tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/west-africa-11739/articlesWest Africa – The Conversation2024-03-14T13:15:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255172024-03-14T13:15:14Z2024-03-14T13:15:14ZBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger hint at a new west African currency: what it’ll take for it to succeed<p><em>On 11 February 2024, the head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20240213-niger-hints-at-new-currency-in-step-out-of-colonialisation">possible creation of a common currency</a> with Burkina Faso and Mali. “The currency is a first step toward breaking free from the legacy of colonisation,” he said on national TV, referring to the CFA franc inherited from French colonisation.</em></p>
<p><em>Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three former French colonies, have experienced military coups in recent years. They’re now all ruled by military regimes. They also formed a new defence alliance, known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">Alliance of Sahel States</a> (AES).</em> </p>
<p><em>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240226-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-sanctions-contre-le-niger-un-net-changement-de-braquet-pour-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao">has condemned</a> these coups and imposed sanctions on the countries involved. In response, these countries decided to withdraw from Ecowas. However, they remain members of the <a href="https://www.umoatitres.org/en/commission-de-luemoa/">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Uemoa). Uemoa has a common currency, the CFA franc, which is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).</em></p>
<p><em>The BCEAO and the Banque de France are bound by <a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/banque-de-france/partenariats-afrique-france">cooperation agreements</a> that include the deposit of a portion of foreign exchange reserves at the Banque de France and France guaranteeing the CFA franc.</em></p>
<p><em>Thierno Thioune, an expert on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352717047_Interdependance_entre_Politique_monetaire_et_politique_budgetaire_au_niveau_de_l4UEMOA?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">monetary policies and unions between west African states</a>, analyses the potential implications and feasibility of launching a new currency for the AES member countries.</em></p>
<h2>What conditions must be met for a multilateral currency to work?</h2>
<p>To successfully launch and maintain a multilateral currency, several key factors must be considered.</p>
<p>First, macroeconomic and budgetary policies must be closely coordinated. Rigorous harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies between participating countries is imperative to guarantee the stability of the currency’s value and prevent trade imbalances. This will help maintain the confidence of economic players and promote regional growth.</p>
<p>Second, robust monetary management institutions must be established. Strong institutions responsible for currency management, like a common central bank, are essential. This central bank must have adequate authority to implement an independent and stable monetary policy. This will ensure the preservation of the currency’s value and address cyclical fluctuations. </p>
<p>Third, creating an integrated common market is vital. The unrestricted flow of goods, services, capital and labour is key to driving economic growth and enhancing regional cooperation. The current framework provided by the West African Economic and Monetary Union offers a significant advantage in this regard.</p>
<p>Finally, mechanisms to monitor and resolve crises need to be established. For instance, common reserve funds and <a href="https://www.abc-forex.net/contenu/swap-de-change/swap-devises.php">currency swap arrangements</a> could help address external and internal shocks that may affect the new currency. Currency swaps – when two parties exchange amounts in two different currencies for a certain period at a fixed rate – can be used to manage exchange rate risks and facilitate cross-border financing. </p>
<h2>Are these conditions met in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali?</h2>
<p>It’s difficult to say whether these conditions have been fully met in the three countries. It would mean having a firm understanding of whether these, among other, conditions have been met: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>harmonisation of government policies</p></li>
<li><p>macroeconomic stability through inflation control</p></li>
<li><p>limit on public debt</p></li>
<li><p>maintenance of a balanced current account.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At this time, it’s hard to say whether these countries have done this. </p>
<h2>Does their monetary union membership make any difference?</h2>
<p>These three countries have been part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1963. In theory, this should give them some experience in coordinating economic and monetary policies through the CFA franc. </p>
<p>They could have experience with infrastructure, like the Central Bank of West African States (which manages the single currency and monetary policy for member states), that would help them with the transition.</p>
<h2>What are the potential gains and risks of the initiative?</h2>
<p>Despite the risks involved, the initiative could bring several benefits. </p>
<p>Establishing a larger monetary zone can foster greater trade integration and improved resource allocation. </p>
<p>It could enhance the country’s “flexibility” in dealing with external partners. </p>
<p>By joining a new monetary union, these three countries could also benefit significantly from increased trade integration, independence from external partners, lower transaction costs and investor attractiveness. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this initiative also entails risks, particularly with regard to their position within the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas. The latter could perceive the creation of a new currency as a threat to their regional influence. It could cause the fragmentation of existing economic blocs. In addition, the departure of the three countries could weaken the solidity of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas in terms of economic and political influence. </p>
<p>There are also risks that the currency could quickly lose value. </p>
<p>The new currency could depreciate against the CFA franc. This could have substantial negative repercussions for exporters to other West African Economic and Monetary Union countries.</p>
<p>Second, without proper formal frameworks to control and manage the new currency, speculation and uncertainty regarding its value may emerge. This is why establishing robust institutions to support the management and supervision of the new currency is crucial.</p>
<h2>How will the new currency affect trade in the zone?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three nations could, temporarily, have a negative impact on their trade with countries within the current bloc. It could even lead to some turbulence in trade with countries outside it.</p>
<p>The transition to a new currency typically introduces a level of uncertainty among economic actors and trading partners, as questions arise about the currency’s value, convertibility and stability. This adjustment phase can lead to a temporary slowdown in trade.</p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of a new currency often requires legislative and regulatory changes, especially regarding foreign exchange operations and customs duties. These can act as administrative and regulatory barriers and result in delays in commercial transactions.</p>
<p>During the transitional period, there may be fluctuations in exchange rates. This will lead to disparities between the old and new currencies. It can affect price competitiveness between exporters and importers and reduce the overall volume of trade.</p>
<p>The perceptions and attitudes of external partners matter when a new currency is announced. Some trading partners may exhibit reluctance or express doubts regarding its reliability and credibility. This could diminish their willingness to continue trading with member countries of the zone.</p>
<h2>Could the move isolate them?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three countries may indeed raise questions about their potential isolation. However, such an initiative should not automatically lead to a diplomatic rupture or total marginalisation.</p>
<p>To avoid this, proactive communication, constructive cooperation and balanced, inclusive regional economic integration are key. This will help mitigate the risks of isolation for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in their monetary project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierno Thioune has received funding from the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Romanian Government for the "Eugen Ionescu" doctoral programme at the University "Dunarea De Jos" in Galati, Romania. CODESRIA also awarded him a prize as part of its thesis grant programme.</span></em></p>Several conditions must be met to ensure the successful launch and operation of a multilateral currency.Thierno Thioune, enseignant-chercheur, directeur du CREA, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242092024-02-28T16:56:15Z2024-02-28T16:56:15ZEcowas: west African trade bloc shaken as three member states withdraw and form their own alliance<p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on January 27. Ecowas, which was formed in 1975, is a regional political and economic union of 15 mainly former British and French colonies located in west Africa. </p>
<p>The withdrawals come as no surprise. Throughout west Africa, there is growing frustration with Ecowas over its struggle to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">ensure security</a> in the region. Coups have become commonplace and west Africa has seen a dramatic increase in terrorist activity over recent years. Two west African states, Mali and Burkina Faso, are now among the the world’s five countries <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sahel-now-accounts-43-global-terrorism-deaths">most affected</a> by terrorism. </p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/what-is-the-new-alliance-of-sahel-states-challenging-neo-colonialism-in-west-africa/">perceived support</a> for leaders aligned with former colonial powers is also seen as contributing to the persistent poverty experienced by their populations. The leaders of several Ecowas member states have been accused of being <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/domino-effect-frances-disintegrating-influence-africa">“puppets”</a> under the influence of France, which critics <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">say</a> never really let go of its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Niger, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66406137">allegations</a> that the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, was a puppet for French interests were used to legitimise his removal from power in a military coup in July 2023. French colonial rule (1895–1958) established political systems designed to extract natural resources from African states.</p>
<p>The response to the coup marked a significant political shift in the region. Ecowas imposed economic sanctions on Niger and issued a seven-day <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/08/niger-ecowas-bazoum-nigeria-tinubu-military-intervention/">ultimatum</a>, vowing to use force to dislodge the military junta (a government led by a council of military officers) should it not restore Bazoum to power. But the junta refused to back down and Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">pledged</a> to counter any action by Ecowas troops in Niger.</p>
<p>The agreement of these leaders and their readiness to take military action against Ecowas revealed the extent of their animosity towards the organisation and its leaders. These three countries, which are also governed by military rulers who have ousted democratically elected leaders in recent years, have all been hit with punitive sanctions since 2021.</p>
<p>On September 16 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger signed a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a> named the Alliance of Sahel States. Ecowas is encouraging these countries to return to the bloc by <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">lifting its sanctions</a>. But new partners like Russia, which is looking to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increase its influence</a> across the continent, are at the same time supporting their efforts to form a united front. </p>
<p>African governments have increasingly welcomed economic, diplomatic and security <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-growing-footprint-africa">ties</a> with Russia, facilitated in part by the state-backed <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">Wagner Group</a> (now called the “Expeditionary Corps”). The group is known for deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders.</p>
<h2>The company of the old guards</h2>
<p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa. In 1990, the military arm of Ecowas was deployed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">peacekeeping role</a> in Liberia. Despite some initial success, Ecowas was unable to prevent an escalation of hostilities that lasted for the best part of a decade. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite efforts by Ecowas to restore peace in Sierra Leone after a coup in 1997, a brutal civil war broke out, requiring the intervention of UN peacekeepers. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">Niger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ecowas has been instrumental in safeguarding democracy within the region as well. In 2016, Gambia’s incumbent leader, Yahya Jammeh, refused to leave office after losing a presidential vote to Adama Barrow. But, with Ecowas troops poised to march on the capital, Banjul, Jammeh <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ousted-gambia-president-jammeh-to-stand-down-adama-barrow-takes-power/a-37217907">relinquished power</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the 15 member states of Ecowas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas is a regional political and economic union of 15 countries in west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-2341602777">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Ecowas has been inconsistent in its condemnation of military and civilian coups. And it has also been criticised for overlooking unlawful term extensions, a common practice among many entrenched leaders in the region. </p>
<p>In 2015, Ecowas leaders <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">dropped a proposal</a> to limit west African presidents to a maximum of two terms in office. As a result, there is no established protocol for penalising leaders from member states who seek to remain in power indefinitely.</p>
<p>This paved the way for the presidents of both Ivory Coast and Guinea (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201103-ivory-coast-president-ouattara-wins-re-election-to-third-term">Alassane Ouattara</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54657359">Alpha Condé</a> respectively) to secure controversial third terms in 2020. The failure of Ecowas to intervene resulted in Condé being <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/09/09/alpha-conde-the-president-of-guinea-is-ousted-in-a-coup">ousted from power</a> by a military coup one year later.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">Oge Onubogu</a>, the director of the Africa Program, a Washington-based think tank: “Ecowas is fast losing its effectiveness and support among citizens, who see it as representing only the interests of the leaders and not that of the masses.” </p>
<h2>The challenger group</h2>
<p>The loss of any member from Ecowas will affect <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">trade</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-trade-will-take-a-hit-as-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-leave-ecowas-223098">economic development</a> and the movement of citizens within the bloc. But the decision by Ecowas to lift post-coup sanctions signals its readiness to negotiate and cultivate relationships with these countries, regardless of whether they rejoin the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">says</a> that the decision to lift sanctions was based on considering their impact on citizens and the need to maintain regional unity and security. Ecowas also <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">noted</a> the period of Lent and the approaching month of Ramadan as factors influencing their decisions. </p>
<p>Millions of young Africans are being <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">drawn</a> to the Alliance of Sahel States, signalling discontent with the ineffectiveness of Ecowas and disillusionment with the west. Russia has capitalised on this trend. The Wagner Group is reportedly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/20/putin-wagner-mercenaries-regime-survival-package-africa/">offering</a> military support to willing African leaders in the form of “regime survival packages”.</p>
<p>A competitor to Ecowas appears to have emerged in west Africa, and this alliance is not backing down. Only time will tell whether the new alliance will favour the citizens of west Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa – member states are now starting to leave.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonOlayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230782024-02-28T13:31:51Z2024-02-28T13:31:51ZNigeria’s security problems deepen as Anglophone insurgency in Cameroon spills across border<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576415/original/file-20240219-30-q5d1lg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C0%2C8575%2C5729&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grieving for the 140 victims of a January 2024 attack in north-central Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NigeriaArmedViolence/744fff9339094b5c858f3235bb986cf4/photo?Query=nigeria%20violence&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1261&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Sunday Alamba</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past two decades, Nigeria has grappled with multiple and complex national <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/nigeria-mulls-state-policing-to-combat-growing-insecurity">security threats</a>, each posing a significant challenge to its stability.</p>
<p>The nation finds itself fighting a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2017/02/13/oil-and-violence-in-the-niger-delta-isnt-talked-about-much-but-it-has-a-global-impact/?sh=532d63f54dc6">violent militancy in the Niger Delta</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/farmers-herders-conflicts-in-nigeria-a-role-for-fbos">conflicts between farmers and herders</a> across multiple regions, terrorism and insurgency in the northeast, banditry in the northwest and secessionist campaigns by groups such as the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-should-not-designate-nigerias-ipob-terrorist-group">Indigenous People of Biafra</a> in the southeast.</p>
<p>Now a new layer of complexity has emerged in the form of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroons-anglophone-conflict-has-lasted-for-six-years-what-citizens-say-about-how-to-end-it-208381">Ambazonian secessionist group</a> from Cameroon. This group’s growing threat, most recently seen in the December 2023 violent invasion of the Nigerian <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/12/11/ambazonia-rebels-control-belegete-community-block-nigerian-troops/">borderline village of Belegete</a>, adds to the strain on Nigeria’s national security capabilities.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KhygkzYAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar specializing in</a> radicalization, violent extremism and counterterrorism in West and Central Africa, I believe the latest threat raises concerns about Nigeria’s strategic preparedness and ability to confront growing challenges.</p>
<p><iframe id="Cwek2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Cwek2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>How the country responds could have far-reaching consequences. Nigeria is Africa’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1120999/gdp-of-african-countries-by-country/">largest economy</a> and <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-africa-by-population/">most populous country</a>. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has played a crucial role in regional stability and security. It remains an <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-nigeria-partnering-for-prosperity">important diplomatic partner for the United States</a>, which provides support to the Nigerian government in its efforts to combat extremism in the region.</p>
<h2>Rise of a violent campaign</h2>
<p>Ambazonian separatists, seeking independence from the Republic of Cameroon, are mounting a bloody civil war that stems from the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/b188-second-look-cameroons-anglophone-special-status">Anglophone crisis</a>, a protracted conflict rooted in the colonization of Cameroon by both the French and British governments.</p>
<p>Separatists from Camaroon’s two English-speaking regions declared independence from the French-speaking majority in 2017, and war has been raging between the separatists and Cameroon government forces ever since.</p>
<p>The Ambazonian secessionist movement, fueled by grievances that include <a href="https://theconversation.com/cameroon-how-language-plunged-a-country-into-deadly-conflict-with-no-end-in-sight-179027">the perceived dominance of Francophone Cameroonians</a>, seeks to secede and establish an <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/">independent Federal Republic of Ambazonia</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Grievance over perceived Francophone bias is fueling Camaroon insurgency." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576417/original/file-20240219-16-blke3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sign saying ‘Speak English and French for a bilingual Cameroon’ outside an abandoned school in a rural part of southwest Cameroon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sign-saying-speak-english-or-french-for-a-bilingual-news-photo/1154062017?adppopup=true%5C">Photo by Giles Clarke/UNOCHA via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Agitation over the past seven years has resulted in <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/cameroon/">violence and widespread human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reveal that over <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/cameroon/">1.7 million</a> people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the Anglophone crisis has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">resulted in</a> over 6,000 deaths and displaced 765,000 people. About 70,000 of these refugees are in Nigeria, including a few in the village of Belegete. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://humanglemedia.com/survivors-of-ambazonia-militant-attack-in-nigeria-are-experiencing-the-festive-season-differently/">attack in Belegete</a> in December left two dead, including the traditional leader, Chief Francis Ogweshi, and 20 others kidnapped. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s national security</h2>
