tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/brexit-party-69483/articlesBrexit Party – The Conversation2021-07-12T16:59:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1641122021-07-12T16:59:31Z2021-07-12T16:59:31ZWhy some people switch political parties: new research<p>Why do some people switch political parties? After all, if someone is committed enough to a particular vision of politics, wouldn’t they be relatively immune to the charms of its competitors?</p>
<p>It turns out, however, that switching parties at grassroots membership level is by no means uncommon, even giving rise in some quarters to accusations of “entryism”. </p>
<p>The massive increase in Labour’s membership which accompanied Jeremy Corbyn’s elevation to the leadership in 2015 was often <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37039222">anecdotally associated</a>, at least in the minds of his enemies (internal as well as external), with an influx of people who had previously belonged to parties on the far left fringe of the country’s politics. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ adoption of an ever harder position on Brexit was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/30/grieve-accuses-ex-ukip-opponent-of-insurgency-after-confidence-vote-loss">blamed by some</a> not just on Theresa May’s desire to keep Tory Eurosceptics on board, but on pressure put on more moderate MPs by former members of the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) joining and even taking over their local associations.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2021.1941062">Our new research</a> sheds light on the truth of party-switching politics – how many people really switch, why people are motivated to do so, and whether the claims of entryism are credible.</p>
<h2>Patterns of party-switching</h2>
<p>We surveyed nearly 7,000 members of British political parties (including registered Brexit Party supporters) within two weeks of the 2019 general election. When we analysed the data, we found a remarkably high proportion of our sample (23%) claimed to have previously been – or, if we allow for registered Brexit Party supporters as well, currently were – members of a different political party than the one to which they were now affiliated. </p>
<p>Some 29% of Tory members who admitted in 2019 to having been members of other parties claim to have been UKIP members. Interestingly, though, virtually as many were former Labour members. As a proportion of all Conservative Party grassroots members, these figures amount to 3% who were former members of UKIP, 4.5% who were simultaneously Brexit Party supporters, and 4% who were ex-Labour members. </p>
<p>This puts into perspective the scale of the entryist phenomenon. At most, 7.5% of all Tory members in 2019 had a history of connections with UKIP or the Brexit Party (probably fewer, given the likely overlap of UKIP and Brexit Party connections). </p>
<p>This is not to say that their impact may not have been significant in certain constituencies when it came to selecting party candidates, nor is it to deny that the Conservative Party grassroots have increasingly come to favour “hard” forms of Brexit over the course of the past few years. But it would appear that, in the vast majority of cases, this will have been down to the changing views of members who had no formal associations with UKIP or the Brexit Party.</p>
<p>As for Labour’s members, two-fifths of those with previous party memberships joined the party after 2015 – surely the Corbyn effect? Those Labour members who had past lives in other organisations came mainly from the Greens or Liberal Democrats – or, intriguingly, from an amorphous “other parties” category, with the latter maybe hinting (but only hinting) at a degree (albeit limited) of entryism from the far left.</p>
<p>It is worth bearing in mind that the smaller parties have generally experienced even higher levels of cross-party flows, proportionately speaking. For instance, three-fifths of Green members were former Labour members, as were around half of SNP and Liberal Democrat members.</p>
<h2>Why switch?</h2>
<p>But what drives some people to quit one party and join another? <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Footsoldiers-Political-Party-Membership-in-the-21st-Century/Bale-Webb-Poletti/p/book/9781138302464">Our research</a> suggests that the most telling reasons are connected with ideology and party leaders. If people feel themselves to be in tune with particular a party in terms of its core values and leader, they are naturally attracted to join it. However, they are equally inclined to eventually quit the same party if they feel it or its leadership has changed tack and become more remote.</p>
<p>In particular, we discovered that ideological radicals are especially prone to switching parties. The same goes for Brexiteers -– although this is perhaps a time-sensitive finding relevant to the past few years, given the special power of Brexit to cut across longstanding <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/brexitland/667A60CB4C315A755792074E79B20FBA">patterns of partisan alignment</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the traditional breadth of the major parties in Britain partly reflects the nature of the first-past-the-post electoral system, which makes it hard for minor parties to gain parliamentary representation unless – like the Scottish and Welsh nationalists or, more unusually, the Greens in Brighton – they have geographical concentrations of support.</p>
<p>As a result, both Labour and the Conservatives are coalitions of quite diverse types of people. We should not be surprised, then, that their grassroots members often find themselves at odds with their parties’ policies – particularly when there is a change of direction brought about by a change of leadership.</p>
<p>A new leader intent on charting a different course from their predecessor – Keir Starmer and Boris Johnson are both obvious examples – can try to keep as many of their existing members on board as possible. But, ultimately, it may be better for all concerned – and a sign of healthy, pluralist democracy – if those who come to believe another party might represent a better fit for them depart so they can try it for size. </p>
<p>And nowadays, of course, with the emergence of parties that either weren’t around at all (such as populist radical right outfits like UKIP, the Brexit Party and Reform UK) or were less powerful than they are now (like the SNP), there are more alternatives on offer than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Webb has received ESRC funding for this research.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Bale receives funding from the ESRC and the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p>Switching political parties is fairly common in Britain. But does that mean parties are being shaped by entryism?Paul Webb, Professor of Politics, University of SussexTim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1497052020-11-17T16:57:57Z2020-11-17T16:57:57ZNigel Farage turns his attention to opposing lockdown – should we care?<p>Despite being busy supporting the Trump campaign in the US, Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage has kept one eye trained on the British political scene. Never one to miss an opportunity for disruption, Farage’s attention now turns to being <a href="https://twitter.com/Nigel_Farage/status/1324027678052200448">“an opposition voice to lockdown”</a>. </p>
<p>Farage’s Brexit Party will be renamed <a href="https://www.thebrexitparty.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Refrom-UK-Telegraph-Article-Nov-1-2020.pdf">“Reform UK”</a> and its primary focus will be opposing coronavirus restrictions in the UK. The decision was announced just as England entered its second national lockdown in a year, prohibiting most social gatherings and enforcing a wide range of non-essential business closures.</p>
<p>This is, of course, not the first time Farage has used his cult-like <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/11/06/beyond-no-deal-what-else-does-the-brexit-party-want/">populist</a> status to harness the power of voter discontent in a time of crisis to pressure government. This time he has sensed that confusion over the pandemic is driving distrust of government. Sections of the public appear to be particularly responsive to suggestions that experts are producing <a href="https://twitter.com/brexitparty_uk/status/1325882516847341570">“dodgy data”</a> rather than grappling with a never-before-seen problem.</p>
<p>Although Reform UK is launching with an anti-lockdown message, it’s continuing the Brexit Party’s broader goal to <a href="https://www.thebrexitparty.org/">“change politics for good”</a>.</p>
<p>The Brexit party promised a “political revolution”. It called for electoral reform to end Labour and Conservative dominance in Westminster and abolition of the House of Lords. Following the 2016 Brexit vote it also wanted referendums to become a common part of British decision-making.</p>
<p>Reform UK looks set to continue this trend. Having a rallying cause like opposing lockdown can be seen as a useful way to build an identity in the post-Brexit world. </p>
<h2>Younger voters</h2>
<p>The big question is who Reform UK is appealing to. Libertarian Conservative types who disagree with the government’s draconian stance are obvious targets but the party could have appeal beyond older groups.</p>
<p>Reform UK’s anti-government grievances focus on “businesses and jobs being destroyed” by lockdown. With UK unemployment rising, this message may also strike a chord with working-class voters fearing ongoing precarity.</p>
<p>Opponents to lockdown policies are also generally younger and not characteristic Brexiteers. A recent <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2020/11/01/snap-poll-72-english-people-back-prime-ministers-p">poll</a> showed 32% of people aged 18-24 oppose lockdown, compared to 20% of over-65s. Asked about a potential <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/11/06/half-britons-wouldnt-mind-if-restrictions-are-stil">Christmas lockdown</a>, 55% of people aged 65+ said they weren’t fussed about it while 41% of 18-to-24-year-olds said the same.</p>
<p>Events such as the “prison-like” fencing-in of students at the University of Manchester as part of coronavirus restrictions have the potential to increase antagonism towards lockdown among younger voters. Brexit party chairman Richard Tice appeared to recognise as much by <a href="https://twitter.com/TiceRichard/status/1324394969545789441">tweeting about the incident</a>. </p>
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<p>And with current Labour leader Keir Starmer supporting lockdown, it could be that Reform UK spots an opportunity to win over younger Labour voters who oppose the government’s approach. We should also note that the Brexit Party has been branching out much further across the political spectrum than its largely right-wing predecessor UKIP. Farage may not carry much personal appeal for younger Labour voters but his team now counts the likes of left-wing peer Claire Fox among its ranks. </p>
<h2>Political positioning</h2>
<p>Despite all this, beyond the immediate desire to return to normality, its hard to imagine younger voters switching allegiances for the long term, especially with Farage as leader. </p>
<p>Reform UK is fighting an uphill battle. After all, the Conservatives have a strong majority, and the next general election isn’t due until 2024. But forthcoming local elections in May 2021 provide the potential for breakthrough and Farage has form here, having returned 163 UKIP councillors in the 2014 local elections. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Farage formed the Brexit Party and quickly led it to an unlikely victory in the 2019 European elections. That indicates the potential for possible upset. While this success was not repeated in the following general election, the Brexit Party still claimed some of the victory when former prime minister Theresa May was ousted in favour of a pro-Brexit Boris Johnson government.</p>
<p>With growing discontent in Johnson’s handling of Brexit and COVID, Farage and his team appear to sense that this a good moment to surge forward. The populist simplicity of opposing lockdown is a strong antidote to the increasingly confusing and fluctuating demands of controlling COVID. Even though public sentiment against lockdown remains limited, shy sceptics may soon fall for Farage’s charm. The longer this crisis persists, the stronger anti-establishment forces like Reform UK could become.</p>
<p>Electoral victories may seem unlikely but the Brexit Party thrived on exerting pressure by threatening to split the vote in battleground areas. Reform UK could do similar in order to push Johnson’s government into coronavirus policy concessions. A recent series of U-turns, including on free school meals, shows leadership instability. Sensing weakness and further government failure on COVID, Farage and co are ready to pounce. That could herald significant disruption to the lockdown consensus.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Callum Tindall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Brexit Party has become Reform UK. What are they up to now?Callum Tindall, Doctoral Researcher in Politics, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288512019-12-13T04:34:18Z2019-12-13T04:34:18ZBoris Johnson’s Conservatives win majority in UK election – experts react<p><em>Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party has won a large majority in the 2019 general election. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn has confirmed that he will not lead his party in any future elections but will stay on during a period of reflection about what happened in this campaign. Meanwhile, Liberal Democrat leader Jo Swinson has lost her seat. Experts react to the news. Read about its implications for <a href="#Brexit">Brexit</a>, <a href="#NorthernIreland">Northern Ireland</a>, <a href="#Scotland">Scotland</a>, and the <a href="#economy">UK economy</a> and <a href="#market%20reaction">markets</a>.</em> </p>
