tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/kenya-5731/articlesKenya – The Conversation2024-03-27T12:00:09Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260622024-03-27T12:00:09Z2024-03-27T12:00:09ZKenya has tightened its laws to stop money laundering: why banks are the focus<p><em>Kenya’s banking industry has in recent years been in the crosshairs of <a href="https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Money-Laundering-and-Terrorism-Financing-National-Risk-Assesstment-Report.pdf">national</a>, <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-sh72bn-hard-cash-inflow-put-kenya-on-dirty-money-watch--4321252">regional</a> and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/interpol-seeks-unravel-puzzle-of-laundered-sh25bn--3795554">international</a> watchdogs, given the country’s role as a financial hub in eastern Africa. In 2023 Kenya enacted <a href="https://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/2023/TheAntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf">laws</a> to curb money laundering and combat terrorism financing</em>.</p>
<p><em>While the laws have led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8N2AY62G/">tougher sanctions</a> on some banks, the risk of money laundering remains, and the country was recently <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/opinion-analysis/columnists/what-kenya-stands-to-lose-in-financial-crimes-grey-list-4537478">greylisted</a> by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/home.html">Financial Action Task Force</a>. A grey list contains countries that are actively working with the Financial Action Task Force to address loopholes in countering money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://law.uonbi.ac.ke/latest-news/dr-constance-gikonyo-appointed-member-capital-markets-tribunal">Constance Gikonyo</a>, a corporate law academic who has researched the place of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340113669_Banks_in_Kenya_and_anti-money_laundering_obligations_the_conflicts_of_interests_arising">banks</a> and <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/4b63e591-221a-4f39-897a-dbf15325aa6c">piracy</a> in money laundering, answers questions about existing loopholes</em>. </p>
<h2>How is money laundered through banks?</h2>
<p>Money gained illegally can be laundered by placing it into the financial system, through banks. Those who launder money typically engage in <a href="https://insights.namescan.io/smurfing-vs-structuring/">“smurfing” and “structuring”</a>. This is the breaking down of large sums of money into smaller transactions so as to evade the reporting threshold and to avoid suspicion. In Kenya, the reporting threshold has been increased from US$10,000 to US$15,000. Banks have to report certain transactions to the Financial Reporting Centre.</p>
<p>Once in the financial system, the money is moved around in a process known as <a href="https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-4/key-issues/money-laundering.html">layering</a>. Funds are moved through different banks using different transactions and bank accounts so as to disguise the illicit origin of the money. </p>
<p>Once the money is disguised, the banks will again be involved in the process of <a href="https://amluae.com/what-is-integration-in-money-laundering/">integration</a>. This is where the money is deposited into the bank account of the person or entity that finally uses it. That way, the criminal proceeds are integrated with legitimate funds. These funds make their way into the economy through investments such as purchasing a property.</p>
<h2>Why are banks the prime targets of money launderers?</h2>
<p>Banks offer a gateway into the financial system. Once the funds are in the financial system it is easier to disguise their illegal origin. Also, technological advancements and integration of the global financial system makes it easier and faster to move the money around and across borders.</p>
<p>Some banks have weak know-your-customer procedures – mandatory checks meant to identity and verify customers when opening an account and periodically over time. These can be exploited. Banks don’t always continue monitoring customers effectively. </p>
<p>There are also cases of complicit individuals within banks using the system to aid money laundering. </p>
<h2>What are the duties of banks?</h2>
<p>Kenya’s law, the <a href="https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/POCAMLA-REGULATIONS.pdf">Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act</a>, imposes duties on banks in seeking to deal with money laundering. Banks must:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Evaluate their customers thoroughly. The due diligence should be based on an assessment of the customer as a risk. The riskier a customer appears to be, the more comprehensive the evaluation should be. </p></li>
<li><p>Keep records of transactions and customer identification information for at least seven years after the end of engagement.</p></li>
<li><p>Report suspicious transactions and cash transactions of US$15,000 or more to the Financial Reporting Centre, an agency created under the same law for the purpose of fighting money laundering.</p></li>
<li><p>Hire money laundering compliance officers and ensure continuous staff training on anti-money laundering and combating financing to terrorism. All banks are required to develop internal policies, procedures and controls to combat these crimes.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What challenges do banks face in fighting money laundering?</h2>
<p>Technological advancements mean that money launderers can be a step ahead of the measures the banks have put in place. The criminals can find ways to avoid detection by the systems in banks. The rise of digital and cyber-enabled financial crimes increases the challenge for banks. Compliance requirements mean banks have to invest in personnel, technology and training. This increases their operation costs. Banks also invest in research to help identify weaknesses in their systems.</p>
<p>Banks have to balance regulatory requirements with customer service and customer privacy. Customer background checks can be intrusive but a bank faces sanctions and reputational risks if it does not do them.</p>
<p>Corrupt individuals working in banks can assist in money laundering. Banks should vet staff when they hire them, especially those in sensitive roles, and continuously monitor them. </p>
<p>The global nature of the financial system means banks must deal with financial institutions and different regulatory standards in different jurisdictions. Compliance with all these can be a challenge. Criminals will identify the loopholes and gaps created by these differences and seek to exploit them. </p>
<h2>What are the main markers of a well-governed financial system?</h2>
<p>A well-governed financial system has effective policies and practices for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. The relevant authorities ensure the laws are enforced. There should also be international cooperation, and engagement between the private sector and relevant regulatory and enforcement agencies. </p>
<p>Effective supervision by the central bank is a feature of a well governed system. Central banks ensure the stability, soundness and integrity of the banking system. They should establish a proper regulatory framework for banks, tighten their licensing and approval processes, ensure continuous monitoring and examination of sector players, and provide early warning systems. Weak supervision would mean that consumers were not adequately protected. This leads to loss of public trust and international confidence. Financial instability could be the end result.</p>
<p>The public and private sectors should collaborate actively. In Kenya the Financial Reporting Centre and the Law Society of Kenya are working together towards implementing the anti-money laundering provision which requires lawyers to report entities that make suspicious transactions.</p>
<p>Regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies need resources to do their work. Preventing, identifying and dealing with financial crimes requires funds to innovate, to develop staff capacity and for infrastructure. </p>
<p>Transparency and accountability in financial institutions encourages compliance with regulatory standards. Banks with a culture of innovation and investment in new technologies are best placed to achieve transparency and accountability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Constance Gikonyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A well governed financial system is effectively supervised by the central bank.Constance Gikonyo, Corporate Law Lecturer, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259342024-03-25T15:08:37Z2024-03-25T15:08:37ZKenya’s greylisting for weak action on money laundering and terrorism financing: what that means and what must happen next<p><em>Kenya and Namibia are the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">latest</a> African countries to be placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list over their weak measures against money laundering and terrorism financing.</em></p>
<p><em>Being on the grey list is <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ke/en/blog/fatf-grey-list.html">typically seen</a> as an indictment of a country’s ability to identify and effectively redress financial crimes. It warns investors to be cautious in dealings with the country.</em></p>
<p><em>Financial crimes researcher <a href="https://scholars.latrobe.edu.au/ldekoker">Louis de Koker</a>, who has recently studied the <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/5/81">economic consequences of greylisting</a>, answers questions on the move.</em></p>
<h2>Why is Kenya on the grey list?</h2>
<p>In February 2024 Kenya was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/23/fatf-financial-crime-watchdog-adds-kenya-and-namibia-to-its-grey-list.html">greylisted</a> by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/home.html">Financial Action Task Force</a> (FATF), the world body that sets standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. At the same meeting, Namibia was also listed while Uganda was removed from the grey list.</p>
<p>The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental group of economically powerful countries, maintains a set of standards to safeguard the integrity of the international financial system. Kenya, Namibia and Uganda are not members of the task force but they are members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, an associated regional body. </p>
<p>All countries that are members of the Financial Action Task Force or any of the regional bodies are regularly evaluated by their peers. Countries are rated on technical compliance with the standards, as well as the effectiveness with which those standards are implemented. </p>
<p>Kenya’s mutual evaluation reports revealed a host of strategic deficiencies. Kenya, for example, had not taken appropriate steps to investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing offences or to assess and mitigate crime risks associated with crypto assets.</p>
<p>When a country performs poorly in its mutual evaluation the Financial Action Task Force may place it in a one-year <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/More-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html#:%7E:text=The%20FATF%20continually%20identifies%20and,and%20was%20enhanced%20in%202009.">observation period</a>. During the observation period, the country works with the Financial Action Task Force or its regional body to address the identified weaknesses.</p>
<p>If at the end of the observation period the country has not been able to address the deficiencies appropriately but has an action plan to address them and has made the political commitment to do so, the task force may put that country on its list of “jurisdictions under increased monitoring”, also known as the “grey list”. This is what happened to Kenya and Namibia in February 2024.</p>
<h2>What are the consequences?</h2>
<p>At face value, the list sends a positive message. According to the Financial Action Task Force, countries on the list have committed themselves to resolve the identified deficiencies within agreed time frames. They are therefore working actively to improve their compliance with the Financial Action Task Force standards. Greylisting also triggers international technical and other assistance to help countries to improve their compliance levels.</p>
<p>The market, however, tends to respond negatively to countries that are greylisted. Some countries and regulators (including the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/high-risk-third-countries-and-international-context-content-anti-money-laundering-and-countering_en">EU</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2">UK</a>) also compel their institutions to treat the businesses and persons linked to greylisted countries as higher risk customers and parties. The accompanying enhanced due diligence measures (such as collecting and verifying more information about the customer and the customer’s funds) slow down the pace of business, increase transaction costs and may even threaten deals and business relationships.</p>
<p>In the past two years, the Financial Action Task Force has <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">called on</a> foreign regulators and their markets to take a measured approach. It added explicitly to its greylisting statement that it does not call for enhanced due diligence measures against greylisted countries and cautioned against termination of business relationships. It is not clear that this has had the intended effect.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/5/81">study</a> my co-authors and I found that greylisting appears to continue to have a negative economic impact on listed countries. Correlations point to a negative impact on GDP growth rates and, worryingly, even development aid appears to be adversely affected. Some of the negative impacts may lag after delisting. Uganda may, for instance, take some time to see the positive benefits of being off the list.</p>
<p>Impact, however, differs from country to country, and smaller economies are often likely to face greater impact than large economies.</p>
<h2>What does Kenya need to do now?</h2>
<p>Since its 2022 mutual evaluation report, Kenya has been working to improve its compliance levels. Now it must implement the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html">agreed action plan</a> to address the remaining strategic deficiencies. Actions include completing a national terrorist financing risk assessment and sharing the results with the public and private sector stakeholders. Kenya is also committed to improving its risk-based supervision of regulated entities including licensing and supervision of virtual asset (crypto) service providers.</p>
<p>Other actions required include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>enhancing risk-based compliance and the reporting of suspicious transaction reports to the <a href="https://www.frc.go.ke/">Financial Reporting Centre</a></p></li>
<li><p>increasing the number of money laundering and terrorist financing prosecutions to match the country’s risk levels</p></li>
<li><p>revising the framework for the regulation of non-profit organisations and their oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate non-profit organisations’ activity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Uganda spent four years on the grey list. Given what Kenya will need to achieve, a time-frame of three to four years may be realistic.</p>
<h2>Why does greylisting matter to Africa?</h2>
<p>Greylisting poses a challenge for sub-Saharan Africa. Since February 2024, the region accounts for 12 of the 21 grey-listed countries. The listed countries include <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-been-grey-listed-for-not-stopping-money-laundering-and-terrorism-funding-what-it-means-200696">Nigeria and South Africa</a>. The economic impact of this level of simultaneous greylisting on the development of the region as a whole gives cause for concern. </p>
<p>The reasons why countries from this region have not been able to meet the task force standards adequately should be probed. Is there really a sufficient level of political commitment to fight money laundering, corruption and terrorist financing? Given the negative impact of crime and the negative impact of a failure to implement the crime combating standards, can the region afford political complacency?</p>
<p>The task force is about to start another round of mutual evaluations. Countries that are delisted in this round may be listed again in the next round. The listed countries have the opportunity now to ensure that these serious crimes are combated appropriately. Doing so will serve the national interest and prevent a relisting in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louis de Koker received funding from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GiZ) to research the economic impact of greylisting.</span></em></p>Kenya must complete a national terrorist financing risk assessment and share it publicly.Louis de Koker, Professor of Law, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253302024-03-18T20:34:22Z2024-03-18T20:34:22ZOperation Legacy: How Britain covered up its colonial crimes<p>In 2011, the world learned of the secret British policy called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes">Operation Legacy</a> that was implemented in the 1950s. The goal of this policy was to remove incriminating documents from former colonies in the months before each one became politically independent. </p>
<p>Documents that might embarrass or damage the British government, police and military <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/29/revealed-bonfire-papers-empire">were either secretly removed or destroyed</a>. This policy had an impact far and wide, and was implemented in British colonies throughout the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. </p>
<p>In an age where <a href="https://www.pbs.org/video/the-misinformation-age-0xqnez/">misinformation</a> is everywhere, Operation Legacy provides us with an instructive example of the repercussions faced when people with power determine what information is available to interpret events of the past. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oPGVGckn7kQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A TED-Ed explainer on Operation Legacy and how British officials destroyed embarrassing documents or sent them to the U.K.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Kenya: the unravelling of a British lie</h2>
<p>We know about Operation Legacy because of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/21/mau-mau-torture-kenyans-compensation">a case brought before the British High Court</a>. Five elderly Kenyans accused the British colonial government of imposing a policy of torture and human rights abuses during a state of emergency from 1952-1960 instituted in response to a rebellion against colonial rule.</p>
<p>The case revealed the price many Kenyans paid as they fought against colonialism. At the core of the conflict was access to land. From the beginning of colonial rule in 1895, the British were aggressive in their efforts to displace Africans from their lands. The goal was to reserve the most fertile land for white settlement and farms. </p>
<p>By the 1950s, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12997138">African resistance became more organized and intense</a>. When the colonial government declared a state of emergency, Kenyans suspected of challenging British colonial rule faced even greater risks. The state of emergency gave colonial authorities a wide ranging set of powers — which included torture and other human rights abuses — to deal with the anti-colonialists. </p>
<p>The propaganda from the period is telling. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-vOLVyPSdwc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A 1955 British news report casting Kenyan anti-colonial rebels as fanatics and bandits.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Privileging the colonizer’s narrative</h2>
<p>Many historians of 20th century Kenya — but not all — overlooked or downplayed this colonial policy of violence. Some might argue they should be forgiven as there were no official colonial documents that revealed a British policy of human rights violations in Kenya. </p>
<p>But what happens when the absence of proof is really due to the deliberate removal of evidence?</p>
<p>Others might be inclined to think those historians did not look hard enough. They were only willing to believe the official colonial records even though there were Kenyans alive who could give oral testimony. </p>
<p>For the five elderly Kenyans, the irrefutable evidence was the scars they bore on their bodies. Make no mistake, the human rights violations were extreme. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/5/5/we-are-the-mau-mau-kenyans-share-stories-of-torture">They even included castration</a>. The Kenyans also had their memories. Yet, this mattered little for those historians who privileged official colonial documents above all else. </p>
<p>However, it was the work of historians David Anderson, Huw Bennett and Caroline Elkins that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.629082">helped turn the court case around</a>. Their research challenged the historical silence on colonial violence during this period. </p>
<p>In court, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbv027">evidence was presented</a> that colonial documents were deliberately removed and that the testimony of the elderly Kenyans was, in fact, credible. In December 2010, the presiding judge ruled that the British Foreign and Commonwealth office had to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/120/3/852/19858">release all documents related to the case</a>. </p>
<p>Once these documents were released and analyzed, the evidence was clear. The British colonial government sanctioned extreme abuses. We now know that over 80,000 people were imprisoned without trial and more than 1,000 people were convicted as “terrorists” and put to <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Histories-of-the-Hanged">death by hanging</a>. </p>
<p>Only eight white officers were accused of extreme abuse, and they were all granted amnesty. This includes the officer accused of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/mau-mau-high-court-foreign-office-documents">“roasting alive” one Kenyan</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was required to release documents concerning the case, <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/110405-wms0001.htm?_gl=1*1wvpzwq*_ga*ODkyMzY3MTQxLjE3MTAyODQ4NDI.*_ga_QQVTWCSLDS*MTcxMDI4NDg0Mi4xLjEuMTcxMDI4NTMwOS42MC4wLjA.#1104069000380">an announcement</a> was made in the House of Lords that files were also being held concerning 37 former British colonies. An <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43917577">independent audit</a> revealed there were more than 20,000 files taken from former colonies. </p>
<p>Some files were also slated for destruction, and there is no way to know how many were destroyed. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Part of a document detailing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=136&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=136&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=136&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581372/original/file-20240312-18-k34uug.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=171&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Instructions given to colonial officials for the destruction of documents found in the U.K.’s national archives.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(The National Archives)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Guyana: destroyed documents and a coup</h2>
<p>The files that did survive were eventually transferred to The National Archives in London. They are now officially referred to as the “Migrated Archive,” a carefully chosen misnomer. Now that they are in the public domain, we have a better idea about the documents available for other former British colonies. </p>
<p>I am currently working on a project, <a href="https://www.chainedinparadise.com">Chained in Paradise</a>, that explores the impact of Operation Legacy on the Caribbean. When the public was informed about the specific documents in the Migrated Archive, historian Richard Drayton was <a href="https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/empire-decolonisation/britains-secret-archive-of-decolonisation/">the first to point out</a> there were no documents for British Guiana, present-day Guyana.</p>
<p>In other words, unlike in Kenya where some documents were hidden, in British Guiana they were all destroyed. Did Britain have things to hide concerning its colonial policies in British Guiana? The short answer is yes. </p>
<h2>The Personal net</h2>
<p>Approximately one year after Britain declared a State of Emergency in Kenya, it declared another in British Guiana in October 1953; six months after the colony’s first democratic election.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/26/mi5-files-coup-british-guiana">British troops were deployed to remove the elected Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan</a>. The constitution of British Guiana was suspended and the British governor ruled for three more years. The area formerly known as British Guiana became the independent nation of Guyana in 1966.</p>
<p>Jagan was accused of being a communist and went to England to protest his removal. However, he and his allies were eventually placed under house arrest.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PHRtChiUH7Y?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A British news report on the deposition of Guyana’s Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to one document I have reviewed from the Migrated Archives, less than one month after Prime Minister Jagan was elected, records in British Guiana were incorporated into a secret system for hiding official correspondence. It was called the “Personal” net.</p>
<p>There are three things we can learn from these records:</p>
<p>1) As soon as British Guiana had its democratically held elections, plans were put in place for high levels of British secrecy. Not only was there to be no transparency, there was also to be high levels of duplicity.</p>
<p>2) Before political independence — in other words, when Britain was on the cusp of losing its political control — documents were to be destroyed so the incoming government would be left in the dark about the tactics of its former British colonizers. </p>
<p>3) The document below suggests that certain colonial records could be destroyed because there were copies in England. To date, no such documents have been released as part of the Migrated Archives. This raises questions about where those documents currently are and if they still exist.</p>
<h2>History is about the future</h2>
<p>In his book, <a href="https://www.theportobellobookshop.com/9781846275852"><em>The History Thieves</em></a>, journalist Ian Cobain argues that Operation Legacy was implemented so that British colonialism would be remembered with “fondness and respect.” He is right, but there is more to history than what we remember. </p>
<p>The long-term objective of Operation Legacy was to undermine future criticism of colonialism by sanitizing the past. That would make the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism easier as future economic relations with their former colonies would be negotiated without a proper historical understanding of Britain’s motives.</p>
