tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/olusegun-obasanjo-45561/articlesOlusegun Obasanjo – The Conversation2023-03-02T14:24:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009362023-03-02T14:24:41Z2023-03-02T14:24:41ZNigeria’s election was nearly derailed by technology - but biometric devices weren’t the problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513025/original/file-20230301-2886-56r83n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An election official uses the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System to take a picture of a voter during Nigeria's presidential election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick Meinhardt/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Technology nearly <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/anxiety-parties-kick-as-inec-delays-result-upload-collation/">derailed</a> the conclusion of the 2023 presidential elections in Nigeria. The Independent National Electoral Commission could not fulfil <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/100-days-to-go-no-going-back-on-bvas-irev-for-2023-inec/">its promise</a> to transmit election results from the polling units on its result viewing portal (IReV). This led to calls by some political parties for <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/obasanjo-asks-inec-to-cancel-results-in-areas-were-bvas-servers-failed/">cancellation</a> and <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/02/28/breaking-pdp-labour-party-adc-demand-fresh-election-want-inec-chairman-to-step-aside/">fresh elections</a>. The Conversation Africa asked political scientist Abiodun Fatai how Nigeria can improve its election digitisation.</em></p>
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<h2>Nigeria has been digitising the voting process for 12 years. How has this worked?</h2>
<p>Nigeria started using digital technology in the electoral process in 2011 when the Independent National Electoral Commission introduced the automated fingerprint identification system to stop voters registering more than once.</p>
<p>The permanent voter’s card and smart card reader were introduced in the 2015 general elections. At the polling station, a voter’s identity is verified by matching his or her biometrics to the voter’s card. The voter is then allowed to vote and the votes are counted manually.</p>
<p>In 2022, it introduced the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System, which is an electronic device designed to read permanent voter cards and authenticate voters – using the voters’ fingerprints – to prove that they are eligible to vote at a particular polling unit. This was used in the Ekiti and Osun states’ governorship elections <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/537907-ekitidecides2022-apc-wins-ekiti-governorship-election.html">in June 2022</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mFAdzKc3Vcg">July 2022</a>. The technology worked to its design in both states and was the basis for an election tribunal <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/01/osun-tribunal-sacks-adeleke/">sacking</a> the Osun State winner in January 2023. </p>
<p>The commission also <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/100-days-to-go-no-going-back-on-bvas-irev-for-2023-inec/">introduced the result viewing portal</a>, IReV, to guarantee transparent accreditation and uploading of polling unit results. It said this would enable citizens to view results in real-time on election day. But the results could not be uploaded onto the portal because of <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/inec-says-technical-hitches-responsible-for-delay-in-uploading-results/">technical glitches</a>. This caused <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/585029-nigeriadecides2023-pdp-labour-party-others-walk-out-of-presidential-collation-centre-accuse-inec-of-fraud.html">some party agents to walk out</a> of the collation centre in Abuja.</p>
<h2>Did digital technologies help reduce fraud and promote the credibility of the elections?</h2>
<p>It did to a large extent. It has been a long journey since 2011 and we are making improvements. The biometric technology actually worked. It has eliminated multiple voter registrations. If your biometrics are not captured, you can no longer vote. These are improvements. Look at the figures from the states – we did not see the huge figures of voters that were out of proportion to the number of registered voters, as happened in previous elections. The 2007 presidential election was so bad that even the winner, Umaru Musa Yar'Ádua, <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200705300320.html">acknowledged this</a> and set up a panel to reform elections. But the report of the committee, chaired by a former chief justice, Mohammed Uwais, <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/12/electoral-reform-political-interest-killed-my-report-uwais/">did not see the light of day</a> after Yar'Adua died. </p>
<p>The logistics could still be improved but some of the glitches we saw in the 2023 elections cannot be attributed to technology. They were operational issues. Some of the <a href="https://punchng.com/nigeriaelections2023-polls-record-bvas-malfunctioning-late-arrival-of-materials/">biometric machines malfunctioned</a> or electoral officials didn’t know how to use them. </p>
<p>More importantly, the goal of technology was to enhance the quality and integrity of the elections and reduce electoral fraud. This was achieved.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/digital-technology-can-improve-nigerias-elections-lessons-from-2019-175551">Digital technology can improve Nigeria's elections: lessons from 2019</a>
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<h2>What are the limitations to digitisation?</h2>
<p>Technology is operated by humans and so whatever is put in place can always be defeated by unscrupulous people. Technology does not operate in a vacuum. It is apparent that Nigeria doesn’t have enough capacity to deploy technology fully. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/555958-nigerias-internet-speed-still-amongst-worlds-slowest.html#:%7E:text=Nigeria's%20average%20fixed%20broadband%20internet,that%20are%20relatively%20smaller%2C%20economically.">Nigeria has weak broadband internet</a>, and connectivity is patchy. Some parts of Nigeria <a href="https://guardian.ng/technology/why-3g-technology-remains-dominant-in-nigeria/">are still running on 3G networks</a> when some countries are already on 5G. Some parts of Nigeria are not even <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202210260066.html">connected to the internet</a>. </p>
<p>So, conducting elections in Nigeria by deploying technology is a complex exercise. This was a reason for the commission not being able to transmit results in real time. </p>
<p>Digital elections are not cheap either as technology infrastructure costs a lot. Then there was the issue of <a href="https://www.africanliberty.org/2023/02/27/inec-the-flop-in-nigerias-2023-presidential-election/">inadequate preparation</a>, evident in the <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/voters-decry-late-arrival-of-election-materials/">late arrival of materials</a> in some voting stations and inadequate training of ad hoc staff in operating the biometric machines. All these must have limiting effects on the elections. </p>
<h2>What should Nigeria do to improve digitisation of its elections?</h2>
<p>The electoral commission must follow the electoral law strictly, especially on the transmission of results in real time. This will enhance the credibility of our elections. The results must also be machine readable, with a clear image, and must be generated from the polling units. </p>
<p>The commission staff must be well trained in operating the machines for elections. Some of them don’t have the capacity and skills needed to function in a digital environment. This must change. </p>
<p>Nigeria must also upgrade its broadband networks to improve connectivity. Without these two, the country can’t enjoy the benefits of digital elections. There must be forensic screening of staff hired for election duties so that they are not easily compromised. Their integrity and character must be ascertained. </p>
<p>The country also needs more technical experts to work with the electoral commission than has been the case thus far. It is apparent that the commission lacks enough competent hands to deal with emerging technical issues during the election. </p>
<p>Lastly, Nigerian politicians must allow full digitisation of elections. They must embrace and support it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiodun Fatai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System or BVAS and the result-viewing portal IReV improved the running of the elections.Abiodun Fatai, Senior Lecturer, Lagos State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924202022-10-18T15:31:30Z2022-10-18T15:31:30ZTigray war: two years on, the AU has failed to broker peace and silence the guns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490024/original/file-20221017-18-h1y70o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A damaged tank on the road north of Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, in February 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union pledged in 2016 to “<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">silence the guns</a>” by the end of 2020, an ambitious agenda of ending armed conflicts on the continent. Just two months before that deadline, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-22/ethiopia-s-war-toll-grows-as-the-world-looks-away">deadliest war</a> in years erupted in Ethiopia. On 3 November 2020, the armies of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/11/ethiopia-military-operations-reported-in-tigray-region-november-3">attacked</a> the region of Tigray. Since then, the guns have not been silent. Instead, it is the African Union that has been silent.</p>
<p>That war is now two years old. Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been committed during this time. Some <a href="https://martinplaut.com/2022/03/13/breaking-tigray-war-mortality-half-a-million-people-ghent-university/">estimates</a> show that over 500,000 civilians have been killed. Rape, displacement and starvation have been prevalent. Tigray has been under a complete siege with no access to land and air transport, telephone and internet access, banks and all kinds of humanitarian supplies. </p>
<p>The AU has shown itself to be of no use or consequence since the conflict started. During the first year of conflict, it failed to even acknowledge that there was a war. Instead, it adopted the Ethiopian government’s narrative of a “<a href="https://twitter.com/abiyahmedali/status/1326069599994056705?lang=en">law enforcement operation</a>” by a legitimate government against a rebellious entity. It was not until August 2021 that the AU took the first steps at mediating. </p>
<p>The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed</a> the former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as his “high representative” to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">promote</a> peace, security, stability and political dialogue all over the Horn of Africa region. This was a welcome development. But it soon became evident that the AU was not impartial. And the peace initiative was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">non-starter</a>. </p>
<p>One year on from Obasanjo’s appointment, the AU’s failures are as evident as they’ve been from the start. The AU Peace and Security Council – which is <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">charged</a> with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – has never had any substantive agenda on Tigray. The two times it sat to discuss the war on Tigray were only to hear the briefings of Obasanjo as envoy. </p>
<p>The war has intensified to alarming levels. And another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">attempt</a> by the AU to convene peace talks in South Africa has met delays. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>The AU has failed in applying its norms and principles to the conflict in Ethiopia. Its institutions were not activated and best practices were not utilised. The AU chairperson and his special envoy have put themselves at the service of the Ethiopian government. </p>
<p>The AU needs to launch a credible and robust peace process with mediators mutually agreed by the conflicting parties. The guns can only be silenced by engaging genuine peace processes guided by the norms and principles of the AU.</p>
<h2>AU’s failed diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their reservations, the authorities in Tigray gave Obasanjo the benefit of the doubt, and cooperated with him for the whole year. </p>
<p>Obasanjo shuttled between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, six times. Tigray received him as an elderly statesperson and engaged with him constructively. They accepted his advice to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/ethiopias-tigray-forces-announce-release-of-4000-prisoners">release</a> 4,500 prisoners of war as a confidence-building measure. Tigray was told that this would be reciprocated by Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed releasing an equal number of Tigrayan civilian prisoners. But when Abiy failed to deliver his end of the bargain, Obasanjo did nothing. </p>
<p>Before long, the Tigray leadership realised that Obasanjo was not capable of handling a complex problem that has a politico-military, historical and regional dimension. He never produced an organised agenda with measurable outputs. In three of his trips, his main agenda was to ask the authorities to release prisoners of war. </p>
<p>In March 2022, a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html">humanitarian truce</a>” was brokered by the Americans. Obasanjo is not known to have contributed anything towards it. In August 2022, Obasanjo <a href="https://twitter.com/rabdianalyst/status/1556028070716481538?lang=en">proposed</a> inviting Eritrea to the negotiating table, despite knowing that this crossed a red line for Tigray.</p>
<p>The AU failed in other ways, too. It lost its credibility in relation to the current war when it failed to condemn the atrocities. It has never demanded that Eritrea pull out troops from the Tigray war. It was very careful to call Obasanjo’s position “<a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">high representative</a>” and not “mediator”. Also his brief is the Horn and not Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, a clear nod to Abiy’s preference not to be seen to negotiate.</p>
<p>The AU was also behind the three African states represented at the United Nations Security Council. The so-called “A3” – Ghana, Gambia and Kenya – have continuously blocked any security council action, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/ethiopia-informal-interactive-dialogue.php">most recently</a> in September 2022. </p>
<h2>Litany of errors</h2>
