tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/ken-saro-wiwa-19081/articlesKen Saro Wiwa – The Conversation2022-03-03T15:32:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1773942022-03-03T15:32:16Z2022-03-03T15:32:16ZEmeka Anyaoku: portrait of a skilled diplomat who graced Nigeria, Africa and the globe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448258/original/file-20220224-15-172gc8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chief Emeka Anyaoku, a global icon with local roots. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Jekesai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few Nigerians have distinguished themselves to their compatriots and the world so much and for so long as <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/chief-emeka-anyaoku-1933">Chief Emeka Anyaoku</a>. </p>
<p>The former secretary general of the Commonwealth represents the true essence of a public intellectual and leadership. He turned <a href="https://dailytrust.com/anyaoku-at-89-a-global-citizen-who-thinks-home">turned 89</a> in January 2022.</p>
<p>Born on 18 January 1933 in Obosi town, Anambra State, Anyaoku showed signs of leadership from an early age. In the mid-1950s he was a student leader at the University College Ibadan, where he studied the classics. He took an active part in the push for Nigeria’s independence from Britain.</p>
<p>He studied further in England and France. The young Anyaoku – aged 26 – then landed his first job at the newly formed <a href="https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/about/our-company/">Commonwealth Development Corporation</a> in 1959. The organisation was created to facilitate the growth of private sector businesses in emerging economies. </p>
<p>This job set him on a diplomatic career path. And a lifelong association with the Commonwealth. </p>
<p>In 1962, two years after Nigeria’s independence, Anyaoku <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358539508454249?journalCode=ctrt20">met</a> Tafawa Balewa, then prime minister of Nigeria, in the West Africa regional office of the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The encounter translated into a job in Nigeria’s Foreign Service. </p>
<p>In April 1962, he was appointed personal assistant to the permanent secretary in the ministry of external affairs. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/chief-emeka-anyaoku-1933">1963</a> he was posted to Nigeria’s permanent mission at the United Nations in New York . Thus began a successful international career as a diplomat. </p>
<p>The highlight was Anyaoku’s 10-year tenure as the secretary general of the Commonwealth. This was marked by a desire for a complete political and democratic transition in countries reeling from civil wars, coups and racial division. </p>
<p>He was particularly prominent in South Africa, where he forged an alliance with the African nationalist leaders in dismantling apartheid.</p>
<h2>Anyaoku in international affairs</h2>
<p><a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">The Commonwealth</a> is a voluntary association of 54 independent countries. They are united by their commitment to development, peace and democratic stability. The organisation initially comprised states that had been part of the British empire. But, more recently, any country has been able to join.</p>
<p>Anyaoku left the Nigerian foreign service to join the Commonwealth Secretariat as assistant director of international affairs in 1966. He would later become a director. By 1977 he was elected <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/chief-emeka-anyaoku-1933">deputy secretary general</a> in charge of international affairs and the administration of the secretariat. </p>
<p>Anyaoku was elected the third Commonwealth secretary general at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting on 24 October 1989. </p>
<p>This made him the first African to hold such a high-ranking position in an intergovernmental organisation. In 1995, he was easily reelected for a second five-year term. </p>
<p>In 1983 Anyaoku left the Commonwealth briefly when the administration of Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Shehu-Shagari">President Shehu Shagari</a> appointed him minister of foreign affairs. His stint was cut short by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-11405111">military takeover</a> of the government by Major General Muhammadu Buhari the same year. </p>
<p>Given its colonial heritage, the Commonwealth has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16842428">criticised</a> as a post-colonial club with little relevance to global governance. Anyaoku initially viewed it as a neo-colonial instrument before <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/2013/interview-with-chief-emeka-anyaoku/">committing</a> to finding a decolonial niche for the organisation. </p>
<p>The excitement of his own country’s independence in 1960, and his diplomatic engagement during the 1967-1970 <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970/">Nigeria-Biafra war</a>, guided his foreign policy as secretary general. This was particularly evident in southern Africa and Southeast Asia. </p>
<p>Appalled by the 1960 <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> in South Africa, Anyaoku developed a close relationship with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/African-National-Congress">African National Congress</a>, then a banned liberation movement.</p>
<p>He was a consistent part of the negotiations for a democratic transition in the country. He never missed any opportunity to underscore the fact that the South African situation was significant in the development of a modern Commonwealth. </p>