<p>History was a powerful tool of the British empire, and it has been used to maintain unequal relations with its former colonies long after they attained political independence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Audra Diptée receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Operation Legacy highlights the repercussions faced when people with power determine what information is available to interpret events of the past.Audra Diptée, Associate Professor, History, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247502024-03-18T13:42:37Z2024-03-18T13:42:37ZPress freedom in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda: what journalists have to say about doing their jobs<p>A majority of the world’s population has experienced a decline in press freedom in recent years, according to <a href="https://www.unesco.org/reports/world-media-trends/2021/en">a UN report</a>. In east Africa, the results are mixed and debatable. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">Rwanda</a>, both international press freedom rankings and journalists on the ground say press freedom has increased over the past 10 years. In neighbouring <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">Uganda</a>, both international rankings and local journalists say media freedom has declined. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">Kenya</a>, rankings reflect declining freedom over the past decade, but reporters acknowledge they have more freedom than their counterparts in Uganda and Rwanda.</p>
<p>In our roles as associate professors in journalism and mass communication, we interviewed and surveyed more than 500 journalists in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. We learned that the evolution and current state of press freedom in the region is complex. In our book, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">Press Freedom and the (Crooked) Path Toward Democracy: Lessons from Journalists in East Africa</a>, we provide an updated state of press freedom in these three countries. </p>
<p>We argue that much of the academic research that classifies global media systems has overlooked the world’s most developing nations, and those that have included developing nations have failed to consider their historical contexts. They have worked from a misguided premise that nations develop in a linear fashion – from non-democracy to democracy – and from a restricted press to a free press. In reality, press freedom and democracy ebb and flow. </p>
<p>We examine the impact of social, political, legal and economic factors on media in Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya to help with understanding media systems outside the western world. </p>
<p>We chose to study these three countries because they represent varying stages of development and democracy building. Rwanda, which experienced a genocide in 1994, is in relatively early (though fast paced) stages of reconstruction. Uganda, which experienced a civil war in the 1980s and unrest in the 1990s but arguably not to the extent of Rwanda’s genocide, can be considered in a middle stage of development. Kenya, which has remained largely peaceful, can be understood as being in a more advanced stage of development.</p>
<h2>Rwanda</h2>
<p>In Rwanda, despite 30 years of economic, social and media progress and development, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">lingering impacts</a> from the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi permeate the country’s media. <a href="https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti/">Multiple laws</a> limit free expression in the name of genocide prevention, and international press freedom rankings indicate the nation is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024">not free</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we found</a> that many Rwandan journalists believe that they have a great deal of freedom and that outsiders don’t consider the country’s history when evaluating the media. Outsiders, for example, hear that Rwandan journalists cannot criticise the president or high-ranking government officials and immediately think there is no press freedom. But local journalists say they don’t feel oppressed. They feel relatively free to choose their story topics. They don’t want to publish critical stories because they want to foster peace. </p>
<p>Journalists believe their role is to act as unifiers and right the wrongs of their predecessors who exacerbated the genocide. Public trust in the media <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/49408/chapter-abstract/418504465?redirectedFrom=fulltext">remains high</a>, according to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077699021998647">focus groups</a> conducted with members of the general public. In Rwanda, there appears to be a relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict. That is, the more time that passes since the country experienced war, the more press freedom it has. </p>
<p>Prioritising social good over media rights has helped the country unify and develop, but over the long term <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">we see signs</a> that Rwanda’s linear path towards increasing democracy and press freedom may not continue. Rather, prioritising peace at the cost of press freedom could limit development and reinforce existing <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-a-dictator-who-clings-to-power-but-its-not-just-for-his-own-gain-204834">authoritarian power structures</a>.</p>
<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>In Uganda, the relationship between press freedom and distance from conflict has been less linear. Some media restrictions have lessened and others have worsened. </p>
<p>Despite a sustained period of peace after conflict with the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> in the northern part of the country that began in the 1980s, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2024">press freedom is not increasing</a> as time passes. Overall, journalists in the country largely agree with the international perception that they’re restricted and that the situation is worsening the longer President Yoweri Museveni remains in power. Journalists in Uganda perceive their press freedom to be lower than journalists in neighbouring countries. They also have a more pessimistic outlook. </p>
<p>Government interference, some of which stems from the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/02/media-minefield/increased-threats-freedom-expression-uganda">conflict</a> and some that’s <a href="https://www.cjr.org/analysis/eron-kiiza-defends-the-press-uganda.php">new</a>, remains pervasive. Worn down by government intimidation and repressive laws, coupled with low pay and lack of necessary equipment, some journalists <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097">told us</a> they had turned to unethical behaviour, such as acting as spies in the newsroom. </p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya is home to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2024">freest media environment</a>. It’s also the only one in our study that has seen changes in presidential leadership in recent years. But just because a nation regularly holds elections doesn’t mean the path to democratisation and media freedom is smooth. </p>
<p>External measures indicate that Kenya has more press freedom than Uganda and Rwanda, and journalists in the country perceive this to be true. However, data show ups and downs of media freedom that have mirrored varying political administrations and events, including spurts of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These ebbs and flows are largely due to politicians or powerful members of society who share ideological goals or have financial interests like <a href="https://kenyamedia.reboot.org/">owning major media houses</a> and influencing coverage. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges, journalists attribute Kenya’s state of press freedom to the vast international connections the country and its leaders have. An empowered civil society – which stems from both a space for dissent given by public officials, and the culture and spirit of Kenyans – has promoted the growth of human rights, including media freedoms.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>After a nuanced examination of the factors that affect the media in each of these countries, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/press-freedom-and-the-crooked-path-toward-democracy-9780197634202?cc=us&lang=en&">our book lists</a> a set of factors that affect press freedom and democracy building. </p>
<p>Specifically, we believe each country’s distance from conflict, political benchmarks, international linkages and civil society strength are central to understanding its degree of press freedom, development and democratisation. </p>
<p>While these factors are not the only elements that influence media landscapes, they are a starting point for better understanding and theorising about press freedom environments. </p>
<p>A free and independent press allows the public to hold leaders accountable, make informed decisions and access a diversity of opinions. This makes it important to accurately understand how free varying media landscapes are, and why.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Important factors, such as conflict, are central to understanding a country’s degree of press freedom, development and democratisation.Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityMeghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234582024-03-12T13:52:34Z2024-03-12T13:52:34ZColonial statues in Africa have been removed, returned and torn down again – why it’s such a complex history<p>In 2020, the <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/crime-law-and-justice/killing-of-george-floyd">murder of George Floyd</a> in the US served as a catalyst for the global <a href="https://library.law.howard.edu/civilrightshistory/BLM">Black Lives Matter movement</a>. It sparked widespread protests against police brutality and systemic racism. It also ignited <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/16/the-real-meaning-of-rhodes-must-fall">debates</a> about historical symbols of oppression, such as statues of figures associated with racial injustices. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-12/pulling-down-statues-of-racists-africas-done-it-for-years">These debates presented colonial statues</a> in Africa as having been contested and toppled for many years, ever since African states gained independence. Indeed, colonial statues were at the heart of the colonial world, symbolising its violence, white supremacy and the erasure of precolonial history. But colonial monuments in African public spaces have much more complex and often overlooked histories.</p>
<p>As a scholar of African heritage, I recently published a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13527258.2023.2294738">study</a> examining colonial statues and how they have been regarded in postcolonial Africa. My historical investigation highlights three major phases. </p>
<p>First, in the era of independence of African states, from the 1950s to 1980, some statues were removed from public spaces, but many remained. </p>
<p>Second, the 1990s and 2000s were marked by the “return of empires”: statues that had been removed were put back in public spaces and new neo-colonial monuments were constructed. </p>
<p>Third, the renewed challenges to colonial statues from the 2010s faced some strong resistance. Understanding this history is crucial, as it exposes the challenges of truly moving beyond the colonial world and order.</p>
<h2>Colonial statues at independence (1950s-1980)</h2>
<p>As African countries gained independence from the 1950s to the 1980s, colonial statues faced three main fates: recycling; defacement or toppling; and on-site preservation. </p>
<p>Recycling involved relocating statues from former colonies to former colonial metropolises. Most went from Algeria to France and from Kenya to England. The statues of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3760af0-6545-11e4-91b1-00144feabdc0">Lord Kitchener</a> and <a href="https://equestrianstatue.org/gordon-charles-george/">General Gordon</a>, for example, were sent from Khartoum in Sudan to England in 1958. The reasons for these repatriations were multiple and included the desire to keep alive memory of colonial times and to feed colonial nostalgia. </p>
<p>Defacing or toppling was the second phenomenon, which occurred across the continent, from Algeria to Mozambique. One instance was the defacement and toppling of the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/51780170/The_Maid_of_Algiers_Deploying_and_dismantling_Joan_of_Arc_as_a_globe_trotting_icon">statue of Joan of Arc</a> in Algiers in 1962. These acts of violence were necessary responses to the violence of the colonial order and represented a break from the past. They also symbolised the cleansing of public spaces, to destroy symbolically the power imbalances, racism, inequalities and urban exclusions that defined the colonial world. Some of these toppled statues were then sent back and recycled in the former metropolis. </p>
<p>However, across Africa, many colonial monuments remained untouched, for various reasons. Some African leaders at independence were pro-Europe, having been educated there or having worked there during colonial times. And at independence, privileged links were forged between the former colonies and the metropolises. This was the case with some former French colonies. As a result, the leaders of former French colonies did not want to change the key symbols of the colonial world. </p>
<h2>The empires strike back (1990s-2000s)</h2>
<p>From the 1990s, many colonial statues dismantled and hidden during the independence era were reinstalled. Aid from former imperial powers to former colonial countries is one explanation. An example is the controversial <a href="https://contestedhistories.org/wp-content/uploads/Democratic-Republic-of-Congo_-Leopold-II-Statue-in-Kinshasa.pdf">re-erection of the statue of former Belgian king and Congo “owner” Leopold II</a> in front of the main train station in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2005. It’s easy to see why: the millions of US dollars in aid that Belgium gives the DRC every year.</p>
<p>The turn of the millennium also saw (neo)colonial statues deliberately erected to celebrate 19th century explorers and missionaries. In countries that were once part of the British Empire, such statues were built to attract tourists. For example, a new <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13527258.2023.2294738">statue of David Livingstone was erected in 2005</a> for the 150th anniversary of his arrival at Mosi-oa-Tunya (Victoria Falls) in Zambia. It was paid for by airlines, travel agencies, luxury lodges, TotalEnergies and local authorities. </p>
<p>However, this statue of Livingstone can also be seen as an international event, linked to colonial monuments built with France’s cooperation. This is notably the case of the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/436/367/146718?redirectedFrom=fulltext">2006 Savorgnan de Brazza</a> memorial erected in Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of Congo. This project of Algeria, Congo, France and Gabon <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/436/367/146718?redirectedFrom=fulltext">reburied</a> the remains of the Italian-French explorer De Brazza, his wife and their children in the memorial. </p>
<p>The project mixed geopolitics and bilateral aid, cultural diplomacy and colonial violence. Echoing imperial rivalries, the memorial and its statue also served as distinct markers of France’s spheres of influence, and its attempt to counteract its decline in the region.</p>
<h2>Renewed contestations (from the 2010s)</h2>
<p>(Neo)colonial monuments were increasingly contested in the 2010s. Such protests have accelerated in recent years and have become more visible, thanks to social networks.</p>
<p>The most famous case is the <a href="https://twitter.com/RhodesMustFall">Rhodes Must Fall movement</a>. This led to the removal of the statue of the British colonialist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cecil-Rhodes">Cecil John Rhodes</a> on the campus of the University of Cape Town in South Africa in April 2015. This movement opposed neoliberal economic systems which had failed to respond to fundamental change, especially in areas such as education.</p>
<p>The movement quickly spread to other countries, inspiring other protests such as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/14/racist-gandhi-statue-removed-from-university-of-ghana">#GandhiMustFall</a>” in Ghana, Malawi and England. Statues of the Indian leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mahatma-Gandhi">Gandhi</a>, considered a racist, were contested. Another movement is “<a href="https://faidherbedoittomber.org/a-propos/">Faidherbe must fall</a>”, aiming to remove the statue of the French colonial administrator Faidherbe in Saint-Louis/Ndar in Senegal and in Lille in France.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-background-story-to-a-statue-of-gandhi-and-the-university-of-ghana-117103">The background story to a statue of Gandhi and the University of Ghana</a>
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<p>Some of these movements have drawn attention to the link between colonial or racist statues and aid. For example, the #GandhiMustFall movement prevented the construction of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46051184">Gandhi statue in Malawi in 2018</a>. This project was linked to a <a href="https://sikhsiyasat.net/india-offers-to-double-aid-for-malavi-as-malavian-government-agrees-to-install-gandhi-statue-despite-local-opposition/">US$10 million aid deal from India</a>.</p>
<h2>A complex issue</h2>
<p>While acknowledging successes in removing colonial statues, it is important not to overlook the substantial support for (neo)colonial monuments all over Africa. </p>
<p>Such support can be explained by pressure from former colonial powers and the links of elites with these countries. Financial constraints, international aid and the potential of tourism are also factors. Then there’s the conviction that all vestiges of the past, even the most painful, must be preserved.</p>
<p>The statue of the French military commander <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53148608">Philippe Leclerc</a> in Douala in Cameroon, for example, still stands, despite being attacked several times by Cameroonian <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/7/the-activist-purging-cameroon-of-french-colonial-monuments">activist</a> André Blaise Essama.</p>
<p>As a result, (neo)colonial statues still have a bright future ahead of them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophia Labadi has received funding from the Humboldt Foundation and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.</span></em></p>The fate of several colonial statues in Africa continues to be a subject of controversy.Sophia Labadi, Professor of Heritage, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235682024-03-11T12:51:48Z2024-03-11T12:51:48ZFintech is sold as the answer to Africa’s problems, but digital money services have downsides which media often overlook<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577861/original/file-20240226-16-p2toeq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The research assessed newspaper coverage of fintech in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The online financial products and services known as “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/what-is-fintech/">fintech</a>” have become deeply embedded in the economic and social life of many African countries over the past decade.</p>
<p>Headlines across the continent often extol fintech’s virtues. Technology is “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5S19bJvbYrE">driving financial inclusion</a>” and “<a href="https://observer.ug/businessnews/63783-fintech-revolutionizing-how-we-spend-our-money">making life better for people</a>”. It’s helping “<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001452750/how-fintech-tools-can-help-cushion-kenyans-during-inflation">consumers to manage inflation</a>”. Fintech is “<a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/09/27/how-nigeria-is-expanding-financial-inclusion-through-fintech">too sweeping to ignore</a>”. And, if it’s not embraced, “<a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/10/06/on-boarding-financially-excluded-rural-women">the country and the entire economy will be left behind</a>”. </p>
<p>These headlines depict a popular story about fintech: it is the answer to several of Africa’s economic problems. This story is also appearing in policy documents in countries like Uganda. Fintech is now a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3dno0vThbc">key component</a> of the country’s <a href="https://bou.or.ug/bouwebsite/bouwebsitecontent/FinancialInclusion/2023/Signed_2023_2028_National-Financial-Inclusion-Strategy_.pdf">National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2023-2028</a>. </p>
<p>However, a counter-narrative is emerging. Political economists, anthropologists and social theorists warn that fintech is an example of an exploitative, <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/ideas/2021/07/09/neocolonial-components-of-algorithmic-capitalism-in-africa-today/">neocolonial</a> and <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/histories-of-racial-capitalism/9780231190756#:%7E:text=Racial%20capitalism%20is%20not%20simply,value%20from%20racial%20classification%20">racialised</a> form of platform capitalism, a system by which a fairly small number of commercial networks profit from user activities and interactions. They caution that it is inherently <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/10/kenyas-mobile-money-revolution">anti-development</a>. It is, they say, likely to cause a crisis of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/lifestyle/debt-trap-ensnared-by-loans-women-turn-to-suicide-as-escape-4086004">consumer debt</a>, <a href="https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/perpetual-debt-silicon-savannah/">emotional distress</a>, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/smart-company/suicide-that-jolted-cbk-inside-plan-to-rein-in-digital-lenders-251530">self-harm</a> and <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/opinion/2019/11/29/data-protection-in-the-age-of-huduma-namba-who-will-benefit/">data piracy</a>. </p>
<p>We wanted to know how the press in Africa reports on fintech. Are its failings and potential pitfalls acknowledged? Is it mostly presented as a “good news” story?</p>
<p>So, in a project we began two years ago with South African political economist <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/monobook/book/9781529221770/9781529221770.xml">Scott Timcke</a>, we <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2023.2275816">set out to answer these questions</a>. This kind of analysis helps reveal how public attitudes about this new pillar of everyday economic life are formed. It also shows whether the press is serving as the public’s watchdog with regard to economic matters and corporate affairs. </p>
<p>Our analysis, the first to look at how the fintech story is being told in the African press, reveals that the coverage is celebratory and offers limited cautionary and critical reporting to the public and to policymakers. We found that fintech is most often covered with a positive tone and as a business story. </p>
<h2>The fintech context</h2>
<p>International and African <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Africas-Media-Image-in-the-21st-Century-From-the-Heart-of-Darkness-to/Bunce-Franks-Paterson/p/book/9781138962323">media coverage of the continent</a> is often accused of fuelling negative stereotypes, a trend characterised as “afro-pessimism”. But in the past decade, much of the media conversation has focused on business buzz and followed an “afro-optimism” or “Africa rising” script, as the headlines above depict. </p>
<p>The fintech ecology is shaped by dynamics from the late 2000s. These include the rapid uptake in <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/sub-saharan-africa-embraces-5g-and-smartphone-adoption-soars-gsma-report-reveals/9xnt95l">broadband use</a> and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash. Proponents claim that fintech will reduce poverty and motivate development (sometimes referred to as “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/33/2/135/5127166?login=false">leapfrogging</a>” or “<a href="https://thefintechtimes.com/here-are-four-cities-in-africa-emerging-as-fintech-hubs/">Silicon Savannah</a>”), uplifting those unserved by formal banking. One 2016 study credited fintech with delivering a remarkable <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.aah5309">2% poverty reduction</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>Others call for a more cautious and sceptical approach. Critics dispute claims that fintech produces significant progressive change. They also argue that fintech can be <a href="https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/fintech-digital-futures-paper-tni-web.pdf">exploitative</a> and <a href="https://botpopuli.net/how-fintech-became-the-gateway-to-predatory-lending-in-sub-saharan-africa/">predatory</a>, and that it fuels inequality by further enriching the already wealthy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-mobile-money-system-has-a-dark-side-even-though-its-convenient-new-study-explores-the-risks-207777">Nigeria's mobile money system has a dark side even though it's convenient - new study explores the risks</a>
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<h2>Our analysis</h2>
<p>Previous research into the roll-out of fintech in countries across the continent revealed community-level tactics. “<a href="https://intellectdiscover.com/content/journals/10.1386/jams_00035_1">Change agents</a>” are deployed to recruit new customers for mobile money services. “<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IMR-05-2019-0130/full/html">Brand ambassadors</a>” are hired to “sit in public transport and talk about” fintech products. </p>
<p>We wondered whether journalists were similarly talking up fintech or were warning of its risks. We analysed news coverage and looked at journalism published between 2016 and 2021 by leading newspapers in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa, as well as through the <a href="https://allafrica.com/">AllAfrica</a> news aggregator. We began with a set of 1,190 news pieces and analysed a sample of 368. </p>
<p>Based on our initial examination of articles, we identified nine themes or frames that appeared frequently in news coverage of fintech. </p>
<p>The dominant frame was one we labelled “announcement”: the proclamation of a new fintech product through the media; a celebration of innovation. “Gender inclusivity” was the least common frame. This is the kind of reporting that focuses on a commonly shared <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/06/03/Fintech-Female-Employment-and-Gender-Inequality-518871">rationale</a> for fintech: that it particularly benefits women and gives them new opportunities for equality and participation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-fintech-solutions-succeed-we-built-a-model-based-on-ghanas-experience-169286">What makes FinTech solutions succeed? We built a model based on Ghana's experience</a>
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<p>We paid particular attention to the frame we called “trepidation”. We were surprised that 61% of news stories within that frame had a positive overall tone, despite the frame implying potential danger. This trepidation often appeared as the backdrop for a news item rather than as the main story. </p>
<p>These kinds of stories, we reason, allow government officials to advise the public on safe financial conduct and fintech companies to promote the benefits of their “safe” products. The advice includes guidance on how individuals can enhance their awareness of potential risks, such as fraud, and act with caution. This consumer education approach is typical of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fight-against-economic-fraud-how-african-countries-are-tackling-the-challenge-161432">anti-fraud measures</a> across sectors.</p>
