tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/cabinet-papers-14135/articlesCabinet papers – The Conversation2024-03-14T04:02:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256502024-03-14T04:02:49Z2024-03-14T04:02:49ZRelease of ‘missing papers’ from 2003 shines a light on how Australian troops were sent to fight the Iraq War<p>On March 14, the National Archives of Australia (NAA) released documents from the Howard Government’s National Security Committee (NSC) of cabinet. They all relate to Australia’s entry into the Iraq War in 2003. </p>
<p>This tranche goes beyond the archive’s release of a selection of the records of full cabinet on January 1 2024. </p>
<p>So what do they tell us about the decision to send Australia to war?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-2003-howard-government-sends-australia-into-the-iraq-war-217812">Cabinet papers 2003: Howard government sends Australia into the Iraq war</a>
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<h2>What was the National Security Committee?</h2>
<p>Australian cabinets have usually been assisted by standing and ad hoc committees. The NSC was the peak decision-making body for national security and major foreign policy matters during the Howard government (1996 to 2007). </p>
<p>Its meetings were attended by relevant ministers and senior officials. These officials included the heads of the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force and the head of the Office of National Assessments. Unlike other cabinet committees, decisions of the NSC did not require the endorsement of the cabinet itself. </p>
<p>In the release of cabinet records from 2003, discussion of Iraq was scant. This made clear that a full appreciation of the work of a federal cabinet requires including the documents and records of important cabinet committees.</p>
<p>For the Howard government, that was the NSC. Future releases of cabinet records from Kevin Rudd’s government might need to include the Strategic Priorities Budget Committee (SPBC) or “Gang of Four”. </p>
<p>The release of 2003 cabinet records in January 2024 was followed by a concerted media campaign for the full release of government records on Iraq. The prime minister intervened, ordering a review conducted by former senior public servant, Dennis Richardson. One of the review’s key recommendations concerned the National Archives. This was that its yearly proactive release of cabinet records <a href="https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/review-transfer-2003-cabinet-records-pmc-national-archives-australia">should include</a> those of the NSC. </p>
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<h2>What do the 2003 NSC documents tell us?</h2>
<p>The NSC records reveal planning for Australian military involvement in Iraq was under way well before the formal cabinet decision to join President George W. Bush’s “coalition of the willing” on March 18 2003. For some historians, this will confirm <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/masterful-blunder-john-howards-iraq-war-of-choice/">Australia effectively made the decision</a> to join the war at least as early as 2002. </p>
<p>In a record of a meeting on January 10 2003, the minister for defence, Robert Hill, and the defence force chief noted that some deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) units would be necessary within a month to meet indicative planning from US Central Command “on the likely time-frame for possible military action against Iraq”.</p>
<p>At the same meeting, the NSC agreed to approve specific forward deployments of ADF units from a list the committee had previously agreed on August 26 and December 4 2002. These ADF units were admittedly not to engage in any military action against Iraq unless the government expressly authorised it. But the reference to decisions to forward deploy the ADF in 2002 points to the necessity for these records to be made public. </p>
<p>In the meeting on January 10, Howard made clear any Australian decision formally to commit the ADF in Iraq would be referred to the full cabinet. He also noted he had “foreshadowed to the governor-general the general direction of steps under consideration by the government in relation to Iraq”. </p>
<p>These steps, we know, did not include Howard’s originally planned reference of the Iraq matter to the governor-general via the executive council. The decision not to do so was probably because the governor-general, Peter Hollingworth, had <a href="https://www.naa.gov.au/explore-collection/cabinet/latest-cabinet-release/2003-cabinet-papers-context">asked for legal advice</a> on the war from the attorney-general. </p>
<p>Howard later advised Hollingworth that reference of the Iraq decision to the governor-general was unnecessary, and the ADF could be deployed under section 8 of the Defence Act. </p>
<p>Another of the NSC files includes the minute of March 18 2003, containing full cabinet’s authorisation of military action in Iraq. The full cabinet file had nothing else. The NSC file includes a submission from Hill, “circulated in the cabinet room on 17 and 18 March” seeking cabinet agreement on a national policy for possible military operations in Iraq.</p>
<p>Hill’s submission indicated that before the Australian government had received a formal request for support for Coalition operations, it had authorised the ADF to conduct “prudent contingency planning” for a range of capabilities in Iraq. US targeting strategy, Hill reported, included supporting “regime change” along with incapacitating Iraq’s “delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”. </p>
<p>This document illustrates the tensions between Australian and US war aims in Iraq. The paramount US objective was regime change. Australian policy was not to foster regime change, “although the Government has recognised this may be a desirable, even inevitable, outcome of military action”. </p>