<p>This contribution endeared him to Nelson Mandela. On becoming South Africa’s president Mandela afforded him the rare honour of <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/lifetime-achievers-anyaoku-diplomats-diplomat/">addressing</a> a joint sitting of the South African National Assembly in 1998. </p>
<p>Emeka Anyaoku was awarded the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200804230036.html">highest civilian honour</a> in South Africa in 2008 – the Order of the Supreme Companions of O.R. Tambo: Gold. This was in recognition of his efforts in dismantling apartheid and the general struggle for freedom, justice and democracy on the continent. </p>
<p>His interventions were not limited to Africa. In Bangladesh, Anyaoku <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/2013/interview-with-chief-emeka-anyaoku/">mediated</a> between the then prime minister, Begum Zia, and the leader of the opposition, Sheik Hasina. </p>
<p>He was also prominent in Pakistan during a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/2013/interview-with-chief-emeka-anyaoku/">potentially destabilising</a> disagreement between the then president, Farooq Leghari, and the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. </p>
<p>The most challenging of his interventions was the crisis in his own country, Nigeria. This was after General Ibrahim Babangida <a href="https://journals.aphriapub.com/index.php/SEJPS/article/view/1334">annulled</a> the 1993 presidential election. Chief Moshood Abiola had apparently <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/06/10/counting-the-gains-of-june-12/">won</a> the poll. Anyaoku condemned the action of the junta in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Tensions also reached fever pitch when General Sani Abacha ordered the execution of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ken-Saro-Wiwa">Ken Saro Wiwa</a> and other Niger Delta environmentalists. Anyaoku used the opportunity to develop general principles for the Commonwealth. It was on the basis of these that <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/nigeria/11-11/">Nigeria was suspended</a>. The suspension was lifted only after Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999. </p>
<p>Anyaoku <a href="https://punchng.com/anyaoku-at-89-a-global-citizen-who-thinks-home/">retired</a> from his position as Commonwealth secretary general in March 2000.</p>
<h2>Retirement years</h2>
<p>Since his retirement, he has been a consistent voice of reason in Nigerian and international politics. He lives in Nigeria where he continues to contribute to critical national discourses and participates in cross-cultural activities. </p>
<p>The University of Liverpool bestowed an honorary doctoral degree on him in 1993. It describe Anyaoku as a</p>
<blockquote>
<p>healer of international strife, a seeker after mutual understanding and a patient negotiator.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, generations of leaders in Nigeria and abroad found in Anyaoku an example for transformative leadership. His cross-cultural skills set was invaluable in navigating ethnic, religious and national divides. </p>
<p>For all his international achievements, Anyaoku remains close to his roots as the <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/emeka-anyaoku/m01w_4f?hl=en">Ichie Adazie of Obosi</a> – a traditional title he cherishes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Maiangwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former secretary-general of the Commonwealth represents the true essence of a public intellectual and leader; his sense of duty defines his legacy.Benjamin Maiangwa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lakehead UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846202017-09-27T17:03:03Z2017-09-27T17:03:03ZEconomic inequality lies behind growing calls for secession in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187777/original/file-20170927-24154-141spub.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women carry goods across a makeshift bridge in the Ilaje slum in Lagos. Widening inequality is fuelling tensions across Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Finbarr O'Reilly</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rise of ethnic and religious nationalism in Nigeria in the last decade has led to such high levels of tension that it’s prompted people to ask if it will <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-03-10/roots-nigerias-religious-and-ethnic-conflict">survive as a country</a>. Or if Nigeria is on the brink of another <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2017/09/03/nigerian-christians-warn-another-civil-war/">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>What’s behind the growing tensions is <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-nigeria/nigeria-extreme-inequality-numbers">unequal</a> distribution of the country’s wealth. Inequality has caused mistrust among ethnic groups. This, in turn, has led to conflict and violence. </p>
<p>Nigeria has in fact been at war with itself for some time – a war that has become intensified in the last two decades. </p>
<p>A number of events illustrate this. For instance, militancy in the oil rich Niger Delta region started after the 2003 general elections where arms and ammunition were purchased by some politicians and handed to young people in an attempt to influence the elections. But after the elections, many young Nigerians, angered by high rates of unemployment, turned the weapons against their sponsors and the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580link">Nigerian state</a>. </p>
