tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/spanish-politics-10777/articlesSpanish politics – The Conversation2023-11-16T10:35:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177052023-11-16T10:35:24Z2023-11-16T10:35:24ZThe Spanish amnesty law for Catalonia separatists, explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/559296/original/file-20231113-29-zf2m1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C0%2C5160%2C3445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A night of pro-independence protests in Barcelona.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/night-independence-protests-barcelona-catalonia-1533938189">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Spain has undergone a period of great political uncertainty and upheaval since since <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-happening-in-spain-after-the-general-election-and-what-it-means-for-the-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu-210476">general elections</a> delivered an inconclusive result in July. </p>
<p>In order to hold on to power and gain support from regional parties, incumbent Socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez has made deals with various political forces. One of these is the controversial law that grants amnesty for those who faced criminal charges for their role in the Catalan independence <em>procés</em>, specifically with regard to two events: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Catalan_self-determination_referendum">the non-binding consultative referendum held on 9 November 2014</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Catalan_independence_referendum">referendum held on 1 October 2017</a>.</p>
<p>There has been fierce debate in Spain regarding the constitutionality of the amnesty law. Among its beneficiaries is Junts Per Catalunya, the party of hard line separatist politician Carles Puigdemont, who will be able to return from exile as a result of the pardon. It has met with strong opposition from a very large segment of the general public, as well as the rightwing People’s Party and the far-right party Vox. </p>
<p>The law – entitled <a href="https://www.rtve.es/contenidos/documentos/leydeamnistia.pdf">organic amnesty law for institutional, political and social normalisation in Catalonia</a> – is being processed through urgent legislative channels, minimising the ability of parliamentarians to scrutinise it.</p>
<p>Its authors are evidently aware of the intense and sustained opposition to the measure, as they have taken special care to justify its adoption in an extensive <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-amnesty-bill-catalan-separatists-carles-puigdemont/">explanatory memorandum</a>. In this, they explain the law’s precedents, purpose, content and, above all, its constitutionality. </p>
<h2>Public interest or garnering support</h2>
<p>The acts covered by the bill are the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The organisation and execution of the 2014 and 2017 referendums.</p></li>
<li><p>Other possible offences connected with the referendums (including those committed before or afterwards). The Explanatory Memorandum mentions preparation for these events as an example.</p></li>
<li><p>Various protest actions in favour of allowing these events to take place, or that opposed the prosecution or conviction of those responsible. </p></li>
<li><p>Attendance, assistance, advising or representation of any kind.</p></li>
<li><p>Providing protection and security for those responsible.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The law grants amnesty for the following crimes, regardless of how or by whom they were committed: usurpation of public functions; embezzlement; acts of disobedience; public disorder; attacks against the authorities, their agents and public officials; misconduct committed with the intention of claiming, promoting or procuring the secession or independence of Catalonia.</p>
<p>The amnesty also applies to actions taken by police officers in attempts to prevent crimes, and for administrative offences linked to either of the referendums or the <em>procés</em> in general. A number of exclusively criminal cases related to very serious crimes are excluded from the amnesty law.</p>
<p>The justification for this exceptional measure – and its fast-tracked passing – is public interest. The law aims to guarantee coexistence between Catalonia and Spain within the rule of law, with a view to stabilising the social, political and institutional situation and guaranteeing a peaceful path forward for both parties. According to this argument, it provides a base from which to overcome a decade of political conflict. However, its detractors state that it is only motivated by the need to obtain investiture votes from pro-independence parliamentary groups. </p>
<p>The explanatory memorandum points out that Spain’s Constitutional Court has previously declared other amnesty rulings to be constitutional. It states that the Constitution does not prohibit amnesty, and that the ruling violates neither the principle of jurisdictional exclusivity nor that of equality among the parties involved. It also says that amnesty exists within various Spanish legal norms to provide grounds for terminating liability. Its critics, however, argue that the bill violates the principles of separation of powers and equality.</p>
<h2>The charges being dropped</h2>
<p>The law stipulates a number of key actions to be taken in criminal and administrative fields.</p>
<p>Amnesty subjects who are currently in prison will be immediately released. In addition, their criminal records will be expunged and arrest warrants – be they national, European or international – will be lifted. Furthermore, when the law enters into force all precautionary measures taken with respect to amnestied acts will be lifted, and the relevant criminal sentences will no longer be enforced.</p>
<p>In terms of administrative issues, the relevant bodies will agree on the definitive closure of any procedure initiated, and precautionary measures will be lifted. In the case of public employees who have been sanctioned or convicted – for example headteachers who allowed their schools to be used as referendum polling stations – their rights and jobs will be reinstated.</p>
<p>The amnesty will also mean that outstanding civil and fiscal liabilities are dropped, with the exception of sentences or penalties that have already been served. It is important to note that the amnesty does not include civil liability for damages suffered by individuals.</p>
<p>Lastly, the amnesty will not entitle anyone to compensation of any kind, nor will it generate any other economic rights. It will also not entitle its subjects to reimbursement of fines that have already been paid.</p>
<h2>A law destined for the constitutional court</h2>
<p>Once the law enters into force, the rulings are expected to be adopted within a maximum of two months, though this is not binding and does not preclude the possibility of further appeals. A limitation period of five years is established for any action related to the recognition of statutory rights.</p>
<p>Debate on the law in Spanish parliament is expected to be tumultuous, with continued street protests anticipated during the proceedings. It is expected to get the majority vote of 176 votes needed to pass in Congress, but it will then undoubtedly be subject to constitutional review. This will come by way of an appeal in the Constitutional Court and questions from judges, and will very possibly lead to a divided verdict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>María Luz Martínez Alarcón no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Pedro Sánchez is offering Catalan separatist Carles Puigdemont amnesty for his role in illegal independence referendums in 2014 and 2017.María Luz Martínez Alarcón, Profesora Titular de Universidad (Derecho Constitucional), Universidad de Castilla-La ManchaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067742023-05-31T15:57:21Z2023-05-31T15:57:21ZSpanish elections: why devastating local losses to the right have forced socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez to call an early national vote<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529322/original/file-20230531-27-7ab1pj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1991%2C1329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pedro Sánchez announcing that next general elections in Spain will be held the 23rd of July, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/multimedia/galeriasfotograficas/presidente/Paginas/2023/290523-sanchez-elecciones.aspx">La Moncloa</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The local and regional elections that took place the 28th May have shaken up the political chessboard in Spain. The right-wing Partido Popular <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/29/spains-conservative-opposition-trounces-socialists-in-key-local-and-regional-elections">took</a> the largest proportion of votes and now has the largest number of seats in local and regional governments. </p>
<p>The socialist PSOE only managed to hold onto two regional governments and will have to make a pact in Navarre with the left-wing Basque nationalist party EH Bildu to stay in power. This debacle marks the beginning of a new epoch. Only three cities out of the 20 most populated now have a socialist mayor’s office. In one fell swoop the socialist party has lost around 70% of the local and regional power it had. </p>
<p>In the face of his party’s horrendous regional losses, President Pedro Sánchez has brought forward the general elections that were to take place in November or December to the 23rd July. The move stems from a <a href="https://theconversation.com/claudica-pedro-sanchez-al-convocar-elecciones-anticipadas-no-tan-rapido-206637">mixture</a> of boldness and a sense that a national vote is his only chance to hold onto power. </p>
<p>Sánchez’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/elecciones-adelantadas-en-espana-que-busca-pedro-sanchez-con-este-movimiento-206636">aim</a> is to regain the initiative by forcing a plebiscite on his mandate and prove he maintains the public’s trust.</p>
<h2>National identity</h2>
<p>Ideas about identity and nationalism came to play an important part in what were supposed to be elections about local matters. During the last week of the campaign in particular, national issues dominated the discourse. An association of victims of terrorism (Covite) spoke out about the fact that 44 candidates standing for EH Bildu had belonged to the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/19/spanish-elections-re-open-deep-wounds-as-eta-terrorists-run-for-political-office">terrorist group ETA</a>, and that seven of them had been convicted of violent crimes. The campaigns of the parties on the right subsequently turned into a denunciation of the pacts that the central government had made with EH Bildu, alleging that the socialists were “associating with ETA”. </p>
<p>The Partido Popular has constructed a rhetoric of being the only party defending the constitution and the union of the country. Its constitutional interpretation is conservative, but the message works. Its voters are the most loyal of the Spanish electorate and its aspiration to occupy the centre right has been consolidated. </p>
<p>The party, presided over by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, has absorbed the main voters from Ciudadanos, the Catalan political start-up that was at first phenomenally successful when it came to national prominence in 2015 but has already almost disappeared. Their votes have been transferred to PP, as have around 10% of conservative socialists tired of Sánchez’s leadership and his agreements with Basque and Catalan nationalists. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, electoral successes for far-right party Vox make it the third largest party in municipal government. Its support will be essential to approve budgets and push through legislative initiatives. Its real impact on public policy is minor but it has symbolic strength. Vox’s stance on gender issues, the content of basic education and a certain nostalgia for how things used to be drive a national populist discourse in line with other European parties such as Law and Justice in Poland, Brothers of Italy, Greek Solution, Civic Democractic Party in the Czech Republic and the Finns Party. </p>
<p>On the left, the nationalist question is peripheral. In the Basque Country, support for EH Bildu has increased while the conservative PNV has lost traction. In Catalonia, left-wing nationalist party ERC fell from being the first to third political force, behind the socialists and right-wing nationalists Junts per Catalunya. In Galicia, the Popular and Socialist parties split the main cities.</p>
<h2>Political leadership</h2>
<p>Pedro Sánchez leads based on his personality and charisma, and presents himself as a democratic superhero, with a strong media and institutional presence. He fuses his status as president with that of a candidate in a permanent campaign. He has managed to boost his international image with good performances in Europe and occasional visits to Washington and Beijing. </p>
<p>There are doubts, however, that this external outlook will bring him votes.</p>
<p>And this must now take a backseat as he tries to regain popular support at home and control over his own party, where there is a growing number of dissenting voices and now a decrease of local power. </p>
<p>Yolanda Díaz, current vice-president, has formed a new party, Sumar, which has already registered as a candidate for the election. She seeks to unite all the forces to the left of the PSOE and thus win more votes and more representation. </p>
<p>But there is little time for Sumar to establish a strategy that can turn a social movement into a political entity with representation in the provinces. For the moment, her electoral bets for the municipal and regional elections have not had much success, and Podemos, the party that once governed in coaltion with PSOE, has sunk. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Alberto Núñez Feijoo, of the Spanish People’s Party, proposes a quiet style of leadership. In his campaign, he will rely on his management experience governing in Galicia. Focusing on the increased cost of living, unemployment and inflation will reinforce a clerical but practical discourse. </p>
<h2>Plebiscite</h2>
<p>For the national campaign, Sánchez is basing his mandate on the rhetoric of a leader against the world.</p>
<p>Sánchez triumphs when he stands up to his own – he resigned as the leader of the socialists in 2016 following public disagreements with the party’s executive and was again reelected one year later, in 2017 – but it is not clear that his strategy will win elections. He lost three MPs in the 2019 rerun election and now he has lost ground in many regions. In Catalonia, his acceptance is growing, but the seats it brings to the general elections are not enough.</p>
<p>In this situation, Sánchez’s only chance is to get as near to his current 120 parliamentary seats as he can. He can’t do it all by himself, and needs the support of rest of the left-wing parties. The electoral strategy is to stop the electorate’s swing to the right, to offer an institutional counterweight and to unify the vote in a single bloc.</p>
<p>His idea is right, but may not be enough. Sánchez’s governments have worked because he has been able to incorporate sensitivities in the divisions of identity (nationalism) and social policy (the left). None of these forces currently seem to be growing.</p>
<p>Sanchismo is showing signs of exhaustion. He might be able to maintain a reasonable number of seats, but – without his traditional supporters – his era might also be doomed.</p>
<p>Spanish politics is in transition. We cannot anticipate the outcome of the elections and it is not advisable to extrapolate the municipal results all at once. Experience also shows that the local vote does not correspond to the general elections, but varies significantly. </p>
<p>Whereas local elections weren’t supposed to be a plebiscite on national government, next 23rd of July seems to be the rerun of a general election whose first round took place last weekend.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juan Luis Manfredi no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Regional elections in Spain and the success of the right has made Pedro Sánchez bring forward general elections to the 23rd of July.Juan Luis Manfredi, Prince of Asturias Distinguished Professor @Georgetown, Universidad de Castilla-La ManchaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1941382022-12-15T13:04:21Z2022-12-15T13:04:21ZSpain’s new memory law dredges up a painful chapter of Spain’s often forgotten ties to Nazis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500828/original/file-20221213-22031-8iqefp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Plaques commemorating artists who were killed by the Nazis are marked with flowers in Austria in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1228082555/photo/austria-germany-wwii-salzburg-festival-jews.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=g-1Nlh7mzS7sqGVFsvNVnvzQneKWKGI7oQ-n6_zUHqg=">Barbara Gindl/APA/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Walking down a tree-lined street in the Poble Sec neighborhood of Barcelona, one might easily miss a small bronze square set into the sidewalk. Stamped into the metal in the regional language of Catalan are the words: “Here lived Francesc Boix Campo, born 1920, exiled 1939, deported 1941, Mauthausen, liberated.” </p>
<p>Holocaust memorials like this one – which honors a Spanish Nazi concentration camp survivor – are part of a project that started in Germany but has expanded over the past few years across Europe and the United States. </p>
<p>These unassuming memorials hide a mighty purpose – making the victims of a traumatic past a visible and permanent part of the modern landscape. </p>
<p>In October 2022, Spain’s current progressive government approved a new law – called the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/05/spain-passes-law-to-bring-dignity-to-franco-era-victims">Democratic Memory Law</a> – that recognizes Spaniards who suffered and died at the hands of the Nazis. </p>
<p>Among other measures, the law will create a census and a national DNA bank to help people identify the thousands of Spaniards who were killed during World War II. </p>
<p>I am <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=5ptshgYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">a scholar</a> of Spain’s role in World War II and the Holocaust. The way the country has faced this disturbing past has evolved considerably in recent decades. Spain has publicly avoided the history of Spaniards killed in Nazi camps, who were victims of Adolf Hitler, but also of Francisco Franco, Spain’s dictator from 1939 to 1975. </p>
<p>This new law marks a shift, recognizing that the Spanish government has a role to play in reviving the memory of all of the victims of Spain’s dark years.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three school aged blond girls sit and stand over cobblestones on a sidewalk and appear to place flowers there." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500830/original/file-20221213-18915-zrnofx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children place flowers at a Berlin memorial commemorating a Jewish family killed in World War II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1324757639/photo/locals-research-and-commemorate-a-jewish-family-murdered-in-the-holocaust.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=IbqLnLSWV-bwuA_yy5ZGDZk1xitY9gii1eaHo7z3kbI=">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From the Spanish Civil War to World War II</h2>
<p>Spain underwent a civil war from 1936 to 1939, setting the stage for World War II. A band of military leaders headed by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francisco-Franco">Gen. Franco</a> rose up against the democratically elected Spanish government in 1936. Three violent years later, these fascist-leaning insurgents had won the war, and Franco was installed as dictator. </p>
<p>Spain’s allegiance with the Nazis began with the Spanish Civil War. Hitler sent <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Condor-Legion">Condor Legion</a> planes to bomb the northern city of Guernica – memorialized in a <a href="https://www.museoreinasofia.es/en/collection/artwork/guernica">famous painting by Pablo Picasso</a> – in 1937. Hitler also helped arm the military uprising against the democratic government throughout the civil war. Just a few years later, during World War II, Franco would return the favor by sending <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/026569149502500103">raw materials</a> used to produce weapons of war to Hitler.</p>
<p>In the spring of 1939, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/09/franco-spain-refugees-haunted-by-the-past-retirada">half a million refugees</a> streamed over the border from Spain to France to escape the violence, including hundreds of thousands of veterans who had fought for Spain’s elected government in the civil war. </p>
<p>Forced into refugee camps with little access to food and clean water along the beaches in southern France, they were given a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190209-france-spanish-civil-war-republican-refugees-la-retirada-80th-anniversary">choice</a>: Return to Spain, where they would be met with Franco’s violent revenge, or fight the Nazis. </p>
<p>Thousands enlisted as soldiers or manual laborers for the French army. Others joined the <a href="https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2016/10/11/inenglish/1476196791_317656.html">French Resistance</a>. </p>
<p>When France fell to the Nazis in 1940, Franco disowned the Spanish refugees he considered traitors. Germany deported 10,000 to 15,000 Spaniards to Nazi concentration camps. The Nazis killed about <a href="http://pares.mcu.es/Deportados/servlets/ServletController">60% of these Spanish refugees</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three people stand near white candles on a table, in front of a banner that says 'dia de la memoria del Holocausto' behind them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500833/original/file-20221213-25978-oz0t5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Israeli ambassador to Spain, Rodica Radian-Gordo, center, lights candles at a Holocaust commemoration day in January 2022 in Madrid.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1367333987/photo/the-assembly-of-madrid-organizes-an-event-for-holocaust-remembrance-day.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=-uLHW19VbXzQ6PU8qVOJBpwGXWqaJhIggm_DgfCKlkw=">Eduardo Parra/Europa Press via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bringing WWII victims out of the shadows</h2>
<p>As many as 15,000 Spaniards were <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/spanish-civil-war">deported to Nazi concentration camps</a> during World War II. </p>
<p>But while politicians debate whether it is appropriate to remember Spain’s painful past or if the government is opening old wounds, groups of citizens have stepped in. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.stolpersteine.eu/en/home/">Stolpersteine Project</a>, a public art initiative started by German artist Gunter Demnig in 1992, memorializes Jews and other victims of the Nazis, like people persecuted for their political views, with a “stumbling stone” placed in the sidewalk outside the individual’s last known residence. </p>
<p>By recognizing non-Jewish political prisoners during World War II, Stolpersteine cements Spain’s partnership with the Nazis into the ground people walk on, demonstrating how a dark history can be brought into the light of day. The first memorials in Spain were placed in the small town of Navàs, about an hour north of Barcelona, in 2015. </p>
<p>The project has grown in the past seven years to commemorate more than 600 Spanish men and women in 96 cities and towns scattered across the country.</p>
<p>Sidestepping the political firestorm over Spain’s World War II history, Stolpersteine in Spain aims to bring victims out of the memory shadows. </p>
