tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/youth-bulge-16991/articlesyouth bulge – The Conversation2024-01-21T08:55:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191552024-01-21T08:55:26Z2024-01-21T08:55:26ZSouth Africa’s ageing population comes with new challenges. How best to adapt to them<p><em>Young people – under the age of 15 – currently make up 29% of South Africa’s population. But this will soon change: the aged portion of the population is forecast to rise from 2030, bringing many challenges. Lauren Johnston, an economics and political economy expert, recently published a <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">paper</a> on the subject. We asked her to put the developments into perspective.</em></p>
<h2>What is South Africa’s current population profile?</h2>
<p>South Africa is “young” among the Brics countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), but “old” by African standards. For example, seniors make up 5.9% of South Africa’s population and children 28.6%. This <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">compares</a> with Russia’s 15.8% seniors and 17.2% children, and China’s 13.7% seniors and 17.7% children. </p>
<p>The sub-Saharan average is 3.0% for seniors and 41.8% for children. </p>
<h2>What’s up ahead?</h2>
<p>South Africa faces no fears of a substantially diminished working-age population, unlike a number of high-income countries. Nonetheless, population structure estimates suggest that it will be home to a rising number of seniors. </p>
<p><strong>Projected population structure, South Africa</strong></p>
<p>In general, the increase in population share of seniors is driven by falling rates of mortality and birth, leading to fewer younger people relative to elders. In South Africa’s case, a falling fertility rate <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN">from over six births per woman in 1960 to just over two today</a> is a key driver. </p>
<p>An ageing population is statistically defined as a population with 7% or more of people aged 65 and over. </p>
<p>In 2022, seniors made up 5.9% of South Africa’s population. So, it is not yet home to an ageing population. But the <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">United Nations</a> forecasts it will join the “population ageing” club as early as 2030. By around 2060 it will be home to an “aged” population – with seniors accounting for 14% of the population. </p>
<h2>What unique challenges lie ahead?</h2>
<p>In general, an ageing population puts added pressure on the working-age population. Each worker has to be more productive, just to maintain total output. Fiscal resources also come under pressure because there are fewer people of working age – net contributors to the economy. There are also more seniors requiring resources for their health and welfare. </p>
<p>For developing countries this can be especially precarious because budgets are often under strain. So are the resources needed for pursuing basic national development. Moreover, a trend of population ageing arising in developing countries is relatively new – just a few decades old. </p>
<h2>How prepared is South Africa for the challenges?</h2>
<p>One challenge for “young” South Africa is that the slower pace of demographic change reduces imminent and more obvious demographic change pressure. The very steady increase in the share of elders alongside pressing broader socioeconomic challenges gives the government little incentive to prioritise social or economic ageing-related issues on its policy agenda.</p>
<p>The array of socioeconomic challenges, including <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/1_Stock/Events_Institutional/2020/womens_charter_2020/docs/19-02-2021/20210212_Womens_Charter_Review_KZN_19th_of_Feb_afternoon_Session_Final.pdf">poverty</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-heres-how-they-need-to-rethink-their-approach-218048">crime</a>, entrenched <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-cant-crack-the-inequality-curse-why-and-what-can-be-done-213132">inequality</a> and <a href="https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/news-insights/shedding-the-load-power-shortages-widen-divides-in-south-africa/">energy access</a>, means that the need to respond to the demographic transition is less of an immediate priority. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/millions-of-young-south-africans-are-jobless-study-finds-that-giving-them-soft-skills-like-networking-helps-their-prospects-202969">Millions of young South Africans are jobless: study finds that giving them 'soft' skills like networking helps their prospects</a>
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<p>As a result, very few older South Africans benefit from aged care services, and then only the very frail, with inconsistent reach across provinces. Moreover, according to an October 2023 University of Cape Town study, there is little support for older persons who have high care needs and are at home, <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2023-10-02-funding-elder-care-in-south-africa-new-report#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20estimates%2C%20it%20is,older%20persons%20who%20need%20it.">or for active older persons</a>. Most elders do not have access to services that support their needs, but also fear rising healthcare costs, owing to the rising incidence of non-communicable diseases. These include strokes, cancer and diabetes.</p>
<p>Overall the basic national social welfare net is inadequate. For example, retirees living off less than 16% of their pre-retirement salaries are among those with the highest risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/retired-women-in-south-africa-carry-a-huge-burden-of-poverty-177379">living in poverty</a>. This group is three times more at risk of poverty than any other group in South Africa. Black female widows are most at risk.</p>
<p>While the economic value of support to older persons has grown over time, the increase has been insufficient to <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2023-10-02-funding-elder-care-in-south-africa-new-report#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20estimates%2C%20it%20is,older%20persons%20who%20need%20it.">meet the needs of this growing population</a>. Statistics South Africa estimates that population ageing alone is already adding around 0.3% to <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13445">expected health-related expenditures annually</a>. These trends suggest that without change, South Africa’s seniors will become even less adequately served with time.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done to prepare better?</h2>
<p>South Africa has committed to establishing frameworks for healthy ageing based on the <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/decade-of-healthy-ageing#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Decade%20of,communities%20in%20which%20they%20live.">United Nations Decade of Healthy Ageing from 2020 to 2030</a>. The agenda has four core areas of priority – age-friendly environments, combating ageism, integrated care, and long-term care. To realise these goals, difficult political decisions would need to be made around taxation and redistribution, as more revenue is required to ensure basic dignity for South African seniors. </p>
<p>Guided by the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2006-013_olderpersons.pdf">Older Persons Act</a> and the <a href="https://social.desa.un.org/issues/ageing/madrid-plan-of-action-and-its-implementation-main/madrid-plan-of-action-and-its">Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing</a>, the Department of Social Development in partnership with other departments, and the <a href="https://saopf.org.za/">South African Older Persons Forum</a> should further implement <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/government-activities/minister-lindiwe-zulu-officially-opens-2022-active">South Africa’s Active Ageing Programme</a> to empower senior citizens to stay physically and intellectually active, to continue to enjoying healthy, purposeful lives. This should help reduce pressure on more intensive care sectors and needs. </p>
<p>As explained in my <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">paper</a>, South Africa should take advantage of the Brics grouping’s new population structure and <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Jhb-II-Declaration-24-August-2023-%201.pdf">development cooperation agenda</a>. That way, state officials, civil society and entrepreneurs may be better positioned to take advantage of opportunities to reduce healthcare and aged care costs. </p>
<p>To direct sustain the economy as the population ages, South Africa needs to ensure that the economy is robust enough to accommodate a worsening dependency burden. For example, young people must be proportionately empowered to drive productivity growth and innovation. That way, the increasing costs associated with the ageing population could be accommodated while <a href="https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca-discusses-african-middle-income-countries%E2%80%99-challenges-and-solutions-to-accelerate">continuing to drive national development</a>. </p>
<p>Digitisation trends and the Brics population and development agenda may, as examples, also foster opportunities for education and training among not only young South Africans, but all working-age people. This will help raise productivity potential per worker and <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">extend productive working lifespans</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-has-one-of-the-fastest-growing-populations-in-the-world-why-this-isnt-good-news-209420">DRC has one of the fastest growing populations in the world – why this isn't good news</a>
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<p>South African policy makers and entrepreneurs should also be cognisant of how population ageing affects <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/OP-351-AGDP-Johnston-FINAL-WEB.pdf">not only other Brics economies</a>, but also patterns of trade and investment. For example, over the coming decades, population decline in middle-income China, and the rapid decline of its working-age population, is likely to push China away from labour-intensive industries, and <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/222235/1/GLO-DP-0593.pdf">towards capital-intensive industries and sectors</a>.</p>
<p>In other words, population ageing at home and abroad will shift economic demography-weighted opportunities and challenges at home. The more responsive South Africa can be to these changes, the better off will the nation be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In general, an ageing population puts added pressure on the working-age population to be more productive – just to maintain total output – amid growing fiscal constraints.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976332023-01-16T13:45:14Z2023-01-16T13:45:14ZPope Francis’ visit to Africa comes at a defining moment for the Catholic church<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504210/original/file-20230112-53024-f2g4xr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pope Francis in Nairobi, Kenya, during his first papal visit to the African continent in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nichole Sobecki/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During his <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202212020298.html">planned visit</a> to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan in February 2023, Pope Francis intends to be in dialogue with African Catholics – but also to listen to political leaders and young Africans. </p>
<p>This visit comes at a defining moment in what is regarded as a fairly progressive papacy.</p>
<p>Pope Francis has convened a worldwide consultation on the future of the Catholic church. This consultation, called a <a href="https://www.synod.va/en/what-is-the-synod-21-24/about.html">synodal process</a>, began in 2021 and will conclude in 2024. </p>
<p>It is the most ambitious dialogue ever undertaken on bringing changes in Catholic beliefs and practices since the Second Vatican Council’s reforms in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2012/10/10/162573716/why-is-vatican-ii-so-important#:%7E:text=AP-,Pope%20Paul%20VI%20hands%20Orthodox%20Metropolitan%20Meliton%20of%20Heliopolis%20a,Orthodox%20churches%20nine%20centuries%20before">1965</a>. It is exciting for reform-minded Catholics, but distressing for conservative Catholics. </p>
<p>The ongoing synodal process has exposed the fault lines in modern Catholicism on the issues of women, celibacy, sexuality, marriage, clericalism and hierarchism. How Pope Francis – who marks a decade of his papacy this year – manages these increasingly divisive issues will, in my judgement, largely define his legacy. </p>
<p><a href="https://works.bepress.com/stanchuilo/">My research</a> has focused on how African Catholics can bring about a <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/as-pope-francis-visits-af_b_8633590">consensus approach</a> in managing these contested issues.</p>
<p>The big questions for me are how another papal visit to Africa at this point will address the challenges and opportunities that Africans are identifying through the synodal process – and how this plays into the state of Catholicism in Africa.</p>
<h2>The influence of African Catholicism</h2>
<p>The Catholic church is witnessing its fastest growth in Africa (recent statistics show <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/iacs/global-christianity/#:%7E:text=April%2030%2C%202022&text=Following%20recent%20trends%2C%20the%20Catholic,growth%20in%20Europe%20(0.3%25)">2.1%</a> growth between 2019 and 2020). Out of a global population of <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/250362/number-of-catholics-in-asia-and-africa-continues-to-rise">1.36 billion Catholics</a>, 236 million are African (20% of the total).</p>
<p>African Catholics are not simply growing in number. They are reinventing and reinterpreting Christianity. They are infusing it with new language and spiritual vibrancy through unique ways of worshipping God. </p>
<p>Given its expansion, the Catholic church in Africa is well placed to be a central driver of social, political and spiritual life. In many settings, the church provides a community of hope where the fabric of society is weak because of war, humanitarian disasters and disease. </p>
<p>The DRC, for instance, has the highest number of Catholic health facilities in Africa at <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=cZ51EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT649&lpg=PT649&dq=the+Democratic+Republic+of+Congo+(DRC)+has+the+highest+number+of+Catholic+health+facilities+in+Africa+at+2,185&source=bl&ots=c6A8EdULGF&sig=ACfU3U0WBNUa2VbKVLfl4xQMRkmVMeaH2g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwigo7Te88P8AhV1WqQEHchBCSEQ6AF6BAgqEAM#v=onepage&q=the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20(DRC)%20has%20the%20highest%20number%20of%20Catholic%20health%20facilities%20in%20Africa%20at%202%2C185&f=false">2,185</a>. It is followed by Kenya with 1,092 and Nigeria with 524 facilities. Additionally, bishops have mobilised peaceful protests against violence in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/4/dr-congo-thousands-of-churchgoers-protest-rebel-violence">DRC</a> and <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2020-03/nigeria-bishops-protest-march-against-extremism.html">Nigeria</a>. </p>
<p>Another major feature of Catholicism on the continent is that it is witnessing a “youth bulge”. Central to Pope Francis’ advocacy for Africa is his appeal that churches, religious groups and governments show solidarity with young people. He calls them “the church of now”. </p>
<p>The pope expressed this most recently in <a href="https://www.aciafrica.org/news/6990/engage-your-history-keep-your-roots-intact-pope-francis-to-african-catholic-students">November 2022</a> during a synodal consultation with African youth. He denounced the exploitation of Africa by external forces and its destruction by wars, ideologies of violence and policies that rob young people of their future. </p>
<h2>Why DRC and South Sudan?</h2>
<p>Pope Francis comes to Africa as part of the synodal consultation. He takes the message of a humble and merciful church to some of the most challenging parts of Africa: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">DRC</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542">South Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>These two countries illustrate the impact of neo-liberal capitalism and the effects of slavery, colonialism and imperialism. Together, they have unleashed the most destructive economic, social and political upheaval in modern African history. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">Conflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what's gone wrong</a>
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<p>Pope Francis is coming to listen especially to the poor, to young people and to women who have been violated in conflicts. He also hopes to address the hidden wounds of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-catholic-church-sex-abuse-crisis-4-essential-reads-169442">clerical sexual abuse</a> in the church.</p>
<p>Pope Francis will see how war, dictatorship and ecological disasters have denied ordinary people access to land, labour and lodging. These are the “three Ls” he <a href="https://cjd.org/2015/09/08/sacred-rights-land-lodging-and-labor/">proposes</a> as vital in giving agency to the poor. </p>
<h2>Some opposition</h2>
<p>Pope Francis will no doubt receive a warm welcome during his visit. Most African Catholics embrace his message of a poor and merciful church because it speaks to their challenges. </p>
<p>But there are many African Catholics, particularly high-ranking church leaders, who are yet to embrace this reform agenda. The previous two popes encouraged a centralising tendency, which promoted unquestioning loyalty to Rome by African bishops. As a result, these bishops resisted attempts by African theologians to modernise and Africanise Catholic beliefs and practices to meet local needs and circumstances. </p>
<p>This has led to some African bishops being uncomfortable with Pope Francis’ <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html">progressive agenda</a> on liberation theology, openness to gay Catholics, condemnation of clerical privilege and power, and inclusion of women in mainstream leadership. </p>
<p>Rather than being a strong church that looks like Africa, some of the Catholic dioceses on the continent have embraced medieval traditions – like Roman rituals and Latin – that alienate ordinary African Catholics, especially young people. </p>
<h2>Africa’s future role</h2>
<p>Pope Francis has often <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/it/speeches/2022/november/documents/20221119-cuamm.html">spoken</a> of giving Africa a voice in the church and in the world. </p>
<p>Many African Catholics wonder how this will happen when, for the first time in more than 30 years, there is just one African holding an important executive function at the Vatican. This is Archbishop Protase Rugambwa of Tanzania, the secretary of the <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2022-06/dicastery-evangelization-vatican-praedicate-evangelium.html">Dicastery for the Evangelization of Peoples</a>, a department at the Vatican’s central offices. </p>
<p>Many African Catholics hope that Pope Francis will announce some African appointments to the Vatican during his February 2023 visit. </p>
<p>They also are hoping he will create a pontifical commission for Africa, similar to the <a href="http://www.americalatina.va/content/americalatina/es.html">Latin American commission</a> created in 1958. This will be a significant way of giving African Catholics a voice in the church of Rome. </p>
<p>Pope Francis hasn’t fully recovered from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/knee-problem-forces-pope-francis-cancel-july-africa-trip-2022-06-10/">health challenges</a> that led to the cancellation of the trip last July. But he is making this trip because <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/en/2015/11/29/news/pope-opens-holy-door-today-bangui-is-the-spiritual-capital-of-the-world-1.35211106/">he believes</a> that Africa matters. </p>
<p>Through the sessions that the pope will conduct with Africans, especially young people, it’s hoped that the Catholic church in Africa can help address the causes of war and suffering in the DRC and South Sudan, and the obstacles to reforming the church in Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Chu Ilo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African Catholics are growing in number. They are also reinventing and reinterpreting Christianity.Stan Chu Ilo, Research Professor , World Christianity and African Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956012022-12-08T13:38:39Z2022-12-08T13:38:39ZAbiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he’s silencing them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498761/original/file-20221203-16-gyawnf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopians celebrate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Abiy Ahmed took power as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, he was the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-ethiopian-leader-abiy-ahmed-youngest-in-africa-sparks-hope-of/">youngest head of government</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>At 42, he represented a stark contrast to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-has-been-cameroons-president-for-40-years-and-he-might-win-office-yet-again-194856">many ageing African leaders</a> who had been in position for decades. These leaders often stake their claim to power by referring to their victories in revolutionary wars many decades back. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by the same party for 27 years – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a coalition of parties established by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1991. The party claimed legitimacy by pointing to its victory in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">civil war in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>It took mass protests from the youth – and an elite split within the government – to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">overthrow this regime</a>.</p>
<p>After rising to power, Abiy replaced the old ruling party with the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/12/ethiopian-pm-abiy-calls-for-peace-at-launch-of-party-s-first-congress//">Prosperity Party</a>. This, along with his relative youthfulness, was seen as a break with the past. </p>
<p>The hope was that this change would bring the political and economic inclusion of young people in Ethiopia. This category includes those aged 15 to 29, who make up <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact_Sheet_Developing_Ethiopias_Youth_Jul_2017.pdf">28%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">122 million</a>. </p>
<p>This group at the time experienced high unemployment levels and political marginalisation. Little has changed since then.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<p>My co-researchers and I have been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">investigating</a> regime-youth interactions in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe since 2019. By exploring these interactions and the major policies addressing young people, we aim to see whether state policies empower the youth or keep them on the margins.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, we <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">identified</a> two major policy responses to the youth. The first was job creation. The second was political representation through youth-specific representative bodies. </p>
<p>We found that while these responses are officially meant to address economic and political marginalisation, they have instead been used to repress or co-opt the youth. </p>
