tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/nelson-mandela-5996/articles
Nelson Mandela – The Conversation
2024-03-03T14:27:16Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/224915
2024-03-03T14:27:16Z
2024-03-03T14:27:16Z
Brian Mulroney’s tough stand against apartheid is one of his most important legacies
<p>With his <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-passes-away-1.7130287">passing</a> announced on Feb. 29, Canadians have cause to reflect on the legacy of former prime minister Brian Mulroney. What will last when the great book of history is written is that Mulroney played a central role in the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. </p>
<p>This contribution, along with Canada’s contributions to the First and Second World Wars and <a href="https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-peacekeeping-operations/">the creation of peacekeeping</a>, will stand among the great foreign policy contributions in Canadian history. </p>
<p>At the outset, we must acknowledge that apartheid — the system of racial separation and white domination of Blacks and others in South Africa — was <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-end-of-apartheid-101602">brought down principally by South Africans themselves</a>. Their internal opposition to the regime, their mobilization of world opinion and action against it and their courage and moral clarity was a necessary condition for its end. </p>
<p>But the end of apartheid was accelerated by allies in the democratic West, and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-brian-mulroney-south-africa-ramaphosa/">at the head of that group stood Mulroney</a>. Indeed, there is good reason why <a href="https://macleans.ca/news/world/macleans-archives-mandelas-three-city-visit-to-canada/">Nelson Mandela made his first foreign visit to Canada’s Parliament</a> after his release from prison in February of 1990. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2015/12/08/statement-prime-minister-canada-former-prime-minister-brian-mulroney">South Africa awarded Mulroney its highest honour for foreign citizens</a> in 2015 for his “exceptional contribution to South Africa’s liberation movement and his steadfast support for the release of Nelson Mandela.”</p>
<p>It is important that we recognize this accomplishment not only for its moral merits, but because it can teach us how Canadian foreign policy — for moral and instrumental ends — can be done effectively. There are three lessons to learn (or relearn). </p>
<h2>Lesson 1: Mulroney recognized apartheid as indefensible</h2>
<p>Mulroney’s opposition to apartheid was not driven by simple domestic politics and certainly not by diasporic concerns. Opposition to apartheid was widely held in Canada in the late 1980s and it was a live issue. But it was not one that obviously favoured Mulroney politically. So, why did he oppose it? </p>
<p>First, the issue was to him one of simple justice and morality. Like his early political mentor, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1771019570">John Diefenbaker</a>, he thought the system was indefensible and immoral. It could not be redeemed by instrumental appeals to anti-Communism or whatever other realpolitik defences <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brian-mulroney-legacy-south-africa-apartheid-1.7130982">U.S. President Ronald Reagan or U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher</a> advanced. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brian-mulroney-champion-of-free-trade-brought-canada-closer-to-the-u-s-during-his-reign-as-prime-minister-224852">Brian Mulroney, champion of free trade, brought Canada closer to the U.S. during his reign as prime minister</a>
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<p>Second, he thought it was contrary to Canadian values, which have their roots in the founding of the country as a place dedicated to bringing different groups closer together, rather than farther apart. To maintain Canada’s credibility in the world as a <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/middle-power">middle power</a>, Canada had to act in a way that was consistent with a system of values, and not simple power. </p>
<h2>Lesson 2: Mulroney leveraged political and personal power</h2>
<p>Mulroney was a master of the multilateral system. By the late 1980s, accelerating and amplifying pressure on apartheid South Africa required ever stronger and <a href="https://www.history.com/news/end-apartheid-steps">tighter sanctions</a>. This required as many nations as possible to agree to as strong a sanction regime as possible. </p>
<p>I had the opportunity to directly ask Mulroney about his international leadership in the campaign against apartheid. As director of the <a href="https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/event/conversation-rt-hon-brian-mulroney">Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy</a>, I hosted a conversation with Mulroney in September 2022. When I asked him how he used international institutions, Mulroney said:</p>
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<p>People who say that nations only have interests, no friendships, is nonsense. … Everybody has interests but also friendships. And you can’t deal at the international level with any hostility. You gotta try and bring people (together). Canada is a middle power. We’re not a superpower. So we have to leverage our assets as best we can.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The author of this article, Peter Loewen, in conversation with Brian Mulroney on Sept. 22, 2022, at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By 1987 and 1988, Mulroney had managed to secure the chairmanship of three international organizations covering the majority of the democratic world: The Commonwealth, the G7 and the Francophonie. In each of those organizations, he built personal ties with leaders, reinforced by a deep appreciation for their own domestic concerns and motivations. </p>
<p>When push came to shove on <a href="https://doi.org/10.3138/jcs.25.4.17">tightening sanction regimes,</a> he had both personal power and agenda-setting power. He could put apartheid on the agenda, and he could use the depth of relationships to push and pull leaders to his own position. We have not had a prime minister since who has combined institutional power and personal connection to such an effect. </p>
<h2>Lesson 3: Mulroney played a long game</h2>
<p>Mulroney played a long(ish) game. When South African President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/world/south-africa-s-new-era-mandela-go-free-today-de-klerk-proclaims-ending-chapter.html">F.W. de Klerk announced in February 1990 the immediate release of Mandela from a prison</a> off the coast of Cape Town, he did not simultaneously agree to dismantle the laws enforcing apartheid. </p>
<p>Despite this, by Mulroney’s telling, he was under immediate and intense <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/07/14/thatcher-and-mulroney-clash-on-sanctions-against-s-africa/125f7806-a7f5-46aa-85ec-8f49f8c7f991/">pressure from Thatcher</a> to support the lifting of sanctions. Mulroney refused to do so until the system of racial separation in law was dismantled. </p>
<p>The broader context is important here. The Berlin Wall had fallen the year before and the world was experiencing a menacing uncertainty. Mulroney knew that the creation of a broader <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/664d7fa5-d575-45da-8129-095647c8abe7">rules-based order</a> with greater international security, more trade and more, not less, reconciliation depended deeply on defending democratic values. Those values had to be as deeply defended in South Africa as they were in a soon reunified Germany. They could not be abandoned as soon as attention moved elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Mulroney’s legacy</h2>
<p>We can arrive at different judgments of Mulroney’s legacy. To me, it is one marked by huge success and risky failures — but always an ambition to do big, consequential things. But in the final judgment, his confrontation of apartheid married moral clarity and effective politics. If only our politics had that same leadership again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Loewen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Brian Mulroney’s role in the campaign against apartheid in South Africa can teach us how Canadian foreign policy can be done effectively.
Peter Loewen, Director, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/222765
2024-02-06T12:29:17Z
2024-02-06T12:29:17Z
Zuleikha Mayat: South African author and activist who led a life of courage, compassion and integrity
<p>Few Indian South African women have achieved wider public recognition than author, human rights and cultural activist <a href="https://salaamedia.com/2021/05/08/championpeople-meet-zuleikha-mayat-social-activist-and-renowned-author-of-indian-delights-cookbook/">Zuleikha Mayat</a>, who passed away on 2 February 2024. An honorary doctorate from the University of KwaZulu-Natal was just one of many awards bestowed on her during a life that spanned almost 98 years. </p>
<p>Mayat was a remarkable pioneer, evocative writer, public speaker, civic worker, human rights champion and philanthropist. She was a staunch supporter of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/whither-palestine-ronnie-kasrils-19-may-2015-london">Palestinian freedom</a> and an end to Israeli apartheid and genocide. </p>
<p>I am a scholar of social justice issues in South Africa and have known Mayat for 49 years, through my friendship with her children. I assisted her with her last book, and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/dr-zuleikha-mayat-appreciation-saleem-badat">recently penned an e-book about her incredible life</a>. </p>
<p>She embodied principled, faith-based, socially committed, inspired leadership based on special talents and indomitable resilience, and upheld the dignity of all with whom she associated. In <a href="https://alqalam.co.za/zuleikha-mayat-93-a-true-indian-delight/">an interview in 2019</a> she said that she hoped to be remembered as “someone who interacted with everyone, no matter who they were, without prejudice”.</p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>She was born on 3 August 1926 in Potchefstroom in South Africa’s North West province, the third-generation child of Indian-South African shopkeepers of Gujarati origins. In a country marked by racial divides even before the advent of apartheid in 1948, she learnt from her grandfather – <a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">as she later wrote</a> – that intermingling across social divides and boundaries was important, as was “learning the languages and folkways” of other social groups.</p>
<p>Her father was generous to poor people and drummed into her, <a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">she later reflected</a>, that “others have a share in our incomes”. For her “the Bounty of God is not just for a select few but must be shared” so that all “can benefit”. </p>
<p>The young Mayat read voraciously but racialism stifled her formal education. After grade 6 at the Potchefstroom Indian Government School there was no secondary school for Indians. Segregation (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/control-1910-1948">1910-1948</a>), the precursor to apartheid, which legally entrenched racial classification and enforced segregation in all walks of life, meant separate schools for different “races” and the schools for whites would not enrol her. </p>
<p>Patriarchy also played a role. She was one of seven siblings; boys, like her three brothers, continued secondary education in other towns or cities “<a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">but sending daughters away was almost unheard of</a>”. And, so, her ambition to become a doctor was thwarted. </p>
<p>At age 14, as described in her 1996 book <a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">A Treasure Trove of Memories</a>: A Reflection on the Experiences of the Peoples of Potchefstroom, she discovered that she “had a gift as a writer, an intellectual orientation, and a capacity for expressing strong views”. A correspondence course boosted the “English in which (she) would come to write” prolifically. Later, she achieved a certificate in journalism.</p>
<h2>A letter to the editor</h2>
<p>1944 was a turning point. An 18-year-old Mayat posted a letter signed “Miss Zuleikha Bismillah of Potchefstroom” to the newspaper <a href="https://disa.ukzn.ac.za/keywords/indian-views">Indian Views</a>, which was published in Gujarati and English. The editor was M.I. Meer, father of human rights activist and scholar <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/professor-fatima-meer">Fatima Meer</a>. He published the letter, in which <a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">she</a> “argued for higher levels of education for girls” in a “style that revealed not only a principled passion concerning this matter but also her sharp wit”.</p>
<p>In 1954, aged 28, she invited friends to her small apartment in the coastal South African city of Durban. After supper, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/gender-modernity-indian-delights-womens-cultural-group-durban-1954-2010-goolam-vahed-and">Women’s Cultural Group</a> was founded. It sought to mobilise women for social change.</p>
<p>Fatima and her husband <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ismail-chota-meer">Ismail Meer</a> roped Mayat and her husband Mohammed into their revolutionary activities. While hiding from the apartheid authorities, activist and future president Nelson Mandela slept at the Mayat home a few times.</p>
<p>In 1961, she edited the famous <a href="https://www.spiceemporium.co.za/product/indian-delights-orange/">Indian Delights</a>, a recipe book, which flew off the bookshelves “<a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/zuleikha-mayats-indian-delights-still-cooking-9845007">like hot samosas at a buffet</a>”. Several new editions have been published and it remains one of the best selling books in South Africa today.</p>
<p>Between 1956 and 1963 Mayat contributed a weekly column to Indian Views. Her column, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290929021_Fahmida%27s_worlds_Gender_home_and_the_Gujarati_Muslim_Diaspora_in_mid-20th_century_South_Africa">Fahmida’s World</a>, brought what academics Goolam Vahed and Thembisa Waetjen <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/gender-modernity-indian-delights">have described</a> as her “signature liveliness and humour, as well as a sharp moral eye, to bear on various topics”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/gender-modernity-indian-delights">In her columns</a>, she criticised social hierarchies, “ethnic and class prejudices” and racist and inhuman conduct, and commented on “the ethical triumphs and breaches of daily life”. </p>
<p>Mayat was involved in numerous institutions and organisations. These included the McCord Zulu Hospital, Shifa hospital, Black Women’s Convention, South African Institute of Race Relations, the Natal Indian Blind Society, and schools, old age homes and mosques.</p>
<p>And, throughout her life, she wrote.</p>
<h2>A life of writing</h2>
<p>In 1966 she compiled Quranic Lights, a book of prayers. <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-09-textiles-carry-a-living-history-in-nanimas-chest/">Nanima’s Chest</a> appeared in 1981 to promote the appreciation of traditional Indian textiles and clothing.</p>
<p><a href="https://iucat.iu.edu/iub/893561">A Treasure Trove of Memories</a>: A Reflection on the Experiences of the Peoples of Potchefstroom (1996) recounts growing up and life in her home town. South African scholar Betty Govinden <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/author/Devarakshanam-Betty-Govinden/1751866409">called the book</a> “an important contribution to autobiographical fiction in this country”.</p>
<p>History: Muslims of Gujarat was published in 2008, the result of “inner urges” that compelled her to probe into her family’s distant past.</p>
<p>A year later came <a href="https://humanities.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/content_migration/humanities_uct_ac_za/1009/files/Devarakshanam_Govinden.pdf">Dear Ahmedbhai, Dear Zuleikhabehn: The Letters of Zuleikha Mayat and Ahmed Kathrada 1979-1989</a>, based on 75 letters exchanged between herself and anti-apartheid giant <a href="https://theconversation.com/ahmed-kathrada-a-simple-life-full-of-love-after-26-years-of-incarceration-75361">Ahmed Kathrada</a> that covered culture, politics and religion.</p>
<p>Then in 2015 she published <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/post-south-africa/20150520/281526519639492">Journeys of Binte Batuti</a>, a travel memoir. And at age 95 Mayat published <a href="https://muslimviews.co.za/2021/07/30/a-new-book-by-the-evergreen-zuleikha-mayat/">The Odyssey of Crossing Oceans</a>, an enthralling and expansive narrative by a consummate storyteller, which embodied some of her philosophy of life. </p>
<h2>Justice and peace for all</h2>
<p>Post-1994, when democratic elections were held for the first time in South Africa, Mayat continued her fight for equity and social justice. She <a href="https://alqalam.co.za/zuleikha-mayat-sadly-india-has-departed-from-indian-nation-to-hindutva-nation/">spoke out</a> and marched against local and global injustices. </p>
<p>She was acutely aware that for many the world was an inhospitable place. She sought, <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/read-nelson-mandelas-inauguration-speech-president-sa">like Nelson Mandela</a>, “justice for all”, “peace for all” and “work, bread, water and salt for all” – for people to be “freed to fulfil themselves”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saleem Badat receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences. </span></em></p>
Mayat embodied principled, faith-based, socially committed, inspired leadership.
Saleem Badat, Research Professor, UFS History Department, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/221512
2024-01-24T12:34:21Z
2024-01-24T12:34:21Z
South Africa’s genocide case against Israel is the country’s proudest foreign policy moment in three decades
<p>On 11 January 2024, South Africa <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">hauled</a> Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the charge of violating the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">1948 Genocide Convention</a>. This was for Israel’s indiscriminate bombing and siege of Gaza following the deadly 7 October attack on Israel by Hamas which claimed 1,200 Israeli lives.</p>
<p>More than 25,000 Palestinians, at least half of them children, have reportedly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-health-ministry-health-death-toll-59470820308b31f1faf73c703400b033">been killed </a>in Israeli retaliatory attacks. The siege has led to a humanitarian crisis, as civilians struggle to get food and and have no access to hospitals, which have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/21/analysis-the-military-logic-behind-israels-total-gaza-siege">all but totally destroyed</a>.</p>
<p>The South African team of lawyers pleaded with the court to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-expert-sets-out-what-to-expect-from-the-international-court-of-justice-220692">provisional measures</a> – temporary orders to stop irreparable harm, including an immediate ceasefire – while the court considers the merits of the case.</p>
<p>As observers of South Africa’s international relations, we believe this move to be the high-water mark in the country’s foreign policy since the end of apartheid in 1994.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-under-ramaphosa-has-seen-diplomatic-tools-being-used-to-provide-leadership-as-global-power-relations-shift-218966">South Africa's foreign policy under Ramaphosa has seen diplomatic tools being used to provide leadership as global power relations shift</a>
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<p>South Africa’s liberation is sometimes portrayed as the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/postscripts-on-independence-9780199479641?cc=us&lang=en&">last act</a> of 20th century decolonisation: the crowning moment of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/Third-World">“Third World”</a> solidarity. The country’s new approach to foreign policy symbolised the hopes of countries that struggled for freedom. The (now governing) ANC’s discussion document of 1994 <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/policy-documents-1994-foreign-policy-perspective-in-a-democratic-south-africa/">stated</a>: </p>
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<p>a democratic South Africa will be in solidarity with all those whose struggle continues.</p>
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<h2>From Mandela to Ramaphosa</h2>
<p>Nelson Mandela, the first president of democratic South Africa, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy">advocated for human rights</a>, sometimes even at the expense of <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/mandela-begged-abacha-not-to-execute-ken-saro-wiwa-and-companions/">African partners</a>. That early promise was progressively whittled down. </p>
<p>In 1995, for example, Mandela pleaded with then Nigerian military head of state <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sani-Abacha">Sani Abacha</a> to spare the lives of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ken-Saro-Wiwa">Ken Saro-Wiwa</a> and eight other Ogoni activists. Critics of the Nigerian government’s failure to act against foreign oil companies causing environmental damage, they were accused of murdering Ogoni chiefs. Mandela’s pleas fell on deaf ears and they were <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/mandela-begged-abacha-not-to-execute-ken-saro-wiwa-and-companions/">executed</a>.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://archive.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/za-com-mr-s-1576">scathing response</a>, Mandela called for Nigeria to be expelled from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth until it established democratic rule. South Africa also recalled its High Commissioner to Lagos for consultations.</p>
<p>From the late 1990s, under the succeeding presidencies of Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African government has often supported authoritarian regimes in the global south, often in repudiation of people’s struggles. Examples are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/27/dalai-lama-banned-south-africa">China</a>, <a href="https://www.actionsa.org.za/human-rights-will-be-the-light-that-guides-actionsas-foreign-policy/">Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/6/icc-s-africa-broke-rules-by-failing-to-arrest-bashir">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/8/south-africa-is-failing-and-its-failing-zimbabwe-too">Zimbabwe</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>South African foreign policy is often described as being <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/items/9dbfd78a-e95b-469c-8131-f2bd263f385d">inconsistent</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.18772/22010105027.14">unclear and insincere</a>. </p>
<p>Palestine remains the single issue on which South Africa’s support for a people’s struggle has been unquestionably consistent. </p>
<h2>Solidarity with Palestine</h2>
<p>During the Cold War, the apartheid South African and Israeli states <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/unspoken-alliance-israels-secret-relationship-apartheid-south-africa-sasha-polakow-suransky">collaborated</a> on military, diplomatic and nuclear issues. The liberation movements of these two countries – namely the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC) – practised an alternative form of internationalism. This was subversive and inspired by people’s solidarity in the Third World. </p>
<p>In 1974, when the PLO leader Yasser Arafat <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2535860?seq=1">addressed</a> the United Nations General Assembly, the first liberation leader to do so, he called for the same right to be extended to other liberation movements. Arafat used the occasion to denounce the apartheid regime with the same vehemence as he used to criticise Israel.</p>
<p>Two years later, the then ANC president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a>, stood before the same body and both <a href="http://www.gutenberg-e.org/pohlandt-mccormick/pmh03i.html">applauded</a> Arafat’s leadership on this matter and expressed “unswerving solidarity” with the Palestinians.</p>
<p>In addition to diplomatic support, the two movements shared resistance tactics.</p>
<p>Arafat’s own faction within the PLO, Fatah, assisted the ANC and other resistance movements <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/armed-struggle-and-the-search-for-state-9780198292654?lang=en&cc=gb">to acquire training and arms</a>. Importantly, the relations between Tambo and Arafat were based on trust. In 1988, Tambo asked Arafat to help with securing funding from the Middle Eastern countries and requested the PLO to become a financial trustee of funds from that region. </p>
<h2>The lodestar</h2>
<p>This consistency of approach and support was reflected in South Africa’s case before the ICJ. It has put the promise of liberation back into South Africa’s national consciousness. This imaginative initiative reveals a sense of clarity that the country’s foreign policy has lacked due to its <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/items/9dbfd78a-e95b-469c-8131-f2bd263f385d">inconsistencies</a> which resulted in contradictory choices in the 21st century.</p>
<p>It stays true to the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy">founding principles</a> of the post-apartheid polity. Not only was this needed in the country’s approach to international affairs, but it is vitally important to restore its self-image. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-legal-team-in-the-genocide-case-against-israel-has-won-praise-who-are-they-221019">team</a> at The Hague included opponents of the ANC government. As they argued the legal and ethical case against Israel’s genocidal ambitions, their country watched in hope. </p>
<p>Could its international relations finally live up to the high ideals the country set for itself when apartheid ended? </p>
<p>South Africa’s appearance before the ICJ is an affirmation of the moral compass that the ANC government has <a href="https://pari.org.za/new-book-state-capture-in-south-africa-how-and-why-it-happened/">lost</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Palestine remains the single issue on which South Africa’s support for a people’s struggle has been unquestionably consistent.