<p>The Stolpersteine project in Spain puts the names of people who suffered during each country’s violent past on public display. These plaques challenge people to consider who these victims were and what their own connection to this past might be. The Spaniards memorialized by Stolpersteine are not household names: They are men and women who fled Spain in 1939 and never returned.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photo shows two men in military clothing, with one doing a heil salute, next to a row of soldiers, some of whom hold a Nazi flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/500835/original/file-20221213-23347-cximvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A meeting between Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and Spanish Gen. Francisco Franco in Basque Country, France, in 1940.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1083751790/photo/spain.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=np-CIi9o33ttHtZmIQj1WSzOkdQqIRlNI7JZsGtP3YE=">adoc-photos/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Preserving the memory of a painful past</h2>
<p>Spain is now experiencing the rise of <a href="https://rosalux.nyc/vox-a-new-far-right-in-spain/">Vox</a>, a far-right political party. If Vox wins in the 2023 national elections, it will likely <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Xidias-2021.1-CARR-RI-Final.pdf?media=1628264068">roll back the Democratic Memory Law</a> – and the government’s initiative to reform historical education and map mass graves. </p>
<p>The Stolpersteine Project avoids the argument over who is responsible for remembering Spain’s past. Sticking to objective facts, every plaque contains the essential details of each individual political prisoner’s escape from Spain, journey through war-torn Europe and survival or death in a Nazi camp. The stone’s placement outside the prisoner’s last known home makes a connection with the street, city and region where they lived. </p>
<p>As Spaniards and tourists snap photos of the <a href="https://datos.madrid.es/portal/site/egob/menuitem.c05c1f754a33a9fbe4b2e4b284f1a5a0/?vgnextoid=d0802ea16a892710VgnVCM1000001d4a900aRCRD&vgnextchannel=374512b9ace9f310VgnVCM100000171f5a0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default">bronze squares they encounter</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/IStolpersteine">share them on social media</a>, they begin a conversation about who these individuals were, what motivated them to leave Spain, and how they ended up in a Nazi camp. </p>
<p>Francesc Boix, for example, one of the people recognized with a <a href="https://www.elnacional.cat/es/barcelona/francesc-boix-fotografo-mauthausen-stolpersteine-barcelona_762966_102.html">memorial stone</a>, was a a Spanish Civil War veteran and Nazi camp survivor. After fighting fascism in two wars, Boix was imprisoned in the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria for four years. While in the camp, Boix worked as an assistant in the photography lab, where he stole negatives from the Nazis and later used them in his <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/film/trial-testimony-against-albert-speer">testimony at the Nuremberg trials</a>. </p>
<p>Boix, who died in 1951, is one of the most <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6704776/">well-known</a> concentration camp survivors in Spain. His story illustrates the struggle against fascism, which he and his fellow Spanish Nazi camp prisoners fought on a daily basis.</p>
<p>Stolpersteine memorials in Spain are not only increasing the visibility of these largely unknown victims of Nazi violence. They are also connecting them to the residents and visitors who, decades later, walk along the same sidewalks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara J. Brenneis receives funding from UNH Center for the Humanities to support a public humanities study of the Stolpersteine in Spain. </span></em></p>Spain has long avoided addressing the fact that tens of thousands of Spaniards were victims of Nazis, who collaborated with Spain’s former dictator, Francisco Franco.Sara J. Brenneis, Professor of Spanish, Amherst CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257762019-11-05T12:34:21Z2019-11-05T12:34:21ZThe future of protest is high tech – just look at the Catalan independence movement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298338/original/file-20191023-119463-vn83is.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Quique Garcia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People across the world are demonstrating their discontent in increasingly creative and disruptive ways. </p>
<p>The past year has seen schoolchildren across the world join the <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-stand-with-the-climate-striking-students-its-time-to-create-a-new-economy-123893">Fridays for Future</a> strikes, witnessing mass walkouts from schools across the globe. In Chile, coordinated fare-dodging protests on public transport – also led by school pupils – has now grown into <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-protests-escalate-as-widespread-dissatisfaction-shakes-foundations-of-countrys-economic-success-story-125628">mass unrest</a> against the rising cost of living. During the past two weeks, <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanon-uprising-unites-people-across-faiths-defying-deep-sectarian-divides-125772">protests have erupted</a> across Lebanon in opposition to rising taxes, involving road blockades and a human chain across the country to illustrate the unity of the people. </p>
<p>Something notable about these protests, from Chile to Lebanon to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50194846">Catalonia</a>, is that protesters are mobilising around far more than single issues. Their primary demands – from economic issues to climate change – are set against a backdrop of questioning the status quo more broadly. And it’s not just demands that are expanding: the ways in which civil disobedience and direct action are carried out is also becoming increasingly novel.</p>
<p>A closer look at the continuing demonstrations in Catalonia illustrates the significance of this.</p>
<h2>Tsunami Democràtic</h2>
<p>In September, a new initiative was created in Catalonia: Tsunami Democràtic. Nobody fully seems to know where it came from or who was the organising force behind it. Those initially sharing its tweets came from different political families, including all three pro-independence parties, as well as some of those who had been imprisoned as a result of their involvement in the Catalan independence movement.</p>
<p>Following its initial announcement, little was heard from Tsunami Democràtic besides occasional tweets highlighting the effectiveness of peaceful civil resistance. This changed on October 11 – the day the Supreme Court sentence against the Catalan leaders was expected – when Tsunami Democràtic released a song: “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtBbeoIiePg"><em>La Força de la Gent</em></a>” (The Strength of the People). This echoed the spirit of the song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2pEx7PAb30"><em>Agafant l’Horitzó</em></a>” (Let’s take the Horizon), which was released prior to the independence <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-referendum-unmasks-authoritarianism-in-spain-84901">referendum</a> of October 1 2017. The group then started organising protests.</p>
<p>So far, Tsunami Democràtic has only called three of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/catalan-separatist-leaders-given-lengthy-prison-sentences">countless protests</a> we’ve witnessed since Monday October 14, when sentences were announced against the seven government ministers as well as the speaker of the House and two civil society leaders. </p>
<p>The first – and largest – protest was the occupation of Barcelona airport on the same day the sentences were announced. Some 155 flights were cancelled and the disruption caused to the airport was considerable, as the blocking of roads and of one of the terminals lasted well over six hours. On October 21 Tsunami Democràtic called another protest, with only a few hours’ notice, prompted by a surprise visit to Barcelona by Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sanchez. The protest had a simple demand – #SpainSitandTalk – following the weekend’s refusal by Sanchez to answer the Catalan president’s calls.</p>
<h2>High-tech protests</h2>
<p>The group’s great success in calling and enacting enormous protests at the drop of a hat has been enabled, to a large degree, by technology. It has used the messaging app <a href="https://telegram.org/">Telegram</a> with particular success, gathering over 385,000 subscribers. Telegram channels (which are designed to send information from a single source to subscribers) have become crucial sources of information and organising around the world.</p>
<p>Tsunami Democràtic has also developed a new app designed to coordinate protests in real time depending on people’s locations. This proved so popular that its systems collapsed during the first few hours, as so many people tried to download it.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/barcelonia-riots-catalonia-protests-news">The app</a>, which has not been put to use yet, is accessible using QR codes that are shareable among up to ten users. This means that if one of the codes (or nodes) is acting suspiciously, the whole chain can be removed. It is designed to organise users (called water drops) into actions to create a “tsunami”. This could include the occupation of transport hubs (such as train stations or aiports), but also the coordination of demonstrations against specific events. The idea is quite a novelty, and has already gathered interest among <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/17/catalan-separatists-have-tooled-up-with-a-decentralized-app-for-civil-disobedience/">tech communities</a>. </p>
<p>Tsunami Democràtic has already made waves. The Spanish Home Office has labelled it a terrorist organisation. Last week, the <em>Guardia Civil</em> (Spain’s paramilitary police force), closed down the Tsunami Democràtic website, and the home office minister announced that they are investigating who is behind it. So far, except for the musicians that appear in the song, and football manager <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHgyu_xX-RY">Pep Guardiola</a>’s video reading Tsunami’s manifesto, there are no other public faces.</p>
<h2>Changing seas</h2>
<p>We live in a time when <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-this-is-the-age-of-dissent-and-theres-much-more-to-come-52871">protests are growing</a> on a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/08/complexities-of-global-protests/iint">worldwide basis</a>, often in response to undemocratic actions of governments. </p>
<p>In this light, the actions of Tsunami Democràtic are notable: they demonstrate a tendency for a growing proportion of people to turn to creative forms of disruptive protest. These methods are typically open, fluid, without rigid structures. They represent novel attempts to articulate a voice when it appears that those in power are increasingly uninterested in listening.</p>
<p>The rise in mass civil disobedience movements such as Tsunami Democràtic is often talked about in relation to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">the idea</a>, put forward by the political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, that a campaign which attracts 3.5% or more of the population will bring about change. This is in no small part thanks to Extinction Rebellion’s popularisation of this claim. </p>
<p>Whether or not this is true, in the case of Catalonia, the proportion of the population engaging in protest is already much higher than 3.5%. Conservative local police <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50098268">estimates</a> indicate that there were more than 500,000 people participating in the marches for freedom during the last general strike: about 14% of the Catalonian population. </p>
<p>Enabled by technology, such movements are becoming more organised and creative than ever. While there is no guarantee that these novel forms of protest will be successful, the recent news that fracking will be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/02/fracking-banned-in-uk-as-government-makes-major-u-turn">banned in the UK</a> highlights the way that persistent, ongoing, coordinated and novel efforts to challenge those in power can result in surprisingly positive outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125776/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Clua Losada is a member of Omnium Cultural, and in the 2019 municipal election she was an independent member on the CUP-Alternativa per Llagostera electoral list for the town of Llagostera. She is also a member of the international advisory board to the Critical Political Economy Research Network of the European Sociological Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Bailey is on the Executive Board of the Conference of Socialist Economists, a committee member for the University of Birmingham branch of UCU, chair of the Critical Political Economy Research Network of the European Sociological Association, on the steering group of the British Universities Industrial Relations Association, and a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>A new group – Tsunami Democràtic – are using technology to create civil disobedience that is more organised and creative than ever.Monica Clua Losada, Associate Professor in Global Political Economy, University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyDavid J. Bailey, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257622019-10-24T14:54:56Z2019-10-24T14:54:56ZExhumation of Franco’s remains is a chance for Spain to rest in peace<p>After three days of national mourning, the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco was buried in a large crypt in the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/europe/general-franco-grave-valley-tourist-holiday-site-fallen-spain-fascist-dictator-spanish-civil-war-a7652841.html">Valley of the Fallen</a>, a state mausoleum outside Madrid, in 1975. The location of his remains became a place of pilgrimage and fascist glorification for the next 44 years.</p>
<p>But now those remains have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2019/oct/24/spain-exhumes-franco-remains-in-pictures">exhumed and moved</a> – to a public cemetery near Madrid. His new resting place, where Franco’s wife was buried in 1988, is a far cry from what the dictator himself <a href="https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1940/093/A02240-02240.pdf">described</a> as “a grandiose temple for our dead, in which, for centuries, people will pray for the souls of those fallen for God and their Fatherland”.</p>
<p>Built after the end of the Spanish Civil War by up to 20,000 political prisoners in the mountains of Guadarrama, the Valley of the Fallen took 18 years to complete, and sits dramatically under the shadow of a 152 metre Christian cross.</p>
<p>Inside the basilica rest the remains of the fallen during the civil war, from both sides. With 33,847 people buried there, transported from all over the country between 1959 and 1983, it is one of the biggest mass graves in the world, with more than 12,400 corpses still unidentified.</p>
<p>Franco called the burial site a place of “atonement and reconciliation”. But the truth is that it has never been a symbol of unity. Instead it became a monument of fascist propaganda. </p>
<p>From its opening in 1959, burying murdered republicans under the same roof as their enemies was a permanent act of political humiliation. Doing it under a religion which many of them explicitly fought against simply added insult to injury.</p>
<p>This is why the monument continues to be controversial in contemporary Spain. When the socialist government passed its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/nov/03/comment.spain">Historical Memory Law in 2007</a>, the future of the Valley was one of the items in the agenda. </p>
<p>That law explicitly condemned Franco’s regime, and promised to finally recognise the victims of the war. It also promised state aid to help identify and exhume those victims, the removal of Francoist symbols from public spaces, and the prohibition of celebratory fascist events in the valley. </p>
<p>Then in 2011, a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dig-up-franco-to-let-victims-rest-in-peace-says-spanish-commission-6269719.html">Commission for the Future of the Valley of the Fallen</a> was created, which recommended that the valley should become a place to commemorate the dead of the civil war. This would include setting up an educational centre to set the valley in its historical context – and crucially, <a href="https://theconversation.com/digging-up-franco-why-spain-still-cant-decide-what-to-do-with-the-dictators-body-100781">the removal of Franco’s remains</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/digging-up-franco-why-spain-still-cant-decide-what-to-do-with-the-dictators-body-100781">Digging up Franco: why Spain still can't decide what to do with the dictator's body</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.elindependiente.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/informe_expertos_valle_caidos.pdf">The report</a> they produced was published on November 29 2011, nine days after the conservative party PP had won the elections. This meant in practice that the application of the Historical Memory Law, including any recommendations for the Valley, would become frozen for almost a decade. </p>
<p>The PP party had always been reluctant to condemn Spain’s Francoist past. Its (lame) excuse for this view was that the country should look forward rather than backwards, and that dealing with such issues would merely serve to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14189534">reopen old wounds</a>.</p>
<p>It wasn’t until 2017 when the Socialist party filed a non-binding motion to exhume the body that won the support of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/11/its-shameful-for-francos-victims-spanish-mps-agree-to-exhume-dictator">large majority of Parliament</a> that progress was made.</p>
<h2>A fresh start</h2>
<p>After a motion of no-confidence that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/europe/spain-mariano-rajoy-no-confidence.html">ousted the conservative leader, Mariano Rajoy, in 2018</a>, socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez announced the government’s intention to resume work and exhume Franco’s body in an attempt to comply with the law and recommendations, and to “<a href="https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201909/395001-pedro-sanchez-exhumacion-franco.html">symbolically close the circle of Spanish democracy</a>”. </p>
<p>Despite fierce opposition from the Franco family and the Benedictine community in the valley, the Supreme Court finally <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49807372">gave permission to exhume the body</a> in September 2019.</p>
<p>With a general election fast approaching, the socialist government has been accused from both sides for using “Franco’s mummy” for political gain. The leader of anti-austerity party Podemos claimed <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Iglesias-Sanchez-electoralismo-Cataluna-helicoptero_0_955055390.html">it was a distraction</a> from Sánchez’s failed policies on Catalonia. </p>
<p>But in terms of popular support, the issue does not seem to bother most Spaniards, with <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/espanoles-muestran-exhumar-Franco-frente_0_952955653.html">42% approving the removal</a> of the dictator’s remains.</p>
<p>And so finally, after 44 years, Franco is finally denied his own state-run mausoleum at one of the largest basilicas in the world. And 44 long years for Spaniards to finally see the dictator denied the privilege of lying in a place built on the blood and suffering of republican prisoners.</p>
<p>Franco’s ghost has been haunting Spain for decades. It is now time for the country to rest in peace. Hopefully this powerful act will just be the beginning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125762/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Federico López-Terra received funding from the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). </span></em></p>Spanish dictator Francisco Franco no longer has a place in the Valley of the Fallen.Federico López-Terra, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1162582019-04-30T23:48:28Z2019-04-30T23:48:28ZSpanish voters rebuff radical right — for now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271811/original/file-20190430-136787-29ta3p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez with supporters on election day in Spain, April 28 2019. His Socialist Party beat several right-wing to maintain its majority in parliament.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Spain-Election/8fadfd4c5cce46d9af7df3865df4e6f6/3/0">AP Photo/Bernat Armangue</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thanks to massive voter turnout in Spain’s April 28 general election, especially on the left, far-right parties <a href="https://theconversation.com/spanish-general-election-the-winners-the-losers-and-vox-116155">did not win enough votes</a> to form a coalition government. The ruling Socialist Party will remain in power for now. </p>
<p>Turnout in Spanish general elections, which generally hovers around 66%, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2019/04/28/actualidad/1556435851_659546.html">was nearly 76%</a> – the third-highest in its modern democratic history. Historically, Spaniards only vote in such huge numbers during times of trouble. After an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/23/newsid_2518000/2518825.stm">attempted military coup in 1981</a>, nearly 80% of Spaniards turned out to vote in the 1982 general election. In 2004, after al-Qaida <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Madrid-train-bombings-of-2004">bombed Madrid’s Atocha train station</a>, over 77% came out to vote.</p>
<p>This year’s unusually high election participation is likely a response to political and economic crisis in Spain. Consecutive governments have failed to manage the economic crisis resulting from the 2008 global financial meltdown and struggled to find nonviolent political solutions to dissent in the independence-minded <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-referendum-unmasks-authoritarianism-in-spain-84901">Catalunya</a> region. </p>
<p>Since 2010, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-69721-5_7">my research shows</a>, Spain has been volatile. Its politics have been dominated by <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Beyond-Defeat-and-Austerity-Disrupting-the-Critical-Political-Economy/Bailey-Clua-Losada-Huke-Ribera-Almandoz/p/book/9781138890541">mass protests</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-referendum-unmasks-authoritarianism-in-spain-84901">separatist movements</a> and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/justice_scoreboard_2018_en.pdf">mistrust in state institutions</a>, particularly the judiciary – with its <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Consejo-Europa-Espana-Poder-Judicial_0_836066745.html">increasingly political decision-making</a>. </p>
<p>Conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/01/mariano-rajoy-ousted-as-spain-prime-minister">was ousted with a vote of no-confidence in June 2018</a> following his party’s <a href="http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20180524/caso-gurtel-audiencia-nacional-condena-pp-lucrarse-trama-gurtel-acredita-caja/1738968.shtml">involvement in Spain’s largest corruption scandal</a>. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Party replaced him.</p>
<p>On April 28, Spain’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/23/wolf-pack-case-spain-feminism-far-right-vox">energized left wing</a> came out en masse to give Sánchez and the Socialists a vote of confidence: four years in power. </p>
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<h2>Spain’s authoritarian past</h2>
<p>That wasn’t the expected outcome. </p>
<p>Many political analysts predicted that Vox, an extreme-right party aligned with anti-immigrant forces across Europe, would see a significant share of votes, paving the way for a ruling coalition to form between it, the center-right Popular Party and another young right-wing party called Ciudadanos.</p>
<p>That’s the triple alliance now <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/116258/edit">governing the southern province of Andalusia</a>. </p>