<h2><a id="Brexit"></a>Brexit</h2>
<p><strong>Paul James Cardwell, Professor of Law, University of Strathclyde</strong></p>
<p>A Conservative majority is what Boris Johnson wanted in order to ensure that his Brexit deal passed the Commons. There is now little in principle to stop his deal passing. </p>
<p>Various EU leaders will also be relieved that a majority in the Commons will clear a path forward. The exit day of January 31 2020 seems more certain that any of the previous “Brexit days” due to the lack of domestic political hurdles. However, as has been noted repeatedly during the campaign, this would not mark the end of Brexit as a process. The transition period is due only to last for 2020 and what follows from that is still unknown – the future relationship between the UK and the EU is highly uncertain.</p>
<p>The idea that the UK and the EU could negotiate an agreement on future relations is not beyond the realms of possibility in the short time-frame available – after all, Theresa May’s government managed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-draft-withdrawal-agreement-experts-react-107027">get the Withdrawal Agreement in place</a> with the EU. But it is often presented in the UK as a matter of “free trade”. This sounds straightforward, but it is not. </p>
<p>Even in economic areas, the potential wrangling over goods, services, capital as well as other areas where the UK and EU might want to cooperate is fraught with difficultly. The state of Swiss-EU relations where <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-swiss-eu/chances-of-swiss-eu-treaty-deal-this-month-have-vanished-sources-say-idUKKBN1WJ1Q0">negotiation and renegotiation is the norm</a> shows that <a href="https://theconversation.com/lets-be-clear-about-what-get-brexit-done-really-means-128347">“get Brexit done”</a> is a hollow sentiment. But having argued for it and got his wish, the prime minister will now have to own it.</p>
<h2><a id="Scotland"></a>Scotland</h2>
<p><strong>Sean Kippin, Lecturer in Politics, University of Stirling</strong></p>
<p>This election result shows the continuing political divergence between Scotland on the one hand, and England and Wales on the other. While the contest south of the border saw voters embracing culturally conservative politics and Brexit, the Scottish National Party’s moderate pro-independence progressivism seems to have been very successful in Scotland. </p>
<p>The roots of this result lie in two referendums: the 2014 independence referendum, which established the SNP as Scotland’s dominant force; and the 2016 EU referendum, which created a justified grievance that Scotland was being wrenched out of the EU against its will.</p>
<p>Where the Conservatives won <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40192707">13 Scottish seats</a> under Ruth Davidson as leader in 2017, the party seems to have been fulsomely rejected this time around. Boris Johnson concentrating the Tory campaign on Brexit and his seductive message to ‘get it done’ appears to have been decisive in England and Wales, but it may have been a turn off for many Scottish voters. </p>
<p>Discussion now will turn to Scotland’s constitutional future, and whether a newly emboldened Conservative government will feel sufficiently able to dig its heels in and resist Nicola Sturgeon’s calls for a second independence referendum. Scottish politics has been interesting since at least 2014, and it promises to remain so.</p>
<h2><a id="NorthernIreland"></a>Northern Ireland</h2>
<p><strong>Katy Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast</strong> </p>
<p>This has been a momentous election for Northern Ireland. For the first time in its existence, those MPs who designate as unionist are in a minority. And, in stark contrast to Britain, it has more Remain-supporting MPs than Leave-supporting ones – although Sinn Féin MPs traditionally don’t take their seats in parliament. The result is in part a reflection of electoral pacts rather than a reliance on tactical voting. It is also because more unionists and nationalists have voted for the middle ground, as seen in the surge of support for the moderate pro-Remain Alliance Party and Social Democratic and Labour Party. </p>
<p>The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin – both triumphant in 2017 – each received blows. Most dramatically, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50766004">DUP’s deputy leader Nigel Dodds</a> lost to Sinn Féin in a constituency that has never had a nationalist MP before. The political consequences of these results will actually be felt closer to home than in the House of Commons. The talks to restore the devolved assembly and executive at Stormont are <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/fresh-talks-to-resurrect-stormont-to-begin-on-december-16-julian-smith-38731547.html">due to start on Monday</a>. These results, particularly in light of the new landscape in Westminster, will concentrate all parties’ minds towards success.</p>
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<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p><strong>Helen Parr, Professor of History, School of Social, Global and Political Studies, Keele University</strong></p>
<p>This Conservative majority will change the politics of Brexit. Boris Johnson will probably want to bring his withdrawal agreement to the House as soon as he can, perhaps in the first week parliament sits. It could be passed in principle before Christmas, with the technicalities to be debated in January, enabling Britain to leave the EU on January 31. There does not seem much doubt that the Conservative majority means Britain will exit its current relationship with the EU on that date.</p>
<p>After that, we do not know what will happen. We do not know what Boris Johnson’s plan will be, and we do not know how the opposition parties will react to the process of Brexit. Many people are speculating that a large majority will enable Johnson to soften Brexit, which would make a deal with the EU easier to get. Or possibly, it will mean he can extend the transition period – which would be permissible on the current terms for up to two years. But the fact remains that we do not know how Johnson will want to play it. Another possibility is that he might want to pursue a harder Brexit regardless. A large majority will probably mean he can secure agreement in parliament to whichever course of action he prefers. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-the-difference-between-hard-and-soft-brexit-66524">Explainer: what's the difference between 'hard' and 'soft' Brexit?</a>
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<h2>Britain’s place in the world</h2>
<p><strong>Victoria Honeyman, Lecturer in British Politics, University of Leeds</strong></p>
<p>For a post-Brexit Britain, there will undoubtedly be some economic opportunities, but there is a cost. As Boris Johnson removes Britain from the EU, Britain is globally weakened in its economic and political might. To secure those all-important trade deals, Britain will have to decide what pay-offs it is willing to make. For all his bluster, Johnson may have to swallow some uncomfortable truths and some uncomfortable compromises. Whether he can sell those at home is another matter.</p>
<p>While no world leader would object to the British people selecting the government that they want, it’s unlikely that many will be thrilled to see him return to Downing Street. That being said, few would have welcomed Jeremy Corbyn with open arms either. The risk to Britain’s global position and reputation is not primarily the prime minister. The biggest risk is Britain’s global weakness and its desire to stand alone in the world.</p>
<h2><a id="market reaction"></a>Market reaction</h2>
<p><strong>Costas Milas, Professor of Finance, University of Liverpool</strong></p>
<p>Financial markets have responded positively to the general election result. Sterling, the typical barometer of international confidence in the UK economy, <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/fromshowcolumns.asp?Travel=NIxAZxRSxSUx&FromSeries=1&ToSeries=50&DAT=RNG&FD=1&FM=Jan&FY=2016&TD=31&TM=Dec&TY=2019&FNY=&CSVF=TT&html.x=72&html.y=49&C=C8P&Filter=N">jumped</a>. </p>
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<p>This is because Brexit-related economic policy uncertainty is receding. Investors are interpreting the significant Conservative Party majority as a clear indication that Boris Johnson will soon sail his Brexit deal through parliament – he’s pledged to do so by January 31. This will then allow him to speed up negotiations with the EU in order to agree a new trade deal by the end of 2020.</p>
<p>According to Johnson’s pre-election economic pledges, government spending will increase by exploiting <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/fromshowcolumns.asp?Travel=NIxAZxSUx&FromSeries=1&ToSeries=50&DAT=RNG&FD=1&FM=Jan&FY=2014&TD=13&TM=Dec&TY=2019&FNY=Y&CSVF=TT&html.x=66&html.y=26&SeriesCodes=IUDMNZC&UsingCodes=Y&Filter=N&title=IUDMNZC&VPD=Y">historically low interest rates</a> to borrow more from international markets. Lower Brexit-related uncertainty and an expansive fiscal stimulus will provide powerful support to the Bank of England’s <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Bank-Rate.asp">loose monetary policy</a> in stimulating the UK economy. </p>
<p>The improved economic climate should encourage the UK business sector to reverse the business investment slump <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/gan8/cxnv">of the last two years or so</a>. But don’t expect a business investment boom any time soon. At least not until Johnson and the EU agree on a new deal. Whether this happens by the end of 2020 or much later is another story.</p>
<h2>What it means for the <a id="economy"></a>UK economy</h2>
<p><strong>Kevin Albertson, Professor of Economics, Manchester Metropolitan University</strong></p>
<p>Boris Johnson’s clear majority gives him the freedom to act, if he chooses, to address the economic problems faced by the UK and by the world today. But it is not clear he fully understands what these problems are.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2019/10/15/the-world-economy-synchronized-slowdown-precarious-outlook/">world economy is slowing down</a>, <a href="https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/chazen-global-insights/market-concentration-threatening-us-economy">economic concentration</a> means the fruits of economic growth are <a href="https://prospect.org/power/new-economic-concentration/">shared by fewer and fewer people</a>, and <a href="https://measuring-progress.eu/genuine-progress-index-gpi">what passes for economic growth</a> is buoyed up <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/15/global-debt-surged-to-a-record-250-trillion-in-the-first-half-of-2019-led-by-the-us-and-china.html">by debt</a> and <a href="https://www.footprintnetwork.org/our-work/ecological-footprint/">ecological deficit</a> more than by sustainable economic activity. These problems are not new, of course – they have been bubbling <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929254.600-the-wonder-year-why-1978-was-the-best-year-ever/">under the surface for the last four decades</a>. </p>
<p>They leave Johnson, like all world leaders, in a conundrum. There are only enough good jobs in the world for <a href="https://www.gallup.com/analytics/268787/gallup-global-great-jobs-briefing-2019.aspx?utm_source=World_Poll_Global_Great_Jobs_Briefing_Email_2&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=World_Poll_Global_Great_Jobs_Dec_10&utm_content=Download_Briefing_Now_CTA_1&elqTrackId=b075e4c14e5e44b3a4524d9150da28e5&elq=eff34521062f405e841e70d52abc8998&elqaid=2738&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=641">about one third of the adult population</a>, but it is by no means clear, and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/gdp-is-destroying-the-planet-heres-an-alternative/">perhaps not possible, to boost economic activity sufficiently</a> to create all the extra employment needed under the current economic system.</p>
<p>It hardly needs to be said that <a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2019/10/boris-johnson-lets-get-brexit-done-lets-bring-our-country-together-full-text-of-his-conference-speech.html">leaving the EU is unlikely to address these issues</a>.</p>
<p>The general thrust of the Conservative Party’s agenda looks likely to continue down the route of <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/07/britannia-unchained-free-market-book-defines-boris-johnson-s-new-cabinet">global free trade and market-oriented policy</a>. This has, since the 1970s, hampered the UK’s efforts to adapt to a world economy <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cje/advance-article/doi/10.1093/cje/bez037/5550923">which has reached economic and ecological constraints</a>. </p>
<p>It’s also likely that Johnson will be unlucky enough to be in office when the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/03/next-crash-why-world-unprepared-economic-dangers-ahead">world economy moves into an economic slump</a> over the next few years. This will not be his fault, but the economic tools in which he appears likely to place his and the nation’s trust are not adequate to cope with such a situation.</p>
<p><strong>Hanna Szymborska, Lecturer in Economics, The Open University</strong></p>
<p>The large Conservative gains are surprising because much of the dissatisfaction with the economy, which led to Brexit, was fuelled <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-austerity-tipped-balance-towards-leave-new-study-suggests-100685">by the Conservatives’ austerity agenda</a>. They oversaw <a href="https://theconversation.com/neoliberal-epidemics-the-spread-of-austerity-obesity-stress-and-inequality-46416">rising inequality</a>, deteriorating <a href="https://theconversation.com/blame-austerity-not-immigration-for-taking-britain-to-breaking-point-61133">public services</a>, sluggish <a href="https://theconversation.com/ending-austerity-give-everyone-a-pay-rise-103576">real wage growth</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ending-austerity-create-a-national-investment-bank-103559">faltering investment</a> levels over the past nine years – particularly in the areas that have turned blue.</p>
