tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/belarus-protests-91739/articlesBelarus protests – The Conversation2022-03-17T19:21:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792442022-03-17T19:21:43Z2022-03-17T19:21:43ZIn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenko makes for an uncomfortable bedfellow<p>When it comes to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, there are few greater partners in crimes than Belarus’ president Alexander Lukashenko. Since Russia’s invasion on 24 February, the pariah state has provided Putin with territory for the deployment of troops and military assaults on its neighbour.</p>
<p>So far, Belarus’s own troops have not been sent into Ukraine, but this does not alleviate the Belarusian authorities of responsibility in the war.</p>
<h2>A historically unreliable ally</h2>
<p>In the past, Lukashenko has often skilfully played Russia against its geopolitical competitors despite Belarus’ high economic dependency on Russia. Lukashenko has oscillated in the country’s foreign policy between <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00085006.2021.1992238">Russia and alternative partners</a>, and from 2015 to 2020, there was even a rapprochement with EU, in part thanks to <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698806/EPRS_BRI(2021)698806_EN.pdf">Belarus’ refusal to recognise Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko also stood up to Putin on matters of strategic importance for Belarus’ independence such as the introduction of a common currency in the mid 2000s within the Union State, a supranational organisation linking both countries, or the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-belarus-airbase-idUSKBN1WB1NT">establishment of a Russian air base</a> in 2015 coveted by the Kremlin since the 2013-14 Maidan revolution in Ukraine.</p>
<p>In the context of the Donbas war that followed, Lukashenko, thanks to his manoeuvring skills, temporarily changed his international image from “Europe’s last dictator” to that of a “mediator in the Ukrainian crisis”, offering his territory to host talks in 2014-15.</p>
<p>At the time he adopted an ambiguous stance, not recognising Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, yet endorsing Putin’s actions there and the Donbas. Still, despite increased pressure from the Kremlin, in 2022 Lukashenko <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-59491521">remained vague on the question of Crimea</a> as well as the status of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk that Russia recognised as independent on the eve of its invasion into Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Nowhere left to turn but Moscow</h2>
<p>Despite the balancing act, Lukashenko’s own choices put him firmly in Russia’s vicelike grip after he refused to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-2020-crisis-anniversary/31399497.html">give in to his country’s pro-democracy forces in August 2020</a>. Since then, he’s kept into power largely thanks to Putin, who has allowed him to secure the support of the Belarusian regime’s three remaining pillars: the <em>siloviki</em> (men with roots in the country’s security or military services), the country’s executive vertical, and about 20-30% of the electorate.</p>
<p>Lukashenko further isolated himself from the West by ordering the <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-kidnapping-what-international-law-says-about-capture-of-dissident-journalist-roman-protasevich-161511">hijacking of an airplane</a> flying between two European capitals and provoking a <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-lukashenko-threatens-to-turn-off-the-gas-to-western-europe-as-migrant-crisis-deepens-171643">migration crisis</a> within Poland and Lithuania. The growing dependency on Russia also led to the creation of joint military training centres that served as a pretext for Russia maintaining a <a href="https://www.dw.com/ru/uchebnyj-centr-ili-aviabaza-v-chem-sut-voennogo-sotrudnichestva-rb-i-rf/a-56933524">permanent military presence</a> in Belarus.</p>
<p>Over time, Lukashenko has portrayed NATO and the West as a threat to both Russia and Belarus. When protests emerged in Kazakhstan in January 2022, Lukashenko pushed to send troops there under the flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which is under Russian leadership, and held the West, <a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2022/01/28/luka_chirik">and more specifically Poland</a>, responsible for the unrest.</p>
<p>This was not the first time that he turned to the CSTO military alliance to help fellow autocrats stay in power. In 2010, he requested that it <a href="https://www.km.ru/news/lukashenko_prizval_vvesti_v_kirg">send troops to back Kyrgyzstan’s Kurmanbek Bakiyev</a>, without success. This time he had more luck convincing Putin to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdfJ55DASTI&t=2967s">give a hand to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev</a> in Kazakhstan to defeat competing political groups trying to capitalize on what were initially economically driven protests.</p>
<p>On 27 February Belarus <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/belarus-new-dubious-constitution-5760/">adopted a new Constitution</a> under Kremlin pressure, although Lukashenko told the media three days earlier he was happy with the previous version. The new text, which was approved in a referendum grossly violating democratic procedures, was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/urope/launchpad-russias-assault-ukraine-belarus-holds-referendum-renounce-non-nuclear-2022-02-27/">stripped of articles</a> that committed Belarus to denuclearisation and neutrality. Members of the Belarusian opposition such as Anatoli Liabedzka have said the change set up the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-jhP21piygs&t=6164s">“legal foundation for a Russian military base and the placement of nuclear weapons”</a> on Belarusian territory.</p>
<p>On the day of the vote, the Belarusian opposition decided to mobilise the electorate on anti-war sentiments. For the first time since December 2020, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">Belarusians took the streets</a>, forming picket lines and chanting anti-war slogans outside polling stations. Approximately <a href="https://spring96.org/en/news/106972">800 people were detained</a>, according to the human rights defence centre Viasna. The opposition in exile encouraged their supporters to invalidate ballots by voting both for and against the new constitution, and some not only responded to this call but also added anti-war messages, <a href="https://kyky.org/news/h-y-voyne-slava-ukraine-referendum-vozrodil-aktsii-protesta-v-belarusi-vot-dokazatelstva">as suggested by photos surfaced on the Internet</a>.</p>
<h2>Lukashenko’s ambiguous anti-war stance</h2>
<p>When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, the Belarusian president initially blamed the Ukrainian administration for <a href="https://t.me/s/pul_1">not capitulating in the face of a powerful nuclear state</a>. He has warned of a potential bloodbath and denied that his country’s has participated in the war, pointing to the non-involvement of Belarusian troops in the invasion. However, he promptly contradicted himself by stating during the same meeting that his military forces <a href="https://president.gov.by/ru/events/operativnoe-soveshchanie-s-voennymi">“will be there if needed”</a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Belarus president accuses Ukraine of instigating the conflict (Sky News, February 2022).</span></figcaption>
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<p>A few days later, at an event celebrating the new constitution on March 4, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kE6KgvXs5y8">he tried to reassure his inner circle</a> that he would not send Belarusian troops to fight in Ukraine. Indeed, the perception of the war in Belarus, a country where one in every four people lost their lives between 1941 and 1944, is very different from perceptions in Russia.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1n-YgM_KrOAN6eqC6tFjmN4zpiKJKL4sq">poll conducted by the Chatham House</a> from 20 January to 9 February, the majority of Belarusian city dwellers opposed sending soldiers to Ukraine, preferring that authorities adopt a neutral position. This is hardly surprising in a country where many have been traumatised by the proximity to the battlefields of the Second World War, <a href="https://t.me/belaruspolls">according to Belarusian sociologist Hienadz Korshunau</a>. While Ukraine has regularly been discredited on Belarusian state TV since 2014, <a href="https://gazetaby.com/post/sovsem-drugoe-delo-kogda-vozniknet-vopros-chto-i-m/183957/">overall it’s far less than in Russia</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has sought to distract from Belarus’ participation in the war by filling prime-time TV programmes with festivities. As such, on 5 March he took part in a skiing event, and the next day, media covered a running event in Minsk involving 300 women. The Ministry of Defence also released a sarcastic video featuring representatives of the Belarusian army <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGtb03RGeh4">denying their presence in Ukraine</a>. However, such attempts may fall on deaf ears, as Belarusians have increasingly <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2020/11/16/perelomit-oppozitsionnye-nastroeniya-v-belarusi-dolzhen-desant-rossiyskih-polittehnologov-nu-i-kak-poluchaetsya">switched off state media</a>.</p>
<p>Given Belarusians’ <a href="https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1n-YgM_KrOAN6eqC6tFjmN4zpiKJKL4sq">limited appetite for the war</a>, including among the president’s own supporters, Lukashenko’s hosting mediation talks on 28 February and 3 March looks rational. It also gives him manoeuvrability room with Putin to justify not sending in troops and thus risking fewer sanctions on the part of the West.</p>
<p>While Lukashenko is striving to remain independent despite his need for Putin’s support, any hopes that he might bail out of the alliance with Russia remain slim.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ekaterina Pierson-Lyzhina ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Caught between reliance on the Kremlin and strong antiwar sentiments at home, Alexander Lukashenko is treading a fine line on Russia’s war against Ukraine.Ekaterina Pierson-Lyzhina, Chercheuse au Centre d‘étude de la vie politique (Cevipol) , Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780722022-03-07T14:54:49Z2022-03-07T14:54:49ZUkraine invasion: how Belarus has become Russia’s pawn<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">political crisis</a> that has gripped Belarus for the past 18 months has seen president Aliaksandr Lukashenka (the preferred Belarusian spelling; “Alexander Lukashenko” is the Russian transliteration) transition from a peacemaker to a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. </p>
<p>After hosting talks in 2015 to end fighting in eastern Ukraine, Belarus <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-reasons-belarus-is-helping-russia-wage-war-against-ukraine-177984">has now opted</a> to facilitate the Russian attack on its neighbour. In doing so, Lukashenka has surrendered the sovereignty of his own state without a single shot being fired on its territory.</p>
<p>The relationship between Minsk and Moscow has a long and complicated history. Until the 2020 Belarusian revolution, Lukashenka <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/09/moscow-has-limited-options-belarus">maintained</a> a cautious independence in foreign policy. This included keeping the Russian military out of Belarus. </p>
<p>The fraudulent presidential elections of August 2020, however, sparked the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53799065">largest protests</a> in the country’s modern history. Faced with the greatest popular challenge in his 26 years in power, Lukashenka was quick to churn out anti-Nato rhetoric, aimed at Putin as much as at domestic audiences. </p>
<p>He claimed the west was fomenting the protests to destabilise Belarus and turn it into “<a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/29/president-lukashenko-claims-nato-has-aggressive-plans-against-belarus">the bridgehead against Russia</a>”. This strategy worked. In Lukashenka’s vulnerable position the Kremlin <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/belarus-plane-action-eases-russian-military-restraints">saw an opportunity</a> and offered support. </p>
<h2>A Soviet republic</h2>
<p>Belarus first appeared on the world map after the first world war. The 1917 revolution in Russia brought down the tsarist empire. German occupation of the latter’s Belarusian lands enabled local nationalists to proclaim the Belarusian People’s Republic in March 1918. After Germany’s collapse, the Bolsheviks returned to establish a Soviet Belarusian republic in 1919. And in the chaotic years that followed, a large portion of Belarusian land went to Poland under the 1921 Riga Peace Treaty. </p>
<p>Soviet Belarus was a founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922 and enjoyed a brief period of nation-building under the auspices of what historian Terry Martin terms Moscow’s <a href="https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/278">affirmative action</a>. This Soviet policy sought to win over non-Russian minorities in the multi-ethnic union by promoting their native languages and cultures and by training local cadres. </p>
<p>From the late 1920s on, however, this process of Belarusisation was curtailed. Stalinist repressions of the 1930s hit Belarus harder than many other republics and its cultural elites were decimated. </p>
<p>The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the USSR nearly doubled Belarus’s prewar territory, gains which were not reversed after 1945. The second world war saw Belarus suffer terribly, however, losing <a href="https://www.timothysnyder.org/books/bloodlands">a greater share</a> of its population than any other European country did. </p>
<p>The war left deep scars on the national psyche but also served to cement the country’s place in the Soviet empire. Post-war investment from Moscow poured in. By the 1970s, Belarus was one of the most economically successful Soviet republics. </p>
<h2>A complicated relationship</h2>
<p>The stability and prosperity of the final Soviet decades made many Belarusians <a href="http://countrystudies.us/belarus/39.htm">reluctant</a> to see the USSR die. And even before Lukashenka was elected president in 1994, Minsk pursued closer economic and political ties with Russia. </p>
<p>Lukashenka quickly grasped that economic integration with Russia was a good idea. He pushed for economic and foreign policy cooperation between the two countries. In 1999, Belarus and Russia signed a treaty establishing the Union State. This vaguely defined entity saw both states retain their sovereignty but share some supranational institutions. </p>
<p>Most of the larger integration goals – a single currency; common taxation; a joint defence policy – never materialised, however. And the relationship between the two states was further strained by Belarus’ dependence on Russian energy resources, with Lukashenka routinely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-belarus-factbox-idUSKBN1YZ0XW">haggling</a> with the Kremlin over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/jan/09/oilandpetrol.russia">concessionary prices</a> for Russian gas and oil. </p>
<p>Belarusians, meanwhile, might have close affinity with Russia (most being Russian speakers) but they <a href="http://www.iiseps.org/?p=114&lang=en">baulk</a> at the idea of a full merger with the Russian Federation. This is partly a new habit of independence. It is also a legacy of that conflicting approach to nationalities in the later Soviet era, when ethnic identities of individual republics were promoted alongside the supra-ethnic Soviet identity. The Belarusian nation-building process did not start from scratch in 1991. It had begun well before the country gained independence from the USSR. </p>
<h2>Pivotal moment</h2>
<p>Putin’s aggressive stance on Ukraine from the early 2010s initially worried Lukashenka. Concerned about the precedent it might set for Belarus, he used nationalist rhetoric to <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2017/02/21/the-strange-death-of-russias-closest-alliance/">distance</a> his government from Russia, even as Moscow grew keener to integrate the two nations. </p>
<p>In 2014, Lukashenka avoided formally recognising Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instead made overtures to the west. By 2020, relations with the Kremlin <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/01/integration-hold-russia-and-belarus">had reached a new low</a>. </p>
<p>And then 2020 happened. Lukashenka’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters">violent crackdown</a> brought on Western sanctions, which intensified after Minsk <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-plane-hijacking-snarls-bidens-hopes-to-repair-strained-us-russia-relationship-161969">hijacked</a> an international flight over its airspace. He <a href="https://theconversation.com/trouble-on-the-belarus-poland-border-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-migrant-crisis-manufactured-by-belarus-leader-172108">manufactured</a> a migrant crisis on the Polish border, which earned Belarus widespread condemnation and further sanctions. </p>
<p>By the end of 2020, relentless repression had forced the protest movement underground. Belarus currently has <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">1,076</a> political prisoners, but thousands more were detained, and scores fled the country to escape persecution. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in November 2021, Minsk and Moscow <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-lukashenka-union-state/31546225.html">signed</a> a comprehensive economic integration programme and agreed a joint military doctrine. Lukashenka’s international isolation gave Putin a new ability to force Minsk to accept the presence of Russian troops on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, only 50 miles from Kyiv. </p>
<p>This undoubtedly played a key role in Moscow’s decision to attack Ukraine. And while Minsk has claimed that its troops are not yet involved, Belarus has nonetheless taken steps to reverse its 1994 decision to abandon nuclear weapons. On February 27, 2022, a national referendum scrapped the country’s constitutional pledge to remain nuclear-free. </p>
<p>The Lukashenka regime has long falsified electoral outcomes and this referendum was no different. Anti-war sentiment remains strong among Belarusians, as demonstrated by the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-lukashenko-tightens-grip-in-referendum/a-60940398">hundreds</a> of protestors on the referendum day who came out to show solidarity with Ukraine; <a href="https://referendum2022.spring96.org/en/news/106936">800</a> were arrested. </p>
<p>Exhausted by repression and with their opposition leaders exiled or imprisoned, ordinary Belarusians have few tools at their disposal to effectively resist the government. If they were to try to fight Lukashenka, the state army and special forces would likely be used against them. But if Lukashenka decides to throw his army into Putin’s war, this could all change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalya Chernyshova receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>By allowing Russian military presence in Belarus, president Aliaksandr Lukashenka has forfeited his country’s sovereignty.Natalya Chernyshova, Senior Lecturer in Modern History, University of WinchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779842022-03-03T13:28:07Z2022-03-03T13:28:07Z3 reasons Belarus is helping Russia wage war against Ukraine<p>Russia is attacking Ukraine, but Belarus, a neighboring country, is “the other aggressor in this war,” European Union President Ursula von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1441">said on Feb. 27,</a> 2022. </p>
<p>One politician, Alexander Lukashenko, has ruled Belarus with a draconian hand for the last 28 years, with no interruption in power. And now, Lukashenko is supporting Russia in the war, reciprocating Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent help in maintaining his own political power.</p>
<p>Putin is using Belarus as a staging ground for his war, which has resulted in at least <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113002">500 Ukrainian civilian deaths</a>, and caused <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1084100763/1-million-refugees-fled-ukraine">more than 1 million people</a> to flee the country. Russian troops have crossed into Ukraine through <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-belarus-joins-conflict-against-ukraine/">the Belarusian border</a> in the north.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tatsiana-Kulakevich-2">an expert on Eastern Europe</a>, I believe there are three key points to understand about Belarus’ involvement in the Ukraine war. </p>