<p>Most stories about the hazards of fintech conclude that it is nonetheless a beneficial force and that any “hiccups” are minor. These can be soothed through state action (such as regulation) or individual responsibility (such as consumer education). Overall, this reinforces a narrative that it is safe and logical to embed fintech in society: it is “sanitised” through this style of news coverage. </p>
<p>Overall we concluded that the journalism in the African press we examined was largely sanitised. The tone, content and sourcing of reporting, even in the context of well-founded fears about fintech, point to an uncritical promotion of fintech products, firms and the entire industry.</p>
<h2>More critical journalism needed</h2>
<p>The breadth of fintech’s expansion across Africa and extent of potential harm it carries – even if its critics are only minimally correct – indicates a pressing need for further analysis of what story is being told. News audiences, politicians and civil society need to demand a more critical journalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Coverage is celebratory and offers limited cautionary and critical reporting to the public and to policymakers.Cathleen LeGrand, Postgraduate researcher, University of LeedsChris Paterson, Professor of Global Communication, University of LeedsJörg Wiegratz, Lecturer in Political Economy of Global Development, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185452024-03-11T10:04:45Z2024-03-11T10:04:45ZEast Africa must prepare for more extreme rainfall during the short rainy season – new study<p>East Africa has recently had an <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150712/worst-drought-on-record-parches-horn-of-africa">unprecedented series of failed rains</a>. But some rainy seasons are bringing the opposite: huge amounts of rainfall. </p>
<p>In the last few months of 2023, the rainy season, known as the “short rains”, was much wetter than normal. It brought severe flooding to Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. In Somalia, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1144202">more than</a> 2 million people were affected, with over 100 killed and 750,000 displaced from their homes. Tens of thousands of people in northern Kenya <a href="https://www.euronews.com/green/2023/12/15/floods-have-washed-away-entire-villages-kenyas-rains-made-twice-as-intense-by-climate-chan">lost</a> livestock, farmland and homes. </p>
<p>The very wet short rainy seasons are linked to a climate event known as a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (known as the “IOD”). And climate model projections <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-00943-1">show an increasing trend</a> of extreme Indian Ocean dipoles. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2023GL105258">new research paper</a>, we set out to investigate what effect more frequent extreme Indian Ocean Dipole events would have on rainfall in east Africa. We did this using a large number of climate simulations and models.</p>
<p>Our results show that they increase the likelihood of very wet days – therefore making very wet seasons. </p>
<p>This could lead to extreme weather events, even more extreme than the floods of 1997, which led to <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/w7832e/w7832e00.htm">10 million people requiring emergency assistance</a>, or those of 2019, when <a href="https://fews.net/east-africa/special-report/january-2020">hundreds of thousands were displaced</a>.</p>
<p>We recommend that decision-makers plan for this kind of extreme rainfall, and the resulting devastating floods.</p>
<h2>How the Indian Ocean Dipole works</h2>
<p>Indian Ocean Dipole events tend to occur in the second half of the year, and can last for months. They have two phases: positive and negative. </p>
<p>Positive events occur when the temperature of the sea surface in the western Indian Ocean is warmer than normal and the temperature in the eastern Indian Ocean is cooler than normal. Put simply, this temperature difference <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/43854">happens when</a> winds move warmer water away from the ocean surface in the eastern region, allowing cooler water to rise. </p>
<p>In the warmer western Indian Ocean, more heated air will rise, along with water vapour. This forms clouds, bringing rain. Meanwhile, the eastern part of the Indian Ocean will be cooler and drier. This is why flooding in east Africa can happen at the same time as <a href="https://theconversation.com/indian-ocean-linked-to-bushfires-and-drought-in-australia-20893">bushfires in Australia</a>.</p>
<p>The opposite is true for negative dipole events: drier in the western Indian Ocean and wetter in the east. </p>
<p>Under climate change we’re expecting to see more frequent and more extreme positive dipole events – bigger differences between east and west. This is <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-climate-change-will-cause-more-strong-indian-ocean-dipole-events/">shown by climate model projections</a>. They are believed to be driven by different paces of warming across the tropical Indian Ocean – with western and northern regions projected to warm faster than eastern parts.</p>
<p>Often heavy rain seasons in east Africa are attributed to El Niño, but <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/asl.1015">recent research</a> has shown that the direct impact of El Niño on east African rainfall is actually relatively modest. El Niño’s principal influence lies in its capacity to bring about positive dipole events. This occurs since El Niño events tend to cool the water in the western Pacific Ocean – around Indonesia – which also helps to cool down the water in the eastern Indian Ocean. These cooler temperatures then help kick-start a positive Indian Ocean Dipole.</p>
<h2>Examining unprecedented events</h2>
<p>Extreme positive Indian Ocean Dipole events are rare in the recent climate record. So to examine their potential impacts on rainfall extremes, we used a large set of climate simulations. The data allowed us to diagnose the sensitivity of rainfall to larger Indian Ocean Dipole events in a statistically robust way.</p>
<p>Our results show that as positive dipole events become more extreme, more wet days during the short rains season can be expected. This effect was found to be largest for the frequency of extremely wet days. Additionally, we found that as the dipole strength increases, the influence on the most extreme days becomes even larger. This means that dipole events which are even slightly “record-breaking” could lead to unprecedented levels of seasonal rainfall. </p>
<p>Ultimately, if positive Indian Ocean Dipole seasons increase in frequency, as predicted, regular seasons of flooding impacts will become a new normal.</p>
<p>One aspect not included in our analysis is the influence of a warmer atmosphere on rainfall extremes. A warmer atmosphere <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-what-climate-models-tell-us-about-future-rainfall/">holds more moisture</a>, allowing for the development of more intense rain storms. This effect could combine with the influence of extreme positive dipoles to bring unprecedented levels of rainfall to the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>2023 was <a href="https://wmo.int/media/news/wmo-confirms-2023-smashes-global-temperature-record">a year of record-breaking temperatures driven both by El Niño and global warming</a>. We might expect that this warmer air could have intensified rain storms during the season. Indeed, evidence from <a href="https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/climate-change-indian-ocean-dipole-compounding-natural-hazards-and-high-vulnerability-increased-severity-of-flooding-in-the-horn-of-africa/">a recent assessment</a> suggests that climate change-driven warming is highly likely responsible for increased rainfall totals. </p>
<h2>Responding to an unprecedented future</h2>
<p>Policymakers need to plan for this. </p>
<p>In the long term it is crucial to ensure that any new infrastructure is robust to withstand more frequent and heavier rains, and that government, development and humanitarian actors have the capacity to respond to the challenges.</p>
<p>Better use of technology, such as innovations in <a href="https://fastaweather.com/">disseminating satellite rainfall monitoring via mobile phones</a>, can communicate immediate risk. <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/ai-churns-out-lightning-fast-forecasts-good-weather-agencies">New frontiers in AI-based weather prediction</a> could improve the ability to anticipate localised rain storms, including <a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/2023-machine-learning-early-warning-systems">initiatives focusing on eastern Africa</a> specifically. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g_06jBU-ag">Linking rainfall information with hydrological models designed for dryland environments</a> is also essential. These will help to translate weather forecasts into impact forecasts, such as identifying risks of flash flooding down normally dry channels or bank overflow of key rivers in drylands.</p>
<p>These technological improvements are crucial. But better use of the forecast information we already have can also make a big difference. For instance, initiatives like <a href="https://www.climatecentre.org/priority_areas/fbf-ibf/">“forecast-based financing”</a>, pioneered by the Red Cross Red Crescent movement, link forecast triggers to pre-approved financing and predefined action plans, helping communities protect themselves before hazards have even started.</p>
<p>For these endeavours to succeed, there must be dialogue between the science and practitioner communities. The scientific community can work with practitioners to integrate key insights into decisions, while practitioners can help to ensure research efforts target critical needs. With this, we can effectively build resilience to natural hazards and resist the increasing risks of our changing climate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik W. Kolstad receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme through the CONFER project (grant 869730)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katerina Michaelides receives funding from EU H2020, the FCDO and the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Singer receives funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Programme. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David MacLeod does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Projections show that there’ll be Indian Ocean dipoles in the future – and that means more rainy days, and more extreme rainfall.David MacLeod, Lecturer in Climate Risk, Cardiff UniversityErik W. Kolstad, Research professor, Uni ResearchKaterina Michaelides, Professor of Dryland Hydrology, School of Geographical Sciences, University of BristolMichael Singer, Professor of Hydrology and Geomorphology, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2241662024-03-10T06:42:33Z2024-03-10T06:42:33ZHappy smiling African children: why school tourism in Zimbabwe shouldn’t be encouraged<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578562/original/file-20240228-26-doqnyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children will often sing and dance for visiting tourists.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pascal Deloche/GODONG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A large, air-conditioned bus draws up outside a school. Tourists, most from Europe and the US, disembark, cameras at the ready. Some have brought gifts: packages of pens and pencils. They distribute these to the children, who spontaneously begin singing and dancing. </p>
<p>This scene and others like it play out in schools around the world. It’s called school tourism. It’s similar to <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-slavery-and-tourism-when-holidays-and-human-exploitation-collide-78541">orphanage tourism</a> and so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/slumming-it-how-tourism-is-putting-the-worlds-poorest-places-on-the-map-61320">“slum” tourism</a>, in which tourists visit orphanages or “slums” in poor countries to witness poverty and suffering. These sorts of tourism come with several ethical problems: photography of unconsenting children and adults, intrusions on people’s private lives, daily interruptions to children’s routines and issues of child protection.</p>
<p>Tourists visit a school for between two and three hours. They usually enter classrooms, photograph children and sometimes watch cultural displays like singing and dancing. These tours are generally part of an arrangement with a tourism company but exist in a multitude of forms globally. As an example, a school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, schools have arrangements with tourism companies that enable funding for infrastructure and sponsorship of children. In Matabeleland North, close to Mosi-oa-Tunya (Victoria Falls) and Hwange National Park, for example, 19 out of 20 companies <a href="https://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/26974">interviewed by researchers in 2012</a> provided some sort of support, sponsorship or infrastructure to schools in nearby areas. </p>
<p>These partnerships are often in conjunction with an exchange of philanthropic funding for access to their school. This phenomenon has also been reported in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09669582.2019.1643871">Fiji, Zambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160738321000906">Kenya, Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2010.540314">Mozambique</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">Zimbabwe’s economic troubles</a>, including severe hyper-inflation, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/inflation-is-spiking-in-zimbabwe-again-why-high-interest-rates-arent-the-answer-187362">well documented</a>. Schools are poorly resourced and, in government schools, teachers are often unpaid or <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_zimbabwe-teachers-reject-promised-salary-increase-far-too-low/6198233.html">earn below the poverty line</a>.</p>
<p>I am a Zimbabwean-born Australian woman and a trained secondary school teacher. In 2015, I was working with a school in Zimbabwe as part of my university degree and witnessed this tourism myself. In 2019, as part of my doctoral research, I spent one term at a school in Matabeleland North. It received 129 visits from tourist groups that year alone. </p>
<p>During my time there I talked with teachers, tourism workers and NGO staff. I also asked students to draw <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">pictures of their experiences of tourism</a>. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">a recently published article</a> I contribute to the growing field of research about how schools funded by tourism operate. I offer a critique of how an image of “Africa” is reproduced for the tourist gaze, and the fact that images shared by tourists after their visits further inculcate damaging tropes of the African continent as a place only of extreme poverty and neediness. Schools funded by tourism become a mirror of the tourism industry. </p>
<h2>The study</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17508487.2023.2286230">My research identified</a> the sorts of images involved in marketing of tourism that portray a static and cliched <a href="https://theconversation.com/ordinary-peoples-stories-can-change-the-worlds-views-about-africa-48597">image of “Africa”</a>. This includes landscapes filled with animals, extreme poverty, white women and men dressed for safari and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00607-7">images of Maasai men</a> herding cattle. Smiling, happy children are another part of the image.</p>
<p>The tourism workers I interviewed tried to prevent the continuation of these images by presenting counter-narratives of how Zimbabweans live. But they were not always successful. This is partly due to the structured nature of mass tourism initiatives: tourists are sold an itinerary and this must be followed. Since the school tours are part of broader tours of southern Africa, the school and tourism workers felt a need to conform to a particular image – and this involved interactions with happy children. When teachers and schools feel a need to conform to a particular image, their actions and choices are constrained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/changing-the-african-narrative-through-social-media-platforms-97097">Changing the African narrative through social media platforms</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The school I worked with had different arrangements with three tourism companies. One donated US$200 in cash on every visit. Another had promised to build one classroom block. The third company actually founded the school, providing teachers’ salaries and significant infrastructure development. Some tourists had also donated larger pieces of infrastructure, such as the materials for a borehole and electrical connections to the main grid.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>The school tours are disruptive to students and staff. They are a diversion from the usual routines of the school. One teacher said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sometimes you may be called, maybe you did not know that there are visitors coming and they just want to come in at that particular time … Then you are called off the lesson and the time does not wait for you. It goes and that subject is being interrupted. Then you are no longer going to be able to move onto the next subject now. Since you had already introduced the previous lesson, you will not leave it in the air, you have to finish it, so the next subject now is being disturbed.</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-close-up-look-at-what-happens-when-tourists-and-maasai-communities-meet-84095">A close-up look at what happens when tourists and Maasai communities meet</a>
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<p>The school in my study found it difficult to balance the perceived needs of the tourists and the institution’s needs. As one of the school leaders put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have to look at it in the sense that, yes, it is taking time: it is probably asking the kids to do something that they would not just usually do when meeting someone. But you have to look at the guest side of things, and also think, these are the people who are helping us. Potential helpers, some are already helping, what are (the tourists) taking away?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The children were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508281.2022.2133812">highly aware of the need to please the tourists</a>, whom they saw as fulfilling a particular need. Tawanda, aged 10, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would prefer to come to school which has visitors because they will be helping us. When there are no books, they will be paying, they will be giving us some money, and we buy some books. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Teachers worried that some groups would donate less if they weren’t able to interact with children.</p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>Ideally, school tours should not occur at all. However, due to Zimbabwe’s economic instability, schools are becoming increasingly resourceful to find avenues for additional funding. Although they are not a perfect solution, philanthropic partnerships need to exist.</p>
<p>My research does not suggest that people should avoid visiting Zimbabwe as a whole and I do not want to suggest that philanthropic funding of schools is necessarily bad. Rather, it is important to seek out tourism experiences that do not homogenise culture and cultural experiences. Tourists should also consider the itinerary of any tours they book and aim to avoid companies that offer school tours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kathleen Smithers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A school tour often sits within the itinerary of a tour of southern Africa, or alongside wildlife tourism ventures.Kathleen Smithers, Lecturer, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243432024-03-04T11:47:59Z2024-03-04T11:47:59ZKenyans use humour to counter unpopular state policies – memes are the latest tool<p>Seemingly disillusioned with the country’s leadership, Kenyans have taken to new ways of expressing their anger and frustration with their government. </p>
<p>On social media and in everyday conversations, President William Ruto is now referred to as Zakayo, named after the infamous <a href="https://www.bible.com/bible/111/LUK.19.1-10.NIV">Zaccheaus</a>, the much-hated chief tax collector in biblical Jericho. </p>
<p>Ruto is also called Kaunda Uongoman, which mimics the stage name of a controversial Congolese musician, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/wahito-kanda-bongo-man-and-the-story-of-his-kenyan-beauty-1789094">Kanda Bongoman</a>. The first name is a reference to Ruto’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67563308">recent penchant</a> for Kaunda suits. The surname is a portmanteau of the Kiswahili word <em>uongo</em>, meaning liar, and man. </p>
<p>These nicknames are examples of the many humorous but pointed and pithy descriptions now widely used by Kenyans, particularly on social media platforms, to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329099584_Whatwouldmagufulido_Kenya's_digital_practices_and_individuation_as_a_nonpolitical_act">ridicule and express defiance</a> towards a president and government whose policy decisions have become <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67694865">deeply unpopular</a>. </p>
<p>Satire and humour have always been legitimate sites for popular engagement with the state in Kenya. But a new weapon in the armoury of those criticising the state is the use of memes. Across social media, Kenyans are employing a range of memes drawn from folk, biblical, global and everyday expressions, as well as videos, screen grabs and photographs riffed off circulating news stories to comment on the government’s failings. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-advertising-blackmail-to-physical-threats-kenyas-journalists-are-under-attack-but-they-must-also-regain-public-trust-203580">From advertising blackmail to physical threats, Kenya's journalists are under attack – but they must also regain public trust</a>
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</p>
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<p>Memes have become an <a href="https://berghahnbooks.com/downloads/OpenAccess/BernalCryptopolitics/BernalCryptopolitics_03.pdf">important feature</a> of Kenya’s everyday and discursive political practices. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1470412914551351">Memes</a> are defined by media scholars Laine Nooney and Laura Portwood-Stacer as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>digital objects that riff on a given visual, textual or auditory form and are then appropriated, re-coded, and slotted back into the infrastructures they came from. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=CmVgKXsAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researched</a> these popular cultural forms particularly within the context of digital media in Africa. I have demonstrated, for example, how <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23743670.2015.1119490?casa_token=Sue0yxvwcvUAAAAA:dTsuDNJM9KDsFfjWqA7JvO1jupx_WdVmiLg7eKpMGu_7cbbqo-LoBohB6USKYQhGZHtpGfRp2ByF">Twitter</a> has incubated various cultures of popular expression. These create important “<a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/downloads/OpenAccess/BernalCryptopolitics/BernalCryptopolitics_03.pdf#page=9">pockets of indiscipline</a>” through which state power is constantly challenged. </p>
<p>Media repression in Kenya has taken new forms. The focus is largely on <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-advertising-blackmail-to-physical-threats-kenyas-journalists-are-under-attack-but-they-must-also-regain-public-trust-203580">invisible tactics</a> that don’t make the state look bad. These range from the use of advertising blackmail to legal instruments often vaguely defined to facilitate misuse. There’s also the creation of a pliant “independent” media council which is <a href="https://mediacouncil.or.ke/index.php/about-us/origins-of-the-council">partly funded by the government</a>. </p>
<p>Memes aren’t completely insulating users from potential state harassment and legal transgressions. Nevertheless, they are making it possible for Kenyans to expand their spaces and boundaries of popular expression, and to navigate some of the existing legal barriers to free expression.</p>
<h2>Resistance legacy in Kenya</h2>
<p>Satire and humour have historically been important forms of political practice in Kenya. The tradition has existed in different forms across various platforms, including broadcast and print media, as well as in popular cultural forms such as music and drama. </p>
<p>For example, in the 1980s and 1990s a satirical newspaper fiction column, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504630500161581">Wahome Mutahi’s column Whispers</a>, became a must-read. Through satirical and humorous accounts of a fictionalised Kenyan family, Mutahi was able to openly criticise the government, commenting on state policies and failings in a way that mainstream press couldn’t. </p>
<p>This was at the height of the terrifying reign of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">late Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi</a>, when criticism of the government was dangerous. Journalists were routinely jailed, exiled or even killed for it. </p>
<p>Kenyans are again tapping into this history using new media technologies to creatively challenge power. </p>
<p>The political context in the country is different from that of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the government continues to exert influence on mainstream media. Its main means of doing so is through <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-advertising-blackmail-to-physical-threats-kenyas-journalists-are-under-attack-but-they-must-also-regain-public-trust-203580">the control of advertising revenue</a>. The state is the largest single advertiser in the country’s media, and organisations regarded as hostile are denied government advertising. </p>
<p>As a result, social media platforms have become alternative critical debating spaces. This is despite efforts by the state to <a href="https://www.article19.org/resources/kenya-withdraw-proposed-amendments-to-cybercrimes-law/">undermine free speech</a> in various communication platforms. </p>
<p>As rights group <a href="https://www.article19.org/resources/kenya-harmonise-free-expression-with-iccpr-recommendations/">Article 19</a> has argued, content-based restrictions on free expression that are incompatible with international human rights law and standards remain in Kenya’s penal code. Another problematic law is the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ComputerMisuseandCybercrimesActNo5of2018.pdf">Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act</a>, which the government has routinely used to punish those on social media exposing instances of state corruption. <a href="https://mediainnovationnetwork.org/2022/04/07/the-legal-challenges-facing-east-africas-bloggers-and-influencers/">Bloggers and political activists</a> have been subjected to some of these laws.</p>
<h2>Game of cat and mouse</h2>
<p>In an environment where the government seems determined to control public communication spaces, and has the means to do so, alternative cultures of defiance that have been known to elude state capture should thrive.</p>
