tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/algeria-7891/articles
Algeria – The Conversation
2023-12-15T09:07:27Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/216555
2023-12-15T09:07:27Z
2023-12-15T09:07:27Z
The Sahara Desert used to be a green savannah – new research explains why
<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179/">Tassili N’Ajjer plateau</a> is Africa’s largest national park. Among its vast sandstone formations is perhaps the world’s largest art museum. Over 15,000 etchings and paintings are exhibited there, some as much as 11,000 years old according to scientific dating techniques, representing a unique ethnological and climatological record of the region. </p>
<p>Curiously, however, these images do not depict the arid, barren landscape that is present in the Tassili N'Ajjer today. Instead, they portray a vibrant savannah inhabited by elephants, giraffes, rhinos and hippos. This rock art is an important record of the past environmental conditions that prevailed in the Sahara, the world’s largest <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">hot desert</a>. </p>
<p>These images depict a period approximately 6,000-11,000 years ago called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/green-sahara-african-humid-periods-paced-by-82884405/">Green Sahara or North African Humid Period</a>. There is widespread climatological <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332220301007#bib31">evidence</a> that during this period the Sahara supported wooded savannah ecosystems and numerous rivers and lakes in what are now Libya, Niger, Chad and Mali. </p>
<p>This greening of the Sahara didn’t happen once. Using marine and lake sediments, scientists have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076514">identified</a> over 230 of these greenings occurring about every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. These greening events provided vegetated corridors which influenced species’ distribution and evolution, including the out-of-Africa migrations of ancient humans.</p>
<p>These dramatic greenings would have required a large-scale reorganisation of the atmospheric system to bring rains to this hyper arid region. But most climate models haven’t been able to simulate how dramatic these events were. </p>
<p>As a team of climate modellers and anthropologists, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41219-4">we have overcome this obstacle</a>. We developed a climate model that more accurately simulates atmospheric circulation over the Sahara and the impacts of vegetation on rainfall. </p>
<p>We identified why north Africa greened approximately every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. It was caused by changes in the Earth’s orbital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/precession-of-the-equinoxes">precession</a> - the slight wobbling of the planet while rotating. This moves the Northern Hemisphere closer to the sun during the summer months. </p>
<p>This caused warmer summers in the Northern Hemisphere, and warmer air is able to hold more moisture. This intensified the strength of the West African Monsoon system and shifted the African rainbelt northwards. This increased Saharan rainfall, resulting in the spread of savannah and wooded grassland across the desert from the tropics to the Mediterranean, providing a vast habitat for plants and animals. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the sensitivity of the Sahara Desert to changes in past climate. They explain how this sensitivity affects rainfall across north Africa. This is important for understanding the implications of present-day climate change (driven by human activities). Warmer temperatures in the future may also enhance monsoon strength, with both local and global impacts. </p>
<h2>Earth’s changing orbit</h2>
<p>The fact that the wetter periods in north Africa have recurred every 21,000 years or so is a big clue about what causes them: variations in Earth’s orbit. Due to gravitational influences from the moon and other planets in our solar system, the orbit of the Earth around the sun is not constant. It has cyclic variations on multi-thousand year timescales. These orbital cycles are termed <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/211/orbital-cycles/">Milankovitch cycles</a>; they influence the amount of energy the Earth receives from the sun. </p>
<p>On 100,000-year cycles, the shape of Earth’s orbit (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/eccentricity-astronomy">eccentricity</a>) shifts between circular and oval, and on 41,000 year cycles the tilt of Earth’s axis varies (termed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/obliquity">obliquity</a>). Eccentricity and obliquity cycles are responsible for driving the ice ages of the past 2.4 million years. </p>
<p>The third Milankovitch cycle is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/251/axial-precession-wobble/">precession</a>. This concerns Earth’s wobble on its axis, which varies on a 21,000 year timescale. The similarity between the precession cycle and the timing of the humid periods indicates that precession is their dominant driver. Precession influences seasonal contrasts, increasing them in one hemisphere and reducing them in another. During warmer Northern Hemisphere summers, a consequent increase in north African summer rainfall would have initiated a humid phase, resulting in the spread of vegetation across the region.</p>
<h2>Eccentricity and the ice sheets</h2>
<p>In our study we also identified that the humid periods did not occur during the ice ages, when large glacial ice sheets covered much of the polar regions. This is because these vast ice sheets cooled the atmosphere. The cooling countered the influence of precession and suppressed the expansion of the African monsoon system. </p>
<p>The ice ages are driven by the eccentricity cycle, which determines how circular Earth’s orbit is around the sun. So our findings show that eccentricity indirectly influences the magnitude of the humid periods via its influence on the ice sheets. This highlights, for the first time, a major connection between these distant high latitude and tropical regions.</p>
<p>The Sahara acts as a gate. It controls the dispersal of species between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and in and out of the continent. The gate was open when the Sahara was green and closed when deserts prevailed. Our results reveal the sensitivity of this gate to Earth’s orbit around the sun. They also show that high latitude ice sheets may have restricted the dispersal of species during the glacial periods of the last 800,000 years. </p>
<p>Our ability to model the African humid periods helps us understand the alternation of humid and arid phases. This had major consequences for the dispersal and evolution of species, including humans, within and out of Africa. Furthermore, it provides a tool for understanding future greening in response to climate change and its environmental impact. </p>
<p>Refined models may, in the future, be able to identify how climate warming will influence rainfall and vegetation in the Sahara region, and the wider implications for society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Sahara Desert is green and vegetated every 21,000 years. A climate model shows why.
Edward Armstrong, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of Helsinki
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/214393
2023-09-29T12:31:48Z
2023-09-29T12:31:48Z
South Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses
<p><em>The deaths of three members of the South African Navy (<a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">SA Navy</a>) <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/media/statements/Pages/SANavyIncidentKommetjie.aspx">on 20 September 2023</a>, when a freak wave swept them off the deck of the submarine SAS Manthatisi, has put the spotlight on the organisation and its work. André Wessels is a military historian; his latest <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">book</a> is A Century of South African Naval History: The South African Navy and its Predecessors 1922-2022. The Conversation Africa asked him for insights.</em></p>
<h2>How big is South Africa’s navy? How does it compare?</h2>
<p>The South African Navy has always been one of the strongest naval forces in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Egypt has the <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">strongest navy in Africa</a>, and Algeria is the second strongest as it has been steadily building <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/navy-modernization.htm">up its</a> naval forces. The Moroccan navy is also strong, as is the Nigerian navy, which has acquired <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigerian-navy-commissions-large-number-of-new-vessels/">a large number of naval vessels</a>, mostly patrol ships and smaller patrol craft. </p>
<p>Thanks to its submarine capabilities, the SA Navy can be regarded as one of the strongest on the continent. However, with its present ten “major” warships, the SA Navy is not in the same league as, for example, Brazil (about 100 ships), Russia (550), India (250) and China (600).</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">sources</a> that are in the public domain, the SA Navy at the moment has three submarines, four frigates, one multi-mission inshore patrol vessel (with another to be commissioned in the near future, and a third under construction), one survey ship (with a new one under construction), one combat support ship, and a number of smaller craft (most of them in reserve). In terms of its number of warships, this is the smallest that the navy has been since the mid-1950s.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">Money has little to do with why South Africa's military is failing to do its job</a>
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<p>Severe financial restrictions have put its capabilities under strain. For example, it has had to curtail anti-piracy patrols (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/operation-copper-extension-to-cost-r154-million/">“Operation Copper”</a>) in the Mozambique Channel due to the unavailability of ships.</p>
<h2>Can it protect the country’s territorial waters?</h2>
<p>Submarines provide South Africa with a crucial deterrent potential. And the navy can also do patrol work with its surface vessels (if they are able to go to sea). But it has a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, and is not able to project much power across long distances. </p>
<p>The government needs to gradually increase defence spending from the present less than 1% of GDP to at least 1.8%, which is what countries globally on average spend on defence. That will enable the navy to increase training opportunities, send more ships out to sea, and perhaps even acquire much-needed larger offshore patrol vessels.</p>
<p>South Africa is a maritime state, given that all its borders are on the ocean bar its northern one. The country needs a small but well-equipped navy that can defend it, underpin its diplomatic efforts, and assist other state departments in various ways.</p>
<h2>What’s its role?</h2>
<p>Geographically South Africa is a large <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/peninsula/">peninsula</a> on the strategic Cape sea route. Some <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">90% of its trade</a> flows through its harbours. The navy must assist in ensuring the integrity of the country as an independent state, by patrolling its territorial waters and acting as a deterrent against foreign military aggression and maritime crime. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">core business</a> is “to fight at sea”, with its official mission “to win at sea”. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">vision</a> is</p>
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<p>The navy can also play a role in humanitarian relief operations, search-and-rescue operations and <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">peace support operations</a>. </p>
<p>In the course of its history, the SA Navy has performed these and many other tasks. For example, in 1993 it facilitated the <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/bosnia/726/">sending of a mobile hospital and relief supplies</a> to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/">Gift of the Givers</a>, the disaster response NGO. The navy has also helped provide food and medical aid to countries ravaged by conflict or drought, for example when the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg took supplies to Bangladesh <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">in 1991</a>. The navy has also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/final-voyage-for-veteran-ship-20011010">rescued the crew members</a> of many yachts that have been caught in storms or were in need of other assistance off the South African coast and elsewhere, for example during the 2014 Cape-to-Rio Transatlantic Yacht Race. </p>
<p>The navy is also responsible for hydrographic survey work along the South African coast. It maps the ocean floor so that reliable charts can be drawn up, making it safe for merchant and other ships to sail along the coast and visit ports. </p>
<p>In addition, the navy has an important diplomatic role in sending warships (<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">“grey diplomats”</a>) on flag-showing visits to other countries. </p>
<p>But under <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">financial constraints</a>, the navy has been hard-pressed to fulfil its obligations. For example, it has for several years not been able to take part in flag-showing visits to other countries because of the unavailability of ships. In general, less time has also been spent at sea. </p>
<h2>What is the history of the SA Navy?</h2>
<p>The navy can trace its history back to <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">1 April 1922</a>, when the SA Naval Service was established. This became the Seaward Defence Force in 1939 when the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">Second World War</a> broke out, and the SA Naval Forces in 1942. It played a <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">small but important role</a> in the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany, patrolling the South African coastal waters. It also sent warships to the Mediterranean and Far Eastern war zones.</p>
<p>On 1 January 1951, the Naval Forces were renamed the SA Navy. In accordance with the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230376366_5">Simon’s Town Agreement</a> (1955), the navy <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">acquired</a> the Simon’s Town Naval Base from Britain (1957), and was strengthened by the acquisition of a number of destroyers, frigates, patrol boats and minesweepers, and later also a replenishment ship (1967) and three submarines (1970-1971). </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">South Africa's military is set for personnel reforms. Why it matters</a>
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<p>But by then, the ruling National Party’s apartheid policy had led to South Africa’s growing international isolation. The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa/un-arms-embargo-on-south-africa">mandatory arms embargo</a> against the country (1977) had obvious detrimental consequences for the then South African Defence Force (SADF), and in particular the navy. For example, it did not receive the submarines and frigates that it had ordered from France.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the navy <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027#page=5">assisted the other arms of the defence force</a>, in particular the SA Army’s Special Forces, during the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">Namibian war of independence</a>, which spilled over into Angola. The navy’s submarines and strike craft, as well as other ships, assisted the South African Special Forces <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080013-8.pdf">in operations</a> “behind enemy lines”.</p>
<p>The end of this conflict in 1989, and of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">freedom struggle in South Africa in 1994</a>, led to a new dawn. On the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346383?seq=4">eve of the 1994 elections</a> the SADF was renamed the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). </p>
<p>In due course the navy was transformed into a navy of and for all the people of South Africa. All cultural groups, as well as an increasing number of women, would henceforth be represented in the navy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Wessels in the years c 2012-2017 received funding from the NRF, but at the moment no longer receives any funds from the NRF. </span></em></p>
South Africa is a large peninsula on the strategic Cape sea route. Some 90% of its trade flows through its harbours. The navy defends the country’s sovereignty and national interests.
André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213221
2023-09-11T09:40:18Z
2023-09-11T09:40:18Z
What caused Morocco’s earthquake? A geologist studying the Atlas mountains explains
<p><em>The epicentre of Morocco’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66759069">devastating earthquake</a> on 8 September was in the High Atlas Mountains, about 71km south-west of Marrakesh. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Jesús Galindo-Zaldivar, who has been carrying out research on the formation of the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370838816_cGPS_Record_of_Active_Extension_in_Moroccan_Meseta_and_Shortening_in_Atlasic_Chains_under_the_Eurasia-Nubia_Convergence">Atlas mountains</a> and the geology of the area, about the factors which led to this situation.</em></p>
<h2>What research have you been doing in Morocco’s Atlas Mountains?</h2>
<p>The Atlas Mountains are a fascinating range in north-west Africa, spanning Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They’re situated south of the main Eurasia and Africa (Nubia) tectonic plate boundary.</p>
<p>This area doesn’t usually have a lot of earthquakes compared to other places near the edges of tectonic plates, where the movements of plates will cause intense seismic activity. But in 1960 the <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29249722/">Agadir earthquake</a> caused a lot of damage and loss of life. </p>
<p>I’m part of a team of geologists, geophysicists and <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/geodesist.html#:%7E:text=Geodesists%20measure%20and%20monitor%20the,point%20will%20move%20over%20time.">geodesists</a> from various Moroccan universities and Spanish institutions carrying out research in the area. We want to understand this mountain range’s development and its position at the edge of a continental plate boundary. Studies of seismic activity, gravity and other geophysical phenomena allow us to understand the Earth’s deep structure, down to depths exceeding 100km. </p>
<p>Through field geological research, we can detect and analyse faults – fractures or cracks in the Earth’s crust along which there has been movement. These movements can be horizontal, vertical or diagonal, and they occur due to the immense forces acting on the Earth’s tectonic plates.</p>
<p>Finally, using geodetic techniques (GPS recordings) we are able to determine how tectonic plates are moving. This is done by regularly measuring benchmark sites with millimetre accuracy.</p>
<h2>What has your research found?</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">research</a> shows that the Atlas Mountains were formed during the break-up of the <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-was-pangea#:%7E:text=From%20about%20300%2D200%20million,a%20single%20continent%20called%20Pangea.">Pangea</a> supercontinent. It is now a mountain range that is actively rising, as evidenced by its high peaks and steep slopes. </p>
<p>The steep slopes of the mountains and the straight lines where the Earth’s crust has cracked suggest that there has been recent movement in the Earth beneath this area. It’s surprising that there aren’t more earthquakes here.</p>
<p>The Atlas Mountains are getting pushed together at a rate of <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">about 1 millimetre each year</a>. This happens because the Eurasian and African plates are moving closer to each other. This squeezing action is responsible for creating the tallest mountains in the area, the southern edge of where these two big plates meet.</p>
<h2>What do your findings tell you about this earthquake?</h2>
<p>The catastrophic earthquake took place to the north of the western Atlas mountains, south of Marrakesh. According to estimates by Morocco’s <a href="https://fr.le360.ma/societe/seisme-au-maroc-un-responsable-de-linstitut-national-de-geophysique-livre-les-details-du-tremblement_5JCEYXQBQZCGBAULJBO5SFQSDA/">National Institute of Geophysics</a> and the <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us7000kufc/origin/detail">US geological survey</a>, the depth is between 8km and 26km.</p>
<p>The earthquake resulted from a geological phenomenon called a “reverse fault”. This occurs when tectonic plates collide, causing the Earth’s crust to thicken. The stress along these fault lines can induce earthquakes as rocks abruptly shift to release accumulated stress, which is characteristic of a seismic fault.</p>
<p>The 6.8 magnitude implies that the fault responsible for this earthquake is probably around 30km long. This estimate takes into account the <a href="https://pubs.geoscienceworld.org/ssa/bssa/article/84/4/974/119792/New-empirical-relationships-among-magnitude?casa_token=wI4CsF8HBNYAAAAA:GiDCYkcTUC7_QzF0YQ5xqs-rerR89jeKwMmBef-XYWHRljm5caHPeIhxwrgilBKZN0rCL1E">relationships</a> between active fault length and earthquake magnitudes. </p>
<p>So, why don’t we see many earthquakes in this area, even though it’s a place where the tectonic blocks are moving and the mountains are rising? Earthquakes happen when there’s a sudden shift in rocks along a fault line, caused by the release of stored energy that’s been building up over time. In this region, there haven’t been any major recorded earthquakes before, which suggests that the stress from the plates pushing together has been building up deep underground for a long time. When the stress got too much for the fault to handle, it caused an earthquake.</p>
<p>In this mountain belt faults might not produce earthquakes very often. After the earthquake, the rocks in the area moved and adjusted, but other nearby faults might now be under extra stress, and they could produce smaller earthquakes known as aftershocks that might continue for months or even years.</p>
<h2>What should authorities be doing to prepare?</h2>
<p>Earthquakes are difficult to predict and cannot be avoided. However, we can mitigate their impact. Through integrated studies of the region’s geology, geophysics and geodesy we can find out where there are active earthquake faults. We can also estimate how powerful the earthquakes on these faults could be and how often they might happen again. This helps us understand how strong future earthquakes in a specific area could be. Faults that don’t have earthquakes often but can still produce strong ones are a big concern. In the future, finding and studying these types of faults will be a focus of earthquake research.</p>
<p>The best way to minimise earthquake damage is to improve seismic building design codes to withstand the highest possible seismic activity. This will help buildings and other structures hold up better against strong shaking. In addition, it’s crucial that traditional homes and rock constructions in mountain villages be reinforced to prevent future disasters. New constructions must be tested and designed cheaply and efficiently, respecting new seismic building standards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jesús Galindo-Zaldivar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The earthquake was caused by the collision of two tectonic plates.
Jesús Galindo-Zaldivar, Professor of Geodynamics, Universidad de Granada
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213220
2023-09-11T06:40:21Z
2023-09-11T06:40:21Z
Morocco’s earthquake wasn’t unexpected – building codes must plan for them
<p><em>More than 2,000 people <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66759069">died</a> when a powerful magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck Morocco on 8 September. The epicentre was in the High Atlas Mountains, 71km (44 miles) south-west of Marrakesh. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked José A. Peláez, a professor in geophysics who has carried out <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306004500_Energetic_and_spatial_characterization_of_seismicity_in_the_Algeria-Morocco_region?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">research</a> on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327542846_Comparative_stochastic_modeling_of_the_Al_Hoceima_Morocco_aftershock_sequences_in_1994_Mw_60_2004_Mw_64_and_2016_Mw_63?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">seismic activity</a> in Morocco, about what led to this situation.</em></p>
<h2>What geological factors contributed to this earthquake?</h2>
<p>The Earth’s surface is constituted of several <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/plate-tectonics">tectonic plates</a>, large segments of the planet’s outer layer, which move against each other. This movement is responsible for various geological phenomena, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and the formation of mountains and ocean basins.</p>
<p>The tectonic activity in Morocco primarily involves the convergence of the Eurasian and the Nubian (African) plates. The Eurasian Plate pushing against the Nubian Plate is what led to the formation of the Atlas Mountains, which run through Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The mountains are where the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/10/africa/morocco-earthquake-moulay-brahim-survivors-hnk-intl/index.html">epicentre</a> of this recent earthquake was. </p>
<p>Currently, the collisions between the plates are causing a shortening of the Atlas Mountains, explaining the area’s seismicity. We know this because of data from GPS measurements, which show that they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">moving about 1 millimetre</a> closer to each other every year. </p>
<p>This shortening and compression is causing what are known as <a href="https://earthhow.com/types-of-faults/#:%7E:text=Reverse%20faults%20occur%20when%20one,move%20horizontally%20past%20each%20other.">faults</a>, huge friction between plates. These faults are the likely cause of this earthquake. Scientists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0040-1951(02)00368-2">think</a> that these faults have been active for a long time, going back a few million years.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104846">as pointed out</a> by various researchers, the High Atlas Mountains have a unique geological feature where the Earth’s outermost and hard layer, called the lithosphere, is thinner than usual, combined with an unusual rise of the mantle. All these features could have influenced the occurrence of this high magnitude earthquake.</p>
<h2>What is Morocco’s history of earthquakes?</h2>
<p>Seismic activity and its phenomena, like earthquakes, are not unusual in Morocco. </p>
<p>Over the last thousand years, earthquakes affecting Morocco have tended to take place mainly in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/gssrl.78.6.614">two areas</a>. Offshore, along the Azores-Gibraltar transform fault and the Alboran Sea, and another one onshore, along the Rif mountains in northern Morocco and the Tell Atlas mountain range in north-western Algeria. Earthquakes along the Atlas Belt are smaller in number, but not unusual.</p>
<p>The most significant, recent earthquakes affecting Morocco <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/app12178744">were in</a> 1994, 2004 and 2016, with magnitudes ranging between 6.0 and 6.3. These occurred in the most seismically active region in Morocco and also in the western Mediterranean region. </p>
<p>A bit further back in history, there was the devastating Agadir earthquake in February 1960, with a magnitude of 6.3. It was located around the boundary between the western High Atlas and the Anti Atlas, to the south. Available data indicates that between 12,000 and 15,000 people died due to this event. In addition, near the location of the recent event, there was another earthquake in 1955, with an estimated magnitude of about 5.8.</p>
<p>Even further back, prior to the establishment of seismometers, several significant events were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1785/gssrl.78.6.614">recorded</a> in Morocco. Among them were the 1624 Fès earthquake, with an estimated magnitude of 6.7, and the 1731 Agadir earthquake, with a magnitude of 6.4. </p>
<h2>Could it have been predicted?</h2>
<p>Earthquakes cannot be predicted, even with the current knowledge in seismology. In fact, many researchers think that it will not be possible to do so in the future either. What seismologists can do is establish the areas in which earthquakes are most likely to occur, even establish the probability of their occurrence and its uncertainty.</p>
<p>This is that we call a long-term prediction, carried out from specific seismic hazard studies in the region. They are based on knowledge of past seismicity in the area, both historical and instrumental, and on the existence and knowledge of active tectonic structures (faults) that could generate earthquakes. The greater the knowledge that one has on these two topics – seismicity and active faults in the region – the more knowledge one will have about the future seismicity that may occur in the area, and the less the uncertainty will be.</p>
<p>Seismic hazard studies also include the study of near-surface soil conditions and the characteristics of buildings. This helps to assess the possible damage from these potential earthquakes.</p>
<h2>What can be done to lessen the impact of future earthquakes in Morocco?</h2>
<p>The best tool we have to mitigate the impact of earthquakes is to conduct reliable seismic hazard studies. The results of these must then be implemented into national building codes. This way engineers can incorporate seismic safety into building designs.</p>
<p>Building codes need to take into account several factors, including the characteristics of the soil, the way seismic waves move and how the soil can amplify its movement during an earthquake. Also the expected shaking of the ground, which influences the behaviour and damage of buildings. These factors vary from one city to another, and in some cases from one district to another.</p>
<p>Seismologists know that earthquakes do not kill people – buildings do. Buildings with lack of regulation and lack of structural support are potential killers in high seismic hazard areas. Building codes must therefore be mandatory, and should be updated periodically. As more is learned about earthquake geology and the impact of earthquakes on buildings, building codes should be updated regularly. This is the best way to protect ourselves against these catastrophic phenomena. Territorial planners and rulers must know this and take it into account.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>José A. Peláez Montilla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Earthquakes cannot be predicted; the best tools to mitigate the impact are seismic hazard studies.