<p>We argue that regime strategies towards the youth in Ethiopia – as in the other countries in our study – are part of the “menu” of authoritarian strategies for incumbents to hold on to power. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our research in the four countries started with the question: are youth agency and regime policy leading to empowerment, or to suppression and old patterns of subordination? </p>
<p>The question was particularly intriguing in the context of Ethiopia, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">youth-dominated protests</a> were instrumental in bringing Abiy to power. </p>
<p>Recognising this, Abiy and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics">promised to address</a> the demands of the youth for inclusion. This naturally created high expectations. </p>
<p>But more than four years after this promise, the situation for Ethiopia’s large youth population looks bleak. It’s <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-fractured-after-two-years-of-war-4007368">arguably even more so</a> than before. A two-year war in the country’s northern region of Tigray reinforced ethnic divisions and created a humanitarian crisis. Unemployment rates are still high and the youth are still being mobilised for political ends.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Employment schemes, such as the <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/995_2017-ethiopian-youth-revolving-fund-establishment.pdf">Youth Revolving Fund</a> and <a href="https://jobscommission.gov.et/who-we-are/">Job Creation Commission</a>, have been used as mechanisms to silence and co-opt the youth. Youth protest movements have either been co-opted into the established party machinery or turned into militarised vigilante groups. These became instrumental in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">2020 war in Tigray</a>. </p>
<h2>Co-option</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">case study of the Youth Revolving Fund</a> shows that this government scheme failed to create sustainable job opportunities and improve livelihoods. </p>
<p>Introduced at the height of the youth-dominated protest in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dj-EKYZ8AA">2017</a>, the scheme was used to pacify the youth. Consequently, it lacked sufficient capacity and skills training components. Loans were made without proper guarantees for repayment, preventing money from revolving and becoming available to fund new youth projects. </p>
<p>Our study of regime-youth interactions in Oromia and Amhara – the most populous regional states in Ethiopia and home to the youth protests – revealed that the government resorted to co-opting and repressing young people. </p>
<p>In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, material co-option was seen in the distribution of credit, land, rights over resources and even condominium housing. </p>
<p>In Amhara, in north-west Ethiopia, rhetorical co-option was used. The worldview dominant among protesters was ostensibly adopted so as to get their support. Abiy appeared to castigate the country’s federal system and emphasise “national unity”. </p>
<p>We also observed institutional co-option: bringing activists and opposition leaders into government. </p>
<h2>Repression</h2>
<p>While the immediate post-2018 period saw a decline in repressive tactics, it resumed as the youth <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">started to challenge</a> the Abiy regime. </p>
<p>The Prosperity Party considers Oromia its home base – Abiy is considered an Oromo leader. The party was, therefore, less likely to tolerate dissent in the region. This, coupled with an active insurgency from the Oromo Liberation Army, made Oromia youth exceptionally vulnerable to repression. Arbitrary mass arrests and a crude counter-insurgency resulted in severe human rights violations. </p>
<p>In Amhara, the government resorted to repression as youth protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/villagers-massacred-western-ethiopia-says-state-appointed-body">returned</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>The government relaxed the use of force as it needed the Amhara youth following the outbreak of war in Tigray in 2020. Repression resumed when the government felt the initial threat from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been reversed.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Co-option and repression weakened and fragmented the youth movements responsible for the anti-government protests of 2014-2018 in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war in Tigray – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cease-fire-agreed-to-stop-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/a-63640781">currently on pause</a> – also resulted in the heavy militarisation of the youth, especially in the Amhara region. </p>
<p>Our research demonstrates that governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can nonetheless resort to authoritarian tactics to neutralise dissent from the same movements. In authoritarian contexts, translating protest gains into genuine political (and economic) gains is an uphill battle. </p>
<p>The alternative is to think strategically about young people’s potential to achieve the “prosperity” the ruling party promises. </p>
<p>We also found that youth employment schemes can be turned into instruments to silence the youth.</p>
<p>Deeper analyses of youth-specific policies should be contextually grounded to reveal possible authoritarian uses beyond official objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Norglobal programme at Research Council of Norway (project no. 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanuel Tesfaye is an associate researcher under the Youth in Africa project, currently writing on regime-youth interactions in post-2018 Ethiopia.</span></em></p>Governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can employ authoritarian tactics to silence dissent from the same movements.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteAmanuel Tesfaye, Lecturer, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877052022-08-11T14:53:46Z2022-08-11T14:53:46ZNot yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477122/original/file-20220802-19-k8vu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the African Union Summit held in Malabo, Capital of Equatorial Guinea, on 27 May 2022 to address worsening humanitarian crises in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) was born in the South African port city of Durban <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">in 2002</a>. Under its first chair,<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, African leaders seemed determined to abandon the grandiose plans of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU had been established <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">in 1963</a> to promote African unity and liberation. Other aims included: to protect the territorial integrity of its member states, promote non-alignment, and advance the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">peaceful settlement of disputes</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union, for its part, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">was established</a> to achieve an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa which would be led by its own citizens and play a dynamic role in global politics. Unlike the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">OAU Charter</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000</a> allowed for interference in the internal affairs of its members to stem instability, halt egregious human rights abuses and sanction military coups d’état.</p>
<p>Military regimes in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/25/togo-suspended-from-au">Togo</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-coup-idUSL855802420080809">Mauritania</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/20/african-union-suspends-madagascar">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20100219-african-union-suspends-niger-thousands-celebrate-coup">Niger</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union#:%7E:text=On%20the%206th%20of%20June,exit%20from%20its%20current%20crisis.">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-guinea-after-military-coup/a-59144311">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/4/17/guinea-bissau-suspended-from-african-union">Guinea-Bissau</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-suspends-mali-participation-all-activities">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-2022-01-31/">Burkina Faso</a> were thus suspended from the AU. The continental body launched praiseworthy military stabilisation missions into <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-4-the-african-union-mission-in-burundi">Burundi</a> (2003), <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201231-un-african-union-peacekeeping-mission-in-sudan-s-darfur-ends">Darfur</a> (2007) and <a href="https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/">Somalia</a> (2007). However despite this progress, autocrats continued to rig electoral outcomes. </p>
<p>As the AU <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">turned 20 in July 2022</a>, it had achieved a few successes. But it remains a weak organisation embarking on sporadic bouts of illusory reforms. This is due to financial and capacity constraints. And too much decision-making power resides with its omnipotent heads of state which has denied the organisation the ability to take decisions, and act more effectively on behalf of its members.</p>
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<h2>Institutional sclerosis</h2>
<p>The Addis Ababa-based <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> – its implementing arm – is led by an <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of Heads of State</a>, with an Executive Council of foreign ministers and a Permanent Representatives Committee of ambassadors. The ambassadors work with specialised development, governance, parliamentary and judicial organs. The AU Commission has, however, struggled to establish its independence to take initiatives on behalf of its 55 member states in fulfilment of its mandate. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">2007 audit report</a> led by the Nigerian scholar-technocrat <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/tribute-my-mentor-professor-adebayo-adedeji">Adebayo Adedeji</a> revealed how the AU Commission headed by <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/professor-alpha-oumar-konare/">Malian Alpha Konaré</a> (2003-2008) misunderstood its mandates and authority levels, and failed to coordinate overlapping tasks. Some of these problems still persist.</p>
<p>Under the French-influenced Gabonese <a href="http://jeanping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CV-Jean-Ping-VGB.pdf">Jean Ping</a> (2008-2012), the commission’s annual budget had reached <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/27/short-of-cash-and-teeth">$260 million by 2011</a>. Only 40% of this sum was actually paid by members. The European Union, China and the United States mostly funded the rest. This posed the risk that AU institutional priorities could be set by its donors.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">AU Assembly</a> of heads of state has often failed to adhere to the principle of subsidiarity: taking decisions at the lowest practical level, as the European Union – the world’s only genuinely supranational regional organisation – does. </p>
<p>The AU also conducts most of its business through unanimity, making it difficult to reach quick decisions.</p>
<p>While the AU Commission has some impressive staff, it also has much “dead wood” inherited from the OAU era. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more-robust-response-to-conflict-in-cameroon-132449">African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon</a>
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<p>The AU’s 2003 plan to set up an <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> by 2010 was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/african-union-says-progressing-to-military-force-by-end-2015/">postponed until 2015</a>. In December 2020, the organisation simply declared the force to be fully operational, despite the fantasy involved in such a statement. The deadline for “Silencing the Guns” (ending armed conflicts) <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1995222#:%7E:text=The%20Africa%20Union's%20Agenda%202063,all%20illegal%20weapons%20in%20Africa.">by 2020</a>“ was casually pushed back a decade.</p>
<h2>Illusory reforms</h2>
<p>As chair of the AU Commission (2012-2016), former South African foreign minister <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> complained that over 97% of the continental body’s programmes were <a href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/Dec/27467/budget_challenge_for_dlamini_zuma_at_au.aspx">funded by external donors</a>. In 2013, $155 million of the $278 million annual budget (56%) was still <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6158/african-union-its-never-too-late-to-avoid-war-dlamini-zuma/">provided by foreign partners</a>. But Dlamini-Zuma failed to reduce this dependence during her four-year tenure. AU leaders refused to back efforts to find alternative sources of funding, such as customs duties and <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/885/Assembly%20AU%2018%20%28XIX%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">taxes on flights and hotel stays</a>. </p>
<p>Among the more quixotic ideas of the Dlamini-Zuma-driven 50-year development vision, <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">"Agenda 2063”</a> includes increasing intra-African trade from 12% to 50% by 2045, ending armed conflicts by 2020 ](https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020) and eradicating poverty in two decades.</p>
<p>Under the Francophile Chadian chair, <a href="https://au.int/en/biography-he-moussa-faki-mahamat">Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, since 2017, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">report</a> chaired by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Kagame">Rwandan president Paul Kagame</a> on reforming the AU seemed rushed and lacked substance, and its laundry list of recommendations on institutional reforms were on a level of vacuity as to be of no real utility. </p>
<p>These were physicians proposing half-baked cures to ills that had not been properly diagnosed. All the 2017 report’s “key findings” had been more coherently outlined in <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">Adedeji’s report</a> a decade earlier, the recommendations of which still have not been implemented. </p>
<p>Another disappointment has been the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> which seeks to facilitate trade, build infrastructure, establish a common market and ensure the free movement of people. But outside West and Eastern Africa, the free movement of people <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement">remains a pipe dream</a>.</p>
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<p>Most African governments are security-obsessed and hostile to intra-African migration. There is also a lack of convergence of African economies. Many compete to export raw materials rather than exchange diverse goods.</p>
<p>Road, rail, and port infrastructure remains poor. Rules of origin – which define where goods are made – are often restrictive, and non-tariff barriers are widespread. If integration has not worked at the national and sub-regional levels, transferring all these problems to the continental level will certainly not integrate Africa. </p>
<h2>Need for realism</h2>
<p>The 15-member <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">AU Peace and Security Council</a> has contributed substantively to peacemaking efforts across Africa, and coordinated closely with the United Nations.</p>
<p>But other AU organs have performed less well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nepad.org/publication/nepad-brief">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> clearly lacks the resources and capacity as a development agency to uplift the continent. The <a href="https://au.int/en/aprm#:%7E:text=APRM%20is%20a%20voluntary%20arrangement,economic%20growth%20and%20sustainable%20development">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, which identifies governance challenges in 41 countries, is toothless.</p>
<p>The Pan-African Parliament remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">“talking shop”</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/about/ecosocc">Economic, Social and Cultural Council</a> has failed to provide genuine civil society participation in the AU’s institutions. The idea of the African Diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe as a <a href="http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/six-regions-african-union">sixth African sub-region</a>, along with the five continental ones, is largely devoid of substance.</p>
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<p>The AU must thus adopt more realistic and less illusory mandates. Its approach should be based on an accurate assessment of financial and logistical realities. </p>
<p>More positively, AU members had contributed <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220630/african-union-peace-fund-board-trustees-convene-meeting-review-progress">$295 million</a> to their <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">revised Peace Fund</a> by June 2022, complementing a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/">$650 million 2022 budget </a>. African leaders must now strengthen the institutions they have created.</p>
<p>They must also establish one effective economic body in each sub-region that can promote socio-economic development and provide jobs for the continent’s youthful population.</p>
<p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations. This is not yet uhuru (freedom).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796832022-03-23T11:21:13Z2022-03-23T11:21:13ZZimbabwe by-elections are attracting huge crowds, but don’t read too much into them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453646/original/file-20220322-302-js9i5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's opposition Citizens Coalition for Change supporters attend an election campaign rally in Harare, in February. Zimbabwe, 20 February.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are set to cast their votes in key parliamentary and local government by-elections on 26 March 2022. The by-elections have the potential to set the tone for next year’s national elections. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s national assembly has <a href="https://parlzim.gov.zw/members/">270 parliamentarians</a> of which 210 are elected. The 60 additional parliamentarians are brought into the house through a quota system reserved for women. </p>
<p>The 28 parliamentary and 105 local government council seats that are up for grabs in these by-elections were left vacant due to recalls and deaths of representatives. The empty seats constitute 13.3% of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2773/">210 elective parliamentary seats</a>. The council positions represent <a href="https://genderlinks.org.za/news/zimbabwe-local-govt-quota-takes-shape-ahead-of-2023-elections/">5.4% of the 1,958 local government seats</a>. </p>
<p>Parliament is currently overly dominated by members of the governing Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The election of new parliamentarians will bring new voices. </p>
<p>The polls were initially due to take place in December 2020 but were <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-suspends-by-elections-indefinitely/">postponed</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The by-elections have attracted huge national and regional focus. They will give communities that have gone without representation for almost two years a chance to choose their candidates. They also provide an opportunity for the youthful and charismatic Nelson Chamisa to showcase the party he recently rebranded after breaking away from the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-lack-of-a-succession-plan-has-left-morgan-tsvangirais-party-in-disarray-91714">bitter leadership struggle</a> after the death of its founder Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">raised the political stakes</a> by leaving the original party and rebranding his political grouping to the “Citizens Coalition for Change” at the end of January 2022.</p>
<h2>Hopes for the opposition</h2>
<p>Twenty of the 28 parliamentary seats being contested – 71.4% – <a href="https://zimfact.org/factsheet-who-previously-held-seats-to-be-filled-on-march-26/">became vacant</a> after the controversial recall of the representatives by a faction of the Movement for Democratic Change party led by Douglas Mwonzora between May and October 2020.</p>
<p>The significance of these by-elections is also evident from the way the two main parties, ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change, have invested huge human and financial resources in organising campaign rallies across the country. </p>
<p>Rallies have attracted huge crowds and ignited political excitement in the country. They have also fuelled speculation that the 2023 national elections, due in less than a year, will be a tight political contest between the two main parties. Some even say Citizens for Coalition for Change poses an <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/politics-and-society/bsr-what-happens-when-zanu-pf-faces-an-existential-threat/">existential threat to ZANU-PF</a>. </p>
<p>The by-elections <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-28-zimbabwes-new-political-party-citizens-coalition-for-change-sparks-fear-and-violence-from-zanu-pf/">have even been described</a> as a dress rehearsal for the 2023 elections which some think could be a watershed poll.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58270973">wide expectations</a> that Zimbabwe’s opposition will be able to build on its earlier successes and capitalise on the deteriorating political and economic conditions in the country to break ZANU-PF’s authoritarian control since 1980. </p>
<p>There are, nevertheless, some caveats.</p>
<h2>Need for circumspection</h2>
<p>It’s important not to exaggerate the impact of the poll.</p>
<p>First, it is unlikely that the huge public turnout at the rallies is going to translate into a huge voter turnout. That’s partly because by-elections in Zimbabwe have always had a low voter turnout. For example, the 2018 general election showed a very low turnout. In some areas, <a href="https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ZESN-Cowdray-Park-By-election-Report.pdf">not even a quarter of the registered voters</a> showed up.</p>
<p>Second, political violence <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">has spoiled Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 1980, and even more so <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections">since 2000</a>. This is likely to dissuade some voters from turning up.</p>
<p>Most recently, there have been clashes between ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change supporters in the mining town of Kwekwe on 27 February 2022. One <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">person was killed and ten injured</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, media and human rights watchdog reports have <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/rights-groups-bemoan-escalating-political-violence/">noted</a> that some supporters and leaders of Citizens Coalition for Change have been violently attacked by ZANU-PF and state security agencies. This has included including candidates for the by-elections.</p>
<p>The violence could deter voters on election day.</p>
<p>Third, evidence from recent surveys suggest that Zimbabweans have become more politically disengaged since the 2018 elections. An example is <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-zimbabwe-afrobarometer_round_8-21jul21.pdf">one done in June by the independent pan-African network Afrobarometer</a>. Instead, they’re turning their focus on economic survival in the deteriorating economy. </p>