<p>The war in Tigray has intensified. Ethiopian and Eritrean armies have encircled Tigray in an attempt to break the resistance. Up to 60% of Ethiopian federal troops are deployed to Eritrea to fight under the command of the Eritreans. The Ethiopian Air Force has moved its operational base into Asmara. So far, several towns have been decimated by indiscriminate air raids and artillery shelling of the joint forces. </p>
<p>Most international actors, such as the UN, US, EU and the UK, have condemned the resumption of hostilities and the involvement of Eritrea in the war. But the AU has not. </p>
<p>In the middle of this, the AU chairperson <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ethiopias-tigray-leader-invited-peace-talks-africa-91023467">invited</a> the president of Tigray for talks in South Africa. The letter fell below the standards of the AU Commission. It did not say who else was invited. It misstated the date for the talks and didn’t say anything about logistical arrangements for the Tigrayan delegates living under a complete siege. </p>
<p>These mistakes are unusual from a bureaucracy that routinely organises such talks.</p>
<p>The letter claimed that there were continuous consultations with the parties on the issues. But the authorities in Tigray <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/au-led-ethiopia-peace-talks-delayed-over-logistics-diplomats">denied</a> this. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-to-skip-ethiopia-peace-talks-3977112">strongly worded letter</a>, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta – a would-be co-mediator in South Africa – confirmed this lack of consultation by the AU Commission. There were also reports that the second co-mediator, former South African deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and the South African government were not consulted on the event. </p>
<p>The AU’s listed agenda did not include an immediate <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202210060051.html">cessation of hostilities</a>.</p>
<h2>AU principles</h2>
<p>The chairperson of the AU and his high representative have failed Africa and the norms, principles and institutions of the African Union. The AU needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators. This is what the Tigrayan authorities demanded at the outset. </p>
<p>The AU peace and security council should also be active enough to hold the chairperson in check and hold him to the norms and principles of the union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe (PhD) is affiliated to the Tigraian resistance and now lives in Mekelle. Does everything he can to support the resistance. </span></em></p>The African Union needs to launch a credible, robust mediation process with mutually accepted mediators.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798622022-04-08T08:15:18Z2022-04-08T08:15:18ZObasanjo: from a Nigerian village to the pinnacle of power on the continent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455482/original/file-20220331-25-v46ioh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/olusegun-obasanjo-former-president-of-nigeria-at-the-book-news-photo/1160298341?adppopup=true">Darren Stewart/Gallo Images via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former president and a pan Africanist extraordinaire, <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/03/05/obasanjo-clocks-85-amid-loads-of-goodwill-messages/">turned 85 on 5 March 2022</a>. </p>
<p>Obasanjo was Nigeria’s military head of state <a href="https://www.theafricaceoforum.com/en/portraits/olusegun-obasanjo/">between 1976 and 1979</a> and two-time democratically elected president, <a href="https://www.clubmadrid.org/miembro/olusegun-obasanjo/">from 1999 to 2007</a>. </p>
<p>“OBJ”, as he is widely called, is probably the most globally known and celebrated Nigerian leader. One probable reason is his political credentials as military and civilian head of state. He also led Africa’s biggest country longer than any other person. </p>
<p>His initiatives and policies as Nigerian leader are another reason. In 1976, he introduced <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Operation-Feed-the-Nation">Operation Feed the Nation</a>, a social revolution aimed at changing the fortunes of the people through farming. To increase production and exports, his administration also created the <a href="https://nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-History.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</a> in 1977. This initially recorded some successes but is currently unable to make refined fuel available for local consumption and export. </p>
<p>Obasanjo <a href="https://republic.com.ng/august-september-2021/political-legacy-obasanjo/">returned Nigeria to democratic rule in 1979</a>, the country’s first successful transition from military to civilian rule. After 19 years of social and political upheavals, including bloody coups, a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9cSA1gLizE">civil war</a>, economic crisis and a corruption pandemic occasioned by an oil boom, Obasanjo handed over power to civilian successors. He also set up a constitutional conference culminating in <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/nig_const_79.pdf">the 1979 Constitution</a>. Thus, he helped create a path towards a multiparty democracy. </p>
<h2>Obasanjo’s second coming</h2>
<p>The years between 1979 and 1999 witnessed political instability, corruption in public office, economic collapse and decay of social infrastructure. Becoming president in 1999, Obasanjo introduced an anti-corruption regime with three agencies: the <a href="https://www.efcc.gov.ng/">Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</a>, <a href="https://icpc.gov.ng/">Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission</a> and the <a href="https://www.bpp.gov.ng/background/">Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligent Unit</a>. The unit is also known as the Due Process Commission. </p>
<p>The agencies’ dragnets <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/aaechp/978-3-030-50509-7_21.html">caught</a> some big fish, projecting the administration as the first of its kind in Nigerian politics. </p>
<h2>Pan-Africanism as personal philosophy</h2>
<p>Obasanjo’s <a href="https://www.nepad.org/news/olusegun-obasanjo-my-africa-utopia">vision for Africa</a>, which manifested in his public policies as a leader, brought back memories of the radical pan-Africanism of the 1960s. For example, British Petroleum was <a href="https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/3479#:%7E:text=In%20July%201979%2C%20Nigeria's%20federal,been%20controlled%20by%20foreign%20investors.">nationalised in 1979</a> as a sanction against Britain for supporting apartheid in southern Africa. His administration <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05152.6?seq=1">granted asylum to leaders and financed the anti-apartheid movement in southern Africa</a>. It also supported liberation movements in Angola and other African countries. </p>
<p>In 1988, Obasanjo established the <a href="https://www.africaleadership.org/">African Leadership Forum</a>. This brought thought leaders to Nigeria from across Africa and the world to discuss issues relating to black people and the African continent. He also travelled widely to attend high-profile meetings and meet world leaders about charting new paths for the continent. These meetings became the thinking hub for African regeneration. Some of the outcomes included some continental bodies and initiatives.</p>
<p>Obasanjo joined others to form the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/nepad">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> in 2001. The partnership introduced the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/african-peer-review-mechanism-comes-age">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, an initiative intended to commit leaders to good governance. For the years that it was effective, accountability and transparency in leadership became the watchwords for most African governments and governance <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/the-african-peer-review-mechanism-development-lessons-from-africas-remarkable-governance-assessment-system/">picked up positively</a>.</p>
<p>He was also there when the <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a> succeeded the Organisation of Africa Unity in 2002. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/9191/1/Folarin%206.pdf">an assessment</a> of Obasanjo’s policy score-sheet, I found that his administration’s West Africa policy between 2001 and 2006 tried to stem the tide towards war in Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. Rebuffed by the latter two, he had to influence the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union to attend to the situation.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://guardian.ng/features/obasanjos-story-of-debt-relief-and-burden/">secured</a> US$20 billion in debt relief for Nigeria and cleaned up the Nigerian debt profile, he <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200005180015.html">rallied other African leaders</a> to do the same thing. However, his successors in Nigeria have raised the country’s debt profile <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/government-debt-to-gdp">to dangerous levels</a>.</p>
<p>Obasanjo was <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/former-president-obasanjo-appointed-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed </a> as the African Union’s High Representative for the Horn of Africa in 2021. His task is to work towards achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. His experience in peacemaking, his personality and his leadership qualities make him the right person for the job. </p>
<h2>Controversies galore</h2>
<p>Obasanjo is, however, not free from controversies. </p>
<p>His administration’s Operation Feed the Nation is <a href="http://ng.dailyadvent.com/politics/2019/05/13/obasanjo-how-operation-feed-the-nation-project-became-obasanjos-well-known-ota-farms/">dismissed sometimes</a> as having been used to advance his own personal cause. </p>
<p>He has also been described in some quarters, by either political opponents or some Yoruba ethnic leaders, as someone who often put other ethnic groups ahead of his own. He has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/20/chrismcgreal">accused</a> of being too soft on Northern ethnic militants and highhanded on Southern counterparts. </p>
<p>He was also alleged to have nursed an ambition to remain in power <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/obasanjos-costly-failed-third-term-bid">after his constitutional two terms</a>. </p>
<h2>Humble beginnings</h2>
<p>Obasanjo’s legacies are better appreciated when viewed against his humble background. He was born into a poor family in Ibogun-Olaogun, a farming settlement in Owu-Egba, near Abeokuta, south-west Nigeria. <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw52799.html">In 1958</a> he joined the Nigerian Army, where he specialised in engineering. He had military training in the Congo, Britain and India. </p>
<p>He fought on the Nigerian side of the civil war between 1967 and 1970. From 1975 to 1976, he was second-in-command to military ruler Murtala Muhammad. Many regard him as the man who put an end to the civil war. </p>
<p>He became a farmer and published 24 books on various issues, including military and political leadership, the civil war and his vision for Africa. </p>
<p>Obasanjo remained the nemesis of several successive rulers, checking their excesses. He will be remembered for his roles in the rebirth of the African Union and peacemaking. </p>
<p>Some see Obasanjo as a great Nigerian; others as an African hero like Nelson Mandela, or an influential thinker. Some believe he is just a self-serving tyrant who tries to bring the world to his feet. </p>
<p>No matter how others see him, Obasanjo may just pass for another local but influential village farmer who was fortunate to lead his country and Africa in many diverse ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheriff Folarin receives funding from William P. Hobby Center for Public Service, Texas State University. </span></em></p>Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, will be remembered for his roles in the rebirth of African Union and peacemaking.Sheriff Folarin, Professor of International Relations and Visiting Scholar, Texas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798522022-03-24T14:31:26Z2022-03-24T14:31:26ZNigeria’s police work under terrible conditions: what needs to be fixed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453823/original/file-20220323-17-t39m5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria must improve the welfare of its police officers. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/policemen-in-riot-gear-and-ak-47s-during-a-demonstration-news-photo/1318786086?adppopup=true">Adeyinka Yusuf/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Junior officers of the Nigeria Police Force are planning to embark <a href="https://www.newtelegraphng.com/police-plan-2-week-strike-over-salary-outdated-weapons/">on a strike </a> in protest against poor welfare. The leadership of the force has <a href="https://www.arise.tv/strike-action-mutinous-nigeria-police-chief-warns-personnel/">denied that conditions are bad and warned against the strike action</a>. Lanre Ikuteyijo, a police affairs expert, speaks on the implications of the strike and how Nigeria can improve the welfare of its police officers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the situation when it comes to police welfare?</h2>
<p>The last time that Nigerian police <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/02/world/nigeria-calls-out-army-after-police-strike-declares-mutiny.html">went on strike was</a> under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration in 2002. The action embarrassed the government terribly. Police officers embarked on strike action in reaction to failed government promises on conditions of service. Their action led to <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/flashback-2002-obasanjo-retired-musiliu-smith-new-psc-chairman-police-went-strike">the sacking</a> of the Inspector General, Musiliu Smith, and other top police management team.</p>
<p>The major factors that led to the strike action were ‘bread and butter’ issues - the welfare of officers. </p>
<p>Welfare issues aren’t limited to salaries. They also include affordable and decent housing, health care, clothing, promotion and a conductive working environment. The welfare of officers also includes the condition of police barracks which have been shown to be in a <a href="https://dailytrust.com/police-barracks-reel-in-despair">terrible state</a>. </p>
<p>In 2013 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTHLL-1juoI">a viral video</a> showed the terrible state of the Nigeria Police Training School. It showed the appalling conditions under which Nigeria trains future police officers. </p>
<p>The video provided clear evidence of the neglect of even trainees’ welfare. </p>