<p>Yet, even as the use of memes, especially for political accountability, proliferates, there is always the fear that the state can simply ignore their spread and “vitality”, or appropriate them. This would weaken their subversive intent. For example, during a recent foreign trip to Japan, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2024-02-08-ruto-i-dont-mind-being-called-zakayo-but/">Ruto “accepted”</a> his nickname Zakayo, insisting that he wouldn’t backtrack on his unpopular tax policies. </p>
<p>When the state takes “ownership” of this language of resistance, it presents an interesting paradox, one which the Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe once likened to a form of “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/provisional-notes-on-the-postcolony/BE5FFE3AC0DB10125B69E0D63E36DD89">mutual zombification</a>”. This is where the ruler and the ruled “rob each other of their vitality, leaving both impotent”. </p>
<p>In other words, none is left the stronger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Ogola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Satire and humour have always been sites for popular engagement with the state in Kenya.George Ogola, Professor of Media Industries, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2237392024-02-29T14:41:33Z2024-02-29T14:41:33ZSerengeti migration: fire and rain affect how zebras, wildebeest and gazelles make the journey<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578227/original/file-20240227-18-b7rwld.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zebra and wildebeest taking part in the Serengeti migration.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">nikpal/iStock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzania’s Serengeti ecosystem is like a time machine. As one of the world’s last remaining fully intact grazing ecosystems it provides a glimpse of what others in Australia, Eurasia and the Americas might have looked like when communities of large grazing mammals roamed freely across these continents.</p>
<p>During the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/Pleistocene-Epoch">Late Pleistocene</a>, which spanned from 129,000 to 11,700 years ago and is sometimes referred to as the “ice age”, populations of these grazing animals collapsed all over the world. </p>
<p>But those populations left a mark: the effect they had on plant communities. Animals and plants shape each other’s evolution. These effects are visible and continuing in the Serengeti. One way this plays out is during one of Earth’s last great herbivore migrations – of zebras, wildebeest and Thomson’s gazelles in Serengeti National Park in northern Tanzania. </p>
<p>Since the early 1970s there have been various theories about what explains the order and timing of the three main Serengeti migratory herbivores. Is it always zebras first, followed by wildebeest and then gazelles? Is that because of competition for the best food? The foraging benefits that smaller herbivores gain from following larger herbivores? Or the risk of being eaten by predators?</p>
<p>Now we believe we have the answer. In <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adg0744">our new research</a> in the journal Science, we report that the large herds sweeping across the grasslands of Tanzania in synchronised migration waves overlap in patterns that can be influenced by fire and rain. </p>
<p>Our findings may help conservationists manage migratory herbivore populations, especially as they face future threats due to human induced climate change.</p>
<h2>Various hypotheses</h2>
<p>The Serengeti is composed of the Serengeti National Park, the Maasai Mara in Kenya, and several smaller protected areas. It’s a tropical savanna dominated by grass. Thorny acacia trees are sparsely scattered in the grassland. </p>
<p>Several competing hypotheses have emerged in the past five decades about the Serengeti migration.</p>
<p>In 1971, Richard Bell, a leading researcher in African savanna ecology and conservation, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24922780">described</a> the Serengeti migration as a “grazing succession”. During this year-long trek, African herbivores navigate an ecosystem the size of Lesotho (about 30,355km²) in a way that depends on body size. </p>
<p>In his description zebras come first. Wildebeest follow about eight weeks later. And, again about eight weeks later, Thomson’s gazelles follow. The description painted the migration as a giant game of follow the leader, smaller herbivores benefiting from following larger herbivores. Zebras (and then wildebeest) graze the tallest, low-quality components of grass. This exposes the more nutritious grass tissues nearer to the ground and promotes the regrowth of fresh, high-quality leaf tissue.</p>
<p>By visiting a grassland patch weeks after being grazed by larger herbivores, the smaller herbivores, which require more protein per unit body weight, can be selective and obtain better nutrition per bite.</p>
<p>In the years after Bell’s seminal paper, other competing hypotheses emerged which could also account for the movement patterns of Serengeti migratory herbivores. </p>
<p>Some authors argued that competition between grazing species explained the body-size dependent order of migration. Anthony Sinclair of the University of British Columbia, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00389015">for instance</a>, argued that wildebeest, because of their enormous population size and capacity to reduce the height of vegetation, out-compete zebra for food. This forces zebras to seek taller vegetation to meet their energy demands. Under the competition hypothesis, zebras migrate in front of the wildebeest because they are consistently nudged forward so that they encounter abundant forage, lest they be left behind to starve behind massive herds of wildebeest.</p>
<p>Finally, the mixed herding behaviour sometimes observed during migration was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4386">proposed</a> as an anti-predation strategy which reduced the risk of being killed by large predators such as lions, cheetahs and leopards. This hypothesis argues that, if herbivores must move to obtain forage, they should do so in groups that contain other species to decrease their chance of being killed by predators.</p>
<h2>Breakthrough</h2>
<p>The size of the migration (<a href="https://www.serengeti.com/great-migration-africa.php">around two million animals</a>), involving large herbivore populations and a huge spatial footprint, made it nearly impossible to explicitly test these hypotheses. </p>
<p>Then, in 2010, Craig Packer from the University of Minnesota launched a bold project to establish 200 camera traps in central Serengeti. Today the Serengeti camera trap database offers the longest running camera trap study in Africa. It is one of the most significant spatiotemporal databases of herbivore occupancy, movements and habitat selection ever collected. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Grant Hopcraft of the University of Glasgow was attaching GPS satellite collars to migrating wildebeest and zebras to <a href="https://www.serengeti-tracker.org/about">track animal movements</a>.</p>
<p>Other satellites, operated by Nasa, provide data on <a href="https://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/">vegetation growth and fires</a>, which animals respond to on a year-to-year basis. </p>
<p>Finally, Rob Pringle’s lab at Princeton pioneered <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1503283112">an emerging technology</a> that relies on DNA sequence data from the faecal matter of individual herbivores. This opened the door to quantifying herbivores’ diets over time and space.</p>
<p>A combination of camera trap observations and multiple seasons of dietary and GPS collar data allowed me and my collaborators to, for the first time, explicitly test the mechanisms proposed to control the Serengeti migration.</p>
<h2>Our study</h2>
<p>We made several major findings.</p>
<p>First, the movement of migratory herbivores only cursorily matched the classic predictions of grazing succession. Rather than spacing themselves months apart as observed by Bell, zebras and wildebeest travelled closer together than expected. They also frequently crossed paths during migration. Thomson’s gazelles followed behind the larger migrants by approximately three weeks. This was consistent with the classic predictions of grazing succession and foraging facilitation, but over a shorter window than reported by Bell.</p>
<p>Second, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/env.2657">statistical analyses</a> developed by Wake Forest University professor Staci Hepler revealed spatial associations between Thomson’s gazelles and wildebeest that were strong in high rainfall years and weakened in years with widespread fires. This strengthened the evidence for foraging facilitation on the tail end of the migration. </p>
<p>The movements of individual collared zebras and wildebeest demonstrated a striking pattern: zebras consistently selected habitats away from wildebeest, and more so in a dry year. Wildebeest, though, were indifferent to the location of zebras during habitat selection. Dietary analysis revealed strong grass consumption and considerable overlap between zebras and wildebeest. And Thomson’s gazelles consumed largely flowering plants that would have only become accessible after larger herbivores removed the tall grasses.</p>
<p>Together the results suggested a “push-pull” mechanism of multi-species migration. Zebras are nudged ahead of wildebeest due to the negative consequences of competition. The smaller Thomson’s gazelles follow in the wake of larger herbivores to gain access to high quality forage. Rainfall strengthens the association by stimulating grass productivity and creating a greater reliance of small herbivores on the foraging of larger herbivores. Fire, however, weakens the association by burning vegetation and opening the grass canopy for smaller herbivores.</p>
<h2>Understanding herbivore populations</h2>
<p>If conservationists are going to protect remaining herbivore populations, or restore those that have collapsed, they must have a fundamental understanding of how they function and what promotes their stability. Our hope is that this study’s lessons will help.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>T. Michael Anderson received funding from the National Geographic Society (grants WW-025R-17 and NGS-52921R-18) and the US National Science Foundation (grant BCS-1461728).</span></em></p>Lessons from the Serengeti herds may help conservationists manage migratory herbivore populations.T. Michael Anderson, Professor of Biology, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230482024-02-27T14:07:04Z2024-02-27T14:07:04ZBenefits of using cleaner cooking fuels are blunted in urban areas where outdoor air is polluted: findings from Ghana, Cameroon and Kenya<p>Household air pollution from cooking, heating and lighting with fuels like wood, charcoal and kerosene poses a substantial global health problem. </p>
<p>Globally, <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/20-01-2022-who-publishes-new-global-data-on-the-use-of-clean-and-polluting-fuels-for-cooking-by-fuel-type">2 billion</a> people cook with polluting fuels and are exposed to high levels of household air pollution. The highest proportion live in sub-Saharan Africa, where <a href="https://www.nihr.ac.uk/news/new-research-could-help-boost-growth-of-clean-cooking-in-sub-saharan-africa/29340#:%7E:text=Approximately%20900%20million%20people%20cook,health%2Ddamaging%20and%20climate%20pollutants">about 900 million</a> people cook with polluting fuels.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(20)30197-2/fulltext">Studies</a> have shown that use of cleaner cooking fuels, like electricity, ethanol and liquefied petroleum gas, reduces exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), a damaging pollutant. But <a href="https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-021-00756-5">other studies</a> have also shown that the use of cleaner cooking fuels doesn’t necessarily reduce PM2.5 levels in people’s homes.</p>
<p>To understand why, our research looked at three rapidly urbanising communities in Cameroon (Mbalmayo), Ghana (Obuasi) and Kenya (Eldoret). We looked at differences in air pollutant levels across cooking fuel types as well as other environmental factors. We measured levels of PM2.5 as well as carbon monoxide (CO), another damaging air pollutant. </p>
<p>Half of the households that were part of our study were mostly cooking with LPG, which is considered a cleaner cooking fuel. The other half were cooking only with polluting fuels, including wood and charcoal.</p>
<p>Our findings showed that the type of cooking fuel households used did indeed affect levels of pollution inside people’s homes. But we found wide disparities between the three communities. For example, there was hardly any difference in average PM2.5 exposures between LPG and charcoal users in the Ghanaian setting. However, in the Kenyan and Cameroonian communities, women’s average PM2.5 levels were much higher among those cooking with wood, compared with those cooking with LPG. In Eldoret, Kenya, women cooking with charcoal were also exposed to substantially higher levels than those cooking with LPG. </p>
<p>We concluded from our results that this could be explained by the fact that environmental factors were also at play – air pollution levels outside people’s homes. In the Ghanaian area, outdoor air pollution levels were around double the levels in the other two communities. This difference is likely due in part to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231099002964?via%3Dihub">increased levels</a> of Saharan dust in Ghana during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/harmattan">harmattan</a> season. </p>
<p>In addition, most women in the Ghanaian setting usually cooked outdoors on a veranda. This increased their exposure to outdoor air pollution. In contrast, women in Kenya and Cameroon typically cooked indoors.</p>
<p>We also found that women, regardless of the cooking fuel they used, had higher exposure to PM2.5 if they lived closer to a busy road (less than a five minute walk away) and travelled outdoors during the day. This suggested that traffic emissions probably made up a substantial proportion of the air pollution that women were breathing in these urban areas. And emissions generated from cooking might have contributed less to overall PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<p>This may explain why there were minimal differences between PM2.5 exposures among women using LPG and charcoal stoves in the Ghanaian community, despite LPG stoves generally emitting lower levels of PM2.5. It follows that, in some areas with rapid urbanisation, outdoor air pollution is probably lowering the ability of clean cooking fuels to reduce PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>As cities continue to urbanise and the African population increasingly migrates to cities, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-023-01311-2">evidence</a> points to the fact that localised levels of air pollution from industrial sources, traffic, and trash burning are likely to increase. This means that people will become increasingly exposed to air pollutants outdoors and that reductions in PM2.5 exposure that happens when people switch from polluting fuels to LPG may be lower. </p>
<p>Our findings show that clean cooking fuels can reduce indoor air pollution. However, a focus on reducing indoor pollution by switching cooking fuels may only have a limited effect on people’s exposure to damaging air pollutants. Our findings point to the need for developing strategies for reducing both indoor and outdoor air pollution levels. Lower outdoor PM2.5 concentrations can be achieved through stricter regulations on traffic emissions and limiting or eliminating trash burning in favour of less polluting methods for solid waste disposal.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, efforts to encourage a transition towards clean cooking fuels should remain an important policy priority, particularly in communities that are exposed to lower levels of outdoor PM2.5. The transition to clean cooking fuels can potentially have a greater health benefit in these settings. </p>
<p>A more targeted approach and prioritising certain areas in the drive for access to cleaner cooking fuels makes sense. As the <a href="https://cleancooking.org/">Clean Cooking Alliance</a> has pointed out, there are limited resources and funding to tackle the move towards cleaner cooking fuels. Targeting specific areas for clean cooking transitions may therefore be a useful strategy. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the global health community must devote more resources to providing universal access to clean cooking by 2030 <a href="https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/sustainable-development-goals/why-do-sustainable-development-goals-matter/goal-7">(United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7)</a>].</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Shupler is also a researcher in the Department of Public Health, Policy and Systems at the University of Liverpool. This research was funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) (ref: 17/63/155) using UK aid from
the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esong Miranda Baame and Theresa Tawiah do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dust and traffic pollution add to the health hazard posed by some cooking fuels.Matthew Shupler, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Environmental Public Health, Harvard UniversityEsong Miranda Baame, PhD Candidate, Université de DschangTheresa Tawiah, Health Economist ,Department of Environmental Health, Kintampo Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221792024-02-21T13:13:29Z2024-02-21T13:13:29ZAntibiotic use on Kenya’s dairy farms is putting consumers and animals at risk<p>Farmers often use antibiotics to keep their livestock healthy. They’re sometimes used as “quick fixes”, to avoid more costly management measures like regular disinfection, waste management, routine vaccination or provision of clean drinking water. </p>
<p>Animal husbandry now accounts for about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1503141112">two thirds</a> of the global consumption of antibiotics. As livestock and fish production grows, by 2030 the consumption of antibiotics is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1503141112">projected to increase</a> by 67%.</p>
<p>Worryingly, this overuse in food animal production can create problems for both animals and people.</p>
<p>It can contribute to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria which, through food or environmental exposure such as drinking contaminated water, can be transmitted to people. </p>
<p>This means that some antibiotics may become ineffective in treating human infections. Antibiotic resistant infections are associated with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02724-0">4.95 million deaths</a> globally every year. Sub-Saharan Africa <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02724-0/fulltext">accounts for</a> 22% of these.</p>
<p>Similarly, animals can also become infected with antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This leads to infections that are difficult or impossible to treat.</p>
<p>Our latest <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-50325-8">study</a>, which focused on the central Kenyan highlands, looked at antibiotic use on smallholder dairy farms as well as antibiotic quality (substandard or counterfeit antibiotics). </p>
<p>Kenya is <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-dairy-sector-is-failing-to-meet-domestic-demand-how-it-can-raise-its-game-176017">one of the largest</a> milk producers in Africa and one of the countries with the largest per capita consumption of milk. About <a href="https://afs.ca.uky.edu/dairy/extension/around-the-world">80%</a> of the milk produced in Kenya comes from smallholder farmers. </p>
<p>We found that smallholder farmers weren’t using antibiotics properly and were buying poor quality products. Also, traces of some antibiotics were found in milk.</p>
<p>This puts the health of both people and animals at risk.</p>
<h2>Antibiotic access and use</h2>
<p>For our study, we collected data from 248 dairy farms and 72 veterinary drug stores between February 2020 and October 2021. This included milk samples and the antibiotics themselves.</p>
<p>Most dairy farms surveyed reported using antibiotics at least once in the past year. This is not unusual – cows get sick. Dairy cows are especially prone to getting udder infections. </p>
<p>Antibiotics were used to treat and to prevent infections. Most were obtained through animal health service providers. A small number (6%) were bought directly from veterinary drug stores or other farmers. </p>
<p>Antibiotics were often sold without a prescription, and based on farmers’ own diagnosis. These are imprudent practices – the wrong antibiotic could be used to treat an infection or antibiotics could be overused. </p>
<p>The improper or excessive use of antibiotics in dairy farming can lead to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This then leads to economic losses for farmers, because animals will be less productive and the cost of treatment will grow. </p>
<p>It’s estimated that, as a result of antimicrobial resistance, livestock output could <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/323311493396993758/pdf/final-report.pdf#page=17">fall by 11% by 2050</a>, with the highest decline in low income countries.</p>
<p>There’s also <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/fpd.2017.2411">the risk</a> of these antibiotic-resistant bacteria being transmitted to humans, either directly through contact with animals or indirectly through the consumption of milk and dairy products. This can lead to infections that are difficult to treat, posing a public health risk. </p>
<h2>Antibiotics found in milk</h2>
<p>Also worrying, in this study we detected nine antibiotics in milk. Three samples exceeded <a href="https://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FStandards%252FCXM%2B2%252FMRL2e.pdf">global standards</a>. Antibiotics can get into milk supplies when withdrawal times are not strictly followed.</p>
<p>The presence of antibiotic residues in milk – even at low levels – can pose health risks to consumers, particularly those who are allergic to specific antibiotics. </p>
<p>Even for those who aren’t allergic, prolonged exposure to low levels of antibiotics <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7255607/">may contribute</a> to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.</p>
<h2>Quality of antibiotics</h2>
<p>The study also examined the quality of antibiotics available in veterinary drug stores in central Kenya. </p>
<p>Poor quality, substandard, or counterfeit antibiotics can lead to ineffective treatment and prolonged illness. Low-quality antibiotics are even more likely to contribute to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. This is because they won’t fully eradicate the pathogen (disease-causing bacteria), allowing them to adapt and become resistant. </p>
<p>Almost 44% of the antibiotics we tested were of poor quality. This has considerable implications for the efficacy and safety of these drugs. It can also contribute to antibiotic resistance.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The findings of the study underscore the need for better management practices on Kenya’s dairy farms. This includes:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>stricter regulation of antibiotic sales </p></li>
<li><p>improved veterinary oversight </p></li>
<li><p>education of farmers about the risks of antibiotic misuse. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>For a country like Kenya, where agriculture plays a significant role in the economy, ensuring livestock is healthy and productive is crucial for both farmers and the country. </p>
<p>We recommend a few steps for policymakers to take:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>strengthen regulations around antibiotic use in livestock</p></li>
<li><p>enhance surveillance and monitoring systems for antibiotic residues in milk</p></li>
<li><p>improve the quality control of antibiotics sold in veterinary drug stores</p></li>
<li><p>educate farmers about the responsible use of antibiotics</p></li>
<li><p>promote better animal husbandry practices that reduce the reliance on antibiotics.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dishon Muloi receives funding CGIAR Trust Fund, the Fleming Fund, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Danish International Development Agency.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arshnee Moodley receives funding from the CGIAR Trust Fund, the Fleming Fund, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Danish International Development Agency, and International Centre for Antimicrobial Resistance Solutions.</span></em></p>Kenya’s smallholder farmers aren’t using antibiotics properly, some are of poor quality and some antibiotics are being found in milk.Dishon Muloi, Research scientist, International Livestock Research Institute Arshnee Moodley, AMR Team Leader, CGIAR System OrganizationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221682024-02-12T14:14:27Z2024-02-12T14:14:27ZKenya’s sex workers have solutions to their problems, but international NGOs aren’t hearing them<p>In Kenya, rights organisations run by sex workers have gone into numerous partnerships with international organisations over the past decade. In <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/making-noise-sex-worker-led-organising-and-knowledge-politics-in-">recent research</a>, I set out to understand whether these relationships worked in favour of the sex workers and their organisations. My research focused on an organisation in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, that supports male sex workers. </p>
<p>Kenya’s laws punish activities related to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/CallEndingImmigrationDetentionChildren/CSOs/RefugeeConsortium_of_Kenya_Annex2.pdf#page=57">sex work</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/CallEndingImmigrationDetentionChildren/CSOs/RefugeeConsortium_of_Kenya_Annex2.pdf#page=59">same-sex relationships</a>. These laws, along with societal prejudice, force the men in my study to <a href="https://www.northumbriajournals.co.uk/index.php/IJGSL/article/view/1264">operate in the shadows</a>. </p>
<p>This exposes them to various types of violence. In response to their everyday experiences, more than 70 Kenyan organisations led by sex workers are doing what they can to achieve social justice. </p>
<p>Following interviews and conversations with 99 sex workers between 2018 and 2022, I found that in most cases, sex workers’ knowledge – based on their daily experiences – was sidelined. Donor organisations, despite having good intentions, sometimes fell short of their objectives because they didn’t draw on the knowledge held by marginalised communities. </p>
<p>By ignoring sex workers’ knowledge, development partnerships keep power imbalances unchanged. This leaves many issues that sex workers face – including insecurity, poverty and mental health – unresolved.</p>
<p>My findings illustrate that policies, services and support should include sex workers’ experiential knowledge and needs. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Between 2018 and 2022, I conducted a 10-month study as part of my PhD project. I investigated how international NGOs worked with a community-based organisation led by Kenyan sex workers. Their collaborations were aimed at improving health and human rights outcomes. </p>
<p>My focus was how more powerful organisations, such as international NGOs, include sex workers’ knowledge and expertise in these partnerships.</p>
<p>I identified two primary issues affecting the relationship. </p>
