tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/brics-2531/articlesBRICS – The Conversation2024-01-21T08:55:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191552024-01-21T08:55:26Z2024-01-21T08:55:26ZSouth Africa’s ageing population comes with new challenges. How best to adapt to them<p><em>Young people – under the age of 15 – currently make up 29% of South Africa’s population. But this will soon change: the aged portion of the population is forecast to rise from 2030, bringing many challenges. Lauren Johnston, an economics and political economy expert, recently published a <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">paper</a> on the subject. We asked her to put the developments into perspective.</em></p>
<h2>What is South Africa’s current population profile?</h2>
<p>South Africa is “young” among the Brics countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), but “old” by African standards. For example, seniors make up 5.9% of South Africa’s population and children 28.6%. This <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">compares</a> with Russia’s 15.8% seniors and 17.2% children, and China’s 13.7% seniors and 17.7% children. </p>
<p>The sub-Saharan average is 3.0% for seniors and 41.8% for children. </p>
<h2>What’s up ahead?</h2>
<p>South Africa faces no fears of a substantially diminished working-age population, unlike a number of high-income countries. Nonetheless, population structure estimates suggest that it will be home to a rising number of seniors. </p>
<p><strong>Projected population structure, South Africa</strong></p>
<p>In general, the increase in population share of seniors is driven by falling rates of mortality and birth, leading to fewer younger people relative to elders. In South Africa’s case, a falling fertility rate <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN">from over six births per woman in 1960 to just over two today</a> is a key driver. </p>
<p>An ageing population is statistically defined as a population with 7% or more of people aged 65 and over. </p>
<p>In 2022, seniors made up 5.9% of South Africa’s population. So, it is not yet home to an ageing population. But the <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">United Nations</a> forecasts it will join the “population ageing” club as early as 2030. By around 2060 it will be home to an “aged” population – with seniors accounting for 14% of the population. </p>
<h2>What unique challenges lie ahead?</h2>
<p>In general, an ageing population puts added pressure on the working-age population. Each worker has to be more productive, just to maintain total output. Fiscal resources also come under pressure because there are fewer people of working age – net contributors to the economy. There are also more seniors requiring resources for their health and welfare. </p>
<p>For developing countries this can be especially precarious because budgets are often under strain. So are the resources needed for pursuing basic national development. Moreover, a trend of population ageing arising in developing countries is relatively new – just a few decades old. </p>
<h2>How prepared is South Africa for the challenges?</h2>
<p>One challenge for “young” South Africa is that the slower pace of demographic change reduces imminent and more obvious demographic change pressure. The very steady increase in the share of elders alongside pressing broader socioeconomic challenges gives the government little incentive to prioritise social or economic ageing-related issues on its policy agenda.</p>
<p>The array of socioeconomic challenges, including <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/1_Stock/Events_Institutional/2020/womens_charter_2020/docs/19-02-2021/20210212_Womens_Charter_Review_KZN_19th_of_Feb_afternoon_Session_Final.pdf">poverty</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-heres-how-they-need-to-rethink-their-approach-218048">crime</a>, entrenched <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-cant-crack-the-inequality-curse-why-and-what-can-be-done-213132">inequality</a> and <a href="https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/news-insights/shedding-the-load-power-shortages-widen-divides-in-south-africa/">energy access</a>, means that the need to respond to the demographic transition is less of an immediate priority. </p>
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<p>As a result, very few older South Africans benefit from aged care services, and then only the very frail, with inconsistent reach across provinces. Moreover, according to an October 2023 University of Cape Town study, there is little support for older persons who have high care needs and are at home, <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2023-10-02-funding-elder-care-in-south-africa-new-report#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20estimates%2C%20it%20is,older%20persons%20who%20need%20it.">or for active older persons</a>. Most elders do not have access to services that support their needs, but also fear rising healthcare costs, owing to the rising incidence of non-communicable diseases. These include strokes, cancer and diabetes.</p>
<p>Overall the basic national social welfare net is inadequate. For example, retirees living off less than 16% of their pre-retirement salaries are among those with the highest risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/retired-women-in-south-africa-carry-a-huge-burden-of-poverty-177379">living in poverty</a>. This group is three times more at risk of poverty than any other group in South Africa. Black female widows are most at risk.</p>
<p>While the economic value of support to older persons has grown over time, the increase has been insufficient to <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2023-10-02-funding-elder-care-in-south-africa-new-report#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20estimates%2C%20it%20is,older%20persons%20who%20need%20it.">meet the needs of this growing population</a>. Statistics South Africa estimates that population ageing alone is already adding around 0.3% to <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13445">expected health-related expenditures annually</a>. These trends suggest that without change, South Africa’s seniors will become even less adequately served with time.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done to prepare better?</h2>
<p>South Africa has committed to establishing frameworks for healthy ageing based on the <a href="https://www.who.int/initiatives/decade-of-healthy-ageing#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Decade%20of,communities%20in%20which%20they%20live.">United Nations Decade of Healthy Ageing from 2020 to 2030</a>. The agenda has four core areas of priority – age-friendly environments, combating ageism, integrated care, and long-term care. To realise these goals, difficult political decisions would need to be made around taxation and redistribution, as more revenue is required to ensure basic dignity for South African seniors. </p>
<p>Guided by the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2006-013_olderpersons.pdf">Older Persons Act</a> and the <a href="https://social.desa.un.org/issues/ageing/madrid-plan-of-action-and-its-implementation-main/madrid-plan-of-action-and-its">Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing</a>, the Department of Social Development in partnership with other departments, and the <a href="https://saopf.org.za/">South African Older Persons Forum</a> should further implement <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/government-activities/minister-lindiwe-zulu-officially-opens-2022-active">South Africa’s Active Ageing Programme</a> to empower senior citizens to stay physically and intellectually active, to continue to enjoying healthy, purposeful lives. This should help reduce pressure on more intensive care sectors and needs. </p>
<p>As explained in my <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">paper</a>, South Africa should take advantage of the Brics grouping’s new population structure and <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Jhb-II-Declaration-24-August-2023-%201.pdf">development cooperation agenda</a>. That way, state officials, civil society and entrepreneurs may be better positioned to take advantage of opportunities to reduce healthcare and aged care costs. </p>
<p>To direct sustain the economy as the population ages, South Africa needs to ensure that the economy is robust enough to accommodate a worsening dependency burden. For example, young people must be proportionately empowered to drive productivity growth and innovation. That way, the increasing costs associated with the ageing population could be accommodated while <a href="https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca-discusses-african-middle-income-countries%E2%80%99-challenges-and-solutions-to-accelerate">continuing to drive national development</a>. </p>
<p>Digitisation trends and the Brics population and development agenda may, as examples, also foster opportunities for education and training among not only young South Africans, but all working-age people. This will help raise productivity potential per worker and <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/poor-old-brics-demographic-trendsand-policy-challenges/">extend productive working lifespans</a>.</p>
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<p>South African policy makers and entrepreneurs should also be cognisant of how population ageing affects <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/OP-351-AGDP-Johnston-FINAL-WEB.pdf">not only other Brics economies</a>, but also patterns of trade and investment. For example, over the coming decades, population decline in middle-income China, and the rapid decline of its working-age population, is likely to push China away from labour-intensive industries, and <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/222235/1/GLO-DP-0593.pdf">towards capital-intensive industries and sectors</a>.</p>
<p>In other words, population ageing at home and abroad will shift economic demography-weighted opportunities and challenges at home. The more responsive South Africa can be to these changes, the better off will the nation be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In general, an ageing population puts added pressure on the working-age population to be more productive – just to maintain total output – amid growing fiscal constraints.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193712024-01-03T17:41:22Z2024-01-03T17:41:22ZGlobal triggers: why these five big issues could cause significant problems in 2024<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/20/us-china-will-try-to-limit-rising-tensions-amid-domestic-challenges-control-risks.html">tensions</a> between the US and China made the global economy shudder in 2023. The ramifications of the Ukrainian war echoed beyond the country’s border. In Africa, the coup d’état in Niger and Gabon contributed to the global <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/issues/democracies-decline">democratic retreat</a> of recent years and the Hamas/Israel conflict has so far resulted in thousands of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/15/us-presses-israel-on-civilian-deaths-move-to-lower-intensity-war-in-gaza#:%7E:text=US%20President%20Joe%20Biden%20says,to%20protect%20civilians%20in%20Gaza.&text=The%20United%20States%20has%20ramped,lower%20intensity%E2%80%9D%20war%20against%20Hamas.">deaths</a>.</p>
<p>Such trends of global power tensions, open war, democratic decline and extreme job market fluctuations are likely to continue in 2024. With this in mind, here are five global geopolitical and economic trends to watch out for.</p>
<h2>Power shifts</h2>
<p>As the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) organisation expands to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its growing economic influence could dramatically change the global balance of power. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.euronews.com/business/2023/08/29/how-the-brics-expansion-could-shake-up-the-world-economy">From January 2024</a>, Brics will represent about 46.5% of the world’s population, US$30.8 trillion (£23.7 trillion) about a third of global GDP and 45% of global oil production. A related economic consequence is that the Brics’ expanded trade network can reduce their dependence on western markets, particularly through <a href="https://www.bernstein.com/our-insights/insights/2023/articles/brics-expansion-a-journey-of-a-thousand-miles.html">preferential trade agreements</a> and possibly the use of a common currency. </p>
<p>For countries that have been sanctioned by the west, <a href="https://news.mit.edu/2023/taylor-fravel-brics-expansion-0926">such as Iran</a>, becoming a Brics member increases their diplomatic options. This may make Brics attractive to other sanctioned countries. The Brics’ expansion can also enable members to strengthen their impact by pursuing their political and economic interests more easily. <a href="https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3652&context=facoa">Challenging the west</a> may not take the form of direct confrontation, but occur by gradually <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/soft-balancing-institutions-and-peaceful-change/BBC6E5E3549848F27B5ABFA17F488105">moving away from</a> current institutions such as the IMF.</p>
<h2>Global election cycle</h2>
<p>The list of general elections in 2024 includes countries from all continents and the participation of billions of people. At the core is the US election where former president Donald Trump is likely to be the Republican candidate. If re-elected, he may continue with his policy of “global engagement abstention” as evidenced by his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">past willingness</a> to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/">disengage from Nato</a>. </p>
<p>Such a stance may weaken the global economic and political system and contribute to the rise of other countries searching for greater global clout. Another important aspect emerging from the cornucopia of general elections is the potential erosion of democracy. In the US, for instance, there is talk of a possible <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67667198">Trump dictatorship</a>. In Russia, a win by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67660745">President Vladimir Putin</a> can see him remaining as president until 2030 with the possibility of a further sixth term up to 2036 (or about 32 years in power). </p>
<p>In other countries, such as El Salvador, some politicians are willing to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0241105c-ab30-40f6-ac87-b879ffb6c84c">circumvent their constitutions</a> to be re-elected or to <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-kais-saied-bar-foreign-election-monitors">ban efforts to monitor</a> elections, as is happening in Tunisa. Such practices are likely to weaken democratic institutions or constrain their development.</p>
<h2>Heightened tensions in the Middle East</h2>
<p>The Israel/Hamas war will continue to have repercussions beyond the Middle East. The risk of further <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-how-could-it-change-the-middle-easts-political-landscape-expert-qanda-215473">escalation of the conflict</a> regionally has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/02/israel-hamas-war-latest-news-updates-gaza-day-88-live/">intensified</a> after an air strike in Beirut. Some nearby states, for example, have strongly condemned Israel’s overall response to Hamas’ attack. Jordan called that response a “<a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231027-jordan-fm-condemns-collective-punishment-by-israel-in-gaza-as-a-war-crime/">war crime</a>” and Egypt a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-egypt-usa-idAFS8N39M02L/">collective punishment</a>.” The war is likely to compound regional uncertainty and instability.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0927538X19303609">evidence</a> suggests that increasing political instability will also <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JFC-09-2023-0229/full/html?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=rss_journalLatest">affect the health</a> of the region’s financial institutions. </p>
<p>In turn, greater instability could increase refugee flows to the US and Europe. The latter will exacerbate the already tense political debate over immigration policy. The Israel/Gaza war is also likely to <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-geopolitical-uncertainty-hits-india-europe-middle-east-corridor-as-hamas-israel-war-erupts-3267399/">discourage investment</a> in the Middle East and disrupt trade routes leading to increasing shipping costs.</p>
<h2>China’s economic pressures</h2>
<p>Recently, China’s economy has been described as a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66636403">“ticking time bomb”</a> as a result of slow economic growth, high youth unemployment, the property sector crisis, lower Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and weaker exports. Growth prospects are expected to remain <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/12/07/will-china-leave-behind-its-economic-woes-in-2024">“structurally weaker”</a> with low consumer confidence and spending and declining external demand.</p>
<p>Lower internal Chinese consumption means <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66840367">lower demand for raw material and commodities</a> which, in turn, will affect larger exporters such as Australia and Brazil. </p>
<p>Multinational corporations are likely to experience some negative impact on their profits as relocation of production and <a href="https://flow.db.com/more/dossier-asean/navigating-china-s-slowdown">supply chain</a> diversification continues as a result of trade frictions and armed conflicts. This may have a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66840367">knock-on effect</a>, not only on their suppliers but also on their workforce in terms of salary growth, if not, downsizing and job losses.</p>
<p>More generally, the increased risks for China’s economy will <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/world-growth-outlook-for-2024-deteriorates-as-china-risks-rise-13-09-2023">hit global growth</a>, according to the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/september-2023/">OECD</a>.</p>
<h2>Ageing populations</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/29345/countries-and-territories-with-the-highest-share-of-people-aged-65-and-older/">2022</a>, Japan, Italy, Finland and Germany were among the countries with the greatest share of populations over 65 years of age and by 2050 it is projected that the list will include Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. By <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ageing-and-health">2050</a> the percentage of the world’s over 60 population will increase from 12% to 22%. At the same time, <a href="https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-life-expectancy-and-healthy-life-expectancy">life expectancy</a> is increasing. Such a population trend has implications for social security and other parts of the economy. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ageing-and-health">Demands on governments and health providers</a> to deliver greater volumes of care will grow because of potential escalating risks of disease among the elderly. The <a href="https://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/2017-06/WPAM.pdf">ratio of workers to pensioners</a> is falling which is also putting pressure on the sustainability of current pensions systems. </p>
<p>In addition, there is <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16238.pdf">evidence</a> that the ageing of the population affects labour productivity and labour supply. It can, therefore, have an <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/effects-of-aging-population/">effect</a> on economic growth, trade, savings and investment. All in all, 2024 could be another rocky year.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trends of global power tensions, open war, democratic decline and extreme job market fluctuations are likely to continue in 2024Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2187212023-12-12T19:17:01Z2023-12-12T19:17:01ZChina-Africa relations in 2023: key moments and events to remember<p>In a year when headlines have been dominated by conflict in Europe and the Middle East, and geo-economic tensions between China and the West, China-Africa relations were, in comparison, a steady and stable norm. </p>
<p>Having followed China-Africa relations for two decades, I wanted to flag a few key moments from this year. These reveal that the relations between China and the continent have focused on building momentum and deepening ties, especially when it comes to trade and the promotion of African exports. </p>
<p>They also highlight China’s growing commitment to supporting the development of African countries. </p>
<h2>China-Africa trade and the expo</h2>
<p>In June, the third <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/326222.html">China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</a> was held in Changsha, Hunan province. </p>
<p>It’s the most intensive China-Africa trade event in the calendar because of its scale and focus. It’s also a chance for small and medium enterprises to be involved. </p>
<p>This year’s expo <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3226366/deals-down-hunans-china-africa-trade-expo-reaps-us10-billion">reportedly recorded</a> some 100,000 visitors and agreed some 120 projects worth a total of US$10.3 billion.</p>
<p>The expo allows face-to-face interaction to happen in the hope of developing commercial partnerships and sales. There were deals <a href="http://www.focac.org/zfzs/202306/t20230630_11106280.htm">around essential oils from Madagascar, gems from Zambia, wood carvings from Zimbabwe</a>, and flowers from Kenya. One Chinese food group <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230627/9efd6c4d936b415598b0632ce4e6d2b4/c.html">displayed</a> its first imported batch of Kenyan anchovies to seafood distributors. This helped catapult demand – on one day in September, <a href="http://www.news.cn/fortune/2023-09/07/c_1129848863.htm">52 tons</a> of dried wild Kenyan anchovies landed in Hunan for distribution across China.</p>
<p>There were a few important take-aways from the event: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>It flagged the emerging role of <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">Hunan</a> in China-Africa relations. Hunan is the source of a sizeable share of China’s own food supply. It’s also home to advanced agricultural processing and heavy industry capabilities. </p></li>
<li><p>There were high-level <a href="https://venturesafrica.com/a-slice-of-opportunity-benin-joins-chinas-fruit-export-market/">“green lanes” dialogues</a> where issues in clearing more African fruits, vegetables, and other African products for export to China were discussed. The aim of these dialogues was to support agricultural modernisation in Africa and increase export revenue. </p></li>
<li><p>The emerging Hunan-based <a href="http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/hneng/Government/Bulletin/202306/t20230608_29370776.html">“Africa Brand Warehouse”</a> project used the event to support the entry of more (106 specificially) African brands into major Chinese shopping malls</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</h2>
<p>In August President Xi Jinping visited South Africa for a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">summit</a> of the five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Brics. </p>
<p>Parallel to the Brics summit the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue</a> – a dialogue initiated by China and co-chaired by Presidents Xi and Cyril Ramaphosa – was held. </p>
<p>A couple of things stood out from the dialogue.</p>
<p>First, its emphasis on promoting <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">African integration</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/south-africa-co-chair-china-africa-leaders-round-table-dialogue">the participation</a> of African regional organisations that play key roles in fostering intra-African trade. Discussions focused on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and trade-related infrastructure and policy.</p>
<p>Second, Xi <a href="https://www.kzaobao.com/shiju/20230826/145524.html">announced</a> three new plans for Africa relating to agriculture, industrialisation and talent development. The plans aim to address challenges in China-Africa economic relations, such as laggard agricultural productivity, lack of manufacturing and economic diversification, insufficient job creation and educational opportunities. They also aim to address hurdles in Africa’s development. </p>
<p>These actions speak to Xi’s <a href="https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/735319/the-gravity-of-chinas-african-export-promise">promise</a> to create a “new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”. </p>
<p>This involved the growth of trade, especially with respect to African exports to China. </p>
<p>It would also see a change in the structure of trade. A long-standing <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12229">pattern</a> is that Africa sells raw materials and buys manufactured goods, which entrenches the continent’s under-development. China is trying to move past this by buying more processed goods, and fostering services like tourism and finance. </p>
<h2>China’s foreign minister comes to Africa</h2>
<p>As has happened every year for at least the past 30 years, China’s foreign minister visited Africa. Qin Gang’s trip in January included visits to Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Benin and Egypt.</p>
<p>From my lens, Qin’s visit was conservative in its announcements and continued to demonstrate China’s commitment to the continent. </p>
<p>He cemented important bilateral and multilateral ties, for instance with the African Union and China-Arab relations. </p>
<p>One moment that stood out was the launch of the Horn of Africa Peaceful Development Concept, which aims to bring lasting peace and economic stability to countries of the conflict-afflicted region. This stands out because China has a
<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/05/11/what-to-make-of-chinas-non-interference-policy-in-africa/">long-held foreign policy doctrine of non-interference</a>, and a much shorter history of US or European-style proactive roles in seeking to foster cross-country peace.</p>
<h2>Infrastructure changes around Lagos</h2>
<p>Various infrastructural developments around Lagos, Nigeria were a milestone in China-Africa relations this year. These will gradually change the scale with which Nigeria can trade with the world. </p>
<p>In April, Lekki Deep Sea Port – Nigeria’s first deep sea port – launched its commercial operations. It’s <a href="https://lekkiport.com/project-overview-structure/">administered</a> by Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited, a joint venture enterprise owned by a group of investors (comprising China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and Singapore’s Tolaram Group), the Lagos state government and the federal government of Nigeria through the Nigerian Ports Authority.</p>
<p>The port, one of the largest in Africa, will eventually connect to Lagos’ Rail Mass Transit system. <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/lagos-set-to-increase-train-trips-on-chinese-built-metro-rail/">The first phase of the rail system, the Blue Line, was opened in September</a>. </p>
<p>The Blue Line was <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/00L77SUF.html">built by</a> China’s Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. Its corridor spans 13km and covers five stations. It’s the first rail infrastructure traversing Okokomaiko, a densely populated area of western Lagos, and the Marina district, notable for high-rise commercial offices. </p>
<h2>Into 2024</h2>
<p>Relations look set to keep evolving and growing into the new year. </p>
<p>Later in the year, a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit is due to be hosted by China. Typically the forum leads to announcements of new directions in China-Africa ties by both sides, and commercial deals being agreed. </p>
<p>Otherwise, there are some key bilateral anniversaries to be marked, such as the 60th anniversary of China-Tanzania and China-Zambia relations. In addition, China and Tanzania are expected to launch the flagship <a href="https://dailynews.co.tz/tz-sees-investment-fortunes/#google_vignette">East Africa Commercial and Logistics Centre project</a>. This is expected to expand trade and investment ties between China and other landlocked economies within the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Several key events highlighted the growing ties between China and Africa.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162732023-10-29T10:05:40Z2023-10-29T10:05:40ZAgoa trade deal talks: South Africa will need to carefully manage relations with the US and China<p>South Africa must tread carefully in its economic relationships to avoid being caught in the escalating tension between east and west, and more specifically China and the US. The country’s hosting, and the outcome, of the <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2023 Agoa Summit</a> should strengthen its role in diplomatic relations and contribute towards safeguarding the country’s economic interests. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16309-south-africa-confirmed-as-agoa-host-country-for-2023.html">2-4 November 2023</a>, the US and 35 sub-Saharan African countries will meet in Johannesburg for the 20th Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (Agoa Forum). It entails strengthening trade and investment ties between the US and sub-Saharan Africa through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), US legislation which provides various trade preferences to eligible countries in the region. </p>
<p>Given Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine and its <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm">rising tension with Nato</a>, plus the <a href="https://www.piie.com/research/trade-investment/us-china-trade-war">China-US trade war</a>, tensions between east and west are high. South Africa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-how-south-africa-blew-its-chance-as-a-credible-mediator-181101">come under attack</a> for its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-state-of-non-alignment-in-south-africas-foreign-policy/">non-alignment role</a> in the Ukraine war. It refused to support UN resolutions condemning Russia. This resulted in some US congressmen pushing for the forum <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16226-warning-shot-fired-top-us-congressmen-urge-biden-to-move-agoa-forum-away-from-south-africa.html">to be moved out of South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The country recently hosted the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics summit</a>, which resolved to expand the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping to 11 member states. The enlargement will bolster Brics’ role as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">geopolitical alternative to the west</a>, which is dominated by the US. Might this be a direct challenge to American hegemony?</p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.ufs.ac.za/econ/faculty-of-economic-and-management-sciences-home/general/staff?pid=zIFzQiuvO3o%3d">researching</a> major global economic developments, such as globalisation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, for 20 years. This body of work shows the risks that come with behaviour like South Africa’s. The country could find itself in the middle of a tense situation. </p>
<p>South Africa needs to pull off an exceptional balancing act in managing its international relations in a sensible way that protects and advances its economic interests. </p>
<p>Note that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">geopolitical tensions between China and the US</a> are not just about trade disputes. They also include <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/U.S.-China-spy-battle-casts-shadow-over-push-for-Biden-Xi-summit#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20%2D%2D%20The%20U.S.%20and,trade%20disputes%20and%20technological%20rivalry.">espionage</a>, China’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, climate change and environmental issues, and tensions over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">Hong Kong, Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">South China Sea disputes</a>. </p>
<p>As a major source of infrastructure financing to sub-Saharan Africa, China is now the region’s largest bilateral official lender. Its total sub-Saharan African external public debt – what these governments owe to China – rose from less than 2% before 2005 <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/slowing-debt-accumulation-growing-risks-unveiling-complexities-sub-saharan-africas-debt">to over 17% in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Agoa might present a challenge to China as competition for its own interests in Africa. China would like African countries to untie or loosen their agreements with the US. It is thus a good moment to take stock of the actual benefits South Africa has derived from the Agoa agreement with the US.</p>
<h2>What Agoa is about</h2>
<p>The Agoa agreement was approved as legislation by the US Congress in May 2000 for an initial 15 years. On 29 June 2015 it was extended and <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/23/supporting-us-africa-partnership-through-agoa-extension-and-enhancement-act-2015">signed into law</a> by then president Barack Obama for a further 10 years to 2025. </p>
<p>It will come into review again in 2024, hence the importance of the upcoming summit. Recently, Louisiana senator John Kennedy <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16326-us-senator-wants-agoa-in-place-until-2045-to-deter-china-s-influence.html">introduced a bill</a> to the US Congress to extend Agoa by a further 20 years to 2045. This is a bid to counter China’s <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-expansion-of-chinese-influence-in-africa-opportunities-and-risks-9612">growing influence in Africa</a>, and to continue to allow sub-Saharan African countries preferential access to US markets. </p>
<h2>Agoa’s benefits to South Africa</h2>
<p>In 2021, the US was the second most significant destination for South Africa’s exports worldwide, mainly thanks to Agoa. China took the top spot; Germany was third. The US ranked third as a source of South Africa’s imports, following China and Germany. In that year, the total trade volume between South Africa and the US reached its zenith at $24.5 billion, with a <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">trade imbalance of $9.3 billion in South Africa’s favour</a>. </p>