<p>Because the Conservative Party manifesto did not offer any radical policies to boost the UK economy, it is hard to see how Boris Johnson’s government will help turn things around. In the short term, the near-certain prospect of a 2020 Brexit may bring a period of long-awaited certainty, reinforcing the market’s optimism by strengthening the position of the pound against other major currencies and restoring some confidence in consumer spending. But these initial feelings of stability <a href="https://theconversation.com/lets-be-clear-about-what-get-brexit-done-really-means-128347">may be short lived</a>.</p>
<p>The transition period is bound to bring a fresh wave of uncertainty <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservative-promise-of-a-hard-brexit-would-be-worse-for-the-uk-economy-than-labours-radical-spending-plans-128570">in the years to come</a> as the UK begins to separate its legislative system from the EU. This is likely to discourage demand and drive investment away from the UK, which would put a further strain on the economy that already suffers from <a href="https://theconversation.com/debunking-the-uks-productivity-problem-88042">low productivity</a>.</p>
<p>In the long run (depending on what kind of Brexit is concluded) the prospect of low demand, possible trade restrictions, and the potential loss of cheap migrant labour from the EU is likely to have a negative impact on firms and on consumers if prices rise. In this context, the Conservative manifesto promises for boosting public spending may be difficult to do and too modest to make up for the increase in the cost of living, which is likely to ensue in this situation.</p>
<h2>‘Let the healing begin’</h2>
<p><strong>Ken Rotenberg, Professor in Psychology, Keele University</strong></p>
<p>After the win by the Tories in the 2019 election, Johnson stated in his opening speech, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/boris-johnson-pledges-to-prioritise-nhs-after-election-victory">“let the healing begin”</a>. Although the desire for healing is highly commendable and needed, social psychological research suggests that the path to achieving such healing will be a difficult one for the UK.</p>
<p>A snap poll after the BBC debate showed that the public judged Johnson as less trustworthy than Corbyn by a margin of <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/12/06/yougov-due-release-bbc-debate-snap-poll-930pm">38% to 48%</a>. Those findings are limited by the sample and meaning of the question. It is possible, though, that Johnson and his party may have been successful because of the popularity of their policies but that Mr Johnson was not successful in securing trust from UK citizens. The conflict between popularity of policy and distrust could result in political instability.</p>
<p>Trust between people of different cultures, religions, and races is <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351035743">essential for the success of democracy</a>. There were allegations of Islamophobia and antisemitism by both parties in this election. While both leaders apologised, there remain questions about whether those apologises and the parties have solved the apparent violations of trust. There was also a proliferation of allegations of deception and <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/the-biggest-whoppers-and-dubious-tactics-parties-used-in-the-election-campaign/ar-AAK2Weq">misbehaviour by both main parties</a>. These could fuel the propensity for people with different political affiliations to <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351035743">distrust each other</a> and to distrust others with opposing views. And having a government with a reputation for untrustworthiness could make it difficult for the UK to achieve a positive exit from the EU because it <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351035743">undermines negotiation</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul James Cardwell has received research funding from the UK in a Changing Europe and the James Madison Charitable Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward is a senior fellow at UK in a Changing Europe, which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Albertson is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Costas Milas, Hanna Szymborska, Helen Parr, Ken Rotenberg, Sean Kippin, and Victoria Honeyman do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Our panel of experts analyse the results of the British election.Paul James Cardwell, Professor of Law, University of Strathclyde Costas Milas, Professor of Finance, University of LiverpoolHanna Szymborska, Lecturer in Economics, The Open UniversityHelen Parr, Professor of History, School of Social, Global and Political Studies, Keele UniversityKaty Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastKen Rotenberg, Professor in Psychology, Keele UniversityKevin Albertson, Professor of Economics, Manchester Metropolitan UniversitySean Kippin, Lecturer in Politics, University of StirlingVictoria Honeyman, Lecturer in British Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1276942019-12-02T13:55:34Z2019-12-02T13:55:34ZElection 2019: what are the Brexit Party’s policies – apart from the obvious<p>If the Conservatives are to gain a majority in the upcoming election, it will hinge on the Brexit Party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigel-farage-will-fight-labour-seats-after-pact-with-boris-johnson-fails-so-whats-he-up-to-127030">unofficial support</a>. The latter has stood down its candidates in all <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/11/brexit-party-will-not-contest-317-tory-seats-nigel-farage-says">317 Conservative-held seats</a>, reduced its criticism of Boris Johnson’s government and taken full aim at traditional Labour-held seats on the campaign so far. The goal is to capture Labour voters, splitting the Remain vote. Consequently, this should facilitate a Conservative victory and ensure that Brexit is achieved. </p>
<p>Where other parties have published their traditional election manifestos, setting out their proposed policies for government, the Brexit Party produced what it is calling a <a href="https://www.thebrexitparty.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Contract-With-The-People.pdf">“contract with the people”</a>.</p>
<p>As expected, the Brexit Party’s flagship policy is to leave the EU entirely (including the customs union and single market) without a deal. The party insists this restores the UK’s freedom to “reshape” its future by returning sovereignty on “laws, borders, money, fishing and defence”.</p>
<p>With television doctor David Bull as its health spokesman, the party insists the NHS must remain publicly owned and better funded. It challenges steps towards privatisation already taken, such as the Private Finance Initiatives that have “burdened the NHS with billions of pounds of debt”. Fundamentally, the party insists that a “clean-break Brexit” <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-the-nhs-in-a-post-brexit-trade-deal-with-the-us-128020">would not involve NHS privatisation</a>. </p>
<p>The Brexit Party says it is aiming to crack down on illegal immigration and human trafficking. Party leader, Nigel Farage, has claimed that his party would intend to reduce UK net migration to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50478341">50,000 a year</a> with a points-based immigration system that is “blind to ethnic origin”. It’s worth noting that this precise figure does not actually feature in the “contract” – suggesting it perhaps shouldn’t be taken as a firm commitment. </p>
<h2>A populist ‘political revolution’</h2>
<p>The Brexit Party says it is aiming for nothing short of a “political revolution”. It wants to reform the electoral system to be more proportional. This reflects the fact that the UK’s electoral system has historically excluded minor parties. One clear example is the 2015 general election, when UKIP won <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results">12.6%</a> of the national vote but only one seat in parliament. Farage would be keen to avoid a repeat. </p>
<p>It also wants to abolish the unelected House of Lords, replacing it with a “<a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1207778/brexit-party-manifesto-nigel-farage-election-2019-house-of-lords-peerage-uk-politics">smaller, democratic second chamber</a>”. However, this could cause a potential power imbalance with the House of Commons. </p>
<p>Another goal is to Americanise the Supreme Court, with a greater role for parliament in appointing judges. This is deemed necessary after the court’s 2017 ruling that parliament must be given a vote on whether to trigger Article 50 to begin the Brexit process. This all adds to the Brexit Party’s populist rhetoric of “the elite” being against the common will of “the people”.</p>
<p>Citizens should also be able to call referendums, the party suggests, provided 5 million people register to vote in support of one. Interestingly, this idea originates from the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome">European Union</a>. We might also remember that 6 million people signed the <a href="https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/241584">petition to revoke Article 50</a> – although it is unclear how many were eligible voters. </p>
<h2>Who is it for?</h2>
<p>The Brexit Party’s target audience is predominantly voters in the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/11/06/beyond-no-deal-what-else-does-the-brexit-party-want/">“Brexit heartlands”</a> of the north, the Midlands and Wales. This is clear from several pledges aimed at the politically disenchanted working and lower-middle class voters.</p>
<p>While the Liberal Democrats are promising a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/49634508-0b82-11ea-b2d6-9bf4d1957a67">“Remain bonus”</a> if the UK stays in the EU, the Brexit Party is touting the exact opposite in a £200 billion “Brexit dividend”. This will be funded by cutting 50% of the UK’s foreign aid budget, scrapping the HS2 high-speed rail project and saving £13 billion a year in EU payments.</p>
<p>Billions of pounds would be channelled into “regional regeneration” alongside removing VAT on domestic fuel to reduce energy bills. These are clear bids for votes in deprived Labour-held seats. For coastal communities, there will be a £2.5 billion investment to regenerate jobs and tourism.</p>
<p>It also appears to have partially adopted the Labour Party’s policy for <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/free-broadband-labour-plan-internet-wifi-nationalisation-a9205031.html">free public broadband</a>, by suggesting it would offer “free base level domestic broadband in deprived regions and free Wi-Fi on all public transport”.</p>
<p>Smaller businesses are also supported through a zero-rate corporation tax on the first £10,000 of pre-tax profit. Yet the Brexit Party only intends to offer a “safety net” of basic state provisions, rather than the wholescale redistribution of wealth <a href="https://labour.org.uk/manifesto/tackle-poverty-and-inequality/">proposed by Labour</a>. Meanwhile a pledge to abolish inheritance tax – referred to as a “grief tax” – could be seen as a play for older voters. </p>
<p>The Brexit Party also proposes some progressive policies – from removing interest from student loans to planting millions of trees. It wants to recycle waste in the UK, making it illegal to export waste to other countries “to be burnt, buried or dumped at sea”.</p>
<p>The Brexit Party knows that it has no realistic chance of becoming the party of government in this election, so these pledges serve a different purpose. The primary objective is to push for Brexit by winning as many votes as possible and proving that the British people still want to leave the EU. All the other populist bells and whistles are designed to win as many people over to the cause as possible – particularly Labour voters. This will enable the Brexit Party to continue to exert pressure on whichever party does win.</p>
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerB">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Callum Tindall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like everyone else in this election, Nigel Farage has caught the spending bug, with a little help from a ‘Brexit dividend’.Callum Tindall, Doctoral Researcher in Politics, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270302019-11-15T11:03:54Z2019-11-15T11:03:54ZNigel Farage will fight Labour seats after pact with Boris Johnson fails – so what’s he up to?<p>Some 200 years ago, Britain, France and Austria agreed a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Congress-of-Vienna">treaty</a> designed to counter their common rivals, Russia and Prussia. It was signed in secret by the British foreign secretary Viscount Castlereagh and his opposite numbers, the French Duke of Talleyrand and the Austrian Prince of Metternich.</p>
<p>No one, of course, remembers the treaty but the names of its authors and signatories may ring one or two bells for some people.</p>
<p>Castlereagh was one of Britain’s heartless governing class named in Percy Shelley’s poem <a href="https://www.bl.uk/learning/langlit/poetryperformance/shelley/poem3/shelley3.html">Masque of Anarchy</a>, now something of an anthem for Corbynistas everywhere. Talleyrand and Metternich are probably best remembered for a famous quote. The latter, on hearing of the death of the former, is said to have remarked “I wonder what he meant by that”. His reaction beautifully captures how those observing or involved in politics are obsessed with (over) interpreting the every move of the main players.</p>