<p>The file also includes the “memorandum of advice” constituting the legal justification for Australian participation in Iraq. The advice was authored not by the solicitor-general but by first assistant secretaries in DFAT and the Attorney-General’s Department. </p>
<p>When published, the memorandum was sharply criticised by legal scholars and former solicitor-general <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/this-war-is-illegal-howards-last-top-law-man-20030321-gdggwb.html">Gavan Griffith</a>. The later release of departmental documents will permit us to see what other legal opinions on the war were held in the two departments.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iraq-war-20-years-on-how-the-world-failed-iraq-and-created-a-less-peaceful-democratic-and-prosperous-state-200075">Iraq war, 20 years on: how the world failed Iraq and created a less peaceful, democratic and prosperous state</a>
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<h2>Now we need to know more</h2>
<p>The proactive digitisation of NSC documents on Iraq is a welcome development for which the National Archives should be congratulated. It should be commended, too, for foreshadowing the release of other NSC records from 2003. </p>
<p>However, fuller understanding of how and why Australia went to war in Iraq requires the release of NSC documents from 2002 and 2001.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lee was the National Archives of Australia's cabinet historian for the releases of records from 2002 and 2003 and is a member of Australian s for War Powers Reform. </span></em></p>New papers released by the National Archives of Australia reveal how the decision was made for Australia to join the US’s “coalition of the willing”.David Lee, Associate Professor of History, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959162023-01-01T00:15:56Z2023-01-01T00:15:56ZTampa, Bali bombings, 9/11 and the Kyoto Protocol: today’s cabinet paper release shows what worried Australia in 2002<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499693/original/file-20221208-20-33blyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2326%2C1555&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">NAA: A14482, 020309DI-03 AUSPIC/Photographer Peter West</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every year, the National Archives of Australia releases the cabinet records from 20 years earlier, and this year’s batch is out today. </p>
<p>This release, from the cabinet records of 2002, is framed by two events of the previous year. </p>
<p>The first took place in August 2001, when Australian troops boarded a Norwegian ship, MV Tampa, carrying more than 400 rescued asylum seekers. </p>
<p>The Howard government quickly introduced legislation to forbid “unauthorised arrivals” from landing on the Australian mainland. It also determined that those arriving by boat would be processed offshore.</p>
<p>The second event of 2001 was the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US mainland on September 11. These attacks ushered in <a href="https://www.naa.gov.au/explore-collection/cabinet/latest-cabinet-release/2001-cabinet-papers-context">a new securitised era</a> in global and Australian politics that has lasted to the present day. They also led to two wars in which Australia participated. The first, in Afghanistan, lasted from 2001 until 2022. The second, the intervention by the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, was launched in 2003 following decisions in Washington in 2002.</p>
<p>The two events of 2001, the Tampa and 9/11, overwhelmed Labor’s campaign and contributed to the third consecutive victory of the Coalition parties in the federal election held in November that year.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Howard government cabinet at Parliament House in 2002." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499701/original/file-20221208-20-jbhhtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Howard government cabinet at Parliament House in 2002.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NAA: A14482, 020470-13a AUSPIC/Photographer David Foote</span></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-politics-explainer-the-mv-tampa-and-the-transformation-of-asylum-seeker-policy-74078">Australian politics explainer: the MV Tampa and the transformation of asylum-seeker policy</a>
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<h2>The ‘Pacific Solution’ and immigration</h2>
<p>Many of the cabinet records of 2002 relate to the Howard government’s continuation of its “Pacific Solution”. </p>
<p>They include offshore processing in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, building a new immigration detention facility on Christmas Island, and revamping immigration centres on the mainland. </p>
<p>A conference in Indonesia in February 2002 led to the “Bali Process”, an official international forum to facilitate discussion and information-sharing on issues related to people-smuggling.</p>
<p>Other papers relate to Australia’s normal immigration program, which included a “special humanitarian program” for refugees not coming by boat. </p>
<p>Thus, refugees attempting to come by boat were excluded. But others who were lucky to be plucked from refugee camps around the world prospered. </p>
<p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/30/australia-soccer-qatar-world-cup-team-refugee-policy/">Four of the 2022 World Cup Socceroos squad</a> were born in Africa and three were refugees who entered Australia under the special humanitarian program. Defender Thomas Deng, for example, was born in Kenya to parents who had fled Sudan and moved to Australia in 2003. </p>
<h2>National security</h2>