<p>Agoa offers preferential entry for about 20% of South Africa’s exports to the US, or <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/16248-south-africa-asks-us-for-early-agoa-extension.html#:%7E:text=Agoa%20provides%20preferential%20access%20for,US%20market%E2%80%9D%2C%20Patel%20said.">2% of South Africa’s global exports</a>. The stock of South African investment in the US has more than doubled since 2011, <a href="https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-reached-record-83-billion-2021">amounting to US$3.5 billion in 2020</a>. American foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa increased by over 70% over that period, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/south-africa/">to US$10 billion</a>. This made the US South Africa’s fifth largest source of FDI in 2019. The US was its third largest destination for outward FDI. </p>
<p>US investment in South Africa is mainly concentrated in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and wholesale trade, <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/southern-africa/south-africa">which is vital for economic growth</a>. American multinationals doing business in South Africa <a href="https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#436">employ about 148,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>More specifically, Agoa’s benefits include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for a wide range of South African products. This benefits South Africa’s textile and apparel industry in particular. To sub-Saharan African countries, Agoa provides duty-free access to the US market for <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/september/joint-statement-us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-and-minister-trade-industry-and-competition#:%7E:text=AGOA%20provides%20eligible%20sub%2DSaharan,Generalized%20System%20of%20Preferences%20program.">over 1,800 products</a>. This is in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are eligible for duty-free access under the US <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp#:%7E:text=GSP%20promotes%20economic%20growth%20and,products%20from%20least%20developed%20countries.">Generalised System of Preferences programme</a></p></li>
<li><p>export diversification, especially of items such as agricultural products, textiles, and manufactured goods. This is vital for increasing export earnings, which help to improve South Africa’s balance of payments, particularly its trade account.</p></li>
<li><p>capacity building through technical assistance and programmes to help South African businesses meet US standards, thus becoming more competitive in the global marketplace.</p></li>
<li><p>economic development and poverty reduction, which aligns with South Africa’s developmental goals.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Balancing economic interests</h2>
<p>China is the largest consumer of South African commodity exports, and thus a key influencer of the rand exchange rate. In addition, China and Russia’s planned move towards <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization">de-dollarisation</a> (trying to replace the petrodollar system with their own system) <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/10245294221095222">puts American interests under threat</a>. This means South Africa needs to carefully navigate its relations with the US and its Brics partners, China and Russia.</p>
<p>It will want to keep strong ties with the US through Agoa without getting into a difficult position between China and the US. The outcome of the November meeting will have serious economic implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arno J. van Niekerk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pretoria needs to pull off a balancing act in managing South Africa’s international relations to advance its economic interests.Arno J. van Niekerk, Senior lecturer in Economics, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131882023-10-02T15:07:17Z2023-10-02T15:07:17ZFive things that the west doesn’t understand about China’s foreign policy<p>China’s capacity to surprise western politicians was demonstrated recently, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unexpectedly <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/g20-lives-mistrust-between-west-and-china-hampers-progress">absent</a> from the G20 summit. There were a few reasons why this G20 might have been less important for Xi, including the rising influence of the <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/08/18/brics-expansion-would-be-a-sign-of-chinas-growing-influence-says-oliver-stuenkel">Brics</a> (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) partnership. </p>
<p>But often western reactions to a Chinese decision can come from a lack of understanding of Beijing’s motivations. A deeper knowledge of China would help the west interpret Beijing’s actions more clearly, helpful at a time where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-names-china-a-strategic-priority-for-the-first-time">many analysts</a> see China as a potential challenger to the US as the dominant world power. With this in mind, here are five things that the west often gets wrong about Chinese foreign policy.</p>
<h2>1. It’s not a grand scheme</h2>
<p>In the western media, Chinese foreign policy has often been seen as a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/hundred-year-marathon">grand scheme</a> to secure world leadership. Such an image has been popular with western politicians, such as South Dakota governor Kristi Noem, who claimed that China had a “<a href="https://twitter.com/barryeisler/status/1635058846317309954?lang=en-GB">2000-year plan to destroy the US</a>”.</p>
<p>However, Chinese policy is not quite the labyrinthine plot that it has often been presented as. An example of this can be seen in “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/18681026221079841">Wolf Warrior diplomacy</a>”, which has often interpreted as a long-term, calculated strategy of Chinese aggression to western leaders. But another way of looking at Wolf Warrior diplomacy is as an opportunistic <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2023.2205163">response</a> to the bellicose rhetoric of the former US president Donald Trump’s administration as well as a need to cater to nationalism at home. Showing Chinese leaders “talking tough” to their foreign counterparts also plays well with a domestic audience, and can divert attention from a poorly performing economy.</p>
<p>Equally, grander Chinese initiatives, such as the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), which provides aid and finance to African and South American countries to create new infrastructure, may also have been created as a response to outside developments, particularly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the US</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">pivot</a> towards expanding its influence in Asia, from 2010. Chinese foreign policy has largely been devised in response to recent developments rather than being a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/11/12/chinas-grand-plan-to-take-over-the-world/">long-term scheme</a> for domination.</p>
<h2>2. China deals with democracies</h2>
<p>Another common fear is that Beijing has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-16/how-china-exports-authoritarianism">encouraged</a> the rise of political authoritarianism in other countries. The <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshaping-international-development-pub-80703">Chinese model of economic development</a> has racheted up fears of China attempting to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3139351/could-chinas-model-be-its-biggest-export-world">spread</a> its political system beyond its national borders. But, some of the biggest advocates of the China model have been the <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/08/27/the-chinese-model-in-africa-and-its-wider-challenge/">political elites</a> in developing nations, many of whom have a colonial history, and who appreciate that China offers an alternative to the west in attracting investment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-brics-cooperation-accelerates-is-it-time-for-the-us-to-develop-a-brics-policy-210021">As BRICS cooperation accelerates, is it time for the US to develop a BRICS policy?</a>
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<p>Overall though, Beijing generally takes a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615956">laissez-faire</a> approach towards the internal politics of its partners, with China being <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2091502/how-chinas-foreign-policy-non-intervention-all-about">willing</a> to deal with democracies and dictatorships, rather than forcing its partners to fall in line with its own political system.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing China's historical trade routes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An historical map of the Silk Road, linking China to its trade routes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/map-ancient-silk-road-between-china-2127092582">Dimitrios Karamitros/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. China’s role in the world order</h2>
<p>One of the most common depictions of China in recent years has been of it as <a href="https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-607">a revisionist power</a> that seeks to overthrow the liberal rules-based world order and international bodies. Such an image was popularised by Graham Allison’s 2017 book <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/destined-war-can-america-and-china-escape-thucydidess-trap">Destined for War</a>, which warned of a China seeking to overthrow US domination. It presents the China/US relationship as the latest in the long line of great power relationships that follow the same pattern.</p>
<p>However, while China wishes to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021">amend</a> certain areas of the post-Cold War system, most notably it being centred around the US and liberal values, it does not <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.2005462">wish</a> to fully overturn the whole system. For instance, China has played a significant part in established international bodies, such as the United Nations. China was also one of the primary <a href="https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/china-is-one-of-globalisations-winners-it-wont-throw-that-away-for-russia">beneficiaries</a> of post-Cold War globalisation, with China’s rapid development being achieved partially through this economic model.</p>
<h2>4. China’s historical experience</h2>
<p>One of the greatest challenges posed by Chinese foreign policy is that it questions many of the dominant understandings of international relations, which have been grounded in the <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-05-11/opinion-with-asias-rise-west-must-let-go-of-eurocentrism-101248061.html">experiences</a> of the west.</p>
<p>But China draws on a different history, one that includes its own dominant position internationally, but also its defeat and occupation. Beijing references this <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/">past</a> when talking of the “<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/modernisation-and-chinas-century-humiliation">Century of Humiliation</a>” (1839-1949), a period when China was dominated and occupied by colonial powers. This powerful image can rally the domestic population as well as building a common cause with developing nations, many of which are former colonies themselves.</p>
<p>China’s golden ages of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties (202BC-1279) has also influenced Chinese thinking. This was a time of huge cultural and economic influence, with Asia trade centred around the Silk Road. The <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/silk-road/">Silk Road</a> refers to an historical network of highly lucrative trade routes linking a powerful China to the rest of the world, and used to sell its products for centuries. Its ambitions to build a new version of this can be seen in the BRI, which gives China a “<a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/11/08/the-chronopolitics-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-reinvented-histories/">new Silk Road</a>”. It is by understanding the logic behind these legacies that one can see Chinese foreign policy more clearly. </p>
<h2>5. The appeal of Chinese aid</h2>
<p>China’s financial aid and investment projects in developing countries are sometimes portrayed as simply <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-10-05/fight-against-chinas-bribe-machine">bribing</a> corrupt states or ensnaring them with “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/551337-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/">debt trap diplomacy</a>”.</p>
<p>While these images have been popular in western media <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/china-debt-diplomacy-belt-and-road-initiative-economy-infrastructure-development/">coverage</a> of Chinese foreign policy, they overlook the role of the country receiving aid to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/">choose to accept</a> Chinese finance and how this also appeals as an alternative to western aid packages which traditionally come with many conditions relating to governance. </p>
<p>Chinese military leader and strategist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu">Sun Tzu</a> once emphasised the importance of knowing one’s enemies as well as oneself; these words are especially pertinent in understanding China today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213188/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding China’s history could help western observers see its foreign policy more clearly.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2145152023-09-28T13:54:32Z2023-09-28T13:54:32ZThe UN and the multilateral system are in crisis – what the Global South must do<p>The planet is on fire, but almost all the firefighters have deserted. At <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-2023-united-nations-general-assembly-day-1">the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly</a>, which began on September 19 in New York, the leaders of four of the five permanent members of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">Security Council</a> – the UN’s most powerful executive body – were absent. </p>
<p>The absence of the top representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, replaced by ministers or diplomats, demonstrated the emptying of the main global multilateral forum and highlighted the speeches of the two presidents who opened the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/un-general-assembly-31319">General Assembly</a>: Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the US’s Joe Biden. </p>
<p>Both leaders, with decades of experience, referred bluntly to fires that are ravaging the planet - starting with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/climate-emergency-71637">climate emergency</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">war in Ukraine</a>. And both, albeit in very different tones, pointed the finger at the central issue hanging over the meeting, which the absentees made clear: the crisis of the UN and the multilateral system that has been built around it in recent decades.</p>
<p>The UN was created in 1945, on the initiative of the United States and with the support of the allied countries that had defeated Nazism and fascism (primarily the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France) with the aim of “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">preserving future generations from the scourge of war</a>”. </p>
<p>A year earlier, in 1944, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system">Bretton Woods Agreements</a> had laid the foundations for the post-war global financial system, and created the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/home">World Bank</a> and the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/home">International Monetary Fund</a>. Over the years, dozens of agencies, funds and specialised programmes have been added, gradually building up what is known as the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-system">UN System</a>. </p>
<p>Practically every country in the world is a member of the UN and the organisation deals with countless issues, ranging from protecting life in the oceans to coordinating satellite orbits, humanitarian aid operations, vaccination campaigns, agreements to limit climate change and, more recently, attempts to create regulations against disinformation on social networks and to combat tax avoidance by large international corporations. </p>
<h2>An imperfect system, but one that worked</h2>
<p>The system, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/19/politics/biden-unga-remarks/index.html">as Biden pointed out in his speech</a>, “is not always perfect and has not always been perfect”, but with its ups and downs, it worked reasonably well for seven decades. During the Cold War, the UN was a crucial channel of communication that contributed to avoiding nuclear conflict. After it, the UN’s remit expanded further: for example, with the multiplication of <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military">peacekeeping operations</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, in those two decades the number of armed conflicts (between countries and within countries) steadily declined, as did the number of victims. The curve reversed in 2012, when the civil war in Syria worsened, and since then it has continued to rise year on year. According to the <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">Conflict Data Programme</a> at Uppsala University, 184 different conflicts were recorded in 2022, including the war in Ukraine, with more than 238,000 victims in total, compared to an average of 120 conflicts and 30,000 victims per year between 2001 and 2012. </p>
<p>The UN’s inability to respond appropriately to the war in Ukraine is more an indicator than a trigger of the crisis of multilateralism. Russia has brought the war of aggression, of territorial annexation, back as a tool of foreign policy. But the same Western powers with permanent seats on the Security Council that are rightly criticising the Russian invasion today have resorted to the <a href="https://nuso.org/articulo/305-america-latina-caja-pandora-unilateralismo-grandes-potencias/">unilateral use of military force</a> in recent decades, contrary to the UN Charter and international law. </p>
<p>What we usually call multilateralism is the way in which the international system adopts a grammar of principles and norms that, in theory, should be followed by all states. It is a process of institutionalising forms of coordination and cooperation in public policy that generates a certain stability and predictability in relations between states and societies. </p>
<p>In the way the UN works, there is an element of equality in the treatment of states (all 193 member countries have the right to vote and voice in the General Assembly), but there are also obvious asymmetries of power, such as the special status of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The so-called P5 have kept their veto power unchanged since 1945 and often ignore the rules they are supposed to enforce – a historical incongruity that Lula rightly attacked again in his speech in New York.</p>
<h2>Global governance</h2>
<p>Even so, this grammar organises a large part of global governance mechanisms, which increase international dialogue and cooperation, and decrease the propensity to use force as the main instrument for settling disputes. </p>
<p>The UN system is based on the idea that power relations between states should not be the only element that determines the shape of international relations. In fact, as recently as 2015, the multilateral system reached a consensus to adopt two global agreements of great importance and impact: the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement">Paris Agreement</a> for the reduction of greenhouse gases, responsible for the climate emergency, and the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda">Agenda 2030</a> for sustainable development. </p>
<p>From then on, the multilateral system was able to do little more than try to manage a growing number of humanitarian emergencies. In June 2023, the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/">UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</a> (OCHA) estimated that there were 362 million people around the world <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2023-mid-year-update-snapshot-18-june-2023">in need of international aid</a> to meet their basic survival needs.</p>
<h2>A crisis of legitimacy and authority</h2>
<p>During the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-organization/index.html">under heavy fire from the administration of then US President Donald Trump</a>, was virtually ignored by the richest countries in its attempt to ensure equitable distribution of vaccines. The conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Israel/Palestine drag on, with no solution in sight. Efforts to strengthen the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, promised by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ant%C3%B3nio_Guterres">Secretary-General António Guterres</a>, have backfired, and the organisation has been unable to do anything to prevent the invasion of Ukraine or to facilitate a ceasefire. The system has apparently ground to a halt.</p>
<p>It continues to shape a large part of international interaction, but today there are two key areas of resistance to it: the emergence of countries in the <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/07/03/what-is-global-south-china-india-third-world-developing-countries/">Global South</a> willing to reinterpret the hegemony of the liberal order, and the growth of a transnationally articulated radical right. </p>
<p>In the international debate, there is much more attention paid to the first question than the second. However, as the experience of the Trump and Bolsonaro governments has shown, the radical right’s sovereigntist vision is at odds with the essence of multilateralism, which requires agreed transfers of national sovereignty in favour of common goals, such as the fight against climate change. It’s no coincidence that the Spanish radical right party Vox has been running <a href="https://www.tellerreport.com/business/2023-09-25-vox-attacks-mercadona-for-supporting-the-2030-agenda-and-criticizes-that-it-is-dedicated-to-making-%22political-campaigns%22.ByZKf5qJeT.html">a campaign against the 2030 Agenda </a>for years, which has been expanding throughout Latin America. Even so, the entire UN bureaucracy, from Secretary-General Guterres onwards, is reluctant to engage in open conflict with the radical right.</p>
<h2>A strategic problem</h2>
<p>For Brazil, and Latin America in general, the crisis of the multilateral system is a strategic problem. The region has an old multilateralist tradition, in which conflicts between states have been resolved <a href="https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol12/iss3/">by diplomatic means and not by arms</a>. A dozen countries from the region took part in the creation of the League of Nations in 1920, and 20 were among the 51 founding nations of the UN. To this day, the multilateral space represents the only international arena in which the region has any influence, since from an economic and military point of view <a href="https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/latin-americas-contribution-to-global-gdp-declines-by-one-third-over-the-past-decade">Latin America’s weight is extremely limited</a>: the region is home to 8% of the world’s population, but in 2022 it accounted for only 5.26% of global GDP. </p>
<p>At the same time, the collective influence of the so-called Global South is increasing. In the weeks leading up to the UN General Assembly, the leaders of developing nations met at the BRICS summits in South Africa, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20">G20</a> in India and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_of_77">G77</a>+China in Cuba. </p>
<p>For Brazil and the other countries of the Global South, the challenge is to maintain political independence and action, seeking to defend the interests of their populations, without taking sides in the dispute over the new global hegemony between China and the United States. It’s <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2023/02/27/non-alignment-is-back-in-the-global-south-albeit-in-a-different-incarnation/">the concept of active non-alignment</a>. </p>
<p>Concluding his speech in New York, Lula recalled that “the UN needs to fulfil its role as a builder of a more just, supportive and fraternal world. But it will only do so if its members have the courage to proclaim their indignation at inequality and work tirelessly to overcome it”. </p>
<p>Brazil and the Global South must endeavour to reform the multilateral system, such as the unsustainable composition of the Security Council, while respecting all its norms - especially with regard to the UN Charter and all human rights protection mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court. Only in this way will it be possible to reaffirm the legitimacy of multilateralism, reduce global power asymmetries and try to put out the fires that threaten our planet.</p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of the original article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Os autores não prestam consultoria, trabalham, possuem ações ou recebem financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que se beneficiaria deste artigo e não revelaram qualquer vínculo relevante além de seus cargos acadêmicos.</span></em></p>The war in Ukraine is both a symptom and a cause of a paralysing crisis in the international system. It is up to the Global South to reform the multilateral system.Monica Herz, Full Professor, Institute of International Relations (PUC-Rio), Associate Dean for Research of the Social Science Center (PUC-Rio), Senior Researcher, BRICS Policy Center, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)Giancarlo Summa, Co-fundador com Mônica Herz do projeto MUDRAL (Multilateralismo e Direita Radical na América Latina), Pesquisador no Centre d'Études Sociologiques et Politiques Raymond Aron (CESPRA), École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128652023-09-10T20:06:06Z2023-09-10T20:06:06ZAs Russia woos nations to support its war in Ukraine, will fault lines deepen around the globe?<p>Some 560 days have passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We have repeatedly been reminded about the awfulness of war – the senseless waste of human life and indiscriminate misery caused by the imperial delusions of a self-interested leader.</p>
<p>But the war has also been revealing in other ways. It has repeatedly defied expectations about its scope, impact and duration. </p>
<p>For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html">mistaken belief</a> that he could conquer much of Ukraine in a few days highlighted the depth of his hubris. Since then, his decision to continue the onslaught has revealed the ongoing practical costs to the Russian military. </p>
<p>Now, Moscow’s attempt to meet those costs is also showing how the world is beginning to split along broad, albeit fuzzy, lines of competition that could resonate beyond the Ukraine war.</p>
<h2>Russia’s war depends on ammunition</h2>
<p>Putin’s problem is a simple one. His forces are running out of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/acute-artillery-shortage-is-hampering-russias-offensive-in-east-ukraine-western-officials-say-6f2fb94a">ammunition</a> – specifically 155mm and 122mm artillery shells, plus 120-mm mortar rounds. The Russian army relies heavily on them: massive artillery fire is central to its military doctrine.</p>
<p>According to an authoritative <a href="https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf">report</a> by the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/">Royal United Services Institute</a>, Russia fired a whopping 12 million shells at Ukrainian targets in 2022. Despite a more disciplined approach prompted by dwindling war stocks, it is still likely to go through 7 million rounds in 2023. </p>
<p>Russia’s domestic <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/18/europe-weapons-military-industrial-base/">manufacturing capacity</a> – at around 2.5 million shells per year – makes this usage rate clearly unsustainable, with the war set to enter its third year. </p>
<p>An additional complication is the problem of <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA440938.pdf">barrel erosion</a>. Artillery guns gradually warp with use and need to be replaced regularly.</p>
<p>So, if Russia is unable to make up the shortfall between what it is firing and what it can produce, its forces will be unable to blunt Ukraine’s counteroffensive for much longer. This makes Russia’s painstakingly constructed “<a href="https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-state-of-the-ukraine-campaign">Surovikin Line</a>” (its defensive network of minefields, trenches and tank traps) likely to be more quickly overrun.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-is-unlikely-ever-to-return-to-the-russian-empire-in-a-new-book-mark-edele-unpacks-whats-at-stake-in-a-bloody-war-211497">'Ukraine is unlikely ever to return to the Russian Empire': in a new book, Mark Edele unpacks what's at stake in a bloody war</a>
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<h2>Limited help, so far, from the BRICS</h2>
<p>However, finding new ammunition suppliers is tricky. They must have the capability to quickly produce large volumes of shells that match Russian guns. They also need access to <a href="https://www.frtr.gov/matrix2/section2/2_10_1.html">explosive energetic materials</a>, especially the base materials for RDX (also known as <a href="https://www.nitrochem.com.pl/en/products/explosives/hexogen/">hexogen</a>) and TNT, the main ingredients in military-grade explosives. </p>
<p>But there are additional limits to the types of suppliers Russia can realistically seek out. Any nation that provides Moscow with ammunition would end up in dangerous diplomatic waters since the US and the broader West have threatened <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-over-100-targets-action-over-russias-invasion-ukraine-2023-04-12/">sanctions</a> against those who aid Russia’s war effort.</p>
<p>As such, Russia’s search for ammunition partners has turned up a hodgepodge of aggrieved, ambitious and opportunistic nations. Many of these can be found in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order">BRICS</a> grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), which is loosely in favour of a “multipolar” (read: not solely US-dominated) world. </p>
<p>Of the BRICS members, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-us-brazil-security-cooperation-opportunities-presented-brazils-major-non-nato-ally">Brazil</a> has been designated by the US as a “major non-NATO ally”. It has ruled out selling arms to Russia, but also to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/americas/brazil-ukraine-weapons.html">Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Although China calls Russia its “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/limits-of-a-no-limits-partnership-china-russia">no limits</a>” partner, it has also reportedly turned down requests to provide Moscow with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/755b7302-6f69-4790-a143-d75dd2ad8aef">munitions</a>. But questions remain about its provision of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-firms-russia-body-armor-bullet-proof-drones-thermal-optics-army-equipment-shanghai-h-win/#:%7E:text=CHINESE%20DUAL%2DUSE%20EXPORTS%20TO,2022%20and%202023%2C%20in%20dollars.">dual-use</a> technologies and electronics to Moscow, not to mention body armour and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-built-armored-trucks-make-appearance-in-chechnya-33af6e4a#">armoured personnel carriers</a>. </p>
<p>The South African company Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) has recently announced <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/rheinmetall-denel-munition-wins-big-new-155-mm-ammunition-orders/">new deals</a> to supply ammunition to both NATO and non-NATO countries. </p>
<p>But President Cyril Ramaphosa had to publicly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/4/south-africa-says-no-evidence-of-arms-shipment-to-russia-following-inquiry">deny</a> sending Russia shipments of weapons after the US ambassador to South Africa accused his government of doing so. In a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66703901">report</a> released in September, an independent commission found “no evidence” that a Russian ship was loaded with ammunition before departing Cape Town in late 2022.</p>
<p>And while India has traditionally been heavily dependent on Russia for its military equipment, New Delhi <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/03/india-russia-ties-under-scrutiny-as-moscow-moves-closer-to-china.html">reacted uneasily</a> after Moscow <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/24/india/india-russia-arms-delivery-ukraine-war-intl-hnk/index.html">announced</a> in March it would be unable to meet its arms delivery commitments due to the war. </p>
<h2>Other partners emerging</h2>
<p>Beyond the BRICS, North Korea has been the most promising candidate to meet Russia’s ammunition needs, since it can mass produce 155mm artillery shells. </p>
<p>Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will reportedly hold a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/04/us/politics/putin-kim-meeting-russia-north-korea-weapons.html">summit</a> in Vladivostok this month, which would follow a visit by Russian Defence Minister <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90315">Sergei Shoigu</a> to Pyongyang in July. </p>
<p>This has sent the worrying signal that Russia is preparing to abandon its participation in UN Security Council <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons">sanctions</a> on North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. The sanctions ban the trade of military equipment and high-end technologies. </p>
<p>Given Moscow’s critical need for arms, North Korea will find itself in the unusual position of having the upper hand if the meeting goes ahead. These negotiations could easily progress from simple financial transactions to the provision of Russian systems for North Korea’s nuclear, guided missile and submarine programs. </p>