<p>The International Republican Institute’s survey on public perceptions of local government <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/iri-zimbabwe-poll-in-bulawayo-and-mashonaland-east-shows-concerns-over-corruption-and-the-economy-approval-of-basic-services/">of October 2021</a> also shows an increase in citizen apathy towards political parties and community leaders. This is especially so for local government councillors and members of parliament, due to loss of trust in representative leadership. The growing trust deficit is strongly linked to increased corruption and irresponsible leadership among parliamentary and local officials. </p>
<p>Fourth, a growing number of Zimbabweans are losing confidence in elections as a mechanism for bringing leadership change at both national and local levels. This is mainly because of <a href="https://kubatana.net/2018/06/04/electoral-irregularities-point-2018-electoral-fraud/">strong allegations of electoral fraud</a> and the <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/coup-constitution-and-the-count-zimbabwes-disputed-elections/">growing list of disputed election results since 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The disillusionment is fuelling voter apathy. Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.</p>
<p>Fifth, attendance at political rallies cannot be taken as an indicator of likely voter turnout. Most people who attend rallies <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/27/politics/2016-election-crowd-size/index.html">don’t necessarily turn out to vote</a>. </p>
<p>Evidence from past elections indicates that crowd size is frequently not a good indicator of success on election day. Attendance of rallies is often motivated by <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/inside-shadowy-world-political-crowds-for-hire-3754652">different factors</a>. These include a range of incentives on offer, such as free music entertainment, alcohol, food, t-shirts and other items of clothing. All are absent on election day.</p>
<p>And most people who have been attending campaign rallies, especially in urban areas, are young. But a significant proportion of Zimbabwean youth – most of whom are unemployed and frustrated with the current political and economic status quo – are still not registered as voters. Analysis conducted by Pachedu (a group of data experts that has been analysing the Zimbabwe Voters Roll since 2018) showed that in 2018, 39% of Zimbabweans aged between 18 and 34 <a href="https://twitter.com/PacheduZW/status/1475526009017544709?t=_gzhe_EpIYvsKgWdIZm43A&s=08">were not registered and nearly 50% eligible young voters didn’t vote</a>. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission recently pointed out that <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/zec-revises-figure-on-registered-voters/">only 2,971 new voters</a> registered countrywide in 2021, and that <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2022/02/23/zec-registered-50000-new-voters-between-february-1-and-february-20/">just under 50 000</a> people registered during the Commission’s registration blitz conducted in January and February 2022.</p>
<p>For all these challenges, the upcoming poll cannot be dismissed. Coming a few months before the country goes for the 2023 national elections, the elections create an opportunity for electoral stakeholders, including political parties, the electoral management body, security sector agencies, civil society and citizens, to review opportunities and challenges ahead of the milestone elections. </p>
<p>The elections are coming at a time when the country, which has been experiencing political and economic crisis for the last two decades, is going through its <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2021/12/17/notable-risks-for-zim-economy-in-2022/">worst crisis since 2007-2008</a>, with unemployment and poverty soaring and political divisions worsening. </p>
<p>A peaceful and credible election is needed to restore political and economic normalcy in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Muzondidya is also an independent political and development analyst.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Munyaradzi Mushonga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.James Muzondidya, Part-time Lecturer, African History and Politics, University of ZimbabweMunyaradzi Mushonga, Senior Lecturer and Programme Director for Africa Studies in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792342022-03-17T14:09:52Z2022-03-17T14:09:52ZBoda bodas are critical to Kenya’s transport system. But they’ve gone rogue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452233/original/file-20220315-17-1tqdrg8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Boda boda riders carry passengers at Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sally Hayden/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya’s removal of import duty on motorcycles <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">over a decade ago</a> led to the instant creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the transport sector, notably in the growth of motorcycle taxis, better known as boda bodas. However, the sector is also in the news for <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">all the wrong reasons</a> – fuelling crime, mob assaults on other road users, disregard for traffic rules. A viral video in which a mob of riders <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyan-police-arrest-16-sexual-assault-of-motorist-3740216">sexually assaulted</a> a female motorist recently amplified the rot in the sector. Policy analyst Douglas Lucas Kivoi unpacks what went wrong and what should be done to make the boda boda sector safer for everyone.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the history of boda bodas in Kenya?</h2>
<p>The government of Kenya <a href="http://aeromarine.co.ke/news/1221/76/Insurers-and-KRA-win-big-in-motorbike-rules/">zero rated</a> import duty on motorcycles of up to 250cc in 2008. This made them affordable to average Kenyan homes, previously a pipe dream. It meant that most rural and urban families could afford to own one. They also provided vulnerable constituencies in communities an avenue to lift themselves out of poverty. </p>
<p>Boda bodas filled a gap in the absence of reliable, efficient transport across Kenya, in both urban and rural areas. It also addresses the problem of a poor transport infrastructure, especially a pathetic road network. In some areas the <a href="https://africabusinesscommunities.com/features/column-phyllis-wakiaga-fix-kenyas-road-construction-challenges/">road network is so bad</a> that only motorcycles can access communities. </p>
<p>In its 2018 report the National Transport and Safety Authority documented <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">nearly 1.4 million registered motorcycles in Kenya</a>. But, in fact, an accurate number of motorcycles operating as boda bodas remains a mystery. This lacuna pertaining to registration, regulation, monitoring and the use of motorcycle boda bodas as public service vehicle transport is a cause for concern. </p>
<h2>What social and economic role do they play?</h2>
<p>When the government liberalised the motorcycle industry, many unemployed young men took advantage of poor road networks and the chaotic transport sector to eke out a living by transporting people and goods on motorbikes. This gave rise to gangs of young men who have organised themselves into informal associations with a clear chain of command. </p>
<p>The sector’s economic contribution is immense: it is <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">estimated</a> that it provides more than one million direct jobs for riders who earn roughly about less than US$10 a day. </p>
<p>Treasury is estimated to be collecting <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">roughly</a> Ksh60 billion (about US$525 million) yearly in fuel taxes from boda bodas. Each consumes <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/how-boda-boda-riders-make-sh1bn-every-day-3743962">an average of Ksh300 (about US$3) worth of petrol </a>each in a day. It is, simply, a sector that cannot be wished away.</p>
<h2>What are its downsides?</h2>
<p>The boda boda transport business was in the limelight in early March 2022 for all the wrong reasons. A group of riders <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/counties/president-kenyatta-orders-crackdown-on-rogue-boda-boda-3741000">sexually assaulted</a> a female motorist in Nairobi. President Uhuru Kenyatta ordered a crackdown on the entire sector in a bid to instil sanity.</p>
<p>The sector has operated without decorum and decency for a long time. Drivers are not trained in road safety – most <a href="http://www.crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-on-Boda-boda-Motorcycle-Transport-and-Security-Chalenges-in-Kenya-2018.pdf">don’t even have a driving licence </a> and they are a law unto themselves. This has bred criminal gangs where impunity reigns supreme, especially on the road. The chaotic situation has put drivers in danger: some have lost their lives along with their innocent passengers. Thousands have been <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2001319869/wheeler-killers-boda-bodas-are-new-death-traps">maimed</a>. In <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/surge-in-boda-boda-accidents-death-toll-sparks-reform-calls-2275742">2019</a>, for instance, 1,421 boda boda riders and pillion passengers died, compared to 1,049 motor vehicle drivers and passengers.</p>
<p>Some boda boda riders have been accused of actively participating in or abetting crime. Some have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/central/2019-11-18-stop-ferrying-criminals-muranga-boda-boda-riders-told/">accused</a> of helping remove or conceal the bodies of those killed by criminals.</p>
<h2>What’s to be done?</h2>
<p>The entire transport sector in Kenya is extremely <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/technology-answer-to-kenya-s-chaotic-transport-sector-are-we-ready--198840">chaotic</a> and requires serious policy and legal interventions to tame cartels and rogue operators.</p>
<p>The lack of a comprehensive framework to regulate the public transport sector has been the country’s main undoing. Kenya’s road network lacks lanes to protect bikers and motorcycles. Urban roads need to be redesigned to accommodate motorcyclists and cyclists. </p>
<p>Because impunity is deeply entrenched in Kenya’s transport sector, it is prudent that the government adopts both short and continuous long term measures to address the menace in the boda boda sector. </p>
<p>In the short term, one consideration should be to get all boda boda drivers to attend driving schools. This may be a tall order. But the national government, National Transport Safety Authority and county governments should organise continuous training for the drivers, focusing particularly on road safety and decorum. </p>
<p>The government should also consider establishing a database of all boda boda operators in Kenya through mandatory registration, refresher training and testing. This should be followed up with a robust enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.</p>
<p>But it’s crucial that interventions don’t affect the livelihoods of communities. All 47 county governments ought to develop humane by-laws and policies to sustainably govern and regulate the boda boda sector’s operations. This, instead of adopting a retributive penal approach of arrests, prosecution and enforcing bans on boda boda operations. </p>
<p>Counties could, for instance, designate zones of operation for boda bodas. </p>
<p>Whatever approach is taken, it must be done in consultation with all stakeholders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Lucas Kivoi currently works as a Principal Policy Analyst, Governance sector at the . The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) .</span></em></p>The entire transport sector in Kenya is extremely chaotic and in need of urgent policy and legal interventions.Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1705542021-10-31T06:36:21Z2021-10-31T06:36:21ZYoung Nigerians turned to Twitter on the night of the Lekki shootings: what that tells us<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429050/original/file-20211028-15-15odfqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young Nigerians holding up a banner at the 1-year memorial of the Lekki shootings.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mobile messaging services have become influential in recent times in reshaping social movements.</p>
<p>They make it cheaper and quicker for protesters to mobilise resources. They also circumvent conventional communication networks so people can create personalised narratives, decentralise logistics, and gain communicative power. </p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pa.2583">paper</a> I explored the Twitter activities of the #EndSARS protesters in Nigeria on the night of 20 October 2020. Armed Nigerian military <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-nigerian-soldiers-in-civil-unrest-whats-in-place-and-whats-missing-149283">personnel</a> allegedly stormed Lekki Toll Gate, one of the most active and visible sites of the protests against police brutality. They reportedly shot live rounds into the crowd of young protesters. The news got explosive reactions on Nigerian spaces on social media, local African communities and the Nigerian diaspora networks. The day of the shooting – which is now called Black Tuesday – will be remembered as one of the darkest times in Nigeria’s recent history.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pa.2583">research</a> evaluated the role of influencers within the movement. I also identified the emotions being expressed, mostly anger or hope. I discovered that users trusted foreign-owned media houses more than local ones. Also, I found that diaspora Nigerians amplified news of the shooting on an international level.</p>
<p>My paper provides insights into how social media apps such as Twitter are used by young Nigerians. I did this by using an automated program to examine the connective action among the social media users who used the #EndSARS hashtag. </p>
<p>The Nigerian government recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-twitter-ban-could-backfire-hurting-the-economy-and-democracy-162233">banned</a> Twitter, without considering the negative consequences. The move shows a lack of understanding of the role of social media in the lives of young Nigerians. Young Nigerians already suffer marginalisation in most aspects of their <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-a-deleted-tweet-a-twitter-ban-and-biafran-wounds-that-have-never-healed-162290">political</a> and social experiences. This ban added to it.</p>
<h2>Young Nigerians and Twitter</h2>
<p>Young people are the majority of Africa’s population – the median age is 19.5 – giving Africa an enviable position as the world’s youngest continent. </p>
<p>But policies on the continent, particularly in Nigeria, are not always inclusive of youth advancement. This is counter-productive. As recent academic <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199793471-e-30">research</a> has shown, there are growing concerns among developed nations about youth participation in governance. Some <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/110330880901800103">scholars</a> have to tried to give reasons for this supposed lack of interest among young Africans. These include a dissatisfaction with the formal institutions of politics and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/1467-856X.t01-1-00001">governance</a> and lack of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/110330880901800103">trust</a> for these formal institutions.</p>
<p>But young people’s use of technology shows that they are interested in politics and governance. Instead of using conventional methods, Nigeria’s youth have found other reliable means of <a href="https://theconversation.com/livestreaming-lekki-digital-evidence-of-endsars-shooting-in-nigeria-makes-impunity-much-harder-148696">participating</a>. </p>
<p>Twitter serves that purpose. The micro-blogging site has become a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327837477_Twitter_as_a_Tool_of_Political_Discourse_in_Nigeria_Dialogue_Self-Aggrandizement_or_Party_Politicking">favourite</a> among politically conscious young Nigerians. Twitter is a one-stop shop for young Nigerians, who put it to a range of uses including job connections, marketing <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/seyiamakinde/status/1401096161876905985">products</a>, finding missing people and directly challenging public <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57568370">officials</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man sticks his head out of a car, waving a large green-white-green flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/429052/original/file-20211028-5568-c3ad00.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man in a car carries the Nigerian national flag adorned with writing ‘Say No To Oppression’ during a protest to commemorate the anniversary of the EndSARS protest in lagos.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Etomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Due to the ban, Nigeria’s economy has reportedly <a href="https://www.telecompaper.com/news/nigeria-to-lose-over-ngn-2-bln-daily-because-of-twitter-suspension-report--1385625">lost</a> $4.86 million daily (over 2 billion naira). </p>
<p>Despite this, resilient young people have stuck to the platform. They have continued to use the site by finding by-pass channels using virtual private <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-a-virtual-private-network-vpn-12741">networks</a>. Their refusal to leave Twitter not only underscores how crucial the platform is in their daily lives, it is also a political statement. </p>
<p>The night of the Lekki shooting is a great example of Twitter’s importance to Nigeria’s youth.</p>
<h2>The Lekki shooting</h2>
<p>For my research, I retrieved over 18,000 tweets on the night of the Lekki shooting, probing them for dominant themes. I used the NodeXL software to analyse connected action within the #EndSARS hashtag. </p>
<p>I discovered that the most influential Twitter users within the selected tweets were a mix of activists, celebrities and foreign media handles. The dominance of foreign media handles indicates young Nigerians’ distrust for their local media. </p>
<p>Nigerians in the diaspora also emerged as formidable allies of their home-based compatriots on the night of the shooting. As threats of an internet shut-down loomed over protesting youths on the ground, Nigeria’s diaspora community emerged, assisting with increased amplification of events. It was social media collaboration at its finest. The hashtag exploded, attracting global attention from celebrities who joined in the conversation to demand justice. </p>
<h2>Unending youth marginalisation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-police-few-promises-of-reform-have-been-kept-a-year-after-endsars-protests-170028">events</a> that led to the Lekki shooting – the curfew imposition and government’s call on the youths to disperse – reveal a disconnect between Nigeria’s political class and the masses. It suggests an unwillingness to listen and cooperate with citizens. By sending in armed officers to the protest site, the government was communicating that it preferred scare tactics to progress.</p>
<p>The Twitter ban follows this format of silencing dissent. Due to Twitter’s role in the #EndSARS protest coordination, the Nigerian government used all means to shut it down. A few months later, it succeeded.</p>
<p>The only way forward is for a new class of political leaders that embrace equality and justice to emerge. For that to happen, Nigerian youths must start to intentionally use their numbers to their own advantage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamar Haruna Dambo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young people’s use of technology such as Twitter shows that they are interested in politics and governance and have found a way to participate.Tamar Haruna Dambo, Lecturer, Eastern Mediterranean UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670032021-09-07T14:55:37Z2021-09-07T14:55:37ZYoung people and women bear the brunt of South Africa’s worrying jobless rate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418863/original/file-20210901-16-wk12bo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women fill plastic shopping bags with light polyethelene plastics to make soccer balls from re-used plastics in Cape Town. Women bear the brunt of joblessness in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s unemployment figures have made for grim reading for a long time. The <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2021.pdf">latest</a> for the second quarter of 2021 were, by several measures, gloomier than usual. The official unemployment rate for the second quarter <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/one-in-3-south-africans-looking-for-jobs-and-it-could-get-even-worse-20210825">worsened to 34.4%</a>. This is the highest the rate has been since the survey was started in 2008.</p>
<p>Worse is still to come: analysts <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2021-07-22-employment-bloodbath-on-the-cards/">have warned</a> that the effects of the July 2021 <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-social-unrest-in-south-africa-and-what-might-be-done-about-it-166130">violent unrest</a> that swept through two provinces that are the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/GDP%202020%20Q4%20(Media%20presentation).pdf#page=47">biggest contributors to economic output</a> are not yet reflected in employment figures.</p>
<p>We considered youth unemployment trends by using two sets of data – Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey and the long-running <a href="http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/">National Income Dynamics Survey</a>. As has long been the case, young people bear a disproportionate share of the unemployment burden. <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1856&PPN=P0211&SCH=72944">Nearly two-thirds</a>, or 64.4%, of people aged between 15 and 24 are unemployed. This is <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_737648.pdf">among the highest recorded in the world</a>.</p>
<p>We <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Unemployment%20report%20FINAL%20interactive.pdf">examined</a> why this is the case in a chapter, “South Africa’s high youth unemployment: structural features and current responses”, in the book <em>Youth in South Africa: Agency, (In)visibility and National Development</em>, edited by Ariane De Lannoy, Malose Langa and Heidi Brooks, due to be published in November.</p>
<p>Our analysis showed that youth unemployment is embedded in the long-standing structural dynamics of a labour market that has for several decades left far too many young people at the margins of the economy.</p>
<p>We developed a gap analysis, identifying what’s missing and what else needs to be done to address youth unemployment. The research found that most of the drivers of youth unemployment are addressed with current instruments. But the underlying causes of limited job growth, gender inequalities in employment and increasing discouragement among youth are not specifically addressed.</p>
<p>In addition, more needs to be done to ensure the coordination of policies to make the journey from learning to earning more seamless for a young person. </p>
<p>Finally, existing policy interventions can’t promote the levels of youth employment required in a context of low economic growth and low job growth.</p>
<h2>Unpacking the data</h2>
<p>Although the youth unemployment rate has been consistently high over the past two and a half decades, there was improvement between 2003 and 2007, a period when the country’s economic growth was high. <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Unemployment%20report%20FINAL%20interactive.pdf">Our analysis</a> reveals that this decrease in youth unemployment was explained largely by increases in the labour market’s capacity to absorb labour.</p>