<p>As Cameroon’s clash with separatists worsens in southwestern Cameroon, the Ambazonian insurgents have moved into Nigeria. </p>
<p>The violent attack on the Belegete community, which followed earlier incursions in Nigeria such as the <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/11/ambazonia-attack-death-toll-rises-to-12/">Manga village attack</a> of November 2021, suggests a growing cross-border element to Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis.</p>
<p>As well as presenting a violation of territorial integrity, the incident also suggests collaboration with Nigeria’s own secessionist groups, with evidence of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/20/separatists-nigeria-cameroon-biafra-ipob-ambazonia-anglophone-joining-forces/">links between Ambazonian secessionists</a> and the Indigenous People of Biafra.</p>
<p>Ambazonian insurgents are also <a href="https://doi.org//10.4236/aasoci.2021.111001">engaged in drugs, arms and human trafficking</a> and have brought that illegal trade across the border into Nigeria.</p>
<p>The incursion of Ambazonian activities has not only added to Nigeria’s security challenges. It has also intensified an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Nigeria’s border region, displacing thousands of people and straining the capacity of authorities to care for its internally displaced persons and refugees from neighboring countries, including Cameroon.</p>
<p>As of June 2023, Nigeria has an estimated <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/nigeria">2.3 million internally displaced persons</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/urban-refugees-nigeria-operational-update-may-2023-issue-2">93,130 refugees and asylum seekers</a>. The Belegete attack added to this by displacing the entire village of over 2,000 people, who took refuge in the neighboring village of Becheve.</p>
<h2>Confronting the emerging threat</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s capacity to confront the emerging Ambazonian threat is questionable, given multiple strategic, operational and tactical limitations. </p>
<p>The 2022 Afrobarometer <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Working%20papers/wp190-mapping_state_capacity_in_africa-professionalism_and_reach-afrobarometer_working_paper-22jan22.pdf">working paper</a>, which mapped states’ capacity to prepare for or respond to security threats, concludes that Nigeria – like several African states – “is widely seen to lack the necessary capacity for the physical and material security of its citizens or to command legitimacy.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues holding a gun Nigerian police officer stands guard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576422/original/file-20240219-23-kh7yv5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A police officer in Yola, Nigeria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-sits-inside-the-armoured-personnel-carrier-news-photo/1247496889?adppopup=true">Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Ambazonian separatist insurgency poses a threat not only to Cameroon and Nigeria but risks further degrading the security situation in West Africa.</p>
<p>The Nigerian government, undoubtedly, understands the magnitude of the security threats it faces, and its apparent limitations, and has called for assistance. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, in a January 2024 letter to the outgoing French ambassador to Nigeria, Emmanuelle Blatmann, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/658605-tinubu-wants-greater-cooperation-between-nigeria-france.html">stressed the need for strengthened cooperation</a>. “On regional security, we want you to remind Paris at every opportunity that it is necessary to upgrade our technical cooperation,” he wrote.</p>
<p>The United States has said it remains committed to assisting Nigeria. In January 2024, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Nigerian counterpart, Nuhu Ribadu, and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/18/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-nigerian-national-security-adviser-nuhu-ribadu/">underscored the need</a> for continuous bilateral security cooperation.</p>
<p>And while Nigeria has in recent years partnered with Cameroon to ensure regional stability, the latest attack suggests a need to increase strategic cooperation between the neighboring countries to stem the growing threat. </p>
<p>However, countering the Ambazonian separatists and other internal security threats will remain a challenge for the Nigerian government. With a vast population and territory, security personnel are already stretched thin. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the existing security apparatus in the country is compromised. The military is beset by problems, including <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">low morale</a> <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2023-02-16-nigerias-military-is-broken/">and corruption</a>, and the national police force is perceived as largely <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/AD715-Nigerians-fault-police-for-corruption-and-lack-of-professionalism-Afrobarometer-10oct23.pdf">unprofessional and corrupt</a>. </p>
<p>These issues hamper Nigeria’s capacity to respond, and they undermine any attempt to counter the spiraling security threats faced by Nigeria, including the Ambazonian separatists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Augustine Aboh works for the University of Calabar, Nigeria. He is affiliated with the Office for Strategic Preparedness and Resilience - National Early Warning Centre, Nigeria. </span></em></p>Nigeria is beset with security threats. Confronting them will take regional and international cooperation.Augustine Aboh, Ph.D. candidate in Global Governance and Human Security, University of MassachusettsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202052024-01-23T13:25:57Z2024-01-23T13:25:57ZHow the word ‘voodoo’ became a racial slur<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570735/original/file-20240122-20-mdblis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C10%2C3607%2C2392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An engraving from 1992 representing a voodoo rite in Haiti.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-voodoo-in-haiti-in-1992-engraving-representing-a-voodoo-news-photo/113929671?adppopup=true"> Nicolas Jallot/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, it has been common for people to throw around terms like “voodoo politics,” “<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/voodooeconomics.asp">voodoo economics</a>,” “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/rejecting-voodoo-science-in-the-courtroom-1474328199">voodoo science</a>” and “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/voodoo-medicine-time-to-s_b_11474550?ec_carp=6516617630977493781">voodoo medicine</a>” to reference something that they think is ridiculous, idiotic or fraudulent.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0096071/">Horror movies</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0793707/">crime shows</a> often tell stories about evil “voodoo doctors” who terrorize their victims with black magic. Even Disney’s first movie with a Black princess, released in 2009, had a “voodoo doctor” as the villain. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, these shows and movies promote myths about voodoo that reinforce more than a century of stereotypes and discrimination. In my 2023 book, “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/46772">Voodoo: The History of a Racial Slur</a>,” I argue that voodoo is an extremely problematic term with a deeply racist history. </p>
<p>Most African diaspora religions, which are religions that have roots in Africa, have been mislabeled as voodoo at some point in time. This is especially true of Haitian Vodou – the religion that is most frequently stereotyped by outsiders as “voodoo” in the 21st century.</p>
<h2>Early uses of the term</h2>
<p>The term voodoo traces its roots back to a word in the Fon language in West Africa that means “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Vodou">spirit” or “deity</a>.” The French adopted a version of this term, “vaudou” or “vaudoux,” to refer to African spiritual practices in their colonies in Louisiana and Saint-Domingue – modern-day Haiti. </p>
<p>Later, “vaudou” evolved into “voodoo” in the English-speaking world. It first became a household term in the U.S. in the 1860s and 1870s. When the U.S. public was <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/46772">first introduced</a> to voodoo, it was typically in newspaper articles and other publications that described African American spiritual practices in an exaggerated way, often retelling bizarre or even fabricated stories as if they were common practice. </p>
<p>Most of the time, the authors used these narratives about voodoo to argue that African Americans were unfit for citizenship, voting rights and holding public office because of their so-called superstitions. </p>
<p>In fact, the first time the term was widely used was after the Union forces seized New Orleans during the U.S. Civil War. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197689400.001.0001">Confederate supporters argued</a> that the popularity of voodoo in Union-controlled New Orleans showed the barbarity that Africans would return to if not under the control of white people. </p>
<p>Later, in the 20th century, claims about voodoo were used as one way to justify the U.S. colonization of Caribbean countries with large Black populations. In particular, fabricated <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/McClure_s_Magazine/RZZEAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=voodoo+cuba&pg=PA502&printsec=frontcover">claims that Black Cubans were</a> practicing the ritual murder of children as part of their voodoo practices circulated in the media to support sending forces to the island in the 1900s and 1910s.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the early 20th century, <a href="https://archive.org/details/whereblackrulesw00pric">journalists, travelers and others falsely claimed</a> that U.S. intervention was necessary because Haitians were engaging in cannibalism, human sacrifice and snake worship as part of their voodoo rituals. Historian <a href="https://people.miami.edu/profile/2d45ee761ea7c9776e6f13729f2ebea3">Kate Ramsey</a> writes in her 2011 book, “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo10454972.html">The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power in Haiti</a>,” that while U.S. Marines were occupying Haiti from 1915 to 1934, they persecuted and prosecuted devotees – arresting the people they found participating in ceremonies and burning their sacred objects. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the first half of the 20th century, references to voodoo continued to be a way to speak disparagingly about Black populations in the U.S. Even the founders of the <a href="https://ia904601.us.archive.org/19/items/the-voodoo-cult-of-detroit/The%20Voodoo%20Cult%20of%20Detroit.pdf">Nation of Islam</a> were stereotyped as a “voodoo cult” after an alleged member committed a highly publicized murder in 1932.</p>
<p>Allegations that Black Muslims practiced human sacrifice followed the group for decades, long after the person who committed the crime was determined to be legally insane and sent to an asylum. </p>
<h2>Prejudices linger</h2>
<p>This history has left a stain on public perceptions of voodoo that is difficult to wash away. The best example is the treatment of devotees of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-haitian-voodoo-119621">Vodou, a religion in Haiti</a> that can trace many of its beliefs and practices back to West and Central Africa. Vodou centers on honoring the ancestors and venerating spirits known as the Lwa. </p>
<p>Vodou was frequently labeled as “voodoo” in Anglophone newspapers and other literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and devotees were falsely accused of committing atrocities like cannibalism and human sacrifice during their ceremonies. Although Vodou has no ultimate source of evil in its cosmology, it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-haitian-voodoo-119621">often denounced</a> as devil worship. These myths have led to discrimination and violence against devotees.</p>
<p>In 2010, some Haitians and some foreigners blamed Vodou, which they often misspelled as “voodoo,” for the tragic earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak that devastated Haiti. The most famous remarks came from the late <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2010/01/pat_robertson_blames_haitian_d.html">Pat Robertson</a>, an Evangelical minister and political commentator, who claimed that the earthquake was God’s retribution against Haitians for holding a Vodou ceremony. He described the Vodou ceremony as a pact with the devil to assist in their revolution against the French. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a wide-brimmed hat holds her hands up as she prays, with some other people in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570737/original/file-20240122-19-uv5o5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An old woman prays in an earthquake-damaged church in the Ti Ayiti neighborhood Feb. 23, 2010, in Cité Soleil, Haiti, after a Christian mob attacked a Haitian Vodou ceremony for earthquake victims.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/just-paces-away-from-where-a-christian-mob-attacked-a-news-photo/96989923?adppopup=true%2A%2A%2A%2A">Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Within Haiti, some people <a href="https://haitiantimes.com/2020/01/12/vodou-was-once-blamed-for-the-haiti-earthquake-10-years-later-its-seeing-a-slow-revival/">committed acts of violence</a> against devotees and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934710394443">denied them the emergency aid</a> that was sent to quake victims. Later that year, violence escalated as some Haitians blamed Vodou for the cholera outbreak. In November and December of 2010, lynch mobs <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12073029">violently killed</a> dozens of Haitian Vodou priests. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, discrimination and the violence perpetrated against Haitian Vodou and <a href="https://www.religiousracism.org/brazil">other African diaspora religious groups</a> often goes <a href="https://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-1-64602-103-1.html">unpunished and unnoticed</a>. In fact, a recent survey suggests that a large portion of the U.S. public subscribes to the stereotypes about voodoo that led to these attacks.</p>
<p>With support from the Public Religion Research Institute, my fellow researchers and I <a href="https://www.prri.org/spotlight/discrimination-against-voodoo-and-santeria/">asked 1,000 adults</a> living in the U.S. whether they used the term “voodoo.” Two in 10 respondents, or about 20%, said they had used or heard others use the term at least once a month. The survey found fewer than 1 in 4 considered voodoo to be a religion. </p>
<p>Further, approximately 3 in 10 respondents believed that followers of voodoo were more likely to be involved in criminal activity than the average person, and an astonishing 64% said they believed that followers of voodoo were more likely to practice black magic or witchcraft than the average person. </p>
<p>This survey shows the pervasiveness of these biases that developed to support slavery and imperialism. Therefore, I argue that when someone makes a statement like, “That just sounds like some ‘voodoo’ to me!” they are co-signing the long racist history of the term and promoting the idea that religions from Africa are primitive, evil and barbaric.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Boaz is a public fellow with the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). In this capacity, Dr. Boaz and three other fellows received a microgrant from the PRRI to conduct the survey mentioned in this piece. </span></em></p>Shows, movies and day-to-day language promote myths about voodoo that reinforce more than a century of stereotypes and discrimination, writes a scholar of Africana studies.Danielle N. Boaz, Associate Professor of Africana Studies, University of North Carolina – CharlotteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2184852024-01-07T15:35:53Z2024-01-07T15:35:53ZWhy traditional cooking isn’t always healthier: the case of Ghanaians in Manchester and in Accra<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567995/original/file-20240105-20-wdtvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C2000%2C1365&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Analysis of participants' photos demonstrated hybrid cooking practices, with a combination of ingredients and cooking methods and/or techniques.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In popular discussions of healthy eating, including political rhetoric and nutrition counselling, women are often blamed for a lack of nutrition knowledge or cooking skills, leading to the assumption that a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2796.2008.01922">decline in cooking skills is connected with unhealthy diets and obesity</a>. This has been called a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Evolution-of-Deficit-Thinking-Educational-Thought-and-Practice/Valencia/p/book/9780750706650">“deficit approach”</a> and my research with Ghanaian women set out to <a href="https://axa-research.org/funded-projects/health/towards-healthier-culinary-practices-among-overweight-and-obese-ghanaian-women">challenge some of its assumptions</a>.</p>
<p>Previous studies on Ghanaian immigrants showed that following their arrival in the United Kingdom, most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03014460.2017.1333148">maintained their dietary traditions</a>. This cuts against the perception that they, like others, would <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48710190">quickly succumb to fast-food culture in high-income countries</a>. We also know that traditional diets, while seemingly healthy, can also contain <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912420301061">excess calories and fat</a> and thus cause a range of health issues such as type 2 diabetes, cancer, and hypertension. The reason for this may lie in the way the home-cooked food is prepared, cooked, or served.</p>
<h2>Seeing versus telling</h2>
<p>We asked Ghanaian women living in Manchester, England, and in Accra, Ghana, to take photographs of their own cooking experience. We then used the photographs as a prompt to allow participants to tell the “stories” of their everyday cooking.</p>
<p>In both countries, the women said that they viewed their practices as a distinct subtype of home cooking, characterised by raw ingredients and/or whole foods, locally produced ingredients and specialised equipment. They also saw themselves as cooking with love and care and adhering to culturally acceptable ways of feeding their families.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I have introduced my kids to the local dishes, and they love them, and one of my boy’s favourites is yam. Every now and then I tend to cook spinach or what is called ‘nkontomire’.” (Manchester resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Analysis of participants’ photos demonstrated hybrid cooking practices, with a combination of ingredients and cooking methods and/or techniques. In some cases, the hybrid methods contributed to unhealthy food practices, including the excessive use of oil and processed foods/flavourings; extended periods of stewing and frying. Many women continued to cherish their <em>asanka</em>, an earthenware grinding pot central to Ghanaian cooking.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[An ‘asanka’] is very important in every Ghanaian home, because there are some foods that you cannot prepare using the blender, as it will not taste nice.” (Manchester resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The <em>asanka</em> is a traditional Ghanian grinding pot, a key tool of Ghanaian kitchens.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not surprisingly, the adoption of newer ways of cooking has been linked to the “nutrition transition”, where populations across the world are embracing a food revolution. Studies have shown that many in Britain have abandoned traditional ways of cooking and turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2013.12.014">new ways of cooking and eating</a>.</p>
<p>While a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975518791431">general decline in cooking skills has also been reported</a> in many western societies over the past decades, this was not the case for Ghanaian women both in Ghana and the UK. Our findings showed that they love to cook, and saw maintaining traditional foods as being a central part of their cultural heritage. While they made use of freezers and microwaves, these were used as tools to help them maintain their cultural heritage – for example, cooking in bulk to create food stocks that would last days or weeks.</p>
<h2>When tradition doesn’t rhyme with safety</h2>
<p>While traditional Ghanaian cooking was perceived as being healthier, this is not always the case. In Ghana, disease risks included foodborne illnesses, and both there and in the UK, the risk of obesity, high cholesterol and heart disease were highlighted. In Ghana, those interviewed strongly emphasised the need for clean water, sanitation, and hygiene, while concerns about the adulteration of packaged and/or processed ethnic foods were highlighted in both settings.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The ingredients make the food healthy.” (Accra resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To better understand the willingness of Ghanaian women in Manchester to change unhealthy lifestyle behaviours, in another study we assessed their readiness to engage in healthier dietary practices and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10389-022-01777-1">reduce the risk of obesity</a>. We found that despite the women recognising that obesity was an important health issue, it was not seen as a priority for targeting change. Our research suggests sociocultural rules and structural determinants often specify which foods are considered preferable, cooking choices as well as the differences in habitual intake for different people.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>“It takes a lot of time to cook over a fire and it produces a lot of smoke, which ends up making the food reek.” (Accra resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/126956">many others around the world</a>, cooking for Ghanaian women has a range of dimensions. Perceptions of “good” cooking were linked to nutrition and health but also had social, cultural, and emotional associations. There is therefore the need to continue to challenge the idea that women lack knowledge or the will to cook healthy foods.</p>
