of Section 230 would look like, or where a possible line in the sand could be drawn regarding what content social media firms could or could not be held accountable for.</p>
<p>Justice Clarence Thomas <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2022/21-1333_7l48.pdf#page=33">noted that the same algorithm </a> used to recommend Islamic State group videos was also responsible for promoting cooking videos to cooking enthusiasts.</p>
<p>“I don’t understand how a neutral suggestion about something that you’ve expressed an interest in is aiding and abetting,” he said.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A screenshot shows a shepherd's pie with a fork in it on Youtube." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511865/original/file-20230223-2933-htl0p2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">YouTube serves up thumbnails in response to search queries, a key point in Twitter vs. Taamneh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">YouTube</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>You can’t always tell from oral arguments how justices will rule, but I wouldn’t be surprised if justices try to find a way to refine the existing standards, but without making any sweeping changes.</p>
<p>In part, this is because any sweeping changes could have implications that go beyond Big Tech. It was notable that among the many amicus – or friend of the court – briefs filed were ones representing the business community and nonprofit organizations. They are all afraid that if the social media companies are deemed to have aided and abetted terrorists, then they too could be open to litigation for accidentally providing assistance to terrorists through the normal course of their activities.</p>
<p>This all boils down to a clause in the Anti-Terrorism Act that says aiding or abetting means “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/233">knowingly providing substantial assistance</a>.”</p>
<p>Again, I feel the justices are likely to rule in favor of the social media companies. But the court might want to clarify to lower courts what the standard is on the questions of what constitutes “knowing” and “substantial” assistance.</p>
<p>One interesting thing to note is that the court didn’t seem to be split down any ideological lines. My impression is that the justices were genuinely struggling in both cases with the issue of where the line should be drawn. They seemed willing to provide some guidance that encourages responsible practices, but they don’t want a result that fundamentally changes how the internet works.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael W. Carroll does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Justices are weighing the arguments in two cases that have the potential of changing the way social media platforms operate.Michael W. Carroll, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982692023-02-16T13:25:10Z2023-02-16T13:25:10ZCOVID-19 restrictions unexpectedly reduced Islamic State violence – political science experts explain why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510108/original/file-20230214-24-ab590n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman walks in Raqa, the former Syrian capital of the Islamic State, in December 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1230242180/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-daily-life-raqa.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=i-FdQOqRBmciGD8TCY0hyKF8kvbZ5ixLz7y_77mY_7E=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>World leaders and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus">policy experts </a>at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/">feared that</a> the health crisis might make the world more dangerous. They worried specifically that terrorist organizations like the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group</a> would <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/69508/how-terrorist-groups-will-try-to-capitalize-on-the-coronavirus-crisis/">capitalize on the pandemic</a> to increase attacks on civilians and recruit new sympathizers. </p>
<p>In some ways, the pandemic presented an opportunity to groups like the Islamic State group, known by the initials IS, because the sudden increase in health spending <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35298/From-Double-Shock-to-Double-Recovery-Implications-and-Options-for-Health-Financing-in-The-Time-of-COVID-19.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y">strained many countries’ budgets</a> and diverted attention <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/28/preventing-violent-extremism-during-and-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/">away from extremism</a>. Governments’ COVID-19 responses also called on police and armies to deliver health care services <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7870912/">in some cases</a>. </p>
<p>But the feared increase in IS violence <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2021/06/28/has-isis-made-gains-as-a-result-of-the-pandemic/">largely did not materialize</a>.</p>
<p>We are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C2IitzkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars who study</a> the causes of violence within countries, often between armed groups and governments, and what works to prevent it. Along with our colleague <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/qutaiba-idlbi/">Qutaiba Idlbi</a>, a senior fellow at the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/">Atlantic Council</a> think tank, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1dHeQGgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">we wanted to understand</a> how COVID-19 lockdowns affected the ability of groups like IS to operate. </p>
<p>As our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/locking-down-violence-the-covid19-pandemics-impact-on-nonstate-actor-violence/19073EF1BC0873E1D614A34F6BD1365C">research</a> shows, 2020 COVID-19 lockdown measures such as curfews and travel bans – which governments have mostly <a href="https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-lockdowns/">since lifted</a> – made it difficult for IS to operate and, as an indirect result, helped reduce violence in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier in camouflage steps into a destroyed vehicle that appears charred from the inside." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi fighter inspects the site of an Islamic State group attack north of Baghdad in May 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1211657465/photo/topshot-iraq-conflict-is.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=s34V40b5F3hAhyP1ZlD-BjZRPY6MdKZxgDoUmPzBCL0=">Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Understanding the Islamic State group</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html">Islamic State group</a> – also known as IS, ISIS and ISIL – emerged as an offshoot of the Islamic <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">militant terrorist group</a> al-Qaida in Iraq around 2004. </p>
<p>In its rise, Islamic State group used unusually brutal and sadistic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61016908">tactics</a> against government officials, as well as civilians, including intense <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/syria-isis-tortured-kobani-child-hostages">torture</a> and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/death-steven-sotloff">beheadings</a>. </p>
<p>But IS still cultivated genuine support from some locals in Iraq and Syria by exploiting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/17/not-by-counterterrorism-alone-root-causes-and-the-defeat-of-the-islamic-state-group/">their grievances</a> over weak, corrupt governance – while sometimes providing better <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html">public services</a>, like routine street cleanings and power line repairs, than the government did in the areas it controlled. </p>
<p>Omar, a local journalist and civil society activist from Deir Ezzor, Syria, recalled in 2022 to our co-author Qutaiba how for many in his province, “When ISIS took over Deir Ezzor province, the poor and those unable to flee were glad that the province did not fall back to the Assad regime. For them, ISIS was the better devil.” </p>
<p>Throughout 2013 and 2014, the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">Islamic State group began</a> to take over territory in Syria and Iraq. At the time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229">engaged in a civil war</a>, which began in 2011 when Assad attempted to quash a popular uprising against his family’s 40-year-long rule. </p>
<p>The Assad regime shot at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/syria-protests-forces-shoot">peaceful demonstrators</a>, detained and tortured activists, and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coisyria/2022-06-28/Policy-paper-CoH-27-June.pdf">retaliated against communities</a> that challenged his authority. In 2013, the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/09/18/united-nations-releases-report-use-chemical-weapons-syria">Assad regime attacked its own</a> people with sarin gas, killing more than 1,400 people – many of them children – in Eastern Ghouta. </p>
<p>Political instability was not limited to Syria at the time. </p>
<p>In Iraq, for example, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki responded to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests/thousands-rally-in-iraqs-day-of-rage-protests-idUSTRE71O1RN20110225">2011 protests</a> against corruption with violence, kidnapping, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/133440159/group-claims-iraq-secret-prison-in-operation">torture and</a> <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/who-are-the-people-killed-by-nouri-al-maliki-and-why-482227">assassinations of activists</a> and protesters. </p>
<p>The Islamic State group grew during the civil conflicts and public uprisings, and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war">tried to establish</a> control over territory in parts of Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>At its height in 2014, IS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">controlled</a> 34,000 square miles – or 88,000 square kilometers – across Syria and Iraq, home to about <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">10 million people</a>. The group also changed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277">its name from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham to the Islamic State</a>, reflecting its plans to expand control over more territory. </p>
<p>The U.S. launched an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis">international military intervention</a> to defeat the Islamic State group in 2014. </p>