José A. Peláez Montilla, Professor of Geophysics, Universidad de Jaén
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213217
2023-09-10T14:57:35Z
2023-09-10T14:57:35Z
Marrakech artisans – who have helped rebuild the Moroccan city before – are among those hit hard in the earthquake’s devastation
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547343/original/file-20230910-15-27q05s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C25%2C8614%2C5716&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The earthquake has damaged many homes in Ijjoukak village, near Marrakech, Morocco.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MoroccoEarthquake/e1a299f4c3d247e4938c9103b189828f/photo?Query=Morocco%20earthquake&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=714&currentItemNo=3&vs=true">AP Photo/Mosa'ab Elshamy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A powerful earthquake that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/09/09/world/morocco-earthquake-marrakesh">hit close to the medieval city of Marrakech in Morocco</a> on Sept. 8, 2023, has killed thousands and injured many more. It has also put at risk buildings and monuments of major historic importance, among them <a href="https://www.aajenglish.tv/news/30333076/historical-marrakech-mosque-damaged-in-morocco-quake">the minaret of the Kutubiyya mosque</a>, a 12th-century structure that is an icon of the city.</p>
<p>The Medina, the medieval walled portion of the city, is now littered with rubble. The cultural significance of the Medina extends far beyond the antiques and trinkets sold to tourists.</p>
<p>It is the location of numerous artisan workshops that make the ceramic tiles, carved plaster and intricate woodwork that decorate the city. Many of these workshops have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1386/ijia_00023_5">maintained traditional methods for centuries</a>, transmitting skill sets down through the generations.</p>
<p>Part of Morocco’s bid for Marrakech’s UNESCO status was based on these craft traditions being “<a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/what-is-intangible-heritage-00003">intangible cultural heritage</a>,” which the U.N. describes as knowledge or skills that are passed down orally rather than in written form. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A brick ancient wall with rubble scattered near it and some intact buildings across." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=181%2C38%2C8433%2C5703&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547333/original/file-20230909-152282-vuv5u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People drive past a damaged wall of the historic Medina of Marrakech after the earthquake.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MoroccoEarthquake/9ca08fdd29e9410ea690ac0d1be7e9f2/photo?Query=morocco%20medina&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=160&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Mosa'ab Elshamy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I’ve been <a href="https://smu.academia.edu/AbbeyStockstill/CurriculumVitae">working in Marrakech since 2014</a>, living there on and off as I completed research on a book about the development of Marrakech as a medieval metropolis. Although my work focused on the 12th century, the more I learned about the city, the more I realized that most of the urban fabric and architectural sites I was looking at were thanks to the conservation efforts of local workshops.</p>
<p>The UNESCO designation was a historical acknowledgment of the traditions of poor and rural communities that can often get left out of larger conversations about art history. It is precisely these communities that have maintained Marrakech’s architectural heritage for generations, but the earthquake has destroyed the workshops and residences of many in the Medina.</p>
<p>These poor and rural communities are at their most vulnerable just when their skills will be needed the most to help rebuild the city after this disaster.</p>
<h2>Oral origins</h2>
<p>Marrakech was <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-almoravid-and-almohad-empires.html">founded in 1070</a> by the Almoravid dynasty, which derived from a tribe that was part of a larger non-Arab confederation of peoples <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9780812251302/inventing-the-berbers/">now referred to as Berbers</a>. </p>
<p>It was one of the first major cities in the wider Islamic west, known as the Maghrib – now comprising Morocco, Algeria and parts of Tunisia - to be founded by a group indigenous to the region. </p>
<p>The majority of the community <a href="https://doi.org/10.24425/ro.2021.139544">spoke a dialect of Tamazight</a>, an Afro-Asiatic language distinct from Arabic. It was primarily an oral language, meaning that knowledge was more commonly handed down via poetic stories rather than written texts.</p>
<p>Some Arabic sources described the Almoravids as “unsophisticated” and “illiterate,” yet the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10630/15883">evidence of their architectural and artistic heritage</a> suggests otherwise. In Marrakech, they built an elegantly proportioned dome known as the Qubba al-Barudiyyin and commissioned the elaborate wooden minbar (pulpit) that now sits in the Badiʿ Palace Museum.</p>
<p>They were followed by the Almohad dynasty, another largely indigenous group, that faced similar accusations in historical accounts despite building the Kutubiyya minaret, Marrakech’s signature monument.</p>
<h2>Site of independence movements</h2>
<p>The city’s origins as a Berber capital contributed to making Marrakech the epicenter of contemporary Moroccan national identity, rooted in a pride and independence centuries old. Whereas other North African cities had roots in Arab or Roman tradition, Marrakech could claim to be distinctly Moroccan.</p>
<p>In the face of Ottoman expansion in the 16th century, the kingdom of Morocco, based out of Marrakech, was the sole region of the Arabic-speaking world <a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/304006747/abstract/680536CC2D40436BPQ/1?accountid=6667">to maintain their autonomy from Turkish control</a>.</p>
<p>Although the French and the Spanish would compete for colonial rule of the country, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700005119">the Moroccan independence movements of the 20th century</a> were largely based out of Marrakech. The city was so prone to revolt that the French administration moved the colonial capital further north to Rabat.</p>
<p>Even the word “Morocco” is derived from an <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315073842-114/marrakech-morocco-robert-john">etymological transmutation</a> of “Marrakech.”</p>
<h2>A hidden history</h2>
<p>And yet, recovering the city’s significant past is an exercise in reading between the lines. </p>
<p>The oral traditions of the city’s founders were rarely faithfully transcribed. Written sources are often scattered and unpublished, and those that do exist are often written by <a href="https://www.rct.uk/collection/1022581/primera-parte-de-la-descripcion-general-de-affrica-con-las-todos-los-successos-de">outsiders or visitors</a> to the city. </p>
<p>The Ottomans were excellent record-keepers, enabling scholars to explore extensive centralized archives on every part of the Arabic world – except Morocco, whose archives remain dispersed and underfunded. Historians have had to work obliquely to uncover concrete details, relying on archaeological and anthropological research to supplement oral traditions.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Shops selling an array of colorful goods on either side of a narrow old marketplace while two women in headdress walk through the lane in the center." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547334/original/file-20230910-17-qpvn3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women walking through the old Medina in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXMoroccoMarrakechTourism/ffb0896604584ab98dba6fddf6257745/photo?Query=Marrakesh%20&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=287&currentItemNo=41&vs=true">AP Photo/Mosa'ab Elshamy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Integral to these efforts was the role of craft traditions in and around Marrakech. Craft was a <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/138704">key point of France’s colonial efforts in Marrakech</a>, where they established “artisan schools” in the Medina to ostensibly document and preserve their methods. In doing so, the French Protectorate - which ruled the country from 1912 to 1956 - created a kind of <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674980327">living nostalgia</a> within the Medina, conflating the people who actually lived there with the city’s medieval past.</p>
<p>This effectively <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49723">created a form of economic and social segregation</a> in which craftsmen and their families were siloed into the old town, while the wealthier expatriates and tourists occupied the Ville Nouvelle outside the medieval walls.</p>
<h2>Preserving the past through craft</h2>
<p>At the same time, these craft traditions are also what made it possible to preserve and restore many of the sites in and around Marrakech that now draw thousands of tourists each year. </p>
<p>The Qasba Mosque, the city’s “second” major mosque after the Kutubiyya and originally built between 1185 and 1189, <a href="https://doi.org/10.58278/0.2023.13">underwent successive restorations in both the 17th and 21st centuries</a> after political instability led to their decline. In both cases, local artisans were employed to renovate the mosque’s stucco walls and the mosaic tile work known as zellij.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An wall with multicolored tiles and carved plaster decoration." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547332/original/file-20230909-17-7y2k4z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Ben Youssef Madrasa in Marrakech.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abbey Stockstill</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 11th-century Almoravid pulpit required <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/THE_LUMINOUS_IMAGE/7Wk2_MI8oqEC?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">a team of Moroccan craftsmen</a> to successfully restore the minbar’s intricate marquetry. </p>
<p>Artisans have also been important ambassadors for Morocco’s place in the larger canon of Islamic art, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/arts/design/metropolitan-museums-moroccan-courtyard-takes-shape.html">building a courtyard as part of the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s</a> 2011 renovation of their Islamic galleries using 14th-century techniques and materials.</p>
<p>With the Marrakech Medina partially destroyed, many of these artisans and workshops will face tough choices regarding their future. <a href="https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/morocco-hostels-foreign-ownership-tourism-indsutry-news-15421/">Gentrification over the last decade</a> has priced many residents out of their ancestral homes, and many of these workshops operate on thin margins – too thin to both pay for damages and retain control over their property. </p>
<h2>Rebuilding intangible heritage</h2>
<p>Parts of the city walls cracked in the earthquake, and an 18th-century mosque in the main square lost its minaret. The <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/09/09/earthquake-strikes-morocco-historic-tourist-sites/">historic 12th-century site of Tinmal</a>, not far from Marrakech and nestled in the Atlas Mountains, has also collapsed.</p>
<p>The human toll of the earthquake is still being tallied, and the material damage is likely to be extensive. Nothing can replace the loss of life. Yet the history and resilience of a place are <a href="https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781787354845">instrumental in any recovery</a>. </p>
<p>It will be the role of Marrakech’s intangible heritage – its artists and artisans – to rebuild after this disaster. In the midst of narratives about caliphs and sultans, philosophers and poets, it can be easy to forget that the people who built these places often went unnamed in the historical texts.</p>
<p>But these artists will need support to maintain Marrakech’s history, to preserve the past for future historians to discover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abbey Stockstill received funding from American Institute of Maghrib Studies. </span></em></p>
A scholar who has been working in Marrakech writes about the artisan communities, which have maintained the city’s architectural rich heritage for generations and have been hit hard by the earthquake.
Abbey Stockstill, Assistant Professor of Art History, Southern Methodist University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209609
2023-09-03T07:45:37Z
2023-09-03T07:45:37Z
Africa’s vast underground water resources are under pressure from climate change - how to manage them
<p>All countries have a variety of water resources – some are on the surface, like rivers, and some are beneath the ground. This groundwater provides <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 50%</a> of all global domestic use and <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099145503202323072/p178601171e7ffac1ea0714b5e187c0122449517b07d">43%</a> of all the water used for agriculture.</p>
<p>Groundwater is stored in aquifers, which come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be accessed in several ways, but mostly by drilling wells. Not all groundwater is useful to us – it depends on whether it’s fresh or mixed with salt and on how deep it is, as this will affect how easy it is to tap into. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-aquifers-hold-more-than-20-times-the-water-stored-in-the-continents-lakes-but-they-arent-the-answer-to-water-scarcity-201704">Africa’s aquifers hold more than 20 times the water stored in the continent's lakes, but they aren’t the answer to water scarcity</a>
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<p>In Africa, groundwater is very important. It supports <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2023/06/13/groundwater-the-hidden-wealth-of-nations">almost 100%</a> of household and agricultural activities in rural areas. And, because it’s underground it’s protected from evaporation, a crucial resource in a warming climate.</p>
<p>These facts and figures are in a recent World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/the-hidden-wealth-of-nations-groundwater-in-times-of-climate-change">report</a> which unpacks issues facing groundwater in times of climate change. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=m6uqRGMAAAAJ&hl=th">groundwater scientist</a> focusing on its sustainable use, I’ve picked out some of the key issues when it comes to managing groundwater from the report. It’s vital that African countries address these as pressure <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/state-of-climate-africa-highlights-water-stress-and-hazards">increases</a> on the continent’s water resources, through growing populations, development and changing weather patterns. </p>
<h2>Key issues</h2>
<p><strong>Ownership of groundwater</strong></p>
<p>Figuring out ownership of groundwater is important for the management of this finite resource. Without a clear understanding of ownership, conflict can happen.</p>
<p>In some countries groundwater is owned by the landowner, in others by the government. Generally, it’s being poorly managed <a href="https://publications.iwmi.org/pdf/H048386.pdf">across the continent</a>. In many cases, boreholes used to extract groundwater <a href="https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1094769/Perceptions_of_trends_in_the_development_of_private_boreholes_for_household_water_consumption.pdf">aren’t</a> even being registered. </p>
<p>South Africa has used laws and policies to <a href="http://ward2forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NWAguide.pdf">transfer</a> the ownership of resources to the government. But this has led to issues around red tape and licensing permits, which determine how water is allocated.</p>
<p>The success of permit systems depends on a thorough understanding of the resources, property owners’ compliance with granted user rights, and the enforcement of this regulation. This is particularly problematic in the developing world, according to the World Bank report. </p>
<p>A possible solution is decentralised management, as seen by the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/harvesting-water-and-harnessing-cooperation-qanat-systems-middle-east-and-asia">Qanat system</a> in the Middle East. The system consists of a network of underground canals that transport water from aquifers in highlands to the surface at lower levels using gravity. It is normally managed by the community and financed collectively. These historical pieces of infrastructure have been abandoned in recent times, but could solve many of the water shortage issues in the semi-arid to arid areas of Africa.</p>
<p><strong>Recharging aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater in aquifers is finite, but it <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/12/7/1846">can be recharged</a> with surface water or treated wastewater. The process also sometimes helps in the removal of harmful chemicals because the aquifer’s material can act like a very large filter. </p>
<p>The World Bank report highlights <a href="https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/managed-aquifer-recharge#:%7E:text=Managed%20aquifer%20recharge%20(MAR)%2C,water%20supplies%20may%20be%20low.">managed aquifer recharge</a> as a technique which can be used to recharge aquifers. Water is either injected through a well or seeps into the ground through infiltration ponds, man-made or natural depressions in the ground which allows water to soak into the earth.</p>
<p>Countries in <a href="https://gw-project.org/books/managed-aquifer-recharge-southern-africa/">southern Africa</a> have practised this for the past 40 years. </p>
<p>Aquifers can also be recharged <a href="https://unepdhi.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/05/WEB_UNEP-DHI_NBS-PRIMER-2018-2.pdf">naturally</a> when rainwater infiltrates deep into the ground. This can be encouraged through afforestation, agricultural terraces and the prevention of land clearing. These practices allow permeable surfaces to dominate the landscape, stabilise the soil through plant growth, and slow the flow of water.</p>
<p><strong>Monitoring aquifers</strong></p>
<p>Monitoring aquifers is vital to know how much water is left in them. Unfortunately many African countries have poor monitoring networks and infrastructure in place. The number of monitoring points in certain countries is <a href="https://www.un-igrac.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Kukuric%20and%20van%20Vliet%2C%202008.pdf">also dwindling</a>, owing to financial constraints. </p>
<p>Satellite data can be used for monitoring. One example is the <a href="https://grace.jpl.nasa.gov/data/data-analysis-tool/">GRACE (Gravity, Recovery and Climate Experiment)</a> twin satellites which have provided insights into subsurface water storage over the past 20 years. This means that the changes in aquifer volumes can be monitored, but only at a very large scale. It’s necessary to know what’s happening on the ground. Localised monitoring networks are needed, with data loggers at multiple wells.</p>
<p><strong>Effective policies</strong></p>
<p>Policies and incentives play a major role in the use of groundwater. They influence the cost of energy and abstraction and the overall accounting of groundwater resources and environmental impact. </p>
<p>In an African context, good policies are missing in places. There are, however, some community practices which help to protect the resource, like the Qanat system. These types of systems should be encouraged and replicated. </p>
<p><strong>Groundwater dependent ecosystems</strong></p>
<p>Groundwater dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, play a <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/fs_7_livelihoods_en_v5_2.pdf">critical role</a> for many livelihoods in Africa and need to be more effectively managed. These ecosystems use groundwater to support plant and animal life and ecosystem services, such as fresh water and clean air, throughout the year. </p>
<p>But they’re exposed to major risks because they’re often close to semi-arid and arid areas. This is particularly true in the Sahel region. Groundwater dependent ecosystems are often close to border crossings and transport routes. Human activities, such as over-pumping, could adversely affect how they function and lead to a loss of biodiversity. </p>
<p>The conservation of these water bodies is of the utmost importance for the preservation of water resources and livelihoods. Policies which protect them – like the <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/">Ramsar convention</a> – must be properly enforced. Governments could should also consider creating protected areas around some of these ecosystems. </p>
<h2>Managing resources</h2>
<p>It’s imperative that governments better monitor our water resources. Coupled with good practical solutions, such as managing pump rates, this will sustain groundwater resources for many years to come. </p>
<p>The monitoring network on our continent is unfortunately limited or non-existent in certain countries. In some, like South Africa, the network is slowly diminishing. This is unfortunate as the ability to measure allows better management of groundwater resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaathier Mahed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Better monitoring of groundwater is important for sustainable management.
Gaathier Mahed, Senior lecturer, Nelson Mandela University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/207150
2023-06-25T11:11:29Z
2023-06-25T11:11:29Z
Children’s movement affects health and development but research is lacking in Africa: here’s why
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531373/original/file-20230612-220077-jzsxfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children’s health and development depend on how much time they spend doing physical activity, being sedentary and sleeping.</p>
<p>Research on movement behaviours in children is essential. It helps us to understand what influences these behaviours, and their contribution to health and development. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/11/10/e049267">evidence</a> on movement behaviours comes from high-income countries. Here children have different lifestyles, environments and cultures from those in low- and middle-income countries. For example, children in African countries face different challenges in achieving healthy levels of physical activity and sleep. Safety, transport, infrastructure, culture, climate, nutrition, and different levels and types of screen time exposure may all present challenges. </p>
<p>Africa, as a continent, contributes less than <a href="https://www.elsevier.com/connect/africa-generates-less-than-1-of-the-worlds-research-data-analytics-can-change-that">1% of research</a> worldwide. This means over <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/">16%</a> of the world’s population has been excluded from the research. </p>
<p>The international <a href="https://sunrise-study.com/#about">SUNRISE study</a>, which we are part of, aims to bridge this gap. It conducts studies on movement behaviour in collaboration with researchers in several African countries, including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, where we are based. We bring a collective expertise across disciplines such as public health, physiotherapy and child development. </p>
<p>SUNRISE findings so far show that the proportion of children in low- and middle-income countries meeting recommendations for movement behaviours is low, compared to high-income countries. This highlights the need for research and intervention in Africa. </p>
<p>But since the beginning of this study we have faced a wide range of challenges. In each country, the target number of children for the study is around 1,000. Researching their movement behaviour requires technology.</p>
<p>The challenges include access to devices to track movement, the lack of awareness of such tools and what they do, difficulty in securing funds, and institutional challenges. </p>
<p>Solutions include local collaboration, reducing financial barriers, developing new low-cost devices, and using contextually relevant methods. The following sections describe the challenges and possible solutions in detail.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p><strong>Access to devices</strong></p>
<p>Accelerometers are a type of digital wearable device, similar to Fitbits and smart watches. But they measure movement more accurately than commercially available devices. This is why they are more commonly used in research. These devices are generally more expensive because they are “research-grade”, and upwards of US$250 each (before software and delivery). This is a major challenge for those of us working in African countries, as at least 50 devices would be needed to conduct large scale studies like SUNRISE. There is no local manufacturer or distributor of accelerometer devices. Researchers need a legal licence to import or export them. </p>
<p>The SUNRISE study is able to loan devices. But exorbitant customs and shipping charges for moving this equipment to and between African countries makes sharing difficult – even when it’s only for research. This leads to unnecessary costs and delays, which means Africa gets left behind in this scientific field. </p>
<p><strong>Lack of awareness about the benefits of accelerometers</strong></p>
<p>These devices are often novel in African settings. Some parents and caregivers in our study areas have been sceptical about using them. For example, caregivers have asked whether the devices attract lightning, or whether they have some physical effect on the body. This may lead to another challenge in recruiting sufficient participants for the study. And data collection can take a long time when the shortage of devices is added to the time to get local buy-in. </p>
<p><strong>Difficulty in securing funds</strong></p>
<p>SUNRISE study researchers in Africa battle to get funding. They rely on highly competitive international funding, which seldom prioritises movement behaviour research in young children. It costs a lot to attend conferences internationally and to publish research in reputable academic journals. Open access journal fees can even exceed the monthly salary of a research assistant in an African country. </p>
<p><strong>Institutional challenges</strong></p>
<p>Within African research institutions, another challenge is how to build capacity. Few research institutes focus on movement behaviours in Africa. Accelerometer data is often complex to manage, and needs trained staff. High-income countries typically have access to support staff and students who can assist with this. This is not the case in many African countries. So it is difficult to conduct high-quality research and translate it into policy and practice. </p>
<h2>Possible solutions</h2>
<p>A possible solution is to collaborate with local partners and stakeholders to identify the most appropriate devices for each context and population. </p>
<p>All stakeholders, including local government and non-government organisations, ought to remove barriers so that the researchers can focus on the quality of evidence to inform policy and practice that is anchored to the local context. </p>
<p>Establishing some type of research equipment hub in Africa would go some way to help. But even moving equipment within Africa is not easy. Governments should consider waiving import and export charges for research equipment. The development of low-cost devices that can be produced and used efficiently in Africa is the best way forward. </p>
<p>Researchers in Africa could also examine other new data collection methods that are customised to the local context. Qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) can provide valuable insights into the factors that influence movement behaviours in different contexts. These insights are vital for the development of measurement tools and interventions that are culturally appropriate and effective. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>There are many other pressing needs in Africa. But the contribution of movement behaviours to population health and development is significant, particularly as there is growing evidence of the global economic costs of physical <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214-109X%2822%2900482-X">inactivity</a>. We need local research on these behaviours, starting in the early years, when patterns of behaviour are established. </p>
<p>Without addressing barriers to robust research, researchers in this region will continue to lag behind in this field. </p>
<p>This means that we lose opportunities to learn how to promote movement behaviours that support health and development, thus setting children on the best path for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Draper receives or has received funding from the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, the South African Medical Research Council, the Jacobs Foundation, and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Okely receives funding from NHMRC, Research Council of Norway, World Health Organization, and UNICEF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoko Oluwayomi receives funding from ISBNPA-PIONEER PROGRAM SCHOLARSHIP 2022</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chalchisa Abdeta receives funding through HDR Scholarship from the University of Wollongong, Australia.</span></em></p>
Africa contributes less than 1% of research worldwide on movement behaviours in children. This means that research on movement behaviours has largely excluded over 16% of the world’s population.