<p>The welfare of police officers was one of the <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/breaking-fg-accepts-5-point-demand-of-endsars-protesters">five point demand</a> of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/nov/01/nigeria-end-sars-protesters-find-no-justice-one-year-on">#EndSars protesters</a>. The government promised to review the welfare of police officers, particularly salaries. But this has still not been done. </p>
<p>The police as the main custodians of law and order in Nigeria. In 2021 the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/07/perspectives-on-the-nigeria-police-force/">headcount of police personnel</a> was over 370,000 police personnel. Most belong to the junior officers cadre. These are usually the officers one can describe as the foot soldiers of the force as they are mostly involved in day to day policing such as check point duties, station duties and other policing activities that have direct relations with the public. </p>
<h2>What factors are behind the poor state of affairs?</h2>
<p>They’re not very different from the factors driving poor welfare of most public servants in Nigeria. This includes university lecturers, among others. Factors include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>inadequate funding. At N403 billion, (US$980 million) the 2020 budget for the Nigeria Police was <a href="https://placng.org/i/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Analysis-of-Police-Bill-Factsheet-1.pdf">the highest</a> it has been allocated in the past 5 years in terms of amount. This might seem like a large number. But it is only just over a quarter of the total security budget. Five years ago the budget for the police made up a third of the total security budget. </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to address complaints</p></li>
<li><p>systemic corruption in the force which plays out in several matters of welfare of police officers. This affects a range of things, including <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/psc-kicks-over-alleged-hijack-of-police-recruitment-promotion-by-igp/">recruitment</a>, promotion, salaries, and postings. </p></li>
<li><p>A lack of internal accountability and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/11/shocker-buharis-directive-on-police-flouted-3-times/">inability to implement</a> presidential directives to address the welfare of police officers.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What is the impact on the effectiveness of the the police force?</h2>
<p>Obviously having police officers who aren’t well motivated affects the security of the country. Police officers with low morale won’t discharge their duties as law enforcement agents. Their effectiveness will also be affected by a lack the requisite working tools such as modern crime fighting technology, transportation, as conducive working environment. </p>
<p>Even <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/04/21/gbajabiamila-seeks-improved-welfare-for-police/">the clothing of an average Nigeria police officer</a> should be a matter of concern as it affects how the public perceive the police. A police officer who is shabbily dressed won’t command the respect of citizens. </p>
<p>In 2016, the World Internal Security and Police Index International, (WISPI) rated Nigeria Police <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/249058-nigeria-police-worst-world-report.html">as the “worst police in the world”</a>. The rating was promptly <a href="https://punchng.com/nigerian-police-reject-ranking-as-worlds-worst/#:%7E:text=The%202016%20World%20Internal%20Security,%2C%20Process%2C%20Legitimacy%20and%20Outcomes.">rejected</a> by the police authorities in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Can the welfare of Nigeria’s police officers be improved?</h2>
<p>The root causes of the poor welfare needs to be addressed.</p>
<p>First, the police require funding and funding needs to be well monitored to ensure it reflects in the life of an average police officer. </p>
<p>There should also be effective feedback mechanisms to attempt to the complaints of officers, especially the rank and file.</p>
<p>Likewise, the <a href="https://fmic.gov.ng/tag/federal-ministry-of-police-affairs/">Ministry of Police Affairs</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/policeservicec2?lang=en">Police Service Commission</a> should drive improvements on a range of fronts. This includes recruitment, training, discipline and promotion.</p>
<p>State governments should do their bit. They should make it a priority to support the police by providing decent accommodation as well as educational support for their children.</p>
<p>The welfare of retired police officers should equally be taken care of. This would serve as a way of showing appreciation for officers who serve. </p>
<h2>What can police do to address for bad welfare?</h2>
<p>There are very limited legal outlets for police officers to draw the attention of the government to their poor welfare. This is because of the nature of their role in society. Labour laws in Nigeria categorised policing among the essential services and excludes them from trade union activities.</p>
<p>Although it’s not expressly illegal for police officers to strike, <a href="https://placbillstrack.org/upload/Police%20Act,%202020.pdf">the Police Act (2020) </a> categorises offences of police officers to include mutiny, sedition and desertion. Police authorities emphasise these aspects of the law whenever police officers threaten to go on strike in Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lanre Ikuteyijo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Going on strike is not an option for the police in Nigeria as the consequences could be dire.Lanre Ikuteyijo, Senior lecturer, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692932021-10-13T14:24:43Z2021-10-13T14:24:43ZWhy the African Union’s mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425881/original/file-20211012-13-uxdcy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Nigerian president General Olusegun Obasanjo.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Jeff Overs/BBC News & Current Affairs via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations <a href="http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400960/8%20November%202019%20%28Mediation%20and%20Negotiation%29%20GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29.pdf?sequence=47">recognises</a> mediation as one of the most effective methods of preventing, managing and above all, resolving conflicts. </p>
<p>The UN guidelines underscore that the mediation process has to have integrity if it’s going to succeed.</p>
<p>Key elements include, firstly, cultivating the consent of the parties. Success depends on conflicting parties agreeing to the process.</p>
<p>Another important factor is securing the acceptability of the mediator and the mediating entity. This includes the appointment of an even-handed, high-profile negotiator. The person needs to be impartial – one of the cornerstones of any successful mediation.</p>
<p>If either parties question the partiality of the person, the process is bound to fail. Lakhdar Brahimi, who served as head of UN Department of Peace Operations, once described partiality as one “<a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SevenDeadlySinsofMediation_BrahimiAhmed2008.pdf">seven deadly sins” of mediators</a>. </p>
<p>Partiality isn’t just about preferring one side to the other. It can also contribute to a biased definition of the problem and lead to a flawed agenda and structure for the mediation. This is a recipe for its failure. </p>
<p>It’s useful to consider the credibility and acceptability of Africa Union’s newly-announced mediation plan for the conflict in Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray against these criteria. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58869970">conflict in Tigray region</a> is a war waged by the federal government against the regional administration since November 2020. It followed Tigray’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics-idUSKBN25Z35S">holding of regional elections against the will</a> of the federal government.</p>
<p>In August 2021, the African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">appointed</a> the former Nigerian president General Olusegun Obasanjo as its special envoy to initiate and lead the mediation process. The announcement by the chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210826/appointment-president-obasanjo-high-representative-horn-africa">billed this as part</a> of its </p>
<blockquote>
<p>drive to promote peace, security, stability and political dialogue all over the Horn of Africa region. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In my view neither the AU, nor its mediator, are a credible start to a mediation aimed at resolving the crisis in Ethiopia. That is because both the AU and its special envoy are not even-handed and their definition of the problem is flawed.</p>
<p>I believe that it will be up to other states and institutions of the international community – such as the US, European Union, and the UN – to start a credible process. </p>
<h2>AU’s relationship with Ethiopia</h2>
<p>The AU is not in a position to drive a mediation process because its stance fails to meet the impartiality test. It failed to act as the situation deteriorated in Tigray region. African intellectuals <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/121757/ethiopia-african-intellectuals-call-for-urgent-action-over-tigray-war/">pointed this out in an open letter calling for dialogue to end the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU has been seen to be tone deaf to events on the ground. At the height of a government-led offensive marked by executions, rape and ethnic cleansing, Moussa Faki <a href="https://au.int/en/speeches/20201220/remarks-auc-chairperson-38th-igad-extraordinary-summit">congratulated the Ethiopian government</a> for </p>
<blockquote>
<p>bold steps to preserve the unity, stability and respect for the constitutional order of the country; which is legitimate for all states.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The AU’s impartiality can be questioned further given its role in the recent elections in Ethiopia. It was <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210623/preliminary-statement-african-union-election-observation-mission-21-june-2021">one of the few non-Ethiopian institutions</a> to observe the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-election-idUSKCN2DZ1F4">general elections</a> held in June 2021. The election was held at a time when leaders of the key opposition parties were in prison and the country was caught in civil wars in several corners. In many places the ruling party ran without a single competitor. </p>
<p>The conduct of the election was <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-five-opposition-parties-who-participated-in-this-weeks-general-election-complain-about-electoral-process/">condemned</a> by numerous political parties, including five considered close to the ruling party of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.</p>
<p>Yet Olusegun Obasanjo, head of the AU observer mission, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-election-idAFKCN2DZ1F4">declared</a> that the election had been held in a credible way. </p>
<p>The AU’s choice of the chief observer as chief mediator raises even more questions about its partiality in mediation process. The problem begins with the willingness of the AU to legitimise the June elections and its choice of the very same individual who championed this decision to be the candidate for mediating the conflict. </p>
<p>This is more than a question of mere partiality. It affirms the legitimacy of a political process brought about by a combination of transactional strategies. It indicates that the mediator will be willing to countenance, such strategies of political management in the future.</p>
<p>But there’s an even greater reason why the AU can’t be seen as playing a credible role in the Ethiopian conflict. The AU has failed to act based on the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">foundational principles</a> contained in the constituent act of the union. It is never heard of condemning the<a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/ethiopia/#:%7E:text=The%20Ethiopian%20Human%20Rights%20Commission,Kadra%20on%209%20November%202020."> war crimes and crimes against humanity</a> committed in the war in Tigray. </p>
<h2>The Tigray question</h2>
<p>Given events in the Tigray region, the AU should not have embarked on a mediation process without first negotiating a declaration of principles as a prelude to talks for full political settlement. A good example of this <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_940520_The%20IGAD%20Declaration%20of%20principles.pdf">approach</a> is the 1996 prelude to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.</p>
<p>It appears from this oversight that the AU wants to accept that Abiy has a “legitimate” government that cannot be subject to ‘unconstitutional’ change – as stipulated in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">constitutive act</a> of the AU. Ethiopia can then lay down the terms on which it can talk to “rebels”, on an individual basis. </p>
<p>In addition, a negotiated settlement begins with each accepting the need to talk to the other. It is also essential to agree on transitional arrangements up until a complete political settlement is reached. </p>
<p>But currently the two governments don’t recognise one another. </p>
<p>The Regional National Government of Tigray has demanded that the existing constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia be the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202107040087.html">principle</a> on which a negotiated settlement is based. For the people and government of Tigray, full accountability and guarantee of non-recurrence of such crimes is an essential agenda item. </p>
<p>A mediation that fails to consider these fundamental issues in defining the nature of the conflict will be a non-starter.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article first appeared <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2021/10/01/not-impartial-not-principled-non-starter-african-union-mediation-in-ethiopia/">as a blog</a> for the World Peace Foundation.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe is affiliated with the Tigrayan Defense Forces.</span></em></p>The AU’s choice of Olusegun Obasanjo as chief mediator raises even more questions about its partiality in Ethiopian conflict.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572542021-04-13T14:43:15Z2021-04-13T14:43:15ZFifty years, five problems - and how Nigeria can work with China in future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392810/original/file-20210331-13-1oqs43e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vendors in front of their shop in China Town, Ojota, Lagos</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vendors-sit-in-front-of-their-shop-in-the-deserted-china-news-photo/1203737316?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since establishing diplomatic relations on <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t142490.htm">10 February 1971</a>, Nigeria’s relationship with China has developed into one of the most important bilateral relationships maintained by either country. </p>