<p>Firstly, international development agencies prioritised their own expertise over that of the communities they set out to help. This was despite NGO employees believing they had taken the perspectives of sex workers into account. They didn’t realise they weren’t listening to what sex workers were telling them. </p>
<p>Secondly, because it relied on statistics and frameworks, the development aid system made it difficult to incorporate other kinds of knowledge into intervention programmes. </p>
<h2>The gaps</h2>
<p>Development partnerships tend to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12758">sideline the perspectives of sex workers</a>. </p>
<p>For example, NGOs asked the sex workers in my study to provide input on outreach strategies for HIV prevention. But they had already decided what they thought would work best – peer educators and a drop-in centre.</p>
<p>As one respondent in my research put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(We ask them), ‘How do you plan to do outreach work; how do you plan to make the DICE (drop-in centre) more attractive to peer educators?’. And then we work around that. So, they get the idea, and then we fine-tune it with the team.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This approach limits sex workers to providing local contacts rather than shaping the agenda based on their priorities. </p>
<p>This tokenistic approach leaves sex workers frustrated. They recognise their crucial role in the success of programmes but <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13691058.2020.1842499?role=tab&tab=permissions&scroll=top">are excluded</a> from the decision-making. </p>
<p>This has led to a strong programmatic focus on sex workers’ sexual health and HIV. But they’d like to address other issues too, like insecurity and mental health. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can the community get more services on mental health … condoms and lubes we can buy; you have empowered us enough. Now get to know our story, our sad moments, the violence we have faced and how it has affected us. How trying to make a living, get a job, a house has been the struggle and how we cope. That’s what we need.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The focus on scientific evidence, professional knowledge and statistical data makes it difficult to discover and share what sex workers know. This knowledge comes from the experience of what it means to do sex work and <a href="https://theconversation.com/queerphobia-in-kenya-a-supreme-court-ruling-on-gay-rights-triggers-a-new-wave-of-anger-against-the-lgbtiq-community-204575">live as queer in Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>One respondent said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Now, most (of what) they are doing is health services, but you see the sex worker has been beaten, has been raped, so still the HIV prevalence wouldn’t really go down … They are talking about how to reach targets but this sex worker is still being violated, still being raped, still being beaten.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s difficult to integrate such perspectives into the evidence-based policies typical of the international development aid system. Interviews with NGO employees illustrate that requirements for accountability add to the challenge.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They (headquarters) have set out goals and strategies towards epidemic control and everything we do is guided in that context. We work within the context … and then we try … to take into account the more structural issues.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>The sex workers in my study wanted their knowledge to be included in development partnerships. They identified three things they’d want development organisations to consider.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Take sex workers’ experiential knowledge more seriously. Acknowledge that their insights are as important as academic and professional knowledge. </p></li>
<li><p>Acknowledge the leadership, creativity and expertise of marginalised communities. Allow these groups to design programmes based on their unique desires and needs. <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/60520/9781000843309.pdf?sequence=1#page=58">Community-led research methods</a> can help make this a reality. Support communities to address what they – instead of others – consider important and liberating.</p></li>
<li><p>Recognise and disrupt the power dynamics in the international aid system. Dominant actors need to unlearn the power differences in their relationships with communities, which are often uncritically perceived as natural. Critically examine assumptions and practices. Question the legitimacy of the expertise of donors in community collaborations, and see whether there are gaps created by sidelining sex work-related knowledge.</p></li>
</ol><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lise Woensdregt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sex workers have a deep understanding of their needs but development partnerships tend to prioritise scientific knowledge.Lise Woensdregt, Assistant Professor in Sociology, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216142024-01-31T15:25:32Z2024-01-31T15:25:32ZAfrican countries are struggling with high debt, demands to spend more and collapsing currencies: the policy fixes that could help<p>Highly indebted African countries are facing stark trade-offs between servicing expensive debt, supporting high and growing development needs, and stabilising domestic currencies.</p>
<p>Government debt has risen in at least <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">40 African countries</a> over the past decade. As a result, some are experiencing a bad combination of high debt, elevated development spending needs amid budget shortfalls, and unfavourable exchange rate pressures. </p>
<p>These issues have become more pressing since 2022, when persistently high inflation prompted major central banks around the world to embark on the most aggressive <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">monetary tightening campaign</a> in decades. Monetary policy tightens when central banks raise interest rates. </p>
<p>Since then, global interest rates have climbed even <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">higher</a>, triggering a jump in repayments on external loans and adding to debt burdens accumulated over the last decade. In addition, some countries with worsening debt situations have endured large exchange rate depreciations and struggled to stabilise the value of their domestic currencies. </p>
<p>My perspective, shaped by years of researching Africa’s development challenges, is that this presents many countries with a triple set of dilemmas that’s not easy to navigate. Tackling any of one of these issues imperils the others.</p>
<p>Here are some examples:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>stemming the rise in public debt and containing exchange rate decreases would make it more difficult to meet bigger public spending needs </p></li>
<li><p>pushing for lower public debt while supporting extra spending risks putting more strain on domestic currencies </p></li>
<li><p>prioritising higher spending needs and easing currency strains runs the risk of inviting extra government debt. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Steps can be taken to expand the policy space to tackle these challenges while easing difficult trade-offs. These steps include prioritising public spending measures that raise growth, fixing the revenue collection problem facing all African countries, and restructuring unsustainable government debt.</p>
<h2>Rising government debt and policy dilemmas</h2>
<p>The triple dilemma unfolded as government debts rose substantially over the last decade. As shown in Figure 1, median government debt has more than doubled since 2012 and amounted to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">61% of GDP</a> as of 2023. </p>
<p>At first, <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/11/02/markets-think-interest-rates-could-stay-high-for-a-decade-or-more">historically low global interest rates</a> in the decade after the global financial crisis in 2008 contributed powerfully to burgeoning debt by making it easy to borrow large amounts of cheap money. </p>
<p>The debt trends of countries have worsened sharply since then. Factors have included the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered a cost-of-living crisis, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which contributed to a rapid rise in global interest rates. </p>
<p>In Africa, the pain from higher borrowing costs is particularly acute for governments, given that public debt represented <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">nearly 60%</a> of the region’s total external debt in 2022 (Figure 1). <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">Nineteen countries</a>, including Ghana and Zambia, are already in debt distress (meaning they are unable to meet financial obligations) or at high risk of debt distress.</p>
<p>Ghana’s public debt has more than doubled since 2012 and amounts to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">85%</a> of GDP. Zambia’s went up much higher and stood at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">98%</a> as of 2022. </p>
<p>Both <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Zambia</a>, along with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Ethiopia</a>, have defaulted on their foreign debt, sparking fears about a broader sovereign debt crisis on the continent if more countries fall into debt distress. </p>
<p>Others face high risk of debt distress. Kenya is on the edge of financial distress after its debt increased steadily to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">70%</a> of GDP. South Africa also faces elevated public debt, which has almost doubled over the last decade and currently stands at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">74%</a> of GDP. </p>
<p>And yet trimming high debts won’t be easy. Development needs are high after coffers were drained by higher spending tied to the pandemic and fallout from Ukraine. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund estimates that the median sub-Saharan African country needs to increase spending by at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2023/09/15/Navigating-Fiscal-Challenges-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Resilient-Strategies-and-Credible-529230">least 20% of GDP</a> to meet sustainable development goals on health, education and infrastructure by 2030. Climate change adaptation is expected to add <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2023/09/15/Navigating-Fiscal-Challenges-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Resilient-Strategies-and-Credible-529230">billions of dollars</a> each year for the continent.</p>
<p>Coffers are also being depleted by more money being spent repaying expensive loans. This has the additional effect of depleting foreign exchange reserves, which means countries overburdened by debt also have to contend with weakening currencies. </p>
<p>Kenya’s debt interest payment as a share of revenue rose from <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">11% in 2014</a> to more than <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">20%</a> after 2020. This depleted its reserves as a share of external debt from 47% to less than 20% over the same period. This has pressured the Kenyan shilling, which lost more than <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-28/-paramilitary-tax-agents-deployed-in-kenya-budget-revenue-drive">19%</a> against the US dollar last year.</p>
<p>In the cases of Ghana and Zambia, debt interest payments climbed even higher. For Ghana they were around <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">45%</a> of revenue. For Zambia, around <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">39%</a>. By 2022 reserves had dwindled to <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">22%</a> in Ghana and to <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">10%</a> in Zambia. </p>
<p>This precipitated large depreciations of Ghana’s cedi and Zambia’s kwacha. </p>
<p>South Africa’s debt interest payments increased at a relatively slower pace to about <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">15%</a> of revenue after 2021 and it kept a higher reserve share of about <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">35%</a>. This was why the decline in the rand was not as steep as in the other three countries. </p>
<p>Weakening currencies also make foreign debt servicing costlier. Consequently, reasonable debt can quickly turn into unmanageable debt.</p>
<p>Lower government revenue collection has also intensified debt risks.</p>
<p>In 2023, revenue collected was <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">16%</a> of GDP in Ghana, <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">17%</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">21%</a> in Zambia. This is significantly below the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023">27%</a> median level seen in other developing economies. Although this median level is matched by South Africa, rising costs of social transfers including welfare grants and subsidies to state-owned enterprises such as the power utility Eskom and transport utility Transnet have added upward pressure on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">public debt amid slowing growth</a>. </p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>A number of steps can be taken to alleviate the trade-offs countries are having to make.</p>
<p>Firstly, governments should prioritise public spending measures that raise growth. </p>
<p>These include critical spending on education, health, infrastructure and other high-quality growth enhancing investments. As economic growth picks up, it is likely to generate more government revenue to pay down the debt.</p>
<p>It also means allocating more spending on first generation reforms. These are structural reforms that alleviate major growth constraints. For example, long-standing reforms in governance remain critical in African countries which generally lag behind countries in other regions on various measures of governance quality such as rule of law, control of corruption and government accountability. </p>
<p>Secondly, countries need to fix their revenue collection problems. While growth leads to a larger economy that generates additional revenue, low levels of domestic revenue collection constrain the ability of governments to pay down debt and fund vital social and growth sectors.</p>
<p>Across Africa, several countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia, have mobilised efforts to spur gains in revenue collection. These include new levies, higher taxes, registering more shops on the tax roll, broadening tax bases, strengthening tax administration and other revenue enhancing measures.</p>
<p>Lastly, governments need to restructure their debt portfolios. When a debt crisis cannot be avoided, restructuring debt can reduce the amount owed to creditors by revising the amount and timing of future principal and interest payments. Chad reached an agreement to restructure its external debt under the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023">G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment in 2022</a>. This is an initiative designed to support low income developing countries with unsustainable debt. Since then, Ghana and Zambia have also launched debt restructuring negotiations under the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/annex_common_framework_for_debt_treatments_beyond_the_dssi.pdf">G20 Common Framework</a>. </p>
<p>Other highly indebted countries struggling to service their liabilities may have to do the same amid rising concerns about slow progress of the Common Framework.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo is affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. He was appointed as an International Affairs Fellow for Tenured International Relations Scholars for the 2023-24 academic year.</span></em></p>Many African countries face a triple set of dilemmas that are not easy to navigate.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2183872024-01-29T13:07:49Z2024-01-29T13:07:49ZKenya’s healthcare workers abuse a third of teen mums from informal settlements – study<p>Adolescent pregnancy is a global public health concern: in <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">2022</a>, about 13% of girls and young women gave birth before the age of 18. </p>
<p>Compared with women in their early 20s, adolescents are more <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(13)70179-7/fulltext?__scoop_post=9ef44560-18a4-11e5-90a9-001018304b75&__scoop_topic=1749219">susceptible</a> to maternal deaths. Pregnancy-related complications are among the leading causes of <a href="https://esaro.unfpa.org/en/topics/adolescent-pregnancy#:%7E:text=Early%20childbearing%2C%20high%20fertility%20rates,women%2020%20years%20and%20above.">death</a> among Africa’s adolescent girls. </p>
<p>Babies born to adolescent mothers in low- to middle-income countries also face an increased risk of <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0195731">neonatal deaths</a>, and pre-term and underweight birth. </p>
<p>These risks make it vital that pregnant girls feel comfortable seeking healthcare.</p>
<p>Adolescent pregnancy is an issue in Kenya, too, where <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">15%</a> of adolescent girls become mothers before the age of 18. Girls from the <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186/s12905-022-01986-6.pdf">poorest households</a> are more likely to become mothers than girls from the richest households. </p>
<p>As specialists in medical sociology and public health, we conducted a <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/8/11/e013268.full.pdf">survey</a> in 2022 of adolescent mothers in an informal settlement in Kenya. About a third reported that they had been abused by health providers during childbirth. The study found that abusive treatment <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/8/11/e013268.full.pdf">discouraged</a> these girls from seeking future maternity care at healthcare facilities. </p>
<p>This matters for several reasons. One is that <a href="https://bmcpregnancychildbirth.biomedcentral.com/counter/pdf/10.1186/1471-2393-13-18.pdf">facility-based childbirths</a> have a lower neonatal mortality rate than home childbirths. Maternal deaths are also lower when births occur in health facilities than at home. </p>
<h2>Young mothers in Kenya</h2>
<p>Our study site, Korogocho, is an informal settlement on the outskirts of Nairobi. About 200,000 people live there. It is overcrowded, with poor infrastructure and limited access to water and sanitation. Crime rates are high and residents are often exposed to violence and social unrest.</p>
<p>The study focused on 491 adolescent girls ranging in age from 14 to 19 years, who had a biological child at the time of the interviews.</p>
<p>Data were analysed to estimate the scale of abuse of girls during childbirth in health facilities. In total 32.2% of adolescent mothers suffered abuse from health providers during childbirth. </p>
<p>1.) Physical abuse was reported by 7.5% of participants. </p>
<p>To assess physical abuse, we asked girls if health workers punched, kicked, slapped, gagged, or hit them with an instrument, physically tied them to a bed, forcefully held them down to the bed, or had forceful downward pressure placed on their abdomen before the baby came out.</p>
<p>2.) Among those interviewed, 26.7% reported verbal abuse. </p>
<p>We assessed verbal abuse by asking girls if they were shouted at or screamed at, insulted, scolded, mocked, or had negative comments made about their physical appearance (such as cleanliness, private parts or weight), the baby’s physical appearance, and their sexual activity. </p>
<p>3.) Of the participants 15.1% claimed they had been the victims of stigma and discrimination.</p>
<p>Experience of stigma and discrimination was assessed by asking participants if health workers made negative comments to them regarding their ethnicity, race, tribe or culture, religion, age, marital status, education and literacy level, economic circumstances, and HIV status. </p>
<p>4.) One in 10 girls reported neglect and abandonment during childbirth. Neglect and abandonment were assessed by asking girls if staff members were present or not during admission and when the baby came out. </p>
<p>5.) Detainment was assessed by asking girls if they or their babies were held at the facility against their will because of their inability to pay fees. About 17% of the girls reported detainment. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, and consistent with a previous <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/5/Suppl_2/e003688.full.pdf">study</a> conducted among females within the reproductive age (15-49 years), we found that girls who were abused were less likely to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>report being satisfied with the care received</p></li>
<li><p>intend to use the facility for future births</p></li>
<li><p>be willing to recommend the facility to others.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Ways forward</h2>
<p>Pregnant girls endure societal stigma and discrimination. These attitudes filter into the healthcare system and healthcare workers need to be trained properly to counter the shame that pregnant girls endure. </p>
<p>These adolescents also need to be informed about their rights to respectful care. </p>
<p>There are small scale interventions in some parts of <a href="https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/early/2023/04/03/GHSP-D-22-00169">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0125267">Ghana</a> that show the potential to strengthen health systems to be more responsive to the needs of adolescents.</p>
<p>Until the mistreatment and abuse of adolescent girls is highlighted and addressed, professional care for pregnant girls will not be attained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Kabiru receives funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through a grant to the African Population and Health Research Center for the Challenging the Politics of Social Exclusion project (Sida Contribution No. 12103). She also receives funding from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for the Action to empower adolescent mothers in Burkina Faso and Malawi to improve their sexual and reproductive health project (Grant No. 109813-001). The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of IDRC or its Board of Governors or Sida.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Idowu Ajayi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Adolescent girls are more at risk during childbirth. Stigma and abuse by healthcare workers makes them less likely to seek medical care, putting their lives further in danger.Anthony Idowu Ajayi, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterCaroline W. Kabiru, Senior Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212302024-01-17T15:41:01Z2024-01-17T15:41:01ZShould Kenya abolish all school exams? Expert sets out five reasons why they’re still useful<p>The role of <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/education/article/2001488553/highlights-of-the-2023-kcse-results">examinations</a> in Kenyan schools is under scrutiny. This is because there is a lot that is wrong with the country’s examinations, a situation that threatens to derail <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-new-education-curriculum-is-a-triumph-for-kenyas-children-75090">education gains made over the decades</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, for two consecutive years – <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-10-12-report-how-cheating-was-orchestrated-in-2022-kcse-exam/">last year and the year before</a> – the periods during the country’s national examination period were marred by <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2024-01-08-kcse-results-for-4109-candidates-suspected-of-cheating-withheld/">allegations of leaked tests</a>. These allegations are linked to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001302037/exam-cheating-cartel-exposed">cartels</a> which make money from parents and learners.</p>
<p>There were also reports this year of high school students receiving <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2024-01-10-kcse-2023-candidates-schools-and-parents-in-shock-over-changing-grades/">contradicting results</a> from the examinations results portal. </p>
<p>These issues cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the examining body and the ministry of education in general. </p>
<p>In 2017 the government set out to replace summative examinations – national tests done at the end of eight years of primary school and four years of high school – with continuous assessments. Most students have moved over to the new system, which revolves around a <a href="https://theconversation.com/6-priorities-to-get-kenyas-curriculum-back-on-track-or-risk-excluding-many-children-from-education-195235">competency-based curriculum</a>. But four more cohorts of students still have to sit the annual national high school examinations under Kenya’s old education curriculum. There is still a lot that is unclear about how the new curriculum will assess students in secondary school.</p>
<p>As someone who has been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=12A_S6QAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">involved in education for over 20 years</a>, I believe that exams are crucial. There are five main reasons for this, including highlighting inequalities in the education system and providing learners with guidance on their career path.</p>
<p>But they need to be done right to be effective. For any system to work efficiently – which Kenya’s doesn’t – this includes changing a situation in which so much relies on the exam outcome. Other career pathways need to be opened up so that children aren’t under such huge pressure. Also, schools need adequate staffing and facilities to promote learning. </p>
<h2>Why examinations matter</h2>
<p>There are compelling reasons not to do away with examinations. </p>
<p>First, examinations help identify, understand and address inequalities in access to education. As a <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/right-education">basic human right</a>, every child should be able to get a quality education. A persistently low performance in examinations can be an indicator of <a href="https://www.oecd.org/education/school/50293148.pdf#page=11">personal or social obstacles</a> like gender, geographical position, social class, race or ethnicity in a learner’s life. </p>
<p>Second, examinations help improve teaching and learning by strengthening teaching methods. A learner-centred approach has <a href="https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1143881.pdf#page=3">better outcomes</a> than a teacher-centred one, which tends to silence learners’ voices. Tests help indicate which students need additional help to support their learning. </p>
<p>Third, they are used as a <a href="https://learningportal.iiep.unesco.org/en/blog/four-reasons-why-we-need-credible-examinations-in-sub-saharan-africa">tool</a> for knowing what learners are learning and its relevance to the country’s development goals. Education is <a href="https://www.oecd.org/education/school/50293148.pdf#page=5">closely linked</a> to the political, social and economic development of a country. Examinations test the skills, knowledge and values that students pick up in the course of an education cycle, and how well the country can harness these skills and knowledge to industrialise and for general development. </p>