Catherine Draper, Associate Professor at MRC/Wits Developmental Pathways for Health Research Unit, University of the Witwatersrand
Anthony Okely, Distinguished Professor of Public Health, University of Wollongong
Aoko Oluwayomi, PhD Candidate (Exercise Physiology), University of Lagos
Chalchisa Abdeta, PhD candidate, University of Wollongong
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/199791
2023-02-16T08:26:04Z
2023-02-16T08:26:04Z
Pan-Africanism remains a dream: four key issues the African Union must tackle
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510080/original/file-20230214-22-qyk3hy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at an African Union summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-general-view-shows-delegates-in-malabo-on-may-27-2022-news-photo/1240955390?phrase=african%20union&adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">African Union</a> (AU) – made up of 55 member countries – has made significant progress with integrating the countries of the continent and giving them a voice in global politics. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades it has developed meaningful policies on <a href="https://au.int/documents/1504">peace and security</a>, and trade, like the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> helps set the agenda and represent African interests in global forums alongside important partners like the United Nations and the European Union. </p>
<p>But the AU still has a long way to go to achieve the political, economic and cultural goals set out in <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a>, adopted in 2013. </p>
<p>I was an adviser to the union for over a decade and I am now the editor of the <a href="https://brill.com/display/title/61135">Yearbook of the African Union</a>. In my view, progress in implementing the pan-African agenda has stalled. This is partially due to the challenging dynamics in how member states, the AU’s governing organs and external partners relate and pursue their interests. </p>
<p>The annual <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of African Heads of State and Government</a> offers an opportunity to consider these issues and decide how to resolve them. In 2023, the summit will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from <a href="https://au.int/en/summit/36">18 to 19 February</a>.</p>
<h2>Four factors stalling progress</h2>
<p>I believe that four issues have stalled progress in the pan-African agenda. These issues relate to collective decision making, independent financing, division of labour and the adoption of common policies that would nurture strategic partnerships. </p>
<p><strong>1. Member states have implemented too few collective decisions</strong> </p>
<p>The AU has adopted several <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties">important legal documents</a> which member states are supposed to adopt for themselves, too. These documents – signed during heads of state and government meetings – must be ratified and then deposited with the union. </p>
<p>This usually happens very slowly and only very patchily. The reasons vary. According to one of the few <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1687380/Maluwa.pdf">academic inquiries</a> into the subject, these reasons include a lack of political will, administrative lethargy and deficits in technical capacity among member states.</p>
<p>The AU has no power to force member states to carry out common decisions. It can only monitor compliance on three legal instruments, including the 2007 <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-treaty-african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a>).</p>
<p>To see progress in policy implementation, member states will have to think seriously about how to arrive at binding, transparent and enforceable mechanisms. </p>
<p>One way to do this would be through introducing a clear and limited window of time for ratifying legal documents. The union could also make it mandatory to report on the implementation of all decisions. </p>
<p><strong>2. Independent finances have not been established</strong></p>
<p>The AU’s ambitious plans depend heavily on external finance. Almost two-thirds of the union’s annual budget comes from donors, dubbed international partners. </p>
<p>Contributions from member states account for the remaining third. However, these tend to come late, or in some cases only in part. About <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-faq.pdf">30 member states</a> default partially or completely each year. In 2007, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa volunteered to make higher contributions. They account for 45% of the funds raised by African governments. Morocco, which rejoined the AU in 2017 after a 33-year absence, has replaced Libya as a major donor. </p>
<p>The AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing">financial reform</a> process began in 2015 to make the organisation more self-reliant. Members committed to paying a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-faq.pdf">0.2% levy</a> on various goods imported from outside the continent.</p>
<p>This money is expected to support 100% of the union’s operational budget (which includes maintenance and salaries), 75% of the programme budget (which includes implementation of policies) and 25% of the budget for union-led peace operations.</p>
<p>The union still must decide how the 100/75/25 target will be met by 2025. In the <a href="http://apanews.net/en/news/aus-2023-budget-at-6548m">current budget</a> (US$655 million for the 2023 financial year), the financial shortfall stands at US$201 million, a 31% deficit.</p>
<p><strong>3. The division of labour between the African Union and regional economic communities remains unclear</strong></p>
<p>Relations between the African Union and the eight officially recognised <a href="https://au.int/en/recs">regional economic communities</a> are based on two principles. These are subsidiarity (where, whenever possible, the regional level takes the lead) and comparative advantage (where the institution that’s better equipped to deal with a situation leads).</p>
<p>A <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/Kagame_Report.pdf">2017 report</a> on the operations of the AU noted that the division of labour between the union and regional communities was “unclear”. This caused a duplication of roles and a lack of clear boundaries.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15548-how-relevant-is-the-protocol-on-relations-between-the-recs-and-au">new protocol</a> on the relationship between the AU and regional economic blocs was adopted in 2020. But its details are yet to be finalised.</p>
<p><strong>4. The instruments of a common global policy are either underused or underdeveloped</strong></p>
<p>The AU is working to increase its bargaining power in global politics by developing common policies and nurturing strategic partnerships. </p>
<p>But because of member states’ insistence on sovereignty, <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-30-2.pdf">few common policies</a> have been developed. The most prominent one relates to the <a href="https://oau-aec-au-documents.uwazi.io/en/document/jc4bndxh7vpc23nevov18aor?page=2">reform of the UN Security Council</a> to give Africa more power. </p>
<p>In terms of strategic partnerships, the AU currently is <a href="https://au.int/en/partnerships">focusing its activities</a> on three multilateral (Arab League, European Union and United Nations) and five bilateral (China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey) partnerships. However, the frequency of meetings, scope of activities and meaning of the word “strategic” vary widely. </p>
<h2>Opportunity for change</h2>
<p>This year’s <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of African Heads of State and Government</a> is expected to attend to these urgent items:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementing and domesticating union decisions</p></li>
<li><p>the division of labour between the AU and regional economic communities</p></li>
<li><p>how best to use the organisation to shape Africa’s place in the world. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The financial dependency issue will be tackled by the African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/executivecouncil">Executive Council</a> in July.</p>
<p>In my view, there is likely to be progress on some of these issues and stalling on others. What’s at stake is Africa’s place in the world and averting harm to the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ulf Engel receives research funding from the German Research Council, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the EU Commission. </span></em></p>
Member states need to arrive at binding, transparent and enforceable priorities to see progress.
Ulf Engel, Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of Leipzig
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/195732
2023-01-11T09:36:27Z
2023-01-11T09:36:27Z
Chinese workers on Africa’s infrastructure projects: the link with host political regimes
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499767/original/file-20221208-11-oy4h0a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese workers are part of most Chinese government-funded projects in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China has rapidly become Africa’s most important infrastructure builder, and the footprint of Chinese construction companies is seen in cities, towns and villages across the continent. </p>
<p>With the launch of Beijing’s “Go Global” policy in 2000, and President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, the volume of roads, bridges, railways, power stations and other infrastructure built by China has increased markedly. The number of overseas contracts signed by Chinese companies more than doubled from just under 6,000 in 2004 to almost 12,000 in 2019. </p>
<p>In 2019, Chinese companies won over US$250 billion of infrastructure contracts around the world, paid for by the Chinese government, international institutions and host governments. Chinese firms won over 30% of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/brief/summary-and-detailed-borrower-procurement-reports">public works</a> contracts funded by the World Bank, one of the world’s largest infrastructure financiers.</p>
<p>Chinese records also show that the number of Chinese citizens dispatched to work on infrastructure projects increased almost five-fold, from a global total of 79,000 in 2002 to 368,000 in 2019 (with a peak of 405,000 in 2015). Of these, around one quarter were recorded in sub-Saharan Africa, while one-third were in the Middle East and north Africa region.</p>
<p>The presence of large numbers of Chinese workers labouring on these projects is one of the most controversial aspects of China’s economic engagement with Africa and the wider world. </p>
<p>Chinese workers have been accused of taking job opportunities from locals, undercutting labour standards by being willing to work for longer hours and with fewer rest days, and being the source of culture clashes. A 2021 <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0143831X211029382">meta-analysis</a> of Chinese labour practices in Africa found evidence of tense labour relations driven in part by practices such as weekend work and dormitory systems. These are common practice in China but not in many African economies. </p>
<p>However, the debate on Chinese workers underplays the agency of host governments. After all, they make local laws and issue work visas.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2022.2127833">research</a> covering 195 countries explored whether different types of host regime were more likely or less likely to allow Chinese workers in or force Chinese companies to hire locally. We found that democratic governments were much more prone to limiting the number of Chinese workers in the infrastructure sector in the face of potential domestic opposition to those workers. The opposite was true in more authoritarian countries.</p>
<p>This means that the long-term economic benefits that Chinese-built infrastructure brings are likely to be limited in authoritarian countries. It also gives rise to the possibility that local dissatisfaction with the lack of job opportunities complicates the political relations between China and the host country.</p>
<h2>China’s overseas infrastructure builders</h2>
<p>Prior <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2014.898894">research</a> has shown that Chinese companies like to bring their own workers because they require less training, work efficiently and help to avoid difficult labour relations issues. However, the number of Chinese workers varies a lot across different host countries. For example, Algeria has long hosted huge numbers of Chinese citizens building infrastructure. Others, like Ghana, have relatively few, despite China playing a large role in the country’s infrastructure sector.</p>
<p>There has been remarkably little quantitative research on the factors shaping the number of Chinese workers completing infrastructure projects in different countries. Our research, using data gathered from Chinese statistical yearbooks (many of which are available only in mainland China), aimed to address this gap in knowledge.</p>
<p>The starting point of our research was that it matters how policymakers assess and pursue their interests. In democracies, governments face more pressure to ensure that construction projects deliver local jobs. They run the risk that opposition groups can use the presence of foreign workers as an issue to stir up opposition to the government. Therefore, they are more likely to force Chinese firms to hire locally, even if it means projects are completed more slowly.</p>
<p>Autocrats, on the other hand, do not face the same electoral pressures. Instead, their interest lies in completing construction projects quickly and efficiently. Doing so boosts their “performance-based legitimacy” – citizens accept them because they get things done. Foreign workers, who are politically neutral, provide a convenient way to do this.</p>
<h2>The evidence</h2>
<p>Our analysis used data gathered from 195 host countries and territories. It showed strong empirical evidence that democracies host significantly fewer Chinese workers than autocracies, all other things being equal. The results hold up using a variety of different statistical modelling techniques.</p>
<p>We also explored two case studies: Ghana and Algeria. </p>
<p>In Ghana, a vibrant democracy, we found that both the country’s main political parties faced pressure to ensure Chinese-built projects delivered local jobs. For example, in the construction of the Bui Dam, the agreement between Sinohydro, the Chinese state-owned behemoth contracted to complete the project, and the Ghanaian government stipulated that a certain proportion of the workforce would be local.</p>
<p>Unlike many governments, Ghana’s tends to limit foreign workers in practice as well as on paper. </p>
<p>In Algeria, on the other hand, Chinese labour has been used to quickly complete projects seen as politically expedient. Algeria is a “hybrid” regime that was ruled by a single man, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, from 1999 to 2019. Even when domestic discontent over Chinese workers prompted measures to limit their presence, the measures were not implemented.</p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>Our findings have several important implications. First, host country agency is important. Host governments have the ability to ensure Chinese companies hire locally. </p>
<p>Second, projects that hire locally may bring more long-term economic benefit to host countries. This can happen both directly through the jobs that they create, and via knowledge and technology transfers into the wider economy. Our analysis therefore suggests that the wider developmental benefits of Chinese built infrastructure may actually be stronger in democracies than in autocracies.</p>
<p>Finally, there’s an implication for China’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations. Many Chinese citizens are in autocratic countries where they may be welcomed by leaders but resented by the local population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Countries that lean towards democracy are less likely to welcome Chinese labourers.
Pippa Morgan, Lecturer, Political Science, Duke Kunshan University
Andrea Ghiselli, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192235
2022-11-11T13:13:21Z
2022-11-11T13:13:21Z
This course examines how images of veiled Muslim women are used to justify war
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489092/original/file-20221011-26-p5xwvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C18%2C2038%2C1355&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Photographs capture images of women in war-torn regions of the world.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-picture-showing-an-afghan-woman-passing-by-a-french-news-photo/55712325?phrase=afghan%20women%20war&adppopup=true">SHAH MARAI/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em> </p>
<h2>Course Title:</h2>
<p>“Women and War”</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>When I was on a fellowship at the Library of Congress finishing my first book, “<a href="https://sararahnama.com/research">The Future is Feminist</a>,” I had the opportunity to connect with other scholars. One of those scholars, <a href="https://marthasjones.com/">historian Martha Jones</a>, encouraged me to design a class based on my research interests. With that in mind, I designed a new freshman seminar, “Women and War.” The seminar bridges my research on gender and Islam in French colonial Algeria with my new project, a history of girlhood in the 1970s Middle East.</p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>The course looks at how particular depictions of Muslim women – as <a href="https://veil.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/306/2012/04/moorish-women-promenade-1000.jpg">veiled</a>, <a href="https://veil.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/306/2012/04/yachmak.jpg">oppressed</a>, <a href="https://media.newyorker.com/photos/59d26c8527eccc3d6d6ada7e/master/w_1600,c_limit/Sentilles-Colonial-Harem_1.jpeg">constrained</a> and yet <a href="https://veil.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/306/2012/04/dance-of-the-veil-1.jpg">sexually alluring</a> – have been used to legitimize political intervention and wars in three contexts: colonial Algeria, Iran before and after the Iranian Revolution, and Afghanistan since 2001. </p>
<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Tensions over gender and Islam reappear regularly in the news. Examples include developments in the Middle East, such as the case of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-iran-protests-over-dress-codes-stoked-broader-public-anger/2022/10/11/d73a5b96-497d-11ed-8153-96ee97b218d2_story.html">died in police custody in Iran</a> after being detained for violating the country’s dress code. Other examples include new laws in Europe that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/top-eu-court-rules-hijab-can-be-banned-at-work">curtail Muslim women’s right to wear a veil</a>. Yet, these discussions are often disconnected from political and military intervention in the Middle East. </p>
<p>I begin the course with a look at how in 2001, former U.S. Rep. Carolyn Maloney of New York <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4645885/user-clip-rep-carolyn-maloney-wears-burka-house-floor">wore a burqa on the floor of the House of Representatives</a>. She did so to <a href="https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2021/08/26/maloney-defends-wearing-burqa-amid-criticism-from-challenger">argue in favor</a> of United States military intervention on behalf of Afghan women. She assumed the public would read the burqa as a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/afghanistan-burqa-congress-speech-b1904142.html">visible marker of women’s subjugation</a> – and many people did. This gives students a concrete example of the themes we discuss in the course and their ongoing relevance.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>One example is how, from the very beginning of the French colonial rule in Algeria, French photographers <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/colonial-postcards-and-women-as-props-for-war-making">produced postcards that depicted Algerian women</a>, usually either fully veiled or in various states of undress. These photographs evoked both notions of oppression and exotic allure. The images also helped make the colonization of Algeria a more popular enterprise, with people at home both fascinated by Algerian women and convinced that they needed intervention to emancipate them from the shackles of their oppressive religion. </p>
<p>Later, we examined how even as the French empire was struggling to survive in Algeria during the Algerian War of Independence, the French army targeted Algerian women through <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/13/frances-ban-veil-looks-far-more-sinister-historical-context/">unveiling campaigns and veil-burning ceremonies</a>.</p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>The class has used a wide range of materials, from an <a href="https://apexart.org/falecka.php">art exhibition</a> that showcases the women who participated in Algeria’s war of independence, to the 1971 book “<a href="https://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/fatima_is_fatima1.php">Fatima is Fatima</a>,” written by the Iranian leftist revolutionary <a href="https://merip.org/1982/01/ali-shariati-ideologue-of-the-iranian-revolution/">Ali Shariati</a>. It describes how Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, could be a model of revolutionary action for Iranian women.</p>
<p>We have also looked at <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877920957348">vintage Iranian photographs</a> on social media. In <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CivKubYMwCA/">one montage</a> that has garnered almost 100,000 likes on Instagram, color photographs of women in bikinis and miniskirts during the time of the shah transition to black-and-white photographs of women in black chadors in Iran after 1979. The first two photographs were actually Mexican American women. Still, such images could be subbed in such montages for Iranian women and used to convey a shorthand: Freedom means the freedom to be unveiled, while veiling can only mean restriction and oppression. </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>The course prepares students to critically engage with news from the Middle East by being able to identify and analyze the recurrent <a href="https://ajammc.com/2017/09/06/weaponization-nostalgia-afghan-miniskirts/">misogynistic</a> and <a href="https://fair.org/home/please-stop-using-woman-in-chador-walks-by-anti-us-mural-stock-photo-for-every-article-about-iran/">Islamophobic</a> ways the region and its peoples are represented.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192235/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Rahnama previously received fellowship funding from the John Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. </span></em></p>
Pictures of women in war play a pivotal role in the battlefield of political ideas, argues a feminist historian who examines how images and attire are used and seen in war zones and occupied lands.
Sara Rahnama, Assistant Professor of History, Morgan State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/193399
2022-11-04T06:57:52Z
2022-11-04T06:57:52Z
Malaria in Africa: why most countries haven’t beaten it yet
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492516/original/file-20221031-21-j9vutx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">80% of malaria deaths are in children younger than five. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia de Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Malaria remains one of the most devastating parasitic diseases affecting humans. In 2020 there were around 241 million cases and 672,000 malaria-related deaths. This is a sharp <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240040496">increase</a> from 2019. </p>
<p>One reason it’s so persistent is that the malaria parasite has a very <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/about/biology/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20malaria%20parasite%20life%20cycle,which%20rupture%20and%20release%20merozoites%20">complex life cycle</a>. It involves many different developmental stages and multiple hosts (mosquitoes and humans). </p>
<p>And in Africa, what adds to the challenge of controlling malaria is that the continent is home to some of the most <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/310862/9789241550499-eng.pdf">efficient malaria vectors</a>. These include <em>Anopheles gambiae</em> and <em>An. funestus</em>. Also, the malaria parasite species <em>Plasmodium falciparum</em>, the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria">dominant species</a> in Africa, is the most lethal. It’s responsible for most malaria cases and deaths – 80% of which occur in children younger than five. </p>
<p>The World Health Organization (WHO) acknowledged these factors when it excluded Africa from its first Global Malaria Eradication Campaign, which ran <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/about/history/">from 1955 until 1969</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, there have been many advances in malaria control. These include long-lasting insecticide treated nets, malaria rapid diagnostic tests and artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) for malaria treatment. </p>
<p>But malaria elimination is still a challenge. Only <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/global-malaria-programme/elimination/countries-and-territories-certified-malaria-free-by-who">two African countries</a>, Algeria and Morocco, have been certified malaria-free by the WHO. </p>
<p>There are many reasons for the elimination targets remaining out of reach. In this article we highlight four: poverty, human movement, resistance and climate change.</p>
<h2>Poverty</h2>
<p>The limited progress towards malaria elimination is not surprising considering that some of the most malaria-burdened countries in Africa are also some of <a href="https://www.malariaconsortium.org/userfiles/file/Past%20events/factsheet2%20-%20malaria%20and%20poverty.pdf">the poorest countries</a> in the world.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ending-malaria-in-africa-needs-to-focus-on-poverty-quick-fixes-wont-cut-it-169205">Ending malaria in Africa needs to focus on poverty: quick fixes won't cut it</a>
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<p>Malaria is both a cause and a consequence of poverty. The disease will therefore remain a significant problem in Africa, if more is not done to improve the socio-economic status of malaria-affected communities. Eliminating poverty to improve the health and well-being of all are part of both the <a href="https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/">millennium</a> and <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">sustainable</a> development goals. This should be a priority for governments of malaria-endemic countries.</p>
<h2>Mobility</h2>
<p>Africa has one of the fastest growing populations, with a <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement#:%7E:text=The%20African%20continent%20has%20the,region%20is%20growing%20even%20faster">high level of mobility</a>. Marginalised and vulnerable populations are some of most mobile groups within Africa. They travel vast distances across countries with varying malaria transmission intensities. </p>
<p>Human mobility is strongly associated with the global <a href="https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/5-reasons-why-pandemics-like-covid-19-are-becoming-more-likely">spread of infectious diseases</a>, as demonstrated by the recent COVID-19, Ebola and monkeypox outbreaks. This presents a challenge to Africa’s malaria elimination aspirations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-africas-porous-borders-make-it-difficult-to-contain-ebola-118719">How Africa's porous borders make it difficult to contain Ebola</a>
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<p>Malaria parasites and mosquitoes do not respect country borders, so malaria services must expand to mobile and marginalised populations. Universal access to effective malaria diagnostics and treatment will reduce the malaria burden by decreasing onward transmission.</p>
<h2>Resistance</h2>
<p>One of the biggest threats to eliminating and eradicating malaria is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria#:%7E:text=Progress%20in%20global%20malaria%20control,to%20insecticides%20among%20Anopheles%20mosquitoes">emergence and spread</a> of insecticide, diagnostic and drug resistance. </p>
<p>Both the malaria vectors and parasites have proved to be very adaptable. They have rapidly developed mechanisms to survive and multiply in the presence of insecticides and antimalarial drugs, respectively. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/some-malaria-parasites-are-evading-detection-tests-causing-an-urgent-threat-to-public-health-177258">Some malaria parasites are evading detection tests, causing an urgent threat to public health</a>
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<p>Insecticide resistance is widespread across the <a href="https://www.bdi.ox.ac.uk/news/tracking-the-spread-of-mosquito-insecticide-resistance-across-africa">African region</a>. It reduces the efficacy of strategies based on suppressing vectors, such as long-lasting insecticide treated nets and indoor residual spraying. </p>
<p>To extend the effective lifespan of the available insecticides, the WHO has provided <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44768/9789241502801_eng.pdf;jsessionid=233E06F6978781E9163F1479ED99F9F7?sequence=1">new guidance</a> in its handbook for integrated vector management. The handbook highlights the importance of routine entomological surveillance to determine the type of vectors present, changes in vector behaviour and the insecticide susceptibility status of the vector. All this information can guide effective vector suppression if available in good time. </p>
<p>Having the correct diagnostic method and treatment in place also hinges on having a robust surveillance system. The system must be capable of generating efficacy data in near real-time to allow for prompt evidence-based decision-making. The need for this type of <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/28-05-2021-statement-by-the-malaria-policy-advisory-group-on-the-urgent-need-to-address-the-high-prevalence-of-pfhrp2-3-gene-deletions-in-the-horn-of-africa-and-beyond">routine surveillance</a> has become even more urgent as African malaria parasites have developed mutations that allow them to evade detection by the most widely used rapid diagnostic tests on the continent. These undetected cases will go untreated, potentially sustaining onward transmission. The result will be major increases in malaria cases, severe disease, and potentially death.</p>
<p>Besides becoming invisible to rapid diagnostic tests, <em>P. falciparum</em> parasites in many central and west African countries have become <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/02/06/1077953012/drug-resistant-malaria-is-emerging-in-africa-doctors-are-worried-yet-hopeful">resistant</a> to artemisinins. This is a component of the most widely used antimalarials in Africa, ACTs. The spread of artemisinin-resistant parasites will potentially raise case numbers and deaths, repeating the devastating trend observed when drug-resistant parasites previously emerged. The loss of ACTs would severely set back elimination efforts as there are no novel WHO-approved antimalarials currently available. Efforts are needed to prevent the spread of artemisinin-resistant parasites through strong surveillance and containment responses.</p>
<h2>Climate change</h2>
<p>The impact of climate change is complex, but there are <a href="https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/climate-change-and-malaria-complex-relationship#:%7E:text=An%20increase%20in%20temperature%2C%20rainfall,it%20was%20not%20reported%20earlier">suggestions</a> that more places will become malaria risk areas. Mosquitoes will now be able to survive and transmit malaria in these warmer areas. This, in turn, will increase malaria cases, severe illness and deaths in the non-immune communities.</p>
<h2>Positive developments</h2>
<p>In spite of these challenges, there is some light at the end of tunnel. </p>
<p>After years of research there are two new malaria vaccines. The first, <a href="https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/press-releases/who-grants-prequalification-to-gsk-s-mosquirix-the-first-and-only-approved-malaria-vaccine/">Mosquirix</a>, has been prequalified for use by the WHO. The second, <a href="https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/malaria-new-vaccine-candidate-shows-promise-in-clinical-trials">R21/Matrix M</a>, has shown promising results in phase 2 clinical trials. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vaccines-could-be-a-game-changer-in-the-fight-against-malaria-in-africa-193233">Vaccines could be a game-changer in the fight against malaria in Africa</a>
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<p>There are new long-lasting insecticide treated nets and insecticide formulations for vector control. There are also novel strategies for parasite suppression. </p>
<p>Adding these tools to the elimination toolbox will assist Africa get closer to malaria elimination.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jaishree Raman is affiliated with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases, the Wits Research Institute for Malaria and UP Institute for Sustainable Malaria Control. She received funding from the South African Research Trust, South African Medical Research Council, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund, Clinton Health Access Initiative, National Research Foundation and the National Institute for Communicable Diseases</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shüné Oliver s affiliated with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases and the Wits Research Institute for Malaria and receives funding from the National Research Foundation, the National Health Laboratory Services Research Trust and the Female Academic Leadership fund. </span></em></p>
There are many reasons that malaria is so persistent in Africa. Four of them are poverty, human movement, resistance and climate change.