Peter Vale, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria., University of Pretoria
Vineet Thakur, Assistant Professor, International Relations, Leiden University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/218966
2023-12-12T09:12:23Z
2023-12-12T09:12:23Z
South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa has seen diplomatic tools being used to provide leadership as global power relations shift
<p>Leadership plays a critical role in diplomacy. What quality of leadership does South Africa need if it’s to secure its international interests?</p>
<p>This is a question my colleagues and I have had the opportunity to reflect on in researching and writing about foreign policy since the late 1980s.</p>
<p>Presidents <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> displayed <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol36(2)/04-le-pere-pp-31-56.zp39575.pdf">assertive African and global south leadership</a>. Their successor, Jacob Zuma, did much to reverse the country’s international moral standing. </p>
<p>In our view, the current president, <a href="https://www.dpme.gov.za/about/Pages/President-Cyril-Ramaphosa.aspx">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, is restoring the country’s standing and role as a global moral leader. He has done so in an environment in which seismic changes are taking place in the balance of power between the world’s largest nations.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s messages, and tone of delivery, suggest an assertive southern leader who understands how the world works. He’s not afraid to challenge the dominant narrative and is prepared to put global south demands on the table.</p>
<p>In his speech on Africa Day on 25 May 2023, Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-africa-day-celebrations#:%7E:text=There%20can%20be%20no%20better,are%20optimistic%20about%20our%20future.">said</a>:</p>
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<p>We are … witnessing Africa being dragged into conflicts far beyond our own borders. Some countries, including our own, are being threatened with penalties for pursuing an independent foreign policy and for adopting a position of non-alignment. South Africa has not been and will not be drawn into a contest between global powers. We will maintain our position on the peaceful resolution of conflict wherever those conflicts occur.</p>
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<p>In a similar assertive tone, at a Financing for Development Summit in New York in September 2023, he <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/reform-international-financial-architecture-president-ramaphosa">said</a>:</p>
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<p>… at a time when solidarity was needed most, agreed international commitments were not honoured. Principles such as common but differentiated responsibilities are not being respected. Four decades since the right to development was established by the United Nations as a human right, the failure to act on commitments to support development is deepening the divide between the global north and south.</p>
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<p>These statements reflect Ramaphosa’s shrewd reading of a fundamental shift in the global balance of forces. Over the past year it is this that has informed his assertiveness in foreign policy matters. As a result, we argue, he has used the tools of diplomacy to lead Africa and the global south to shape the architecture of a new world order currently being forged.</p>
<h2>Facing a complex world</h2>
<p>However, Ramaphosa and his administration’s ability to advance South Africa‘s interests globally has became much more complex because of rising geopolitical tensions. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia’s invasion of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/russia-ukraine-war">Ukraine in February 2022</a> brought into sharp relief the longstanding tense relationship between Russia seeking recognition as a recovering superpower and the west’s pursuit of containment. </p>
<p>The conflagration has serious consequences for the world at large, including Africa, already struggling with food and energy insecurities. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Under these conditions, Pretoria struggled to formulate a clear position. It initially condemned the Russian intervention in Ukraine. It later took a <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/south-african-government-calls-for-a-peaceful-resolution-of-the-escalating-conflict-between-the-russian-federation-and-ukraine/">more neutral position</a> – “<a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-state-of-non-alignment-in-south-africas-foreign-policy/">non-alignment</a>”. </p>
<p>Yet it became clear that Ramaphosa was reading a fundamental shift in the global balance of forces. One of his responses was to <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-78th-session-united-nations-general-assembly-united-nations%2C-new-york">call for reform of the UN Security Council</a>. </p>
<p>He also led an eclectic assembly of African leaders on a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-russia-ukraine-peace-mission-what-can-it-achieve-206201">peace mission</a>” to Ukraine and Russia. It was initially scorned by pro-western commentators. The benefits of the initiative for Africa are becoming apparent, particularly in <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/peace-african-style-6936/">enhancing food security</a>.</p>
<p>But the turning point in Ramaphosa’s increasingly assertive foreign policy conduct came with the hosting of the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics Summit</a> in South Africa in August. His government succeeded in hosting, chairing and steering the group to new levels of cooperation. Ramaphosa’s congenial personality played no small role in the successes.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-outcomes-15th-brics-summit%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">Achievements</a> include facilitating new trade relations between Africa and Brics, strengthening the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>, and forging an agreement to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">expand membership</a> to make Brics more inclusive.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>These breakthroughs are not to be underestimated. Reshaping the global order opens the space for an emboldened global south to co-determine the future.</p>
<p>His seeming over-dependence on consultation, seen by many as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosas-famous-negotiating-skills-have-failed-him-heres-why-130393">liability</a>, stands him in good stead. Because he is comfortable with exercising soft power, he speaks boldly at international meetings. It has also given him the ability to position South Africa prominently, and on the right side of history, on the tragedy in Gaza, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/opening-remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-extraordinary-joint-meeting-brics-leaders-and-leaders-invited-brics-members-situation-middle-east">seeking peace, not war</a>. </p>
<h2>Criticism and scepticism</h2>
<p>Some foreign policy practitioners and scholars are sceptical of Ramaphosa as a foreign policy leader. An entire volume of the respectable <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">South African Foreign Policy Review</a> is dedicated to this theme – the decline of South Africa’s global moral standing. </p>
<p>Many commentators, including some from the <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/">Brenthurst Foundation</a> think-tank, view South African foreign policy through domestic lenses, coloured by their aversion to the African National Congress which Ramaphosa leads and which runs the country. </p>
<p>From this perspective they are quick to denounce South African foreign policy decision-makers as <a href="https://bridgebooks.co.za/products/good-bad-ugly">lacking awareness of the objective of international relations and diplomacy</a>. The minister of foreign affairs, <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/dr-grace-naledi-mandisa-pandor/">Naledi Pandor</a>, in particular, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-11-07-pandor-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza-and-an-end-to-israels-collective-punishment-on-all-palestinians/">has attracted scorn</a>. In her case, it could be as a result of her <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-naledi-pandor-ongoing-israeli-palestinian-conflict-07-nov-2023">outspoken position</a> on the Israel-Palestine conflict.</p>
<p>To understand the tough judgments made of the government’s foreign policy it’s useful to look at them against the backdrop of domestic politics. Domestic politics and foreign affairs are interwoven. What happens at home affects a country’s global standing. </p>
<p>In African foreign policy analytical circles, there is a <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/African_Foreign_Policies_Power_and_Process">belief</a> that a weak president embraces international crises as it redirects the attention from failures at home.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa is indeed embattled on the home front. He was meant to put a stop to <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">years of abuse</a> and <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">high corruption</a> under his predecessor, Jacob Zuma, and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-08-12-political-platitudes-unpacking-ramaphosas-real-battle-in-aftermath-of-zondo-commission-testimony/">repair the damage</a> he caused. </p>
<p>Euphoria and unreserved support for a “reformist” president turned into <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/7/22/ex-president-mbeki-rebukes-ramaphosa-predicts-sas-arab-spring">disappointment and cynicism</a> as his efforts at “house cleaning” got bogged down <a href="https://witspress.co.za/page/detail/State-Capture-in-South-Africa/?k=9781776148318">in the intricacies of power play</a> in the ANC.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aziz-pahad-the-unassuming-south-african-diplomat-who-skilfully-mediated-crises-in-africa-and-beyond-214648">Aziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond</a>
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<p>Nevertheless, we would argue that if Ramaphosa survives the forces of disruption at home as his ruling party <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-12-07-anc-veteran-of-60-years-mavuso-msimang-painfully-severs-ties-tenders-devastating-resignation/">decomposes</a>, he will surely be counted among those who read global events, understood that there was a need for a stronger voice from the global south, and acted to make it happen.</p>
<p>He should also be remembered for breathing new life into the <a href="https://au.int/en/about/vision">vision of the African Union</a>: an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>
President Cyril Ramaphosa’s messages, and tone of delivery, suggest an assertive leader representing the interests of the global south.
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/214998
2023-10-23T14:03:22Z
2023-10-23T14:03:22Z
Leadership in a crisis: how President Ramaphosa’s COVID speeches drew on Mandela’s ideas of South African unity
<p>In times of crisis, leaders wield more than just political power. They harness the art of rhetoric in a bid to unite their nations towards a common goal. South Africa, with a tumultuous history marked by apartheid, has seen leaders employ persuasive communication to navigate challenges. </p>
<p>For instance, in the 1990s then-president <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/read-nelson-mandelas-inauguration-speech-president-sa">Nelson Mandela</a> appealed to patriotic sentiments. He often used reconciliatory rhetoric to help smooth the transition from centuries of colonial and apartheid oppression to democracy for South Africans. </p>
<p>In 2020, at the outbreak of the <a href="https://www.nicd.ac.za/first-case-of-covid-19-coronavirus-reported-in-sa/">COVID-19 pandemic</a>, President Cyril Ramaphosa faced the challenge of steering the country through one of its biggest crises since democracy in 1994.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nelson-mandelas-legacy-is-taking-a-battering-because-of-the-dismal-state-of-south-africa-209883">Nelson Mandela's legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa</a>
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<p>I’ve been a <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=YVmxkJ0AAAAJ&hl=en">media and rhetoric scholar</a> for a decade. My colleague and I examined Ramaphosa’s communicative approaches during the pandemic. Our <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/ejc-aar_rhetoric_v15_n1_a6">paper</a> on his speeches looked at how leaders use their speeches to unify citizens amid turmoil and uncertainty.</p>
<p>In his regular televised addresses, commonly known as <a href="https://www.702.co.za/articles/433374/president-cyril-ramaphosa-calls-a-family-meeting-tonight-at-8pm">family meetings</a>, Ramaphosa tried to promote nation-building. The pandemic had exposed the nation’s deeply entrenched <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-south-africas-social-divide-and-economic-woes-exposed/a-53739914">economic and social divisions</a>. Fostering social cohesion and unity was <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-africas-bold-response-covid-19-pandemic">vital to improving the overall response</a> to the pandemic.</p>
<p>A unified and socially cohesive society was more likely to adhere to health guidelines, cooperate in efforts to control the virus, and ensure that vulnerable populations had access to necessary resources and support. </p>
<h2>Rallying cry</h2>
<p>We analysed the four speeches Ramaphosa delivered in the early stages of the pandemic – between March 24 and April 21. These speeches, when COVID-19 cases were still relatively low, but uncertainty loomed large, provide a critical window into Ramaphosa’s leadership and persuasive techniques.</p>
<p>We observed that Ramaphosa’s communication style bore distinct traits of what has been “Mandelaism” by some academics to rally South Africans behind a common cause. So-called after the iconic statesman, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02564718.2017.1403706">Mandelaism</a> refers to rhetoric that appeals to patriotism to promote national unity and reconciliation. It is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>based on mythologising Nelson Mandela, and imagining a South African nation characterised by ‘harmony, peace, reconciliation, and success, denying the significance of informational disturbances that contradict these narratives.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/jls/article/view/11861">Mandelaism perpetuates a narrative of forgetting that overlooks the realities of apartheid oppression</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This rhetorical approach tends to discourage dissent, underpinning the belief that all South Africans share the same goals.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mandela-was-a-flawed-icon-but-without-him-south-africa-would-be-a-sadder-place-142826">Mandela was a flawed icon. But without him South Africa would be a sadder place</a>
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<p>Our analysis of Ramaphosa’s rhetoric and its parallels with Mandelaism provides a case study of leadership and communication in times of crisis. It offers lessons for current leaders and scholars, highlighting the enduring influence of historical figures like Nelson Mandela on the rhetoric and leadership styles of their successors. </p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s rhetoric</h2>
<p>Little scholarship exists on Ramaphosa’s political-ideological convictions and philosophy or describes his approach to persuasion. The historian <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/tom-lodge-1256885">Tom Lodge</a> has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209320">observed</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Cyril Ramaphosa gives many interviews, but he keeps his personal philosophy to himself. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The COVID-19 crisis forced Ramaphosa to communicate continuously. It provided an opportunity for rhetorical critics and scholars to consider how he used persuasive techniques, and how these might point to his ideas about the South African nation.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa frequently began his addresses with the inclusive greeting, <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/message-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-on-covid-19-pandemic-30-march-2020/">“My fellow South Africans”</a>. This sought to invoke a sense of belonging and unity. As a linguistic technique it primed citizens to connect with the ideals of togetherness, inclusivity and reconciliation. These are all critical components of Mandelaism. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s rhetoric also emphasised reconciliation. He urged citizens to remember past hardships they had overcome together. This appeal to historical resilience reinforced the idea that South Africans unite in moments of great crisis. It echoed Mandela’s ability to unify a nation divided by apartheid. For example, in a speech delivered on <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/message-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-on-covid-19-pandemic-thursday-9-april-2020/">9 April 2020</a> Ramaphosa said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I wish to thank you for reaffirming to each other and to the world that we South Africans are a people who come together … Our ability to come together in a crisis, and our commitment to each other and our common future.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He downplayed the diverse perspectives and experiences of South Africans to promote the unity narrative.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>And then there is each of you, the 58 million South African citizens and residents who are standing together to <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/message-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-on-covid-19-pandemic-30-march-2020/">confront this national health emergency</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A significant aspect of Mandelaism is its close association with corporate entities that fund Mandela-related projects. Ramaphosa also incorporated business as a force for good in his speeches. He portrayed business as <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-escalation-measures-combat-covid-19-epidemic%2C-union">integral</a> to the fabric of a reconciled South Africa.</p>
<h2>Lessons for uniting nations</h2>
<p>South Africa’s journey from apartheid to democracy and its response to the COVID-19 pandemic provide rich examples of the role of political rhetoric. These historical instances serve as invaluable lessons for leaders worldwide facing the daunting task of uniting their nations during times of uncertainty and turmoil. </p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/sikelelwa-dlanga-380a5123/?originalSubdomain=za">Sikelelwa Dlanga</a>, an independent communications specialist, worked with the author on the research and this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sisanda Nkoala has previously been awarded an AW Mellon-UCT Graduate Scholarship in Rhetoric and received funding from the National Research Foundation. For this study, however, there are no funders to declare.
</span></em></p>
President Cyril Ramaphosa tried to foster social cohesion in his speeches during a pandemic that had exposed the nation’s divisions.
Sisanda Nkoala, Senior Lecturer, University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213340
2023-10-04T12:33:07Z
2023-10-04T12:33:07Z
The Nobel Peace Prize offers no guarantee its winners actually create peace, or make it last
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551816/original/file-20231003-21-46u90x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1091%2C0%2C71%2C233&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Norwegian Nobel Committee is set to announce its annual winner for the peace prize on Friday, Oct. 6, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/plaque-depicting-alfred-nobel-at-the-nobel-peace-prize-news-photo/83979203?adppopup=true">Chris Jackson/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Norwegian Nobel Committee is <a href="https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/presse/arrangementer/accreditation-announcement-nobel-peace-prize-2023?instance=0">set to announce</a> the recipient of the annual Nobel Peace Prize on Oct. 6, 2023, drawing from a pool of 351 nominees. </p>
<p>Environmental activist Greta Thunberg and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/how-is-nobel-peace-prize-decided-2023-09-29/">are reportedly two of the nominees</a>, among political dissidents, leaders and human rights activists who are up for the prize. The winner will receive a medal, US$994,000 and global recognition.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.sandiego.edu/peace/about/biography.php?profile_id=2091">worked in the peace-building field</a> for over 20 years to support societies as they work to prevent violence and end wars. Each year, I think I should look forward to this moment, when a champion of peace is celebrated on the world stage. But given the track record of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, I always feel some dread before the peace prize announcement. Will the award celebrate a true peace builder, or a politician that just happened to sign a peace agreement? Will it celebrate a true and historic achievement, or what happens to be in the newspaper right now? </p>
<h2>A mixed history</h2>
<p>Admittedly, the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/about/the-norwegian-nobel-committee/">Norwegian Nobel Committee</a> – made up of five Norwegians, mostly former politicians, whom the Norwegian parliament appoints for a six-year term – has made some great peace prize selections over the years. </p>
<p>South African politician Nelson Mandela, for example, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1993/summary/#">won the prize</a> in 1993 for his work to help end apartheid.</p>
<p>And Leymah Gbowee, an activist who helped bring peace to Liberia, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2011/gbowee/facts/">won the award</a> in 2011, alongside former Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Yemeni women’s rights activist Tawakkul Karman.</p>
<p>Gbowee brought Christian and Muslim women together to end Liberia’s devastating 14-year civil war by using creative tactics – <a href="https://qz.com/958346/history-shows-that-sex-strikes-are-a-surprisingly-effective-strategy-for-political-change">including a sex strike</a>, in which Liberian women promised to withhold sex from their husbands until a peace agreement was signed. </p>
<p>Despite the prize’s mixed track record – and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/end-nobel-peace-prize/616300/">despite calls by some to stop giving the award</a> – I think the Nobel Peace Prize should continue. War remains one of humankind’s greatest problems, and peace is still a human achievement worth celebrating.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Leymah Gbowee wears a white shirt and marches with a long line of women, also wearing white." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551809/original/file-20231003-25-gozy93.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leymah Gbowee, who was a joint Nobel Peace Prize winner in 2011, marches with women’s rights activists to pray for peace in Monrovia, Liberia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/liberias-joint-nobel-peace-prize-2011-leymah-gbowee-and-news-photo/1250772202?adppopup=true">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The prize can be off-mark</h2>
<p>The Nobel Committee, in my view, does not always give the peace prize to people who actually deserve the recognition. And the prize is not a precursor to peace actually happening, or lasting. </p>
<p>Some previous awardees are head-scratchers, for peace experts and casual observers and recipients alike. For example, former President Barack Obama said that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2009/10/09/113677764/obama-surprised-at-winning-nobel-peace-prize">he was even surprised by the award</a> when he won it in 2009.</p>
<p>The committee gave him the award “based on his extraordinary efforts to <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2009/press-release/">strengthen international diplomacy</a> and cooperation between peoples.” However, Obama had been in office for less than a year when he got the prize, which is likely not enough time to do either of these things.</p>
<p>Geir Lundestad, a former secretary of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, wrote in his 2019 memoir that he had hoped the award “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34277960">would strengthen Mr. Obama</a>” to pursue nuclear disarmament, but in the end he said that he regretted giving Obama the award. </p>
<p>Others selections, such as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have proved embarrassing in hindsight. </p>
<p>Just one year after winning the award in 2019, Abiy ordered a large-scale military offensive against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">a controversial political party</a> that represents the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war between the Ethiopian military and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths before it ended in November 2022. A <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-united-nations-africa-ethiopia-eritrea-dcb992b8389069490c8b44357500cabe">United Nations investigation</a> found in 2022 that all sides in the conflict have committed <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">war crimes</a> against civilians.</p>
<p>Berit Reiss-Andersen, the chair of the Nobel award committee, later said in 2022 that Ahmed “has a special responsibility to end the conflict and contribute to peace.” </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, such statements encouraging peace – alongside the Nobel Prize itself – have had little effect on how prize winners act. The factors that drive war or peace are complex and are unlikely to be significantly influenced by an annual award given in Norway.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A picture of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali is on display at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, alongside other framed photos of people in a dark room with blue lighting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551815/original/file-20231003-19-ful84d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A photo of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is on display at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, Norway, recognizing winners of the Nobel Peace Prize.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-of-the-2019-nobel-peace-prize-laureate-ethiopian-news-photo/1175337675?adppopup=true">Stan Lysberg Solum/NTB Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Peace is long term</h2>
<p>Other Nobel awarding committees seem to understand that it takes a significant amount of time to judge whether an achievement truly merits the prize.</p>
<p>Both physicists and economists wait an average of 23 years to <a href="https://www.nature.com/nature-index/news/chemistry-fastest-path-nobel-prize">receive an award</a> after they achieve their award-winning work. </p>
<p>In contrast, American diplomat Henry Kissinger won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for negotiating a <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cease-fire-goes-into-effect">cease-fire in Vietnam that same year</a>. The cease-fire began to falter almost immediately, and Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell to the North Vietnamese army in May 1975. Kissinger then unsuccessfully tried to return the prize, noting that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/world/kissinger-nobel-peace-prize-vietnam-war-b2261492.html">“peace we sought through negotiations has been overturned by force</a>.”</p>
<p>Similarly, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli political leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin won the peace prize in 1994, one year after they signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloaccord93">Oslo Accords,</a> a series of agreements that set up Palestinian self-governance for the West Bank and Gaza. But by 2000, Palestinians had launched the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Israel/The-second-intifada">second intifada</a>, and widespread violence returned to the region.</p>
<p>The Nobel committee tends to award prizes to those involved in current events and doesn’t award prizes long after those events have happened. But some awards have stood the test of time, in part because they were given to individuals following long struggles.</p>
<p>Mandela, for instance, won the prize 53 years after his expulsion from university for joining a protest. This sparked <a href="https://southafrica-info.com/history/nelson-mandela-timeline/">a 53-yearlong career in activism and politics</a> that included 27 years of incarceration as a political prisoner by the government he had fought against – and later led as president.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Yaser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzak Rabin stand in a row and show an open book with a gold Nobel peace prize in it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551831/original/file-20231003-21-fn9thz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palestinian leader Yaser Arafat, left, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, center, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin display their joint Nobel Peace Prizes in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-from-the-government-press-office-israeli-news-photo/51663003?adppopup=true">Government Press Office via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>It’s about peace</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/alfred-nobels-life-and-work/">Swedish scientist Alfred Nobel</a> – the founder of the Nobel awards – said the Nobel Peace Prize should go to the person “who has done the most or best to advance fellowship among nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies, and the establishment and promotion of peace congresses.” </p>
<p>The language is somewhat archaic, but the message is clear – the peace prize was designed to be about stopping war and promoting peace. </p>
<p>However, in the last 20 years, the peace prize has been awarded to those working on a variety of issues, including <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2021/summary/">freedom of expression</a>, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2014/summary/">children’s education</a> and <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2007/summary/">climate change</a>.</p>
<p>All of these are important issues that require more support and recognition – but it is not the case that freedom of expression or climate change adaptation directly leads to peace.</p>
<p>In my view, there are more than enough problems and deadly conflicts in the world whose solutions merit the award of the Nobel Peace Prize as a reflection of its original intent – to acknowledge attempts aimed at ending the scourge of war and building a sustainable peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Blum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Nobel Peace Prize has recognized some legendary leaders and peace activists, but it has a mixed track record of recognizing people who actually deserve the prize.