<p><iframe id="tYySA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/tYySA/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Russia unofficially controls Belarus</h2>
<p>Belarus is a former Soviet republic of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/belarus/overview#1">9.4 million people</a> that borders both Russia and Ukraine as well as Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. It is also Europe’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/05/25/why-belarus-is-called-europes-last-dictatorship">last dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has spent nearly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/europe/lukashenko-belarus-russia-ukraine.html">three decades balancing his ties</a> to both Western powers and Putin. But the last presidential election marked a turning point that pushed Lukashenko closer toward Putin. </p>
<p>Lukashenko claimed victory after the Aug. 9, 2020, election, which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/europe/eu-belarus-election.html">international experts</a> widely consider fraudulent. Lukashenko <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/europe/belarus-election-lukashenko.html">received 80% of the popular vote</a>, an impossibly favorable result given public discontent with his regime. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.alamy.com/the-largest-protests-in-the-history-of-independent-belarus-demonstration-against-elections-of-president-lukashenko-peaceful-protestors-holding-big-w-image368847343.html">unprecedented public uprising</a> followed, as hundreds of thousands of Belarusians protested the election results. </p>
<p>Putin <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-vows-support-for-belarus-leader-alexander-lukashenko-11600105778">offered financial and military</a> support to help Lukashenko silence the protests — without any international response or pushback. Putin also warned foreign powers not to interfere in Belarus’ affairs. This promise boosted Lukashenko’s confidence and feelings of impunity.</p>
<p>Belarusian police subsequently attacked protesters with <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20201011-police-break-up-belarus-opposition-protest-with-water-cannon-stun-grenades">water cannons, tear gas and stun grenades</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2020, Belarus has faced a series of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-approves-new-sanctions-against-belarus-over-ukraine-invasion-source-2022-03-02/">international economic sanctions</a> that further alienated Lukashenko from the West. The European Union and the U.S. announced on March 2, 2022, <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/596560-biden-targets-belarus-russian-defense-sector-with-new-restrictions">a new set of sanctions</a> that restricts technology and potential war material exports to Belarus. </p>
<p>The lack of international reaction to Putin enabling Lukashenko’s behavior — alongside the economic pressure — pushed the Belarusian leader even closer to the Kremlin. This leaves Lukashenko with a limited ability to have an independent, or neutral, position on the war.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four people sit and stand around a table and dump out white ballots of paper from a large maroon envelope." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449025/original/file-20220228-13-1rqo7d5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election commission staff count votes on Feb. 27, 2022, after the Belarusian constitutional referendum that ended Belarus’ stance as a nuclear-free zone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/election-commission-staff-count-votes-after-the-2022-belarusian-at-picture-id1238812001?s=2048x2048">Peter Kovalev/TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Belarusian people cannot easily speak against Lukashenko</h2>
<p>The human rights situation in Belarus has sharply deteriorated since the 2020 elections, prompting an estimated <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/belarus/news/article/situation-in-belarus-france-s-position">100,000 to 200,000 people</a> to leave Belarus for neighboring European Union countries and Ukraine.</p>
<p>People increasingly cannot freely express their opinions about any of the government’s decisions, for fear of persecution and arrest. </p>
<p>Since 2020, Belarus has <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">detained more than</a> 1,000 political prisoners, the U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.state.gov/political-prisoners-in-belarus/">reported in January 2022</a>.</p>
<p>And at least 497 journalists and media workers were detained by the government during the first eight months of 2021, according to <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/05/25/why-belarus-is-called-europes-last-dictatorship">United Nations human rights expert Michelle Bachelet</a>. An estimated 129 Belarusian nonprofit and human rights organizations also closed down during this time frame.</p>
<p>Despite threats of government fines and arrests, thousands of Belarusians again took <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-ukraine-protests/31726865.html">to the streets</a> on Feb. 27, 2022, to protest the referendum and to express solidarity with Ukraine. As a result, <a href="https://spring96.org/ru/news/106932">police arrested an estimated 800 protesters</a>. </p>
<p>The silencing of public opinion gives Putin more power to exploit Belarusian territory for his political and military interests. Belarusians cannot apply pressure to the government and stop Lukashenko from following Putin’s orders.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An aerial shot shows a large crowd of people marching across a bridge over a river on a grey day" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449032/original/file-20220228-25-1f7n3hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A large crowd of protesters march in Minsk, Belarus, after the disputed presidential election on Aug. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/large-crowd-of-protesters-march-through-the-streets-on-september-29-picture-id1228786618?s=2048x2048">Artem Dubik/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Belarus is a strategic stage for Russia</h2>
<p>The border between Belarus and Ukraine stretches about 674 miles – roughly half the length of Ukraine’s border with Russia. This significantly expanded Russia’s base for attacking Ukraine. </p>
<p>Belarus and Russia conducted large-scale, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/10/1079888622/russia-military-exercise-belarus-ukraine">joint military exercises</a> ahead of the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/16/belarus-says-not-a-single-russian-soldier-will-stay-after-joint-drills-a76408">Despite public assurances</a> from the Belarusian government that the Russian troops would go back to Russia, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60451955">some 30,000 Russian troops</a> extended their stay in Belarus, and many eventually crossed into Ukraine. </p>
<p>Lukashenko continues to follow Putin’s orders as the war escalates.</p>
<p>Putin put Russia’s <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-nuclear-forces-ukraine-fighting/">nuclear forces on high alert</a> on Feb. 27, raising international concern. That same day, Belarus <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/belarus-holds-referendum-to-renounce-non-nuclear-status">scrapped its commitment to remaining nuclear free</a> following a public referendum vote that was rigged, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/belarus-referendum-russia-ukraine-invasion-1.6367876">international experts say</a>. This change in Belarus’ constitution would allow Belarus to physically host Russian nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Belarus’ military ties to Russia have strengthened since 2020.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/1/russia-to-send-arms-maybe-even-s-400s-to-belarus-lukashenko">Lukashenko announced in September 2021</a> that Russia would send military equipment, including helicopters and air defense systems, to the Belarusian-Ukraine border. </p>
<p>Two months later, Lukashenko broke his neutrality on Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula that Russia forcibly annexed in 2014. The Belarusian leader publicly recognized that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/belarus-lukashenko-says-annexed-crimea-is-legally-russian">Crimea was Russian territory</a>. Lukashenko also offered to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-migration-europe-ab1efae5e65bf01af3be2f6139ef6f4b">host Russian nuclear weapons</a> if NATO moves nuclear weapons from Germany to Eastern Europe, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-germany-migration-europe-ab1efae5e65bf01af3be2f6139ef6f4b">as had been reported</a>. </p>
<p>Lukashenko <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/launchpad-russias-assault-ukraine-belarus-holds-referendum-renounce-non-nuclear-2022-02-27/">repeated his plan to station Russian warheads</a> on Belarusian soil on Feb. 27, 2022, speaking at a polling station on the day of the referendum.</p>
<p>Russia’s ability to place nuclear weapons in Belarus has raised alarm for neighboring NATO countries, chiefly Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the U.S. and other Western powers.</p>
<p>By hosting Russian troops and weapons, Lukashenko has shown that he is closely aligned with Putin — despite <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-people-of-belarus-dont-want-to-fight-in-ukraine/a-60923917">the popular will</a> of the Belarusian people to maintain distance. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus’ alliance with Russia is a strategic factor in the Ukraine war. The country’s long-term dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, has indicated he will do as Russian President Vladimir Putin says.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of instruction at School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721082021-11-18T13:10:53Z2021-11-18T13:10:53ZTrouble on the Belarus-Poland border: What you need to know about the migrant crisis manufactured by Belarus’ leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432493/original/file-20211117-13-lknwzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C3278%2C2114&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hopes for a better future?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/migrants-aiming-to-cross-into-poland-camp-near-the-bruzgi-news-photo/1236622809?adppopup=true">Maxim Guchek/BELTA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Using migrants as pawns is perhaps nothing new. But rarely do you have a situation in which one country encourages a migrant crisis on its own border for nakedly geopolitical reasons.</em></p>
<p><em>That is what appears to be happening at the Poland-Belarus border, where <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/11/16/poland-belarus-migrants-border-crisis-chance-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn">violence has broken out</a> between Polish border guards and Middle Eastern migrants who traveled there via Belarus, and who are set on reaching the European Union. Meanwhile, there is growing concern over those <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/world/europe/poland-belarus-border-crisis.html">camped out in freezing conditions</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Tatsiana Kulakevich, a <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">specialist on Eastern European politics at the University of South Florida</a>, to break down how the migrant crisis came about and what the fallout might be.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on at the Belarus-Polish border?</h2>
<p>Images of migrants – many of them families with children – <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2021/11/16/1051199592/photos-belarus-poland-border-migrants">camped at the Belarus-Poland border</a>, trying to force their way into Poland and being <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/poland-uses-water-hoses-on-migrants-condemns-belarus-for-attack">deterred by water hoses</a>, have gained international attention in recent days. On Nov. 18, it was reported that many of the migrants were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/18/world/belarus-poland-border-migrants?partner=slack&smid=sl-share">being moved back from the border</a>, to a government-run facility. But it is not clear what the long-term plan is for those who have gathered in Belarus with no intention of returning to their countries of origin.</p>
<p>The crisis has been months in the making.</p>
<p>The influx of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">migrants to Belarus from the Middle East began in early summer 2021</a>. But they didn’t come to stay in Belarus. Their ultimate destination was Western Europe. Now, there are thousands of people spending nights near the barbed-wire fence separating Belarus from EU member Poland.</p>
<p>The situation took a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-fears-major-incident-migrants-belarus-head-border-2021-11-08/">dramatic turn on Nov. 8</a> when thousands of new arrivals showed up at the Belarus-Poland border and tried to break through makeshift fences on the border, with the goal to crossing into the European Union.</p>
<p>This migrant crisis has a twist – it appears to be encouraged by Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus’ leader, who’s at the center of the border conflict as part of a ploy to flood the EU members that border Belarus – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – with large numbers of migrants in retaliation for a series of sanctions against the Lukashenko government.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">denied encouraging migrants</a> into Europe. The evidence suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>Belavia, the Belarus state airline, increased the number of flights from the Middle East – including Iraq, Lebanon and Syria – in recent months to enable more migrants to come. For example, <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/11/12/bilet-v-belorusskii-kontslager">flightradar24.com</a>, which monitors global air traffic, reported 27 flights from Beirut to Minsk from August to November 2021, compared to only five in the whole of 2020.</p>
<p>And according to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/world/middleeast/belarus-migrants-iraq-kurds.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur">some of the migrants from Iraq</a>, Belarusian officials arranged for their stay in hotels and helped them reach the border with Poland. Belarusian border guards, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/59233244">it has been reported</a>, led migrants to a gap which had been cut in the border fence, allowing them to bypass the official checkpoint. Meanwhile, other migrants say they were provided axes and wire cutters by Belarusian border guards to cut through fences.</p>
<p>In response, the Polish government has closed its border with Belarus.</p>
<h2>What is the background to the crisis?</h2>
<p>The actions of the Belarusian government appear to be in retaliation for economic sanctions imposed by the international community in response to Lukashenko’s increasingly autocratic rule.</p>
<p>In August 2020, Belarusian authorities cracked down on protesters demanding the resignation of Lukashenko following a disputed – many say <a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-ap-top-news-europe-72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb">rigged</a> – election. Opposition leaders say as many as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-election-protests/more-than-130-anti-lukashenko-protesters-detained-in-belarus-rights-group-idUSKBN28N0FK">30,000 people were detained</a> in efforts to suppress demonstrations.</p>
<p>The United States and the European Union <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-eu/eu-says-lukashenko-is-not-legitimate-belarus-president-idUSKCN26F0ZE">refused to recognize Lukashenko’s legitimacy</a> as president and, in September 2020, imposed a series of sanctions targeting Belarusian officials with asset freezes and travel bans. </p>
<p>The EU followed that up with two further rounds of sanctions in November and December of that year.</p>
<p>A fourth packet of EU sanctions came after Belarus <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2021/05/23/belarus-intercepts-ryanair-flight-and-detains-journalist-sparking-international-outrage/?sh=6e1a91634e6f">intercepted a Ryanair flight</a> carrying Raman Pratasevich, an opposition journalist and a former editor-in-chief of the Telegram Nexta news channel, along with 132 other passengers in May 2021. Belarusian authorities arrested the journalist and his partner before allowing the plane to continue to its destination. In June 2021, Pratasevich was moved under house arrest.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has sought to suppress any signs of protest activities. Since the beginning of the presidential election campaign in May 2020, the number of political prisoners in Belarus has increased from three to <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">868 as of November 18, 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>Where are these refugees coming from, and why?</h2>
<p>The asylum seekers are mostly Kurds from Iraq, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-11-17/why-iraqi-kurds-are-fleeing-their-peaceful-homeland">fleeing persecution and poverty</a>. But there are also migrants from Lebanon, Syria and Afghanistan. They are trying to cross into EU member states Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.</p>
<p>Previously, Middle Eastern migrants mainly crossed the Turkish border with the EU, and from Africa via the Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>These crossings can be treacherous, so the prospect of flying straight into Belarus instead of risking drowning proved an attractive option.</p>
<p>But now thousands are stuck or hiding along the Belarusian-Polish border, facing freezing temperatures. The cold and lack of humanitarian support have caused multiple cases of hypothermia and at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/16/poland-belarus-border-crisis-eu-refugees">nine deaths</a>.</p>
<h2>What chances are there for a resolution to the crisis?</h2>
<p>Lukashenko is using the border issues as leverage against the EU. He wants the lifting or easing of existing sanctions and recognition that he is the legitimate ruler of Belarus. </p>
<p>The EU, meanwhile, has announced plans for more sanctions against Belarus. But it has also held out the possibility of negotiations on resolving the migration crisis.</p>
<p>Lukashenko and Germany’s acting Chancellor, Angela Merkel, have held <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/germanys-merkel-belarus-lukashenko-hold-another-phone-call-belta">two phone calls</a> since the escalation of the border crisis on Nov. 8. They represented Lukashenko’s first conversations with a European leader since the 2020 presidential election. </p>
<p>The phone calls happened after Russian President Vladimir Putin, an ally of Lukashenko and the Belarusian regime, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-merkel-hold-2nd-phone-talk-in-2-days-about-migration-crisis-on-belarusian-polish-border/2418512">called on EU leaders</a> to talk directly with Lukashenko. </p>
<h2>What could be the fallout?</h2>
<p>The EU, the U.S. and NATO have strongly condemned <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-23/belarus-accused-of-using-migrants-in-hybrid-attack-against-eu">Lukashenko’s ushering</a> migrants to the EU border. The EU recently announced plans for a fifth round of sanctions against Belarus, targeting airlines, travel agencies and individuals believed to be facilitating the push of migrants. </p>
<p>Lukashenko, in turn, has threatened to retaliate against further sanctions, including <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/belarus-threaten-europe-gas/2021/11/11/970c725c-42df-11ec-9404-50a28a88b9cd_story.html">cutting off natural gas transit</a> from Russia to EU countries through Belarus.</p>
<p>Setting the stage for this, on Nov. 17, Belarus <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/17/belarus-limits-oil-flow-to-poland-due-to-pipeline-repairs-amid-growing-tensions-on-border/">restricted the pumping of oil</a> through the Druzhba pipeline to Poland, saying it was the result of “unscheduled repair work” that would last approximately three days. </p>