<p>Which brings us neatly to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-everything-you-need-to-know-about-brexit-partys-leave-pact-126794">decision</a> by Nigel Farage not to stand Brexit Party candidates in the constituencies won by the Conservatives won in 2017. Hours of airtime and acres of newsprint have been consumed in offering more or less convincing explanations for his decision.</p>
<p>And you can see why. Clearly the stand-down was a climb-down from a politician normally inclined to cross the street to get into a fight rather than avoid one. But that isn’t the strangest aspect of the decision. No, the weirdest thing is Farage’s seeming determination to carry on the fight in constituencies that the Tories need to gain to win the election. These are seats that voted Leave in 2016 but have traditionally been held by Labour.</p>
<p>Johnson hopes that support for Brexit in these areas will deliver him a parliamentary majority if he can convince voters who traditionally back Labour to support him. But splitting the Leave vote with Farage puts that in jeopardy. To be effective, any pact with Farage worth the name would have had to centre on marginals in the West Midlands. And the so-called Labour <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2019/11/election-2019-how-the-tories-plan-to-break-labours-red-wall/">“red wall”</a> that the Conservatives are aiming to breach in the North is a far greater risk in these areas. But, with nominations closed, the Brexit Party still appears set on standing candidates in those (and plenty of other) seats.</p>
<p>Sure, what Farage has offered Johnson improves the latter’s chances of holding off the challenge from the Liberal Democrats in south-west England and the Scottish National Party in Scotland. It also sends a pretty clear signal to those Leave-supporting voters not naturally inclined to support the Conservatives that, if they really do want to “get Brexit done”, then they’d better hold their noses and vote Tory. Yet, as it stands, Farage is only offering Johnson half a loaf. What, then, is he playing at?</p>
<h2>The real deal</h2>
<p>In trying to work that out – wondering for example whether it’s down to some desperate need on Farage’s part to maintain his place in the limelight for just a little longer – perhaps we are all over-interpreting and over-complicating things. Rather than messing about with Metternich, maybe we should be opting for <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/scientific-experiments/occams-razor.htm">Occam and his razor</a>. Maybe it would be better to take the explanation that requires the fewest assumptions.</p>
<p>On that basis, then, we should give up the attempt to get inside Farage’s head – which will doubtless come as a relief to many. Perhaps the simple fact is that this is a man who has spent his life in politics campaigning to get the UK out of the EU, ideally in a form that leaves it completely untethered from Brussels.</p>
<p>Having helped push the Conservatives into dumping Theresa May in favour of Johnson – a prime minister who, especially if he wins a comfortable majority, looks likely to be able to pass a hard Brexit through parliament and may even be persuaded to go for a no-deal departure – Farage knows he is close to getting what he’s always wanted. Yet he is simultaneously in danger of throwing it all away by splitting the Leave vote.</p>
<p>However, because Johnson cannot be trusted, it surely makes sense, for a few more precious weeks at least, to maintain the pressure on him to make more and more public promises as to what will happen in post-withdrawal trade negotiations before eventually granting the PM what he really needs.</p>
<p>Putting it bluntly, Farage is paying Johnson to do a job. As in all good gangster movies, it’s a case of half now and half when the job’s done.</p>
<p>In an ideal world, for Farage anyway, that second transaction would only be made once the UK has actually left the EU. But in the real world, a binding (or at least supposedly binding) manifesto commitment covering next year’s negotiations will probably have to do.</p>
<p>If and when that commitment comes, then don’t be surprised to see Farage handing over the other half of the payment. It won’t be in used £50 notes in a big brown envelope but in what Johnson sees as the most valuable currency of all: an announcement a few days before polling day by the Brexit Party’s leader that Leavers should vote, not for his candidates, but for the Conservatives.</p>
<p>That announcement, if it happens, won’t of course guarantee a Conservative victory on December 12 but, for Boris Johnson, could make winning a whole lot easier.</p>
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerC">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127030/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Bale is Deputy Director of The UK in a Changing Europe initiative which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>The Brexit Party’s most baffling decision is to continue to fight key Labour-held seats. But all is not what it seems.Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1267942019-11-12T13:10:49Z2019-11-12T13:10:49ZUK election 2019: everything you need to know about Brexit Party’s Leave ‘pact’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301140/original/file-20191111-194650-1e7owq8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=117%2C34%2C3005%2C1558&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/boris-johnson-secretary-state-foreign-affairs-1039146241?src=051a07e9-a80f-4236-9a04-29ffc35efe7f-1-2">shutterstock/ PA Alexandros Michailidis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigel Farage, leader of the Brexit Party, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-of-a-threat-is-the-brexit-party-to-boris-johnson-and-jeremy-corbyn-126466">has revealed</a> he will not field candidates in any of the seats currently held by the Conservative Party (or won by them in 2017) in next month’s general election – but what will this mean come polling day?</p>
<p>Farage has vowed instead to “take the fight to Labour”, which could provide a boost for the Conservatives in the seats they are trying to hold. <a href="https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/uncategorized/is-nigel-farage-a-threat-to-labour/#.Xcmb5ZL7RFL">But it could also spell trouble</a> for the seats the Tories want to win. </p>
<p>He also said that his move to stand down Brexit party candidates in Tory-held seats heralded the creation of a <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/general-election-we-now-have-a-leave-alliance-farage-11859389">Leave alliance</a> – which he hopes will rival the <a href="https://theconversation.com/remain-alliance-can-it-halt-brexit-and-beat-boris-johnson-121266">Remain alliance</a> – a cooperation between three parties, Lib Dems, Greens and Plaid Cymru, in 60 seats in England and Wales. </p>
<p>As part of the Remain alliance, the three parties have all agreed not to stand candidates against each other. Instead they will all support one anti-Brexit candidate drawn from one of their parties in each constituency. The Liberal Democrats have also agreed to stand down in a handful of special cases, such as Broxtowe where Anna Soubry, leader of the Independent Group for Change, hopes to hold her seat. And the Green parties (in England and Wales and Scotland) have agreed to stand down in a handful of seats to benefit <a href="https://leftfootforward.org/2019/11/greens-stand-aside-for-labour-in-second-seat/">Labour</a> and the <a href="https://leftfootforward.org/2019/11/scottish-greens-step-aside-to-help-beat-tories-in-three-seats/">SNP</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a difference, of course, between a negotiated (Remain) alliance and what looks like a unilaterial move by the Brexit Party (Leave alliance) – and time will tell whether there are any reciprocal moves by the Conservatives or any involvement of UKIP.</p>
<h2>How will this impact the Conservatives?</h2>
<p>Electoral deals, unilateral standing aside and tactical voting seem to have become the hallmark of this election campaign so far. And, if the assumption that in the absence of a Brexit party, or of UKIP, supporters will tend to vote Conservative holds, then this is both good and bad news for the Tories. Because although it may help some defences, it undermines Johnson’s team in their attack seats. And it may not do wonders for its brand in other areas. </p>
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<p>Let’s say, for example, you are the Conservative candidate in Twickenham, a marginal seat held by the Lib Dems. You may well lose votes to the Brexit party at a time when the Lib Dems have fewer competitors because of the Remain alliance. Then let’s say you are the Conservative candidate taking over in Putney, an area with a large Remain vote and a previously Remain MP in Justine Greening. Will it help to be associated with the Brexit Party?</p>
<h2>What about the Remain alliance?</h2>
<p>With a smaller field to worry about in those Tory held, Remain alliance seats, those parties campaigning on a strong anti-Brexit message can now use a clear attack on Conservative candidates – whoever they are. As every Tory candidate can now be tarred with the Brexit brush. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/ChukaUmunna">Chuka Umunna</a>, Liberal Democrat candidate for Cities of London and Westminster was quick off the block with his tweet:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1193889818096414720"}"></div></p>
<p>Umunna may not be in a Remain alliance seat, but he knows the message to use.</p>
<p>Green Party candidate <a href="https://twitter.com/CarolineLucas">Caroline Lucas</a>, whose Brighton Pavilion seat is included in the Remain alliance list, had this to say:</p>
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<p>Possibly though, the best way of examining the likely effect is to find a seat now affected by the Remain alliance arrangements and the Brexit Party stand down at the same time. One such seat is Southport. In Southport the Remain alliance candidate is the Lib Dem. It’s a very closely fought seat, that changed hands last time and in which Labour has become stronger. Historically this seaside area has tended to be either Lib Dem or Conservative. Lib Dem John Pugh stood down ahead of 2017 when the Conservatives took it back. At this same election Labour moved into second place. This in turn means quite some argument about who is better placed to stop a Tory hold.</p>
<p>It’s also a seat in which a UKIP candidate got more than 1,000 votes in 2017 and stood candidates in this year’s local elections– at a time when many areas didn’t have a UKIP representative. No UKIP candidate was successful here, but the commitment and organisation to field candidates should not be written off. Defending Conservative Damien Moore has reported that UKIP will not stand this time, thereby removing the other potential choice for strong Brexiteers. Southport will be one to watch then for plenty of reasons. </p>
<h2>What about the other parties?</h2>
<p>Clearly it will be some time before there is canvass or polling information which reflects the Brexit Party announcement. But the national reaction of political parties indicates that most leaders feel a vote for the Tories is now the same as a vote for the Brexit Party. </p>
<p>Ed Davey, the Lib Dem deputy leader said that “the Conservatives and the Brexit party are now one and the same”. Labour is calling the arrangement a Trump alliance which is “Thatcherism on steroids” and a <a href="https://labourlist.org/2019/11/brexit-party-stands-down-in-tory-held-seats-to-focus-on-labour-leavers/">Thatcher tribute act</a>. </p>
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<p>The Plaid Cymru leader Adam Price meanwhile said: “That Nigel Farage is willing to endorse Boris Johnson is proof that they are planning to deliver a disastrous no deal”. </p>
<p>The SNP, like the Lib Dems, also say the Brexit Party and the Conservative party are one and the same.</p>
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<p>The anti-Brexit group Best for Britain has referred to the announcement as “two cheeks of the same Brexit arse”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1193926929319124993"}"></div></p>
<p>Iain Duncan Smith, the former Conservative leader and prominent Brexiter however, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/nov/11/general-election-parties-vie-for-veterans-votes-as-keith-vaz-quits-politics-live?page=with:block-5dc97d6b8f0867dcebfd2c68">said Farage’s announcement</a> was a “good thing” and may help the Conservatives to win a majority, adding: “of course winning a majority is critical if you want to deliver Brexit and Boris to stay.”</p>
<p>The Brexit party clearly believes it can do well against Labour. And there is some evidence for this. In its heyday, UKIP challenged in key Labour seats and came very close to a by-election gain in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Heywood_and_Middleton_by-election">Heywood and Middleton</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>At the time, then deputy leader Paul Nuttall was openly calling for a strategy of focusing on northern Labour seats. But intervention in Labour-held seats could well split the anti-Labour vote and so keep incumbents in place. Indeed, it seems the <a href="https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/uncategorized/is-nigel-farage-a-threat-to-labour/#.Xcl6wTP7SUn">Brexit Party is more of a threat</a> to the Conservatives than to Labour.</p>
