tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/zamiba-39320/articlesZamiba – The Conversation2024-03-13T14:22:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253022024-03-13T14:22:57Z2024-03-13T14:22:57ZFinancial abuse from an intimate partner? Three ways you can protect yourself<p><a href="https://www.divorcelaws.co.za/what-is-financial-abuse.html">Financial abuse</a> occurs when one person takes control over another person’s ability to acquire, use and maintain financial resources. An example is being denied access to your own funds or being forced to deposit your salary into a joint bank account but not having access to the account. It could also take place when large withdrawals are made from joint bank accounts without any explanation. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.isdj.org.za/">Institute for Social Development and Justice</a>, a South African non-profit company, financial abuse can vary and change shape or form but happens when access to economic opportunities is controlled or limited by an intimate partner. </p>
<p>This can happen when your partner withholds financial information or hides money from you. Another example is when your partner refuses to allow you to work, thereby controlling your ability to earn an income. Or being coerced into paying for most of the household expenses when you earn less than your partner. Alternatively, it can happen when the abuser racks up debt on a credit card, knowing the card is not in their name. </p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2021-014.pdf">Domestic Violence Act</a> identifies financial abuse as a criminal act. Several other African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe also recognise it to be a criminal offence. But it remains largely unprosecuted.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, financial abuse is not a new problem. Over the years, my <a href="https://researchprofiles.canberra.edu.au/en/persons/bomikazi-zeka">research</a> has found that the proper use of financial services can help those in disadvantaged situations to turn income into wealth. But when money is entangled with relationships, it can become a tricky situation to navigate. </p>
<p>Financial abuse can happen to anyone, irrespective of age, gender, marital status, employment status or income levels. When financial abuse occurs, it is women who are more likely to see their financial security threatened should the dynamics in a relationship take a turn for the worse. Women are more likely to experience financial abuse since it can happen in tandem with <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10896-023-00639-y">other forms of abuse</a>. </p>
<p>When you know the signs, you can put the following three measures in place to increase your financial safety: prevent, prepare and protect. </p>
<h2>Prevent</h2>
<p>Knowing your partner’s financial history is an important starting point in preventing financial abuse. Ask about how they have managed their debt in the past (and how they got into it in the first place) or whether they are actively saving money. </p>
<p>Broaching the money-talk conversation is difficult but this information should give you insight into their past financial behaviours which could influence and explain future financial behaviours. </p>
<p>Another strategy in prevention is asking about their attitudes towards money in relationships. For instance, do they believe that gender roles influence who manages money? Engaging in this topic early can also help you set boundaries about how money is managed within the relationship. </p>
<h2>Prepare</h2>
<p>Learning the signs of financial abuse can help you be prepared. If you suspect that financial abuse is beginning to emerge then keep close tabs on it by documenting all the evidence. This is important because an abuser may gaslight you into thinking you’re exaggerating, especially when the signs are subtle. Document as much evidence as you can and ensure you have copies of all important legal documents as this will help you, should you require legal assistance. </p>
<p>If you don’t already have one, speak to a financial advisor about how you can protect your finances and assets. </p>
<h2>Protect</h2>
<p>As far as possible, keep an independent source of income as this reduces any likelihood of dependency on a partner. Financial dependency can lead to feelings of isolation and hopelessness, which makes it more difficult to leave an abuser because they control the finances. </p>
<p>Another way you can protect your financial position is by making sure you don’t sign any documents you don’t understand. Often abusers will acquire financial assets in their partner’s name and leave them with the financial burden of the repayments, thereby entrapping them through debt. </p>
<h2>Getting help</h2>
<p>While the measures outlined here are not exhaustive, they are a good starting point to think about when your finances are merged with someone else’s. </p>
<p>If you are concerned about your financial safety, there are ways to get help. FIDA-Kenya, a women’s rights organisation in Kenya, offers <a href="https://www.fida-kenya.org/">free legal aid</a>. In Nigeria, the Women at Risk International Foundation operates a 24-hour confidential toll-free <a href="https://warifng.org/contact-us/">helpline</a>. </p>