<p>The threat of radical right-wing leadership appears to have mobilized voters in Spain, a young democracy with a chilling history of rightist authoritarianism. Spaniards endured brutality under the right-wing military dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, who ruled the country from 1939 to 1975. </p>
<p>Many of his regime’s atrocities – which included <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/26/judge-investigate-franco-era-crimes-against-spanish-women-sexual-assault-forced-abortion-child-theft">kidnappings, forced abortions</a> and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9055231/Franco-victims-relatives-relive-the-horror.html">mass killings of political opponents</a> – have been left <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/15/bringing-justice-franco-era-crimes-spain">painfully unresolved</a> in Spain. </p>
<p>For decades since, Spain was considered a place where the far right could get no foothold. Even as extreme right-wing parties grew across Europe, Spain’s political system after Franco was basically centrist.</p>
<p>The Francoist right voted for the mainstream Popular Party. In recent years it has grown ever more <a href="https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20190417/461707806609/cayetana-alvarez-de-toledo-irene-montero-feminismo-debate-tve-elecciones.html">socially conservative</a>, effectively capturing and mainstreaming Spain’s far right. </p>
<p>Then, in 2006, came Ciudadanos, a right-wing nationalist party. Vox was founded in 2013 by Popular Party defectors with an anti-feminist, anti-gay and anti-immigrant political agenda. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271815/original/file-20190430-136810-31rj71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The young, extreme-right Vox party has earned real power in Spain’s parliament for the first time.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Vox-Election-Rally/13b1cec53e564d3dbf42eb76aa32774a/70/0">Jorge Rey/MediaPunch /IPX</a></span>
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<p>With the rise of new ultra-right parties, Spain’s once unified right was split in three. As a result, the Popular Party suffered the biggest defeat in its 30-year history, winning just 16.7% of the vote. </p>
<p>That helped the Socialists stay in power nationwide. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/29/spain-socialist-psoe-victory-without-majority-podemos-peoples-party-far-right">progressive ruling alliance</a> between the Socialist Party and the Podemos party, its leftist ally, now seems the likely outcome of the election. </p>
<p>Given the deep fragmentation of parliament, however, an <a href="https://www.elcritic.cat/opinio/roger-pala/psoe-cs-el-govern-de-ibex-22877">unexpected right-left coalition</a> like that seen in Germany or France’s ruling En Marche party is also possible.</p>
<h2>Spain’s fragile democracy</h2>
<p>In his election night <a href="http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/especiales-informativos/pedro-sanchez-ganado-futuro-perdido-pasado/5170458/">victory speech</a>, Prime Minister Sánchez said the election results show the strength and quality of Spain’s political system.</p>
<p>Voters proved that “this is a great democracy,” <a href="http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/especiales-informativos/pedro-sanchez-ganado-futuro-perdido-pasado/5170458/">he said on April 28</a> to the crowds celebrating outside the Socialist Party’s headquarters in Madrid.</p>
<p>My political research in Spain suggests the contrary. Spanish democracy is increasingly fragile, with its growing polarization, its jailing of Catalan independence leaders and its rising right wing. </p>
<p>Vox won 10% of the vote on Sunday, giving it real power on the national level for the first time. Together, right-wing parties now control 147 of the 350 seats in Spain’s parliament.</p>
<p>Progressive forces won election day, but Spain’s political future remains divided.</p>
<p><em>This story has been corrected to more accurately reflect the political context of France’s current administration.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Clua Losada does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Socialist Party handily won Spain’s April 28 election, thanks to very high turnout among leftists who feared a return to ultra-right government. Spain had a rightist military regime until 1975.Monica Clua Losada, Associate Professor in Global Political Economy, University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1159622019-04-29T09:44:59Z2019-04-29T09:44:59ZSpanish election: victory for Socialists as VOX surge fragments right-wing vote<p>Spain’s left-wing parties have beaten the right in the country’s most polarised <a href="https://theconversation.com/elecciones-generales-en-espana-el-ganador-el-perdedor-y-la-sorpresa-116147">election</a> in decades. With the Socialist party (PSOE) winning 123 of the national parliament’s 350 seats, and far left Unidas Podemos winning 42, the statewide left combined to take 165 seats.</p>
<p>This trumped the 147 seats secured by the three right-wing parties combined. The Conservative party (PP) took 66 seats, centre right challenger Ciudadanos (Citizens) 57, and the far right Vox 24. The remaining 38 seats went to an array of regionally-based parties across the left-right spectrum. </p>
<h2>Sánchez remains in charge</h2>
<p>The result is a huge victory for Socialist leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/pedro-sanchez-25607">Pedro Sánchez</a> and a historic defeat for the Conservatives. The ball is now firmly in Sánchez’s court. With the left still falling short of the absolute majority of 176 seats needed in Spain’s 350-seat parliament, Sánchez will need to secure pacts with smaller parties to secure his investiture and make it possible for the Socialist party to govern.</p>
<p>The big question is whether Sánchez will be able to form a viable, stable government with <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/podemos-13452">Unidas Podemos</a> and an array of regionally-based parties without the need for the Catalan separatist parties. It was the Catalan parties who triggered these elections in the first place. When Sánchez would not meet their demands for dialogue on Catalan self-determination, they voted against his 2019 budget in parliament, bringing the government down and forcing a vote. </p>
<p>Assuming the support of Unidas Podemos, the PSOE still needs 11 more seats to reach the minimum of 176 needed for Sánchez to win a first-round investiture vote, unless there are some abstentions. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) is likely to play ball with its six seats and so too are a couple of small parties in other regions with one or two seats each. But the numbers still don’t quite add up without at least one of the Catalan pro-independence parties, unless Sánchez gets the radical Basque pro-independence party Bildu on side. </p>
<p>A second-round investiture vote only needs a simple majority if it comes to that, but governing effectively thereafter will not be easy without a strong majority. News emerging from Spain in the hours after the vote suggested the PSOE will try to govern alone rather than entering into a formal coalition, which leaves open the door to shifting alliances depending on the legislation once Sánchez’s investiture is secured.</p>
<p>While the maths actually favours a centrist PSOE-Ciudadanos coalition (180 seats), PSOE voters shouting “not with Rivera” outside the party headquarters on election night made it clear they would consider any such pact a betrayal. So would many Ciudadanos voters.</p>
<p>Their leader, Albert Rivera, explicitly vetoed the possibility of any such pact ahead of the election, due to the parties’ contrasting visions on how to deal with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">Catalan crisis</a>. Many will have voted for Ciudadanos instead of another right-wing party due to this cordon sanitaire, and Rivera currently looks set to stick to it. His first post-election declarations suggest he intends to continue challenging the PP for the leadership of the right, from the opposition. With 15.9% of the vote, Ciudadanos came very close to the PP’s mere 16.7%. </p>
<h2>Vox enters parliament</h2>
<p>While the right has declined overall compared to the 2016 elections, it has also fragmented. New far right party <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/vox-64134">Vox</a> has entered the national parliament for the first time, stealing seats primarily from the Conservatives.</p>
<p>With the emergence of this far right challenger in recent months, Spanish nationalism has resurfaced to a degree few would ever have anticipated just a year ago. Vox also pulled the Conservatives and Ciudadanos further to the right as each sought to become the lead party in the right-wing space.</p>
<p>What first sparked the resurgence of right-wing Spanish nationalism was the Catalan independence crisis. Vox argued it would clamp down on the pro-independence movements once and for all, by taking over the regional government and recentralising the Spanish state.</p>
<p>Yet it soon became clear the left-right split was about much more than Catalonia. The revival of Spanish nationalism has gone hand in hand with a resurgence of traditional Spanish right-wing social conservatism. Vox not only targets Catalan separatists and illegal immigrants, but also <a href="https://theconversation.com/spanish-election-right-wing-parties-want-to-restrict-abortion-and-ban-feminist-groups-115935">women’s</a> and LGBT rights. </p>
<p>The extreme right is not, in fact, new to politics in democratic Spain. The traditional conservative PP party has always embraced the full spectrum of right-wing sensibilities, from the moderate right through to the extreme right. Many of those who voted for Vox come from the far right of the PP, having become disillusioned with the latter.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The left has clearly won this vote, but if Sánchez does not quickly secure the necessary support for his investiture, Spain could be faced with weeks or months of yet more political wrangling and paralysis. With regional elections just around the corner in late May, tactical behaviour is set to continue.</p>
<p>Much will also depend on how the weakened and fragmented right composes itself, and how, in particular, the PP will attempt to reinvent itself after its losses. </p>
<p>Of course, as long as Spain remains mired in these domestic dilemmas, any aspirations it may have to play a greater role on the European or global stage will remain frustrated. Some of Spain’s top political analysts have expressed their exasperation at the almost complete absence of Spain’s role in the EU and beyond from any of the electoral debates and discussions, even with European elections just around the corner and at a time of unprecedented challenges to the EU project. </p>
<p>There is a lot hanging on whether the country can better navigate the new reality of parliamentary fragmentation this time around to make progress, within its own borders and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Gray has received funding in the past from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) of the UK.</span></em></p>Sánchez seeks to build alliances but not a formal coalition as the Socialists win but fall short of an absolute majority.Caroline Gray, Lecturer in Politics and Spanish, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1159352019-04-25T13:40:23Z2019-04-25T13:40:23ZSpanish election: right-wing parties want to restrict abortion and ban feminist groups<p>Spain is heading for its third general election in less than four years on April 28. And with days to go before the vote, the leaders of the four main political parties – the ruling Socialists, the conservative People’s Party (PP), the centre-right Ciudadanos and the left-wing Unidas-Podemos – went head-to-head in a televised debate. The all-male panel sparred on immigration, the economy and Catalan independence in an effort to sway the electorate. The only women to take to the stage were the two photographed mopping the podium prior to broadcast. </p>
<p>The right-wing vote currently appears split between the PP, Ciudadanos and Vox, an anti-immigration, anti-feminist party that has only recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/gains-for-spains-far-right-vox-party-in-andalusia-fuelled-by-tough-opposition-to-catalan-independence-108107">broken into the mainstream</a>. The alarming rise of Vox has been aided by waning support for the conservative People’s Party (PP) following <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-pp-ruling-party-rocked-by-major-corruption-case-mariano-rajoy/">corruption scandals</a> that saw it ousted from office last summer. </p>
<p>While the Spanish right may be more fragmented now than at any point since Franco’s death in 1975, the PP and Vox are united on one key issue: opposition to abortion. With recent polls suggesting up to 40% of voters remain undecided and a coalition government likely, the election results will prove critical to the future of women’s rights in Spain. Echoing the patriarchal, anti-feminist policies of the Franco dictatorship, both parties pose a very real threat to a 2010 law that allows for elective termination until 14 weeks into a pregnancy. </p>
<p>This comes at a time when women’s rights in Spain are under international scrutiny following the controversial “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/26/wolf-pack-case-spain-law-misogyny">La Manada</a>” (“wolf pack”) case. A gang of five men prosecuted for sexually assaulting a woman in Pamploma in 2016 were acquitted of rape because the court ruled their crime didn’t involve “violence”. Instead, they were found guilty on the lesser charge of sexual abuse. The trial galvanised Spanish feminists, who took to the streets to protest against the machismo culture that endures. In response, there has been a spike in misogynistic rhetoric from the Spanish right and a backlash against “radical feminism” – a label applied liberally to policies on gender equality. </p>
<p>When protests organised by the anti-choice <a href="https://www.aciprensa.com/noticias/si-a-la-vida-gran-marcha-recorrera-madrid-este-24-de-marzo-53708">“Yes to Life” movement</a> attracted millions to the Spanish capital on March 24, prominent figures from <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2019/03/22/actualidad/1553265287_354088.html">both Vox and the PP attended</a>. At the International Women’s Day march held in Madrid a fortnight earlier, both parties were conspicuous by their absence. Members of Spain’s other electoral challengers were in attendance, publicly backing feminist causes.</p>
<h2>Anti-feminist manifestos</h2>
<p>Vox’s aggressively anti-feminist manifesto includes a commitment to <a href="https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20190308/46903566534/vox-8-marzo-feminismo.html">end public funding for abortions</a>. It also wants to repeal the 2004 gender violence law on the grounds that it is discriminatory, and shut down what it describes as “radical feminist organisations”.</p>
<p>A staunchly anti-choice platform informs Vox’s core ethos. Indeed, one of the <a href="https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2014-01-16/los-cuatro-pilares-de-vox-no-al-aborto-la-familia-la-unidad-de-espana-y-no-a-eta_76858/">four fundamental political objectives</a> that led to the party’s formation in 2013 was opposition to abortion in all circumstances, along with a commitment to <a href="https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2014-01-16/los-cuatro-pilares-de-vox-no-al-aborto-la-familia-la-unidad-de-espana-y-no-a-eta_76858/">“protect the family”</a>. Tweets from Francisco Serrano, the party’s leader in Valencia, condemn <a href="https://twitter.com/FSerranoCastro/status/611649146899054592?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">“psychopathic feminazis”</a>, and he has declared himself proud to be labelled <a href="https://twitter.com/FSerranoCastro/status/647527123868086272?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">“machista”</a> if it means “defending life”. In a disparaging reference to the La Manada case, Serrano Tweeted that some women are <a href="https://twitter.com/FSerranoCastro/status/905538192211890176?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">not attractive enough to be gang-raped</a>. </p>
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<p>Meanwhile, Pablo Casado, leader of the PP, is endorsed by the ultra-conservative anti-feminist HazteOír (“Make Yourself Heard”) campaign group because of his anti-choice stance. Casado, who is among the more probable candidates to become Spain’s next prime minister, has frequently advocated reverting to the much more <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/07/inenglish/1549552104_487070.html">restrictive 1985 abortion law</a> that only allowed terminations in very limited cases. He drew <a href="https://www.publico.es/tremending/2018/10/29/la-ley-del-aborto-de-pablo-casado-las-tuiteras-plantan-cara-a-casado-por-su-cruzada-antiabortista-nos-vereis-en-la-calle/">furious reactions</a> in February when he argued women should be informed that the embryo is an <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.es/2019/02/24/pablo-casado-aborto_a_23676836/">“autonomous life”</a>.</p>
<p>Recent comments made by Adolfo Suárez Illana – a prominent figure in the PP – were so extreme they attracted criticism from within his own party. He falsely claimed New York had approved post-birth terminations and compared abortion rates with deaths from traffic accidents and suicide. He stated that abortion results in a <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/29/inenglish/1553847183_963327.html">“dead child”</a>.</p>
<h2>Global trend</h2>
<p>We need only consider Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-abortion/on-abortion-trump-agenda-likely-leads-to-supreme-court-not-congress-idUSKCN1PV2CE">recent efforts</a> to restrict abortion access in the US to see how the rise of populism translates into patriarchal policies. The rejection of the abortion bill proposed in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/09/argentina-senate-rejects-bill-legalise-abortion">Argentine senate</a> last summer reminds us that the progress made in Ireland is not necessarily indicative of a consistent international trend.</p>
<p>In Spain, reproductive freedoms have always formed a crucial component of the social and political tensions that continue to divide a country torn apart by a bloody civil war. Abortion legislation introduced in 1936 under the progressive Second Republic was swiftly overturned when Franco’s Nationalists declared victory in 1939. Abortion was criminalised and motherhood actively promoted by the regime and Catholic Church.</p>
<p>Women were bombarded with propaganda that presented bearing children as a form of national service. This philosophy was echoed in alarming comments made by Casado in February. The PP leader linked voluntary abortion with the sustainability of the country’s <a href="https://elpais.com/sociedad/2019/02/07/actualidad/1549537328_965105.html">pension and healthcare systems</a>, arguing, with no trace of irony: “In order to finance pensions and healthcare, we need to think about having more children not having abortions.” </p>
<p>The current law was introduced by a Socialist government in 2010 but the PP vowed to return to the more restrictive legislation when it came back into power in 2011. It was, however, forced to <a href="http://www.eltrendelalibertad.com/">shelve these plans</a> in 2014 after major protests. </p>
<p>Abortion remains a divisive, polemical issue in Spain and the increasingly conservative character of the Spanish right makes future aggressive challenges to the law likely. With Vox forecast to make parliamentary gains, the party could prove critical in propping up a right-wing coalition government. The PP’s lurch to the right in an effort to attract Vox supporters is equally foreboding. Although immigration, Catalan nationalism and the economy dominate the headlines, it is crucial we remember that women’s bodies remain a key battleground in Spanish politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115935/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah Madden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The PP wants to restrict access to terminations and Vox wants to ban all public funding for them.Deborah Madden, Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155252019-04-24T12:36:02Z2019-04-24T12:36:02ZVox: how to understand the peculiarities of Spain’s hard-right movement<p>Ahead of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-catalan-question-dominates-ahead-of-wildly-uncertain-election-115501">election in Spain</a> in which a large proportion of voters are still <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world-europe-47937031">undecided</a>, one party is causing a major stir. Vox is campaigning largely on an anti-separatist ticket – proposing recentralisation of powers to Madrid after decades of devolution to regional powers. </p>
<p>Its eruption onto the scene cannot be explained by combining clichés about a Francoist comeback. What is happening in Spain is not like the populist, anti-immigration euroscepticism in vogue elsewhere. Comparisons with the Brexit and Trump campaigns abound, but these only offer misleading explanations for a phenomenon that is firmly rooted in one internal Spanish affair: the Catalan crisis of 2017.</p>
<p>From the outside, the surge of Vox looks typical of the political atomisation that followed the prolonged systemic crisis of 2008. Yet in Spain, that gap was already plugged by <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/podemos-13452">Podemos</a>, the anti-austerity party that grew out of the protest movements of a decade ago. The Vox story is quite different. The party was created in 2013, but it only took flight in 2018, straight after the Catalan referendum.</p>
<p>This new party can only be understood in the context of Spain’s territorial struggle. This is a country that has undergone a major process of decentralisation while simultaneously suffering from a post-Franco identity crisis that almost proscribed any emotional attachment to the nation’s collective history. </p>
<p>In this there is a nuanced similarity between Vox and the patriotic aesthetics of some other movements – like Brexit, Vox displays a revival of historicism. One of the pillars of the Leave narrative was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-is-not-world-war-ii-politicians-should-stop-comparing-them-111286">simplification of World War II</a> that presented Britain as the continent’s saviour from German expansionism. This fuelled a sense of exceptionalism and the associated idea that “they need us more than we need them”. </p>
<h2>Historical images</h2>
<p>In Vox’s case, its leader Santiago Abascal has purposefully rallied his growing crowds of supporters alongside the monuments to three national heroes: <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27762393">Pelayo</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_World_of_El_Cid.html?id=GDMoa4EzrcMC">El Cid</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Blas+de+lezo+cartagena+de+indias+war+jenkin%27s+ear&btnG=#d=gs_qabs&u=%23p%3Dv2U-Brnh108J">Blas de Lezo</a>. All three have something in common: they’re brave but unlikely heroes defending a Spanish nation under attack.</p>
<p>Pelayo, a Visigothic lord who fought against the Muslims in 722AD, is credited in Christian legend with creating the Kingdom of Asturias. His foundational myth is that of a “plucky underdog”. Armed with stones, Pelayo defeated the mighty Munuza, catalysing a Christian fightback. </p>
<p>El Cid is another semi-mythical figure, and the historical <em>reconquistador</em> of Valencia. A soldier of fortune who fought both for and against the Christians during his lifetime, El Cid is presented, in the first surviving lines of the canonical Spanish epic, as a vulnerable hero. He is found “weeping very sore” following his banishment from Castile. </p>
<p>And the statue of Blas de Lezo, in Madrid, is Vox’s most iconic location. Lezo, a Basque admiral, defended Cartagena de Indias from British attacks in 1741. The ultimate underdog, he was nicknamed “The Half Man”, as he delivered this naval victory despite losing a leg, an arm and an eye in the process. Abascal skilfully blends his own biography into this storyline. He was born in the depths of the Basque Country and narrowly escaped ETA’s many attempts to assassinate him. He presents himself as a credible, defiant victim.</p>