<p>Instead, health promotion interventions need to emphasise social, cultural, and emotional connotations of cooking in addition to the usual emphasis on physical health, for recommendations to resonate with women’s realities.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund has supported nearly 700 projects around the world conducted by researchers in 38 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the Axa Research Fund or follow on Twitter @AXAResearchFund.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>To better understand Ghanaian women in Manchester, England, we asked them to tell the “stories” of their everyday cooking through photographs.Hibbah Araba Osei-Kwasi, Lecturer, Loughborough UniversitySawudatu Zakariah-Akoto, Research fellow in nutrition, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165552023-12-15T09:07:27Z2023-12-15T09:07:27ZThe Sahara Desert used to be a green savannah – new research explains why<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179/">Tassili N’Ajjer plateau</a> is Africa’s largest national park. Among its vast sandstone formations is perhaps the world’s largest art museum. Over 15,000 etchings and paintings are exhibited there, some as much as 11,000 years old according to scientific dating techniques, representing a unique ethnological and climatological record of the region. </p>
<p>Curiously, however, these images do not depict the arid, barren landscape that is present in the Tassili N'Ajjer today. Instead, they portray a vibrant savannah inhabited by elephants, giraffes, rhinos and hippos. This rock art is an important record of the past environmental conditions that prevailed in the Sahara, the world’s largest <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">hot desert</a>. </p>
<p>These images depict a period approximately 6,000-11,000 years ago called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/green-sahara-african-humid-periods-paced-by-82884405/">Green Sahara or North African Humid Period</a>. There is widespread climatological <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332220301007#bib31">evidence</a> that during this period the Sahara supported wooded savannah ecosystems and numerous rivers and lakes in what are now Libya, Niger, Chad and Mali. </p>
<p>This greening of the Sahara didn’t happen once. Using marine and lake sediments, scientists have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076514">identified</a> over 230 of these greenings occurring about every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. These greening events provided vegetated corridors which influenced species’ distribution and evolution, including the out-of-Africa migrations of ancient humans.</p>
<p>These dramatic greenings would have required a large-scale reorganisation of the atmospheric system to bring rains to this hyper arid region. But most climate models haven’t been able to simulate how dramatic these events were. </p>
<p>As a team of climate modellers and anthropologists, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41219-4">we have overcome this obstacle</a>. We developed a climate model that more accurately simulates atmospheric circulation over the Sahara and the impacts of vegetation on rainfall. </p>
<p>We identified why north Africa greened approximately every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. It was caused by changes in the Earth’s orbital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/precession-of-the-equinoxes">precession</a> - the slight wobbling of the planet while rotating. This moves the Northern Hemisphere closer to the sun during the summer months. </p>
<p>This caused warmer summers in the Northern Hemisphere, and warmer air is able to hold more moisture. This intensified the strength of the West African Monsoon system and shifted the African rainbelt northwards. This increased Saharan rainfall, resulting in the spread of savannah and wooded grassland across the desert from the tropics to the Mediterranean, providing a vast habitat for plants and animals. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the sensitivity of the Sahara Desert to changes in past climate. They explain how this sensitivity affects rainfall across north Africa. This is important for understanding the implications of present-day climate change (driven by human activities). Warmer temperatures in the future may also enhance monsoon strength, with both local and global impacts. </p>
<h2>Earth’s changing orbit</h2>
<p>The fact that the wetter periods in north Africa have recurred every 21,000 years or so is a big clue about what causes them: variations in Earth’s orbit. Due to gravitational influences from the moon and other planets in our solar system, the orbit of the Earth around the sun is not constant. It has cyclic variations on multi-thousand year timescales. These orbital cycles are termed <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/211/orbital-cycles/">Milankovitch cycles</a>; they influence the amount of energy the Earth receives from the sun. </p>
<p>On 100,000-year cycles, the shape of Earth’s orbit (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/eccentricity-astronomy">eccentricity</a>) shifts between circular and oval, and on 41,000 year cycles the tilt of Earth’s axis varies (termed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/obliquity">obliquity</a>). Eccentricity and obliquity cycles are responsible for driving the ice ages of the past 2.4 million years. </p>
<p>The third Milankovitch cycle is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/251/axial-precession-wobble/">precession</a>. This concerns Earth’s wobble on its axis, which varies on a 21,000 year timescale. The similarity between the precession cycle and the timing of the humid periods indicates that precession is their dominant driver. Precession influences seasonal contrasts, increasing them in one hemisphere and reducing them in another. During warmer Northern Hemisphere summers, a consequent increase in north African summer rainfall would have initiated a humid phase, resulting in the spread of vegetation across the region.</p>
<h2>Eccentricity and the ice sheets</h2>
<p>In our study we also identified that the humid periods did not occur during the ice ages, when large glacial ice sheets covered much of the polar regions. This is because these vast ice sheets cooled the atmosphere. The cooling countered the influence of precession and suppressed the expansion of the African monsoon system. </p>
<p>The ice ages are driven by the eccentricity cycle, which determines how circular Earth’s orbit is around the sun. So our findings show that eccentricity indirectly influences the magnitude of the humid periods via its influence on the ice sheets. This highlights, for the first time, a major connection between these distant high latitude and tropical regions.</p>
<p>The Sahara acts as a gate. It controls the dispersal of species between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and in and out of the continent. The gate was open when the Sahara was green and closed when deserts prevailed. Our results reveal the sensitivity of this gate to Earth’s orbit around the sun. They also show that high latitude ice sheets may have restricted the dispersal of species during the glacial periods of the last 800,000 years. </p>
<p>Our ability to model the African humid periods helps us understand the alternation of humid and arid phases. This had major consequences for the dispersal and evolution of species, including humans, within and out of Africa. Furthermore, it provides a tool for understanding future greening in response to climate change and its environmental impact. </p>
<p>Refined models may, in the future, be able to identify how climate warming will influence rainfall and vegetation in the Sahara region, and the wider implications for society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sahara Desert is green and vegetated every 21,000 years. A climate model shows why.Edward Armstrong, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of HelsinkiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2145972023-11-14T14:11:48Z2023-11-14T14:11:48ZWest Africa’s plastic waste could be fuelling the economy instead of polluting the ocean: experts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557777/original/file-20231106-23-bfkep5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4031%2C3024&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A beach littered with plastic and other waste in the fishing village of Kayar, north of Dakar, Senegal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bara Deme</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Plastic pollution is an urgent environmental issue, globally. Every year, about eight million tonnes of plastic <a href="https://www.unoceandeplastique.fr/ocean-les-faits/">end up</a> in the oceans.</p>
<p>Most of the 17 west African countries have a problem managing plastic waste. Eight of them are <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1260352">among</a> the top 20 with the least effective plastic waste management practices – up from <a href="https://slacc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.-Jambeck2015.pdf#page=2">five</a> in 2015. This has worsened marine pollution and adversely affected activities in the region. </p>
<p>Coastal provinces account for about <a href="https://www.wacaprogram.org/">56% of west Africa’s GDP</a> and one-third of the population lives there. </p>
<p>In 2018, west African nations launched the West Africa Coastal Area Management Programme <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/12/15/world-bank-approves-246-million-to-strengthen-coastal-resilience-in-west-africa#:%7E:text=The%20WACA%20Program%20was%20launched,erosion%2C%20flooding%2C%20and%20pollution.">to protect and restore</a> the ecological, social and economic assets of coastal areas. It’s supposed to do this by addressing coastal erosion, flooding and pollution. Last year it received an additional <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/12/15/world-bank-approves-246-million-to-strengthen-coastal-resilience-in-west-africa#:%7E:text=The%20WACA%20Program%20was%20launched,erosion%2C%20flooding%2C%20and%20pollution.">US$246 million in funding</a> from the World Bank. This has brought the World Bank’s total financing of the project to US$492 million. </p>
<p>For many years, we have <a href="https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/en/persons/pierre-failler/publications/">researched</a> development economics, particularly the interface between the use of <a href="https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/en/persons/elhadj-deme/publications/">natural resources</a> and the development of countries. We’ve also been involved in research on plastic pollution through the interdisciplinary <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/themes/sustainability-and-the-environment/revolution-plastics">“Revolution Plastics”</a> initiative of the University of Portsmouth’s Centre for Blue Governance.</p>
<p>Our findings on plastic pollution could help west African countries to spend World Bank funds effectively.</p>
<p>We recommend that nations first quantify the volume, type and origin of plastics discarded in coastal zones. Then they must focus on reducing plastics from source, as well as promoting reuse and recycling. They can draw on successful case studies globally, which can be adapted to local contexts.</p>
<h2>Healthy oceans and a circular economy</h2>
<p>The West Africa Coastal Area Management Programme has initiated studies to <a href="https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2023/07/12/we-are-losing-our-treasure-the-west-african-coastal-areas-tackle-plastic-waste#:%7E:text=En%20Afrique%20de%20l%27Ouest,secteurs%20touch%C3%A9s%20de%20plein%20fouet">assess</a> the environmental and economic impact of plastic pollution in the region. These studies also aim to explore the benefits of moving to a circular economy: an economic system that reuses or regenerates materials or products in a sustainable way.</p>
<p>The programme expects that a circular economy will create new economic opportunities through markets for reusing products and materials. Rather than discarding products, they can be put back into the economy. This can create demand for services and technologies related to collecting and processing them. </p>
<p>The programme can benefit from research on sustainable plastic management from other regions to achieve its objectives.</p>
<h2>Research partnership</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/research-groups-and-centres/centre-for-blue-governance">Centre for Blue Governance</a> has expertise in blue economy, marine ecosystem management, climate change and circular economy. It has extensively researched plastic pollution in Portsmouth, a port city in the United Kingdom, and beyond. We have found that sustainable plastic management can be achieved in various ways. These strategies could be relevant for initiatives in west Africa. They include:</p>
<p>Inclusive partnerships: Collaborating with businesses, campaigners and citizens on the <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/themes/sustainability-and-the-environment/revolution-plastics">Revolution Plastics</a> initiative, we apply research to develop eco-friendly fabrics and combat microplastic pollution. </p>
<p>Awareness campaigns through art: Community awareness of the harmful effects of plastic pollution is necessary. Through the <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/research-projects/masibambisane">Masibambisane project</a> in South Africa, we explored street art, theatre and song to create awareness about plastic pollution. </p>
<p>The project achieved significant results in KwaMhlanga, in South Africa’s Mpumalanga province. It demonstrated that raising awareness through art could inspire people to change their behaviour. These communities now have a deeper understanding of the urgent need to act against plastic pollution. </p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of sorting facilities close to homes increased recycling rates and encouraged sustainable habits. The west African programme can incorporate these lessons into the e-book it is planning. This is a way to share information about best practices and encourage action in communities. </p>
<p>Reuse and recycling projects: Through our <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/research-projects/indigo-project">inDIGO-EU</a> and <a href="https://www.port.ac.uk/research/research-projects/microseap">Microseap</a> projects we reduced plastic waste by promoting recycling and reuse. For example, the INdIGO project has developed biodegradable fishing gear that reduces the environmental impact of ocean fishing in the UK and France. Based on this project, the West Africa Coastal Area Management Programme can develop a sustainable alternative to the gear used for small-scale fishing in the region. </p>
<h2>From diagnosis to action</h2>
<p>Our research findings suggest that for optimal use of the World Bank fund, the West Africa Coastal Area Management Programme could consider the following action plans:</p>
<p>Collect data on plastic pollution: Start with a regional study to quantify the volume, typology and origin of plastics discarded in coastal zones. This could involve the use of technologies such as drones, sensors and remote sensing to map pollution hotpots. Perception surveys could also help to understand behaviours and attitudes related to plastic pollution. The aim is to establish precise indicators and predictive models that can measure how well future interventions work.</p>
<p>Plan for a switch to a circular economy: The plan should focus on source reduction, reuse, recycling and material recovery. A committee made up of government actors, private enterprises and local communities could oversee implementation.</p>
<p>Design community awareness and education programmes: These campaigns should instil a sense of environmental responsibility and give people tools to actively participate in reducing plastic pollution. Involving opinion leaders could increase their impact.</p>
<p>Develop ways to use plastic waste: Value chains for sorting, recycling and valorising require infrastructure, like modern sorting centres. Advanced recycling technologies and market mechanisms for recycled materials are also necessary. Partnerships could be established with local businesses to create products from recycled plastics, such as construction materials or textiles.</p>
<p>By investing in these targeted areas, it is possible to create a sustainable system that offers economic and social opportunities to local communities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Initiating a circular economy can help coastal west African countries to address plastic pollution with a World Bank fund.Elhadj Bara Dème, Research Associate, University of PortsmouthPierre Failler, Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre for Blue Governance, UNESCO Chair in Ocean Governance, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2149822023-10-25T13:29:56Z2023-10-25T13:29:56ZChristian leaders in Ghana are trying to reshape government – it may not end well<p>Ghana is constitutionally <a href="https://classic.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Ghana.pdf">a secular state</a>. This means religious liberty is guaranteed, and all citizens are free to believe and manifest any religious faith. No political parties are allowed to base their appeal on religion. </p>
<p>However, the situation is changing. Church leaders are becoming more vocal on issues of national interest in Ghana. The Church of Pentecost recently <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/thecophq_nadec23-pentecostnews-possessingthenations-activity-7090623609685073920-1xGI?trk=public_profile_like_view">proposed</a> setting up a Christian morality council to oversee private and public behaviour. Some Christian leaders are also <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/9/1202">cultivating</a> “insider” status with political elites and developing a high media profile.</p>
<p>They aim to remake Ghana according to their values and beliefs. The question is what impact that will have on democracy.</p>
<p>Many Ghanaians regard the country as a “nation of Christians”. According to the <a href="https://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/">2021 census</a>, about 71% of the population is Christian. Muslims make up 18%. Followers of indigenous or animistic religious beliefs make up 5%. Another 6% are members of other religious groups or don’t have religious beliefs.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=wyX5M8UAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of religion and politics</a>, I argue in a recent paper that <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/9/1202">the “Christianisation” of politics in Ghana</a> is an attempt to deal with Ghana’s serious problem of state-level corruption and to improve democracy. But I don’t believe it will have this effect. Rather, Christian nationalism seeks to push aside people who have other beliefs. That is not a basis for democracy. And trying to influence policy through religion will get in the way of fundamental institutional reforms that are necessary to make the government more accountable and its actions more transparent.</p>
<h2>Christianity and politics</h2>
<p>Influential expressions of Christianity in Ghana include the <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/The-Birth-and-Effects-of-Charismaticism-in-Ghana-I-116593">burgeoning Pentecostal or Charismatic</a> churches, which in recent years have become the <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ghana/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%202021%20government,or%20have%20no%20religious%20belief">most popular churches</a> in Ghana. Census data puts them at <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ghana/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%202021%20government,or%20have%20no%20religious%20belief">44%</a> of Christians in the country. These churches tend to have a <a href="https://thecophq.org/">conservative political orientation</a>, a strong belief in the veracity of the Bible, and a message that the nation is undergoing serious moral decay. </p>
<p>Some leading Christians would like to see Christians governing the country and all of society according to biblical law. Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams, leader of the Action Chapel, one of the most prominent charismatic churches in the country, stated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2TaTLnWg7U">interview</a> in 2019 that: Christians “should rule in corporate, politics, the marketplace, everywhere”. The implication is that Christianity should be a dominant social, political and economic expression in Ghana which would project a certain worldview which all Ghanaians, whether or not they are Christians, should adhere to. </p>
<p>The issue is what the appropriate values are to which Ghanaians should adhere. On the one hand, there is a Christian approach, as suggested by Archbishop Duncan-Williams. On the other there is what might be called a “secular” approach where values are not linked to religious belief. </p>
<p>Afrobarometer <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Summary-of-results-Ghana-Afrobarometer-R9-21oct2022-1.pdf">data</a> indicates that most Ghanaians are socially conservative, for example in relation to the rights of LGBTQI+ people. Many also despair about the country’s perceived moral decay, characterised by serious corruption, and about democratic decline. There has been extra-parliamentary, yet peaceful and pro-democracy, opposition to the government, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/20563051221147328">demanding</a> a new constitution and a more equitable political system.</p>
<h2>Democratic decline</h2>
<p>Ghana transitioned from several years of military rule to democracy in 1993. It has since conducted several free and fair elections. It has a reputation as a democracy. America’s National Intelligence Council <a href="https://irp.fas.org/nic/african_democ_2008.pdf">stated</a> in 2008 that “Ghana has emerged as one of Africa’s most liberal and vibrant democracies, reclaiming a position of political leadership on the continent.”</p>
<p>In recent years things have changed under the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party, both of which have had turns governing the country.</p>