<p>Other highlights of the cabinet papers relate to national security, foreign policy, defence and counter-terrorism. </p>
<p>The emblematic moment of 2002 came tragically for Australia on October 12, when the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group detonated a bomb in the tourist district of Bali. More than 200 people were killed, 88 Australians <a href="https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/bali-bombings">among them</a>. Two short cabinet minutes of oral reports to cabinet refer to the enormous amount of work done by agencies, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in the Bali crisis.</p>
<p>Other papers relate to peace-keeping operations in trouble spots in the region, including East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The operation in the last was an overture to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, launched in 2003.</p>
<p>There are many submissions from Defence Minister Robert Hill on the defence program and acquisitions. This was was the year Hill made the <a href="https://kokodafoundation.wildapricot.org/resources/Documents/Reid%20Hutchins%20-%20What%20was%20the%20%27Defence%20of%20Australia%27%20strategic%20policy.pdf">strongest official criticism</a> yet of the “Defence of Australia” strategy that had governed Australian defence policy since the 1980s.</p>
<p>Hill presaged a new direction for strategy when he <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/when-defence-goes-around-in-circles-20020716-gdfgdf.html">remarked</a>:</p>
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<p>It probably never made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing concentric circles around our coastline, but it certainly does not do so now. </p>
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<p>The strategic debate in which Hill engaged in 2002 <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">continues</a> vigorously 20 years later. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-bali-bombings-transformed-our-relations-with-indonesia-192011">How the Bali bombings transformed our relations with Indonesia</a>
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<h2>Climate change, the environment and heritage</h2>
<p>Issues relating to climate change, the environment and heritage occupy as prominent a place in Howard’s 2002 cabinet as they do today. </p>
<p>Critically, following the lead of US President George W. Bush, cabinet decided not to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. </p>
<p>The European Union and Japan ratified the protocol in 2002. But it was not until 2005, after ratification by Russia and Canada, that the protocol came into effect. Australia’s cabinet accepted advice not to burden its emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries by accepting commitments not also accepted by competitors.</p>
<p>The decision not to ratify in 2002 was <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-wars-carbon-taxes-and-toppled-leaders-the-30-year-history-of-australias-climate-response-in-brief-169545">symbolic</a> of Australia’s failure to sustain a meaningful climate change regime in the years up to 2022.</p>
<h2>Transport and social and economic policy</h2>
<p>Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson made several submissions on transport and regional policy. In one, cabinet decided not to proceed with a proposal for a very-high-speed rail network between Brisbane and Melbourne on economic grounds. Now, 20 years later, the Albanese government has <a href="https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/c-king/media-release/high-speed-rail-gathers-speed">reversed</a> the decision.</p>
<p>Communications Minister Richard Alston obtained cabinet approval for a package of significant <a href="https://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article/the-sad-history-of-australian-media-reform">media reforms</a> with detrimental consequences for Australia’s media diversity. These could not, however, be implemented until after 2004 when the coalition parties gained control of the Senate. </p>
<p>Many other submissions relate to economic policy, including the first <a href="https://treasury.gov.au/intergenerational-report">Integenerational report</a>, welfare policy, health policy and agreements with the states on matters such as housing.</p>
<h2>Indigenous policy</h2>
<p>The release includes important submissions on Indigenous policy. </p>
<p>One approved a review of the operation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Commission, a body established under Hawke and dissolved in 2005. </p>
<p>In another, the government decided not to proceed with recommendations of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, including for a treaty and recognition of Indigenous people in a new preamble to the Constitution. </p>
<p>In 2007, just before its defeat, however, Howard <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/world/asia/11iht-australia.1.7848215.html">changed his mind</a>, at least on the Constitutional question.</p>
<p>Arguably, Howard’s 2007 change of mind was an important step in the current process towards a constitutionally enshrined Indigenous <a href="https://spectator.com.au/2021/08/why-conservatives-should-support-an-indigenous-voice-to-parliament/">Voice to Parliament</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Indigenous Education Ambassadors Michael O’Loughlin (left) and Reverend Shayne Blackman (centre) meet with Dr Brendan Nelson to discuss the National Indigenous English Literacy and Numeracy Strategy in 2002." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499703/original/file-20221208-16-zjb51s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Indigenous Education Ambassadors Michael O’Loughlin (left) and Reverend Shayne Blackman (centre) meet with Dr Brendan Nelson to discuss the National Indigenous.