<p>This military coalition <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">brought IS to its knees</a> by the beginning of 2018 and ended its control over the large territory it once controlled in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">announced it would pull out its troops</a> from Syria in 2018 and declared victory over IS. The Islamic State group lost control over its last <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">bit of</a> territory in Syria in 2019. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of men, one with crutches and an amputated leg, walk, followed by some men with cameras photographing them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Men suspected of having collaborated with the Islamic State group are released from a Syrian prison in October 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1229085930/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-kurds-prisoners.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=mGP42EEK4ZWsKARtSrKaK5OxLHxJxpKX8gWJAF_MWQw=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Islamic State group under lockdown</h2>
<p>But despite the group’s setbacks – including <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/gen-raymond-thomas-socom-60000-to-70000-isis-fighters-killed-2017-7">tens of thousands</a> of fighters killed since its rise – IS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/kurdish-leader-isis-conflict-iraq-iran/606502/">remained active in early 2020</a>.</p>
<p>In March 2020, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-response-2020-fact-sheet">Syrian government enforced</a> a two-month lockdown that closed most businesses and imposed a partial curfew. <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/03/iraq-nationwide-lockdown-implemented-march-22-update-15">Iraq</a> <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/coronavirus/2020/06/23/Coronavirus-Egypt-to-reopen-restaurants-cafes-sports-clubs-from-July-27">and Egypt</a> also implemented widespread closures and curfews to prevent COVID-19 from spreading. </p>
<p>We analyzed data on more than 1,500 attacks initiated by IS over an 18-month period in these places during 2019 and 2020. Our <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001423">research, published in January 2023</a>, shows that travel bans and curfews helped reduce IS attacks substantially. </p>
<p>These findings highlight that COVID-19 lockdown measures affected the Islamic State’s ability to operate. The curfews made it difficult for IS to generate revenue and hide its movements by closing public and private institutions and restricting travel between provinces.</p>
<p>Our analysis showed that while in effect, curfews and travel bans helped to significantly reduce IS violence, especially in highly populated areas. </p>
<p>In Iraq, violence declined around 30% because of lockdowns. In Syria, there was an approximate 15% overall reduction in violence during this period.</p>
<p>But in Egypt, the government had already instituted curfews <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/curfew-announced-in-some-north-sinai-areas/">in some areas because of the Islamic State group’s presence</a> and violence there. This made it difficult to analyze COVID-specific lockdowns.</p>
<p>Unlike many other militant groups, IS had large <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/isis-caliphate-money-territory/584911/">financial reserves</a> to sustain itself during the lockdown. It also operates in largely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria">rural areas</a> and, therefore, was not especially vulnerable to the effects of lockdown measures in urban areas. </p>
<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>Our research comes at a critical time as policymakers and <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA900/RRA958-1/RAND_RBA958-1.pdf">counterterrorism experts debate</a> a long-term strategy to eliminate the Islamic State group. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/01/19/who-are-the-syrian-democratic-forces">local military forces in</a> Syria <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/iraqi-security-forces">and Iraq</a> conducted 313 operations in Iraq and Syria, killing 700 IS fighters. </p>
<p>The U.S. and its partners in the region have also killed several prominent <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3266973/us-partners-find-success-in-mission-to-defeat-isis/">IS leaders</a> over the past few years, including Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2922796/leader-of-isis-dead-following-us-raid-in-syria/">who died</a> in February 2022. </p>
<p>But we think the United States’ <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/09/the-us-played-down-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-forces-that-couldnt-last/">current strategy</a>, which focuses heavily on military alliances with local partners, is not sustainable – in part because it does not pay heed to the reasons some people in Syria and Iraq still support IS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some world leaders and foreign policy experts expected IS to increase its attacks during COVID-19’s early days, travel bans and curfews helped slow violence.Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, Professor Comparative Politics, University of MarylandDawn Brancati, Senior Lecturer, Political Science Department, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1957062022-12-29T20:55:25Z2022-12-29T20:55:25ZIs the terrorism threat over?<p>Eight years after <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/threat-advisory-system">raising the national terrorism threat level</a>, Australia recently <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/resources/speeches-and-statements/national-terrorism-threat-level">lowered it</a> again – from mid-range (probable) to low-range (possible). </p>
<p>Does this mean the threat from terrorism is over?</p>
<p>Few are better placed to answer this than Mike Burgess, Director-General of Security and head of ASIO, Australia’s domestic intelligence agency. </p>
<p>Burgess is one of the handful of people who can talk openly about his agency’s work. And when he speaks, his words are carefully calibrated and warrant close attention.</p>
<p>In a rare public address in November he told the Australian public that, for the time being at least, they could stop worrying about the threat of a terrorist attack in Australia. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When ISIL formed its caliphate in the Middle East, significant numbers of Australians were seduced by slick propaganda and false narratives, and that led ASIO to raise the terrorism threat level to PROBABLE. Our decision was tragically justified.</p>
<p>Since 2014, there have been 11 terrorist attacks on Australian soil, while 21 significant plots have been detected and disrupted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Decades of hard work by police, communities and government agencies have ultimately reduced the capacity of terrorist groups (al-Qaeda and the Islamic State movement in particular) to significantly threaten stable, democratic states.</p>
<p>But in <a href="https://eeradicalization.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Taliban-Report-by-Ajmal-Souhail-final.pdf">weak or failing states</a> (including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia) al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates continue to represent an existential threat. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf">Global Terrorism Index</a>, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost half of all terrorist deaths, and <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">the Sahel</a> (a region of North Africa that includes countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) is home to some of the most potent terrorist networks on the planet.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadists-and-bandits-are-cooperating-why-this-is-bad-news-for-nigeria-195619">Jihadists and bandits are cooperating. Why this is bad news for Nigeria</a>
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<h2>How have stable democracies minimised the terror threat?</h2>
<p>Established democracies have developed police-led counterterrorism intelligence capacity to the point where ambitious, large-scale, terrorist plots are largely detected and disrupted, and terrorist social networks are effectively pinned down.</p>
<p>And this is not just the case with Western democracies. In our region, for example, Indonesia, <a href="https://stratsea.com/deradicalization-programs-in-malaysian-prisons-amidst-covid-19-pandemic-limitations-challenges/">Malaysia</a> and the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/un-philippines-peacebuilding-programme-scores-gains-achieving-peace-bangsamoro">Philippines</a> have made impressive progress in constraining a resilient and pernicious terrorist threat.</p>
<p>For Indonesia, and Australia, the bomb attacks in Bali 20 years ago were transformative. In the wake the bombings, successful forensic investigations by the Indonesian National Police, in partnership with the Australian Federal Police (AFP), profoundly reshaped the police forces of both nations.</p>
<p>The AFP was established in 1979 and tasked with leading counterterrorism, in response to the <a href="https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/criminal-hilton-hotel-bombing-nsw-1978/">Sydney Hilton bombing of 1978</a>. This was an unprecedented attack that killed three and injured 11. By the turn of the century, however, the modest resources of the AFP were being reorientated towards more pressing threats, such as counternarcotics and port security. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"726266323731259392"}"></div></p>
<p>The September 11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on America in 2001, however, forced an abrupt pivot, returning the AFP to its original focus on counterterrorism. A year later, in October 2002, AFP agents Mick Keelty and Graham Ashton were forced to draw on their relationships of trust with Indonesia National Police officers to figure out who was responsible for the Bali bombings, and to limit their capacity to launch further attacks.</p>
<p>Their successful cooperation led to the arrest of members of a breakaway bombing cell of an Indonesian al-Qaeda affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah. Formed in 1993 along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by so-called mujahideen, or holy fighters, this group supported the resistance to Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The Bali attacks resulted in the establishment of a specialist counterterrorism unit of the Indonesia police called Densus 88. In the 18 years since its establishment Densus 88 has arrested, and contributed to the successful prosecution of, more than 2,000 terrorists (this is my estimate based on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48687392.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A105e01db6bb2055a5ab2cee590c10073&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">hundreds of arrests reported year on year</a>).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368">How Indonesia's counter-terrorism force has become a model for the region</a>
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<p>The challenge now for Indonesian police is breaking the cycle of radicalisation. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-63883431">recent release</a> of Bali bomb-maker Umar Patek, on closely supervised parole, is confronting. But it’s also an encouraging indication of the success of Indonesian police in rehabilitating former terrorists.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-extremism-could-beckon-in-north-western-nigeria-if-local-dynamics-are-ignored-195044">Violent extremism could beckon in north-western Nigeria if local dynamics are ignored</a>