Andrew Blum, Executive Director and Professor of Practice at Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace, University of San Diego
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/214648
2023-09-29T15:56:49Z
2023-09-29T15:56:49Z
Aziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond
<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/funeral-category-2-honour-mr-aziz-pahad-29-sep-2023-0000">Aziz Goolam Pahad</a>, who has died at the age of 82, was a South African anti-apartheid activist, politician and deputy minister of foreign affairs in the post-1994 government. </p>
<p>Together with a small group of foreign policy analysts, I worked with Aziz over the span of 30 years, shaping the post-apartheid South African government’s approach to international relations and its foreign policy. We spent countless hours debating foreign affairs and the numerous crises and challenges government had to face as a relative “newcomer” in continental African and global affairs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad#:%7E:text=Aziz%20Pahad%20was%20born%20on,University%20of%20the%20Witwatersrand%2C%20Johannesburg.">Aziz</a> was generous with giving his time to formulate positions that would allow for the unlocking of a crisis. He remained open to intellectual challenges throughout his career. He was a keen participant in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912">academic research projects</a> dealing with <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/eb0f44d3-a550-4740-8db1-6463330b0f82">foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>He made a monumental contribution to the struggle against apartheid and colonial oppression in South Africa, the continent and the Middle East. And he contributed significantly to the development and execution of a progressive African-centred foreign policy doctrine. Sadly, towards the end of his career as a diplomat he witnessed the <a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/images/pulp/books/edited_collections/foreign_policy/SA%20Foreign%20Policy%20Book%20Chapter%201.pdf">slow decline</a> of South Africa’s <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/18180.pdf">stature and influence</a> in global affairs. </p>
<h2>The Mandela and Mbeki years</h2>
<p>Under presidents <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-presidency-1994-1999">Nelson Mandela</a> (1994-1999) and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (1999-2008), South African diplomats who’d sharpened their skills during many years of exile became sought-after as facilitators and mediators. Under their guidance Africa converted the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, and reset relations with the international community via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. </p>
<p>South African diplomats were articulate and visible in the corridors of the United Nations and in gatherings such as the Group of 7, Group of 20 and the Non-Aligned Movement. They were able to advance Africa’s quest for peace and development. In Africa, political and security crises, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Burundi, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768">were given attention</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>However this “golden era” of South Africa’s foreign policy, as fellow scholar Chris Landsberg calls it, was unable to withstand the corroding effects of foreign meddling in African affairs. Neither could it withstand the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">grand corruption</a> which reached its apogee in South Africa under former president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> (May 2009 - February 2018). </p>
<h2>Preparatory years</h2>
<p>Aziz was born <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">on 25 December 1940</a> in the former Transvaal, the current North West province in South Africa. His parents were <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">Amina and Goolam Pahad</a>, activists in the Transvaal Indian Congress, a political organisation established in the early 1900s by Mahatma Gandhi and others. The congress became involved in the broader anti-apartheid struggle in later years. His elder brother, Essop, also became an activist. Essop passed away <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">in July</a>.</p>
<p>In 1963, Aziz completed a degree in sociology and Afrikaans at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. As an activist, he was served with a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">banning order</a> and arrested on several occasions. After the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rivonia-trial-1963-1964">Rivonia Trial</a> from 1963 to 1964, in which ten leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) were tried for sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system of racial oppression, he and Essop left South Africa and went into exile.</p>
<p>Aziz spent some time in Angola and Zimbabwe but lived mostly in London. He completed a master’s degree in politics and international relations <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">at the University of Sussex</a>. He worked full-time for the exiled ANC and supported the development of the <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/anti-apartheid-struggle-south-africa-1912-1992/">Anti-Apartheid Movement</a>.</p>
<p>Even before his return to South Africa in 1990, he contributed to the transition from apartheid to democracy, a role well described in his book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Insurgent_Diplomat_Civil_Talks_or_Civil.html?id=mbR9BAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Insurgent Diplomat: Civil Talks or Civil War?</a>. </p>
<p>Aziz worked closely with Thabo Mbeki, at the time head of the exiled ANC’s international relations department, and a small team of academics in formulating the ANC’s position on foreign policy. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/anc_foreign_policy_perspective_in_a_democratic_south_africa.pdf">paper</a> formed part of preparations by the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a>, the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a> and the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Congress of South African Trade Unions</a>, for governing the country. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>The foreign policy paper provided a broad roadmap for diplomats post-apartheid. It eventually shaped government’s more formal foreign policy of 2011, entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. In the mid-1990s, Aziz was instrumental in the establishment, with support from the German government, of an ANC-aligned think-tank called the <a href="http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/">Foundation of Global Dialogue</a>, run by foreign policy expert and academic <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/garth-le-pere">Garth le Pere</a> and myself. It lives on as the <a href="https://igd.org.za/">Institute of Global Dialogue</a>, based at the University of South Africa.</p>
<h2>Role in government</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the ANC in South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, Aziz was elected to parliament. From there, he was appointed by President Mandela as deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was re-elected to parliament in 1999 and 2004, and kept his position as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">deputy minister of foreign affairs </a> throughout the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. </p>
<p>Holding the post for 14 years meant that he was able to create and nurture a wide network of political, academic and diplomatic connections. This enabled him to play an unassuming but key mediating and facilitation role dealing with major crises on the continent and beyond.</p>
<p>But Aziz also showed his activist roots when he <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/war-can-be-averted-says-pahad-101327">spoke out against</a> the American-led <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">invasion of Iraq in 2003</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">Nato-led invasion</a> of Libya and assassination of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. He supported the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-mourns-passing-former-deputy-minister-foreign-affairs-aziz-pahad">Palestinian struggle</a> for recognition over many decades.</p>
<p>Aziz resigned from government and parliament in 2008, shortly after Mbeki was removed as president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘diplomat-scholar’</h2>
<p>In retirement, Aziz remained active as a “diplomat-scholar”. He played a prominent role, with his brother Essop, in a small but influential think-tank, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ConcernedAfricansForum/">Concerned Africans Forum</a>. In 2015 he headed the short-lived South African Council on International Relations.</p>
<p>The council was established by the government as a body of experts and a sounding board for senior decision-makers. However, its semi-autonomous identity brought it into conflict with the ruling party’s foreign affairs structures. Politicians allowed it to wither away. </p>
<p>In 2018 the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa asked Aziz to lead a commission of experts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-04-17-pahad-panel-missteps-noted-but-no-overhaul-of-sa-foreign-policy-on-the-cards/">to review South Africa’s international relations</a>. In a sad repeat of the council’s demise, the commission was never given a proper hearing and its value remains untapped.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-time-south-africas-foreign-policy-was-driven-by-ideas-again-50407">Why it's time South Africa's foreign policy was driven by ideas (again)</a>
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<p>This is perhaps illustrative of the reality of policy-making in dynamic settings such as South Africa’s foreign affairs. The essence of Aziz’s contribution to a progressive African-oriented worldview was ultimately ignored by the foreign policy mandarins. </p>
<p>The country will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>
South Africa will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209883
2023-07-18T14:32:55Z
2023-07-18T14:32:55Z
Nelson Mandela’s legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538003/original/file-20230718-27-ey48jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, the late first president of democratic South Africa, is credited with the relatively peaceful transition from apartheid rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multiple concerns about the dismal state of South Africa – including a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">stagnant and failing economy</a>, a seemingly incapable state, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">massive corruption</a> – have led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">questioning</a> of the political and economic settlement made in 1994 to end apartheid. The settlement is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nelson-Mandela">strongly associated with Nelson Mandela</a>, who oversaw its progress to a successful conclusion. He subsequently underpinned it by promoting reconciliation with white people, especially Afrikaners, the former rulers.</p>
<p>The questioning of the 1994 settlement, and therefore Mandela’s legacy, has different dimensions, running through diverse narratives. One, associated with a faction of the governing African National Congress (ANC) that claims to stand for “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ret-and-what-does-it-want-the-radical-economic-transformation-faction-in-south-africa-explained-195949">radical economic transformation</a>”, is that the settlement was a “sell-out” to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">white monopoly capital</a>”. Another is the inclination to lay the blame for state failure <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">on the constitution</a>, thereby deflecting responsibility for massive governance failures away from the ANC.</p>
<p>Yet another stems from the frustrations of recent black graduates and the mass of black unemployed for whom there are <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q4%202022.pdf">no jobs</a>. There are also huge numbers of people without either <a href="https://apsdpr.org/index.php/apsdpr/article/view/372/739">adequate shelter</a> or <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16235#:%7E:text=More%20than%20half%20a%20million,high%20risk%20of%20acute%20malnutrition.">enough to eat</a>. South Africans want someone to blame. While their search regularly targets a wide range of usual suspects, it also leads to a questioning of what Mandela really left behind. </p>
<p>It does not help that Mandela continues to be lionised by many, if not most, white people, who despite much grumbling about the many inconveniences of life in South Africa have largely continued to prosper.</p>
<p>This means that those of us who are social scientists and long-term observers of South Africa’s politics and history need to think carefully about how we think critically about Mandela’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Questioning Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>From a historian’s view the questioning of Mandela’s legacy is normal. Historians are always asking new questions and reassessing the past to gain new insights about the role important political leaders play.</p>
<p>This has posed particular problems for Mandela’s biographers. Biography has always had a problematic relationship with history as a discipline. This partly stems from history’s reluctance to endorse “Great Men” versions of the past. Partly from the more generic problem of assessing individuals’ role in shaping wider developments. Thus it has been with Mandela. Nonetheless, the six or seven <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Mandela+biopgraphies&rlz=1C1GCEA_enZA1007ZA1007&oq=Mandela+biopgraphies&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQABgNGIAEMgkIAhAAGA0YgAQyCQgDEC4YDRiABDIJCAQQABgNGIAEMggIBRAAGA0YHjIICAYQABgNGB4yCAgHEAAYDRgeMggICBAAGA0YHjIKCAkQABgFGA0YHtIBCDQ5NjNqMWo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">significant biographies of Mandela</a> may be said to revolve around the following arguments.</p>
<p>First, Mandela played a critical role in preventing a descent into total civil war. It was brutal enough as it was. Narratives at the time often suggested that the period 1990-94 was a “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2019-07-09-sas-transition-to-democracy-miracle-or-mediation">miracle</a>”, a difficult but “peaceful transition to democracy”. But this was misleading. <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02335/06lv02357/07lv02372/08lv02379.htm">Thousands died</a> in political violence during this time.</p>
<p>Mandela’s biographers argue that his initiating negotiations with the regime from jail, independently of the ANC, was crucial. Without his actions, the apartheid state would not have come to the party. This, even though by the time FW de Klerk, its last president, came to power, it was seeking a route to a settlement. </p>
<p>Second, Mandela played his cards carefully in steadily asserting his authority over the ANC. Although the ANC in exile had carefully choreographed the imprisoned Mandela as an icon around which international opposition to apartheid could be mobilised, there remained much questioning within the organisation following his release about his motivations and wisdom. Also whether he should replace the ailing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> as its leader. That he proceeded to convince his doubters by constantly proclaiming his loyalty to the ANC, its militant “line” and his subjection to its discipline while simultaneously edging it towards negotiations is said to have been key to his establishing his claim to leadership. This was necessary to convince his doubters within the ANC that it could not defeat the regime on the field of battle. Hence there was a need for compromise with the regime.</p>
<p>Third, Mandela is credited with successfully steering the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">negotiations which led to South Africa’s democracy</a>. That he played a limited part in negotiating much of the nitty-gritty of the new constitution is acknowledged. Yet, this is combined with recognition of his acute judgment of when to place pressure on the regime to secure concessions and when to adopt a more conciliatory line. Generally, it is agreed that the ANC outsmarted the apartheid government during the negotiations. Praise is correctly showered on Mandela for his role in bringing both the far right, under <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02691.htm">Constand Viljoen</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>’s quarrelsome Inkatha Freedom Movement <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/Policy_Note_ID137.pdf">into the 1994 election at the very last moment</a>, without which it would have lacked legitimacy.</p>
<p>Fourth, while today it is recognised that a narrative of the time – that South Africans had negotiated the finest constitution in the world – was overcooked, the negotiations resulted in the country becoming a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>We now know, of course, that the ANC has subverted much of the intention of the constitution and undermined many of its safeguards. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-ruling-party-has-favoured-loyalty-over-competence-now-cadre-deployment-has-come-back-to-bite-it-199208">Its cadre deployment policy</a> of appointing loyalists to key state institutions has severely diminished the independence of the state machinery. Furthermore, the ANC has merged party with state. Above all, it has severely weakened the capacity of parliament to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-parliament-fails-to-hold-the-executive-to-account-history-shows-what-can-happen-192889">hold the president and ministers accountable</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">State Capture Commission</a> has laid bare the mechanics of all this in great detail. It has placed huge responsibility for this upon the ANC. Nonetheless, it is widely recognised by civil society that the constitution and the law still provide the fundamental basis for exacting political accountability. This is confirmed by the many judgments the Constitutional Court has <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-south-africas-constitutional-court-protecting-democracy-107443">rendered against the government</a>.</p>
<p>Fifth, while his critics often argue that Mandela leant over too far to appease whites, the counter-argument is that this grounded democracy. At the beginning of his <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/318431.Long_Walk_to_Freedom">autobiography</a>, Mandela presents the struggle in South Africa as a clash between Afrikaner and African nationalisms. His role during negotiations can be viewed through the prism of his conviction of the need to reconcile these, as one could not defeat the other. Without reconciliation, however imperfect, there could be no making of a new nation. After all, what was the alternative? </p>
<h2>Capturing Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to. If it really does become a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-political-risk-profile-has-gone-up-a-few-notches-but-its-not-yet-a-failed-state-170653">failed state</a>”, as the doomsters predict, there will be much need for reexamination of whether this failure has its roots in the constitutional settlement which Mandela did so much to bring about. For the moment, however, Mandela continues to inspire South Africans who place their hopes in constitutional democracy. What other hopes do they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209166
2023-07-07T10:30:19Z
2023-07-07T10:30:19Z
Tennis and apartheid: how a South African teenager was denied his dream of playing at Wimbledon
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536045/original/file-20230706-30-5qdns0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some 1971 tour players, from left, Hira Dhiraj, Hoosen Bobat, a Dutch friend, Jasmat Dhiraj, Charmaine Williams and Oscar Woodman. Williams toured at her own expense.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy the 1971 players/UKZN Press</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Today the <a href="https://www.wimbledon.com/en_GB/atoz/about_aeltc.html">All England Lawn Tennis Club</a>, hosts of the famous <a href="https://www.wimbledon.com">Wimbledon Championships</a>, pledges to be diverse and inclusive. But in 1971 an 18-year-old university student, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2023/jun/28/how-junior-wimbledon-apartheid-south-africa-blocked-hoosen-bobat-tennis-dream">Hoosen Bobat</a> from Durban, was excluded from achieving his dream of becoming the first black South African to play in the Wimbledon men’s junior tournament. This was due to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a>, and the collusion of the all-white tennis union in South Africa and the International Lawn Tennis Federation, with Wimbledon toeing the line. </p>
<p>I tell Bobat’s story in the new book <a href="https://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=598">Tennis, Apartheid and Social Justice</a>. I am a scholar who has published numerous <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=saleem+badat&btnG=">books and papers</a> on the histories of <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-forgotten-people-political-banishment-under-apartheid/">black exclusion</a> and organised <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Black_Man_You_are_on_Your_Own/DsLYRwAACAAJ?hl=en">black resistance</a> during apartheid, and on social justice and transformation. </p>
<p>My book documents the historic 1971 first international tour by a squad of black South Africans who played tennis under the auspices of the non-racial Southern African Lawn Tennis Union.</p>
<p>In 1973, the union was a founding affiliate of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-south-african-council-on-sport-at-50-the-fight-for-sports-development-is-still-relevant-today-202402">South African Council on Sport</a>, which popularised the slogan</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No normal sport in an abnormal society. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the context of apartheid, this must be contrasted with tennis played by white South Africans under the racially exclusively white tennis union.</p>
<p>The 1971 touring players were dubbed the “Dhiraj squad” after tennis champion Jasmat Dhiraj, a school teacher. The other five were Hira Dhiraj, Alwyn Solomon, Oscar Woodman, Cavan Bergman and Bobat.</p>
<p>The union’s goals were for its most promising players to compete in tournaments in Europe irrespective of “race” and nationality, to improve their games and be ambassadors for upholding equity and human dignity in sport.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-south-african-council-on-sport-at-50-the-fight-for-sports-development-is-still-relevant-today-202402">The South African Council on Sport at 50: the fight for sports development is still relevant today</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I wrote the book because I believe important social justice issues arose from the tour. At a minimum, a public apology is due from the international tennis body and Wimbledon to the non-racial sport community, the 1971 tour players and Bobat.</p>
<p>I also thought it was important to tell the story while most of those who lived through it were were still with us. And the book was also an opportunity to focus on “ordinary” people, on unsung heroes, on their tribulations and triumphs. A focus on everyday histories rather than on dramatic events and on elites.</p>
<h2>The issues</h2>
<p>In the book I cover three issues. </p>
<p>Firstly, I place the tour within the political, social and sporting conditions under apartheid. In 1971 South Africa was a racist, segregated and repressive society, based on white supremacy and privilege and black subjugation. Black people were denied proper sports facilities, coaching and opportunities to excel, could not belong to the same clubs as whites or compete in competitions with or against white players. Considered subjects, not citizens, they couldn’t represent South Africa in sport. Sport under apartheid was a killing field of ambitions and dreams.</p>
<p>Secondly, it records the players. The tournaments they participated in, their performances and challenges, the tour’s impact on them, the lessons learnt and their lives and tennis accomplishments after 1971.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the book demonstrates the collusion between the International Lawn Tennis Federation and the white South African tennis body. That collusion, and the action of the All England Lawn Tennis Club, prevented Bobat from becoming the first black South African to play in the junior Wimbledon championships.</p>
<h2>The arguments</h2>
<p>I make five main arguments. </p>
<p>One is that, since democracy in 1994, there has been no fitting recognition, symbolic or material, of outstanding apartheid-era non-racial tennis players. Nor has there been appropriate restitution and reparation of any kind.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536123/original/file-20230706-24-7rnte4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UKZN Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A second argument is that apartheid’s legacy continues to profoundly affect and shape tennis today. A walk around the affluent white town of Stellenbosch in the Western Cape province and a black township like KwaMashu near Durban reveals the stark differences in terms of tennis courts, coaching and the like.</p>
<p>Third, probably less tennis is played today in black schools and communities than before democracy. Certainly, there is less self-organisation of the kind that harnessed limited economic and social capital in black communities to ensure non-racial tennis.</p>
<p>Fourth, as in other areas of South African society, there has been much talk about “transformation” but <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10130950.2010.9676325">little substantive transformation</a> in tennis. </p>
<p>Fifth, there should have been a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> for sport that laid bare apartheid sports crimes, the perpetrators and collaborators, and forged agreement on reparations and transformation.</p>
<p>The collaborators included big business and the media. With the support of the South African sugar industry, the tennis Sugar Circuit <a href="https://www.filepicker.io/api/file/80SLoFsUS9iyZ9PbDBv6">became</a> the “breeding ground for world ranked (white South African) players”. The sugar industry was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/kzns-sugarcane-plantations-fed-off-the-blood-sweat-and-tears-of-indentured-labourers-38db5e28-e88b-4bbd-87a0-5580cd8bfadd">built on</a> the blood and sweat of Indian indentured labour and black labour more generally.</p>
<p>Yet, sugar big business did little to support black players. The commercial media linked to big business were also complicit, devoting print copy and airtime principally to white sports.</p>
<h2>Class, racism and patriarchy</h2>
<p>Opportunities in tennis were profoundly shaped by class, racism, patriarchy and other factors. </p>
<p>The players in the 1971 tour were classified “Coloured” or “Indian”. There were no “Black” South African players chosen because of a debatable notion of “merit” used by the Southern African Lawn Tennis Union.</p>
<p>And the tour was an exclusively male affair even though there were outstanding women tennis players and well-established women’s tournaments. Charmaine Williams joined the tour at her own expense.</p>
<p>In my study I identify how non-racial tennis officials in South Africa exemplified dominant patriarchal attitudes and didn’t take gender inclusion seriously. This would remain an issue in the South African Council on Sport of the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>Jasmat Dhiraj <a href="https://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=598">told me</a> that he had to “overcome inhibitions and complexes” on tour. Bobat states that they </p>
<blockquote>
<p>had to overcome the so-called inferiority complex of playing against white tennis players.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Truth and justice</h2>
<p>Former South African president and liberation leader <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a> <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/No_One_to_Blame.html?id=nAgAzUwnyN4C&redir_esc=y">commented</a> in 1995:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We can now deal with our past, establish the truth which has so long been denied us, and lay the basis for genuine reconciliation. Only the truth can put the past to rest.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, in my view, instead of dealing with our past South Africans are letting it fester, failing to see that genuine reconciliation cannot be achieved by ignoring the injustices and pain of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saleem Badat receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. </span></em></p>
A new book delves into the issues faced by a 1971 international tennis tour, and calls for injustice to be recognised.
Saleem Badat, Research Professor, UFS History Department, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/205251
2023-06-13T16:18:40Z
2023-06-13T16:18:40Z
South African activist Frank Anthony wrote a novel that has been forgotten: why it shouldn’t have been
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526767/original/file-20230517-11985-ieafwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Detail of a photo of Frank Anthony (front left) on Robben Island with Walter Sisulu (front right).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Unknown/Courtesy Nelson Mandela Foundation</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How does it come about that a man who dedicated the greater part of his life to a vision of a just South Africa, and sacrificed his family and personal relationships to do so, disappears from the annals of the country’s history?</p>
<p>How does a writer with consummate command of two of South Africa’s national languages – English and Afrikaans – and whose work in poetry and prose reflects deep insights into world politics, literature and culture come to be virtually totally forgotten?</p>
<p>This is what happened to Frank Anthony, a South African author and activist who lived a life committed to ending racial, economic and gender injustice in apartheid South Africa. Anthony was born in 1940 and died in 1993.</p>
<p>He is the author of an Afrikaans poetry collection <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Robbeneiland.html?id=rgniAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Robbeneiland: My Kruis, My Huis</a> (Robben Island: My Cross, My Home) and the novel <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Journey.html?id=nUIgAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">The Journey: The Revolutionary Anguish of Comrade B</a>. Both works draw on his six-year incarceration on <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/robben-island">Robben Island</a>, and the impact of being restricted within the Kraaifontein district of Cape Town for five years after his release.</p>
<p>I have studied his works, and his life, over the past three years, and have distilled my findings in a recently published <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/eia.v50i1.4">article</a> on his novel The Journey.</p>
<p>The novel is set in the 1980s. Yet it seems to speak to the betrayal and crisis of leadership experienced in South Africa at the present time. I am also interested in the ways the novel seems to exclude personal relationships, especially romantic love, in its political vision. </p>
<p>Investigating Anthony’s life and work, I discovered that his political and literary contributions had not been recognised. Almost <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/frank-anthony-1">no information</a> is available about him online. Both his publications are out of print, so not easily available to the general reading public, and his work has completely fallen out of view in South African literary studies.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526770/original/file-20230517-15-sjf3sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kampen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In my view this is because of his implicit criticism of the leadership of the political organisation to which he belonged, the <a href="https://www.apdusa.org.za/about-us/">African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa</a>, which has expunged his presence and his political contribution from their website. Another factor was the racialised way in which his poetry and fiction were viewed. Reviews of his poetry collection at the time of its publication, for example, focus on the racial identity of the poet rather than on the literary sophistication of his collection. </p>
<p>For me, Anthony’s experience amounts to censorship and “banning”. This was something many South African writers experienced at the hands of a number of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> laws and censorship boards. </p>
<p>It also echoes the experience of dissident writers in Africa such as <a href="https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/authorpage/nuruddin-farah.html">Nuruddin Farah</a>, as well as international writers like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/18/vaclav-havel">Václav Havel</a> who challenged authoritarian regimes through their life work and writing.</p>
<h2>The times</h2>
<p>Anthony was born in Stellenbosch in 1940. Stellenbosch is a town in the Cape winelands, steeped in colonial history. It is still home to the descendants of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa">enslaved people</a> brought by the Dutch to the Cape from the mid-17th century.</p>
<p>Apartheid segregation and discrimination were layered onto this history by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a>, which came into power in 1948. This was the society into which Anthony was born, and the context that influenced his political allegiances.</p>
<p>He joined the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/non-european-unity-movement-neum">Non-European Unity Movement</a>, and later its affiliate, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-peoples-democratic-union-southern-africa-apdusa">African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In 1972, Anthony was arrested and convicted on four counts under the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1967-terrorism-act-no-83-1967">Terrorism Act</a>. The act gave the apartheid government the legal power to clamp down on resistance movements.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photograph of two prison guards standing supervising three men with gardening implements - a man on the left looking directly to camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526771/original/file-20230517-15-mjxdxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1114&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Frank Anthony (left).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Unknown/ Courtesy Nelson Mandela Foundation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Anthony was imprisoned for six years on Robben Island. Leaders like <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/walter-ulyate-sisulu">Walter Sisulu</a> of the African National Congress were serving their sentences there at the time.</p>
<p>On his release in 1978 Anthony was put under a banning order. This meant that he was physically restricted to the Kraaifontein area, a semi-rural district of Cape Town. He worked at a supermarket in the area even though he was a qualified economics lecturer.</p>
<p>After his banning order was lifted, Anthony again become involved in clandestine anti-apartheid operations. </p>
<h2>Contributions to literature</h2>
<p>Anthony was one of a number of significant writers of his time who acknowledged that literature and culture reflected – and were affected by – politics. Other celebrated South African writers, including <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/mongane-wally-serote-1944">Mongane Wally Serote</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/epitaph-for-a-baobab-remembering-south-african-poet-and-activist-don-mattera-187654">Don Mattera</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nadine-gordimer">Nadine Gordimer</a>, also believed that literature had the power to transform hearts, minds and the world. </p>
<p>Anthony’s Afrikaans poetry collection, Robbeneiland: My Kruis, My Huis, was published in 1983. It was titled after the extended poem where he reflects on his prison experience. This poem was also published in the well-known resistance literary magazine, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/staffrider-vol5-no2-1982">Staffrider</a>. </p>
<p>The collection was the first example of Afrikaans prison literature, and an exemplar of how Afrikaans could be an African language of resistance rather than “the oppressor’s tongue” as it had been seen, following the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">1976 Soweto youth uprising</a>, when Afrikaans was imposed in black schools.</p>
<p>But the poetry collection has not been studied for its literary qualities and its creative exposition of debates and philosophies. Rather it has simply become a footnote in Afrikaans literary scholarship. </p>
<p>Anthony’s 1991 novel, written in English, has been almost completely elided from history, despite receiving good reviews in the South African press when it was published.</p>
<p>The highly satirical novel allegorically tells the story of the journey of Comrade B through South Africa to a neighbouring country where his political leaders are exiled. The organisation is never named in the novel. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/epitaph-for-a-baobab-remembering-south-african-poet-and-activist-don-mattera-187654">Epitaph for a baobab: remembering South African poet and activist Don Mattera</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The novel uses well-known literary allusions to foreground the idea of betrayal, especially by leaders who seem to have lost touch with realities on the ground.</p>
<p>The organisation Anthony was still close to read the novel narrowly and defensively. The leadership saw it as an autobiography rather than as a novel, presenting a non-fictional critique of organisational and leadership failings.</p>
<p>In its response to the novel in newsletters and other correspondence, references were made to the “mental instability” of its author. </p>
<h2>Importance</h2>
<p>In my view the novel is important for a number of reasons. </p>
<p>Firstly, it highlights the idea of betrayal of ethical and political principles. Current disillusionment with political parties is not new.</p>
<p>Secondly, the narrative seems, by omission, to be highlighting how personal lives and relationships, especially <a href="https://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/8992">romantic love</a>, might be a politically radical concept. The novel, following dominant Marxist theory, regards love as a bourgeois preoccupation. Contemporary leftist and radical black debates, by contrast, have re-evaluated the importance of love in political struggle.</p>
<p>Today the novel is available only at the Library of Parliament, the National Library of South Africa, and a handful of university libraries. Its disappearance impoverishes our understanding of activists and resistance movements, and their missteps and misapprehensions, in the South African context, as well as worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>F. Fiona Moolla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The activist and writer has been erased from South Africa’s history - but new academic work seeks to restore his voice.