<p>Apart from the exchange of high level visits, Chinese companies and money have found their way into Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. They are involved in <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">a variety of major projects</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>As at 31 March 2020, Chinese loans to Nigeria stood at <a href="https://www.dmo.gov.ng/facts-about-chinese-loans-to-nigeria">US$3.121 billion</a>, which is 11.28% of the country’s external debt of US$27.67 billion. The growing trade and presence of Chinese finance in Nigeria has also led to changing narratives about <a href="https://za.boell.org/en/2018/10/09/nigerian-migrants-china-changing-narrative">increased</a> migration on both sides.</p>
<p>Over the years, Nigeria’s relationship with China has broadened and deepened with China’s growing power and interest in securing its regional interests (particularly within the South China Sea), and taking its place as a major global actor. Although Nigeria has largely stayed away from China’s fairly assertive regional posture, it’s affirmation of a commitment to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354">‘One-China Policy’</a> has been important to China. Nigeria demonstrated this by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-nigeria/taiwan-says-nigeria-wants-it-to-move-its-trade-office-from-abuja-idUSKBN14W0IX">forced relocation</a> of Taiwan trade office from Abuja to Lagos in 2017.</p>
<p>The governments of both Nigeria and China often describe their relationship as a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/06/c_137585555.htm">“win win”</a> partnership – a term China often <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-06-28/President-Xi-China-Africa-cooperation-always-produces-win-win-results-HTaBDoIaDC/index.html">uses</a> to describe its relationships with other African countries.</p>
<p>During former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria in 2006, his host and then Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">remarked</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>From our assessment, this twenty-first century is the century for China to lead the world. And when you are leading the world, we want to be close behind you. When you are going to the moon, we don’t want to be left behind.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Bitter sweet mixture</h2>
<p>But 50 years of Nigeria-China relations has been a bitter-sweet mixture. At independence, Nigeria’s pro-British and pro-West foreign policy <a href="https://www.ijrhss.org/papers/v6-i11/1.pdf">had no dedicated space or support</a> for communist China.</p>
<p>During the <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970/">Nigeria-Biafra war</a>, the Nigerian government received arms support the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319766091_Strange_Bedfellows_An_Unlikely_Alliance_between_the_Soviet_Union_and_Nigeria_during_the_Biafran_War">from USSR</a> - but not China. It has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/75/298/14/102588?redirectedFrom=PDF">reported</a> that China supported Biafra in terms of small arms and ammunition via Tanzania.</p>
<p>After the war, the Nigerian government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338739945_Gowon's_Three_R's_and_Yar'Adua's_General_Amnesty_an_Analysis_of_Policy_Failures_Security_Challenges_and_Consequences_in_the_West_African_Atlantic_Seaboard">implemented</a> the 3Rs - reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. It also visited countries in the West and East. It was within this context that Nigeria, along with other African countries, supported the <a href="https://china.usc.edu/united-nations-admits-peoples-republic-china-october-25-1971">1971 resolution</a> to accept China as a full-fledged member of the UN.</p>
<p>An economic exhibition followed in <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t792194.htm">1972</a> and <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095902167">Yakubu Gowon</a>, Nigeria’s leader, visited Beijing <a href="https://www.wathi.org/two-distant-giants-china-and-nigeria-perceive-each-other/">in 1974</a>. But it was not until the early 1990s that China assumed an <a href="https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2Fs11366-016-9453-8?author_access_token=WPKvbExnHCczCqgM0LI_Hve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY7OLvXN-XgPiWgO5WDqKEtaTSOh-plEmXHRWQp1VgNkOrh4kU-Bs4v4HZ-lddROqoFazhV8tFcaZvfUEQCEf6kV1IHlJiRJsOMU13MAf4YvUQ==">important role</a> in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The backlash from the West over the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/24/world/nigerian-military-rulers-annul-election.html">annulment</a> of the June 1993 presidential election forced Nigeria to look more towards China.</p>
<p>Thus, China became an important element for Nigeria’s response to Western sanctions and other forms of pressures, and strategies to force a preferred political outcome. China’s <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2019/conflict-mediation-chinese-characteristics-how-china-justifies-its-non-interference-policy/">non-interference policy</a> in the domestic affairs of other countries fitted well into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54929254">Sani Abacha</a>’s ultimate goal of becoming a civilian president. The period also coincided with the early beginnings of Beijing’s own “going global” policy that saw it unleash abroad its economic influence and multinational companies.</p>
<p>Under Abacha, an agreement was signed in 1995 with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to take up projects -although some reports trace the company’s entrance into the Nigerian market to 1981. What is clear is that Nigeria is the company’s <a href="https://dailytrust.com/we-built-businesses-in-29-states-in-40yrs-ccecc">first overseas market </a>; and currently CCECC works in 29 of Nigeria’s 36 states.</p>
<p>Over the last 50 years, the Sino-Nigerian relationship has developed clear patterns. Roughly, the first 20 years may be described as a political phase. The ensuing decade was a mixed era of political and economic features while the last 20 years or so show an intensification of China’s economic presence in Nigeria. Clearly, the relationship has become more economic as China evolved from a political power to a global economic giant.</p>
<p>However, after a half century of official relationship, the time has become ripe for a review of the balance sheet. </p>
<h2>The “win-win” smiles</h2>
<p>China is one of the most important <a href="https://www.dmo.gov.ng/facts-about-chinese-loans-to-nigeria">lenders of development finance to Nigeria</a>. Chinese firms and finance play a prominent role in Nigeria’s infrastructure development. This is <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sr_423_chen_final.pdf">notably in the construction</a> of railway lines and road (re)construction across the country. Some <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-maltreatment-of-nigerians-in-china-may-not-end-soon-137828">examples</a> are the $874 million, 187km Abuja-Kaduna rail; the $1.2 billion, 312km Lagos-Ibadan expressway; the $1.1 billion Kano-Kaduna railway lines and the $600 million airport terminals in Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano. </p>
<p>Nigeria is also <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5ea7317f6ed4781cebc9c0ce/1588015487828/WP+36+-+Chen+-+Manufacturing+Nigeria.pdf">one</a> of Africa’s top destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). Although accurate figures are <a href="https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/deciphering-chinese-investment-in-nigeria">difficult</a> to ascertain, it is estimated that about 5% of Chinese FDI stocks in Africa and 4.6% of FDI inflow in 2019 <a href="http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa">goes to Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>Data on trade between the two nations for the first 30 years of their relationship is not available. Nevertheless, more reliable data has been available since 2003. Since then trade between the two nations has increased from <a href="http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/cne/t142490.htm">US$1.86 billion</a> to an estimated <a href="https://punchng.com/chinese-companies-investments-in-nigeria-hit-20bn-cccn/">US$20 billion</a> in 2019. Trade flows are in China’s favour, with China running a trade surplus of about US$17.5 billion for the years 2015 to 2018. Nigeria sells crude oil to China and, in turn, buys manufactured goods.</p>
<p>China also contributes to the development of Nigeria’s human capital. Many Nigerian students now <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/09/c_138296964.htm">study</a> in Chinese schools – with a few on scholarship. Chinese companies are also building <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/03/c_138602919.htm">education</a> and <a href="https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2016/10/huawei-innovation-experience-center-nigeria">training</a> facilities in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>The underbellies of win-win</h2>
<p>The relationship is not without its problems. Aside from <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-maltreatment-of-nigerians-in-china-may-not-end-soon-137828">racism</a> against Nigerians and other black people in China, there are four other problems.</p>
<p>First is the negative impact of Chinese imports on Nigerian industries, of which the biggest casualty has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-china-arrests/nigeria-arrests-45-illegal-chinese-textile-traders-idUKL5E8GNDBM20120523?edition-redirect=uk">textiles</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in Kano - which is considered to be one of the main textiles cities in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006534?seq=1">northern Nigeria</a>, an estimated <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2015/09/02/chinese-textile-materials-send-28000-kano-dyers-out-of-business/">28,000 Nigerians</a> lost their jobs to Chinese imports as at 2015. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s shoe industry has also taken <a href="https://dailytrust.com/how-chinese-products-are-killing-made-in-aba-shoes">a big hit</a>. </p>
<p>The second problem relates to the bad treatment of Nigerian workers by their Chinese employers. There have been many <a href="https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=A3XhCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA191&lpg=PA191&dq=between+the+dragon%27s+gift+and+its+claws&source=bl&ots=Bg8CxNqchq&sig=ACfU3U0RQwuwsBqTK7oqr8dUQV6zpZcsvQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj9-9C-7KzvAhV04uAKHf3lARwQ6AEwEHoECBEQAw#v=onepage&q=between%20the%20dragon's%20gift%20and%20its%20claws&f=false">instances of maltreatment</a> of these workers. This raises questions about the ability of Nigerian government to develop – or enforce – appropriate labour laws and conduct regular inspection of work places.</p>
<p>Third is the issue of <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2011/06/17/chinese-prisoners-invade-nigeria/">unsubstantiated claims </a> about Chinese companies in Nigeria. A good example is the claim that <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/rep-raises-concern-over-import-of-chinese-prisoners-to-work-in-nigeria/">China uses its prisoners</a> in construction projects in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The fourth problem relates to Chinese loans to Nigeria, which often generate concerns among citizens. These range from those that believe they are unsustainable to those that claim that the agreements <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/406420-amaechi-explains-sovereignty-clause-in-500m-chinese-railway-loan.html">allow China to take over</a> Nigerian assets. These persist because of the secrecy surrounding the loans.</p>
<h2>Preparing for the next 25-50 years</h2>
<p>Nigeria now needs to prepare for the next 25 to 50 years.</p>
<p>China can continue to play an important role in Nigeria’s development. However, Nigeria must urgently address the negative side of the relationship. </p>
<p>First, Nigeria’s regulatory institutions, including the courts, standards setting bodies, ministries and agencies, must apply the laws of the country without fear or favour.</p>
<p>China has <a href="https://www.today.ng/news/nigeria/chinese-companies-obey-nigerian-labour-laws-foreign-minister-338004">said</a> it will not tolerate Chinese companies disregarding Nigeria’s labour laws. But, it is up to the local regulatory institutions to assert the supremacy of the Nigerian law.</p>
<p>Secondly, Chinese textile firms must be <a href="https://shipsandports.com.ng/between-nigerias-1-2bn-smuggled-textiles-and-chinas-2bn-investment/">encouraged</a> to create employment.</p>
<p>Lastly, people-to-people relationship must also be encouraged and strengthened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Lagos State Government, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETfund), Population Media Center (PMC), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), Think Tank Initiative, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is currently an American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program (ACLS-AHP) postdoctoral fellow, conducting research for a book entitled ‘Imageries of Mao Zedong's China in Ghanaian newspapers, 1957-1976.’ </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ufo Okeke Uzodike is affiliated with African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage). The institute is a not-for-profit, non-partisan and independent think tank devoted to economic, social and peace research, capacity building, and networking. AfriHeritage’s history dates back to 2001 when operations commenced (nationally and across Africa) under the name “African Institute for Applied Economics'' (AIAE). Its name was changed in 2012 to African Heritage Institution in order to broaden its focus beyond economic issues. Its vision is for a renascent Africa that is democratic, prosperous and a frontline player in the global economy; and its Mission committed its management to work for positive social change through sustained advocacy to promote transparent and effective management and governance of the Nigerian and African economies. </span></em></p>Nigeria and China should work more on the relationship between their citizens so that the two countries can continue to have good bilateral relations.Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State UniversityUfo Okeke Uzodike, Honorary Research Professor, Durban University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1538922021-02-17T14:45:17Z2021-02-17T14:45:17ZWhy being endowed with oil is not always a boon: the case of Nigeria and Angola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382714/original/file-20210205-13-ilajqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Angolans protest for bettter living conditions in the capital Luanda in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In countries with weak governance institutions, natural resource wealth <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x">tends</a> to be a curse instead of a blessing. Where citizens are relatively powerless to hold ruling elites to account, resource wealth undermines development prospects. On the contrary, where citizens are able to exert constraints on executive power, resource wealth can generate development that benefits ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>Development scholar <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0305750X94901651">Richard Auty</a> first coined the term ‘resource curse’ in the early 1990s. He used the phrase to describe the puzzling phenomenon of resource wealthy countries failing to industrialise. Manifestations of the ‘curse’ now range from widespread corruption to civil war to deepening authoritarian rule. </p>