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<p>The rise of the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq in mid-2014 marked a disturbing setback in counterterrorism in Australia and Southeast Asia. It was, in large part, a product of an unwise, and unwarranted, military intervention in Iraq a decade earlier. This toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein and opened the door to insurgent forces, including Al Qaeda in Iraq, which later became Islamic State in Iraq, and then Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).</p>
<p>The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein proved deeply destabilising, with cascading perverse outcomes. The international military operation, in which Australia played a significant role, contributed both to the rise of ISIS and to its ultimate defeat.</p>
<p>A similar, though strikingly incomplete, cycle of events played out in Afghanistan. Initially, the US-led military operation that began in October 2001 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">constrained al-Qaeda</a>, almost to the point of defeat. But <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html">ultimately</a>, the military intervention led to the reconquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban, and the opening of the door to al-Qaeda and its rival Islamic State. </p>
<p>Not only does al-Qaeda now enjoy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/al-qaida-enjoying-a-haven-in-afghanistan-under-taliban-un-warns">safe haven in Afghanistan</a>, Islamic State continues to launch <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-recruits-multiethnic-fighters-in-afghanistan-threatening-regional-security-us-says/6878397.html">devastating attacks</a> across Afghanistan.</p>
<p>For the time being, however, police counterterrorism intelligence has constrained the capacity of both al-Qaeda and ISIS to project a threat into Australia.</p>
<h2>What about far-right terror?</h2>
<p>Far-right and related conspiracy extremism has gone from representing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter-terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism">just 10-15%</a> of the counterterrorism caseload of ASIO and the AFP to <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7269257/ideologically-motivated-terror-now-taking-up-half-of-asio-work/">almost 50%</a>. This is a <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/rising-right-wing-violence-and-its-impact-on-the-fight-against-terrorism/">pattern</a> matched across <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/the-reichsburger-movement-explainer/">North America and Europe</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-almost-like-grooming-how-anti-vaxxers-conspiracy-theorists-and-the-far-right-came-together-over-covid-168383">'It's almost like grooming': how anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theorists, and the far-right came together over COVID</a>
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<p>For the moment, this new threat is mostly likely to manifest in lone-actor attacks that are mostly smaller-scale and less lethal (but not always, as we saw in <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-extremists-still-threaten-new-zealand-a-year-on-from-the-christchurch-attacks-133050">Christchurch in 2019</a>).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-extremists-still-threaten-new-zealand-a-year-on-from-the-christchurch-attacks-133050">Far-right extremists still threaten New Zealand, a year on from the Christchurch attacks</a>
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<p>For Western democracies, and increasingly Asian democracies as well, toxic ultranationalism in the form of ethnic and religious supremacist movements is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63889792">rising threat</a>. Currently it’s <a href="https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/extremist-recruitment-reaching-young-australian-gamers">less well organised and coordinated</a> than jihadi terrorism. But that’s <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/extremists-far-right-figures-exploit-recent-changes-twitter">likely to change</a>. </p>
<p>And, as the tragic attacks in <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/devils-and-demons-wieambilla-shooters-film-video-after-killing-police-20221216-p5c6wu.html">Wieambilla</a> have shown, it has all became much more complex and unpredictable. Paranoia fuelled by conspiracy theories, mixed with religious fundamentalism and hatred of governments and police, is generating new forms of violent extremism.</p>
<p>As Mike Burgess reminded us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Terrorism is an enduring threat. And terrorism is an evolving threat […] We keep the terrorism threat level under constant review. There can be no ‘set and forget’ in security intelligence.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>For the time being, terrorism is a reduced threat in Australia. But the threat is not going away entirely.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956192022-12-06T13:14:41Z2022-12-06T13:14:41ZJihadists and bandits are cooperating. Why this is bad news for Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498444/original/file-20221201-26-pce5tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents fleeing a village in Plateau State, north central Nigeria, after an attack by armed bandits. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nigerian state has come under severe security stress in recent times. It has faced multiple national security threats: <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b180-after-shekau-confronting-jihadists-nigerias-north-east">jihadist groups</a> in the north-east; <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/29/who-are-the-armed-bandits-of-northwest-nigeria">armed bandits</a> in the north-west; <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2022/05/01/how-ipob-esn-is-promoting-insecurity-in-nigeria-nigerian-army/">militia secessionists</a> in the south-east; and <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-delta-young-men-face-exclusion-and-violence-in-one-of-the-most-polluted-places-on-earth-142109">militancy</a> in the south-south. </p>
<p>Thousands of people have died or been displaced.</p>
<p>Hardly a day goes by without reports of kidnappings for ransom, thefts, cattle rustling or sexual violence by armed bandits in the troubled north-west region. </p>
<p>Armed bandits have become so emboldened as to stage <a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-attack-kaduna-abuja-highway-abduct-scores">highway attacks</a> and set <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/471996-exclusive-bandits-ambush-nigerian-troops-kill-seven-soldiers-injure-five-others.html">ambushes</a> against the country’s security forces. Concern is increasing about the threat they pose to peace and security in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Much has been written about this banditry, including its linkages to the country’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">farmer-herder crisis</a> – the tensions over grazing for livestock. But there appears to be a new trend in the bandits’ way of operating which warrants attention. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">a previous article</a> I explored the factors that contribute to the spread of violence in Nigeria and across the Sahel region. These include poverty, inequality, high unemployment and illiteracy rates, weak institutions and poor governance, to mention a few. Taking these factors into account, I argue in this article that the interests of bandits and jihadists are converging. This poses a formidable threat to Nigeria’s national security.</p>
<p>The large number of bandits offers a significant pool of potential fighters for jihadists.</p>
<h2>Why the bandit threat is real</h2>
<p>Bandits are mostly known for their pursuit of economic opportunism. They are mostly interested in enriching themselves rather than taking other kinds of power.</p>
<p>Jihadist groups such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-west-africa-province-iswap-0">Islamic State in West Africa Province</a> are rather driven by political ideology.</p>
<p>But there are pointers that armed bandits <a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-boko-haram-terrorists-working-together-says-fg">may be willing</a> to <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-terrorists-now-training-bandits-in-kaduna-other-north-west-states-military-sources/">work alongside jihadists</a> in the north-west. The government has said this may have been the case in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/21/over-160-passengers-still-missing-from-train-attacked-in-nigeria">attack</a> on an Abuja-Kaduna bound train. More than 160 commuters were abducted in a jihadi-style attack.</p>
<p>There have also been records that point to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem">arms trading</a> between bandits and terrorists in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The jihadist group <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ansarus-comeback-in-nigeria-deepens-the-terror-threat">Ansaru</a>, which broke away from Boko Haram in 2012, has recently re-emerged. This proscribed group is known for its <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11455.doc.htm">deadly attacks </a> on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, in 2013. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> affiliated group now mostly operates within Birnin Gwari, a local government area in north-west Nigeria’s Kaduna state. The group has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/4/19/are-nigerias-bandits-a-new-boko-haram-cell-or-rival">sought</a> the cooperation of armed bandits in the pursuit of its goals and objectives, which it claims are to protect Muslims across Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests.</p>
<p>Though there have been occasional <a href="https://dailytrust.com/breaking-bandits-ansaru-terrorists-clash-in-kaduna">clashes</a> between bandits and jihadists, the quest for strategic relevance among jihadist groups implies a willingness to form new alliances and bolster existing ones. Bandits could confer strategic relevance on jihadists by providing them with the manpower and economic resources required in the pursuit of their goals.</p>
<p>The Nigerian military’s <a href="https://army.mil.ng/?tag=operation-hadarin-daji">Operations Hadarin Daji</a> and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/air-force-launches-operation-thunder-strike-2-against-boko-haram/">Thunderstrike</a> inflicted operational defeats on the jihadists. They have since embarked on an intensified effort to recruit fighters into their fold, including <a href="https://punchng.com/boko-haram-iswap-recruiting-child-soldiers-army/">child soldiers</a>.</p>
<p>Numbering over <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north">30,000</a> across the northern region, armed bandits could fill the void.</p>
<h2>An attractive option</h2>
<p>Armed bandits and jihadists in Nigeria have a common enemy – the Nigerian security forces. </p>
<p>Armed bandits are interested in exploiting governance gaps.</p>
<p>The jihadists’ objective is to establish sharia rule and an Islamic caliphate.