F. Fiona Moolla, Senior Lecturer in English, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/205494
2023-06-01T14:39:45Z
2023-06-01T14:39:45Z
Harry Oppenheimer biography shows the South African mining magnate’s hand in economic policies
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528020/original/file-20230524-17-ybhahz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The late South African mining tycoon, Harry Oppenheimer.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harry Frederick Oppenheimer in his Johannesburg office. (Photo by William Campbell/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Harry Oppenheimer: Diamonds, Gold and Dynasty, his outstanding <a href="https://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/harry-oppenheimer-diamonds,-gold-and-dynasty">biography</a> of the South African mining magnate who died in 2000, Michael Cardo shows that there is still mileage to be made in the study of dead white males who played a role in the making of South Africa. Based on a remarkable depth of research, it is written in an elegant style which makes for a delightfully easy read. </p>
<p>It is rendered the more impressive by the author’s deep conversance with the debates over the relationships between mining capital, Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/28">Cardo</a> is an opposition MP. </p>
<p>Cardo’s reckoning is that Oppenheimer transcended his country’s parochial political arena to become a significant figure on the world stage. As chairman of both Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers Consolidated Mines, he expanded their global reach and dominion. </p>
<p>In South Africa, the Anglo powerhouse came to dominate the economy, which by the 1980s accounted for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/16/business/international-business-south-african-industrial-giant-moving-to-london.html">25% of South Africa’s GDP</a> and an estimated 60% (or more) of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, for all the limitations of his liberalism – and there were many – Oppenheimer made a vital contribution to political and economic progress in a country hamstrung by rival racial nationalisms. (pp.442-43)</p>
<p>Three dimensions of this biography stand out. First, it paints a fascinating picture of Oppenheimer as a person. Second, it offers a careful assessment of his liberalism. Third, it profiles his behind-the-scenes influence as a magnate.</p>
<h2>The man behind the money</h2>
<p>The Oppenheimer empire was built on cheap black labour. Yet Oppenheimer emerges from this study not as a “malevolent monster” (p.1) but as a personally likeable individual, intensely loyal to his friends. One who was highly cultured and sophisticated, with a deep love of art, literature, old books and antiques for their own sake, rather than for opulent display.</p>
<p>His devotion to his Anglican faith was deep and real, underlying his perhaps too-convenient conviction that wealth and power could be combined with “doing good”. He was also highly able. His father, Ernest, was the founder of the Oppenheimer empire, but Harry would become its consolidator (p.18).</p>
<p>By the time of Ernest’s death and his succession by Harry as chairman of both companies in 1957, Anglo had become the world’s largest producer of gold while its twin, De Beers, commanded 90% of the world’s diamond trade.</p>
<p>Born in 1908, Harry enjoyed an exceptionally close relationship with his father, who had converted to the Anglican faith in the mid-1930s. Harry followed in his wake, his Anglo-centricity shaped by his education at public school (Charterhouse) in England before “going up” to Oxford in 1927.</p>
<p>After returning to South Africa in 1931, Harry began his long apprenticeship to his father. After settling at Brenthurst, the “English country house” built by Ernest in Johannesburg, he lived a “blend of business, politics and pleasure”. Then, after a brief (but brave) period in the army, his status as heir to Ernest resulted in his early return to civilian life in 1943.</p>
<p>Oppenheimer now plunged into business, developing Anglo’s interests in the Orange Free State goldfields. By now married with two children, he watched his father meld business with politics. Much impressed by the liberal philosophy of citizenship promoted among troops during the second world war, he sensed the urgent need for social reform. However, while supporting the recommendations of prime minister Jan Smuts’ <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive_files/FAGAN%20REPORT.pdf">Fagan Commission</a> that black urbanisation must accompany industrialisation, he clung to a belief in political segregation. His liberalism allowed for more humane treatment of black people while denying them equal rights (p.116).</p>
<h2>The conservative liberal</h2>
<p>Oppenheimer served as a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Party">United Party</a> (UP) MP from its defeat in 1948 by the National Party, which went on to formalise apartheid, until 1957. He left parliament to become chairman of Anglo after his father’s death. He served as the party’s financial spokesman and was touted as a future leader. </p>
<p>Later, when liberals formed the Progressive Party, he lent them his firm support. He became the party’s main funder and power behind the throne.</p>
<p>Cardo characterises Oppenheimer’s liberalism as “pragmatic”, opposing the idea of a universal franchise. Instead, he favoured a common roll qualified franchise. On this basis, he met Albert Luthuli, leader of the African National Congress (ANC), to see if he would play ball (which he wouldn’t). Nonetheless, he gave discreet financial backing to the defendants in the Treason Trial which, beginning in 1956, saw 156 anti-apartheid activists, including Nelson Mandela, accused of treason. Thereafter, he backed proposals for constitutional reform which would steer a middle path between the ruling <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a>’s racial exclusivism and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.18772/12011115423">ANC-led Congress liberation movement</a>’s demand for universal franchise.</p>
<p>Regarding himself heir to British colonialist and businessman <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cecil-Rhodes">Cecil Rhodes</a>, he deplored the threat to civilisation represented by “primitive tribesmen”. Yet he had to accommodate Africa’s new heads of state if his ever-expanding commercial empire was to flourish. He struck up cordial relationships with both presidents Kenneth Kaunda (of today’s Zambia) and Julius Nyerere (of today’s Tanzania), despite questioning their socialist policies. Indeed, his fondness for Kaunda survived the latter’s (catastrophic) nationalisation of Anglo’s operations in Zambia in 1974.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528220/original/file-20230525-15-jeia88.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Shocked by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">Soweto uprising in 1976</a> and fearing bloody revolution and the installation of a Marxist government, he collaborated with fellow tycoon and philanthropist <a href="https://www.nb.co.za/en/view-book/?id=9780624048190">Anton Rupert</a> to establish the <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/e6e73d0b-fae6-495f-91dd-d0b2f673bda8">Urban Foundation</a>. Its goal was to improve the conditions of black urban dwellers and promote a property-owning black middle class, thereby laying the ground for an orderly political transition. </p>
<p>Oppenheimer supported a qualified franchise until 1978, but Soweto had changed the game. He now gave his wary support to the Progressive Party’s proposals for constitutional negotiations. These were underpinned by the principles of a universal franchise, federal government, a bill of rights, executive power-sharing between majority and minority parties, minority vetos, and a constitutional court as the final arbiter of disputes. </p>
<h2>The influential magnate</h2>
<p>Even after his retirement in 1982, Oppenheimer’s influence did not wane. His views remained highly sought after, especially internationally. He exercised all the soft power at his disposal, through Anglo and his personal contacts with politicians locally and internationally.</p>
<p>His advice to prime minister and president PW Botha to inaugurate multiracial negotiations was ignored. But when Botha’s notorious <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01600/05lv01638/06lv01639.htm">“Rubicon” speech</a> in August 1985 prompted a massive outflow of capital, he urged US companies to resist the disinvestment drive. Meanwhile, he backed initiatives for democracy which would not crash the economy. </p>
<p>All these efforts were capped by Gavin Relly, who had succeeded Oppenheimer as chairman of Anglo, meeting with the ANC in exile. Oppenheimer considered Relly’s initiative “unwise” (p. 375), yet he did not move to stop it. When the meeting was held at Kaunda’s safari ranch in Zambia, it was a roaring success. There was a friendly but robust exchange of views between the old white corporate elite and the new black political elite about the inevitability of liberal democratic governance (p.376). Even so, he confided in UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher that the ANC’s economic strategies were unrealistic and reinforced her own view that support for the ANC was exaggerated and that Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Zulu-ethnic Inkatha movement, was the dominant black political leader in South Africa (p.377). </p>
<p>Oppenheimer and Anglo now reached out to leading figures in the ANC to reshape their ideas on the economy. In Nelson Mandela they found a man who was willing to listen. Soon he became a regular dinner guest at Brenthurst. Yet, famously, it was not Oppenheimer and Anglo who shifted Mandela’s views on nationalisation, but the advice of Chinese and Vietnamese socialist leaders at the meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos <a href="http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1992/92_davos.htm">in February 1992</a>. Oppenheimer grew in confidence as his intimacy with Mandela developed, and the message that private enterprise was essential was getting home. He foresaw a new government with which business could work (p.399). Nonetheless, he had long since sent much of his money abroad! (p.401).</p>
<p>Cardo discounts leftist suspicions of a bargain between powerful white capitalists and the black political elite. He argues that the formers’ influence was marginal and that the repositioning of the ANC’s approach to economic affairs was primarily a result of the collapse of communism and other global pressures. At most, he argues, the ANC’s retreat from its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">Reconstruction and Development Policy</a> – a redistributive economic framework – and its transition to the conservative <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf">Growth, Employment and Redistribution</a> macroeconomic policy was “accelerated” by Anglo (p.413). Yet he does allow that the white business establishment felt an “understandable compulsion” to demonstrate their bona fides to the new government. </p>
<p>Their solution, pioneered by Anglo and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37420687.pdf">Sanlam</a>, the historically Afrikaans insurance company, involved the transfer of unbundled assets to ANC luminaries. They established the model later codified as <a href="http://www.thedtic.gov.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/b-bbee/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment/">Black Economic Empowerment</a> (p.413). Ultimately, Cardo concludes, this gave rise to an undesirable form of “comprador capitalism” – the alliance between big business and dependent political elites– for which Anglo and Oppenheimer must share the blame. But he also asks: what else could they reasonably have been expected to do?</p>
<p>This book does not offer a radical re-interpretation of either the Oppenheimers or the Anglo-American empire. But what it does do is to valuably complicate both our understanding of “white monopoly capital” and its relationship to liberalism in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Regarding himself heir to Cecil Rhodes, Oppenheimer deplored the threat to civilisation represented by ‘primitive tribesmen’.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/205584
2023-05-18T08:13:22Z
2023-05-18T08:13:22Z
The Plot to Save South Africa: masterful account of an assassination that nearly derailed efforts to end apartheid
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526549/original/file-20230516-24-mt7dsp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chris Hani (R) after being elected secretary general of the South African Communist Party in December 1991. To his left is the former secretary general Jo Slovo.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Walter Dhladhla/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I was about to set off to the airport on the morning of 10 April 1993 to cover the great American boxer Muhammad Ali’s arrival in Johannesburg when the news came through: <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/chris-hani">Chris Hani</a> had been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2016-03-10-remember-how-the-sunday-times-covered-chris-hanis-assassination/">murdered</a>. </p>
<p>Of all the African National Congress (ANC) leaders I’d met during a decade of underground membership during the 1980s, the one who impressed me the most was Hani.</p>
<p>From 1987 to 1992 Hani was chief of staff of the movement’s military wing, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, and leader of the South African Communist Party <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/chris-hani">from 1991 to 1993</a>. Intelligent, brave, warm and witty, he exuded the kind of energetic charm that made him a hugely compelling revolutionary. I spent time with him in 1987 and 1989 and felt then, and later, that he would have made a far better successor to Mandela than the anointed dauphin, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thabo-Mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a>.</p>
<p>The news of his assassination outside his home in Dawn Park, Boksburg, came as a shock. I found it difficult to focus on the appearance of Ali, who’d been a kind of hero of mine for more than 20 years.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/the-plot-to-save-south-africa">recently released book</a>, The Plot to Save South Africa, journalist and author Justice Malala does a masterful job of telling the tale of Hani’s murder and the precarious spell that followed before his funeral. He describes the nine days that followed, days that contained the potential to scupper fragile negotiations to end apartheid and prompt prolonged chaos or worse. </p>
<p>The subtitle of this book – “The week Mandela averted civil war and forged a new nation” – is appropriately chosen.</p>
<p>The book is a gripping read for anyone interested in late 20th century history, and in the end of apartheid more specifically. Malala has done a fine job in making this not just an impressively researched record, but also a compelling, fast-moving tale.</p>
<h2>Narrative balance</h2>
<p>Malala, who was a young reporter at The Star at the time of the killing, is a talented story-teller, adept at weaving the required facts into a page-turning narrative. Each anecdotal vignette comes with the kind of vivid descriptive detail that is only possible with exhaustive research. He interviewed scores of the key players from all sides in this drama. He also had access to a wealth of archival material, allowing him to delve into the minds of the protagonists and to recount their movements, what they were wearing and the words they shared with each other. </p>
<p>He draws on his experience, discipline and flair as a writer to maintain the momentum all the way through to the funeral at the end. </p>
<p>The key player in this enthralling story is <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1993/mandela/biographical/">Nelson Mandela</a> who had been released after 27 years in prison in February 1990. He adored Hani, treating the 50-year-old as his son. He was overwhelmed with sadness. But he retained the clarity of purpose to hold back ANC supporters from wrecking the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">negotiations to end apartheid</a> that had started soon after Mandela’s release, and had resumed shortly before Hani’s murder, after a spell of suspension.</p>
<p>The assassins wanted the talks derailed. They hoped Hani’s death would ignite a civil war that would unleash the apartheid security forces against the ANC and the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03480.htm">Mass Democratic Movement</a>, an alliance of anti-apartheid groups, as never before.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526799/original/file-20230517-23-usl6oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>There was indeed an outpouring of rage, grief and violence following the murder. In the areas around Johannesburg and Pretoria alone 80 people were killed and hundreds injured in violence directly related to Hani’s assassination, with many more casualties in the rest of the country.</p>
<p>Most of the injuries and fatalities were due to the actions of the apartheid security forces and right-wing vigilantes. </p>
<p>But the outcome of the assassination was the opposite to the killers’ intentions. The incendiary climate following the murder focused minds on both sides. Mandela, his lead negotiator <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/cyril-ramaphosa-1952">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, and other ANC leaders successfully used the moment to press for an election date and a <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03162.htm">Transitional Executive Council</a> to run the country until the first democratic election. This was hugely significant. It meant that the then ruling <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a>, the party of apartheid, could no longer call the shots before the election. </p>
<p>Without the urgency injected into the negotiations process by the assassination, it is possible that it would have dragged on, and many more would have died.</p>
<p>The outcome was the opposite to the killers’ intentions. Immediately afterwards, power leaked away from the state president, FW de Klerk, the National Party and the security establishment, and flowed to Mandela, the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement.</p>
<p>In his accounts of these killings Malala retains narrative balance, giving space to all of the players. For example, he devotes several pages to the murder by ANC activists of the liberal anti-apartheid teacher and activist Ally Weakley, who was tragically mistaken for a right-wing vigilante.</p>
<h2>A far-right plot</h2>
<p>The book starts with Mandela receiving news of the murder and quickly segues to the movements of the two men who would be convicted, the Polish immigrant <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63887332">Janusz Walus</a>, who pulled the trigger, and his mentor, the Conservative Party MP <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02267/06lv02268/07lv02273.htm">Clive Derby-Lewis</a>, and also those who assisted them, including Derby-Lewis’s wife, Gaye, and the journalist <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/white-supremacist-arthur-kemp-steps-leader-neo-nazi-group-national-alliance">Arthur Kemp</a>, who supplied Hani’s address (and subsequently emerged as a leading player in the international extreme-right). </p>
<p>Later, Malala raises the possibility that others within the apartheid security forces were aiding them. For example, the regular police investigating the murder were instructed by the Security Police not to probe into Walus’ links to his employer, the arms trader Peter Jackson. Jackson owned the car the killer used on the day, and Malala notes that the killer’s diary disappeared from the police docket, later reemerging with several pages missing.</p>
<p>He also points to the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> finding that Walus operated as a source for the National Intelligence Service (the apartheid state’s version of the CIA). The commission probed human rights abuses by the apartheid state and those who fought against it.</p>
<p>To maintain the hour-by-hour tension, Malala avoids reaching ahead, instead portraying the players in this drama as they were then. Perhaps inevitably, some of those who star in his account fared less well in the decades that followed – in particular the ANC spokesperson <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/carl-niehaus">Carl Niehaus</a>, who confessed to fraud and was eventually expelled from the ANC. </p>
<p>More generally, many of the devoted ANC leaders who played a central part in the build-up to Hani’s funeral went on to become multi-millionaires, more interested in self-enrichment than the common weal. </p>
<p>Appropriately, Malala resists the temptation to speculate about what would have happened if Hani had lived. Instead he closes with Mandela and De Klerk winning the Nobel Peace Prize and the launch of the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03162.htm">Transitional Executive Council</a> which ushered in the largely peaceful elections on April 27 1994.</p>
<p>This book serves as a reminder of how close South Africa came to civil war in the countdown to democracy. Nearly three decades on, it is also a timely reminder of the selflessness and dedication of many of the main players of the time, qualities that seem in short supply today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The book is a gripping read for anyone interested in late 20th century history, and in the end of apartheid.
Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/201499
2023-03-10T12:41:33Z
2023-03-10T12:41:33Z
Peter Hain: Neil Aggett died fighting apartheid – South Africa’s rulers have betrayed the struggle
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514634/original/file-20230310-17-6nwu0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anti-apartheid activist Neil Aggett (29) died in apartheid police detention in 1982.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Charcoal on paper by Dr Amitabh Mitra/Wiki Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dr-neil-hudson-aggett">Neil Aggett</a>, the trade unionist and anti-apartheid activist who died in detention at the hands of police 41 years ago, was one of very few white South Africans who actively fought apartheid. He was only 29 when he died. </p>
<p>He came from a community enjoying one of the most privileged existences on earth, with a black servant class attending to their every need. Yet he gave that all up because he believed every person – regardless of their “race”, religion, gender or sexuality – had the right to justice, the right to liberty, the right to equality of opportunity. </p>
<p>He was selfless, fighting for others. He lived according to <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/selected-quotes">Nelson Mandela’s guidance</a>:</p>
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<p>What counts in life is not the mere fact that we have lived. It is what difference we have made to the lives of others.</p>
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<p>Neil was a role model, winning numerous awards and certificates at <a href="https://kingswoodcollege.com/">Kingswood College</a> in Makhanda, Eastern Cape, before studying at the University of Cape Town and completing his medical degree in 1976. </p>
<p>He became a doctor working mainly in overcrowded and desperately under-resourced hospitals reserved for black people across the country. At the same time, he was a champion of workers’ rights and workers’ health and safety. He became a volunteer organiser with the <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/15859">African Food and Canning Workers’ Union</a>, working without pay, taking additional weekend hospital night shifts to support himself. </p>
<p>But his passionate trade unionism proved fateful. It made him a target of a brutally repressive apartheid police state. He was arrested in late 1981, ending up in Johannesburg’s notorious police headquarters, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/john-vorster-square-police-station-or-johannesburg-central-police-station">John Vorster Square</a>. He emerged from there in a coffin. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ahmed-timol-inquest-why-uncovering-apartheid-crimes-remains-so-important-85761">Ahmed Timol inquest: why uncovering apartheid crimes remains so important</a>
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<p>The apartheid security police who had brutally interrogated Neil maintained he had “hung himself with a scarf” – just as they claimed others who died in prison had “slipped in the shower” or <a href="https://theconversation.com/ahmed-timol-the-quest-for-justice-for-people-murdered-in-apartheids-jails-116843">“fallen out of a window”</a>. He was the 51st person to die in detention under apartheid. The total later escalated to over 70. </p>
<p>He was the first and only white person to die in detention from torture. No one has ever been convicted for any of <a href="https://newafricabooks.com/products/no-one-to-blame-george-bizos?variant=32109551419428">those 70-plus murders</a>.</p>
<h2>Sacrifice and betrayal</h2>
<p>Today it is taken for granted that Nelson Mandela walked to freedom <a href="https://history.blog.gov.uk/2020/02/11/whats-the-context-the-release-of-nelson-mandela-11-february-1990/">in February 1990</a> after 27 years’ imprisonment, and four years later was elected president. Today it is taken for granted that, however serious South Africa’s problems of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-be-done-to-tackle-the-systemic-causes-of-poverty-in-south-africa-169866">poverty</a>, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15407">unemployment</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2019/06/Prof-Emeka-E-Obioha-Emeka-Obioha-ADDRESSING-HOMELESSNESS-THROUGH-PUBLIC-WORKS-PROGRAMMES-IN-SOUTH-AFRICA.pdf">homelessness</a>, <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">corruption</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-in-south-africa-are-playing-havoc-with-the-countrys-water-system-197952">power and water cuts</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/link-between-crime-and-politics-in-south-africa-raises-concerns-about-criminal-gangs-taking-over-198160">mafia-like crime</a>, each South African citizen has human rights protected by their <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>.</p>
<p>But none of that was achieved without a bitter fight against merciless opponents. My family’s story was a small part of that. The apartheid security forces dispatched my parents, me, my brother and two small sisters <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/peter-gerald-hain">unwillingly into exile</a>.</p>
<p>Not because my mom and dad had committed the sort of “normal” crimes in democratic societies policed by the rule of law – such as theft, fraud, violence, rape or murder – but because they stood up and fought <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid">apartheid</a>: the most institutionalised system of racism the world has ever seen. </p>
<p>In exile, the apartheid security service tried to kill me in June 1972 with one of their specialities, a lethal letter bomb, sent to our family’s London address. It would have blown up our family and our home except for a <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/peter-gerald-hain">fault in the trigger mechanism</a>. </p>
<p>Other anti-apartheid campaigners weren’t as fortunate as I was. A letter bomb killed <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ruth-first">Ruth First</a> in Maputo in 1982 and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/abram-ramothibi-onkgopotse-tiro">Abram Tiro</a> in Botswana in 1974. Neil Aggett also paid that ultimate price. In any civilised society he would have lived a full life, protecting people’s health as a doctor or protecting food workers’ rights as a trade unionist.</p>
<p>But today, tragically, the many thousands of freedom struggle activists like Neil have been betrayed by the governing African National Congress (ANC) <a href="https://twitter.com/CyrilRamaphosa/status/1297459045041868801/photo/1">politicians who have looted</a> and brought the country nearly to its knees. Similarly betrayed have been the heroes of the liberation struggle, the leaders such as <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Mandela</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/walter-ulyate-sisulu">Walter Sisulu</a>, <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/news-and-events/images/documents/Citation_Ahmed%20Kathrada.pdf">Ahmed Kathrada</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sobukwes-pan-africanist-dream-an-elusive-idea-that-refuses-to-die-52601">Robert Sobukwe</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bikos-black-consciousness-philosophy-resonates-with-youth-today-46909">Steve Biko</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/lilian-masediba-ngoyi">Lilian Ngoyi</a> who gave up the prime of their lives to serve harsh jail sentences.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/multiparty-democracy-is-in-trouble-in-south-africa-collapsing-coalitions-are-a-sure-sign-192966">Multiparty democracy is in trouble in South Africa – collapsing coalitions are a sure sign</a>
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<p>South Africans from every walk of life, black and white, young and old, tell me they feel helpless, feel they cannot do anything about power cuts, water cuts, or about dysfunctional or non-existent <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/editorial/2022-12-07-editorial-the-post-office-doesnt-even-know-its-dead/">postal</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-revolting-against-inept-local-government-why-it-matters-155483">local municipal services</a>, feel politics doesn’t serve them anymore, feel their vote is worthless – even though it took a momentous fight to get it for everyone. </p>
<p>My message to them, my message to you all, is: learn from South Africa’s struggle history.</p>
<h2>Need for active citizenship</h2>
<p>The struggle giants, the Nelson Mandelas and Oliver Tambos, the Neil Aggetts and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/joe-slovo">Joe Slovos</a>, didn’t defeat apartheid on their own. They were leaders of a mass movement of many tens of thousands of ordinary people who, in the most oppressive of conditions, threw themselves into activism.</p>
<p>Many made sacrifices, some small, some big. Some did a little, others did a lot – but they all did something. And they each contributed in whatever way they could to one of the most successful movements for change ever in modern history. </p>
<p>They defeated a powerful police state. They refused to be subjugated by an economic system feeding profitably in a trough of racism. And they beat apartheid.</p>
<p>Back in the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s, people said, people feared, that could never happen, might be impossible.</p>
<p>But it was made possible because enough ordinary citizens rose up together and campaigned, and struggled and fought for change. </p>
<p>Courageous school students in Soweto lit a fuse <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-epochal-1976-uprisings-shouldnt-be-reduced-to-a-symbolic-ritual-185073">in June 1976</a>. They were gunned down by police for protesting peacefully, but refused to be cowed, and their defiance triggered a fresh wave of resistance. </p>
<p>Today South Africa must be changed again – radically, and soon. But history teaches us that big change doesn’t normally come from the top. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>I don’t know if the ANC can be saved from itself. I don’t know if the good people still in the ANC can fully reclaim it from the corrupt ones who riddle the party from top to bottom. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-in-crisis-south-africas-governing-party-is-fighting-to-stay-relevant-5-essential-reads-196580">ANC in crisis: South Africa's governing party is fighting to stay relevant - 5 essential reads</a>
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<p>But meanwhile, every South African can do their bit. First by doing your very best, driven by the vision of an inclusive and united South Africa propagated by democracy’s founding mothers and fathers. </p>
<p>And also saying “No!” to paying a bribe or a backhander for a contract, for a job, for a permit, for a licence, for starting a business, for building a home.