<p>Fourth, examinations provide guidance for learners’ personal and career development in the post-secondary world. This gives tertiary institutions the opportunity to select suitable students for various career pathways in their institutions. However, high school examination results are not necessarily a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/ielapa.200100198">predictor of student success</a> in tertiary education.</p>
<p>Fifth, examinations offer <a href="https://bestaccreditedcolleges.org/articles/careers-and-education/what-is-an-educational-certificate.html">qualifying certification</a> that accounts for a student’s time in a learning institution. This certification shows that one has successfully completed an education period. </p>
<h2>What needs to change</h2>
<p>But this system needs to be improved.</p>
<p>Firstly, the pressure needs to be taken off children sitting final examinations at school. Many candidates write examinations under immense pressure and anxiety as failing a national examination has major implications on the direction their life takes. For this to change, Kenya’s education system needs to be geared to <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/gender/exams-must-never-be-allowed-to-define-our-children-s-worth-4456844">preparing students</a> to seize other opportunities of earning a livelihood beyond going to university. </p>
<p>Secondly, examinations have been given <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/kenya/counties/534280-kakamega-video-parents-chasing-school-principal-poor-kcse-results-angers-kenyans/">outsized importance as an accountability measure</a> in the education system, despite other factors being at play. These include adequate staffing, having trained and motivated teachers, and providing a good work environment and facilities. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the ranking of top schools and learners based on exam results needs to be abolished entirely. The government officially <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/11/kcse-student-school-exam-ranking-abolished/">stopped such rankings in 2014</a>, but the practice persists in other forms, like in <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/education/kabarak-basks-in-national-glory-as-school-tops-exam--4486054">informal media rankings</a>.</p>
<p>Rankings promote elitism and corruption. Schools that are ranked “the best” are often those near urban centres, and have better teaching facilities than those in rural or marginalised areas. Parents who can afford it can <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2024/01/eacc-urges-parents-to-report-headteachers-soliciting-bribes-for-form-1-admission/">pay bribes</a> to get their children admitted into such schools, even if these students don’t meet the grades officially required. This crowds out poor and deserving learners.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/798140/pdf">dangers of ranking schools</a> include the exclusion of non-performing learners, forced repetition of classes and the transfer or dropping out of students perceived to be poor academically. Rankings narrow curriculum coverage, lead to the neglect of other aspects of education and encourage examination malpractices. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Examinations are viewed negatively for a number of reasons. These include increased stress levels among learners, and human interference in the management and administration processes. But they still play a relevant role in providing a quantitative measure of a learner’s academic ability. This helps with identifying their strengths and weaknesses, which provides an idea of where to place them in tertiary institutions or in jobs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Beatrice M’mboga Akala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Examinations help a country measure if its system of education is teaching the skills and knowledge needed to meet development goals.Beatrice M’mboga Akala, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177312024-01-14T12:51:29Z2024-01-14T12:51:29ZUrban Kenyans mistrust police even more than rural residents do: study sets out why it matters<p>Across the African continent – from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/10/20/in-nigeria-police-brutality-on-two-years-after-endsars-protests">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanaians-dont-trust-the-police-a-criminologist-on-what-needs-to-be-done-about-it-216671">Ghana</a> to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-protests-police-trfn-idUSKBN23G2QQ/">South Africa</a> – widespread protests have taken place to demand police reform in the wake of police misconduct and brutality. A continent-wide survey done in 2022 shows very low trust in the police and a prevailing perception of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/AD512-PAP9-Citizens-report-widespread-predation-by-African-police-forces-Afrobarometer-dispatch-20march22.pdf#page=2">the police as the most corrupt</a> among key institutions.</p>
<p>Low public trust in police poses a serious problem for the most central state institution tasked with upholding law and order. Trust influences both <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2015.1077837?casa_token=lT9eMx7fNTYAAAAA%3AdNayrFpApabWcaVi3iJ3A2fZIMWBCkM9M1g6gSNg4shQZxGJbShjWG0N4scdiQzDz_btx94CIdGl">police effectiveness</a> and the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1098611103258959?casa_token=Tb5FMa0zv0UAAAAA:_aXSde5HYiY68ovVq8SzIPufP7zx8D-nHE4RB39LCVXF0E7mcU0OhKssPhFTXYIQ4P5rk2u8Nl5h">perception of safety</a> among the public.</p>
<p>We are scholars with a longstanding research engagement with Kenya who <a href="https://www.katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=N99-1598_1">study</a> the <a href="https://www.katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=N7-1153">role of the police</a> from the perspective of conflict research and political science. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2023.2239430">study</a>, we set out to analyse citizens’ trust in the police in Kenya. </p>
<p>We analysed data from four national surveys conducted in the country between 2011 and 2019. In each survey, respondents were asked a number of questions, including how much they trusted the police. <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/AD552-Kenyans-cite-criminal-activity-and-corruption-among-police-failings-Afrobarometer-16sept22-1.pdf#page=2">These surveys found</a> that Kenyans had limited trust in the police. </p>
<p>Trust, as we study it, is an individually held belief that a certain actor can be relied on. It is closely related to perceptions about fairness and legitimacy. We argue that individuals who have witnessed or experienced unfair treatment by the police are more likely to mistrust them. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2023.2239430">study</a> found that urban and rural residents in Kenya perceived the police differently. Those in cities and urban centres had lower trust in the police than the rural population. The findings matter because Kenya is rapidly urbanising, and the policing challenges we describe will grow with the expansion of urban centres.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">reform processes</a> intended to improve legitimacy and effectiveness of Kenyan policing will be more likely to succeed if there is adequate understanding of the contexts in which the police operate, and how environments shape citizens’ perceptions of the police.</p>
<h2>Understanding the differences in trust</h2>
<p>Over several years, we have conducted interviews with local residents, the police, experts and civil society actors in Kenya. Based on our research, we argue that three major dynamics help explain the urban-rural divide in police trust. </p>
<p>Firstly, the police face <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=sv&lr=&id=HXEdAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=urban+policing+cities+challenges+&ots=g1cHUCy00Q&sig=EPfpfoaKqXJ3XYEwIyrVmY7BYAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=urban%20policing%20cities%20challenges&f=false">different security challenges</a> in urban and rural settings. Urban environments are generally more challenging than rural contexts because:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>police-citizen interactions are more frequent and visible to the public in cities</p></li>
<li><p>many different groups and interests are present in cities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Secondly, police have been involved in <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-killings-point-to-systemic-rot-and-a-failed-justice-system-193468">extrajudicial killings</a> in urban settings. These have primarily affected poor, young men in low-income and densely populated settlements. An estimated <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2023/07/kenya_country_brief_final_en.pdf#page=4">50%</a> of Kenya’s urban population will be residing in slums, as defined by UN Habitat’s <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/06/wcr_2022.pdf#page=18">World Cities Report</a>, by 2030. It is in these types of settlements that police have become <a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">notorious</a> for arbitrary arrests and use of excessive force. </p>
<p>This behaviour has negative spillover effects on the urban population and makes citizens in urban areas more likely to form negative views of the police.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">Many Kenyans have embraced vigilante cops – an ineffective police force is to blame</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Third, the dynamics in rural settings are different from those in urban areas. In many rural locations, police are spread thin. They cover large jurisdictions and geographical distances, influencing whether and how citizens can be served. Although around 70% of Kenya’s population lives in rural areas, such areas are usually served by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43905012">few and often under-resourced police officers</a>. A <a href="https://icj-kenya.org/news/executive-summary-report-of-the-national-taskforce-on-police-reforms/">task force</a> reviewing ongoing police reforms recently concluded that police vehicles in rural areas don’t always have enough fuel to cover the area under jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Due to limited interactions with the police, Kenyans in rural areas are less likely to see the police as a relevant actor, for good and for bad, and are more likely to turn to other security providers. These include <a href="https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policing-the-Periphery-Opportunities-and-Challenges-of-Kenya-Police-Reserves-.pdf#page=17">community-based militias and vigilante groups</a>.</p>
<h2>Implications for police reforms</h2>
<p>In Kenya, law enforcement remains influenced by colonial legacies and extended periods of authoritarian rule. In colonial times, the police were used to <a href="https://theconversation.com/humiliation-and-violence-in-kenyas-colonial-days-when-old-men-were-called-boy-and-africans-were-publicly-beaten-218261">repress and control Kenyans</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these legacies is necessary for democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>Kenya has initiated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">police reform</a> with the purpose of building a more legitimate and effective police force. A major reform process began in 2009, codified into the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/158-chapter-fourteen-national-security/part-4-the-national-police-service/412-243-establishment-of-the-national-police-service">2010 constitution</a> and new <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalPoliceService(Amendment)ActNo11of2014.pdf">police legislation in 2011</a>. These processes established national policies for community policing and an independent agency to improve civilian oversight. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gove.12672?casa_token=KDZIMZZyBYsAAAAA%3AjZS68xeaqMZ6ZfXIsb3Jr0XpmuJj4_YCLEn9t8AhJCKTatR7fEWNnK_ARbhsXP7aQQ-TuutQTj5H6h8">progress has been limited</a>. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/gove.12672">Corruption</a> within the Kenyan police remains widespread and normalised. Impunity remains high. Despite an emphasis on community policing, the establishment of such structures has been <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/reader/68f17c94582e95f55d6faac47761d73251f89120">uneven</a>, and public awareness remains low.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">Kenya has tried to reform its police force, but it's left gaps for abuse</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The need to improve police-community relations is underlined by frequent transgressions of human rights and police brutality, including over 100 <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-09-14-imlu-128-cases-of-extrajudicial-killings-recorded-in-11-months/">extrajudicial killings</a> documented in the last year.</p>
<p>Therefore, improving security provisions and reducing misconduct in informal settlements in urban areas should be a key priority. </p>
<p>Better oversight to address impunity would help address issues of trust, but the police also need sufficient resources to carry out policing tasks. Investing more in community policing structures – intended to serve as a link between communities and the police – could also help improve relationships and build trust.</p>
<p>Much of Kenya’s police reform is premised on addressing the most serious problems facing urban areas. While it’s important to address issues of insecurity here, reform processes must not lose sight of priorities in rural areas, where the majority of the population still reside.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristine Höglund receives funding from the Swedish Research Council and the Formas research council for sustainable development.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from the Swedish Research Council and the Formas research council for sustainable development.</span></em></p>Due to limited interactions with the police, Kenyans in rural areas are less likely to see the police as relevant actors.Kristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityEmma Elfversson, Associate professor, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187212023-12-12T19:17:01Z2023-12-12T19:17:01ZChina-Africa relations in 2023: key moments and events to remember<p>In a year when headlines have been dominated by conflict in Europe and the Middle East, and geo-economic tensions between China and the West, China-Africa relations were, in comparison, a steady and stable norm. </p>
<p>Having followed China-Africa relations for two decades, I wanted to flag a few key moments from this year. These reveal that the relations between China and the continent have focused on building momentum and deepening ties, especially when it comes to trade and the promotion of African exports. </p>
<p>They also highlight China’s growing commitment to supporting the development of African countries. </p>
<h2>China-Africa trade and the expo</h2>
<p>In June, the third <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/326222.html">China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</a> was held in Changsha, Hunan province. </p>
<p>It’s the most intensive China-Africa trade event in the calendar because of its scale and focus. It’s also a chance for small and medium enterprises to be involved. </p>
<p>This year’s expo <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3226366/deals-down-hunans-china-africa-trade-expo-reaps-us10-billion">reportedly recorded</a> some 100,000 visitors and agreed some 120 projects worth a total of US$10.3 billion.</p>
<p>The expo allows face-to-face interaction to happen in the hope of developing commercial partnerships and sales. There were deals <a href="http://www.focac.org/zfzs/202306/t20230630_11106280.htm">around essential oils from Madagascar, gems from Zambia, wood carvings from Zimbabwe</a>, and flowers from Kenya. One Chinese food group <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230627/9efd6c4d936b415598b0632ce4e6d2b4/c.html">displayed</a> its first imported batch of Kenyan anchovies to seafood distributors. This helped catapult demand – on one day in September, <a href="http://www.news.cn/fortune/2023-09/07/c_1129848863.htm">52 tons</a> of dried wild Kenyan anchovies landed in Hunan for distribution across China.</p>
<p>There were a few important take-aways from the event: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>It flagged the emerging role of <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">Hunan</a> in China-Africa relations. Hunan is the source of a sizeable share of China’s own food supply. It’s also home to advanced agricultural processing and heavy industry capabilities. </p></li>
<li><p>There were high-level <a href="https://venturesafrica.com/a-slice-of-opportunity-benin-joins-chinas-fruit-export-market/">“green lanes” dialogues</a> where issues in clearing more African fruits, vegetables, and other African products for export to China were discussed. The aim of these dialogues was to support agricultural modernisation in Africa and increase export revenue. </p></li>
<li><p>The emerging Hunan-based <a href="http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/hneng/Government/Bulletin/202306/t20230608_29370776.html">“Africa Brand Warehouse”</a> project used the event to support the entry of more (106 specificially) African brands into major Chinese shopping malls</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</h2>
<p>In August President Xi Jinping visited South Africa for a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">summit</a> of the five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Brics. </p>
<p>Parallel to the Brics summit the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</a> – a dialogue initiated by China and co-chaired by Presidents Xi and Cyril Ramaphosa – was held. </p>
<p>A couple of things stood out from the dialogue.</p>
<p>First, its emphasis on promoting <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">African integration</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">the participation</a> of African regional organisations that play key roles in fostering intra-African trade. Discussions focused on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and trade-related infrastructure and policy.</p>
<p>Second, Xi <a href="https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20230826/145524.html">announced</a> three new plans for Africa relating to agriculture, industrialisation and talent development. The plans aim to address challenges in China-Africa economic relations, such as laggard agricultural productivity, lack of manufacturing and economic diversification, insufficient job creation and educational opportunities. They also aim to address hurdles in Africa’s development. </p>
<p>These actions speak to Xi’s <a href="https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/735319/the-gravity-of-chinas-african-export-promise">promise</a> to create a “new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. </p>
<p>This involved the growth of trade, especially with respect to African exports to China. </p>
<p>It would also see a change in the structure of trade. A long-standing <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12229">pattern</a> is that Africa sells raw materials and buys manufactured goods, which entrenches the continent’s under-development. China is trying to move past this by buying more processed goods, and fostering services like tourism and finance. </p>
<h2>China’s foreign minister comes to Africa</h2>
<p>As has happened every year for at least the past 30 years, China’s foreign minister visited Africa. Qin Gang’s trip in January included visits to Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Benin and Egypt.</p>
<p>From my lens, Qin’s visit was conservative in its announcements and continued to demonstrate China’s commitment to the continent. </p>
<p>He cemented important bilateral and multilateral ties, for instance with the African Union and China-Arab relations. </p>
<p>One moment that stood out was the launch of the Horn of Africa Peaceful Development Concept, which aims to bring lasting peace and economic stability to countries of the conflict-afflicted region. This stands out because China has a
<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/05/11/what-to-make-of-chinas-non-interference-policy-in-africa/">long-held foreign policy doctrine of non-interference</a>, and a much shorter history of US or European-style proactive roles in seeking to foster cross-country peace.</p>
<h2>Infrastructure changes around Lagos</h2>
<p>Various infrastructural developments around Lagos, Nigeria were a milestone in China-Africa relations this year. These will gradually change the scale with which Nigeria can trade with the world. </p>
<p>In April, Lekki Deep Sea Port – Nigeria’s first deep sea port – launched its commercial operations. It’s <a href="https://lekkiport.com/project-overview-structure/">administered</a> by Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited, a joint venture enterprise owned by a group of investors (comprising China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and Singapore’s Tolaram Group), the Lagos state government and the federal government of Nigeria through the Nigerian Ports Authority.</p>
<p>The port, one of the largest in Africa, will eventually connect to Lagos’ Rail Mass Transit system. <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/lagos-set-to-increase-train-trips-on-chinese-built-metro-rail/">The first phase of the rail system, the Blue Line, was opened in September</a>. </p>
<p>The Blue Line was <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/00L77SUF.html">built by</a> China’s Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. Its corridor spans 13km and covers five stations. It’s the first rail infrastructure traversing Okokomaiko, a densely populated area of western Lagos, and the Marina district, notable for high-rise commercial offices. </p>
<h2>Into 2024</h2>
<p>Relations look set to keep evolving and growing into the new year. </p>
<p>Later in the year, a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit is due to be hosted by China. Typically the forum leads to announcements of new directions in China-Africa ties by both sides, and commercial deals being agreed. </p>
<p>Otherwise, there are some key bilateral anniversaries to be marked, such as the 60th anniversary of China-Tanzania and China-Zambia relations. In addition, China and Tanzania are expected to launch the flagship <a href="https://dailynews.co.tz/tz-sees-investment-fortunes/#google_vignette">East Africa Commercial and Logistics Centre project</a>. This is expected to expand trade and investment ties between China and other landlocked economies within the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Several key events highlighted the growing ties between China and Africa.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180972023-12-12T09:10:47Z2023-12-12T09:10:47ZWhat’s east Africa’s position on the Israel-Hamas war? An expert unpacks the reactions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda<p>The reactions of some east African countries to the ongoing conflict in Gaza have been less dramatic than South Africa’s. South Africa’s parliament has passed a resolution calling for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21/">closure</a> of its embassy in Tel Aviv. Algeria and South Africa have been the most supportive of the Palestinians. Thus far only South Africa and Chad have withdrawn their representatives from Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>In contrast, the reactions from east African capitals have been less dramatic. At the outset of the current conflict in Gaza, Kenya’s President William Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-10-08-kenya-stands-with-israel-ruto-says-amidst-war-with-palestine/">expressed solidarity</a> with Israel and condemned</p>
<blockquote>
<p>terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals-4393308">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-calls-for-peace-as-israel-palestine-war-intensifies-4394110">Tanzania</a> condemned all forms of violence and called for</p>
<blockquote>
<p>restraint to stem further loss of human life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Michael+Bishku+research&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">scholar</a> of Middle Eastern and African history, I have researched the relationship between Israel and African countries including those in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312006990_Israel's_Relations_with_the_East_African_States_of_Kenya_Uganda_and_Tanzania_-_From_Independence_to_the_Present">east Africa</a>. </p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the reactions of the east African states to the conflict in the Middle East are shaped by two things: the perceived national threat of terrorism by Islamist factions and, for those states with democratic institutions, domestic public opinion.</p>
<p>In my view these three countries are unlikely to change their stance unless the current conflict escalates. On the one hand they will continue to limit their actions to voting in the United Nations for resolutions in support of the Palestinians. On the other they will continue to solicit technical assistance – especially in agriculture and security – from Israel.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Relations between African countries and Israel have been tested before. For example, in 1973, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455585">25 independent African states</a> cut diplomatic relations with Israel after its occupation of Egyptian territory. These included east African states, such as Kenya, which had enjoyed particularly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892">close relations</a> with Israel since its independence from Britain in 1963.</p>
<p>East African countries colonised by Britain <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html">sought</a> technical assistance after independence. This was particularly true in agriculture. They viewed Israel as complementary or an alternative to having to seek assistance from the big powers.</p>
<p>When African states cut off the diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, Kenya was reluctant but had to act in solidarity with other independent African nations. It kept its cooperation with Israel even before the formal ties were restored in 1988. It facilitated Israel’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">1974 rescue operation</a> at Uganda’s Entebbe airport. The operation was meant to rescue passengers of a French jet airliner that was hijacked on its way from Israel to France, and flown to Entebbe. </p>
<p>Tanzania, on the other hand, sought a more neutral course after independence. It found the socialist character of the Israeli Labour governments appealing but Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">1967 Six-Day War</a> complicated relations. </p>
<p>Tanzania was one of the last African states to <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481841?ln=en">renew</a> relations with Israel in 1994. That was a year after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oslo-Accords">Oslo Accords</a> between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Tanzania was also the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">first African country</a> to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1973 and to host a representative office in its capital. </p>
<p>Uganda has had the most tempestuous relationship with Israel. Under the erratic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a> the country broke off relations with Israel and embraced Libya. Israel and Uganda have had good relations under President Yoweri Museveni. Israeli companies <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/bilateral-relations/Pages/Israel-and-Uganda.aspx">currently operate</a> in Uganda’s construction, infrastructure, agriculture and water management, communications and technology sectors.</p>