The groups differ among themselves on how exactly to achieve this. This explains the internal rift within Boko Haram which led to the emergence of ISWAP in 2015. In May 2021, ISWAP staged an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/islamic-state-west-african-province-says-nigerias-boko-haram-leader-is-dead-2021-06-06/">assault</a> on Boko Haram’s leader <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57378493">Abubakar Shekau</a>, resulting in his death. </p>
<p>What they have in common however is a hierarchical leadership structure from which they derive their instructions. ISWAP has ties with the Islamic State, and Ansaru and Boko Haram have ties with Al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>The absence of such external leadership structures for armed bandits means it might be difficult to achieve an ironclad partnership between them and jihadists in the long run. </p>
<p>As armed bandits become more assertive, however, they might adopt a political ideology. This is evident from their recent attack on an <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/bandits-attack-immigration-patrol-base-one-officer-killed-two-injured/">immigration base</a> and their attempted attack for the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/511043-military-foils-another-attack-in-nda-kills-20-bandits.html">second time</a> on the Nigerian Defence Academy - both of which represent institutions of the state. A potential trigger for this is the <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/fg-declares-bandits-as-terrorists/">proscription</a> of armed bandits as terrorists by the federal government. </p>
<p>Armed bandits could potentially formalise whatever existing strategic partnerships they have with jihadist groups such as Ansaru, given its proximity to them, if they resolve their <a href="https://punchng.com/two-die-as-bandits-terrorists-clash-in-kaduna/">recurring differences</a>. </p>
<p>Doing so would guarantee steady sources of funds and arms for both armed non-state actors.</p>
<p>A second trigger could be the effect of ransom payments to kidnappers being made <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-27/nigerian-senate-passes-law-banning-ransom-payments-to-kidnappers">illegal</a>. The Nigerian government recently enacted this law. </p>
<p>As the law takes effect, families of kidnapped victims will be less willing to pay ransom – the major financial resource for armed bandits. Bandits could potentially become desperate and set aside their differences with jihadists, choosing to partner with them. </p>
<p>A synergy between armed bandits and jihadists would lead to more civilian deaths, displacement, and destruction of property. </p>
<p>It could attract more foreign terrorist fighters, too, given Nigeria’s porous borders, who would be keen on recruiting combat-ready terrorists for armed conflict across the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions. </p>
<p>This also has serious implications for external state actors such as the United States, France and the European Union in the long run. That’s because the activities of terrorists in the region could jeopardise their economic interests.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>To avert this, the federal government of Nigeria must act fast. It must intensify covert action to disrupt the potential consolidation of partnerships between armed bandits and jihadist groups. </p>
<p>In doing so, it must however be careful not to rely solely on the use of force, which tends to result in the over-militarisation of an already complex issue. It ignores the triggers and drivers of terrorism and has the unintended effect of terrorists becoming adaptive over time. </p>
<p>Efforts must be directed at addressing underlying socio-economic, environmental and political <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/521768-unpunished-crimes-poverty-others-fuel-banditry-in-nigerias-northwest-report.html">root causes</a> of the country’s farmer-herder crisis, which contributes to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the region.</p>
<p>Lastly, poor governance must be replaced with <a href="https://republic.com.ng/june-july-2022/citizens-over-terrorists/">people-centric governance</a>, given that the former has <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/521768-unpunished-crimes-poverty-others-fuel-banditry-in-nigerias-northwest-report.html">contributed</a> to the emergence of both jihadism and “banditism” across Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The interests of bandits and jihadists are converging in Nigeria and this poses a formidable threat to the country’s security.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942822022-11-10T11:53:32Z2022-11-10T11:53:32ZSouth Africa provides fertile ground for funders of terrorism. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494600/original/file-20221110-18-z9fote.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The country needs to pay closer attention to compliance with anti-money laundering legislation. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US embassy in South Africa has twice raised the alarm recently about terrorism in the country. On <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-possible-attack/">26 October</a> it issued a security alert for a possible terror attack in <a href="https://www.tripadvisor.co.za/Tourism-g312586-Sandton_Greater_Johannesburg_Gauteng-Vacations.html">Sandton</a>, the financial centre of Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Days later it <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1084">blacklisted four individuals and eight companies</a> as terrorist financiers for Islamic State (ISIS). This followed media reports, most notably by <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/04/16/islamic-state-is-using-south-african-money-to-build-its-network">The Economist</a>, showing that ISIS was using South Africa to add to its war chest.</p>
<p>There is a long history of concerns about the country’s deficiencies in dealing with terrorism financing activities within its borders. More than 15 years ago, American terrorism expert <a href="https://jamestown.org/analyst/john-solomon/">John Solomon</a> <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/new-report-of-terrorist-camp-in-south-africa/">warned</a> that lawlessness and government corruption in the country facilitated terrorist financing. </p>
<p>I have been researching terrorist financing within South Africa for many years. In my book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=15ZdEAAAQBAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions">Jihad: A South African Perspective</a>, I unpack the state of terrorist financing in the country using open sources.</p>
<p>The latest US action comes as South Africa is <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/hasty-law-amendments-to-avoid-sa-greylisting-face-serious-pushback/">rushing to avert “greylisting”</a>: being placed on the list of countries subject to increased monitoring by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/">Financial Action Task Force</a>. The inter-governmental task force has identified deficiencies in the country’s policies and efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.</p>
<h2>Risk of greylisting</h2>
<p>The issue will also surface in February 2023 when South Africa is due for another review by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/">Financial Action Task Force</a>. This body evaluates steps by governments to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-south-africa-2021.html">In its last evaluation</a>, published in October 2021, the task force said South Africa had a strong legal framework against money laundering and terrorism financing. But its implementation had significant shortcomings, including a failure to prosecute criminal cases.</p>
<p>The country has either not complied or only partially complied with <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/financial-advisor-views/what-happens-when-south-africa-is-greylisted/#:%7E:text=The%20report%20concluded%20that%20South,laundering%20and%20terrorism%20funding%20risks.">20 of the body’s recommendations</a> to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. There is thus a strong possibility that South Africa will be added to the greylist of countries that are <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2022.html">monitored closely</a>.</p>
<p>Greylisting is an attempt by the international community to prevent illicit funds being directed towards terrorist groups. </p>
<p>The task force’s concerns about South Africa aren’t new. In 2009, <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm">it warned</a> that the country needed to pay closer attention to regulating trusts, monitoring financial transactions, compliance with anti-money laundering legislation, and enhancing the disclosure of trans-border cash transfers. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2022-10-02-sa-cannot-escape-greylisting-says-financial-intelligence-centre-chief/">risk of greylisting</a> suggests that the country has not taken the necessary steps to ensure compliance.</p>
<p>This should hardly come as a surprise to those following the growing footprint of terror groups in South Africa. </p>
<h2>A longstanding problem</h2>
<p>In January 2007 <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/pretoria-unguarded?_amp=true">Jonathan Schanzer</a>, a security analyst, reported that two South African cousins – Farhad Ahmed Dockrat, the principal of the Darus Salaam Islamic College in Laudium, Pretoria, and Dr Junaid Ismail Dockrat, a dentist – were proposed for consideration on the UN Security Council’s list of terror suspects. They had already been placed on the US treasury department’s <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp230">list</a> of Al Qaeda’s supporters.</p>
<p>According to papers submitted to the Security Council, Farhad was alleged to be an Al Qaeda “facilitator and terrorist financier”. Junaid, it was claimed, was also an Al Qaeda “financier, recruiter and facilitator”. </p>
<p>Since 2007, the South African government has not done much to ensure that the country does not become a terrorist haven. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/anti-corruption">Corruption</a>, general <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">lawlessness</a> and a security apparatus <a href="https://theconversation.com/zondo-commissions-report-on-south-africas-intelligence-agency-is-important-but-flawed-186582">focused on party factional battles</a> all account for why terrorist financiers thrive in the country. </p>
<h2>Terrorist financing</h2>
<p><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=15ZdEAAAQBAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions">My book</a> documents the case of <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg89957/html/CHRG-107shrg89957.htm">Yassin al-Qadi</a>, a US-designated terrorist financier, who invested US$3 million for a 12% stake in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/GDRS:US">Global Diamond Resources</a>, which mined diamonds in South Africa. He also controlled New Diamond Corporation, an offshore company that had <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-danger-of-terrorist-black-holes-in-southern-africa/">mining interests in the country</a>. </p>