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<p>Iran is another important piece of Russia’s armaments puzzle. It has already supplied Moscow with numerous <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-03/here-s-what-you-need-to-now-about-russia-iranian-made-drones/102562834">Shahed 136</a> kamikaze drones and hundreds of thousands of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-ships-ammunition-to-russia-by-caspian-sea-to-aid-invasion-of-ukraine-e74e8585">artillery shells</a>. </p>
<p>And in April, the Egyptian government was forced to deny accusations it intended to secretly ship some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/10/egypt-weapons-russia/">40,000 rockets</a> to Russia to “avoid problems with the West”.</p>
<h2>What this means for global competition</h2>
<p>What these nations have in common is that they are all either hostile to the United States, ambivalent towards it, or prepared to have a bet both ways. </p>
<p>Both Iran and Egypt were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-invites-six-countries-including-saudi-arabia-iran-be-new-members-2023-08-24/">invited</a> to join the BRICS group last month, along with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina and Ethiopia.</p>
<p>BRICS is by no means a well-developed organisation. It is geographically disparate and has no charter or secretariat to steer a coherent agenda for its work. </p>
<p>But it is reflective of the gradual coming together of nations favouring alternatives to the rules-based order, who tend to equate it with US hegemony. And, like any emergent rival bloc, what it lacks in architecture, it makes up for in potential. Adjusted for purchasing power, the BRICS <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/30638/brics-and-g7-share-of-global-gdp/">overtook the G7</a> in 2023 in terms of total share of global GDP, although its members still <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/30641/gdp-per-capita-in-brics-and-g7-countries/">lag</a> far behind the G7 members on measures like GDP per capita.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200">Brics expansion: six more nations are set to join – what they’re buying into</a>
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<p>Russia’s ammunition woes have certainly reinforced its desire to woo the BRICS. That alone is unlikely to send shivers down the spines of Western policy planners. Yet, it is a reminder that Moscow is continually seeking to counter Western influence where it can, especially in countries where it perceives it to be vulnerable.</p>
<p>It has also been doing so through the presence of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/08/wagner-group-ukraine-africa-syria-prigozhin/">Wagner group</a> in the resource-rich areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. And Russia eagerly promotes anti-West narratives in places where they resonate among sections of society, like South Asia, <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/why-do-so-many-indonesians-back-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">Indonesia</a> and <a href="https://fulcrum.sg/social-media-discourse-in-malaysia-on-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-rationales-for-pro-russia-sentiments/">Malaysia</a>. </p>
<p>Importantly, the same <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-concerning-new-strategy-on-human-rights-unite-the-world-behind-a-selective-approach-212007">tactics</a> are being adopted by China, albeit in a more muted form. </p>
<p>While Russia’s ammunition woes seem to be an isolated affair, how it seeks to mobilise support among like-minded nations is important. </p>
<p>The more it looks for support in areas where Western influence is muted or tenuous, the broader the competition will become between those favouring a US-led international order and others interested in exploring alternatives.</p>
<p>And on that basis, Russia’s war in Ukraine takes on even greater significance. Instead of a conflict that fits within clear regional boundaries, it is increasingly becoming a war with global ramifications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>Russia is not only looking for much-needed ammunition, it is trying to counter Western influence wherever it can.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126582023-09-06T14:51:05Z2023-09-06T14:51:05ZChina is switching away from its aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ foreign policy – here’s why<p>As India prepares to host the G20 summit on September 9, there’s one person not readying his plane for the gathering of world leaders. China’s president Xi Jinping, who has attended every meeting of this summit since 2013, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/04/china-signals-xi-jinping-will-not-attend-g20-summit-in-india#:%7E:text=Xi%20Jinping%27s%20attendance%20at%20the,the%20country%27s%20premier%2C%20Li%20Qiang.">is not going</a>.</p>
<p>Xi is busy dealing with significant <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">economic problems</a> at home, while also rejigging his foreign policy approach away from the aggressive “<a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/">wolf warrior</a>” diplomacy, a strategy he has pursued since 2017. He is now trying to position China as more of a global peacemaker and is testing out new ways of creating alliances with the west and in Asia.</p>
<p>The apparent abandonment of his previous wolf warrior policy, which typically had included shouting at foreign leaders and storming out of meetings, can be seen as a move away from the bellicose tone that characterised China-US relations and China’s wider relationship with the west in the mid to late 2010s. </p>
<p>It initially appeared that the abandonment of this approach, which took its name from the Chinese action <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/analysts-take-note-wolf-warrior-is-the-new-chinese-rambo/">series</a> starring Wu Jing as a Chinese soldier battling western foes in Asia and Africa, could be attributed to changes in China’s foreign ministry in the summer of 2023. </p>
<p>Some of the most prominent “wolf warriors” were moved to posts outside foreign affairs. These include the former foreign ministry spokesperson, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-64218847">Zhao Lijian</a>, being shifted to the department of boundaries and ocean affairs, or being dismissed altogether, most notably in the case of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/08/15/chinese-diplomat-qin-gang-fall-00110333">Qin Gang</a>, who was removed from his post as foreign minister in unclear circumstances.</p>
<p>Both Qin and Zhao were well known for their fiery <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/china-foreign-minister-qin-gang">rhetoric</a> from the days of the Sino-American <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/china-bares-teeth-in-wolf-warrior-trade-diplomacy/a-55720212">trade war</a>, which saw them spar with the equally belligerent administration of then US president Donald Trump. This period saw the dialogue between the US and China taking on a more coarse, hardline tone.</p>
<p>However, such a change has gone deeper than simply moving personnel around.</p>
<p>Another possible reason for the change in Chinese diplomacy has been Beijing’s efforts to deal with an increasingly difficult <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-chinas-economic-slowdown-causes-and-implications">domestic economy</a>, where <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66506132">youth unemployment</a> is at a record high. It can also be seen as an effort to establish more partnerships internationally, rather than <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-is-fading/">antagonise</a> the entire western world. </p>
<p>The recent visit of UK foreign secretary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66656443">James Cleverly</a> to Beijing may have been indicative of China’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2023.2193150">new softly softly approach</a>.</p>
<p>Another example of this could be seen in Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/4/5/frances-macron-visits-china-seeking-breakthrough-in-ukraine-war">visit</a> to China earlier in 2023, with the French president receiving a warm reception – far different from the previous era. Such a reception is also indicative of China’s preference to deal with individual states rather than international blocs as well as trying to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/">ensure</a> that the major European economies do not follow Washington’s lead on China. An aggressive diplomacy style could be counterproductive for these goals.</p>
<h2>China the peacemaker?</h2>
<p>The move away from wolf warrior diplomacy has also been part of a changing image that China has sought to promote in recent years. This has seen Beijing present itself as an international peacemaker, as illustrated by its <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/">mediation</a> of the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as Beijing’s proposed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/06/china-backs-further-ukraine-peace-talks-saudi-arabia-summit">peace plan</a> for the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Such an approach has appeared to give Beijing some diplomatic successes, which was illustrated by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/brics-summit-2023-seeking-alternate-world-order">Brics summit</a> this year, where the bloc underwent the biggest expansion since its creation. As with China’s dealings with Europe, wolf warrior diplomacy here would again be contrary to Beijing’s aim of a new international image.</p>
<p>China’s move towards a new style of foreign policy has also echoed some changes in Washington. US rhetoric towards China during the Trump administration was as belligerent as the wolf warriors, which contributed to the crude nature of Sino-American interactions.</p>
<p>Since 2021 and the arrival of a new US president, this language has largely been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/19/958472423/how-president-trumps-rhetoric-has-affected-u-s-politics">dialled back</a> and the more belligerent tone of the past has largely been confined to <a href="https://time.com/6242314/real-winners-of-the-2024-election-could-be-china-and-russia/">US domestic politics</a>, where aspiring presidential candidates have competed over who is seen to be the toughest over China. This has also been mirrored in China, where nationalist rhetoric has primarily been the preserve of Chinese <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/static/vdata/infographics/china-social-media/">social media commentators</a>, rather than the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>While the rhetoric of the wolf warrior has been toned down on both sides, does this also change what both the west and China want to achieve?</p>
<p>The Biden administration, for instance, has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/cost-trumps-trade-war-china-still-adding">continued</a> many of the previous administration’s policies towards China. It could be argued that the abandonment of wolf warrior diplomacy is simply a cosmetic change, so far.</p>
<h2>Is this a significant change?</h2>
<p>Wolf warrior diplomacy has largely fallen out of fashion. But some of China’s core aims have been retained, but in a different form. This can be seen in the recent ban on imports of Japanese seafood. </p>
<p>Unlike previous Chinese diplomatic manoeuvres, Beijing has used environmental and safety <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/27/business/japan-fukushima-water-china-import-ban-intl-hnk/index.html">concerns</a> over the release of treated radioactive water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant rather than relying on nationalist chest-thumping as it had done in the past. Such a message is likely to resonate with many in Asia, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66603831">several nations</a> in the region imposing similar bans on Japanese produce.</p>
<p>In this way, it adds Asian allies and ramps up anti-Japanese feeling, as well as extending China’s diplomatic influence further.</p>
<p>While the wolf warriors are no longer as powerful as they once were, the objectives they sought to achieve may well remain the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s president Xi Jinping is testing out a “softer” foreign policy approach.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122992023-09-05T21:03:20Z2023-09-05T21:03:20Z4 ways to rein in China and Russia, alleged superpower perpetrators of atrocity crimes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545779/original/file-20230831-27-66cu2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3051%2C2018&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast during their dinner at the Kremlin in Moscow in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pavel Byrkin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the latest meeting in South Africa of BRICS — a grouping of the world economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — Russian President <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/20/europe/putin-brics-no-show-analysis-hnk-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin was a no-show.</a> </p>
<p>Because the International Criminal Court issued an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin-explainer">arrest warrant</a> for him earlier this year over atrocity crimes allegedly committed against Ukrainian children, Moscow was apparently concerned Putin might actually be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/21/putin-was-meant-to-be-at-a-summit-in-south-africa-this-week-why-was-he-asked-to-stay-away">taken into custody</a> if he travelled to Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Mass atrocity crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Amid the challenges facing the world today, the urgency of preventing mass atrocity crimes has taken centre stage. </p>
<p>In 2023, we’re grappling with an unprecedented number of forcibly displaced people — <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/100-million-forcibly-displaced.html">more than 100 million</a> — in part <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/">due to a surge</a> exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Progress stagnating</h2>
<p>While there has been some success in efforts to curb these human rights abuses, such as the introduction of the United Nations’ <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">Responsibility to Protect</a> doctrine and the creation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>, recent developments have raised concerns that progress has not only stagnated but regressed. </p>
<p>Particularly troubling is the spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — that stand accused of perpetrating mass atrocity crimes. </p>
<p>China has grown increasingly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-are-chinas-neighbors-viewing-beijings-military-plans/a-64921927">bellicose and aggressive</a>, threatening its neighbours and persecuting minorities within its borders. Beijing’s actions against its Uyghur Muslim population have sparked global outrage, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/case-study/current-risks/chinese-persecution-of-the-uyghurs">with allegations</a> of genocide, forced labour, mass detentions, cultural repression and destruction of mosques. </p>
<p>Similarly, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has raised grave concerns about human rights abuses. Many <a href="https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/images/reports/2023-07-26-Genocide-Ukraine-Report.pdf">scholars and experts</a> are labelling Russia’s war as being genocidal in intent given its massacre of civilians in Ukrainian towns <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html">such as Bucha</a>, widespread cases of torture that were confirmed by the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/widespread-use-torture-russian-military-ukraine-appears-deliberate-un-expert">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/targeted-destruction-ukraines-culture-must-stop-un-experts">ongoing attempts that seem aimed at destroying</a> Ukraine’s culture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a blue patterned dress looks at a large memorial wall with Ukrainian names etched on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman visits a memorial wall honouring people killed by Russian troops in Bucha, Ukraine. Bucha was occupied by the Russian forces for about a month in the early days of the invasion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jae C. Hong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China, Russia ties</h2>
<p>The emerging alliance between authoritarian China and Russia is a grave cause for concern. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent trip to Moscow, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-putin-pledge-new-world-order-chinese-leader-leaves-russia-rcna76048">he told Putin</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Now there are changes that haven’t happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A future global order shaped and led by these two autocrats gives a new ominous meaning to English novelist George Orwell’s <a href="https://www.sparknotes.com/lit/1984/quotes/character/obrien/">famous quote</a>: “If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — forever.”</p>
<p>As Putin and Xi work to transform the international order, every country should contemplate the grave threat this could pose to human rights, democratic norms and the very essence of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a>, especially with regards to acts of aggression. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1637828614879150082"}"></div></p>
<p>The disconcerting reality of great power perpetrators is a disheartening testament to the erosion of the global commitment to prevent such horrors.</p>
<p>The current situation underscores the dire need to rekindle the flames of progress and ensure that human rights norms and institutions are not abandoned. </p>
<p>The onus lies on the international community to reassert its commitment to preventing mass atrocities, regardless of the culprits’ geopolitical stature and economic power. To achieve this, four fundamental pillars must be pursued.</p>
<h2>Four ways to uphold global human rights</h2>
<ol>
<li><p>Awareness and education must be disseminated to amplify the voices of those allegedly targeted by Russia and China. An informed populace can apply pressure on their governments to uphold human rights and hold perpetrators accountable. They can also demand <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/">companies stop doing business</a> with both countries until their behaviours and policies change. Both Moscow and Beijing are going to great lengths <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html">to spread propaganda</a> <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15226.doc.htm">and disinformation</a> by targeting global audiences.</p></li>
<li><p>Diplomatic initiatives must be pursued to ensure that <a href="https://time.com/6160282/arab-world-complicit-china-repression-uighurs/">economic interests</a> don’t eclipse the need to prevent mass atrocities. Countries must band together to circumvent and counter Moscow and Beijing’s plans to achieve global hegemony that will be a death knell for human rights and democracy.</p></li>
<li><p>Strengthening the mechanisms of justice is paramount. The International Criminal Court must be empowered to investigate and prosecute all perpetrators, regardless of their positions of power. This includes exploring avenues for the court to use even when faced with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/icc-member-states-say-russia-putting-prosecutor-wanted-list-is-deplorable-2023-05-20/">sanctions and threats</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Countries must continue to uphold <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">Article 51</a> of the UN Charter — “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” — and support Ukraine in its efforts to stop Russia’s genocidal invasion. False claims of peace talks mask Russia’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war">intention to recolonize</a> Ukraine, which will only be achieved through mass violence and the destruction of Ukrainian identity. This will also send a message to Beijing that <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/19/china-helping-arm-russia-helicopters-drones-metals-xi-putin/">its role in helping</a> Russia invade Ukraine, to say nothing about a prospective <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3230014/mainland-china-airs-documentary-signalling-military-preparation-taiwan-attack-and-willingness">Chinese attack</a> on Taiwan, will come with consequences.</p></li>
</ol>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The international community must acknowledge that the era of great power nations perpetrating atrocity crimes is upon us and that it poses a real threat to global peace and security.</p>
<p>Countries that commit genocide within and outside their borders — not to mention <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/08/china-detains-journalists-dangers-2021-report/">imprisoning journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66408444">political opposition leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle">civil society groups</a> — are a danger to humanity. </p>
<p>When they are permanent members of the UN Security Council and working together in unison, they represent a totalitarian threat that cannot be ignored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Matthews has received funding from the Government of Canada (Department of Canadian Heritage) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. He is affiliated with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, the Canadian International Council and the BMW Foundation. </span></em></p>The spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — allegedly perpetrating mass atrocity crimes is deeply troubling. Here’s how the international community must step up.Kyle Matthews, Executive Director, The Montréal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122582023-08-31T23:40:36Z2023-08-31T23:40:36ZJokowi is right not to join ‘BRICS’ for now – but the alliance is still important for Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544728/original/file-20230825-19-lhyfct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C7%2C1595%2C838&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">BRICS leaders announce the outcomes of the XV BRICS Summit, at the Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, 24 August 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/197960982@N04/53138459169/">Official media of 15th BRICS Summit</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo travelled to Johannesburg, South Africa, on August 24 to attend <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/08/24/en-indonesia-masih-kaji-keanggotaan-di-brics">the 15th BRICS summit</a>, an informal grouping of five major emerging nations: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.</p>
<p>Just before the summit, the BRICS group <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/aug/24/five-brics-nations-announce-admission-of-six-new-countries-to-bloc">announced</a> Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, would become members as of January 1 next year.</p>
<p>There had been speculation Indonesia might join.</p>
<p>There were <a href="https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/south-africa-announces-67-countries-invited-to-brics-not-fra">67 countries invited</a> to attend the summit and Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-brics-who-are-its-members-2023-08-21/">reported</a> more than 40 countries, including Indonesia, had expressed interest in joining BRICS.</p>
<p>As Southeast Asia’s largest economy, some experts <a href="https://theconversation.com/jokowi-akan-hadiri-ktt-brics-apa-manfaatnya-untuk-indonesia-210070">argue Indonesia</a> should join the BRICs grouping.</p>
<p>However, Jokowi says Indonesia still needs to consider its position.</p>
<p>As an international relations scholar focusing on diplomacy and international development, I suggest not joining BRICS, at least not today, is an appropriate decision for Indonesia. As a country that does not want to be aligned <a href="http://119.40.116.186/resources/files/Pertanika%20PAPERS/JSSH%20Vol.%2029%20(2)%20Jun.%202021/09%20JSSH-7368-2020.pdf">with super powers</a>, joining BRICS could put Indonesia in a complicated situation in terms of diplomatic relations.</p>
<h2>Avoiding an anti-Western interests ‘trap’</h2>
<p>Historically, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/brics">BRICS</a> aims to promote cooperation between countries in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">Global South</a> and enhance cooperation with other developing countries in economy, trade, politics and social development.</p>
<p>Russia initiated BRICS in 2009 to <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/how-brics-was-born-how-it-overtook-g7-and-where-it-is-headed/articleshow/102913989.cms?from=mdr">balance the economic power)</a> of developed countries grouped in Group of 7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544729/original/file-20230825-26-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian President Joko Widodo arrives at OR Tambo International Airport, ahead of the XV BRICS Summit in Sandton from 22-24 August 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/197960982@N04/53137363322/">Official media of 15th BRICS Summit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, both BRICS and G7 cannot resist expanding their own agenda towards wider global political and security issues, with <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/why-brics-summit-could-be-big-deal">China and Russia</a> trying to position BRICS as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/40f7cd4d-66f2-4e4d-876d-a0c7aa7097e1">a counterweight to the G7</a> and other <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/brics-nations-meet-south-africa-seeking-blunt-western-dominance-2023-08-17/">Western-led alignments</a>.</p>
<p>In the Russia-Ukraine war, for example, the blocs have shown obvious opposing stances.</p>
<p>For example, during the BRICS summit, BRICS leaders issued a <a href="https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-de-joanesburgo-ii-sandton-gauteng-africa-do-sul-23-de-agosto-de-2023">joint statement</a> expressing their concern about the current war, calling for an immediate ceasefire.</p>
<p>Despite the absence of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the summit, due to an <a href="https://time.com/6307033/vladimir-putin-brics-summit-icc-warrant/">arrest warrant</a> over war crime allegations, South Africa, China and India <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-urges-brics-expansion-at-summit-of-emerging-economies/7237463.html">did not condemn</a> Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Brazil <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-urges-brics-expansion-at-summit-of-emerging-economies/7237463.html">has refused</a> to join Western countries in sending arms to Ukraine or imposing sanctions on Moscow. </p>
<p>This is in contrast to the <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/05/22/summit-concludes-with-full-support-for-ukraine">G7 summit</a> in March, which imposed heavier sanctions on Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544730/original/file-20230825-21-4n04v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping in the plenary session of the 15th BRICS Summit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/197960982@N04/53136401944/">Official Media of 15th BRICS Summit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This could mean BRICS provides room for its members to counter and challenge the US-led Western dominance. But this kind of anti-Western sentiment contradicts the principles of Indonesia’s <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/washington/en/pages/kebijakan_luar_negeri_ri/716/etc-menu">free and active foreign policy</a>, meaning it does not side with world powers or bind to any military pact.</p>
<p>Indonesia was one of the <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/142/halaman_list_lainnya/gerakan-non-blok-gnb">pioneering countries</a> of the Non-Aligned Movement. So it always upholds the principle of noninterference in the great power rivalries and only wants to focus on achieving world peace and social justice. </p>
<p>Indonesia <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesia-as-g20-host-can-be-a-mediator-between-russia-and-ukraine-180128">tried to be a peacebroker</a> between Russia and Ukraine during its 2022 G20 presidency. So joining BRICS would only put Indonesia in unnecessarily complicated situations.</p>
<p>Moreover, if Indonesia joins BRICS, the West will probably see it as a signal of alignment towards Russia and China, and this could affect Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with the US and other Western countries.</p>
<h2>Personal interests of old members</h2>
<p>It appears some of the existing BRICS members stand to gain the most from increasing membership of the group. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544731/original/file-20230825-22-byibkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, chairs the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/197960982@N04/53136652961/">Official Media of 15th BRICS Summit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/08/18/brics-expansion-would-be-a-sign-of-chinas-growing-influence-says-oliver-stuenkel">China</a>, as the largest economy in BRICS, seems to be in favour of adding members to bolster its own global influence. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-putin/russias-putin-says-sanctions-violate-principles-of-wto-idUSKBN0HD17V20140918">Russia</a>, isolated and unfairly sanctioned, also needs new allies because of the protracted war in Ukraine. South Africa as the group’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-brics-who-are-its-members-2023-08-21/#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%2C%20the%20smallest%20member,quarter%20of%20the%20global%20economy.">smallest economy</a>, meanwhile, wants more African members to join BRICS in order to strengthen the influence of the Africa continent.</p>
<p>On the other hand, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3226537/why-india-wary-chinas-brics-expansion-push-indonesia-saudi-arabia-egypt-and-others-seek-join">India and Brazil</a> chose to be more careful in taking any approaches as they would not want to get caught up in polarisation. </p>
<h2>But BRICS remains important for Indonesia</h2>
<p>Although the Indonesian government has not joined BRICS, it is fully aware of the importance of BRICS as a strategic partner, especially economically.</p>
<p>President Jokowi, Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi and Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Pandjaitan all went to Johannesburg. This showed Indonesia’s bilateral and regional interests as 2023 ASEAN Chair. With <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/internasional/2023/08/21/peluang-tiwikrama-brics">an economic value of 33.6%</a> of global Gross Domestic Product and being home to <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/08/21/intra-brics-trade-and-analysis-2023/">45% of the world’s total population</a>, BRICS is clearly a significant partner for the ASEAN bloc. </p>
<p>For developing economies such as ASEAN countries, BRICS can help bring exchanges of technology, knowledge and trade, which is mutually beneficial.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544732/original/file-20230825-19-4v4rcf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Family photo of BRICS leaders.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/197960982@N04/53137049345/">Official Media of 15th BRICS Summit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, BRICS countries are currently promoting “<a href="https://www.indmoney.com/articles/brics-2023-summit-countries-discuss-de-dollarization-and-bloc-expansion">de-dollarisation</a>”, with the aim of moving away from global dependency on the US dollar as an international currency. The establishment of <a href="https://www.ndb.int">BRICS New Development Bank</a> in funding various projects has marked an integral part of the bloc’s economic development step.</p>
<p>This is in line with Indonesia’s mission to <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/ekonomi/2023/04/19/indonesia-lanjutkan-dedolarisasi">intensify the use of rupiah currency</a> and avoid further depression of the rupiah exchange rate against the US dollar. In this case, the BRICS New Development Bank can perhaps <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-23/brics-bank-aims-to-increase-local-currency-borrowing-to-30">help strengthen the rupiah</a> in international transactions.</p>
<p>Although BRICS is starting to focus more on <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-partnership-strategy-en.html">a development and trade agenda</a>, the possibility of it becoming a proxy battleground between China/Russia and the West remains.</p>
<p>So Indonesia’s decision to stay out of BRICS for now is wise. If it Indonesia wants to focus on expanding cooperation, investment and technology development, and this all needs to be done with all parties, both the Global North and the Global South.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayu Anastasya Rachman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia has taken a good decision by not joining BRICS, but still needs to be aware that this bloc remains important for the country, and ASEAN.Ayu Anastasya Rachman, Head of International Relations Department, Universitas Bina Mandiri GorontaloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122732023-08-29T13:33:47Z2023-08-29T13:33:47ZBrics: African countries face opportunities and risks in alienating China or the US - an expert weighs in<p><em>South Africa recently hosted a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">Brics summit</a>. The event attracted international attention because the group has recently begun to emerge as a possible rival against US dominance of world affairs. The US and China lie at the heart of this debate. They are the two biggest trading partners of most African countries and both have strategic interests that they are determined to protect. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international relations expert Christopher Isike to explain.</em></p>
<h2>How might Brics affect US-African ties?</h2>