<p>Another example is the role played by the Oodua Peoples Congress, a group that advocated for an autonomous region for the Yoruba speaking southwest Nigeria. The congress started its agitation in 1994, a year after the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by M.K.O Abiola, a member of the Yoruba ethnic group. Their dominant message was the alleged marginalisation of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence">Yoruba ethnic group</a>.</p>
<p>And in 2009 the Boko Haram insurgency erupted after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/06/mohammed-yusuf-boko-haram-nigeria">the brutal murder</a> of Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric based in Maiduguri who had started a movement seven years earlier to push for an end to corruption and action against inequality. He also supported Islamic practices in the northeast region of Nigeria. Yusuf was arrested by the police and died in custody in 2009. Many members of his sect immediately staged a peaceful protest. Protests later became violent when they started targeting police offices and police posts across the North. </p>
<p>Now there is a resurgence of opposition in Biafra. It echoes back to 1967 when the then military governor of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Col. Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Igbo speaking East independent from Nigeria. This followed Igbos in the North being targeted after the first military coup d'etat that ended Nigeria’s first republic. The 1966 coup, mostly led by military officers from the Igbo speaking east of Nigeria, was perceived by many in the North to have specifically targeted and killed many Hausa/Fulani politicians from the Northern region. </p>
<p>Economic inequality cannot be separated from the root of all these developments. Nigerians are frustrated because they can see <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-nigeria/nigeria-extreme-inequality-numbers">economic inequality growing at a faster pace than ever before</a> and no one seems to be doing anything about it. </p>
<p>Will these agitations lead to an outright war in the scale of the 1960s civil war? There is no categorical answer to that. But I doubt that there will be another civil war on the scale of 1967-1970, although there may be large scale violence. </p>
<h2>A history of violence</h2>
<p>Violence has always been part of the history of economic and political marginalisation in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Examples can be drawn from the mass violence that led to the 1967-70 civil war as well as the ethno-religious violence of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. These included the <a href="https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr90/fnigeria1992.htm">Zango Kataf conflict</a>, <a href="https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/maitatsine-riots">Maitatsine riots</a> in the North between 1980 and 1985, the Agbekoya farmers uprising in the West 1968-70, the first iteration of the resurgence of Biafra by the Ralph Uwazuruike-led <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/31666/262387_de.html">Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra in 2000</a> and the national protests against the annulment of the June 12, 1993 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/07/world/rioting-in-nigeria-kills-at-least-11.html?mcubz=1">presidential election</a> won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187684/original/file-20170926-19342-1843y70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2003 picture of current Nigeria President Muhammadu Buhari with Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu who led the failed Biafran secessionist war in the 60s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Howard Burditt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these mass actions started as protests against perceived injustice. But they were aggravated by the forceful response of the Nigerian government. The protests all paralysed state activities. But none threatened the survival of the Nigerian state more than the oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta. </p>
<p>Beginning with the state murder of Niger Delta rights activist <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/07/world/rioting-in-nigeria-kills-at-least-11.html?mcubz=1">Ken Saro Wiwa in November 1995</a> and crystallising in the insurgency against oil corporations and the state, protest action in the Niger Delta have affected the production and sale of oil which is the mainstay of the <a href="http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/nig0608.php">Nigerian economy</a>.</p>
<h2>How Nigeria got here</h2>
<p>The resurgence of ethno-religious protests in Nigeria can be traced to the fact that wealth circulates among a small group of elites. Although they come from all ethnic and religious <a href="https://economicconfidential.com/editors-pick/12-people-who-control-nigerias-economy/">groups</a>, they resort to fanning ethno-religious sentiments when they feel there’s a threat to their wealth. Cries of marginalisation becomes the dominant cry when they’re out of power. </p>
<p>The election of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, triggered new tensions. This is because he is considered a member of the Northern elite. Immediately after his election protests began supporting self-determination or secession by various groups from the South. These included the <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2017/09/23/biafra-police-dare-ipob-members-protest/">Indigenous People of Biafra</a> in the South East as well as groups such as the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/20/niger-delta-avengers-who-they-are-and-what-they-want.html">Niger Delta Avengers in the South-South</a>. </p>