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<p>But cutting off the gas supply to Europe would likely only be a short-term measure for Lukashenko. Anything more than a few days would go against Russia’s interests and could cause a rift with Putin – and keeping Putin on his side is crucial for Lukashenko.</p>
<p>Moscow has provided a financial lifeline to Lukashenko’s regime and promised to protect Belarus from external military threats. As long as Lukashenko retains Putin’s support, he will be able to continue to suppress dissent internally and ignore international pressure to respect borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus has created a migrant crisis at its border in an apparent move to punish the European Union for its opposition to the country’s leader.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at SIGS, Research Fellow, Affiliate Faculty at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1716432021-11-12T15:36:23Z2021-11-12T15:36:23ZBelarus: Lukashenko threatens to turn off the gas to western Europe as migrant crisis deepens<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431685/original/file-20211112-25-1akpf21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4244%2C2829&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">h</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Threats from the president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59246899">interrupt the flow of Russian gas to Europe</a> are the clearest indications yet that he has no plans to back down from the rapidly escalating confrontation between Belarus and the EU over the presence of growing numbers of asylum seekers on the border with Poland.</p>
<p>Global energy prices are at <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/10/21/soaring-energy-prices-pose-inflation-risks-as-supply-constraints-persist">record high levels</a> and expected to stay there. So Lukashenko’s threat to disrupt gas supplies to Europe is one that EU leaders cannot afford to ignore. </p>
<p>The humanitarian crisis on the eastern borders of the EU is in fact just the latest and potentially most dangerous stage in Lukashenko’s continuing struggle to maintain his grip on power in Belarus in the face of mass protests that have undermined the legitimacy of his regime since a contested election in August 2020. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, reacting to the imposition of sanctions by the EU, Lukashenko threatened to “<a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/952979/belarus-dictator-threatens-flood-eu-with-drugs-migrants-avoid-sanctions">flood Europe with drugs and migrants</a>”. And, in recent months, thousands of people have travelled to Belarus from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia in search of better and safer lives in Europe. Those who have spoken to journalists <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-poland-migrant-crisis-syria/31549911.html">report that</a> every step of their journey was organised by the Belarusian regime. Tour companies with links to the state sold them flights to Minsk and provided ground transport to the border. Once there, they said, members of the Belarus security services show them where to cross, and then actively prevent them from returning to Belarus if they are caught by patrols on the other side.</p>
<p>The lucky ones manage to evade the border guards and get <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/10/poland-belarus-crisis-volunteers-border-police-aggressive">help from local activists</a>. But many remain trapped in the open without food, adequate shelter or warm clothing. At least eight people have already died.</p>
<h2>Political turmoil</h2>
<p>Although the links may not be immediately obvious, the engineering of this crisis by Belarus follows directly from the protests that have gripped the country for more than a year.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-opposition-pressure-continues-inside-and-outside-the-country-will-it-work-156330">Belarus: opposition pressure continues inside and outside the country – will it work?</a>
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<p>The disputed presidential election of August 2020 marked the beginning of the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/02/europe/belarus-lukashenko-interview/index.html">most serious threat</a> to Lukashenko’s position since he first became president in 1994. Even in the face of brutal reprisals by the security forces, ordinary people came out onto the streets en masse in support of opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, whom many regard as the real winner of the election. Real political change in Belarus <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/765761">seemed possible</a>. </p>
<p>Lukashenko’s response was firstly to remove leading opposition figures from the political arena. Tikhanovskaya <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/belarus-opposition-candidate-lithuania-protests-svetlana-tikhanouskaya">left Belarus</a> soon after the election, citing threats made against her children and finding asylum in Lithuania. Others also went into exile or, like <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-58719084">Maria Kolesnikova</a> – another prominent critic of Lukashenko – were imprisoned. </p>
<p>Journalists and civil society organisations were the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/29/belarus-crackdown-independent-journalism#">next to be targeted</a>, to remove remaining sources of support for the opposition and starve Belarusian society of independent sources of news. By the summer of 2021, Lukashenko’s strategy of dividing the opposition while keeping key interest groups – especially the security services – on his side <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25739638.2021.1928880">was paying off</a> and he could turn his attention to critics in the west. </p>
<h2>Sanctions bite, Lukashenko bites back</h2>
<p>Since August 2020, western countries have <a href="https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/2021/08/27/uk-us-canada-and-switzerland-significantly-escalate-sanctions-against-belarus-12082021/">introduced a range of measures</a> against Lukashenko’s regime, targeting key Belarusian exports as well as individuals and businesses with close ties to the president. While some <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/how-half-hearted-sanctions-put-the-future-of-belarus-at-risk/">critics argue</a> that sanctions do not go far enough, it is clear that Lukashenko finds even <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210809-one-year-after-controversial-re-election-lukashenko-denies-targeting-belarus-activists">the fact of western censure offensive</a>, not to mention its <a href="https://wiiw.ac.at/new-eu-sanctions-against-belarus-what-will-be-their-economic-effect-n-513.html">damaging impact</a> on the Belarusian economy.</p>
<p>In July, Lukashenko threatened to allow masses of migrants to <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-threatens-to-allow-migrant-masses-into-europe">pass through Belarus into the EU</a>, making it clear that this was retaliation for EU economic sanctions against Belarus. The decision to use asylum seekers as political weapons is callous enough, but has so far proved to be highly effective in provoking a response that shows EU member states in a negative light. Poland, in particular, has declared a state of emergency and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-belarus-border-wall-migrants/31536084.html">passed legislation</a> to authorise funds to build a wall on the border with Belarus. Meanwhile its security forces have been criticised for their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/10/europe/poland-belarus-border-migrant-crisis-wednesday-intl/index.html">heavy-handed tactics</a> against the refugees.</p>
<p>The recent suggestion from Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, that the EU might simply <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-floats-idea-eu-paying-belarus-stop-migrant-flows-2021-11-09/">pay Belarus</a> to keep the refugees away from Europe may indicate that Lukashenko aims not merely to punish the EU but hopes to make some material gains from this crisis. If so, he is likely to be disappointed. Far from offering concessions to Belarus, the EU has been looking for ways to impose <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-09/eu-backs-poland-as-migrant-crisis-on-belarus-border-escalates">yet more sanctions</a>. And if Lukashenko goes ahead with his threat to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/nov/11/belarus-threats-yamal-europe-pipeline-gas-prices">block gas pipelines</a> that cross Belarusian territory, the reduction in transit revenues will deal a further blow to his country’s economy. </p>
<p>The current crisis is almost certain to intensify the antagonism between the Belarusian regime and the west, especially the EU, and to strengthen its ties to Moscow. Although Lukashenko has a track record of blowing hot and cold in his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/25/lukashenko-belarus-russia-putin/">relations with Russia</a>, his response to the threat posed by Tikhanovskaya and the opposition movement has left him with little choice of allies. </p>
<p>The big question that remains is whether the mastermind behind Lukashenko’s migrant gamble is <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-whether-or-not-putin-is-behind-the-border-crisis-it-plays-into-kremlin-hands-171684">really Vladimir Putin</a>. There is no firm evidence that Russia is the puppet-master, although the tactic certainly bears many of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putin-how-to-understand-the-russian-presidents-view-of-the-world-93212">hallmarks of Putin’s</a>: unconventional and often indirect but well targeted measures that are effective in provoking an exaggerated response.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-whether-or-not-putin-is-behind-the-border-crisis-it-plays-into-kremlin-hands-171684">Belarus: whether or not Putin is behind the border crisis, it plays into Kremlin hands</a>
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<p>So far, Putin has shown no signs of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-migrant-crisis-putin-influence/31555420.html">intervening to restrain Lukashenko</a> and bring an end to the current crisis. Disruption and confusion on Europe’s borders along with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/09/the-guardian-view-on-belarus-and-migrants-exploiting-the-vulnerable">ethical and legal questions raised</a> about the EU’s response to a humanitarian crisis on its doorstep all help to advance Putin’s broader agenda: to take advantage of opportunities to <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117583/we-need-to-talk-about-putin/9781529103595.html">divide, demoralise and distract</a> his opponents in the west.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The crisis at the Belarus/Poland border follows 18 months of political turmoil for the country’s authoritarian president.Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1656302021-08-04T12:54:20Z2021-08-04T12:54:20ZBelarus: targeting of critics likely to intensify as Lukashenko expands his reach<p>Nearly one year after the presidential election that plunged Belarus into a crisis of political legitimacy, persecution of government critics and activists appears to be on the rise.</p>
<p>Two recent incidents – a Belarusian Olympian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/04/belarus-sprinter-krystsina-tsimanouskaya-poland">refusing to return</a> to Belarus from Tokyo, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/03/belarus-exile-group-leader-vitaly-shishov-missing-in-kyiv-police-say">suspected murder</a> of a Belarusian activist in Ukraine – show that Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko’s acts against dissidents are transcending international borders.</p>
<p>Lukashenko was declared the winner of the August 9 2020 presidential election, leading to his sixth consecutive term as president. This was despite surveys predicting a landslide victory for his main opponent Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya, and subsequent reports of mass <a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-ap-top-news-europe-72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb">electoral irregularities</a>. </p>
<p>Following the announcement of the electoral results, unprecedented mass protests broke out, and Tsikhanouskaya fled to Lithuania amid rising concerns <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f8726f35-693f-4c39-bc0d-8592214f9431">over her safety</a>. But the movement has lost much of its momentum compared to when it first began – likely due to relentless <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/07/27/are-the-protest-movements-dead-in-russia-and-belarus-a74623">government repression</a> </p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-leader-has-little-fear-eu-sanctions-analysts-2021-07-01/">EU sanctions</a> have been relatively ineffective amid Russia’s enduring support for Lukashenko.</p>
<h2>Expanding government repression</h2>
<p>In recent months, the Belarusian government has intensified its targeting of critics, and expanded the crackdown beyond its borders. </p>
<p>In May 2021, Lukashenko forced a passenger Ryanair flight to land minutes before it entered Lithuanian airspace to arrest journalist and government critic <a href="https://theconversation.com/kidnapping-of-roman-protasevich-will-force-pariah-belarus-more-firmly-into-russias-orbit-161678">Roman Protasevich</a>. The incident drew international attention and led the EU to implement a new round of sanctions against Belarus, with the new measures also targeting the country’s important <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/most-belarus-potash-exports-not-affected-by-eu-sanctions-analysts-2021-06-25/">potash sector</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, Olympic sprinter Krystsina Tsimanouskaya claims she was forcibly taken to the airport to return to Belarus after reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-58052144">criticising her coaches</a>. She refused to fly back to Belarus over <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-58065318">concerns for her safety</a> and has since been granted a humanitarian visa in Poland. However, it remains uncertain whether the athlete will ultimately be safe in Poland – though, given that she is technically not a political dissident, the risk of her being targeted is likely to be moderately smaller. </p>
<p>In Kyiv, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-activist-shyshou-dead/31390897.html">Belarusian activist</a> Vitaly Shishov, who ran an organisation in Ukraine aimed at helping Belarusians <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-activist-shyshou-dead/31390897.html">fleeing persecution</a>, was found dead August 3 in a suspected murder.</p>
<p>These are just the latest in the series of other repressive acts by the Lukashenko regime over the summer. These included <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-crackdown-journalists-released/31377463.html">arrests of journalists</a>, forced <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-shuts-down-ngos/31374183.html">closures of NGOs</a>, imprisonment of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/belarus-university-students-expelled-from-universities-and-imprisoned-for-peaceful-protest/">student protesters</a> and branding of international television <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-government-and-politics-europe-business-belarus-6d55a365261d2f18fb3aba94a04364cf">channels as “extremist”</a>. </p>
<p>These two incidents in Ukraine and Tokyo indicate that the Lukashenko regime is increasingly likely and willing to target dissidents -– even on foreign soil -– regardless of international scrutiny.</p>
<h2>Reliance on Russia</h2>
<p>Despite international outcry, sanctions appear to have had little meaningful impact and have failed to deter Lukashenko from pursuing an increasingly repressive path. In response to the latest round of sanctions, Lukashenko retaliated by openly admitting to sponsoring illegal migration into the EU <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-lithuania-migrants-belarus-/31384931.html">through Lithuania</a>, adding severe pressure on border security mechanisms and increasing regional tensions with Europe.</p>
<p>The uptick in repression also comes against the backdrop of increasing political tensions. Lukashenko’s political rival Tsikhanouskaya recent travelled to the US to ask Washington to support the pro-democratic movement in Belarus and a rerun of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/biden-tsikhanouskaya-meeting-belarus/31382532.html">presidential election</a>. Although Biden expressed his support, the meeting between the two lasted <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/biden-tsikhanouskaya-meeting-belarus/31382532.html">only 15 minutes</a> with no concrete plans for possible action from Washington announced at this stage.</p>
<p>In contrast, Lukashenko made an unscheduled trip to St Petersburg to meet with Russian president, <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/lukashenko-pays-surprise-visit-to-putin-in-st-petersburg-215580/?source=belarus">Vladimir Putin</a>, further underlining that Lukashenko is highly reliant on Moscow for survival amid a virtually complete isolation from the West.</p>
<p>Indeed, Russia’s support remains an important factor in Minsk’s ongoing and expanding offensive against dissent. Having been virtually cut off from the west, Minsk is more reliant than ever on Russia for <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-russia-lukashenka-crackdown/31356710.html">financial assistance</a>. For example, the country’s economy continues to rely on subsidised <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-russian-money-keeps-belarus-afloat/a-58680063">Russian oil and gas</a>, with a US$1.5 billion (£1.08 billion) loan promised by Russia following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/30/russia-confirms-500m-loan-for-belarus-as-west-toughens-sanctions">outbreak of protests</a> also an important factor contributing to Lukashenko’s ability to cling to power.</p>
<p>Moscow’s increasing presence in Belarus has extended beyond the economic realm. The two countries have reportedly conducted a record number of military exercises so far this year, ahead of the Zapad <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/concerns-mount-over-russia-belarus-military-exercises/">military exercises</a> due to run at training sites in <a href="https://tass.com/world/1322159">Belarus and Russia</a> in September. These exercises take place every four years to test the mobility and <a href="https://cepa.org/event/zapad-2021-implications-for-defense-military-mobility-in-europe/">readiness of troops</a> and are defensive in nature. </p>
<p>The increasing presence of Russian troops and military equipment in Belarus will ensure that wider regional tensions remain heightened over the coming weeks. The drills will take place just months after concerns over a mass buildup of Russian troops on Ukraine’s eastern border sparked fears of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-and-russia-why-troop-build-up-unlikely-to-lead-to-all-out-war-157634">possible military escalation</a>.</p>
<p>The exercises also come amid heightened tensions between the west and Russia over Russia’s own persecution of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-raids-home-detained-open-russia-opposition-group-leader-2021-06-01/">political opposition</a> and crackdown on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/technology/russia-twitter-google-facebook-censorship.html">western tech giants</a> ahead of the State Duma elections in September.</p>
<p>To that end, given the growing presence of the Russian and Belarusian regimes’ increasingly aggressive approach to silencing perceived critics in order to survive, it remains highly unlikely that human rights indicators will improve in Belarus in the short term. </p>
<p>Attacks on independent media, foreign NGOs and perceived regime critics are likely to persist ahead of the election anniversary and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent actions against critics of the Belarusian government show that Lukashenko’s crackdown on dissent is extending beyond the country’s borders.Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1619692021-06-03T12:25:43Z2021-06-03T12:25:43ZBelarus plane hijacking snarls Biden’s hopes to repair strained US-Russia relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404122/original/file-20210602-21-odn74h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=232%2C0%2C3735%2C1269&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Biden is expected to confront Russian leader Vladimir Putin (center) over his stalwart backing of Europe's last dictator, Alexander Lukashenko (left).