<p>You can access free counselling from a social worker via the South African Department of Social Development’s <a href="https://gbv.org.za/about-us/">website</a>, which provides a call centre facility 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The call centre operates an emergency line number on 0800 428 428. You can visit the <a href="https://thewarriorproject.org.za/helplines/">website</a> of the Warrior Project, a non-profit organisation, for more information on helplines and resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225302/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bomikazi Zeka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When money is entangled with relationships, it can often become a tricky situation.Bomikazi Zeka, Assistant Professor in Finance and Financial Planning, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1665132021-08-22T12:18:26Z2021-08-22T12:18:26ZWhy Edgar Lungu and his party lost Zambia’s 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417234/original/file-20210820-23-ksl8vn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia's new president Hakainde Hichilema.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Patrick Meinhardt / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hakainde Hichilema’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58226695">election victory</a> is the third time an opposition leader has unseated an incumbent president in Zambia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/02/world/zambian-voters-defeat-kaunda-sole-leader-since-independence.html">since 1991</a>. The victory bequeaths on the new president and his party, the United Party for National Development (UPND), the immense task of restoring the rule of law, fixing the ailing economy and uniting a divided nation.</p>
<p>Hichilema won the poll with 59.38% of the vote. He secured a 1 million-vote lead over his closest rival and incumbent, Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front. Lungu polled <a href="https://zambiaelections2021.org.zm//home/results_by_constituency">38.33%</a>.</p>
<p>The election was effectively a referendum on Lungu and the conduct of his party during his tenure from 2015 to 2021. Zambians opted to believe in the campaign promises of his opponent. Hichilema promised to <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/06/hakainde-hichilema-zambians-want-change-we-dont-count-how-many-times-we-run/">grow the economy</a> to alleviate people’s suffering, restore the rule of law, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/94754/zambias-hakainde-hichilema-weve-never-seen-such-levels-of-corruption/">end corruption</a> and that, unlike his opponents, he was not contesting to secure a job.</p>
<h2>Contested candidacy</h2>
<p>Lungu’s candidature was controversial and highly contested. He completed his predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/30/the-death-of-president-michael-sata-and-issues-of-the-health-of-african-leaders/">Michael Sata’s</a> unfinished term in 2016. He then served a full five-year term after beating, Hichilema in elections held that same year <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2884/">by a narrow margin</a>. </p>
<p>In 2021 Lungu was contesting for office in what some argued would effectively be a third term. The Constitutional Court was thrice petitioned to declare him ineligible. The court ruled in Lungu’s favour on all the occasions. It found that he had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">served only a year</a>, not a full presidential term, between 2015 and 2016 after Sata’s death. This made him eligible to contest the polls in 2021. </p>
<p>In the end it was the ballot box that ended his tenure. The arrogance of power displayed by the Patriotic Front in defying the concerns of the country’s citizens in the way it ran the affairs of state drove voters to voice their displeasure.</p>
<p>There were a number of reasons the electorate decided to back his opponent.</p>
<p>Zambians were irked by the decline of democracy under Lungu, as shown by intimidation, harassment and arrests of members of the <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/196/zambia.pdf">oposition</a>, and <a href="https://www.news24.com/channel/Music/News/activist-musician-who-fled-to-south-africa-arrested-as-he-arrives-home-in-zambia-20180517">critics</a> of the government. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/zambia-activists-in-court-on-escalating-crackdown-on-human-rights/">Human rights violations</a> were on the rise.</p>
<p>In December 2020, a state prosecutor and a United Party for National Development supporter were <a href="http://www.hrc.org.zm/index.php/multi-media/news/369-hrc-calls-for-inquest-to-establish-identity-of-individuals-responsible-for-shooting-to-death-of-a-state-prosecutor-and-a-suspected-upnd-sympathiser">shot dead</a> when police fired on a crowd that had gathered near police headquarters to protest the harassment of Hichilema.</p>
<p>The Lungu government even tried to amend the constitution. Experts said this would have taken parliament’s oversight over the executive, creating a <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Levels of <a href="https://www.u4.no/publications/zambia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020">corruption</a> also reached unprecedented levels.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Financial Intelligence Centre reported acts of corruption estimated at about <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/64">$284 million</a>. That same year, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK withheld aid worth about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption-idUSKCN1VH1S7">$34 million</a> because they were concerned about corruption and financial mismanagement.</p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/95">money laundering and terrorist financing trends report</a> of Zambia’s Financial Intelligence Centre disclosed that public officials had influenced the awarding of contracts. Corruption linked to public sector procurement was a major contributor to proceeds of crime. </p>
<h2>Misplaced priorities</h2>
<p>Zambians went to the 2021 polls in the midst of a <a href="http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Charles.Lascu_.AFRODAD-1.pdf">second debt crisis</a> created under the Lungu government. The <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/20/its-true-cost-of-living-has-gone-up-says-wina/">cost of living</a> had also soared as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-27/zambian-inflation-jumps-to-18-year-high-on-meat-and-fish-prices">annual inflation rate</a> was the highest in about two decades.</p>