<p>Altering diplomatic relations between African countries and the US on account of Brics would have its pros and cons for the continent. Some potential gains from alienating the US would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Increased autonomy for African countries in their foreign policy decisions. They might be able to align more closely with their own interests and priorities without the perceived influence of a major global power. </p></li>
<li><p>The potential of diversifying partnerships and alliances with other countries or regional blocs that Brics presents. This could lead to more economic, political and security relationships, reducing reliance on any single nation. </p></li>
<li><p>Stronger regional cooperation and integration. This could unify efforts to address common challenges such as security, infrastructure development and economic growth. Such regional cooperation offers more fertile ground for the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>to thrive. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>However, a strained relationship with the US could also come at a cost. Some of the losses would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reduced trade opportunities, foreign direct investment and economic aid, potentially leading to economic setbacks for the continent. Beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), which provides preferential access to the US market, would be hit the hardest. </p></li>
<li><p>The US has been accused of militarising the continent to advance its own interests. But it plays a significant role in <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/pkpg/c10834.htm">supporting peacekeeping efforts</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-who-thinks-wins-how-smarter-u-s-counterterrorism-in-the-sahel-can-pay-dividends-for-great-power-competition/">counterterrorism initiatives</a> in various African regions. Alienation could therefore affect security and stability, leaving a void in terms of resources, expertise, and coordination in these critical areas. </p></li>
<li><p>Alienating a major global player like the US could also lead to diplomatic isolation for many African countries on the international stage. This could weaken their influence in international organisations, negotiations and decision-making processes.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What if African countries alienated China?</h2>
<p>On gains, African countries would be able to diversify their economic and political partnerships by reducing dependence on China. This could lead to increased engagement with other countries and regions, potentially resulting in a more balanced and varied international relations portfolio.</p>
<p>African countries could also enhance their bargaining power in negotiations. This could lead to more favourable terms in trade deals, investment agreements and development projects. Other countries including the US, EU members and Australia might see an opportunity to fill the void. </p>
<p>Some Africans see China’s influence as overly dominant, potentially leading to <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwik_ufxrv-AAxX3YPEDHanLDBcQFnoECDUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theelephant.info%2Ffeatures%2F2021%2F05%2F10%2Fwhat-africans-think-of-china-and-america%2F&usg=AOvVaw27sl28dalUXdGrayDchrvJ&opi=89978449">concerns about sovereignty and autonomy</a>. Alienating China could be seen as a way to assert national interests and prevent over-reliance on a single foreign partner.</p>
<p>That said, African countries can ill afford to alienate China. </p>
<p>China is a major economic partner for many African countries, providing investments, trade opportunities and infrastructure projects. Alienating it could lead to economic setbacks, including reduced trade and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Second, China is involved in various <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/183370/china-is-delivering-over-30-of-africas-big-construction-projects-heres-why/">infrastructure development projects across Africa</a>. These include roads, railways, ports and energy facilities. A strained relationship with China might hinder the completion of these projects or slow down future infrastructure development, potentially affecting economic growth and connectivity.</p>
<p>Third, China is a significant player in international diplomacy and geopolitics. So, alienating it could lead to reduced influence in global forums where China has a presence. These include the United Nations and various other international organisations. This might limit African countries’ ability to advance their interests on the global stage.</p>
<p>However, it must be noted these gains and losses from alienating either the US or China are speculative and would depend on a wide range of factors. For example, the relationship between African countries and both of these superpowers is multifaceted and complex. Any decision to alienate either of them should involve careful assessment of both the short-term and long-term consequences, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The trick is for Africa to articulate its own interests and pursue them consistently. </p>
<h2>Is there a common African position on the US and China?</h2>
<p>African countries have diverse foreign policy priorities and alliances. Their responses to international conflicts can vary widely. Some might choose to align with major powers like the US, China, the European Union or Russia. Others might opt for neutrality or noninterference in the conflicts of other regions.</p>
<p>These strands have played out in the voting patterns on the three UN General Assembly votes to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent. They should act consistently in line with that common position. They could also have a common position on Brics instead of leaving it entirely to South Africa to define an African agenda for Brics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Isike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121302023-08-25T11:29:27Z2023-08-25T11:29:27ZHow Russia is fighting for allies among the Brics countries using ‘memory diplomacy’<p>Since the start of the Ukraine war, there have been numerous diplomatic visits by Russian officials to Africa and Latin America aiming at boosting Russia’s global influence. </p>
<p>In 2023 Russian officials <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-06-09/russian-diplomacy-more-active-africa-ever">visited</a> Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Eswatini, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, South Africa and Sudan. In the same year, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov toured some areas of <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1605357">Latin America</a> visiting Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. The <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-foreign-minister-seeks-deeper-ties-in-latin-america-24801709">objective</a> was to deepen ties and increase the <a href="https://features.diplomatmagazine.com/russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-and-the-worrying-neo-colonial-paradox/index.html">support</a> for Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>As the Ukrainian war goes on, some <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-ukraine-be-able-to-win-over-the-global-south-in-its-fight-against-russian-aggression-208948">observers</a> have noted that Russia is trying to gather influential support for its position in the war. Its claims to be fighting against the <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-04-07/anti-colonial-alliance-global-south-new-foreign-policy-concept">west’s power and neo-colonialism</a> appear to have won some supporters. <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-ukraine-be-able-to-win-over-the-global-south-in-its-fight-against-russian-aggression-208948">Ukraine’s attempts</a> to win allies in the same regions by arguing that it is fighting off an empire don’t appear to have resonated so well. </p>
<p>Some observers argue that we are witnessing the “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/global-russia/">return of the global Russia</a>” through economic and political influence, and through its use of digital disinformation techniques to distribute narratives. In the 2010s, the expansion of Russia’s influence in Africa was the result of economic “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236">opportunism</a>”, but during the Ukraine war, it has become more strategic. There is evidence that in some African countries the influence of Russia continues to intensify. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-democratic-countries-around-the-world-are-not-prepared-to-support-ukraine-and-some-are-shifting-closer-to-russia-203699">South Africa</a>, for instance, seems to be moving away from the west and steering towards <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">China’s and Russia’s orbit</a>.</p>
<p>But this could partly be because a challenge to the current liberal order is likely to be beneficial for the global south, giving it more power to negotiate in the international arena and achieve some of its policy targets. This was hinted at the recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj1QDDr3nXI">Brics conference</a> meeting of senior leaders from Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa. The leaders of these expanding economies are therefore hesitant to fully condemn Russia for its actions in Ukraine. </p>
<p>At the summit, Brazil’s president Lula da Silva said the Ukraine war “showed the limitations of the UN security council”, and pointed to the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/30638/brics-and-g7-share-of-global-gdp/">economic power</a> of the Brics allies as a symbol of its global relevance. The recent decision to integrate six new countries (including Argentina, Iran and UAE) into the bloc will increase that relevance and could enable its members to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-poised-invite-new-members-join-bloc-sources-2023-08-24/">influence</a> the current world order. </p>
<h2>The strategic value of nostalgia</h2>
<p>Two interrelated factors can help us understand Russia’s attractiveness to the global south, and reluctance to fully support Ukraine. First, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/08/russia-ukraine-colonialism-diplomacy-africa/">Russia frames itself</a> as an “anti-colonial” agent, particularly in Africa. Such a strategy is based on “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/25/russia-puting-ww2-soviet-ussr-memory-diplomacy-history-narrative/">memory diplomacy</a>”, aimed at increasing its influence overseas by taking advantage of shared positive memories. </p>
<p>Memory diplomacy, for instance, invokes Russia’s contribution to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17506980211073108">victory against fascism</a> during the second world war. In addition, it points out that <a href="https://twitter.com/EmbassyofRussia/status/1598615938869432322?s=20&t=W013aDJF14pV8lnWiYGQ-Q">Russia has never colonised an African country</a> and that it did not participate in the slave trade. On the contrary, the argument goes, Russia, as the centre of the Soviet Union, supported different anti-colonial struggles in the region during the cold war, for example, in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022009419893739">Angola and Mozambique</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1598615938869432322"}"></div></p>
<p>Another factor in understanding Russia’s appeal to the global south is the “legacy” of Moscow’s solidarity with various countries in the past.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516">Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn't pick sides</a>
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<p>In 1927, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvt6rn2c">Communist International</a>, an international organisation supportive of world communism that was led by the Soviet Union, sponsored the League Against Imperialism. The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/81831">league</a> aimed to eliminate colonial rule in the world. It brought together leading anti-colonial activists from around the world and prominent people such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein">Albert Einstein</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahatma_Gandhi">Mahatma Gandhi</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the league became an <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/81831">inspiration</a> for many of the leaders of the global south’s decolonisation struggles. In this sense, it has left a long-term legacy in the countries where Moscow’s support had an effect on their anti-colonial struggles.</p>
<p>This is evident in the case of South Africa. Its position towards the war in Ukraine is arguably partly defined by a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">nostalgia</a> relating to Moscow’s support for its struggle against apartheid combined with a distrust for the west’s policies. The criticism levelled at the west in the global south by leaders such as Brazil’s Lula is that it <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/10/how-the-west-selectively-promotes-democracy-through-sanctions/">upholds democracy</a> at home while being willing to violate democratic principles elsewhere if the advancement of its interests makes it advantageous.</p>
<h2>Challenging nostalgia</h2>
<p>Ukraine has responded to Russia’s diplomatic actions by increasing its embassies in <a href="https://mfa.gov.ua/en/events/dmitro-kuleba-rozpochinaye-tretye-turne-krayinami-afriki">Africa</a> and prioritising the global south as a foreign policy. But this “battle” front may be more difficult than it seems. </p>
<p>Russia continues to advance narratives, usually via its expertise in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/global-russia/digital">use of digital channels</a>, that strengthen its geopolitical influence. In addition, for the global south, Russia is perceived as a counterbalance to the west – particularly the US. And importantly, what can Ukraine offer to the global south?</p>
<p>Ukraine could gather further support from Brics countries by strengthening existing economic ties and pointing out shared problems caused by Russia. Building the proposed <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/88148/">new grain hubs</a> for storing crops, such as wheat and corn, is a good start. This is particularly important because of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138752">Russia’s decision</a> to withdraw permission for Ukrainian ships carrying grain to leave Black Sea ports. This is likely to cause <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/07/19/1188714712/russias-nixing-of-ukraine-grain-deal-deepens-worries-about-global-food-supply">food shortages across Africa</a>. The Kenyan government, for instance, denounced Russia’s decision as a “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66223280">stab in the back</a>” for African countries. </p>
<p>Ukraine could also tap into the similarities of its national struggle and those of the global south’s anti-colonial experiences. Rather than focusing its narrative against Russia, it could begin to build shared “memories” with the global south by concentrating on the commonalities of victimhood.</p>
<p>What is becoming increasingly clear is that any country that attempts to challenge the image of Russia as an anti-imperialist agent, is in for a long battle. Particularly, if those countries cannot effectively appeal to their own shared positive memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the Brics alliance signs up new members, Russia continues to win over more allies.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122002023-08-24T18:37:30Z2023-08-24T18:37:30ZBrics expansion: six more nations are set to join – what they’re buying into<p>One key outcome of the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">15th Brics summit</a>, hosted by South Africa, is the decision to invite six more countries to join the group with effect from January 2024. They are Argentina, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. All six had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-meet-with-friends-seeking-closer-ties-amid-push-expand-bloc-2023-06-02/">applied</a> for membership. The enlargement will grow the association’s membership to 11, and increase its envisaged role as a geopolitical alternative to global institutions dominated by the west.</p>
<p>The five current member countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have argued that their size, in economic and population terms, was not represented in the world’s institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). </p>
<p>The Brics five represent about <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/brics-investment-report">42%</a> of the world’s population and more than 23% of <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/evolution-of-brics/">world GDP</a>. </p>
<p>The enlarged grouping will account for 46.5% of the world population. Using <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/CHN">IMF GDP data</a>, we can deduce that it will account for about 30% of global GDP.</p>
<p>The disparate nature of the six new members is bound to spark debate about the real nature of Brics.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-south-africa%27s-foreign-policy">welcoming remarks</a> at the summit (22-24 August), the host, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Brics stands for solidarity and for progress. Brics stands for inclusivity and a more just, equitable order. Brics stands for sustainable development.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The group has been remarkably consistent on these values and aspirations.</p>
<h2>Understanding the nature of Brics</h2>
<p>One of the first questions about Brics is often “what is it?”. This is telling. This question does not come up, for example, about the European Union or even the G20. </p>
<p>Brics is not an organisation (it has no headquarters, secretariat or treaty). But it does have a formal institution that is jointly owned – the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>. Confusion about Brics’ precise nature is understandable. </p>
<p>At various points it has referred to itself as a <a href="http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hywj/ODS/202203/t20220308_10649517.html">forum</a>, a <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html">platform</a>, a <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html">mechanism</a>, a <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html">partnership</a>, or a <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html">strategic partnership</a>, to name a few. Others have called it an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373113580_The_BRICS_and_Africa's_Strategic_Interests">alliance</a> or a bloc. It is neither. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">South Africa's role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists</a>
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<p>In international relations, both terms are strictly defined. The term “<a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/390/425">alliance</a>” refers to a mutual defence pact and implies military cooperation. A “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209394">bloc</a>” refers to ideological consistency (political bloc) or a free trade agreement (trade bloc). Brics has none of these characteristics. </p>
<p>The members also disagree on some key issues. China and Russia are noncommittal (at best) on the aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa to become members of the UN Security Council. Their declarations have over the years <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202206/t20220623_10709037.html">reiterated</a> the same phrase:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China and Russia understand and support the aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa to play a greater role in the United Nations. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This shows there is some serious disagreement within the group. </p>
<p>As a political scientist interested in global politics, I have <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-62765-2">written about Brics</a> and its potential for changing the status quo. With hindsight, I can assert that certain principles have informed it since its establishment and <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html#:%7E:text=We%20call%20upon%20all%20parties,the%20WTO's%20Doha%20Development%20Agenda.">first summit</a> in 2009. In my view, at a material level, the 15 years of summit declarations point to four fundamental values:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>mutual development</p></li>
<li><p>multilateralism</p></li>
<li><p>global governance reform</p></li>
<li><p>solidarity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The association self-reportedly seeks secure sustainable development for itself and the global south, to safeguard and advance multilateralism, to institute reform for the goal of representative institutions, and to achieve solidarity among members.</p>
<h2>Economic development</h2>
<p>Economics comes first in the group; at its root, it is a collective of emerging economies eager to sustain and improve their economic trajectory. Their insistence on reform is, after all, based on their perceived disproportionate under-representation in global financial institutions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">China’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region</a>
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<p>The group’s first, and so far only, notable establishment is the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>, primarily to finance infrastructure development. There’s also a contingent reserve that members can draw from in emergencies. It is <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/the-brics-new-development-bank-and-contingent-reserve-arrangement-at-a-glance/''">valued at US$100 billion</a>. </p>
<h2>Multilateralism</h2>
<p>The second value refers to the group’s concern about the use of entities outside the UN to pursue global objectives. Most notable is the use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (<a href="https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/">Nato</a>) to invade <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">Afghanistan</a> in 2001 following the <a href="https://www.911memorial.org/911-faqs">9/11</a> attacks in the US, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and the UK, circumventing the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>Russian president Vladimir Putin expressed <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034">this concern in his speech</a> to the 2007 Munich Conference on Security:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Global governance reform</h2>
<p>Thirdly, the Brics countries have long pushed for leaders of global institutions to be elected in a transparent and democratic way. For example, the president of the World Bank has <a href="https://fortune.com/2019/01/11/next-world-bank-president-jim-yong-kim/">always been an American</a>, and the managing director of the IMF <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/18/why-is-the-imf-chief-always-a-european/">a European</a>. The World Bank has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership#:%7E:text=The%20World%20Bank%20is%20like,policymakers%20at%20the%20World%20Bank.">189 member states</a> and the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-at-a-Glance">IMF 190</a>.</p>
<p>The idea of the New Development Bank was not to substitute the World Bank but to “<a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html">supplement</a>” existing international financial institutions. Brics still envisions a World Bank in which its members have voting rights proportional to their economic weight, and with staff drawn from across the world in a geographically balanced way. </p>
<h2>Solidarity</h2>
<p>Finally, the members have articulated solidarity with one another in a number of declarations, beginning in 2010. It comes down to mutual assistance in times of humanitarian disasters, respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">When two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries</a>
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<p>In light of criticism and sanctions plans against <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/3/29/us-sanctions-chinese-firms-over-alleged-abuses-of-uyghurs">China</a>, for its alleged suppression of the Uyghur-Muslim population, and <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/ukraine-russia-related-sanctions">Russia</a>, for invading Ukraine, solidarity has come to mean silence or nonalignment. </p>
<h2>A blank slate</h2>
<p>Brics is a nebulous entity. This has proved beneficial for member countries hosting Brics summits. They get to set the agenda and use it for their ends – without upsetting the consensus. One common pattern has been the use of summits to set overarching themes that are favourable to the host country’s domestic policy and regional leadership or foreign policy stance.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516">Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn't pick sides</a>
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<p>Thus, for example, all Brics summits hosted by South Africa foregrounded Africa in their names: “Brics and Africa: Partnership for mutually accelerated growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism” <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/theme-and-priorities/">in 2023</a>. Brazil and Russia have inserted issues that are important to their region, and often invited leaders of neighbouring countries to retreats.</p>
<p>This shows how much clout they enjoy, as they get to funnel access to a now-renowned association that is simultaneously well established but also evades easy definition. With the addition of the six new members, such evasiveness is set to only continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212200/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bhaso Ndzendze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The disparate nature of the six prospective members is bound to spark debate about the real nature of Brics.Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090442023-08-24T14:12:10Z2023-08-24T14:12:10ZChina’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region<p>China experienced a <a href="https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p320411/pdf/ch16.pdf#page=391">massive economic boom</a> in the 1990s and 2000s which increased its demand for resource imports, like oil, from Africa. This led to a model of development finance in which China funded infrastructure in African countries in return for access to resources. This approach became known as the <a href="https://upjournals.up.ac.za/index.php/strategic_review/article/view/73">Angola model</a>, because it all started with an infrastructure-for-petroleum partnership between China and Angola in 2004. </p>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044#:~:text=The%20new%20focus%20is%20more,that%20is%20leading%20the%20push.&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Within a decade, however, a shift in China’s approach was needed, for a couple of reasons.</p>
<p>First, African countries are vulnerable to shocks and they <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/98/4/1347/6628400">struggle</a> to keep up with mounting debt repayments. For instance, in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/09/18/na-angola-confronting-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-oil-price-shock">Angola’s case</a>, the price of oil fell from a high of US$115 to below US$50 in mid-2014. More recently, the impact of COVID’s economic shutdowns and supply shocks around the war on Ukraine are taking a toll.</p>
<p>Second, China’s domestic needs are changing. In recent years, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gcb.15290?casa_token=6h-f26GDRhEAAAAA:o_0q2eUwj8Fjza-yDTOmsH2atFk1pRtfFfzcAEBBpcUY_2LJ0ZIVwJNlbhUoBtCepLu1xjfGDaD8Yw">climate change</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-023-03042-1">changing diets</a> have put pressure on China’s domestic supply of food. This triggered interest in <a href="https://odi.org/en/publications/chinas-appetite-for-international-agricultural-investment-case-studies-of-kyrgyzstan-myanmar-and-tanzania/">partnerships</a> that could help. China is also moving away from being an exporter of heavy-industry and energy-intensive manufactured goods. Its focus is more on growth areas, such as higher value-added agriculture and manufacturing. Geopolitically, it also wants <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/325672.html">to support</a> African development and its own food security. </p>
<p>My study of these shifts <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/SAIIA_OP-349_TheHunanModel.pdf">reveals</a> a changing relationship between China and Africa, moving beyond a focus on mainly oil and extractive commodities. The new focus is more on industrial production, job creation, investments that lead to African exports, and productivity-enhancing agricultural and digital technology opportunities.</p>
<p>This model, called the <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/SAIIA_OP-349_TheHunanModel.pdf">“Hunan model”</a>, is named after the province in southern China that is leading the push. African bureaucrats, researchers, trade associations and businesses should understand what’s happening in Hunan. It’ll help them to grasp new opportunities and ensure that African companies are competitively placed. </p>
<h2>What is the ‘Hunan model’?</h2>
<p>The Hunan model aims to support the <a href="http://lagos.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zlszc/202112/t20211206_10462694.htm">2035 Vision for China–Africa Cooperation</a> by pushing for: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>medical cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>poverty reduction and agricultural development</p></li>
<li><p>trade</p></li>
<li><p>investment</p></li>
<li><p>digital innovation</p></li>
<li><p>green development</p></li>
<li><p>capacity building</p></li>
<li><p>cultural and people-to-people exchange</p></li>
<li><p>peace and security.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The delivery of those goals happens under the umbrella of the <a href="http://www.kaifu.gov.cn/English/MediaCenter0/News127914/202306/t20230616_11137479.html">China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</a> and a pilot zone for in-depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. Both are centred on Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. </p>
<p>Hunan province was chosen as the new frontier of China-Africa relations partly because many of China’s competitive industries are based there. They include major agri-tech companies, a leading Chinese electronic vehicle company (BYD Changsha), and manufacturing equipment and construction industry companies. Many of these companies have a presence in, and long-run strategy for, African markets. </p>
<p><strong>China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo</strong></p>
<p>The China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo has many activities and events hosted in big exhibition centres. This allows new business partnerships to be forged with speed and logistical ease. At a 2023 event with 10,000 Chinese and 1,700 foreign participants, <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/home/rolling/326437.htm">it was reported</a> that 120 projects, worth a total of US$10.3 billion, were signed. All 53 African countries with which China has diplomatic relations were present. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537463/original/file-20230714-17-awaw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Zambia booth at the 2023 China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Hunan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chen Hongdou/VCG via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Pilot zone</strong></p>
<p>The pilot zone for in-depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation is a huge area that’s been developed with the aim of expanding bilateral trade, dealing with bottlenecks in trade and cooperation and improving logistics between the two regions. Examples of typical bottlenecks include market access, finance, logistics, talent and services such as marketing and law. </p>
<p>Some of the initiatives that can be found in the pilot zone include vocational and education training and a digital services hub that supports Chinese companies in the efforts to economically engage Africa. The zone includes a permanent exhibition platform and a demonstration park.</p>
<h2>Some implications of the shift</h2>
<p>The Hunan model’s specific focus is on agriculture, heavy industry equipment, and transport such as electric automobiles and trains. These are areas where Hunan is a leader within China. And they are growth industries in many countries in Africa. </p>
<p>For China it may lead to new sources of food security as well as new markets for technology products and opportunities to set technology standards. The approach thus places Africa in an important position for grasping new opportunities and shaping related areas of cooperation – at home, with China and globally. </p>
<p>The Hunan model also seeks to support more efficient trade. New trade passageways by rail, river, air and ocean are <a href="http://ydyl.hunan.gov.cn/ydyl/ydylen/engHighlights/202109/t20210918_20618125.html">being forged</a> to better connect Hunan with African countries, especially trade hubs. </p>
<p>There are also efforts to tackle issues of <a href="https://www.sohu.com/a/505202379_120933031#google_vignette">access to foreign exchange</a> and foster greater use of local currencies. At the moment a lot of international trade is done in the US dollar, because it is widely accepted across all countries. But many developing countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/foreign-exchange-several-african-countries-have-a-shortage-of-us-dollars-why-this-happens-and-how-to-fix-it-202980">struggle to accumulate dollars</a> if they don’t have a commodity like oil or gas to export. Small and medium-sized (SME) traders struggle in particular, and are less able to bear any currency risks against the value of their own local currency. The zone in Hunan includes <a href="https://moment.rednet.cn/pc/content/2019/09/12/5972089.html">a centre</a> that is testing trade payment systems based on other currencies. This could become a broader model for SME-based trade in local currencies.</p>