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<p>Literature <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359">on the resource curse</a> has done an adequate job of describing the general nature of the relationship between resource dependence and underdevelopment. It now needs to focus on understanding specific manifestations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">In my latest book</a>, I detail what these are in relation to oil in Nigeria and Angola, sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest oil producers.</p>
<p>My book shows that the resource curse manifests differently in different contexts. </p>
<p>Why does this matter?</p>
<p>If governance interventions are to be useful, it’s important to <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.2.173">understand the context</a>. Otherwise, policy interventions won’t gain traction. If political dynamics play a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">determinative role</a> in long-run economic outcomes, we must understand them better. </p>
<h2>Two countries, two stories</h2>
<p>In 2018, Angola’s fuel exports constituted 92.4% of the country’s total exports. Oil rents – the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/adjusted-net-savings/series/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS">difference</a> between the price of oil and the average cost of producing – accounted for 25.6% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2019 the country ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">148th</a> out of 189 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s oil exports in 2018 were 94.1% of total exports, oil rents amounted to 9% of GDP. In 2019 it ranked <a href="http://www.hdr.undp.org/">161st on the human development index</a> . As is clear from the graph above, sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producers are clustered around the lower end of the human development spectrum and are mostly autocratic.</p>
<p>Both Nigeria and Angola have been characterised by one form or another of autocratic rule for most of their post-independence histories. Autocracy invariably <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/700936?mobileUi=0&">undermines</a> a country’s development prospects.</p>
<p>Angola was plunged into a civil war shortly after independence in <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/angola#:%7E:text=Portugal%20granted%20Angola%20independence%20on,over%20the%20newly%20liberated%20state.">November 1975</a>. It then suffered an unsuccessful coup attempt <a href="https://www.amazon.com/History-Modern-Angola-Birmingham-2015-12-17/dp/B01K91W048">in 1977</a>. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the balance of power at independence in 1960 was just as precarious as Angola’s. Nigeria suffered two <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Max-Siollun-Politics-2009-03-30-Paperback/dp/B01GYOUQFY">military coups</a> in 1966, and a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Brothers-War-Biafra-Nigeria/dp/0571251919">civil war</a> from 1967-1970. </p>
<p>But why does oil fuel the consolidation of autocratic rule in one context, but not necessarily in another? </p>
<p>It all comes down to how the leader of the ruling coalition extracts and distributes the oil rents. In my book, I employ a game theory model <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-authoritarian-rule/7F78A8828A5714F0BE74E44A90A44868">developed by Princeton political scientist Milan Svolik</a> to explain these divergent political outcomes.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>Jose Eduardo dos Santos came to power in 1979 as served as president until 2017, grabbing power early and repeatedly. Svolik’s model predicts that rulers who can do this at the same time as limiting the probability of a coup being against them manage to entrench their rule. </p>
<p>Within six years, dos Santos had consolidated power. He eliminated internal threats by subverting power sharing institutions and purging key individuals. For instance, in 1984 the central committee of the ruling <em>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</em> (MPLA) – created a ‘defence and security council’, chaired by dos Santos. As I note in the <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">book</a>, it became an inner cabinet, “effectively eclipsing the Political Bureau as the country’s top decision-making body”.</p>
<p>A year later, dos Santos dropped Lúcio Lara, the party’s stalwart intellectual, from the Political Bureau, thus removing the last potential threat to his rule. Simultaneously, he used the extensive oil rents at his disposal – and the cover of civil war – to either co-opt or eliminate opposition. </p>
<p>He did so by ensuring that the state oil firm, Sonangol, was proficiently run. It soon became Angola’s <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/magnificent-and-beggar-land/">shadow state</a> through its vast web of subsidiaries. After the civil war - 1975 to 2002 - Sonangol became the driver of (limited) development, but also the key distributor of patronage to cement dos Santos’s power. He not only bled it to enrich his family dynasty; he also used it to appease his inner circle. </p>
<p>Dos Santos ended up ruling for <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26426/how-different-is-the-new-angola-under-lourenco">38 years</a>. But, his key strategic mistake was placing his children in plum Sonangol positions ahead of loyalists.</p>
<p>In 2017, <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">João Lourenço</a>, a former Defence Minister, became the new Angolan president. Dos Santos was to remain head of the MPLA until 2022. But, he was ousted through what was essentially a bloodless coup in 2018, engineered by his former loyalists like Manuel Vicente, the long-standing former head of Sonangol.</p>
<p>The Politburo appointed Lourenço president of the MPLA. He has since <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/angola-the-fall-of-the-dos-santos-clan/a-45646757">purged the dos Santos children</a> from plum positions. Angola is still heavily dominated by the ruling MPLA, though. Prospects for a more competitive political settlement appear limited.</p>
<h2>The case of Nigeria</h2>
<p>Within six years of independence from Britain on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54241944">1 October 1960</a>, the military launched a coup. This initiated a long period of military rule. Seven coups <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Nigeria">occurred</a> between 1966 and 1993. Military rule was largely uninterrupted from 1966 to 1999. </p>
<p>But neither the coups nor the civil war were driven by oil.</p>
<p>Oil wealth only became a major factor in Nigeria’s political economy in the early 1970s, when the price rocketed as a result of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">global supply crisis</a>. Windfall oil wealth exacerbated the preexisting fragility. The state run oil firm, the <a href="https://www.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx">Nigerian National Petroleum Company</a>, was inefficient compared to Sonangol. Nonetheless, it served as the country’s cash cow, milked to extend patronage. </p>
<p>But, unlike in Angola, no aspirant Nigerian autocrat was able to monopolise personal control over the national oil company. As I detail in <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6076-5">the book</a>, oil exacerbated fragility in Nigeria. While Angola’s dos Santos maintained a stable bargain among elites, Nigeria’s balance of power remained precarious. </p>
<p>In 1975, another military coup toppled Yakubu Gowon who had ruled Nigeria through the civil war. Murtala Muhammed came to power but was assassinated in a coup attempt six months later, which brought <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/people/olusegun-obasanjo/">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> to power in 1976. Obasanjo guided a transition to civilian rule in 1979 but this only lasted four years.</p>
<p>A 1983 coup brought current president Muhammadu Buhari to power and another ousted him two years later. Ibrahim Babangida then ruled until 1993. After a brief attempt at civilian rule, Sani Abacha came to power through yet another coup that same year. He died in office in 1998. His successor, Abdulsalami Abubakar, returned the country to civilian rule a year later. </p>
<p>Former military ruler Obasanjo – who had been imprisoned by Abacha – won the 1999 elections but attempted to grab a third term as president in 2006. Despite <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/16/world/africa/16iht-lagos.html">alleged oil-funded bribery</a> to lobby party members to support his cause, they held fast to the constitution’s term limits. </p>
<p>The importance of that moment cannot be overstated. It has resulted in a more open and competitive political settlement in Nigeria. Maintaining constitutional term limits can stop autocratic entrenchment in its tracks. Unfortunately, this has not guaranteed stability in Nigeria. Post-2015 fragility has deepened considerably. </p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>As my book shows, oil rents grease the wheels of political dynamics very differently in Angola and Nigeria. </p>
<p>Existing explanations for different manifestations range from ethnic fragmentation, inherited colonial structures, the role of foreign actors and how <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/129/619/1425/5334637?login=true">lootable</a> the oil is.</p>
<p>More attention now needs to be paid to how aspirant autocrats use natural resource rents to accumulate power for themselves. This can lead to policy practitioners developing an early warning system that may help citizens to nip power-grabs in the bud. </p>
<p>This may serve, in conjunction with other policy interventions, to ultimately reverse the curse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ross Harvey is the Director of Research and Programmes at Good Governance Africa, a non-profit organisation. </span></em></p>A new book explains the manifestations of the oil curse in Nigeria and Angola since independence.Ross Harvey, Senior Research Associate, Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1481212020-11-24T15:02:00Z2020-11-24T15:02:00ZMbeki and Obasanjo: case studies in the use of soft power in Africa’s interests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364785/original/file-20201021-23-7ijop4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki share a light moment at a meeting of the G8 and developing nations in Tokyo in 2000.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Michel Euler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The concept of soft power has been part of the parlance of international relations for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">three decades</a>. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1819629?journalCode=ctrt20">Soft power</a> actors use non-coercive and persuasive means to achieve their objectives. Attraction rather than force is their preferred language.</p>
<p>The application of soft power remains focused on states because of their primacy in international politics. But, the increasing influence of non-state actors dictates a need to review this approach. Non-state actors on the international stage include international organisations, NGOs, multinational corporations, terrorist groups and individuals. </p>
<p>It is against this backdrop that I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1819629?journalCode=ctrt20">studied</a> the power of attraction of non-state actors. I focused on the soft power credentials of former African presidents – <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/people/olusegun-obasanjo/">Olusegun Obasanjo</a> (Nigeria, 1999-2007) and <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (South Africa, 1999-2008). </p>
<p>The two have made important contributions to the continent this century through promoting peace, democracy, pan-Africanism and regional integration.</p>
<p>The study captures the essence of their soft power. It also engages how it has rubbed off on their respective countries – during and after their presidencies. </p>
<p>I examined Obasanjo’s and Mbeki’s traits, ideas and policies. In particular I focused on their contribution to pan-Africanism and the idea of the <a href="http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html">African Renaissance</a>. I argue that they successfully used their soft power and international clout to make significant contributions in Africa and beyond.</p>
<h2>Obasanjo as a soft power president</h2>
<p>After Obasanjo’s civilian administration ended in 2007, he attracted widespread criticism within Nigeria. This is perhaps best captured by Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s description of him as a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81pgm">master of hypocrisy</a>”.</p>
<p>But, this underplays some of his accomplishments. The period between 1976 and 1979 when he was the military head of state is <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Nigeria_s_External_Relations_and_Foreign.html?id=ImN0AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">lauded by some</a> as the most dynamic era of Nigeria’s foreign policy. And during his civilian administration (1999–2007) Nigeria was catapulted from a pariah state (due to gross human right abuses by successive military regimes) to a significant regional and, to a lesser extent, global player. </p>
<p>Thanks to Obasanjo’s idiosyncratic soft power, Nigeria, once neglected in global affairs, witnessed an influx of high profile visits, including US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Its voice was better heard in such bodies as the <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a>, <a href="https://www.g77.org/">Group of 77</a> and the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/nam.htm">Non-Aligned Movement</a>. </p>