<p>Sweden’s V-Dem (“Varieties of Democracy”) Institute <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/18/dr_2017.pdf">categorised</a> Ghana as a liberal democracy in 2003-2014 and again in 2017-2020. This description changed to “<a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/12/dr_2021.pdf">electoral democracy</a>” in 2021 and “<a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/19/dr_2022_ipyOpLP.pdf">autocratizer</a>” in 2022 – indicating steep democratic decline. </p>
<p>The American organisation Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/ghana/freedom-world/2023">says</a> the decline involves “discrimination against women and LGBT+ people”. It also notes “weaknesses in judicial independence and the rule of law”. It points out corruption, poor public service delivery, political violence and illegal mining. </p>
<h2>A Christian solution?</h2>
<p>There are several ways to deal with these issues. One is to amend the constitution to reform government and the state, making functionaries more accountable and policies more transparent. </p>
<p>The Church of Pentecost, Ghana’s largest church, with more than three million members, favours <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2023/07/clergy-chiefs-others-call-for-establishment-of-national-moral-and-integrity-council/">another way</a>. It suggests creating a National Morality and Integrity Council with statutory powers to oversee private and public behaviour, even at state level. </p>
<p>The church believes that to improve democracy and reduce corruption it is necessary for practising Christians to play a leading role in society – including government. According to <a href="https://thecophq.org/infest-others-with-your-purity-rev-dr-joyce-aryee-tells-christians/">Joyce Aryee</a>, a former government appointee and Christian leader, this would “infest others with their purity” and transform behaviour for the good. </p>
<p>Critics <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/does-ghanas-democracy-lack-moral-integrity/">argue</a>, on the other hand, that bringing more Christians into positions of leadership and having a morality council to oversee society would weaken democracy. Ghana must nurture a diversity of beliefs, motivations and behaviours. It could then pursue the common good by drawing on a variety of worldviews, reasoning, values, aspirations and habits – not only those deriving from Christianity. </p>
<h2>Mutual respect</h2>
<p>Democratic development can only be realised when citizens make a moral commitment to treat each other with the same respect as they would like to receive. It is necessary to care for each other’s wellbeing as one might care for one’s own growth and happiness. </p>
<p>Ghana’s democracy will fail unless the moral agency of citizens works to moderate economic and social iniquities, by reforming democratic institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Haynes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Christian leaders in Ghana are pushing the envelope of influence in political affairs.Jeffrey Haynes, Professor Emeritus of Politics, London Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143052023-10-04T13:43:08Z2023-10-04T13:43:08ZCocoa prices are surging: west African countries should seize the moment to negotiate a better deal for farmers<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/cocoa-prices-are-surging-west-african-countries-should-seize-the-moment-to-negotiate-a-better-deal-for-farmers-214305&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The global price of cocoa is spiking, a direct response to <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/07/29/chocolate-inflation-wholesale-cocoa-west-africa-ghana-production/">dwindling cocoa output</a> in west Africa. In September, cocoa futures reached a <a href="https://www.confectioneryproduction.com/news/44853/ghana-and-ivory-coast-cocoa-prices-surge-to-46-year-high-as-concerns-remain-over-supply-deficits/">44-year price peak</a> due to mounting concerns over reduced supplies from the region. </p>
<p>The price surge could prove to be a critical moment for cocoa farming and policy in west Africa.</p>
<p>The cocoa-producing belt of west Africa is responsible for <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/39596493.pdf">generating over 80%</a> of the total global output. Between them, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.732831/full#:%7E:text=Most%20of%20the%20world's%20cocoa,2019%3B%20Fairtrade%2C%202020">contribute</a> more than 60% to the global output. Ghana is the <a href="https://www.confectioneryproduction.com/news/42498/icco-reports-show-increase-in-ghana-and-ivory-coast-cocoa-crops-but-key-export-challenges-persist/">second-biggest producer</a> in the world and cocoa is a vital component of the country’s economy. </p>
<p>The global price spike has led west African governments to increase the guaranteed producer prices to farmers. Ghana recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ghana-hikes-20232024-cocoa-farmgate-price-supplies-tighten-2023-09-09/">raised</a> the state-guaranteed cocoa price paid to farmers by two thirds. The announcement means that Ghana’s cocoa farmers will be paid 20,943 cedis (US$1,837) per tonne for the upcoming 2023-2024 season, up from 12,800 cedis. </p>
<p>Cameroon, the world’s fourth-largest cocoa producer, raised the price cocoa farmers get to 1,500 CFA francs (US$2.50) per kilogram, a 25% jump from the previous rate of 1,200 CFA francs. This increase is even more significant than Ghana’s when factoring in Cameroon’s single-digit inflation. Additionally, the Cote d'Ivoire government has announced a <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ivory-coast-sets-2023-24-cocoa-farmgate-price-at-1000-fcfa/">rise</a> in the producer price.</p>
<p>As an economics researcher who has extensively <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/history/people/academic-staff/dr-michael-ehis-odijie">studied and written</a> about cocoa production in west Africa, I contend that the recent shortages can be harnessed to strengthen the position of cocoa producers. This will enable them to address the structural challenges ingrained in the cocoa production value chain. Rising production costs have not been recognised in the value of cocoa beans. Farmers therefore haven’t been able to earn enough income and this has led to unsustainable farming practices. </p>
<p>In my view, west African countries should use the cocoa shortage as negotiating leverage against multinational corporations to address these structural issues. Both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire must recognise this pivotal moment. They must take the lead, and frame the current production challenges as deep-seated structural problems requiring solutions, rather than as short-term issues.</p>
<h2>What’s driving the change?</h2>
<p>Ghana’s cocoa regulator recently <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/ghana-may-not-meet-demand-for-cocoa-after-weak-harvest-626238">indicated</a> that its farmers might not be able to meet some cocoa contract obligations for another season. Ghana’s <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/ghanas-2022-2023-cocoa-output-expected-to-be-lower-by-11-than-target-sources">projected cocoa yield</a> for the 2022/23 planting season was the lowest in 13 years, falling 24% short of the initial estimates of 850,000 metric tonnes. </p>
<p>This trend has been repeated across the region, with production falling in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon.</p>
<p>Reduced output means demand can’t be met and global prices rise. </p>
<p>The reduction in cocoa output is attributed to short-term and long-term factors. </p>
<p>Commentators typically emphasise the short-term factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>poor weather conditions</p></li>
<li><p>black pod disease, which causes cocoa pods to rot</p></li>
<li><p>the decline in the number of cocoa farmers, some of them selling their land to <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/illegal-mining-an-existential-threat-to-cocoa-production-in-ghana/">illegal miners</a> </p></li>
<li><p>a <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa#:%7E:text=The%20Bank%20estimates%20that%20fertilizer,exacerbate%20food%20security%20throughout%202023.">shortage of fertilisers and pesticides</a>, especially since the conflict in Ukraine has curtailed Russia’s export of potash and other fertilisers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of long-term structural issues have beset cocoa farming in west Africa for decades. They shouldn’t be overshadowed by concerns with short-term problems.</p>
<p>The first is the <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/9/12/524">declining availability</a> of forest land and its connection to increasing production costs.</p>
<p>Over the last two decades, depletion of forest land has led farmers to turn to grasslands for replanting cocoa plants. This requires extensive land preparation, regular weeding around the cocoa trees, pruning, and the application of fertilisers and pesticides. What’s more, the plants are highly susceptible to disease. All these things result in increased labour costs.</p>
<p>None of these additional burdens have been incorporated into the pricing for sustainable cocoa production. In light of the new cost structure, cocoa beans have been undervalued for decades. Farmers have become poorer and are exploring alternative sources of livelihood. </p>
<p>The cost of sustainably cultivating cocoa in grasslands must be reflected in the price that farmers receive. Relying solely on market forces will not achieve this. For instance, every year, typically in September, the Ghana Cocoa Board <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ghana-pegs-farmgate-cocoa-price-at-ghs1308-for-2023-24-crop/">announces</a> the official producer price for cocoa beans for the upcoming cocoa season on behalf of the government. This official price is based on the anticipated export market price, with an understanding in Ghana that farmers should receive approximately 70% of it. However, the resulting market price, and consequently the producer price derived from it, often falls short of covering the costs of sustainable cocoa cultivation.</p>
<h2>A path forward</h2>
<p>What would it cost for cocoa farmers to cultivate cocoa beans sustainably, and ensure a living income, without contributing to deforestation or resorting to child labour? </p>
<p>If the market price falls below this cost (which isn’t static), then the farmers face exploitation, giving rise to many of the problems that plague the industry.</p>
<p>A few years ago, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-efforts-by-cote-divoire-and-ghana-to-help-cocoa-farmers-havent-worked-162845">pioneered the introduction</a> of the “living income differential” – a premium that cocoa buyers would pay on top of the market price to ensure that farmers earned a sustainable income from their produce. Despite its noble intent, the initiative <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/africas-fields-plan-pay-fair-wages-chocolate-withers-2023-04-04/">faltered</a>. It was not well thought through. And it came at a time when these countries had diminished bargaining clout in a saturated market. Now is a favourable moment.</p>
<p>The crisis in the sector puts cocoa producers in a stronger negotiating position. </p>
<p>Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire could collaborate with other regional countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, to negotiate a better position for their cocoa farmers, ensuring sustainable cultivation. There are many strategies these countries can explore, including supply management (such as buffer stocks, export controls, or quotas), price premiums and value addition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E Odijie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana and other west African cocoa growing countries must harness their combined bargaining strength to address the challenges plaguing cocoa farming.Michael E Odijie, Research associate, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2130482023-09-12T12:27:00Z2023-09-12T12:27:00ZUS response to Gabon and Niger coups suggests need for a new West Africa policy in Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547570/original/file-20230911-8175-ma4a9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C56%2C2524%2C1673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's pro-coup National Council for Safeguard of the Homeland celebrate</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-nigers-national-concil-for-safeguard-of-the-news-photo/1657635765?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent coups in the West African nations of Gabon and Niger <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/blindsided-hours-coup-niger-us-diplomats-said-country-was-stable-rcna99708">caught U.S. diplomats a little off guard</a>. They also indicate Washington may need to reassess its policy in the region or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new governments.</p>
<p>Despite following similar overthrows of governments <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">in Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/chads-covert-coup-and-the-implications-for-democratic-governance-in-africa-159725">and Chad</a> in recent years, the U.S official reaction to the coups in Gabon and Niger has come across to <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/us-africa/">some observers as makeshift and uncertain</a>.</p>
<p>In Niger, U.S. diplomats have resisted referring to the overthrowing of President Mohamed Bazoum in July as a coup. Doing so would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/biden-niger-coup-aid.html">mandate the cutting off of military and economic assistance</a> to the country, in which America has sizable military bases. Nonetheless, Washington <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/niger-us-seeks-hang-best-counterterrorist-outpost-west-102008004">later threatened to cut millions of dollars in aid</a>. In Gabon, America acknowledged the coup, which brought down President Ali Bongo Ondimba, and called for the restoration of a democratic process.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/history/amin_julius_a.php">scholar of U.S—Africa relations</a>, and my forthcoming book, “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Sixty-Years-of-Service-in-Africa-The-US-Peace-Corps-in-Cameroon/Amin/p/book/9781032584836">Sixty Years of Service in Africa: The U.S Peace Corps in Cameroon</a>,” examines the nature of U.S.-Africa relations. From my position, Washington’s reaction to coups suggests U.S. policy is out of step with the needs of the region. It is reactive rather than proactive, and based on notions that prioritize Washington’s security needs over the aspirations of the countries of West Africa. It also risks <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-russia-cooperation-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">diminishing U.S. influence in West Africa</a> at a time when rivals – Russia and China – are expanding links.</p>
<p>Such signs are already evident. When U.S Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with the military junta in the Nigerien capital of Niamey in early August 2023, she was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/07/niger-coup-leaders-refuse-to-let-senior-u-s-diplomat-meet-with-deposed-president-00110207">denied access to the deposed leader</a>. </p>
<h2>The contours of US policy in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. policy toward Africa was shaped – and is still scarred – by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/03/01/rethinking-u.s.-policy-in-africa-pub-834">Cold War considerations</a> and European colonial ideologies. </p>
<p>From nationalist struggles to earning their independence, African people were often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396096.001.0001">dismissed by U.S. diplomats</a> as backward, incapable and inferior. Washington’s policy often treated African nations as junior partners to Europe and often <a href="https://archive.org/details/jfk-ordeal-in-africa">deferred to former colonial powers on issues concerning the former colonies</a>. </p>
<p>These perceptions of Africa and its people have endured, so it was not surprising when former President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/politics/immigrants-shithole-countries-trump/index.html">dismissed African nations as “shithole”</a> places dominated by chaos, violence and poverty.</p>
<p>Such thinking and American policy have largely failed to understand the rapid changes taking place on the continent, I believe. African people are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/19/us-africa-leaders-summit-china-russia-competition-scramble/">no longer prepared to be lectured</a> to about who to engage with in their development. Yet American officials <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-09-08/niger-gabon-coups-the-us-must-tread-more-carefully-in-africa?embedded-checkout=true">stand accused of being too slow</a> to recognize this shift.</p>
<h2>Openings for China and Russia</h2>
<p>Such sluggishness has created avenues for China and Russia to move into the Sahel region and East Africa. </p>
<p>China’s serious advancement in the continent <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">began at the Bandung Conference</a> in 1955, where its leaders aligned themselves with African nationalists, emphasizing dogmas of “win-win partnership,” “equality and mutual benefit” and “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509374.htm">mutual respect for sovereignty</a>.” Today, China’s premier makes frequent visits to Africa, while the country invests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/02/chinese-firms-african-labor-are-building-africas-infrastructure/">billions of dollars in the region</a> on infrastructure and other projects. </p>
<p>Like China, Russia engaged Africa gradually. In 1958, Russia’s ignorance of the continent was revealed <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=20981">when it included snow plows</a> among its aid package to Guinea, a country located in tropical Africa. But today, African leaders <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">overwhelmingly participate in the Russia-Africa Summits</a> that have taken place in 2019 and 2023, during which Moscow has aid and trade deals and pledged to become an alternative to Western influence.</p>
<p>And Russia has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit">surpassed China in arms sales to Africa</a>, accounting for 40% of its major weapon shipments. It supplies about 30% of the continent’s grain, and African leaders are increasingly seeing Russia as a counter to the action of other powers, such as France.</p>
<p>Russia and China can easily flatter African leaders with gifts, money, support and state visits, making them feel respected. Both nations have a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/03/16/south-africas-love-affair-with-russia">long history of siding with African nationalists</a> on anti-colonial struggles and in opposing South Africa’s Apartheid.</p>
<p>More recently, at the U.N. vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many African nations <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">either remained neutral or abstained or opposed the U.S. position</a>.</p>
<p>Already, there have been suggestions that the coups may be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">exploited to serve the interests of Russia</a> <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/niger-chinas-path-stability-may-093000342.html">and China</a>. The Wagner Group, a pro-Russian mercenary group, was supportive of the coup in Niger, seeing it as an opportunity to enhance Russia’s involvement there <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66436797">as it did in Mali</a>. Officially, China has said it remains <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/niger-coup-can-blight-chinese-investments-in-africas-sahel-region/articleshow/102688818.cms">concerned about the impact of the coups</a> but stuck to its position of not interfering in other nations’ internal affairs. </p>
<h2>Where does the US go from here?</h2>
<p>Africa’s shifting allegiance to Moscow and Beijing comes at the expense of Washington’s influence – and that could hurt U.S. economic and strategic interests.</p>
<p>The Sahel region and the rest of Africa is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32091/chapter/268011948">home to immense and valuable resources</a>, most notably cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton, diamond, gold, manganese, cobalt, uranium, titanium and coltan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit stands in front of a map of Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Barack Obama was the last U.S. president to make an official state visit to Africa, in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-delivers-a-speech-at-the-african-news-photo/482183512?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sahel region is also of huge strategic importance in the battle against Boko Haram and other extremist organizations. The continent, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africa-can-play-a-leading-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/">is crucial in the struggle</a> to safeguard the environment and addressing climate change. It also contains some of the the fastest-growing nations in the world. Nigeria is set to <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">double its population to 375 million by 2050</a> – and in the process potentially overtake the U.S.</p>
<p>It is for good reason, therefore, that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/secretary-blinken-visits-kenya-nigeria-senegal/6343059.html">noted in 2021 that</a> “Africa will shape the future … of the world.”</p>
<p>But for too long, America has fallen back on discarded notions to shape its African policy rather than look to the continent’s future. By focusing on its own security needs, America has, in my view, failed to understand that alleviating the political, economic and social conditions of locals remains a vital part of the struggle. In Niger, for example, America spent millions of dollars via the government and the U.S. military’s Africa Command, yet 43% of its people <a href="https://concernusa.org/news/poverty-in-niger/">still live in poverty</a>. And to them, resolving problems including chronic unemployment, poor governance and weak democratic institutions is more important than military spending. </p>
<p>U.S. policy risks becoming increasingly ineffectual if it fails to better focus on alleviating conditions that create political unrest, rather than just reacting when it happens. For example, America <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-u-s-should-bid-biya-goodbye-cameroon-security-foreign-policy-yaounde/">can better pressure the continent’s autocrats</a>, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, to institute genuine democratic reforms and make way for new leadership. </p>
<p>The Biden administration pledged at 2022’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-strengthening-partnerships-to-meet-shared-priorities/">invest US$55 billion</a> in the continent over a three-year period.</p>