English Literacy and Numeracy Strategy in 2002.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NAA: 14482, 020239DI-004 AUSPIC/Photographer David Foote</span></span>
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<h2>Inclusions and omissions</h2>
<p>Not every subject came to cabinet and some are only referenced by short minutes or oral presentations by ministers. </p>
<p>There is no submission, for example, on Howard’s finalisation of a A$25 billion <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/how-australia-blew-its-future-gas-supplies-20170928-gyqg0f.html">natural gas deal</a> to China. In this, Howard took an important step in the evolving trade relationship with China. </p>
<p>But 20 years later, the Australian people are suffering from failure by the Commonwealth and the states to establish a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gas-trigger-wont-be-enough-to-stop-our-energy-crisis-escalating-we-need-a-domestic-reservation-policy-188057">gas reservation policy</a> on Australia’s east coast.</p>
<p>Likewise, there is only a short minute on <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/history-delivers-howard-some-heady-moments-20020615-gduaxm.html">Howard’s discussions with Bush</a> in June 2002 and too little to indicate what significance they may have had to the subsequent intervention in Iraq.</p>
<p>Cabinet records are only the top of a pyramid. Records of individual agencies (which may be requested by individual researchers separately after 20 years) are equally important to the historical record. </p>
<p>This makes it imperative for the the National Archives to be adequately resourced to carry out its essential role as the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/national-archives-gets-money-to-save-decaying-documents-20210701-p585rx.html">custodian of the records</a> of the Australian people.</p>
<p>To that end, discontinuing the efficiency dividend on the National Archives and other struggling cultural institutions would be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-good-is-a-new-national-cultural-policy-without-history-188741">welcome start</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-keatings-climate-policy-grapples-sound-eerily-familiar-89490">Cabinet papers 1994-95: Keating's climate policy grapples sound eerily familiar</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195916/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Funding from the National Archives of Australia to David Lee in the role of Cabinet historian in 2022 is being made to the research funds of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Canberra.
David Lee is a member of the Australian Labor Party. </span></em></p>This year’s release, from the cabinet records of 2002, is framed by two events of the previous year: the Tampa affair and 9/11.David Lee, Associate Professor of History, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911462018-02-02T06:12:26Z2018-02-02T06:12:26ZThe Cabinet Files show that we need to change the nature of record-keeping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204519/original/file-20180202-123846-d2hqbm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">We need to redesign our records so that they are more accessible. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-31/investigation-into-cabinet-breach-exposing-classified-documents/9379016?section=politics">Punishing</a> the person or persons responsible for this week’s Cabinet Files leak does not address the underlying issue. The real problem is that the way governments and businesses keep records is broken. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="http://www.chairdigitaleconomy.com.au/">we</a> collaborated with <a href="https://www.qld.gov.au/dsiti/qsa">Queensland State Archives</a> to design a bot to automatically identify, appraise, store, and secure their records. No human intervention, or compliance, is required.</p>
<p>This kind of system is called “compliant-by-default”, and it is just one way we can re-imagine record-keeping to address low levels of compliance in our organisations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-files-story-shows-australia-still-needs-to-be-more-open-about-the-debates-that-shape-the-nation-91077">Cabinet files story shows Australia still needs to be more open about the debates that shape the nation</a>
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<p>A compliant-by-default system manages issues of security and restricted access by ensuring that only people with appropriate permission can see the contents of a record, while others are still allowed to see that the record exists, alongside high-level attributes of what the record contains. </p>
<p>This is essentially the difference between seeing the outside of an envelope versus its contents. The information written on the envelope is public, to aid in searching data, while the contents of the envelope are private. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204550/original/file-20180202-162101-19fuqo6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Bot: Security and permissions logic.</span>