<p>Obasanjo was notable for his courage and decisiveness, particularly when it came to colonialism and, later, apartheid. His toughness on these issues, and his promotion of regional integration, had remarkable success. </p>
<p>A foreign policy that embraces genuine promotion of democracy and peacemaking generates <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=x5Q5DgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=soft+power&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwje2-zgiLvsAhX_SxUIHZ7aBt4Q6AEwAHoECAQQAg#v=onepage&q=soft%20power&f=false">soft power</a>. </p>
<p>Obasanjo enhanced his, and by extension Nigeria’s soft power through his successful peacemaking and promotion of democracy. The former, in places such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The latter, in São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.</p>
<p>In Liberia, he was instrumental in ending the war. Obasanjo also facilitated the resignation of President Charles Taylor who was granted asylum in Nigeria. He played an active role in the transition to democratic rule that ushered in President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02533952.2018.1492833?journalCode=rsdy20">in 2006</a>.</p>
<p>In São Tomé and Príncipe, Obasanjo ensured the reinstatement of President Fradique de Menezes following a military coup <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02533952.2018.1492833?journalCode=rsdy20">in 2003</a>.</p>
<p>His reformist ideas, set out in the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/cssdca.htm">Memorandum of Understanding</a> of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, was adopted by the African Union summit in 2002. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589000600769926">memorandum</a> has four cornerstones. These are security, stability, development and cooperation as prerequisites for good governance on which African states would be measured. </p>
<p>It is thus clear that Obasanjo’s towering personality and international stature have enabled Nigeria to shape African institutions. He is thus a wielder of soft power.</p>
<p>Since leaving office, Obasanjo has continued to exhibit this soft power through conflict mediation and humanitarian interventions, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008–2009) and Côte d'Ivoire (2011). </p>
<p>But, a number of shortfalls blot his soft power credentials. These include his unilateral decisions and apparent disdain for the rule of law <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/aa_afren/5/1/EJC10288">while in power</a>.</p>
<h2>Mbeki’s legacy</h2>
<p>Mbeki was influenced by some of Africa’s great political minds, as well as pan-African thinkers, during his years in exile in the UK. </p>
<p>For example, while studying at Sussex University in England in the mid-1960s, he engaged the ideas of pan-Africanist luminaries <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aime-Cesaire">Aimé Cesaire</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/fanon-and-the-politics-of-truth-and-lying-in-a-colonial-society-102594">Frantz Fanon</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-Senghor">Leopold Senghor</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/W-E-B-Du-Bois">W.E.B. Du Bois</a>. Arguably, all these individuals influenced Mbeki’s views as seen in his pursuit of pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. </p>
<p>Mbeki has often been labelled an “African intellectual” and “African <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17532523.2017.1414396">philosopher king</a>”. There is no gainsaying that his administration had the most impact of any post-apartheid government in international affairs – even more so than <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a>. </p>
<p>This was evident in his push for South-South solidarity and reform of old international institutions such as the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">UN Security Council</a>. The African Union, despite its weaknesses, provided the platform for him to promote peace and security in Africa.</p>
<p>Exercising his soft power attribute (persuasion), Mbeki used shuttle diplomacy to garner the support of other African states, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations#:%7E:text=The%20Group%20of%20Eight%20(G8)%20refers%20to%20the%20group%20of,security%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20terrorism.">Group of Eight</a> and the <a href="https://asean.org/">Association of Southeast Asian States</a> to establish the <a href="https://www.nepad.org/">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> and the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. He was noted as a major peacemaker on the continent. This is best shown by his administration’s peacemaking and peacekeeping in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan.</p>
<p>Mbeki was often called upon to mediate and find lasting solutions to conflict in Africa. In 2004, the African Union asked that he proffer a political solution to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. He was actively involved in mediation to end conflicts in Comoros, Rwanda, Sudan, Eswatini and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Some of the interventions turned out to be a mere plastering of wounds as countries such as the DRC and Sudan remained fragile. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Mbeki facilitated the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-lusaka-agreement99">Lusaka ceasefire agreement</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/burundi_arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-for-burundi.pdf">Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement</a>. The accords aimed to end the DRC and Burundi’s conflicts, respectively.</p>
<p>Indeed, the calls for Mbeki’s mediation reflect recognition of his idiosyncratic soft power.</p>
<p>Mbeki’s administration demonstrated remarkable commitment to provide aid to Africa. The African Renaissance Fund was established in 2000 to disburse aid to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10220460802636158">fellow African states</a>. This offered an alternative to Western aid laced with debilitating conditions.</p>
<p>Mbeki continued to play a significant role after his presidency. He was appointed chair of the African Union’s efforts to bring peace to <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/progress-report-of-the-african-union-high-level-implementation-panel-for-sudan-and-south-sudan">Sudan and South Sudan</a> in 2009. This culminated in South Sudan’s independence in 2011.</p>
<p>The most significant factors that undermined his credibility were his <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175024?seq=1">quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.25159/0256-8845/3094">HIV/AIDS denialism</a>. </p>
<p>Due to their soft power resources, Obasanjo and Mbeki made their mark on pan-Africanism and conflict resolution in Africa. Their ideas remain deeply ingrained in the African Union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oluwaseun Tella does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Former presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki have arguably made the most important contribution to Africa in the 21st Century by promoting peace, democracy, regional integration and pan-Africanism.Oluwaseun Tella, Director, The Future of Diplomacy at the Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1249042019-10-08T14:27:07Z2019-10-08T14:27:07ZBuhari’s visit to South Africa eased tensions. But more needs to be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296020/original/file-20191008-128648-5a7rce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the immediate outcomes of talks between Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Cyril Ramaphosa was the easing of tensions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were mixed feelings among Nigerians over President Muhammadu Buhari’s state visit to South Africa because of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-a-new-narrative-could-tackle-anti-migrant-crisis-123145">recent xenophobic attacks</a> in the country. While many Nigerians disapproved of the visit, Buhari’s government <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-04-nigeria-in-sa-mzansi-reacts-to-ramaphosas-meeting-with-buhari/">insisted</a> that it was imperative to go ahead. Their argument was that it was vital for the two countries to continue working together.</p>
<p>The recent attacks sparked angry reactions in Nigeria. Some Nigerians called for <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-09-03-nigeria-calls-for-sanctions-on-sa-as-relations-flounder/">severing relations</a> with South Africa or imposing additional taxes on South African companies in Nigeria. They claimed these actions would serve as an ample response to the xenophobia and also send a signal to South Africa that xenophobia is unacceptable. </p>
<p>But others argued that there was a need to <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201909070010.html">mend the relationship</a> so that the two countries could prevent further chaos. Buhari heeded these calls, clearly choosing to tread the path of reconciliation when he visited South Africa. </p>
<p>His visit is important for three main reasons. First, to protect the close economic ties between the countries, second, the Nigerian government wants to be seen as proactively protecting its citizens abroad and lastly because the South African government had to do something to mend fences with its important ally. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>One of the main drivers behind Ramaphosa’s invitation, and Buhari’s visit, was the need to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-nigeria/south-africa-nigeria-mend-relations-and-agree-trade-deals-idUSKBN1WI28I">ease tensions</a> between the two largest economies in Africa. </p>
<p>There are deep economic ties both ways. Over <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/120-south-african-companies-in-nigeria-risk-attacks/">120 South African companies</a> operate in Nigeria, ranging from mobile operators to retailers. </p>
<p>South Africa, on the other hand, is a significant buyer of Nigerian oil. There are also a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201909070010.html">significant number</a> of Nigerian businesspeople, professionals and other migrants in South Africa.</p>
<p>Any further escalation would not only hurt the relationship but also threaten the economies of both countries. </p>
<p>Second, the Nigerian government has been <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2019/09/03/killings-nigerian-government-have-failed-citizens-in-south-africa-mgbo/">previously accused</a> by the Nigeria Union South Africa (NUSA) of not protecting its own citizens abroad. The visit could therefore be seen in context of addressing the displeasure of Nigerians at home and also to assure those living in South Africa that the government takes their welfare seriously. </p>
<p>For his part Ramaphosa certainly made all the right noises. He reiterated South Africa’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigerias-president-buhari-visits-south-africa-amid-tensions-over-xenophobia/a-50690234">“deep regret”</a> over the violence and assured Nigerians living in the country of adequate protection.</p>
<p>Third, the visit could also help South Africa address tensions with other aggrieved African countries. These include Rwanda, Malawi and <a href="https://time.com/5671003/what-the-xenophobic-violence-gripping-south-africa-means-for-future-of-country/">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. All have threatened to cut ties with South Africa over the attacks.</p>
<h2>Bilateral ties</h2>
<p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are often cast as rivals, they have a strong bilateral relationship founded over the decades. This springs in part from Nigeria’s historical role in its support for the liberation struggle against apartheid. Nigeria provided support, as well as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/south-africa-should-be-eternally-grateful-to-nigeria-7955145">financial backing</a> for the African National Congress (ANC) during its campaign against the apartheid regime. </p>
<p>For instance, after the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> in 1960, Nigeria led calls for sanctions against the apartheid regime. Under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity, now the African Union, it championed the imposition of a trade embargo on the regime.</p>
<p>But relations haven’t always been cordial. For example, after the end of apartheid rule in 1994, South Africa put pressure on the international community to support the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/1995-11-17-the-crisis-in-nigeria">protests against military rule </a> in Nigeria especially after the execution of Ogoni activists. This enraged the ruling military government. </p>
<p>Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999. This laid the ground for a renewal of cordial relations which resulted in several bilateral arrangements. For example, in October 1999, a South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664032">established</a>. Several bilateral agreements on trade and investment followed.</p>
<p>The first major international partnership was in 2000, when president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa both attended the <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/nigeria/meet0007.html">G8 meeting</a> of the world’s richest states to argue for debt forgiveness for African countries. Both leaders also played a significant role in the creation of the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/6453">New Partnership for African Development</a> (Nepad).</p>
<h2>What still needs to be done</h2>
<p>Buhari’s visit has already been judged successful by <a href="http://www.lagazzettadelsudafrica.net/index.php/current-news/6920-joint-communique-on-the-occasion-of-the-state-visit-to-south-africa-by-president-muhammadu-buhari-of-nigeria-and-the-inaugural-session-of-the-elevated-bnc-between-south-africa-and-nigeria">government</a> officials and media outlets in Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there are practical issues that must be addressed by both countries. </p>
<p>For the South African leader, there is need to act on attenuating the rhetoric that foreigners are responsible for the social ills in the country. For instance, the Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, has been accused of making “reckless” remarks against migrants which <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-01-mashaba-da-using-xenophobia-like-trump-says-rights-group/">“may incite more xenophobic violence”</a>.</p>
<p>For his part, Buhari needs to provide assurances of protection to South African businesses in Nigeria. He needs to reassure them that Nigeria will continue to protect them and their investments. </p>
<p>Both leaders also need to work together to reduce poverty, corruption and unemployment in their countries. These are some of the key issues stoking attacks and counter-attacks in both countries.</p>