<p>But while Secretary Blinken has endorsed an equal partnership with African nations, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-africa-policy-biden-administration/2021/11/19/cc11c95c-4933-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">past practices of marginalizing the continent continue</a>. Joe Biden has not visited sub-Saharan Africa as president – nor did his predecessor. You have to go <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/26/president-obama-travels-kenya-and-ethiopia">back to 2015</a> for the last time a U.S. president – Barack Obama – set foot on sub-Saharan Africa as part of an official state visit. </p>
<p>To many on the continent, that speaks volumes about Washington’s priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No US president has set foot on sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 – and it hasn’t gone unnoticed.Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127302023-09-01T15:07:57Z2023-09-01T15:07:57ZCoup in Gabon: Ali Bongo the eighth west African leader to be ousted by military in two years<p>Gabon’s prime minister, Ali Bongo, has become the latest in a string of African leaders to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66652015">ousted by a military coup</a> in recent years. Bongo, who had just won a third term in power, was ousted by a junta of senior officers who have named <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66666585">General Brice Oligui Nguema</a> – the former head of the presidential guard and Bongo’s cousin – as the country’s new “interim president”.</p>
<p>The coup in Gabon is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/recent-coups-west-central-africa-2023-08-30/">eighth in west and central Africa since 2020</a>, and the second – after Niger – in as many months. He is being held under house arrest from where he made an emotional plea for help for him and his family from international “friends of Gabon” to “make noise”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NKiY-AXSf5k?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Deposed Gabonese president, Ali Bongo, makes an emotional plea for help after being placed under house arrest.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup appears to have brought an end to his family’s <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/timeline-gabon-since-independence-in-10-dates/">55-year hold on power in Gabon</a>. His father, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, was president for almost 42 years from 1967. When he died in hospital in 2009, his son won the presidency in an election criticised at the time as little more than a dynastic handover.</p>
<p>News of Bongo’s removal from power was greeted by many with jubilation, with crowds taking to the streets in support of the military junta. There has long been talk of corruption in Gabon, with many believing that revenues from the country’s considerable oil wealth are not being distributed evenly, leaving many in poverty.</p>
<p>Gabon, a <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3520.htm">member of Opec</a>, produces more than 200,000 barrels of oil a day, but – despite having one of Africa’s highest incomes per capita – more than one-third of the population of 2.3 million are thought to be living below the poverty line, according to the UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/GAB.pdf">Development Programme</a>. </p>
<h2>Contested election</h2>
<p>The result of the August 26 election, which appeared to hand Bongo his third term in power, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66620070">widely disputed</a>. Before polls even closed there were complaints that many of the polling stations did not have papers bearing the name of Bongo’s main opponent, former university professor and one-time education minister, Albert Ondo Ossa. </p>
<p>There were reported long delays in polling stations being opened, the internet was shut down, and a curfew was imposed as polls closed. It took three days for the electoral authorities to announce that Bongo had won with 64.3% of the vote compared with 30.8% for Ossa. The coup is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/a-coup-in-gabon-who-what-and-why">reported to have taken place</a> within an hour of the results being announced.</p>
<p>This was not an attempt to unseat Bongo. In 2016, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20160831-gabon-bongo-wins-presidential-election-commission-ping">outbreaks of violence</a> which resulted in more than 50 deaths after an extremely tight election result which Bongo won by 49.8% of the vote against his main opponent, Jean Ping with 48.2%. </p>
<p>There was also a coup attempt in January 2019, when a group of army officers tried to take power while Bongo was undergoing treatment for a stroke in Morocco. The 2019 botched coup attempt was an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190108-gabon-botched-coup-ali-bongo-disputed-elections">early signal</a> of Bongo’s weakening grip on the military. He responded in December 2019 by arresting his chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, on corruption charges.</p>
<p>But this time, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">loud celebrations</a> in the capital Libreville would seem to indicate that, for now at least, the military junta enjoys a level of popular support.</p>
<p>Any unrest is likely to be met with a military clampdown. Gabon’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/">human rights record</a> has been mixed, with reports of abuse and violence, especially <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/gabon/report-gabon/">against dissident voices</a> after the 2016 election. All of which have serious consequences for governance and stability in the short to long term, both in Gabon and across the region. Under Bongo, Gabon had a Freedom House score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2023">20 out of 100</a>, reflecting the tight grip held by Bongo through his control of the military. Now the military has control.</p>
<h2>International reaction</h2>
<p>The African Union has responded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup">suspending Gabon’s membership</a> and, if the EU and other western countries react the same way as they have to other recent coups, sanctions are likely to be imposed. France, which has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military ties with Gabon, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed">400 soldiers stationed in the country</a>, has roundly condemned the coup and called for the election result to be respected, as has the UK. The US has called the events in Gabon “deeply concerning”, while the EU has said the coup would be discussed by ministers this week, according to its top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who said: “If this is confirmed, it’s another military coup, which increases instability in the whole region.”</p>
<p>Gabon is not a member of west Africa’s regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). But the events in Libreville will put pressure on the regional body which is already discussing ways to reverse the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">recent coup in Niger</a> which occurred barely a month ago. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of central and west African countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Troubled region: political instability is rife across central and west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/west-central-africa-political-map-capitals-212454859">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup puts France in a difficult position, given its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/31/gabon-crisis-is-another-challenge-to-frances-african-strategy">close relationship with Ali Bongo</a>, and it might feel pressure to intervene militarily, given that Ecowas already has its hands full with Niger. French influence in a region it once saw as its imperial backyard has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysis-france-losing-its-diplomatic-grip-on-west-africa-hsxhq6k0v">taken a battering</a> in the past two years with coups in francophone countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger.</p>
<p>Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135#:%7E:text=Russian%20military%20advisers%20arrived%20in,2022%2C%20it%20delivered%20arms%20shipments.">trying to strengthen its influence in the region</a> and might see an opportunity to gain further influence by supporting Gabon’s military junta. China, too, is keen to play a growing role in the region – although Beijing tends mainly to concentrate on building economic ties on the resource-rich continent.</p>
<p>But the aftermath of recent events in Libreville will no doubt be watched most closely by the various other longstanding rulers in the region whose democratic mandate might be weaker than their dependence on their armies or foreign mercenaries to keep them in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo is the latest in a string of leaders to be ousted in military coups since 2020.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124672023-08-30T09:08:34Z2023-08-30T09:08:34ZWagner Group: what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death means for stability in Africa<p>The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin after his <a href="https://theconversation.com/yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-boss-joins-long-list-of-those-who-challenged-vladimir-putin-and-paid-the-price-212181">private jet crashed</a> on August 23 has raised questions about the Wagner Group’s future. Many in the west <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/24/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-reported-killed-death-russia-biden-suggests-putin">suspect Kremlin involvement</a> in his death and are asking what will become of the mercenary group without its charismatic leader.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group, often described as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria/">a private military company (PMC)</a> is a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">state-linked</a> actor with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">close ties to the Russian military</a>. It has involved itself in the internal politics of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">numerous African countries</a>, advancing Kremlin interests while providing the Russian leadership with “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">The Wagner Group comprises</a> former Russian soldiers, convicts and foreign nationals paid to provide mercenary services. It first emerged in Crimea in 2014 and has since extended its services to many other countries including many in Africa. </p>
<p>The death of the Wagner Group’s charismatic leader, a former close ally of Putin, raises questions about these African operations. Based on credible news reports, these include activities in: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">Equatorial Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Central African Republic (CAR)</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Chad</a>, <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">Mali</a>, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Burkina Faso</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Mozambique</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Madagascar</a>. The group reportedly has more than <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">5,000 operatives</a> across its Africa operations.</p>
<p>A common denominator among these countries is the presence of insurgencies or civil wars, abundant natural resources, corrupt leadership, and unconstitutional governance, among other factors. Many of these states, such as <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Libya-Remains-a-Failed-State-11-Years-After-NATO-Intervention-20220217-0006.html">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/24/sudan-is-heading-towards-complete-state-collapse">Sudan</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/07/mozambique-is-a-failed-state-the-west-isnt-helping-it/">Mozambique</a>, have many of the characteristics of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/failed-states">“failing” or “failed states”</a>. </p>
<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Designated by the US government as a “<a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-us-designation-wagner-group-transnational-criminal-organisation#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20declaring,United%20States.%E2%80%9D%20What%20constitutes%20a">transnational criminal organisation</a>” the Wagner Group offers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">a range of services</a>. These include conducting offensive combat operations, training, ensuring regime security, advising government leadership, and the management and extraction of natural resources. </p>
<p>Described by South Africa-based think tank In On Africa as “<a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2023/07/07/more-than-mere-mercenaries-the-wagner-group-in-africa/">more than mere mercenaries</a>”, the Wagner Group has also discreetly but effectively put stress on Afro-European relations while bolstering autocratic governments. </p>
<p>It has also promoted anti-neo-colonial figures, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/296849/russia-how-yevgeny-prigozhin-funded-kemi-seba-to-serve-his-own-african-ambitions/">such as Kemi Séba</a> (also known as Capo Chichi). Currently based in Moscow, Séba has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-09/niger-coup-prigozhin-wagner-exploits-anti-french-sentiment/102696370">gained celebrity status </a> through his social media presence and TV talk shows which frequently target French foreign policy. </p>
<p>This has helped to popularise and boost anti-French sentiment among francophone countries in west Africa. France has arguably <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/12/emmanuel-macron-france-erased-from-africa-niger-coup/">continued a neo-colonial approach to west Africa</a> and refused to accept that the era of its “<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/">Francafrique</a>” sphere of influence is over, which has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/17/french-mistakes-helped-create-africas-coup-belt">exacerbated instabilities</a> across the region. For instance, the persistence of French <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/07/12/the-cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-in-africa/">control of the CFA Franc</a>, the common currency used among former French colonies, gave it control over their economies and political affairs.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in west Africa furthers Russian interests by challenging French dominance. The group has done this through the reportedly <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-internet-research-agency-disbands/">now defunct</a> <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2023/03/soft-power-and-disinformation-the-strategic-role-of-media-in-wagners-expansion-in-africa/">Internet Research Agency</a>, known as “Russia’s troll farm”. This organisation orchestrated disinformation campaigns on social media to spread anti-colonial sentiments. </p>
<p>By doing this, it reinforced the <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/anti-french-sentiment-west-africa-reflection-authoritarian-confrontation-collective-west">already strong anti-French sentiments</a> in the Sahel region to discredit France and position Russia as better alternatives. The Internet Research Agency was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14/">directly associated with the Wagner Group</a> via Prigozhin as its founder and owner.</p>
<p>Beyond propping up failed and failing states, the Wagner Group has faced accusations of <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">targeting civilians</a> and committing severe human rights violations in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/24/mali-new-atrocities-malian-army-apparent-wagner-fighters">Mali</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/russian-mercenaries-accused-of-human-rights-abuses-in-car-un-group-experts-wagner-group-violence-election">CAR</a>. </p>
<h2>The circular business of conflict</h2>
<p>In addition to its military activities, the Wagner Group is estimated to have garnered <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">more than US$20 billion</a> (£15.9 billion) from its diverse business dealings, which range from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">gold mining in Sudan</a> to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/313233/how-wagner-prigozhin-teamed-up-with-the-cars-diamond-mafia/">diamond extraction in CAR</a>, where it is also reported to be heavily invested in the <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">forestry and timber business</a>. </p>
<p>Since mercenaries tend to thrive in conflicts, they are likely to profit by prolonging the conflicts they become involved in. So the activities of a PMC such as Wagner can exacerbate conflicts by prolonging hostilities, as witnessed in Libya, Mozambique and CAR. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique/">For instance</a>, small raids against villages and police units in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where Wagner groups were deployed, escalated into a full-scale terrorist insurgency linked to the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43047/chapter-abstract/361462906?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Islamic State’s Central African Province</a>.</p>
<p>In Libya, meanwhile, Wagner Group units <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/108429/pdf/">first appeared in 2018</a>, according to a submission to the UK parliament, ostensibly to provide technical support for repairing and maintaining armoured vehicles for the Libyan National Army. Since then, the scope of their operations has expanded with increased funding from Russia and the fighting continues.</p>
<p>The involvement of Wagner or other PMCs in these countries almost inevitably leads to the erosion of sovereignty as unstable governments become dependent on the mercenaries for their survival. This situation may cause local leaders to favour the interests of the PMCs, reinforcing their roles as puppet leaders, causing mass exploitation of resources, leading to environmental degradation, poverty, grievances, intensified conflicts – all of which creates further demand for mercenary services.</p>
<p>As long as certain African countries and their leadership remain plagued by corruption, extended terms in office, election manipulations, neo-colonial influences, and looting of the national treasury, coups will remain a persistent concern. Military coups are on the rise again <a href="https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/as-coups-return-to-west-africa-frances-footprint-in-africa-fades/">particularly in west Africa</a>, stimulating an increased demand for mercenary services. As such, Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to significantly affect the Wagner Groups’s African operations. The more pertinent question is what the new leadership will look like and whether it will be more directly state-controlled. </p>
<p>But the use of mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group to help unstable or illegitimate governments hold on to power will not bring sustainable peace. Instead, dialogue, transitional governments reflecting people’s desires, the rule of law, and genuine democracy are essential. Otherwise, Africans will keep demanding positive change by all means.</p>
<p>To maintain popular support in an era of instability, African leaders must be seen to act in their people’s best interests. They must heed popular demands to halt misrule and the misuse of African resources across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Idris Mohammed receives funding from the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development to commission a report on sexual violence in the northwest region of Nigeria. He is a member of conflict research network of west Africa ( CORN West Africa). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia was using the mercenary group to further its foreign policy aims in west Africa. There’s no reason to think Prigozhin’s death will change that.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonIdris Mohammed, Conflict Researcher, Department of Mass Communication, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, SokotoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122092023-08-25T11:17:05Z2023-08-25T11:17:05ZNiger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators<p>A month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup in Niger</a> that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">military intervention</a>. </p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.</p>
<p>But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/niger-coup-divisions-as-ecowas-military-threat-fails-to-play-out">have expressed solidarity with the military junta</a> and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention. </p>
<p>France, which <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/20-2%20Africa%20Field%20Study%20Book%20II%20Final%20reduced%20Part%20II.pdf">occupied Niger</a> from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/23/niger-group-calls-for-withdrawal-of-french-troops//#:%7E:text=Some%201%2C500%20French%20soldiers%20have,its%20Sahel%20operation%20last%20year.&text=On%20August%203%2C%20Niamey's%20ruling,a%20one%2Dmonth%20notice%20period.">notice to withdraw</a>. Algeria has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention#:%7E:text=While%20the%20AU%20issued%20a,diplomatic%20efforts%20to%20restore%20democracy">denied France permission</a> to fly over the country.</p>
<p>For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people. </p>
<p>The recent coup underscores <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">a geopolitical rivalry</a> deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of Niger’s resources.</p>
<p>Although Niger <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">grapples with extreme poverty</a>, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/01/uranium-niger-france-coup/">seventh-biggest producer of uranium</a>. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.</p>
<p>First <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx#:%7E:text=Uranium%20was%20discovered%20at%20Azelik,(CEA)%20initiated%20further%20studies.">discovered in 1957 at Azelik</a> by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">surpassed only by gold</a>. The country is a <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU)</a> and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the country <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230814-power-cuts-worsen-in-niger-following-sanctions-from-ecowas">struggles to produce its own electricity</a> because Nigeria <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">recently terminated</a> its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.</p>