<p>Ultimately, China’s Hunan agenda will mean different things for different African countries and will evolve over time. It’s a recent shift, since 2018 especially, but beyond its potential to elevate food security and production capacity in China and African countries, there will be other important implications. It may facilitate digital and communications logistics for trade between China and Africa, as well as research on technology, industry and trade standards, and trade flows and trends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is moving beyond oil and extractive commodities towards industrial production, job creation and investments that lead to exports.Lauren Johnston, Senior Researcher, South African Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the China Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105162023-08-21T14:39:17Z2023-08-21T14:39:17ZAfrica is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn’t pick sides<p>Some three decades since the end of the Cold War, the world order is undergoing a structural transformation. At the heart of it is the challenge posed to the hegemony of the US. This is primarily being led by Russia and China which are discontented with Washington’s excesses across the global stage. The most recent example of this rebellion was the Russian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">invasion of Ukraine in 2022</a>. Fiona Hill, a British-American foreign affairs specialist, <a href="https://lmc.icds.ee/lennart-meri-lecture-by-fiona-hill/">observed that</a> the war was a “proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the ‘Rest’ against the United States”.</p>
<p>The African continent is an obvious contender for major power courting as this realignment takes place. This is for at least four reasons.</p>
<p>Firstly, it is the largest <a href="https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/regional-groups">regional bloc</a> in the United Nations, representing some 28% of all the votes in the General Assembly. Secondly, it possesses some crucial raw minerals that are found only in the continent. Thirdly, it possesses some important sea trade routes, particularly in east Africa. Finally, the continent is home to the fastest-growing youth demographic, and will account for about <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/why-africa-youth-key-development-potential/">42%</a> of the world’s youth by 2030.</p>
<p>I am a scholar of geopolitics and have conducted <a href="https://bhasondzendze.co.za/">research</a> on the continent’s trade ties to the major powers. My findings have led me to the conclusion that Africa can gain more by being neutral than by picking sides. </p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>Africa’s size in the UN General Assembly can’t be overstated. The continent sometimes struggles to respond in a co-ordinated way. Nevertheless, it has, in the past, been able to vote in sync in a way that has proved influential. The most notable example of this was the <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en">1971 vote</a> for the resolution that <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/">brought mainland China into the UN and replaced Taiwan</a>. In total, there were 76 votes in favour, of which 27 came from African member states. </p>
<p>In today’s UN, having this large grouping on one’s side helps countries the most when it comes to passing – or defeating – resolutions. With the UN Security Council in gridlock because the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) have veto power, there has been a shift towards the UN General Assembly, which works on one-member-one-vote. General Assembly votes are mainly symbolic. But they are a useful indicator of where the international community stands, and are a powerful moral weapon for any major power.</p>
<p>Africa’s other major attraction is, of course, its resource wealth. This has become even more pronounced and taken on extraordinary importance in the push towards alternative sources of energy, both renewable and non-renewable. And in the production of products driven by the rise in technological innovation, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt, which is needed to make device screens among other things. The DRC is the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/ev-cobalt-mines-congo/">world’s leading producer</a> of this crucial mineral.</p>
<p>At the same time the oil reserves of Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will become increasingly important as countries look to diversify away from Russia for natural gas, and from fossil fuels more broadly.</p>
<p>Then there are the trade routes. The Red Sea route, which straddles northeast Africa and links it to the Indian Ocean, <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-complicated-nature-of-red-sea-geopolitics/">constitutes 10% of annual global trade </a>. </p>
<p>The Red Sea route passes countries such as <a href="https://african.business/2023/07/apo-newsfeed/eritrea-president-isaias-afwerki-held-talks-with-president-putin">Eritrea</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-says-russia-grants-relief-debt-worth-684-million-2023-07-27/">Somalia</a>. Both have been actively courted by Russia.</p>
<p>For its part, China has earmarked the route through its <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-maritime-silk-road-and-security-red-sea-region">Maritime Silk Road </a> initiative. Its aim is to boost port infrastructure among countries with Indian Ocean coastlines. </p>
<p>Lastly, Africa is home to the fastest-growing youth population. This will be important in the search for future markets, particularly in sectors such as technology and education.</p>
<p>The US and Europe are also keen to tap this human capacity as their own populations age above the global average. Many are looking to Africa <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/beyond-the-headlines-as-china-and-india-age-young-africa-has-potential-to-power-global-workforce/">as a source</a> of inward migratory flows.</p>
<h2>Africa’s ties with the major powers</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c842%7c%7c%7c7%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1">2022</a>, the continent as a whole exported US$43.1 billion worth of goods to the US and imported goods worth US$30.6 billion.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c156%7c%7c%7c7%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1">By comparison</a>, China exported US$164.1 billion to Africa and imported US$117.5 billion worth of African goods, in the same year. With African exports totalling US$661.4 billion, the US accounts for 6.5% and China 17.7%. </p>
<p>China, the notable growth story of the past half-century, has thus become the African continent’s single biggest trading partner, though the combined power of the European Union’s trading bloc of 27 countries <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234977/main-trade-partners-of-africa/">still leads</a>.</p>
<p>China’s ties with the continent are the result of decades of diplomatic and commercial efforts to woo the continent through the <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">Forum on China–Africa Cooperation</a>. Part of this has been driven by its desire to counter the US. The other driving force has been to sustain its economy, given Africa’s untapped potential.</p>
<p>Russia has pursued a different strategy. Given that its trade with the continent is at a minimum – <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c643%7c%7c%7c7%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1">exports</a> and <a href="https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c643%7c%7c%7c7%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1">imports</a> were around US$18 billion in 2021 – it has rather sought to become a security partner, drawing on sentimentalised Soviet history.</p>
<p>Washington’s principal instrument for growing trade, and encouraging good behaviour, in Africa is the <a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a>, set to expire in 2025. The framework is a lever. But, as <a href="https://african.business/2022/11/trade-investment/us-trade-with-africa-in-decline-but-aid-remains-stable#:%7E:text=The%20overall%20value%20of%20US%20exports%20to%20the%20continent%20fell,the%20United%20States%20Census%20Bureau.">the data show</a>, trade is in evident decline. </p>
<p>The general picture can obscure some nuances. Some African states are more deeply intertwined with the US than others. For example, Djibouti has an <a href="https://politicstoday.org/djibouti-surrounded-by-military-bases-of-china-us-france-uk-germany-others/">American military base</a> (along with other states, though not Russia at this point). And Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are also among the <a href="https://afr-ix.com/comparison-of-fdi-in-africa/">top recipients</a> of US direct investment. </p>
<p>On the other hand, Eritrea, which was the only African state to brazenly vote against the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seems to have no aspirations to be in America’s good graces. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-peace-will-mean-for-eritrea-africas-north-korea-100063">notorious</a> outlier aside, the world is deeply intertwined, with high interdependence even among the competing major powers. </p>
<p>The US and China, despite their trade war, have struggled to decouple from one another, with their bilateral trade <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-trade-in-goods-hits-new-record-in-2022-what-does-it-mean-for-bilateral-ties/#:%7E:text=US%2DChina%20trade%20in%20goods%20in%202022,to%20reach%20US%24153.8%20billion.">reaching new heights</a> as recently as last year.</p>
<p>In light of the comparatively diminished US-Africa trade, the US may be looking to make use of third parties. It could potentially influence the EU to influence Africa. The Huawei issue demonstrates this. The US has successfully pressured quite a few of its allies to halt doing business with the Chinese technology giant. According to <a href="https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-reached-record-83-billion-2021">Unctad data</a>, France (US$60 billion) and the UK (US$65 billion) are the principal holders of African assets.</p>
<p>As these and other European states seek to “<a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20230720113914406">de-risk</a>” from China, there may be third-party consequences for Africa. This might include undue pressure on the continent to behave in certain ways towards China and towards Russia.</p>
<h2>Picking sides isn’t the best option</h2>
<p>Recent research, including my own on <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-98076-4">US-China trade “competition”</a> over Africa, shows that the prevailing notion that smaller countries need to “pick sides” in polarised global contexts is false. Africa is best served when it conducts trade with as many partners as possible. </p>
<p>Indeed, as shown, the major contenders are themselves conducting <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-trade-in-goods-hits-new-record-in-2022-what-does-it-mean-for-bilateral-ties/#:%7E:text=US%2DChina%20trade%20in%20goods%20in%202022,to%20reach%20US%24153.8%20billion.">record-breaking trade</a> with one another. </p>
<p>All the while, Europe continues to conduct trade with Russia following the war against Ukraine (indeed, it is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/numbers-delayed-impact-eu-european-union-war-sanctions-russia-vladimir-putin/">growing</a> in some respects). </p>
<p>The continent can, therefore, afford to be neutral. What it cannot afford to do is pick sides and preclude any partnerships. In the oncoming multipolar order, there are no self-evident, African-specific needs to pick sides. All options can be on the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bhaso Ndzendze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African continent is an obvious contender for courting by major powers.Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2100212023-08-18T13:26:16Z2023-08-18T13:26:16ZAs BRICS cooperation accelerates, is it time for the US to develop a BRICS policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542982/original/file-20230816-25-afpteq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C129%2C3573%2C2263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">BRICS foreign ministers meet in Cape Town, South Africa, in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-5-brics-countries-qin-news-photo/1258481879?adppopup=true">Jaco Marais/Die Burger/Gallo Images via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When leaders of the BRICS group of large emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/key-facts-about-brics-2023-summit-2023-08-07/">meet in Johannesburg for two days beginning on Aug. 22, 2023</a>, foreign policymakers in Washington will no doubt be listening carefully.</p>
<p>The BRICS group has been <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/brics-rivalry">challenging some key tenets</a> of U.S. global leadership in recent years. On the diplomatic front, it has undermined the
White House’s strategy on Ukraine by <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ukraine-war-brics-iran-argentina-russia-china-brazil-india/">countering the Western use of sanctions</a> on Russia. Economically, it has sought to chip away at U.S. dominance by <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brics-currency-is-unlikely-to-dislodge-dollar-any-time-soon-but-it-signifies-growing-challenge-to-established-economic-order-206565">weakening the dollar’s role</a> as the world’s default currency. </p>
<p>And now the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-08-11-extra-brics-members-should-be-about-more-than-the-west-versus-the-rest/">group is looking at expanding</a>, with 23 formal candidates. Such a move – especially if BRICS accepts <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">Iran, Cuba or Venezuela</a> – would likely strengthen the group’s anti-U.S. positioning.</p>
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<p>So what can Washington expect next, and how can it respond? </p>
<p>Our research team at Tufts University has been working on a multiyear <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/rising-power-alliances-project">Rising Power Alliances</a> project that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540661231183352">has analyzed</a> the evolution of BRICS and the group’s relationship with the U.S. What we have found is that the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/can-china-achieve-its-brics-ambitions/">common portrayal of BRICS as a China-dominated</a> group primarily pursuing anti-U.S. agendas is misplaced. </p>
<p>Rather, the BRICS countries connect around common development interests and a quest for a multipolar world order in which no single power dominates. Yet BRICS consolidation has turned the group into a potent negotiation force that now challenges Washington’s geopolitical and economic goals. Ignoring BRICS as a major policy force – something the U.S. has been <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40647-014-0022-2">prone to do in the past</a> – is no longer an option. </p>
<h2>Reining in the America bashing</h2>
<p>At the dawn of BRIC cooperation in 2008 – before South Africa joined in 2010, adding an “S” – members were mindful that the group’s existence could lead to tensions with policymakers who viewed the U.S. as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/madeleine-albright-saw-us-as-an-indispensable-nation-and-nato-expansion-eastward-as-essential-179925">world’s “indispensable nation</a>.” </p>
<p>As <a href="https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-could-take-brics-forward/">Brazil’s former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim observed</a> at the time, “We should promote a more democratic world order by ensuring the fullest participation of developing countries in decision-making bodies.” He saw BRIC countries “as a bridge between industrialized and developing countries for sustainable development and a more balanced international economic policy.” </p>
<p>While such realignments would certainly dilute U.S. power, BRIC explicitly refrained from anti-U.S. rhetoric. </p>
<p>After the 2009 BRIC summit, the <a href="http://vancouver.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/news/200906/t20090617_4877401.htm">Chinese foreign ministry clarified</a> that BRIC cooperation should not be “directed against a third party.” Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had already <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-reluctant-to-join-de-dollarisation-chorus-at-bric/articleshow/4659464.cms?from=mdr">confirmed that there would be no America bashing</a> at BRIC and directly rejected China’s and Russia’s efforts to weaken the dollar’s dominance.</p>
<p>Rather, the new entity complemented existing efforts toward multipolarity – including <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234074?ln=en">China-Russia cooperation</a> and the <a href="https://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/">India, Brazil, South Africa trilateral dialogue</a>. Not only was BRIC envisioned as a forum for ideas rather than ideologies, but it also planned to stay <a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html">open and transparent</a>. </p>
<h2>BRICS alignment and tensions with the US</h2>
<p>Today, BRICS is a formidable group – <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/14/WS6438c78ba31057c47ebba230.html">it accounts for</a> 41% of the world’s population, 31.5% of global gross domestic product and 16% of global trade. As such, it has a lot of bargaining power if the countries act together – which they increasingly do. During the Ukraine war, Moscow’s BRICS partners have ensured Russia’s economic and diplomatic survival in the face of Western attempts to isolate Moscow. Brazil, India, China and South Africa engaged with Russia in 166 <a href="http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zg2022/EC2022/">BRICS events</a> in 2022. And some members became crucial export markets for Russia. </p>
<p>The group’s political development – through which it has continually added new areas of cooperation and extra “bodies” – is impressive, considering the vast differences among its members.</p>
<p>We designed a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352">BRICS convergence index</a> to measure how BRICS states converged around 47 specific policies between 2009 and 2021, ranging from economics and security to sustainable development. We found deepening convergence and cooperation across these issues and particularly around industrial development and finance.</p>
<p>But BRICS convergence does not necessarily lead to greater tension with the United States. Our data finds limited divergence between the joint policies of BRICS and that of the U.S. on a wide range of issues. Our research also counters the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231367/why-chinas-dominance-puts-brics-expansion-plans-and-very-existence-jeopardy">argument</a> that BRICS is China-driven. Indeed, China has been unable to advance some key policy proposals. For example, since the 2011 BRICS summit, China has sought to establish a BRICS free trade agreement but could not get support from other states. And despite various trade coordination mechanisms in BRICS, the overall trade among BRICS remains low – <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-floats-brics-free-trade-093000443.html">only 6% of the countries’ combined trade</a>.</p>
<p>However, tensions between the United States and BRICS exist, especially when BRICS turns “bloc-like” and when U.S. global interests are at stake. The turning point for this was 2015, when BRICS achieved major institutional growth under Russia’s presidency. This coincided with Moscow enhancing its <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953">pivot to China</a> and BRICS following Western sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia was eager to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/can-brics-dedollarize-the-global-financial-system/0AEF98D2F232072409E9556620AE09B0">develop alternatives</a> to Western-led institutional and market mechanisms it could no longer benefit from.</p>
<p>That said, important champions of BRICS convergence are also close strategic partners to the U.S. For example, India has played a major role in strengthening the security dimension of BRICS cooperation, championing <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/3/801/6226154">a counter-terrorism agenda</a> that has drawn U.S. <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/179207.pdf">opposition</a> due to its vague definition of terrorist actors. </p>
<p>Further constraints on U.S. power may emerge from BRICS <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-14/brics-isn-t-competing-with-any-bloc-south-africa-s-sooklal-says">transitioning to using local currencies</a> over the dollar and encouraging BRICS candidate countries to do the same. Meanwhile, China and Russia’s efforts to engage BRICS on <a href="https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/china-russia-space-cooperation-may-2023">outer space governance</a> is another trend for policymakers in Washington to watch.</p>
<h2>Toward a US BRICS Policy?</h2>
<p>So where does a more robust – and potentially larger – BRICS leave the U.S.? </p>
<p>To date, U.S. policy has largely ignored BRICS as an entity. The U.S. foreign and defense policymaking apparatus is regionally oriented. In the past 20 years, it has pivoted from the Middle East <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">to Asia</a> and most recently to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">the Indo-Pacific region</a>. </p>
<p>When it comes to the BRICS nations, Washington has focused on developing bilateral relations with Brazil, India and South Africa, while managing tensions with China and isolating Russia. The challenge for the Biden administration is understanding how, as a group, BRICS’ operations and institutions affect U.S. global interests.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, BRICS expansion raises new questions. When asked about U.S. partners such as Algeria and Egypt wanting to join BRICS, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/07/24/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-44/">the Biden administration explained</a> that it does not ask partners to choose between the United States and other countries. </p>
<p>But the international demand for joining BRICS calls for a deeper reflection on how Washington pursues foreign policy.</p>
<p>Designing a BRICS-focused foreign policy is an opportunity for the United States to innovate around addressing development needs. Rather than dividing countries into friendly democracies and others, a BRICS-focused policy can see the Biden administration <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/21/united-nations-general-assembly-biden-us-sustainable-development-goals/">lead on universal development issues</a> and build development-focused, close relationships that encourage a better alignment between countries of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">the Global South</a> and the United States.</p>
<p>It could also allow the Biden administration to deepen cooperation with India, Brazil, South Africa and some of the new BRICS candidates. Areas of focus could include issues where the BRICS countries <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352">have struggled to coordinate their policy</a>, such as AI development and governance, energy security and global restrictions on chemical and biological weapons. </p>
<p>Developing a BRICS policy could help re-imagine U.S. foreign policy and ensure that the United States is well positioned in a multipolar world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210021/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mihaela Papa previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank O'Donnell previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zhen Han previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.</span></em></p>BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – compose 41% of the world population and almost a third of global GDP.Mihaela Papa, Senior Fellow, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityFrank O'Donnell, Adjunct Lecturer in the International Studies Program, Boston CollegeZhen Han, Assistant Professor of Global Studies, Sacred Heart UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110492023-08-07T12:46:48Z2023-08-07T12:46:48ZUkraine war: talks in Jeddah give Kyiv an opportunity to push its ten-point plan to Brics and the global south<p>As the war in Ukraine escalated on and beyond the existing battlefields with intensified <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66419331">air</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66402046">drone</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66383377">ground operations</a>, more than 40 countries met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, over the weekend of August 5-6 2023, to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-calls-jeddah-talks-productive-russia-calls-them-doomed-2023-08-06/">discuss peace</a>. </p>
<p>The talks in Jeddah were the latest effort to rally support behind Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s ten-point peace plan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/we-will-have-fight-longer-liberate-ukrainian-land-says-zelenskiy-2022-11-15/">first presented</a> at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, on November 15 2022. Aimed at mobilising a global and diverse coalition of support, these efforts are not only about bringing this or that particular vision of peace to a war in the heart of Europe. Their deeper significance lies in the continuing shifts in the international order that they reflect.</p>
<p>No breakthrough joint declaration was reached in Jeddah. This is hardly surprising given that some <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/6/7414426/">40 countries participated</a> with very diverse views on the war, its causes and possible solutions. But the fact the meeting was attended, not only by the “usual suspects” among Ukraine’s western partners, but also by four of the five <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brics.asp">Brics members</a> was highly significant. Brazil, India, China and South Africa all sent senior envoys. The fifth member of the bloc, Russia, was not invited.</p>
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<p>The meeting in Jeddah followed an earlier one in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-peace-summit-talks-make-progress-long-way-go-officials-2023-06-26/">Copenhagen</a> at the end of June. Taking place at the same time as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-seriously-weakened-by-wagner-group-mutiny-but-it-was-a-missed-opportunity-for-ukraine-too-208426">ultimately failed mutiny unfolded</a> in Russia, the Copenhagen gathering was a more low-key affair without Chinese participation.</p>
<p>In Jeddah, China not only participated but also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-ukraine-peace-talks-russia-war-in-saudi-arabia/">sent</a> its Ukraine point man – the special representative of the Chinese government on Eurasian affairs, Li Hui. Li attended <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/doval-in-jeddah-for-2-day-nsa-conference-on-ukraine/article67162395.ece">alongside</a> US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, and his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval. This is indicative of the importance that China and India – two key Russian allies among Brics – assign to these western-backed Ukrainian efforts to galvanise support for Zelensky’s ten-point plan.</p>
<h2>Russia under pressure</h2>
<p>That China remains engaged in, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/06/china-backs-further-ukraine-peace-talks-saudi-arabia-summit">supports</a>, the continuation of discussions around Ukraine’s plan will be deeply worrying for Russia. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">plan calls for the</a> restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied Ukrainian lands, and a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes.</p>
<p>In fact, commenting on the Jeddah meeting, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, was only able to <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1657191">express an expectation</a> that “a relevant exchange of views between us and the Brics participants who were there at different levels will be held”. This does not bode well for Russia, which will not be represented by Vladimir Putin, at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">upcoming</a> Brics summit in South Africa. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66247067">Putin</a> is subject to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134732">arrest warrant</a> issued by the International Criminal Court, which South Africa is bound as a signatory to execute. </p>
<p>Adding further to a sense of continuing marginalisation of Russia, even in formats such as the Brics, Moscow has also been subject to pressure from some of its traditional African allies over the war in Ukraine. An <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-failed-african-peace-mission-underscores-need-for-more-powerful-political-and-military-pressure-on-putin-208162">African peace mission</a> to St Petersburg in June 2023, just before the Copenhagen meeting, yielded no success. </p>
<p>What’s worse for Moscow, a second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg on July 27 and 28 2023 was an almost unmitigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">disaster</a> for Putin. The Russian president’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse">justifications for abandoning</a> the Black Sea <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf">grain deal</a> fell on deaf ears among the significantly lower number of African leaders who even bothered to attend the gathering.</p>
<h2>Different drivers, one outcome: a changing world order</h2>
<p>But at the same time, it is important not to overestimate the momentum that appears to be slowly building behind Zelensky’s western-backed peace plan. Proposals for a ceasefire to be followed by negotiations, like that <a href="https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2023/provisional-transcripts/p-3/general-retd-prabowo-subianto-minister-of-defense-indonesia---as-delivered.pdf">suggested</a> by Indonesia’s defence minister, Prabowo Subianto, at the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2023">2023 Shangri-La dialogue</a> in early June, remain on the table. </p>
<p>They may not get traction in Kyiv or western capitals, but they are mirrored in similar efforts, including by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-asks-italian-cardinal-carry-out-peace-mission-ukraine-war-vatican-says-2023-05-20/">Vatican</a> and the group of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-ukraine-agree-african-mission-potential-peace-plan-ramaphosa-says-2023-05-16/">African leaders</a> who travelled to Kyiv and St Petersburg in June on a peace mission of their own.</p>
<p>Above all, China has not given up on its peace plan either. Beijing’s “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis</a>”, like the Indonesian, African and Vatican proposals, also prioritises a ceasefire over the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. And Beijing is unlikely to change its stance in this regard until something more compelling emerges that would serve China’s own interests better in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">becoming</a> a major player in a new Eurasian, and global, security order.</p>
<p>This highlights a deeper meaning to the summit. It’s not merely the various different peace plans on the table. But the emergence of a variety of coalitions pushing for different visions of a peace settlement is also of huge significance. This ultimately reflects – and will determine – the nature of the new international order that is emerging. </p>
<p>The meeting in Jeddah, inconclusive as it may have been, signals a continuing shift in Ukraine’s favour, albeit at glacial speed. This is driven by the self-interests of those involved, be it <a href="https://theconversation.com/food-crisis-in-africa-the-high-cost-of-imported-fertilisers-is-adding-to-the-problem-209664">African</a> food security, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">Chinese</a> great-power ambitions, or <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5d69508a-e8c3-46b7-82cf-8c033499b445">Saudi</a> middle-power aspirations. </p>
<p>All of these and other players may <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3230083/saudi-arabia-hosts-ukraine-peace-talks-bid-become-global-mediator">agree</a> with Ukraine and its western partners “that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty should be at the heart of any peace settlement”. But this should not be mistaken for a reaffirmation of a US-led international order. If anything, it is another indication of its replacement which will be decided both on the battlefield in Ukraine and at a future negotiation table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Ukraine was able to advance its plan for peace with an audience including China and other Brics nations.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105072023-08-06T08:47:35Z2023-08-06T08:47:35ZAn expanded BRICS could reset world politics but picking new members isn’t straightforward<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540476/original/file-20230801-18384-y0dg77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C127%2C2813%2C1757&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa will host the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Government Communication and Information System</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Eager to <a href="https://lmc.icds.ee/lennart-meri-lecture-by-fiona-hill/">escape perceived western domination</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/more-countries-want-to-join-brics-says-south-africa-/7190526.html#:%7E:text=Argentina%2C%20Iran%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20and,nations%20have%20in%20the%20organization.">several countries</a> – mostly in the global south – are looking to join the <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/#">Brics</a> bloc. The five-country bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is also looking to grow its global partnerships. </p>
<p>What <a href="https://www.gov.za/events/fifth-brics-summit-general-background">began in 2001</a> as an acronym for four of the fastest growing states, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), is projected to account for 45% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms by 2030. It has evolved into a political formation as well.</p>