Jaishree Raman, Principal Medical Scientist and Head of Laboratory for Antimalarial Resistance Monitoring and Malaria Operational Research, National Institute for Communicable Diseases
Shüné Oliver, Medical scientist, National Institute for Communicable Diseases
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192270
2022-10-27T09:34:47Z
2022-10-27T09:34:47Z
The French-Algerian war: 60 years on, what is behind France’s reconciliation agenda?
<p>If you cross the Seine in the centre of Paris at the iconic <a href="https://www.travelfranceonline.com/pont-saint-michel-paris-bridge-facts/">Pont Saint-Michel</a> and walk along the promenade, you may glimpse a small plaque on your way towards the steps that lead down to the riverbank. Placed not on the actual bridge itself, but on a wall to the side, the plaque was mounted in October 2001 to mark 40 years since Parisian police, led by a Nazi war criminal, massacred hundreds of Algerian demonstrators on October 17 1961.</p>
<p>France and Algeria were gripped in a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/13/france-algerian-war-legacy-politics-colonialism/">bloody war</a> that would eventually lead to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/a-chronology-of-the-algerian-war-of-independence/305277/">Algerian independence</a> in 1962. On October 17, a demonstration organised by the <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm">Algerian National Liberation Front</a> (Front de libération nationale – FLN) took place in the centre of Paris. The demonstrators were made up of Algerians – men, women, children, the elderly – who were living and working in Paris, mainly on the outskirts of the capital.</p>
<p>Importantly, as the FLN had insisted, this was a peaceful demonstration, protesting against a curfew imposed on Algerians living in Paris. As demonstrators marched in the heart of the French empire’s metropolitan centre, they were met with indiscriminate <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58927939">violence on the part of the Parisian police</a>.</p>
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<p>Chief of police at the time was <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/10/18/papo-o18.html">Maurice Papon</a> who, in 1998, was convicted of complicity with Nazi Germany in crimes against humanity following his role in the deportation of Jews during the second world war. While the Parisian police downplayed the violence meted out to Algerians that night in October 1961, it is generally agreed that between 100 and 300 Algerians <a href="https://webdoc.france24.com/october-17-1961-massacre-algerians-paris-france-police-history/chapter-1.html">were killed</a>.</p>
<p>The commemorative plaque was unveiled in 2001 by mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, but no government official attended the unveiling ceremony. Its inconspicuous location and lack of state presence at its inauguration demonstrates the long period of silence and forgetting in France surrounding the massacre of 17 October 1961 and the Algerian war of Independence (1954-1962) more broadly.</p>
<h2>Agenda for reconciliation</h2>
<p>More recently, French politicians have moved to acknowledge this difficult past. In 2012, then president <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170405-france-president-francois-hollande-five-years-not-normal-look-back">François Hollande</a> belatedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-france-algeria-idUKBRE89G1NE20121017">acknowledged</a> the massacre and paid “homage” to the dead. In 2021, current president <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron">Emmanuel Macron</a> attended a commemoration ceremony and admitted that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/18/macron-statement-on-1961-protest-killings-falls-short-say-critics">inexcusable crimes</a>” had been committed by the republic on that date. </p>
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<p>These official recognitions in the past decade reflect the extent to which October 17 and the Algerian war have become a regular and important part of political and public debates around how France comes to terms with its colonial past.</p>
<p>Indeed, Macron has made this – and particularly the Algerian war – a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/politics-macrons-commemoration-algerian-war">key aspect of his political agenda</a>. So much so that he gave renowned French-Algerian historian <a href="https://benjaminstora.univ-paris13.fr/index.php/biographie/505-biography.html">Benjamin Stora</a> the task of submitting a report on how the war – and France’s colonisation of Algeria – have been remembered.</p>
<p>Underlying the report was the desire for reconciliation between French and Algerians. It <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/09/0586b6b0ef1c2fc2540589c6d56a1ae63a65d97c.pdf">was published</a> in January 2021, part of a conciliatory drive which included Macron making an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220826-macron-looks-to-past-and-future-on-algeria-visit-to-turn-a-new-page">official visit to Algeria</a> in August 2022.</p>
<p>But while attention was focused on the memorialisation of colonialism and the war, Macron’s visit was also about <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62659181">more present and pressing concerns</a>. For example, France may well look to its historical ties with Algeria to draw on its <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/algeria-oil-and-gas-hydrocarbons">considerable oil and gas reserves</a> – especially in light of the European energy crisis.</p>
<p>France has other motivations for the recent drive for reconciliation. Algerians have historically constituted one of the country’s largest immigrant populations. As a result, a significant number of French citizens – and therefore the French electorate – have Algerian roots. When Macron commissioned the report and planned his state visit, he would have had one eye on the election in April 2022 (which he won). So his agenda of reconciliation was not necessarily all about coming to terms with France’s complex past, but at least partly motivated by present political concerns.</p>
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<h2>Cultural interpretations</h2>
<p>So, if the state-sponsored approach to remembering the past, imposed from above and seeking easy reconciliation, is insufficient, where do we turn for more nuanced understandings of the complexity of these dark, violent past events? </p>
<p>Literary representations of the war go further back than the relatively recent political debates. A number deal with the events of October 17 in diverse ways. The first prominent text to do so was Didier Daeninckx’s Meurtres pour mémoire (translated into English as <a href="https://www.mhpbooks.com/books/murder-in-memoriam/">Murder in Memoriam</a>, a crime novel originally published in 1984.</p>
<p>The novel mainly deals with that other shameful period in French history, namely the collaboration with Nazi Germany during the second world war. However, the initial chapters of the text comprise a re-imagining of the demonstration and massacre that followed as experienced by a group of young Algerians living in Paris.</p>
<p>Opening the novel in this way, in a text that depicts the extent of French collaboration in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps, also draws attention to other silenced, shameful and more recent, events in French history.</p>
<p>Leïla Sebbar’s La Seine était rouge (<a href="https://iupress.org/9780253220233/the-seine-was-red/">The Seine Was Red</a>), which was published in 1999, places the 1961 massacre at the centre of its narrative. In this short novella, not only is state silence evoked, but also inter-generational silence.</p>
<p>The teenage protagonist, frustrated that her Algerian mother and grandmother have never passed on their memories of October 17 to her, retraces the footsteps of the demonstrators in central Paris. This takes her to important Parisian landmarks which glorify moments in French history. To the side of one such landmark, a commemorative plaque remembering the resistance in the second world war, she spray-paints her own ad hoc commemoration to the Algerians who resisted colonial rule on that October night.</p>
<p>Prefiguring the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200624-french-parliament-statue-of-black-code-author-colbert-splashed-with-paint">Black Lives Matter</a> movement, this act invites parallels with the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200622-protesters-daub-paris-statues-of-voltaire-french-colonial-era-general-in-red-paint">defacement of statues in 2020 in France</a>, the UK and elsewhere, of historical figures involved in the slave trade and colonial exploitation. The message we are left with in Sebbar’s novel is of the uneasy coexistence of memories of resistance and the difficulty of uncovering silenced histories.</p>
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<p>Austrian director Michael Haneke’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2006/feb/19/worldcinema">2005 thriller Hidden</a> also deals with repressed memories of the massacre, and, like La Seine était rouge, suggests that recovering silenced histories is a necessary, though difficult and traumatic task. On being asked what his opaque mystery was about, Haneke replied: “The real question the film raises is, how do we treat our conscience and our guilt and reconcile ourselves to living with our actions?”</p>
<p>What all of these depictions of October 17 end up telling us is that the path to reconciliation is fraught with intricacy and complexity. A state-sponsored agenda that seeks to impose reconciliation will not change that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Lewis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
France’s ‘renewed partnership’ with Algeria may be less about exploring a difficult and painful past and more about pressing political concerns.
Jonathan Lewis, Lecturer in French and Francophone Studies, Bangor University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/189175
2022-08-25T09:16:45Z
2022-08-25T09:16:45Z
Macron in Africa: a cynical twist to repair the colonial past while keeping a tight grip
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480624/original/file-20220823-11-sz325m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron (L) and Guinea-Bissau's President Umaro Sissoco Embalo (R) during Macron's visit in July 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late July 2022 French president Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220725-macron-embarks-on-african-visit-to-renew-relationship-with-continent">concluded a tour</a> of Cameroon, Benin and Guinea-Bissau. And he visits <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220820-five-years-after-last-visit-macron-to-return-to-algeria-in-bid-to-reset-ties">Algeria</a> between 25 and 27 August.</p>
<p>At first glance, his choice of countries is difficult to understand. Three former French colonies – Cameroon, Benin and Algeria – and a former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau, seem very different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, taken together, Macron’s visits tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while simultaneously trying to maintain the influence it gained through colonialism. </p>
<p>These two themes also emerged at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-wants-to-fix-its-relations-with-africa-but-its-going-about-it-the-wrong-way-171234">New France Africa Summit</a> in October 2021 in Montpelier. There, Macron promised investments in African technology startups as a way to increase the influence of French private business, while also promoting the scholar Achille Mbembe’s <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/11/47114246c489f3eb05ab189634bb1bf832e4ad4e.pdf">report</a> on the new relationship between France and Africa. </p>
<p>Macron got another chance to show off his good relationship with African leaders at the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/02/17-18/">European Union-African Union summit of February 2022</a>. This was hosted by Macron – France held the presidency of the European Union at the time – and EU Council president Charles Michel.</p>
<p>The penance efforts were on show in each of the recent country visits. At a press conference with Cameroon’s president Paul Biya, Macron said France’s archives on colonial rule in Cameroon would be <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220726-macron-says-france-remains-committed-to-africa-s-security-on-first-stop-of-three-nation-tour">opened</a> “in full”. He said he hoped historians from both countries would work together to investigate “painful moments”.</p>
<p>In Benin the French president <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/27/macron-contin-to-visit-benin-to-talk-about-security-and-culture">accompanied</a> Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, on a visit to an exhibition devoted to the royal treasures of Abomey. These had been robbed by France 139 years ago and were returned in November 2021. In Guinea-Bissau he <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2022-07-29/French-president-wraps-up-Africa-tour-in-Guinea-Bissau-1c2SjqOqiqs/index.html">announced</a> the opening of a French school and a sports exchange programme, in line with his increased emphasis on cultural diplomacy. </p>
<p>The effort to maintain influence was evident in all three visits too. With the presence of French troops in Mali dwindling, Paris is looking for new military options and hoping to find those with Macron’s hosts. In Benin the French president therefore talked about security while in Yaoundé he restated France remained <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/07/26/macron-promises-to-open-archives-on-cameroon-colonial-era_5991547_4.html">committed</a> to the security of the continent. </p>
<p>In Guinea-Bissau Macron declared France should “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220729-macron-promises-to-revive-relations-with-guinea-bissau-and-help-region-battle-terrorism">contribute</a> to the fight against terrorism everywhere in the region”.</p>
<p>In my view Macron exploits the increased call for the more fundamental decolonisation of African societies as a cover to exercise continued influence on the continent.</p>
<h2>Rectifying the colonial past</h2>
<p>The project for <a href="https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/about/equity/centre-for-equity-and-inclusion/race/decolonising-academia/what-does-decolonising-mean/">decolonial justice</a> has recently been used by other former colonial powers to brush up their image in Africa. Belgium recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/belgium-returns-patrice-lumumba-tooth-congolese-independence">returned a tooth</a> of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, 61 years after enabling his assassination. </p>
<p>Rectifying the colonial past has become a popular way for northern governments to do their diplomacy in Africa. In the past there were calls for new relationships and a forgetting of the colonial past. Now heads of state showcase their willingness to face colonial crimes head on. US secretary of state Antony Blinken, for instance, talked about the need to become “<a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16039-transcript-us-secretary-of-state-s-address-at-south-africa-s-future-africa-institute.html">equal partners</a>” and acknowledge </p>
<blockquote>
<p>generations of Africans whose destiny had been determined by colonial powers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In my view this is a smart way to flip the script the Russians and the Chinese employ. They stress that they never colonised the continent, a claim already put forward in the 1960s when <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/zhou-enlais-african-safari-1963-1964/">Zhou Enlai and Leonid Brezhnev</a> visited the continent. </p>
<p>In his bid to reset this narrative, Macron went as far as to brand Russia “one of the last imperial colonial powers” for its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>It’s all part of the cynical twist of Macron’s version of decolonisation, which seeks to repair the old while setting back the cause of decolonisation through intervention. </p>
<h2>Renewed interest in Africa</h2>
<p>What separates France from the US and Belgium is that the Elysée is trying to offset a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60419799">dwindling military position</a> in Mali. Its troops are leaving and are being replaced by Russian mercenaries, the so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/world/europe/wagner-group-russia-ukraine.html">Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>France intervened in the north of Mali in 2013 with <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-06_Issue-3/spet_e.pdf">Operation Serval</a>. Paris also brought in allied nations like Belgium and Sweden to provide additional capacity and training. The aim was to push out Islamic fighters in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Cold War logic that has been imposed on this trip, however, is far too simplistic. It overlooks the regional politics of West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (<a href="https://ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a>) has increasingly felt the need to intervene against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a> that have plagued the region: Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, Guinea in September 2021, Burkina Faso in January 2022 and the failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022.</p>
<p>The West African coups, rather than the intervention in Ukraine, also explain what brought Macron to Guinea-Bissau, which took over the rotating presidency of ECOWAS in July. The organisation <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">lifted sanctions</a> when the junta in Mali promised to hold elections in February 2024. </p>
<p>ECOWAS has also managed to reach an agreement with Burkina Faso’s military junta on a timetable for a transition back to democracy. A return to civilian rule is scheduled for July 2024.</p>
<p>With a combined promise of increased cultural investments and weapons for Guinea-Bissau, Macron is seeking to meddle with the regional organisation. That’s despite claiming France “always respected” the position of ECOWAS in regional matters. It is an easy way for the Élysée to blanket West Africa without having to engage in shuttle diplomacy to different West African capitals when it has a vital interest to protect.</p>
<p>Keeping the focus on Ukraine and Lavrov’s mission was therefore in the interest of the French president, who was also conveniently asked questions about why African countries had not received weapon shipments as easily as Ukraine. The delivery of weapons could then be presented as something positive, rather than a disastrous policy that hardly ever works. </p>
<p>As always, it will be regular people who will pay the price because they are forced to live in increasingly heavily armed societies. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali">uprising</a> in the north of Mali in 2013, which Macron is now seeking to manage through ECOWAS, was the consequence of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france">2011 military intervention</a> by France and its allies in Libya and the subsequent overthrow of Libyan leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muammar-al-Qaddafi">Muammar Gaddafi</a>. </p>
<p>It might set these countries back for years, preventing them from joining the African Lion economies – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa – countries that were avoided by Macron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in the United Kingdom </span></em></p>
Macron’s recent visits to Africa tell a story in which France is doing penance for its colonial crimes while trying to maintain influence gained through colonialism.
Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/187712
2022-08-03T17:40:27Z
2022-08-03T17:40:27Z
France struggled to relinquish Algeria as a nuclear test site, archives reveal
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476065/original/file-20220726-10345-2dv4z5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C981%2C970&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Explosion in the Hoggar
massif in March 1963 </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">©Photographe inconnu/ECA/ECPAD/Défense/F63-115 RC19</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Top French officials, including French President Charles de Gaulle, sought to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara following the former French colony’s independence in 1962. These plans, described in recently declassified French documents, never came to fruition. If they had, they would have violated a request made several times by the first Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella and his cabinet not to conduct atmospheric nuclear testing in their country – a call he notably extended to the rest of the world.</p>
<p>The publication in 2021 of <a href="https://www.puf.com/content/Toxique"><em>Toxique</em></a>, the French-language study of French nuclear testing in Polynesia by the physicist Sébastien Philippe and the investigative journalist Tomas Statius, recently highlighted the health and environmental risks taken for the sake of the French nuclear arsenal. <a href="https://moruroa-files.org/en/investigation/moruroa-files">Their analysis</a> revealed much greater radioactive contamination in French Polynesia than Paris had admitted, with French forces conducting nearly two hundred nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and underground between 1966 and 1996.</p>
<p>Together with a round-table event including Polynesian civil society and French officials, the publication prompted <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20210310-france-speeds-up-access-to-secret-algeria-war-archives-emmanuel-macron-classified-files">French president Emmanuel Macron</a> to order an <a href="https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/fr/article.php?larub=371&titre=essais-nucleaires-en-polynesie-francaise">unprecedented declassification of French nuclear archives</a>. The importance of these documents for <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000021625586/2022-07-01/">victims’ rights to compensation</a>, which have been guaranteed by French law since 2010, raises questions about <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-internationale-2022-2-page-172.htm">nuclear secrecy’s compatibility with democracy</a>.</p>
<p>The recent study <a href="https://www.editions-vendemiaire.com/catalogue/nouveautes/des-bombes-en-polynesie-renaud-meltz-alexis-vrignon-dir/"><em>Des Bombes en Polynésie</em></a> (2022), funded by Polynesia’s semi-autonomous government and edited by the French historians Renaud Meltz and Alexis Vrignon, has kept the public’s eyes on the Pacific. Most of the recent French declassifications also pertain to Polynesia.</p>
<p>Yet some of these documents create an opportunity to revisit Algeria’s nuclear history in the wake of the sixtieth anniversary of the country’s independence.</p>
<h2>The Algerian Sahara, the first French test site</h2>
<p>Between 1960 and 1966, France conducted in the Sahara Desert its first nuclear tests, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/info/algerie-sous-le-sable-du-sahara-le-lourd-passe-nucleaire-francais-417402">totalling 17 detonations</a>, including four in the atmosphere. </p>
<p>French nuclear ambitions collided with the Algerian War for Independence (1954–62), as the historian Roxanne Panchasi <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/history-of-the-present/article-abstract/9/1/84/155705/No-Hiroshima-in-Africa-The-Algerian-War-and-the">has explained</a>, and then with the construction of the new Algerian state. <a href="https://h-france.net/fffh/reviews/radiation-affects-three-novels-about-french-nuclear-imperialism-in-algeria/">Novelists</a>, <a href="https://www.architectural-review.com/essays/nuclear-powers-frances-atomic-bomb-tests-in-the-algerian-sahara">architects</a>, and <a href="https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2020-07/Collin-Bouveret-2020-Sous-le-sable-la-radioactivite.pdf">activists</a> have also turned their attention to these French explosions in Algeria.</p>
<p>Four atmospheric tests took place near Reggane, an oasis town in the Algerian Sahara, before French underground tests began in 1961 beneath the Hoggar Massif. Underground testing, intended to prevent a radioactive leak produced by the nuclear explosion, <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb433/">did not always achieve this goal</a>. Four underground explosions in the Algerian Sahara “were not totally contained or confined,” according to a <a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-oecst/essais_nucleaires/i3571.asp">French parliamentary report</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Nearly 70 000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues. <a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/newsletters/la-newsletter-quotidienne-5">Sign up now</a>.</em>] </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/evian-accords-1962">Evian Accords</a>, which established the ceasefire in Algeria in 1962, granted France the rights to continue using both nuclear sites for five years. At least, that was the French interpretation, which several Algerian leaders would go on to contest. The agreement did not include any clause preventing the resumption of atmospheric tests on Algerian territory. But France did not resume atmospheric tests until <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210727-french-polynesians-seek-a-reckoning-as-france-vows-to-open-archives-on-nuclear-testing">1966</a> in Polynesia.</p>
<p>Brought on by the Evian negotiations, <a href="https://www.sfhom.com/spip.php?article3910">the détente in Franco-Algerian relations</a> allowed representatives of the new Algerian state to contest the most harmful of French nuclear plans. </p>
<h2>Saharan fallout and African borders</h2>
<p>The French decision in December 1961 to switch to underground tests would not last. Why worry about a return to atmospheric testing? Following the first French explosion in 1960 radioactive fallout had landed — much to the surprise of French officials and their allies — in independent Ghana led by Kwame Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist government and in Nigeria, a British colony also on the verge of independence.</p>
<p>The Ghanaian and Nigerian governments - as the historians <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/atomic-junction/908C8667C97132B19B3DA93B90BCD41A">Abena Dove Osseo-Asare</a> and
<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13619462.2018.1519426?journalCode=fcbh20">Christopher Hill</a> have respectively documented - developed systems to measure French radioactivity in their countries. Other neighbouring states, like Tunisia, turned to the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/about">International Atomic Energy Agency</a>, and eventually to the United States, for similar assistance with fallout monitoring. </p>
<hr>
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<p>These African officials wanted scientific proof that the French explosions in Algeria had violated their sovereignty. Controversy notwithstanding, top French officials, including de Gaulle, hoped to retain the possibility of conducting atmospheric tests in the desert near Reggane in Southern Algeria.</p>
<p>In late 1961, French military officials refused to alter air traffic controls above the site, explaining in one document that it was still “<a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2150/19610908_-_19760078-72_-_Lettre_de_la_DGA_au_ministre_des_travaux_publics_et_transports_%28Maintien_du_NOTAM_Reggane%29.pdf?1656596734">not possible to predict the characteristics of future tests that could be conducted at Reggane</a>.”</p>
<p>In May 1963, the Algerian President Ben Bella grew impatient with the French refusal to cease nuclear activities in Algeria. French unwillingness to relinquish the test sites at that time threatened his domestic authority and <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899142.001.0001/acprof-9780199899142">his foreign policy</a>, which both hinged on independence from Paris. He asked Jean de Broglie, France’s State Secretary for Algerian Affairs, if French forces could hasten their departure from Reggane since the site remained unused. De Broglie did not give a straight answer, claiming that “studies” needed to be carried out to determine whether an early departure was possible. </p>
<p>Ben Bella made the same request at least two more times in 1963 to the French Ambassador to Algeria Georges Gorse, who would confirm the French decision to keep the Reggane site several more years. French interest in retaining Reggane, and the possibility of resuming atmospheric tests there, seriously worried the Algerian president, who strongly supported the <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB94/">Partial Test Ban Treaty</a> (1963). France did not sign <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/15403500322_fr.pdf">this treaty</a>, which outlawed nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.</p>
<h2>A fifth atmospheric test in Algeria? French plans to reactivate Reggane</h2>
<p>Recently declassified French documents show that, notwithstanding Algerian protests, French officials likely prepared to conduct a fifth atmospheric test at Reggane in 1964. <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1997/12/17/le-general-jean-thiry_3812159_1819218.html">General Jean Thiry</a>, in charge of the French nuclear test sites from 1963 to 1969, alluded in spring 1963 to “<a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2151/19630228_-_GR_6_V_9827_-_Lettre_du_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Thiry.pdf?1656597027">the reopening of the Hammoudia polygon [test site] for an atmospheric shot in 1964</a>,” using another name for the blast zone next to Reggane. </p>
<hr>
<p>
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</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Thiry and other top French brass worried about French capabilities to conduct underground tests following the infamous <a href="https://editionsthaddee.com/reportages/23-les-irradies-de-beryl.html"><em>Béryl</em> accident</a> in 1962. Radioactive fallout from the poorly contained shot had contaminated the
French state ministers Pierre Messmer and Gaston Palewski, French soldiers, and nearby Algerian communities.</p>
<p>Thiry was not the only French military officer to discuss new plans for Reggane. In March 1963, the Brigadier General Plenier, in the military engineering division, mentioned “<a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2152/19630312_-_GR_6_V_9827_-_Lettre_du_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Pl%C3%A9nier_au_Ministre_des_Arm%C3%A9es.pdf?1656597060">the resumption of [radiation] protection experiments during an atmospheric shot planned for the beginning of 1964</a>.” Even if he had faith in these plans moving forward, he noted that his work would “depend on details, not yet set, of the test conditions,” like the precise location or the altitude of the explosion. On March 29, 1963, the Division General Labouerie, also in military engineering, took his turn celebrating: “<a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2153/19630329_-_GR_6_V_9827_-_Lettre_du_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Labouerie_au_Ministre_des_Arm%C3%A9es.pdf?1656597094">It could be possible that favourable conditions might come together for the atmospheric explosion planned for 1964.</a>” </p>
<p>Back then, at least three military officers deep inside the French nuclear program eagerly expected the reactivation of the Reggane site. No atmospheric test took place in 1964, however. In the course of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1964/03/16/la-rencontre-de-gaulle-ben-bella-permettra-de-mieux-adapter-la-cooperation-franco-algerienne_2118967_1819218.html">his meeting with de Gaulle</a> at the Château de Champs near Paris in May 1964, the Algerian President Ben Bella had asked his French counterpart not to resume, if possible, atmospheric tests in Algeria. De Gaulle refused to guarantee it.</p>
<p>By the end of 1964, he was still discussing with his cabinet the possibility of conducting atmospheric explosions at Reggane, while they awaited the completion of France’s Pacific test site (le <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1963/05/03/le-centre-d-experimentation-du-pacifique-fonctionnera-dans-trois-ans_2213016_1819218.html">Centre d’Expérimentations du Pacifique</a>) in Polynesia.</p>
<hr>
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</em>
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<p>Even if French officials ultimately respected Ben Bella’s request, in December 1966 a top official at the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Jean Viard, <a href="https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/fr/_depot_mdh/_depot_images/TerritoiresExpeditions/Essais_Nucleaires_Polynesie/CEA/S7507098-declassifie.pdf">assessed the potential impacts of reactivating Reggane</a>. Viard did not think the option was optimal. De Gaulle would have wanted to keep the site anyway. In a note to his cabinet in February 1967, he asked them to study how it might be possible to maintain a French presence at Reggane, a site that could, without substantial renovations, facilitate only atmospheric tests.</p>
<h2>Nuclear archives and Algerian independence</h2>
<p>Nothing guaranteed French abstention from atmospheric nuclear tests in independent Algeria. Recent declassifications have revealed French plans to resume these atmospheric tests, notwithstanding the protests from the highest levels of the new Algerian state. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding years of negotiations shrouded in secrecy, French authorities would fail to reach a decision about the use of the Reggane site before the Algerian authorities acquired it. Some French archives, including military and diplomatic files from this period, remain unavailable for historical research. But glimpses suggest the importance of this episode — involving French plans abandoned during bilateral negotiations — for the French nuclear weapons program, for the new Algerian state, and for the détente between these two countries. New access to French nuclear archives, despite gaps, has begun to illuminate little known aspects of Algerian Independence on its sixtieth anniversary.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Fraise has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (NUCLEAR project, grant agreement No. 759707).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Austin R. Cooper ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
The unprecedented declassification of French nuclear archives sheds light upon the nuclear tests in Algeria circa 1960.
Thomas Fraise, Doctorant au sein du projet ERC NUCLEAR, Nuclear Knowledges/CERI, Sciences Po
Austin R. Cooper, Postdoctoral fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/186675
2022-08-01T13:54:46Z
2022-08-01T13:54:46Z
Unpacking the power plays over Western Sahara
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475103/original/file-20220720-14-firre3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand the freedom of the Sahrawi population. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jesus Merida/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/unpacking-the-power-plays-over-western-sahara-186675&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The western Mediterranean region has recently witnessed an intensifying set of diplomatic and economic stand-offs between neighbours Morocco, Algeria, and Spain. </p>
<p>In 2021, Algiers <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-morocco-sever-diplomatic-ties">completely severed</a> its already fractured relations with Rabat, and then <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/01/algeria-to-halt-gas-exports-to-spain-via-morocco//">halted gas exports</a> via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline that flows through Morocco. </p>
<p>More recently, Algeria has launched a number of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/8/algeria-suspends-spain-co-operation-over-w-sahara-dispute">diplomatic protests</a> against Spain and frozen some of its trade relations. It has also suggested that it no longer views Madrid as a <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/algeria-suspends-treaty-of-friendship-and-cooperation-with-spain">reliable</a> political and economic partner. </p>
<p>At the centre of these tensions is the disputed territory of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14115273">Western Sahara</a>, a 266,000km² country slightly larger than the whole of the United Kingdom. It is located across from Spain’s Canary Islands along Africa’s Atlantic coast, primarily between Mauritania and Morocco. </p>
<p>For a long time the Western Sahara dispute was considered a frozen conflict. But it roared back to life in late 2020 when the Algerian-backed Sahrawi nationalist movement, the Frente Polisario (Polisario Front), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-westernsahara-idUSKBN27U0GE">resumed</a> its armed struggle. The front, which is demanding independent statehood, had been adhering to a United Nations ceasefire since 1991.</p>
<p>Morocco has illegally occupied Western Sahara with tacit European and American blessing since 1975. It controls roughly three fourths of the territory, including its major cities and economic resources. The most important of these are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16101666">fisheries and phosphate rock</a>. </p>
<p>Morocco has also encouraged mass migration of its own citizens, who now likely equal the number of native Sahrawis in the territory. </p>
<p>Rabat has asserted historical title to Western Sahara since the 1950s. But the territory’s right to independence has been enshrined under <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/www.un.org.dppa.decolonization/files/2009_5_nsgt_western_sahara.pdf">UN decolonisation law</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://vest-sahara.no/en/news/the-question-of-sovereignty-in-the-western-sahara-conflict">landmark 1975 opinion</a> of the International Court of Justice found the justices unconvinced that the territory belonged to anyone but the native Sahrawi people. </p>
<p>Spain first took control of the land in <a href="https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1991/dec/12/western-sahara">1885</a>. </p>
<p>Subsequent UN opinions and rulings of the European Union Court of Justice have upheld Western Sahara’s right to independence. Western Sahara remains on the UN list of non-self-governing territories. But it’s the only one without a clearly designated administering power. </p>
<p>Western Sahara matters because of the legal principles at stake. These include Morocco’s expansion of territory by force. Another is the right of non-self-governing territories like Western Sahara to choose their sovereign status. </p>
<p>Experts have <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/">warned</a> for a long time that the unwillingness of the North Atlantic powers to put pressure on Morocco to resolve the conflict will inevitably lead to an even more complicated and entangled set of crises.</p>
<p>This has now come to pass. The failure to resolve the issue is having a negative effect on security and trade relations across the western Mediterranean. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>In October 1975, knowing that Spain intended to grant Western Sahara its independence, Morocco announced its intent to take the territory by force. To this end it launched a secret <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4005894">military invasion</a>. </p>
<p>In the chaos of the ensuing transition from Spanish to joint Moroccan-Mauritanian rule, <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/decades-displacement-45-years-sahrawi-refugee-camps">nearly 40%</a> of the Sahrawi population fled to neighbouring Algeria. Today, over 170,000 continue to live in these refugee camps. </p>
<p>The Cold War strongly influenced the 1975–1991 war between Morocco and Polisario. Rabat received substantial backing from the US, France and Saudi Arabia. For its part, the Western Saharan nationalist movement received extensive support from Algeria and other influential members of the Non-Aligned Movement.</p>
<p>This aid allowed Polisario to quickly eject Mauritania from the territory. Nevertheless Moroccan forces successfully ensconced themselves behind a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-polisario-front-morocco-and-the-western-sahara-conflict/">heavily mined 2,700km barrier</a> that bisects the territory to this day. </p>
<p>By the time the UN was able to arrange a cease-fire in the early 1990s, Western Sahara had been recognised as its own state by dozens of countries and the African Union. </p>
<h2>Dashed hopes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minurso">UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</a> (Minurso, its French acronym) was also created in 1991. It sought to poll the native Sahrawi population on the simple question of whether to join with Morocco or form an independent state. </p>
<p>Despite the elegance of this solution, Morocco and Polisario maintained wildly different understandings of how the UN should go about identifying the Sahrawi electorate for the vote. </p>
<p>These criteria were eventually solidified in a series of agreements negotiated by former US Secretary of State James Baker in the <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_62897.html">Houston Accords of 1997</a>. </p>
<p>Just as Minurso was finalising the provisional voter list, two critical developments derailed the UN referendum effort. Morocco’s long-reigning monarch, <a href="https://www.economist.com/obituary/1999/07/29/king-hassan-of-morocco">Hassan II</a>, died in the summer of 1999, handing his kingdom to a young and untested Mohammed VI. </p>
<p>Then, in East Timor, a similar UN referendum effort saw Indonesian security forces go on a <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/1999/09/02/the-violent-reaction-to-east-timors-voice">violent rampage</a> when the Timorese voted for independence. </p>
<p>Morocco’s allies on the Security Council, primarily France and the US, realised that the referendum in Western Sahara was heading towards a similar outcome. The fear was that people would vote for independence but the occupying power would refuse to recognise it. </p>
<p>Since 2000 the Security Council has pressed Morocco and Polisario to develop a more comprehensive political agreement between themselves. The Security Council wanted an agreement that would satisfy Western Sahara’s legal right to self-determination. This has proved to be a fool’s errand. </p>
<p>Under Mohammed VI, Morocco’s policy has shifted to vehemently opposing any process or proposal that could lead to an independent Western Sahara. Morocco has instead put forward a proposal to offer Western Sahara limited self-governance under ultimate Moroccan control. </p>
<p>New tensions were added to the mix in 2022 when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13992/Madrid_embroiled_in_zero-sum_fight_with_Rabat_and_Algiers">endorsed</a> Morocco’s proposal. The endorsement reflected an important change in Madrid’s policy towards Western Sahara, its former colony, which had been officially neutral on the question of final status. </p>
<p>The statement precipitated the recent break in Algerian-Spanish relations. </p>
<p>An even more extreme position had been taken by Donald Trump. In his last days in office in late 2020, the former US president extended official <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/united-states-recognizes-moroccos-sovereignty-over-western-sahara/36A7A41EC0BB341D79CE4661EDD8B60E">US recognition</a> of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. No other North Atlantic power has done so.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Polisario, citing international law, continues to demand a final status vote with an independence option. </p>
<p>With the UN Security Council continually focused on more pressing crises, the Western Sahara issue has faded, barely keeping the comatose peace process on life support. </p>
<p>The fifth in a series of UN envoys attempted to visit Moroccan occupied Western Sahara for the first time in July 2022 only to be <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/un-envoy-cancels-western-sahara-trip-after-rabat-visit">denied access</a> by Rabat. </p>
<p>Thus recent developments between Morocco, Spain, and Algeria should be understood as a more aggressive posture on the part of Algiers to defend its strategic interests vis-à-vis Western Sahara. </p>
<p>What makes Algeria’s policy shift all the more extraordinary is Algiers’ traditional refusal to mix politics (Western Sahara) and economics (oil). </p>
<p>The global energy crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine would appear to strengthen its position, as Algeria is Africa’s largest exporter of gas. </p>
<p>What remains to be seen is whether Madrid, Paris, Brussels and Washington have got the message yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Mundy is a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. He has previously received funding from the American Institute for Maghreb Studies (AIMS), the Project on Middle East Political Science, the Social Science Research Council, the Century Foundation, Security in Context, and the Fulbright program. He is a member of the AIMS board of directors and the editorial committee of Middle East Report. </span></em></p>
Long considered a frozen conflict, the Western Sahara dispute roared back to life in late 2020, reviving old wounds and inflicting fresh ones.