<p>However, economic growth has been depressed since 2008 and the youth unemployment rate has steadily increased. From 2008 to 2020, the youth (15-34 years) unemployment rate – using the expanded definition – rose by 15 percentage points, from 38% to 53%. The <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2021.pdf#page=17">expanded definition</a> includes both workers who are still actively searching for work and the discouraged workseekers. Comparatively, for those aged between 35 and 64 there was an increase of 10 percentage points, from 17% to 27%.</p>
<p>Racial and gender disparities in access to work are entrenched features of the South African labour market. African youth (15-34 years) have the worst unemployment rate compared to the other groups, at 57%. Young women (15-34 years) across the board experience a higher unemployment rate of 57%, while that of young men is 49%.</p>
<p>The statistics do reflect a positive relationship between economic growth and labour absorption among young people. This means that efforts to significantly reduce youth unemployment are made difficult by the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/south-africa/south-africa-economic-outlook">sluggish economic growth rate</a>.</p>
<h2>Interventions</h2>
<p>Our analysis identified four key structural drivers of youth unemployment:</p>
<ul>
<li>low economic growth rates </li>
<li>skills mismatches </li>
<li>continued spatial inequalities </li>
<li>labour market inefficiencies. </li>
</ul>
<p>In response to these and other unemployment drivers, a number of Active Labour Market Programmes exist. These are macro-level interventions aimed at keeping people employed, ensuring that more people become employed, and <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17053">improving the efficiency of the labour market</a>.</p>
<p>The first set of interventions are about protecting jobs – that is to limit the number of jobs lost during economic downturns or company difficulties. For instance, the department of employment and labour <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/ene/FullENE.pdf">sets aside a portion</a> of the Unemployment Insurance Fund annually for initiatives that support turnaround strategies for companies in distress. The funds are also used for reskilling employees to minimise job losses.</p>
<p>Perhaps the largest set of interventions are labour absorbing. These are programmes that create work opportunities funded through public expenditure, including the <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/expanded-public-works-programme">Expanded Public Works Programmes</a>, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/CommunityWorkProgramme">Community Work Programme</a> and the <a href="http://www.nyda.gov.za/Products-Services/National-Youth-Services-Programme">National Youth Service</a>. They are intended to absorb large numbers of unemployed people, and youth in particular, into work or service opportunities.</p>
<p>The third set of interventions give employers incentives to hire more workers. One example is the <a href="https://www.sars.gov.za/types-of-tax/pay-as-you-earn/employment-tax-incentive-eti/">Employment Tax Incentive</a>. It is a tax-based intervention which encourages employers to hire young people in return for a tax rebate on the pay-as-you-earn tax that the company is liable to pay for each employee.</p>
<p>The fourth type of intervention is labour market intermediation – interventions intended to achieve better connection between employers and employees. Such interventions include workseeker support offered through the department of employment and labour’s Public Employment Support programmes, and private employment agencies such as <a href="https://www.lulaway.co.za/">Lulaway</a>, <a href="https://www.giraffe.co.za/">Giraffe</a> and <a href="https://jobjack.co.za/">JobJack</a>. </p>
<p>Another example of intermediation efforts deals with spatial inequalities. In recent years, a transport subsidy has been tested to ascertain whether providing work seekers with a transport voucher would alleviate the transport costs barrier of work seeking. <a href="https://portal.cepr.org/discussion-paper/15926">Evidence shows</a> that the transport subsidy was ineffective in improving job placement chances.</p>
<p>Finally, a plethora of interventions occur on the supply-side of the labour market, seeking to address skills mismatches.</p>
<h2>Filling the gaps</h2>
<p>We developed our gap analysis by drawing on a <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Unemployment%20report%20FINAL%20interactive.pdf">synthesis of existing research on the drivers</a>, mapped against existing interventions. For every driver we considered whether an active labour market programme existed to address it. This allowed us to draw conclusions about gaps in the current offerings.</p>
<p>Our analysis reveals that for most of the drivers, programmes exist to address them. However, these are severely hampered by low job growth. </p>
<p>Further, we found that there is little coordination between interventions. This leaves many young people struggling to understand what their next step is in their labour market journeys. </p>
<p>Increasing discouragement rates also point to the need for better curated and coordinated support that is easily accessible to young people as they seek to navigate labour market opportunities.</p>
<p>The issue of gender is an oversight in current strategies. While many programmes have targets for reaching women, they don’t address some of the barriers that women face in entering and remaining connected to the labour market – such as the higher burden of care that women face (which has <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Casale-Gender-the-early-effects-of-the-COVID-19-crisis-in-the-paid-unpaid-economies-in-South-Africa.pdf">increased since the COVID-19 pandemic began</a>). This suggests that even in a higher job growth labour market, women may still be left behind.</p>
<p>Finally, economic growth that promotes job growth is the key factor in shifting the youth unemployment challenge. Strategies to promote job-intensive economic growth must be at the forefront of policymakers’ minds. If such growth is achieved, the existing suite of programmes, with some additions to address discouragement and gender inequalities, should ensure that young people are well placed to take up jobs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Graham receives funding from the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the Capacity Building Programme for Employment Promotion, and the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cecil Mlatsheni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Racial and gender disparities in access to work are entrenched features of the South African labour market.Cecil Mlatsheni, Senior lecturer, School of Economics, University of Cape Town, University of Cape TownLauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1644992021-07-14T12:17:07Z2021-07-14T12:17:07ZUnrest is being used to subvert South Africa’s democracy: giving in is not an option<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411208/original/file-20210714-21-11w1gzb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looters grab items from a vandalised mall in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/looting-violence-grips-south-africa-after-zuma-court-hearing-2021-07-13/">mayhem</a> of the last few days is a reminder of the danger that South Africa continues to live with, as well as an indication of the disfigurement of its law enforcement institutions. </p>
<p>The danger stems from the deferral of a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">better life for all</a>” which the governing African National Congress promised when apartheid ended, while the crisis in law enforcement institutions is born of a sinister motive to evade accountability. The poor will emerge worse off, and the bandits are hoping for state institutions too weakened to dispossess them of their bounty and throw them into prison.</p>
<p>Failure to stop former president Jacob Zuma’s incarceration has led to where the country is. This is not an unavoidable result, but the fruition of a calculated strategy – call it “Plan B”. Zuma zealots had hoped their <a href="https://www.news24.com/witness/politics/mkmva-stands-firm-on-civil-unrest-threats-if-zuma-is-arrested-20210706">threats of a violent breakout</a> would scare off the police from arresting him, thereby forcing the authorities to hatch some arrangement that would keep him out of prison.</p>
<p>Once the threats proved hollow, which led to Zuma being jailed, the plan morphed to inciting <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57797007">lawlessness</a>. The intention is to inflict sufficient harm on property and sources of livelihood and instil fear of widespread loss of life to a point where the authorities regret the decision to proceed with Zuma’s incarceration.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-moment-as-constitutional-court-finds-zuma-guilty-and-sentences-him-to-jail-163612">Historic moment as Constitutional Court finds Zuma guilty and sentences him to jail</a>
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<p>For their destructive plans, Zuma’s fanatics found willing accomplices among the hungry, the underworld and petty thieves looking to feed a drug habit. And criminality is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-turn-the-tide-against-south-africas-crime-wave-131839">not unusual in South Africa</a>. It makes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/africa/cape-town-crime-military.html">global headlines</a>, now and then. </p>
<h2>Not unexpected</h2>
<p>The looting and violence is not unexpected for a country with the kind of social ills South Africa faces. For instance, of those who’re able to work, between the ages 15 and 65 years, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">43% can’t find jobs</a>. About two-thirds of the unemployed are youthful, below the age of 34. Most may never find jobs in their lifetime. They are school dropouts without <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-has-worsened-south-africas-system-of-developing-the-skills-of-young-people-162528">any skills to sell in the labour market</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with dim prospects of finding jobs and without much to do, these unemployable youngsters have taken to drugs to soothe their misery and to criminality as a source of livelihood. Drug abuse has emerged recently as the most worrying problem among <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-outputs/view/5058">the country’s youth</a>. It has predisposed them even more to criminality. </p>
<p>What’s happening now also can’t possibly come as a surprise because of poor police visibility. Police absence has emboldened some. These are the hungry in South African society, but they have remained obedient and fearful of imprisonment. Given the unlikeliness of arrest in this climate, the usually timid have decided to join the looting frenzy. And, though it may not be their first choice, they all possibly feel entitled to steal to assuage hunger.</p>
<p>That is the social deprivation that Zuma’s devotees are successfully exploiting. One can’t rule out the possibility that these marauding mobs have been initially encouraged, or bussed, to loot. It’s not unusual for leaders of the governing African National Congress to enlist the help of the underworld, including for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-fails-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-killings-in-kwazulu-natal-128167">murder of their own comrades</a>. </p>
<p>Once orchestrated, the looting and destruction frenzy took on a life of its own. But the aim of those involved is not just wanton destruction and to raise the spectre of mob attacks. Zuma devotees remained focused on freeing their cult-figure. They’re blaming the judiciary for the chaos, saying the jurists have taken an irresponsible decision. Their goal is to discredit the judiciary to justify making a deal that would <a href="https://www.news24.com/witness/news/pietermaritzburg/we-are-mobilising-to-get-zuma-released-20210709">free Zuma from punishment</a>.</p>
<h2>The question of a political pardon</h2>
<p>A political pardon, especially under these circumstances, would set this country down a potentially irreversible path. It would mean that all the guilty need to do to avoid accountability is to threaten violence. That would mean Zuma would never be punished for accumulated <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-criminal-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">allegations of corruption</a>. </p>
<p>If he managed to force a pardon now, who says he wouldn’t employ violence the next time he faced jail time? There’s a real possibility that Zuma will go back to prison. He’s currently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/17/new-delay-in-south-africa-ex-president-jacob-zuma-corruption-trial">going through a trial</a>, and evidence of his impropriety is piling up at the Zondo commission probing allegations of <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">state capture and corruption</a>. </p>
<p>If the state pardons Zuma now, it’s effectively saying he enjoys indemnity from prosecution, regardless of how severe his improprieties are. Once that happens, South Africa will lose any claim to being a country governed by the rule of law. It would pave the way for the proliferation of militia forces and mobs organised by strong-men to threaten law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>Countries don’t renounce the rule of law on account of a mere refusal to comply. The idea is to enforce the law. That is why the police and prosecutors are called <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-sa/police-and-defence">law enforcement agencies</a>. </p>
<p>But South Africa is faced with a dreadful failure of law enforcement, resulting from sheer failure to detect the likelihood of the current mayhem. Imprisonment of any heroic figure, especially one who encourages his zealots to break the law, is likely to incite chaos. The likelihood of that happening is even greater in a country with deep grievances like South Africa. </p>
<p>How the country’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-africas-tipping-point-how-the-intelligence-community-failed-the-country/">intelligence could not have foreseen</a> this is inexplicable. Either they’re hopelessly inept, or they have simply deserted their posts and left the country exposed to internal threats.</p>
<h2>Major setback</h2>
<p>The current chaos has set the country back. More people have possibly been infected by COVID-19 due to failure to observe preventative measures. Even more deaths are likely to follow because of the <a href="https://sacoronavirus.co.za/2021/07/13/media-release-impact-of-violent-protests-on-health-services/">disruption of the vaccination programme</a> and lack of staff at hospitals for fear of violent attacks by the mob.</p>
<p>This will add to the already high number of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235941788_Child-headed_households_in_South_Africa_The_legal_and_ethical_implications_when_children_are_the_primary_caregivers_in_a_therapeutic_relationship">child-headed households in the country</a>. Destruction of businesses will lead to a multiplication of unemployment, which is unlikely to decrease any time soon as business people remain uncertain about the return of law and order. This means criminality is likely to rise even more.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zuma-isnt-a-man-with-a-cause-just-a-wily-politician-trying-to-evade-the-law-163660">Jacob Zuma isn't a man with a cause. Just a wily politician trying to evade the law</a>
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<p>South Africa can’t possibly remain the same country in the aftermath of this mayhem. There are just too many storms ahead to simply continue unchanged. State institutions need to rid themselves of people who are not proving their worth. Their retention is truly reckless.</p>
<p>The “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2021-05-21-inequality-in-south-africa-is-a-ticking-timebomb">ticking bomb</a>” in South Africa does actually have the potential to explode. Mere promises of a better life are not enough to disarm the bomb. Malfeasant elements within the governing party are determined to take the entire country down with them. South Africans can’t say they have not been warned.</p>
<p><em>Mcebisi Ndletyana is the author of Anatomy of the ANC in Power: Insights from Port Elizabeth, 1990 - 2019 (HSRC Press, 2020)</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mcebisi Ndletyana receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences.</span></em></p>South Africa can’t possibly remain the same country in the aftermath of this mayhem. There are just too many storms ahead to simply continue unchanged.Mcebisi Ndletyana, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1626332021-06-14T15:09:52Z2021-06-14T15:09:52ZStereotypes about young jobless South Africans are wrong: what they’re really up to<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/406143/original/file-20210614-73866-7r6c4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Makeshift shops have mushroomed as people try to make ends meet amid South Africa's excessive unemployment.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hobermunemployment. an Collection/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world. A whopping <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14415">63%</a> of its young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years are jobless. A large proportion of these young people have never worked in the formal economy.</p>
<p>The media frequently portray young people excluded from wage work as inactive, aimless and alienated from mainstream society. This image feeds into fears of crime, violence and social unrest in which people who are jobless are cast as a “<a href="https://insideeducation.co.za/2021/06/07/south-africas-youth-unemployment-crisis-a-ticking-time-bomb/">ticking time bomb</a>” that poses a threat to a country’s stability.</p>
<p>But this is a very misleading characterisation. Most analyses of unemployed youth fail to grapple with the reality that unemployment in the sense of “doing nothing” is not a feasible option for most young people.</p>
<p>As research in many parts of Africa, including <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132517690039?journalCode=phgb">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-012-9156-y">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2010.485784">Zimbabwe</a>,
has shown, unemployed young people use a wide range of economic strategies and practices to acquire an income. </p>
<p>I conducted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02533952.2021.1909949?src=">research</a> in Zandspruit informal settlement, north of Johannesburg, in 2015 and 2016, on the lives, livelihoods and struggles of mostly young men who were either unemployed or marginally employed. It included life and work history interviews with 37 young people, a survey of 100 young people and a mapping exercise of the local economy, including semi-structured interviews with 40 local business owners. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-covid-19-is-likely-to-slow-down-a-decade-of-youth-development-in-africa-159288">How COVID-19 is likely to slow down a decade of youth development in Africa</a>
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<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02533952.2021.1909949?src=">study</a> showed that many unemployed young people are engaged in a variety of economic activities. Many of these are not necessarily recorded as a form of self employment or informal employment, but they consume a large part of young people’s lives.</p>
<h2>Survival strategies</h2>
<p>I found that livelihoods included running car wash ventures, fixing people’s cars as informal mechanics, and renting back rooms or shacks. Other activities included wiring illegal electricity connections for a fee and street-side gambling. They also acquired sponsorship from NGOs and local politicians to support local initiatives and community based organisations that helped local youth access educational and economic opportunities.</p>
<p>These livelihood strategies rarely constituted a formalised business or enterprise. Many young people in Zandspruit combined short stints in the formal economy with forms of “hustling” and self-employment. </p>
<p>In many instances, informal livelihoods were taken up because of the loss of a job or the failure to find one. There was also evidence of young men rejecting jobs in some of the low-paying sectors, in favour of self employment in the informal economy. </p>
<p>This not only reflects a desire for greater social autonomy and social power – something that low end wage employment denied them. It also shows the importance of investing in highly localised relationships in a time of generalised precariousness. </p>
<p>These informal livelihoods are embedded in networks and social relations that are critical to young people surviving unemployment. </p>
<p>Take a car wash business for example. While often analysed as a standalone business or enterprise, my research highlighted how it also operates as a connecting point for a dense web of social relations that underpin and connect various informal enterprises. These included the taxi industry (drivers and washers), informal mechanics, a <em>chesanyama</em> (barbecue joint) and the local drug trade.</p>
<p>A car wash also provides a space where young men (most of whom also make a living informally) can gather to socialise and pass time. These social relationships are a critical part of young men gaining leverage within a particular niche of the local economy. They also serve as a critical source of male sociality and mutual aid that one young man described as “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02533952.2021.1909949?src=">communal living</a>”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-giving-young-people-basic-financial-skills-helps-them-find-jobs-118860">How giving young people basic financial skills helps them find jobs</a>
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<p>The relationship between the young men who gather at car wash stands to pass time and “hustle” a living are premised on an understanding of “flexible reciprocity”, whereby those who currently have money, or are employed in some form, help those who are without. These networks of support offered an informal kind of “insurance”, as one of my interlocutors put it, but also social relations that provided alternative avenues to earn an income. As Sandile, aged 27, explained:</p>
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<p>There is a big communal living. You are not going to starve when you have friends.</p>
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<p>The social embeddedness of informal work is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these relations of interdependence are a critical source of support and solidarity. On the other hand, the relations are embedded within complex power dynamics that can reproduce forms of social differentiation and inequality.</p>
<p>They also require informal entrepreneurs to invest so much in personal relationships, fees and protection that many are left with little money to invest in improving their business. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Given the failure of the formal economy to produce enough jobs, policy makers and governments often present self employment in the informal economy as the solution to youth unemployment. </p>
<p>For instance, the provincial government of Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, has identified the mostly informal “<a href="https://www.gep.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gauteng-Township-Economy-Revitalisation-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf">township economy</a>” as key to tackling unemployment and promoting entrepreneurship.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.1982.10559651?journalCode=rsag20#:%7E:text=Positioned%20just%20to%20the%20west,3">Townships</a> are historically black urban residential areas. They are mostly characterised by underdevelopment and high levels of poverty.</p>