<p>Control of Nigeria’s oil resources in the Niger Delta always comes into the mix. Recent clashes involving the Biafra group in Port Harcourt – capital city of oil rich Rivers State – must be understood in that context. It is no surprise that once again, the Niger Delta is at the heart of the current clamour for secession just as it was between 1966 and 1970 when oil extraction started taking root in Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there are important differences between today’s protests and those staged earlier in Nigeria’s history. The main ones include the fact that people are mobilised differently, and the way in which information is disseminated and consumed. </p>
<p>News travel faster than it used to and unfounded rumours spread like wildfire. Fuelling the tensions is the fact that hate speech is rife. The state is as guilty as the agitators. Voices of reason and objective analysis are lost in the noise especially now that everyone with a smart phone has become a ‘journalist’. In the confusion, the road to anarchy looms large over Nigeria. </p>
<h2>What’s to be done</h2>
<p>An inclusive economic and political system is the only solution. The current public discourse is focused on political restructuring along ethnic lines. The calls for a political arrangement where major ethnic groups will have control over their geographical areas as well as resources therein might help. The danger is that rather than unify Nigeria, it would further divide the country along <a href="http://leadership.ng/2017/06/30/politics-intrigues-behind-restructuring-debate/">ethnic and religious lines</a>.</p>
<p>What’s missing in the conversation is the fact that the environment for violence and oppression of most Nigerians has come about because of the way in which the country’s economy is structured. The elitist economy cuts across all ethnic groups. The disenfranchisement, marginalisation and exploitation defy ethnic colouration. </p>
<p>For restructuring to be meaningful, Nigeria must create an inclusive economic and political system where ethnic and religious affiliation will no longer be a defining factor in economic and political participation. What Nigerians need, and are clamouring for, is a country that will accommodate them regardless of ethnic or religious creed. Political, religious and ethnic tolerance is the key to economic and political success, therefore economic and political inclusivity must account for greater tolerance for it to be effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84620/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omolade Adunbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests are raising tensions in Africa’s most populous country, with agitators and federal troops clashing on the streets. But is Nigeria on the brink of another civil war?Omolade Adunbi, Associate Professor of Afroamerican and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/599902016-06-07T12:55:49Z2016-06-07T12:55:49ZDivestment from fossil fuels should be linked with active engagement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123958/original/image-20160525-25205-gt85fr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A singular focus on divestment from oil and gas companies to counter climate change could be detrimental.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/40969298@N05/13635340783/in/photolist-mLUFLt-mM6hcT-psgGLL-qg8q6x-h5wbqR-hwBJzg-h5vaY1-mM6wgg-mM6iQe-jCSxRm-mM6u2K-mM6HFv-mM8aKw-mM8cFq-mM6J9H-mM6PRB-rcMs4D-mM8kr5-mM6N3K-mM6jsV-mHtbZQ-mM6kTn-mHo2d6-rcWohB-mM6nTT-qfVcN1-rcQCeo-h5uQsD-mHo3Fp-qVtnY4-mHmvQZ-qVm9Pw-mHrAVj-mM6u9v-qfVkY9-qVtjh6-mM6Efk-qVtta6-mM6Mux-qg8rgZ-mM6E52-rcWhNv-qWKhgz-raCQ5s-mM6KuF-edsmjP-qVtm5z-rbUGLS-rcQBjN-qVttWB">Joe Brusky/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The global <a href="http://gofossilfree.org/">divestment movement</a> is gaining steam. This involves investors like <a href="https://350.org.au/news/one-of-sydneys-largest-councils-divests-from-fossil-fuels/">city councils</a>, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/05/norways-pension-fund-to-divest-8bn-from-coal-a-new-analysis-shows">pension funds</a> and <a href="http://www.fossilfreestanford.org/about-us.html">universities</a> publicly withdrawing their assets from coal, oil and gas companies – those which produce fossil fuels.</p>
<p>The divestment campaign is part of activists’ strategy to bring about reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. It counteracts an entrenched economic and institutional system with vested interests. Fierce resistance is to be expected.</p>
<p>Now the debate is reaching South Africa. At a recent <a href="http://www.acdi.uct.ac.za/events/lunchtime-seminar-uct-and-fossil-fuel-divestment">panel discussion</a> hosted by the University of Cape Town African Climate and Development Initiative, I argued both for and against divestment. The broad principle is sound, but its application needs more sophistication.</p>
<h2>The arguments for divestment</h2>
<p>Historical analogy can be helpful in this regard. Consider the abolition movement opposing slavery. The moral case for countering climate change is arguably similarly strong. (But note that I am not suggesting coal miners are as directly exploitative as slave traders, nor am I recommending a latter-day corollary for the British navy’s <em><a href="http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/binder113.pdf">volte-face</a></em> from protector to opponent of the Atlantic slave trade.) </p>