<p>As ever in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-message-is-clear-its-time-to-put-first-past-the-post-out-to-pasture-40984">UK’s first-past-the-post system</a>, much will depend on which challenger party can claim the mantle of most likely to succeed. And of course, if the start of the campaigning is anything to go by, it appears voters can’t take anything for granted.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300096/original/file-20191104-88414-1yh2yvf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerB">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Keaveney is a member of the Liberal Democrats</span></em></p>“We now have a leave alliance”.Paula Keaveney, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Edge Hill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1264662019-11-11T11:15:10Z2019-11-11T11:15:10ZHow much of a threat is the Brexit Party to Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn?<p>The Brexit Party has announced that it will not stand candidates in the 317 seats the Conservatives held at the last election, but will contest all the other constituencies in the country. Nigel Farage <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50377396">said his aim was</a> to give Boris Johnson “half a chance” and avoid a second referendum. </p>
<p>Farage has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/04/brexit-party-contest-more-than-600-seats-election-says-farage">reasserted his claim</a> that the Brexit Party poses more of an electoral threat to Labour than the Conservatives – although he himself is not standing for a seat. Yet, the Conservatives believe that he has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/01/nigel-farage-has-handed-hartlepool-to-labour-says-tory-chair">“effectively handed”</a> several swing constituencies to Labour by splitting the Leave vote in those areas. This, the Conservatives fear, will undermine Boris Johnson’s ability to gain a majority. But who is right? Which side has more to fear from the Brexit Party?</p>
<p>Anti-European Union party UKIP and now the Brexit Party have occupied an unusual position in British politics because although they sit on the right of political spectrum, they threaten both the main political parties – on the right and left. </p>
<p>In the 2015 election, <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-farage-takes-credit-for-conservative-election-win-in-2015">UKIP drew most of its support</a> from people who voted Conservative in 2010 rather than those who voted for Labour. However, when we look at the demographics of UKIP’s support, some of the core of UKIP’s support comes from groups which are traditionally associated with the Labour Party – <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/laurence-stellings/ukip-poll-voters_b_6631026.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAALAsaeJxgHVwSE-UzJHtn-DeYgd3rTbke12L-wpHvX9CO-9_6mnozbe8VsoikN7_V9RTnlQD_3KXU8hpgHsv2slPEQl7e4cOAwmmyH8boiuj3SqJh6Vux-mg5MaSk9ljUXRbueGA7vszMJFLA2Q4gyBB_Gt0ce0lmmHmeE8cs-cV">working class voters in the Midlands and the north and east of England with fewer formal qualifications</a>.</p>
<p>And while UKIP did not deny David Cameron’s Conservatives a majority in that election, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/545335/Ukip-take-two-million-votes-from-Conservative-Party-next-election">as had been predicted</a>, the party did take 12.6% of the national vote.</p>
<h2>Battling for the Leave vote</h2>
<p>Now, the Brexit Party presents a clear and present danger to the Conservatives in 2019. It is the Conservatives’ main challenger on the centre-right of the political spectrum.</p>
<p>We cannot be certain of much in the forthcoming election, but we can be sure that the Brexit Party’s support will be formed almost exclusively of those who voted to Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Around two-thirds of people who voted Conservative in 2017 were also <a href="https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2017/06/result-happen-post-vote-survey/">Leave voters in 2016</a>. Meanwhile, around two thirds of Labour voters in 2017 voted Remain in 2016. Simply put, in purely numerical terms, there are more Conservative Leave supporters than Labour Leave supporters. </p>
<p>That is not to say that the Brexit Party doesn’t pose a threat to Labour, though. The Brexit Party will seek to challenge Labour in its traditional northern heartlands, where Labour Leavers may be dissatisfied with their own party’s Brexit stance, but would never vote for the Conservatives.</p>
<p>Numerically, the threat is smaller but between 3m and 4m people who voted Labour in 2017 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48039984">also voted Leave in 2016</a>, and the Brexit Party will expect to take some of these votes in 2019.</p>
<p>Just 43% of Labour Leave voters intend to vote for Labour in 2019, with 25% intending to vote for the Brexit Party. This compares with 77% of Conservative Leave voters intending to vote for the Conservatives in 2019, and only <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/01/how-will-eu-referendum-and-2017-voters-cast-their-">19% voting for the Brexit Party</a>. So in terms of proportion of Leave voters, the impact of the Brexit Party will be felt by both parties. </p>
<p>The key factor shaping the national picture may be Labour’s position on Brexit rather than the Brexit Party itself. Labour will be squeezed on both sides. It could potentially lose over half its Leave supporters to other parties but it is also at risk of losing up to 42% of its <a href="https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/u6d7apgzof/LargeMerge_RefVoters_191101_w.pdf">Remain supporters</a> to more clearly anti-Brexit rivals such as the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<p>Conversely, Conservative support appears to be holding more strongly, retaining the support of 77% of Leave supporters and 61% of Remain voters. Labour’s ambiguous position on Brexit may well cost it dear. </p>
<h2>No uniform swing</h2>
<p>In any general election it is impossible to make predictions about the outcome. In 2019 in particular, there is unlikely to be a uniform national swing and the factors at play in individual constituencies will likely shape the overall national result. For many voters, Brexit may not be the most important issue. The competing economic visions of the two main parties and support for individual candidates will still influence voting behaviour. Yet, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-50303512">Brexit remains the issue most voters consider the most important</a>, so we can expect the Leave/Remain divide to be main fault line shaping the 2019 election.</p>
<p>Here, the Brexit Party poses a bigger threat to the Conservatives in pure numerical terms than to the Labour Party. But the Labour Party’s ambiguity on the Brexit issue may cost it support from both Leave and Remain supporters. The 2015 election showed that a eurosceptic party could win a large number of votes and still not be able to stop the Conservatives from forming a majority government. 2019 may see history repeat itself.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gemma Loomes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The anti-EU party will not contest constituencies the Conservatives won in 2017 in the upcoming general election. But it still hopes to take votes from both of the two biggest parties.Gemma Loomes, Teaching Fellow in Comparative Politics, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261622019-11-05T15:04:48Z2019-11-05T15:04:48ZCan the Conservative Party win in the North of England?<p>The upcoming UK election is likely to be the most volatile and unpredictable in modern times. In order to win a majority, the Conservative Party will be targeting Leave-voting seats in the North of England – many of which have long been Labour strongholds.</p>
<p>The Conservatives are seeking to win over the so-called “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-50239341">Workington Man</a>”. This, apparently, is an older, white, Brexit-voting man from a former industrial town (such as Workington in Cumbria) who has traditionally voted Labour but could perhaps be tempted to consider the Conservatives now.</p>
<p>But will this strategy succeed? The extent to which Brexit identities trump traditional party-political allegiance in determining voter choice will be a key factor. </p>
<p>The North voted 56% to 44% in favour of Leave. However, it broadly represented the national picture of more deprived towns opting for Leave and cities and more affluent places backing Remain. The characterisation of the North as overwhelmingly Leave supporting is therefore inaccurate.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are many places across the North where support for Leave was high and this could help the Conservatives. Brexit identities – being a “Leaver” and “Remainer” – have become increasingly significant political labels for much of the electorate. They are now <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters/">more important</a> than party allegiance in some cases. If this proves to be the case in this election it may well be that Boris Johnson’s position as an ardent Leaver wins him votes in Leave-supporting towns in the North. </p>
<p>But the failure to secure an exit from the EU on the October 31 deadline may go against the party, particularly if the Conservatives are faced with an attack from the Brexit Party on this front. While it is unlikely that the Brexit Party will win any seats in the North themselves, they may split the Leave vote enough to ensure that the Conservative do not actually benefit significantly from any Leave-Remain voting divides. At present, it seems unlikely there will be a formal alliance between the two parties to prevent this from happening.</p>
<p>Labour may also lose votes in the North because of their position on Brexit but this will probably be less damaging than a Conservative-Brexit Party voter split will be for Johnson’s party. </p>
<h2>Towns and cities</h2>
<p>The Leave-Remain divide is not the only issue that the 2016 referendum brought to the fore. The divide between Leave and Remain and towns and cities connects with what has been termed <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/two-englands-and-divided-world">a cosmopolitan-communitarian divide</a>. This encompasses political divides along education, social class and age lines. These divides have long existed but increased in prominence at the EU vote and were also notable at the 2017 election.</p>
<p>In terms of the impact of this on party support, it now appears that the young, the more highly educated, professionals and more liberal-minded voters are increasingly likely to vote Labour. Meanwhile, older, less well educated, semi-skilled workers and those with a more socially conservative outlook are increasingly likely to back the Conservatives. </p>
<p>This goes beyond Brexit. Socially conservative voters – many of whom self-identify as working-class and tend to hold fewer formal qualifications – who are concerned about cultural identity, national security, and value a “sense of belonging” have been <a href="https://labourlist.org/2015/08/labour-has-to-stop-patronising-socially-conservative-voters/">deserting Labour</a> since at least the 2015 election. </p>
<p>Then it was largely to UKIP – but this time around it is likely that these voters will find greater appeal in the Conservative’s pledges to both increase public spending and “take back control” rather than Labour’s more radical policy proposals. For many such voters, Labour and <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/jeremy-corbyn-has-lowest-leadership-satisfaction-rating-any-opposition-leader-1977">Jeremy Corbyn</a> in particular are perceived to pose a threat to the values they hold dearest. </p>
<p>This is significant because, when viewed as a whole, the North is disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms relative to much of the rest of England. In many constituencies across the North, working-class, socially conservative voters like those described above are a key demographic. As such, it is likely that the Conservatives will benefit there from this changing nature of party support in the forthcoming election. But the extent to which they will do so remains unclear as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629818304712">there is evidence</a> that the Conservatives still fail to connect with the most disadvantaged voters.</p>
<p>Since becoming prime minister, Johnson has attempted to appeal to poorer areas of the North, pledging to <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-northern-powerhouse-george-osborne-theresa-may-yorkshire-north-economy-581130">reboot the Northern Powerhouse agenda</a> and promising <a href="https://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/boris-johnson-says-its-governments-17018597">greater investment in the region</a> as well as in public services nationally. </p>
<p>With Labour also campaigning strongly on <a href="https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/power-up-north-jeremy-corbyn-16408772">tackling regional inequality</a> this could become a key debate. The question of whether the Conservatives remain too “toxic” a brand for many Northerners may prove pivotal here.</p>
<p>It seems likely that the Conservatives will have their best performance in decades in the North of England at the 2019 election, at least in terms of the number of votes gained. They will pick up additional support across the region because of their position on Brexit and from socially conservative voters in traditional Labour areas turning their back on the party in line with the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide.</p>
<p>But it is likely that this will still prove to be insufficient in terms of winning a significant number of seats in the North because of potential splits in the Leave vote, the historic distrust of the Conservatives that persists across much of the North, and the sheer scale of Labour majorities in the types of seats the Conservatives will be seeking to win. </p>
<p>If the party is pinning its hopes of winning a majority on a breakthrough in the North then it may struggle to remain in government following the election – particularly if it loses seats to the SNP in Scotland and the Liberal Democrats in the South of England. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300094/original/file-20191104-88372-xpdf2e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126162/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My PhD research is funded by an Economic and Social Research Council scholarship.