<p>Vox’s patriotic discourse holds the strong appeal of emotive simplicity. It is a David and Goliath narrative in which David is the beleaguered Spanish nation and the Goliaths are the powerful regional governments. The regional powers in wealthier regions such as Catalonia have come to represent a particularly potent existential threat to not just the nation but many of its citizens. VOX therefore wants to suspend their powers.</p>
<p>Where other European far-right parties use an ethno-nationalist narrative to paint the EU or other supranational powers as the enemy, Vox attacks the ethno-nationalism within its own nation. It is the Basque and Catalan nationalists who base their ideas on tribal and ethnic exceptionalism.</p>
<p>Basque nationalist ideas stem from 19th century race-based theories about the Basques’ distinctive DNA. The current Catalan leader, Quim Torra, has been accused of xenophobia for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/17/quim-torra-sworn-in-catalan-president-xenophobia-claims">various remarks</a> he has made over the years referring to Spaniards as “beasts” who have a “glitch in their DNA”. </p>
<p>Torra’s rhetoric is underpinned by a sense of Catalan supremacism over the Spanish speakers from the south of the country, many of whom have migrated to the wealthier Catalan region in search of better opportunities. In other words, a wealthy, northern elite sees its neighbours – the Spanish speakers – as inferior beings. </p>
<p>In Spain, ethno-nationalism is the defining feature of peripheral independence movements rather than the hard national right. Vox is capitalising on this by promising to focus on Spain’s historical “survival” after four decades of continuous devolution. The “plucky underdogs” of history are now the Spanish-speaking children prevented from <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/is-catalonia-using-schools-as-a-political-weapon/544898/">studying in their mother tongue</a> in Catalonia, the small business owners fined for <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/05/16/in-barcelona-do-it-in-catalan-or-pay-the-fine">advertising only in Spanish</a>, the working class from Spain’s interior mocked by Catalonia’s wealthy bourgeoisie. If Vox secures a place in the national parliament, the independence movements can expect a difficult time ahead. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/spanish-election-right-wing-parties-want-to-restrict-abortion-and-ban-feminist-groups-115935">Spanish election: right-wing parties want to restrict abortion and ban feminist groups</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos Conde Solares does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rather than setting itself against the EU like many other groups, Vox sees regional independence movements as its enemy.Carlos Conde Solares, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136012019-04-21T12:46:32Z2019-04-21T12:46:32ZWhy Spain’s upcoming election will change Spanish immigration politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267928/original/file-20190406-115766-htzpt6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators take part in a recent protest against a rally by the Spanish far-right Vox party in Barcelona, Spain. The nationalist Vox party has recently emerged onto the political scene by winning representation in regional elections in the country's south in December.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manu Fernandez)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The upcoming election in Spain will be different. </p>
<p>While the country has long been one of the few in western Europe without a populist anti-immigrant party, the legislative elections on April 28 will likely change that.</p>
<p>Vox, a party that looks very similar to the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party, will, <a href="https://pollofpolls.eu/ES">according to current polls</a>, garner about 10 per cent of the vote and rake up a sizeable number of seats in parliament. </p>
<p>If the experience in other countries offers any indication, that means anti-immigrant rhetoric will likely become a staple of Spanish politics in the indefinite future.</p>
<p>Vox was initially founded as a nationalist party opposing separatism and decentralization. Recently, however, it has become more vocal in criticizing immigration, multiculturalism, the European Union and Islam. </p>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.voxespana.es/biblioteca/espana/2018m/gal_c2d72e181103013447.pdf">party manifesto</a>, it advocates the deportation of undocumented and criminal migrants, restrictions in naturalization policies, a selective and arguably discriminatory admission process favouring immigrants from “friendly” countries and restrictions on the public expression of Islam.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2014.985448?casa_token=Uq6fWbea7pIAAAAA:UESiouJpABEgrc-oCp4w6myD46fSSg7USUq2eMsGgRoB92rwGGg-SDtcsBJW4ho7YV8N_jYntUU">Political scientists long predicted</a> that this type of party could not gain a foothold in Spain. Because decentralization is a more central concern than immigration, and the mainstream right-of-centre party (the Partido Popular) already takes a restrictive position on immigration, so the argument goes, there is no place for an anti-immigrant party in Spain. </p>
<h2>Why this election will be different</h2>
<p>While this type of reasoning describes Spanish politics well in normal times, it does not today. With highly volatile election results in recent years (in 2015, the net change in seats amounted to more than 70 per cent) and an ongoing constitutional crisis regarding the status of Catalonia within the Spanish state, politics are marked by uncertainty.</p>
<p>After having climbed out of the economic abyss of the 2008 financial crisis, <a href="https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-forecast.htm">the Spanish economy has been in recession since 2015</a>, and the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis has seen the annual intake of asylum-seekers in Spain skyrocket from less than 6,000 in 2014 to more than 30,000 in 2017. </p>
<p>In addition to all this economic and social turbulence, the current partisan context lends itself very well to the populist argument that there is a politically correct and self-serving elite that does not care about the concerns of “the people.” </p>
<p>The Partido Popular, usually the most obvious choice for a voter who opposes immigration, is embroiled in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44247770">a massive corruption scandal</a> that has been estimated to involve a loss of at least 120 million euros (about $180 million Canadian dollars) to the public treasury. Indeed, the very reason an election is taking place is that the scandal forced former prime minister Mariano Rajoy to resign.</p>
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<p>The interim prime minister, social democrat Pedro Sánchez, is an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/07/09/626095187/spains-socialist-leader-sets-a-new-course-on-migrants-gender-and-catalonia">anti-populist, pro-EU intellectual</a> who tends to invoke humanitarian considerations rather than majority opinion when describing his views on immigration, and who has repeatedly offered a safe haven to migrant ships that were denied in other European countries.</p>
<p>In research that is currently under review, I demonstrate that most anti-immigrant parties in western Europe had their first electoral success under these kinds of unusual circumstances, but that they did not disappear once politics normalized afterwards. </p>
<p>When these parties break through, they are able to lock up a spot in the party system, <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/comm.2010.35.issue-2/comm.2010.008/comm.2010.008.xml">gain credibility</a> as a realistic political player, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00235.x">draw more attention</a> to the issue of immigration and obtain the <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/abstract/9781847794420/9781847794420.xml">necessary resources</a> to build their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2016.1145685?casa_token=ZFAhhv0TCkcAAAAA:ZbPeWGJ8bvFmQTH2dd2ZOMQWsQZnZeuwyLbd0j6m3ufXTEZKHkunHZlqkKf85D49SBRtFkPvRsk">party organization</a>. These are exactly the kinds of factors that previous research has shown to be crucial to anti-immigrant parties’ success.</p>
<p>The following figure illustrates this pattern:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267913/original/file-20190406-115791-281vhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Electoral breakthroughs of anti-immigrant parties in western Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because their electoral breakthrough depends on an unusual set of circumstances, the timing of anti-immigrant parties’ arrival has been quite different from one western European country to the next. </p>
<p>But once that unusual election occurs, anti-immigrant parties tend to stick around. In all countries, anti-immigrant parties have had considerable success after breaking through, and only in Belgium do we see a recent decline in their electoral fortunes. </p>
<p>It would be a grave mistake to assume these parties are inconsequential: across western Europe, they have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2013.766473?casa_token=H7O3K9ED9NUAAAAA:usLmXXvPiWnEnTM7GMdM4WeIqSORtkl7-nJZ60FxWboKN7T8pf09OH6qBLB40HzaAwZHiwxAcxY">affected public policy</a>, incentivized mainstream parties to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068809346002?casa_token=XhHvuwVE2aAAAAAA:xHSqpmQzJWwVjDZ7RFyizQfzFQ0PrG9fVI_HdoZybwF3s0OVVvLNHMbYjEnL4o-62DBov6ASPLs">take a harsher stance on immigration</a> and made anti-immigrant sentiment more <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gTxdDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA268&dq=koning+making+xenophobia+matter&ots=sgQzLrTy3a&sig=NAjbvcjUB_4ArIg-7tIrqHGPYsQ#v=onepage&q=koning%20making%20xenophobia%20matter&f=false">politically consequential</a>.</p>
<p>The election in Spain, therefore, is not only important because it changes the political landscape for the next legislative term. The success of Vox will likely secure a place for anti-immigrant parties in the Spanish party system for the indefinite future, with important implications for the future of immigration politics in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Koning receives funding from SSHRC. </span></em></p>The upcoming Spanish election will not only change the political landscape in the short term. The success of Vox will likely secure a place for anti-immigrant parties for the indefinite future.Edward Koning, Associate professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155012019-04-17T10:09:58Z2019-04-17T10:09:58ZSpain: Catalan question dominates ahead of wildly uncertain election<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/spain-543">Spain’s</a> third general election in four years is fast approaching. Voters will take to the polls on April 28 in a climate of unprecedented parliamentary polarisation and fragmentation. And while this is a national election, the question of Catalan independence looms large. </p>
<p>Throughout the lead-up to the election, Spanish parties have been divided into left and right-wing blocs based primarily on their views on the Catalan predicament. Economic and social issues seem to have taken a backseat while candidates seek to present a solution to the impasse created by the Catalan government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/catalonia-3828">unsuccessful attempt</a> at declaring independence in 2017. </p>
<p>On the left, the mainstream socialists (PSOE) and new challenger Podemos advocate trying to negotiate with the Catalan government. On the right, the traditional conservatives (PP), new challenger Ciudadanos (Citizens) and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-47957010">far-right Vox</a> want to clamp down harder on the secessionists by re-centralising power. </p>
<p>This left-right division was cemented when Albert Rivera, the leader of Ciudadanos, boldly ruled out any post-election alliances between his party and the PSOE. He opposed the latter’s apparent willingness to engage with the Catalan pro-independence parties.</p>
<p>While Ciudadanos was initially founded in Catalonia itself in 2006 to oppose Catalan nationalism, it also attempted to occupy a liberal-centrist space when it later branched out to national politics. Following the 2015 elections, the PSOE and Ciudadanos tried to form an alternative government to the PP – although they ultimately failed because they didn’t have the numbers.</p>
<p>For Ciudadanos to rule out collaboration with the PSOE this time around is a definite step away from the centre and towards the right-wing camp. It is also a daring move, considering that some polls show a PSOE-Ciudadanos coalition might be the only viable government.</p>
<h2>Political cleavages and party alliances</h2>
<p>Understanding the division into blocs over the Catalan question requires an insight into the longstanding political cleavages and nature of the party system in Spain.</p>
<p>The traditional left has long been associated with pro-decentralisation attitudes while the right has a stronger ideological inclination towards centralisation. But it is rare to see the Catalan question become quite such a defining issue in their divide. This new phenomenon has only gradually crystallised under the short period of socialist government from June 2018 and is due to a shift in party alliances and governance arrangements.</p>
<p>Between 1982 and 2015, either the PP or PSOE had always easily formed a government after every election. Even when they fell short of an absolute majority of seats, they would always be able to form a functioning minority government by striking deals with regionally based nationalist parties with representation in the Spanish parliament. This involved securing those parties’ support in parliament in return for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">devolution of further powers</a> or other quid pro quos for the region.</p>
<p>The 2015 election brought this system to the brink. Because challenger parties were emerging and taking votes from the old guard, the winning party (this time, the PP) failed to secure enough seats to govern even with the support of regional parties. Not only that, but the rise of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-independence-referendum-how-the-disputed-vote-led-to-crackdown-82277">pro-independence movement</a> in Catalonia made the Catalan parties with seats in the Spanish parliament far less likely to collaborate with national parties.</p>
<p>Another election swiftly followed in 2016. The PP finally managed to form a government – albeit a very weak one – without the need for the support of the Catalan pro-independence parties. But this all changed when conservative prime minister Mariano Rajoy was ousted in a no-confidence vote. The PSOE, under <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/pedro-sanchez-25607">Pedro Sánchez</a>, formed a new government in June 2018.</p>
<p>With only 85 seats out of 350 in the Spanish parliament, the PSOE needed the support not only of Podemos, but also of the full array of regionally based parties, including the Catalan pro-independence ones. The PSOE wanted to reduce tensions with dialogue, but ultimately failed to commit in a way that satisfied the parties holding up its government. As a result, it found itself unable to pass its 2019 budget and was forced to call early elections.</p>
<p>By then, the left-right divide in statewide politics over how to address the Catalan question was already entrenched. Ciudadanos had moved definitively to the right-wing camp as an opposition tactic, joining the PP in its criticism of the PSOE’s willingness to negotiate with pro-independence Catalan politicians.</p>
<h2>To the polls</h2>
<p>The regional elections held in December 2018 in <a href="https://theconversation.com/gains-for-spains-far-right-vox-party-in-andalusia-fuelled-by-tough-opposition-to-catalan-independence-108107">Andalusia</a> have been seen as a possible precursor of the general election outcome. Fought on national rather than purely regional issues, those elections not only saw the rise of Vox, but also the establishment of a post-electoral alliance between the PP, Ciudadanos and Vox. This put the PSOE into opposition for the first time in the region.</p>
<p>Whether or not the three right-wing parties will be able to combine to secure an absolute majority, however, is far from certain. With the PSOE gaining in most polls, a more likely alternative looks to be a repeat of some combination of the PSOE, Podemos and regionally based parties. Whether the electoral maths is viable may well depend on whether they need Catalan parties to support them or if they can get by with the support of other regional parties from the Basque Country and the Canary Islands.</p>
<p>Another option might still be a formal or informal coalition between the PSOE and Ciudadanos. While this would require a volte-face from Ciudadanos, it would not be impossible if the PSOE toughens its discourse on Catalonia again. Ciudadanos would not budge, but Sánchez is known for shifting tone or strategy depending on which party he needs to attract.</p>
<p>Either way, another weak, unstable government currently appears the most likely outcome. In this new context, Spanish parties need to become more open to coalition-building than in the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115501/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Gray has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK). </span></em></p>With the big parties under pressure from regional forces, it’s hard to see how anyone could form a government on April 28.Caroline Gray, Lecturer in Politics and Spanish, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1081072018-12-05T15:34:49Z2018-12-05T15:34:49ZGains for Spain’s far-right Vox party in Andalusia fuelled by tough opposition to Catalan independence<p>Although the Spanish Socialist Party won the most seats in the Andalusian regional elections on December 2, this was not a victory to celebrate. In an area where the socialists have ruled unchallenged since the first autonomous elections in 1982, to be reduced to <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/02/actualidad/1543774582_128933.html#?id_externo_nwl=newsletter_diaria_manana20181203m">33 seats with 27.9% of the votes</a> was a humiliation. </p>
<p>This humiliation was sharpened by the fact that the Socialist premier of Andalusia, Susana Diaz, called the elections early (they were scheduled to take place in March 2019). She believed that her mandate would be strengthened and her assumed victory would consolidate the Socialist government at a national level. The very opposite happened. </p>
<p>This regional election, with a low turnout of 58.65%, demonstrated both the decline of the Spanish left in general, and a corresponding rise in the rise of the right across Andalusia.</p>
<h2>The rise of Vox</h2>
<p>The two real winners of the election were the centre-right Cuidadanos and the extreme-right Vox parties. <a href="http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/3220_3239/3230/Es3230_mapa_pdf.html">Opinion polls</a> before the vote predicted Vox might make a breakthrough and gain one seat, but it surpassed all expectations and won 12 seats, going from 0.46% of the vote in 2015 to 10.97%.</p>
<p>An absolute majority requires 55 seats in the Andalusian parliament. There is no easy combination of forces to form the next regional government in Andalusia. The left in the form of the Socialist Party and Adelante Andalusia – which only won 17 seats – can only total 50 seats together, five short of the 55 required. Only a combination of right-wing forces, the Popular Party, Ciudadanos and Vox would provide <a href="https://elpais.com/tag/elecciones_andaluzas/a">the necessary number of 59 seats</a>. It’s significant that neither the Popular Party or Ciudadanos have ruled out the possibility of seeking the support of Vox. </p>
<p>Pablo Casado, the leader of the Popular Party, said on December 4 that he <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/04/actualidad/1543928771_340736.html">was considering negotiating</a> with both Ciudadanos and Vox, including offering each party ministries in the regional government. He <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/03/actualidad/1543847174_403261.html?rel=str_articulo#1543940210678">argued</a> that the real danger was not Vox but Podemos, the left-wing populist party, who he called “the most radical party of democracy”. Meanwhile, Vox candidate Francisco Serrano <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/03/far-right-party-wins-seats-in-andalusia-a-first-in-spain.html">argued</a> that his party’s victory marked the beginning of “the reconquest” of Spain. </p>
<p>The far-right French leader Marine Le Pen was the <a href="https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/1069315775935197186">first to congratulate</a> Vox on its unprecedented victory. This is no coincidence. Vox is an extreme right-wing party which campaigned on an anti-immigration, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/03/actualidad/1543828526_382772.html">anti-feminist</a> and nationalist platform. Its call for <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46422036">tougher immigration controls</a> has worked particularly well in Andalusia, which receives the majority of immigrants who cross the Mediterranean to Spain. </p>
<h2>The Catalan issue</h2>
<p>Yet the key issue which galvanises Vox and which has fuelled its rise from 2014 is its complete rejection of Catalan independence. Vox rejects Spain’s current semi-federal state and demands the unity of the country in a tone reminiscent of the Francoist dictatorship. Its electoral manifesto demanded the immediate suspension of autonomy in Catalonia and the trial of those who had pushed for independence following the referendum in October 2017. Vox depicts Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, as a separatist puppet who governs thanks to “<a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/11/22/actualidad/1542844409_768373.html?rel=str_articulo#1543842780464">the enemies of Spain</a>”. </p>
<p>The rise of Vox in Andalusia has serious consequences for the weak Socialist government in Madrid which has been punished, among other things, for the perception that it has been too easy on the Catalan independence movement. Although Diaz’s campaign was a regional one with a markedly Andalusian focus, Sánchez was conspicuous by his absence from the campaign trail, the result is a clear verdict on his government. </p>
<p>There are also serious consequences for Catalonia and <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-a-year-on-political-prisoners-go-unnoticed-by-the-rest-of-the-world-106411">the upcoming trial</a> of the nine politicians and grassroots activists who have remained in jail for over a year without trial on charges of rebellion and the misuse of public funds. Vox was not alone in focusing on Catalonia: both Ciudadanos and the Popular Party also focused on the need to quash the Catalan independence movement and to defend the unity of Spain. </p>
<p>Yet the victory of the extreme right also has its roots in the long reign of the Socialist Party in Andalusia, which has led to the abuse of power on a number of fronts. Their time in power in the region became <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-corruption-country-of-thieves-high-court-trial/">marred by corruption crises</a> and an inability to solve the region’s longstanding economic problems, not the least unemployment. Two former Socialist premiers of Andalusia, José Antonio Griñán and Manuel Chaves, are <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/spain-s-socialists-seek-to-retain-southern-stronghold-1.3716048">currently on trial</a> over allegations relating to illegal severance payments to laid-off workers. In this sense, Andalusia’s regional election is Spain’s Brexit moment, when left-behind communities give their political class a wake up call. </p>