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-his-belarusian-counterpart-on-picture-id1233169834?k=6&m=1233169834&s=612x612&w=0&h=Am5vNn8sIc5YoMXvssYtWPcMJSMoG_tz2mAGe6IonPs=">From left to right: Sergei Ilyin/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images and Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The extraordinary May 23 interception of a Ryanair flight carrying Belarusian opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and 132 other passengers over Minsk, the capital of Belarus, came at an awkward time for the U.S. and Russia.</p>
<p>On June 16, Joe Biden and Russian leader Vladimir Putin are <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-putin-geneva-summit-c9b0543248313447b0eac28da50c6188">set to meet</a> for the first time since Biden took office. The Biden administration has signaled a desire to build a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjy4J-v4-vwAhXaKs0KHR7UCXkQFnoECAMQAA&url=https://www.npr.org/2021/05/21/999196021/biden-wants-a-stable-predictable-relationship-with-russia-thats-complicated&usg=AOvVaw3rxtqKMojJhexsakELwj0W">stable, predictable relationship</a> with Russia. Just recently, the White House <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-waive-sanctions-firm-ceo-behind-russias-nord-stream-2-pipeline-source-2021-05-19/">waived sanctions against the Nord Stream 2</a> natural-gas pipeline from Russia to the European Union, allowing Russia to sell more gas to the EU. </p>
<p>Days later, Belarus’ authoritarian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, sent <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/graphics/2021/05/24/belarus-hijack-plane-minsk-opposition-journalist-dissident/5239340001/">a MiG-29 fighter jet</a> to force the landing of the airplane flying between two NATO allies, which carried Raman Pratasevich as a passenger. The journalist was arrested by the Belarusian authorities upon landing. </p>
<p>The European Union reacted furiously, advising airlines to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-airline-wizz-air-redirects-flight-to-avoid-belarus-airspace-11621847226">avoid Belarusian airspace</a>, banning Belarusian airlines from Europe and agreeing to hit Belarus with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-starting-work-economic-sanctions-belarus-borrell-says-2021-05-27/">new economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<p>Putin is a strong ally of Lukashenko’s. Days after the plane incident, he hosted Lukashenko at the Russian resort city of Sochi, where they spent five hours talking and then left on a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-lukashenka-yacht-meeting-black-sea/31282954.html">yacht trip</a> together on the Black Sea. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Ryanair plane on a runway" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404084/original/file-20210602-21-18nzfbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">This Ryanair passenger plane from Athens, Greece, was diverted to Minsk on May 23, 2021, after being told, falsely, there was a bomb on board.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/photo-taken-on-may-23-2021-shows-a-boeing-7378as-ryanair-passenger-picture-id1233071703?k=6&m=1233071703&s=612x612&w=0&h=oGR_abbxRo9EAVwFc2jGPTgfjI8clwPe3sDPF2gI0XQ=">Pettras Malukas/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>At the upcoming summit in Geneva, Biden and Putin are expected to talk about a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/05/25/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-may-25-2021/">range of pressing issues</a>, including Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine, arms control and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/25/politics/biden-putin-summit-geneva/index.html">the COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>Now, Biden must also use his personal meeting with Putin to try to ratchet up pressure on Lukashenko, who <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/belarus-prevent-citizens-from-leaving-amid-crackdowns-president-lukashenko-critics-2021-6">has essentially closed Belarus’ borders to prevent citizens from leaving</a>. Russia is critical <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/25/belarus-eu-sanctions-but-experts-arent-convinced-they-will-work.html">to holding Lukashenko accountable</a> – but Putin is unlikely to endorse any effort to do so.</p>
<h2>The Russia-Belarus relationship</h2>
<p>Lukashenko was already on the outs with Europe and the United States after <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-explained-how-europes-last-dictator-could-fall-144711">rigging a presidential election last August</a> and brutally suppressing citizens who protested his fraudulent win. Pratasevich covered the uprising as editor-in-chief of the Telegram Nexta Live channel, which has 1.4 million subscribers. </p>
<p>An array of international sanctions followed Lukashenko’s August 2020 crackdown. But Moscow provided a crucial lifeline. In addition to recognizing Lukashenko as Belarus’ legitimate president – unlike at least 33 countries worldwide – Putin also <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eastern-europe/news/putin-vows-military-support-for-belarus-lukashenko/">promised to protect Belarus</a> and warned foreign powers not to interfere in Belarus’ affairs.</p>
<p>That allowed Lukashenko to demonstrate to regime insiders and security forces that he could sustain his 26-year-long grip on power. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Huge crowds waving red-and-white flags in a public square" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404085/original/file-20210602-21-4xe9y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Tens of thousands of Belarusians joined protest against Lukashenko’s disputed reelection in August 2020, when election results showed this longtime dictator winning by more than 80%.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/an-aerial-view-as-tens-of-thousands-attend-a-mass-rally-to-protest-picture-id1228275393?k=6&m=1228275393&s=612x612&w=0&h=LM_XfXUQUyeGREAp59OxTsRs8I4L3s_iEjCXmpJJhaM=">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Putin’s support has not wavered with the plane hijacking. After the summit between Putin and Lukashenko in Sochi on May 29 and May 30, Russia announced that it would soon release a delayed <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5953320d-c342-457a-af40-50424d159ffd">$500 million credit to Belarus</a>. It also agreed to increase flights between Belarus and Russia.</p>
<h2>US and Russia at odds</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia-U.S. relations are badly strained.</p>
<p>First there was Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/06/us-eu-sanctions-obama-russia-ukraine-crimea">2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula</a>. Then, there was Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential vote and other elections, and its apparent involvement in the 2020 <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/28/russias-nobelium-using-usaids-email-system-for-hack-microsoft-says.html">SolarWinds hacking attacks</a> that breached the data of multiple U.S. federal agencies and thousands of organizations globally.</p>
<p>In April, Biden imposed <a href="https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/04/us-imposes-additional-round-of-sanctions-on-russia">sanctions against the Kremlin</a> for these acts.</p>
<p>The 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, apparently by agents of the Russian government, and his subsequent jailing has only increased tensions.</p>
<p>When asked if Putin is “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/18/europe/biden-putin-killer-comment-russia-reaction-intl/index.html">a killer</a>” during an interview in March, Biden said yes.</p>
<p>This troubled history explains why both the U.S. and Russia are setting <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/kremlin-spokesperson-cautions-us-others-excessive-expectations-biden-putin-summit-1595018">low expectations</a> for the upcoming U.S.-Russia summit. </p>
<p>Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said the two leaders will exchange views but are <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/05/2021/60ae1b1a9a7947d157c62dd5">unlikely to “come to an understanding”</a> on most issues. The Biden administration says it simply hopes the summit will “<a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-13/kremlin-says-biden-in-phone-call-told-putin-he-wanted-to-normalise-ties">normalize ties</a>” between the two countries.</p>
<h2>US to punish Belarus</h2>
<p>In a <a href="https://belsat.eu/en/news/31-05-2021-us-envoy-julie-fisher-west-must-respond-in-terms-that-lukashenka-is-able-to-understand-interview/">May 31 interview</a>, the U.S. ambassador to Belarus, Julie Fisher, said the U.S. would “work in unison with our European partners in order to come up with appropriate responses” to Lukashenko’s plane hijacking.</p>
<p>“West must respond in terms that Lukashenko is able to understand,” she said. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police in riot gear and holding batons physically carry a man down the street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/404082/original/file-20210602-21-1395p8e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Police arresting a protester at an anti-government march last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/riot-police-officers-detain-a-man-during-a-march-of-opposition-from-picture-id1229395994?s=2048x2048">Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. plans to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/28/statement-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-on-the-united-states-response-to-belaruss-forced-diversion-of-ryanair-flight-and-continuing-attack-on-fundamental-freedoms/">reimpose full sanctions</a> on June 3 prohibiting U.S. people and businesses from conducting financial transactions with nine state-owned enterprises in Belarus. The U.S. also intends to cease allowing Belarusian air carriers to enter its airspace.</p>
<p>Biden’s office is reportedly preparing an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/28/statement-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-on-the-united-states-response-to-belaruss-forced-diversion-of-ryanair-flight-and-continuing-attack-on-fundamental-freedoms/">executive order</a> allowing him to impose additional punishments on Lukashenko. </p>
<p>And before meeting with Putin, Biden will attend the <a href="https://cafod.org.uk/Campaign/Reclaim-our-common-home/What-is-the-G7-Summit-2021">Group of Seven (G-7) summit</a> in England. <a href="https://news.trust.org/item/20210525140812-8iu1t/">Belarus’ dangerous behavior</a> is on the group’s agenda. </p>
<h2>Raising the cost of repression</h2>
<p>Belarus will most likely be targeted with new sanctions through a combined effort by the EU and the U.S. to help hold the Lukashenko regime to account for its bad behavior.</p>
<p>Sanctions alone, however, will not stop Lukashenko. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>As long as he maintains Russian backing, the West’s power to curb him is limited. Measures to increase the cost for Russia to keep supporting the Belarusian regime may be necessary to limit Lukashenko’s apparent sense of impunity.</p>
<p>But the Belarusian people will benefit if Biden and the EU stand united against a rogue state on Europe’s eastern border. Its authoritarian leader terrorizes his own people – and, as the Ryanair incident demonstrated, the international community – with Russia as a willing enabler.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some tension was inevitable at the June 16 US-Russia summit. But Vladimir Putin’s defiant support for Belarus’s rogue regime now pits him harder against the West.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Lecturer at SIGS, Research Fellow, Affiliate Faculty at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614982021-05-25T06:16:01Z2021-05-25T06:16:01ZWith brazen dissident arrest, Belarus finds itself more isolated than ever<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402500/original/file-20210525-22-6cfrfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=69%2C93%2C4709%2C3248&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>Belarus’ authoritarian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, has gone to extraordinary measures to cling to power in the face of the stiffest opposition to his rule in 26 years. Last weekend, this included the state-sanctioned hijacking of a passenger plane.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-24/the-moment-belarus-dissident-he-knew-he-was-done-for/100159860">Ryanair flight 4978</a> en route from Athens to the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius was forced to land in Belarus, the 26-year-old journalist dissident Roman Protasevich was arrested. </p>
<p>In a move not so far removed from Soviet-era practices, the government’s main security agency had put Protasevich’s name on a list of terrorists last year. He now faces a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/23/world/europe/roman-protasevich.html">possible death penalty</a>. </p>
<p>According to Lukashenko’s press service, the president personally ordered a fighter jet to escort the Ryanair plane to Minsk after a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-points-hamas-bomb-threat-plane-diversion-hamas-rejects-claim-2021-05-24/">purported bomb threat</a> from the Palestinian militant group Hamas. It was a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210524-how-belarus-s-aviation-piracy-broke-international-law">brazen violation</a> of international agreements, but fitting with Lukashenko’s increasingly autocratic and isolationist style of rule.</p>
<h2>Tireless campaign against government opponents</h2>
<p>Belarus’ <a href="https://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce5220,50ffbce5226,4c222a5b2,0,,,BLR.html">law on the “fight against terrorism”</a>, enacted in 2002, defines terrorism as an </p>
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<p>attempt on the life of a government or public official carried out in connection with his government or public activities with the aim of destabilising public order or exerting influence on decision-making of government bodies or hindering political or other public activity. </p>
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<p>A rather vague definition like this can be malleable in the hands of a dictatorship. Belarus’ laws are designed to vilify and incarcerate the opposition while protecting those in power. Lukashenko’s actions are informed by a sense of survival – even if this is at the expense of global norms and human rights. </p>
<p>Less than a year ago, Lukashenko was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-lukashenko-wins-belarus-election/a-54506718">declared the winner</a> of a presidential election that was widely regarded to be rigged. A week later, an <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-17/belarus-protest-alexander-lukashenko-rejects-vote-rerun/12564170">estimated 200,000 people</a> marched around the country to demand he step down – the largest gathering in Belarus’ history. The government immediately <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-12/police-in-belarus-crack-down-on-protesters-detain-dozens/12753288">cracked down</a>, arresting many opposition leaders and forcing others to flee abroad.</p>
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<img alt="Police officers kick a demonstrator in Minsk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402514/original/file-20210525-18-blft1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Police officers kick a demonstrator during a mass protest following the presidential election in Minsk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP</span></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/23/world/europe/roman-protasevich.html">Protasevich helped organise the massive street protests</a> from abroad by using the <a href="https://t.me/s/nexta_tv">NEXTA</a> channel on the social media platform Telegram.</p>
<p>The name of the channel comes from the Belarusian word <a href="https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-57228394">Нехта</a>(Nehta), which translates in English as “someone”. The name refers to the thousands of anonymous tips that were sent to the channel by people within Belarus and then circulated. </p>
<p>The creation of the platform was an attempt to challenge Belarus’ centralised media and foster a sense of free speech among opponents of the government. Even with this precaution, however, the price for challenging the state has proven to be high.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-opposition-pressure-continues-inside-and-outside-the-country-will-it-work-156330">Belarus: opposition pressure continues inside and outside the country – will it work?</a>
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<h2>A state built on its Soviet past</h2>
<p>Belarus’ independence from the USSR in the early 1990s was not a true break from the Soviet-era mentality of state control. Coming to power in 1994, Lukashenko enacted policies that censored the media and demeaned <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/belarus/report-belarus/">human rights</a>, consolidating his rule of an authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Unlike other post-Soviet countries, such as the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine, which confronted the past and moved away from this style of rule, Lukashenko continued to weave a Soviet narrative of total control and power in Belarus.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-vladimir-putin-has-alexander-lukashenko-just-where-he-wants-him-146256">Belarus: Vladimir Putin has Alexander Lukashenko just where he wants him</a>
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<p>Political leaders often mobilise national symbolism in order to establish their legitimacy and a national narrative. In Belarus, for example, <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/history-memory-and-art-protest-belarus">the Soviet-era flag</a> was restored in 1995 and a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Belarusian_referendum">controversial referendum</a> gave the Russian language equal status to Belarusian. (Lukashenko is the Russian spelling for the president’s name, for example, while Lukashenka is Belarusian.) Schools and history books were changed to glorify the Soviet past. </p>
<p>Last year, Lukashenko also put forward stricter amendments to the <a href="http://house.gov.by/ru/news-ru/view/2-aprelja-2021-goda-na-zasedanii-palaty-predstavitelej-byli-rassmotreny-11-zakonoproektov-63267-2021">laws on mass media and mass gatherings</a>. </p>
<p>By mobilising Soviet and pro-Russian nation-building tactics in this way, Lukashenko has not only legitimised himself in Belarus but also in Russia. He has <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-vladimir-putin-has-alexander-lukashenko-just-where-he-wants-him-146256">heavily relied</a> on the backing of Russian President Vladimir Putin to solidify his position, particularly when it comes to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/14/alexander-lukashenko-vladimir-putin-sochi-belarus-russia">financial and military support</a>.</p>
<p>And just as government critics have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sweeping-clampdown-putin-critics-warning-repressions/30719838.html">increasingly targeted</a> in Russia — including a journalist who was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/world/europe/russia-journalist-convicted.html">sentenced</a> for allegedly inciting terrorism last year — Protasevich’s arrest shows the lengths that Lukashenko will go to punish any challenge to his rule. </p>
<p>As the protests against the government have failed to create democratic change in the past year and some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/24/roman-protasevich-belarus-lukashenko/">30,000 people are believed to have been arrested</a>, this begs the question of whether the opposition has any fight left.</p>
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<h2>Global pressure will be fruitless</h2>