</span></em></p>In order to win a majority in the upcoming election the Conservative Party is targeting traditional Labour strongholds that voted Leave.Ryan Swift, PhD Researcher in Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227592019-09-03T22:33:10Z2019-09-03T22:33:10ZUK general election? If so, here’s what the polls are telling us<p>After a showdown between prime minister Boris Johnson and MPs opposed to a no-deal Brexit, the UK appears on course for an election in a matter of weeks.</p>
<p>Much parliamentary action will <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/sep/03/commons-showdown-looms-in-battle-over-no-deal-brexit-live">now play out</a> to determine exactly when the vote will take place. The government remains eager to ensure the UK’s exit from the EU by October 31. Oppositions parties are eager to ensure this does not happen in a no deal scenario. But developments at Westminster mean an election at some point soon is almost certain. The key question, therefore, what might the outcome of such an election be in such unpredictable times?</p>
<p>We have considered the results across 138 polls conducted between November 4 2018 and August 22 2019.</p>
<p>All polls contain a combination of information and noise, the latter resulting from errors in sampling, in interviewing and in other factors which are an inherent part of survey methodology. By “pooling the polls” the figure maximises the information and minimises the noise because the samples are very large and rogue polls which happen by chance do not dominate the picture.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290703/original/file-20190903-175673-19gu028.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Note: trends estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Both Conservative and Labour support declined markedly in the run-up to the European parliament elections on May 23. Since then, Conservative fortunes have partially revived, but party support is only in the low 30% range – nearly 10% less than its vote in the 2017 general election.</p>
<p>Labour is in even worse shape, languishing in the low to mid-20s. Polls on voting intentions go back as far as the 1930s, but it is safe to say that such a car crash in support for both major parties has never been seen before. So we are in uncharted territory.</p>
<p>The major parties’ poll numbers indicate that, in a two-party contest, the apparent “Boris bounce” in Conservative vote intentions would very likely deliver a majority in the House of Commons.</p>
<p>One important reason why Labour has fallen so far behind is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/jeremy-corbyn-18860">large decline</a> in Jeremy Corbyn’s popularity since the 2017 general election. His approval ratings then were around 45%. But by August this year they had fallen below 20% and are now very stable from one poll to the next. A large majority of voters appear to have reached the conclusion that he is not up to the job of being prime minister. Negative public feelings about Corbyn are bound to be a drag on his party’s efforts to close the gap with the Conservatives.</p>
<h2>Lib Dem threat</h2>
<p>The real problem for the Conservatives is not Labour but the continuing popularity of the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party. The Liberal Democrats are now consistently polling in the high teens – twice what previously had been typical. In the 2015 general election, the Liberal Democrats’ vote <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results">collapsed</a> and the Conservatives took 27 seats from them. While the Liberal Democrats recovered a little in the subsequent 2017 general election, they still only had 12 MPs.</p>
<p>The situation has now completely changed. If the current surge in Liberal Democrat voting intentions holds, there is a good chance that the party will win back all of the seats it lost to the Conservatives in 2015. In addition, the Lib Dems are likely to win extra seats from disgruntled Conservative Remainers who will defect in response to the Conservative’s hard-line stance on Brexit.</p>
<p>It is true that the Liberal Democrats will take votes from Labour as well as the Conservatives, but the policy distance between the Lib Dems and Labour on relations with the EU is now much smaller than it is with the Conservatives. The danger for the Conservatives is that Remainers are likely to vote tactically as a result, supporting the Liberal Democrats in seats in the West Country, for example, and Labour in seats in the North-East and Merseyside.</p>
<h2>What of the Brexit Party?</h2>
<p>There is a narrative which suggests that Brexit Party support will collapse in a forthcoming election much like UKIP’s did in 2017. But this ignores a key difference between Brexit Party and Conservative supporters. In our national survey conducted shortly after the European elections, 78% of Brexit Party identifiers wanted to leave the EU with no deal. This compared with only 46% of Conservative identifiers who wanted this outcome.</p>
<p>In a rally in London Nigel Farage <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49482032">committed his party</a> to no deal. He was quick to point out that Johnson had voted for Theresa May’s agreement when it came up for a third time in parliament – and was therefore not to be trusted. The prime minister is taking a very hard line against Conservative rebels by threatening to remove the whip from them, but at the same time he is arguing that he wants a deal with the EU – something which is an anathema to the Brexit party supporters.</p>
<p>This lack of trust in the prime minister to deliver a no-deal Brexit puts him in a tricky situation – he needs most of the Brexit Party supporters to produce a no-deal outcome. Given his insistence that he is still seeking a deal with Brussels, Johnson is unlikely to win Brexit Party voters until there is actually a no-deal Brexit.</p>
<p>The Brexit Party will not take seats in a snap election, but it could easily stymie the Conservatives’ chances of winning.</p>
<p>The prime minister has had to seek an early election since the alternative was to stagger on without a majority and with parliamentary action to stop a no-deal Brexit becoming a reality. The campaign hasn’t formally begun yet, but the posturing is underway. The outcome, though, remains very difficult to predict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the ESRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke receives funding from the National Science Foundation (US).</span></em></p>Findings over the past few months show the two main parties are in terrible shape ahead of this snap vote.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, University of Texas at DallasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1189252019-06-17T12:34:16Z2019-06-17T12:34:16ZNigel Farage’s Brexit Party attracts more men voters than women – here’s why that’s a problem<p>Of the 29 seats won by Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party in the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/05/28/european-eu-election-results-2019-uk-maps-brexit-party/">European elections</a>, eight were taken by women. At 28%, this is far short of the proportion of women in the electorate, but not dissimilar to the gender split of political representation in many other parties, especially those on the right.</p>
<p>But it’s when you look at who voted for the Brexit Party that the figures get really surprising. Something about this party makes it far less attractive to women than to men.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/k5jkiheowo/TheTimes_190529_VI_Trackers_w.pdf">YouGov poll</a> conducted at the end of May shows that the Brexit Party has the biggest marked difference in voting preferences between the sexes of all the political parties. While 26% of male respondents would cast a vote for the party, only 18% of women would.</p>
<p>This means that while the Brexit Party would top the poll of men’s votes, it would come fourth among women. In this ranking, the Liberal Democrats land narrowly in first place, with 22% of women’s votes. The Conservatives and Labour follow, both with 21%. You could even infer from these results that women may have played a part in swaying the result of the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48532869">Peterborough by-election</a>, with just 606 votes between Labour and the Brexit Party.</p>
<p>What would happen in a full-blown general election is of course unknown, but we do know that in recent years gender has been a critical factor in election results. In 2017 there was a sizeable gap in party support between men and women. In particular, significantly fewer women than men <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/how-women-could-vote-in-the-european-elections-and-why-its-important">voted Conservative</a>, a factor that hindered the party’s ability to secure a majority. Women make up 51% of the adult population and a greater proportion of the electorate, so if the Brexit Party is serious about making a breakthrough into Westminster, and others are serious about winning a majority, they can ill afford to ignore women’s votes.</p>
<h2>Why the difference?</h2>
<p>Although there was no sizeable difference between men and women’s support for Brexit in 2016, women do tend to be less supportive of a hard Brexit. While 18% of men think that leaving the EU without a deal would be a very good outcome, only 11% of women hold this position. </p>
<p>Beyond Brexit, there could be other factors at play too. Compared with men, women are generally less supportive of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354068813491536">spending cuts to public services</a>, and this is even true among supporters of parties of the right. Women are also more likely to give priority to healthcare and the NHS. The YouGov poll found that 37% of women selected health as one of the three most important issues currently facing Britain – ten percentage points more than the 27% of men who felt the same.</p>
<p>So although the Brexit Party has focused solely on the issue of leaving the EU, media coverage of Farage’s position on opening up the NHS to more privatisation might have a bigger, negative impact on women’s vote choice than men’s – especially if US access to the NHS in a future trade deal continues to be a <a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/nigel-farage/nigel-farage-is-astonished-eu-companies-nhs/">live issue</a>.</p>
<p>When it comes to tax and spend, many (but not all) hard Brexiteers take a libertarian view, favouring lower tax and lower public spending. This might have turned women voters off the Brexit Party, as they tend to prioritise welfare spending over tax cuts more than men.</p>
<p>Increasing tolerance may also be a factor for the party’s poor showing among women. Rates of racial prejudice have fallen <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00212.x">more quickly among women than men</a>, and although Farage states that neither he nor the Brexit Party tolerate racism, his comradeships with the US president, Donald Trump, the Italian deputy prime minister, Matteo Salvini, and France’s far-right politician Marine Le Pen are probably not helping the party’s efforts to be seen as inclusive and welcoming.</p>
<p>Nor is Farage’s personal style helping – clear as its appeal may be for many (mainly male) voters. Women are almost 50% less likely than men to rate Farage favourably. We can’t be certain why this is, but his “bloke down the pub” image doesn’t necessarily make a positive impression among all women.</p>
<p>Added to the Brexit Party’s woman problem is its generational one. Unsurprisingly, given the age divide in Brexit/Remain support, the party fares poorly among the under 50s, with just 5% of those aged 18 to 24 intending to vote for them, compared with 33% of over-65s.</p>
<p>So while Farage will have to appeal to a broader slice of the electorate if he’s to overtake the established parties that have long dominated Westminster, his current voter-targeting strategy mostly appears to be successful in recruiting the old boys.</p>
<p><em>This article has been published in partnership with the <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/nigel-farages-brexit-party-attracts-more-men-voters-than-women-heres-why-thats-a-problem/">UK in Changing Europe</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosie Campbell has received research funding from the ESRC, The Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy. </span></em></p>Survey shows 26% of men would cast a vote for the party, but only 18% of women would do the same.Rosie Campbell, Director of the Global Institute for Women’s Leadership and Professor of Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1178652019-05-27T15:36:27Z2019-05-27T15:36:27ZNigel Farage triumphs: survey reveals what drove voters to the Brexit Party in the European elections<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/european-elections-6507">European elections</a> in England were a triumph for Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party, which took 32% of the vote. There was real success for the Liberal Democrats and Greens as well, <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-labours-dismal-european-election-performance-is-it-too-late-for-jeremy-corbyn-to-back-a-second-referendum-117845">deep disappointment for Labour</a> and the new Change UK party and disaster for the Conservatives.</p>
<p>Survey research we conducted just before the vote shows where the Brexit Party votes came from, offering some vital insight into what the main parties need to do to recover from their losses ahead of any future general election.</p>
<p>In the survey, conducted just before the European elections, we found that the Brexit Party benefited most from disaffected Conservative voters. However, it also took votes from Labour and even the Liberal Democrats as well as soaking up the UK Independence Party (UKIP) vote.</p>