<p>Lungu built his campaign on the <a href="https://chinaafricaproject.com/2021/08/09/president-edgar-lungu-commissions-new-chinese-built-airport-as-part-of-a-last-minute-campaign-push/">physical infrastructure</a> his government put up and increased <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-uk-zambia-economy-idAFKBN28R1LU-OZABS">government control</a> of Zambia’s mines.</p>
<p>He promised to roll out more infrastructure if reelected. But for many in Zambia economic conditions were tough. The economy got worse and many remained <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">jobless and disgruntled</a> on his watch. </p>
<p>Unemployed young people and households <a href="https://www.jctr.org.zm/uploads/1/1/8/1/118170975/final_bnnb_statement_11.08.2021.pdf">struggling</a> to meet basic needs against escalating prices of essential commodities <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">blamed the government</a> for the worsening conditions.</p>
<p>Some analysts attributed Zambia’s economic woes to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/707aed78-27ef-4e11-95a3-792b2b91da55">undisciplined debt accumulation</a> to <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame">finance the projects</a> Lungu boasted about.</p>
<p>The combination of high government debt and a weak economy meant that Zambia couldn’t service its debts. Lungu’s government had a fallout with international financial markets after it defaulted on debt repayment <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html">in 2020 </a>. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had refused to bailout Zambia in 2016 over concerns about <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zambia-braces-for-imf-crunch-talks/a-56496748">government’s commitment</a> to economic reforms.</p>
<p>The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">resumed talks</a> with Zambia to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">reform the economy</a> in February 2021, but a deal was <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/66687/zambia-imf-debt-talks-unlikely-to-stop-lungu-from-trying-to-pawn-copper-to-china/">unlikely</a> until after the election. </p>
<h2>Failed reelection strategy</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">past elections</a> the Patriotic Front used infrastructure and the tribalism trump card to beat Hichilema. </p>
<p>But, this failed in 2021. </p>
<p>While Hichilema maintained popularity in his traditional stronghold in Zambia’s south-west region, he also broke into Lungu’s stonghold in the north-east, and gained unprecedented support. His campaign message to end corruption, restore the rule of law and the economy resonated among the majority of voters across Zambia.</p>
<p>His pick of Vice President and running mate in <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Mutale_Nalumango">Mutale Nalumango</a> also helped him break into Lungu’s core constituency. The educator and former vice president of the Secondary Schools’ Teachers Union of Zambia served as Movement for Multiparty Democracy Member of Parliament for Kaputa in Northern Zambia from 2001 to 2011. </p>
<p>Hichilema’s break into Lungu’s core constituency saw Lungu <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210815-zambia-election-president-cries-foul-as-opposition-leads-in-early-vote-count-lungu-hichilema-unfair">cry foul</a> that the 2021 election was not free and fair.</p>
<h2>Restoring a fractured country</h2>
<p>Hichilema has his work cut out for him. He has to endear himself to the whole country and prove that he is a national leader. This will enable him to clear his name of accusations that he is a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/04/07/distinguishing-the-tribe-from-the-tribalist-every-tribe-is-good-but-every-tribalist-is-bad-the-dying-of-upnd/">tribalist</a>. </p>
<p>He also faces the daunting task of undoing the culture of violence and extortion in the political arena by party “cadres” - unemployed men who extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events. Hichilema will have to tame his own party cadres, and restore sanity through impartial application of the law to set Zambia back on the path of democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>The task that will make or break Hichilema’s leadership, however, is fixing the economy. He has spoken large about this since he stepped on to the political stage, claiming he was best suited to fix Zambia’s economic problems. </p>
<p>Potential supporters of Zambia’s economy, such as the IMF, demand <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/04/pr2159-zambia-imf-staff-completes-virtual-mission-to-zambia">austerity</a> to restore its economic fortunes and set it on a path of recovery. Hichilema will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zambia’s new president will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614322021-06-30T15:16:34Z2021-06-30T15:16:34ZThe fight against economic fraud: how African countries are tackling the challenge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404182/original/file-20210603-27-2nv14z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technology has been key in tackling fraud</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mpedigree</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has stifled many sectors of the global economy. But it has apparently <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/criminal-contagion/">boosted the business of fraudsters</a>. Experts <a href="https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Fraud%20The%20Facts%202021-%20FINAL.pdf">note</a> that some fraudsters have taken advantage of the new opportunities of the <a href="https://www.teiss.co.uk/covid-19-phishing-scams-sophisticated/">pandemic economy</a> and that they seem to become ever <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/online-scams-go-viral-as-pandemic-gives-fraudsters-new-opportunities-1.4549085">more sophisticated in their methods</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time anti-fraud measures are becoming more sophisticated too, with technology <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/news-highlights.php?news=2&read">playing a big part</a>, and more increasingly <a href="https://www.expresscomputer.in/exclusives/neurotags-anti-counterfeiting-ai-solution-is-helping-crack-down-on-fake-products/71649/">artificial intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>In recent years many initiatives have been put forward in the name of fighting and reducing various forms of fraud and other crimes in the economy. But have these measures actually been effective in containing fraud? Will the typical package of anti-fraud measures stop the fraud pandemic? </p>