<p>Then there was the case of <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Abd_al-Muhsin_Al-Libi">Abd al-Muhsin al-Libi</a>, also known as Ibrahim Tantouche, who set up two Al Qaeda financing fronts – the Afghan Support Committee and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society. Both operated as charities for orphans. In reality, the orphans were either dead or nonexistent. </p>
<p>As I point out in my book, terrorist financing can be simple or sophisticated. An example of the simple occurred on 25 April 2001 when <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1039475895846624273">Mohamed Suleman Vaid</a> was arrested with his wife while attempting to smuggle US$130,000 in local currency across the border with Eswatini. The ensuing police investigation found that he had made this trip 150 times in the previous 18 months, and that there may have been connections to Al Qaeda via a Lebanese businessman.</p>
<p>A more sophisticated example came to light <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=15ZdEAAAQBAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions">in 2010</a> following a forensic investigation by South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry. This showed the convergence of corruption, criminality and terrorism. It took advantage of the corruption occurring within South Africa’s Companies and Intellectual Properties Registration Office. </p>
<p>The case involved tax fraud, money laundering, racketeering, organised crime, fraud and siphoning off millions of rands to fund international terrorism. One Pakistani suspect who is now in custody, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2010-12-01-tax-fraud-syndicate-member-gets-8-years/">Aliraza Syed Naqvi</a>, specialised in cloning legitimate companies by registering a fake company with the same name as a legitimate company and its own bank account. Monies meant for the legitimate businesses were then diverted to the fake one.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=15ZdEAAAQBAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions">forensic audit</a> estimated that up to 285,000 fake or dubious companies were created in this way. This scheme would never have occurred had it not been for corruption within <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/lifestyle/2010-05-09-corruption-at-cipro-funds-global-terror/">the company registration office</a> itself. The report identified 60 of its officials as being involved in such suspicious activities.</p>
<h2>Addressing the problem</h2>
<p>In this context, the US <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1084">blacklisting</a> of companies and individuals comes as no surprise. What South Africa needs to do is to implement the Financial Action Task Force recommendations completely and ensure compliance. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61912737">high level of corruption</a> within the ruling party, this will be not be easy. But it needs to be done to deter terrorist financiers and ensure the credibility of the government.</p>
<p>The country has signed and ratified the necessary <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/acts/downloads/juta/terrorism_act.pdf">counter-terrorism legislation</a>. It is now time to walk the talk. Government needs to work with business, especially banks, to ensure early warning systems are in place.</p>
<p>The judicial system needs to be empowered to develop the necessary specialised capacity to ensure speedy convictions. Finally, the country needs to work with global partners to aggressively respond to this threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa has long been seen as deficient in dealing with terrorism financing.Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor and Academic Head of Department: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1918562022-10-07T03:45:04Z2022-10-07T03:45:04ZFor the traumatised Australian children escaping Syrian detention camps, help here will be life-changing<p>Around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/oct/05/young-and-sick-children-to-be-first-australians-repatriated-from-syrian-detention-camps">60 Australian women and children</a> are reported to be living in Syrian detention camps, most of them children under six years of age. This week, the federal government <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/islamic-state-women-and-children-to-be-returned-to-australia-from-syrian-camps-20221002-p5bml1.html">announced</a> plans to rescue these Australians – family members of slain or jailed Islamic State combatants – from the camps and repatriate them.</p>
<p>UNICEF <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/nearly-850-children-immediate-risk-violence-continues-northeast-syria">says</a> these and hundreds of other children in the camps are “critically vulnerable and in urgent need of protection”, without basics including warm clothes, hygiene, health, education and food.</p>
<p>The time spent in the Syrian detention camps will have affected these children differently depending on their age and stage of development. Their experiences will likely affect their lifelong health and well-being. What is needed to address the trauma experienced during their stay and the challenges they will face following repatriation? How can we help?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-well-placed-to-make-the-long-overdue-repatriation-of-islamic-state-women-and-children-work-191752">Australia is well-placed to make the long-overdue repatriation of Islamic State women and children work</a>
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<h2>How they got there</h2>
<p>In 2013, the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/ISISCaliphate">Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)</a> (also called <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)</a>) joined a rebellion against the Syrian government in the Middle East. </p>
<p>By mid to late 2014, they controlled a large part of Syrian and Iraqi territories. During this peak of successes in gaining territories, ISIS attracted thousands of people from around the world to come join their ranks. Reportedly, about <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/australia-is-major-contributor-of-isis-fighters-2014-6">300 people from Australia</a> joined ISIS and other militant groups. </p>
<p>In Syria, ISIS set up a government with a caliphate as the head in its control areas. Vulnerable young Muslim women were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/the-passionate-eye/these-western-women-left-their-home-countries-to-join-isis-why-did-they-do-it-1.6207886">lured online from western countries</a> to become brides of ISIS fighters. Women were promised a better future and community where they would be <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/the-passionate-eye/these-western-women-left-their-home-countries-to-join-isis-why-did-they-do-it-1.6207886">loved, appreciated and valued</a> as Muslim members. But they became a commodity, sold among ISIS fighters on arrival to Syria.</p>
<p>In March 2019, ISIS was defeated and its government collapsed. Thousands of women and children of ISIS fighters were rounded up by the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/thousands-foreigners-unlawfully-held-ne-syria?fbclid=IwAR0J-3FUAWG7VgSh6Q4rOU4bB5nZ1uYiixivW4IOHyQAzjwyD7CHQoRyvGk">Autonomous Administration of North East Syria</a> and placed in detention camps. In the camps, they have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/thousands-foreigners-unlawfully-held-ne-syria?fbclid=IwAR0J-3FUAWG7VgSh6Q4rOU4bB5nZ1uYiixivW4IOHyQAzjwyD7CHQoRyvGk">limited</a> access to clean drinking water, poor hygiene, insufficient medical care and counselling, lack of schooling, and poor nutrition. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-how-western-european-states-are-failing-to-protect-28-000-children-born-to-foreign-fighters-183672">Islamic State: how western European states are failing to protect 28,000 children born to foreign fighters</a>
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<h2>Trauma and the building blocks of adulthood</h2>
<p>Early childhood provides the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/injury/priority/aces-priority.html">foundations</a> for adult relationships, behaviours, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6915556/">health</a>, and sociocultural outcomes such as employment and education. </p>
<p>Experts <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cch.12485">report</a> children of all ages and stages in refugee camps experience a wide range of issues that can affect their <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6915556/">ability to thrive</a>. </p>
<p>Our work on <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/15/5484">migrant and refugee health</a>, vulnerability and resilience reveals migrant youths face challenging stressors such as trauma, loss of status and social networks, lack of opportunities, cultural differences, poverty and unemployment, language difficulties and more. Depending on the support they receive and their environment, young people pass through phases of readjustment following resettlement, with outcomes ranging from integration through to marginalisation.</p>
<p>The Australian children in Syria will have experienced <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28736840/">negative health outcomes</a> under ISIS rule and afterwards in the Syrian refugee camps. They will have experienced direct or indirect violence, poor housing, disrupted schooling and malnutrition. They may have been <a href="https://www.msf.org/syria-depth">exposed to diseases</a> such as tuberculosis and gastrointestinal infections, and inadequate vaccination against preventable illnesses.</p>
<p>Long-term exposure to these conditions as children are linked to subsequent <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6034311/">high-risk behaviours</a> including <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/1534">substance and alcohol abuse</a>. It may lead to mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. Chronic medical conditions such as heart disease, diabetes and cancer are <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6915556/">more likely</a>. And a broad range of social determinants of health – including <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6034311/">poor academic outcomes and poor socioeconomic status</a> – are also affected.</p>
<p>While their time in the Syrian camps will have been traumatic, their repatriation may also be disruptive and influence their health, in similar ways to <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/1534">other migrant groups</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/15/5484">circumstances of their repatriation</a>, alongside challenges of resettling, may come with stigma and discrimination. They will be unfamiliar with the language and culture in Australia and have uncertain legal status. </p>
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<h2>Mediation and resilience building</h2>