<p>Resistance to the abolition movement highlighted the expected economic costs of doing away with slavery. As it happened, abolition created losses for some, but the broader economic impacts may well have been positive, not least because a reliance on slaves stifled <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/09/economic-history-2">innovation</a>.</p>
<p>In a similar vein, an argument against divestment is that it will lead to reduced returns and higher risks for the investors and lower economic growth. Yet arguably our reliance on fossil fuels breeds the kind of intellectual laziness that slavery once did. Freeing ourselves from this laziness can unleash more creative and potentially exponential gains from renewable energy and other technologies and innovations.</p>
<p>This contributes to a number of analysts and <a href="http://www.impaxam.com/sites/default/files/20130704%20Impax%20White%20Paper%20fossil%20fuel%20divestment%20FINAL.pdf">asset managers</a> supporting divestment not only because they are concerned with climate change, but also because companies producing fossil fuels do not offer good returns over the long run. They point to investment baskets excluding such companies doing just as well, or better, and they point out the risks associated with “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-stranded-assets-matter-and-should-not-be-dismissed-51939">stranded assets</a>”. These are fossil fuel reserves that energy companies list as assets, but whose exploitation would explode multilateral agreements to curb emissions in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-paris-climate-agreement-at-a-glance-50465">Paris agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Some point to South Africa’s specific circumstances to oppose divestment, especially the relatively small size of its investment market, as well as the important role of fossil fuel companies in this market. Yet, even in a small market like South Africa, alternative companies can be added to the basket to maintain risk-adjusted return prospects. </p>
<p>The abolition analogy also helps counter claims that investment decisions are not political, as argued by <a href="http://www.harvard.edu/president/news/2013/fossil-fuel-divestment-statement">Harvard President Drew Faust</a>. It is disingenuous to say that investments are made purely for economic reasons, as long as they are legal. Laws change, and norms play a role too. Just because slavery was legal does not mean that it was morally or economically right.</p>
<p>A further counterclaim is that divestment won’t make a difference: there will always be others who will take your place to invest in fossil fuel companies. But, of course, this depends on the proportion of participants in the divestment movement, which may well reach a critical threshold sooner rather than later. More importantly, it is not primarily the economic impact on the fossil fuel industry that matters – it is the symbolic impacts, the stigmatisation. Some belittle symbolic impacts, but they can be very important. For instance, ask Shell about employing skilled engineers after the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/nuccomtoolbox/documents/Brent_Spar_Case_Study.pdf">Brent Spar</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/10/ken-saro-wiwa-father-nigeria-ogoniland-oil-pollution">Ken Saro-Wiwa</a> debacles in the 1990s.</p>
<p>So there is a compelling moral, economic and environmental case for divestment. However, the current approach of the divestment campaign is misguided. To paraphrase Albert Einstein, it is trying to make things as simple as possible to enhance its impact – but in so doing it is making things too simple. Climate change is a complex problem and focusing on just one lever of change while disregarding the broader picture can be detrimental.</p>
<h2>A broader approach</h2>
<p>An important part of the divestment movement’s simplification process is to target a specific group of “fossil fuel companies”. But where would you legitimately draw the line? It will necessarily involve some arbitrary choices. Moreover, divesting from oil companies will probably mean investing instead in, say, banks – which then pass the money on to those same oil companies. A more inclusive, holistic approach to strategic change in a broader range of businesses (especially finance) is required. The focus should not be only on a specific group of companies, but on the direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions of all organisations.</p>
<p>Second, there are likely to be unintended consequences from a single-minded approach to divestment. These include possible job losses, especially if divestment decisions are implemented abruptly. This is clearly a problem in the South African context. Companies and other stakeholders in their sectors need to be given signals that changes are going to be made over a specified period so that adaptations can be made as much as possible. Such adaption will include, for instance, reskilling of workers.</p>
<p>Third, despite clear signs of unscrupulous behaviour among some of the targeted energy companies, it is unhelpful to paint companies with a single brush. Furthermore, investors lose influence when they divest from one day to the next. As part of a gradual divestment strategy, an active shareholder engagement approach should be applied to cajole companies – those identified as “fossil fuel companies” and others, especially banks – into making a broader array of shifts.</p>
<p>Fourth, we need to recognise that the largest proportion of fossil fuels are extracted and burnt by governments and their state-owned enterprises. In the South African context, it would be silly to focus activists’ attention only on Sasol (the second largest polluter), while disregarding state-owned energy company Eskom (by far the largest polluter). In addition, we need more concerted efforts to get rid of state subsidies for fossil fuels, which remain huge. </p>