<h2>Western exploitation</h2>
<p>Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction</a>. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">misguided and ineffective leadership</a>, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.</p>
<p>While some Ecowas members oppose the coup in Niger and have threatened <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/18/africa/niger-ecowas-d-day-military-intervention-intl-hnk/index.html">military intervention against the coup leaders</a>, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-senate-cautions-against-niger-military-intervention/a-66450388">opposes military intervention</a>, with one of its <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/niger-coup-dont-allow-us-france-push-you-to-unnecessary-war-orji-kalu-tells-tinubu/">members alleging</a> that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.</p>
<p>Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee6fb170-3284-46fa-9eb7-da64212c4989">profoundly influenced</a> Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">Former Coloniser that Stayed</a>”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/30/france-warns-attacks-on-its-interests-in-niger-will-not-be-tolerated">met with retaliation</a>. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/05/niger-junta-wagner-group-mali-mohamed-bazoum-ecowas/">is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger</a>. </p>
<p>But following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733">reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin</a>, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military. </p>
<h2>African resources, western interests</h2>
<p>Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-countries-seek-to-revive-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-dream/a-62778681">trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP)</a>, designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.</p>
<p>The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination <a href="https://journal.iag.ir/article_118383_en.html">uncovers a more intricate reality</a>. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">control over resource allocation</a> – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-coup-could-exacerbate-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian consequences</a> of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.</p>
<p>As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention. </p>
<p>Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A geopolitical struggle for valuable resources such as uranium is behind the wrangling over Niger.Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of WaikatoOlumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105572023-08-03T20:03:02Z2023-08-03T20:03:02Z‘Limitless’ energy: how floating solar panels near the equator could power future population hotspots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540935/original/file-20230803-17-ypizoo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C4%2C992%2C660&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/aerial-top-view-solar-panels-cells-1924116725">Tavarius, Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Vast arrays of solar panels floating on calm seas near the Equator could provide effectively unlimited solar energy to densely populated countries in Southeast Asia and West Africa.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2673-9941/3/3/23">new research</a> shows offshore solar in Indonesia alone could generate about 35,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) of solar energy a year, which is similar to current global electricity production (<a href="https://ourworldindata.org/electricity-mix">30,000TWh per year</a>). </p>
<p>And while most of the world’s oceans experience storms, some regions at the Equator are relatively still and peaceful. So relatively inexpensive engineering structures could suffice to protect offshore floating solar panels.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://re100.eng.anu.edu.au/offshore_solar_atlas/">high-resolution global heat maps</a> show the Indonesian archipelago and equatorial West Africa near Nigeria have the greatest potential for offshore floating solar arrays. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A heatmap showing the best locations for floating solar panels, away from tropical storm tracks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540572/original/file-20230801-20-dkpvgr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Heatmap for offshore floating solar panels. Red areas are best, followed by yellow, green and dark blue. The grey lines show tropical storm tracks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author-supplied, using OpenStreetMap base</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despairing-about-climate-change-these-4-charts-on-the-unstoppable-growth-of-solar-may-change-your-mind-204901">Despairing about climate change? These 4 charts on the unstoppable growth of solar may change your mind</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Solar power rules by mid-century</h2>
<p>On current trends, the global economy will be largely decarbonised and electrified by 2050, supported by <a href="https://theconversation.com/despairing-about-climate-change-these-4-charts-on-the-unstoppable-growth-of-solar-may-change-your-mind-204901">vast amounts of solar and wind energy</a>. </p>
<p>About 70 square kilometres of solar panels can provide all the energy requirements of a million affluent people in a zero-carbon economy. The panels can be placed on rooftops, in arid areas, colocated with agriculture, or floated on water bodies. </p>
<p>But countries with high population densities, such as <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/population/most-populous-countries/">Nigeria and Indonesia</a>, will have limited space for solar energy harvesting.</p>
<p>Their tropical location in the so-called “doldrum” latitudes also means wind resources are poor. Fortunately, these countries – and their neighbours – can harvest effectively unlimited energy from solar panels floating on calm equatorial seas. </p>
<p>Floating solar panels can also be placed on inland lakes and reservoirs. <a href="https://www.pv-magazine-australia.com/2023/03/23/global-study-highlights-potential-of-floating-solar/">Inland floating solar</a> has large potential and is already growing rapidly. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2673-9941/3/3/23">recently released paper</a> surveys the global oceans to find regions that didn’t experience large waves or strong winds over the past 40 years. Floating solar panels in such regions do not require strong and expensive engineering defences. </p>
<p>Regions that don’t experience waves larger than 6 metres nor winds stronger than 15m per second could generate up to one million TWh per year. That’s about five times more annual energy than is needed for a fully decarbonised global economy supporting 10 billion affluent people. </p>
<p>Most of the good sites are close to the Equator, in and around Indonesia and equatorial west Africa. These are regions of high population growth and high environmental values. Marine floating solar panels could help resolve land use conflict. </p>
<h2>Indonesia has vast solar energy potential</h2>
<p>Indonesia is a densely populated country, particularly on the islands of Java, Bali and Sumatra. By mid-century, Indonesia’s population may exceed <a href="https://www.population-trends-asiapacific.org/data/IDN">315 million people</a>. </p>
<p>Fortunately, Indonesia has <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/14/17/5424">vast solar energy potential</a> and also vast <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/9/3457">pumped hydro energy storage potential</a> to store the solar energy overnight. </p>
<p>About 25,000 square km of solar panels would be required to support an affluent Indonesia after full decarbonisation of the economy using solar power. </p>
<p>Indonesia has the option of floating vast numbers of solar panels on its calm inland seas. The region has about 140,000 square km of seascape that has not experienced waves larger than 4m – nor winds stronger than 10m per second – in the past 40 years. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s maritime area of 6.4 million square km is 200 times larger than required if Indonesia’s entire <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-could-harvest-solar-energy-from-10-billion-panels-so-where-do-we-put-them-167299">future energy needs</a> were met from offshore floating solar panels. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A heatmap showing the best locations for floating solar panels, away from tropical storm tracks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540573/original/file-20230801-23-ko6dda.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Heatmap for offshore floating solar panels in Indonesia. Red areas are best, followed by yellow, green and dark blue. The grey lines show tropical storm tracks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author-supplied, using OpenStreetMap base</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The future for offshore floating solar</h2>
<p>Most of the global seascape experiences waves larger than 10m and winds stronger than 20m per second. Several companies are working to develop engineering defences so offshore floating panels can tolerate storms. In contrast, benign maritime environments along the equator require much less robust and expensive defences. </p>
<p>We have found the most suitable regions cluster within 5–12 degrees of latitude of the Equator, principally in and around the Indonesian archipelago and in the Gulf of Guinea near Nigeria. These regions have low potential for wind generation, high population density, rapid growth (in both population and energy consumption) and substantial intact ecosystems that should not be cleared for solar farms. Tropical storms rarely impact equatorial regions. </p>
<p>The offshore floating solar industry is in its infancy. Offshore solar panels do have downsides compared with onshore panels, including salt corrosion and marine fouling. Shallow seas are preferred for anchoring the panels to the seabed. And careful attention must be paid to minimising damage to the marine environment and fishing. Global warming may also alter wind and wave patterns.
Despite these challenges, we believe offshore floating panels will provide a large component of the energy mix for countries with access to calm equatorial seas. By mid-century, about a billion people in these countries will rely mostly on solar energy, which is causing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/despairing-about-climate-change-these-4-charts-on-the-unstoppable-growth-of-solar-may-change-your-mind-204901">fastest energy change in history</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sunshine-by-day-water-by-night-indonesia-could-pair-its-vast-solar-and-hydro-storage-to-decarbonise-the-country-183219">Sunshine by day, water by night: Indonesia could pair its vast solar and hydro storage to decarbonise the country</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210557/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Blakers receives funding from ARENA, P4I and similar organisations</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Firnando Silalahi's ongoing PhD study is funded by the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP).</span></em></p>New research shows densely populated countries in Southeast Asia and West Africa could harvest effectively unlimited energy from solar panels floating on calm tropical seas near the equator.Andrew Blakers, Professor of Engineering, Australian National UniversityDavid Firnando Silalahi, Phd Candidate, School of Engineering, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083812023-07-30T11:11:43Z2023-07-30T11:11:43ZCameroon’s anglophone conflict has lasted for six years: what citizens say about how to end it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537335/original/file-20230713-15-vyok0a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroonians want an end to the six year old armed conflict. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">armed conflict</a> in Cameroon between separatist groups and the military is in its sixth year. Armed groups are fighting for <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/cameroon-civil-war-anglophone-crisis-paul-biya-politics/">secession </a>of the English-speaking north-west and south-west regions and establishment of the Republic of Ambazonia. The government rejected a Canadian <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/01/statement-on-peace-process-in-cameroon.html">peace initiative</a> in January 2023. </p>
<p>Cameroon is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13146029">officially bilingual</a>. However, the minority English-speaking population has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/world/cameroon-anglophone-crisis/">complained for decades </a>of unfair treatment by the francophone-dominated state. Periods of opposition and resistance have come and gone, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8784587/#:%7E:text=Genesis%20of%20the%20Anglophone%20crisis&text=Cameroon%20became%20a%20German%20colony,Britain%20and%2080%25%20to%20France.">for instance</a> in the 1990s. But the current levels of violence are unprecedented.</p>
<p>The impact on the civilian population has been devastating. In almost six years of conflict, over <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">6,000 civilians</a> have been killed. Hundreds of villages have been razed in the military’s counterinsurgency campaign. Hundreds of thousands have fled the violence. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Recent figures</a> indicate 628,000 internally displaced people and 87,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria, out of a total population of some four million in the anglophone regions. </p>
<p>Drawing from our personal experiences and <a href="https://www.coventry.ac.uk/globalassets/media/global/08-new-research-section/ctpsr/voices-from-ground-zero---report.pdf">research</a> on the conflict since 2017, we assessed the current situation and the prospects for resolution based on citizen feedback. Most citizens propose inclusive dialogue and a referendum.</p>
<h2>Current impasse in peace efforts</h2>
<p>A number of factors currently sustain the conflict and make peacemaking difficult. </p>
<p>The foremost obstacle is the Cameroon government’s desire to crush the separatists and achieve a military victory. While government forces are better equipped and more numerous, this is a guerrilla war fought in difficult terrain. Such wars are difficult to win. This is especially so when fighting mobile armed groups fuelled by decades of <a href="https://panafricanvisions.com/2019/11/cameroon-from-biya-a-mea-culpa-on-the-anglophone-crisis-in-paris/">grievances</a>. The grievances relate to policies of forceful political, social and cultural assimilation, economic deprivation and marginalisation. </p>
<p>Additionally, a war economy has developed. Military personnel, political leaders and some Ambazonian groups are all <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/07/19/Cameroon-anglophone-crisis-separatism-secession-elusive-peace">profiting</a> from the conflict. </p>
<p>On the Ambazonian side, other factors also go against peacemaking. Notably, the Ambazonian movement has become increasingly fragmented politically and militarily. The political leadership, based mainly in the diaspora, has long been split between the Ambazonian Governing Council and the Interim Government. The Interim Government is now <a href="https://www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/press-room/173-one-interim-government-one-legitimate-leader-restoration-council-affirms">fragmented</a> further under competing leaders. </p>
<p>The apparent disconnect between the political leadership living securely in the diaspora and the longstanding suffering of the civilian population in the conflict zones is another factor that militates against peace talks.</p>
<p>Militarily, there is a proliferation of armed groups. This makes any ceasefire prospects more difficult. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.chrda.org/the-human-rights-situation-report-of-the-north-west-and-south-west-regions-of-cameroon-between-january-2023-march-2023-first-quarter-report">atrocities against civilians</a> are undoubtedly committed by both warring sides, the military in particular continues to exercise extreme <a href="https://mimimefoinfos.com/anglophone-crisis-mother-and-son-murdered-in-big-babanki">violence</a> against the civilian population. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are rampant. </p>
<p>All this has led to a palpable shift in the mood among local civilians, with war-weariness and a strong desire for conflict resolution.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Among our research participants from <a href="https://bit.ly/Voices-Ground-Zero-Report">Ground Zero</a> – the local name given to the conflict zones – an almost unanimous desire was expressed for an end to the violence through a political settlement. Perhaps it is time to listen to these voices from Ground Zero for their perspectives on how to resolve the conflict.</p>
<p>One research participant succinctly summed up a possible pathway:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ceasefire is the first button that should be clicked … [and] all the political detainees should be released. After their release, dialogue and a referendum and the people will decide. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The call for “inclusive dialogue” was the most commonly voiced element of this peace strategy. As one respondent noted: “real, genuine, inclusive national dialogue”, inclusive of diaspora elements and their own grassroots voices. </p>
<p>While we found support for both secession and a two-state federation among our participants, there was consensus on a referendum among the English-speaking population as their preferred means of political decision-making. </p>
<p>Although research participants favoured a bottom-up approach that facilitated local participation in peace processes, a mediation role for the international community was perceived as important:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If there is no foreign intervention, it will be difficult.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The UN and African Union were most frequently mentioned. At the time of our study, the Canadian initiative was unknown.</p>
<p>However, the warring parties remain entrenched in their unwillingness to countenance a political solution that either challenges the status quo (government side) or does not entail independence (Ambazonian side). </p>
<p>While most separatist factions (though not all) have shown more willingness to commit to the Canadian peace process, all of them should now listen to the views of anglophone civilians that they purport to represent and respect their desire for a peace agreement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gordon Crawford has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the project "Voices from 'Ground Zero': Interrogating History, Culture and Identity in the Resolution of Cameroon's 'Anglophone' Conflict".</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University's International and Interdisciplinary Pilot Projects for the project: "The Shrinking Civic Space in Cameroon and the Role of Civil Society Organisations in Resolution of the ongoing ‘Anglophone’ Conflict".</span></em></p>The Cameroonian government’s pursuit of military victory is likely to prolong the war.Gordon Crawford, Professor, Coventry UniversityMaurice Beseng, Assistant Professor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089282023-07-13T15:25:06Z2023-07-13T15:25:06ZFermented food is a staple in west Africa: 5 ways to make sure it’s safe for eating<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536763/original/file-20230711-27-3496wk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">West African cuisine makes significant use of fermented condiments.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A typical west African menu is not complete without a fermented food or drink. These are foods that have been transformed by natural processes involving “friendly” microorganisms like bacteria or yeast. The microorganisms break down the sugars and other substances in the food, which changes the taste and texture, and sometimes even preserves the food.</p>
<p>Some examples of fermented foods from the region are those made from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/parkia-biglobosa">African locust beans</a>, such as iru (Nigeria), <a href="https://thechronicle.com.gh/10-health-benefits-of-african-locust-bean-dawadawa/">dawadawa</a> (Ghana), <a href="https://www.my-gambia.com/mymagazine/must-try-locust-beans-or-netetu/">netetu</a> (Senegal) and <a href="https://issuu.com/dr.ahkabir/docs/ijaar-vol-11-no-5-p-7-15">afitin</a> (Benin). Other products include <a href="https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=pjn.2012.270.275">okpehe</a> (Nigeria), soydawadawa (Ghana), <a href="https://www.allnigerianrecipes.com/food-ingredients/how-to-make-ogiri-igbo/">ogiri</a> (east Nigeria), and Burkina Faso’s <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajb/article/view/58575">bikalga</a> and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2022/08/31/soumbala-an-african-mustard-to-the-rescue-of-french-gastronomy_5995321_124.html">soumbala</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-combining-and-fermenting-grains-can-help-nutrition-in-africa-117203">Fermented foods</a> are rich in protein, dietary fibre, and essential minerals such as iron, calcium, and potassium. Although many of these foods are used as condiments, they also serve as low-cost meat substitutes due to their high protein content and <a href="https://theconversation.com/chocolates-secret-ingredient-is-the-fermenting-microbes-that-make-it-taste-so-good-155552">taste</a>. </p>
<p>The alkalinity of these fermented foods helps preserve them, because microorganisms (which cause food to spoil) don’t grow so easily in alkaline substances.</p>
<p>However, there are safety concerns with some of these foods. Risks can arise in the way they are prepared and the quality of the fermentation process.</p>
<p>As a microbiologist, I’ve <a href="https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/safety-evaluation-of-west-african-alkaline-fermented-foods">studied</a> west African alkaline fermented foods and highlighted some safety issues they present. I’ve also suggested ways to make these foods safer.</p>
<h2>Food safety risks</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/parkia-biglobosa">Iru</a> (African locust beans) and other legume-based products provide essential amino acids and are a rich source of protein and fibre. Dawadawa contains antioxidants that help protect cells from oxidative damage (cell damage caused by stress).</p>