Jacob Mundy, Associate Professor, Colgate University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180422
2022-04-11T13:47:44Z
2022-04-11T13:47:44Z
Setting up the G5 Sahel: why an option that seemed unlikely came into being
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455762/original/file-20220401-12-w8cda2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A G5 Sahel meeting on Burkina Faso and Mali</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/minusma/40484342923">MINUSMA/Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At first glance, the creation in 2014 of the G5 Sahel, an international organisation set up to deal with conflict management in the Sahel, seemed unlikely. Some analysts were already describing a “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security">security traffic jam</a>” in the region. This was in reference to the fact that there were a range of actors involved in conflict management in the Sahel. </p>
<p>Indeed, there were already structures in place, notably the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa">African Peace and Security Architecture</a>. As I showed in my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707">earlier research</a>, African and non-African governments promoted this architecture vigorously – at least on paper. With that institutional framework as a backbone – combined with widespread international support – the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sought to play an active role in conflict management in the Sahel.</p>
<p>There were, however, several reasons why Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – as well as others, particularly France – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2022.2031993">considered</a> the establishment of the G5 Sahel (as well as the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2017) as helpful despite the existing security architecture.</p>
<h2>Bypassing the African security architecture</h2>
<p>There were early signs of such a move. Once a crisis in Mali deepened throughout 2012, the AU and ECOWAS decided to step up to lead conflict management in the area. In December 2012, the United Nations Security Council <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/2085">authorised</a> the AU’s and ECOWAS’s African-led International Support Mission to Mali, or AFISMA.</p>
<p>Despite this, some regional leaders searched for alternatives. Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou, for example, asked France to intervene. Other leaders like Macky Sall of Senegal and Alpha Condé of Guinea likewise supported a French intervention. This was effectively a snub of the AU and ECOWAS.</p>
<p>The French military – and eventually President François Hollande – considered the AU and ECOWAS as incapable as I elaborated <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264087682_The_UN_and_the_African_Union_in_Mali_and_beyond_A_shotgun_wedding">elsewhere</a>. In early 2013, Hollande decided to deploy Opération Serval, a French military operation to fight Islamic militants who were gaining ground in Mali. Benin’s president Boni Yayi applauded France. He <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/1/27/african-union-says-its-mali-response-was-slow">described</a> the decision as something that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we should have done a long time ago to defend a member country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With regional states themselves indicating a limited trust in the AU and ECOWAS to solve the conflict in Mali – and with the conflict spilling over into the wider Sahel – the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire">idea</a> arose that a new collective defence mechanism should be tried out.</p>
<h2>Against the odds?</h2>
<p>Despite the regional “security traffic jam” and the existence of the African security architecture, there were many reasons for the G5 to create a new organisation.</p>
<p>First and foremost, it meant that the governments of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger would have more control over actions on the ground. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, the G5 Sahel blurs the line between troop contributing and mission host country. G5 Sahel troops are deployed within their own countries. This gives the governments notable control over their actions.</p>
<p>Second, the new organisation served the interests of the G5 Sahel leaders – it helped protecting their regimes. Setting up the G5 Sahel Joint Force meant that they had a vehicle to further their own interests. The force’s <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel/">mandate</a> includes fighting both terrorism and organised cross-border crime. </p>
<p>The G5 states also receive substantial military and financial aid. France initially spent Euro 8 million, the European Union donated Euro 50 million, Saudi Arabia pledged Euro 85 million and the US allocated US$51 million. </p>
<p>Leaders benefited from these funds as it allowed them to build stronger and better equipped security forces that helped them to cling to power. </p>
<p>Finally, the G5 states saw the situation as offering them an opportunity to push back against Algeria and Nigeria, the main regional powers. Algeria had been the dominant player in the Sahel region and Nigeria had played a key role within the ECOWAS. Their dominance in regional affairs meant that the G5 states had less control over conflict management.</p>
<h2>Overlap</h2>
<p>Yet the establishment of the G5 Sahel caused an institutional overlap. It meant that the United Nations, the AU, the ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel had a mandate to deal with conflicts in the region. One consequence was friction between the organisations as well as competition over financial support, human resource expertise and technical assistance.</p>
<p>This was, however, not perceived as problematic. Particularly France wanted to see the creation of the organisation. The French government was involved in the discussions among G5 Sahel leaders from the beginning. It engaged in substantial diplomatic efforts to drum up international support for the new organisation, playing a key role in organising funding for the entity, and participating in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2021_442_E.pdf">G5 Sahel Operational Coordination Committee</a>.</p>
<p>France’s assistance in forming the G5 Sahel is hardly surprising given that the organisation effectively serves its interests and that of its Western partners. It enables Paris to subcontract security and control migration without shouldering too much risk.</p>
<p>France was aware of the many shortcomings of the G5 Sahel. Yet having received little active support from its European partners for its counter-terrorism efforts in Mali and beyond and being itself financially overstretched, France was in need for relief.</p>
<p>As no other major actor – besides the AU – indicated its willingness to engage with the crisis in the Sahel, the options for France narrowed. As Michael Shurkin has <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/11/what-is-the-sahel-g5-force-and-why-should-the-us-support.html">expressed</a> it: The spirit was </p>
<blockquote>
<p>not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These reasons led to a situation in which the creation of the G5 Sahel was a logical step. Another actor was born and added to the “security traffic jam”. </p>
<p>Despite its many flaws, question marks behind its <a href="https://www.prio.org/download/publicationfile/2355/Sandnes%20-%20The%20G5%20Sahel%20Joint%20Force_Operationalisation%20and%20dependency%20on%20external%20actors,%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%205-2021%20(2).pdf">effectiveness</a>, and the problems caused by the institutional overlap, the G5 Sahel is likely to stay. This is because it serves the interests of regional governments, France and its Western partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Welz acknowledges the kind support of the German Foundation for Peace Research. </span></em></p>
The creation of the G5 Sahel added to the traffic of security groupings in the region
Martin Welz, Lecturer of Political Science, University of Hamburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/178791
2022-03-16T14:00:54Z
2022-03-16T14:00:54Z
Algeria and Libya are unlikely to plug Europe’s energy gap
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452425/original/file-20220316-19-1pvcw7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abdelmadjid Tebboune after winning the Algerian presidential election in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Nacerdine ZEBAR/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ramifications of the Russian war on Ukraine are being felt across the world. The effects are likely to be particularly acute for countries in North Africa. The region is a major exporter of energy and raw material, and has had complex, sometimes contentions, relations with Europe, the US and Russia.</p>
<p>The US reportedly <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/012522-us-working-with-europe-to-identify-additional-non-russian-gas-supplies-white-house">asked</a> North African and Middle Eastern countries to increase their gas production to supply Europe.</p>
<p>Among the Maghreb countries that could step to the fore are Algeria and Libya, with Algeria harbouring the highest potential. Algeria is one of the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/europe-looks-to-africa-to-fill-natural-gas-gap/a-61017873">world’s largest gas producers</a>, and is among <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/europe-looks-to-africa-to-fill-natural-gas-gap/a-61017873">Europe’s top five LNG exporters</a>. It could technically increase its gas supply to Europe through several operating pipelines running through Italy and Spain.</p>
<p>However, Algeria’s <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/algerias-opaque-transition-potential-trap-upcoming-elections">opaque domestic political decision-making</a>, highly contentious relationship with neighbouring Morocco, and decades-long strategic alignment with Russia, stand in the way. </p>
<p>Libya is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/6472625.html">Africa’s largest</a> oil reserves holder. It also has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/12/15/libya-has-promising-future-with-oil-reserves-minister//">sizeable gas assets</a>. But the country has been marred by a bitter armed conflict, exasperated by the presence of Russian mercenaries on its territory. This has all but undermined its energy <a href="https://atlantic-community.org/energy-in-north-africa-challenges-and-opportunities/">export potential</a> to Europe. </p>
<p>Algeria has a close relationship with Russia and the US largely based on strategic military synergies. In Libya, Russia <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-pendulum-how-russia-sways-its-way-to-more-influence-in-libya/">put its weight</a> behind the main spoiler – General Khalifa Haftar. For its part, the US has mainly focused on working with the UN and with Libyans interested in organising contested election processes.</p>
<p>Countries like Algeria are unlikely to step up to replace Russian gas supply without an implicit nod from Russia. European policy makers had hoped Algeria and Libya would alleviate European dependence on Russia. However, North African countries are acting based on their own calculus. This involves seeking concessions from Europe and the US on their priorities and managing their relationship with Russia. </p>
<p>This diminishes hopes of European policy makers expecting that Algeria and Libya would alleviate economic hardship. </p>
<h2>Algeria is walking tightrope</h2>
<p>Algeria, a major gas exporter to the EU, is walking a tight rope. It is undoubtedly the country with the most expansive relations with Russia in the region. This is requiring it to try and reconcile two conflicting principles. Living by its longstanding position on the sanctity of international borders while signalling its continuous unwavering support to its strategic military and diplomatic ally, Russia. </p>
<p>Algeria is <a href="https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/fs_2103_at_2020.pdf">Russia’s third largest weapon importer</a>. In the lead-up to the Ukraine invasion, Algeria stopped short of signalling any antagonism towards its historic ally.</p>
<p>However, as the EU seeks new, sustainable alternatives to the sanction-stricken Russian energy exporters, Algeria is strategically positioned to fill the gap. It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-algeria-gas-idUKC6N2UL01Q">could</a>, technically, meet Europe’s gas demands. </p>
<p>Algeria currently exports approximately 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually via the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-offers-supply-eu-extra-gas-amid-russia-ukraine-crisis">TransMed pipeline</a> to Italy. It could, increase this by nearly half the current rate. The Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG), linking Algeria’s largest gas field to Spain through Morocco was <a href="https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2021-10-28/why-the-closure-of-an-algerian-gas-pipeline-is-bad-news-for-spain.html">shut down in October 2021</a> when Algeria severed its relations with Morocco.</p>
<p>But Algeria seems to be <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220307-algeria-not-responding-to-europe-requests-for-increase-in-gas-supplies/">reluctant</a> to fulfil requests to increase its gas exports to Europe. Algeria won’t want to alienate Russia. Nevertheless it will want to take advantage of skyrocketing energy prices. It might also try and secure concessions from the EU and US on a number of issues the country deems strategic, such as Western Sahara. </p>
<p>The dispute over the Western Sahara territory has strained relations between Morocco and Algeria since the 1970s. Morocco <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_20.pdf">took control of most of the territory</a> in 1976. Algeria has provided <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/algeria-morocco-tensions-onset-regional-cold-war">military, diplomatic, and financial support</a> to the Polisario Front ever since. The front is an armed insurgent group working for the independence of the territory. Decades and several UN mediation attempts later, the conflict continues to be intractable. </p>
<p>In 2020 the US administration recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory as part of the tripartite normalisation agreement known as <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/morocco-and-israel-are-friendlier-than-ever-thanks-to-the-abraham-accords-but-what-does-this-mean-for-the-rest-of-north-africa/">the Abraham Accords</a>. Algeria was facing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-president-makes-first-appearance-since-hospitalisation-2020-12-13/">deep political strife</a> and took a while to respond to the US recognition and Morocco’s perceived assertive posture. </p>
<p>It was only in 2021, when president Abdelmajid Tebboune consolidated his power base, that Algeria turned up the heat on Morocco. Among its retaliatory measures was the <a href="https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2021-10-28/why-the-closure-of-an-algerian-gas-pipeline-is-bad-news-for-spain.html">discontinuation</a> of its longstanding agreement with Morocco on the transfer of gas to Spain through the MEG pipeline. </p>
<p>Algeria has expressed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/algeria-westernsahara-usa-idUSKBN28M0MZ">strong frustrations</a> at the perceived Morocco-friendly positions of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/2021-report-benefits-people-western-sahara-extending-tariff-preferences-products-western-sahara_en">European Commission</a> and the US on Western Sahara. Algeria could well try to link gas capacity increases to a watering down of EU/US support for Morocco on Western Sahara. And it may have just found an ally for that: Spain.</p>
<p>The Iberian Kingdom is highly <a href="https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2021-10-28/why-the-closure-of-an-algerian-gas-pipeline-is-bad-news-for-spain.html">dependent on Algerian natural gas exports</a> and views a potential blow out in North Africa as a direct threat to its national and economic security. With Algeria’s sustained political and economic boycott of Morocco, coupled with its unprecedented military chest beating, the region is closer to war than it has ever been since the 1960s. </p>
<p>Morocco, designated by the US as a major non-NATO Ally, has traditionally aligned itself with the US and the EU on key military and diplomatic matters. At the same time it has sought to maintain “positive neutrality” with Russia. </p>
<p>For its part, Algeria has been increasingly looking for clear signals from Russia about where it stands on the Western Sahara issue. It was in that context that Russia, in an extraordinary move, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211029194046/https://tass.com/politics/1355843">abstained</a> in October 2021 from the UN Security Council vote on Western Sahara. This was preceded by <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88/2398055">President Putin’s Special Representative for the Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov</a>, receiving a high-level Polisario delegation in Moscow. </p>
<p>Russia’s actions were symbolically significant. But it didn’t go as far as fully embracing the desired Algerian position by vetoing the resolution, or, more radically, recognising Western Sahara as independent. </p>
<p>It was against this background that Algeria’s abstained in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-set-censure-russia-over-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-02/">March 3 UN General Assembly resolution</a> on Russia. For its part, Morocco stated a no-show despite its <a href="https://twitter.com/MarocDiplomatie/status/1497600367802073094?s=20&t=rjlvvwTWOLUAehQrGKFh6Q">tacit rejection</a> of the Russian assault.</p>
<h2>Libya’s case</h2>
<p>Libya’s oil minister has <a href="https://libyaupdate.com/libya-is-unable-to-replace-russian-gas-says-oil-minister/">already announced</a> that “Libya does not have sufficient reserves to make a difference.” </p>
<p>Since last month, Libya has plunged into another political crisis characterised by <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-man-from-misrata-why-libya-has-two-prime-ministers-again/">two competing governments</a>. This jeopardises political progress the country had achieved in early 2021 when the Government of National Unity was <a href="https://mena.fes.de/blog/e/assessing-the-first-100-days-of-the-government-of-national-unity">established</a> as the first national government unifying all parts of Libya since 2013. </p>
<p>The renewed power struggle has adverse effects on Libya’s production of natural resources: Libya’s oil production has fallen below 1 million barrels a day and the state-controlled National Oil Corporation <a href="https://gcaptain.com/libyas-oil-production-drops-as-political-crisis-deepens/">halted shipments</a> from the ports of Zawiya and Mellitah after armed actors <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/libyan-key-oil-fields-resume-production-after-3-week-shutdown">once again</a> shut down Sharara, the country’s biggest field. </p>
<p>In the current power struggle, Libyan politicians are reliant on local support but also international backers. High-ranking officials have been outspoken in their condemnation of the Russian attack. Nevertheless, Libya’s alliances are volatile. It still has Russian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58009514">mercenaries in the country</a>. In addition, Russia has proven far more flexible on the unpopular aim among many Libyan elites to conduct elections soon. This is something that the UN, US and European countries are pushing for.</p>
<h2>Shake up on the horizon</h2>
<p>Maghreb countries, despite their capacities, are unlikely to step up to replace Russian gas supply without an implicit nod from Russia. This could give way to complex new regional alignments and posturing. </p>
<p>However, the current Ukraine crisis and attempts by the US and the EU to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-venezuela-discuss-easing-sanctions-make-little-progress-sources-2022-03-06/">“separate” Russia from its key regional allies</a> (in this case, Algeria), coupled with what Algeria can offer the EU in terms of energy, could potentially shake the equilibrium in the Great Powers relations with the Morocco and Algeria dyad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inga Kristina Trauthig is affiliated with the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies (IMES) at King's College London. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:amine.ghoulidi@kcl.ac.uk">amine.ghoulidi@kcl.ac.uk</a> is affiliated with the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies (IMES) at King's College London.</span></em></p>
Maghreb countries are unlikely to step up to replace Russian gas supplies without an implicit nod from Moscow.
Inga Kristina Trauthig, PhD Candidate at King's College, King's College London
Amine Ghoulidi, PhD Candidate at King's College London, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/178879
2022-03-14T18:57:40Z
2022-03-14T18:57:40Z
Russia’s war on Ukraine is driving up wheat prices and threatens global supplies of bread, meat and eggs
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451493/original/file-20220311-15-ztcm3i.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=176%2C149%2C1955%2C1023&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia and Ukraine between them account for almost <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/wheat">a quarter</a> of the world’s wheat exports. </p>
<p>Russia and Ukraine are also big exporters of maize (corn), barley, and other grains that much of the world relies on to make food. </p>
<p>Wheat alone accounts for an estimated <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264675389_Feeding_humanity_through_global_food_trade">20%</a> of human calorie consumption. </p>
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<iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/8930887/embed" title="Interactive or visual content" class="flourish-embed-iframe" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="width:100%;height:800px;" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-scripts allow-downloads allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<div style="width:100%!;margin-top:4px!important;text-align:right!important;"><a class="flourish-credit" href="https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/8930887/?utm_source=embed&utm_campaign=visualisation/6827820" target="_top"><img alt="Made with Flourish" src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/made_with_flourish.svg"> </a></div>
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<p>Since the start of February, as war became more likely, the grains and oilseed <a href="https://www.igc.int/en/markets/marketinfo-goi.aspx">price index</a> compiled by the International Grains Council has jumped 17%.</p>
<p>The big drivers have been jumps of 28% in the price of <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/wheat">wheat</a>, 23% in the price of <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/maize-corn-flour">maize</a> and 22% in the price of <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/barley-2100300">barley</a>.</p>
<p>Russia and Ukraine account for <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/barley-2100300">one fifth</a> of the world’s barley exports. Maize is a common substitute for wheat and barley.</p>
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<p><iframe id="291PL" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/291PL/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
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<p>Russia and Ukraine are also enormous producers of sunflower oil, between them accounting for around <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/sunflower-seed-or-safflower-oil-crude">70%</a> of global exports. </p>
<p>Among the world’s biggest wheat importers are <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/hs92/wheat">Egypt</a>, along with its North African neighbours Algeria and Nigeria, one of the world’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-poverty-profile-is-grim-its-time-to-move-beyond-handouts-163302">poorest</a> nations.</p>
<p>Indonesia, Turkey and the Philippines are also big importers.</p>
<p>Supplies from Russia might come through – and Russia is in <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-sanctions-are-biting-harder-than-imagined-and-itll-get-worse-178322">desperate need</a> of foreign exchange. But Ukraine’s ports are closed, transport infrastructure is disrupted and might not be working when harvest season begins in July, and barley planting would normally begin about now.</p>
<h2>Rationing and riots have happened before</h2>
<p>Sudden shortages and price hikes will hit poor countries and their poorest citizens hard. Low income households spend far more of their income on <a href="https://nutritionj.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12937-020-00654-5">staples</a> such as bread than high income households. </p>
<p>The effects will flow through to meat and egg prices, as cereal grains are used as feed of livestock and poultry production.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa's food supplies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Throughout history, violence and unrest have flowed from hikes in commodity prices. <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-bread-riots-protests-erupt-after-subsidy-cut-hits-poor">Egypt</a> was racked with bread riots and rationing in 2017. <a href="https://www.detailedpedia.com/wiki-2022_Kazakh_protests">Kazakhstan</a> suffered massive protests in January after a spike in liquefied gas prices.</p>
<p>Humanitarian organisations are set to face greater calls for food aid, which will be more expensive to provide.</p>
<p>Fortunately, the big southern hemisphere wheat producers, Australia and Argentina, have produced <a href="https://daff.ent.sirsidynix.net.au/client/en_AU/search/asset/1033304/0">bumper crops</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-war-in-ukraine-will-affect-food-prices-178693">How the war in Ukraine will affect food prices</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The value of Australian wheat production is set to hit an <a href="https://daff.ent.sirsidynix.net.au/client/en_AU/search/asset/1033304/0">all-time high</a>.</p>
<p>But food supply chains and global stability are certain to be tested. </p>
<p>It will take a village to stop this war and mitigate its repercussions. The rich and powerful of the village should do all they can to hold it together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Ubilava does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Wheat accounts for about 20% of human calorie consumption, and Russia and Ukraine are both major exporters. The war could hit household food supplies in countries as far apart as Egypt and Indonesia.
David Ubilava, Senior Lecturer of Economics, University of Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/176037
2022-01-31T13:51:24Z
2022-01-31T13:51:24Z
Snowfall in the Sahara desert: an unusual weather phenomenon
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443434/original/file-20220131-117572-tk68h8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Snowfall in the Sahara desert.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">derdour rachid/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Snowfall in a hot desert may seem a contradiction but snow has been recorded <a href="https://www.livescience.com/sahara-desert-ice-beautiful-photos.html">several times</a> in the Sahara Desert over the last decades, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60045153">most recently</a> in January 2022. Thus, snowfall may be unusual but is not unprecedented in the region. </p>
<p>In order for snow to form, two distinctive weather properties are needed: cold temperatures and moist air. The presence of snow reflects a special combination of air circulation in the atmosphere and the nature of the land surface upon which the snow falls.</p>
<p>Although the Sahara commonly experiences very high temperatures (more than 50°C), low temperatures are also recorded (in particular at night) because of the bare land surface and the cloudless skies. A maximum cold of -14°C was recorded in Algeria in January 2005 during the northern hemisphere winter. </p>
<p>The Sahara is the world’s largest hot desert. It <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">spans across</a> 11 countries in northern Africa: Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Western Sahara, Sudan and Tunisia. It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Red Sea on the east, the Mediterranean Sea on the north and the Sahel Savannah on the south. </p>
<p>Winter air circulation patterns draw cool, moist air towards the northern Sahara from the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This results in higher winter precipitation along the Saharan fringe in this season. </p>
<p>Over higher ground – such as the Atlas Mountains of Morocco and Algeria – rising air can cool, condense, and if the air is cold enough its moisture can freeze to form snow crystals and then, eventually, a blanket of snowfall. If the land surface is also cold, snow can persist and not immediately melt away. </p>
<p>It is under these weather conditions, and in these mountainous areas, that snow in the Sahara can occasionally be found.</p>
<h2>Saharan rainfall and snowfall</h2>
<p>The Sahara’s centre is hyperarid, receiving less than 100 mm of rainfall per year, but it also has water bodies on three of its four sides. Wet air comes into the region from the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean, by low-pressure cyclones in the northern Sahara during winter, and monsoon rains in the southern Sahara during summer. The peripheries of the desert are therefore wetter than its centre. This means that snow is more likely to form at the periphery of the desert.</p>
<p>The Atlas Mountains in particular act as a snowtrap because of their proximity to the Atlantic and elevation. The Algerian town of Aïn Séfra received snow in the northern hemisphere winters of 1979, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2021 and 2022. This <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91556/a-dusting-of-white-in-the-sahara">latter event</a> was just a light dusting, transforming the sand dunes with a thin white coat, whereas in 2018 for example up to 30 cm of snow fell in higher elevation areas. Several ski resorts are found in the Atlas Mountains (mainly with machine-made snow however) as <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/77156/snow-in-the-atlas-mountains-of-morocco">evidence shows</a> that snow falls relatively frequently here.</p>
<h2>The Sahara and climate change</h2>
<p>Is snow in the Sahara becoming more or less common? The short answer is that we don’t yet know. This is in part because of the lack of data on past events, but also because climate modelling effort has not focused on the Sahara, an area of low population.</p>
<p>A key property of the Sahara is its size (9 million km2) and remoteness. This means that satellite remote sensing methods rather than field observations are now used to map the timing, amount and distribution of rainfall and snowfall. But this only extends to the last few decades: there is <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/89302/rare-snow-in-the-african-desert">very little evidence</a> for snowfall patterns prior to satellite records becoming available in the 1970s. </p>
<p>So Saharan snowfall historically may be more common than we think. It would be interesting to use anthropological evidence and oral histories to explore this possibility.</p>
<p>Globally, however, climate change is leading to more unpredictable weather patterns. In the Sahara, this may mean increased variability of rainfall along its wetter Sahelian fringe and along the Atlantic and Mediterranean seaboards (including in the Atlas Mountains). </p>
<p>Snow events are likely to continue –- and may become more variable in timing and quantity –- if colder conditions over the mountains persist.</p>
<p>Although snow patterns are uncertain, this is not the main challenge that the Sahara faces under climate change. It’s <a href="https://earth.org/data_visualization/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-sahara-desert/">predicted</a> that the landward side of the mountains will become drier and the centre of the Sahara will remain dry and become even hotter. Increased dryness and unsustainable pumping and pollution of groundwater aquifers means that there is less water available for its agriculture and growing cities. </p>
<p>Over recent decades, the Sahara itself has also <a href="https://earth.org/data_visualization/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-sahara-desert/">been getting bigger</a> because of the southern Sahel becoming drier and turning to desert, and this is likely to continue in future decades.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: There’s no profile picture of the author of this article at their request.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasper Knight does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
In order for snow to form, two distinctive weather properties are needed: cold temperatures and moist air. The Sahara can tick these boxes.