<p>Uganda joined most other African countries in <a href="https://truman.huji.ac.il/publications/uganda-and-israel-history-complex-relationship">renewing</a> relations with Israel just after the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Uganda, along with Kenya, has militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission. </p>
<p>The ebbs and flows of these relationships have to be seen against the backdrop of the hard work Israel has put in to building <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with a range of other African countries too. By 2023 it had ties with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<h2>National security threat</h2>
<p>Kenya has been affected by instability in neighbouring Somalia and has been the victim of terror attacks. </p>
<p>In 1998, al Qaeda attacks <a href="https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980813.sc6559.html">targeted</a> the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi attack <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-victims-of-1998-us-embassy-bombing-demand-compensation-/7215264.html">resulted</a> in over 200 deaths and thousands of people were injured. Since then, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/nairobi-attack-israel-advising-kenyan-forces">has taken the lead</a> among foreign countries in aiding and advising Kenyan security.</p>
<p>Kenya has suffered attacks since then by al-Shabaab – across its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">border</a> as well as in <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/kenya/">Nairobi</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s security situation has been different. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has not militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission (Amisom). The mission has been operating since 2007 to provide security in that country in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Uganda has its own set of security problems. A terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital Kampala in 2010 was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/13/al-shabab-claims-uganda-bombings">attributed</a> to al-Shabaab. But a bigger threat to Uganda’s security has come from Islamist rebels known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">Allied Democratic Forces</a> based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Domestic institutions and public opinion</h2>
<p>There is one other factor that explains east Africa’s relations with Israel: the religious composition of populations in the region. </p>
<p>Israel is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/truth-many-evangelical-christians-support-israel-rcna121481">popular</a> with many devout Christians in east Africa, as is the case throughout the continent. If given the opportunity, these Christians would make a pilgrimage to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.09">Holy Land</a>. This factor obviously affects <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-in-africa-9781786995056/">public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Muslims in east Africa have a greater concern for the situation of the Palestinians. All three countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – have populations adhering to these two religions. </p>
<p>Given the democratic characters of Kenya and Tanzania, where there have been peaceful transfers of power, public opinion has more of an impact. This explains Ruto’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-ruto-changes-tune-on-israel-hamas-conflict-4431560">change of tone</a> after the initial statement strongly critical of Hamas.</p>
<p>Tanzania has remained consistent in condemning all forms of violence. That country calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as do the other east African states. </p>
<p>Public pressure is less important in Uganda, where Museveni is quite autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael B. Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa’s reaction to the war in Gaza appears shaped by history, affinity to the policies of the west and the threat of terrorism.Michael B. Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2195002023-12-11T14:51:17Z2023-12-11T14:51:17ZEast Africa’s troops are leaving the DRC: what went wrong and what comes next<p><em>The East African Community <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">deployed a regional force</a> for the first time into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2022. Just over a year later, the troops have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">started withdrawing</a> amid <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">tension</a> with the host state. We asked <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/by/jenna-russo">Jenna Russo</a>, who has covered the conflict and interventions in the DRC for more than a decade, what happened with the regional force and where the DRC goes from here.</em></p>
<h2>What was the mandate of the East African Community’s intervention in the DRC?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2537-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-22nd-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">July 2022 decision</a> to deploy an East African Community Regional Force to eastern DRC was prompted by renewed violence from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">armed group, M23</a>. </p>
<p>However, the scope of the force’s mandate has been a point of contention between the East African Community and the Congolese government. <a href="https://www.eac.int/statements/2791-status-of-the-east-african-community-regional-force-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo">According to the regional bloc</a>, the regional force was to oversee the withdrawal of armed groups – including M23 – from areas in eastern DRC. There are estimated to be more than <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">120 armed groups</a> in this region. It was also to ensure that a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> negotiated in December 2022 was observed. </p>
<p>The Congolese government wanted a more <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">assertive posture</a>, but the regional force has refused to engage in offensive operations. </p>
<p>It’s not clear how the two parties came to interpret the force’s mandate so differently, and this has been a major point of contention throughout its deployment.</p>
<h2>What were the force’s challenges and achievements?</h2>
<p>It’s much easier to speak of the force’s challenges than its achievements, which have been limited. It did experience some <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">early victories</a>, in particular the December 2022 <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> that included 53 armed groups. However, these and other efforts have been largely ineffective, with violence growing over the past year. And M23, the principal target of the intervention, has taken over new areas in the eastern region, including <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">some where the east African troops were stationed</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not only the DRC government that has been critical of the east African regional force. Many community members <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-downs-eac-protest/6923424.html">have expressed their anger</a> at the force’s lack of effectiveness. In some cases, this has led to riots and outbreaks of violence against the force. </p>
<p>There is also an overall <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">lack of trust</a> in foreign forces, given the history of military and economic meddling by the DRC’s neighbours. The exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by regional actors has been <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22074/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf#page=3">well documented</a>. Further, some members of the East African Community Regional Force, including Burundi and Uganda, have <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">illegally occupied</a> areas of DRC territory.</p>
<p>Frustrations are also high over continued insecurity following years of intervention, including nearly 25 years of <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">UN peacekeeping</a> in the country. Yet, violence continues to grow, with <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/sadc-fails-to-signal-military-deployment-to-dr-congo-4426108">more than six million people</a> currently displaced in the east.</p>
<p>The military presence of the east African force was <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">intended to complement a political process</a> that also involved the regional bloc’s leadership. However, this political process has stalled amid mounting tension between the DRC and Rwanda. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">Accusations of Rwanda’s support for M23</a> remain a crucial point of discord between the two countries. Rwanda officially <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/31/rwanda-denies-supporting-m23-rebel-group-in-eastern-drc//">denies</a> these accusations. </p>
<p>While the East African Community has expressed its intention to remain engaged politically even after its troops withdraw, overcoming regional political tensions remains a major obstacle.</p>
<h2>What prompted the exit from the DRC?</h2>
<p>After just over a year, the DRC government decided not to renew the mandate of the East African Community Regional Force past its 8 December 2023 expiration. President Felix Tshisekedi has accused the force of not only being ineffective but even of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">colluding with rebels</a>. </p>
<p>The more likely reason for the force’s exit, however, is Tshisekedi’s dissatisfaction with its unwillingness to use proactive force against M23. This posture would entail the force undertaking offensive operations to neutralise non-state groups in partnership with government forces. </p>
<p>Similar frustrations have been directed at the UN peacekeeping operation, which also <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">begins its drawing down in December 2023</a>. While most of the benchmarks identified for the UN mission’s withdrawal have not been met, the government has made it clear the mission is no longer welcome in the country. In the <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2023/02/23/a-majority-of-congolese-reject-east-african-community-regional-force/">eyes of the government and many community members</a>, if foreign forces cannot tamp down non-state armed groups, they should leave the country.</p>
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
<p>Though the east African force and UN peacekeepers will begin leaving the country this month, this is not the end of foreign forces in the DRC. The Southern African Development Community, which the DRC is a part of, <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-african-troops-versus-m23-rebels-in-the-drc-4-risks-this-poses-218282">has agreed to provide troops</a>. While the exact timing of their deployment has not yet been specified, it may correspond with the east African force’s withdrawal to ensure continuity of presence.</p>
<p>Underpinning the southern African deployment is the DRC’s renewed hope that the force will provide more robust operations. Tshisekedi noted that this regional bloc had resolved to help the DRC “<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">annihilate</a>” its enemies. The country’s deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, Christophe Lutundula, similarly <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">stated</a> that the force would </p>
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<p>support the Congolese army in fighting and eradicating the M23 and other armed groups.</p>
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<p>Even if southern African forces are willing to engage offensively, the chances of them facilitating longer term peace in the country are small. </p>
<p>This is because such operations rest on the DRC government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">flawed assumption</a> that it can achieve peace through <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">sheer military force</a>. The lack of sustained political engagement by the main parties to the conflict has undermined numerous attempts at peace. </p>
<p>The DRC is not the only accountable party in this situation – Rwanda carries its fair share of responsibility. But unless the government can facilitate a viable political process, more boots on the ground – whether international, regional or bilateral – are unlikely to bring the peace that the Congolese people seek.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research at the International Peace Institute (IPI), and Heads IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.</span></em></p>Chances of longer term peace are small because of the DRC’s assumption that it can achieve peace through sheer military force.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2195842023-12-11T12:34:28Z2023-12-11T12:34:28ZKenya at 60: the patriotic choral music used to present one version of history – podcast<p>Kenya is marking 60 years since its independence from British colonial rule on December 12, 1963. Each year, the country celebrates the occasion with a national holiday, Jamhuri Day. And for much of the past 60 years, patriotic choral music has been a regular feature of those celebrations. </p>
<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, we explore how much one song can tell you about the politics of a new nation – and who controls what gets remembered and what gets forgotten. </p>
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<p>Doseline Kiguru grew up hearing the song <em>Wimbo wa Historia</em> on Kenyan national radio in the 1980s and 1990s. Kiguru says the piece of choral music, which means “song of history” in Kiswahili, was often played on national holidays. </p>
<p>Today, Kiguru is a research associate in cultural and literary production in Africa at the University of Bristol in the UK. She has published research with her colleague Ernest Patrick Monte on the <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/epdf/10.10520/EJC-f184b6256">history of patriotic choral music</a> and the role it plays in Kenyan political culture. </p>
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<p><em>Wimbo wa Historia</em> was written in the 1960s by the composer Enock Ondego. “It’s trying to write history through music,” explains Kiguru. The song focuses on Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya. According to Ondego’s autobiography, it was first performed by schoolchildren in front of Kenyatta himself.</p>
<p>The lyrics recount a part of Kenya’s violent history in the lead up to independence, including Kenyatta’s imprisonment, release and visit to London for negotiations on the country’s new constitution. </p>
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<p>We argue that presenting the first president as somebody that suffered not only emotionally, but physically in so many different ways, it means that when he becomes president … you’re supposed to revere him, he’s the person who sacrificed the most. So that means his position as a leader of government, his position as president should not be questioned. It means that we are foregrounding specific individuals, and this later became known as a cult of personalities in Kenya. </p>
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<p>The music became a stalwart at national holiday celebrations in the late 20th century. It fell out of favour in the early 2000s, but then had a comeback after 2013 when Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, became president. </p>
<p>When Uhuru Kenyatta’s term ended in 2022, he was replaced by the current president, William Ruto. Kiguru says the song hasn’t been played at national holiday celebrations since Ruto’s election, but she speculates that it could still reappear because of the way it frames Kenya’s leaders in a cult of personality. </p>
<p>Listen to the full interview with Doseline Kiguru on the <a href="https://podfollow.com/the-conversation-weekly/view">The Conversation Weekly</a>, and read an article she wrote about her <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-patriotic-choral-music-has-been-used-to-embed-a-skewed-version-of-history-183850">research into Kenyan choral music here too</a>. </p>
<p>A transcript of this episode <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2998/Kenyan_Music_Transcript.pdf?1704360471">is now available.</a></p>
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<p><em>This episode was produced by Katie Flood and Mend Mariwany. It was written by Gemma Ware, who is the executive producer of the show. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.</em></p>
<p><em>Newsclips in this episode from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZR099-5USo">British Pathé</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVLIzq_qhWg">DW News</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ju1hugt0v4s">Al Jazeera English</a>. Wimbo wa Historia original version from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixZ2Mg-fEb4">ArapKaruiTV</a> and Leyla’s 2018 version from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPm5y2FLN6E">DJ Survival Kenya</a>. Additional music from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CjG9zCCJTAo">Heko Jamhuri by Muungano National Choir</a> from Tamasha Records.</em> </p>
<p><em>You can find us on X, formerly known as Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doseline Kiguru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Kenya marks 60 years of independence, we explore how much one song can tell you about the politics of a new nation. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182612023-12-08T13:03:45Z2023-12-08T13:03:45ZHumiliation and violence in Kenya’s colonial days – when old men were called ‘boy’ and Africans were publicly beaten<p>When King Charles visited Kenya in November 2023, many Kenyans <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/khrc-demands-reparations-for-colonial-injustices-ahead-of-king-charles-iiis-visit-n330247">renewed their demands</a> for an official apology for atrocities committed by the British government during the colonial era. The widespread human rights abuses during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mau-mau-apology-is-a-victory-50-years-in-the-making-14981">Mau Mau rebellion</a> are the best-known of these atrocities. Yet we should not forget more mundane, everyday acts of domination.</p>
<p>I am a social historian who has studied race, violence, colonialism and white settlement in Kenya. From the start of colonialism in 1895 to the drawing down of the Union Jack on 12 December 1963, black Kenyans were constantly subjected to violence and humiliation at the hands of colonial officials, settlers and missionaries alike.</p>
<p>In one book chapter, drawing on a set of political tracts, autobiographies and novels written by Gikuyu men since 1950s, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-56930-3_10">I demonstrate</a> how humiliation and violence were central to their experience of colonialism. </p>
<p>Because the Mau Mau rebellion largely involved Gikuyu, and the education system favoured boys, Gikuyu men’s reminiscences about the era were more likely to be published than women’s or those of other Kenyans. </p>
<p>These men were well aware of the structural iniquities of British colonialism. But it was also intensely personal. </p>
<p>This drove them to respond. Some went on to join radical politics, others took up arms. </p>
<p>The individual humiliation and violence became for them a basis for collective political action and organised resistance. While we cannot downplay the impact of land alienation, mass incarceration and racial dictatorship, the personal experience played a key role in the dismantling of British rule in Kenya. </p>
<h2>Humiliating words</h2>
<p>Left-wing activist and post-independence martyr <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31817667">J.M. Kariuki</a> <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Mau_Mau_Detainee.html?id=vjhyAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">explained</a> how white people could humiliate educated Africans, elder men and Africans of socio-economic means:</p>
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<p>Many Europeans refused to talk to educated Africans in any language but their deplorably bad Swahili; old men were addressed as boys and monkeys; Africans were barred from hotels and clubs.</p>
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<p>Any status that an African man might achieve was denied respect by whites.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/180220">kipande</a> – registration papers kept in a tin canister around the neck when Africans left their “reserves” – was one common humiliation. Another was that of “a European calling a 70-year-old African ‘boy’.” (<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Child_of_Two_Worlds.html?id=Q8UJAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Mugo Gatheru</a>). </p>
<p>The words and blows struck these Gikuyu men particularly hard because they had undergone initiation which had transformed them from boys into men who could, Gatheru wrote, “now make our own choices.” They would “walk with great confidence … and take responsibilities that are assumed only by the circumcised ones.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Land-sunshine-Scenes-Kenya-before/dp/B0000CJX2C">Muga Gicaru</a>, who in the 1950s tried to alert Britons to the violence and humiliations endemic in their east African colony, explained how initiated men “acquired self-respect” and a sense of self-mastery, maturity and adulthood.</p>
<p>Yet they weren’t granted respect, and they were disregarded as “men”. Radical pamphleteer Gakaara wa Wanjau <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3819874">charged that</a> whites believed that Africans’ “minds are the minds of children and therefore our leaders do not qualify for wise mature leadership.” </p>
<h2>Use of violence</h2>
<p>To the stings of these words and policies were added those of violence. </p>
<p>Charles Muhoro Kareri, who would in 1961 become the first African moderator of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Life_of_Charles_Muhoro_Kareri.html?id=itCkAAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">wrote</a> a dozen years after independence that: </p>
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<p>people may fail to comprehend how the whites used to beat black people … missionaries, farmers, or government officers, all whites beat black people.</p>
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<p>The full power of the state stood behind white people, and protesting against this violence could bring yet more violence. </p>
<p>Recalling one brutal assault he witnessed, Kareri and others could only watch “in amazement, for there was nothing for us to do.” This inability to retaliate could be just as painful as the physical blows. </p>
<p>World-famous novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’o <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Dreams_in_a_Time_of_War.html?id=uT2Q4S8VrXsC&redir_esc=y">tells of</a> being struck by a white officer when Ngugi failed to address him as “effendi” (sir). Then he was ordered to utter the word:</p>
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<p>‘Yes, effendi!’ I said, tears at the edges of my eyelids. I was now a man (having been initiated); I was not supposed to cry. But a man is supposed to fight back, to defend himself and his own, but I could not summon even a gesture of self-defence.</p>
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<p>In that moment of humiliation and violence, the pain was personal: Ngugi felt crushed when he could not react as he should. </p>
<p>Before he became a radical trade union activist and advocated for violent anti-colonialism, Bildad Kaggia was a clerk for the colonial state. One day when he <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Roots_of_Freedom_1921_1963.html?id=knWRAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">was yelled at</a> by his white supervisor for not removing his hat, he was “very embarrassed.” Kaggia and the friend he was with did not speak of it, “but I felt very indignant at being humiliated in his presence.” </p>
<p>The spectacle was meant to remind Kaggia of his station in life. Despite being an educated, white-collar employee of the state, Kaggia concluded that “what mattered was colour.” </p>
<p>The examples of white people humiliating and beating Africans are extensive in the writings of these Gikuyu men, as well as in the writings of <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526106810/">white people</a> who lived in colonial Kenya. </p>
<p>These everyday acts were central to the racial dictatorship. White people were daily reinforcing a hierarchy that allowed one person to abuse another, like a parent scolding and spanking a child.</p>
<h2>From humiliation to political action</h2>
<p>Kaggia, and others, took their personal hurt and used it towards a broader political programme. They sought ways to organise resistance through pamphlets, political parties, and force of arms to end a colonialism that was based on racial hierarchies. </p>
<p>Gakaara <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/mau-mau-author-in-detention-gakaara-wa-wanjau/TQGyxdcXWWPl4A?hl=en">began writing</a> radical treatises after witnessing Africans suffering “constant physical assaults and verbal abuse by white land owners.” </p>
<p>Gatheru <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4184590">wrote that</a> “Africans were being regarded as small children.” Their treatment in “such humiliating and degrading fashion” led him to organised politics. </p>
<p>Each of these men fought for freedom of their people, their passions raised by experiencing colonialism as a personal attack on their dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218261/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brett Shadle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Colonialists daily reinforced a hierarchy that allowed white people to abuse Africans.Brett Shadle, Professor, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186082023-12-08T13:03:35Z2023-12-08T13:03:35ZKenya at 60: the shameful truth about British colonial abuse and how it was covered up<p>It is fairly well known that the lives of hundreds of thousands of Kenyans were affected by terrible acts of violence under the British colonial administration. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/britain-maumau-empire-waiting">British government</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/king-charles-stops-short-of-apology-for-british-colonial-violence-kenya">King Charles</a> have acknowledged it, and some victims of violence have taken the British government <a href="https://www.leighday.co.uk/news/blog/2017-blogs/the-mau-mau-case-five-years-on/">to court</a> for these crimes. </p>
<p>Less-known is how much the British imperialist government tried to cover up these violations. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670796">research</a> reveals how harsh British detention camps in Kenya were, and the extremes to which the colonialists went to conceal information about this.</p>
<p>Much of this violence happened during the state of emergency, which lasted between 20 October 1952 and 12 January 1960. </p>
<p>As militant nationalism, including the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/mau-mau-uprising">Mau Mau rebellion</a>, grew against the colonial state, a state of emergency was declared in 1952. It introduced a raft of extraordinary regulations, akin to wartime powers. </p>