<p>Crucial to this was these countries’ decision to form their own club <a href="http://infobrics.org/page/history-of-brics/">in 2009</a>, instead of joining an expanded G7 as envisioned by former Goldman Sachs CEO <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/archive/building-better.html">Jim O’Neill</a>, who coined the term “Bric”. <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1">Internal cohesion</a> on key issues has emerged and continues to be refined, despite challenges.</p>
<p>South Africa joined the group after a Chinese-initiated invitation <a href="https://www.gov.za/events/fifth-brics-summit-general-background">in 2010</a>; a boost for then president Jacob Zuma’s administration, which was eager to pivot further to the east. The bloc also gained by having a key African player and regional leader. </p>
<p>Ever since, the grouping has taken on a more pointedly political tone, particularly on the need to <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/10th-brics-summit-johannesburg-declaration-27-jul-2018-0000#:%7E:text=We%20recommit%20our%20support%20for,democracy%20and%20the%20rule%20of">reform global institutions</a>, in addition to its original economic raison d’etre.</p>
<p>The possibility of its enlargement has dominated headlines in the run up to its 15th summit in Johannesburg <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/about-the-summit/">on 22-24 August</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">When two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries</a>
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<p>We are political scientists whose <a href="https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-political-economy-of-intra-brics-cooperation-siphamandla-zondi/1140951138">research interests</a> include <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-62765-2">changes</a> to the global order and emerging alternative centres of power. In our view, it won’t be easy to expand the bloc. That’s because the group is still focused on harmonising its vision, and the potential new members do not readily make the cut. </p>
<p>Some may even bring destabilising dynamics for the current composition of the formation. This matters because it tells us that the envisioned change in the global order is likely to be much slower. Simply put, while some states are opposed to western <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">hegemony</a>, they do not yet agree among themselves on what the new alternative should be. </p>
<h2>Evolution of BRICS</h2>
<p>BRICS’ overtly political character <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-62765-2_1">partially draws</a> on a long history of non-alignment as far back as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference">Bandung Conference of 1955</a>. It was attended mostly by recently decolonised states and independence movements intent on asserting themselves against Cold War superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. </p>
<p>BRICS has come to be viewed as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13540661231183352">challenging the counter hegemony</a> of the US and its allies, seen as meddling in the internal affairs of other states. </p>
<p>Reuters estimates that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/more-than-40-nations-interested-joining-brics-south-africa-2023-07-20/#:%7E:text=South%20African%20officials%20want%20BRICS,Kazakhstan%20have%20all%20expressed%20interest.">more than 40 states</a> are aspiring to join BRICS. South African diplomat Anil Sooklal says 13 had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/05/28/how-brics-became-a-real-club-and-why-others-want-in/5caecc7e-fdb7-11ed-9eb0-6c94dcb16fcf_story.html">formally applied</a> by May 2023.</p>
<p>Many, though not all, of the aspiring joiners have this overtly political motivation of countering US hegemony. The other important incentive is access to funds from the BRICS’ <a href="https://www.ndb.int/projects/">New Development Bank</a>. This is especially pronounced in the post-COVID climate in which many economies are <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136727#:%7E:text=Prospects%20for%20a%20robust%20global,Prospects%20report%2C%20released%20on%20Tuesday.">yet to fully recover</a>. Of course the two can overlap, as in the case of Iran.</p>
<p>The notable applicants have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-it-has-applied-join-brics-club-russian-ria-agency-2023-07-25/">included</a> Saudi Arabia, Belarus, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-wants-to-join-the-brics-group-of-nations-an-expert-unpacks-the-pros-and-cons-209141">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-says-has-chinas-support-join-brics-group-2022-07-07/">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">Algeria, Iran</a>, Mexico, and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-obvious-nation-for-expanded-brics-says-leading-economist/2896122">Turkey</a>. </p>
<h2>Expanded BRICS</h2>
<p>A strategically expanded BRICS would be seismic for the world order, principally in economic terms. </p>
<p>Key among the club’s reported priorities is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-states-russia-china/">reduction of reliance</a> on the US dollar (“de-dollarisation” of the global economy). One of the hurdles to this is the lack of buy-in by much of the world. Though some states may disagree with the dollar’s dominance, they still see it as the most reliable.</p>
<p>Given the extent of globalisation, it’s unlikely that there will be attempts to chip away at the west’s access to strategic minerals and trade routes as happened during the <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/speech-president-nasser-alexandria-july-26-1956-extract">Suez Crisis of 1956</a>, at the height of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Instead, the new joiners would likely use their new BRICS membership to better bargain with their western partners, having more options on hand.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-wants-to-join-the-brics-group-of-nations-an-expert-unpacks-the-pros-and-cons-209141">Ethiopia wants to join the BRICS group of nations: an expert unpacks the pros and cons</a>
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<p>Herein lies the challenge (and the paradox) with BRICS expansion. On one hand, the grouping is not yet offering anything concrete to justify such drastic measures as de-dollarisation. On the other, the current five members also need to be selective about who they admit.</p>
<p>Among the considerations must surely be the track record of the applicants as well as their closeness to the west. The experience of having had a right-wing leader such as former Brazilian president <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-jair-bolsonaro-is-devastating-indigenous-lands-with-the-world-distracted-138478">Jair Bolsonaro</a> in its midst must have been a lesson about the need to be circumspect when admitting new members.</p>
<h2>Weighing the likely contenders</h2>
<p>In this regard, aspirants such as Saudi Arabia and Mexico seem the least likely to make the cut in the short term. That’s despite the Saudis’ oil wealth and Mexico’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/obrador-mexico-first-leftist-president-in-decades/4463520.html">leftist-progressive</a> leader Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Although they might be currently experiencing rocky relations with Washington, they have proven to be capable of rapprochement following previous disagreements with the US, with which they seem inextricably intertwined. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has a long-term military relationship with the US, while Mexico is the US’s <a href="https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2023/0711#:%7E:text=and%20border%20region-,Mexico%20seeks%20to%20solidify%20rank%20as%20top,partner%2C%20push%20further%20past%20China&text=Mexico%20became%20the%20top%20U.S.,four%20months%20of%20this%20year.">number-one trading partner</a>. </p>
<p>Of equal importance in the evaluation of potential new members is the relationship the aspirants have with the existing BRICS members. This is because another crucial lesson has been the tiff between two of its largest members, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20578911221108800?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.1">China and India</a>, over their disputed border. As a result of the uneasy relationship between two of its members, the bloc has become alert to the importance of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1758-5899.13010">direct bilateral relations and dispute resolution</a> among its constituent leaders.</p>
<p>Among the applicants, Saudi Arabia, which has had a fractious relationship with Moscow in the past, seems to face an uphill climb. It also has difficult relations with Iran, another applicant, despite their recent rapprochement.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">South Africa's role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists</a>
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<p>The country which seems the most suitable to join BRICS for ideological reasons, and will expand the bloc’s footing in the Caribbean, is Cuba. It enjoys strong ties with the existing members. It also has solid “counter-hegemonic” credentials, having been the bête noire of the US for more than 60 years. </p>
<p>Cuba is also a leader in the Latin American left and enjoys strong ties with many states in Central and South America (particularly with Guatemala, <a href="https://latinarepublic.com/2022/07/20/honduras-and-cuba-sign-a-memorandum-to-strengthen-bilateral-relations/">Honduras</a>, <a href="https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/07/27/nicaraguan-fm-described-relations-with-cuba-as-endearing/">Nicaragua</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/venezuela-and-cuba-ties-bind">Venezuela</a>). Membership would boost its influence. </p>
<h2>Character matters</h2>
<p>If an expanded BRICS is to be an agent for change on the world scene, it will need to be capable of action. Having rivals, or states that are at least ambivalent towards each other, seems anathema to that.</p>
<p>Eager to proceed cautiously and expand strategically, the current BRICS states seems likely, at least in the short term, to pursue a <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">BRICS-plus</a> strategy. In other words, there may emerge different strata of membership, with full membership granted to states that meet the group’s criteria over time. </p>
<p>It is thus not mere expansion, but the character of the expansion which will guide the five principals on whether they grow from that number.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi is affiliated with the University of Johannesburg. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bhaso Ndzendze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is not mere expansion, but the character of the expansion which will guide the five Brics countries on whether they admit new members.Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of JohannesburgSiphamandla Zondi, Acting Director: Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2091412023-07-11T16:16:27Z2023-07-11T16:16:27ZEthiopia wants to join the BRICS group of nations: an expert unpacks the pros and cons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536810/original/file-20230711-23-y6x8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) with China's President Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andy Wong / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A few years ago, the BRICS grouping – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa – had lost salience because three of its members were in severe economic difficulty. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are primarily natural resource exporters and were badly affected by the global <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/what-triggered-oil-price-plunge-2014-2016-and-why-it-failed-deliver-economic-impetus-eight-charts">commodity price bust</a> of 2014.</p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine has now given BRICS a new geopolitical salience as the members and their respective allies respond to events. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">South Africa's role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists</a>
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<p>In the emerging world order there is also now <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/world/brics-gets-influx-of-interest-as-saudi-arabia-iran-and-more-knock-on-its-door-will-members-open-up-11682501595762.html">increased demand</a> to join BRICS, in part as a countervailing power to “the west”. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-says-has-chinas-support-join-brics-group-2022-07-07/">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=393341622&Country=China&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations&oid=863331669&flid=93319592">Saudi Arabia</a> and lately, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-applies-to-join-brics-bloc-of-emerging-economies-4288736">Ethiopia</a>, have expressed strong interest in becoming members.</p>
<p>I have researched the political economy of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=P%C3%A1draig+Carmody+%2B+RESEARCH&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">globalisation in Africa</a> over the last 30 years. I have specifically examined the scramble for Africa by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629807000406">the US and China</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/ejdr.2012.8">South Africa’s involvement in BRICS</a>, the nature of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/33547/chapter-abstract/287921649?redirectedFrom=fulltext">BRICS engagement with Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1337359">market and resource access by BRICS in southern Africa</a>.
It would be a major coup for Ethiopia if it were able to join the grouping as it would raise its global profile, allow it to interact and coordinate more closely with some of the major world powers and move the discourse beyond the recent civil war there, potentially enabling it to attract more investment.</p>
<h2>Opportunities</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopia-submits-application-to-join-brics-bloc-of-developing-nations/">cited</a> its key role in founding the African Union and other institutions, along with its national interest as grounds for seeking BRICS membership. In my opinion, there are five key reasons why Ethiopia would want to join the grouping. </p>
<p><strong>Deteriorating relations with western powers</strong>: Ethiopia has historically depended on substantial western support through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-suspends-food-aid-ethiopia-because-diversions-2023-06-08/">aid</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">security</a> cooperation. But its relations with the west <a href="https://ethiopianbusinessreview.net/foreign-aid-holds-itself-back/">have soured</a> as a result of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">civil war</a>, in which human rights violations were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/un-experts-warn-potential-further-atrocities-amid-resumption-conflict">reported</a>. Joining BRICS would make the country more geostrategically important, perhaps encouraging western powers to downplay human rights concerns, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/58653/drc-how-the-cia-got-under-patrice-lumumbas-skin/">as they have in the past</a> in the interests of “realpolitik”.</p>
<p><strong>Alternative growth frontier</strong>: Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, at <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook">over 5% a year</a>. It has developed strong <a href="https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-ali-meets-with-qin-gang?lang=en">economic ties</a> with China in recent decades. Similarly, <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_33771">Indian companies</a> have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10455752.2012.759247/">acquiring land</a> in Ethiopia. China and India are now Africa’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234977/main-trade-partners-of-africa/">two largest</a> single trading partners (not counting the European Union as a single entity). Joining BRICS would signal openness and lead to greater cooperation through platforms like the business council and forum. It could also add impetus to the “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-real-is-the-ethiopia_b_7985180">resurgent Ethiopia</a>” narrative, an image the authorities are keen to promote to attract investments. </p>
<p><strong>Negotiations over finance</strong>: The Ethiopian government is <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2023-04-08/IMF-talks-with-Ethiopia-to-continue-after-progress-made-1iONtaKnpLi/index.html">negotiating</a> a financial package with the International Monetary Fund. Joining BRICS might give it greater leverage. Western powers, which largely control the IMF, might be more wary of alienating Ethiopia in BRICS and driving it further “into the arms” of China. The creation of a new BRICS currency, to challenge US dollar hegemony, is on the agenda and its existing Contingency Reserve Arrangement already partly competes with the IMF. </p>
<p><strong>Non-interference policy</strong>: BRICS powers rhetorically largely subscribe to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep05168.10.pdf">non-interference</a> in the sovereign affairs of other states, with the qualification that President Lula de Silva of Brazil <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285596738_Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_under_Lula_from_non-intervention_to_non-indifference">talked about</a> “non-indifference” to human rights when he was previously in power and Russia has violated the principle through invasions and election interference, amongst others. Ethiopia may be interested in the political cover that joining BRICS would provide. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has received political cover from China, and some would argue from South Africa. The Ethiopian government may be keen to avoid human rights governance conditions attached to new loans, aid or debt relief from the west. </p>
<p><strong>A prime minister seeking new friends:</strong> BRICS membership would help restore the tarnished image of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who is a Nobel peace prize recipient. Ahmed was heavily <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-leader-marking-year-war-says-he-will-bury-his-foes-with-our-blood-2021-11-03/">criticised</a> as a war-monger during the civil war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Joining the BRICS club would show that his government is still politically acceptable to some major world powers. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Photo of Russian president Vladimir Putin with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed on the sidelines of the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi on 23 October 2019" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535799/original/file-20230705-15-sqixl8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abiy Ahmed with Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergei Chirikov/POOL/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The risks</h2>
<p>There would of course be risks in Ethiopia joining the BRICS. Western powers might perceive it as drifting into the alternative geopolitical bloc or alignment, which could reduce aid and investment from them. But this could also have advantages for Ethiopia’s relations with the west by making the country more geo-strategically important. </p>
<p>Based on past experience, Ethiopia would be an unlikely addition to the grouping. The last and only country to be admitted after the group’s founding was South Africa in 2010. Other countries have applied and have not been admitted. BRICS now operates in what is sometimes described as a <a href="https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-s-new-foreign-policy-concept-the-impact-on-brics-plus.html/">BRICS-plus</a> format with countries such as Egypt already members of its development bank and all African leaders invited to the up-coming BRICS’ summit in South Africa. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s economy, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ET">estimated</a> at around US$126.78 billion in 2022, is less than half the size of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZA">South Africa’s US$405.87 billion</a>. South Africa is by far the smallest economy in the BRICS. But in some ways Ethiopia might be seen as a more representative African country in BRICS than South Africa. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Its capital, Addis Ababa, is sometimes described as the continent’s diplomatic capital. The outcome of Ethiopia’s application will likely be known after the next summit in August.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Padraig Carmody previously received funding from National Geographic and the University of Johannesburg to conduct research on related topics. </span></em></p>There is increased demand to join BRICS in the emerging world order, partly as a countervailing power to “the west”.Padraig Carmody, Professor in Geography, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2065652023-06-22T12:45:30Z2023-06-22T12:45:30ZA BRICS currency is unlikely to dislodge dollar any time soon – but it signifies growing challenge to established economic order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533267/original/file-20230621-21-r6auqr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2658&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A window into a new way of doing global economic business.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-a-reflection-on-a-window-of-a-man-staring-at-the-news-photo/1258374197?adppopup=true">Rodger Bosch/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Could a new currency be set to challenge the dominance of the dollar? Perhaps, but that may not be the point.</p>
<p>In August 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/CyrilRamaphosa/status/1633803100308791299">South Africa will host</a> the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – a group of nations known by the acronym BRICS. Among <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-10/south-africa-urges-careful-debate-on-option-of-introducing-brics-common-currency#xj4y7vzkg">the items on the agenda</a> is the creation of a new joint BRICS currency. </p>
<p>As a scholar who has <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/cierp/rising-power-alliances-project/">studied the BRICS countries</a> for over a decade, I can certainly see why talk of a BRICS currency is, well, gaining currency. The BRICS summit comes as countries across the world are confronting a changing geopolitical landscape that is <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-forging-a-new-foreign-policy-in-the-face-of-war-in-ukraine-china-us-tensions-active-nonalignment-207078">challenging the traditional dominance of the West</a>. And while the BRICS countries have been seeking to reduce their reliance on the dollar for over a decade, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">Western sanctions on Russia</a> after its invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the process.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-65474456">rising interest rates</a> and the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-debt-ceiling-crises-and-the-political-chaos-theyve-unleashed-205178">debt-ceiling crisis</a> in the U.S. have raised concerns among other countries about their dollar-denominated debt and the demise of the dollar should the world’s leading economy ever default.</p>
<p>That all said, a new BRICS currency faces major hurdles before becoming a reality. But what currency discussions do show is that the BRICS countries are seeking to discover and develop new ideas about how to shake up international affairs and effectively coordinate policies around these ideas. </p>
<h2>De-dollarization momentum?</h2>
<p>With <a href="https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx22_fx.htm">88% of international transactions</a> conducted in U.S. dollars, and the dollar accounting for <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/24/economic-and-political-factors-behind-acceleration-of-de-dollarization.html">58% of global foreign exchange reserves</a>, the dollar’s global dominance is indisputable. Yet de-dollarization – or reducing an economy’s reliance on the U.S. dollar for international trade and finance – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/signs-de-dollarisation-emerge-dollar-top-currency-jpmorgan-2023-06-05/">has been accelerating</a> following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>The BRICS countries have been <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/can-brics-dedollarize-the-global-financial-system/0AEF98D2F232072409E9556620AE09B0">pursuing a wide range of initiatives</a> to decrease their dependence on the dollar. Over the past year, Russia, China and Brazil have <a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/dollar-dominance-russia-china-india-brazil-oil-trade-reserve-currency-2023-1">turned to</a> greater use of non-dollar currencies in their cross-border transactions. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are actively <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-dollars-dominance-is-declining-in-the-middle-east/a-65662358">exploring</a> dollar alternatives. And central banks have sought to shift more of their currency reserves away from the dollar and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ef6ed550-422a-4540-a8af-41ff2ac30e67">into gold</a>.</p>
<p>All the BRICS nations have been critical of the dollar’s dominance for different reasons. Russian officials have been championing de-dollarization to ease the pain from sanctions. Because of sanctions, Russian banks have been <a href="https://time.com/6153951/swift-sanctions-russia/">unable to use</a> SWIFT, the global messaging system that enables bank transactions. And the West froze Russia’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/repo-global-task-force-freeze-330-billion-russia-oligarch-assets-2022-6?utm_medium=ingest&utm_source=markets">US$330 billion</a> in reserves last year.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Under a banner with Chinese letter and 'XIV BRICS SUMMIT' five screens show the face of five world leaders in front of flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533301/original/file-20230621-11103-g7nxfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">BRICS leaders at the time of the 2022 summit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-hosts-the-14th-brics-summit-news-photo/1241486840?adppopup=true">Li Tao/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, the 2022 election in Brazil reinstated Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president. Lula is a longtime proponent of BRICS who previously sought to reduce Brazil’s dependence on and vulnerability to the dollar. He has reenergized the group’s commitment to de-dollarization and spoken about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-brazil-lula/update-1-brazils-lula-supports-trading-currency-for-brics-countries-idUSL1N36T1WW">creating a new Euro-like currency</a>.</p>
<p>The Chinese government has also clearly <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html">laid out its concerns</a> with the dollar’s dominance, labeling it “the main source of instability and uncertainty in the world economy.” Beijing directly blamed the Fed’s interest rate hike for causing turmoil in the international financial market and substantial depreciation of other currencies. Together with other BRICS countries, China has also <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Xi-rallies-BRICS-against-sanctions-abuse-Cold-War-mentality">criticized the use of sanctions</a> as a geopolitical weapon.</p>
<p>The appeal of de-dollarization and a possible BRICS currency would be to mitigate such problems. Experts in the U.S. are deeply divided on its prospects. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen believes <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/treasury-secretary-janet-yellen-says-041422267.html#:%7E:text=Treasury%20Secretary%20Janet%20Yellen%20said,most%20countries%20have%20no%20alternative.">the dollar will remain dominant</a> as most countries have no alternative. Yet a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-states-russia-china/">former White House economist sees a way that</a> a BRICS currency could end dollar dominance.</p>
<h2>Currency ambitions</h2>
<p>Although talk of a BRICS currency has gained momentum, there is limited information on various models under consideration.</p>
<p>The most ambitious path would be something akin to the Euro, the <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/html/index.en.html">single-currency adopted</a> by 11 member states of the European Union in 1999. But negotiating a single currency would be difficult given the economic power asymmetries and complex political dynamics within BRICS. And for a new currency to work, BRICS would need to agree to an exchange rate mechanism, have efficient payment systems and a well-regulated, stable and liquid financial market. To achieve a global currency status, BRICS would need a strong track record of joint currency management to convince others that the new currency is reliable.</p>
<p>A BRICS version of the Euro is unlikely for now; none of the countries involved show any desire to discontinue its local currency. Rather, the goal <a href="http://infobrics.org/post/38136">appears to be</a> to create an efficient integrated payment system for cross-border transactions as the first step and then introduce a new currency. </p>
<p>Building blocks for this already exist. In 2010, the <a href="http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zdhzlyhjz/others/202208/t20220826_10754259.html">BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism</a> was launched to facilitate cross-border payments between BRICS banks in local currencies. BRICS nations <a href="https://www.brics-pay.com/">have been developing “BRICS pay</a>” – a payment system for transactions among the BRICS without having to convert local currency into dollars. And there has been talk of a <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/brics-nations-discuss-shared-crypto-to-break-away-from-usd-and-swift">BRICS cryptocurrency</a> and of strategically aligning the development of <a href="https://cyberbrics.info/promoting-brics-economic-integration-via-central-bank-digital-currencies%EF%BF%BC">Central Bank Digital Currencies</a> to promote currency interoperability and economic integration. Since many countries expressed an interest in <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-05-07-countries-of-the-global-south-show-a-surge-of-interest-in-joining-brics-anil-sooklal/">joining BRICS</a>, the group is likely to scale its de-dollarization agenda. </p>
<h2>From BRICS vision to reality</h2>
<p>To be sure, some of the group’s most ambitious past initiatives to set up major BRICS projects to parallel non-Western infrastructures have failed. Big ideas like developing a <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/06/12/brics-setting-up-its-own-credit-rating-agency/">BRICS credit rating agency</a> and creating a <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/news/reactions-u-s-cybersecurity-policy-bric-undersea-cable/">BRICS undersea cable</a> never materialized. </p>
<p>And de-dollarization efforts have been struggling both at the multilateral and bilateral level. In 2014, when the BRICS countries launched the New Development Bank, its <a href="https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf">founding agreement</a> outlined that its operations may provide financing in the local currency of the country in which the operation takes place. Yet, in 2023, the bank remains heavily <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-bank-china-backed-to-challenge-the-dollar-now-needs-the-dollar-d9dc27ee">dependent on the dollar for its survival</a>. <a href="https://www.ndb.int/insights/address-by-ndb-president-dilma-rousseff-at-opening-of-the-plenary-session-of-the-8th-annual-meeting-of-the-ndb/">Local currency financing represents</a> around 22% of the bank’s portfolio, although its new president hopes to increase that to 30% by 2026. </p>
<p>Similar challenges exist in bilateral de-dollarization pursuits. Russia and India have sought to develop a mechanism for trading in local currencies, which would enable Indian importers to pay for Russia’s cheap oil and coal in rupees. However, <a href="https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2023-05-04/exclusive-india-russia-suspend-negotiations-to-settle-trade-in-rupees-sources">talks were suspended</a> after Moscow cooled on the idea of rupee accumulation.</p>
<p>Despite the barriers to de-dollarization, the BRICS group’s determination to act should not be dismissed – the group has been known for defying expectations in the past.</p>
<p>Despite many differences among the five countries, the bloc managed to develop joint policies and survive major crises such as the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13010">2020-21 China-India border clashes</a> and the war in Ukraine. BRICS has deepened its cooperation, invested in new financial institutions and has been continuously broadening the range of policy issues it addresses. </p>
<p>It now has a huge network of interlinked mechanisms that connect governmental officials, businesses, academics, think tanks and other stakeholders across countries. Even if there is no movement on the joint currency front, there are multiple issues on which BRICS finance ministers as well as central bankers regularly coordinate – and the potential for developing new financial collaborations is particularly strong. </p>
<p>No doubt, talk of a new BRICS currency in itself is an important indicator of the desire of many nations to diversify away from the dollar. But I believe focusing on the BRICS currency risks missing the forest for the trees. A new global economic order will not emerge out of a new BRICS currency or de-dollarization happening overnight. But it can potentially emerge out of BRICS’ commitment to coordinating their policies and innovating – something this currency initiative represents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mihaela Papa previously received funding for BRICS research from Minerva Research Initiative federal grant.