<p>We did <a href="https://roape.net/2015/12/07/researching-anti-fraud-measures-in-the-global-south/">research</a> into major characteristics of anti-fraud measures in several African countries. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1660156">south</a> we looked at Malawi, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2020.1866524">east</a> we covered Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Madagascar and in the west Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.</p>
<p>We looked at the various fraud responses to identify major dynamics and themes. We used online data from news outlets and reports on websites of private companies and governmental agencies to analyse the characteristics of anti-fraud measures across 11 countries. </p>
<p>We found a diverse set of measures had been introduced. We were able to identify 10 particular characteristics. </p>
<h2>The landscape</h2>
<p>The first notable feature was a remarkable proliferation of anti-fraud agencies and cross-agency alliances and cooperation. This was between government agencies, the government and the private sector, and at times civil society actors such as <a href="https://twitter.com/ucc_official/status/1111564692500164608">consumer protection agencies</a> too.</p>
<p>Agreements, memorandums of understanding and partnerships had been signed to encourage data collection and sharing and knowledge exchange within and across borders as different actors were brought together <a href="https://www.sabric.co.za/media-and-news/press-releases/saps-and-sabric-recommit-to-intensify-fight-against-bank-robberies/">to fight the “common enemy”</a>. </p>
<p>At the state level, new anti-fraud agencies, taskforces, squads and networks were set up regularly. One example was the <a href="https://www.cid.go.ke/index.php/sections/investigationunits/insurance-fraud-investigations-unit-ifiu.html">Kenya Police Insurance Fraud Investigations Unit</a>. We also found that a number of regulatory agencies had been established. These included competition and consumer protection authorities <a href="https://www.ccpc.org.zm/">at</a> <a href="https://www.cak.go.ke/">national</a> and <a href="https://www.arcc-erca.org/">regional</a> <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/eac-competition-authority-to-start-operations-in-july--1351478">level</a>.</p>
<p>Second, outreach, engagement and “empowerment” of consumers played a major role. Here, education, sensitisation and awareness raising – also among business actors – <a href="https://www.genghis-capital.com/newsfeed/kba-launches-the-annual-kaa-chonjo-awareness-campaign-to-boost-security-of-payments-platforms/">emerged strongly</a> as a way to popularise <a href="https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=64659&dir=2016/november/16">the anti-fraud fight</a>. This was promoted by a range of actors. Among them were banks, insurance providers, private consultancies, international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and aid agencies, as well as NGOs. Regional organisations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa were also included. </p>
<p>Third, large-scale technology was used extensively in anti-fraud measures. This was particularly the case in financial services and banking. </p>
<p>Anti-fraud software in various forms featured strongly. One example was detecting fraudulent transactions. Additional technological solutions included PIN protection techniques, enhanced chip technology for payment cards and authentication technology. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.securingindustry.com/pharmaceuticals/nigeria-insists-on-mobile-authentication-of-medicines/s40/a2083/#.YJA9m2ZKj9E">Technology</a> was <a href="https://medium.com/innovate4health/mpedigree-battles-counterfeit-drugs-through-innovative-verification-system-50de6f4a4bea">also used</a> to uncover counterfeit or substandard products. </p>
<p>Fourth, anti-fraud measures regularly came with rhetoric and language that was strong in giving a sense of alarm and urgency. The vices of fraud (and corruption) were presented as “weeds” needing to be “rooted out”. They were also referred to as a virus or a disease that needed “eradication”. </p>
<p>At times, warfare-type language was used, that is, fraud needed to be “combated” like an enemy. </p>
<p>Fifth, anti-fraud measures were regularly political in nature. Pledges to counter fraud featured in election campaigns. The rising or falling of fraud was used as a metric to determine whether politicians and public servants were effective in their roles. At times, political or business opponents of the government were allegedly targeted by the measures. And some powerful business actors reportedly got around regulations. </p>
<p>Sixth, corruption, as well as in-fights, conflicts, tensions and power struggles within and between state agencies charged with anti-fraud measures, featured too. One example was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001387385/kebs-staff-in-sh26m-fraud-case">Kenya Bureau of Standards</a>. In recent years, several managing directors of the bureau <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/news/article/2001377377/kebs-boss-arrested-over-graft-allegations">were accused of graft</a>. </p>
<p>The seventh feature was that many anti-fraud measures were carried out by specialised for-profit private actors. They were therefore arguably shaped by business interests, competition for anti-fraud measure contracts, and the dynamics of industries and markets.</p>