<p>Also, the question remains whether the international community can do anything to punish Belarus.</p>
<p>Until last year’s elections, relations between Belarus and the EU had been on the mend. In 2016, the EU <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-eu-sanctions-idUSKCN0VO1TP">lifted five years of sanctions</a> on Belarus following the release of political prisoners. And less than two years ago, Lukashenko <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-president-alexander-lukashenko-visits-austria/a-51209658">visited Austria</a> in a push for closer ties with the EU. </p>
<p>However, Belarus has long positioned itself as an outsider not only on the basis of its inhumane treatment of the opposition and Belarusian civil society, but as an ally of Russia. As such, new economic pressure from the West will likely prove useless, given Lukashenko predominantly relies on economic support from Russia.</p>
<p>The only tool the EU potentially has at its disposal is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/24/world/europe/european-union-belarus-flight-ban.html">severing air links</a> with Belarus, which would further isolate the country from the West. </p>
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<p>But Lukashenko has proven to be immune to pressure in the past. And solidifying his power will also benefit the Kremlin, given it allows Russia to hold onto its sphere of hegemonic influence on some post-Soviet spaces. This could be particularly important if it is indeed seeking to take <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589">further military action</a> against Ukraine, as some fear.</p>
<p>This is all bad news for Lukashenko’s opponents. Protasevich’s controversial arrest proves the opposition is not safe from the grasp of Belarus’ dictatorship — no matter whether it is on ground or in the air. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-slow-international-response-shows-limits-of-worlds-human-rights-regime-146165">Belarus: slow international response shows limits of world's human rights regime</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastasiya Byesyedina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus’ leader, Alexander Lukashenko, has gone to extraordinary measures to cling to power. Last weekend, this included the state-sanctioned hijacking of a passenger plane.Anastasiya Byesyedina, PhD Candidate in the Department of Government and International Relations, Sessional Teacher and Student Writing Fellow, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1563302021-03-03T16:19:54Z2021-03-03T16:19:54ZBelarus: opposition pressure continues inside and outside the country – will it work?<p>Six months on from the disputed re-election of Alexander Lukashenko as president, the opposition in Belarus shows no signs of giving up on <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/alexander-lukashenko-faces-belarusian-opposition-svetlana-tikhanovskaya-ultimatum/">its demands</a>. Protesters are calling for Lukashenko to resign, for an end to the regime’s use of violence against its own citizens, and for the release of political prisoners.</p>
<p>The odds are undeniably stacked against them. The leaders of the opposition are dispersed. Some, such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/belarus-officials-charge-opposition-leader-maria-kolesnikova-with-undermining-national-security">Maria Kolesnikova</a> are imprisoned. Svetlana Tikhanovsksaya, who is widely regarded as the actual winner of what many believe was a rigged presidential election in August 2020, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/belarus-opposition-candidate-lithuania-protests-svetlana-tikhanouskaya">fled Belarus</a> after she was threatened by the regime. </p>
<p><a href="https://time.com/5941818/svetlana-tikhanovskaya-belarus-opposition-leader/">In a recent interview</a>, Tikhanovskaya has indicated that the path to political change in Belarus will be a long and difficult one, but she outlined the opposition’s strategy of putting both internal and external pressure on Lukashenko and those who support him. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can listen to an interview about the protests in Belarus with researcher Félix Krawatzek in the first episode of our new podcast, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> – the world explained by experts. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.</em> </p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/a-big-month-for-mars?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
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<p>Tikhanovskaya herself is leading the campaign to encourage external pressure on Belarus, playing a vital role in keeping the country’s political woes on the international agenda and pressing world leaders for tougher measures against the regime. </p>
<p>This effort is paying off. In December <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-sanctions-belarus/31006041.html">the EU imposed a third round of economic sanctions</a> against key individuals and companies in Belarus, while in February the Biden administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-about-biden-needs-new-ways-to-fight-for-democracy-here-are-some-ideas/2021/02/19/fca8104e-7152-11eb-93be-c10813e358a2_story.html">expanded the list</a> of senior officials in the country who are no longer welcome in the United States.</p>
<h2>Keeping up the pressure</h2>
<p>Tikhanovskaya also heads a “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/30802198.html">Coordination Council</a>”, effectively a government in waiting. This body is drafting a new constitution and keeps in regular, frequent contact with <a href="https://meduza.io/en/episodes/2021/02/26/under-pressure-the-evolving-belarusian-opposition-movement-versus-lukashenko-s-embattled-regime">key groups and individuals in Belarus</a> to ensure that the opposition in exile does not become detached from the people who are keeping up the pressure on Lukashenko from within.</p>
<p>This internal pressure is most visible in the daily protests in towns and cities across Belarus, which have continued despite harsh crackdowns by the security services. In fact, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">research</a> by the Centre for East European and International Studies in Berlin indicates that many of the protesters – and especially younger people – have been motivated to support the opposition precisely because of the harsh response by the regime.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">Belarus protests: why people have been taking to the streets – new data</a>
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<p>These protests are remarkable for their peacefulness and good humour, as well as for their creativity. They have evolved from mass outpourings onto the streets to <a href="https://belarusvision.org/">“creative guerrilla warfare”</a>: actions that are smaller in scale and easy to disperse. Flash mobs appear to <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-02/belarusians-organize-flash-mob-protests">stand silently and clap</a> or to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-protests-are-a-marathon-says-conductor/a-54800493">sing</a>. Small groups walk through their own neighbourhoods <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusian-protests-continue-using-flash-mob-tactics-to-avoid-police-crackdown/31039954.html">chanting demands for change</a>. The red and white Belarussian flag that has become the symbol of the opposition <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusians-red--white-flag-protests-solidarity/30829635.html">is displayed widely</a> – and even painted on the snow.</p>
<p>Spontaneous, grassroots acts of protest are supported by longstanding Belarussian non-governmental organisations and have, in turn, given them a new sense of purpose. Viasna (“Spring”) was founded in 1996 during another period of mass protests against Lukashenko. It documents human rights abuses, <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">using its website</a> to profile hundreds of current and former political prisoners of the regime. </p>
<p>Similarly, the <a href="https://baj.by/en">Belarussian Association of Journalists</a> dates from 1995. It monitors violations of freedom of expression and freedom of the media across the country and <a href="https://baj.by/en/events/109">highlights the arrest and prosecution of journalists</a> for covering the current wave of protests.</p>
<h2>Breaking ranks?</h2>
<p>An important component of the opposition’s strategy for achieving real, lasting change in Belarus is to appeal to those who are <a href="https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/events/news/cc7c0e18fe2cb2f.html">keeping Lukashenko in power</a>. These are the officials who work in structures of the state, especially law enforcement. The regime relies heavily on the use of violence, detention and arrest by the police and security forces, as well as on the courts to deliver convictions and prison sentences.</p>
<p>So far the security forces on the ground display undiminished enthusiasm for brutally suppressing the protests. There are, however, now <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/14/lukashenko-belarus-by-pol-security-forces-protests/">signs of some breaking of ranks</a>, especially among more senior civil servants. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/exiled-defectors-belarus-police-holding-ex-colleagues-to-account/30976835.html">BYPOL (or Belarus Police) Initiative</a> is composed of former law enforcement officials from Belarus who gather and disseminate evidence of the human rights abuses carried out by agents of the regime. The members of BYPOL are all in exile, but they remain in contact with their former colleagues in Belarus, who supply detailed evidence. This includes <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCs-6x-6RKU_1ks1DNKi2oqA/videos">video recordings</a> of the treatment of protesters held in detention that are uploaded onto the group’s YouTube channel.</p>
<p>It is impossible to know how far sympathy for the opposition extends within the ranks of Belarussian security forces. Tikhanovskaya and her colleagues in the Coordination Council are hopeful that they can exploit <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210204-listen-to-the-people-tikhanovskaya-tells-putin">existing splits in law enforcement agencies</a> and persuade more officials to work for the opposition.</p>
<p>Even if the opposition achieves this, it is likely to face yet another, even more daunting obstacle in the shape of Russia. As long as Lukashenko is secure in his position, Vladimir Putin seems content to limit Russia’s involvement to rhetorical and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-belarus/belarusian-leader-thanks-putin-for-economic-support-during-mass-protests-idUSKBN2AM238">financial support</a>. But all that could change if the opposition succeeds in undermining the foundations keeping Lukashenko in power. Putin has indicated that he is prepared to send forces to Belarus under the terms of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-europe-53930796">Collective Security Treaty Organization</a> the two states are members of. </p>
<p>The prospect of a Russian military intervention is the ultimate guarantor of Lukashenko’s grip on power. It also explains the intensity of Tikhanovskaya’s efforts to keep Belarus at the centre of world attention. The opposition in Belarus will need to have powerful friends if it is to persuade Lukashenko to go – and Russia to allow that to happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition protests continue and there are signs they are beginning to have an effect both inside and outside Belarus.Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543262021-02-04T12:04:33Z2021-02-04T12:04:33ZMars: The Conversation Weekly podcast explores why three missions are about to reach the red planet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381766/original/file-20210201-13-12n2be.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=131%2C47%2C1769%2C1068&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artist's illustration of the aeroshell containing NASA’s Perseverance rover guiding itself towards the surface of Mars.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/jpl/perseverance-guides-itself-towards-the-surface">NASA/JPL-Caltech</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Welcome to the first episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, a new podcast from The Conversation’s global network. </p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/a-big-month-for-mars?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="50px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In this episode, we find out why February 2021 is such a big month for Mars. Three different missions from three different countries – the United Arab Emirates, China and the U.S. – are due to arrive at the red planet within a few weeks of each other. </p>
<p>We talk to <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jim-bell-1200218">Jim Bell</a>, Professor in the School of Earth and Space Exploration at Arizona State University, who is leading one of the camera teams for NASA’s Perseverance Rover. He explains how these missions are looking for signs of ancient life – and where the scientists will start their search. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/steffi-paladini-342264">Steffi Paladini</a>, Reader in Economics and Global Security at Birmingham City University, sheds light on some of the political motivations behind China’s ambitious Mars mission, Tianwen-1, which includes an orbiter, lander and rover. You can read <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mars-became-the-prize-for-the-new-space-race-and-why-china-is-hellbent-on-winning-it-153133">more about the Chinese space race here.</a></p>
<p>And <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/nidhal-guessoum-1204012">Nidhal Guessoum</a>, Professor of Astrophysics at the American University of Sharjah explains the symbolism of the UAE’s Hope mission and what it’s trying to achieve. </p>
<p>In our second story, we turn to Belarus, where protests continue more than six months after a disputed election. <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/felix-krawatzek-190619">Félix Krawatzek</a>, Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies and Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of Oxford, talks through the initial findings from a recent public opinion survey in Belarus – and why he sees similarities between what happened in Belarus and the protests currently rocking Russia following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-jailing-alexei-navalny-the-kremlin-may-turn-him-into-an-even-more-potent-opposition-symbol-154258">detention of opposition leader Alexei Navalny</a>. Read more about <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">the survey data here</a>. </p>
<p>And we finish with some reading recommendations from Ina Skosana, health and medicine editor in Johannesburg, South Africa. </p>
<p>The Conversation Weekly is produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens and music by Neeta Sarl. </p>
<p>News clips in this episode from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV9x1lyR6BQ">BBC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csGJ33IkElo">CCTV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIB3JbIIbPU">Nasa</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MPcmxVnzcsI">Euronews</a>, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHhlHFv4O_A&feature=emb_logo">Embassy of the UAE - Washington</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sun553pfTYk&t=59s">ABC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXkZ5OCSvqk">AFP News Agency</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWoyUJwfHAs&t=16s">Al Jazeera English</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11BkOW47dPM&t=18s">DW News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lCj09WxRia8&t=41s">France 24</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5Cs_ihJAb4&t=139s">Global News</a>.</p>
<p>A transcript of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-weekly-podcast-ep-1-transcript-why-its-a-big-month-for-mars-154500">episode is available here</a>. </p>
<p><em>You can also listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus what protesters in Belarus want to happen next. Episode 1 of The Conversation’s new weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1544942021-02-04T09:58:55Z2021-02-04T09:58:55ZBelarus protests: why people have been taking to the streets – new data<p>Since the presidential elections in Belarus in August 2020, hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the street to oppose Alexander Lukashenko’s regime. According to official figures, the longstanding president won the election with a <a href="http://www.rec.gov.by/files/2020/inf9.pdf">vote share of 80%</a>. But widespread reports of electoral fraud and large-scale mobilisation against the result speak to a different reality. </p>
<p>The state responded to these protests with extreme violence, but this seemed to bring more people out on to the streets. Six months later the protests continue – although in response to the repression, protesters have adjusted their strategies and now focus on organising smaller local marches and neighbourhood actions.</p>
<p>We still know little about the protesters and the range of political views they may hold beyond their shared aim to overthrow Lukashenko. We know even less about the current attitudes and expectations of the general population. To find out more about these questions, the Berlin-based <a href="https://en.zois-berlin.de/">Centre for East European and International Studies</a> has conducted one of the first large surveys since the start of the mass protests – and these are the initial findings. </p>
<p>In view of safety concerns, our December 2020 survey was carried out online. It included 2,000 Belarusians aged between 16 and 64 living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, chosen by quota to reflect the population in terms of age, gender and place of residence.</p>
<p>Overall, 14% of the respondents in the survey said that they had participated in protests since the presidential elections, although about 6% refused to answer the question – which might reflect concerns about safety. At first glance this might appear at odds with the images of streets packed with protesters. But it means that at least 700,000 of the 5 million people represented in the sample must have protested.</p>
<p>We found that men were more likely to say they had participated in the protests, as were people living in larger cities and people without children. People working in the private sector were the most prominent group represented in the protests, followed by people employed in the public sector such as healthcare, education and the arts. Better educated individuals were more likely to participate in the protests.</p>
<p>Compared to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/10/belarus-wanted-to-tax-its-unemployed-as-parasites-then-the-protests-started/">previous political protests</a> in Belarus around elections or social welfare reforms, levels of participation have been high. Only about 4% of our respondents said they had taken part in protests before 2020. This confirms a previous survey we conducted in 2019 among young Belarusians (up to 34 years old), which showed that protest participation among young people had been very low <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-report-52019/">at only about 3%</a>.</p>
<h2>Violence a key trigger</h2>
<p>You didn’t have to actually be involved in the current protests to have been politicised by them. Half of our respondents told us they knew someone who had taken part in the protests since August. Moreover, 20% of respondents said that either they themselves or friends and family members had suffered violence during the protests. </p>
<p>Data shows that young Belarusians, aged 16-26, have been disproportionately affected during the protests by violence inflicted by security personnel. They were also the most likely (alongside people living in larger cities) to know someone who had taken part in the protests. Nearly 80% of those who report having protested said they had been mobilised by the violence.</p>