Often it’s very difficult to say “No!”. But until everyone unites to say “No!”, nothing will change. Until a mass uprising said “No!” to apartheid, it didn’t change, and never would have.</p>
<p>South Africans can join a popular uprising to say “No!” and demand change, and stop their beautiful, special country from becoming a failed state. </p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghUeVs1YzWI">Neil Aggett lecture</a> delivered at Kingswood College, Makhanda, on 7 March 2023.</em></p>
<p><em>Peter Hain’s <a href="https://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/a-pretoria-boy">memoir</a> A Pretoria Boy: South Africa’s ‘Public Enemy Number One’ is published by Jonathan Ball, as are his thrillers <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rhino-Conspiracy-Peter-Hain/dp/1916207715">The Rhino Conspiracy</a> and <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/63219017">The Elephant Conspiracy</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Hain is President of Britain's Action for Southern Africa and Chair of the Donald Woods Foundation, a charity based at Hobeni in the Transkei. A Labour member of the House of Lords since 2015, he was an MP for 24 years and government minister for 12 years.</span></em></p>
Neil Agget’s passionate trade unionism proved fateful. It made him a target of a brutally repressive apartheid police state.
Peter Hain, Visiting Adjunct Professor at Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/199997
2023-02-21T09:40:14Z
2023-02-21T09:40:14Z
South Africa and Israel: new memorial park in the Jewish state highlights complex history
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510859/original/file-20230217-16-6qx4p0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artist's impression of Gan Siyobonga memorial park in Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israeli officials and Jewish South African activists <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-723790">inaugurated</a> a memorial park in Tel Mond, a city north of Tel Aviv, in November 2022. Gan Siyabonga (We Thank You Garden) commemorates several dozen Jewish South African anti-apartheid activists who had personal connections to Israel. </p>
<p>The main sponsors of Gan Siyabonga are the <a href="https://www.jnfsa.co.za/">Jewish National Fund South Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.sazf.org/">South African Zionist Federation</a>. The park’s creation is a milestone in the South African Jewish community’s decades-long introspection into its complex relations with the apartheid regime. </p>
<p>This memorial site is unique in Israel, where an <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-south-africa-home-white-colonialists">estimated</a> 20,000 South Africans live.</p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is the first site in Israel to highlight the involvement of Jews in the anti-apartheid struggle. It is also unique because it calls attention to a group that was both anti-apartheid and pro-Zionist, or at least not anti-Zionist. The combination is considered unconventional today. That’s because <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zionism">Zionism</a>, the political ideology that favours a Jewish state, is largely associated in South Africa with collaboration with apartheid and the oppression of Palestinians. </p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is a reminder that relations between Zionism and apartheid, and between Israel and South Africa, were complex and multilayered. In the last few years I have been working on a PhD dissertation that explores this complexity. Digging into archives and historical periodicals revealed a fascinating story that defies some assumptions. </p>
<h2>Israel’s troubled relations with apartheid</h2>
<p>Israel is commonly remembered as one of the last allies of apartheid South Africa. From the mid-1970s, the Israeli government maintained <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/unspoken-alliance-israels-secret-relationship-apartheid-south-africa-sasha-polakow-suransky">close relations</a> with the minority white regime in Pretoria. </p>
<p>It was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/09/17/israel-imposes-sanctions-on-south-africa/70cbb4f4-77b9-4898-8df7-dc39c2c5a500/">last countries</a> to enforce full sanctions on Pretoria. As a result, many anti-apartheid activists, including Jewish ones, held fierce anti-Zionist stances. These were amplified by the strong alliances South African liberation movements forged with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">Soviet Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220609-the-plo-at-58-and-the-anc-at-110-how-they-evolved-and-where-do-they-stand-today/">Palestinian Liberation Organisation</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-push-led-by-south-africa-to-revoke-israels-au-observer-status-is-misguided-168013">Why the push led by South Africa to revoke Israel’s AU observer status is misguided</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">accusation</a> that Israel practises apartheid-like policies against Palestinians is another reason Israel hasn’t been seen as anti-apartheid. Recent anti-Zionist rhetoric by some Jewish veterans of the South African struggle, such as <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2021/05/17/how-stop-apartheid-israel">Ronnie Kasrils</a>, strengthened this feeling of unbridgeable contradiction between Israel and anti-apartheid values.</p>
<h2>Support for Israel</h2>
<p>But anti-apartheid activism and Zionism were not always in conflict. Up until the late 1960s, many radical anti-apartheid activists were sympathetic towards Israel and Zionism’s more progressive strands.</p>
<p>In 1948, most radical activists in South Africa supported the establishment of the State of Israel and its war against the invading Arab armies in Palestine. <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/362107/pdf">The Guardian</a>, the main radical weekly in South Africa at the time (linked to the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a>), rooted for an Israeli <a href="https://twitter.com/AfrIsrRel/status/1626615101770936322">victory</a>. </p>
<p>Young Israel was a symbol of opposition to racial persecution and fascism. Those two themes strongly resonated with South African anti-apartheid activists. They tended to see the Afrikaner <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a> as an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02582473.2021.2009014?tab=permissions&scroll=top">ideological relative</a> of the Nazis. </p>
<p>The initial <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/who_saved_israel_1947.pdf">Soviet support for Israel</a>, and a prominent socialist element within Zionism, also contributed to these feelings, especially among South African Marxists.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">In search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union</a>
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<p>From the late 1950s, many anti-apartheid activists cherished Israel’s stances against South Africa <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/132/559/1440/4831456">at the United Nations</a>. Similarly its <a href="https://www.academia.edu/90295451/_We_Are_Returning_to_Africa_and_Africa_is_Coming_Back_to_Us_Israels_Evolving_Relations_With_Africa">support for decolonisation</a> in Africa. By the early 1960s, Israel had become the most anti-apartheid country in the “western” camp of the Cold War. In 1963, it <a href="https://www.jta.org/archive/south-african-premier-attacks-israel-for-recall-of-envoy-israel-mum">recalled its envoy</a> and supported international sanctions against South Africa. Israeli archives contain many <a href="https://twitter.com/AfrIsrRel/status/1524773424324923393">letters</a> from South African liberation movements <a href="https://www.archives.gov.il/archives/Archive/0b071706800399c8/File/0b071706804bc4fc">thanking Israel</a> for its support at the UN and elsewhere. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An old typed letter signed by an ANC official praises Israel" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Letter from ANC officials praising Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Israel State Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the 1960s, Israel offered covert material support to anti-apartheid groups, perhaps even <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2013-12-20/ty-article/.premium/mandela-and-the-mossad/0000017f-e66d-dc7e-adff-f6eda1960000">to Nelson Mandela</a>. Israeli experiences inspired the early stages of uMkhonto we Sizwe, the African National Congress’ (ANC) military wing, for example through <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/arthur-goldreich">Arthur Goldreich</a>. It also had stable communication channels with the <a href="https://www.archives.gov.il/archives/Archive/0b0717068031bdef/File/0b0717068062f0ae">Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania</a>. </p>
<h2>Post-1967</h2>
<p>Sympathy towards Israel diminished considerably after the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4325413">Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973</a>. But relations between anti-apartheid activism and Zionism remained complicated.</p>
<p>Many Jewish individuals who joined the struggle against apartheid had been active in Zionist youth movements. The socialist-oriented <a href="https://habonim.org.za/">Habonim</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Shomrim_in_the_Land_of_Apartheid.html?id=ZMltAAAAMAAJ">Hashomer Hatzair</a> stand out. Those who joined the anti-apartheid struggle (such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Slovo_the_Unfinished_Autobiography.html?id=9QxzAAAAMAAJ">Joe Slovo</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Revolutions_in_My_Life.html?id=vQYwAQAAIAAJ">Baruch Hirson</a>) typically abandoned Zionism. But they acknowledged its role in forming their radical worldview.</p>
<p>Jewish South African individuals were prominent in the liberal strand of the anti-apartheid struggle too. They usually used their professional skills to challenge the apartheid regime. Lawyers like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/advocate-israel-isie-aaron-maisels">Isie Maisels</a>, parliamentarians like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/helen-suzman">Helen Suzman</a>, journalists like <a href="https://southafrica.co.za/benjamin-pogrund.html">Benjamin Pogrund</a>, and rabbis like <a href="https://www.sajr.co.za/rabbi-ben-isaacson-a-maverick-soul-finds-rest/">Ben Isaacson</a> were examples. Jewish liberal activists usually expressed support for Israel in various ways.</p>
<p>Developments since the mid-1970s have largely overshadowed the complex history of Zionism’s engagement with the apartheid regime. The anti-apartheid struggle became tightly associated with the Palestinian struggle. And, after its rise to power in 1994, the ANC reaffirmed its commitment to its Palestinian allies.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since then, relations with Israel have largely remained chilly. The ANC <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/news/s-africas-ruling-party-anc-reaffirms-boycott-israel-resolution">supports</a> the movement to boycott Israel and Pretoria <a href="https://thewire.in/external-affairs/south-africa-israel-anc">downgraded</a> its representation in the Jewish state. South African foreign affairs minister Naledi Pandor has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/bds-threat/article-713140">called</a> for Israel to be declared an “apartheid state”. </p>
<h2>A step in the right direction</h2>
<p>Israel and South Africa’s Jewish communities have a long and ambiguous history of entanglement with race politics. There were admirable moments in this history. But there were also periods of complicity with racism. In Israel, both sides of this history are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is an important first step in placing this history in the Israeli public sphere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asher Lubotzky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Gan Siyabonga is unique in Israel. It highlights a group that was both anti-apartheid and pro-Zionist.
Asher Lubotzky, PhD Candidate, History, Indiana University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/198430
2023-02-01T12:36:54Z
2023-02-01T12:36:54Z
South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa’s foreign policy explained
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507115/original/file-20230130-6879-11w5zo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>January was a busy diplomatic month for South Africa. The country <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russias-lavrov-visits-ally-south-africa-amid-western-rivalry-2023-01-23/">hosted</a> Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and US treasury secretary <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-treasury-secretary-yellen-meet-president-ramaphosa-south-africa-trip-2023-01-24/">Janet Yellen</a>. Josep Borrell, vice-president of the European Commission, was also <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/media-advisory-high-representative-josep-borrell-travels-south-africa-and-botswana_en">in town</a>.</p>
<p>The biggest talking point, though, has been Lavrov’s visit, which met with criticism in the west. Similarly, the South African-Russian-Chinese joint maritime exercise, <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/sandf-on-ex-mosi/">Operation Mosi</a>, scheduled for February off the South African Indian Ocean coast. Critics have slammed South Africa’s hosting of the war games in the light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/">in February 2022</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa has been reticent to criticise Russia openly for invading Ukraine. The country <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">abstained during each vote</a> criticising Russia at the United Nations. Some have read this as tacit support of Russia.</p>
<p>The visits and South Africa’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put the spotlight on the country’s foreign policy.</p>
<p>I follow, study and have published extensively on South Africa’s foreign policy. In a recent publication, <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">Ramaphosa and a New Dawn for South African Foreign Policy</a>, my co-editors and I point out that South Africa’s voting pattern in these instances should be read in the context of its <a href="https://pmg.org.za/briefing/28596/">declared foreign policy</a> under the stewardship of President Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>Like his predecessors, Ramaphosa’s policy encompasses at least five principles:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>pan-Africanism </p></li>
<li><p>South-South solidarity </p></li>
<li><p>non-alignment </p></li>
<li><p>independence </p></li>
<li><p>progressive internationalism. The governing ANC <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/anc-npc-discussion-document-on-foreign-policy">defines</a> this as</p></li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>an approach to global relations anchored in the pursuit of global solidarity, social justice, common development and human security, etc. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Evolution of South Africa’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>In the era of Nelson Mandela, the first president of democratic South Africa, the country, once a pariah state, returned to the international community. Under him, the country saw a significant increase in its <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC88112">bilateral and multilateral relations</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">History may explain South Africa's refusal to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It enjoyed global goodwill and Mandela was recognised for his <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-russian-visit-says-about-south-africas-commitment-to-human-rights-in-the-world-188993">outspoken views</a> on international human rights abuses. His involvement in conflict resolution efforts in, for example, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/22/mandela-indonesia-and-liberation-timor-leste.html">Timor Leste</a> (East Timor) and Africa also received <a href="https://www.un.org/en/exhibits/page/building-legacy-nelson-mandela">international acclaim</a>. The UN declared 18 July <a href="https://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/">Nelson Mandela International Day</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s tenure was followed by the aspirational era of President Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="https://journals.co.za/journal/aa.afren">African renaissance</a>. Mbeki’s foreign policy aspired to reposition Africa as a global force as well as to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330614094_Mbeki_on_African_Renaissance_a_vehicle_for_Africa_development">rekindle</a> pan-Africanism and African unity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man wearing a suit and tie shakes hands with a woman wearing a dress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507113/original/file-20230130-14-p18rp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, (left), with South African foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, in Pretoria on 23 January 23.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phill Magakoe/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26976626#metadata_info_tab_contents">Jacob Zuma’s era</a> could be described as indigenisation of South Africa’s foreign policy, driven by the values of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-archbishop-tutus-ubuntu-credo-teaches-the-world-about-justice-and-harmony-84730">ubuntu</a> (humanness). In giving effect to ubuntu – equality, peace and cooperation – as a foreign policy principle, South Africa gravitated towards the global south, rather than just Africa. Yet the continent remained a focus of South Africa’s foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">foreign policy</a> under President Cyril Ramaphosa has shifted to a strong emphasis on economic diplomacy. This is joined by a commitment to <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/National-Policy-Conference-2017-International-Relations.pdf">“progressive internationalism”</a>.</p>
<p>Progressive internationalism formed the basis for South Africa’s vocal position on UN reform, global equity and ending the dominance of the global north. The global north could view this as challenging to its hegemonic power and dominance in the UN. </p>
<p>This has challenged South Africa’s declared foreign policy principles. It maintains strong economic and political relations with the global north. But it also maintains strong relations with the global south (including Cuba, Venezuela and Russia). For this, it has been <a href="https://gga.org/south-africas-foreign-policy-decisions-ambiguous-or-misunderstood/#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%20has%20been%20criticised,means%20deployment%20is%20more%20rapid">criticised</a> by the west.</p>
<p>South Africa’s quest for global status in line with its declared foreign policy principles continues under Ramaphosa. It has adopted several roles to achieve this: balancer, spoiler and good international citizenship. </p>
<p>As a balancer, it has attempted to rationalise its relations with both the north and south in accordance with the principles of non-alignment and independence. As a spoiler, it has failed to condemn, for example, China for its poor human rights record, claiming it is an internal Chinese matter. This could be read as an expression of its south-south solidarity with China. Its role as a good international citizen has made it an approachable international actor. It has promoted the rule of international law and upholding international norms. This speaks to its progressive internationalism principle.</p>
<h2>At home and abroad</h2>
<p>The Ramaphosa era set off in 2018 with less emphasis on foreign policy. But by the time the COVID pandemic broke out <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30211-7/fulltext">in December 2019</a>, his foreign policy really came to the fore as he led both the South African and African pandemic responses.</p>
<p>South Africa has been attempting to capitalise on the geostrategic changes in the balance of forces on the world stage. Blatant realpolitik has returned. During the past year, for example, the country has conducted joint multilateral military exercises with several states, most notably with France (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/ex-oxide-2022-will-be-west-coast-based/">Operation Oxide</a>), a permanent member of the UN Security Council.</p>
<p>South Africa’s soft diplomacy has <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-09-22-jerusalemadancechallenge-south-africas-display-of-soft-power-amid-covid-19/">made some inroads</a> at UN agencies and through its cultural diplomacy. But this has not necessarily resulted in material gains – such as more leadership in multilateral organisations.</p>
<p>Moreover, its gravitation towards strong non-western military powers such as Russia, China and India has met with western disappointment. Its foreign policy position of solidarity, independence, non-alignment and <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-african-heads-mission-conference-7-apr-2022-0000">progressive internationalism</a> has not translated into material foreign policy benefits either, such as increased foreign direct investment as envisaged by Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-african-heads-mission-conference-7-apr-2022-0000">economic diplomacy</a>.</p>
<p>Trade with states such as China, Turkey, Russia and India has <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/06/20/cyril-ramaphosa-brics-partnership-has-great-value-for-south-africa">increased</a>. But it is not enough as the country requires massive investment to update infrastructure and start new development projects in line with Ramaphosa’s vision of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-dawn-should-be-built-on-evidence-based-policy-118129">“new dawn” </a> for South Africa.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man and a woman smile for the camera while sitting. Miniature South African and America flags are on the table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507110/original/file-20230130-14-90njg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African finance minister, Enoch Godongwana, meets his American counterpart, Janet Yellen, in Pretoria on 26 January.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The post-pandemic international political economy has also adversely affected the country. This has been amplified by the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bloomberg/news/2022-08-05-donor-fatigue-could-mean-starvation-for-900000-in-west-africa/">economic impact of the Ukraine crisis </a>. Massive Western financial commitments are <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/10/council-adopts-18-billion-assistance-to-ukraine/#:%7E:text=The%20Council%20reached%20agreement%20on,its%20possible%20adoption%20next%20week">directed towards Ukraine</a>. This leaves South Africa in a vulnerable economic position as it <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZA">needs foreign development assistance</a>.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>As our South African Foreign Policy Review volume 4 has shown, Ramaphosa’s “new dawn” <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/south-african-foreign-policy-review-volume-4">has been deferred</a>. This as his party and government jump from crisis to crisis. This kind of instability often seeps into the diplomatic landscape. Investors are aware of the investment risks posed by <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-power-crisis-five-essential-reads-187111">power</a> crises.</p>
<p>Globally, the age of soft power has somewhat waned since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. South Africa needs to be proactive – not only reactive – to emerging international geostrategic conditions. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-can-it-offer-an-alternative-to-the-us-and-china-117764">Russia in Africa: can it offer an alternative to the US and China?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Besides its current leadership of the <a href="https://infobrics.org/">BRICS bloc</a> (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the country needs to be bolder. It should, for example, campaign for a fourth term <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2022.2144250?journalCode=finp20">on the UN Security Council</a>, and for leadership in multilateral organisations. In these, it can actively achieve its foreign policy objectives in support of the country’s national interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jo-Ansie van Wyk has taught at the Diplomatic Academy of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. </span></em></p>
South Africa’s foreign policy under Ramaphosa emphasises economic diplomacy and ‘progressive internationalism’, which promotes global equity and ending the dominance of the global north.
Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Professor in International Politics, University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/198253
2023-01-24T16:28:28Z
2023-01-24T16:28:28Z
Russia rekindles old friendship with South Africa, its ally against apartheid
<p>The recent announcement that the South African, Russian and Chinese navies will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/19/world/africa/south-africa-naval-drill-russia-china.html">conduct joint exercises</a> off the east coast of South Africa between February 17 and 27, has alarmed the United States. Washington has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/lavrov-says-west-prevented-negotiations-to-end-ukraine-war/2023/01/23/a97b2252-9b18-11ed-93e0-38551e88239c_story.html?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wp_world">condemned the decision</a> as the exercises would appear to compromise South African neutrality in the diplomatic controversies surrounding the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The exercises will be in the Indian Ocean between Durban and Richards Bay on the country’s east coast. They will not amount to much in strict naval terms. The <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/552770/south-africas-military-strength-in-2022-vs-the-world/#:%7E:text=50%20rocket%20projectors-,Naval%20power,4%20frigates">South African navy</a> consists of three German-built submarines, about 15 years old, and four German-built ocean-going frigates of the same vintage. </p>
<p>The rest of the navy is made up of five coastal patrol vessels. One, by far the heaviest at 1,031 tonnes, was built locally in 2022. Three are from about 25 years ago and displace only 37 tonnes each. And the last is from the apartheid era. There are also a handful of harbour patrol vessels.</p>
<p>Essentially, the exercises can only feature the four frigates with possibly some cameo appearances by the three submarines. The Russian and Chinese ships, simply by virtue of their capacity to reach South African waters, are likely to be much larger. </p>
<p>The countries <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/19/world/africa/south-africa-naval-drill-russia-china.html">previously conducted joint drills</a> in 2019 running anti-piracy drills and rescue exercises. The country has also conducted four joint naval drills with the US, most recently in 2021.</p>
<p>It will be a far cry from the days of the cold war when the apartheid-era navy shared some Nato communications systems and there was talk of the need for a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2619934">Sato</a>” alliance, centred on the US, South Africa and South America.</p>
<p>Having said that, there is a very real military history between South Africa and Russia in that the Soviet Union played a significant role in the struggle against apartheid. This is something Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov will have been at paints to remind his opposite number, Naledi Pandor, at their <a href="https://www.africannewsagency.com/news/russia-appreciates-pretorias-position-of-principle-on-the-conflict-with-ukraine-says-foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-13f3fb22-01d5-4b2a-9cbe-4c4235b0720b/">meeting in the capital, Pretoria, on January 23</a>, where he praised South Africa’s “position of principle” over the war.</p>
<p>A large number of cadres from the African National Congress or ANC (formerly an anti-apartheid organisation, now the ruling party of South Africa) went to Moscow for military training during the apartheid era, chiefly in sabotage work, what today would be called terrorism. Former members of such cadres I have met since those times told me they would transit through Paris and frequent a bar near Boulevard St Germaine called La Palette. </p>
<p>They would wait there, sometimes for days, until Soviet agents were satisfied that they were not being tracked by South African intelligence. Then the pickup would be made. I was taken to see this bar by ANC veterans.</p>
<p>Nelson Mandela’s successor as president, Thabo Mbeki, was himself <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">trained as a saboteur in the Soviet Union</a>. The irony, given the subsequent bitter falling out between Mbeki and his rival and successor Jacob Zuma, was when Zuma sang “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2009-11-01/bring-me-my-machine-gun-battle-soul-south-africa-mandela-zuma">Bring me my machine gun</a>” during his election rallies. He had been taught how to use that machine gun by the three-piece suited Thabo Mbeki.</p>
<h2>Cold war: out of Africa</h2>
<p>But the key contribution of the Soviet Union to a liberated South Africa was decisive. As the cold war turned against the USSR, its final premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, was actively contemplating retrenching commitments overseas – including in Africa.</p>
<p>The apartheid government wanted to prevent ANC infiltration into South Africa from Angola, then under a Marxist regime. So Pretoria planned to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37320507.pdf">set up a buffer state</a> in southern Angola for pro-western rebel group <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03515.htm">Unita</a>. With a capital in Cuito Cuanavale, the buffer state would have all the attributes of a state, a kind of deluxe and large Bantustan (an apartheid government-controlled Black “homeland”) led by Unita general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/feb/25/guardianobituaries.victoriabrittain">Jonas Savimbi</a>.</p>
<p>Angola was a staunch Soviet ally and its government had come to power in 1976 with Soviet help. Unita had been supported in its struggle against the regime by the USA and South Africa, along with some early support from China. </p>
<p>The Soviet generals approached Gorbachev, appealing to the leader for “one last throw of the dice” in its bid to destroy Unita, saying: “We have expended so much energy there.” Gorbachev gave them a squadron of latest Mig fighters with Soviet pilots. Instantly South Africa lost air superiority.</p>
<p>Even more importantly, a Cuban army, certainly at Soviet behest, deployed in Angola. At the battle of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/battle-cuito-cuanavale-1988">Cuito Cuananavle</a> in 1988, the Cubans surrounded the South Africans. Accounts are divided as to what happened. Certainly Cuban and South African generals gave very different reasons for the withdrawal. But withdraw the South Africans did. </p>
<p>It would appear the “battle” essentially a series of manoeuvres, and the Cubans outmanoeuvred the South Africans. The legend is that the Cuban general then messaged his South African counterpart asking whether he wanted his men to walk home or be carried home in body bags. Whichever is the true (or truer) account, the South African army walked out.</p>
<h2>Debt of gratitude</h2>
<p>It was a huge embarrassment, if not defeat. At the very least the mighty apartheid machine had been faced down. South Africa’s ruling National Party underwent a palace revolution. The hawks fell from power. A hitherto unknown figure, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1993/klerk/biographical/">F.W. de Klerk</a>, became president. Convinced that apartheid could no longer be militarily defended, he held <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-29-mn-1209-story.html">talks in 1989 with Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda</a>, one of apartheid’s fiercest critics in Africa, to discuss his plans for a transition to democracy, </p>
<p>I tracked these talks from contacts in Zambia’s foreign ministry and Kaunda’s own state house presidential office in Lusaka. Kaunda told de Klerk he had to free Nelson Mandela and unban the ANC. Both happened in 1990. What followed were four years of arduous negotiations that led to majority rule elections and a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution of equalities in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC has never forgotten. Whichever faction of the ANC is dominant, it knows it owes its accession to power in 1994 to the Russians.</p>
<p>It also knows it must tread a fine line in the new cold war of today. For the South African government, a naval joint exercise seems a modest signal that, within this new cold war, alliances feature multiple partners. But not all of them have to be from the west that in the old cold war supported the now reviled apartheid regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The relationship between Pretoria and Moscow was forged in the apartheid era with the then Soviet Union giving support to banned ANC fighters.
Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/196456
2022-12-15T14:32:09Z
2022-12-15T14:32:09Z
Dear Comrade President: book highlights ANC leader Oliver Tambo’s role in preparing South Africa for democracy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501088/original/file-20221214-10567-5pwq8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo during his exile in Botswana. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">William Campbell/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than three decades have passed since the apartheid government in South Africa unbanned the African National Congress (ANC), the country’s leading liberation movement, and released its leader, Nelson Mandela, from prison. This launched four fraught <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230617278_7">years of negotiations</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-political-killings-have-taken-hold-again-in-south-africas-kwazulu-natal-143908">violence</a> that led to South Africa’s first-ever democratic elections.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/dear-comrade-president/9781776096688">book</a> Dear Comrade President: Oliver Tambo and the Foundations of South Africa’s Constitution, by South African historian Andre Odendaal, focuses on a dimension ignored in previous histories and memoirs of this period: the ANC’s constitution-framing process, which would help to shape the future democratic South Africa.</p>
<p>In the mid-1980s conditions for negotiations to end apartheid did not seem promising. President PW Botha’s government had shifted control away from the white parliament towards the military. A wave of assassinations, proxy terror killings and regular <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/list-sadf-raids-neigbouring-countries">raids on neighbouring states</a> was launched.</p>
<p>On the ANC side, most felt the route to power was armed revolution. Its main sources of support were the then Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic and Cuba. Much of its leadership was beholden to Marxism-Leninism. </p>
<p>Odendaal quotes former South African Communist Party
leader <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/joe-slovo">Joe Slovo</a> saying (in 1994) that the political content of the ANC was “moulded” in these three countries – content Slovo calls “very mechanical Stalinist concepts”. Slovo adds:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Thinking back on it now it horrifies me to remember the kind of things they were taught.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This 442-page book unpicks the process of adopting constitutional principles that included support for multiparty democracy and a bill of rights. This process was launched by the ANC leader Oliver Tambo in 1985. It involved a seven-person constitution committee which eventually came up with a document that proved hugely influential in negotiations with the apartheid government. </p>
<h2>Making of democratic South Africa’s constitution</h2>
<p>The committee set up by <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Tambo</a> drew up 14 drafts after many delays and much frustration. But it finally produced a document that was endorsed in 1988, and became the basis for the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/our-work">United Nations</a> approach to South Africa. </p>
<p>This document guided the ANC’s stand in the negotiations under the umbrella of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa)</a>. Odendaal writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A feature of the negotiating process was the way in which the ANC, with its more than four years of focused pre-planning, outmanoeuvred opponents determined to block democracy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most compelling bits of the book include profiles of the main players – Tambo and those on the committee, including <a href="https://ourconstitution.constitutionhill.org.za/harold-jack-simons/">Jack Simon</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/kader-asmal-1934">Kader Asmal</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/zola-sidney-themba-skweyiya-dr">Zola Skweyiya</a>, <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/11-former-judges/65-justice-albie-sachs">Albie Sachs</a> and the man whose 1985 intervention set it in motion, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/zweledinga-pallo-jordan">Pallo Jordan</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500750/original/file-20221213-16533-lciae2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Penguin Random House</span></span>
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<p>Jordan’s paper , The New Face of Counter-Revolution, went against prevailing revolutionary wisdom. It argued that the ANC should take the initiative through backing multiparty democracy with a bill of rights guaranteeing individual freedom. It should also win the support of the black middle class.</p>
<p>Some within the ANC had severe doubts, worried this was getting in the way of revolution.</p>
<h2>Challenging orthodoxy</h2>
<p>Odendaal counters <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50013048">the view</a> that it was the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 – marking the unravelling of the Soviet Union, the main backer of the ANC’s armed struggle – that nudged the ANC towards multiparty democracy. He shows it had already endorsed these principles more than three years earlier. </p>
<p>The collapse of the Soviet Union had “little impact on the ANC’s immediate thinking and strategy in relation to negotiations”, Odendaal adds. (In my view, it certainly had a longer-term impact, helping open the way for one-time Marxists to become multi-millionaires.) </p>
<p>Odendaal’s account also challenges the claim by some analysts, including <a href="https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Niel_Barnard">Niel Barnard</a>, the former head of the apartheid government’s National Intelligence Service, that the fall of communism allowed the government to negotiate. Odendaal acknowledges the collapse of the communist bloc made it easier for the government to unban the ANC. It also meant the government</p>
<blockquote>
<p>could no longer rely on support from Western countries as a bastion against the supposed spread of communism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the process leading to negotiations was already unstoppable by then. The secret “Consgold talks”, aimed at easing the way towards negotiations, started in 1986. They were between the ANC and Afrikaner academics led by the Stellenbosch University philosophy professor Willie Esterhuyse, and backed by the National Intelligence Service.</p>
<p>Adding to the momentum were the talks <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a> held with apartheid justice minister Kobie Coetsee <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mandela/interviews/coetsee.html">in 1986</a>, and the government’s invitation to Soviet leader Mikhael Gorbachev to engage in discussions. </p>
<p>It’s often forgotten that it was the hardliner PW Botha, who preceded FW de Klerk as president, who met with Mandela and released Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners on 15 October 1989. The Berlin Wall came down <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50013048">on 9 November 1989</a>.</p>
<p>Odendaal highlights the role played by the regular “safaris” that saw more than a thousand South African notables and activists meeting with the ANC between 1985 and 1990. This counters the view promoted by Barnard and Esterhuyse that these were irrelevant. </p>
<p>Instead, he suggests, they helped set the climate for negotiations by softening white South African attitudes to the ANC and widening ANC perspectives on conditions within the country. He quotes Barnard’s admission that these visits to the ANC in exile</p>
<blockquote>
<p>were threatening to take over from the government so we had to act quickly.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Weaknesses and strengths</h2>
<p>The book stresses that mass resistance and international sanctions pushed the apartheid government to the point where it had to negotiate. But its laser focus on the ANC’s constitutional process means that sometimes detail gets in the way of perspective, leading to too much listing of names and not quite enough contextual information.</p>
<p>For instance, Odendaal notes that the ANC was in “organisational disarray” by 1990. He also hints at the depth of the problems faced by the ANC’s army, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a> (MK), referring to a meeting between Tambo and MK’s Ugandan camp commander <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thenjiwe-mtintso">Thenjiwe Mtintso</a>, where she explains the dire conditions faced by recruits.</p>
<p>More could be said here. MK was decimated through being pushed out of its “forward areas” (its southern African bases), deeply infiltrated by apartheid agents and overwhelmed by internal problems under its compromised leader <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014-09-02-joe-modise-benefited-from-arms-deal-former-scopa-chair/">Joe Modise</a>. Its other strand, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/members-anc-and-sacp-are-detained-due-operation-vula">Operation Vula</a> (which involved
establishing command structures within the country), was more successful but arrived too late to make a substantial difference to the balance of power between the ANC and the apartheid government. </p>
<p>These issues could have been explored in more depth even if it meant sacrificing some of the blow-by-blow detail.</p>
<p>Dear Comrade President might be hard going for the casual reader, but it makes a valuable contribution to the South African “struggle” library, revealing the importance of the constitutional process within the ANC for setting the trajectory of a democratic South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Evans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A historian counters the popular view that the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall set in motion talks to end apartheid. The process was unstoppable by then.
Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/195949
2022-12-07T14:39:13Z
2022-12-07T14:39:13Z
What is RET and what does it want? The Radical Economic Transformation faction in South Africa explained
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499500/original/file-20221207-3544-nqjswm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Loyalists of the ANC's Radical Economic Transformation (RET) at the Olive Convention Centre in Durban. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rajesh Jantilal/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been standard for some years, in any analysis of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), to refer to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-01-11-the-ret-faction-wants-total-control-of-everything-in-the-state-and-society-as-an-end-in-itself/">“radical economic transformation”</a> (RET) faction. Yet, there has been little serious analysis of what it is. </p>
<p>The RET is difficult to define. It has no clear shape, leadership, membership, rules or policies. It is rather an aggregation of the aggrieved and aspirant within the ANC, linked by a set of broadly shared attitudes towards the state and power. Nor, in conventional terms, is the faction particularly “radical”. The “economic transformation” it seeks is the displacement of white racial domination, rather than the overturn of capitalism.</p>
<p>Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and under President Cyril Ramaphosa, a constant constraint on his leadership and any effort to reform the economy and promote clean governance. For that reason, it needs to be understood.</p>
<h2>Growth and composition</h2>
<p>Its origins lie in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-like-a-tsunami-wave-20050307">“tsunami wave”</a> which led to the defeat of Thabo Mbeki as ANC president <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007 by Jacob Zuma</a>, followed by Zuma’s elevation as state president in 2009. During Zuma’s presidency (<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma-mr">9 May 2009 – 14 February 2018</a>), the RET faction overlapped heavily with his support base, which was drawn heavily from KwaZulu-Natal, his home province. Yet it was also closely aligned to ANC heavyweights in the other provinces, notably those dominated by the then <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/anc-suspensions-death-of-the-premier-league-9492a864-f3f0-4792-a94a-7c6a9080a0e6">“premier league”</a> – provincial premiers in three mainly rural provinces Mpumalanga, Free State and North West. Simultaneously it drew heavily on the support of black business lobbies doing business with the state, notably at provincial and local government levels. </p>
<p>By implication, the RET faction was often implicated in the corrupt practices referred to as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">“state capture”</a>. Yet there was more to it than that. While various “Indian” business people who were tied to Zuma, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, were on the periphery of the RET, the faction itself was largely Africanist politically, protesting a continuation of white power under a veil of democracy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924">Factionalism and corruption could kill the ANC -- unless it kills both first</a>
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<p>The faction also drew energy from black professionals fighting against what they depicted as white domination of their professional spheres, and the radical black student lobbies which emerged during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd84n8?turn_away=true">“RhodesMustFall”</a> and <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/south-africa-student-protests-explained/">“Fees must fall”</a> protest waves of the late Zuma period. </p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">December 2017 ANC elective conference</a>, the RET faction was strongly anti-Cyril Ramaphosa and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-ramaphosas-victory-mean-for-south-africas-economy-89420">pro-Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> in the race for the ANC presidency. The narrowness of Dlamini-Zuma’s defeat has provided it with a strong oppositional presence within the ANC during the Ramaphosa presidency, hampering his efforts at reform. </p>
<h2>Understanding the RET faction</h2>
<p>If it is difficult to pin down who belongs to the RET, it is equally difficult to define what they want. Nonetheless, four broad themes emerge.</p>
<p>First, the motive behind the faction seems to be black economic empowerment, but not the empowerment originally envisaged by Thabo Mbeki with its carefully regulated industrial charters <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40283176#metadata_info_tab_contents">and targets</a>. The RET version was a generalised insistence that the state machinery (government departments, provincial and local administrations, and state-owned enterprises) be leveraged to allocate contracts to black businesses. </p>
<p>This is justified by attacks upon <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">“white monopoly capital”</a>, arguing that the South African economy has changed very little since democracy in 1994, and that white business is covertly determined upon maintaining white power. </p>
<p>The second thrust, closely related to the first, is a generalised attack on the constitutional settlement of 1994-96. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-wrong-to-blame-south-africas-woes-on-mandelas-compromises-96062">“Mandela compromise”</a> is criticised as having done little to ease the poverty and unemployment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-remains-hotly-contested-in-south-africa-this-detailed-history-shows-why-138378">black population</a>.</p>
<p>The RET is highly ambivalent about the constitution’s defence of property rights but has little respect for the other laws, rules and regulations which the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> puts in place. By implication, the judiciary is regarded as suspect, as its function is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">see that the constitution is enforced</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">Can the ANC survive the end of South Africa's heroic epoch?</a>
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<p>Third, an overlap with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which depicts itself as <a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2019/12/30/the-effs-%EF%BB%BFmarxist-leninist-fanonist-thought-as-founded-by-mngxitama/">Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist</a>, sees the RET faction driving the call for the state to extend its right to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-expropriation-without-compensation-anc-eff-toenadering-on-state-land-custodianship-its-all-about-the-politics/">compulsory expropriation of land</a>. The impetus comes from the fact that, despite the government’s programme of land reform, a hugely disproportionate amount of land suitable for agriculture remains in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201802/landauditreport13feb2018.pdf">white hands</a>. The faction, like the EFF, appears to admire the Zimbabwean land reforms of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725843.2022.2032591?journalCode=cafi20">early 2000s</a>, which saw mass expropriation of white farms, but rarely advocates this openly.</p>
<p>Fourth, the RET faction is a strong supporter of state enterprises. Although the faction would not object to the transfer of state enterprises into black hands, privatisation is feared as likely to result in acquisition of state businesses by white companies. </p>
<p>In any case, the RET faction is heavily embedded within the state owned enterprises. Their operatives allocate valuable contracts to black <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – business people who feed on government contracts. By implication, it is opposed to all versions of “structural reform” touted by the Ramaphosa government and lobbies attached to “big business”.</p>
<h2>What the RET faction wants</h2>
<p>Trying to work out precisely what the RET faction wants is difficult because it has <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ret-manifesto">no agreed manifesto</a>. However, three problems stand out:</p>
<p>First, it remains unclear what the RET faction would put in place of the existing constitution. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">The ANC insists it's still a political vanguard: this is what ails democracy in South Africa</a>
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<p>Should the constitution be reworked, and if so, how? What are the specific flaws in the constitution as it stands? For the moment, all we are left with are generalised attacks on the judiciary for individual judgements the RET dislikes, demands for changes of the expropriation clause in the constitution, and so on.</p>
<p>Second, the RET faction has no general plan for land reform. Crucially, it ignores the increasing domination of agriculture by <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-is-failing-ignoring-the-realities-of-rural-life-plays-a-part-190452">huge agri-businesses</a>.</p>
<p>These mega-firms are hugely complex operations. It is one thing to expropriate small white farms; quite another to engage in a battle with huge corporations which probably incorporate foreign as well as local ownership. And what would happen to food production if the state were to take them over?</p>
<p>Third, it is common knowledge that South Africa’s parastatals are failing. <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/investing/461772-eskoms-failure-in-four-charts.html">Eskom</a>, the power utility, can’t deliver enough electricity and is burdened by <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2022-10-26-mtbs-government-to-take-a-chunk-of-eskoms-debt/">unpayable debt</a>. <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/transnet-decline-inside-business-big-battle-for-private-rail-20221129">Transnet</a>, the transport parastatal, is in chaos, unable to maintain infrastructure needed for business to operate efficiently. The public railway system is a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60202570">shambles</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-oldest-surviving-party-the-anc-has-an-achilles-heel-its-broken-branch-structure-150210">Africa's oldest surviving party – the ANC – has an Achilles heel: its broken branch structure</a>
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<p>South African Airways, the national airline, has collapsed financially and is being propped up by <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/the-days-of-bailouts-are-gone-saa-to-start-flying-ahead-of-takatso-deal-20210922">state funding</a>. The Post Office is <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-10-05-ag-highlights-sapo-mess-as-it-faces-collapse/">unable to deliver the post</a>. The reasons for these failures are many, ranging from the ANC’s systematic undervaluation of technical ability to run complex operations, its <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">political deployment strategy</a>, and the mass looting of state bodies that took place <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">under Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>Turnaround strategies have failed. The difficult question for the RET (and the ANC at large) is: if not privatisation, then what?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and a constant constraint on Ramaphosa leadership.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/194741
2022-11-24T13:51:34Z
2022-11-24T13:51:34Z
Simon Nkoli’s fight for queer rights in South Africa is finally being celebrated – 24 years after he died
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496715/original/file-20221122-21-6degfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Simon Nkoli (left) with activist and physician Ivan Toms in 1989. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy Julia Nicol Collection/GALA Queer Archive</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Born in 1957, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/simon-nkoli">Simon Tseko Nkoli</a> had just turned 41 when he died, in 1998, of an AIDS-related illness. In his short life, the South African activist fought against different forms of oppression. He fought for those downtrodden because of their “race”. He stood up for those ostracised because of their HIV status. His greatest fight, though, was for those persecuted because of their sexual orientation.</p>
<p>Nkoli was born and raised in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/soweto-johannesburg">Soweto</a>, the largest black township in a South Africa ruled by a white minority who enforced <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a>, a system of racial segregation. His activism began in 1980 when he joined the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/congress-south-african-students-cosas">Congress of South African Students</a>, a youth organisation fighting apartheid. </p>
<p>In 1984, Nkoli was arrested and became a trialist in the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/63470">Delmas Treason Trial</a>. During his imprisonment, he came out as gay to his comrades. This caused much debate in the liberation movement but it was important in changing the attitude of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-anc">African National Congress</a> (ANC) to gay rights. The ANC would go on to govern the country with the advent of democracy in 1994, helping shape the first <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/gay-and-lesbian-rights">constitution</a> in the world to outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation. Nkoli was responsible for setting up diverse projects including organising the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/first-gay-pride-march-held-south-africa">first Pride march</a> in Africa. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man holds up his fist, a garland of flowers around his neck, a banner behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=815&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1025&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1025&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496741/original/file-20221122-14-azc0hg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1025&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nkoli at an anti-apartheid protest in the UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gordon Rainsford/Simon Nkoli Collection/GALA Queer Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There has been a growing wave of interest in Nkoli’s life. South African musician <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/musician-who-sings-gay-songs-isixhosa/">Majola</a> sings about queer love in isiXhosa, one of the country’s most widely spoken languages. His 2017 album Boet/Sissy has a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ltEPTp0Tdw">song</a> dedicated to the activist. Also noteworthy is the South African artist <a href="https://www.whatiftheworld.com/artist/athi-patra-ruga/">Athi-Patra Ruga</a>’s <a href="https://zeitzmocaa.museum/art/proposed-model-for-tseko-simon-nkoli-memorial/athi-patra-ruga-proposed-model-for-tseko-simon-nkoli-memorial/">sculptural work</a> on Nkoli. A new South African musical production by composer <a href="https://www.philipmiller.co.za">Philip Miller</a> called <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/lifestyle/2022-10-23-new-show-glow-celebrates-sas-queer-freedom-fighter-simon-nkoli/">GLOW: The Life and Trials of Simon Nkoli </a> is set to launch in 2023. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/desmond-tutus-long-history-of-fighting-for-lesbian-and-gay-rights-131598">Desmond Tutu's long history of fighting for lesbian and gay rights</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The annual <a href="https://simonnkolicollective.wordpress.com/2018/10/04/simon-nkoli-memorial-lecture-an-introduction/">Simon Nkoli Memorial Lecture</a> is another event that celebrates the legacy of the late activist. The <a href="https://twitter.com/unisachs/status/1590342469593464832">ninth edition</a> was held in November 2022, co-organised by the <a href="https://simonnkolicollective.wordpress.com/">Simon Nkoli Collective</a>, where I gave the keynote address. </p>
<p>I argued that Nkoli’s activism highlighted the <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/what-is-intersectionality-explained/">intersectionality</a> of systems of oppression. Intersectionality refers to how multiple social struggles are interlinked. It recognises the interconnectedness of various systems of oppression such as racism, sexism and homophobia. </p>
<p>Nkoli was acutely aware of how these were interrelated and this article considers what can be learnt from his activism today.</p>
<h2>Intersectional systems of oppression</h2>
<p>In a compelling speech in 1990 before the first Pride march in Johannesburg, organised by the <a href="https://www.gala.co.za/resources/docs/Archival_collection_articles/GLOW.pdf">Gay and Lesbian Organisation of the Witwatersrand (GLOW)</a>, Nkoli said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is what I say to my comrades in the struggle when they ask me why I waste time fighting for moffies (a deregatory Afrikaans language term that means faggot). This is what I say to gay men and lesbians who ask me why I spend so much time struggling against apartheid when I should be fighting for gay rights. I am black and I am gay. I cannot separate the two parts into secondary and primary struggles. In South Africa I am oppressed because I am a black man, and I am oppressed because I am gay. So, when I fight for my freedom, I must fight against both oppressors.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nkoli recognised that the struggles of queer folk are linked to the struggles of women and that the struggles of queer folk and women cannot be disconnected from those of black people.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/6EdHmZ1xRGc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>He was, however, aware of the fact that the intersectionality of struggles had its limits. Although queer people of different classes and races marched together in 1990, he was not so shortsighted that he believed all those people were considered equal. He explained in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6EdHmZ1xRGc&t=1310s">1989 interview</a> that even within the queer liberation movement there were splinters due mainly to racial differences. </p>
<p>Nkoli’s activism ensured that the rights of sexual minorities were enshrined in the <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/constitution/your-rights/the-bill-of-rights">Bill of Rights</a> of South Africa’s constitution of 1994. This was done through the advocacy work of organisations like the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality that brought together diverse organisations. </p>
<h2>What we can learn from Nkoli today?</h2>
<p>We learn from Simon Nkoli that the fight for social justice and social equality demands collaborative and joint efforts. I muse at the isiZulu language term for intersectionality coined by a student activist, Zandile Manzini: “<a href="https://twitter.com/PanasheChig/status/711149927242534914">ukuhlangana kobuntu</a>”. Any sustainable forms of fighting against social inequality are built on the idea of returning the humanness to people. Fighting oppression demands that the humanity and the dignity of everyone is respected regardless of social class, race, ethnicity, political affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity or nationality.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four people of differing ages pose with an elderly man in a nondescript office setting. They smile at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496746/original/file-20221122-20-obu6wn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The president meets gay and lesbian activists, 1995. From left: actor Ian McKellen, activist Phumi Mtetwa, Nelson Mandela and Simon Nkoli.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy the National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality Collection/GALA Queer Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Retired South African judge Edwin Cameron, himself openly gay and living with HIV, explained Nkoli’s legacy at the opening of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNxThs1O45A&t=176s">Simon Nkoli exhibition</a> at the Stellenbosch University Museum in 2019. He said that Nkoli’s activism crossed boundaries and had resonated in many other parts of the continent.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-singer-nakhane-redefines-ideas-of-masculinity-144957">South African singer Nakhane redefines ideas of masculinity</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>As artists and activists commemorate and celebrate the life and legacy of Nkoli, let us remember his fight for the creation of a democratic South Africa in which all people could live dignified lives without fear of discrimination. As we remember Nkoli, we should think through what other fights still need to be fought, what systems of oppression still need to be unbuckled and what solidarities still need to be forged.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The activist is today the subject of songs, sculptures, an annual lecture and even a new musical.