<p>However, the our survey results also show that voters are locked in a dead heat on the question of how they would vote in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/peoples-vote-59512">second referendum</a>; we found 43% said they’d vote to remain and 43% said they’d vote to leave. Another 6% said they would not vote, while 8% said they didn’t know which way they’d go.</p>
<h2>Tory exodus</h2>
<p>We worked all this out using an internet survey commissioned from Deltapoll conducted between the May 18 and 22, 2019. This survey is part of a wider project to study the Brexit process and it involved interviewing just over 2,500 people, making it more than twice as large as a standard opinion poll.</p>
<p>We asked respondents which party they voted for in the 2017 general election and then compared their answers to their vote intention in the European elections. The survey showed that 64% of the Brexit Party vote came from Conservatives, 22% came from Labour, 11% from Liberal Democrats, and 3% from other parties, largely UKIP. </p>
<p>Put simply, the Brexit Party took three times as many votes from the Conservatives as it did from Labour and six times as many as it took from the Liberal Democrats.</p>
<h2>Bad news for Corbyn and Johnson – but Farage too</h2>
<p>We also asked if respondents felt satisfied or dissatisfied with <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-may-resigns-as-british-prime-minister-heres-where-it-all-went-wrong-117763">Theresa May</a> as prime minister and only 22% said they were satisfied. A massive 74% were dissatisfied. That said, the public evaluates leaders using a variety of characteristics such as their competence, honesty, caring quality and other attributes. It turns out that these are all summarised rather well by asking people if they like or dislike a particular leader. If the public like a leader they are very likely to think that they are competent, honest and so on.</p>
<p>We measured the likeability of leaders using an 11 point scale, where zero means they dislike them a lot and ten means that they like them a lot. The chart below shows the average scores on this leadership scale for <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/jeremy-corbyn-18860">Jeremy Corbyn</a>, Nigel Farage, Theresa May and Vince Cable. Boris Johnson is also included since he is currently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/uk/may-resigns-what-next-merrick-gbr-intl/index.html">the frontrunner</a> in the Conservative leadership race.</p>
<p>Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn did worst, with a likeability score of only 3.8 and Vince Cable did best with a score of 5.9. These scores, in part, may explain why Labour’s performance was poor and the Liberal Democrats did so well in the election. </p>
<p>Interestingly though, Nigel Farage had the same score as May, indicating that there is more to the success of the Brexit Party than his popularity. Among the public as a whole the Brexit leader is not that popular. What’s more, Johnson was only marginally ahead of Theresa May on 4.4. This suggests that if he does succeed her as party leader he is not going to give the Conservatives much of a boost.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276614/original/file-20190527-193535-nq7tjz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An unpopular bunch.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Only 9% of the public think the Conservatives have done well in handling the negotiations with the EU compared with 71% who thought they had done badly. This goes a long way to explaining why they received only 9% of the vote in the elections.</p>
<h2>The next election</h2>
<p>It is nevertheless clear that while the two major parties performed badly in these elections, they both have a reservoir of identifiers or loyalists, many of whom are likely to stick with them when times are difficult. That’s not true for the Liberal Democrats or the Brexit Party. These two parties have only a limited brand loyalty which means that if things go wrong, as they did with UKIP following the 2016 referendum, they could rapidly lose support.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276616/original/file-20190527-193527-c4c8x0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can party loyalty prevail?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So the two major parties have the potential to bounce back in a general election in the future. Needless to say, these results show that Labour is in a much better position to do this than the Conservatives. A new Tory leader is going to have their work cut out to change the perception that the party has really messed up the Brexit negotiations and is therefore unfit to govern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council</span></em></p>Newcomers took most support from the Conservatives. But survey shows Nigel Farage is not as popular as he likes to think.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1176272019-05-24T13:24:15Z2019-05-24T13:24:15ZIs throwing a milkshake an act of political violence? What political theory tells us<p>That the word “violence” is a powerful piece of political rhetoric has been brought home by the welter of opinion pieces, editorials and tweets that have emerged about a recent spate of “milkshakings” – in which prominent right-wing figures have been doused with dairy-based beverages. Those who have sought to condemn these actions have labelled them “political violence”, taking them to be unjustifiable. Those who have sought to defend and justify these actions have rejected the term “political violence”. It is worth asking two questions: as political violence, could “milkshaking” be justified? And is milkshaking even violence in the first place?</p>
<p>At the outset, it’s worth dealing with the objection that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/31b6c7b0-7be8-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560">political violence is always wrong</a>. This is almost certainly incorrect. It’s useful to think of a distinction <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1969/02/27/a-special-supplement-reflections-on-violence/">Hannah Arendt</a> made between legitimacy and justification. Violence can never be legitimate – it cannot be <em>intrinsically</em> right – but it can be justified. If we are committed to a present state of affairs – such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09kxq2p">enfranchisement of women</a> – then we cannot completely dismiss the way that that state of affairs was brought about. The difficulty is in determining the “ends” that justify violence and whether those ends can be attained. It’s a near impossible task to weigh the consequences of violence after the fact, let alone beforehand and, as Arendt added, the further the ends recede into the future, the less justified violence becomes.</p>
<p>Are these milkshakings actually violence? Hardly. These are disruptive actions, no doubt, and they sit somewhere on the spectrum between the peaceful and the violent, but, by nearly all accounts, political violence entails intentionally inflicting harm. So far, if their own accounts of their intentions are to be believed, the “milkshakers” have wanted, at most, to inflict humiliation.</p>
<p>Even if we were to accept a more permissive definition of violence as only the infliction of harm (whether intentional or not) it’s still difficult to see how, of all things, a milkshake could be construed as harmful. The instruments of violence really are important here. We associate things like knives, guns and bombs with violence precisely because of what they can do to somebody – both physically and psychologically. That said, public ignominy may be more of a harm to some than to others, particularly when we consider relative positions of privilege, power, and vulnerability, and particularly if want to include a psychological element to our understanding of “violence”.</p>
<p>In the early 1960s, at a time of radical protest in the US, the political theorist <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1963.tb00355.x">Sheldon Wolin</a> claimed that violence should be understood as an “intensification of what we ‘normally’ expect”. Something is “violent” when it exceeds a normal level of controversy.</p>
<p>Such an understanding might be problematic in that we wouldn’t want to say something had ceased being “violent” because we had simply become inured to it, and it raises the broader question of what is “normal”. But this tells us something useful. In the context of political campaigning in Britain, vigorous debate has often been accompanied, <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/05/we-shouldnt-cheer-milkshaking-right-wingers-heres-why-0">not coarsened</a>, by a certain level of theatrics. Small and harmless projectiles like eggs have often been thrown, and just as often met with a good deal of sangfroid. After being egged on the campaign trail in 1970, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/21/far-right-milkshake-nigel-farage-tommy-robinson?fbclid=IwAR2dkhNxsmLD2Is1mytRosFsnLOuUKGRWH04541ZnGgYp7DEGMYeW1VEMX4">Harold Wilson</a> quipped that if the Conservatives got into power, nobody would be able to afford eggs to throw. It’s hard to see how “milkshaking” exceeds a typical level of controversy.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1130471629732155392"}"></div></p>
<p>The idea of “relative severity” here allows us to recast initially poor justifications for violence in a new light. One does not justify an act by claiming that the far right have already undertaken violence, or that politics has already become imbued with violence – as though two wrongs had ever made a right. Rather, it’s as though commentators on the left are arguing that, if the right, or public opinion more widely, is prepared to call milkshaking “violence”, then it must be prepared to call things like <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/05/no-throwing-milkshake-someone-not-act-political-violence">hate speech</a> “violence” too.</p>
<p>The point here is that whether we choose to call something “violence” or not is not a dry philosophical question. The word “violence” has a strong emotive force and is used, when applied to actions, to uphold or denounce a certain moral vision of the world. Those who choose to call this or that act “violence” have already, in a sense, made up their mind about the fact of that action being wrong. In applying that term it paints one’s opponent in a certain light and puts them on the back foot. But in applying the word “violence” to a given action one is also saying that that action should be treated with all the seriousness and gravity that the word “violence” demands. That is something that should not be done without thought.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Blanchard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How dangerous is dairy? Hannah Arendt can help us understand.Alexander Blanchard, Researcher on Political Violence, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171112019-05-17T12:35:29Z2019-05-17T12:35:29ZEuropean elections guide: how to vote if you support Brexit<p>The European Elections weren’t supposed to involve the UK. But the UK is still a member of the EU, having failed to agree a Brexit deal, so it is obliged to hold elections for the European Parliament. Excluding the possibility of a vote to remain in a confirmatory referendum, any MEPs sent to the European Parliament by the UK will have very little time, if any, to influence European policy. </p>
<p>As a result, much of this vote will be based on sending messages to Westminster and for many it has become a proxy for a second referendum. Those who still want to leave the European Union have lots of options on May 23 but many will find it a difficult choice. The perceived failures of the Conservative Party are forcing Brexit supporters to consider fringe, populist parties over the established ones.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/european-elections-guide-how-should-remainers-use-their-vote-117108">European elections guide: how should Remainers use their vote?</a>
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<h2>The Brexit Party</h2>
<p>Despite only being formally established at the beginning of the year, the Brexit Party is predicted to be the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/nigel-farages-brexit-party-polling-higher-than-labour-and-tories-combined-before-eu-elections-11717553">big winner</a> at the European elections. Founded by Nigel Farage and other breakaway UKIP MEPs, the party supports leaving the European Union without a deal and trading with the EU on WTO terms until a suitable deal can be struck. The party has <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/brexit-party-has-no-policies-1-6011379">no manifesto</a>. The leadership says it will publish one after the vote.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> Rather than championing specific policies, the Brexit Party’s main function is to serve a as protest option. If your main goal is to send a strong message to the major political parties and you aren’t too concerned what the specifics of that message are, then the Brexit Party may well be a valid vote choice for you. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you are concerned about a specific aspect of Brexit, such as the backstop or freedom of movement, and want to send more than a blunt statement, the lack of a manifesto means that you don’t really know what you are voting for policywise. And, without a manifesto, the party will have limited accountability to you after the election. There are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-deal-seven-reasons-why-a-wto-only-brexit-would-be-bad-for-britain-102009">serious doubts</a> about the viability of trading on WTO terms. </p>