<p>We also found that international companies specialising in regulations and standards often played a role. Such commercially oriented actors were particularly active <a href="https://www.sgs.co.uk/en-gb/public-sector/product-conformity-assessment-pca/kenya-pvoc-program">in promoting the proliferation of anti-fraud measures</a>. </p>
<p>Eight, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-revenue-authority-arrests-8-businesspersons-over-vat-offences/">arrests</a>, <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/fake-goods-worth-r5m-seized-joburg">confiscation</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-corruption/kenya-authoritiesarrest-standards-bureau-head-over-fertilizer-imports-idUSKBN1JJ0AO">destruction of items</a> were widespread in reports about anti-fraud activity. </p>
<p>Ninth, we noticed a prevalence of anti-fraud measures in efforts to increase tax revenue and inhibit illicit financial flows. Various initiatives emphasised the need to increase compliance. At times we detected tensions in moves to create an “enabling” business environment to attract foreign investment – such as low taxes – and calls to protect the national tax bases.</p>
<p>We found there was international cooperation and the involvement of civil society actors in efforts to address tax evasion and transnational money laundering. One example was the <a href="https://www.taxjustice.net/">Tax Justice Network</a>. </p>
<p>Tenth, civil society actors seemed to have a limited role – or no role at all – in various anti-fraud measure coalitions. In some cases, however, they seemed to play a larger role. One example was consumer protection agencies.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>A challenge we identified was that anti-fraud measures could be launched and sustained for reasons that went beyond an interest in simply fighting fraud. This included commercial interests of specialised anti-fraud firms. These were often companies that operated globally. Other interests at play included governments that used anti-fraud platforms to seek legitimacy or state agencies that sought government funding as well as new areas of operations and streams of revenues. </p>
<p>We also came across criticisms in some cases of the measures’ design, costs, bureaucracy and impracticality. There were also concerns about the heavy handed way in which some <a href="http://www.psfuganda.org/new/images/downloads/Trade/position%20paper%20on%20pre-inspection.pdf">measures were implemented</a>. There were allegations about:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>bias (for example, against small-scale actors such as traders and against poor sections of costumers) in favour of foreign, large scale multinationals; </p></li>
<li><p>opaqueness and <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/kacita-calls-for-a-two-months-import-boycott-to-protest-pvoc">irregularities</a>; </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.observer.ug/component/content/article?id=31498:a-year-later-has-pvoc-locked-out-fake-goods">effectiveness problems</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Currently, anti-fraud measures seem largely an affair between state and corporates (including business associations), and consumers. Consumers are mostly on the “receiving” end of anti-fraud measures. They are regularly encouraged to play their role by, for example, calling an anti-fraud hotline, verifying the goods they buy and not contributing to the facilitation of fraud. Aid agencies played a decisive role in some anti-fraud measure cases too.</p>
<p>Anti-fraud measures are mostly initiated and shaped by powerful actors. This includes big business, particularly transnational companies, rather than grassroots or activist organisations. They are uneven across sectors (for example, the financial sector gets significant attention), and they seem to have become a business and revenue generation vehicle in itself. </p>
<p>It is important to acknowledge that some measures certainly <a href="https://www.unbs.go.ug/">make a positive impact</a> and that efforts are made by various agencies to address internal and other shortcomings, thereby improving the effectiveness of measures. But the question remains: how can countries substantially contain “irregularities” in situations where the irregular has become widespread, routine and institutionalised? And the dominant agendas and pressures of the day – such as economic growth, profit and commercialisation – are highly conducive to fraud. </p>
<p><em>Nataliya Mykhalchenko is serving as an intern at the United Nations Population Fund. The views expressed in the article are her own.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nataliya Mykhalchenko has received funding from the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jörg Wiegratz has received funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust Fund, the University of Leeds ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme, and the Review of African Political Economy.</span></em></p>Countries have adopted a wide array of measures involving a proliferation of fraud agencies.Nataliya Mykhalchenko, Research Associate, University of LeedsJörg Wiegratz, Lecturer in Political Economy of Global Development, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1095942019-01-22T13:56:13Z2019-01-22T13:56:13ZAfrican countries need to manage the rising power of credit rating agencies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254723/original/file-20190121-100270-bjhnl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The rising gap between developmental needs and available financial resources – including <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-what-the-data-tells-us-about-africa-s-declining-revenue-93555">poor revenue collection</a> – has pushed sub-Saharan African governments to consider different options to support their budgets. </p>