<p>Despite the challenges, children have high levels of resilience and can enjoy <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/injury/priority/aces-priority.html">improved health, well-being and development</a> once in a safe, stable, supportive and nurturing environment.</p>
<p>Research shows children who’ve been through similar transitions are able to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12205">bounce back</a>, express a positive outlook and high level of motivation.</p>
<p>To help the repatriated children thrive in Australia, we recommend interventions underpinned by a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cathryn-Hunter/publication/294775580_Trauma-informed_care_in_childwelfare_services_CFCA_Paper_No_37/links/56c3f61b08aee3dcd41682f0/Trauma-informed-care-in-child-welfare-services-CFCA-Paper-No-37.pdf">trauma-informed framework</a>. This approach would consider different experiences endured by children under ISIS rule, while in refugee camps, on repatriation and during resettling in Australia. </p>
<p>The holistic approach understands the experiences of trauma from different perspectives including awareness, sensitivity, responsiveness and systemic care. Support services could include health assessment, counselling, educational support and maintaining healthy relationships with chidren’s caregivers. Helping children to establish routine can also help with readjustment. These services need to be coordinated and not siloed from one another. </p>
<p>Such integrated services should provide both preventative and curative care services that are <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.24.2.499">culturally appropriate and respectful</a>. <a href="https://www.academicpedsjnl.net/article/S1876-2859(13)00318-5/fulltext">Interpreting and mediation</a> services will be needed across the spectrum of medical, emotional and social support. </p>
<p>Services should empower children and address stigma and discrimination. These Australians should not be referred to as “children and families of ISIS”. Their repatriation will be an opportunity for governments, schools, healthcare, community organisations and religious institutions to work together for the children’s development and wellbeing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/refugee-camps-can-wreak-enormous-environmental-damages-should-source-countries-be-liable-for-them-152519">Refugee camps can wreak enormous environmental damages – should source countries be liable for them?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Mude receives funding (4-H3C9CYL) from the Australian Government to investigate hepatitis B service use and access for Pacific Islander seasonal workers in regional Queensland. There are no other disclosure to make other than my affiliation with my current institution. The views expressed in this article does not represent my institution's views.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lillian Mwanri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Though young, the trauma experienced by children in Syrian detention camps could have lifelong effects. A coordinated approach is needed to support them into new lives here.William Mude, Public Health Lecturer, CQUniversity AustraliaLillian Mwanri, Associate Professor of Public Health, Torrens University AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1918672022-10-04T09:01:28Z2022-10-04T09:01:28ZWord from The Hill: Yet another rate rise, Stage 3 tax cuts, a repatriation mission, Higgins case<p>As well as her interviews with politicians and experts, Politics with Michelle Grattan includes “Word from The Hill”, where she discusses the news with members of The Conversation politics team.</p>
<p>In this episode, Michelle and politics + society editor Amanda Dunn discuss the Reserve Bank’s Tuesday interest rate rise of 25 basis points, as the bank tries to chart a careful path between fighting inflation and avoiding the risk of pushing the economy into recession. Amid all the current economic uncertainty, overseas and domestically, there is now speculation the government may rearrange the Stage 3 tax cuts. </p>
<p>The podcast also canvasses the government’s plans to return Australian women and children held in Syrian camps, as well as the start in Canberra of the case involving the alleged rape of former Liberal staffer Brittany Higgins.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan & politics + society editor Amanda Dunn canvass Tuesdays interest rate hike, Australia's repatriation mission of women and children in refugee camps and the Brittany Higgins trial.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881322022-08-15T12:38:00Z2022-08-15T12:38:00ZA year after the fall of Kabul, Taliban’s false commitments on terrorism have been fully exposed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478925/original/file-20220812-6128-xe8uwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C48%2C5377%2C3531&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Taliban's success in taking control in Afghanistan has encouraged other militant groups.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-july-8-2022-shows-taliban-fighters-news-photo/1241790455?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Taliban <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">returned to power in Afghanistan</a> on Aug. 15, 2021, there were faint hopes that this time would be different.</p>
<p>The Taliban promised to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/afghanistan-taliban-women-school-1.6219358">respect girls’ education and women’s rights</a>, and to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-17/taliban-say-women-can-work-shifting-from-stance-before-9-11">not allow the country to become a breeding ground</a> for terrorism, <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm">as it had been</a> in the Taliban’s previous stint in government before the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/key-dates-us-involvement-afghanistan-since-911-2021-07-02/">2001 U.S. intervention</a>.</p>
<p>But a year after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban has failed to deliver on these promises and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on/">gradually become more repressive</a> as it tries to consolidate power in the country.</p>
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<p>Its <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122892">record on women’s rights</a> has been abysmal, as has its <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/afghanistan-kabul-residents-complain-about-unfair-distribution-of-humanitarian-aid-articleshow.html">distribution of much-needed humanitarian aid</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the view that the Taliban could meaningfully mitigate the counterterrorism concerns of the West has only grown more absurd since it first <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">made such promises</a> as part of 2020’s Doha agreement to secure a U.S. exit. The Taliban’s leading political ranks remain dominated by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/haqqanis-afghanistan-taliban/2021/09/10/71f82620-123b-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html">wanted terrorists</a>, including members of the influential terrorist group the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html">Haqqani Network</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IpUS-O4AAAAJ&hl=en">scholars who monitor</a> <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">extremist groups in the region</a>, we believe terrorists in Afghanistan have only become more emboldened in the first year of Taliban rule. And despite isolated successful operations by the U.S., including the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">drone strike</a> that killed al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahri, we are still concerned that U.S.’s current counterterrorism policies are insufficient to contain the growing threat.</p>
<h2>False promises</h2>
<p>Taliban statements both before they took power and after suggested that the group – publicly, at least – was shunning <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">terrorist groups</a> and <a href="https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-tells-members-to-avoid-recruiting-foreign-fighters/31119080.html">foreign fighters</a>.</p>
<p>But the most recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/333/77/PDF/N2233377.pdf?OpenElement">United Nations security monitoring reports warned</a> that the Taliban are simply relocating some terrorist groups and individuals to make them more inconspicuous. Moreover, the Taliban are allowing the continued functioning of terrorist training camps, and potentially even awarding citizenship to some foreign fighters, the <a href="http://theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/al-qaida-enjoying-a-haven-in-afghanistan-under-taliban-un-warns">monitoring team reported in May 2022</a>. Their assessments suggests that al-Qaida “has a safe haven under the Taliban” while casting doubt over the Taliban’s intent to restrain other terrorist groups, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K, an offshoot of the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s disdain for its Doha commitment not to allow “individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” was exposed most recently in the case of al-Zawahri. Prior to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">terrorist leader’s death</a>, al-Zawahri was residing in downtown Kabul apparently under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/02/what-ayman-al-zawahris-death-says-about-terrorism-in-taliban-run-afghanistan/">permission, invitation and protection</a> of top Taliban officials.</p>
<p>The accommodation of al-Qaida is not isolated. The Taliban has similarly been reluctant to crack down on the <a href="https://southasianvoices.org/the-untenable-ttp-pakistan-negotiations">Tehrik–e-Taliban Pakistan</a>, the Afghan Taliban’s deadly terrorist ally in Pakistan that has increased cross-border attacks on Pakistan following the U.S. withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Sheltering terrorists</h2>
<p>The circumstances of al-Zawahri’s death have <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">left many unknowns</a>. It is not clear who among the Taliban was aware of al-Zawahiri’s presence – the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">group’s initial statement</a> on the U.S. strike suggested that it had “no knowledge of his arrival and residence.” Nor is it immediately apparent how the targeted killing <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-kabul-what-might-be-the-repercussions-for-the-taleban-and-afghanistan/">will affect</a> intra-Taliban dynamics, including for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/after-al-zawahiris-killing-whats-next-us-afghanistan">younger</a> and more hard-line members who may push senior leadership to respond aggressively.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A still from a video shows the bearded former al-Qaida leader dressed in white address the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri was found sheltering in Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-still-image-obtained-september-10-2012-from-news-photo/151856346?adppopup=true">IntelCenter/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Counterterrorism experts have also voiced concerns over <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/02/zawahris-death-and-afghanistans-future-00049239">which other</a> al-Qaida members the Taliban might be sheltering.</p>