Jasper Knight, Professor of Physical Geography, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/171234
2021-11-17T14:43:49Z
2021-11-17T14:43:49Z
France wants to fix its relations with Africa. But it’s going about it the wrong way
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431974/original/file-20211115-19-or7up2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron, right, and President of Burkina Faso Roch Marc Christian Kabore at the Elysee Palace, in Paris in November.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Antoine Gyori/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>French President Emmanuel Macron has committed himself to remaking the country’s relationship with Africa. In 2017, six months after his inauguration, he visited the University of Ouagadougou, in Burkina Faso, where he gave a <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/28/emmanuel-macrons-speech-at-the-university-of-ouagadougou">speech</a> announcing a new French policy that focused on African youth. </p>
<p>He wanted to forge a new connection with Francophone and Anglophone Africa while also acknowledging the traumas that French colonialism had caused. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">The Algerian War</a> of independence from France between 1954 and 1962, for instance, is still an open wound to many in Africa.</p>
<p>Macron followed his visit four years later with a key event showcasing the new direction of Afro-French relations. He hosted the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/the-new-africa-france-summit-reinventing-our-relationship-together/">New France-Africa Summit</a> in Montpellier, in October 8, 2021. </p>
<p>Civil society representatives from France and Africa met to discuss topics such as ‘citizen engagement and democracy’ and <a href="https://sommetafriquefrance.org/en/programme/">‘doing business and innovating’</a>. The summit was organised with the help of Cameroonian intellectual and philosopher <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/users/achille-mbembe">Achille Mbembe</a>, who was also asked to write a <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/11/47114246c489f3eb05ab189634bb1bf832e4ad4e.pdf">report</a> on the French-African relationship. The summit was billed to be ‘<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/africa-france-summit-held-without-african-heads-of-state/2387088">radically different</a>’.</p>
<p>Rather than having heads of state in attendance, young people <a href="https://sommetafriquefrance.org/en/">debated one another</a>. </p>
<p>In one roundtable discussion, young African entrepreneurs accused Macron of perpetuating French <a href="https://www.sociologygroup.com/neocolonialism/">neo-colonial policies</a> in Africa. They cited France’s support for <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/103222/chad-my-father-would-be-proud-of-me-says-president-mahamat-deby/">Mahamat Idriss Déby</a>, the new leader of Chad.</p>
<p>This criticism of Macron’s approach is particularly painful for the French foreign affairs ministry because the event was meant to move France away from <a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/">Françafrique</a>, the approach to France’s sphere of influence in Africa built on personal <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/africa-france-summit-held-without-african-heads-of-state/2387088">alliances with African strongmen</a>. </p>
<p>This form of realpolitik was started under <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-de-Gaulle-president-of-France">President Charles De Gaulle</a> (1959-1969) and reached an apex under <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-Jean-Raymond-Pompidou">Georges Pompidou</a> (1969-1974). Jacques <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897073">Foccart</a>, who was secretary-general for African and Malagasy Affairs under both presidents - became the point man of both presidents. Known as <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/monsieur-afrique-france-s-neo-colonial-architect-dies-1.54046">“Monsieur Afrique”</a>, he is considered to have been the mastermind behind several African coups.</p>
<h2>Return to the past</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">my own research</a> shows, Macron’s new approach – focusing on cultural diplomacy – is nothing new. It was tried in the 1950s without success. </p>
<p>A good outcome also seems unlikely this time around. That is because it is out of kilter with the worldview of Africans - a world made up of imperialists and anti-colonialists, where the need for the fundamental <a href="https://theconversation.com/decolonisation-debate-is-a-chance-to-rethink-the-role-of-universities-63840">decolonisation</a> of society is constantly highlighted.</p>
<p>Macron’s plan also fails to acknowledge the injustices of an unequal economic system dominated by the global North at the expense of the South. In his view, addressing the ‘<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jc8RRhmwK80">aspirations of young people</a>’ in Africa will improve international relations.</p>
<p>In line with this, France’s Africa strategy of the 1950s, which was built upon <a href="https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy">cultural diplomacy</a> – an exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture – is being revived. </p>
<p>After 1945, African trade unionists and other members of civil society began making political claims and called for a new relationship with Paris. <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/history-matters/revolt-madagascar">Madagascar</a> was in the grips of a violent nationalist revolt against France between 1947 and 1948. Dakar, the capital of Senegal, became the epicentre of anti-colonial activism as trade unions became more political, as shown by the <a href="https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/senegalese-workers-general-strike-increased-wages-1945-1946">general strike</a> of 1946.</p>
<p>In response, French magazines such as <a href="https://www.parismatch.com/">Paris-Match</a> and <a href="https://sismo.inha.fr/s/fr/journal/261754">Bingo</a> were offered in the cultural centres of French West Africa. It was part of a plan to spread French culture as a ladder to modernity and a higher societal position for Africans. </p>
<p>What was called modernisation in the 1950s is today being re-branded by Macron as entrepreneurship. An example of this is the establishment of <a href="https://qz.com/africa/2072374/why-macron-is-remaking-frances-factory-of-african-unicorns/">'Digital Africa’</a>, an initiative set up by de <a href="https://www.afd.fr/en">Agence française de développement</a> to help tech startups in Francophone Africa.</p>
<h2>Old recipe</h2>
<p>The French leader’s willingness to venture beyond French speaking Africa as well as his reliance on an African intellectual (Mbembe) to sell his visions is also an old recipe. </p>
<p>In October 1955, <a href="https://www.presidence.sn/en/presidency/leopold-sedar-senghor">Léopold Senghor</a>, president of Senegal between 1960 and 1980 and in the mid-1950s the minister responsible for international cultural matters in the French government of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edgar-Jean-Faure">Edgar Faure</a>, travelled to Lagos in Nigeria. The trip by one of the main intellectuals of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/Negritude">Négritude</a>, a literary movement, was meant to reinvigorate the link between French and African cultures.</p>
<p>Senghor considered Négritude a means to jump-start modernisation. French <a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-Center/Images/Programs/Anthropology/Events/Wilder,-Freedom-Time.pdf">language</a> education in particular was important since it facilitated the study of science, and increased the social mobility of lower classes. They would, like the elites, be able to familiarise themselves with France, which was in <a href="https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">Senghor’s definition</a>, a place of innovation an imagination.</p>
<p>By teaching more Africans French, more social classes would have access to all the science France had on offer. Senghor in effect turned Négritude – a way to reaffirm ‘black’ values, art and culture, with an emphasis on the French-African language and poetry – into an instrument of development. Like <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2020/04/a-letter-unanswered">Senghor</a>, Mbembe has also been <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/african-postcolonial-critic-mbembe-tries-fresh-start-with-france-20210604">criticised</a> by African intellectuals.</p>
<p>By the end of the 1950s, French cultural diplomats even believed they had something valuable to offer and they expected diplomatic support in exchange for cultural products. Therefore, institutions such as universities, cultural centres and language schools in places like Dakar and Accra had to be renovated. French books had to create an appetite for the French language by focusing on scientific, technical and medical knowledge.</p>
<p>By foregrounding the services that France could offer, the French foreign ministry wanted to avoid hurting African nationalistic pride which was at a high point as 1960, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/06/world/africa/africa-independence-year.html">the year</a> when 17 countries became independent, was approaching. Macron’s efforts at giving Africa tangible benefits, a bridge loan for <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/president-macrons-two-africa-policies">Sudan</a> for instance, is a throwback to that era. </p>
<h2>Why Macron’s plan will fail</h2>
<p>Why is Macron emulating old strategies?</p>
<p>A big part of the answer can be found in the fact that the international circumstances today are very similar to the post-World War II decade when the Soviets, the Americans, the British and other African nationalists were all locked in a competition to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">win the hearts and minds</a> of French Africa.</p>
<p>Africa’s economic growth and expanding political influence since 2000 have attracted external partners keen on building relations with the continent. Russia, China, Turkey, Japan, India, the United Kingdom and France have all held regular summits with African states. </p>
<p>A cynical policy of weapon shipments and business deals would simply be ineffective in such an environment where Africans are self-confident as a result of the <a href="https://data.imf.org/?sk=5778f645-51fb-4f37-a775-b8fecd6bc69b">economic improvements</a> of the past decade. Therefore, Macron’s cultural strategy that targets civil society seems logical. </p>
<p>But, it will remain ineffective if it does not acknowledge that many members of the African civil society do not appreciate French interference. The testy interaction during the roundtable at <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211008-macron-seeks-to-rejuvenate-relationship-with-africa-at-revamped-summit">Montpellier</a> suggests as much. </p>
<p>It is, therefore, doubtful that the French return to the cultural diplomacy strategy of the 1950s and 1960s will yield very different results. As long as leaders like Macron do not fully grasp the distaste for French interventions in African affairs, no amount of cultural products or young people will improve the Afro-French relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits is an Assistant Professor at Utrecht University and receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the United Kingdom. He is a co-investigator in a project on “Regionalism in East Africa c. 1900 to the present” with Christopher Vaughan (PI), Alden Young (Co-Investigator) and Mr P J O'Reilly (Researcher) (January 2020-January 2023)</span></em></p>
Macron’s approach to Africa policy emulates the 1950’s strategies. Why? A big part of the answer can be found in the fact that today’s global circumstances are similar to those of post-World War II.
Frank Gerits, Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht University, the Netherlands and Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, Utrecht University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/170121
2021-10-18T14:16:32Z
2021-10-18T14:16:32Z
The Battle of Algiers: an iconic film whose message of hope still resonates today
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426899/original/file-20211018-20-10uc2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yacef Saadi (R), military leader of the FLN National Liberation Front networks of the autonomous zone of Algiers, poses after being captured at the end of the "Battle of Algiers".</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Saadi Yacef, the Algerian revolutionary leader who fought for his country’s liberation from French colonial rule, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/movies/saadi-yacef-dead.html">died on 10 September 2021</a>. Yacef is perhaps one of the better known of Algeria’s resistance fighters because of the role he played in the creation of the film <a href="https://www.criterion.com/films/248-the-battle-of-algiers">The Battle of Algiers</a>, directed by the renowned Italian film maker <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0690597/">Gillo Pontecorvo</a>. </p>
<p>The Battle of Algiers was filmed in 1965 as a co-production between an Italian creative team and the new Algerian FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) government, whose representative Yacef produced the film and stars as the character of Jaffar.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426939/original/file-20211018-83508-1vdqq9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Battle Of Algiers, lobby card, Jean Martin, 1965.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by LMPC via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the most extraordinary films ever made, The Battle of Algiers is an emotionally devastating account of the anticolonial struggle of the Algerian people and a brutally candid exposé of the French colonial mindset. Many French people were unhappy with the representation of their army and country in the film. It was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698010701618596?queryID=%24%7BresultBean.queryID%7D">not officially censored in France</a>, but the general public and all cinemas boycotted it. It was seen as anti-French propaganda.</p>
<p>In later years, the film was screened to groups classed as revolutionaries and terrorists, apparently becoming a “<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/battle-of-algiers-transposed-into-palestinian-key/">documentary guidebook</a>” in the Palestinian struggle, and for organisations such as <a href="https://www.criterion.com/current/posts/342-the-battle-of-algiers-bombs-and-boomerangs">the Irish Republican Army and the Black Panthers</a>, who examined its detailed representation of guerrilla tactics.</p>
<p>It was also shown in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/weekinreview/the-world-film-studies-what-does-the-pentagon-see-in-battle-of-algiers.html">the Pentagon in 2003</a>, in the middle of the Iraq War. US Counterterrorism experts <a href="https://www.criterion.com/films/248-the-battle-of-algiers">Richard Clarke and Mike Sheehan</a> suggest that the film showed how a country can win militarily, but still lose the battle for “hearts and minds”.</p>
<p>What relevance does The Battle of Algiers hold today, 55 years after it was first released?</p>
<p>The message of the film is ultimately one of hope: the oppressed multitude will eventually triumph because their cause is just. The images of revolutionary crowds in the film recall the jerky, grainy footage that has emerged from a wave of recent protests in the last decade, from the <a href="https://blacklivesmatter.com/">Black Lives Matter</a> movement to <a href="https://rebellion.global/">Extinction Rebellion</a>. Pontecorvo thrillingly captures the power and possibility of large gatherings of citizens, who come together to demand rights, putting their bodies at risk to create social and political change.</p>
<p>Additionally, the film refuses to condemn any of the agents in this conflict. As Pontecorvo has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWwI3WxU4Dk">stated</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>in a war, even if from a historical standpoint, one side is proven right, and the other wrong, both do horrendous things when they are in battle.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A film of contrasts</h2>
<p>Shot in black and white, the film is difficult to classify in terms of style. Its military action sequences and tactical montages remind us of films like <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1790885/">Zero Dark Thirty</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2057392/">The Eye in the Sky</a>; indeed, it is almost impossible to film a scene of politically-motivated <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/723807/summary">torture</a> without having The Battle of Algiers as an implicit or explicit point of reference.</p>
<p>The collective aspect of the film’s creation, and the socialist ideals that inspired it, link it to what’s called <a href="https://thirdcinema.blueskylimit.com/thirdcinema.html">Third Cinema</a>. This was a kind of revolutionary cinema, a cinema of the “Third World”, that was designed to overthrow the systems of colonialism and capitalism. </p>
<p>The Battle of Algiers is also an example of Italian neorealism, a major film movement coming out of mid-twentieth century Italy. The neorealists made films that opposed Mussolini’s fascist regime, and they focused on the hardships of the working class in Italy. Neorealism was a moral and aesthetic system: it brought art and politics together to expose the ills of society and bring about social change.</p>
<p>The Battle of Algiers was shot entirely on location in Algiers, and Colonel Mathieu was the only professional on set. Pontocorvo selected the other actors from the local population based on their faces and expressions.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426926/original/file-20211018-28-12w4yqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Algerian rebel Ali La Pointe (Brahim Haggiag) is set upon by the Europeans in a scene from the movie</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other elements of the neorealist style was the use of techniques that create a documentary aesthetic such as the hand-held camera. Pontecorvo also uses extracts from real-life FLN and police communiqués, letters, and title cards. And he used newsreel stock, which was cheaper, but also added to the sense of verisimilitude in the film.</p>
<p>Although he believed the Algerians cause to be just, Pontecorvo wanted to create a nuanced and fair account of the war. Therefore, he sets up a series of contrasts to reflect this opposition between French and Algerian. This is present in the original musical score by <a href="http://www.enniomorricone.org/">Ennio Morricone</a>: while groups of French soldiers rampage through the Casbah to the sound of jaunty military drums and horns, a haunting flute theme accompanies sequences which feature Algerian civilians. </p>
<p>Contrast is also evident in the use of light and shadow: there are strong chiaroscuro effects, perhaps reflecting the themes of right and wrong in the film. Pontecorvo also uses shadow to highlight the covert operations of the Algerians: Ali La Pointe’s face is filmed with deep shadows, and the face of Colonel Mathieu is always brightly lit.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426932/original/file-20211018-26-vgl9l3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French paratroop Colonel Mathieu (Jean Martin) walks past a cheering throng in a scene from the movie</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Space provides another important contrast in the film. Frantz Fanon, a famous theorist of the Algerian revolution, describes the colonial world as a world “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/719495">cut in two</a>” because of the stark divide between the coloniser and the colonised. In The Battle of Algiers, the wide boulevards of the European quarter are juxtaposed to the narrow, winding, labyrinthine alleyways of the Casbah. Space is also divided vertically and horizontally – the European quarter is flat, while the Casbah is steep and sloping. </p>
<p>This opposition of space highlights the gap between rich and poor, coloniser and colonised.</p>
<h2>The question of bias</h2>
<p>The biggest contrast in the film is of course between the French and Algerians. The embodiment of French and European values in the film is Colonel Mathieu. He is a suave figure, confident and controlled in army fatigues, stylish sunglasses and slick speech – he has more dialogue than other characters in the film. A number of critics have argued that Mathieu is far ‘too cool’, given that he is a practitioner and a proponent of torture.</p>
<p>Yet Colonel Mathieu is not depicted as an ogre: above all, he embodies reason. We see this in his statements about the use of torture, when he uses solid rhetorical devices to justify it. He says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…do you think France should stay in Algeria? If you do, you have to accept the necessary consequences. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is persuasive as a logical argument – if you want French Algeria, you have to accept the actions that result in this outcome – torture.</p>
<p>If Mathieu and the French have reason, what do the Algerians have? </p>
<p>Firstly, they have raw, visceral emotion and the power of the group. The victory at the end of the film is a victory of the masses, embodied in two figures – the martyr Ali La Pointe, the illiterate everyman who becomes a hero for the revolution, and the gyrating, anonymous Algerian women, whose gaze outwards to the future closes the film.</p>
<p>This takes me to the final point about what the Algerians have on their side – the power of historical right. We see this through Pontecorvo’s use of chronology – the narrative proceeds as a flashback, until we leap forward in time to the euphoria and mania of the end of the war and the triumph of the revolutionaries. Pontecorvo here glosses over the fact that the real Battle of Algiers was lost by the Algerians, and jumps into a future of eventual victory in the war. </p>
<p>This is how he views the process of history – the masses, with moral right on their side, will eventually win.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Flood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The film showed how a country can win militarily, but still lose the battle for ‘hearts and minds’.
Maria Flood, Lecturer in Film Studies, University of Liverpool
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/169045
2021-09-30T17:54:23Z
2021-09-30T17:54:23Z
Bouteflika ruled for two decades: his legacy will haunt Algerians for many years to come
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/424048/original/file-20210930-26-2mrjd4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Late Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's, seen in this 2004 photograph, is one leader whose legacy will linger for long. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdelaziz-Bouteflika">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> ruled Algeria with an iron fist for 20 years – from 1999 to 2019. </p>
<p>He was a political figure, one of the initial architects of Algeria’s authoritarian political system in the decades after <a href="https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/AlgeriaFINAL.pdf">its independence from France in 1962</a>. </p>
<p>His journey passed through different phases. During the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/bouteflika-abdelaziz-1937">first</a> (1963-1979), he was the visible face of the golden age of the country’s foreign policy. In the following years he lived in self-imposed exile, returning to the country only occasionally. In <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/world/ex-algerian-leader-bouteflika-ousted-amid-protests-dies/">1994</a> he turned down the presidency, but then accepted it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/3/abdelaziz-bouteflika-algerias-longest-serving-president">five years later</a> in 1999. </p>
<p>He came to power through a highly controversial election. On the eve of the presidential poll six contenders <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9904/14/algeria.03/index.html">withdrew</a> believing – rightly – that he had already been chosen by the real powers. </p>
<p>His ascendance to the presidency was a gratifying moment for Bouteflika. Twenty years earlier he had firmly believed that he was the rightful heir to his mentor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Houari-Boumedienne">Houari Boumediene</a>, who ruled the country from 1965 until his death in late 1978 due to grave illness. </p>
<p>But it was not to be: Bouteflika was not trusted. And the head of intelligence and other powerful members of the regime barred him from succeeding Boumediene. </p>
<p>His ascension to power in 1999 might have comforted his conviction that he should have been the rightful ruler after Boumediene. Nevertheless, his two decades in power were the most damaging the country had experienced since independence.</p>
<h2>A man thirsty for power</h2>
<p>Many Algerians continue to wonder how a man like <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Bouteflika-Lhistoire-secr%C3%A8te/dp/2268103188/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=1893PZZ6BXHV8&dchild=1&keywords=farid+alilat&qid=1632922580&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sprefix=farid+alil%2Caps%2C219&sr=8-1&sres=2268103188%2C2846120625%2CB085V9QN1F%2CB08C3MT5VZ%2CB07NJCHFYZ%2CB082PQ7221%2C2213701652%2C2358721921%2C2213706204%2C2360134906%2CB01M4S1ECL%2C2864772086%2C2353410146">Bouteflika</a> was able to stay in power, serving not two terms – as set down in the 1996 Constitution – but four. He was in the process of attempting to run for a fifth before being forcibly removed from office by the military on <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/10/why-algerias-army-abandoned-bouteflika/">April 2, 2019</a>.</p>
<p>This was preceded by massive and <a href="https://merip.org/2019/12/from-protesta-to-hirak-to-algerias-new-revolutionary-moment/">incessant marches</a> calling for his departure and that of his followers.</p>
<p>His many flaws did not go unnoticed during his prolonged stay in power.</p>
<p>In 2003, on the eve of his second term, former minister of defense Khaled Nezzar delivered a damaging criticism of the president in a book <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Alg%C3%A9rie-Sultanat-Bouteflika-Khaled-Nezzar/dp/291272807X/ref=sr_1_3?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&dchild=1&keywords=khaled+nezzar&qid=1632921332&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sr=8-3&sres=9947392589%2C2866007964%2C291272807X%2C2866008359%2C2915161011%2C9947393224%2C9961633946%2C1243186356%2C1980727996%2CB07XVQ469Z%2C2707139009%2C2707171506%2CB01BW4C7ZI%2C2842721594%2CB0047UJZ0U%2CB0047TMXX2%2C9947886581%2C9961634586%2C9947393488%2C9947212017"><em>Algérie, le Sultanat de Bouteflika</em></a>. </p>
<p>A year later Algerian journalist Mohamed Benchicou published a <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/Bouteflika-imposture-alg%C3%A9rienne-Mohamed-Benchicou/dp/2864772086/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_fr_FR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=2QZSID52O9427&dchild=1&keywords=bouteflika+une+imposture+algerienne&qid=1632920617&qsid=257-5069052-1026663&sprefix=bouteflika%2C+une+im%2Caps%2C227&sr=8-1&sres=2864772086%2C2268103188%2CB085V9QN1F%2C2266204939%2CB0862DPW5C%2CB07NJCHFYZ&srpt=ABIS_BOOK">book</a> in which he gave a blow-by-blow account of why he believed the president was a sham. </p>
<p>This echoed the views of credible former veteran leaders who were of the view that he had played an insignificant role in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko7GMxQsdKE">war of independence</a>. </p>
<p>Bouteflika’s supporters presented a very different picture, referring to him as the great Mujahid and compared to the <a href="https://www.elmoudjahid.dz/fr/nation/abdelaziz-bouteflika-inhume-au-carre-des-martyrs-du-cimetiere-el-alia-l-adieu-a-un-moudjahid-15179">great revolutionaries</a> who fought colonial France, a reference that helped him legitimise his rule and those who <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Algeria-Domestic-Issues-and-International-Relations/Zoubir/p/book/9781138331006">usurped</a> the revolutionary credentials for their personal gains. </p>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>In 1963 Algeria’s foreign minister Mohamed Khemisti was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1963/05/06/archives/khemisti-is-dead-of-bullet-wound-algerian-foreign-minister-shot-by.html">assassinated</a> by an allegedly mentally unstable individual. Bouteflika, who was serving as minister of youth and sports, became the foreign minister – the youngest foreign minister in the world at age 26. He held the position until 1979. </p>
<p>He owed his position to Boumediene his mentor, who also protected him. </p>
<p>During the first term of his presidency, Bouteflika was able to redress Algeria’s image overseas; a great orator, his speeches at international forums, such as Davos, were well received. The events of <a href="https://www.911memorial.org/911-faqs">9/11</a> offered him the opportunity to position Algeria as a credible partner in the fight against terrorism. </p>
<p>But, while he mended relations with Western powers, he totally neglected relations with sub-Saharan Africa. This did a disservice to Algeria, which had begun losing the capital it had accumulated on the continent since the war of independence. Given that he believed that foreign policy was his reserved domain, no one could challenge his views. </p>
<p>During Bouteflika’s first several years in office, Algeria benefited from <a href="https://www.diploweb.com/Algerie-les-illusions-de-la.html">increased wealth</a>. </p>
<p>Two major drivers of this had nothing to do with him – a <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=699041253&Country=Algeria&topic=Economy&subtopic=Fo_3">significant increase</a> in oil revenues and abundant rain. </p>
<p>But he didn’t capitalise on this boon and failed to act on promises he had made. These included reforming schools, universities, justice, the country’s administration and the banking system.</p>
<h2>The middle and the end</h2>
<p>Bouteflika <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/04/02/les-mille-et-une-vies-politiques-d-abdelaziz-bouteflika_5444690_3212.html">claimed </a> that he needed a second term to carry out the purported reforms. But he didn’t use his second term, which started in 2004, well either. Instead of developing the country he spent it consolidating his power and undoing the limited democratic advances that Algeria had made since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/25/world/algeria-approves-new-constitution.html">introducing</a> a multiparty system and freedom of the press in 1989. </p>
<p>He did this by putting in place a system in which institutions served a few individuals, including members of his family, loyal to him. </p>
<p>In the absence of a genuine, productive economy, Bouteflika’s Algeria depended exclusively on <a href="https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/lalgerie-malade-de-petrole/00088704">rent from oil</a>, which was redistributed to co-opt clients. In turn, this engendered endemic corruption never witnessed before in Algeria. </p>
<p>The Bouteflika regime isolated opposition parties, except for three. But these could barely be described as opposition parties. The so-called “presidential coalition” was made up of the old single <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Liberation-Front-political-party-Algeria">ruling party FLN</a>, its twin brother <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Democratic-Rally">the RND</a> that had been created in 1997 to provide <a href="https://plus.lesoir.be//art/apres-l-adoption-de-nouvelles-lois-electorales-algerie-_t-19970222-Z0DCF0.html">Liamine Zeroual</a> with a popular base, and the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/algeria-s-largest-islamic-party-eyes-national-unity-gov-t/2266857">Islamist party, MSP</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, Bouteflika, not content with the two mandates, decided to amend the Constitution to lift the two-term limit and prepare the ground for his <a href="https://merip.org/2009/04/introducing-algerias-president-for-life/">presidency for life</a>. </p>
<p>Five years later, though unable to communicate and confined due to the second stroke he had suffered, Bouteflika, or rather his entourage, sought a fifth term so he could rule until death. </p>
<p>In the last seven years of his presidency, Algeria gave the impression of a ship without a captain. The president was rarely seen in public and when he was, he looked pitiful. His cronies wanted the sultan to be seen, albeit rarely, so they could justify the extension of his rule and to maintain their privileges and the dilapidation of the country’s resources. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-sprin">drop in the oil price</a> and the pauperisation of large segments of society infuriated Algerians. But what triggered in 2019 the protest movement against the fifth term was the degree of humiliation they suffered seeing their president being mocked on <a href="https://www.algerie360.com/video-une-nouvelle-fois-la-chaine-francaise-tf1-se-moque-de-bouteflika/">foreign TV stations</a> and <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/la-diffusion-d-une-photo-de-bouteflika-relance-le-debat-sur-sa-succession_1783542.html">paraded</a> nearly paralysed to prove he was alive. </p>
<p>Algerians were also inflamed seeing the president becoming the subject of idolatry by his followers. The adoration resembled pagan practices, an offence in an Islamic society. </p>
<p>Clearly, Bouteflika had created <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinionfr/algerie-incroyables-moeurs-republique-bouteflika-corruption">new mores</a> which Algeria will have difficulty discarding for years to come. His legacy will haunt Algerians for many years. No wonder his death on September 17 went unnoticed. As a citizen <a href="https://www.operanewsapp.com/fr/fr/share/detail?news_id=dfa5b13716e58cf22d0d4ddb21a1041a&news_entry_id=783ee58210919fr_fr&open_type=transcoded&from=newseu&request_id=share_request">put it </a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This funeral is a non-event. Around me, nobody is talking about it anyway. It is as if it were the death of a simple person, who was never president. Algerians give the impression of having forgotten Bouteflika, of having turned the page of his reign.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Bouteflica’s two decades in power were the most damaging Algeria had experienced since independence from France in 1962.
Yahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business School
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/167313
2021-09-12T08:22:29Z
2021-09-12T08:22:29Z
Why Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco: and implications for the future
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420075/original/file-20210908-25-1s4hkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita (R) welcomes his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapidis to Rabat, in August 2021.
The normalisation of relations between the two precipitated the breakup of Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic ties. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alal Morchidi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The breakup of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-says-cutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/#:%7E:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20news%20conference,on%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue">in August</a> is the product of a long history of tension. The two nations have never had long periods of friendship, notwithstanding the many factors that bring them together. Indeed, they belong to the same <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/report-regional-integration-maghreb-2019-challenges-and-opportunities-private-sector-synthesis">Maghreb region</a>, share the same religion (Sunni Islam and Maleki rite) and identity, and speak a similar dialect. They also share a <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/algeria%E2%80%93morocco-border/g1229dss0?hl=en">1,550km common border</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, Algerian and Moroccan people are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them. But, historical, political and ideological dissimilarities since their respective independence weigh heavily in the relations between these “brotherly” countries. </p>
<p>How can one account for the tensions that have characterised their relations, which have now gone through a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1169bh2">second breakup in diplomatic relations</a>? The first, initiated by Morocco, was from 1976 to 1988.</p>
<p>I have researched relations between Algeria and Morocco for more than 40 years and published studies on the topic. Relations between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have seldom been cordial. This is due to the different nature of their anti-colonial struggle, their dissimilar political systems, and opposite ideological orientations. </p>
<p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria. The reawakening of Algeria’s diplomacy and its decision to counter what it considers Morocco’s “hostile acts” resulted in the latest breakup.</p>
<p>Their tumultuous relationship has been an impediment to the integration of the region, which could bring sizeable benefits to both. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia founded the <a href="https://maghrebarabe.org/fr/union-du-maghreb-arabe/">Arab Maghreb Union in 1989</a>. But since 1996, the union has become moribund due to repeated tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations.</p>
<p>The divergences of recent years are potentially far more consequential. They could threaten the stability of the whole North Africa region.</p>
<h2>History of Algerian-Moroccan relations</h2>
<p>Algerian nationalists had relatively good relations with <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-relations-internationales-2011-2-page-77.htm.">King Mohammed V of Morocco</a> He died in 1961, one year before Algeria gained its sovereignty. Morocco became independent <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/326269/morocco-celebrates-64-years-of-independence-from-european-colonizers">in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">Algeria</a> in 1962. </p>
<p>King Mohammed’s son, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hassan-II">King Hassan II</a>, who succeeded him, made claims over Algerian territory. He invaded the country <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_19">in 1963</a>. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped fighters.</p>
<p>Although short, this war shaped the minds of the Algerian military-political establishment. There was an era of cooperation between 1969 and the mid-1970s. But the conflict in Western Sahara, invaded by Morocco under the so-called Green March <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-34667782">in 1975</a>, resulted in another era of tensions.</p>
<p>Indeed, in March 1976, Algeria’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, saw Morocco break diplomatic relations with Algeria. Many other African countries recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Relations were restored <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260">in May 1988</a>. </p>
<p>The renewal of relations was based <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/rupture-des-relations-avec-le-maroc-le-texte-integral-de-la-declaration-de-lamamra/">on a number of agreements</a>. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a commitment to enduring relations of peace </p></li>
<li><p>good neighbourliness and cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>hastening the building of the Great Arab Maghreb</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s noninterference in Morocco’s domestic affairs </p></li>
<li><p>solving the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>From Algeria’s perspective, Morocco has reneged on all of them. </p>
<p>In the background, there has been a continuous buildup of Algerian-Moroccan tensions.</p>
<h2>Growing tensions</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, Algeria underwent a bigger crisis than it had ever known. The country was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/remembering-algeria-1992-first-arab-spring-never-became-summer">devastated</a> by civil strife opposing the state, and armed Islamist groups. In 1994, in the midst of that crisis, Moroccan authorities <a href="https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/56799/attack-hotel-asni-marrakech-straw.html">falsely accused Algerian intelligence</a> of being behind the deadly terrorist attacks at the Asni hotel in Marrakech.</p>
<p>Morocco imposed visas on Algerians, including those holding another citizenship. Algeria retaliated in imposing visas and closed its land borders with Morocco. In late 1995, Morocco froze the institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union due to Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.</p>
<p>A shift in relations seemed to have occurred when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118854">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> became president of Algeria in April in 1999. He planned on meeting King Hassan II to iron out differences. But the king died in July that year. His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559304">Mohammed VI</a> showed no inclination for a resolution of Western Sahara under United Nations terms.</p>
<p>Amazingly, during his presidency, Bouteflika not only neglected the question of Western Sahara, he also instructed officials not to respond to any Moroccan hostile actions.</p>
<p>Following his <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">forcible removal in April 2019</a>, Algeria reiterated its support for the principle of self-determination. </p>
<p>For its part, Morocco had been lobbying the <a href="https://au.int/en">African Union</a>, Europe and the US for support for its claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. Two events in the last 10 months escalated tensions. The first was an attack on Sahrawi demonstrators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/morocco-military-operation-western-sahara.html">in El-Guergarat</a>, the buffer zone in the south of Western Sahara, by Moroccan troops. Then there was <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/western-sahara-conflict-upended-by-a-trump-tweet/">a tweet from President Donald Trump</a> announcing US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.</p>
<p>These constituted part of Algeria’s decision to break up diplomatic relations with Morocco. </p>
<p>Trump had traded Moroccan occupied Western Sahara in exchange for <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Morocco normalising relations with Israel</a>. Other Arab states did the same thing in the framework of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> brokered by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. </p>
<p>Before the Abraham Accords, Moroccan officials displayed relentless hostility toward Algeria to which the Algerian government did not respond. Trump’s tweet on <a href="https://twitter.com/ap/status/1337069459551506432?lang=en">10 December</a> seemed to galvanise Morocco’s hostile attitude toward Algeria. </p>
<p>Algeria perceived both decisions as a real threat to its national security. </p>
<p>Algiers’ threshold of tolerance against acts it considered hostile came <a href="https://fr.sputniknews.com/amp/international/202107191045896006-soutien-marocain-aux-separatistes-kabyles-le-debut-dune-dangereuse-escalade-entre-alger-et-rabat/">in mid-July</a> when Morocco’s ambassador to the UN distributed a note expressing support for a group fighting for the secession of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24042103">Kabyle coastal region of Algeria</a>. The group is listed as a terrorist group by Algeria. This resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador in Morocco for “consultations” and <a href="http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/6594.aspx">asking Morocco to clarify</a> whether this was the ambassador’s sole decision or the government’s. It never received a response. </p>
<p>Another hostile act in the eyes of Algeria was a <a href="https://www.afrik.com/pegasus-plus-de-6000-algeriens-espionnes-par-le-maroc-dont-lamamra">vast spying scandal</a> revealed by a consortium of international newspapers and human rights organisations. They found that Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerians, including many senior political and military officials.</p>
<p>Algeria decided to break diplomatic relations with Morocco as of 24 August.</p>
<h2>Implications of the breakup</h2>
<p>The breakup may result in geopolitical realignments. But all will depend on whether Morocco will escalate tensions and use the Israeli card against Algeria, or whether it will seek to reduce tensions. </p>
<p>Algeria has already begun strengthening its control at the Algerian Moroccan border. It could create serious problems for Morocco if it decided to expel the tens of thousands of Moroccans (many of whom are illegal migrants) from Algeria. </p>
<p>There are wider implications too.</p>
<p>The breakup has marked the death knell of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was already dormant. The strained relations will either mean the regional grouping remains at a standstill or a new grouping might emerge.</p>
<p>And the rivalries between Algeria and Morocco can be expected to intensify at the African Union over <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Admission-of-Israel-as-an-Observer-in-the-African-Union.aspx">Israel’s observer status at the AU</a>, and over Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the economic realm, the Algerian energy minister announced in late August that the contract for the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), which goes through Morocco, will not be renewed after it <a href="https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2021/08/26/lalgerie-ne-renouvellera-pas-le-contrat-du-gazoduc-traversant-le-maroc/">expires on 31 October 2021</a>. The decision has now <a href="https://www.olcnbvc4jz.com/renouvellement-du-gazoduc-maghreb-europe-lalgerie-a-tranche/">been confirmed</a>. The pipeline goes directly from northwest Algeria and then crosses Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Instead, Algeria will distribute natural gas to Spain and Portugal via the pipeline, MEDGAZ.</p>
<p>The term impact of this breakup is unpredictable. What’s certain, however, is that Algerian-Moroccan rivalry will intensify.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by Business Kedge School or those of the Brookings Doha Centre.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria
Yahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business School
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/166944
2021-09-01T14:42:24Z
2021-09-01T14:42:24Z
Algeria suffers from devastating wildfires, but faces big challenges in addressing them
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418472/original/file-20210830-21-3pdakp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke rises from a wildfire in the forested hills of the Kabylie region, east of the capital Algiers, on August 10, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">RYAD KRAMDI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Algeria, like many other countries in the Mediterranean region, is prone to wildfires especially between June and September. António Bento-Gonçalves, provides information about these fires in Algeria and what should be done to manage them better.</em></p>
<h2>How often do wildfire incidents take place in Algeria and which areas are most affected?</h2>
<p>In recent years major fires, with devastating consequences, have occurred in various parts of the world. The Mediterranean region is particularly affected by heatwaves between July and August which cause major fire incidents in several countries including Greece, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. </p>
<p>I’ve carried out <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296939491_Forest_fires_in_Algeria_Occurrences_causes_and_prevention">research on wildfires</a> in Algeria and looked into what causes them. </p>
<p>In Algeria, forests and scrubland occupy a total area of around 4 million hectares. This makes a huge part of the country susceptible to fire. For instance, between 1876 and 2005 (the longest complete data series) it’s estimated that <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296939491_Forest_fires_in_Algeria_Occurrences_causes_and_prevention">almost</a> 40,000 hectares burned each year, representing approximately 1% of all existing woodlands of the country. </p>
<p>Over a period of 25 years, from 1985 to 2010, Algeria recorded 42,555 fires that burned <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/mediterranee/6827">a total area of</a> 910,640 hectares. </p>
<p>The municipalities (known as “wilayas”) most affected are in the North – the most forested parts of the country – and in the West. These areas are more populated, hilly (with steep slopes) and a pronounced Mediterranean climate – a very dry and hot season in summer, but sufficiently wet in winter to allow for rapid vegetation growth.</p>
<h2>What causes them?</h2>
<p>Wild fires spread the fastest in places that are hard to reach and in the right conditions. Large parts of Algeria tick these boxes.
With very limited access and steep slopes, detection and effective first intervention by firefighters is very difficult. In addition there’s usually very dry undergrowth and forests are composed of flammable species.</p>
<p>Added to this, Algeria’s forested areas are subject to multiple human pressures which create conditions that are favourable to the spread of fires. These include the the use of fast-growing but more flammable forest species or the frequent use of fire for pasture regeneration. In addition, having long periods of hot and dry weather increase fire risk. </p>
<p>Forest fires in Algeria were <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325258786_Wildfire_risk_and_its_perception_in_Kabylia_Algeria">historically</a> caused by people. However, <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/15462">recent official information</a> on the causes of fires is characterised by high rate of fires of “unknown origin”, representing between 40% to 70% of all fires. Essentially, we know they’ll be caused by people, but there’s no specific data on what activity that caused them or motivations behind them.</p>
<p>Why do we not know? This is related to difficulties in monitoring by the <a href="http://iii-med.forestweek.org/content/general-directorate-forestry-government-algeria">General Directorate of Forests</a>. Between 1980 and 2000, when the causes of fires of unknown origin were higher, this was due to instability. Algeria had a civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002 and prevented government agencies, including the Directorate of Forests, from working properly. This <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296939491_Forest_fires_in_Algeria_Occurrences_causes_and_prevention">made it difficult</a> to have a good understanding of what caused the fires. </p>
<h2>How are they managed and are there prevention measures in place?</h2>
<p>Generally, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296939491_Forest_fires_in_Algeria_Occurrences_causes_and_prevention">policies put in place</a> to combat forest fires are organised around several points: information and education of the population, development and maintenance of rural and forest areas, surveillance of wooded areas, and improvement of the means of fire fighting. </p>
<p>However, not knowing exactly what type of human activity causes the fires limits what can be done to prevent them. Instead, policies tend to be more reactionary – they focus on dealing with fires when they break out. </p>
<p>In recent years, public authorities <a href="https://www.uc.pt/fluc/nicif/riscos/Documentacao/Territorium/T24_Artg/T24_Artg13.pdf">strengthened</a> the resources of the General Directorate of Forests for the prevention and fight against forest fires. In particular, by acquiring first intervention equipment, such as forest fire trucks, preparing more aircraft for firefighting, and a radio network for rapid communication in the event of fire outbreak. </p>
<p>In addition, more collaborative work is <a href="https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC122115">being done</a> in the region to improve intervention and surveillance. </p>
<h2>What else can be done to better prepare and manage wildfires in Algeria?</h2>
<p>Policies to prevent and protect against forest fires have been implemented gradually since the 1980s, but the country faces many challenges in effectively rolling them out. </p>
<p>Algeria is a huge country – with a size <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1207844/largest-countries-in-africa-by-area/">exceeding</a> 2.38 million km2, it’s the biggest country in Africa. With a massive territory to manage, all actions – to prevent, to detect and to fire fight – aren’t enough. Operations are <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5909104">also very complex</a> due to the very uneven, hard to access, terrain.</p>
<p>There’s also a high population density around and inside the forest massifs. This means its hard to control the actions that people take which are a fire hazard.</p>
<p>Added to this, forestry officials lack authority and resources to perform their duties. </p>
<p>To effectively combat fires, there must be political, social and economic stability in the country. And the causes of the fires must be clearly known. Without this, it’s impossible to win the battle against forest fires. </p>
<p>There is, however, hope. New technologies, such as Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems, could improve data acquisition and thus the prevention of fires. </p>
<p>Other actions that must be taken include; the strengthening of education and awareness-raising and improvements in the equipment used to monitor, detect and fight forest fires. </p>
<p>Finally, policymakers must focus on strengthening cooperation and mutual assistance between all the Mediterranean countries. Fire knows no borders and no single country is capable of having all the necessary resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>António Bento-Gonçalves does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
With a massive territory to manage, all actions taken - to prevent, to detect and to fire fight - aren’t enough.
António Bento-Gonçalves, Associated Professor, Department of Geography, University of Minho
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/161607
2021-06-13T07:59:29Z
2021-06-13T07:59:29Z
How African Union members came to share power despite themselves
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405869/original/file-20210611-15-1in80z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The establishment of the African Union shows how social context is important in international organisations.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">held its first summit</a> in 2002, establishing itself as a new international organisation. It also <a href="https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/what-a-difference-a-decade-makes-understanding-security-policy-re">launched</a> a new vision for African security cooperation. </p>
<p>Nearly two decades later, it is worth reflecting on the process that produced that vision. It may have something to teach us about international negotiations.</p>
<p>The vision is captured by the <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">African Peace and Security Architecture</a> – a framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It’s intended to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts. Although its effectiveness is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/89/1/89/2326623">debated</a>, it marked a major departure from how African states traditionally cooperated on security.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2020.1710915">research</a>
sought to understand how this switch happened. Most negotiation analyses emphasise economic or security-based leverage and narrowly defined material interests. I took a different approach. I looked at the social and organisational environment in which the AU negotiations took place and its effect on the peace and security framework’s form and function. </p>
<p>My analysis offers insights for negotiators and researchers about the significance of social context for the outcome of international negotiations.</p>
<h2>AU’s new approach to security</h2>
<p>From 1963 until <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/3870303.stm">the AU replaced it in 2002</a>, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) usually adopted a “hands off” approach to security. This had its roots in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4378141?casa_token=lxGmqH1I29AAAAAA%3ATQJOIBGo_AoMzCjzdwnXm4HYxBSMLsDQV6n0pA4EPfuDHKcyy73ELX1vcICrogAy7s-J5JsM_nvvBXZwg8Csv-bwo7uecvnAU1dCBWLpw5RZN80tBLg&seq=1">well-founded fears among leaders</a> that their recently acquired political autonomy would be violated by former colonial powers or other OAU members. Therefore, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">the OAU Charter</a> carefully protected the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>One consequence was shielding oppressive governments from reprimand for abuses against their citizens. The vast majority of Africa’s conflicts prompted <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC51414">little</a> reaction from the OAU. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/the-oau-and-human-rights-towards-a-new-definition/18D6D6363E1A00004FE2E5091F553531">several cases</a>, leaders even ruled out discussion. Ugandan president Idi Amin was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/the-oau-and-human-rights-towards-a-new-definition/18D6D6363E1A00004FE2E5091F553531">even</a> elected OAU chairman in 1975, at the height of his government’s human rights abuses.</p>
<p>By contrast, the AU’s approach - at least in treaty documents - is groundbreaking. It gives the Union a much greater security role. Most notable is the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/constitutive-act">right to intervene</a> in a member state </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Union also has a much <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf">broader range of security responsibilities</a>. These include peacekeeping, human rights protection, and promotion of democracy and good governance. Such shifts started in the 1990s but the new peace and security framework provided a legal foundation for AU involvement in activities like elections. The OAU had viewed these as the sole responsibility of governments.</p>
<p>The African Peace and Security Architecture is also notable for the rules of procedure used by its core decision-making organ, the Peace and Security Council. Like the UN Security Council it can deploy peace missions and apply sanctions. But unlike its UN counterpart, there are no veto holders or permanent seats (though <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/psc-109-1.pdf">Nigeria has become a de facto permanent member</a>). </p>
<h2>What influences negotiations</h2>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800908001110">studies</a> of international negotiations assume that participants try to maximise their resources, power or influence. This isn’t what happened when African governments – traditionally very conscious of sovereignty – gave power to an organisation in which members held equal sway.</p>
<p>In trying to understand this outcome, my analysis examined negotiators’ loyalties, rivalries and shared understandings of the world. It also examined the use of informal diplomatic networks.</p>
<p>A strong sense of shared identity developed between the leaderships of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria and Mali. They were the most active proponents of the eventual security framework. They privately referred to themselves as the Like-Minded Five.</p>
<p>Their main “sparring partner” was Muammar Gaddafi, with his own alliance of smaller states and a very different vision for the future – a federal <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.2009.9725324?casa_token=5woIaABoy8sAAAAA:IxmqOrxjEpqPtCyOc-iqydHewgD19I1CuDgpVvCsb_pKE6VlREuuBVNcNZJjvWSm21cnq5NWL1Oa">“United States of Africa”</a>. The Libyan leader’s focus was much more on threats from outside the continent. And he aspired towards a standing army, led from Tripoli.</p>
<p>The Like-Minded Five produced a united front that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/411/249/28273">reaped</a> several negotiation successes over Gaddafi. Many governments shared a stronger sense of identity with them than with the Libyan leader. Gaddafi’s interest in Africa, many suspected, stemmed from his earlier <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/104/416/469/85283?login=true">rejection as a regional leader</a> by Arab countries. The Like-Minded Five capitalised upon this perception.</p>
<p>Another factor that influenced negotiation outcomes was the use of informal pathways of influence. The Like-Minded Five, particularly South Africa, shared a worldview and warm relations with Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU’s secretary general from 1989 until 2001, when most of new framework was negotiated. His informal engagement with other states helped secure a critical mass of members behind many of the group’s positions.</p>
<p>Also influential was a new but growing understanding among members of how to achieve continental stability and what responsibilities African governments should bear. The decade prior to the AU’s establishment was arguably the most violent in Africa’s history. It witnessed genocides in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://undocs.org/S/1996/682">Burundi</a>, and many major conflicts. These often originated from human rights abuses and repressive rule.</p>
<p>Many African leaders shared a sense of shame over not responding to humanitarian catastrophes, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html">particularly Rwanda’s</a>. That, combined with a sense that the non-African international community could not be relied upon for assistance, smoothed the pathway to reform. One of the drafters of the AU’s Vision and Mission Statement told me;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Rwanda loomed large as a reminder of just how horribly things could go. It is because of Rwanda in particular that genocide and crimes against humanity are a stated unequivocal pretext for intervention.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This combination of factors - group loyalties and rivalries, informal pathways of influence, and shared understandings of the world - helps explain the outcome of the negotiations. Without a strong core of like-minded leaders for reform, it is unlikely the AU would have given democracy, human rights and good governance such prominence. Without a strong ally in Salim, their ability to persuade at least some other members would have been very restricted. </p>
<p>This change in how many governments viewed their collective security role allows the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/09/future-peace-operations-african-demands-better-coordination/">AU to be active</a> in peacekeeping today.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>Although the impact of social context will vary across circumstances, this snapshot of how it influenced the African Peace and Security Architecture negotiations suggests it’s worth considering such variables when analysing international negotiations. In recent years, Brexit and Donald Trump have created an impression of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357823.2019.1680604?casa_token=bpx21iUmcWMAAAAA%3Ayzv01-2OoGw3qmLw3m0TmpJSzOtV75RyZgeHZJArhbylG-HaCBSiJQMGLZhDSNihG9AGS0YHNQX4">“transactional diplomacy”</a> with negotiators motivated by little other than self-interested material considerations.</p>
<p>As the AU negotiations indicate, every diplomatic engagement takes place in a particular social context. Understanding that context can prove crucial to understanding what happens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J. Hogan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Formation of the African Union shows how social context is important in international negotiations.
John J. Hogan, Lecturer, International relations, University of Groningen
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.