<p>Finally, any organisation opting to include divestment into its strategy must get its own house in order. It would be hypocritical of the University of Cape Town, where I work, to divest from oil companies without making much more committed changes to energy consumption and generation on campus, as well as to employees’ travel arrangements. Indeed, a vigorously debated question during our panel discussion was whether our current emphasis on transforming and <a href="https://theconversation.com/decolonising-universities-isnt-an-easy-process-but-it-has-to-happen-59604">decolonising South African universities</a> was preventing attention to climate change and related problems. </p>
<h2>Transparent and vocal responses needed</h2>
<p>In sum, universities and others should develop a hybrid approach that connects an active shareholder engagement strategy with clear expectations on a range of key social, environmental and governance issues. The parameters for such engagement exist in the form of the <a href="https://www.unpri.org/about/the-six-principles">United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment</a>, to which organisations and higher education institutions should subscribe, and which they should then vigorously implement. </p>
<p>But this engagement needs to be beefed up with much clearer expectations, especially on greenhouse gas emissions. If such targets are not met, we shall withdraw funds. Moreover, this should all be done not just in a transparent manner, but also vocally, so that the message is loud and clear: our research shows that current responses to climate change are too meek and we’re putting our money where our mouth is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ralph Hamann receives funding from the South Africa National Research Foundation and the UCT African Climate and Development Initiative. </span></em></p>The broad principle of companies, government bodies and universities divesting from oil, gas and coal companies is sound. But its application needs more sophistication.Ralph Hamann, Professor, Research Director, Research Chair, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/431302015-08-01T07:25:12Z2015-08-01T07:25:12ZWhy the death penalty is losing favour in sub-Saharan Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90321/original/image-20150730-25753-1als732.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi waves at his trial with other Muslim Brotherhood members in Cairo, in May. He was subsequently sentenced to death. Egypt is among a handful of African countries that regularly execute.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mohamed Abd El Ghany</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death penalty is <a href="http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6093">declining worldwide</a> despite a surge in executions during the first few months of 2015 in countries such as <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/01/saudi-arabia-spike-executions">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistans-execution-surge-carries-hard-line-message-for-foreign-leaders/2015/04/21/f18c8020-e812-11e4-aae1-d642717d8afa_story.html">Pakistan</a>. The African continent is a vanguard of this trend. </p>
<p>The death penalty has been abolished or has fallen into disuse throughout Portuguese and French-speaking Africa. The same goes for South Africa and Namibia. Only a handful of countries regularly execute, most prominently Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya. Several verge on abolition. Zambia has had a moratorium for 25 years. </p>
<p>In 2012, the Ghanaian government endorsed a <a href="http://blog.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/2012/07/ghana-accepts-constitution-review-commissions-recommendation-to-abolish-the-death-penalty.html">constitutional change</a> to abolish capital punishment. The death penalty in Kenya, historically mandatory for robbery and rape, faces frequent court challenges. Executions that do occur on the continent, as in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/01/gambia-pressure-execution-prisoners">The Gambia in 2012</a> or <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/us-nigeria-execution-idUSBRE95O0RA20130625">Nigeria in 2013</a>, generate controversy at home and abroad.</p>
<h2>A macabre foreign import</h2>
<p>As with most aspects of criminal justice, the death penalty as it exists in law is a <a href="https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/3085/Killing%20the%20condemned.pdf?sequence=5">colonial import</a>. Except in centralised empires, criminal justice before the modern era was a private matter in which a victim’s family, clan, or kin group negotiated compensation from a perpetrator’s kin under threat of spiritual harm. Law enforcement and punishment were collective and crime could result in misfortune for the group. Compensation restored the harmony of a community, a nascent concept of restorative justice that resonates today.</p>