<p>The renewed interest in the “township economy” is important considering the extent of unemployment, poverty and the damaging legacy of township marginalisation under apartheid. <a href="https://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Bond%20Townships.pdf">Townships</a> were seen as labour dormitories for white businesses in towns and suburbs, and not intended to have their own viable economies. </p>
<p>But the government’s interest in township economies as the generators of jobs, entrepreneurship and “<a href="https://www.gep.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Gauteng-Township-Economy-Revitalisation-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf">socially inclusive wealth</a>” is woefully out of sync with the reality of most township enterprises. They are too small to offer an escape from poverty.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-children-in-zimbabwe-are-working-to-survive-whats-needed-149033">More children in Zimbabwe are working to survive: what's needed</a>
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<p>While the idea of entrepreneurship is gaining traction among young people, research suggests that only a small number see it as a viable livelihood and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwimvZe7lY_xAhVHY8AKHR_OCu4QFjAFegQICRAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.uj.ac.za%2Ffaculties%2Fhumanities%2Fcsda%2FDocuments%2FSiyakha_Report___Oct_2016_Print_FINAL%255B1%255D.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3gRgEBzDsvwJ3Gh3qLvvib">something to strive towards</a>.</p>
<p>The majority have a strong preference for stable formal sector jobs, which they associate with economic stability and social mobility.</p>
<p>The growing insecurity of jobs in the formal economy highlights the urgency of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-needs-to-ensure-income-security-beyond-the-pandemic-137551?fbclid=IwAR2VQ5qwKv0ZvVJWt2qBfB17xLpfRs9p_TMS0xDJPxnDk0q0mOrpi9Rhni4">stronger social protection and income support</a> for young people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hannah J. Dawson receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa (grant number: 116768), which I gratefully acknowledge. </span></em></p>Many unemployed young people are engaged in a variety of economic activities. These may not necessarily be recognised as a form of self employment or informal employment.Hannah J. Dawson, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614402021-06-07T15:11:14Z2021-06-07T15:11:14ZWhy young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404490/original/file-20210604-19-wmm67h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A queue of eager voters in Hawassa, Ethiopia, during the Sidama referendum in November 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael Tewelde/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Young people have been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/80/321/519/10549">key drivers of social and political change</a> in Ethiopia going back to the closing decades of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Solomonid-dynasty">imperial era</a>. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, university students played a crucial role in the massive protests that led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime. A <a href="http://memory.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et_01_07.html">military regime</a> was installed in its place.</p>
<p>Subsequently, an armed rebellion against the military regime – known as the Derg – was powered by young combatants. Most leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – including prime minister-to-be Meles Zenawi – left university to join the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249608704221">armed struggle</a> that overthrew the Derg in 1991. </p>
<p>These young people grew to be the country’s governing elite as part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, who would themselves be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopia-imposes-state-of-emergency-as-unrest-intensifies/2016/10/10/7825391e-8ee9-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html?utm_term=.4c90400fa9f3">challenged</a> in the mid-2010s by a new crop of youths. This led once again to a change in the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-ruling-party-chooses-abiy-ahmed-to-lead-the-party/a-43161198">balance of power</a> in Addis Ababa with the rise of Abiy Ahmed in 2018.</p>
<p>We are involved in a multi-year <a href="https://www.york.ac.uk/igdc/research/democratisation-ethno-federalism-ethiopia/">research project</a> to document young Ethiopians’ concerns about institutions and governance. Our focus is on young people between the ages of 20 to 35 years in Oromia and Sidama. These have been centres of popular protests since 2015. This project brings together young people and members of parliament in conversations about the effectiveness of the country’s representative institutions. A key question we asked was how institutions might be reformed to include and represent young people better. </p>
<p>Under its federal structure, Ethiopia has <a href="https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Ethiopia_Regions.html">10 regional</a> parliaments, known as regional councils. At federal level is the house of people’s representatives, made up of 547 directly elected MPs. The young people we spoke to said parliaments in Ethiopia had not lived up to their promise. They needed to be legitimate, representative, inclusive and vibrant enough to make better decisions and lead to better outcomes.</p>
<p>These views matter in a country where over <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-can-convert-its-youth-bulge-from-a-political-problem-into-an-opportunity-75312">70%</a> of the population is under the age of 30. Elections are scheduled for late June 2021. Initially scheduled for August 2020, they were delayed twice. The reasons given were logistical challenges and the conflict in Tigray, which was in part sparked by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57094394">delayed polls</a>.</p>
<h2>Simmering discontent</h2>
<p>The 2020 <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/ethiopia-0">Afrobarometer</a> survey found that 53% of Ethiopians believed the government was managing the economy badly. In addition, 62% believed the government was doing a bad or very bad job of creating new jobs. Nearly 60% of people believed young people’s needs were not being addressed. Over the <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=ETB&to=USD">last five years</a>, the Ethiopian currency has halved in value against the US dollar, raising the cost of living. </p>
<p>Unresolved historical grievances over the <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/01/10/ethiopias-federation-needs-reviving-not-reconfiguring/">distribution of power</a> between the central state and federal regions and a heavy-handed state response have heightened <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">instability</a> in the country. Two recent popular protest movements – in Oromia and Sidama – point to this dissatisfaction.</p>
<p>Protests in Oromia were triggered by the 2014 <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/unrest-in-ethiopia-ultimate-warning-shot">expansion</a> of Addis Ababa city boundaries into neighbouring Oromia region. This had the potential to displace farmers and undermine local land rights. </p>
<p>The government plan was soon cancelled but protests led by young men and women – most of them students – continued. <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/twofold-crisis-in-ethiopia-elites-and-street/">In 2018</a> the protesters forced out prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2018/08/01/riding-the-wave-of-populism/">paving the way</a> for prime minister Abiy Ahmed.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Driving reform: youths and parliaments in Oromia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the south of the country, the Sidama have long agitated for <a href="https://www.eajournals.org/journals/global-journal-of-politics-and-law-research-gjplr/vol-7-issue-7-november-2019/the-quest-for-regional-statehood-and-its-practicability-under-the-post-1991-ethiopian-federation-the-discontents-and-experience-of-sidama-nation/">statehood</a>. The quest developed fresh <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/20/ethiopia-at-least-17-killed-in-violence-over-sidama-autonomy">momentum</a> after the 2018 reforms. A popular movement driven by an informal activist group called <em>Ejjetto</em> led to autonomy through a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/11/23/sidama-referendum-over-98-vote-yes-for-ethiopia-s-10th-regional-state/">2019 referendum</a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Youths and parliaments in Sidama.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Youth exclusion</h2>
<p>Trust in Ethiopian parliaments is the second lowest of all institutions in the country. Some 47% of Afrobarometer respondents trusted the house of people’s representatives “just a little” or “not at all”. Similarly, 22% of young people (ages 18-35) didn’t trust parliament at all and 27% trusted it just a little. Some 71% of young people thought that at least some MPs were corrupt. </p>
<p>We held focus groups with 30 young people from around Oromia and the Sidama Regions, over several days in August 2019 and 2020. Our aim was to establish how young people perceived their role in Ethiopian society, and how they felt about the institutions that represented them. </p>
<p>Parliaments – particularly regional parliaments – are one of the most important institutions where citizens can raise their issues and deliberate on policy through their elected representatives. </p>
<p>But young people have generally been excluded from participation at both the national and regional levels. As a result, they argued that these institutions suffer a lack of legitimacy, inclusiveness and representativeness and are broadly distrusted by the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/ethiopia-0">public</a>.</p>
<p>Many young people in both regions said that they did not trust members of the regional bodies to represent their interests or to voice their demands. The youths said they were not consulted when laws were enacted, including those which directly affected their lives.</p>
<p>Youth movements are demanding greater inclusion. They suggested that quota systems would give young people their own representatives and a say in their governance. These young people want more democracy, not less, and would like to see free and fair elections. </p>
<p>For young people in Ethiopia, the government has refused to listen for too long – but history shows that their demands can only go unaddressed for so long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) and the UKRI. This project was funded by the Global Research Network on People and Parliaments, which receives funding from the UKRI and GCRF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This project was funded by the Global Research Network on People and Parliaments, which receives funding from the UKRI and GCRF</span></em></p>Ethiopian history shows that the demands of its young people can’t go unaddressed for long.Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandAssefa Fiseha, Professor, Center for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa UniversityHenok Kebede, Lecturer, School of Law, Hawassa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1555952021-04-14T14:26:07Z2021-04-14T14:26:07ZSouth Africa’s efforts to tackle joblessness can be more effective: here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392740/original/file-20210331-23-9ogybc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C24%2C528%2C353&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A group of young men wait on a road for work in South Africa. A staggering 74% of the country's youth are jobless. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Frederic Lewis/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Youth unemployment is one of South Africa’s most intractable challenges, made worse by COVID-19. Prior to the pandemic the unemployment rate (including people who had given up looking for work) was <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2019.pdf">just under 70% for people aged 15 to 24</a>. </p>
<p>A year later <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2020.pdf">the rate had increased to 74%</a> – despite government investments. So it is crucial to understand what interventions are working. But how do we evaluate whether youth employment programmes are successful, particularly when unemployment is caused by the <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/structural-unemployment-3306202">structure of the economy</a>?</p>
<p>The obvious answer, of course, is whether a programme results in a young person getting employed. </p>
<p>This is logical and easy to measure. It can easily be linked to the release of funding to programmes. And it allows for programmes to be compared. This was done in a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X18303905">systematic review of 113 programmes internationally</a>.</p>
<p>However, as we have explored in several recent studies, there are a number of drawbacks to relying solely on job placement as an indicator of successful intervention. Doing so misses out on outcomes that are equally important, or more so, amid high structural unemployment. </p>
<p>These lessons are particularly important in economies that have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, where youth employment recovery will take time. </p>
<h2>Inadequate measure of success</h2>
<p>We make this argument based on several studies. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0190740920303431">The first</a> looked at long-term employment outcomes of 1,892 youth between 18 and 25 who participated in youth employability programmes over the period 2017-2018. These are programmes run by NGOs, business and the state. They typically include technical and soft skills training. </p>
<p>The proportion of participants who found jobs and stayed in them over time was <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Siyakha%20Report%20June%202019%20Web%20LowRes.pdf">just 28% – somewhat better than a matched sample from the quarterly labour force survey data</a>, but still low. But we also found evidence that programmes had other important outcomes. These included a continued positive orientation to the labour market, and improved self-esteem and self-efficacy – important attributes for managing the protracted transition to work in a low growth economy. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/963/2019_249_Saldruwp.pdf?sequence=1">The second</a> involved analysis of the quarterly labour force survey and general household survey data to understand the nature of young people not in employment or in education and training. It found that while many such youth have never worked, a significant portion find themselves in and out of work without making much longer-term progress. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/968/2019_253_Saldruwp.pdf?sequence=3">third study</a> draws together several qualitative studies conducted in the past 10 years. It shows that young people are frustrated by the constant cycle of finding and taking up training and employment opportunities, without making progress towards a longer-term career. </p>
<p>Together, these studies show that job placement alone is an insufficient goal and measure of the success of youth employability programmes. Four reasons for this argument emerge from these studies. </p>
<p>First, job placement says more about demand than supply. A young person’s ability to find a job doesn’t depend only on their skills but also on whether the labour market is creating sufficient demand for employees. No matter how well a programme trains and supports a young person, if there are limited jobs, young people are unlikely to be employed. </p>
<p>Second, if a programme is getting young people into jobs even though job numbers are not growing – as in South Africa – these placements may be at the <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/wbrobs/v32y2017i2p127-154..html">expense</a> of other work seekers. </p>
<p>Individual programmes can get people into jobs while the overall youth unemployment rate stays stagnant or rises. In the context of a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/07/18/covid-19-has-throttled-south-africas-economy">rapidly contracting economy in the COVID-19 era</a>, this is a particularly important argument against job placement as the only measure of a programme’s success. </p>
<p>Third, using this single indicator takes attention away from longer-term pathways towards sustainable livelihoods. Many jobs in South Africa, especially at entry level, are insecure, part time or casual. There’s a risk of disregarding whether a job is decent and has prospects for learning and career development. </p>
<p>Young people typically <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-29-we-must-equip-young-people-to-bounce-back-into-work/">do not stay in jobs</a>. This is either because the job is not a good fit or is for a short term only. Other barriers, such as transport costs, also account for why they are unable to stay in jobs.</p>
<p><a href="http://opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/968/2019_253_Saldruwp.pdf?sequence=3">Qualitative</a> and <a href="http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/images/papers/2016_17_NIDSW4.pdf">quantitative evidence</a> shows that young people find jobs that are typically short lived, before having to look again for their next placement. Policymakers should consider whether these short term experiences add up to something longer term – or there’s a risk of perpetuating the cycle of underemployment. </p>
<p>Finally, and perhaps most importantly, evaluating programmes on the basis of job placement alone underestimates the <a href="http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/handle/11090/818#:%7E:text=Using%20National%20Census%202011%20data,%20the%20Youth%20Multidimensional,its%20spatial%20distribution%20across%20relatively%20small%20geographical%20regions.">multidimensionality of poverty</a>. Evidence repeatedly shows how many barriers and <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Unemployment%20report%20FINAL%20interactive.pdf">challenges young people face</a> as they leave the education system and begin to find their way towards a job, and perhaps even a career. </p>
<p>These barriers are not only related to the labour market or education system. They also include issues such as <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Siyakha%20Report%20June%202019%20Web%20LowRes.pdf">food insecurity, income poverty, and care responsibilities</a>, among others. Each of these limit the ability of young people to look for work. </p>
<p>These interrelated challenges influence young people’s ability to take up training or job opportunities. </p>
<p>Taken together, these challenges require far more intensive support than simply training and placing a young person in a job.</p>
<h2>Alternative approaches</h2>
<p>It is crucial that funders, policy makers, and programme developers invest in more intensive support that can help young people meet the challenges they face in seeking work. They must also insist on measures beyond job placement as indicators of success. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X18303905">International evidence </a> bears this out. It shows that across 113 programmes reviewed, multidimensional programmes that seek to provide more comprehensive support to youth are more effective than those that offer training only. They are particularly successful when they target the most vulnerable youth. </p>
<p>Further, <a href="https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/BPS_policy-brief_final-23_03_2020.pdf">our research</a> recognises the crucial contribution such programmes play in keeping young people connected to opportunities, and reducing social exclusion and social drift. This is when young people become increasingly disconnected from the labour market, training opportunities and positive social inclusion, which in turn can have negative consequences on mental health. </p>
<p>Given this evidence and the fact that South Africa is facing a stagnant economy for some time, it is crucial that funders, policy makers and those working on youth employment interventions evaluate and invest in programmes on the basis of their ability to keep young people positively oriented towards the labour market. The programmes should help improve their employability, even if the young participant is not yet able to find an actual job. </p>
<p>Outcome indicators that can more adequately measure these factors include enhancing <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0190740920303431">job search resilience, promoting self-esteem and self-efficacy, and reducing discouragement</a>.</p>
<p>There are ample reasons to move away from evaluating employability programmes on the basis of employment outcomes alone. Rather, a range of indicators should be used to track whether young people remain engaged, believe in themselves and keep trying to find a job. This, while developing the personal attributes that will make them attractive to future employers. </p>
<p>Each of these outcomes is more difficult to measure than a simple count of job placements. But it’s not impossible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>For the studies reported on in this article Lauren Graham received funding from the Government Technical Advisory Committee, the Ford Foundation, and the Capacity Building Programme for Employment Promotion. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariane De Lannoy receives funding from the European Union via the Capacity Building Programme for Employment Promotion, based at the Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC). I also receive funding from UNICEF and the DG Murray trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the Department of Science and Technology and the National Research Foundation for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development.</span></em></p>Relying solely on job placement as an indicator of successful intervention misses out on outcomes that are equally important, or more so, amid high structural unemployment.Lauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgAriane De Lannoy, Senior Researcher: Poverty and Inequality Initiative, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape TownLeila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1410762020-08-26T15:01:40Z2020-08-26T15:01:40ZAfrican farmers are younger than you think. Here is why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345296/original/file-20200702-111333-1ajtquz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young African farmer</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past 20 years sub-Saharan Africa has registered the <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/a-bo092e.pdf">highest rate</a> of agricultural production in the world. There have been knock-on effects with the region also seeing the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_624872.pdf">fastest growth</a> in off-farm employment and non-farm labour productivity. </p>
<p>There’s a <a href="https://farmerline.co/2019/05/29/securing-the-future-of-agriculture-in-the-face-of-an-ageing-farmer-population/#:%7E:text=Ghana%20is%20like%20many%20other,Food%20and%20Agriculture%2C%202011">widely held</a> view that Africa’s agricultural growth trajectory could be jeopardised by an ageing farm population because young people are fleeing from farming. Several sources indicate that the average age of Africans in farming has risen to 60 years or more. But we are unaware of any empirical evidence to support this claim. </p>
<p>To understand what’s really going on, we used nationally representative survey data collected by the government statistical offices of six African countries – Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Because these surveys were replicated multiple times in each country between 2000 and 2018, we can compute how much time people spent annually in farming and off-farm jobs. We can examine trends in the age distribution of the labour force in farm and off-farm employment since 2000. </p>