She is affiliated with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.</span></em></p>Talk of a joint BRICS currency feeds into ‘decline of the dollar’ rhetoric. But it is the economic bloc’s focus on innovation that will reshape the international system.Mihaela Papa, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Sustainable Development and Global Governance, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070782023-06-16T12:36:59Z2023-06-16T12:36:59ZThe Global South is forging a new foreign policy in the face of war in Ukraine, China-US tensions: Active nonalignment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532264/original/file-20230615-16608-dw7p4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=365%2C455%2C3502%2C2143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lula and Modi walking a new diplomatic path.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/vietnams-prime-minister-pham-minh-chinh-japans-prime-news-photo/1256611319?adppopup=true">Takashi Aoyama/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does the Ukraine war have to do with Brazil? On the face of it, perhaps not much.</p>
<p>Yet, in his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/01/1146518711/leftist-lula-brazil-sworn-in-president">first six months in office</a>, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – now in his third nonconsecutive term – has expended much effort <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">trying to bring peace</a> to the conflict in Eastern Europe. This has included <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/10/joint-statement-following-the-meeting-between-president-biden-and-president-lula/">conversations with U.S. President Joe Biden</a> in Washington, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230414_11059515.html">Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing</a> and in a teleconference call with <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/lula-speaks-via-videoconference-with-the-president-of-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a>. It has also seen “shuttle diplomacy” by Lula’s chief foreign policy adviser – and former foreign minister – Celso Amorim, who has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-envoy-met-putin-push-ukraine-peace-talks-cnn-brasil-2023-04-03/">visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/18/brazil-russia-ukraine-kirby-blowback-00092485">welcomed his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov</a>, in Brasília.</p>
<p>One reason Brazil has been in a position to meet with such an array of parties involved in the conflict is because the nation <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-wont-take-sides-over-russias-invasion-ukraine-foreign-minister-2022-03-08/">has made a point of not taking sides</a> in the war. In so doing, Brazil is engaging in what my colleagues <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/people/carlos-fortin/">Carlos Fortin</a> and <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/carlos-ominami">Carlos Ominami</a> <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/jorge-heine/">and I</a> have called “<a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2022/08/15/heine-outlines-the-doctrine-of-active-non-alignment/">active nonalignment</a>.” By this we mean a foreign policy approach in which countries from the Global South – Africa, Asia and Latin America – refuse to take sides in conflicts between the great powers and focus strictly on their own interests. It is an approach that The Economist has <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/04/11/how-to-survive-a-superpower-split">characterized as</a> “how to survive a superpower split.”</p>
<p>The difference between this new “nonalignment” and a similar approach <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">adopted by nations in decades past</a> is that it is happening in an era in which developing nations are in a much stronger position than they once were, with rising powers emerging among them. For example, the gross domestic product in regard to purchasing power of the five BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – has <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/03/27/the-brics-has-overtaken-the-g7-in-global-gdp/">overtaken that of the G7</a> group of advanced economic nations. This growing economic power gives active nonaligned nations more international clout, allowing them to forge new initiatives and diplomatic coalition-building in a manner that would have been unthinkable before. Would, for example, João Goulart, who served as <a href="https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-6/presidents/joao-goulart/">Brazil’s president from 1961 to 1964</a>, have attempted to mediate in the Vietnam War, in the same way that Lula is doing with Ukraine? I believe to ask the question is to answer it.</p>
<h2>Neither neutral nor disinterested</h2>
<p>The growth of active nonalignment has been fueled by the increased competition and what I see as a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">budding second Cold War</a> between the United States and China. For many countries in the Global South, maintaining good relations with both Washington and Beijing has been crucial for economic development, as well as trade and investment flows.</p>
<p>It is simply not in their interest to take sides in this growing conflict. At the same time, active nonalignment is not to be confused with neutrality – <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law8_final.pdf">a legal position under international law</a> that entails certain duties and obligations. Being neutral means not taking a stance, which is not the case in active nonalignment.</p>
<p>Nor is active nonalignment about remaining equidistant, politically, from the great powers. On some issues – say, on democracy and human rights – it is perfectly possible for an active nonaligned policy to take a position closer to the United States. While on others – say, international trade – the country may side more with China.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Men in suits stand by the coast." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=909&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532269/original/file-20230615-15503-3rtdan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1142&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavian President Marshal Tito at the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1956.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/from-left-to-right-egyptian-president-gamal-abdel-nasser-news-photo/1365178535?adppopup=true">Archive Photos/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>This form of nonalignment requires a highly fine-tuned diplomacy, one that examines each issue on its merits and makes choices steeped in statecraft. </p>
<h2>Opting out across the world</h2>
<p>As far as the war in Ukraine is concerned, it means not supporting either Russia or NATO. And Brazil isn’t the only country in the Global South taking that position, although it was the first to attempt to broker a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Across <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/05/western-allies-pressure-african-countries-to-condemn-russia/">Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Asia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fc8d51c8-5202-4862-a653-87d1603deded">Latin America</a>, several key countries have <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">refused to side with NATO</a>. Most prominent among them has been India, which despite its closer ties with the United States in recent years and its joining the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> – or the “Quad,” a group sometimes described as an “Asian NATO” – with the U.S., Japan and Australia, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/03/16/explainer-why-india-walks-a-tightrope-between-us-and-russia/8bbe579c-c3fa-11ed-82a7-6a87555c1878_story.html">refused to condemn Russia’s invasion</a> of Ukraine and has significantly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-16/india-now-buying-33-times-more-russian-oil-than-a-year-earlier">increased its imports of Russian oil</a>.</p>
<p>India’s nonalignment will presumably be on the agenda during <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-modi-india-state-visit-white-house-c969d6e4e9770c105ca7affe7c190714">Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with Biden</a> in his upcoming visit to Washington.</p>
<p>Indeed, the position of India, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12557384">world’s largest democracy</a>, shows how the war in Ukraine, far from reflecting that the main geopolitical cleavage in the world today is between democracy and autocracy, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/democracy-vs-autocracy-biden-s-inflection-point">as Biden has argued</a>, reveals that the real divide is between the Global North and the Global South.</p>
<p>Some of the most populous democracies in the world in addition to India – countries like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110">Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-plays-on-both-sides-of-ukraine-war/articleshow/98496174.cms?from=mdr">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/6/2/a-russian-love-affair-why-south-africa-stays-neutral-on-war">South Africa</a>, Brazil, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/blog-mexico-and-war-ukraine">Mexico</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/24/argentina-fernandez-russia-ukraine-war-brazil-lula-nonalignment/">Argentina</a> – have refused to side with NATO. Almost no country in Africa, Asia and Latin America has supported <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/countries-have-sanctioned-russia">the diplomatic and economic sanctions</a> against Russia. </p>
<p>Although many of these nations have voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly, where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/un-condemns-russias-annexations-in-ukraine-how-countries-voted">140-plus member states have repeatedly done so</a>, none wants to make what they consider to be a European war into a global one.</p>
<h2>How the ‘great powers’ are reacting</h2>
<p>Washington has seemingly been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/10/nonalignment-superpowers-developing-world-us-west-russia-china-india-geopolitics-ukraine-war-sanctions/">caught by surprise</a> by this reaction, having portrayed the war in Ukraine as a choice between good and evil – one where the future of the “rules-based international order” is at stake. Similarly, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/27/taking-nonalignment-seriously/">referred to nonalignment as “immoral</a>.”</p>
<p>Russia has seen the new nonaligned movement as an opening to bolster its own position, with Foreign Minister Lavrov <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/lavrov-returns-to-africa/">crisscrossing Africa, Asia and Latin America</a> to buttress Moscow’s opposition to sanctions. China, in turn, has ramped up its campaign to enhance the <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-might-give-the-chinese-yuan-the-boost-it-needs-to-become-a-major-global-currency-and-be-a-serious-contender-against-the-us-dollar-205519">international role of the yuan</a>, arguing that the weaponization of the U.S. dollar against Russia only confirms the dangers of relying on it as the main world currency.</p>
<p>But I would argue that active nonalignment depends as much on regional multilateralism and cooperation as it does on these high-profile meetings. A recent <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/south-americas-presidents-meet-in-brazil-for-the-first-regional-summit-in-9-years">South American diplomatic summit</a> in Brasília called by Lula – the first such meeting held in 10 years – reflects Brazil’s awareness of the need to work with neighbors to deploy its international initiatives. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men sit at a bench the one in the center has a plaque saying 'Brazil' on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532266/original/file-20230615-17-62b2q9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva speaks during a meeting with fellow South American leaders on May 30, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazils-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1258293847?adppopup=true">Mateus Bonomi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Think local, act global</h2>
<p>This need to act jointly is also driven by the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/latin-america-crisis-economy-castillo-peru-lula-brazil-chile-boric/">region’s economic crisis</a>. In 2020, Latin America was hit by its worst economic downturn in 120 years, with regional GDP <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-port_of_spain/documents/genericdocument/wcms_819029.pdf">falling by an average of 6.6%</a>. The region also suffered the highest COVID-19 death rate anywhere in the world, accounting <a href="https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47923/1/S2200158_en.pdf">for close to 30% of global fatalities</a> from the pandemic despite comprising just over 8% of the world’s population. In this context, to be caught in the middle of a great power battle is unappealing, and active nonalignment has resonated.</p>
<p>Beyond the incipient U.S.-China Cold War and the war in Ukraine, the resurrection of nonalignment in its new “active” incarnation reflects a widespread disenchantment in the Global South with what has been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/">known as the “Liberal International Order”</a> in existence since World War II. </p>
<p>This order is seen as increasingly frayed and unresponsive to the needs of developing countries on issues ranging from <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/international-debt-time-global-restructuring-framework">international indebtedness</a> and <a href="https://time.com/6246278/david-beasley-global-hunger-interview/">food security</a> to <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/migration-myths-and-the-global-south/">migration</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/11/climate-change-is-devastating-the-global-south">and climate change</a>. To many nations in the Global South, calls to uphold the “rules-based order” appear to serve only the foreign policy interests of the great powers, rather than the global public good. In such a context, it is perhaps not surprising that so many nations are actively refusing to be caught in an “us versus them” dynamic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jorge Heine is a Wilson Center Global Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization and a former Chilean ambassador to China, to India and to South Africa.</span></em></p>Brazil and India are among the countries pointedly not taking sides over the war in Ukraine. But this is not the nonaligned movement of yesteryear.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2068982023-06-02T11:31:51Z2023-06-02T11:31:51ZSouth Africa’s role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529635/original/file-20230601-21-wls2oa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the 14th BRICS Summit via video link in Beijing. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the summit. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Tao/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa will <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/blog/2023/04/21/south-africa-to-host-brics-deputy-ministers-and-special-envoys-on-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/">host the BRICS summit in August 2023</a>. The event could offer the country an opportunity to exercise leadership in the BRICS’ efforts to reform the arrangements for global economic governance and in supporting sustainable and inclusive development in Africa and the Global South. However, the opportunity has morphed into an international challenge because Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/vladimir-putin-arrest-warrant-ukraine-war-crimes">indicted by the International Criminal Court</a>, has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-russia-will-take-part-brics-summit-proper-level-2023-05-30/">indicated</a> that he will attend. South Africa could face the wrath of its BRICS partners if it fulfils its international obligation and arrests him. On the other hand, if it does not arrest him, it could face sanctions from those countries that want to see Putin tried for war crimes.</em> </p>
<p><em>Hosting the 2023 BRICS summit is therefore fraught with dangers. The international environment is complicated, dynamic and unpredictable. South Africa can avoid embarrassment and capitalise on the opportunities presented by the summit only if it is able to skilfully manoeuvre in these choppy waters.</em> </p>
<p><em>Trying to understand South Africa’s dilemma raises a number of questions: Who are the BRICS? What has the grouping achieved?</em> </p>
<hr>
<h2>Who are the BRICS?</h2>
<p>In 2001, the global investment bank Goldman Sachs stated that it expected Brazil, Russia, India and China to become leading actors in the global economy. It collectively named the four countries <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/history/moments/2001-brics.html">“BRICs”</a>. </p>
<p>These countries decided that Goldman Sachs had a point and that they could enhance their global influence if they cooperated. They first met at a ministerial level in <a href="http://infobrics.org/page/history-of-brics/">2006</a> and at a leaders’ summit in <a href="http://infobrics.org/page/history-of-brics/">2009</a>. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bric-safrica-idUSTRE6BN1DZ20101224">In 2010</a> they invited South Africa to join the group. The group became known as “BRICS”. </p>
<p><a href="https://unacademy.com/content/upsc/study-material/international-relations/brics-objectives-and-history/">A primary objective of the group </a> is to reform global economic governance so that it is more responsive to the concerns and interests of the Global South. For example, the BRICS have called for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-states-russia-china/">a new global currency</a> that can challenge the dominant role of the US dollar in the international monetary system. It has also pushed for a greater voice – and more votes – for developing countries in key international economic organisations like the IMF and the World Bank.</p>
<p>The group has also sought, through groups like its <a href="https://sabricsbusinesscouncil.co.za/event/participate-in-the-business-activities-during-brics-summit-august-2023/">business forum</a>, to promote greater economic cooperation between the participating countries.</p>
<h2>What has the BRICS grouping achieved?</h2>
<p>The BRICS record of achievements is mixed. </p>
<p>In 2016, the group established two new international economic entities. </p>
<p>The first was the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>. They contend that it is a “new” multilateral development bank which offers its members an alternative to institutions like the World Bank. It claims that its governance is fairer than the World Bank because its five original members all have <a href="https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/shareholding/">equal votes</a>. At the World Bank, shares (and therefore votes) are unevenly distributed among member states. </p>
<p>The development bank also strives to provide financing more quickly than the World Bank, and in a way that is more respectful of the laws in its member states. </p>
<p>However, to date, the New Development Bank has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-brics-new-development-bank-can-improve-transparency-and-accountability-186265">less transparent and accountable</a> than other multilateral development banks.</p>
<p>It has <a href="https://www.ndb.int/projects/">provided US$32.8 billion</a> to 96 projects in the 5 BRICS countries and it has begun looking to expand the scope of its operations. </p>
<p>Since 2021 it has approved membership for <a href="https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/shareholding/">Bangladesh, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay</a>. It is expected to add new members in the coming years. </p>
<p>The second new entity was the <a href="https://www.aspireias.com/upsc-study-notes/Contingent-Reserve-Arrangement-CRA-BRICS">Contingent Reserve Arrangement</a>. This established a series of swap arrangements between the BRICS central banks. These arrangements allow each central bank, when its country is facing a balance of payments crisis, to exchange its local currency for hard currencies, like the US dollar, with its counterparts in the BRICS. </p>
<p>Pursuant to the terms of the arrangement, a central bank can only draw on a fraction of the available financing without also having to enter into a financing arrangement with the IMF. Thus, the conditions that are attached to the IMF’s finances also become applicable to the funds made available through the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. </p>
<p>To date, no BRICS central bank has used the arrangement. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/">According to their communiques</a>, the BRICS leaders have agreed to create other entities, such as a vaccine centre and a new credit rating agency. However, they have not yet implemented these agreements. </p>
<p>They have not been successful either in reforming the existing institutions and arrangements for global economic governance, such as the IMF. One reason for this failure is the strong opposition to reform from states, primarily those in Europe, which currently have dominant voices in the IMF and would lose them in the case of true reform. </p>
<p>But another important reason is that the BRICS are not unified in their demands for reform. For example, while Brazil, India and South Africa support reforming the UN Security Council to include more permanent members and to eliminate the veto power of the existing permanent members, China and Russia, as sitting permanent members, don’t. </p>
<p>Similarly, not all the other BRICS have supported South Africa’s call for a third African seat on the IMF’s board of directors. </p>
<h2>Are there any downsides to BRICS membership?</h2>
<p>The global political and economic situation has changed dramatically since 2010. These changes have created both opportunities and challenges for the BRICS. </p>
<p>One opportunity arises from the fact that <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/05/25/world/politics-diplomacy-world/brics-expansion-emerging-economies-join/">approximately 19 countries</a> in the Global South, including Argentina, Cuba, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have expressed an interest in joining the BRICS. It is expected that the BRICS will consider the issue of membership at their upcoming August 2023 summit. </p>
<p>Another opportunity arises from the growing interest around the world in having an alternative currency to the US dollar as the basis for the international financial system. The BRICS have been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/brics-currency-end-dollar-dominance-united-states-russia-china/">vocal supporters of de-dollarisation</a>. However, given the complex economic and political relations between the BRICS member states, there is considerable scepticism about the feasibility of the BRICS developing a new global currency in the near term.</p>
<p>The primary challenges facing the BRICS arise from geopolitics. The war in Ukraine has created tensions within the BRICS. The participating states have been <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/a-global-rebalance/">forced to balance their respect </a>for such international law principles as self-determination, sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes with their friendly relations with Russia. In addition, the BRICS cannot escape the fallout from the growing economic and security tensions <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/04/27/chinas-latest-attempt-to-rally-the-world-against-western-values?gclid=CjwKCAjwpuajBhBpEiwA_ZtfhdEfPP2nUUq4vCYYTp3gK6av_gR71ro86sVIZKvEduRkmt7u6iwQ_xoCc7EQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">between China and the west</a>, particularly the US. </p>
<p>Both these issues complicate the efforts of the other BRICS to maintain their formal non-aligned position. They also exacerbate existing tensions within the BRICS. The most important example of this is the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/india-china-relations-quad-answer?__cf_chl_tk=8WwBOhRRpvovxPXN3HILt.MUbGy_.LyODow70NcSHds-1685690745-0-gaNycGzNDfs">complex and tense relationship</a> between India and China. In recent years, they have had military skirmishes in disputed border areas. In addition, India has imposed economic constraints on Chinese companies operating in India. The two countries <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-india-kick-out-nearly-all-of-each-others-journalists-as-rivalry-escalates-75d51c42">have refused to renew the visas of journalists</a> from each country so that now there are almost no journalists from Chinese publications in India and vice versa.</p>
<h2>What hangs on the summit?</h2>
<p>South Africa faces another opportunity that is fraught with danger when it hosts the G20 in 2025. The G20, which brings together the 20 leading economic powers in the world, has called itself <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/premier-forum-making-g20-permanent/">the “premier forum” </a>for global economic governance. South Africa is currently the only permanent African member of the G20 and 2025 will be the first time the group is hosted by an African country. </p>
<p>Planning for this G20 event must begin soon because in 2024 South Africa will join India, the current G20 host, and Brazil, <a href="https://unacademy.com/content/upsc/study-material/international-relations/india-joins-g20-troika/">the 2024 G20 host in the troika</a> that manages the G20 process. If the country does not plan carefully and effectively for this G20 event, South Africa risks emerging with a diminished reputation and its credibility shredded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danny Bradlow receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for a project unconnected to this article. He is also a Compliance Officer in the Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU) at the UN Development Programme.</span></em></p>Geopolitics is forcing BRICS countries to balance respect for international law, self-determination, sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes with their friendly relations with Russia.Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060202023-05-28T08:26:07Z2023-05-28T08:26:07ZSouth Africa’s pact with Russia – and its actions – cast doubt on its claims of non-alignment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528307/original/file-20230525-17-r3ysjl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Vladimir Putin, left, and President Cyril Ramaphosa in Sochi, Russia, in 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergei Chirikov/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict">in February 2022</a> South Africa has <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-05-16-ukraine-south-africa-is-not-neutral-we-are-non-aligned/">proclaimed</a> a policy of non-alignment in that conflict. This position was placed in doubt when US Ambassador Ruben Brigety claimed recently that he had evidence that South African arms and ammunition <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-weapons-arms-south-africa-e89bac38997f240655ddf5d892e44f85">were loaded on a Russian ship</a> in December 2022. </p>
<p>Brigety concluded that South Africa’s alleged behaviour did</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7ad94426-aafc-4f04-99d7-05f6d5e6f71d">not suggest to us the actions of a non-aligned country</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The South African government, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/did-south-africa-sell-arms-to-russia-only-a-series-of-unlikely-scenarios-could-have-made-it-possible-205689">regulates the sale of arms and ammunition</a> to and from the country, has vehemently denied Brigety’s accusation. Thandi Modise, the minister of defence, said that nothing <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/lady-rs-cargo-manifest-is-classified-claims-anc-as-opposition-wants-answers-20230523">“was loaded onto the Russian ship”</a>. However President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/presidency-responds-claims-weapons-supply-russia-made-us-ambassador">announced</a> that an independent commission, headed by a retired judge, would probe the American claims.</p>
<p>I have studied South Africa’s foreign relations for the last decade, including its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2020.1871796">alliance policy</a>.</p>
<p>Brigety is correct. Though South Africa maintains that it is non-aligned, the agreements it has made and the actions it has taken over the past decade make it clear that it is aligned with the Russian Federation. </p>
<h2>The South Africa-Russia partnership</h2>
<p>In 2013 South Africa inked a <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol%2037%20(2)/geldenhuys-pp118-145.zp74595.pdf">Comprehensive Strategic Partnership deal</a> with Russia. Signed by presidents Jacob Zuma and Vladimir Putin, this <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Policy-Briefing-75.pdf">declaration</a> lays out a framework for cooperation between the two nations. It covers a wide range of areas, including political, economic, technological and cultural collaboration. </p>
<p>The only other state South Africa has such a far reaching agreement with is <a href="https://treaties.dirco.gov.za/dbtw-wpd/images/20100824ChinaDeclarationStrategicPartnership.pdf">China</a>. But the agreement with Russia contains a passage that makes that accord even more consequential than that with China. It <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/1428">stipulates</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Non-participation in any military-political or other alliances, associations or armed conflicts directed against the other Side, or in any treaties, agreements or understandings infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security interests of the other Side. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short, South Africa and Russia will not challenge or condemn each other. This is essentially a non-aggression pact. An agreement international relations scholars classify as <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances/">a type of alliance</a>.</p>