<p>Images of the injuries inflicted upon the thousands of protesters arrested during the first days of the protests circulated widely on social media. Reports of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters">torture</a> – and visual evidence shared by people after their release from custody were the trigger for the protests to turn into mass mobilisation. Violent repression thus constitutes a risky strategy on the part of the regime, as it proves impossible to stop the circulation of images and individual stories that alienate people further from the state and increase criticism of the country’s political system.</p>
<p>And what of the people who stayed at home? Two very different profiles emerge. On the one hand, there are the “silent loyalists”, a share of around 20%, who said they didn’t protest because either they don’t believe protests change anything or they suspect that the protesters were hiding their real motives. Another 20% said they simply weren’t interested in politics. There were also the “silent opponents”, about 25% of our survey sample. These people mainly said they would have liked to take part in the protests but were afraid to do so.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can listen to an interview with Félix Krawatzek in the first episode of our new podcast, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> – the world explained by experts. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.</em> </p>
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<h2>Diversity of views</h2>
<p>The Belarusian population has a clear sense of what the protests are about. Of the many different response options we provided when asking what the main aims of the protests had been, the main responses were: the organisation of new free and fair elections, the resignation of Lukashenko, the investigation of violence committed against protesters and the release of all political prisoners.</p>
<p>But the attitudes towards the protests are diverse. At the ends of the scale, 29% of the respondents said they completely agreed with the protests, while 20% said they completely disagreed. 19% said they didn’t know how to answer this question, and the rest either somewhat agreed or somewhat disagreed with the protests.</p>
<p>This diversity of views underlines the complexity of the situation. In particular, older people tend to be opposed the protests, but also 35% of women somewhat or completely disagreed with the protests (as opposed to 27% of men). People with lower levels of education were also more likely to disagree with the protests.</p>
<p>The mass protests and the high degree of politicisation in society that our survey highlights suggest that public trust in the state can only erode further with continued repression. So far there is no clear trajectory for political change emerging. In that context, outward migration – in particular by the young and educated – is likely to be a significant trend, alongside a society distanced from the political class.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Félix Krawatzek is Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), an independent research institute funded by the German government. The institute also receives funding from German and international research councils. The survey this article refers to was funded by the German Federal Foreign Office. This article reflects the views of the authors.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gwendolyn Sasse is the Director of the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), an independent research institute based in Berlin. In addition to German government funding, ZOiS also holds research grants from German and international research councils. The survey this article refers to was funded by the German Federal Foreign Office. This article reflects the views of the authors.</span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of people have protested the regime of Alexander Lukashenko over the last six months – a new survey reveals what they want.Félix Krawatzek, Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies and Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of OxfordGwendolyn Sasse, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Associate Member, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1469102020-09-28T12:24:09Z2020-09-28T12:24:09ZBelarus’ embattled leader secretly inaugurated himself, sparking new protests and global backlash<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360078/original/file-20200925-14-q1rzkf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4328%2C2887&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko takes the oath of office during an unannounced inauguration ceremony Sept. 23 in Minsk.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/belarus-president-elect-alexander-lukashenko-takes-oath-of-news-photo/1228665640?adppopup=true&uiloc=thumbnail_more_search_results_adp">Andrei Stasevich\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As if a fraudulent election and months of mass protest weren’t enough drama for Belarus, its embattled authoritarian leader went ahead and inaugurated himself as president in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/23/lukashenko-sworn-in-belarus-president-secretive-ceremony">secretive Sept. 23 ceremony</a>, held without prior announcement or live television broadcast. </p>
<p>This begins Alexander Lukashenko’s sixth term as president, at least according to Lukashenko and government-controlled Belarusian media. But the Belarusian people and at least <a href="https://charter97.org/en/news/2020/9/24/394367/">15 countries</a> – including the United States, Canada and Germany – say the country’s Aug. 9 presidential election was rigged and refuse to recognize Lukashenko as its rightful leader. The election delivered him <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/europe/belarus-election-lukashenko.html">80% of the vote</a>, an impossibly favorable result given the clear popular discontent with his regime. </p>
<p>While intended to assure Lukashenko’s future, the secret inauguration appears to be backfiring.</p>
<h2>Crumbling legitimacy</h2>
<p>Lukashenko did not invite foreign diplomats or dignitaries to his self-declared inauguration ceremony. Only a few hundred hand-picked regime insiders attended. </p>
<p>Not even Russia, Lukashenko’s main booster after the disputed presidential vote, was <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1204039">aware of the planned inauguration</a> ceremony. Moscow, like the Belarusian people, learned Lukashenko had assumed the presidency only after the fact. </p>
<p>In Belarus, news of the self-inauguration triggered <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/23/secret-lukashenko-inauguration-triggers-fresh-belarus-clashes-a71522">widespread new demonstrations</a> in the street. Online, people staged satirical inauguration “flash mobs,” dressing up and inaugurating themselves with fictional titles. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Flash mob of Belarusian women in dresses and crowns" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360080/original/file-20200925-20-pglgjc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women don their own crowns after Lukashenko’s secret inauguration Sept. 23.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-take-part-in-a-flash-mob-following-the-inauguration-news-photo/1228669449?adppopup=true">Natalia Fedosenko\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another mass protest, dubbed the “<a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/crowd-gathers-minsk-peoples-inauguration-183336697.html">people’s inauguration of the real president</a>,” was held Sept. 27 to declare Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya – Lukashenko’s main election rival – as the country’s legitimate leader. </p>
<p>Lukashenko’s stunt has left him isolated, both locally and internationally. </p>
<p>In coordination with neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia announced on Sept. 25 it had imposed an indefinite entry ban <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/diplomacy/latvia-sanctions-101-more-belarus-officials.a375733/">on 101 Belarusian officials</a>. The European Union is considering sanctions against <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-summit-delay-postpones-belarus-sanctions-debate/30852388.html">about 40 high-level Belarusian officials</a>, including the country’s interior minister. The U.S., Canada and the U.K. all say they could <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/30856286.html">impose sanctions within days</a>.</p>
<p>Shortly after the disputed election, Russia gave Belarus a <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/09/17/russias-emergency-loan-to-belarus-changes-little-for-embattled-lukashenko-a71462">US$1.5 billion emergency loan</a>. That was a lifeline to Lukashenko’s regime, though not enough to save a tanking economy. Once <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/belarus-is-emerging-as-the-silicon-valley-of-eastern-europe-1481032802">a tech-startup magnet</a>, Minsk is now seeing companies flee. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>As an <a href="http://tatsianakulakevich.com">Eastern Europe researcher</a> who was born and raised in Belarus, I can attest this is not the first time Lukashenko has been at odds with the world.</p>
<p>The past four presidential elections in Belarus – all of which Lukashenko won with upwards of 80% of the vote – <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/10/512522-belarus-election-neither-free-nor-fair-says-un-human-rights-expert">were not recognized as free and fair</a>. The Belarusian government was sanctioned for falsifying results in <a href="https://news.house/lib/browse/analytics-17-10-en">2006 and 2010</a>.</p>
<p>But this time feels different. In an unprecedented political crisis, all Europe is uniting around serious sanctions intended to pressure top regime officials into reconsidering their support of Lukashenko. Sanctions also effectively give Belarus’ pro-democracy protesters an international stamp of approval.</p>
<p>Since 1994, populist Lukashenko has rested his legitimacy on his mission to <a href="http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/1393">provide stability and protect the common people</a>. Now, amid months of protests, he’s forced to rely on coercion and violence to stay in power. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Law enforcement officers detain a man during an opposition rally to protest against the presidential inauguration in Minsk on Sept. 23." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360076/original/file-20200925-24-1cyx7ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ever since the contested August election, crushing dissent has been Lukashenko’s main strategy for staying in power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/law-enforcement-officers-detain-a-man-during-an-opposition-news-photo/1228672038?adppopup=true">Tut.By/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/01globaleconomics_desai.pdf">research shows</a> that repression alone is too costly a means of sustaining authoritarian rule. Even <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860">dictatorial regimes need a certain level of legitimacy to survive</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that Lukashenko felt compelled to hold a tiny, secret inauguration ceremony suggests that even he knows he’s in trouble. At this point, Lukashenko’s fate <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/28/is-putin-about-to-make-a-costly-mistake-in-belarus/">probably depends on Vladimir Putin</a>, who has taken a wait-and-see attitude about his fellow post-Soviet strongman. </p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>After Lukashenko’s secret inauguration, Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, refused to comment on what he called an “<a href="https://www.startribune.com/president-of-belarus-inaugurated-despite-disputed-election/572501651/">internal decision of the Belarusian leadership</a>.” </p>
<p>If Putin continues to support the Belarusian ruler it would probably assure Lukashenko stays in power. But there’s a cost for Russia to intervening in Belarusian affairs, particularly if that means <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/belarus-leader-accuses-neighbors-of-waging-hybrid-war/2020/08/27/34c2267c-e855-11ea-bf44-0d31c85838a5_story.html">assisting in Lukashenko’s violent crackdown on protesters</a>. </p>
<p>Doing so would pit Putin against Europe, and could push Belarusians who seek a greater political voice away from Russia and toward the West.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146910/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Has Europe’s last dictator finally gone too far?Tatsiana Kulakevich, Lecturer and Research Fellow at USF Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1461652020-09-23T09:58:14Z2020-09-23T09:58:14ZBelarus: slow international response shows limits of world’s human rights regime<p>After an urgent debate initiated by the European Union, the UN Human Rights Council has condemned human rights violations in Belarus following the country’s disputed election in August. On September 18, the council <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/18/belarus-attempts-to-stop-testimony-at-urgent-un-human-rights-debate">passed a resolution</a> instructing the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to enhance its scrutiny of the situation in Belarus. </p>
<p>But international organisations have been depressingly slow to react to the events in Belarus – demonstrating the inherent problems with the effectiveness of the international human rights regime.</p>
<p>Almost every known human right of Belarusians has reportedly been violated by authorities in recent weeks. The key opposition candidates standing against the president, Alexander Lukashenko, were <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-why-strongman-alexander-lukashenko-faces-unprecedented-resistance-142524">arrested before the poll</a> – and remain in prison. The counting of the ballots themselves was not transparent, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34499387">according to observers,</a> and after the results were announced, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-contested-result-sparks-massive-unrest-as-europes-last-dictator-claims-victory-144139">massive peaceful protests</a> were interrupted by brutal violence from state police. Lukashenko’s principle remaining opponent, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/11/europe/belarus-opposition-leader-flees-intl/index.html">fled into exile</a> in Lithuania with her children. </p>
<p>People have reportedly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters">been</a> killed, tortured, raped, arbitrarily detained, and their privacy and freedom of expression violated. The internet was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/belarus-president-cuts-off-internet-amid-widespread-protests">blocked in Belarus</a> for several days, and journalists arrested. </p>
<p>There are very few examples of human rights violations of this scale happening in Europe since the collapse of the Iron Curtain. But the reaction of international and European human rights institutions has not been proportionate to the magnitude of the crisis. </p>
<h2>Limited powers</h2>
<p>There are two key reasons which hinder international action after human rights violations. First, authorities which violate human rights need to agree to be supervised by international bodies and invite observers into their country. This rarely happens during human right crises – and even if an organisation is already in the country it can be removed fairly easily. </p>
<p>In 2010, after the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) criticised the results of a previous Belarusian election, its office in the country <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12100765">was shut down</a>. In mid-September, more than a month after the recent election, the OSCE established an <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/464001">expert mission</a> to look into the situation with human rights in Belarus. But it’s unlikely that the Belarusian authorities will collaborate. </p>
<p>Second, political realities mean consensus is difficult. The most brutal human rights violations can be prevented by force by the UN Security Council but its five permanent members – Russia, China, France, the US and the UK – must agree on the course of actions. In the case of Belarus, this is practically impossible. The Russian and Chinese authorities are regarded as allies of Lukashenko and they would almost inevitably block any immediate actions to protect human rights in Belarus. The situation in Belarus <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200818-un-security-council-discusses-disputed-belarus-vote-protests">was discussed</a> in the UN security council in late August, but no identifiable actions were taken. </p>
<p>The UN secretary-general, Antonio Guterres, and other UN officials, including the UN special rapporteur on Belarus, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26261&LangID=E">Anaïs Marin</a>, have expressed their concerns about the situation. But Marin is not currently allowed into Belarus. </p>
<h2>Mixed European response</h2>
<p>Belarus is a European country and, while it is not an EU member, the EU has a legitimate interest in what is happening in the country, which borders EU members Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. </p>
<p>The EU has refused to recognise <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/eu-don-recognise-lukashenko-legitimate-president-200915114733368.html">the result of the elections</a>, and condemned reports of human rights violations. The EU is trying to impose sanctions against top Belarusian officials responsible for crimes and human rights abuses. But sanctions have so far been blocked by the Cypriot delegation, which is trying to use the situation as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-ministers-to-try-to-break-a-deadlock-on-belarus-sanctions/">leverage to impose sanctions it wants on Turkey</a>. </p>
<p>But what of the Council of Europe, the organisation created to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law? Even though Belarus is not a member, collaboration between Belarus and the council has intensified over the past decade, and the council operates an information point in the country. The reaction of the council’s secretary-general, Marija Pejčinović Burić, to the unrest was initially <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/secretary-general-comments-on-the-situation-in-belarus">muted</a>, although in mid-September she did issue a statement that mass intimidation of citizens was “<a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/secretary-general-gravely-concerned-by-human-rights-violations-in-belarus">totally unacceptable and must stop</a>”. On September 21, the council’s commissioner for human rights, Dunja Mijatović, also issued <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-violations-in-belarus-must-stop-immediately">a statement condemning the human rights violations</a>, and said there could be “no peace without justice and proper respect for human rights”. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, which consists of members from all its 47 member states, was more proactive. It plans to discuss a <a href="http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-en.asp?newsid=7992&lang=2">motion</a> to create an investigatory body on the ill-treatment of Belarusian citizens at its next session. If this motion is approved, although it won’t have an immediate impact on the situation, it will send a clear message that those who violate human rights will be identified. The assembly should coordinate its efforts with the OSCE, as joint actions might be more effective.</p>