<p>What is apparent is that at least some high-ranking Taliban felt <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/opinion/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaeda-afghanistan.html">comfortable enough</a>, despite public commitments, to host a terrorist leader who continued to incite violence against the West until his death.</p>
<p>The repercussions of this decision could further hamper the stability and well-being of Afghanistan. If the Taliban continue to fail on their commitments to steer clear of harboring militants, the country is likely to remain an international <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban.html?smid=tw-share">pariah</a>, which will only worsen its rampant problems and potentially steer Afghanistan toward <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/afghanistans-future-after-the-taliban-takeover/">another civil war</a>.</p>
<h2>Resistance to Taliban rule</h2>
<p>Despite their seemingly rapid takeover of the country in August 2021, the Taliban have yet to exert full control over all of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>In addition to the <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/state-afghanistans-economy-and-private-sector#:%7E:text=Afghanistan's%20economy%20and%20people%20have,of%20Afghan%20foreign%20exchange%20reserves.">severe economic crisis</a>, pockets of resistance persist, and in some areas appear to be growing. Reports suggest that by spring 2022, the number of armed groups challenging the Taliban’s authority had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-fighting-season-ushers-in-new-anti-taliban-groups/6542148.html">grown significantly</a>. Among them is a breakaway Taliban faction led by an ethnic Hazara commander named <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">Mawlawi Mehdi</a> and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/08/afghanistan-panjshir-valley-taliban-resistance/">National Resistance Front</a> led by the son of Ahmad Shah Mahsud, the deceased former leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>The Taliban have since deployed tens of thousands of their fighters to suppress <a href="https://8am.af/eng/taliban-deploys-30000-special-fighters-in-panjshir-baghlan-and-takhar/">both</a> <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">groups</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, in May 2022, dozens of exiled warlords who fled the country rallied together to form the High Council of National Resistance. The <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/14/afghanistan-warlords-taliban-authority-comeback/">leaders of the council are demanding</a> a stake in their country’s future or else, in the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exiled-afghan-warlord-organising-group-in-turkey-against-taliban-481388">words</a> of the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, “Afghanistan will experience civil war once again.”</p>
<p>And then there is the challenge posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>. We <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/governance/smaller-and-smarter-defining-a-narrower-u-s-counterterrorism-mission-in-the-afghanistan-pakistan-region/">warned</a> back in February 2021 and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">again</a> in October that American drones and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry">Taliban’s animosity</a> for ISIS-K wouldn’t be enough to stop the group’s revival and violence. Indeed, in January 2022, we <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">traced</a> ISIS-K’s resurgence under its <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-new-leader-islamic-state-khorasan-province">new leader</a>, from its depletion following years of <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Broken-but-Not-Defeated.pdf">personnel and territorial losses</a> due to military operations, to the revived threat that the group poses today. The deadly consequences of that resurgence were seen on Aug. 26, 2021, in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">attack that left at least 100 people dead</a>, including 13 U.S. troops.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A Taliban fighter holding a gun stands in front of a fence. On the floor is bloodstained clothing and debris." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter stands guard at the site of a 2021 ISIS-K suicide bombing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/taliban-fighter-stands-guard-at-the-site-of-the-august-26-news-photo/1234889168?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At present, ISIS-K is in the middle of two key campaigns. The first is aimed at building a wide militant base that draws on <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/ISK-poses-indigenous-threat-to-Afghan-Taliban">local populations</a> and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">regional militant groups</a>. The second is a campaign to delegitimize the Taliban through attacks and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">propaganda designed to highlight</a> Taliban incompetence, and <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/iskp-criticizes-talibans-acceptance?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">frame the Taliban government</a> as illegitimate. </p>
<p>Over time – and with the backing of the core <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria</a> and other resistance groups draining the Taliban’s resources – we believe ISIS-K has the potential to chip away at the Taliban’s governance while expanding its own influence.</p>
<h2>A global threat?</h2>
<p>Emboldened militant groups in Afghanistan pose a threat not just to the country itself, but also to the region and potentially the global community.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s success in retaking Afghanistan encouraged an already-resurgent <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan">Pakistani Taliban</a> to pursue a campaign of violence and push for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/five-things-watch-islamabad-pakistani-taliban-talks">political concessions</a> from the Pakistani government. </p>
<p>Similarly, al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates has drawn inspiration from the Taliban’s victory. And despite the symbolic blow of <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">al-Zawahri’s death</a>, many of those affiliates in the Middle East and Africa <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">remain operationally unaffected</a> by any fallout from the U.S. strike.</p>
<p>In spite of the success of that operation, <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/">debate continues</a> over the effectiveness of the United States’ <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">over-the-horizon counterterrorism strategy</a>, which involves the launching of surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside the country.</p>
<p>The al-Zawahri operation demonstrated that sound intelligence can result in effective targeting of high-profile terrorists. But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/05/politics/us-counterrorism-afghanistan/index.html">counterterrorism experts</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">including ourselves</a> remain concerned over whether such strikes can be effective in targeting less prominent militants who nevertheless play a critical role in the day-to-day operations.</p>
<p>To bolster the strategy, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">the U.S.</a> could seek out more robust relationships with resistance groups hostile to the Taliban, as well as with neighboring <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/21/us-central-asia-counterterrorism/">Central Asian countries</a>, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in order to bolster the intelligence needed to conduct over-the-horizon strikes. But such partnerships would not come without their downsides, including further isolating the Taliban. </p>
<p>International diplomatic efforts and U.S. counterterrorism operations, along with internal pressure from resistance groups and jihadist rivalries, may encourage the Taliban to reform its ways.</p>
<p>But if the second year of Taliban rule fails to produce meaningful changes, the outlook for the country and its citizens will likely only turn for the worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban promised not to allow Afghanistan to be used by groups seeking to attack the US, yet terrorist groups have only become more emboldened under its rule.Andrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880562022-08-02T13:16:52Z2022-08-02T13:16:52ZWho was Ayman al-Zawahri? Where does his death leave al-Qaida and what does it say about US counterterrorism?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477165/original/file-20220802-19-5lqhr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C85%2C2986%2C2250&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Who will replace the man who replaced bin Laden?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/osama-bin-laden-sits-with-his-adviser-ayman-al-zawahiri-an-news-photo/681898?adppopup=true">Visual News/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ayman al-Zawahri, leader of al-Qaida and a plotter of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">has been killed in a drone strike</a> in the Afghan city of Kabul, according to the U.S. government.</em></p>
<p><em>Al-Zawahri was the the successor to Osama bin Laden and his death marked “one more measure of closure” to the families of those killed in the 2001 atrocities, U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/08/01/remarks-by-president-biden-on-a-successful-counterterrorism-operation-in-afghanistan/">said during televised remarks</a> on Aug. 1, 2022.</em></p>
<p><em>The operation came almost a year after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/30/politics/us-military-withdraws-afghanistan/index.html">American troops exited Afghanistan</a> after decades of fighting there. The Conversation asked <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/team/dr-daniel-milton/">Daniel Milton</a>, a terrorism expert at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/dr-haroro-ingram">Haroro J. Ingram</a> and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">Andrew Mines</a>, research fellows at the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to explain the significance of the strike on al-Zawahri and what it says about U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan under the Taliban.</em></p>
<h2>Who was Ayman al-Zawahri?</h2>