<p>The opening paragraphs of the <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/1428">pact</a> emphasise that the foundation of the relationship between South Africa and Russia is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the rich and fruitful experience of cooperation in different spheres accumulated over the period of struggle against apartheid…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Officials of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), regularly refer to this history. The minister of international relations and cooperation, Naledi Pandor, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/0001/01/01/minister-pandor-says-russia-an-old-historical-friend">stated in March</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have made it clear that Russia is a friend and we have had cooperative partnerships for many years, including partnerships as we combated the apartheid regime.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, Lindiwe Zulu, South Africa’s minister of social development and chairperson of the ANC’s subcommittee on international relations, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/africa/russia-ukraine-eritrea-africa.html">said</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Russia is our friend through and through … We are not about to denounce that relationship that we have always had. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The partnership in effect</h2>
<p>South African-Russian relations have been guided by the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement over the last decade. When Russia invaded the Ukrainian territory of Crimea the year after the agreement was signed, <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181295/1d676013a28a2c93f0abf4a5dfc4567b.pdf">South Africa did not protest</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, South African and Russian officials were busy working towards an expansive and now notorious nuclear deal. In their book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Inside-South-Africas-Secret-ebook/dp/B09WW9P187">Nuclear: Inside South Africa’s Secret Deal</a>, journalist Karyn Maughan and former national treasury insider Kirsten Pearson show that the objective of this agreement was not to enhance the country’s capacity for energy production at a reasonable cost. Instead, a major motivation for the then Zuma administration was geopolitics – enhancing the relationship between South Africa and Russia.</p>
<p>South Africa has also sought increased military cooperation with its partners in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (<a href="http://infobrics.org/">BRICS</a>) group. During the 2013 BRICS summit in the South African port city of Durban, South Africa <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/archive/2013-03-04-defence-plans-show-talks-at-brics-summit/">held an accompanying armaments exposition</a> to spur cooperation and trade among the states in the group.</p>
<p>Military coordination between Russia and South Africa has recently expanded. The two states, along with China, have held naval exercises <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-military-drills-with-russia-and-china-raise-eyebrows#:%7E:text=This%20week%E2%80%99s%20unprecedented%20joint%20trilateral,tanks%%2020back%20in%20their%20capitals">in 2019</a> and again <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-64380572">in 2023</a>. The timing of the latter exercises – in the midst of Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine and on the anniversary of the conflict – was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/05/18/exp-south-africa-russia-brics-ramaphosa-zane-dangor-intv-051812pseg1-cnni-world.cnn">noteworthy</a>.</p>
<p>When Russia <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict">invaded Ukraine</a> in 2022 Pretoria refused to criticise the attack. The Ramaphosa administration <a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/blog/2022/03/02/south-africas-statement-in-explanation-of-vote-on-ukraine-in-the-un-general-assembly-emergency-special-session-2-march-2022/">claimed</a> its position was motivated by its longstanding belief that such conflicts should be resolved through negotiations. Taking sides, it said, would not encourage such negotiations.</p>
<p>However, When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Pretoria unequivocally (and correctly) <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sas-opposition-to-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-ten-year">condemned Washington</a>.</p>
<h2>Arms to an ally</h2>
<p>Ambassador Brigety’s claims about South African arms shipments to Russia should be taken seriously. He is an <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/ambassador-reuben-e-brigety-ii-ph-d/">experienced diplomat, scholar and soldier</a>. He surely recalls Colin Powell’s erroneous statement to the United Nations <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/18/colin-powell-un-security-council-iraq">in 2003</a> about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. He would be cautious to go public with a claim of this nature unless he was confident in its credibility. </p>
<p>Furthermore, unlike the Iraq situation in which political pressure from senior Bush administration officials led to the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/colin-powells-fateful-moment">manipulation of intelligence</a>, there is no one in the Biden administration who has a vested interest in singling out South Africa by spinning intelligence reports. Brigety would not bet his life on the accuracy of these reports <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/12/united-states-south-africa-russia-weapons-sanctions/125feaac-f0c1-11ed-b67d-a219ec5dfd30_story.html">unless he fully believed them</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s alleged shipment of weapons to Russia is consistent with its increasingly close ties with Moscow over the past decade. Whether such alignment is wise should be the subject of future debate, but the fact that South Africa is aligned with Russia should not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s clear that South Africa is aligned with the Russian Federation.Christopher Williams, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050012023-05-25T12:28:02Z2023-05-25T12:28:02ZLula’s diplomatic dance is nothing new for Brazil or its leader – what has changed is the world around him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528069/original/file-20230524-27-e2ybqj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C47%2C3982%2C2610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is Lula pursuing divisiveness or diplomatic pragmatism on the world stage?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/JapanG7Summit/e94fe64a66a64a7d8b08be562dc0845d/photo?Query=G7%20Lula&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Louise Delmotte</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is a man currently very much <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/lula-part-two-brazils-role-international-stage">in demand in international circles</a>.</p>
<p>In April, the leftist leader was being courted by China during a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/brazil-china-lula-xi-trip-216ace0e80e6f0882571125c673f6964">high-profile visit to Beijing</a>. That was followed a month later with <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/g7-summit-intense-schedule-of-bilateral-meetings-awaits-lula-in-japan">an invite to the G7 summit</a> in Japan, where Lula rubbed shoulders with leaders of the largest economies of the so-called Global North. In recent weeks Brazil’s president has also been busy <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/15678">restoring regional ties</a> in Latin America and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">pushing a proposed path to peace</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Lula’s diplomatic whirlwind has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-foreign-policy-us-venezuela-iran-2ca10d070df6177a33e909c20acbe030">confounded his critics</a>. He has been accused of “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/lula-cozies-up-to-americas-enemies-brazil-kremlin-beijing-ukraine-catholic-church-bishop-alvarez-socialist-human-rights-nicaragua-iran-c7705711">cozying up” with the United States’ enemies</a> or “<a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/dont-blame-lula-for-playing-both-sides/">playing both sides</a>” over Ukraine.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://liberalarts.du.edu/about/people/rafael-r-ioris">scholar of Brazil and its position in the world</a>, I believe Lula’s actions reflect two main elements: one relating to global geopolitical developments, the other tied to the Brazilian leader’s long-held vision.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.csis.org/executive-education/courses/dynamics-and-implications-chinas-rise">rise of China</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">the war in Ukraine</a> have underscored that the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/end-unipolar-moment-opinion-1687036">unipolar reality of the 1990s</a> – under which the U.S. was the predominant power – is being seriously challenged. In its place appears to be <a href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/bipolarity-is-back-why-it-matters">emerging a bipolar dynamic</a> in which Beijing and Washington battle for influence – or a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">multipolar world</a> in which regional powers compete for hegemony.</p>
<p>Anticipating this new world ordering, nations that have historically aligned with the European-U.S. center of power – particularly those in places like Latin America – are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">repositioning themselves</a>. This seems to be the case for Brazil, the largest nation and economy in South America. </p>
<h2>Waning US influence in Latin America</h2>
<p>During much of the 20th century, Brazil developed <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/">in close economic cooperation with the U.S.</a> while managing to sustain a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-global-ambitions">largely autonomous foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>But since 2001, U.S. influence in Brazil has diminished as Washington has pivoted its attentions away from the region to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/07/reflections-on-the-long-term-repercussions-of-september-11-for-us-policy-in-the-middle-east/">first the Middle East</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy">and then Asia</a>. In the same period, China replaced the United States as Brazil’s most important economic partner. <a href="https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/brazil/foreign-trade-in-figures">Figures from 2021 show</a> China received 31% of Brazilian exports compared with the United States’ 11.2%, and supplied 22.8% of its imports, compared with the United States’ 17.7%.</p>
<h2>Reviving Lula-ism, strenghening the BRICS</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Lula’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/01/americas/brazil-lula-da-silva-inauguration-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Brazil's%20new%20President%20Luiz%20Inacio,Brazil%2C%20January%201%2C%202023.&text=The%20Senate%20president%20opened%20the,with%20a%20minute%20of%20silence.">return to the presidency</a> in January 2023 has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lula-brazil-politics-100-hundred-days-bolsonaro-government-ada128391d4f855a5146192a50bc49a0">paved the way for a revival</a> of an ambitious and assertive foreign policy set out by the leader during his first term in office between 2003 and 2010.</p>
<p>During this earlier period, the metalworker-turned-president managed to sustain <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070331-3.html">good relations with both the Bush</a> <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lula-da-silva-brazil">and Obama administrations</a> while also seeking to diversify Brazil’s economic and geopolitical partners, especially in the Global South.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits shake hands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528091/original/file-20230524-45026-eqan30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=635&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva with U.S. President George W. Bush in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-is-welcomed-news-photo/1243423329?adppopup=true">Manny Ceneta/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He also played a central role in the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2019/08/brics-was-created-as-a-tool-of-attack-lula/">creation of the BRICS</a>, a loosely defined multilateral bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The bloc has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26455170">helped reshape</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09749101211067096">the economic</a> <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/The-BRICS-Reshape-the-Global-Geopolitical-Map-20230428-0012.html">and geopolitical balance</a> of the world over the past two decades.</p>
<p>Since returning to power, Lula sought to <a href="https://tvbrics.com/en/news/lula-da-silva-advocates-brics-currency-security-council-reform-and-new-world-order/">strengthen the BRICS bank</a> – a funding agency for developmental projects in the Global South that offers a financial alternative to the World Bank. In a show of intent, Lula <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/former-brazilian-president-named-as-head-of-china-based-new-development-bank/">pushed for the appointment</a> of ex-Brazilian president – and his former chief of staff – <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/former-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseff-is-new-brics-bank-chief-101679666146344.html">Dilma Rousseff to head the agency</a>. </p>
<p>Much as with his domestic agenda of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/lula-back-what-does-mean-brazil">rebuilding social programs</a>, undermined by his predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, in the international arena Lula is looking to restart his project of strengthening Brazil’s ties with a variety of partners. In his first month in office, Lula <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2023/01/lula-and-the-revival-of-unasur-and-celac/">attended a meeting</a> of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean nations (CELAC) in Argentina, where he outlined a desire to strengthen Brazil’s relations in the region. </p>
<p>Soon after, he visited President Joe Biden in Washington, where both leaders <a href="https://www.braziloffice.org/en/articles/lula-and-biden-common-challenges-and-potential-shared-efforts-to-come">professed their mutual desire</a> to promote democracy and push for a more environmentally sound developmental path, particularly in the Amazon region.</p>
<p>Once that trip was concluded, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/13/1169648748/brazils-president-lula-travels-to-china-to-find-support-to-help-end-war-in-ukrai">Lula visited China</a> to deepen trade relations and to try to lead a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/11/americas/lula-brazil-china-visit-intl-latam/index.html">peace effort for the war in Ukraine</a>. He then went to Europe to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lula-portugal-visit-brazil-ukraine-39a6bf8c84f2ac20669cd9ee8e09252d">meet with traditional allies</a>, like Spain and Portugal. </p>
<h2>Divisive or dynamic diplomacy?</h2>
<p>All things considered, this “many friends” approach isn’t so different from Lula’s experiences of 20 years ago. Then, Brazil was largely welcomed as a <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/obama-says-most-popular-title-belongs-to-lula/articleshow/4352514.cms?from=mdr">rising diplomatic force</a> in the developing world. President Barack Obama, during a 2009 meeting, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lula-da-silva-brazil">made special note</a> of Lula’s “forward-looking leadership … throughout Latin America and throughout the world.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in coats walk side by side in front of a parade of military men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528092/original/file-20230524-19-1c3zr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lula inspects an honor guard with Chinese President Xi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/brazilian-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-inspects-an-news-photo/1251815692?adppopup=true">Ken Ishii/Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>What has changed since are the domestic and global contexts in which Lula now operates. And what was once seen as a progressive pursuit of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy is now being interpreted by many in <a href="https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/04/17/para-casa-branca-brasil-papagueia-propaganda-russa-e-chinesa-sobre-a-ucrania.ghtml">Brazil</a> <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/foreign-policy-brazil-lula-takes-141942941.html">and the West</a> as divisive, inappropriate or <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/lula-cozies-up-to-americas-enemies-brazil-kremlin-beijing-ukraine-catholic-church-bishop-alvarez-socialist-human-rights-nicaragua-iran-c7705711">even a betrayal</a> of Brazil’s traditional alignments. </p>
<p>Such a view, I believe, ignores not only Lula’s earlier international record but also a wider historical perspective. For more than a century, Brazil’s diplomatic efforts have <a href="http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/548-A_diplomacia_multilateral_do_Brasil_Um_tributo_a_Rui_Barbosa.pdf">focused on promoting multilateralism</a> and on <a href="http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/relacoes-internacionais-politica-externa-diplomacia-brasileira-volume-2.pdf">pushing for the peaceful</a> resolution of conflicts. </p>
<p>And while it drew closer to Western allies during World War II and the Cold War, successive governments in Brazil – be they progressive or conservative, <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5627535">democratic or authoritarian</a> – pursued a policy of self-determination. Shaped by those dynamics, Brazil’s foreign policy has served the country well as an instrument of its own development. </p>
<h2>The need for a neutral peacemaker</h2>
<p>As such, Lula’s overtures to both traditional and new trading partners is not surprising. Nor is his plan to find a solution to the war in Ukraine through the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">creation of a neutral bloc of mediating countries</a>.</p>
<p>While attending the G7 meeting at Hiroshima, Lula <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/speech-by-president-lula-at-session-8-of-g7">stressed the need for peace talks</a> not only to end the tragedy in itself, but also because it was distracting the global community from focusing on other matters, such as global warming and hunger. </p>
<p>Perhaps some of his <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/24/americas/brazil-lula-ukraine-peace-coalition-intl-latam/index.html">statements about the war</a> could have made it clearer that he held Russia primarily responsible for the conflict – something that may have played a role in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/brazils-lula-says-meeting-fell-through-because-ukraines-zelenskiy-was-late-2023-05-22/">the falling through of a planned meeting</a> with Ukraine leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the G7. But it should be remembered the contention that countries perceived as neutral, like Brazil, may have a better chance of bringing Russia to the negotiating table is a valid position.</p>
<h2>Not in Brazil’s interest to pick a side</h2>
<p>It is unclear at this early stage of his new presidency whether Lula can revive the international balancing act that he pulled off during his first period of governance. The world has changed since then, and economic and geopolitical disputes appear ever more prone to include a military dimension, as the war in Ukraine shows. And although Brazil could indeed play a peacemaking role, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/kyiv-moscow-to-separately-host-african-leaders-to-discuss-grain-fertilizer-exports-amid-war">neither side</a> in the conflict seems ready to negotiate yet. Similarly, the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China will be difficult to navigate – and given the historic and current economic ties, Brazil cannot afford to pick a side. </p>
<p>In fact, not picking a side could work to Brazil’s advantage. It was only after Lula’s visit to China that the Biden administration announced an increase by tenfold of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/20/americas/us-biden-amazon-fund-petro-intl-latam/index.html">its contribution to the Amazon Fund</a>. It is clear thus that in an increasingly divided world, Brazil’s nonaligned position could be the best path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205001/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafael R. Ioris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lula’s courting of – or by – China and Western powers has confounded critics. But in reality, it is a continuation of the foreign policy he pursued during his earlier term in power.Rafael R. Ioris, Professor of Modern Latin America History, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043212023-05-16T11:37:39Z2023-05-16T11:37:39ZWhy the west needs to offer Brazil, India and South Africa a new deal<p>The unwillingness of <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-ukraine-war-pub-86961">some countries</a> to back the west’s position on Ukraine is a wake-up call. Western leaders must now determine what they can offer to powerful states including Brazil, India and South Africa to keep them onside.</p>
<p>A new generation of alliances could begin to redistribute global power and grant emerging economies greater input into decisions that affect, and reflect, their interests. New alliances could also include fairer terms of trade and more effective <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm">development or aid</a> schemes. </p>
<p>This should help ensure the sustainability <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-democratic-countries-around-the-world-are-not-prepared-to-support-ukraine-and-some-are-shifting-closer-to-russia-203699">of a wider global alliance</a>, for example, to back Ukraine. Currently the global consensus to back Ukraine seems to be fragmenting. For instance, despite Brazil’s support for several UN resolutions in Ukraine’s favour, it has not condemned Russia outright. </p>
<p>Brazil also rejected calls to send <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine">military materiel</a> to Ukraine. And during India’s time as a member of the UN security council, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/caution-tact-how-asian-countries-voted-ukraine-un">it abstained</a> on votes related to the conflict.</p>
<p>All of this is a sign of wider unhappiness with western leadership of global institutions and global decision making and is perceived, by some, as the west having too much power over other states.</p>
<h2>Where does power lie?</h2>
<p>International power is largely defined by the relative economic and military strengths of countries as well as historic influence. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/19/russia-ukraine-war-un-international-condemnation/">The UN</a> permanent security council membership, for instance, is based on post-second world war strengths. </p>
<p>Power relations are often described to be between superpowers or “great powers” and “<a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781788112925/9781788112925.00007.xml">non-great powers</a>”. These power gaps have led to large economies such as Brazil, India and South Africa being treated as <a href="https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10092/101587/2%20Small%20states-final.pdf?sequence=5">less important</a> in international affairs. </p>
<p>Some argue that <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781788112925/9781788112925.00007.xml">international institutions</a> such as the UN grant non-great powers a “bigger voice” to influence global affairs but simultaneously constrain their autonomy and deplete their already limited diplomatic resources. Their lack of a veto (only given to China, the UK, the US, France and Russia) often forces them to align their policy positions with those of superpowers. </p>
<p>This power structure ultimately leads to the marginalisation of states that may lack military strength but are considered <a href="https://wisevoter.com/country-rankings/largest-economies-in-the-world/">economic forces</a> in their own right, such as Brazil, India and South Africa.</p>
<h2>China v the west</h2>
<p>Into this mix of resentment about historic inequalities of power, China has added its own agenda, and power play: to provide and enhance alternative sources of political and economic influence.</p>
<p>Right now, China is keen to show that <a href="https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/courting-lula-china-seeks-to-show-it-has-more-to-offer-than-the-u-s/">it has more to offer</a> Brazil, India, South Africa and others than the west. An indication of this was that Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/brazil-is-back-lula-says-during-state-visit-to-china/7048547.html">visit to China</a> in April 2023 included many agreements and investment commitments.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the Brics countries, Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Russia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525108/original/file-20230509-25-uslr52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wind vector/Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>There is also <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/americas-bad-bet-india-modi?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=America">evidence</a> of a political and economic shift away from the US and towards China, in particular through decreasing <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/de-dollarization-countries-seeking-alternatives-to-the-u-s-dollar">reliance on the dollar</a> and the strengthening of the Brics alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lula-and-the-world-what-to-expect-from-the-new-brazilian-foreign-policy-202645">Lula and the world: what to expect from the new Brazilian foreign policy</a>
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<p>This bloc was set up in 2009, arguably to <a href="https://sciencespo.hal.science/view/index/identifiant/hal-03473952">erode the political dominance of the US and Europe</a>. In 2015, the member states created the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a> as a way of accessing infrastructure funding through an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-new-world-order-brics-nations-offer-alternative-to-west/a-65124269">alternative to western-led</a> economic institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.</p>
<p>Then in 2022, the bloc began discussing <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/11/09/the-new-candidate-countries-for-brics-expansion/">expanding membership</a> to other countries, with Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates among those that have expressed interest. The organisation aims to represent a section of world GDP 30% greater than that of the United States, over 50% of the world’s population, and control of 60% of the world gas reserves.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-democratic-countries-around-the-world-are-not-prepared-to-support-ukraine-and-some-are-shifting-closer-to-russia-203699">Why democratic countries around the world are not prepared to support Ukraine – and some are shifting closer to Russia</a>
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<h2>China rising</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/05/china-military-size-power-asia-pacific/673933/">military power within Asia</a> may soon exceed that of the US, and so the US sees the need to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-aims-counter-chinas-influence-global-institutions-yellen-says-2023-03-29/#:%7E:text=US%20aims%20to%20counter%20China's%20influence%20in%20global%20institutions%2C%20Yellen%20says,-By%20David%20Lawder&text=WASHINGTON%2C%20March%2029%20(Reuters),Janet%20Yellen%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">counter China’s influence in global institutions</a>.</p>
<p>China’s stated position of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-beijing-squares-its-noninterference-circle">non-interference</a> in the domestic affairs of other economies may seem more favourable to other countries. This is often compared to the west’s interventions in other countries’ domestic affairs, particularly the United States’ long history of <a href="https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/united-states-interventions/">interventionism</a> around the world.</p>
<p>An expanded Brics alliance provides an institutional platform for non-great powers such as Brazil and India to acquire a louder voice in international affairs. This can also grant them a more prominent role in making decisions that affect their national interests. Importantly, any expansion of membership will also increase China’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-15/brics-debates-expansion-as-iran-saudi-arabia-seek-entry#xj4y7vzkg">diplomatic clout</a>.</p>
<p>The challenge for the west is to counterbalance these trends so as to retain countries including Brazil, India and South Africa within its sphere of influence. A new deal, particularly for these large democratic countries, is likely to be crucial, and will need to be something that advances alternative models to the current state of international affairs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Alliances around the Ukraine war have highlighted fragmenting support for the west.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.