<p>There are many more actions that international organisations could initiate to support human rights in Belarus. These could include an international tribunal capable of investigating torture, multiple personalised sanctions or investigations of businesses that collaborate and sell military and police equipment to the Belarusian regime. Political will, and a genuine belief in human rights, is necessary for this to become a reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why haven’t international and European human rights organisations done more to protect the human rights of Belarusians?Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Professor in Human Rights Law, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462562020-09-17T11:42:22Z2020-09-17T11:42:22ZBelarus: Vladimir Putin has Alexander Lukashenko just where he wants him<p>After an election where he appeared to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-lukashenko-wins-belarus-election/a-54506718">win 80% of the vote</a>, Alexander Lukashenko should be resting easily in Minsk, looking forward to his sixth term as the president of Belarus. In happier times, Lukashenko performed such mundane duties as <a href="https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-harvests-potatoes-in-his-garden-on-saturday-104359-2017">harvesting potatoes</a>, <a href="https://www.tvr.by/eng/news/prezident/aleksandr_lukashenko_segodnya_poseshchaet_minskiy_traktornyy_zavod/">inspecting tractors</a>, and teasing Russian president, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QEgB33L08A">on his anti-COVID policies</a>. </p>
<p>Lukashenko’s reality today is quite different. The August election was widely seen as fraudulent, bringing Belarusians onto the streets ever since and leading to mass arrests and international condemnation. All this brought the country to the precipice of an economic crash. </p>
<p>Lukashenko has now found himself in the unenviable position of begging the Russian president for help. </p>
<h2>Economic integration</h2>
<p>Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Belarus have had a tight economic connection through various regional groupings and bilateral initiatives. The most recent and comprehensive of these regional agreements is the <a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about">Eurasian Economic Union</a> (EaEU), a step towards full economic integration among the founding members of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. They were joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan when the EaEU was launched in 2015. </p>
<p>Much like the Schengen zone of the European Union, in theory, the EaEU has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0007681313000396">free movement of goods, capital and labour</a> across the borders of these states, while adhering to a common external tariff and trade policy. Although the EaEU has been derided as an attempt to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/clinton-calls-eurasian-integration-effort-to-resovietize/24791921.html">“re-Sovietize”</a> the region, in reality, it’s a way to re-establish trade links and investment and create a vehicle for concluding <a href="http://greater-europe.org/archives/7992">trade treaties with others</a>. It’s also a way to amplify Russian soft power in the region.</p>
<p>Within the EaEU, Belarus has remained reliant on Russian largesse, despite the personal tensions between Lukashenko and Putin. The need for Russian energy subsidies and open markets has been crucial for Minsk, as Belarus has pursued an economic strategy of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14631377.2020.1793586">integration within the EaEU but without liberalisation</a>. The Belarusian economy remains dominated by state-owned companies and several sectors, in particular energy, are Soviet in everything but name. </p>
<p>This economic stability, with slow growth and <a href="https://eng.belta.by/economics/view/economy-ministry-comments-on-belarus-position-on-doing-business-2020-125320-2019/">piecemeal reforms</a> every few years to address low-hanging fruit, has in fact been a source of Lukashenko’s political power, as he continues to provide the same Soviet welfare state to Belarusians. However, the numbers do not add up without continued Russian support in the form of cheap oil and gas. Before the protests, this realisation had already sent Lukashenko <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/is-belarus-doomed-to-dependence-on-russia/">wildly searching for other allies who could provide energy</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-beleaguered-economy-underpins-anger-at-lukashenko-government-145063">Belarus protests: beleaguered economy underpins anger at Lukashenko government</a>
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<h2>Few options</h2>
<p>The double whammy of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing protests have pushed the already-fragile economy to breaking point. Dollarisation, the use of US dollars as currency, was always prevalent in Belarus but started to rocket again as the protests caused the Belarusian ruble to <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/belarusian-ruble-falls-to-record-lows-on-the-back-of-political-crisis-190462/">plummet</a>.</p>
<p>Sporadic labour unrest in support of the protesters, including at the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/europe/Belarus-strike-Aleksandr-Lukashenko.html">Minsk Tractor Works</a>, has created production disruptions, while the continued uncertainty of just how far Lukashenko will go to suppress the protests has created massive uncertainty for the economy. Add to this the global crisis caused by COVID-19, and any form of homegrown uncertainty only creates more difficulties for Belarusian exporters.</p>
<p>This situation – and the realisation that his options are dwindling – is what led Lukashenko to Moscow on September 14, cap in hand, to try and shore up Russian support. Putin is no friend of Lukashenko, and the <a href="https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/putin-dal-lukashenko-15-mlrd-i-kontakt-rieltora-v-rostove-memy-o-peregovorah-prezidentov-rossii-i-belarusi-1518412.html">memes of Putin’s body language</a> while listening to Lukashenko talk went viral in the Russian-speaking world. </p>
<p>However, Putin has Lukashenko just where he wants him: weak, beset by opposition, and unable to say “no” to any demands made of him under the <a href="https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/memorable-notes/treaty-on-the-establishment-of-the-union-state-of-belarus-and-russia">Union Treaty of 1999</a>, which promises much stronger integration between Russian and Belarus. Belarus has resisted the ambitious objectives of the Union Treaty, namely of <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_unsettled_union_the_future_of_the_belarus_russia_relationship">“a united parliament, a single currency, and even a constitutional act”</a> as Lukashenko knew that Putin would never treat Belarus as an equal. </p>
<p>The current crisis may show that Lukashenko, desperate for Kremlin backing, no longer has the luxury of demanding Belarus be respected as an equal in any stronger union. This also means that Putin is able to exert much more control over Belarus without any of the niceties of having to recognise its needs.</p>
<h2>Loans and leverage</h2>
<p>Lukashenko left the meeting in Sochi with what he came for, a promise of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/protests-lukashenko-arrives-russia-talks-putin-200914081656116.html">US$1.5 billion (£1.2 billion) in loans</a>. It is unknown what else he had to promise Putin to keep Russia on his side, especially regarding future integration between Belarus and Russia exclusively – not as part of the EaEU. It’s likely that part of this agreement, as <a href="https://twitter.com/anders_aslund/status/1305640369095413761">others have surmised</a>, might be for Russia to take a more direct role in Belarus’s energy sector (again, the main source of friction between the two), putting Belarus even more under the economic sway of Moscow.</p>
<p>Unlike many countries that were part of the Soviet Union, Belarus under Lukashenko has stood firm against any form of freedom or economic liberalisation. This stance, while providing a stagnant stability for Belarusians, has undermined the economy and made it highly susceptible to external shocks and internal disruption. With Lukashenko’s social contract – social benefits for political acquiescence – irrevocably torn up, the structural weakness of Belarus has been exposed. </p>
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<p>Given Lukashenko’s adamant refusal to yield to the opposition, he’s had to rely on Russia for moral and economic support, a choice he (and the rest of Belarus) may soon regret. Belarus may find that its move towards integration without liberalisation may also lead to integration without representation as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146256/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Hartwell is affiliated with CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw and as a member of the Supervisory Board of CASE-Ukraine.</span></em></p>Belarus’s economy is closely linked to Russia. Could Putin’s support for Lukashenko during ongoing protests be in turn for more integration.Christopher Hartwell, Professor Of Financial Systems Resilience, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1455622020-09-03T13:28:55Z2020-09-03T13:28:55ZYoung Belarusians are turning away from Russia and looking towards Europe<p>Since Belarus’s disputed presidential elections on August 9, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HLfb8XhMFE">hundreds of thousands</a> of Belarusians have taken to the streets. Their protests have been met with extreme <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/28/belarus-internet-disruptions-online-censorship">police brutality</a>. </p>
<p>According to the country’s electoral commission, Alexander Lukashenko <a href="https://news.tut.by/economics/696655.html">won</a> 80% of the vote share, and his principal opponent, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, received 10%.</p>
<p>While some older people, particularly women, have taken to the streets, young people have been at the forefront of the protests. In early September, teenagers <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/back-to-school-belarusian-students-and-school-children-clash-with-police-190977/">were even filmed being removed</a> from school by security services amid student protests.</p>
<p>At the Berlin-based <a href="https://en.zois-berlin.de/">Centre for East European and International Studies</a> (ZOiS), we’ve been conducting surveys among young Belarusians <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-report-52019/">since 2019</a>. One survey in late June 2020, just before the election, found that support for Lukashenko was around 10% among <a href="https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight/belaruss-presidential-election-an-appetite-for-change/">young people</a>. </p>
<p>Our survey results also show that young people are turning away from Russia to look towards Europe.</p>
<h2>Between Russia and Europe</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/21/whats-driving-belarus-protests/">Separate research</a> from early 2020 found that Belarusians appear content with their country being slightly pro-Russian. But people under 40 were significantly more likely to want closer relations with the west. </p>
<p>The ZOiS’s own online surveys have been asking young people what kind of relationship they want Belarus to have with the EU and Russia. Our surveys include 2,000 young people aged between 16 and 34, though the June 2020 survey included young people of voting age between 18 and 34. The respondents, who live in the country’s six largest towns, were included based on quotas for age, gender and city of residence.</p>
<p>Since the ZOiS survey was first conducted in 2019, young Belarusians have significantly shifted away from wanting closer relations with Russia and instead are seeking closer relations with EU countries. Facing the trade-off between closer EU relations and worsening relations with Russia, 55% of young people now wish for closer relations with the EU. </p>
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<p>Asked whether Russia and Belarus should unite as one state, more than 70% of young Belarusians were opposed to the prospect. A union between the two countries was the ultimate aim of the <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_unsettled_union_the_future_of_the_belarus_russia_relationship">1999 Union State treaty</a> which intends to create a federation between Belarus and Russia that would harmonise their laws, state symbols, economy and politics.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing reluctance among young Belarusians for the country to unite with Russia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356375/original/file-20200903-14-1wl8c0b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Our results showed a clear division of views between those living in the east and west of Belarus, with those living in the east, near the Russian border, is significantly more critical of the EU and favourable to Russia. We also found that the better-educated respondents and those who don’t use any state media were particularly in favour of closer relations with the EU. Those with a lower level of education and no political interest were more likely to want closer relations with Russia. </p>
<h2>Language and identity</h2>
<p>The growth in political interest and discontent predates the August election and can be linked to the mishandling of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/07/belarus-votes-sunday-our-new-survey-shows-what-young-voters-are-thinking/">COVID-19 pandemic</a>, which laid bare the ineffectiveness of the Belarusian state.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-why-strongman-alexander-lukashenko-faces-unprecedented-resistance-142524">Belarus election: why strongman Alexander Lukashenko faces unprecedented resistance</a>
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<p>But the current protests also represent a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/belarus-is-a-reminder-that-the-ussr-is-still-collapsing/">national awakening</a>. Many of the protesters have draped themselves in <a href="https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1300048800275402752/photo/1">red and white</a>, colours reminiscent of the independent <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=rRrRBgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">Belarusian People’s Republic</a> that existed for less than a year after March 1918. Its white-red-white flag returned briefly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, but after a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/language-nationalism-and-populism-in-belarus/73DA7DC3AB6B206308365B17ABB80A8B">referendum in 1995</a> it was replaced by the country’s current green-red flag resembling the Soviet Belarusian flag.</p>
<p>The question of Belarusian identity is, therefore, crucial to the current protests. The Belarusian language has been largely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/28/-sp-russian-belarus-reclaims-language-belarusian">marginalised</a> since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lukashenko himself prefers speaking Russian, and Belarusian has become a statement of opposition. The young Belarusians we’ve surveyed overwhelmingly <a href="https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/zois-report-52019/">speak Russian</a> in their daily interactions, although a third consider both to be their native languages.</p>
<p>Still, we found that young people have no strong desire to speak more Belarusian. Instead, more than a quarter of our respondents said they didn’t care, suggesting that the language issue was not a crucial political and social question for young people. People living in towns in the east were even less likely to have a desire to speak more Belarusian. But those respondents over 25-years-old, the better educated ones and women were significantly more likely to express a desire to speak more Belarusian.</p>
<p>Still, protesters are calling for the autonomy to make a political choice. They have expressed this using traditional Belarusian symbols, including elements of medieval history such <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belarus-exit-poll-predicts-aleksander-lukashenko-victory/">as a knight</a>, which refer to the time of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th-18th centuries.</p>
<h2>Visions of Europe</h2>
<p>In June 2020, we also asked our respondents what country Belarus should resemble, both politically and economically. Our initial analysis shows that economically, Switzerland was the most frequently mentioned country and was also the second most desired in political terms. Germany came second economically, and first politically, with Sweden third in economic terms. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing which other country young Belarusians think their country should resemble." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356373/original/file-20200903-20-191c6qi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ZOiS</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All this shows how young Belarusians are increasingly oriented towards European countries. Their turn away from Russia, and the Soviet values associated with it, is striking. The continuing mobilisation is, therefore, part of a new political awakening which is seeking to establish Belarus’s independence both politically and symbolically.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145562/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Félix Krawatzek is Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), an independent research institute funded by the German government. The institute also receives funding from German and international research councils. The survey this article refers to was supported by ZOiS.</span></em></p>A new survey conducted just before the disputed election, shows how the views of young Belarusians are changing.Félix Krawatzek, Senior Researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies and Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1450632020-08-26T11:46:32Z2020-08-26T11:46:32ZBelarus protests: beleaguered economy underpins anger at Lukashenko government<p>Mass protests in Belarus continue to contest the result of the country’s recent election, which gave a <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-contested-result-sparks-massive-unrest-as-europes-last-dictator-claims-victory-144139">landslide victory to longtime leader Alexander Lukashenko</a>. It is not the first time in his six terms as president that people have taken to the streets. But this time the protests are driven by a number of economic factors that were not present in 2001, 2006 and 2010.</p>
<p>Deep economic crisis caused by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and worsened by the Russian financial crisis of 1998 was followed by a decade of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BY">economic growth</a>. But the decade following the 2008 financial crisis has brought back memories of the 1990s. </p>
<p>By 2011 Belarus was in a full <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13975788">economic crisis</a>, which triggered mass protests. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/21/belarus-blocks-online-websites-shops-currency-panic-rouble">currency crisis</a> in 2014 and the “<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/04/03/no-job-pay-up-belarus-imposes-fines-for-being-unemployed-a45428">tax on social parasites</a>” in 2015 led to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/25/belarus-had-a-huge-protest-today-is-it-the-beginning-of-a-movement-or-the-end/">nationwide protests</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>After watching more than 100 interviews with ordinary Belarusians on non-state TV channels over the course of the presidential campaign and closely following how the protest is unfolding, it is clear to me that a decade of <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/07/30/the-right-way-to-get-rid-of-president-alexander-lukashenko">economic stagnation</a> is at the heart of the ongoing protests over Lukashenko’s re-election and that people have no hope that he will fix the problem.</p>