<p>Ayman al-Zawahri was an Egyptian-born jihadist who became al-Qaida’s top leader in 2011 after his predecessor, Osama bin Laden, was <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">killed by a U.S. operation</a>. Al-Zawahri’s ascent followed years in which al-Qaida’s leadership had been devastated by <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/43/2/45/12208/What-Explains-Counterterrorism-Effectiveness?redirectedFrom=fulltext">U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan</a>. Bin Laden had himself been <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined/">struggling</a> in the years leading up to his death to exert control and unity across al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A laptop screen shows Ayman al-Zawahri speaking with the English translation below reading 'Bush do you know where I am. I am in the midst.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C11%2C1982%2C1341&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri challenging then-president George W. Bush.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BidenAfghanistan/32481436d03047e8892fd3cef111ea9b/photo?Query=Zawahri&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=67&currentItemNo=23">AP Photo/B.K.Bangash</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Al-Zawahri succeeded bin Laden despite a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/01/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-killed-drone-strike-afghanistan/">mixed reputation</a>. While he had a long history of involvement in the jihadist struggle, he was viewed by many <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/08/opinions/where-is-bin-ladens-partner-in-crime-ayman-al-zawahiri">observers</a> and even jihadists as a languid orator without formal religious credentials or battlefield reputation.</p>
<p>Lacking the charisma of his predecessor, al-Zawahri’s <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2017/issue-1/0620171-deciphering-ayman-al-zawahiri-and-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-strategic-and-ideological-imperatives-by-sajjan-m.-gohel.pdf">image</a> as a leader was not helped by a tendency to embark on long, meandering and often outdated speeches. Al-Zawahri also struggled to shake rumors that he was a <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">prison informer</a> while detained in Egypt and, as author and journalist Lawrence Wright <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">detailed</a>, acted as a wedge between the young bin Laden and his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.</p>
<p>Al-Zawahri’s influence further waned during a series of popular uprisings known as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East</a>, when it seemed that al-Qaida had been sidelined and unable to effectively exploit the outbreak of war in Syria and Iraq. To analysts and supporters alike, al-Zawahiri appeared symbolic of an al-Qaida that was outdated and rapidly being eclipsed by other groups that it had <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/">once helped onto the global stage</a>, most notably the Islamic State.</p>
<p>But with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate">collapse of the Islamic State group’s caliphate</a> in 2019, the return to power in Afghanistan of al-Qaida ally the Taliban and the persistence of al-Qaida affiliates <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/islamic-state-and-al-qaeda-linked-african-insurgencies">especially in Africa</a>, some experts <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">argue</a> that al-Zawahri guided al-Qaida through its most challenging period and that the group remains a potent threat. Indeed, one senior Biden administration official <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">told the Associated Press</a> that at the time of his death, al-Zawahri continued to provide “strategic direction” and was considered a dangerous figure.</p>
<h2>Where does his death leave al-Qaida?</h2>
<p>Killing or capturing top terrorist leaders has been a key counterterrorism tool for decades. Such operations remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield and force <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/terror-in-transition/9780231192255">succession struggles</a> that disrupt group cohesion and can expose security vulnerabilities. Unlike the Islamic State, which has clear <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">leadership succession practices</a> that it has showcased four times since the 2006 death of its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida’s are less clear. Al-Zawahri’s successor will only be the movement’s third leader <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/al-qaeda-international">since forming</a> in 1988.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">top contender</a> is another Egyptian. A former colonel in the Egyptian army and, like al-Zawahri, a member of the al-Qaida affiliate Egyptian Islamic Jihad, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/saif-al-adel">Saif al-Adel is connected to</a> the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that launched al-Qaida as a global jihadist threat. His reputation as an explosives expert and military strategist has won him strong standing within the al-Qaida movement. A number of other possibilities are behind al-Adel, with a recent <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">U.N. Security Council report</a> identifying several possible successors. </p>
<p>Either way, we’d argue that al-Qaida is at a crossroads. If al-Zawahri’s successor is broadly recognized as legitimate by both al-Qaida’s core and its affiliates, it could help to stabilize the movement. But any ambiguity surrounding al-Qaida’s succession plan could see the new leader’s authority challenged, which in turn could fracture the movement further.</p>
<p>Evidence suggests al-Qaida’s presence as a global movement will survive al-Zawahri’s death, just as it did bin Laden’s. The network has seen <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">a number of recent successes</a>. Longtime allies the Taliban successfully took control of Afghanistan with help from <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis">al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent</a> – an affiliate which is now <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">expanding its operations in Pakistan and India</a>. Meanwhile, affiliates across the African continent – from Mali and the Lake Chad region to Somalia – remain a threat, with some <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">expanding beyond their traditional areas of operation</a>.</p>
<p>Other affiliates, like the group’s Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, remain loyal to the core and, according to the U.N. monitoring team, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">are keen to revive</a> overseas attacks against the U.S. and its allies.</p>
<p>Now, al-Zawahri’s successor will be looking to retain the allegiance of al-Qaida’s affiliates as it strives to remain a potent threat.</p>
<h2>What does this tell us about US operations in Afghanistan under the Taliban?</h2>
<p>The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 prompted questions over whether the U.S. could keep pressure on al-Qaida, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a> and other militants in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/11/20/sof-leader-calls-over-the-horizon-ops-in-afghanistan-hard-but-doable">U.S. officials explained</a> that an “over-the-horizon” strategy – launching surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside any given state – would allow the U.S. to deal with problems that emerged, such as terrorist attacks and the resurgence of groups.</p>
<p>But many experts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">disagreed</a>. And when an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-strikes-islamic-state-group-b8bd9b0c805c610758bd1d3e20090c2c">errant U.S. drone strike</a> killed seven children, a U.S.-employed humanitarian worker and other civilians last fall, that strategy came under sharp scrutiny.</p>
<p>But for those who doubted whether the U.S. still had the desire to go after key terrorists in Afghanistan, the killing of al-Zawahri gives a clear answer. This strike <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">reportedly involved</a> long-term surveillance of Zawahri and his family and robust discussion within the U.S. government before receiving presidential approval. Biden claims it was carried out without civilian casualties.</p>
<p>At the same time, it took the U.S. 11 months to strike its first high-value target in Afghanistan under the Taliban. This contrasts with the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-significantly-reduced-global-airstrikes-in-2021-/6392771.html">hundreds of airstrikes</a> executed in the years before the U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<p>The strike occurred in a Kabul neighborhood populated by senior Taliban figures. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">The safehouse itself belonged</a> to a senior aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani, a terrorist <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorinfo/sirajuddin-haqqani">wanted by the U.S.</a> and a top Taliban leader. </p>
<p>Aiding and abetting al-Zawahri was a violation of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Doha agreement</a>, under which the Taliban agreed “not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies.” The circumstances of the strike suggest that if the U.S. wants to do effective over-the-horizon operations in Afghanistan, it cannot <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/26/how-to-partner-with-the-taliban/">count on</a> the Taliban for support. </p>
<p>The strike on al-Zawahri also tells us little about whether the U.S. strategy post-pullout can contain other jihadist groups in the region like <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>, which is vehemently opposed to the Taliban and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">expanding in Afghanistan</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, we believe that if more jihadists perceive the Taliban to be too weak to protect the top leaders of al-Qaida and its affiliates, while at the same time unable to govern Afghanistan without U.S. aid, many may consider <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">ISIS-K to be the best choice</a>.</p>
<p>These and other dynamics speak to the many challenges of pursuing an over-the-horizon counterterrorism in Afghanistan today, ones that are unlikely to be solved by occasional high-profile drone strikes and assassinations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views expressed by Dr. Milton are his own and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Mines and Haroro J. Ingram do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US strike against al-Zawahri leaves the future of al-Qaida at a crossroads as the terrorist movement looks for a new leader.Haroro J. Ingram, Senior Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAndrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityDaniel Milton, Director of Research, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.