<p>While the death penalty was known for religious reasons in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=T9QMAQAAMAAJ&lpg=PA1&ots=u-_y2eOLBv&dq=legislative%20methods%20in%20the%20zanzibar%20and%20east%20african%20protectorates&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false">Islamic-majority Africa</a>, elsewhere the use of capital punishment was spotty. Crimes that caused spiritual harm, such as incest or adultery in some societies, often triggered the most severe sanctions. Among the <a href="http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Mauritania-to-Nigeria/Igbo.html">Igbo</a> peoples of Nigeria and the <a href="http://www.maasai-association.org/maasai.html">Maasai</a> of Kenya, murder of a kinsman was treated more harshly than murder of an outsider. Execution rituals were intricately linked to beliefs about authority and the afterlife. For instance, the king of Dahomey “owned” the heads of his subjects and therefore carried out executions by decapitation.</p>
<p>Attitudes toward the death penalty in pre-colonial or colonial times are still relevant. The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13040376">Batswana of Botswana</a> practiced capital punishment for murder while the <a href="http://www.aaregistry.org/historic_events/view/shona-people-soul-africa">Shona of Zimbabwe</a> used an intricate system of compensation for wrongs. Unlike Botswana, Zimbabwe suffered excessive political executions during the colonial period. </p>
<p>In Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, even petty security offences by African nationalists could result in death sentences, many imposed by secret military courts. No wonder, then, that Botswana remains committed to legal capital punishment while Zimbabwe’s political establishment is not. The vice president, <a href="http://www.thetelescopenews.com/zimbabwe-news/3790-why-emmerson-mnangagwa-will-not-sign-any-zimbabwe-death-warrants.html">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, once a political prisoner during the Rhodesian War, has publicly stated his <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-12607-We+must+abolish+death+penalty+Mnangagwa/news.aspx">opposition</a>. Zimbabwe’s new constitution also drastically restricts the scope of capital punishment.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, misuse of the death penalty during the colonial era or in the period of one-party and military rule after independence continues to haunt. In Kenya, more than 1,000 executions of militants took place during the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12997138">Mau Mau conflict</a> in the 1950s. During the <a href="Algerian%20War%20%7C%20Britannica.com">Algerian War</a>, the French government even carried out executions for sabotage and other property crimes. </p>
<p>Newly independent governments learned these lessons all too well. The sham capital trials of environmental activist <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Ken-Saro-Wiwa">Ken Saro-Wiwa</a> by the Nigerian military government, opposition leader <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-orton-chirwa-1558842.html">Orton Chirwa</a> in Hastings Banda’s Malawi, and human rights attorney <a href="http://www.jambonewspot.com/koigi-wa-wamwere-why-i-will-buy-uhuru-kenyatta-a-bible/">Koigi wa Wamwere</a> in Kenya under former president, Daniel arap Moi, are only the most well-known examples among thousands.</p>
<h2>The case for abolition</h2>
<p>African political leaders do not need me, an American academic, to tell them that the death penalty is an ineffective tool of criminal justice. I have no moral authority here: the United States executes more efficiently and frequently than the entire African continent combined. These executions have significant costs: 154 death row <a href="http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6162">exonerations</a> since 1976 – and at least two likely wrongful executions, routinely botched executions and an increasingly desperate search for scarce lethal injection drugs.</p>
<p>African countries have similar struggles. Forensics and police investigations are weak in many countries. The <a href="http://innocenceprojectsa.com/about/">Innocence Project</a> South Africa and the <a href="http://www.wits.ac.za/alumni/news/13309/justice_.html">Wits Justice Project</a> at the University of the Witwatersrand uncover the same problems of poor forensic evidence that plague capital cases in the United States. </p>
<p>In 2010, Benard Tagoe was released from <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201007300842.html">24 years on death row</a> in Ghana due to faulty evidence. Resource constraints contribute to a chronic shortage of legal aid for indigent defendants. Swaziland and Zimbabwe have had difficulty <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/2013349325128765.html">hiring executioners</a> who can properly carry out hangings, a vanishing skill. The staggering diversity of the continent, divided into legal systems that operate in often-unfamiliar languages and with bewildering procedures, is its own obstacle.</p>
<p>The question confronting political leaders of all retentionist nations is whether the death penalty is worth the cost and the risk of error. But on a continent with a legacy of misuse by powerful, unchecked executives, the case against the death penalty may be even more compelling. </p>
<p>Certainly, some brutal dictatorships in the world today have abolished capital punishment, but their job is harder. The death penalty is a dramatic expression of state power. Though only a small part of the rule of law landscape, the implications of abolition for judicial independence, transparency, and trust in authority may be far-reaching.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Novak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As with most aspects of criminal justice in sub-Saharan Africa, the death penalty as it currently exists in law is a colonial import. Criminal justice before the modern era was a private matter.Andrew Novak, Adjunct Professor, International and Comparative Criminal Justice, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.