<p>One route to raise capital has been the issuing of sovereign bonds on international financial markets. But to do this successfully, governments need a sovereign credit rating from at least one of the three dominant international credit rating agencies. These are Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch. The number of African countries seeking a sovereign credit rating has increased from one in <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/rating?continent=africa">1994 to 31</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>There’s been growing dissatisfaction with the three agencies. A number of rated countries on the continent, such as Nigeria, are <a href="http://www.businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/2436-nigeria-govt-disagrees-with-moody-s-downgrading-of-nigeria-to-b2-stable-rating">unhappy</a>, joining a chorus of dissatisfied <a href="https://qz.com/india/982240/india-says-ratings-firms-like-sps-moodys-and-fitch-are-biased/">voices around the world</a>. Their unhappiness stems from the fact that, outside the US and the European Union (EU), the agencies don’t subscribe to any international regime or governance body. This means that their misconduct remains largely unchecked.</p>
<p>The international rating agencies have operated unregulated even though the need for them to be regulated has become apparent. </p>
<p>The EU and US provide examples of how it can be done. After the 2008 crisis the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:146:0001:0033:EN:PDF">EU introduced regulations</a> and <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF">several directives</a> to manage the agencies more tightly. In the US, the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf">Dodd-Frank & Consumer Protection Act</a> of 2010 expanded the regulatory power of the Securities and Exchanges Commission to enforce full disclosure about the rating agencies’ methodologies. </p>
<p>The only country in Africa that has comparable laws is <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/37014bn228.pdf">South Africa</a> –although there is still <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/9155">very weak to no civil liability</a> of rating agencies. These laws were passed partly to make it easier for European countries and the US to litigate against rating agencies in cases of misinformation, as well as controlling their influence.</p>
<p>There are no laws elsewhere in Africa to hold the rating agencies’ operations on the continent to account. And there’s no central coordination of their activities within individual African countries. This is because no single institution is responsible for administering their regulations or managing them. Either the ministry of finance, or sometimes the central bank, works hand in hand with rating agencies and liaises on issues relating to a sovereign’s rating profile.</p>
<p>So what can African countries do? The problem is that, as the influence of international rating agencies continues to expand, individual African countries have limited power to act against them. One possibility is that the continent establishes collective and well defined ways to ensure they present a common front to the rating agencies. </p>
<h2>Countries that have complaints</h2>
<p>In 2015, the Zambian government urged <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/09/28/ignore-moodys-credit-downgrade-on-zambia-government-tells-investors-and-the-public/">investors to ignore unsolicited credit downgrade</a> from the rating agencies. It challenged the correctness of its rating, which it said hadn’t been discussed with the country’s representatives. </p>
<p>In 2017, Namibia <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFL5N1KZ0GD">rejected Moody’s decision</a> to downgrade the country’s credit rating to junk status. It said the downgrade was contrary to its generally stable economic outlook. </p>
<p>The government of Nigeria also <a href="http://www.businesstimesafrica.net/index.php/details/item/2436-nigeria-govt-disagrees-with-moody-s-downgrading-of-nigeria-to-b2-stable-rating">strongly disagreed with its downgrading</a>. It questioned both the general rating premises as well as the agency’s conclusions. The government believed the economy had successfully emerged from a recession and recorded important improvements across a broad range of sectors. </p>
<p>In 2018, Tanzania criticised Moody’s decision to assign a low credit rating with a negative outlook on the country’s first international credit rating. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-ratings/tanzania-criticises-moodys-for-negative-rating-outlook-idUSL5N1QN4U8">Tanzania rejected the rating</a>. It argued that it hadn’t been thoroughly consulted.</p>
<p>There are more general complaints too. Judging from the way in which African countries are rated, an argument could be made that rating agencies view the African continent as a homogeneous entity. They appear to consider all African economies as unstable. Only three – Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa – out of 31 rated countries have a rating just above “junk status”. Only one – Botswana – has an <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/ratings">A-class rating</a>. Compared to other regions, 87% of African countries are rated “junk status”. That’s compared to approximately <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/credit-ratings-government-sovereigns-moodys-2018-11">19% in Western Europe, 27% in the Middle East, 38% in Central and Eastern Europe, 54% in Asia Pacific and 55% in Latin America and The Caribbean</a>.</p>
<p>The effect of this is that African countries have to issue sovereign bonds at high discounts, and are subject to higher interest rates. </p>