Gibson Ncube, Lecturer, Stellenbosch University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/194296
2022-11-17T14:11:11Z
2022-11-17T14:11:11Z
South Africa needs strategic leadership to weather its storms. Its presidents have not been up to the task
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495594/original/file-20221116-22-xqzgnr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C37%2C1778%2C1197&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's democratic era presidents, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Penguin Random House South Africa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is in a state of crisis. Its current reality is necessarily shaped by historical events, not least the outcomes of the political settlement process that led to the end of apartheid <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike other countries in southern Africa, where political independence came after gruesome liberation wars, the leaders of the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>), which led the liberation struggle and has been the governing party since 1994 – alongside other political and social movements – managed to negotiate a transition to democracy. There were many “wins”, including assent to the election of a majority-led government and the enactment of policies that would ensure broad-based <a href="http://www.thedtic.gov.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/b-bbee/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment/">economic transformation</a>.</p>
<p>This transition may be seen as a point in history where the nation navigated one of its greatest crises. But its current leadership is confronted with multiple challenges. These range from <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_ZAF.pdf">extreme poverty</a> and high <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q2%202022.pdf">unemployment</a> to the severe undermining of democratic institutions by <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">corruption and state capture</a>. </p>
<p>These “wicked problems” are so difficult and complex that there is no single, silver-bullet answer. There is only a range of clumsy solutions, all of which are imperfect. The policy-making puzzle, therefore, is as much about recognising the nature of the problem as seeking to mitigate risks. </p>
<p>Our new <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/presidents-mandela-ramaphosa-leadership-age-crisis/9781776095940">book</a>, The Presidents: From Mandela to Ramaphosa, Leadership in an Age of Crisis, assessed the leadership of South Africa’s five post-apartheid presidents – <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/souoverview8.htm">Nelson Mandela</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/node/111">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. We wanted to see what lessons can be learned, especially in relation to their strategic abilities. Strategy is one of the critical leadership attributes necessary to cope with the strong headwinds that leaders often encounter.</p>
<p>We concluded that there has been a shortage of truly strategic leadership in South Africa in this period, with a few exceptions. Thus, the country has been unable to grapple with the underlying structural problems that are the fundamental cause of its socio-economic precarity. </p>
<h2>Strategic thinking</h2>
<p>What do we mean by “strategy”? Here we defer to former UK member of parliament and now (UK) Times columnist <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/profile/matthew-parris?page=1">Matthew Parris</a>. He says,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>although the meaning has become diluted through promiscuous and often inappropriate use … strategy remains the best word we have for expressing attempts to think about actions in advance, in the light of our goals and capacities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many leaders, governments and organisations confuse planning with strategy. So this is an apt consideration to keep in mind: have South Africa’s post-1994 presidents addressed the fundamental question of what is wrong with the society and its economy, in a strategic way? </p>
<p>Here’s how the country’s five post-apartheid presidents have fared on strategy.</p>
<h2>Five different styles</h2>
<p>Mandela, the first president of a democratic South Africa, made big strategic choices – not necessarily the right ones, but certainly ones that were befitting of the times. </p>
<p>A primary strategy choice faced Mandela at the very advent of the democratic era. He opted for national reconciliation as his political motif. It was strategic in the sense that the alternative was to drive a strong transformational agenda without seeking to get the powerful and privileged white minority on board. </p>
<p>Crudely put, he could have opted for redemption and even revenge, rather than reconciliation. </p>
<p>This was accompanied by a deep personal commitment to the rule of law and constitutionalism. He used his presidential power to drive that message and execute that strategy, leaving the detail of management of policy and government to his number two, Thabo Mbeki.</p>
<p>The transition from his government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (<a href="https://www.gov.za/faq/finance-business/where-do-i-get-copy-reconstruction-and-development-programme-rdp">RDP</a>) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (<a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/growth-employment-and-redistribution-macroeconomic-strategy-south-africa-gear">GEAR</a>) macroeconomic strategy is another debatable case in point. </p>
<p>The RDP was the ANC government-in-waiting’s flagship programme for socio-economic transformation. It was an essentially Keynesian public investment-focused plan for improving public services such as housing, healthcare and electricity to the black majority. The shift to GEAR was deeply contested. Left-of-centre commentators and players within the broader ANC-led alliance saw it as a neo-liberal approach to fiscal and monetary policy that would constrain the government’s ability to drive redistribution of wealth and opportunity. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>When his turn came as president (1999-2008), Mbeki strove to step up to the strategic standards that Mandela had set. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/mbekis-dream-of-africas-renaissance-belied-south-africas-schizophrenia-58311">vision for Africa</a>, in which Africans would take control of their destiny, was strategic. So was his determination to confront the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm">“two nations”</a> problem – one prosperous and white, the other poor and black. </p>
<p>The shift to GEAR was executed with strategic purpose and an iron fist. There were negative consequences, especially in the long term. But few, if any, big strategic choices can be win-win; there will invariably be a downside. The question is whether the leader understands and then confronts the dilemma, and in doing so can articulate the upside and recognise its intrinsic value, one that justifies the downside. </p>
<p>Mbeki was a flawed visionary. His legacy is scarred by his inexplicable <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mbekis-character-and-his-aids-denialism-are-intimately-linked-54766">lack of judgment on HIV/AIDS</a>, and his stubborn refusal to accept that his government should provide antiretroviral treatment. </p>
<p>Motlanthe, who succeeded him, in his modest way, also recognised the strategic imperative of his short, caretaker time as president – (<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-kgalema-motlanthe">25 September 2008 to 9 May 2009</a>): to consolidate authority in democratic government and to stabilise an unstable body politic in the context of the palace coup that had taken place within the ANC. </p>
<p>Even Zuma, his successor, in his own mendacious and deviously self-serving way, had strategic intent: to <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">capture the state</a> for venal personal gain. He executed it with a ruthless sense of purpose.</p>
<p>Current president Cyril Ramaphosa appears to be the least strategic of them all. His failure to grasp the strategic nettles inhibits his presidency. On issues such as the transition away from coal, the government stake in state-owned enterprises or the need for a basic income grant, Ramaphosa has dithered, seeking to wait until sufficient consensus has formed or putting in place cumbersome consultation processes, before reaching a clear decision. </p>
<p>He gets things done; he gets there in the end, but his design and use of process is that of a master tactician, not a strategist. He has not risen to the leadership heights required by the gravity of the historical moment. This requires leadership that would unshackle government from the congealing embrace of the ruling ANC and its fractious factions. A leader who would rise above the daily throng to inspire ordinary citizens with a compelling narrative of hope and change, underpinned by iron determination to take brave decisions and to execute them with a sense of purpose and urgent expedition. </p>
<h2>Circling the problem</h2>
<p>The crises that confronted these five presidents have been very different, with varying levels of intensity and composition. Each has faced big challenges, that could inevitably not be resolved only by their executive office. Undoubtedly, part of strategic and visionary leadership is the ability to identify existing and potential allies who are willing to invest what is required to drive a transformative agenda. </p>
<p>All have responded to “what went wrong”. But, because of limitations to their strategic leadership, none has fully met the challenge of confronting “what is wrong” head-on. Their ability to address the question of “what is wrong” has been constrained by the very real demands to put out fires, and keeping the boat afloat without an eye on the navigation system. And where they have focused on navigating the rough seas to get to the destination of a more equal, inclusive South Africa, the vessels of governance with a mandate to steward these transitions have not always delivered.</p>
<p>Mandela, Mbeki and now Ramaphosa have circled the problem (while Zuma weakened the state’s capability). But perhaps because it is such a wicked problem, and the structural difficulties run so deep, they have failed to define a strategic course that would confront the underlying structural conditions, consigning South Africa to an uncertain and worrisome future. </p>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from the authors’ <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/presidents-mandela-ramaphosa-leadership-age-crisis/9781776095940">new book</a> The Presidents: From Mandela to Ramaphosa, Leadership in an Age of Crisis</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is employed by the University of Cape Town, is a Fellow of the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, is a partner of political risk consultancy The Paternoster Group, and serves as a member of the Advisory Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC).
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mabel Dzinouya Sithole is employed by the University of Cape Town, contributes regularly to policy advocacy with the Southern African Liaison Office, and other civil society organisations in the region. She advises organisations such as the Ford Foundation on the design of leadership development programmes in Africa and across the globe. </span></em></p>
Mandela, the first president of a democratic South Africa, made big strategic choices – not necessarily the right ones, but certainly ones that were befitting of the times.
Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape Town
Mabel Dzinouya Sithole, Programme Officer - Building Bridges, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192425
2022-10-20T14:07:58Z
2022-10-20T14:07:58Z
South Africa’s struggle songs against apartheid come from a long tradition of resistance
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490044/original/file-20221017-21-qtbypn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions sing political songs in 1987 in Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Walter Dhladhla/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Struggle songs, also known as protest music or liberation songs, are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03007768308591202">defined as</a> “expressions of discontent or dissent” used by politically disenfranchised protesters to influence political conversations and express emotions. </p>
<p>Some scholars <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03007768308591202">argue</a> that these songs date back to ancient biblical times when the Israelites were enslaved in Egypt and “the Hebrew people sang their lamentations”. </p>
<p>In the American context, researchers <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Sinful_Tunes_and_Spirituals.html?id=OvQLVneUgHkC&redir_esc=y">contend</a> that protest music can be traced back to transatlantic slaves. But others <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-50538-1">note</a> that the use of these songs <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-50538-1">goes back even further</a>.</p>
<p>In modern Africa and in other colonised contexts, such as Latin America, protest music was an <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/attachments/jps-articles/jps_2003_32_3_21.pdf">important tool</a> used by oppressed peoples in their quests to overthrow oppressive regimes. </p>
<p>In South Africa, struggle songs were critical in the strategies used to depose the oppressive race-based <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> state. They became effective instruments of confrontation used by the black majority against the white oppressors.</p>
<p>They were also used as a means of keeping alive the memory of political icons who had been killed, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-steve-bikos-remarkable-legacy-often-overlooked-82952">Steve Biko</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-south-african-struggle-hero-chris-hani-lessons-for-today-64715">Chris Hani</a>, and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/solomon-kalushi-mahlangu">Solomon Mahlangu</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time they helped ensure that those resistance leaders who were imprisoned, like <a href="https://theconversation.com/mandela-was-a-flawed-icon-but-without-him-south-africa-would-be-a-sadder-place-142826">Nelson Mandela</a>, or exiled, like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-tambo">Oliver Tambo</a>, were not forgotten. These people, the dead and the living, represented the country’s political struggle.</p>
<p>The songs were also a way of marking moments of grief, of which there were many, and the occasional moments of hope, as black South Africans looked forward to the apartheid regime’s demise.</p>
<p>As a researcher whose work looks at the intersection of rhetoric, language and media, I <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780367823658-26/persuasion-songs-protest-sisanda-nkoala">have</a> <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-20c6b555ff">examined</a> the appeal of struggle music as an persuasive means of engaging in political communication in the South African context. </p>
<p>These texts are relevant even in the post apartheid context because they continue to be an important way in which people deliberate on issues. </p>
<p>Even though the lyrics are relatively simple, and the music can be viewed as straightforward and repetitive, the depth of the ideas they capture makes a case for reading texts like struggle songs at a level much more profound than what they literally denote. </p>
<h2>A brief history</h2>
<p>Different styles of music characterised different periods in South Africa’s struggle for liberation. The change in political and social conditions did not just prompt a change in the lyrics of the songs; it called for a change in the form to capture the tone of the times. </p>
<p>From the late 1800s into the early 1900s, the strong influence of missionaries on black South African literary culture influenced the tone and lyrics of protest music. It resulted in struggle songs that were characterised by a hymn-like sound. This was in the context of a shared Christian belief system. </p>
<p>For example, Biblical and ancient studies scholar, J. Gertrud Tönsing (2017) <a href="https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/4339">talks about</a> how the emphasis of prayer as a tool against the apartheid regime was rooted in the missionary influence. This, in turn, influenced the lyrics and melodies of the struggle songs that emerged so that they featured rhythmically static music and words written like prayers. </p>
<p>From the 1940s and 1950s the violence against black South Africans was written into law through the passing of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/group-areas-act-1950">Group Areas Act</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/pass-laws-south-africa-1800-1994">“pass laws”</a>. These restricted the movement of black people in certain areas. </p>
<p>Music began to incorporate musical elements inspired by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3113919#metadata_info_tab_contents">American jazz and kwela penny whistles</a>. Kwela is a <a href="https://ukzn-dspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/9106/Allen_Lara_V_1993.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">pennywhistle-based street music with jazzy underpinnings and a distinctive, skiffle-like beat</a>.</p>
<p>This merger of musical elements was indicative of the cultural diversity that characterised the townships. Music historian Lara Allen <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3113919#metadata_info_tab_contents">argues</a> that the music found resonance and gained popularity because the sound expressed a “locally rooted identity”. </p>
<p>Another feature of the struggle songs from this era was the topical subject matter. Lyrics spoke to current events as they affected black people – kind of “singing the news”. As Allen <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3113919#metadata_info_tab_contents">puts it</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In this regard vocal jive enjoyed an advantage … in that lyrics, through reference to current events and issues of common concern, enabled listeners to recognize their own interests and experiences more concretely.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The 1960s marked an intensification of the apartheid government’s heavy-handedness on any form of protest and resistance. On 21 March 1960, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> occurred, where 69 people were killed while staging a protest against pass laws. In response, the struggle approach changed from a non-violent to an armed struggle with the establishment of the militant wing of the African National Congress, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">uMkhonto we Sizwe</a>. </p>
<p>The upbeat vocal jive style <a href="http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/265/the-sounds-of-resistance-the-role-of-music-in-south-africas-anti-apartheid-movement">was increasingly replaced</a> by militaristic rhythms and chants accompanied by marching actions. </p>
<p>Some of the songs from this period were simply chants. Nevertheless, they were still musical in the way in which they used the beat and other vocal sound effects to evoke emotions. They were often accompanied by the toyi-toyi, a high-stepping ‘dance’ that Allen describes as a march that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03057070902920015?casa_token=IJZ5nO8NssYAAAAA:WTltYQHaHlYg6ZvMtFriNwlAyF-CADEhEmDcxyV32iauPXJbrCVK0Vnl2xkrU0Hmws5O9K9FrD6rLg">mimicked the movement of soldiers in training</a></p>
<p>As musicologist and expert in struggle music Michela Vershbow <a href="http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/265/the-sounds-of-resistance-the-role-of-music-in-south-africas-anti-apartheid-movement">describes them</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The power of this chant builds in intensity as it progresses, and the enormity of the sounds that erupt from the hundreds, sometimes thousands of participants was often used to intimidate government troops.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>In a post-apartheid world</h2>
<p>In the late 1980s academic and expert on Latin American revolutionary songs Robert Pring-Mill <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/853420#metadata_info_tab_contents">wrote about how</a> songs that featured prominently in many oppressive cultures retained their power and currency over time.</p>
<p>This is true in South Africa too where songs from the struggle continue to hold an established place as part of South Africa’s political communication heritage. Examples include songs of lament, like <em>Senzeni na?</em> which bemoans the unjust treatment of marginalised South Africans. Another is the more confrontational <a href="https://www.newframe.com/political-songs-ndodemnyama-miriam-makeba/">Ndodemnyama we Verwoerd!,</a> which was written by Vuyisile Mini and sung by him and his compatriots while walking to their death in the apartheid gallows.</p>
<p>Pring-Mill argues that struggle songs endure because they reflect historical </p>
<blockquote>
<p>events recorded passionately rather than with dispassionate objectivity, yet the passion is not so much that of an individual singer’s personal response, but rather that of a collective interpretation of events from a particular ‘committed’ standpoint. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s noteworthy that in recent years, some of these songs are now said to be hate speech. There have even been calls <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/political-parties/equality-court-grants-afriforum-leave-to-appeal-kill-the-boer-ruling-20221004">to ban them from being sung</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sisanda Nkoala receives funding from the National Research Foundation and has previously been awarded an AW Mellon-UCT Graduate Scholarship in Rhetoric </span></em></p>
Struggle songs are relevant even in the post apartheid context because they continue to be an important way in which people deliberate on issues.
Sisanda Nkoala, Senior Lecturer, Cape Peninsula University of Technology
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188269
2022-09-23T12:33:33Z
2022-09-23T12:33:33Z
New study seeks to explain the ‘Mandela Effect’ – the bizarre phenomenon of shared false memories
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485906/original/file-20220921-24-2f1xe7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C3%2C2222%2C1456&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When asked to recall the popular children's book series 'The Berenstain Bears,' many people make the same error by spelling it 'The Berenstein Bears.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/lori-carhart-of-agoura-reads-a-book-called-learn-about-news-photo/563565289?adppopup=true">Stephen Osman/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine the Monopoly Man.</p>
<p>Is he wearing a monocle or not?</p>
<p>If you pictured the character from the popular board game wearing one, you’d be wrong. In fact, <a href="https://www.cracked.com/article_24565_hard-truth-time-monopoly-guy-never-had-monocle.html">he has never worn one</a>.</p>
<p>If you’re surprised by this, you’re not alone. Many people possess the same false memory of this character. This phenomenon takes place for other characters, logos and quotes, too. For example, Pikachu from Pokémon is often thought to have a black tip on his tail, <a href="https://www.cbr.com/pikachu-black-tail-belief-theory/">which he doesn’t have</a>. And <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/MandelaEffect/comments/99hv43/fruit_of_the_loom_cornucopia/">many people are convinced</a> that the Fruit of the Loom logo includes a cornucopia. It doesn’t.</p>
<p>We call this phenomenon of shared false memories for certain cultural icons the “visual Mandela Effect.” </p>
<p>People tend to be puzzled when they learn that they share the same false memories with other people. That’s partly because they assume that what they remember and forget ought to be subjective and based on their own personal experiences.</p>
<p>However, research we have conducted shows that people tend to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.plm.2019.02.001">remember and forget the same images</a> as one another, regardless of the diversity of their individual experiences. Recently, we have shown these similarities in our <a href="https://psyarxiv.com/nzh3s">memories even extend to our false memories</a>.</p>
<h2>What is the Mandela Effect?</h2>
<p>The term <a href="https://mandelaeffect.com/nelson-mandela-died-in-prison/">“Mandela Effect” was coined by Fiona Broome</a>, a self-described paranormal researcher, to describe her false memory of former South African president Nelson Mandela dying in prison in the 1980s. She realized that many other people also shared this same false memory and wrote an article about her experience on her website. The concept of shared false memories spread to other forums and websites, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/MandelaEffect/">including Reddit</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, examples of the Mandela Effect have been widely shared on the internet. These include names like “the Berenstain Bears,” a children’s book series that is falsely remembered as spelled “-ein” instead of “-ain,” and characters like Star Wars’ C-3PO, who is falsely remembered with two gold legs <a href="https://screencrush.com/c3po-silver-leg/">instead of one gold and one silver leg</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="T-shirt tag featuring a logo with drawings of fruit." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486259/original/file-20220923-8064-7iecsl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Fruit of the Loom logo has never had a cornucopia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c1/Fruit_of_the_Loom%2C_t-shirt_label.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Mandela Effect became fodder for conspiracists – the false memories so strong and so specific that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12348">some people see them as evidence of an alternate dimension</a>.</p>
<p>Because of that, scientific research has only studied the Mandela Effect as an example of how conspiracy theories spread on the internet. There has been very little research looking into the Mandela Effect as a memory phenomenon. </p>
<p>But understanding why these icons trigger such specific false memories might give us more insight into how false memories form. The visual Mandela Effect, which affects icons specifically, was a perfect way to study this. </p>
<h2>A robust false memory phenomenon</h2>
<p>To see whether the visual Mandela Effect really exists, <a href="https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/nzh3s">we ran an experiment</a> in which we presented people with three versions of the same icon. One was correct and two were manipulated, and we asked them to select the correct one. There were 40 sets of icons, and they included C-3PO from the Star Wars franchise, the Fruit of the Loom logo and the Monopoly Man from the board game. </p>
<p>In the results, which have been accepted for publication in the journal Psychological Sciences, we found that people fared very poorly on seven of them, only choosing the correct one around or less than 33% of the time. For these seven images, people consistently identified the same incorrect version, not just randomly choosing one of the two incorrect versions. In addition, participants reported being very confident in their choices and having high familiarity with these icons despite being wrong. </p>
<p>Put together, it’s clear evidence of the phenomenon that people on the internet have talked about for years: The visual Mandela Effect is a real and consistent memory error.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An example of a set of images shown from the study, with three versions of a yellow cartoon animal." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486260/original/file-20220923-19-qehx50.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The correct version of Pikachu is the one on the left. Most participants in the study not only chose a wrong version of the popular cartoon character, but they also chose the same wrong one – the Pikachu with the black tip on its tail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wilma Bainbridge and Deepasri Prasad</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We found that this false memory effect was incredibly strong, across multiple different ways of testing memory. Even when people saw the correct version of the icon, they still chose the incorrect version just a few minutes later. </p>
<p>And when asked to freely draw the icons from their memory, people also included the same incorrect features.</p>
<h2>No universal cause</h2>
<p>What causes this shared false memory for specific icons? </p>
<p>We found that visual features like color and brightness could not explain the effect. We also tracked participants’ mouse movements as they viewed the images on a computer screen to see if they simply didn’t scan over a particular part, such as Pikachu’s tail. But even when people directly viewed the correct part of the image, they still chose the false version immediately afterward. We also found that for most icons, it was unlikely people had seen the false version beforehand and were just remembering that version, rather than the correct version.</p>
<p>It may be that there is no one universal cause. Different images may elicit the visual Mandela Effect for different reasons. Some could be related to prior expectations for an image, some might be related to prior visual experience with an image and others could have to do with something entirely different than the images themselves. For example, we found that, for the most part, people only see C-3PO’s upper body depicted in media. The falsely remembered gold leg might be a result of them using prior knowledge – bodies are usually only one color – to fill in this gap. </p>
<p>But the fact that we can demonstrate consistencies in false memories for certain icons suggests that part of what drives false memories is dependent on our environment – and independent of our subjective experiences with the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
People are puzzled when they learn they share the same false memories with others. That’s partly because they assume that what they remember and forget ought to be based only on personal experience.