<p>Yet it is the Catalan issue that adds a particular dimension to this result. Sánchez’s Socialist government has been punished for its dependence on the Catalan regional parties to pass the budget and other legislation. It might well have to call an early election in 2019, though with some of the jailed Catalan independence leaders now on <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/12/03/inenglish/1543844085_034347.html">hunger strike</a> as a backdrop, political uncertainty looks likely to continue in Spain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley has previously received funding from the British Academy.</span></em></p>Left-wing parties in Andalusia were the biggest losers as right-wing parties gained seats in in regional elections in early December.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064112018-11-13T12:24:50Z2018-11-13T12:24:50ZCatalonia: a year on, political prisoners go unnoticed by the rest of the world<p>After an unofficial referendum in October 2017, the pro-independence political parties in the Catalan parliament unilaterally declared independence from Spain. In response, the Spanish government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution which effectively suspended the region’s autonomy.</p>
<p>More than a year on from these events, ousted Catalan leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/carles-puigdemont">Carles Puigdemont</a> remains in exile in Belgium. Another six pro-independence leaders remain in exile, including Clara Ponsati, former education minister in the Catalan government who has returned to her employment as an economics professor at the University of St Andrews, in Scotland. Although not formally charged, like the other exiled leaders, were she to return to Spain she would likely be arrested on charges of rebellion and misuse of public funds. She has been critical of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/clara-ponsati-exiled-catalan-minister-eu-spain-separatist-hostages-a8256466.html">Europe’s leaders for their silence</a> on the Catalan question and has claimed that Catalan political prisoners are being used as pawns to deactivate the pro-independence movement. </p>
<p>Two activists and seven politicians remain in custody. They have been charged by Spain’s attorney general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/catalan-politicians-charged-a-year-after-independence-vote-referendum">with rebellion</a> and misuse of public funds. This ignores an earlier decision by Spain’s solicitor general, who recently downgraded the charge of rebellion <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/02/inenglish/1541146388_493726.html">to sedition</a> because the former charge requires the use of violence. The available evidence suggests that violence was not used by any of those in jail. Nevertheless, if the attorney general continues his hardline stance, those in jail could face up to 25 years behind bars. Many will be surprised to hear that Spain’s legal system allows people to be held on precautionary, pre-trial detention for such a long time.</p>
<p>The group facing charges of rebellion includes two civil society activists Jordi Sanchez, president of the campaign group Catalan National Assembly (ANC), and Jordi Cuixart, president of the campaign group Omnium Cultural. Both are facing up to 17 years in jail. Both have been detained since October 2017 in connection with protests in Barcelona on September 20 and 21 that year. The protests were aimed at obstructing police raids to seize material related to the referendum from Catalan government buildings.</p>
<p>Yet Amnesty International’s director in Europe, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/amnesty-calls-for-immediate-release-of-jordi-sanchez-jailed-catalan-leader">Gauri Van Gulik</a>, noted that “although calling protests to obstruct legitimate police operations can – if proof is produced of their commission – constitute a public order offence, it does not constitute a serious crime such as sedition or rebellion”. Amnesty has called for the immediate release of the “two Jordis”, as they have become known across Catalonia.</p>
<p>Amnesty avoids using the term “political prisoner” as there is no accepted definition in international law. However, <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Juristas-politicos-Espana-inmediata-liberacion_0_710430160.html">over 1,000 legal experts</a> have signed a manifesto arguing that the Catalan leaders in jail are effectively that. They say the accused have not been given time to prepare their defence, making a farce of the legal proceedings. Similarly, <a href="https://www.eleconomista.es/politica/noticias/8800071/12/17/El-53-de-los-catalanes-considera-presos-politicos-a-los-soberanistas-encarcelados.html">53.4% of Catalans</a> consider that those in jail are political prisoners. And 60% feel that the judicial proceedings against them are unjustified. It’s worth noting that that’s a higher percentage than the estimated number of Catalans who support independence. </p>
<p>Others, connected with the <a href="https://malarrassa.cat/2018/10/22/sorganitza-la-solidaritat-amb-en-cesc-del-cdr-terrassa-i-les-altres-encausades-per-laccio-davant-el-tsjc/">Committees for the Defence of the Republic</a> – groups campaigning for the unofficial referendum result to be upheld – were charged with public disorder offences following a protest in Barcelona on February 23 2018. They could face two and a half years in prison.</p>
<p>In their resistance to the Spanish authorities, Catalans are drawing on a long tradition. Today’s political prisoners, whether accurately labelled or not, are the latest in a long line who have fought against the perceived injustices of the Spanish state. Foremost among these is Lluis Companys, the president of the generalitat who was arrested for declaring the Catalan republic on October 6 1934 and was executed by firing squad on October 15 1940. The historic parallel is not lost on the Catalan people. Nor it seems was the parallel lost on the right-wing Popular Party’s spokesperson, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-referendum-independence-spain-jail-carles-puigdemont-threat-leader-latest-a7991191.html">Pablo Casado</a>, who threatened Puigdemont, ahead of the unilateral declaration of independence, with the same fate as Companys.</p>
<p>Spain’s <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/25/inenglish/1540464607_998634.html">Supreme Court</a> has ordered that 18 former Catalan leaders stand trial for their role in the unilateral declaration of independence in 2017. The charges against them include rebellion, sedition, the misuse of public funds and disobedience. The trial is likely to take place in early 2019.</p>
<p>The issue of Catalan independence will not be solved by judicial actions. Politics is required. Pedro Sanchez, the socialist prime minister, has certainly taken a softer line than his predecessor, Mariano Rajoy. Nevertheless, the political negotiations necessary to solve the crisis will require a stronger government than the current minority socialist administration. It will also require the Catalan pro-independence parties to present a more united front than is currently the case. And ultimately, it will be hard to have any meaningful negotiations while there are political prisoners. Carla Ponsati’s lawyer in Scotland,<a href="https://www.elnacional.cat/en/politics/anwar-interview-spain-gangster_285804_102.html"> Aamer Anwar</a>, has said that ‘Talking to Spain now is like sitting down with a gangster holding hostages’. A long road lies ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The questions raised by the region’s failed bid for independence remain unanswered. And key figures remain in prison.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1029362018-09-14T12:52:47Z2018-09-14T12:52:47ZSpain tries to limit arms sales to Saudi Arabia – but following international law is expensive<p>The Spanish government recently found itself confronting a deeply unpleasant dilemma: whether to help prevent violations of the law of armed conflicts or protect thousands of jobs at home. On September 3, the <a href="http://cadenaser.com/ser/2018/09/07/politica/1536353904_816437.html">radio station Cadena SER</a> reported that the minister of defence, Margarita Robles, intended to stop the delivery of 400 bombs to Saudi Arabia, whose <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423">bombing campaign in Yemen</a> has claimed numerous civilian lives.</p>
<p>While Robles’s choice is consistent with the law on international arms transfers, it could seriously affect her government’s commercial relationship with the Saudis while undermining the jobs of thousands of Spanish workers involved in the defence sector.</p>
<p>The deal at the centre of the issue was signed by <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/09/07/actualidad/1536321327_059352.html">Spain and Saudi Arabia in 2015</a> during former prime minister Mariano Rajoy’s conservative government. By the time Pedro Sánchez’s current progressive government took office in June 2018, Saudi Arabia had spent three years bombing Yemen, causing numerous civilian casualties. Robles, a minister in the Sánchez government, seemed concerned by the possibility that Spanish armaments might be used in the conflict at some point.</p>
<p>Immediately after her intentions became public, Spanish media reported on the Saudis’ alarmed reaction and the future of other Saudi-Spanish deals. Top of the list was a contract for five warships to be built by Navantia, a Spanish state-owned company. Cancelling that order would have cost <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/09/10/inenglish/1536568351_837677.html">€1.8 billion and left 6,000 workers unemployed</a>. While there was no official statement by Saudi Arabia, Robles’s idea concerned other Spanish politicians. <a href="http://cadenaser.com/ser/2018/09/07/politica/1536353904_816437.html">Susana Díaz</a>, governor of Andalusia, demanded the government defend the jobs that might have been affected.</p>
<p>This disquiet triggered the involvement of the entire Spanish government – and before long, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/09/10/actualidad/1536588502_476070.html">Robles made a statement</a> before the Defence Commission of the Spanish Senate on September 10. In it, she denied that the shipment of bombs had been suspended, claiming that the transfer was solely under examination by her ministry.</p>
<p>In just a week, then, forced to consider the consequence on Spanish economy of the decision to cancel the transfer of armaments to Saudi Arabia, Robles withdrew her plan.</p>
<h2>Over the line</h2>
<p>Since March 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a coalition of countries in a military campaign against <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html">Houthi rebels</a> who had taken control of parts of Yemen. Since then, Saudi-led air forces have bombed the country on a massive scale, often claiming far more <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45382561">civilian lives</a> than could be reasonably be considered “collateral damage”.</p>
<p>In August 2018, an International Committee of the Red Cross representative in Yemen <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-icrc-deplores-civilian-cost-hodeida-attacks">put it bluntly</a>: “this lack of respect for civilian life and civilian property is reprehensible”. The same month, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E">a group of experts</a> appointed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights considered the violations of international law in the conflict. They reported that the majority of the civilian casualties were caused by the Saudi-led coalition’s air strikes, which <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/A_HRC_39_43_EN.docx">appeared to frequently target civilian targets</a> such as “residential areas, markets, funerals, weddings, detention facilities, civilian boats and even medical facilities”.</p>
<p>International law prohibits intentional attacks on civilians during a conflict, and requires that appropriate precautions be taken to reduce accidental civilian casualties. Any failure to abide with these rules amounts to a war crime.</p>
<p>Since the 1990s, the norms of the international arms trade have been entwined with the obligation to respect international law. Within the European Union, the subject is regulated by an <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8472/arms-export-control-arms-trade-treaty_en">EU Council Common Position</a> that prohibits the transfers of arms that would be used to commit serious violations of the law of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>Article 6 of the 2013 <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-arms-trade-treaty-37673">Arms Trade Treaty</a> prohibits transfers when the supplying state knows that the weapons would be used to attack civilians or to commit other war crimes. The treaty also holds that, before authorising an arms export, states must assess the potential risk that they will be used to commit serious violations of the law of armed conflicts.</p>
<p>Considering the frequent involvement of civilians and the targeting of civilian environments, states should hesitate to transfer arms to the Saudis. This means Robles’s concerns over Spain’s 400 bombs were every bit in line with the norms and laws of the international arms trade. Yet even though current international and European law provides legal arguments to support governments who move to stop dangerous arms sales, her move to bring Spain more closely in line with that law was stymied.</p>
<p>It’s just another grim reminder that whatever international law is in place to try and spare civilian lives in armed conflicts, money and business too often come first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riccardo Labianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When it comes to preventing air strikes on civilians, the law of the arms trade is clear. Why is it so hard for countries to observe it?Riccardo Labianco, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1007812018-07-31T13:09:17Z2018-07-31T13:09:17ZDigging up Franco: why Spain still can’t decide what to do with the dictator’s body<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229980/original/file-20180731-136673-kfp06w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/03/Franco777.jpg/1024px-Franco777.jpg">Wikipedia </a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The story of Spain during the 20th century is a complex one. The last remnants of the once-great Spanish empire were slipping away. The Second Spanish Republic was declared in April 1931 and King Alfonso XIII was forced into exile. In 1936 the country fell into a bloody civil war which lasted until the beginning of World War II. Francisco Franco held the nation under his dictatorship for almost four decades, shaping the country’s future for generations. And even in death, he continues to divide the nation, as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/spain-to-exhume-francos-remains-and-turn-site-into-place-of-reconciliation">debate</a> over his final resting place flares up once again. </p>
<p>Generally speaking, the majority on the right think that Franco’s significant role in modern Spanish society should allow his remains to stay within the national memorial site. Most on the left, however, see this as a barrier to reconciliation and want the body moved to a less ostentatious location.</p>
<p>Thousands died and many were exiled during the civil war and the early years of the dictatorial regime. The death of Franco in 1975, however, offered hope. Spain began its transition to democracy, seeing its first real elections in a generation.</p>
<p>Until relatively recently, political power in Spain has generally swung between two main parties. They often disagree over how the country remembers the past; one side wants to commemorate a significant period in the country’s history while the other wants a more balanced recognition of violent atrocities.</p>
<p>At a local level, something as everyday as the names of public buildings or <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-makes-up-with-salvador-dali-after-a-turbulent-relationship-33564">streets</a> can fluctuate depending on the parties in or out of power. In Madrid, the name of the Plaza del Caudillo (The Leader’s Square, in reference to Franco) was changed to refer <a href="https://www.abc.es/espana/madrid/abci-52-calles-cambian-nombre-madrid-memoria-historica-201704280027_noticia.html">only to the geographical area</a> – the Plaza de El Pardo.</p>
<p>Now, little over a month after seizing the country’s presidency from his rival, the Spanish socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez is suggesting that the body of the former dictator be exhumed from the Valley of the Fallen. This is the national site dedicated to those who died in Spain’s recent periods of unrest.</p>
<p>Sánchez’s party was behind a 2007 historical <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spanish-memory-law-reopens-deep-wounds-of-franco-era-394552.html">memory law</a> that was designed to reconcile various factions by recognising past conflicts and encouraging dialogue. It provided an acknowledgement of wrongdoing to those disadvantaged by the conflict, on both sides of the divide. Historically controversial images, such as the Francoist flag bearing an eagle, statues of Franco, and other memorials to nationalists were also removed.</p>
<p>The socialists now believe the removal of the dictator’s body from a site intended to be a place of national reflection – but which is sometimes seen as a shrine for right-wing pilgrims – would be a major step towards reconciliation.</p>
<p>The new PM is supported in his proposal by other left-wing and regional nationalist politicians. But the Popular Party of ousted premier Mariano Rajoy is firmly against any immediate exhumation attempts, despite unopposed parliamentary consensus in 2016 (when they abstained from the vote). </p>
<h2>Disputed memorial site</h2>
<p>The valley – Spain’s largest mass grave – is a controversial site. It was described by Franco himself as a memorial to end all wars, yet the question of what its future should be has caused decades of dispute. There are two right-wing Spanish leaders buried in the crypt there (José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Franco) and it is said that most of the other bodies in that section are from the nationalist side. A number of republican prisoners were involved in the building of the monument.</p>
<p>However, the wider mass burial ground includes the remains of victims from all sides. There are around 34,000 identified in total, although with a lack of clear records, the figure is estimated to be as high as 50,000 if you include unidentified victims. Bodies from other exhumed graves have also been relocated to the valley, accounting for a small proportion of the identified bodies there.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229983/original/file-20180731-136667-1wpn2mp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Valley of the Fallen is a disputed site of enormous significance for both sides.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/mlibrarianus/3709228817/in/photolist-6DLLuZ-3X1QJp-ejuv6E-6nyeLK-23UzfZc-ojAzWR-6Zny4t-4nWgHv-euHX2o-3pZz3J-8aQXST-h56NvZ-6pfsbM-euEKsc-h56MRH-3pZzh1-6z5ZB8-dghwaL-2JaYub-6z2JVo-h571P5-dhnx3p-dghvR7-dghwrs-KMQkW6-LFPgdm-LBNT4v-LijMWu-euEQhp-fGEt7-6Znyw2-9exqd-7QjKLz-7mhbX-6ZryfU-5jbUTq-7Qo775-ejoMzt-6oMH5D-euHYY3-hj82xf-ejusKA-ejurR1-5X52Qp-v1sUp-23SCECk-ejoL8t-ejutBw-6DQF8Q-cy2N1">Beth Tribe</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Popular Party argues that the nation needs to look to the future. It says focusing on issues like the economy and national unity would be a better use of time than talking about the past. Socialists have retorted that acting on the Franco question is precisely what is needed in order to look to the future. The position of the church will also be paramount, given that the tomb lies within the basilica on site. In a potential sign of things to come, a confraternity in Seville recently ended a three-year dispute by deciding to relocate the remains of the Francoist general, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/07/16/actualidad/1531763422_811016.html">Gonzalo Quiepo de Llano</a>, albeit to a more discreet location within the temple.</p>
<p>Time is of the essence politically. Before taking power, Sánchez was promising to hold elections within months. Any progress on memory issues such as what to do with Franco will depend almost entirely on the outcome of that election and legal findings. With the threat of legal challenges from the courts and those vehemently opposed to the exhumation, the government may be forced to change the law to <a href="https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2018-07-20/moncloa-decreto-ley-exhumar-franco-valle-caidos_1595109">prevent legal opposition</a> from all but the highest courts in the country.</p>
<p>And in practical terms, the site is currently in a state of significant disrepair. It has been <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Sacar-Franco-avispero-Valle-Caidos_0_783921862.html">completely closed</a> several times. Experts have suggested the exhumation could be done at minimal cost and completed in only one morning. However, it could cost tens of millions of euros to repair the Valley.</p>
<p>Exhumation or repair may come at significant political cost – or benefit – to any party taking action. But inaction comes with a bigger cost for Spanish society. If no change in mindset can be achieved, the country can’t hope to move on from the divisions of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark McKinty previously received funding from the AHRC.</span></em></p>New prime minister Pedro Sánchez wants to move the remains from a national memorial site. But not everyone agrees.Mark McKinty, Early Career Researcher in Spanish Studies, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/977242018-06-07T10:52:36Z2018-06-07T10:52:36ZWhat a new government in Spain means for Catalonia<p>Spain’s new prime minister Pedro Sanchez rose to office against a backdrop of <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-prime-minister-loses-no-confidence-vote-what-next-97564">unprecedented drama</a>. But now he could capitalise on the circumstances that landed him the top job to resolve the conflict with Catalonia.</p>
<p>Sanchez successfully ousted his predecessor Mariano Rajoy by passing a motion of no confidence against the Partido Popular government. Seizing on the unique opportunity offered by the sentencing of several prominent PP officials in a long-running corruption trial, the opposition leader moved quickly. </p>
<p>Sanchez needed at least 176 votes but his Socialist party (PSOE) only had 84 seats and Ciudadanos, a centrist-liberal formation with a strong Spanish nationalist rhetoric, wouldn’t endorse a new left-wing government. So, Sanchez needed to muster the support of all other parties in the Spanish parliament. This included the left-wing party Podemos, and several nationalist parties from the Basque country and Catalonia, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). </p>
<p>At the same time, in Barcelona, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44109500">Quim Torra</a> – a Catalan nationalist hand-picked by the exiled former president Carles Puigdemont – was elected leader of a new Catalan government. This came after months of protracted negotiations that followed the extraordinary <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-snap-election-how-to-understand-a-confusing-result-89547">regional elections</a> of December 2017. These were called by the Spanish central government immediately after it suspended the Catalan government for having symbolically issued a unilateral declaration of independence after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-independence-referendum-how-the-disputed-vote-led-to-crackdown-82277">referendum</a> held on October 1.</p>
<p>But any hope from Madrid that these elections would quell nationalist fervour backfired. The three parties in favour of Catalan independence (JuntsPerCat, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Candidatura d’Unitat Popular) returned to parliament with a majority (albeit a slim one), determined to pursue their cause, setting them on a collision course with Madrid. </p>
<p>To avert this collision, Sanchez must now make good on the promise he made to his Catalan parliamentary allies to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Catalan government on how to resolve the ongoing conflict. </p>
<h2>The basis of a deal</h2>