<p>The regulations paved the way for mass arrests, detention without trial, excess capital punishment, summary executions, evictions, fines and the forced resettlement of entire villages. </p>
<p>From 1953 to 1960, between <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/20529/15/LHR%20AM%20Duffy.pdf#page=16">70,000</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2011.611677">150,000</a> Mau Mau suspects were detained without trial in an archipelago of camps. Conditions in the camps were dire and British colonials and loyalist warders meted out violence with impunity. </p>
<p>The Kenya Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.khrc.or.ke/index.php/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/826-accept-without-equivocation-responsibility-over-the-atrocious-colonial-rule-british-investments-and-programmes-in-kenya-to-date">estimates</a> that more than 100,000 Kenyans were killed, tortured and maimed during this time. </p>
<p>Using declassified colonial files and government papers, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670796">my research</a> reveals the pressure that was exerted by the Colonial Office in London to conceal evidence of violence against detainees. It shows how a highly sophisticated propaganda machine controlled the public narrative of violent incidents. </p>
<p>It was a form of state-sanctioned amnesia that hid the victims’ perspectives. It officially depicted the British colonials as rational actors doing a difficult job under the circumstances. </p>
<p>Highlighting this colonial story enriches the present and sheds new light on these events.</p>
<h2>Violence in detention</h2>
<p>I identified flash-points of violence which revealed the brutality of the colonial detention regime. </p>
<p>One of these, known as screening, occurred when an entire village or community was confined and interrogated about their political allegiances. Many were subsequently detained. </p>
<p>To progress through the camp complex to eventual release, detainees (none of whom had been charged with or convicted of any crime) had to confess to their Mau Mau activities. </p>
<p>Camp staff achieved this by using systematic brutality that had been sanctioned by the colonial administration. </p>
<p>One example was the “dilution” technique. This occurred when a small number of non-cooperating detainees were housed with cooperating detainees who – through a concerted psychological and physical attack – would push them to accept the rehabilitation regime and confess to taking the Mau Mau oath. </p>
<p>A variation of this, the Mwea procedure, used physical force to break “hardcore” detainees when they first arrived at the detention camp. Incoming detainees would be abused by prison staff and cooperating detainees until they submitted. </p>
<p>Another form of sanctioned violence was the use of “overpowering force”. This was supposed to be executed by European rehabilitation and prison staff in the form of on-the-spot punishment of no more than 12 strokes using a regulation cane. </p>
<p>From 1953, a policy to compel detainees to engage in work was introduced and disobedience was redefined as a major offence. So when detainees refused to work, they were subject to corporal punishment. </p>
<p>The scene was therefore set for the sanctioned use of violence against detainees. And if people were injured or killed in defiance of a legal order, those consequences could more easily be justified by camp authorities.</p>
<p>These methods of corporal punishment resulted in many injuries and deaths because camp staff regularly exceeded the punishment specified in emergency ordinances.</p>
<p>For instance, on 3 March 1959 at Hola detention camp in the north province, 11 detainees were killed and many more injured after being set upon by guards for “refusing to work”. </p>
<p>The initial official account blamed the deaths on contaminated water. However, the local inquest magistrate revealed the deaths “were due to shock and haemorrhage due to multiple bruising caused by violence”. Still, no one was ever prosecuted for these killings.</p>
<h2>Memory and history</h2>
<p>The history that is remembered is no accident. Writing to the governor and the colonial secretary in 1953, Kenya’s attorney general advised, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/mau-mau-sinning-quietly">if we are going to sin, we must sin quietly</a>”. Thus, a version of British imperialism was projected that relied upon concealment of harsh facts.</p>
<p>The violent architecture of the camps was hidden behind complicated bureaucratic language that stripped away its real meaning. </p>
<p>The British public were spun a narrative by the colonial government about the “rehabilitative” nature of the camps – a way to convert people away from Mau Mau allegiance.</p>
<p>In addition to spin, there was a deliberate attempt to suppress information. I was able to pinpoint significant Colonial Office directives from the late 1950s, which I argue were central to official denial and amnesia. </p>
<p>As British colonial territories were inching toward independence in the mid-20th century, the government in Whitehall <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-history-review/article/abs/legacies-of-british-colonial-violence-viewing-kenyan-detention-camps-through-the-hanslope-disclosure/8B1F91BFF8D1F967A9220DA5F9D47551">redoubled its efforts to bury</a> any evidence that implicated its colonial officials in violations that occurred in territories under British administration. </p>
<p>All top secret classified materials were rapidly centralised in executive offices in Kenya and marked for “European eyes only”. </p>
<p>Certain colonial files were given a particular classification in a “Watch” series prior to Kenyan independence in 1963. This included “all papers which might be interpreted as showing racial discrimination against Africans on the part of the Government”. </p>
<p>The files <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-history-review/article/abs/legacies-of-british-colonial-violence-viewing-kenyan-detention-camps-through-the-hanslope-disclosure/8B1F91BFF8D1F967A9220DA5F9D47551">were then</a> either destroyed or removed to the UK in the 1960s. We know about the classification directives and destruction mandates <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/sins-colonialists-concealed-secret-archive">because</a> a paper trail covering those particular processes survived. </p>
<p>It is clear from these directives that evidence of serious human rights abuses would be destroyed in these document purges. Documents deemed to be safe were transferred to the new independent government.</p>
<p>All of these acts meant that the colonial portrayal of the Mau Mau uprising as irrational could be legitimised.</p>
<p>Selectivity over what could be mentioned was a successful colonial strategy, with resonance in how British colonial history is viewed today.</p>
<h2>Apology and reparations</h2>
<p>Those who continue to benefit from Britain’s historical violence are insensitive or unresponsive to the calls for acknowledgement, apology and reparations. </p>
<p>Public statements by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/king-charles-stops-short-of-apology-for-british-colonial-violence-kenya">King Charles</a> and former British foreign secretary <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2013-06-06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement)">William Hague</a> recognise that Kenyans were subjected to torture and ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration, but they fall short of a full apology.</p>
<p>There will be difficulty in examining and addressing historical harms. But my research reveals a need to reconcile the colonial narratives with historical facts. This holds the potential to foster genuine compassion and justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoife Duffy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thousands of Kenyans were held in detention camps, and the British imperialist government tried to cover up brutal violations that occurred there.Aoife Duffy, Senior Lecturer, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181312023-12-03T05:47:39Z2023-12-03T05:47:39ZNine out of 10 South African criminals reoffend, while in Finland it’s 1 in 3. This is why<p><em>A very large percentage of South Africans who are released from prison end up being rearrested and being convicted for crimes again. The country has one of the highest recidivism rates <a href="https://www.702.co.za/podcasts/269/tonight-with-lester-kiewit/279121/nicro-the-high-rate-ofoffender-recidivism">in the world</a>. Criminologist Casper Lӧtter sets out his findings in <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/view/13232">a recent paper</a> on what can be learnt from Finland’s experience in reducing this trend.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the difference between the two countries’ approaches?</h2>
<p>About 9 out of 10 ex-offenders reoffend in South Africa. Expressed as a percentage of 90% of the prison population of roughly 260,000 at any one point in time, this is one of the highest and most unsustainable in the world. </p>
<p>The US has a rate of recidivism of around <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20439062?origin=crossref">67%</a> while <a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-control-what-south-africa-can-learn-from-china-169269">China</a>, an authoritarian country where mass executions of recidivists are the norm, has a rate between 6% and 8%. </p>
<p>In Finland, a liberal democracy, the rate is a very acceptable 31%.</p>
<p>The primary cause of reoffending in South Africa appears to be the state’s unwillingness or inability to clear up areas of conflict in society which either breed criminality or fuel reoffending. Examples of these are <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">inequality</a> (a breeding ground for violent crimes), poverty in an otherwise affluent society, chronic unemployment and government <a href="https://us.sagepub.com/hi/sam/the-sage-handbook-of-criminological-theory/book228876">practices</a> that marginalise and stigmatise people. </p>
<p>Not only has the state failed to keep citizens safe from preventable crime and harm, but politicians have also used the issue to campaign on a “tough on crime” ticket.</p>
<p>South Africa also has a harsh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ex-offenders-should-be-made-prison-wardens-in-south-africa-heres-why-162316">stigmatising</a> shaming culture, as opposed to an integrative shaming culture, when it comes to people convicted of crimes. In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-control-what-south-africa-can-learn-from-china-169269">stigmatising</a> shaming culture, ex-offenders often experience discrimination and ostracisation. This drives them away from mainstream culture and its values and towards criminal subcultures. The US has a similar culture. </p>
<p>In an integrative shaming culture, ex-offenders are encouraged to reintegrate into society. They are provided with employment and other opportunities to ease their transition into mainstream society. China and Japan are examples of this. </p>
<p>This approach is also widespread in African cultures, such as those found in Mali, Kenya and even Nigeria. The reason for this? In most African countries with a history of colonialism, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2637640">a connection</a> has been established between imprisonment and slavery. </p>
<p>Significantly, the leading Australian comparative criminologist John <a href="http://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1999_Crime-Shame-and-Reintegratio.pdf">Braithwaite</a> has argued that stigma is “counter-productive” and fuels reoffending.</p>
<p>Though recidivism (reoffending) is a significant problem in criminology, there are no easy answers on how to fix it. The problem is both complex and nuanced.</p>
<h2>Alternative approaches</h2>
<p>In a <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/view/13232">recent paper</a>, I looked at alternatives.</p>
<p>For example, Finland has a hybrid culture. It has a stigmatising shaming culture that is heavily influenced by integrative shaming features. A well-known Chinese proverb proclaims that nuance is everything. These characteristics are evident in the Finnish prison setting as well as the post-incarceration environment. </p>
<p>Strenuous efforts are made to provide ex-offenders with employment opportunities or financial assistance after their release from prison. </p>
<p>And offenders’ concerns are attended to during incarceration. <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/239477">Prison protests</a>, such as hunger strikes, are unheard of in Finnish prisons. In South Africa they are common.</p>
<p>But the most glaring characteristic of the Finnish system is an admirable rate of recidivism of about 31% (with deincarceration at 53 individuals imprisoned per 100,000 in the national general population). Deincarceration is the result of efforts to limit recourse to imprisonment as much as possible. In <a href="https://www.702.co.za/podcasts/269/tonight-with-lester-kiewit/279121/nicro-the-high-rate-ofoffender-recidivism">South Africa</a> the rate of recidivism (reoffending) is between 86% and 94%. </p>
<p>So, even though South Africa’s rate of incarceration (the number of convicted criminals who go to prison) is almost five times higher than that of Finland, Finland has only one third of South Africa’s reoffending rate. The question is why, since both these countries exhibit stigmatising shaming cultures.</p>
<p>In my research I identified specific features within the Finnish system that makes it a good model for the South African Department of Correctional Services to follow. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Punishment as a mere loss of liberty. Other features of incarceration, such as <a href="https://perjournal.co.za/article/view/12743">torture</a>, forfeiture of privileges (such as family visits), degrading or insulting treatment and solitary confinement are not evident in the Finnish system. All of these are evident in South Africa. </p></li>
<li><p>Reintegration into society. Offenders are provided, as far as possible, with employment opportunities and other measures to help them return to mainstream society. This helps them survive in a harsh stigmatising shaming culture. </p></li>
<li><p>Promotion of normal humane conditions in the prison environment. Prisons in Finland are not surrounded by barbed wire, and prison wardens are dressed in normal civilian clothing. Everything possible is done to normalise the prison environment.</p></li>
<li><p>Just and respectful treatment of prisoners, upholding their human dignity. Research <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781843926030-5/harm-contemporary-prison-john-irwin-barbara-owen">has shown</a> that treating offenders in humiliating ways damages their sense of self and complicates their integration into society.</p></li>
<li><p>Responsiveness to offenders’ concerns. Understanding their problems allows them to feel they are part of the system and breaks down their resistance to cooperation with authorities. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What lessons can be learnt</h2>
<p>My research shows that South Africa could benefit from Finland’s approach.</p>
<p>South African academic <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Conflict_Management_for_South_African_St.html?id=aie7YgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Gavin Bradshaw</a>, an expert on deep-rooted societal conflict as well as social cohesion, notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most recent research work on negotiation also supports the fact that integrative approaches are usually far more effective {than power bargaining}.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Recognition of the formerly incarcerated’s basic human needs, as Bradshaw indicates, is bound to have a significant impact on South Africa’s
rates of recidivism. </p>
<p>I found that Finland’s great achievement is a result of recognising the basic human needs of offenders and ex-offenders, thereby eliminating this primary source of human conflict. Those needs include employment, where possible, basic accommodation, dignity, and responsiveness to their concerns.</p>
<p>In a country where 9 out of every 10 offenders reoffend, it is perhaps time to reevaluate <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2023-03-25-is-the-idea-of-rehabilitation-redundant-in-south-africa/">the rehabilitation paradigm</a>. Finland’s experience shows the value of applying sensible conflict transformation perspectives in the management of crime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Casper Lӧtter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Finland’s experience shows the value of applying sensible conflict transformation perspectives in the management of crime.Casper Lӧtter, Research fellow, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182632023-11-24T15:44:52Z2023-11-24T15:44:52ZUK’s failed asylum deportation plan puts Rwanda’s human rights and refugee struggles in the spotlight<p>The UK Supreme Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf">ruled on 15 November 2023 that</a> sending asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful. The plan would have seen <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/apr/14/tens-of-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-could-be-sent-to-rwanda-says-boris-johnson">tens of thousands</a> of asylum seekers sent from the UK to Rwanda, which would then process and host such refugees indefinitely.</p>
<p>Along with countless <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/uk-abandon-rwanda-asylum-transfer-plan">refugee and human rights groups</a> – including <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-we-do/uk-asylum-and-policy-and-illegal-migration-act/migration-and-economic-development#:%7E:text=UNHCR%20believes%20the%20UK's%20announced,established%20international%20refugee%20protection%20system.">the United Nations</a> – I raised <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uks-plans-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-raise-four-red-flags-182709">red flags about the plan</a> and welcome the decision to halt it. My <a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/people/evan-easton-calabria">research and work</a> over more than a decade has focused on the livelihoods and survival of refugees in east Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-rwanda-plan-unlawful-a-legal-expert-explains-the-judgment-and-what-happens-next-217730">UK court’s decision</a> is grounded in the view that Rwanda is unsafe for asylum seekers because it might force them to return to their home country. Forced return is against <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rights-of-refugees-in-africa-are-under-threat-what-can-be-done-182892">international human rights law</a> as refugees and asylum seekers may be persecuted again in their country of origin. </p>
<p>Much of the recent media focus has been on what the ruling means for the UK and its migration policy. But it’s also important to understand the implications for Rwanda itself and for the refugees already residing there. </p>
<p>Rwanda currently hosts <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/rwa">more than 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers</a>. Most are from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. It’s one of the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/rwanda/#people-and-society">most densely populated</a> countries in Africa and has a <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_RWA.pdf#page=1">high poverty rate</a>, which matters for its ability to host refugees. In the UK’s effort to deter irregular migration, it sought to outsource the asylum-seeking process and ultimately refugee hosting to Rwanda. The east African nation would in return <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/#:%7E:text=In%20return%2C%20the%20UK%20has,around%20%C2%A312%2C000%20per%20person">receive development funds</a>. Neither side of this deal was taking the needs of asylum seekers into account. </p>
<p>The recent UK court ruling highlights two things that Rwanda and its development and humanitarian partners need to consider:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the east African nation’s human rights record</p></li>
<li><p>international support for refugees and asylum seekers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Failing to address the current gaps in these two areas reflects a disregard for human rights that falls on the international community’s shoulders, too.</p>
<h2>Rwanda’s human rights record</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf#page=4">evidence</a> considered in the UK ruling adds to ongoing documentation about Rwanda’s poor human rights record. Refugees and citizens in the country have experienced political repression, including being <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/articles/2018/04/04/please-tell-us-where-we-belong-a-deadly-refugee-protest-in-rwanda">killed during protests</a>. A recent <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/rwanda-global-playbook-abuse-silence-critics">Human Rights Watch report</a> documented Kigali’s use of threats, kidnapping and even killing of Rwandan refugees and migrants abroad who undertake or are affiliated to political activism. </p>
<p>Worrying past evidence of the treatment of asylum seekers includes the outcome of a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/israel-secret-deal-over-deporting-african-migrants-reckless-and-illegal">secretive deal between Israel, Rwanda and Uganda</a> to receive African asylum seekers (mostly from Eritrea and Sudan) between 2014 and 2017. A majority of those deported from Israel to Rwanda immediately left, some through <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/10/moving-under">dangerous migration routes</a>. </p>
<p>In its recent ruling, the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-press-summary.pdf#page=2">UK court concluded</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>there were substantial grounds for believing that there were real risks that asylum claims would not be properly determined by the Rwandan authorities. There were, therefore, real risks of refoulement {forced return}.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The evidence provided by the UN Refugee Agency highlighted <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/sites/uk/files/legacy-pdf/631f52a84.pdf#page=3">serious issues in Rwanda’s asylum system</a>. This included a lack of adequate legal representation, the risk of bias by judges and lawyers in politically sensitive cases, and current practices of forced return. A failure to comply with international law suggests Rwanda may well continue to benefit from development funding while sending asylum seekers home or <a href="https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/10/moving-under">pressuring them to leave the country</a>.</p>
<p>To rectify these failings, the government of Rwanda must commit to eliminating forced return. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms in Rwanda to do so, the international community – including the UN Refugee Agency and activists in the region – must continue to document evidence of human rights violations and speak out. If these violations don’t cease, Rwanda should no longer be funded as the “<a href="https://www.devex.com/news/q-a-new-book-puts-fresh-scrutiny-on-donor-darling-rwanda-99584">donor darling</a>” that it has been. </p>
<h2>Areas for improvement</h2>
<p>At the same time, the UK court ruling illustrates the need for humanitarian and development partners to support Rwanda to improve its conditions for refugees and its asylum-seeking process. In its written evidence for the case, the UN Refugee Agency <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/sites/uk/files/legacy-pdf/631f52a84.pdf#page=3">assessed that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>long-term and fundamental engagement is required to develop Rwanda’s national asylum structures to fairly adjudicate individual asylum claims.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This statement is both a critique of the limitations to the existing asylum infrastructure in Rwanda and an important call for action. </p>
<p>As of 31 October 2023, the UN Refugee Agency’s Rwanda operation was only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-funding-2023">38% funded</a>. This means that refugees within Rwanda <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-operational-update-6137">lack healthcare support and have limited access to legal counselling</a> and assistance.</p>
<p>These figures demand a closer look at the treatment of refugees in Rwanda and the region. These funding deficits restrict the rights of those refugees most in need.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-rwanda-plan-unlawful-a-legal-expert-explains-the-judgment-and-what-happens-next-217730">Supreme court rules Rwanda plan unlawful: a legal expert explains the judgment, and what happens next</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Efforts to improve the asylum system can and should build on the promising practices within Rwanda that relate to refugees. These include <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda-operational-update-6137">over 90%</a> of children born as refugees having their birth registered, and a provision on the <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/turning-policy-into-reality-refugees-access-to-work-in-rwanda/">right to work</a>. Urban refugees and refugee students can also <a href="https://globalcompactrefugees.org/good-practices/community-based-health-insurance-urban-refugees-and-refugee-students-rwanda">access</a> the national community-based health insurance scheme. </p>
<p>Non-legal barriers – such as lack of access to capital for businesses and poor camp infrastructure, including limited electricity – still play a role in impeding access to these services for many refugees. However, these are important rights to continue to actualise – and ones that many other refugee-hosting countries don’t offer at all. </p>
<p>The court’s attention to Rwanda’s human rights violations may lead to restricted development funding or wider repercussions for the country from the international community. But there’s a need for more – not less – investment in refugee assistance in Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>There are two best possible outcomes of the UK-Rwanda migration deal being deemed unlawful. </p>
<p>First is that it leads to commitments by the government of Rwanda to improve its treatment of refugees, including Rwandan refugees abroad. Second is that it encourages the UK and other countries to examine their own unlawful practices, such as the <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/migration-and-displacement/refugees-and-asylum-seekers/scared-confused-alone-the-dark-truths-of-immigration-detention">indefinite detention of asylum seekers</a> and ongoing attempts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/outsourcing-asylum-seekers-the-case-of-rwanda-and-the-uk-180973">externalise asylum</a>. </p>
<p>Just as Rwanda’s human rights record should not be brushed under the rug, neither should the international community’s limited support for refugees.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Easton-Calabria receives funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Research conducted through these grants is unrelated to the contents of this article.</span></em></p>The government of Rwanda must commit to eliminating the forced return of refugees and asylum seekers.Evan Easton-Calabria, Senior Researcher at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, and Research Associate at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.