<h2>UKIP</h2>
<p>Having won the most votes in the 2014 European elections in the UK, the outlook doesn’t look as bright for the party this time around. Since the 2016 referendum, UKIP seems to have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cff64e3c-ff84-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5">lost its identity</a>. A series of internal disputes, notably between current leader Gerard Batten and Nigel Farage, have dogged the party. However, as long as the UK remains in the EU, UKIP arguably still has a purpose. </p>
<p>UKIP’s central policy for Brexit is not all that dissimilar from the Brexit Party’s, although it is more fleshed out and actually written down in a manifesto. UKIP argues that the UK should leave without a deal and then either offer to trade with the EU on a tariff-free basis or on WTO terms, with reciprocal rights for citizens. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you don’t want to support one of the major parties with your vote, but you also want to send more than just a blunt protest message, UKIP’s more clearly defined policies regarding Brexit may be a better option for you than the Brexit Party, especially if you want some accountability for policies after the election. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> UKIP has been dogged by infighting for some time now and the party has lost its momentum as of late. Accusations of it lurching further to the right and associations with former English Defence League leader Tommy Robinson may be off-putting for some voters. And, much as with the Brexit Party’s proposed Brexit solutions, there are serious doubts about their viability. </p>
<h2>The Conservatives</h2>
<p>Much like the local elections just a few weeks ago, the Conservatives are expected to take a beating at the European elections. Even its own party members and elected representatives have claimed they will not be <a href="https://inews.co.uk/opinion/brexit-b-party-candidates-european-elections-conservative/">campaigning</a> for the party – or even <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1124136/brexit-party-latest-news-theresa-may-nigel-farage-conservative-leave-EU-elections-2019">voting</a> for it. Party leader Theresa May had hoped to avoid holding these elections altogether so there is <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1124819/EU-elections-latest-polls-tory-election-labour-lib-dem-european-elections-2019-brexit">no manifesto</a>. Instead, the Conservatives have sent an election leaflet to most households claiming that a vote for the party will send a message that you want the UK to leave with a deal and you want it to leave with it now.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you want the UK to leave the EU with a deal and you have had enough of the lack of progress being made in Westminster, then a vote for the Conservatives would send a strong message to this effect. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> If you don’t like the proposed withdrawal deal then the Conservatives aren’t really offering you anything aside from that. Moreover, given how unpopular the deal is in Westminster, even by sending this message, there is still no guarantee parliament will accept it. </p>
<h2>Labour</h2>
<p>Although many Labour supporters have been calling for a second referendum, the party leadership itself has remained committed to leaving the EU and has been hesitant to support a confirmatory referendum, to the disappointment of many. The party has a much broader and more <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/whats-labours-eu-election-manifesto-15020979">ambitious manifesto</a> for the European campaign than the other parties and it effectively reads like a draft for their next general election manifesto. </p>
<p>Labour continues to promote its own <a href="https://labour.org.uk/issues/labours-plan-brexit/">alternative plan</a> for Brexit – a comprehensive customs union with the EU. This is a much closer relationship than that being proposed by the Conservative leadership. There are provisions for a second referendum, but only if the government tries to leave without a deal and it can’t secure support for its plan or a general election.</p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> If you support leaving the EU with a deal, but don’t much care for the one currently on offer or can’t bring yourself to vote Conservative, then Labour’s alternative plan may be worth your support. </p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> Many within the Labour Party want to see a second referendum, and although there are a few caveats that need to be met first, it is still a possibility that Labour could possibly support this in the future. Additionally, while Labour’s Brexit plan is ambitious, there is no real consensus that it is achievable.</p>
<h2>The DUP</h2>
<p>If you live in Northern Ireland and are pro-Brexit there is another option. Despite its agreement to prop up the Conservative government, the DUP has repeatedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47736913">refused</a> to support the prime minister’s proposed Brexit deal.</p>
<p>The DUP wants to ensure that all of the UK leaves on the same terms, thus protecting the union. Party leaders have warned that if Northern Ireland doesn’t support the DUP in the European elections, Westminster will interpret the vote as a <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/eu-elections-2019/weak-dup-vote-will-be-seen-as-a-rejection-of-brexit-says-foster-38108896.html">rejection of Brexit</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Pros:</strong> For those voters in Northern Ireland who are concerned about the backstop and the stability of the union, a vote for the DUP will send a message to that effect.</p>
<p><strong>Cons:</strong> While it is fairly clear what the DUP is opposed to, it doesn’t really present a clear and viable alternative. So while a vote for the DUP may signal what you don’t want, it won’t provide an endorsement for any alternatives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Stafford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are lots of options for Brexit supporters, but that won’t make it an easy choice.Chris Stafford, Doctoral Researcher, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155262019-04-18T11:16:59Z2019-04-18T11:16:59ZBrexit party: Nigel Farage’s threat to disrupt EU business is a waste of his energy<p>The UK has been catapulted into a rather unusual position as a result of the latest Article 50 extension. The European parliament election, which is typically characterised by <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html">low turn out</a> and its treatment as a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/08/09/turnout-european-parliament/">second order event</a>, has suddenly become a hot topic. </p>
<p>It now seems inevitable that the UK will be taking part in the vote this May. The government appears to acknowledge as much, having put in place the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/832/contents/made">legislation</a> needed to set the “appointed day of poll” as May 23. The only way out is for British members of parliament to swiftly approve Theresa May’s Brexit deal – and they’ve already rejected it <a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/03/29/theresa-may-loses-again-again">three times</a>.</p>
<h2>Trojan horse?</h2>
<p>There is not much time to get campaigns rolling. But one party was very quick out of the blocks – Nigel Farage’s newly launched <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47907350">Brexit Party</a>.<br>
Frustrated by the lack of progress on Brexit, Farage is threatening to <a href="http://www.efddgroup.eu/medias/videos/do-you-really-want-me-back-in-this-place-reject-the-extension-and-let-s-get-on-with-brexit">stack the European parliament with eurosceptic MEPs</a> forming a destructive Trojan horse. The aim seems to be for these MEPs to do what they can to disrupt EU business in some kind of protest against being held in the EU against their will.</p>
<p>But EU leaders apparently saw this coming. When they met at the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39042/10-euco-art50-conclusions-en.pdf">European Council</a> to agree to extend Brexit until October 31, they included an unusual caveat. This stipulates that the UK must behave itself during the time in between the election and its departure from the EU. In particular, the council said it expected the UK “to act in a constructive and responsible manner throughout the extension” and to “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.</p>
<p>In some ways, this was rather redundant – the duty to “sincerely cooperate” with the EU and other member states is in fact <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M004">a legal duty</a>. Enforcing that commitment might be another matter. It would get quite complicated and nightmarish trying to challenge an uncooperative UK. How do you sanction a state that intends to leave anyway? </p>
<p>But in any case, there are limited opportunities to actually obstruct EU activity in the time available to Farage and friends. Sabotage through the ballot box might, therefore, not be the best use of a vote. The European parliament is unlikely to decide on many material matters in the months following an election, and if it does, it will do so by majority. Even if one party won all of the 73 European parliament seats allocated to the UK, it would be a long way short of dominating the 751-seat strong parliament.</p>
<p>But the make-up of UK seats could influence the position the UK takes in the European council, which is made up of national ministers who will have an eye on domestic politics. The UK membership may wish to avoid being seen to frustrate the will of the electorate expressed through these elections. This might make obstruction more feasible.</p>
<p>The council, along with the European parliament, is the <a href="https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en">main decision-making body in the EU</a>. In the coming months, these bodies are due to make various important decisions. Take, for example, a draft directive on <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0797">transparent and predictable working conditions</a>. These would limit probation periods and require employers to give more notice to employees in on-demand work about when they will be expected to be available.</p>
<p>Even if the UK pushed back as a council member, most matters – including this proposed directive – are decided by a qualified majority. The UK would only be able to obstruct if it ended up casting the deciding vote.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/trick-or-treaty-legal-issues-of-second.html">Steve Peers</a>, a professor in the University of Essex’s School of Law, points out, the UK could block everything where it has a veto, which is the case in a few select areas of law, like defence policy and treaty amendment.</p>
<p>But first, the chances of such areas being considered any time soon are slight, and second, as Peers argues, member states might sidestep that problem by only agreeing on initiatives in principle, then enacting them once the UK is out of the way. And for some actions, it has <a href="https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/04/12/menelaos-markakis-a-trojan-horse-in-the-eu-the-curious-case-of-the-eu271/">been suggested</a> that the EU 27 could get creative and use the rules on “enhanced cooperation” that sometimes allow groups of some member states to work together on certain measures without including everyone. </p>
<h2>EU nationals (finally) get to have a say</h2>
<p>It’s fairly clear that troublemaking within the European parliament is probably futile. But it is not clear what can be actually achieved in five months of parliamentary representation for the UK. And that’s bad news for the mainstream parties, as it will be difficult to articulate how they would actually represent their constituents.</p>
<p>What can Conservative and Labour realistically offer in their manifestos? What will they propose on the campaign trail about what they intend to do in parliament if briefly elected? The primary role of an MEP is <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/powers-and-procedures/legislative-powers">playing a part</a> in the EU legislative process – but they are unlikely to be in a position to shape the legislative agenda, or have much influence on what are often quite <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/appendix/legislativeprocedure/europarl_ordinarylegislativeprocedure_howitworks_en.pdf">lengthy law-making</a> processes. </p>
<p>What this vote does offer is a voice to EU nationals in the UK. In the run up to the 2016 referendum, EU citizens were guaranteed <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/restoring_public_trust_in_immigration_policy_a_points_based_non_discriminatory_immigration_system.html">clear and unconditional</a> protection of their rights, by leading Vote Leave campaigners. But those same citizens did not get a referendum vote, and have lived in limbo ever since, with their rights <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/settled-status-scheme-for-eu-citizens-risks-being-next-windrush/">constantly under threat</a>.</p>
<p>In May’s elections, EU nationals are entitled to vote in their state of residence. With 2-3m adult EU nationals living in the UK, the Brexit Party will not have a monopoly on discontent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115526/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charlotte O'Brien has previously received funding from the ESRC, and has been awarded a new ESRC 'Governance After Brexit' grant. </span></em></p>The EU saw this coming and is ready for Farage’s ‘Trojan horse’.Charlotte O'Brien, Professor of Law, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.