<p>At the basis of the deal between these parties was the common goal of ousting Rajoy from power. The Catalan parties will offer stability for the Spanish government: support for the continuation of a minority PSOE administration until the end of the legislature in 2020 and support on the party’s economic and social policies. </p>
<p>In exchange, the PSOE will need to make progress dealing with Spain’s unsolved national and territorial conflict since its transition to democracy in the late 1970s. </p>
<p>In the short term, Sanchez must de-escalate the conflict by putting an end to the acrimonious relationship between Spain and Catalonia. That means being willing to listen and to talk. There is already a ring of cautious optimism on that front. Sanchez seems prepared to engage in dialogue – unlike Rajoy. </p>
<p>Then Sanchez must restore the Catalan government’s authority, restoring devolved powers to the regional parliament. He will also have to deal with the trickier matter of the nationalist leaders who were jailed last autumn. This is a fundamental demand among many Catalans, who see them as political prisoners. But it may not be easy for the party to intervene in a judicial process without it looking like obvious political meddling.</p>
<p>In the longer term, Sanchez will need to think creatively about how to engage the Catalan government over Catalonia’s constitutional future within Spain. He will be treading a thin line, either side of which stand staunch opponents. On one side are the dyed-in-the-wool Catalan republicans, who harbour a seemingly irrepressible will to assert Catalonia’s right to decide its future. They will almost certainly demand a new, legally sanctioned referendum on self-determination. On the other side are the defenders of national unity, the PP and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/05/why-spains-top-populist-is-a-centrist/">Ciudadanos</a>, which may well soon take over the mantle of Spanish nationalism. They hold an equally firm view that any concession on the issue of self-determination is not permissible. That view is shared by an important portion of Spanish public, many of which vote for the PSOE. With a dwindling basis of electoral support, Sanchez can’t afford to alienate them.</p>
<h2>Federal reform</h2>
<p>So Sanchez will have to remain committed to accommodating Catalonia within the framework of the constitution. What that eventually looks like will depend on what is made possible by the political coalition that supports reform. One potential strategy available to the PSOE is to (re)capitalise on its ties with the Catalan Socialist Party to reach out to moderate nationalist forces in the Catalan parliament. They could hash out an agreement over potential federal constitutional reform. </p>
<p>At the heart of any reform are two major longstanding demands that will have to be addressed. The Catalan government wants a new fiscal settlement and for Catalonia to be recognised as a distinct nation within Spain. These reforms can be achieved through a revision of Catalonia’s statute of autonomy and would need to be ratified in a referendum by Catalan voters.</p>
<p>National recognition would represent an acknowledgement of Catalans’ sovereignty and their “right to decide” their constitutional future – albeit within the parameters set by the Spanish constitution. A referendum on a new statute could also open the door to a democratic option on independence. However, at this point, that’s unlikely to happen. The main difficulty will be to ensure this new statute can’t be overturned by future judicial challenges that may water it down.</p>
<h2>A narrow chance for success</h2>
<p>The deal brokered to support the socialist minority government is still fresh and there isn’t a huge amount of trust between the parties. There’s even some lingering hostility. So while there is a chance to solve the conflict with Catalonia, it’s narrow. The deal may yet break down. </p>
<p>But if parties on all sides are prepared to listen to divergent political views – and if Sanchez’s party can show creative spirit – there is hope that a political change in Spain could bring about a constructive dialogue. That, in time, could form the basis of a renewed relationship between Catalonia and Spain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97724/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pere Almeda receives funding from different Spanish and Catalan public administrations. I'm affiliated with the Think Tank Fundació Catalunya Europa </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A strange coincidence of historical circumstances in Spain could, taken together, help to bring about a resolution to the crisis in Catalonia.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamPere Almeda, Adjunct Lecturer, Universitat de BarcelonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/975642018-06-01T10:11:49Z2018-06-01T10:11:49ZSpain’s prime minister loses no-confidence vote: what next?<p>Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish prime minister, has been forced to resign by his national parliament, which voted by 180 seats to 169 in favour of a motion of no-confidence in his leadership. The vote indicates that the Spanish electorate’s patience with corruption is at an end – and puts the country on an uncertain path at an already difficult moment.</p>
<p>Rajoy had already survived one vote of no confidence, which was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/01/podemos-press-no-confidence-vote-mariano-rajoy-spain">tabled in May 2017</a> by left-wing opposition party Podemos, over the numerous corruption scandals tainting Rajoy’s ruling Popular Party (PP). Rajoy survived the vote largely because no-confidence votes in Spain are “constructive”, meaning confidence in the prime minister can only be withdrawn if there is an absolute majority in favour of a successor – and Podemos’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, was not seen as a viable alternative. </p>
<p>But even though that move failed, Rajoy was too unpopular to be safe. And had this latest vote of no confidence failed, his sheer unpopularity meant he would most likely have faced a third one.</p>
<h2>Caught out</h2>
<p>The latest no-confidence vote was called by Pedro Sánchez, the leader of the Socialist Party. He tabled it following a long-awaited verdict in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44247770">Gurtel corruption case</a>, which involved high-ranking members of the PP. The verdict was damning: Spain’s National Court ruled that the PP had profited from funds obtained illegally through “an authentic and efficient system of institutional corruption”. </p>
<p>The PP’s former treasurer, Luis Barcenas, received a 33-year jail sentence after being convicted of taking bribes, money-laundering and tax crimes. Another 29 officials and businessmen were also convicted of securing bribes for municipal contracts. The businessman at the heart of the corruption scandal, Francisco Correa, was sentenced to 51 years in prison.</p>
<p>Even more damming for Rajoy personally was that his own testimony was called into question. Judges <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/24/inenglish/1527173372_872035.html">wrote</a> that what he told the court “does not seem plausible enough to refute the solid existing evidence” about the party’s slush fund.</p>
<p>Spaniards were once happy to turn a blind eye to corruption; it seemed a normal part of both daily and political life. But things have changed. In 2011, they didn’t even rank corruption and fraud as one of Spain’s top seven problems – but according to <a href="http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/11_barometros/index.jsp">monthly opinion poll barometers</a>, since 2013, they now regularly identify it as the second most pressing issue after unemployment.</p>
<p>Rajoy’s popularity has long been slipping in the <a href="http://metroscopia.org/barometro-electoral-enero-2018/">polls</a>. In January 2018, his approval dipped to 27%. Albert Rivera, leader of the centre-right Ciudadanos was at that time polling at 54% and Sánchez 33%. Even among his own voters, Rajoy’s approval rating stood at 73%, lower than Rivera’s 81%.</p>
<p>The vote of no confidence was therefore a perfect opportunity for rival parties to jostle for position. </p>
<h2>How the vote was won</h2>
<p>To pass, Sánchez’s no-confidence motion needed to muster an absolute majority of 176 votes, but Socialist Party only holds 84 seats. Early on in the process, Pedro Sánchez managed to secure the support of Podemos, bringing along a further 67 seats; the left-wing Republican Catalan party (ERC) also agreed to support the no-confidence vote with its nine votes – while other smaller nationalist formations Compromís (four seats) and Nueva Canarias (one seat) also lent their support. This brought the no-confidence total to 165.</p>
<p>On the other side were the PP’s 134 seats. Ciudadanos, with its 32 seats, refused to vote Sánchez’s motion, but would have supported a different motion that would put in place a technocrat government to immediately call new elections. Also against were smaller groups traditionally allied with the PP, such as the UPN (two seats) and Foro Asturias (one seat). This took the final vote against the motion to 169. Suprisingly, Coalición Canaria (one seat), normally a PP ally, decided to abstain. </p>
<p>As is often the case in Spain’s parliament, the balance of power was left in the hands of the small nationalist parties. In this case, the three decisive blocs were the National Basque Party (PNV, five seats), the left-wing, nationalist Basque Eh Bildu (two seats) and the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT, eight seats).</p>
<p>The PNV was keen to avoid an early elections given that the most likely victor would be Ciudadanos, which has pursued a hard line against Catalan separatism and suggested rolling back some of the financial powers enjoyed by the Basque Country. It’s also anxious to safeguard the recently approved budget, which allocates €540m for infrastructure investment in the Basque Country. </p>
<p>But once other nationalist parties supported the no-confidence vote, the pressure on the PNV simply became too intense. The fact that Podemos had announced it would present another no-confidence vote if the Socialist initiative had failed, which in turn would have raised the prospect of an election, only added to the pressure.</p>
<p>The PDeCAT decided to support the motion after hearing Sánchez’s speech in the plenary, in which much was made of the desire to open a dialogue with the Catalan Government. Eh Bildu supported the desire to remove Rajoy but were not convinced Pedro Sánchez represents the necessary break with the current political regime. Ultimately they justified their support of the motion as a rejection of the PP rather than a vote for the Socialists. </p>
<h2>Now what?</h2>
<p>Spanish citizens are <a href="http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=14387">increasingly impatient</a> with the current political situation – and this parliamentary vote will only pile on more pressure. Yet the range of possible electoral outcomes does not present easy solutions to the current problems facing Spain – in particular, the Catalan question. </p>
<p>Ciudadanos might be the most popular political formation at the moment, but if it came to power it would immediately come up against the hostility of the Basque and Catalan nationalists. And even if the Socialists won an election – unlikely at the moment – they would still have to contend with the Catalan question. Since they’ve largely supported the PP’s approach since the independence referendum, that wouldn’t be easy. Rajoy might have been toppled, but there’s no easy road ahead for any party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley has previously received funding from the British Academy and Santander. </span></em></p>Leader of a corrupt party, an unpopular government and a divided country, Mariano Rajoy’s days were numbered long ago.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/895472017-12-22T16:04:20Z2017-12-22T16:04:20ZCatalonia’s snap election: how to understand a confusing result<p>It wasn’t supposed to turn out like this. When the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, dismissed the Catalan government in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">October</a> and called a snap election, he anticipated that anti-independence parties would obtain a majority. The plan was to return Catalonia – and Spain – to “normality”.</p>
<p>Given that several prominent pro-independence figures, including former president Carles Puigdemont, spent the campaign in self-imposed exile or in prison (the former deputy prime minister Oriol Junqueras remains behind bars) the gamble appeared justified. Instead, the pro-independence bloc retains its overall majority, obtaining 70 of the regional parliament’s 135 seats – only two fewer than in the last regional election in 2015.</p>
<p>Puigdemont and Junqueras decided at the start of the campaign not to repeat their 2015 alliance Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes). This now appears shrewd. Their total number of seats increased by four to 66. The weak link in the pro-independence chain was the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy – CUP), the uncompromising anti-capitalist party which has enjoyed considerable influence during its five-year existence. It now has just four representatives, six fewer than in 2015.</p>
<p>Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) obtained its worst result in Catalonia, losing eight of the 11 seats obtained in 2015 and haemorrhaging more than 165,000 votes.</p>
<p>However, the anti-independence Ciudadanos (Citizens), led by <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/22/ines-arrimadas-darling-catalonias-silent-majority/">Inés Arrimadas</a> was the party that actually fared best. The centre-right party obtained more seats (37) and votes (1,100,000) than any other party, having benefited most from the collapse in PP support. Arrimadas’s presidential hopes were only dashed by the relative failure of the other parties opposed to independence. The Catalan Socialists (PSC) won a disappointing 17 seats (one more than in 2015).</p>
<p>Podemos’s Catalan variant, Catalunya en Comú–Podem (Catalunya in Common - We Can), was punished for an ambiguous position on independence which verged on cognitive dissonance. Its calculation that it could be a power broker after the election seems to have been misguided as the party retained just eight of its 13 seats. A geographical divide within Catalonia was also reaffirmed as support for independence was much lower in Barcelona than in the region’s other three provinces.</p>
<h2>A leader in exile</h2>
<p>Shortly after the results were announced, Puigdemont, speaking in Brussels, claimed – with some justification – that Rajoy had designed the election to take place in such a way as to assist the anti-independence cause. Instead, the overall majority in favour of independence has been reaffirmed.</p>
<p>Puigdemont’s own position in the aftermath of the election will now be the focus of speculation. He might understandably regard himself as the obvious candidate to be Catalan president but he is likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-a-lawyer-explains-the-charges-brought-against-carles-puigdemont-86715">arrested</a> should he return to Spain. Another key issue is the continued application of Article 155 of Spain’s constitution, suspending devolved powers. Whether it remains in force until the formation of a government in Barcelona remains to be seen.</p>
<p>Arrimadas has reminded her pro-independence opponents that her party actually won the election and indicated that she would strive to form a pro-unionist coalition. She nevertheless conceded that the electoral arithmetic meant that such a coalition would be difficult to achieve. The anti-independence bloc will nevertheless be relieved that its opponents once again fell short of 50% of the vote despite a remarkably high turnout of just under 82%.</p>
<h2>Rajoy’s next move</h2>
<p>Given the blow dealt to his credibility, Rajoy may now even consider bringing forward a general election – which is not officially due until mid-2020. The campaign would inevitably be dominated by the Catalan question and, beyond Catalonia, Rajoy’s uncompromising stance has been popular. An early vote would also provide him and those in favour of maintaining Catalonia’s status within Spain with a mandate from the electorate.</p>
<p>But early elections are not without risk. The shift from Rajoy’s Popular Party to Ciudadanos in Catalonia may spread to Spain. It might be argued that Catalonia was never a stronghold for the Popular Party in the first place, but the scale of the party’s collapse at the hands of Ciudadanos raises questions about Rajoy’s credentials. Is he really the figure best-placed to solve the constitutional crisis in the long term?</p>
<p>A further concern for Rajoy is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-european-unions-hands-are-tied-over-catalonia-85661">European Union</a> might even begin to reconsider its stance on Catalonia in the light of the election result. Thus far, the EU has unambiguously backed his anti-independence stance. The fact that those parties wishing to break free from Spain undeniably attract significant support may cause as much unease in Brussels as it does in Madrid.</p>
<p>For the pro-independence bloc, there is solace in the fact that it won most seats even if it failed to break through the crucial 50% threshold across the region. Within the anti-independence ranks, Ciudadanos obtained more than a quarter of the vote and more seats than any other party. Arrimadas has established herself as a key political figure who is more capable of attracting support in the region than the Popular Party, the Catalan Socialists, or the Catalan branch of Podemos, all of whom have been left with much to ponder.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, no party or bloc can claim outright victory. Whereas Rajoy hoped that the election would ultimately serve to catch the independence bloc on the wrong foot, he has instead entrenched further division. The absence of a clear way forward is of concern. Catalonia and Spain remain in crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The single biggest party was anti-independence but together, the pro-independence bloc is stronger.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathDavid Cutts, Professor of Political Science, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864892017-10-27T15:19:14Z2017-10-27T15:19:14ZCatalonia declares independence – and Spain enters uncharted territory<p>Shortly after Catalonia’s parliament in Barcelona voted to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">declare independence</a> from Spain on October 27, the senate in Madrid voted to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, removing Catalonia’s autonomy. </p>
<p>In his speech to the senate requesting that deputies approve the proposal, the Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20171027/breaking-catalan-parliament-passes-resolution-declaring-independence">justified his request</a> in the face of “a continuous process of anti-democratic decisions” in Catalonia. </p>
<p>One of the first measures required by Article 155 will be the sacking of the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, which would pave the way for Rajoy to call elections within six months. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Catalan parliament, parliamentarians voted in secret on a proposal from the ruling coalition Junts Pel Sí (Together for Yes) and the far-left Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) to begin a constituent process in order to proclaim the independent Republic of Catalonia. The final vote in the 135-seat chamber was 70 deputies in favour, 10 against and two abstentions. Dozens of deputies from the opposition Catalan Popular Party, the Catalan Socialist party (PSC) and the Ciudadanos party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">abandoned the plenary session</a> ahead of the vote.</p>
<p>In response to the Catalan parliament’s vote, Rajoy went on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/marianorajoy/status/923904575509327872">to ask all Spaniards</a> for calm and to note that the rule of law would be restored in Catalonia.</p>
<p>The vote closed down the one conciliatory amendment which had been proposed by the Socialists in the Madrid senate to freeze the triggering of Article 155 if elections were called in Catalonia. Instead, the vote in favour of independence was seen as a slap in the face for dialogue. </p>
<p>There was little in the way of conciliation present in the senate. Various deputies from Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP) jubilantly applauded parts of the premier’s speech in a manner that seemed overly triumphal and expressly designed to trample upon Catalan sentiment. Rajoy repeatedly criticised Puigdemont for appearing to turn down any offer of dialogue with the Spanish government. Puigdemont, on the other hand, had viewed the request to appear before the senate less as a desire for negotiation and more as an imposition.</p>
<h2>What the people think</h2>
<p>As the two elected assemblies went head-to-head, the rallying cry <em>No nos representan</em> “they don’t represent us” seems as relevant today as when it became the defining <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/15/spain-15-m-movement-activism">cry of the indignant movement</a>, or 15-M movement, which erupted in Spain in 2011 in a challenge to the political status quo. </p>
<p>While the political elites in both Catalonia and Madrid have both been calling the shots, it is not clear what support they have behind them to do so. The Catalan referendum on October 1 was not an accurate representation of the support for a declaration of independence. At 42%, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-storm-catalan-ref-polling-stations">turnout was suppressed</a> – in part because of a heavy police presence and the best efforts of the Spanish government to disrupt the vote. But also because only those in favour of independence were likely to turn out to vote. </p>
<p>Nor was there any time for a proper campaign before the referendum in which the arguments for and against independence could properly be aired and discussed. </p>
<p>There was barely a month between the Catalan parliament <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41177428">passing a law</a> to approve the referendum and the vote itself. It is therefore hard to gauge either the level of public support for independence or the level of public understanding which might underpin such a move.</p>
<p>The most recent elections in both Catalonia and Spain are also an unreliable indicator of public sentiment on the independence question. Rather, they lay bare the divisions which exist in Catalonia and Spain on a whole variety of issues. The June 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-is-a-third-election-in-a-year-on-the-horizon-63681">general election</a> – a re-run of December 2015’s election – reaffirmed the reluctance of voters to give any party an absolute majority. Although Rajoy’s PP strengthened its position <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36632276">with 33% of the vote and 137 seats</a>, this was still short of the 176 seats needed for an absolute majority.</p>
<p>The picture is also fragmented in Catalonia where the ruling coalition Junts pel Sí fell short of an absolute majority in the 2015 elections. Gaining 62 seats with 39.6% of the vote, it was forced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/catalan-separatists-win-election-and-claim-it-as-yes-vote-for-breakaway">form a minority government</a> with the CUP lending confidence and supplying support. Together these separatist political formations garnered 44.3% of the popular vote.</p>
<p>In both Catalonia and across Spain, voters did not give any political party the mandate to govern with an absolute majority. This is a message that politicians should have heeded. It denotes an electorate which wants compromise and negotiation between parties rather than the adoption of maximalist positions by any single political formation.</p>
<p>In all political processes, choices are made at the mass level as well as the elite level. Elite figures should take their cue from voters and the behaviour of groups in civil society who in turn often adapt their behaviour and choices in light of the actions of elites. </p>