<p>Another area of contention is that credit rating methodologies consistently over-emphasise political risk in the rating criteria. Political components constitute <a href="https://www.moodys.com/Pages/HowMoodysRatesSovereigns.aspx">approximately 50%</a> of the composite rating. Other components such as financial and economic components each contribute to the <a href="https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/4432051/Sovereign+Rating+Methodology/5f8c852c-108d-46d2-add1-4c20c3304725">remaining 50%</a>. While the qualitative factors are judged purely based on the ideology of the credit analysts, their <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-citizens-have-good-reasons-to-be-fed-up-with-their-politicians-81053">perception towards</a> the political institutions in Africa is <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/302-political-institutions-in-africa">generally negative</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/credit-rating?continent=africa">data shows</a> that the rating agencies have downgraded more countries than they have upgraded over the past 24 years. There have been 47 downgrades, compared to only 22 upgrades and 113 negative changes in outlooks; only nine positive changes have been recorded. </p>
<h2>Solutions and action plan</h2>
<p>African countries should design a collective response mechanism to save the continent from rating abuse. This mechanism can also be used to bring the operations of agencies under control. The aim should be to avoid unfair and exploitative business practices.</p>
<p>One option would be for the African Union to establish a continental regulatory authority. It could govern the cross-border activities of international rating agencies, administer a prudential standard framework and evaluate the accuracy and fairness of ratings assigned to particular countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African countries need to find a way to present a common front to the rating agencies.Misheck Mutize, Lecturer of Finance, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788472017-06-05T16:39:08Z2017-06-05T16:39:08ZDemocracy is looking sickly across southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172262/original/file-20170605-16869-1kz7k3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Zambia. Beyond multi-party systems and regular elections, many countries resemble very little of true democracies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Politics are in shambles across the world. Populism and political gambles are making headlines from London to Washington. Southern Africa is no exception. If it’s any comfort, this suggests that there’s nothing genuinely typical about African versions of <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">political populism</a>. Nor are the flaws in democracy typically African. </p>
<p>This might put some events into wider perspective. But it’s nonetheless worrying to follow the current political turmoil in some southern Africa countries.</p>
<p>The regional hegemon, South Africa, is embroiled in domestic policy tensions of unprecedented proportions since it became a democracy. And the situation in the sub-region is not much better. </p>
<p>The state of opposition politics and democracy is in a shambles too. The fragile political climate and the mentality of most opposition politicians hardly offer meaningful alternatives. This is possibly an explanation – but no excuse – for the undemocratic practices permeating almost every one of the region’s democracies. </p>
<p>Beyond multi-party systems with regular elections, they resemble very little of true democracies.</p>
<h2>South African hiccups</h2>
<p>At the end of May the dimensions of “state capture” in South Africa were set out in a report published by an <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/26/FULL-REPORT-%E2%80%98How-South-Africa-is-Being-Stolen%E2%80%99-a-report-on-state-capture">academic team</a>. </p>
<p>It shows how deeply the personalised systematic plundering of state assets is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-26-betrayal-of-the-promise-the-anatomy-of-state-capture/">entrenched</a>. Additional explosive evidence was presented only days later through thousands of leaked e-mails. Dubbed the “Gupta Leaks”, they document a mafia-like network among Zuma-loyalists and the Indian Gupta family. </p>
<p>The evidence points to massive influence, if not control, over political appointments, the hijacking of higher public administration and embezzlement of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2017/05/28/Here-they-are-The-emails-that-prove-the-Guptas-run-South-Africa">enormous proportions</a>.</p>
<p>Some 65% of South Africans want Zuma to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/65-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign--ipsos">resign</a>. An all-time low approval rating of 20% makes him less popular among the electorate than even <a href="http://time.com/4785127/michael-temer-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump/">US President Donald Trump</a>. Despite this – combined with growing demands from within the party that he steps down – the ANC still backs its president. </p>
<p>But divisions within the party are deepening, with some in its leadership demanding an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88337066-4797-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996">investigation</a> into the Gupta patronage network. </p>
<p>For his part, Zuma is focused on pulling strings to secure Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/dispatches/2017/03/10/zuma-succession-the-businessman-vs-the-ex-wife-or-is-it-all-smoke-and-mirrors/">his successor</a> as president of the party. The other front-runner candidate is Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>Zuma’s assumption appears to be that, once in office, his former wife would not endorse any legal prosecution of the father of her children. </p>
<p>But the country’s official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), isn’t reaping the benefits of the ANC’s blunders. It has its own problems, which are constraining the gains it might otherwise be making from the ANC’s mess. </p>