<p>This was done as part of our <a href="https://www.rural21.com/english/current-issue/detail/article/the-myth-of-africas-ageing-farmers.html">research</a> into young people’s access to land as well as their migration decisions and employment opportunities.</p>
<h2>Breaking the myth</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.rural21.com/english/current-issue/detail/article/the-myth-of-africas-ageing-farmers.html">findings</a> debunk the myth that most farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are over 60 years of age – far from it in fact. </p>
<p>According to the national government-administered data in the six countries, the average age of the agricultural workforce ranges from about 32 years to 39 years. Even when not counting young adults in the 15 to 24 year old range, the average age of the agricultural workforce ranges from 38 to 45 years of age. And even going beyond the generally accepted labour force age range of 15 to 64 years to include all elderly people of any age working in farming, the mean age of farmers barely changes. </p>
<p>This is explained by the fact that <a href="https://www.populationpyramid.net/africa/2020/">only 3%</a> of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is 65 years and over. And less than half of this group is economically active and engaged in farming. </p>
<p>Secondly, the average age of the agricultural workforce in the six African countries examined has either increased by one or two years or remained constant over the past decade. Between the first and latest survey periods, which spanned from seven to 12 years, the average age of the labour force in farming increased by less than two years in four of the six study countries (Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia). The mean farmer age remained unchanged in Nigeria and declined slightly in Tanzania.</p>
<p>In other words, the age of Africans in farming is barely rising, if at all. Considering that roughly 7 million to 10 million young people are entering the labour force in sub-Saharan Africa each year, it is easy to understand why the average age of the farming population is not rising, even with large numbers of young people partially or fully moving out of farming. </p>
<p>Based on these nationally representative surveys, it is clear that of the region’s many agricultural challenges, an ageing workforce in farming is fortunately not one of them. </p>
<p>Third, our study found that individuals in off-farm jobs are on average one to three years younger than those in farming, especially when the sample excludes the 15-24 year old age group. </p>
<h2>How to make farming profitable for young people</h2>
<p>As highlighted in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2018.1430767?journalCode=fjds20">previous studies</a>, the share of employment in farming has been declining over time as opportunities for off-farm employment expand in Africa’s rapidly transforming economies. But farming still accounts for a significant proportion of the jobs held by working-age individuals and remains the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2018.1430767?journalCode=fjds20">single largest</a> employer of rural youth. Most of the jobs, however, are, part time. </p>
<p>It is true that many young people from rural areas are leaving farming as off-farm opportunities continue to expand. Nevertheless, most young people who are economically active remain engaged in farming. What is missing, however, is a critical mass of skilled young Africans with access to finance and know-how to drive productivity growth in farming and related value chains. </p>
<p>The idea of keeping young people in farming for fear of African agriculture becoming the preserve of the elderly is misplaced. A more effective strategy would prioritise resourcing the millions of rural youth already engaged in farming to make farming more profitable. Making agriculture “sexy” is not nearly as important as making it profitable. Young people will flock to agriculture if and when it becomes clear that it can make good money. </p>
<p>A related priority is to encourage skilled young Africans to apply their expertise to address the many policy, regulatory, and financing barriers that inhibit them from starting and expanding agribusiness firms that provide important services to African farmers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felix Kwame Yeboah receives funding from Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Jayne receives funding from the CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), which is led by the International Food Policy Research Institute. </span></em></p>Africa is far from having an ageing farming population. What is missing is a critical mass of skilled, young farmers with access to finance who could drive productivity in farming.Felix Kwame Yeboah, Assistant Professor of International Development, Michigan State UniversityThomas Jayne, MSU Foundation Professor, Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1406662020-06-15T15:08:43Z2020-06-15T15:08:43ZSouth Africa has taken steps to help young jobless people. Here’s what’s working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341824/original/file-20200615-65961-1bia9us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa has among the worst youth unemployment rates in the world. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has among the <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/youth-unemployment-rate">highest youth unemployment rates globally</a>, with <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2019.pdf">58% of 15-24 year olds</a> not in jobs, education or training. In times of economic crisis, young people are the first to lose jobs and <a href="http://www.redi3x3.org/paper/youth-labour-market-dynamics-south-africa-evidence-nids-1-2-3">the last to gain them back</a>. </p>
<p>That means that now and into the future, as the economy reels from the coronavirus pandemic and the resultant lockdown, these rates are likely to only worsen. South Africa has a very young population <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12362">with about a third</a> of the population being between the ages of 18 and 34 years. </p>
<p>So what should be done? </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Siyakha%20Report%20June%202019%20Web%20LowRes.pdf">research </a> shows that youth employability programmes play a crucial role in maintaining young people’s resilience and sense of agency in a context in which there are high levels of joblessness. These programmes provide young people with training and information to support their entry into the labour market, and are usually close to where young people live. Most provide a combination of technical skills training and personal empowerment inputs. </p>
<p>Given the social and economic consequences of this pandemic, now more than ever, it is crucial to think about how to construct meaningful youth programmes to support young people’s journeys into the economy.</p>
<h2>Youth agency and resilience</h2>
<p>Between 2013 and 2019 we tracked just under 2,000 young people who participated in youth employability programmes. The programmes and organisations that run them are
<a href="https://skoll.org/organization/harambee/">Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator </a>,
<a href="https://lovelife.org.za/en/groundbreakers/">loveLife’s groundBreakers programme</a>,
<a href="https://afrikatikkunservices.com/">Afrika Tikkun Services</a>,
<a href="https://www.eoh.co.za/">EOH</a>,
<a href="https://nydawebsite.azurewebsites.net/Products-Services/National-Youth-Services-Programme">National Youth Service</a> (run by the National Youth Development Agency), <a href="https://www.etafeni.org.za/portfolio/fit-for-life-fit-for-work/">Fit for Life Fit for Work</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Community/Thabiso-Skills-Development-Centre-223380931044853/">Thabiso Skills Institute</a>
and <a href="http://www.ackermanacademy.co.za/">Raymond Ackerman Academy</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Siyakha%20Report%20June%202019%20Web%20LowRes.pdf">The research</a> found that involvement in such programmes had a number of positive outcomes for young people. </p>
<p>First, young people showed improved job-search resilience. They were less likely to indicate being discouraged with looking for work after they had been through the programmes. And they were more likely to be using diverse strategies for searching for work, and felt more confident about looking for work. </p>
<p>They also showed small improvements in their sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy (their sense of control over their future) after participating in the programmes. These are important markers of success in the context of significant difficulties that young people face, and may be important in the transition to employment in the longer term.</p>
<p>Often these changes are overlooked because of the focus on employment and earnings as indicators of programme efficacy. But they are crucial indicators to measure as the country seeks to support young people’s agency in contexts of increasing unemployment.</p>
<h2>Improve young people’s prospects</h2>
<p>Crucially, the study offers insight into what kinds of programme features work for different kinds of young people. The eight programmes that were included in the study all targeted young people who typically came from impoverished backgrounds. They also had limited access to formal post-secondary education and training opportunities. They are broadly reflective of the kinds of young people who struggle most to find work.</p>
<p>We found a set of crucial programme elements that boost the chances of employment for these young people.</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Matching</strong>: Our research found that the programme feature with the strongest effect is matching. We show that connecting work seekers to employers (matching) was the most important programme element, and improves a candidate’s chance of finding work by 28 percentage points in the 6-30 months following their training.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Soft skills</strong>: the study also found that time spent on soft skills – including promoting a sense of confidence and future orientation, as well as supporting young people to take control of their plans for their future – delivers a significant and strong effect. The first month of soft skills training delivers a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of being employed. Soft skills training made a particularly strong impact for the most vulnerable. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Participants who had not completed school, and those who lived outside metropolitan areas, where jobs are mostly located, had a significant employment disadvantage upon entering the programmes compared to their counterparts who had finished high school and lived in urban areas. But access to soft skills training for the more disadvantaged youth helped to close that gap. </p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Financial capability training</strong>: Our research also found that receiving financial capability training improves the probability of being employed by almost 10 percentage points.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Implications of the findings</h2>
<p>Young people in South Africa face multiple forms of deprivation. They also exhibit significant agency and resilience despite these challenges. Our research shows that placing young people at the centre of programme development, and working with them, can improve their resilience. </p>
<p>Further, different programme elements have different effects for young people. Including multiple components in youth employment programmes is crucial if the country is to address the multiple deprivations they face. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Siyakha%20Report%20June%202019%20Web%20LowRes.pdf">study</a> shows that multiple components of training are key, especially when targeting particularly vulnerable youth who face multiple life and labour market challenges. The more challenges young people face, the more programme features are necessary. Tailoring interventions to their different circumstances within the large unemployed population is, therefore, crucial.</p>
<p>While such programmes cannot replace economic growth as a strategy for improving employment outcomes, they nevertheless play a crucial role in supporting young people, and offering bridges to the world of work over time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140666/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Graham received funding for this study from the Ford Foundation, the Government Technical Advisory Committee, and the Newton British Academy Advanced Fellowship fund. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the National Research Foundation (NRF) for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development. She also received funding for this research from the Ford Foundation, the National Treasury's Jobs Fund and the Research Committee of the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p>Employment programmes cannot replace economic growth in improving youth employability, but they play a crucial role in helping them find work.Lauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLeila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1224922019-09-03T11:40:43Z2019-09-03T11:40:43ZTunisians head for the polls amid dimming faith in democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290308/original/file-20190830-166019-1wx1qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisians protest against tax hikes, austerity measures and increased food prices.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Mohamed Messara</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tunisians, and the wider world, expected a great deal after the dawn of democracy in 2011. This followed the popular uprisings that ended President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-tunisians-are-back-on-the-streets-seven-years-after-the-jasmine-revolution-90163">dictatorial rule</a>. </p>
<p>But even two years after those momentous events, many were beginning to doubt both the new government and the democracy it claimed to embody. </p>
<p>Those doubts have deepened.</p>
<p>On 15 September the nation will go to the polls to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/tunisia-sets-presidential-election-september-15-190731155612720.html">elect a new president</a> in its second free elections since 2011. The election will be a major challenge for the country’s fledgling democracy. </p>
<p>The hope since 2011 has been for a government that would be responsive to ordinary Tunisians’ needs. This has given way to disillusionment. Most in the country have lost faith in the government.</p>
<p>To understand what has gone wrong, we need to remind ourselves what the protesters were demanding in 2011, and what concerns have been repeatedly reflected in opinion polls ever since.</p>
<h2>What people wanted</h2>
<p>Protesters who took to the streets eight years ago wanted the end of dictatorship under Ben Ali. This was widely interpreted at the time as a demand for liberal democracy, free and fair elections as well as <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">civil and political rights</a>. </p>
<p>But at best, this is only half the story. The 2011 demonstrations were also against poor living standards, unemployment, police violence, government corruption and a lack of human rights. These grievances were summed up in the popular slogan of the time, </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/mjcc/6/2/article-p232_7.xml?crawler=true&mimetype=application%2Fpdf">Employment, freedom, national dignity</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As our <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Arab-Uprisings-Egypt-Jordan-Tunisia/dp/3319690434/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">research</a> has shown, there was widespread popular support for the overthrow of the Ben Ali government in 2010/11.</p>
<p>And, according to the findings from the <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/arab-barometer-wave-ii/">Arab Barometer public opinion poll</a>, while a quarter of Tunisians took part in the demonstrations against the regime, over 80% expressed support for the protests. </p>
<p>After Ali’s fall, Tunisians were optimistic about their country’s future and looked forward to having a democratic government that would <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">drive the political and economic changes they had demanded</a>.</p>
<p>Over 80% were confident that the new government would deliver on democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, better economic opportunities and <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">greater social justice</a>. </p>
<p>But the euphoria didn’t last long. Within a few years it had been replaced with <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">disillusionment and disaffection</a>. The disaffection has since grown progressively stronger, as shown by the findings of <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno300_crime_and_security_in_tunisia.pdf">public opinion polls</a> carried out by the African research network Afrobarometer.</p>
<p>Earlier this year when protesters took to the streets they were making exactly the same demands as in 2011. Their slogan was, once again: <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/unrest-simmers-in-tunisia-cradle-of-the-arab-spring-9whtqmdm3">“employment, liberty, national dignity!”</a> </p>
<p>The main drivers of the disaffection and anger were a number of adverse developments, combined with a lack of progress in crucial areas.</p>
<h2>Democracy project in danger</h2>
<p>One of the least welcome developments has been a noticeable shift towards illiberalism in governance. At the end of 2015 the government declared a state of emergency following the deaths of 39 tourists in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-security-emergency/tunisias-president-declares-state-of-emergency-after-hotel-attack-idUSKCN0PE0JN20150704">a terrorist attack</a>.</p>
<p>Two years later these measures were written into law under new <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Arab-Uprisings-Egypt-Jordan-Tunisia/dp/3319690434/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">emergency legislation</a>. This gave the government the power to monitor the press, quash protests and close mosques and civil society associations.</p>
<p>Another negative development has been a breakdown in consensus among the country’s elites. Islamists and non-Islamists have begun to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/tunisia-2019-pivotal-year">compete for control over state resources</a>. </p>
<p>These developments exacerbated underlying problems. These included the government’s failure to deliver on the promise of democracy, and its failure to revive the economy. For example, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-tunisian-labor-market-in-an-era-of-transition-9780198799863?cc=us&lang=en&">unemployment remains unacceptably high</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289631/original/file-20190827-184229-i76g76.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">World Development Indicators</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing despair</h2>
<p>The failure of the government to solve the country’s economic problems <a href="https://international-review.org/tunisian-success-an-economic-analysis/">challenges its legitimacy</a>. Tunisians have also become increasingly frustrated with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/public-disgust-over-corruption-threatens-stability-in-middle-east-and-north-africa-79308">high levels of corruption</a>.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/final_-_012019_iri_tunisia_poll.pdf">public opinion poll</a> early this year only 8% of Tunisians think that their country is heading in the right direction (compared with 62% in 2012). A massive 87% think it is heading quite the wrong way (compared with 30% in 2012).</p>
<p>Only 30% of Tunisians believe that they can influence political decision making through the ballot box. <a href="https://www.arabbarometer.org/">Support for all political parties has plummeted</a>, with two thirds saying that no party represents their interests. </p>
<p>The poll also found that only 28% of Tunisians voted in the 2018 municipal elections, with only 31% definitely intending to vote in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. </p>
<p>Support for democracy as the preferred form of government has fallen from 71% in 2013 to 46% in 2018, according to <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/press/support-democracy-dwindles-tunisia-amid-negative-perceptions-economic-conditions">Afrobarometer</a>, with only 33% agreeing that their country is a democracy.</p>
<h2>Hunger for real change</h2>
<p>Through international eyes Tunisia is seen as a country that has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/26/guardian-view-tunisia-transition-success-story">successfully made the transition to democracy</a>, and as a beacon of hope in a region beset by civil war, failed states and a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/tunisia-beacon-hope-speech-johannes-hahn-investor-conference-tunisia-2020_en">return to dictatorship</a>. It is rated <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/tunisia">“free”</a> by Freedom House and a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-10/democracy-index-economist-intelligence-unit-2018/10703184">“flawed democracy”</a> by the Economist Intelligence Unit. </p>
<p>For its part, the European Union is willing to support Tunisia’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/tunisia-beacon-hope-speech-johannes-hahn-investor-conference-tunisia-2020_en">“thin” electoral democracy</a>. This is because it the EU has, in recent years, prioritised its own security over <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629395.2017.1358900">North Africa’s democratisation</a>. </p>
<p>But, the western perception of what’s happening in Tunisia differs sharply with Tunisian’s daily reality. </p>
<p>The truth is that Tunisia’s political transformation is in trouble. What Tunisians want is for their government to deliver on the substance of democracy, which is tangible fairness. And they want their social and economic rights guaranteed as well as their civil and political rights. Being able to cast a vote doesn’t cut it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European Union for the reseach on which this article is bassed. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. He received funding from the Carnegie Trust for Universities of Scotland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Sapsford received funding from the European Commission 7th Framework Programme.</span></em></p>Western perceptions of what’s happening in Tunisia differ sharply with Tunisia’s daily reality: the truth is that its political transformation is in trouble.Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenRoger Sapsford, Honorary Research Fellow, School of Social Sciences, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1086542019-03-21T10:45:22Z2019-03-21T10:45:22ZNiger has the world’s highest birth rate – and that may be a recipe for unrest<p>While fertility levels have declined rapidly in most parts of the world, many countries in the sub-Saharan African region of the Sahel have seen their reproductive rates go down very slowly, and only very slightly.</p>
<p>The average woman in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/nigers-independence-day">Niger</a>, for example, still has 7.2 children, according to the <a href="http://www.prb.org">Population Reference Bureau 2018 World Population Data Sheet</a>. The average in developing countries is 2.6 children per woman. </p>
<p>With an annual growth rate of 3.8 percent, <a href="http://www.prb.org">the world’s highest</a>, Niger could see its population of 22.2 million nearly triple, to 63.1 million, by 2050. Half of all Nigeriens are under the age of 15 – a higher proportion than any other country. </p>
<p>Neighboring <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/birth_rate.html">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/mali/birth_rate.html">Mali</a> have a youthful age structure <a href="http://www.prb.org">similar to Niger’s</a>.</p>