<p>The ability to find a negotiated solution to the crisis in Catalonia then depends on both the elites and the general population. While Catalan leaders obviously felt they were fulfilling their historic duty in the face of protesters calling for independence outside the Catalan parliament, those cheering the loudest should not be confused with the views of all in Catalonia. </p>
<p>Although already weary of voting, it is likely that the electorate could once again be called to the polls in Catalonia as one way out of this current impasse. It is time all of the people had their say.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley has previously received funding from the British Academy and a Santander mobility grant.</span></em></p>Move by the senate in Madrid came just after the Catalan parliament voted for independence.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/862812017-10-26T15:15:32Z2017-10-26T15:15:32ZCatalonia crisis shows Spain’s constitution is no longer fit for purpose<p>Amid reports swirling that Catalonia’s president, Carles Puigdemont, was either set to call new elections to the Catalan parliament or declare full independence from Spain, he abruptly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41760832">cancelled a scheduled press conference</a> on October 26. When he did speak, he did not call elections and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41760832">said it was up to</a> Catalonia’s parliament to decide how to act. </p>
<p>For Puigdemont, calling new elections would be a high-risk tactic. Even though many have come to deeply dislike the government’s violent response to Catalonia’s independence referendum on October 1, there is also dissatisfaction among Catalans who do not want independence. Puigdemont cannot guarantee that another poll will deal him a stronger hand. It could be seen as a tactic to remove the threat of an imposition of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, which would revoke Catalonia’s powers of autonomy – although the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has not officially confirmed that this would be the case. </p>
<p>Following Puigdemont’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/catalan-government-suspends-declaration-of-independence">semi-declaration of independence</a> on October 10, he called for an opening of negotiations with Rajoy. But due to errors on both sides, the possibility for constructive dialogue remains feeble.</p>
<p>The decision of Catalan nationalists to commit to a legally binding referendum, despite the Constitutional Court ruling it to be illegal, was a statement intended to draw a line in the sand. The Rajoy government, however, fanned the fire rather than put it out. By bringing the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/catalonia-independence-referendum-civil-guard-riot-violence-rubber-bullets-a7977046.html">Civil Guard onto the streets of Barcelona</a>, and using every little bit of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/spains-ominous-gag-law.html">crowd control legislation passed in July 2015</a>, the government succeeded in turning an increasing amount of Catalans against them. The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/16/two-catalan-independence-leaders-taken-custody-spanish-government/">arrests</a> of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, the leaders of the two main nationalist organisations in Catalonia, also sparked further outrage.</p>
<p>If, against the current tide, the parties do manage to open negotiations, there would immediately be pressure for a new referendum that has the support of the Spanish parliament. But, after a turbulent period with <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-steels-itself-for-another-election-after-months-with-no-government-60675">two general elections</a> in the span of six months in 2016, the Spanish parliament is highly divided and fragmented. The two main parties, Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP) and the socialist Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), are facing a rising challenge from the newcomers Podemos, on the left, and the centre-right Cuidadanos party. </p>
<p>The current circumstances could spur calls for new elections to the Spanish central parliament too. Rajoy, who is in a weak position and presides over a minority government, technically has little interest in causing a great political stir. At the same time, he is afraid of being seen as weak in a term which has seen prominent members of his party on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/68d7b4a0-6e09-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa?mhq5j=e6">trial for corruption</a> and Rajoy called as a witness. </p>
<p>The electoral base of Rajoy’s PP, which has some <a href="http://www.eldiario.es/zonacritica/franquismo-PP_6_410918913.html">uncomfortable connections to the Francoist past</a>, has little patience for the nationalities question and has often resisted increased autonomy for Spain’s regions. However, even the PSOE – led by the newly re-elected Pedro Sanchez – is largely unwilling to make great concessions to the nations: Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia. The GAL scandal of the 1990s, when it emerged that the PSOE government had <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/141720.stm">funded a death squad</a> against the Basque-separatist group ETA, is a reminder of how toxic the issue of national independence remains, both on the left and on the right.</p>
<h2>Revoking autonomous powers</h2>
<p>Rajoy’s government plans to invoke Article 155, a paragraph of the <a href="http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf">Spanish constitution</a> which allows the central government to revoke the powers of autonomous communities if the: “autonomous community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way seriously prejudicing the general interests of Spain.” </p>
<p>This article has only ever been seriously considered once before, when the Gonzalez government in the late 1980s required the Canary Islands to <a href="http://www.abc.es/espana/canarias/abci-farol-casi-cuesta-canarias-articulo-155-201710052341_noticia.html">comply with new fiscal rules as per EU regulation</a>. In this instance, Article 155 was never actually imposed since the Canary Islands complied with the request and the government did not suspend the powers of the autonomous community. Its imminent invocation is <em>terra incognita</em> for Rajoy. </p>
<p>Article 155 does not enable a complete elimination of the autonomous community, simply a circumscription of its powers, be that political or economic. These powers could be related to the fiscal autonomy of the region, effectively rendering the Catalan parliament superfluous. Rajoy might also opt to take charge of the Catalan police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra. If the Mossos choose to remain loyal to the region, further intervention by the Guardia Civil, which answers to the central state, may seem necessary to Rajoy. </p>
<h2>Need for constitutional reform</h2>
<p>When Franco died in 1975, there were high hopes that Spain would successfully transition to democracy. In many ways, this is what has happened, and Spain consistently <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/spain">performs well in Freedom House rankings</a> on the quality of democracy. But the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">crisis in Catalonia</a> has raised questions about whether Spain has really moved on from its violent past – and whether the Spanish constitution remains fit for purpose. It has proved rigid and out of touch with people’s lives, and is losing legitimacy. </p>
<p>The Constitutional Court is a heavily politicised body, and several of its members <a href="https://www.elplural.com/los-genoveses/2017/03/14/el-tribunal-constitucional-gira-mas-la-derecha">have strong ties to Rajoy’s PP</a>. Of its 12 members, eight are chosen by parliament, two by the government, and two by the Consejo General del Poder Judicial, the highest judicial body in Spain. With a third of the members on the Constitutional Tribunal being renewed every three years, this gives a government with a parliamentary majority ample room to influence the membership of the court.</p>
<p>The Spanish constitution is being read through a particular political prism, reflecting the hostility of the Spanish right towards the nationalities. Constitutional reform is necessary, but will be impossible to realise without support from both the PP and PSOE.</p>
<p><em>This piece was commissioned in collaboration with the <a href="https://campaignforsocialscience.org.uk/">Campaign for Social Science</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmy Eklundh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bid for Catalonian independence brings return of a divided Spain.Emmy Eklundh, Lecturer in Spanish and International Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/862432017-10-24T13:51:03Z2017-10-24T13:51:03ZSpain’s hard line on Catalonia is no way to handle a serious secession crisis<p>Spain is facing its deepest constitutional crisis since the restoration of democracy in 1977, and it’s only getting deeper. On October 18, the Spanish government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/spain-direct-rule-catalonia-deadline-direct-rule">invoked Article 155</a> of the Spanish Constitution, beginning the process of stripping the Catalan government of its autonomy and imposing direct federal rule. Just hours after the announcement was made by the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, 450,000 people took to the streets in protest.</p>
<p>Citing the Catalan government’s “conscious and systematic rebellion and disobedience”, this is a heavy-handed response to Catalonia’s recent separatist moves. Spain hardened its line when it <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-independence-leaders-jailed-spain-judge-sedition-jordi-sanchez-jordi-cuixart-latest-news-a8004001.html">jailed the leaders of two of the largest separatist organisations</a>. The national attorney general has now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/25/spain-attorney-general-refuses-rule-out-arrest-catalan-president">threatened to arrest</a> the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, and others for sedition should a further declaration of independence be issued.</p>
<p>These tough measures aren’t just politically risky and pragmatically dubious, but also constitutionally untested. It is the first time that Article 155 has been invoked, allowing the government to intervene in one of Spain’s regions if its autonomous government “fails to fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the constitution or other laws, or acts in a way seriously prejudicing the general interests of Spain”. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Constitution-of-1978">Constitution of 1978</a> provides for a flexible and open framework that recognises both “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” and “the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions”. And while the Catalan government’s decision to hold the October 1 referendum undoubtedly violated both the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the refusal of the central government to pursue dialogue with the Catalan government, and its attempts to oust democratically elected leaders and suspend regional autonomy will only deepen the antagonism between Catalonia and Madrid. </p>
<p>The question, then, is what an appropriate and reasonable response to this secession claim would look like. And inconveniently, this is something of a grey area.</p>
<h2>Taking independence seriously</h2>
<p>While international law affirms that peoples have a general right to self-determination, it provides little guidance on how that right should be exercised. It’s particularly vague when it comes to secession, which leaves claims like the Catalans’ in something of a legal vacuum. In its <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf">Kosovo opinion of 2010</a>, the International Court of Justice found that a unilateral declaration of independence does “not violate general international law”, but the specific international or domestic legal ramifications of a secessionist claim were left unclear.</p>
<p>The upshot is that different national governments can treat these claims almost as they see fit. The resulting ambiguity is a tricky problem, and it’s played out vividly in two analogous independence movements: Quebec’s and Scotland’s.</p>
<p>In 1995, the Quebecois independence movement <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-referendum-1995/%3E">lost a referendum on independence</a> by a mere 1.16%. The result kicked off years of political talks and legal wrangling, and in 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada weighed in on whether secession claims were legitimate in principle. </p>
<p>It <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do">concluded</a> that outside of a colonial context and in the absence of severe repression or exclusion from the state, there is no positive entitlement to claim statehood. But it also found that the Canadian state, at least on the basis of its own constitutional law, could not “remain indifferent to the clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada”. Crucially, the court noted that under the Canadian constitution, the government has a duty to negotiate. Were it to refuse, that could undermine its claim to legitimacy, which could have international ramifications.</p>
<p>Following this logic, were Quebec to vote for independence in some future referendum, that would impose a duty on the federal government and the province alike to enter into negotiations in good faith – though there would be no specific obligation to conclude the negotiations amicably. </p>
<p>Then there’s Scotland. The UK Government took a similar approach to Canada, passing the <a href="http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence">Edinburgh Agreement</a> in 2012, which granted Scottish nationalists legal authority to stage an independence referendum. They duly did so in 2014. And while that vote ultimately endorsed the status quo, had a majority been in favour of independence, it was largely accepted that the result would have been binding .</p>
<h2>Refuse and reject</h2>
<p>The Spanish government has chosen to pursue a different course. While the vast majority of Catalans <a href="http://www.publico.es/politica/encuesta-catalunya-82-catalanes-creen-solucion-referendum-independencia-pactado.html">wanted to vote in a referendum</a>, the central authorities have been steadfast in their refusal to allow a vote, or recognise the result, and are now refusing to engage in dialogue with the Catalan authorities.</p>
<p>This intransigence dates back to at least 2010, when the independence campaign emerged in response to a growing dissatisfaction with current constitutional arrangements, a centralisation of the distribution of competences, and the impact of the financial crisis. With the Spanish government not responding to requests for dialogue, the Catalan authorities have for years <a href="http://exteriors.gencat.cat/web/.content/00_ACTUALITAT/notes_context/Llei-del-Referendum_ENGLISH.pdf">continually invoked</a> a “right to decide”, derived from a broad reading of self-determination as the right to “democratic management of public affairs”. </p>
<p>Legally speaking, it’s a stretch to argue that the principle of self-determination guarantees the right to hold a vote on secession. Nevertheless, the principle of free political participation and representation is clearly established under international law, and it could certainly provide the basis of a demand for dialogue and negotiation where there is broad public support for independence.</p>
<p>Given that there is also <a href="https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/10/03/elisenda-casanas-adam-the-referendum-on-catalonian-independence-the-position-of-the-catalan-authorities/">scope for seeking dialogue</a> under the Spanish Constitution, this latest sabre-rattling by the Spanish government is unwarranted, as are its actions in recent weeks – threats to arrest Catalan mayors, interference with civic budgets, raids on newspaper office, and mass police deployment including excessive force used by the Spanish police in attempting to prevent the Referendum taking place. These all reinforce the secessionists’ narrative of repression by an anti-Catalan Spanish regime. </p>
<p>For the good of Spain as a whole, a collaborative and productive dialogue needs to begin. The Spanish government’s actions have not yet crossed the threshold of repression that would grant the Catalans a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession/">so-called</a> “remedial right” of independence under international law, but its intransigent, hardline approach is inflaming tensions to no end – and enhancing the credibility of the Catalan claim.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miriam Bak McKenna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Spanish government is dealing with the Catalonian secession movement in entirely the wrong way. But what would getting it right look like?Miriam Bak McKenna, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Law, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/853772017-10-09T11:37:31Z2017-10-09T11:37:31ZCrisis in Catalonia: what the EU must do now<p>Unless the Catalan and Spanish governments immediately open a dialogue about the constitutional future of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">Catalonia</a>, the violent scenes in the region may only be a precursor of things to come. But for this dialogue to take place, the EU must be involved.</p>
<p>With the instant, worldwide circulation of images of brutal police repression of defenceless, peaceful voters, the Catalan government won the battle for public sympathy. However, it is in fact isolated in its struggle.</p>
<p>Madrid has maintained its hard line, refusing to recognise the vote or its result. This strategy has been bolstered by <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/catalan-referendum-spain-king-felipe-attacks-separatist-politicians-unity-a7981701.html">King Felipe’s intervention</a>. Rather than appealing for national unity, he offered a one-sided condemnation of the conflict. The government is also supported by most other Spanish parties, as well as the editorial line of the main Spanish dailies such as El Pais and El Mundo. Catalonia’s potential allies in other historic regions such as the Basque country have remained remarkably silent. </p>
<p>Beyond Spain, European leaders have either taken a neutral stance, relegating the conflict to an internal matter for Spain to resolve, or have offered support to the Spanish government’s defence of the rule of law.</p>
<h2>Risky strategies</h2>
<p>The Catalan government’s current trajectory is fraught with risk. It hasn’t, for one thing, acknowledged the real divisions that exist within Catalonia about the desirability of independence. </p>
<p>And its extreme position is only being met by more immovability from Madrid. The courts have already promised to suspend the parliamentary session in which the Catalan government could declare independence. The central government could go further. It could use its constitutional powers to impose <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/08/catalonia-spain-prime-minister-refuses-rule-out-suspending-autonomy">direct rule</a>. If police intervention were met with protest, it could lead to further clashes, replete with truncheons, rubber bullets, and bloodshed.</p>
<p>But this strategy is equally risky. It does nothing to address the growing sources of grievances in Catalonia. It only adds to the cycle of conflict. Nor is it clear that it could actually work. The 10,000 members of the Guardia Civil deployed across Catalonia could not prevent over 2m voters from casting their ballots. It is doubtful that the Spanish central government could credibly prevent Catalonia from declaring independence without taking brutally repressive measures. But this would have serious economic and political ramifications for the EU.</p>
<p>Already, two large Spanish banks – Sabadell and CaixaBank – are switching their main offices <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1cdfc2c2-4f8f-322e-a982-e8985a606ac7">so as not to be based in Catalonia</a>. With capital flying out of its largest economic region, the Spanish stock exchange took a tumble. This has the potential to seriously affect the value of the euro. The messy economics of a divorce could trigger a return to the volatility that the eurozone experienced in 2011-12.</p>
<p>The EU has remained shamefully powerless in the face of the illiberal measures deployed by right-wing governments in <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-everyone-is-giving-poland-a-hard-time-53074">Poland</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-is-on-the-brink-in-hungary-so-why-is-no-one-talking-about-it-82163">Hungary</a>, towards their media and judiciary. Its reputation would be further tarnished if one of its more established members could curtail the rights of its national minorities.</p>
<p>For these reasons, the EU has the duty to facilitate a dialogue between the Catalan and Spanish governments and to bring them back from the brink.</p>
<p>The EU’s reluctance to engage stems from the fact that these are uncharted waters. The violent territorial conflicts that have beset other countries such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/northern-ireland-1670">Northern Ireland</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/q-a-the-cyprus-reunification-talks-71035">Cyprus</a> and Bosnia-Herzegovina were mediated, to varying degrees of success, by national governments, the United Nations and third parties like the United States. The EU has few procedures for bringing parties in a territorial conflict to the negotiation table. Creativity will be needed.</p>
<h2>What the EU could do</h2>
<p>The first action is for the European Parliament to pass a resolution, endorsed by the Council of Ministers, condemning the situation. This should assign responsibility to both parties and recall the cardinal values of the rule of law, democracy and minority rights in the European constitutional order. This resolution should receive a full endorsement from Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, as well as the heads of governments, such as Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Emmanuel Macron.</p>
<p>Then the EU must offer to act as an impartial mediator in the dialogue. Given the heightened tensions and mutual recriminations, this dialogue cannot be left unmediated. The Catalan government will not accept that the Spanish government take on the role of both an interlocutor and an arbiter.</p>
<p>The EU needs to offer a way out of the conflict. The basic condition for dialogue is a formal renunciation of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Catalan government, in exchange for the right to hold a new legally-sanctioned referendum on independence. In case of a NO vote, the Catalan government should then open negotiation for a revision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, that offers symbolic recognition of Catalonia’s nationhood and a better fiscal pact. </p>
<p>This deal needs to be accompanied by the promise that the EU will not recognise Catalan independence if is illegal and that the Spanish government will be suspended from the Council of Ministers if it violates civil rights in Catalonia.</p>
<p>Europe is not short of diplomatic talent that could be called upon to help foster dialogue: Ireland’s former president Mary Robinson, Carld Bildt, who negotiated negotiated Sweden’s EU accession, and Paddy Ashdown, who served as the high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, are well-seasoned politicians who could play a constructive role in diffusing the crisis. </p>
<h2>Failing to act</h2>
<p>Inaction would have devastating repercussions for Catalonia, Spain and the EU. </p>
<p>To force a reluctant central government to the negotiation table, Catalan people could deploy their most successful strategy so far: mass protests, general strikes, and widespread civil disobedience that would bring the regional and national economy to a standstill and generate further political turmoil.</p>
<p>Or, realising that negotiation is not a forthcoming strategy, it could choose to declare independence unilaterally, with all the consequences that this could reap.</p>