<p>The party is divided over what to do about its former leader and Premier of the Western Cape province, Helen Zille following a tweet in which she defended the legacy of colonialism. The comment whipped up a storm of protest and for weeks the party had been at pains on how to deal with the scandal. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"842260539644497921"}"></div></p>
<p>DA leader Mmusi Maimane finally announced that Zille had been suspended from the party and that a disciplinary hearing would decide what further <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40143710?ocid=socialflow_twitter">political consequences</a> she might face. But a resilient Zille immediately challenged <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/das-u-turn-on-zille-suspension-20170603">the decision</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever the outcome, the DA’s image is damaged. Its aspirations to be the country’s new majority party has been dealt a major blow. </p>
<h2>Regional woes</h2>
<p>In Angola, 74-year-old Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979, has decided to select a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3995176/Angolas-President-Dos-Santos-stand-2017-state-radio.html">successor</a>. The scenario will secure that the family “oiligarchy” will remain in control of politics and the country’s economy, while the governing People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) uses the state apparatus to ruthlessly suppress any meaningful <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170221/281706909446949">social protests</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast Robert Mugabe – reigning in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 - shows no intention of retiring. He was nominated again as the Zimbabwe African Nation Union/Patriotic Front’s (ZANU/PF) candidate for the 2018 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-30365706/mugabe-confirmed-as-zanu-pf-candidate-for-2018-election">presidential elections</a>. But everyone is anxiously following the party’s internal power struggles over the ailing autocrat’s <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/zimbabwes-make-break-moment/">replacement</a>. Fears are that the vacuum created by his departure might create a worse situation. </p>
<p>While the regime’s constant violation of human rights is – as in Angola – geared towards preventing any form of meaningful opposition, there are concerns that the unresolved succession might add another violent dimension to local politics.</p>
<p>Zambia’s democracy also looks sad. The country’s main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) is on trial for high treason. Hichilema has been embroiled in a personal feud with President Edgar Lungu of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) for years. He was arrested in early April after obstructing the president’s motor cavalcade. The charge of high treason is based on the accusation that he <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/09/hichilema-willfully-put-pres-lungus-life-danger-state-house/">wilfully put President Lungu’s life in danger</a>. </p>
<p>The trial is feeding growing concerns over an increasingly autocratic regime. The once praised democracy, which allowed for several <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/05/15/its-time-to-start-talking-about-zambia-says-cheeseman/">relatively peaceful transfers</a> of political power since the turn of the century, is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/16/birmingham-university-professor-cheesemans-ignorance-democracy-shocking-regrettable/">now in decline</a>.</p>
<p>Lesotho is also in a mess. It provides a timely reminder that competing parties seeking to obtain political control over governments are by no means a guarantee for better governance. Aptly described as a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-02-00-lesothos-groundhog-day-election">“Groundhog Day election”</a>, citizens in the crisis-ridden country went to the polls for the third time since 2012 with no new <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/02/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/">alternatives or options</a>. </p>
<p>Their limited choice is between two former prime ministers aged 77 (Tom Thabane) and 72 (Pakalitha Mosisili). The likely election result is another fragile coalition government – provided the military accepts the result. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for relative political stability in the region might still be in the making: President Joseph Kabila, whose second term in office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ended in December 2016, is still hanging on with the promise that he’ll vacate the post by end of this year. </p>
<p>Despite a constitutional two-term limit, his plans remain a matter of speculation. In a recent interview, he was characteristically <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-lage-am-samstag-aggressiver-nationalismus-plus-atomraketen-a-1150544.html">evasive</a>. He refused to give a straight answer on whether he’s still considering <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-says-he-never-promised-to-hold-elections-in-drc-20170603">another term</a> and flatly denied that he had promised anything, including elections. </p>
<p>Kabila’s <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">extended stay in office</a> threatens to exacerbate an already explosive and violent situation, with potentially devastating consequences.</p>
<p>His continued reign would not only provoke further bloodshed at home. Any spill-over will challenge the Southern African Development Community’s willingness and ability to find solutions to regional conflicts in the interests of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">relative stability</a>. A stability which is at best fragile and indicative of the crisis of policy in most of the regional body’s member states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>Democracy is in a parlous state in many countries in southern Africa. Autocrats hold onto power, while electorates have little to choose from at the polls.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.