<p>As a demographer, I am concerned by the situation in the Sahel region. I have <a href="https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319468877">studied sub-Saharan Africa’s population growth</a> for decades, both <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_May80">at the World Bank and as an academic</a>, and I have learned that a surplus of young people can predict social unrest.</p>
<h2>Security demographics</h2>
<p>In theory, a young population should <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanian-president-bluntly-attacks-contraception-saying-high-birth-rates-are-good-for-economy-103513">drive economic growth</a>.</p>
<p>It can be a competitive advantage against Western countries that – like the United States, United Kingdom, France and Italy – have rapidly aging populations. Only 19 percent of the U.S. population <a href="http://www.prb.org">is under 15</a>.</p>
<p>But poor countries like those in Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">Sahel region</a> are struggling to provide many young people with education, health care and, critically, jobs. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264945/original/file-20190320-93057-4rlweo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sahel, a sub-Saharan region of Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saharan_Africa_regions_map.png">Peter Fitzgerald/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Niger is a peaceful and politically stable nation. Yet, despite <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger">robust economic growth since 2000</a>, it remains very poor. Just under half of Niger’s booming population earns less than US$1.90 a day, and <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NER">unemployment is very high</a>.</p>
<p>Incomes in oil producer Nigeria are significantly higher – about <a href="http://www.prb.org">$5,700 per person</a>. But wealth is unevenly distributed, and about half of Nigeria’s population lives on less than $1.90 a day. </p>
<p>The countries of the Sahel are mostly rural. But, with so many young people, there are not enough agricultural jobs to go around. Many rural youth end up moving to cities looking for work – and find unemployment, instead. </p>
<p><a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a422694.pdf">Studies</a> conducted in a number of Middle Eastern countries suggest that a very young age structure coupled with a lack of economic opportunity can be an explosive combination.</p>
<p>That’s why a surging population is a red flag for scholars of a new field called “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ecspr10_C-cincotta.pdf">demographic security</a>.” Baby booms can increase a country’s risk of civil unrest, conflict – and, in extreme cases, these booms can even foment extremism.</p>
<p>The risk of youthful revolt is highest when elected leaders are unresponsive – even <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-key-to-real-change-in-the-middle-east-police-reform-38749">repressive</a> or predatory – in the face of a frustrated and struggling population. Those were the ingredients for the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/28/tunisia-and-the-fall-after-the-arab-spring">2010 revolt in Tunisia</a> that sparked the first Arab Spring uprising.</p>
<p>In the most extreme cases, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-radicalization-happens-and-who-is-at-risk-52248">terrorism can take root</a> after conflict erupts. </p>
<p>Discontent makes people more <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-using-new-media-older-blueprint-to-fight-the-west-from-within-43220">susceptible to extremist ideologies</a>, while poverty helps terrorist groups enlist new recruits often by offering small monetary incentives. Political upheaval makes it easier for terrorist groups to infiltrate a country’s borders.</p>
<p>According to Serge Michailof in his book “<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/africanistan-9780199485666?cc=us&lang=en&">Africanistan: Development or Jihad</a>,” this is effectively how the Taliban took over Afghanistan after a Soviet occupation in the 1980s left the country <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html">leaderless and divided</a>.</p>
<h2>Danger in the Sahel</h2>
<p>Now, I fear the same thing is happening in the Sahel.</p>
<p>A decade ago, this region of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/africanistan-9780199485666?cc=us&lang=en&">West Africa was a generally stable place</a>. Nigeria, Mali and Niger all had <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/martin-meredith/the-fate-of-africa/9781610391320/">secure borders, no civil conflict to speak of and absolutely no terrorism</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-harams-six-years-of-terror-have-revealed-the-depth-of-nigerias-troubles-36164">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-going-on-in-mali-51066">Mali</a> are rife with <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-terrorism-continue-to-decline-in-2019-104466">terrorist threats</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-boko-haram-can-a-regional-approach-help-nigeria-36910">Boko Haram</a>, which was founded in Nigeria in 2002 to “purify Islam in northern Nigeria,” has killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of soldiers and civilians across the Sahel, abducted schoolgirls and executed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/10/africa/boko-haram-women-children-suicide-bombers/index.html">lethal suicide attacks</a> using <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/25/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-suicide-bomb.html">women and children as human bombs</a>.</p>
<p>As al-Qaida loses ground in the Middle East, it, too, has began to spread into Africa. The terrorist organization has an estimated several thousand fighters in North Africa and the Sahel, who have sometimes joined forces with Boko Haram. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-will-talk-up-links-to-islamic-state-but-joint-activity-is-unlikely-38549">Islamic State affiliates are also operating in West Africa</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264934/original/file-20190320-93024-10543tg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigerien Interior Minister Mohamed Bazoum at a refugee camp in Diffa, Niger, in 2016 following attacks by Boko Haram.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pictures.reuters.com/CS.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&VBID=2C0FCIH57TC75&SMLS=1&RW=1536&RH=674#/SearchResult&VBID=2C0FCIH57TC75&SMLS=1&RW=1536&RH=674&POPUPPN=16&POPUPIID=2C0BF1FY6FSYZ">Reuters/Luc Gnago</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of these groups have now penetrated once-peaceful Niger, infiltrating its borders from neighboring Nigeria and Mali. Refugees from those countries fleeing Boko Haram have also settled in refugee camps on Niger’s borders.</p>
<p>Niger faces an “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/official-niger-is-facing-an-existential-threat-from-militants-/4490620.html">existential threat</a>” from militants, according to Minister of Defense Kalla Mountari, who spoke with Voice of America in late 2018. </p>
<p>The U.S. military has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/10/politics/niger-american-troops-presence/index.html">800 troops stationed in Niger</a> , where they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/world/africa/pentagon-commandos-niger.html">provide counterterrorism training</a> to local troops. It is the second-largest U.S. military deployment in sub-Saharan Africa, after Djibouti.</p>
<h2>Challenges ahead</h2>
<p>A youth bulge in a developing country with high unemployment does not automatically lead to terrorism. </p>
<p>Togo and Tanzania, for example, are low-income countries with <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/total-fertility-rate/">high birth rates</a> but relatively low levels of conflict. </p>
<p>What makes Niger and Mali different, in my assessment, is that their populations are growing much faster – faster than virtually anywhere else on Earth. The challenges their governments face in providing for their people are thus much more acute. They are also located next to the vast expanse of the Sahara desert, where terrorist groups <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282841.htm">transport weapons and operate almost freely</a>, according to the U.S. State Department.</p>
<p>In Nigeria’s case, extreme inequality, widespread poverty and poor governance compound the problem of youthful discontent, allowing terrorists to set up shop.</p>
<p>Gen. Michael V. Hayden, CIA director under President George W. Bush, foresaw today’s outbreak of terrorism in the Sahel. </p>
<p>In a 2008 speech delivered at Kansas State University, Hayden cited rapid population growth in “countries least able to sustain it” – specifically Niger, Nigeria and Yemen – as an urgent global concern.</p>
<p>In my experience, however, few leaders in the Sahel are prepared to grapple with the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00165.x">political difficulties of reining in population growth</a>. </p>
<p>Most sub-Saharan African countries do have family planning policies aimed at curbing fertility. But triggering a rapid and significant fertility decline is a daunting task. Attitudes about family size and birth control are deeply ingrained, less than 30 percent of women of reproductive age use a modern contraceptive method and <a href="https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/abortion-africa">abortion access is extremely limited</a>.</p>
<p>Creating real educational and employment opportunities for young people is an equally daunting challenge. </p>
<p>Unless more is done to promote family planning and boost economic prospects in the Sahel’s fastest-growing countries, I fear terrorism is the likely result.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: The caption of the map in this story has been corrected to accurately describe the geography of the Sahel.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108654/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John F. May does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research shows that unrest, even terrorism, can erupt in poor countries with a surplus of young people and not enough jobs. Can Niger, a once-peaceful sub-Saharan African nation, handle its baby boom?John F. May, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University School of Nursing and Health Studies, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1134092019-03-20T14:49:56Z2019-03-20T14:49:56ZWhat we learnt from young South Africans about the minimum wage and employment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264869/original/file-20190320-93044-jrqeky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> A man offers his services at a traffic intersection in Cape Town. Almost 55% of South African youth are unemployed. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>National minimum wages are used in many different countries to reduce poverty and inequality. But there are many unanswered questions, such as what their impact might be on youth employment and unemployment. This is a pertinent question in a country like South Africa where joblessness of people aged between 18 and 24 years stands at a staggering <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2018.pdf">54,7%</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1990s researchers in the US <a href="http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/ts-min-wage.pdf">began to challenge</a> the dominant view that national minimum wages had negative effects on employment. Since then, there has been an <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_235287.pdf">upsurge in their popularity</a>. But the impact in developing countries is under-researched. Existing research suggests that overall employment is unaffected and where negative results are seen, these are small and limited to unskilled workers.</p>
<p>There is some <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jae/article-abstract/25/supp%C2%AC1__1/i61/1750837">limited data</a> about the effects of minimum wages on youth unemployment in South Africa. This stems from evidence following the introduction of minimum wages in some sectors, starting in about 2000. <a href="http://www.lmip.org.za/document/temporary-employment-services-south-africa-assessing-industry%E2%80%99s-economic-contribution">Earlier research</a> found a negative – but small – impact on youth employment in agriculture; with some increases in the retail and taxi sectors, and no negative effects in the other remaining sectors. They also found significant levels of noncompliance with the law, with between 40% and 50% of young people earning less than the applicable minimum wages. </p>
<p>The country <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-01-01-sa-launches-minimum-wage-bill/">introduced</a> a national minimum wage across the board in 2019 with the aim of reducing poverty and unemployment. But little is known about what its impact might be on youth employment and unemployment. </p>
<p>We set out to establish young people’s views on the subject.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1552556?journalCode=cdsa20">our research</a> we conducted 16 focus groups with employed and unemployed youth. Ten were in urban areas, two were in semi-urban areas and four in rural communities. The conversations were conducted in four languages.</p>
<p>The research focused on young people’s experience of unemployment and work-seeking, their understanding of the national minimum wage and how the national minimum wage might affect those looking for work or those in low-wage jobs.</p>
<p>The findings suggest that a national minimum wage could benefit young people who have jobs and that it could stimulate those who have given up trying to find work to do so. </p>
<p>But, the vast majority of unemployed young people probably won’t benefit from a national minimum wage. This is because disadvantaged young people face a range of challenges that prevent them from finding work. Other social interventions are needed to address the youth unemployment crisis.</p>
<h2>What young people told us</h2>
<p>The most interesting findings were that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Many respondents expect employers to try to sidestep the minimum wage. This points to the urgent need for better enforcement of the minimum wage by government.</p></li>
<li><p>Many participants felt powerless to bargain for higher wages which they believe makes it unlikely they would be able to claim their rights.</p></li>
<li><p>There was evidence that the guarantee of a higher wage would encourage job-seeking among unemployed youth, and that it would not affect a young person’s decision to study further. An unemployed respondent from Hillbrow in Johannesburg said: </p></li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>For me it’s an opportunity to advance myself. Maybe at home I’ve got no shoes, no toiletries. Sitting at home doing nothing, being hungry the whole day and no food… for me the minimum wage is a way out of that </p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>Unemployed and employed youth have very different ideas of the lowest wage at which they are willing to work (reservation wage). But all indicated they would be willing to work for a lower wage than their reservation wage, even if it was unfair or below the cost of living.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Challenges young people face</h2>
<p>Young people face multiple challenges when looking for work. These need to be taken as seriously as the wage issue. </p>
<p>The main challenges include a lack of both hard and soft skills as well as work experience. Hard skills are technical skills in, for example, computers and entrepeneurship, while soft skills relate to social skills that are important in the work place.</p>
<p>Other key problems include a lack of jobs and social networks that can link them to jobs. A majority of respondents indicated that the cost of seeking work was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1552556">exorbitantly high</a>.</p>
<p>At this stage it’s not clear whether these issues form part of the broad remit of South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-minimum-wage-act-english-tshivenda-27-nov-2018-0000">National Minimum Wage Commission</a>. This is important because more than just a minimum wage is needed to create opportunities and safeguard the long-term job prospects of half of South Africa’s young population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the Department of Science and Technology and the National Research Foundation for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development. She also received funding from the Department of Labour for this research. </span></em></p>A national minimum wage could benefit young people who have jobs and stimulate those who have given up trying to find work. But those without work need additional help.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640652016-08-18T20:42:44Z2016-08-18T20:42:44ZApathy among young people stands in the way of Africa’s demographic dividend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134620/original/image-20160818-12312-1amfwk8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan youth chant in celebration before the arrival of Pope Francis at the Kasarani stadium in Kenya's capital Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two in three Africans are younger than 35. <a href="http://www.africa-youth.org/">Youth</a> - people between the ages of 15 and 35 - make up more than 35% of Africa’s total population. They have been identified as central to efforts to drive the vast continent’s economic development.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.africa-youth.org/base/wp-content/uploads/resources/African-Youth-Charter_en.pdf">African Youth Charter</a> identifies young people as “partners, assets and a prerequisite for sustainable development and for the peace and prosperity of Africa”. It also outlines their rights and responsibilities, including active citizenship.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/newsevents/30351/commemoration-10th-anniversary-african-youth-charter">African Union (AU) has themed 2017</a> the “year of investment in youth to harness the African demographic dividend”. Regional and national <a href="http://www.africa-youth.org/frameworks/decade-plan-of-action/">youth empowerment policies</a> have also been introduced.</p>
<p>Yet a <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/youth-day-does-less-engaged-mean-less-empowered-political-engagement-lags-among-africas-youth">new survey</a> by Afrobarometer, a non-partisan research network, shows a wide gap between these aspirations and the reality of youth political engagement.</p>
<p>The levels of political engagement and participation in public life are on the decline among young Africans. This trend is worrying. Engagement in the political process is an important avenue for citizen empowerment in democracies worldwide.</p>
<p>Having a voice in economic policies is particularly important for African youth because of the <a href="http://www.ilo.org/addisababa/media-centre/pr/WCMS_413566/lang--en/index.htm">“unemployment crisis”</a> affecting this age group. At 30.5%, North Africa has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world, while 11.6% of young people in <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_412015.pdf">sub-Saharan Africa</a> are unemployed.</p>
<p>Interest in public affairs has declined substantially, from 81% in 2002/2003 to 58% in 2014/2015, in the 16 African countries tracked during this period. Participation rates also decreased on measures of civic engagement, which provide important avenues for representation between electoral cycles.</p>
<p>
<strong>Figure 1: Trends in civic engagement | 18- to 35-year-olds | 16 countries |2002-2015</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134411/original/image-20160817-3571-bf5qao.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Respondents were asked:
1. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member?
2. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. (% “yes”)</em></p>
<p>The report, which was released on <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/youthday/">International Youth Day</a>, is based on almost 54,000 interviews in 36 countries in 2014 and 2015. Included in the surveys were Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Trends in youth political and civic engagement</h2>
<p>Only slightly more than half (53%) of African youth polled say they are “somewhat” interested in public affairs. Two-thirds (67%) say they discuss these issues “occasionally” or “frequently” with family and friends.</p>
<p>But young citizens report lower rates of political engagement than their elders across a variety of indicators, including voting. These findings are consistent with research on <a href="http://www.idea.int/publications/youth_participation/index.cfm">age differences</a> in political participation in advanced democracies.</p>
<p>As shown in the following infographic, two-thirds (65%) of 18- to 35-year-old respondents who were old enough to vote in their respective countries’ last national election say they did so. That’s compared to 79% of citizens older than 35.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134409/original/image-20160817-3571-e08cma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Less than 10% of young people polled said they participated in pre-electoral activities like campaign rallies. The same goes for civic activities such as attending community meetings, joining others to raise an issue, and contacting political or community leaders. A slightly higher number (11%) of those surveyed said they had participated in a demonstration or protest in the preceding year.</p>
<p>Africa is experiencing unprecedented population growth in terms of both scale and speed. The continent’s population is expected to double to <a href="http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Generation_2030_Africa.pdf">2.4 billion</a> by 2050. This is partly because of significant declines in <a href="http://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend">child mortality</a> rates. About 10 million young people enter the labour market each year. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w6268.pdf">East Asian countries</a> were able to capitalise on a large youth cohort – the so-called “demographic dividend” – to fuel an “economic miracle” during the 1990s. </p>
<p>The AU aims to replicate this success by 2063 via supportive policies, including the promotion of youth development and <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Final%20Draft%20Agenda%202063%20Framework%20-Formatted%20TOC-1.pdf">empowerment</a>. In May 2016 the organisation held a series of events to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the <a href="http://www.au.int/en/newsevents/30351/commemoration-10th-anniversary-african-youth-charter">African Youth Charter</a> and to draft activities for its 2017 theme. </p>
<h2>Gender differences</h2>
<p>The youth charter requires its signatories to eliminate laws and practices that are discriminatory toward girls and women. The objective here is to ensure equal access to all spheres of society. But, young women consistently report lower levels of political engagement than their male peers. This is particularly so in West African and East African countries. </p>
<p>This finding indicates that there are persisting social barriers to their participation in the political sphere. On average, disparities between young men and women’s engagement levels are largest for measures of “cognitive engagement” (interest and discussion levels) and smallest for voting (Table 1).</p>
<p>Six in 10 male youth say they are “somewhat” or “very” interested in public affairs, compared to less than half (48%) of young women. Similarly, young men are significantly more likely to discuss politics at least “occasionally” than young women (74% vs. 61%). In contrast, the difference between male and female voting rates (66% vs. 64%) is not statistically significant.