<p>Both scenarios would result from the failure to act.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The potential for more violence is clear unless the two sides can be brought to the negotiating table as soon as possible.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/849012017-10-05T00:57:08Z2017-10-05T00:57:08ZCatalonia’s referendum unmasks authoritarianism in Spain<p>I have long worried about the <a href="https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/states_of_discipline/3-156-3eb492f3-d863-492d-9c2e-908eecf451d3">rise of authoritarianism</a> in the European Union.</p>
<p>The Spanish government’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2017/oct/01/catalan-referendum-hundreds-injured-as-police-attack-protesters-video">violent crackdown</a> during the Catalonia referendum on Oct. 1 is the latest crisis to challenge EU institutions. Several member states are facing serious questions about <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/referendums/scottish-referendum">territorial sovereignty</a>. Just look to the Scottish referendum to leave the U.K. and questions opened up by the Brexit vote over the Irish border.</p>
<p>Catalonia experienced a level of police brutality not often seen in developed democracies. <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/01/europe/catalonia-spain-independence-referendum-vote/index.html">More than 800 people</a> were injured, more than 100 of whom were hospitalized. Yet, in a rare televised appearance, King Felipe VI expressed <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-41491743/spanish-king-catalan-society-is-fractured">full support</a> for the Spanish government’s actions.</p>
<p>As a <a href="http://utrgv.academia.edu/M%C3%B2nicaCluaLosada">scholar</a> of Spanish politics, I fear this creates the possibility for more repression and even the abolition of Catalonia’s autonomy.</p>
<p>Why has the Spanish government reacted with such a severe crackdown? To answer that question, it might useful to go back more than 40 years.</p>
<h2>Franco’s legacy</h2>
<p>When Spanish dictator Francisco Franco died in 1975, pro-democracy forces feared a new military coup. So they carefully crafted Spain’s <a href="http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf">1978 Constitution</a> to ensure stability, rather than create a radical change from authoritarianism.</p>
<p>The transition to democracy involved increasing political freedom for groups that had opposed Franco and had been persecuted by his dictatorship. But it also incorporated existing authoritarian groups and officials into the state. They included the Francoist military, the church and state structures that existed during the dictatorship – such as the judiciary, the police and the civil service.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=786&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=786&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=786&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/188671/original/file-20171003-18673-8fo1s8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=987&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Is Spain in danger of returning to the authoritarian days of the Franco dictatorship?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Francisco_Franco_and_Carmen_Polo.jpg">Zoeken Fotocollectie, Dutch National Archives</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Constitution, and subsequent agreements in 1981 and 1992, organized Spain into 17 autonomous communities. Each has its own executive, legislative and judicial powers. World leaders heralded Spain as an ideal model for peacefully <a href="http://www.oupress.com/ECommerce/Book/Detail/1179/the%20third%20wave">transitioning to democracy</a>. However, its focus on inclusivity, rather than change, meant future demands for self-determination would be shut down. <a href="http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=155&tipo=2">Article 155</a> of the Constitution states that if an autonomous community operates against the general interest of the state they can be suspended by the Senate.</p>
<h2>Spain’s constitutional order</h2>
<p>Catalonia, through years of negotiation, has maintained a relatively high level of autonomy from Spain. The <a href="http://web.gencat.cat/ca/inici/">Catalan government</a> has authority over health care provision, education, local police and many other areas.</p>
<p>However, since 2010, the Spanish judicial body known as the Constitutional Tribunal has refuted many pieces of legislation approved by the Catalan Parliament. This stands in contrast to the U.S., where the Supreme Court deliberates on constitutional matters. In Spain, the Constitutional Tribunal has overturned political decisions made by the Catalan Parliament, such as the housing emergency and fuel poverty bills and a Catalan statute in 2006. This has strengthened Catalonia’s desire for true independence from Spain.</p>
<p>Often, the Constitutional Tribunal has also acted in accordance with the Spanish Executive Cabinet, leading many to <a href="http://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/nueva-politica/politizacion-Tribunal-Constitucional_0_177082923.html">question</a> the separation of powers between the two. Ten members of the 12-person Constitutional Tribunal are political appointees. The other two are appointed by the General Council of Judicial Power – the body in charge of overseeing the judiciary in Spain. The council is also primarily appointed politically. Meanwhile, the Spanish Executive Cabinet <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/world/europe/catalonia-independence-mariano-rajoy.html">has refused</a>, since 2011, to negotiate with their Catalan counterparts on issues to do with more autonomy.</p>
<p>In fact, since 2011, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and his government <a href="http://www.academia.edu/30519987/Authoritarian_Neoliberalism_and_the_Disciplining_of_Labour">have ruled primarily by decrees</a>, which do not require input from the legislative branch. For example, the first Rajoy government (2011–2015) approved 33.8 percent of its legislation by decrees. Compare this to a figure of 20 percent the previous time the same party was in power (2000-2004).</p>
<p>Further evidence of the authoritarian turn of the Spanish government is the approval of repressive laws such as one known popularly as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/spains-ominous-gag-law.html">Gag Law</a> (“Ley Mordaza” in Spanish) in 2015. The law criminalizes many forms of protest and imposes high fines. The government claimed it would protect public order. This law, and the use of excessive force by police in Spain, has been repeatedly denounced by international organizations such as <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/spain/report-spain/">Amnesty International</a>.</p>
<h2>Vanguard of protests</h2>
<p>The rift between Catalonia and the state is also rooted in the 2008 world financial crisis, which hit Catalonia and Spain <a href="https://www.planetadelibros.com/libro-el-impacto-de-la-crisis-en-las-familias-y-en-la-infancia/70358">particularly hard</a>. People suffered from <a href="http://observatoridesc.org/sites/default/files/2013-housing-emergency-spain-observatory-desc.pdf">housing foreclosures</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/25/spain-unemployment-soars-record-high">mass unemployment</a> (consistently over 20 percent since 2011) and deep cuts to public spending. Since 2011, the economic crisis has become a political crisis. Corruption scandals involving the governing party and even the monarchy have caused deep indignation among the population.</p>
<p>The response has often been stronger in Catalonia, where many of anti-austerity movements have originated. They has involved mass demonstrations, occupations of squares and the development of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-016-0072-8">mass social movement groups</a> such as the <a href="http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2015/05/20/building-future-crisis-housing/">Platform of People Affected by Mortgages</a>. </p>
<p>Catalans have been protesting regularly. Demonstrations of more than 1 million people have become the norm. <a href="http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/11/18/catalan-democratic-rebellion/">On Nov. 9, 2014</a>, Catalonia held a “public consultation” that the Constitutional Tribunal ruled illegal. The poll was meant to be a test-case referendum and attracted more than 2.5 million voters in what can be considered Europe’s largest organized civil disobedience protest.</p>
<p>For many Catalans, the Oct. 1 vote had to be different from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/world/europe/catalans-vote-in-straw-poll-on-independence-from-spain.html">previous</a> one, as they felt it was time to find another way forward given Spain’s refusal to negotiate. The ensuing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/opinion/catalonia-independence-referendum-spain.html">violence and chaos</a>, which were sparsely reported by <a href="http://www.lavanguardia.com/television/20171002/431739446450/tve-referendum-1o-catalunya-periodistas-criticas.html">Spain’s public TV channels</a>, show a government unwilling to deal with dissent and prepared to violate the democratic institutions of a region and its people. Although the constitution does not grant the right to secede, constitutional change is not unheard of in modern democracies, including <a href="https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/08/23/actualidad/1314128715_080054.html">Spain</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/catalan-referendum-eu-leaders-remain-muted-over-police-crackdown">EU’s reluctance to get involved</a> has left a vacuum in leadership. The EU has acted in response to other member states resorting to authoritarianism in the EU, such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/27/eu-finally-steps-hungarys-rights-crisis">Hungary</a>. We can now wonder, does the EU’s response to authoritarianism depend on whether the member state is in the west or in the east?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84901/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Clua Losada does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why did the Spanish state forcefully quash Catalonia’s referendum for independence? It is rooted in the country’s nearly 40-year dictatorship and its transition to democracy.Monica Clua Losada, Associate Professor in Global Political Economy, University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850142017-10-02T12:38:28Z2017-10-02T12:38:28ZSpanish government crushes Catalan independence dreams – at a high price<p>Europe has had a rocky ride with referendums in recent years: think of Greece’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33492387">anti-austerity vote</a> in 2015, or the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a> shock and Italy’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-italian-referendum-no-trump-nor-brexit-69603">failed constitutional referendum</a> in December 2016. As the UK found with the 2014 Scottish independence vote, even holding a referendum at all can be <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-vote-gives-uk-a-chance-to-repair-itself-but-its-a-big-job-31918">highly destabilising</a> to the traditional political order and political party systems. </p>
<p>But something different happened in Catalonia on October 1 2017: a referendum that in practice wasn’t a referendum at all. It was considered a referendum by the supporters of Catalan independence, but not their opponents – the Spanish government – who called it “illegal” – for the EU, or any known government in the world. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41463719">reported</a> 42.3% turnout and near-90% vote for independence do not carry any meaningful legitimacy. Even for those who did turn out, anything approaching normal voting was prevented by a heavy and at times <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/01/europe/catalonia-spain-independence-referendum-result/index.html">violent</a> Spanish police presence.</p>
<p>Still, this doesn’t mean the vote isn’t destabilising. The events of October 1 mark a turning point in the ever-growing – but containable – dispute between the government in Madrid, led by the conservative Popular Party, and the pro-independence coalition of parties in Catalonia’s regional government. Since <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/11/catalan-independence-rally-barcelona">mass pro-independence protests of 2012</a>, the dispute between Madrid and Barcelona has simmered along as a low-intensity political conflict.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-gears-up-for-high-stakes-election-47662">Catalan elections of September 2015</a> gave an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34372548">ambiguous result</a>, and the referendum on independence was launched as the mechanism to break the deadlock. </p>
<p>But Madrid refused to accept the legitimacy of any such vote, and promised to block it by all legal means. Even as tensions rose to their highest level yet in September 2017, the Madrid stock market seemed impervious to the apparent turbulence in the weeks leading up to the referendum. This was because nobody seriously believed Spain really was about to lose a fifth of its economy, which is what Catalonian independence would really mean.</p>
<p>Yet still, the independence side made a serious noise, and Madrid was rattled enough to send thousands of police officers to Catalonia with the express intention of stopping the vote. </p>
<p>In the days leading up to the referendum, police confiscated millions of ballot papers, blocked websites related to the referendum, and warned a range of public officials of the danger of breaking the law. The day of the vote itself saw a very heavy police presence, with high drama and tension giving way to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/police-started-throwing-us-aside-more-and-more-vanloads-arrived">outright violence</a>: police forced polling stations to close, charged into crowds of protesters, and even fired rubber bullets.</p>
<p>But for all the Catalan government’s promises, the vote failed to be a true reflection of opinion, and its legitimacy is highly questionable.</p>
<h2>Pyrrhic victories</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://catalannews.com/politics/item/referendum-law-passed-in-parliament">referendum legislation</a> setting October 1 as the date was only <a href="http://catalannews.com/politics/item/referendum-law-passed-in-parliament">formally passed</a> by the Catalan parliament on September 6 2017, barely four weeks before the vote was due. There was no referendum campaign in any real sense. Opponents of independence simply did not campaign, instead boycotting the referendum or simply ignoring it. There was no serious public discussion or debate over the merits of “yes” or “no”, and the pro-independence side was always guaranteed a victory: pro-independence voters are not only the most committed to turning out, but they are the only ones committed to the legitimacy of a referendum. That means there’s a very high correlation between simply turning up to vote and voting “yes”.</p>
<p>Ballot papers were distributed widely in the week leading up to the vote and the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly), the major pro-independence organisation, issued over 1m to its supporters. The Catalan government’s parliamentary spokesman, Jordi Turrull, even called on voters to download their own ballot papers from a government website. These actions gravely undermined the seriousness and credibility of the vote in the days leading up to it. </p>
<p>By the time of the vote itself, the Catalan government seemed to accept that a meaningful referendum was no longer possible, and as the day unfolded, it instead became a show of the civic strength of Catalan independence. The Spanish government, meanwhile, demonstrated that it retains full legal and political control of Catalonia. Crudely speaking, Spain’s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, got his wish: he promised a referendum would not occur, and his government successfully ensured that what transpired on the day was too incoherent and chaotic to be legitimate. </p>
<p>But this victory comes at a very high price. Rajoy’s government hoped to prevent the vote without police sequestering ballot boxes using violent tactics on ordinary people; instead, the spectacle of police preventing people from voting and firing rubber bullets at protesters, by some reports <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-referendum-police-clashes-violence-900-injured-government-independence-vote-banned-latest-a7978166.html">injuring up to 900</a>, has done deep damage to Spain’s international credibility, and helped poison relations between Catalonia and Madrid even further. </p>
<p>The referendum-that-wasn’t may be over, but the stakes remain high. In the weeks and months to come, the crisis could lead to the fall of the Spanish government, and the Catalonian one at that. The dream of an imminent independent Catalan state has been shattered for now, but those Catalans who support independence are now more alienated from Spain than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dowling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The referendum that wasn’t a referendum can’t have a winner.Andrew Dowling, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/822772017-09-21T13:15:22Z2017-09-21T13:15:22ZCatalonia’s independence referendum: how the disputed vote led to crackdown<p>An old refrain often used about Spain is that in the country “everything is politicised”. This became apparent following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/barcelona-attack-42054">terrorist attacks</a> in Barcelona and Cambrils in mid-August 2017.</p>
<p>As the nation sought an explanation for the attacks, the debate rapidly became wrapped up in the ongoing dispute between Madrid and the regional Catalan government in Barcelona. The blame game became framed in Catalan or Spanish terms. For some, the Catalan police became national heroes, while for others they had, through negligence, apparently failed to prevent the attacks. The disagreement is only partially about the aftermath of the attacks. It’s also part of the push for <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">independence in Catalonia</a>, which has become a permanent feature of the political landscape in Spain.</p>
<p>The Catalan parliament passed a measure in September officially announcing its plan to hold a referendum on October 1. If Yes won on the day, the parliament said, it would declare independence from Spain within 48 hours. The Madrid government responded by declaring the vote illegal. The Spanish government is now attempeting to prevent the referendum from taking place. It has ordered police raids on key Catalan government buildings to seize documents related to the vote and had Catalan officials arrested. </p>
<p>As the date of the contested vote approaches, an extremely <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41342205">tense situation</a> has unfolded. The Catalan government has accused Madrid of cutting off its finances to stop it from funding the referendum. Meanwhile, Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy has called for the “escalation of radicalism and disobedience” to end. Tense scenes have played out between pro-independence protesters and the police. But so far the impact of the protests has been modest.</p>
<h2>Small town power</h2>
<p>Spain has consistently refused to recognise the wide demand for a referendum to decide the issue of Catalan independence. That meant that the 2015 elections in Catalonia became something of a substitute for such a vote.</p>
<p>A total of 47.8% of the votes were cast for pro-independence parties. But the weighting of the electoral system, with its anti-urban bias, allowed the pro-independence lists to win a clear majority of seats in the Catalan parliament.</p>
<p>Support for independence is overwhelmingly dominant in the small towns and rural areas of Catalonia, but it’s a minority trend in Barcelona. It was the pro-independence government elected largely by the regional vote that called the October referendum.</p>
<p>Post-election analysis revealed that support for independence wasn’t as clear cut as it seemed. A fifth of voters who voted for independence parties in September 2015 did so with the intention of forcing the Spanish government to negotiate a new political and economic arrangement for Catalonia, rather than explicitly for independence. Therefore, even the 47.8% of the vote obtained in September 2015 was far from being a solid and unambiguous pro-secessionist vote.</p>
<p>The ambivalence of the electoral result enabled both supporters and opponents of independence to claim victory. One side had won more parliamentary seats, with opponents securing more of the total votes cast.</p>
<p>This battle of legitimacy has been played out in Catalonia since 2015, which explains why Catalan independence groups are seeking resolution – and legitimacy – through a binding referendum.</p>
<h2>A movement stalled</h2>
<p>Support for an independent Catalan state rocketed from around 12% in 2005 to figures approaching 50% at times after 2012. This surge was in part a backlash against the wider crisis happening in Spain. Resentment had been growing in Catalonia around issues of culture, language and identity since the mid-2000s but the economic crisis hit the region hard. It had long been one of richest territories in Spain. Economic resentment fed into pre-existing grievances and support for independence intensified.</p>
<p>Supporters of Catalan independence were angry, frustrated and demanded recognition, but their cause was also a vehicle of protest against a Spanish government perceived as using the crisis to recentralise political power. A clash of political cultures – centralising in the case of Madrid and resistance to it from Barcelona – added a new layer to the conflict.</p>
<p>The rapid growth of support for the independence of Catalonia seemed an unstoppable wave. Breaking from Spain was merely a matter of time. Despite the ambivalence of the September 2015 result, the pro-independence parties claimed they had a mandate, even promising an independent Catalonia within 18 months. This strategic error was one of many in a movement that has been trapped in a cycle of wishful thinking. Pro-independence leaders have promised a Catalan state every year since 2012 without delivering. </p>
<h2>A question of legitimacy</h2>
<p>The problem for the proposed referendum of October 1 is that nobody except supporters of Catalan independence consider it legitimate. The Catalan opposition parties reject it, as does the Spanish government. The Spanish government has, in turn, pledged to block this referendum attempt with the full judicial apparatus of the state.</p>
<p>A meaningful referendum on October 1 is now one of the least likely outcomes. The Madrid authorities have placed enormous pressure on local politicians to prevent any vote resembling a referendum taking place in Catalonia. International silence, particularly from leading European countries, has only facilitated its cause. </p>
<p>The Catalan movement for independence has shown itself to be capable of enormous annual public display each September since 2012, with often a million or more protesting in the streets of Barcelona. However, the movement has proven itself incapable of producing other forms of political responses and the recent actions of the Madrid government have revealed the profound limitations of symbolic protest.</p>
<p>The failure to hold a meaningful referendum in October will represent a clear and dramatic defeat for the Catalan independence movement. However, the grievances that drive the desire for independence have barely begun to be addressed by Madrid. A solid 40% or so of Catalans have broken with Spain in political and psychological terms and modest concessions from Madrid will no longer change this. Real political negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona are now needed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dowling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Madrid government is doing everything it can to stop the planned October 1 referendum from happening.Andrew Dowling, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.