<p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are the two largest economies on the continent, both face huge problems. When it comes to the <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update">human development index</a> Nigeria ranked 157 last year and South Africa 113 out of 189 . On corruption, <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018?gclid=CjwKCAjwxOvsBRAjEiwAuY7L8gTSkbKPUBpQ21QOG7WewFcH1QrSgr4kMJjtcBcn5saQvKpOyu65NBoC1pQQAvD_BwE">South-Africa was ranked 73 and Nigeria 144</a> out of 180 countries surveyed last year. </p>
<p>The ability of both to work together to address the issues holding back their development would go along way in determining their future together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Nigeria and South Africa are often cast as rivals they have a strong bilateral relationshipOlayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1067892018-11-25T09:19:51Z2018-11-25T09:19:51ZNigeria’s 2019 election: a two-horse race with uninspiring candidates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246677/original/file-20181121-161627-kfal47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=515%2C0%2C1575%2C1068&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Atiku Abubakar and incumbent Muhammadu Buhari (right) are the two frontrunners in Nigeria's presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Almost all of Nigeria’s 68 political parties have wrapped up their primaries and chosen candidates to stand in the country’s February 2019 general election. The poll is likely to be yet another two-horse race: a contest between the All Progressives Congress (APC) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). These are the only two parties to win the presidency since the end of military rule in 1999. The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina spoke to Olayinka Ajala about the emerging campaign issues and the surprises so far.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who are the main candidates for the February election?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/10/the-31-presidential-candidates-for-2019/">Thirty one aspirants</a> have emerged to contest the presidential election. That number will probably be reduced before the elections, as several smaller parties are in talks to form coalitions. </p>
<p>But there are only two leading contenders – the incumbent, President Muhammadu Buhari, and Atiku Abubakar, who was vice-president under President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007.</p>
<p>Both are contesting on the platforms of the two largest parties in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Apart from the two main contenders, other popular names on the list are former governors <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/10/the-31-presidential-candidates-for-2019/">Donald Duke and Olusegun Mimiko</a>, alongside <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-ezekwesili-minister-turned-activist-who-wants-to-be-president-104975">Obi Ezekwesili</a>. She’s the former minister of education and co-founder of Transparency International.</p>
<p><strong>What are the emerging campaign issues?</strong></p>
<p>The campaign issues are similar to those that featured in the 2015 presidential elections. These included political violence, particularly an end to the Boko Haram insurgency and the recent conflict between herdsmen and farmers which has claimed thousands of lives.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">Why clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel</a>
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<p>Corruption will also loom large. Buhari claims to have curtailed corruption, particularly since the introduction of the single treasury account that has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323584046_The_Impact_of_Treasury_Single_Account_on_the_Liquidity_of_Banks_in_Nigeria">reduced “leakages” in the country’s finances</a>. But the state of the economy and the increase in youth unemployment has negatively affected the current government’s image. The Atiku campaign has capitalised on this. </p>
<p>Other issues that have emerged include a lack of infrastructure, lopsided political appointments - as the president is often accused of neglecting federal character when making political appointments as well as the president’s health. These are likely to dominate the campaign when it <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/05/03/2019-no-political-campaign-december-2018-inec-warns/">officially kicks off in December</a>. </p>
<p>Buhari’s health is likely to feature extensively given that he spent about 15% of his first term in office receiving <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/buharis-health-reemerging-factor-2019-nigerian-elections">medical treatment abroad</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Have there been any surprises ahead of the 2019 ballot?</strong></p>
<p>The first major surprise was the emergence of Atiku as the People’s Democratic Party candidate. Atiku, one of the founding members of the PDP, emerged as the flag bearer for the party despite being relatively quiet politically in the last few years following his movement from PDP to APC and then back to PDP.</p>
<p>The second surprise was former president Olusegun Obasanjo’s endorsement of Atiku. Earlier in the year Obasanjo wrote an <a href="https://punchng.com/full-letter-obasanjo-writes-buhari-asks-president-to-halt-2019-ambition/">open letter to Buhari</a> advising the president not to seek a second term. He argued that Buhari had under-performed and was incapable of understanding the problems the country faces. Subsequently, Obasanjo formed a movement to unseat the incumbent president. </p>
<p>Obasanjo’s endorsement of Atiku came as a shock to most Nigerians because of his frosty relationship with the former vice-president. Obasanjo <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/278869-exclusive-god-will-never-forgive-me-if-i-support-atiku-for-president-obasanjo.html">famously stated in August 2018</a> </p>
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<p>If I support Atiku for anything, God will not forgive me. If I do not know, yes. But once I know, Atiku can never enjoy my support. </p>
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<p>The sudden turn around by the former president just two months later to <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/289774-breaking-2019-obasanjo-forgives-atiku-endorses-him-for-president.html">“forgive and endorse”</a> Atiku came as a surprise to most Nigerians.</p>
<p><strong>What do the primaries tell us about women’s participation?</strong></p>
<p>Despite the large number of aspirants for the 2019 elections, women and young people remain underrepresented. Although <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/2019-why-we-want-buharis-job-by-6-female-aspirants/">six women emerged before the presidential primaries</a>, the number dropped to three immediately after the primaries. Also, several young people were unable to contest in the primaries because of the cost of nomination forms. </p>
<p>Elections are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45450399">costly affairs</a> in Nigeria. The ruling party charges candidates $125,000 (£97,000) to be able to stand for nominations. The People’s Democratic Party also charged $33,000 (£26,000) for its nomination forms. This is in a country where the minimum wage is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/11/minimum-wage-increasewill-make-no-difference-if-ali-baba/">less than USD$100 a month</a>. </p>
<p>The government’s insincerity in supporting women and young people was laid bare in June 2018 when the president passed a bill titled <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/06/04/not-too-young-run-or-too-old-rule-erasmus-ikhide">“Not too young to Rule”</a>. The bill was designed to support the political aspiration of young people interested in pursuing a political career. Minutes after signing the legislation, the president commended the national assembly for passing the bill – but warned that young people would still <a href="http://sunnewsonline.com/2019-presidency-we-wont-wait-for-you-youths-tell-buhari/">have to wait till 2023</a> before they would actually be given the opportunity.</p>
<p>With just a few months to the polls, most Nigerians remain frustrated and concerned because neither of the two leading presidential aspirants offer any real hope. </p>
<p>The president has been accused of being too slow and too ill to handle the rigours of the position. The multiple <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/289930-2019-atiku-must-face-corruption-integrity-test-apc.html">allegations of corruption and fraud</a> levelled against Atiku, meanwhile, continue to taint his image and hopes of gaining power from the Buhari administration. </p>
<p>Unless a credible consensus candidate emerges, the 2019 presidential elections remains a two-horse race with none of the contenders really appealing to the populace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite the large number of aspirants for Nigeria’s 2019 elections, women and young people remain underrepresented.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/996912018-07-11T12:23:10Z2018-07-11T12:23:10ZYoung Nigerians have made their mark, but odds are still with the old in 2019<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227126/original/file-20180711-27033-b0q5oh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Despite a new law allowing younger candidates to run, Nigeria isn't ready for this transition.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The presidency of Muhammadu Buhari continues to <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/fg-delivering-election-promises-lai-mohammed/">lay claim</a> to achievements in the fight against corruption in Nigeria as well as the war against Boko Haram. But its record leaves a lot to be desired.</p>
<p>The state has been unable to tackle the problem of poverty. The US-based research house, the Brookings Institution, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/">recently reported</a> that Nigeria has overtaken India as the country with the largest number of extreme poor in early 2018. For its part, Transparency International has <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/02/21/transparency-international-ranks-nigeria-148th-worlds-least-corrupt-country">reported</a> that Nigeria is sliding backwards when it comes to corruption. </p>
<p>Added to this is the fact that nearly 7.5 million people have lost jobs and the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/7-5m-nigerians-jobless-since-2016-nbs/">unemployment rate is increasing</a>. Young people are alienated while <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/05/16/about-120-people-kidnapped-along-road-in-nigeria-s-kaduna-state//">kidnapping-for-ransom is on the rise</a>. </p>
<p>It’s against this background that Buhari announced that he will be contesting next year’s elections. There were mixed reactions to the news. Some hold the view he is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/obasanjo-rejects-buharis-2019-bid/">too old to grasp how to deal decisively</a> with the challenges of a modern state. His supporters believe there is <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/no-alternative-buhari-2019-forum-tells-northern-elders/">no better alternative</a> to Buhari, who will be 76 years by the time he contests a second term in office in 2019. </p>
<p>Nigeria has a population of 180 million, <a href="http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/index.php">60%</a> of whom are between the age of 18 and 35. Yet the state has been unable to translate the energy of its young population into development. </p>
<p>Young Nigerians don’t only suffer marginalisation from a government that is run by a gerontocracy. They are also the victims of bad governance. </p>
<p>This is what lies behind the recent call for younger people to be able to run for office. Yet, despite a new law <a href="http://punchng.com/breaking-buhari-signs-not-too-young-to-run-bill-into-law/">being promulgated</a>, it’s obvious that the gerontocracy in power isn’t ready for a transition. Buhari is playing political games – and for time. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>In most Nigerian cultures, starting in the family, roles are assigned based on age. In the political arena, the country has been through periods of being run by young men. </p>
<p>In pre-colonial Nigeria, young people acted as the vanguard by providing security of their societies and serving to check or remove tyrannical rulers. </p>
<p>The post-colonial environment gave rise to young people in military uniform taking over government through a series of coup. These <a href="http://www.tribuneonlineng.com/113367/">post-colonial coup beneficiaries </a>were mostly under 40. They included Aguiyi Ironsi (42), Yakubu Gowon (31) , Murtala Muhammed (37) and Olusegun Obasanjo (38). </p>
<p>Student activists such as the late Segun Okeowo led the National Union of Nigerian Students to fight for welfare of students and protest against draconian policies during the famous <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/ali-must-go-and-the-nigerian-left/">“Ali must go protest”</a> staged nationwide against “bad” education policy. This was the peak of active youth involvement in ensuring good governance. The current leadership of the students’ movement have lost the ideology of the early years and have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27756290?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">been co-opted by the ruling class</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>The signing into law of the <a href="http://punchng.com/breaking-buhari-signs-not-too-young-to-run-bill-into-law/">not-too-young to run bill</a> has been widely applauded as a step aimed at democratising the political space. But the facts contradict this. </p>
<p>The law reduces the age for contesting for president from 40 to 35; governor from 35 to 30; senator from 35 to 30; House of Representatives membership from 30 to 25 and State House of Assembly membership from 30 to 25. </p>
<p>But Buhari has asked Nigeria’s young people <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/05/2019-drop-presidential-ambition-now-buhari-begs-youths/">to wait</a> until 2023 before contesting any elections. This is clearly a cynical political strategy designed to capture the vote of young people but leaving the status quo intact.</p>
<h2>Young candidates</h2>
<p>The National Youth Policy of Nigeria and the African Youth Charter <a href="https://www.africa-youth.org/resources/#1459861241522-7a839c69-3f45">pegs the age </a> of youth between 18-35 years of age.</p>
<p>But there’s no consensus on this in practice. Most political parties are much more interested in experienced, versatile and loyal mobilisers. They are less interested in age than they are in candidates who have passion, energy and show enough enthusiasm and have political capital. </p>