<h2>Unsustainable economic system</h2>
<p>Economic growth in the 2000s was mainly driven by favourable <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2016/01/belarus-at-a-crossroads/">external factors</a> rather than Lukashenko’s “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10611991.2016.1222209?journalCode=mpet20">market socialism</a>” which many economists believe is <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/region/BAL/rr/2017/012517.pdf">no longer sustainable</a>. While neighbouring Poland and most of the former USSR republics, including the Baltic States, started to transition to a market economy, Lukashenko was <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366515000093#bib3">unenthusiastic about this kind of reform</a>.</p>
<p>A major reason has been the country’s close ties to Russia, as a long-term provider of <a href="https://belarusdigest.com/story/how-russias-subsidies-save-the-belarusian-economy/">cheap crude oil and gas</a> and other subsidies in exchange for Belarus’s integration in a “<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-belarus-relations-future-union-state-65288/">union state</a>” with its neighbour. But Lukashenko has failed to use this advantage to find new sources of income. </p>
<p>More recently, ties between Belarus and its biggest trading partner have become strained. Lukashenko recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-russia-putin.html">fell out with Vladimir Putin</a> and Russia has been playing hard ball <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-13/putin-s-unruly-ally-casts-eyes-to-west-as-russian-ties-strain">with its subsidies</a>. This has coincided with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BY">decrease in GDP growth</a> from a pre-2008 crisis average of 8% to post-crisis 2%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph showing decline in Russian subsidies to Belarus since 2000." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354652/original/file-20200825-20-1094bms.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian subsidies as a percentage of Belarus GDP.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-13/putin-s-unruly-ally-casts-eyes-to-west-as-russian-ties-strain">Bloomberg</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other poor decisions by Lukashenko’s government in recent years include the move to increase the country’s average <a href="http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-economy-more-stable-but-still-fragile/">salary to US$500</a> a month. This was a pre-2010 election promise that was achieved by printing money. It contributed to a currency crisis and the Belarusian rouble devalued <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/rubel">by more than 60%</a> in 2011. </p>
<p>Inflation then <a href="https://money.cnn.com/gallery/news/economy/2012/08/07/worlds-worst-economies/3.html">hit 109%</a> and the average <a href="https://telegraf.by/in-belarus/belstat_srednjaja_zarplata_s_nachala_goda_snizilas__na_200_dollarov/">wage decreased by 38%</a> from US$530 to US$330. Further declines in its currency <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30555874">have followed</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, Lukashenko made another unpopular decision to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/04/03/no-job-pay-up-belarus-imposes-fines-for-being-unemployed-a45428">tax people for being unemployed</a>. It was an attempt to crack down on tax evasion and people working in informal employment. But when the deadline for paying this tax approached in 2017, only 11.5% of 470,000 people had paid. </p>
<p>So the economy was struggling well before coronavirus hit. The World Bank predicts a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/05/26/belarus-economic-update-spring-2020">severe shock</a> to the Belarus economy from COVID-19. But Lukashenko’s response to the pandemic was to advise people to go to saunas and drink vodka. It did <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-belarus-president-who-claimed-vodka-could-ward-off-covid-19-says-he-survived-virus-on-his-feet-12038414">not go down well</a>. </p>
<h2>What the future holds</h2>
<p>Belarus was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17941131">one of the most prosperous</a> parts of the post-war Soviet Union and, after its collapse, it was the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579068/EPRS_ATA(2016)579068_EN.pdf">second most developed</a> independent state in terms of GDP per capita. It is characterised by highly educated people and a well-developed industrial and agricultural base. But the failing economy is pushing more people to <a href="https://belarusfeed.com/more-belarusians-work-abroad-authorities-worried/">emigrate</a>, depriving the country of many of its main assets.</p>
<p>The success of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/48f3b14a-f81e-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65">Hi-Tech Park</a>, a technology and innovation hub developed by <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/intrigue-in-belaruss-upcoming-presidential-election/">Valery Tsepkalo</a>, a would-be presidential candidate who was barred from standing in the recent election, is proof of how economic reforms can realise the potential of human capital in this country. Home to internationally successful apps such as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c2ef3362-0611-11ea-a958-5e9b7282cbd1">Flo</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-23/the-skype-killers-of-belarus">Viber</a>, along with popular video games, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-tech-insight/world-of-tanks-shows-belarus-potential-beyond-soviet-era-farms-idUSKCN0WX0DM">World of Tanks</a>, the park has become one of the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/belarus-is-emerging-as-the-silicon-valley-of-eastern-europe-1481032802">largest IT outsourcing providers</a> in Europe and contributed <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c2ef3362-0611-11ea-a958-5e9b7282cbd1">significantly to the country’s GDP</a>. </p>
<p>But after a decade of the economy stagnating and further contracting due to coronavirus, people are fed up. This is why they are protesting. </p>
<p>Even workers in large state-owned enterprises, traditionally the pillar of Lukashenko’s economic model, have heeded the opposition’s calls <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-opposition-calls-for-fresh-strikes-in-state-owned-companies/a-54672171">to strike</a>. They are making the financial sacrifice in the short term, hoping to achieve a better economy in the long run. They are joined by professionals across industries, including <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/signing-off-belarusian-journalists-walking-off-the-job-amid-election-protests/30784413.html">journalists</a> and <a href="https://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2020/08/13/1858464.html">state officials</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Lukashenko is running out of options. With people queuing at <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-belarus-election/belarus-arrests-two-opposition-figures-after-mass-demonstrations-idUKKBN25K1RL">currency exchange points</a> and <a href="https://quote.rbc.ru/news/article/5f3fc8769a7947fcdd400497">struggling to withdraw money</a> from their accounts, the country is on the cusp of another currency crisis. </p>
<p>To prevent this, Lukashenko needs money. It will be challenging for him to obtain funds from the IMF, as he <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14227.pdf">failed to implement the agreed economic reforms</a> that came with borrowing in 2011. Loans from <a href="https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/in-english/business/imf-will-not-grant-belarus-an-unconditional-loan/">Russia</a> or <a href="https://chinaobservers.eu/the-curious-timing-of-chinese-loan-to-belarus/">China</a> will not lead to reforms but more dependence.</p>
<p>If the current protest doesn’t succeed, anger at the country’s deep-seated economic issues will only grow even greater. It leaves Lukashenko’s government with little room for manoeuvre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yerzhan Tokbolat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>People have lost all faith in Lukashenko to fix the country’s economy.Yerzhan Tokbolat, Lecturer in Finance, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447112020-08-20T12:18:02Z2020-08-20T12:18:02ZBelarus, explained: How Europe’s last dictator could fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353715/original/file-20200819-42831-d1ujy9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C185%2C4588%2C2850&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deploying riot police to suppress peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators in Belarus turned more people against the country's autocratic leader. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Belarus-Police-Brutality/4cc0b7a02285417484de480d01cc92e8/456/0">AP Photo/Sergei Grits, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko has a reputation as a master tactician. It is well-earned: Since 1994, he has balanced the former Soviet state’s relations with both the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-says-belarus-must-balance-policies-between-east-west/29804500.html">West and Russia</a>, all while eliminating <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/news/belarus-lukashenko-wins-referendum-to-extend-mandate/">presidential term limits</a> and <a href="https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus">orchestrating hefty wins in every presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko was declared president with <a href="https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0493-re-election-of-alexander-lukashenko-as-president-of-the-belarus-republic-in-an-election-that-was-a-foregone-conclusion">76% of the vote in 2001</a>, <a href="https://www.infoplease.com/biographies/people-in-the-news/2006/aleksandr-lukashenko">83% in 2006</a>, <a href="https://www.europeanforum.net/headlines/dictator_lukashenko_wins_in_belarus_rsquo_presidential_elections">80% in 2010</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34499387">83% in 2015</a>.</p>
<p>Now, his luck may be changing. Belarus’s Aug. 9 presidential election, expected to deliver Lukashenko a sixth consecutive term, has instead brought on an unprecedented political crisis. He claimed he received 80% of the vote. But that was quickly met with widespread opposition. On Aug. 16, an estimated over <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/biggest-crowd-yet-protests-belarus">200,000 people marched</a> nationwide to demand Lukashenko’s resignation – the largest gathering in Belarus’s history.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">researcher on Eastern Europe</a> born and raised in Belarus, I’ve been watching the president’s handling of this crisis closely. I find he made two major mistakes since the contested Aug. 9 vote – errors that may help explain how dictators fall.</p>
<h2>Error 1: Hubris</h2>
<p>Holding elections with foregone results is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/so-you-want-to-be-an-autocrat-heres-the-10-point-checklist-125908">modern autocrat’s playbook</a>. Venezuela’s unpopular authoritarian President Nicolas Maduro claimed 68% of the 2018 presidential vote, a result <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-now-a-dictatorship-96960">international observers considered fraudulent</a>. That same year, Russia re-elected Vladimir Putin with <a href="https://tass.com/politics/995729">77% of the vote</a> and no real opposition.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has long gotten away with improbably high electoral margins. This time was different because of the grassroots activism that took place ahead of the presidential vote.</p>
<p>In the weeks before Belarus’s election, a series of self-organized street protests against Lukashenko’s mishandling of the economy and total denial of COVID-19 – known as the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/slipper-revolution-shakes-belarus">Slipper revolution</a> – spread from Minsk, Belarus’s capital, to at least <a href="https://spring96.org/persecution?DateFrom=2020-05-21&DateTo=2020-06-19">35 cities and towns</a>.</p>
<p>Lukashenko had eliminated his main rivals by jailing the banker Viktar Babaryka and blogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski, who might have reached a broad audience, and forcing the former diplomat Valery Tsepkala into exile. Rather than give up on the election, the opposition united around the seemingly improbable candidacy of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a housewife with no political experience.</p>
<p>By July, Tsikhanouskaya was attracting <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/tens-thousands-rally-belarus-pre-election-crackdown-200731074941570.html">large crowds at election rallies</a> as a symbol of change, including one that drew <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-presidential-candidate/30760999.html">at least 63,000</a> supporters in Minsk, a city of 2 million. Still Lukashenko ignored the signs of popular dissatisfaction and underestimated the power of the activism against him.</p>
<p>When election results nonetheless showed an 80% win for Lukashenko, Belarusians poured into the streets to protest what they said was fraud. Tsikhanouskaya, who <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/17/belarus-tsikhanouskaya-says-she-s-ready-to-become-national-leader">fled the country in fear for her life</a>, has called for new elections.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Belarusian president at a podium, speaking and pointing" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353717/original/file-20200819-25336-1pj7umf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lukashenko addresses several thousand supporters in Minsk, Aug. 16, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Belarus-Election/38a32dad438b4dd1989617078339e977/94/0">AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Error 2: Counterproductive violence</h2>
<p>Lukashenko conceded nothing. Instead, he called in the riot police. </p>
<p>Belarus has seen post-election crackdowns before, in <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2006/03/the-belarusian-crackdown.html">2006</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/world/europe/20belarus.html">2010</a>. But this time the police repression was far more violent. </p>
<p>Belarusian law enforcement used flash grenades, water cannons and tear gas to suppress protesters – often injuring bystanders in the process. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/thousands-flood-belarus-capital-as-detained-protesters-freed/a-54562634">Over 7,000 people</a> have been arrested since Aug. 9, many of them brutally beaten and ill-treated in custody. At <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53760453">least two people were killed</a> – the first time post-election unrest in Belarus has been fatal. </p>
<p>Police violence only triggered much bigger protests. Worker strikes and demonstrations demanding free elections have since taken place at dozens of government-owned and private enterprises across Belarus, including Belaruskali, an international fertilizer producer, and Minsk Automobile Plant, one of Eastern Europe’s largest automotive manufacturers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Belarusian workers in orange hardhats stand with arms crossed in front of a factory" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353710/original/file-20200819-24722-1xjqf7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Workers at Grodno Azot, a Belarusian manufacturer, on strike.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/workers-of-grodno-azot-a-belarusian-manufacturer-of-news-photo/1228107114?adppopup=true">Viktor Drachev\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-women/women-in-white-from-belarus-protest-globally-for-peace-and-new-vote-idUSKCN25D1LI">Women in white</a> holding flowers and balloons began marching daily, defying police with their peaceful tactics and demanding a new vote.</p>
<h2>How dictators fall</h2>
<p>Even the most capable authoritarian rulers are fallible. </p>
<p>Daniel Treisman, a political scientist at the University of California, Los Angeles, <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w23944">analyzed 218 episodes when autocracy was replaced by a more democratic system</a> between 1800 and 2015 and found that in three-quarters of cases the path to democratization included one or more mistakes by the incumbent. The most common errors are based on faulty information and miscalculating the outcome of a problematic situation.</p>
<p>Despite his strategic mistakes, Lukashenko seems unprepared to relinquish control of Belarus. He calls his opponents “fascists” and “murderers,” blames protests on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election/protests-swell-in-belarus-lukashenko-blames-foreigners-idUSKCN25A0ZU">foreign spies</a> and puts on shows of power, by <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/europe/lukashenko-urges-supporters-to-defend-belarusian-independence-38949">holding rallies</a> with his supporters. He has also <a href="https://www.euronews.com/video/2020/08/18/strike-delayed-at-major-belarus-tractor-factory-after-workers-threatened-with-dismissal">threatened to fire striking workers</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women dressed in white stand in a line and shout while carrying flowers and balloons" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353716/original/file-20200819-16-9g9y3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The women in white demand a redo of Belarus’s Aug. 9 election, which they say Lukashenko stole, Aug. 15, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-dressed-in-white-take-part-in-the-so-called-chain-of-news-photo/1228054270?adppopup=true">Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Facing the worst crisis of his 26 years in power, Lukashenko turned to his powerful neighbor, Russia, for help. Putin has been both ally and foe to Belarus over the years, depending on his political calculations. Russia has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/15/world/europe/belarus-russia-Lukashenko-Putin.html">promised to protect Belarus from external military threats</a>. But Putin appears unlikely to assist Lukashenko against protesters. He <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-protests-build-in-belarus-putin-warns-european-leaders-to-keep-out-11597784672">warned foreign powers</a> not to interfere in Belarus’s affairs, either. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>If Russia and other countries stay out of the fray, what happens next in Belarus will depend on whether protesters can sustain their pressure on Lukashenko.</p>
<p>Social movements typically go through <a href="https://www.ebscohost.com/uploads/imported/thisTopic-dbTopic-1248.pdf">four stages of development</a>: emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization and decline. The Belarusian opposition has reached the coalescence stage, meaning individuals participating in mass behavior have become aware of each other. </p>
<p>Lukashenko’s opposition is starting to “bureaucratize.” On Aug. 18, the opposition founded an entity called the Coordination Council of Belarus, to coordinate a peaceful transfer of power. Lukashenko declared it an <a href="https://eng.belta.by/president/view/oppositions-coordinating-council-described-as-attempt-to-seize-power-in-belarus-132657-2020/">attempt to seize power</a>. </p>
<p>Bureaucracy sounds boring. But it may decide whether Lukashenko stays or falls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pres. Lukashenka of Belarus has stayed in power for 26 years by being a master tactician. But he has seriously mishandled opposition protests, says a Belarus-born scholar of Eastern European politics.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Lecturer and Research Fellow at USF Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.