<p>But one safety concern is the contamination risk from <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mycotoxins#:%7E:text=Mycotoxins%20are%20toxic%20compounds%20that,dried%20fruits%2C%20nuts%20and%20spices.">mycotoxins</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/coliform-bacteria">bacteria</a> related to poor hygiene. Mycotoxins are toxic substances produced by certain moulds that can contaminate crops during growth, harvest, storage or processing. </p>
<p>Mycotoxins are capable of causing diseases or even death in humans and other animals. The adverse <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mycotoxins#:%7E:text=Mycotoxins%20are%20toxic%20compounds%20that,dried%20fruits%2C%20nuts%20and%20spices.">health effects of mycotoxins</a> range from acute poisoning to long-term effects such as immune deficiency and cancer. Heavy exposure to <a href="https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/aflatoxins#:%7E:text=Aflatoxins%20are%20a%20family%20of,humid%20regions%20of%20the%20world.">aflatoxin</a>, a type of mycotoxin, causes liver damage, jaundice, haemorrhage and oedema. Lower exposure to aflatoxin over a long time may cause <a href="https://www.verywellhealth.com/different-causes-of-immunosuppression-explained-4047405">immunosuppression</a> and cancer. </p>
<p>Unregulated <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ancient-african-fermentation-techniques-reveal-about-probiotics-61221">traditional practices</a>, which may involve unhygienic utensils and handling, can pose a threat to food safety by introducing bacteria that can survive alkaline conditions. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-does-food-get-contaminated-the-unsafe-habits-that-kill-more-than-400-000-people-a-year-205087">How does food get contaminated? The unsafe habits that kill more than 400,000 people a year</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Also, fermented food products often use salt as a preservative. Consuming too much salt may <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/salt-reduction">adversely affect health</a> and worsen conditions like cardiovascular diseases and stroke. </p>
<p>So, to minimise the safety risks of fermented foods, it is important to reduce the amount of salt and to store foods properly. Inspect grains and seeds, and discard any that look mouldy, discoloured, or shrivelled. Avoid damage to grains before and during drying, and in storage. </p>
<p>Food safety requires action and cooperation in five areas: agriculture, food technology, nutrition, microbiology, and regulations. </p>
<h2>Five approaches to safer fermented foods</h2>
<p><em>Agriculture</em></p>
<p>The quality and safety of fermented foods lies in the quality of the “substrate” it’s made from, such as legumes. Starting a fermentation process with low quality substrates creates a high risk of introducing potentially pathogenic bacteria and fungi, or toxins produced by them. Seeds and other <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-must-be-done-to-get-toxin-out-of-kenyas-food-supply-127137">agricultural produce</a> used must be of high quality and certified safe for human consumption. </p>
<p><em>Food technology</em></p>
<p>Safe alkaline fermentation requires careful control of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-role-of-rural-women-in-making-home-brew-a-rwandan-case-study-76805">production conditions</a>. Inadequate fermentation time and sub-optimal temperature may not produce the enzymes that kill pathogens and prevent toxins. </p>
<p><em>Nutrition</em></p>
<p>Generally, very little research has been done on the nutritional composition of fermented products. There’s a need for more data on this. Studies should explore what influences the nutritional content of the products, such as soil characteristics, climate and the state of maturity at harvest. Data should be collected and analysed throughout the process, from the farm to processing and consumption stages. A robust measure of nutrient composition would help to formulate recommendations on daily intakes. </p>
<p><em>Microbiology</em></p>
<p>The safety of the particular strains of organisms used in fermentation needs more investigation. Molecular and genomics tools could be used to identify the enzyme producing species and strains in these fermented foods. </p>
<p><em>Regulation</em></p>
<p>Food regulations, policies and monitoring are needed in west African countries to overcome local challenges. Among various interventions, food handlers should be educated by food safety bodies on essential microbiology, <a href="https://theconversation.com/your-snacks-may-be-delicious-but-are-they-safe-206124">hygiene and sanitation</a> as it concerns their products. Monitoring of compliance during production, packaging and storage in the market is essential. </p>
<p>The culinary traditions of west Africa offer a treasure trove of flavours and experiences. Alkaline fermented foods, with their distinctive tastes, textures and aromas, also offer potential health benefits. With high-quality substrates, appropriate starter cultures, the right hygiene practices, optimal pH and temperature in production, and proper storage and packaging, consumers can enjoy the region’s fermented delicacies with confidence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omololu Fagunwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Fermented foods are a key component of west African cuisine. Making them safer for consumption should be a priority.Omololu Fagunwa, Research Fellow, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057882023-06-05T14:23:25Z2023-06-05T14:23:25ZCensus data in West Africa is badly out of date: 5 reasons fresh population statistics are crucial<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529068/original/file-20230530-21-bktyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guineans living in Ivory Coast wait for their turn during a census on March 26, 2010 in Adjame, a popular district in Abidjan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SIA Kambou/AFP via Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>West Africa, an area composed of 16 countries, is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. The region has a population of over <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac-expo-milano/about/westafrica/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%8CHome%20to%20some%20350%20million,rapidly%20growing%20population%20are%20enormous.">350 million</a>, a five-fold increase since 1950 when 73 million people lived there. </p>
<p>More than half of the population is <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/adolescents-and-youth-report-west-and-central-africa">under the age of 25</a>.
The region’s urban population <a href="https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/population">rose</a> from 8.3% of the total in 1950 to almost 44% in 2015. </p>
<p>Population size, composition and distribution all have implications for what a society needs - including food, water, energy and infrastructure – and how to provide it. </p>
<p>Countries in West Africa have many pressing needs. Some of the reasons are insecurity, poor governance, high military spending and forgone investment. </p>
<p>Forces such as climate change may add pressure, causing food insecurity, economic disruption and extreme harms from floods and droughts. The region is also shifting towards renewable and green energy, creating new job opportunities. </p>
<p>With all these development challenges and opportunities, and limited resources, it’s vital to know what to focus on. Census data is useful for making effective policy plans and tracking progress to reach goals.</p>
<p>The census is a nationally representative survey, and a fundamental tool to collect information on each country’s population. A trained enumerator visits the home to collect information on each person living there, including their genders, ages, marital status, occupations, languages spoken, and other key pieces of basic information.</p>
<p>Without census data, countries are not able to measure or understand patterns of population growth or urbanisation.</p>
<p>The more detailed, up to date, and high quality the data, the better informed policies and programmes can be. Census data that can be disaggregated by key characteristics (broken down into more specific parts) can draw attention to disparities and inequalities. </p>
<p>And routine data allows countries to measure their success on key indicators such as the Sustainable Development Goals. </p>
<p>Many countries in west Africa, however, do not have up to date census surveys. For example the most recent census data for Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal is over 10 years old. Normally these are done every 10 years.</p>
<p>Conducting a census is extremely challenging. It is costly and requires a large staff with training. It involves the participation of large numbers of people. There can be concerns about privacy or questions of a sensitive nature (such as ethnicity). Political instability and conflict can also make <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/census#readmore-expand">enumeration challenging</a>. </p>
<p>As a public health and demography <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jessie-pinchoff-1216414">expert</a> at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/population-council-3531">Population Council</a>, which generates <a href="https://popcouncil.org/basic_page/adolescent-data-hub/">adolescent</a> and <a href="https://cdm.popcouncil.org/">demographic modelling</a> data across west Africa, I’ve listed five reasons why the region needs up to date censuses.</p>
<h2>Five ways a census helps a country</h2>
<p><strong>Allocation of resources and political power:</strong> With growing populations and economies, fresh census data helps governments allocate resources, target services, plan infrastructure projects, and direct investments. </p>
<p>To ensure that people have fair access to what they need, it’s useful to have information about their age, income and other characteristics. This information is also used to create geographic areas containing around the same number of people, so that all voters are represented.</p>
<p><strong>Economic development:</strong> The census asks households for information about their income, employment and demographic characteristics such as age or sex. This can help governments understand patterns of economic growth and how to stoke economic development. The private sector and governments need information like this for decisions about investment.</p>
<p><strong>Social welfare:</strong> Census data provides a better understanding of the needs of different groups in society, such as the elderly, children, and people with disabilities. It informs the design of social welfare programmes that target those who are most in need. </p>
<p>For example, only <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/inclusion-persons-disabilities-west-africa-ecowas-advocates-signature-and-ratification-african-union-protocol-persons-disabilities-all-its-member-states">three countries</a> out of 15 in the regional body ECOWAS have ratified the African Union’s protocol on disability inclusion. </p>
<p><strong>Disaster response and risk reduction:</strong> Census data is also used in disaster planning, response and risk reduction efforts. It provides information on population density, vulnerability and infrastructure, which is vital in identifying areas that are at risk during extreme events such as <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/warming-worsened-west-africa-floods-that-killed-800-people/">floods</a>. It can also indicate where vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or people with disabilities, may be harmed.</p>
<p><strong>Research to inform policies:</strong> High quality, up to date, and routine census data is critical for informing research to generate the evidence that policies and programmes are based on. </p>
<p>For example, the region could benefit from research on how to minimise schooling disruptions due to climate, target areas with low enrolment rates, and use technology to advance education outcomes. </p>
<p>Health research is another critical area, to protect children and their families and build hospitals and facilities where they are most needed. </p>
<p>The census can identify burden of disease, patterns of sickness and death and the distribution of risk factors. Census data can uncover disparities in health, education, social and economic programming.</p>
<h2>Challenging but worth it</h2>
<p>Accurate and timely census data is critical for west Africa to achieve its potential and mark progress. Conducting a census takes time, money and people, and it can be challenging to collect accurate data in certain settings. </p>
<p>However, the census is a critical tool to allow countries to make informed decisions about how best to allocate resources, plan for the future, and improve the lives of their citizens, including the rising generation of young people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessie Pinchoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many countries in West Africa do not have up to date census surveys.Jessie Pinchoff, Associate researcher, Population CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054982023-05-31T13:28:36Z2023-05-31T13:28:36ZWest African countries show how working together over decades builds peace and stops wars breaking out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528872/original/file-20230529-17-fnjtie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From left; Prime Minister of Cote d'Ivoire Patrick Achi, President of Togo Faure Gnassingbe, President of Benin Patrice Talon, and President of Ghana Nana Akufo-Addo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nipah Dennis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is often portrayed as a continent ravaged by war, terrorism, poverty and political instability. But over the past five decades few violent conflicts have occurred between states. In Europe, for comparison, there have been more than 25 inter-state conflicts since 1945. </p>
<p>It’s true that Africa has seen <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/">214</a> coups, the most of any region; 106 have been successful. Out of <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/">54 countries</a> on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. </p>
<p>West Africa, a region of 16 independent states, has <a href="https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups">experienced</a> 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950. There are also cross-border security challenges such as terrorism, banditry, piracy and the wide presence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-has-a-small-weapons-crisis-why-some-countries-are-better-at-dealing-with-it-than-others-203085">arms</a>. </p>
<p>But, since independence in the late 1950s, the region’s countries have not gone to war with one another – <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/69">except</a> for a minor armed confrontation between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2023.2193165">recent paper</a> we explored the possible reasons for this. As scholars studying the political dynamics of west Africa, we arrived at our insights by analysing historical data, diplomatic interactions and scholarly research. </p>
<p>We found evidence that the principles of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes defined the relationships between west African countries. The 15 states under the <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf">umbrella</a> of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) positively identify with the fate of others in the bloc. The regional body was formed in 1975 by west African countries seeking to promote economic development. </p>
<p>We found a strong correlation between decades of regional cooperation and the rarity of conflicts between states in west Africa.</p>
<p>We conclude that systemic cooperation between states in the region has led to a collective identity forming over time. A sense of community has developed. The community has developed conflict management mechanisms. This has prevented members from going into war. </p>
<p>This finding highlights the importance of collaboration and diplomacy in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. </p>
<h2>Making sense of the ECOWAS peace</h2>
<p>Regional dynamics and historical factors shape conflict, as can be seen in the Horn of Africa. That region has witnessed conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example.</p>
<p>In the west African region, we found that the security arrangements agreed under ECOWAS have helped to foster peace between states. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf">ECOWAS agreement</a> was updated in 1993. It includes principles that were absent in the earlier pact. Among them are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>solidarity and collective self-reliance </p></li>
<li><p>non-aggression between member states </p></li>
<li><p>promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness to maintain regional peace, stability and security </p></li>
<li><p>peaceful settlement of disputes among member states</p></li>
<li><p>active cooperation between neighbouring countries </p></li>
<li><p>promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This has led to west African countries choosing peaceful dispute resolution over sovereignty. For example, a <a href="https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-insights/news/2017/september/ghana-wins-maritime-boundary-dispute-against-cote-divoire/">border dispute</a> between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 through an international tribunal. This approach has prevented violent conflicts. </p>
<p>A key factor is that member states have mechanisms for settling disputes peacefully. In both <a href="http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/research/liberia/results/civil-war/root-causes-civil-war">Liberia’s</a> and <a href="http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Sierraleone.pdf">Sierra Leone’s</a> wars, which threatened to engulf other countries in the region, ECOWAS used these settlement mechanisms. It deployed military troops to supervise <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/peace-agreements-and-the-termination-of-civil-wars/">ceasefires brokered</a> by the then Ghanaian <a href="https://theconversation.com/some-ghanaians-hate-him-some-love-him-the-mixed-legacy-of-jerry-john-rawlings-163310">president, Jerry Rawlings</a>.</p>
<p>Another factor is what in our study we call pan-West Africanism. We describe this as a regional version of pan-Africanism that emphasises unity and collaboration among countries. In practice it has facilitated trade, cultural exchanges and diplomatic collaborations. It has also created a sense of shared identity and solidarity among member countries. </p>
<p>We argue that the idea of pan-West Africanism has promoted regional solidarity and reduced the possibility of violence in inter-state relations. It is not just a philosophy, but a practical approach to regional integration and cooperation. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Our paper supports the argument that systemic cooperation among states can lead to a collective identity forming over time.</p>
<p>This has happened with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their collective identities are based on norms that reflect the history and political cultures of their member states.</p>
<p>The importance of shared identity and peaceful coexistence is often overlooked in explaining complex international relations. But it’s essential in understanding the relations of west African states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abubakar Abubakar Usman is a research fellow with International Islamic University Malaysia Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF) and affiliated with the Asia Middle East Centre for Research and Dialogue (AMEC). </span></em></p>Africa has been relatively peaceful in terms of inter-state violent conflicts.Abubakar Abubakar Usman, Researcher, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061312023-05-29T13:09:51Z2023-05-29T13:09:51ZAfrican migration to Europe: forced returns run into resistance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528810/original/file-20230529-19-g9c03p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forced return of irregular African migrants from Europe is affecting political relationships in the two regions. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/29162/concern-at-eus-growing-push-to-return-rejected-asylum-seekers">forced return</a> of migrants from the European Union (EU) to their countries of origin continues to be a source of major tension in African countries as well as EU member states. The result has been that the EU – and individual member states – have been scrambling to come up with ways to improve cooperation on migration. </p>
<p>What EU countries want is for countries of origin to take back migrants that are not able to live legally in Europe. But return rates from the EU to Africa are the lowest compared to other world regions and have <a href="https://afripoli.org/germanys-new-migration-policy-what-the-paradigm-shift-means-for-african-partner-countries">even decreased</a> in the last decade. For example, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2023.2198579?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">only 9% of Senegalese</a> with an order to return from the EU did so between 2015 and 2019. In other words, of the 30,650 Senegalese migrants who received an order to leave from a European country between 2015 and 2019, only 2,805 did. Forced return necessitates the cooperation of countries of origin through for example issuing travel documents or allowing flights to land. </p>
<p>Based on my recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21622671.2023.2198579?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab&aria-labelledby=full-article">work</a> and broader <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/projects/the-political-economy-of-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-0">research project</a>, I argue that returns are so low in part because European policy makers ignore the competing issues and interests African stakeholders face. </p>
<p>I also show how West African states resist cooperating on returns. Their strategies range from reluctant compliance with deportations of their citizens to proactive noncompliance. </p>
<p>My findings help explain why current migration partnerships continue to have little effect on returns. </p>
<h2>Migration partnerships coming up empty</h2>