<p>In pre-2015 presidential campaign, Nigerians were asked <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/dame-jonathan-in-onitsha-describes-apc-as-expired-drug/">to choose between </a> Goodluck Jonathan, who was 58 at the time, and Buhari, who was 73. Adverts were placed in newspapers warning against voting for an older person, pointing to the challenges of ill-health and inability to understand and cope with demands of modern governance.</p>
<p>As 2019 elections draw near, <a href="https://newtelegraphonline.com/2018/01/2019-young-inexperienced-presidential-aspirants/">about 18 young people</a> have indicated interest in the presidency. Ranging between the ages of 33 and 46, they come both from the diaspora as well as from within the country. Two of them, Fela Durotoye and Omoyele Sowore, have <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2018/04/08/of-sowore-durotoye-fasua-rupturing-the-fetish-of-political-experience/">moved around the country</a> to test the ground. They have expressed distrust in the Buhari leadership and promised to edge him out of power in 2019. </p>
<p>Buhari’s Minister of Communication, Adebayo Shittu, has described them as <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/04/08/%E2%80%98you-are-inconsequential%E2%80%A6go-contest-councillor%E2%80%99-nigerian-minister-tells-sowore">inconsequential</a>. That may be true given that the candidates have yet to connect with the real voters. And being young may not be an asset to leadership unless aspiring young leaders have the capacity and capability to govern.</p>
<p>The young aspirant politicians lack structures and the money, both of which remain strong factors in deciding politics in Nigeria. For example, the Young Democratic Party lacks the structure to change the political equation. </p>
<p>On top of this, those contesting positions in popular parties are former governors, former vice president, who are billionaires and have the structures to back them up. </p>
<p>A new paradigm is being championed by <a href="http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw52799.html">former President Olusegun Obasanjo</a>, now 81 years old, who ran the country between 1999 and 2007. He supported Buhari in 2015 but is <a href="https://guardian.ng/politics/obasanjos-coalition-adopts-adc-to-unseat-buhari-in-2019/">spearheading a movement</a> that hopes to support a qualified younger presidential aspirant to unseat Buhari. This <a href="http://thenationonlineng.net/2019-pdp-38-other-parties-form-coalition-against-buhari/">coalition</a> of 38 political parties including Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and marginalised members of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) have signed Memorandum of Understanding. But even if this works, gerontocrats would still be playing backroom politics and assuming the role of godfathers to the ‘young’ leaders. </p>
<p>The implication of is that the odds favour the old in 2019 elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oludayo Tade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young aspirant politicians lack support structure and the money, both of which remain strong factors in deciding politics in Nigeria.Oludayo Tade, Lecturer of Criminology, Victimology, Deviance and Social Problems, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/868672017-11-09T12:39:27Z2017-11-09T12:39:27ZVigilantism is flourishing in Nigeria – with official support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193574/original/file-20171107-1041-quur74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, a vigilante group battling Boko Haram in north east Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Concerns about safety and security are substantial in Nigeria. Here, <a href="http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries%5bsearch%5d=crime">crime is high</a> and the police are <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/corruption-nigerian-police-scrutiny/">considered corrupt</a> and inefficient. The structure of law enforcement does not help. Police are run at the federal level despite <a href="https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2017/07/22/revisiting-state-police-debate/">long-standing calls</a> for state forces. Given that Nigeria has many diverse languages, cultural practices and terrain, the centralised police face many difficulties.</p>
<p>These conditions are conducive for vigilantes – civilians who undertake their own crime control. Although vigilantes can be effective in providing safety and security, their use poses several problems. They sometimes take the law into their own hands and dispense justice as they see fit. Yet in Nigeria they often have authorities’ approval.</p>
<p>The Borno vigilantes fighting against Boko Haram, whose activities have attracted <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/nigerian-vigilantes-aim-rout-boko-haram-2014526123758444854.html">widespread media coverage</a>, illustrate this well. Referred to as the Civilian Joint Task Force, they began in 2013 as a group of local hunters intending to protect their communities, but quickly became <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/251-double-edged-sword-vigilantes-african-counter-insurgencies">integrated into the government’s official counter-insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>With greater knowledge of the local community and terrain than officials, the Civilian Joint Task Force has been <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram">successful</a> in identifying Boko Haram members and limiting their attacks. Nevertheless, they have been <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/news/2013/12/12/civilian-vigilante-groups-increase-dangers-northeastern-nigeria">implicated in abuses</a>, including extrajudicial killings. There are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram">fears</a> that they could evolve into an ethnic militia or be used for political means.</p>
<p>The Civilian Joint Task Force is not the only example. The use of vigilante groups to protect lives and property, with official support, has become part of the fabric of Nigerian society.</p>
<h2>Profiles of the main groups</h2>
<p>Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. Traditional hunter guards have <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00629061/document">pre-colonial origins</a>, and were authorised by the British regime during World War Two. The politicisation of hunter guards after independence led to prohibition. However, vigilantism continued, with groups proliferating in the 1990s:</p>
<p><strong>The Bakassi Boys</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4486721?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Originally a group of shoe producers</a> patrolling the Ariaria market in Aba 1998, the Bakassi Boys quickly spread across the city. They were successful in preventing crime. The state government renamed them the Abia State Vigilante Service in 2000, providing them with funds and equipment.</p>
<p>That same year, the Anambra State governor <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0258900022000005188?journalCode=cjca20">invited the Bakassi Boys</a> to deal with heightened crime at the Ontisha market. Subsequently, the State House of Assembly passed a law to legitimise the group as the Anambra Vigilante Services. A nearby state, Imo, followed suit. </p>
<p>In all three areas, the vigilantes were controlled by an official committee. However, this did not quell <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria2/nigeria0502-03.htm">executions and other abuses, including political killings</a>. Efforts by the federal government to ban these groups <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/44545/262362_de.html">failed</a>, and the Bakassi Boys continue to operate.</p>
<p><strong>Oodua People’s Congress</strong> </p>
<p>The Oodua People’s Congress, based in Southwest Nigeria, was founded by Yoruba intellectuals to promote Yoruba historical and cultural research after the <a href="http://adst.org/2015/12/the-stolen-victory-and-mysterious-death-of-moshood-abiola/#.We8ZE8baS00">Moshood Abiola debacle</a>. Abiola, a Yoruba, won the 1993 presidential election which was annulled by the military government. He was jailed and later died in prison. In 1996 the group’s mandate was expanded to include vigilante activities. </p>
<p>As members opposed military rule, they became <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240697124_Ethnic_Vigilantes_and_the_State_The_Oodua_People%27s_Congress_in_South-Western_Nigeria">involved in political vigilantism</a> during the 1999 election. When former army general Olusegun Obasanjo won, he banned the group.</p>
<p>This ban failed to stop the Oodua People’s Congress from operating and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/02/28/oodua-peoples-congress-opc/fighting-violence-violence">committing violent acts</a>. They became increasingly politicised. By supporting President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 elections they <a href="http://www.informationng.com/2015/06/lagos-apc-hails-fg-for-stopping-pipelines-surveillance-contract-with-opc.html">were awarded a contract</a> to guard the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation pipelines. This contract was withdrawn after Muhammadu Buhari was elected instead. </p>
<p>Although the Oodua People’s Congress’ relationship with the federal government is unstable, it tends to have state support. They recently <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/07/inside-badoo-cult-by-gani-adams-opc-leader/">collaborated with the Lagos police</a> to combat the murderous Badoo cult.</p>
<p><strong>The Hisbah</strong> </p>
<p>Many states in northern Nigeria have implemented Sharia law. In 2000, the Hisbah vigilante group was set up in Zamfara and Kano states in northern Nigeria amongst claims that the federal police failed to effect Sharia. When <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40027367">complaints of extrajudicial killings escalated</a>, the state governments set up monitoring committees. </p>
<p>By 2003, laws to regulate the Hisbah were passed. They became a highly structured organisation, operating in uniforms and marked vehicles, and even broadcasting a weekly radio programme. Again, official regulation did not prevent <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/8.htm">abuses</a>. While the Hisbah enjoy state support, they have clashed with the federal police. This peaked with a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4700314.stm">federal ban in 2006</a>, but the group <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/16311947">continued to operate and spread</a> to other northern states.</p>
<p><strong>Groups in the Niger Delta</strong> </p>
<p>The Niger Delta is rich in oil, yet local communities are excluded from the benefits of this resource. This has been the driving force behind the emergence of various ethnic vigilante groups there. </p>
<p>For example, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/940936/download">Egbesu Boys</a> formed in the early 1990s as a response to oil exploitation on Ijaw land. A clash between the Okrika and Eleme communities over land ownership where the Port Harcourt refinery is situated <a href="http://www.africanleadershipcentre.org/attachments/article/390/Vigilante%20Arming%20Final%20PDF%20Copy.pdf">produced the Okrika Bush Boys</a>. Both groups have allegedly gained support from politicians.</p>
<p>Port Harcourt has also seen <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/3.htm">violent clashes</a> between the Ijaw groups Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and Niger Delta Vigilante, with the state government <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580">supporting the latter</a>. This official alliance <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/3.htm">precipitated the 2004 Nigerian oil crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Federal attempts to <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200205140308.html">ban</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-amnesty-efforts-in-the-niger-delta-triggered-new-violence-74085">disarm</a> various Niger Delta groups have been unsuccessful.</p>
<p><strong>Vigilante Group of Nigeria</strong> </p>
<p>The countrywide Vigilante Group of Nigeria originated in Benue and <a href="http://www.vgnbenuecommand.com/pages/about_us.html">registered as an NGO in 1999</a>. The group is highly structured and collaborates with the police and military. Like the Civilian Joint Task Force, it has also played a role in <a href="http://www.sensornewsonline.com.ng/nass-concludes-vgn-public-hearing-igp-coas-back-recognition-vigilante-group/">combating Boko Haram</a>. </p>
<p>With an understanding of the local communities in which they work, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria has been very successful. Recently, the House of Representatives passed <a href="http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/8449">a bill authorising the group</a>. However, its members have not been exempt from <a href="http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/94f665de-d201-4dcd-9e9a-fa7504ef9250/pdf">committing abuses</a>.</p>
<p>This is not an exhaustive list. Vigilantes cooperate with the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2016.1200314">police and military</a> amidst farmer-pastoralist conflicts in Plateau state. In Kano, aside from the Hisbah, operates <a href="http://books.openedition.org/ifra/739?lang=en">several vigilante groups</a> registered with and funded by the state. In October, the Nasarawa Commissioner of Police <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/police-partner-hunters-vigilante-patrol-difficult-terrain-nasarawa-state/">announced a partnership</a> with local hunters and vigilantes. </p>
<h2>Regulation and bans</h2>
<p>Although official regulation has not completely eradicated abuses, it appears more fruitful than bans. Moreover, the effectiveness of vigilantism in combating crime <a href="http://gjournals.org/GJSC/Publication/2016/October/HTML/101416161%20Chikwendu%20et%20al.htm">cannot be contested</a>. With enhanced training and accountability mechanisms these groups could provide an important component of community policing. </p>
<p>Indeed, nongovernmental organisations <a href="http://www.cleen.org/informalpolicing.html">CLEEN</a> and <a href="https://www.britishcouncil.org.ng/justice-for-all-nigeria/about/safety-security/voluntary-policing-sector">J4A</a> have successfully trained vigilantes and improved their relations with police. Conversely, it has been argued that improvement of official law enforcement <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/06/01/recognition-for-the-vigilante-groups/">should be prioritised</a>, which would remove the need for vigilantism. </p>
<p>But for now, these groups are here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Inefficient policing in Nigeria has forced many communities to rely on vigilante groups for security. Despite using force and violence, many groups even have support from authorities.Leighann Spencer, PhD Candidate in Criminology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.