These results suggest that many citizens, including many young women, continue to see politics as primarily a space for men. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/134635/original/image-20160818-12274-1vver48.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given these trends, greater civic education for all youth – and particularly for young women – may be one strategy for moving toward the AU aspiration of an empowered young citizenry that acts as an agent for prosperity, peace, and development on the continent.</p>
<p>Women’s empowerment is particularly crucial to economic development because Africa’s youth bulge will lead to accelerated economic growth only in countries in which fertility rates are low enough to reduce the proportion of young dependent citizens (children).</p>
<p><a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22036">Better-educated, healthier and empowered women</a> are more likely to have fewer children and to enter the labour market. Greater female political representation is also likely to lead to more supportive policies for gender equality. </p>
<p>Although there are some notable female political leaders, among them Liberian President <a href="https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ellen-Johnson-Sirleaf">Ellen Johnson Sirleaf</a> and AU Commission chairperson <a href="http://www.au.int/en/cpauc/profile">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, women only make up a <a href="http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm">minority of parliamentary representatives</a> in sub-Saharan Africa (23%) and in Arab states (18%).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64065/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rorisang Lekalake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union has identified youth as critical for development. But, a new survey reveals a wide gap between these aspirations and the reality of youth public engagement on the continent.Rorisang Lekalake, Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR)/Afrobarometer Assistant Project Manager for Southern Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/562972016-03-22T04:28:02Z2016-03-22T04:28:02ZForecast of global trends suggest heavy headwinds for Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115710/original/image-20160320-4446-185poq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa contributes the least of any continent to climate change – but it also has the least resources to manage it.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-who-we-are">US National Intelligence Council</a> is preparing a new quadrennial edition of <a href="http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends">Global Trends</a>, looking ahead 20 years.</p>
<p>The report informs the strategic thinking and planning of America’s next president-elect.</p>
<p>Global Trends is intended to inform US leaders. But it can be a useful reference for other countries too. This is especially so in Africa, where the financial and institutional capacity for long-term comprehensive research and analysis is lacking.</p>
<p>The public document can be critically assessed in terms of local interests. It is based on input from scholars, journalists, business, labour and civil society leaders in more than 35 countries, including China and Russia.</p>
<p>The 2012 mega-trends, and a subsequent shortlist <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/?405999-1/discussion-national-intelligence-council-chair-gregory-treverton">recently offered</a> by the council’s chair Greg Treverton, are already evident across Africa. His <a href="http://www.c-span.org/video/?405999-1/discussion-national-intelligence-council-chair-gregory-treverton">preliminary views</a> about which mega-trends will feature in the 2016 edition suggest Africa faces some tough headwinds.</p>
<h2>Previous forecasts</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cfr.org/global-future-trends/nic-global-trends-2030-alternative-worlds/p29631">previous edition</a> was prepared for Barack Obama after his re-election in 2012. It highlighted four “mega-trends”.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The first was an increase in individual empowerment. This would come about due to a decline in poverty, a rise in the middle class and more widely available information and communication technologies.</p></li>
<li><p>Second was a further diffusion of power among and within countries as emerging markets expand and rich countries age and growth slows.</p></li>
<li><p>Third were demographic changes brought about by urbanisation, forced migration, youth bulges and longer life expectancies.</p></li>
<li><p>Finally, it discussed severe strains on existing resources, access to food, energy and water as populations grow and consumption increases.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The trends evident across Africa include rapid urbanisation, the world’s fastest-growing population – including a large unemployed youth bulge – and migration. All are straining already scarce resources of food, energy and water.</p>
<p>Less obvious, but also of concern to Africa, are the trends toward individual empowerment in the north and newly affluent countries. There is also the trend of further diffusion of power within and among countries. These exacerbate partisanship, protectionism and exclusive patriotism, especially in the most powerful and prosperous countries.</p>
<p>The detrimental effects on African countries are likely to be further exacerbated by opposition to two important problems: overdue reform of multilateral institutions, and greater collective action to overcome widening inequities. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>Treverton’s recent shortlist of immediate concerns includes several that were overlooked four years ago. They include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>China’s economic slowdown and restructuring;</p></li>
<li><p>Russian assertiveness under Vladimir Putin’s popular, authoritarian and unpredictable leadership;</p></li>
<li><p>the collapse of commodity prices. This will contribute to sudden, perhaps dangerous, reversals in growth in emerging markets, notably Brazil and South Africa;</p></li>
<li><p>deadly twists in the Middle East turmoil and the outpouring of refugees; and</p></li>
<li><p>political uncertainties in the US affecting its global role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Treverton notes that the council could not address the issue of America’s global role. Nevertheless, it is an implicit reminder of the 2016 election’s global importance.</p>
<p>Treverton expects that, as in 2012, individual empowerment will lead the 2016 list. This will fuel demands for more accountability. It will also be accompanied by acts of violence and criminal behaviour.</p>
<p>The 2016 list is also expected to discuss slower growth, with more strains on scarce resources, coping with the effects of climate change, and rising inequality. It will also include mention of intensifying competition and conflict over values that lie at the heart of demands for greater freedom and equality.</p>
<p>There will also be mention of technological breakthroughs. This will be most notable in areas of artificial intelligence and biotechnology. Treverton compared these to information technology breakthroughs 25 years ago.</p>
<p>Finally, the list is expected to discuss the greater difficulties in achieving collective action among countries as a result of the other four trends.</p>
<p>“African solutions for African problems” remains a vital aspiration among elites eager to purge all remnants of colonialism. This includes practical, political and psychological. But Africa will continue to depend on economic growth in more prosperous regions to sustain commodity exports and fuel diversification and development. </p>
<p>Current trends and the likely revisions to in the 2016 list point to even less likelihood that the 2012 “most plausible positive outcome” in global scenario, Fusion, will predominate. This will further hurt Africa’s development prospects.</p>
<p>Climate change is fast becoming a human survival issue in Africa. It is the region least responsible for global warming. But it also has the fewest surplus resources to deal with its effects. </p>
<p>In addition, most people still depend on subsistence agriculture. A new <a href="http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21852/attribution-of-extreme-weather-events-in-the-context-of-climate-change">report</a> from the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine links extreme weather and resulting humanitarian disasters to climate change.</p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/news-and-events/images/all-news/Book-launch-at-the-Circa%20Gallery_896x1080px.jpg">study</a> shows that southern Africa will experience global warming twice as hot as the global mean. This is likely to lead to famine, forced migration, and risks of deadly new pandemics as humans and animals congest and viruses spread. None will remain local problems. </p>
<p>Whatever scenarios actually happen, acquiring a better understanding of global trends and their local effects must become a top priority for all universities. This must take the form of interdisciplinary and problem-focused research and analysis to inform contingency planning and priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scenarios on global trends over the next 20 years point to some serious challenges for Africa. Whatever actually happens, it’s important for the continent to put in place mitigation strategies.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/486182015-10-08T03:41:01Z2015-10-08T03:41:01ZAfrica’s old men’s club out of touch with continent’s suave, burgeoning youth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97628/original/image-20151007-7363-1jccu13.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, the nonagenarian Zimbabwean president, is the poster boy for Africa's ageing leaders. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is something unmistakably common in Africa: the continent’s <a href="http://www.royalafricansociety.org/blog/africa%E2%80%99s-aging-leaders-must-give-way-new-generation-or-face-disaster">ageing and long-serving</a> presidents. </p>
<p>Its five <a href="http://thisisafrica.me/10-africas-longest-serving-leaders/">longest presidencies</a> stretch between 29 and 36 years, adding to a cumulative 169 years. Their longevity in office is matched by their old age, ranging from 71 to 92 years, and a combined 392 years. </p>
<p>Gabon’s Omar Bongo had been president for a whopping 41 years when he died in office at the age of 73 in 2011. <a href="http://www.malawianwatchdog.com/2015/03/03/malawi-the-incredible-true-story-of-dr-hastings-kamuzu-banda-the-impersonator/">Hastings Banda</a>, Malawi’s self-proclaimed president for life, was in his late 90s when he was ousted from office in 1994. Zimbabwe’s <a href="http://www.biography.com/people/robert-mugabe-9417391">Robert Mugabe is</a> 91, making him the oldest leader in the world. </p>
<p>He is followed closely by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Tunisia’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/essebsi-declared-tunisia-presidential-winner-2014122212464610622.html">Caid Essebsi</a> (91);</p></li>
<li><p>Cameroon’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13146032">Paul Biya</a> (82);</p></li>
<li><p>Liberia’s <a href="http://www.emansion.gov.lr/2content.php?sub=121&related=19&third=121&pg=sp">Ellen Johnson Sirleaf</a> (80);</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Abdelaziz-Bouteflika">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> (78);</p></li>
<li><p>Guinea’s Alpha Conde (75);</p></li>
<li><p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a> (74);</p></li>
<li><p>Equatorial Guinea’s <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-worlds-enduring-dictators-teodoro-obiang-nguema-mbasogo-equatorial-guinea-19-06-2011/">Theodore Nguema</a> (73);</p></li>
<li><p>Namibia’s <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2015/03/21/namibias-new-leader-hage-geingob-sworn-in">Hage Geingob</a> (73);</p></li>
<li><p>Angola’s <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Jose-dos-Santos">Eduardo Dos Santos</a>(72); and</p></li>
<li><p>Uganda’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12421747">Yoweri Museveni</a> (71).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Their average age is 78.1, compared to 52 for the world’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19356410">ten most-developed economies</a>. Arguably, compared to other continents, Africa has a very small proportion of younger leaders between <a href="http://qz.com/420620/africas-leaders-have-an-age-problem/">35 and 55</a>. Paradoxically, the continent has the <a href="http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/africa%e2%80%99s-youth-%e2%80%9cticking-time-bomb%e2%80%9d-or-opportunity">youngest population</a> in the world.</p>
<h2>Old and out of touch</h2>
<p>Africa has a leadership age gap <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/02/04/ageing-african-leaders-need-to-bridge-generation-chasm">disconnect</a> between the leaders and the led. To put it into context, 85% percent of Angolans were not born when Dos Santos came into power in 1979. 83% of Zimbabweans were born after Mugabe first came into power as prime minister in 1980, while 79% percent of Ugandans were born after Museveni took over power in 1986. </p>
<p>On average, only between 15% to 21% of their citizens were alive when these presidents took the reins.</p>
<p>So, with a burgeoning youthful demography at the bottom, the political top is disturbingly a greying lot. The issue here is the age at which African leaders continue to <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/17/opinion/africas-aging-leaders-risk-ibrahim/index.html">hold the fort</a> and ultimately refuse to unclench their grip on power.</p>
<p>This question has been given specific relevance by the poster boy of the ageing leadership, the nonagenarian Mugabe. He recently read an old state of the nation <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/16/africa/zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-mistake-social-media/index.html">address</a> to his parliament.</p>
<p>This, after he had an earlier mistakenly <a href="http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_w_mugabe-blunders-again-dailynews-live/">denounced his own party</a>, shouting “down with ZANU PF”. The increasing gaffes and their frequency tell a progressively sad narrative: the old man is unable to exercise or retain the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/10206066/Zimbabwe-election-Ageing-Mugabe-still-hungry-for-power.html">alertness</a> needed for the job. </p>
<figure>
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</figure>
<p>It shows him to be obviously incapable of providing an unclouded vision that matches the pace, expectations and tongue of time. But most troubling, leaders such as him have failed to deliver on the expectations of their burgeoning youth.</p>
<p>Why is Africa so saddled with leaders who ought to be enjoying their retirement in peace and quiet, instead of in the unforgiving political corridors, campaign trails and taxing political brinkmanship that challenge even the youngest leaders? If the average age of the continent is in the 20s, why is the average age of leadership 65?</p>
<p>Part of the explanation across the board is their mastered use of <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/5417f3939.html">brute force</a> and violence to cow <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Angola+leader+takes+oath+of+office+to+extend+reign/-/979180/1519056/-/dw680pz/-/index.html">opponents</a>. Also, the ageing leaders’ supporters argue that with age and longevity in office comes wisdom, foresight and experience. But this is clearly contradicted by the abysmal performance of their economies and uncertain sociopolitical stability. </p>
<p>Yet, such leaders still attract reverence and unbridled loyalty from their supporters. Equally, being seen as <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/why-mugabe-still-power">“fathers of the nation”</a>, who led independence or liberation struggles, makes them irreproachable, irrespective of their shortcomings, extending their tenure.</p>
<p>Perhaps a broader explanation that cuts across their respective constituencies lies in the combination of political machinations, shrewd political brinkmanship through patrimonial networks and <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/good-leadership-is-africas-missing-ingredient/article9234496/">corrupt practices</a>.</p>
<p>Undoubtedly, it is also their longevity in the executive office that has curtailed and stifled the emergence of credible and youthful successors. But this doesn’t fully explain why Tunisia, Namibia, Liberia, Ghana and others still return leaders in their twilight years. This begs the question: are African youths still unable to appreciate their ability to dictate the pace and direction of their own destinies or the correlation between their leaders’ age and their floundering fortunes?</p>
<p>Clearly the answer is in the affirmative. This paradox is informed by a binary where those at the top are stuck in the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/02/africa-ageing-leaders-barack-obama">anti-colonial/Western mentality</a>. Added to this are nostalgia of <a href="http://www.swapoparty.org/reasons_why_geingob_should_be_namibias_third_president_of_namibia.html">liberation struggles</a> and distrust for youth, while those at the bottom are driven by technological innovation, globalisation, the pressure of consumerism and the frustration of <a href="http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/dbp6.pdf">unfulfilled promise</a>.</p>
<p>Much of the progressive world embraces the innovativeness of youth – its energy, vibrancy, adaptability, willingness to embrace change and enthusiasm to learn. Africa, on the other hand, wobbles behind, unable to keep pace, thanks to its conservative ageing leaders. </p>
<p>For as long as the leaders and their followers have differing <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/30/africas-aging-leaders-must-give-way-to-a-new-generation-or-face-disaster-by-richard-dowden/">interpretations</a> of what the continent needs today and tomorrow, Africa will for the foreseeable future stay caught in unpredictable generational crosswinds between her past and the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why is Africa so saddled with ageing presidents who ought to be enjoying their retirement in peace when the continent desperately needs young, agile and innovative leaders equal to its challenges?David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, Princeton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/418282015-05-18T04:32:05Z2015-05-18T04:32:05ZRenaissance or mirage: can Africa sustain its growth?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81858/original/image-20150515-25403-1st3689.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigerian youth celebrate presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari's victory. Youth unemployment will continue to threaten the continent's growth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic </span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Foundation essay</strong>: <em>This article is part of a series marking the launch of The Conversation in Africa. Our foundation essays are longer than usual and take a wider look at key issues affecting society</em>.</p>
<p>The world’s eyes have turned to Africa after what many consider to be an unprecedented economic performance. Even the most cautious analysts are so sanguine about the continent’s economic prospects that they are willing to bet on its rosy future. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund expects <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/afr/eng/pdf/chap1.pdf">sub-Saharan Africa to grow</a> at an average annual rate of 5.7% between 2014-2019. This will make the sub-continent among the three fastest-growing regions in the world over that period. It would also mark the first time that Africa would have maintained a robust growth rate continuously for more than a decade. </p>
<p>Are these forecasts realistic? Can Africa’s growth resurgence be sustained? There are several reasons why we should be both optimistic and cautious about Africa’s future economic performance.</p>
<h2>Reasons for optimism</h2>
<p><strong>New policy environment</strong>: Military dictatorships, autocracies and one-party systems have overseen impressive growth before. But these governments implemented policies like unsustainable budget deficits, price controls, haphazard trade protection and wasteful subsidies which were inimical to sustainable growth.</p>
<p>There is a lot of work still to be done, but many African countries have made substantial improvements in their <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/29/sub-saharan-africa-business-regulatory-reforms-worldwide">policy environments</a>. </p>
<p><strong>An era of accountability</strong>: One of the reasons growth stalled in the past was that African leaders were not held to high standards of performance. They are now held to higher levels of accountability. The <a href="http://guides.library.cornell.edu/arab_spring">Arab spring </a> has awakened African leaders to the fact that the era of impunity and insensitivity to citizens’ plight is over. </p>
<p><strong>Shift from cronyism to entrepreneurship</strong>: Africa has witnessed the emergence of entrepreneurs willing to invest in productive sectors like manufacturing, information technology, agro-business, aviation and services. These entrepreneurs can infuse new dynamism into African economies. </p>
<p>This contrasts with the post-independence era’s <a href="http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/An-Analysis-of-the-Role-of-Comprador-Class-A-Neo-Colonial-Study-of-a-Case-of-Exploding-Mangoes-by-Hanif.pdf">comprador bourgeoisies</a> who depended essentially on government contracts and largesse. </p>
<p><strong>Discovery of new resources</strong>: Prospects for growth in Africa are likely to be enhanced by recent and future <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/02/05-natural-resources-africa-handjiski-huurdeman">discoveries of new resources</a>, particularly oil and gas, in the region. </p>
<p>During the past five years or so, significant oil and gas reserves have been found in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia. Mozambique is expected to become the third largest producer and exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria. Vast iron ore reserves have also been discovered in Guinea and Sierra Leone.</p>
<h2>Why caution is warranted</h2>
<p><strong>Tinkering with the youth bulge</strong>: Future economic growth depends on whether massive <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/afr/eng/pdf/chap2.pdf">youth unemployment</a> is addressed. Of Africa’s 1 033 billion people, 200 million are between the ages of 15 and 24, making the continent’s population the youngest in the world. </p>
<p>Globally, almost a third of this age group will be African by 2050. Youth unemployment will continue to threaten growth, as jobless youngsters in Africa engage in unproductive activities like terrorism and other forms of violence.</p>
<p><strong>Violence and instability</strong>: The level of violence is dropping in the region but a significant swathe of the continent is still embroiled in violence. Because of Africa’s porous borders conflict and violence in one place can easily spill into neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and Boko Haram continue to be forces of violence and <a href="http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650">instability in northern, eastern and western Africa</a>. The prolonged conflict amongst various militant groups in the <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> has destabilised the economies of Rwanda and the Republic of Congo. </p>
<p><strong>Unexpected shifts in the global economy</strong>: Most economic forecasts expect <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">growth to be anemic</a> in developed economies in the short to medium term, especially in the United States and the Euro zone. Slow economic growth in developed countries will affect African economies in various ways. </p>
<p>Aid-dependent countries may face <a href="http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm">declining aid flows</a> as developed countries grapple with domestic fiscal problems. Demand for commodities and energy will also weaken, leading to declining export revenues for Africa’s commodity exporters. </p>
<p><strong>Adverse environmental and climatic conditions</strong>: US Secretary of State John Kerry has described climate change as perhaps the world’s most fearsome <a href="http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221704.htm">weapon of mass destruction</a>.</p>
<p>Though most Africans are not aware of this weapon of mass destruction, they do feel the pangs of climate change. One of the major causes of climate change in Africa is <a href="http://www.livescience.com/27692-deforestation.html">rapid deforestation</a>. Other causes include gas flaring from oil exploration, coal-powered electricity plants and unsustainable agricultural practices. </p>
<p>Because of its dependence on agriculture and natural resource extraction, Africa suffers more from the effects of climate change and environmental degradation. It also has the least capacity to deal with these challenges. </p>
<p>Fourteen out of the world’s 20 countries <a href="https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2014/10/29/climate-change-and-lack-food-security-multiply-risks-conflict-and-civil-unrest-32-countries-maplecroft/">most at-risk to climate change </a>are in Africa. Maplecroft notes that “climate change may pose a serious obstacle to sustainable economic growth” in the world’s most commercially important cities. </p>
<p><strong>Inequality and relative deprivation</strong>: Africa is one of the most unequal regions in the world. Almost one out of every two Africans lives in extreme poverty. Poverty rates have been declining, but<a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/05/04-africa-poverty-numbers-chandy"> not as fast</a> as expected.</p>
<p>In the midst of this poverty one finds sprawling mansions, several posh cars parked within one household and elites leading opulent lifestyles. This wealth would not be a threat to growth if it was the result of hard work, innovation and entrepreneurship. Instead, it is the fruit of unabashed graft, cronyism, criminal activities and outright theft of public funds. </p>
<p><strong>Lessons from China</strong>: China has managed to sustain high growth rates of GDP for more than a decade. One reason for this is that its growth is driven by exports of manufactured goods. </p>
<p>China’s growth has also been sustained by an <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/winning_in_emerging_markets/chinese_infrastructure_the_big_picture">investment boom</a>, especially in infrastructure. But Africa has been doing the opposite: it exports mainly agricultural and mineral products; shifts resources toward consumption rather than investment and fails to invest in infrastructure. If the region’s growth momentum is to be sustained, African countries need to reverse these trends.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on Steve Onyeiwu’s book, Emerging Issues in Contemporary African Economies – Structure, Policy, and Sustainability (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015)</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu received funding from The Ben Franklin Technology Center, Erie, Pennsylvania. He is affiliated with Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania.</span></em></p>How realistic are expectations about Africa’s economic prospects? There are several reasons why we should be both optimistic and cautious about the continent’s future economic performance.Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.