<p>Apart from Rwanda, which has signed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/europe-outsourcing-asylum-to-african-countries-is-a-terrible-idea-there-are-alternatives-203246">deal with the UK</a> to take in asylum seekers, not yet implemented, returns from European countries are hugely unpopular in most African countries. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf">EU’s Partnership Framework</a> was established in June 2016. It sought to mobilise the instruments, resources and influence of both the EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries in order to “manage” migration flows. It stated that <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2016/0385/COM_COM(2016)0385_EN.pdf">the priority was to achieve fast returns</a>. It named five priority countries for this approach: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, seeking to establish tailored migration compacts with them. </p>
<p>This framework has so far largely failed to achieve better migration cooperation. The same applies to the <a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/negotiating-with-third-countries-under-the-new-pact-carrots-and-sticks/">New Pact on Migration and Asylum</a> from 2020, and a revised visa code which allows <a href="https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Policy-Note-36-Playing-the-Visa-Card-June-2021.pdf">visa restrictions for</a> countries not adequately cooperating on returns. </p>
<p>Forced returns, especially back to west Africa, remain low as noted above.</p>
<p>There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, deportations are often <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07256868.2022.2086224">violent and traumatic events</a> for those being returned and involve serious human rights violations. For example, a Senegalese migrant rights group recently <a href="https://bozafii.org/index.php/2023/05/07/rapport-deportation-3-mai-2023-allemagne-senegal/">documented</a> a case of a person who was deported from a closed psychiatric institution in Germany without medication, medical records or telephone and other personal belongings and was left to fend for himself on arrival. Governments wanting to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106221119598?journalCode=sdib">take care of their citizens</a> will want to avoid this. </p>
<p>Secondly, returns can come at the cost of important remittances (often higher than development aid). For <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">example</a>, Nigeria is the largest net remittance-recipient country in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2017, the country received US$22 billion in official remittances, representing 5.9% of Nigeria’s GDP. In comparison, official development assistance came to US$3.36 billion, only 0.89% of GDP. Thus, countries calculate that returns could reduce remittances. And reintegrating deportees comes with <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12578">social</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7">economic</a> costs. </p>
<p>Thirdly, countries feel that they are badly treated by their European counterparts. Legal migration pathways are <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/publications/policy-papers/policy-briefs/challenges-in-eu-african-migration-cooperation-west-african-perspectives-on-forced-return-14152/">limited</a> and the EU approach has become increasingly punitive. There are stricter visa conditions for countries not seen to be adequately cooperating on returns, like <a href="https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/eu-to-introduce-visa-restrictions-for-senegal-the-gambia-as-a-leverage-for-readmission-of-illegal-migrants/">The Gambia or Senegal</a>.</p>
<p>Governments respond in various ways to return pressures from the EU.</p>
<h2>A range of responses</h2>
<p>The research considered the interests of governments in Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia. It built on 129 interviews with policymakers, politicians, civil society activists and academic experts in these countries and in the EU. </p>
<p>Countries’ responses range from reluctant compliance to reactive and proactive noncompliance. They are likely to use all these strategies at different times, sometimes simultaneously. Responses are influenced by the often conflicting pressures governments face domestically and externally. </p>
<p><strong>Reluctant compliance</strong> is when countries comply with deportations, but only reluctantly. For example <a href="https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Policy-Study28.pdf">informal return agreements</a> signal compliance to international partners but attract less scrutiny from parliamentary oversight bodies or the general public. This strategy can, however, backfire and cause distrust and outrage from citizens. </p>
<p><strong>Reactive noncompliance</strong> includes calling out technical issues and causing delays in return operations. States may fail to identify whether migrants are their citizens, or fail to <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/PB_Returns_at_what_cost.pdf">issue travel documents</a> of migrants awaiting deportation. This can be a less costly strategy than outright refusing deportations, while increasing domestic approval. </p>
<p><strong>Proactive noncompliance</strong> is the most extreme response. This is when states are more direct in their refusal to cooperate with returns. It includes, for example, stalling on negotiations for a formal return agreement. <a href="https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/434">Senegal</a> and <a href="https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/nigeria/">Nigeria</a> have taken this route. The Gambia even implemented a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-return-from-europe-is-causing-problems-for-the-gambia-124036">moratorium</a> on all (chartered) deportation flights for a few months. </p>
<p>Proactive noncompliance holds the most potential for governments to improve their domestic legitimacy – especially during elections. But it can come at the cost of international support. In the case of The Gambia, for example, the EU has imposed <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/08/the-gambia-council-increases-the-visa-fee-due-to-lack-of-cooperation-on-readmission/">visa sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>EU stakeholders could do more to consider the interests that African countries have when it comes to accepting returnees. </p>
<p>Ratcheting up the pressure will produce more resistance. Rather, the EU should focus on repairing relationships. One way would be to offer migration pathways that are <a href="https://www.medam-migration.eu/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/MEDAM-Webseite/Publications/Assessment_Reports/2020_MEDAM_Assessment_Report/MEDAM_Assessment_Report_2020_Political_economy.pdf">accessible, visible and credible</a>. Tying this to return pressures is <a href="https://afripoli.org/germanys-new-migration-policy-what-the-paradigm-shift-means-for-african-partner-countries">not likely to work</a>, and will not improve relationships in the long run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written based on a research project in the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration, funded by the Mercator Stiftung.</span></em></p>The forced return of migrants by European states has ignored pressures and interests of African countries of origin.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060822023-05-22T20:06:43Z2023-05-22T20:06:43ZThe real cost of your chocolate habit: new research reveals the bittersweet truth of cocoa farming in Africa’s forests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527448/original/file-20230522-15-8t65z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4085%2C3278&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chocolate sales <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/09/business/chocolate-sales-ctrp/index.html">have</a> <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/earnings/2023/mondelez-chocolate-sales-jump-18-as-consumers-seek-affordable-comforts/">boomed</a> in recent months. As the cost-of-living crisis bites, consumers are increasingly reaching for chocolate as a simple and <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/chocolate-sales-stronger-ever-170000682.html">affordable</a> pleasure. </p>
<p>The most important ingredient in chocolate is cocoa beans, which come from plants grown in the tropics. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/02/volatile-cocoa-prices-are-pushing-african-farmers-further-into-poverty.html">About 70%</a> of the world’s cocoa comes from West Africa. The countries of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Ghana are two of the biggest producers.</p>
<p>Meeting the world’s insatiable appetite for chocolate has wrought a huge environmental cost, as the incredibly rich and diverse rainforests of West Africa are razed to make way for cocoa farms. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-023-00751-8">Research</a> by my colleagues and me, released today, sheds new light on the problem. By generating a new high-resolution map of cocoa growing areas in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, we found the area under cocoa production is truly enormous – and may be associated with up to 37% of forest loss in protected areas. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man picks cocoa pod from a tree" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527443/original/file-20230522-15-jxc8gx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man picks cocoa pods from a tree on his Côte d’Ivoire farm. Cocoa is a primary driver of deforestation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ben Curtis, AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The price of cocoa farming</h2>
<p>The Upper Guinean forests of West Africa have been <a href="https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/land-cover/deforestation-upper-guinean-forest">classified</a> as a “global biodiversity hotspot”, due to their exceptional concentrations of plant and animal species found nowhere else on Earth. But much of this forest has now been destroyed.</p>
<p>Since 1950, Côte d’Ivoire <a href="https://www.mightyearth.org/2022/02/14/major-chocolate-companies-failed-in-pledge-to-end-deforestation-comprehensive-new-study-shows/">has lost</a> up to 90% of its forest cover and Ghana has lost 65%. Cocoa has been a primary driver of this deforestation, together with other crops, mining and logging. </p>
<p>But the exact contribution of cocoa plantations to the problem is not well understood. This is due in part to a lack of an accurate, high-resolution map of cocoa-growing areas. </p>
<p>Without a map, we don’t know where the chocolate we consume comes from. In particular, we don’t know whether the cocoa was grown in formerly forested areas, or even illegally in protected areas. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/child-labour-on-farms-in-africa-its-important-to-make-a-distinction-between-whats-harmful-and-what-isnt-201433">Child labour on farms in Africa: it's important to make a distinction between what's harmful, and what isn't</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="forest in Ghana" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527444/original/file-20230522-5662-by2qo7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">West Africa’s forests have been classified as a global biodiversity hotspot.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">OLIVIER ASSELIN/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What we did</h2>
<p>We set out to determine the location and extent of cocoa plantations by using artificial intelligence (AI).</p>
<p>We used a type of AI known as a “neural network”, which allows computers to recognise and predict patterns in data. When a neural network is trained on satellite images showing different land uses, it can apply this “understanding” to identify the same land uses in satellite images of other geographic areas. </p>
<p>In our study, we trained the neural network to recognise cocoa plantations across Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. We did this using satellite images, together with the known locations of more than 100,000 cocoa farms. </p>
<p>We then checked the accuracy of the information provided by the neural network, by engaging field teams to confirm the results at 2,000 random locations on the ground. </p>
<p>This combination of advanced technology and hard fieldwork allowed us to create the first high-resolution map of cocoa production across West Africa. And what the map tells us is worrying.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chocolate-chemistry-a-food-scientist-explains-how-the-beloved-treat-gets-its-flavor-texture-and-tricky-reputation-as-an-ingredient-198222">Chocolate chemistry – a food scientist explains how the beloved treat gets its flavor, texture and tricky reputation as an ingredient</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="man empties bucket of cocoa seeds onto pile" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527440/original/file-20230522-15-7zk935.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The research set out to determine the extent of cocoa plantations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rebecca Blackwell/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>We found that the land area devoted to cocoa is enormous, comprising more than 7 million hectares of plantations across both countries. The result is far greater than official figures – up to 40% higher in Ghana’s case.</p>
<p>What’s more, much of the cocoa plantation area exists in vast areas of what was once native forest. And more than 1.5 million hectares of land under cocoa production is located in protected areas. </p>
<p>Deforestation in protected areas is a major issue globally. Given where we found cocoa growing, and where forest loss has been observed, we estimate more than 37% of deforestation in protected areas can be linked to cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire. For Ghana, the figure is 13%. </p>
<h2>How do we fix this?</h2>
<p>Our map demonstrates the massive role that cocoa may be playing in forest destruction in West Africa, including in protected areas. </p>
<p>This is a complex problem, with no easy fix. Cocoa is grown by an estimated two million mostly small-scale farmers, who typically live below the poverty line on less than US$1 a day. Expanding their cocoa farms into forest is one way farmers and their families can maintain or improve their livelihoods. </p>
<p>To fix this problem, we must help farmers manage existing farms in a more productive and sustainable way. Stronger law enforcement is also needed, to safeguard protected areas. Both will require action from governments and companies. </p>
<p>More money from chocolate sales should end up with the farmer. And consumers may also have to pay more for their chocolate.</p>
<p>Only determined changes on all these fronts will preserve the remaining forests of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206082/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilma Hart receives funding from the Lindt Cocoa Foundation, the Joint Cocoa Research Found, BiodivClim ERA-Net COFUND Programme and the Queensland Government through the Advance Queensland Women's Research Assistance Program. </span></em></p>By generating new high-resolution maps, researchers found cocoa plantations were causing far worse forest destruction in West Africa than previously thought.Wilma Hart, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, School of Biological Sciences, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2030852023-05-11T14:27:39Z2023-05-11T14:27:39ZWest Africa has a small weapons crisis – why some countries are better at dealing with it than others<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525193/original/file-20230509-23793-fiq7oo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small arms and light weapons recovered from bandits in Jos, north central Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Research has found that globally, small arms and light weapons <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/mkas98">increase</a> the likelihood, intensity and longevity of conflict. </p>
<p>Small arms and light weapons <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf#page=9">account</a> for most of the African continent’s conflict-related deaths. An estimated <a href="https://oneearthfuture.org/news/stemming-tide-african-leadership-small-arms-and-light-weapons-control">100 million</a> light weapons circulate in Africa. About <a href="https://www.giaba.org/media/f/613_519_giaba%20salw%20nexus-final.pdf#page=4">8 million</a> are in the hands of non-state actors in west Africa. </p>
<p>In 1998 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/3219">established</a> the world’s first small arms and light weapons moratorium. It became a legally binding convention in <a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/112514/fp2p-cs-from-moratorium-convention-small-arms-ECOWAS-140608-en.pdf;jsessionid=C4DBF8CCB40D00B0DF8EA04B2C754F49?sequence=1">2006</a>. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">recent paper</a>, I assessed how ECOWAS members had applied the convention on small arms and light weapons. Compliance varied between countries and the paper looked at domestic political legitimacy as an explanation of these differences. </p>
<p>I used the case studies of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire to test the explanation. </p>
<p>The study revealed that domestic political legitimacy was paramount for effective application and compliance. Legitimacy influences how states and domestic groups behave. A lack of legitimacy can lead to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that political legitimacy is important for states’ ability to implement collective security agreements such as the one on small arms and light weapons. ECOWAS members with legitimacy challenges must be given support around implementation, because they cannot do this individually. </p>
<h2>State legitimacy as a differentiator</h2>
<p>When a state is seen as legitimate, it’s because those who hold power got it in widely accepted ways and wield it rightfully. A legitimate state is lawful and has authority to issue orders. Citizens obey them because the leaders have moral authority. The path to state legitimacy is through the integrity of elections or the degree to which governments represent the populations they govern. </p>
<p>Where a state does not act legitimately, organised political opposition and sustained armed struggles or insurgencies follow. When a government lacks popular support, it will use strong-arm tactics like illegally obtaining small arms and light weapons to rule.</p>
<p>I examined Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’s compliance trends and the role of state legitimacy. The countries are neighbours and have plenty in common, but they differ in two ways: their domestic legitimacy; and their records of implementing the region’s small arms convention. </p>
<p>I assessed compliance by looking at what countries do about illegal production and possession of weapons.</p>
<h2>Côte d'Ivoire</h2>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire was one of the top violators of the small arms conventions. </p>
<p>For instance, Laurent Gbagbo’s government between 2000 and 2011 brazenly purchased weapons using <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">illegal documents</a>. United Nations weapons experts uncovered vast quantities of ammunition and weapons that Gbagbo’s government had bought illegally. A company linked to Gbagbo appointees unlawfully traded <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/biometric-bribery-semlex/how-semlex-and-gunvor-armed-the-ivorian-civil-war">US$16.3 million</a> worth of weapons to the government. </p>
<p>Legal purchases also rose abruptly, accounting for more than <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">50%</a> of small arms imported to the region in 2003 alone. </p>
<p>Non-compliance by Gbagbo’s government’s corresponded with domestic legitimacy problems. Legitimacy crises around electoral processes provoked the first and second Ivorian civil wars between 2002 and 2011, increasing the demand for small arms. Gbagbo, under whose watch the small arms convention regime kicked in, chose not to implement it because of low political legitimacy. </p>
<p>Weakened political legitimacy in Côte d’Ivoire sidetracked compliance by diverting Gbagbo’s focus and rerouting opposition energy towards grabbing political power, which requires more weapons. </p>
<p>Gbagbo contested the results of the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131870188/Ivory-Coast-s-President-Lost-Election-But-Won-t-Concede">2010 election</a>, won by Alassane Ouattara. He bought more weapons illegally to hold on to political power. In response, Ouattara’s fighters used a military offensive to drive Gbagbo from power. </p>
<p>Ouattara’s fighters solicited illicit small arms from foreign and from neighbouring sources. When forces loyal to Ouattara emerged victorious, rebels elevated to military commands used illegal weapons, while troops loyal to Gbagbo fought the state from bases in Liberia. </p>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, political illegitimacy morphed into territorial violence, undermining the country’s compliance records.</p>
<h2>Ghana</h2>
<p>In Ghana, no known evidence exists of Ghanaian authorities or organised groups purchasing weapons illegally. My argument is that this is due to the relatively strong legitimacy of the state and its institutions. </p>
<p>Some Russians and Ukrainians <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3568892">allegedly registered</a> front companies in Ghana and tried to use false letterheads from the Ghanaian defence and foreign ministries to sell weapons in 2003. However, these have been foiled. </p>
<p>Since embracing the ECOWAS convention, Ghana has experienced increased political stability and democratic consolidation. Ghana’s relative state legitimacy is grounded in the elite’s willingness to regulate the competition for political power. </p>
<p>The consensual and efficient management of social differences and electoral processes can explain this avoidance of state legitimacy crises. Ghana’s relative stability minimises the use of weapons.</p>
<p>While Ghana has seen high compliance at the national level, the country has a highly developed artisanal weapon market. People make weapons in Ghana and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">sell them to buyers in other countries</a> where state legitimacy has been questioned. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, domestic legitimacy problems have fuelled small arms and light weapons-seeking behaviours by state and non-state groups. In Ghana, a better record of applying the weapons convention stemmed from the country’s domestic legitimacy. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that in troubled regions like the ECOWAS zone, the state’s domestic characteristics matter for a state-level application of collective security regimes and, at the regional level, for their overall success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Banini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lack of political legitimacy can lead governments to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons.Daniel Banini, Researcher and analyst, Eastern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.