Deepasri Prasad, Ph.D. Student in Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College
Wilma Bainbridge, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Chicago
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/189567
2022-08-30T13:44:25Z
2022-08-30T13:44:25Z
Corruption in South Africa: new book sets out how ruling ANC lost the battle
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481758/original/file-20220830-8742-ye9g6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC supporters show support for corruption accused and suspended party secretary general Ace Magashule outside court in Bleomfontein.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Conrad Bornman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the greatest benefits of South Africa’s democracy is freedom of speech and publication. Mpumelelo Mkhabela’s book, <a href="https://www.nb.co.za/en/view-book/?id=9780624091226">The Enemy Within</a>, is the latest in a cascade of publications over the last decade that record corruption and theft by leading politicians in the country’s ruling party.</p>
<p>In all too many countries in Africa and Asia a book like this would result in its author’s detention, censorship of the book, persecution of the publishers and printers, and harassment of bookshops that sold it. </p>
<p>South Africa is among a select group of democracies that permit such exposés. Books that have explored the deepening levels of corruption in the country include <a href="https://www.scribd.com/book/377308470/How-to-Steal-a-City-The-Battle-for-Nelson-Mandela-Bay-an-Inside-Account">How to Steal a City</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/How-Steal-Country-Capture-Future/dp/1785903616">How to Steal a Country</a>, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/gangster-state-unravelling-ace-magashule%E2%80%99s-web-capture/9781776093748">Gangster State</a> and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/After-Party-Corruption-Africas-Uncertain/dp/1844676277">After the Party</a>. </p>
<p>The Enemy Within takes readers through a series of well-publicised corruption scandals. It argues that the African National Congress (ANC) lost the fight against corruption by tolerating corrupt practices, failing to hold the corrupt to account, and going as far as to shield them. The ANC has governed South Africa since the formal end of apartheid in 1994.</p>
<h2>Corruption scandals</h2>
<p>Mkhabela, a former newspaper editor, considers the ANC’s first big test of ethics – which it failed – was in 1996 when it expelled cabinet minister <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02516.htm">Bantu Holomisa</a> from the party. The reason was that he’d stated publicly that ANC cabinet minister <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/stella-margaret-nomzamo-sigcau">Stella Sigcau</a> had earlier in her career accepted a bribe.</p>
<p>The book then goes through other prominent cases of corruption. The scandals include the looting of VBS mutual bank, which involved “theft, abuse of power, robbing of the elderly, and even murder” (four members of the South African Municipal Workers’ Union were killed). (p.41)</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-in-south-africa-have-some-protection-but-gaps-need-fixing-183992">Whistleblowers in South Africa have some protection but gaps need fixing</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>There was the rare imprisonment of an ANC MP – Tony Yengeni, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/rorycarroll">in 2003</a>, for fraud and corruption. There was also the theft of public funds intended for a memorial service for Nelson Mandela. Then came the procurement by transport parastatal Transnet of locomotives that were too tall to be used on most of the country’s railway lines.</p>
<p>Jacob Zuma, then president, dismantled the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301275880_Countering_corruption_in_South_Africa_The_rise_and_fall_of_the_Scorpions_and_Hawks">Scorpions</a> police unit, which specialised in priority crimes. Public funds were misused for his private residence. The company <a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/bosasa-group">Bosasa</a> allegedly greased the palms of ANC politicians in return for huge contracts with the prisons department. After a wave of Zuma appointments to the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a>, the book says, the authority</p>
<blockquote>
<p>was clearly dancing to the tune of top ANC politicians. (p.123) </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The case of Jackie Selebi, the erstwhile head of police, shows two ANC failings. Mkhabela reminds readers of the lack of condemnation from the ANC when Selebi was convicted of corruption <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/africa/jackie-selebi-south-african-police-head-convicted-in-corruption-case-dies-at-64.html">in 2010</a>.</p>
<p>To this I would add a second point about cadre deployment: Selebi had no training or on the job experience in policing. Had he been kept in diplomatic postings, scandals would almost certainly never had occurred. </p>
<p>The ANC appears blind to this obvious point.</p>
<p>The robbing of funds for a Mandela memorial service reveals another surprising truth. These municipal funds had initially been earmarked to subsidise poor families (p.74) who could not afford municipal services such as water and electricity. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481757/original/file-20220830-18781-109am8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most politicians would consider that invaluable for their subsequent electioneering. But politicians diverted or stole the funds. In short, so extreme was their personal greed that it even undermined their efficacy as politicians.</p>
<p>In summarising widespread corporate collusion with corruption, Mkhabela notes that companies hide bribes under the “cost of business” item in their balance sheets. (p.63) </p>
<p>Then there is the pattern of assassinations. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Anyone who threatens to expose tender corruption risks being eliminated by hired hitmen. In some instances, once caught and convicted, the hitmen are even looked after in prison (p.67)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>ANC leaders</h2>
<p>South Africa had</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a toxic mix of old money, businessmen eager to win favours from politicians, and political leaders ready to tackle anyone who dared make corruption claims against the party. (p.21)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>None of the ANC’s leaders have behaved well. Even Nelson Mandela, who pressed for the dismissal of Holomisa and asked the leader of the South African Communist Party, Jeremy Cronin, to write a leaflet denigrating him. </p>
<p>Mkhabela notes that Thabo Mbeki, as president, was conflicted: he deplored corruption. But he regarded every exposé as a white racist attack. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-corruption-in-south-africa-is-deeply-rooted-in-the-countrys-past-and-why-that-matters-144973">How corruption in South Africa is deeply rooted in the country’s past and why that matters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mbeki signed up South Africa to the <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA18172733_182">Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption</a>, the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf">UN Convention against Corruption</a>, and the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm">OECD Anti-Bribery Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Also to his credit, Mbeki set up autonomous institutions against corruption that survived his own efforts to undermine them. It would require major exertions on the part of Zuma, who succeeded Mbeki as president, to dismantle them. (p.55)</p>
<p>Zuma had to emasculate the prosecution authority to avoid being prosecuted himself; he had to undermine the South African Revenue Service to prevent being sued for unpaid tax. These allowed a host of the corrupt to capture the state.</p>
<p>The rebuilding of these institutions has taken the whole of Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency to date.</p>
<p>But Mkhabela misses one pertinent point. Mbeki oversaw massive pay rises for the top posts in politics, the bureaucracy including the municipalities, and the parastatals. This hugely raised the stakes in ANC political battles. Mbeki never reproached Smuts Ngonyama, then the ANC’s spokesperson, for his widely quoted comment</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I did not struggle (in the liberation movement) to be poor.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his conclusions Mkhabela says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The incentives and rewards for being corrupt for the politically connected far outweigh the risks of being caught in the act. (p.198) </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But he ends by noting that corruption generates pushback from the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the African National Congress,. but writes this review in his professional capacity as political scientist.</span></em></p>
To his credit, former South African president Thabo Mbeki set up anti-corruption institutions that survived his own efforts to erode them.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188993
2022-08-23T11:17:35Z
2022-08-23T11:17:35Z
What Russian visit says about South Africa’s commitment to human rights in the world
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480391/original/file-20220822-73022-52sowx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thandi Modise, South Africa's defence minister.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michal Fludra/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s foreign policy is aimed at contributing to democracy, human rights and <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf">justice in the world</a>. Yet its conduct often suits autocrats and despots. This is why defence minister Thandi Modise’s recent attendance at the <a href="https://eng.mil.ru/en/mcis/index.htm">10th Moscow Conference on International Security</a> has sparked criticism. </p>
<p>The basic objectives of the conference are to share practical ideas and explore solutions on matters of global security. But Russian president Vladimir Putin’s swipe at the US and the <a href="https://www.nato.int/">North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</a> in his <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69166">welcoming address</a> revealed an ideological underpinning. He accused them of “creating aggressive military-political unions” to maintain western hegemony.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Their hegemony means stagnation for the rest of the world and for the entire civilisation; it means obscurantism, cancellation of culture, and neoliberal totalitarianism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>South Africa’s stance towards Russia <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-15-thandi-modise-at-russian-security-conference-shows-solidarity-with-occupiers-and-aggressors/">in recent months</a> has come under severe criticism. Pretoria initially supported calls for Russia to <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2022/ukra0224.htm">withdraw from Ukraine</a>, only to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/08/02/how-do-global-south-politics-of-non-alignment-and-solidarity-explain-south-africas-position-on-ukraine/">retract</a> shortly thereafter. </p>
<p>Some critics object to the mere act of South Africa attending a military conference organised by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-15-flying-circus-thandi-modises-shocking-trip-to-russian-security-conference/?fbclid=IwAR3ywPnPzFWaBO2uIpj1NGpYTWQJXX8dd9eNL3Ts79Ym95y_Qv2%203-dLG2-8">an aggressive, imperialist Russia</a>. </p>
<p>Some feel Pretoria is – as in the past – <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-15-flying-circus-thandi-modises-shocking-trip-to-russian-security-conference/?fbclid=IwAR3ywPnPzFWaBO2uIpj1NGpYTWQJXX8dd9eNL3Ts79Ym95y_Qv2%203-dLG2-8">flip-flopping</a> on its official commitment to promoting human rights globally.</p>
<p>Modise <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/thandi-modise-visits-russia-for-moscow-conference-on-international-security/?fbclid=IwAR2Ryqc22UKqKnqNMbtVTz13V1G0T66POwAYoIEvmT8WTNS9tX_9pdbqJAI">defended her participation</a> as part of “an international peace crusade”. She said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>we will emerge from this conference stronger and more united in our determination to continue building a peaceful world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The question is whether South Africa is once again turning a blind eye – even giving legitimacy – to a great injustice, for political expediency. </p>
<p>The country’s official foreign policy is explicitly guided by <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf">ubuntu</a> (humanness) –</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Inconsistency and ambiguity</h2>
<p>Since 1994 during the Mandela and Mbeki eras, the country has contributed to the reform of continental institutions. It has mediated for peace and stability, and promoted democracy in conflict-ridden countries. </p>
<p>For example, in 1995, former president Nelson Mandela issued a <a href="https://archive.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/za-com-mr-s-1576">hard-hitting statement</a> after the Nigerian government executed environmental activist and writer <a href="https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/ken-saro-wiwa/">Ken Saro-Wiwa</a>. This underscored a foreign policy informed by human rights.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In fact, South Africa’s contributions to the development of Africa’s foreign policy realm earned it the status of a <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/is-south-africa-a-norm-entrepreneur-in-africa">“norm entrepreneur”</a>. That means it set the norms for moral and principled international engagement and interventions on the continent.</p>
<p>But in the second term of the Mbeki era, foreign policy analysts posed serious questions about the country’s willingness to uphold the values of democracy and human rights in its foreign policy. The country has become less principled in its approach to world affairs. There have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2012.670381">inconsistencies and ambiguities</a>, specifically when it is expected to stand up for human rights. </p>
<p>An example was former president Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/16-Dlamini.pdf">quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe</a> since 2000. His refusal to speak out against atrocities during the Robert Mugabe era in favour of fruitless secret meetings was one such example. For many observers this was puzzling, coming from the continent’s most celebrated democracy. It became a source of domestic concern, global scepticism and outspoken criticism.</p>
<p>Later, under Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma, the Libya conundrum in 2011 stood out. South Africa, then <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/unsc/index.html">a non-permanent member</a> of the UN Security Council, voted for a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm">ban</a> on all flights over Libya to protect civilians from attacks by the Libyan air force. </p>
<p>Yet, soon after it was the implemented, Pretoria <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2012.670381">backtracked</a>. It appealed to international role-players to respect the territorial integrity of Libya. This dented South Africa’s credibility.</p>
<p>The country had to be goaded into <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2012.670381">accepting a no-fly zone</a>, based on <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">The Responsibility to Protect principle</a>, to stop the Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi from bombing his own population from the air. </p>
<p>Another controversy was sparked when, in 2015, Zuma hosted the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/25th-african-union-summit-7-15-jun">African Union summit in Johannesburg</a>. It was attended by then Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, who had been declared a “wanted war criminal” by the International Criminal Court for <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-darfur-guide/">genocide in Darfur</a>. Zuma’s government failed to arrest him <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-bashir-what-the-law-says-about-south-africas-duties-43498">despite a court order</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-has-been-at-sixes-and-sevens-heres-why-70089">South Africa's foreign policy has been at sixes and sevens – here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Zuma even accepted Al-Bashir’s invitation for him to visit Sudan. It was a clear indication that the Zuma government was willing to ignore gross <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2015-09-04-zuma-shows-disdain-for-human-rights-by-meeting-al-bashir-da/">human rights violations</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, the South African government is <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">not prepared to condemn</a> Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<h2>New hope for norm entrepreneurship</h2>
<p>The Mbeki and Zuma eras were characterised by an unwillingness to confront authoritarian regimes and human rights abuses. Be it in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Eswatini, or further afield in Myanmar, Syria, China and North Korea. </p>
<p>When Cyril Ramaphosa became president <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/22/south-africas-parliament-elects-cyril-ramaphosa-as-president">in 2018</a>, it was hoped he would restore South Africa’s status as a champion for peace and democracy globally. He came to office with good international relations credentials, having helped <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-president-cyril-ramaphosa-can-help-resolve-the-gaza-crisis-97871">craft the UN’s Responsibility to Protect principle</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, countries in the global south cannot be expected to automatically <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/08/02/how-do-global-south-politics-of-non-alignment-and-solidarity-explain-south-africas-position-on-ukraine/">fall in line with western expectations</a> on world issues.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-human-rights-should-guide-responses-to-the-global-pandemic-147225">Why human rights should guide responses to the global pandemic</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But, South Africa’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and Modise’s visit to Moscow, make one thing clear once again. It is that South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour is not what was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/thandi-modise-visits-russia-for-moscow-conference-on-international-security/?fbclid=IwAR2Ryqc22UKqKnqNMbtVTz13V1G0T66POwAYoIEvmT8WTNS9tX_9pd%20bqJAI">expected of the country</a> as an international and regional norm entrepreneur.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>
South Africa’s foreign policy is supposed to be guided by the principle of ubuntu (humanness), so a visit to an aggressor is hard to explain.
Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188345
2022-08-08T13:43:00Z
2022-08-08T13:43:00Z
Lilian Ngoyi: an heroic South African woman whose story hasn’t been fully told
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477946/original/file-20220807-56706-dfjnx6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Detail of a photo of Lilian Ngoyi making a speech in 1960.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Azola Daniel/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite her key role in the struggle against <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> in South Africa, details about <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/lilian-masediba-ngoyi">Lilian Ngoyi</a>’s life remain sparse. The short paragraphs on her legacy repeat a few well-worn phrases. South Africa’s “mother of the black resistance”, a widow and rumoured lover of <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a>, and the first woman member of the national executive committee – the core leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), the resistance movement that would later become the government of a democratic South Africa. She was also, of course, one of the leaders of the country’s famous <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1956-womens-march-pretoria-9-august">Women’s March</a>. </p>
<p>On 9 August 1956, now commemorated as <a href="https://www.gov.za/womens-day">Women’s Day</a> in South Africa, Ngoyi and other woman leaders led an estimated 20,000 women to the Union Buildings in Pretoria, the seat of power of the white minority government. They were protesting extending the much-hated pass <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/pass-laws-south-africa-1800-1994">laws</a> to women. These laws required black citizens to carry pass documents to better control their movement.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An illustration of a woman with a raised fist, handcuffs broken, and the words 'Now you have touched the women you have struck a rock. You have dislodged a boulder; you will be crushed.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=854&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478097/original/file-20220808-22-co33hn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A poster celebrating the march.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Judy Seidman/Medu Art Ensemble</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beyond this, Ma-Ngoyi, as she was affectionately known, remains an often-mentioned but somewhat two-dimensional figure in history.</p>
<p>Perhaps because she was not the wife of a high-profile ANC leader and lived much of her life as a banned person, dying in penury, there is no Lilian Ngoyi Foundation and no substantive biography. Yet the pioneering role she played, and the sacrifices she made, extended well beyond the Women’s March.</p>
<h2>Upbringing</h2>
<p>Born Lilian Masediba Matabane in 1911, Ngoyi had a different life from other anti-apartheid struggle stalwarts. Not only was she an independent woman, but she was born into urban poverty. She did not hail from a royal or rural household like the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-family-tree">Mandelas</a>, <a href="https://southafrica.co.za/sisulu-family.html">Sisulus</a> and other elite members of the ANC, whose role in the fight against apartheid is well documented. </p>
<p>Ngoyi was the granddaughter of a trailblazing Methodist minister, a historical figure in his own right. But his extraordinary contribution to the missionaries’ endeavours in southern Africa did not translate into any significant upward mobility for the family.</p>
<p>Her mother, though literate, worked as a washerwoman and domestic worker and her father was a miner and labourer, who died of mining-related lung disease. As the only girl in a family of four, she was the last in line when it came to education. Still, Ngoyi’s family rallied to keep her in <a href="https://methodist.org.za/the-kilnerton-story/">Kilnerton</a>, a leading black Methodist school, even though she was only able to complete her junior schooling. She moved to Johannesburg to take up a short-lived position as one of the country’s first black female trainee nurses at City Deep Mine Hospital. </p>
<p>Her youth typified the contemporary experience of many black women in urban South Africa. She fell pregnant at 19, married at 23, but was widowed at 26. She took on the care of her newborn cousin when her brother’s wife died, and was the primary carer for her elderly parents. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white portrait of a young woman with short hair, smiling shyly and tilting her head." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477947/original/file-20220807-60769-n21ldy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lilian Ngoyi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Azola Dayile/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The family spent a miserable decade living in The Shelters, the site of the country’s first urban land invasion under the charismatic <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/james-sofasonke-mpanza">James Mpanza</a>, who encouraged backyarders to occupy open land in Orlando, Soweto. Here, Ngoyi experienced the indignity of poverty first hand.</p>
<h2>Defiance</h2>
<p>Politics changed everything for her. In 1953, at the tail end of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/defiance-campaign-1952">Defiance Campaign</a>, a mass non-violent resistance protest, Ngoyi risked a three-year prison sentence by walking into the whites-only section of a Johannesburg post office. Apartheid laws created and policed racially segregated spaces and to defy them took great bravery.</p>
<p>Ngoyi became an ANC member and rose rapidly through its ranks. She joined the newly formed Federation of South African Women (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/federation-south-african-women-fedsaw">Fedsaw</a>), forging a lifelong friendship with trade unionist and activist <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/helen-joseph">Helen Joseph</a>. A broad-based coalition of women’s organisations, Fedsaw was the organiser of the 1956 march, with Ngoyi and Joseph leading the way. </p>
<p>Ngoyi had the skill to inspire mass mobilisation and bring people together, especially women. By all accounts, she was an exceptional orator. In a 1956 profile in the leading black magazine of the day, <a href="https://theconversation.com/journalism-of-drums-heyday-remains-cause-for-celebration-70-years-later-142668">Drum</a>, author and activist <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/eskia-mphahlele">Ezekiel Mphahlele</a> <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=tXiJAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA236&lpg=PA236&dq=ezekiel+mphahlele+lilian+ngoyi+drum+She+can+toss+an+audience+on+her+little+finger,+get+men+grunting+with+shame+and+a+feeling+of+smallness&source=bl&ots=Uu97v5vImK&sig=ACfU3U3KHLfWiG0howoJGwOrovOgLWm1IA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjvmIvKlbf5AhUihv0HHTTRCYcQ6AF6BAgCEAM#v=onepage&q=ezekiel%20mphahlele%20lilian%20ngoyi%20drum%20She%20can%20toss%20an%20audience%20on%20her%20little%20finger%2C%20get%20men%20grunting%20with%20shame%20and%20a%20feeling%20of%20smallness&f=false">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>She can toss an audience on her little finger, get men grunting with shame and a feeling of smallness.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Anti-apartheid activist and wife of Nelson Mandela, <a href="https://theconversation.com/winnie-madikizela-mandela-revolutionary-who-kept-the-spirit-of-resistance-alive-94300">Winnie Madikizela-Mandela</a> <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/lives-of-courage-women-for-a-new-south-africa/oclc/19723691">recalled</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>She spoke the language of the worker, and she was herself an ordinary factory worker. When she said what she stood for, she evoked emotions no other person could evoke.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 1955 Ngoyi was sponsored for an overseas trip by the Women’s International Democratic Federation, regarded as a Soviet Front organisation. She attended conferences and propaganda tours in Europe, China and the USSR. </p>
<p>She returned home to the government’s plans to extend the pass system to women. The experience abroad, of being treated like a human being for the first time, had invigorated her. Ngoyi set about canvassing support for the famous march. The largest gathering of women in the country’s history, it was the kind of mass mobilisation the ANC men had only dreamed of.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young woman in a uniform holds up her hand to make a point as she stands and talks, earnestly" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477948/original/file-20220807-32086-63k234.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">At friend and comrade Ida Mntwana’s funeral.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Azola Dayile/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1956 Ngoyi was among 156 dissidents arrested in a swoop by security police. Charged with treason, they became known as the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/treason-trial-1956-1961">Treason Trialists</a>. She was finally acquitted in 1960, but had lost her job as a factory machinist. She was soon arrested again and detained for five months, 19 days of which she spent in solitary confinement. In a 1963 arrest, she spent 71 days in solitary, an experience which affected her ability to focus.</p>
<h2>Isolation</h2>
<p>Thereafter, Ngoyi drops out of history. She was subjected to three five-year banning orders, living in a state of permanent lockdown. For most of the remainder of her life she was forbidden from interacting with other banned persons. She was unable to meet with more than three people at a time and could not attend a lecture, go to the cinema or accept invitations to weddings, funerals or parties of any sort. </p>
<p>The banning orders ended her political career and gradually eroded her ability to earn a living as a seamstress, unable to travel into town to purchase fabrics. Security police frequently raided her home, chasing away potential customers. Ngoyi was forced to rely on sporadic donations. In a letter of gratitude to a sponsor, she expressed the humiliation of her position:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We feel small to say thanks all the time. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not the wife of an elite ANC leader, she received no financial contributions from exiled men, nor was she supported by the International Defence and Aid Fund, which helped the families of political prisoners. She did not lose hope, however, and like Mandela, took solace in gardening, planting seeds sent to her by her overseas friends. Her small yard was full of blooms.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0fMNcpl8yG8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Ngoyi’s funeral.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On 13 March 1980, two months before her third banning order was due to expire, Ngoyi passed away, aged 69. She never saw freedom in her lifetime, nor did she receive the recognition she deserved for her efforts to achieve it. At her funeral, activist and church leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/archbishop-desmond-tutu-father-of-south-africas-rainbow-nation-97619">Desmond Tutu</a> <a href="https://sthp.saha.org.za/memorial/articles/isolated_for_two_decades.htm">said</a> that when the true history of South Africa was written Ngoyi’s name would be in “letters of gold”. </p>
<p>This has manifested to some extent – a few clinics and roads bear her name. But the true nature of her accomplishments and challenges, and those of other banned and banished persons in South Africa, should never be forgotten.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martha Evans receives funding from ANFASA. </span></em></p>
The pioneering role she played, and the sacrifices she made, extended well beyond the famous 1956 Women’s March.
Martha Evans, Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.