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<p>The federal government’s current record-keeping system relies on employees fully understanding all the rules and standards associated with creating, storing, managing, preserving, and destroying records. Getting this right 100% of the time is not only improbable, but is unnecessary when it could be automated. </p>
<p>But it’s not just in government that record-keeping needs updating. A <a href="https://warekennis.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/bridging-the-information-worker-productivity-gap.pdf">recent report</a> found that in Western Europe, 57% of office workers spend an hour or more a day looking for missing documents. </p>
<p>This is the most basic <a href="https://www.dpgplc.co.uk/2016/03/time-management-employees/">example</a> of a broken record-keeping system.</p>
<h2>From record-keeping to record-using</h2>
<p>The cabinet files were published by the ABC because there is an appetite for <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-files-story-shows-australia-still-needs-to-be-more-open-about-the-debates-that-shape-the-nation-91077">transparency</a> around political decision-making.</p>
<p>But how many of us actually go and search the records that are already available? There is an opportunity here to re-imagine the way government agencies keep records, so that they not only become more usable, but more accessible for the public as well. </p>
<p>For instance, if someone inside an organisation starts a project with blockchains, a system like ours would make it easier to search and connect with other teams working on similar projects. This would not only allow for more collaboration, but give better transparency through the organisation and avoid duplicate spending (taxpayer money or private funds).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204556/original/file-20180202-162063-5b6bd1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Record-using: gaining context surrounding a record.</span>
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<p>This also has the potential to unlock new revenue streams, by using the records to provide services that were not previously possible. This is similar to how the advent of MP3 technology and high-speed internet made it possible to buy and store music libraries online. </p>
<p>The process of record-keeping could be monetised by <a href="http://www.pads.rwth-aachen.de/wvdaalst/process_science/process_science.html">mining the archival data</a>, to look for efficiency gains in business processes, for example, or <a href="https://ibmcai.com/2015/07/02/insight-as-a-service-the-next-frontier-in-analytics/">sell business insights</a> to the public and private sector. </p>
<h2>The digital vs physical debate</h2>
<p>While the general perception may be that physical records are easier to secure and manage, the reality shows that this is not the case. There are finite possibilities of what can go wrong with digital - copy, hack, share - but there is always a <a href="https://theconversation.com/hunting-hackers-an-ethical-hacker-explains-how-to-track-down-the-bad-guys-70927">trace</a>. </p>
<p>With physical records, there are infinite possibilities of things that can go wrong, and no way to trace it. There is no way to know what is being photocopied, if a record leaves a building, or who has the key to the cabinet.</p>
<p>While the sheer scale of potential attacks on a digital storage system may be much higher, a well-designed digital system can be protected. </p>
<p>It would be absolutely fine to print the records that need to be printed for the time they are needed. Systems should be designed to allow individuals to work in the way they prefer to work. Such a “digital first” approach is now being championed by the Queensland Government in its <a href="https://digital1st.initiatives.qld.gov.au">recent strategy</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204548/original/file-20180202-162087-x1d1c2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Bot: a compliant-by-default recordkeeping concept.</span>
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<p>The Cabinet Files story is not about who lost the key, or who sold the cabinet. It is about why these papers existed, were in a filing cabinet, and how such a range of documents ended up together.</p>
<p>The need for <a href="https://medium.com/qut-cde/prime-minister-and-cabinets-f7c5c260b5af">fundamental record keeping reform</a> is imminent.</p>
<p>If we must continue keeping records, then digital records offer new value to both government and business. Archival agencies have an opportunity to redefine what record keeping means to people and why it’s important, and to turn it from a chore to a superpower, from a back-end operation to front-facing business intelligence.</p>
<p>A digital record isn’t something to be locked away in an archive, it is the currency of knowledge transfer. What is unique about this solution is that we are not looking to make humans more compliant, rather, to making the system compliant-by-default.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Dootson receives funding from QUT, PwC Australia, Queensland Government, and Brisbane Marketing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marek Kowalkiewicz receives funding from QUT, PwC Australia, Queensland Government, and Brisbane Marketing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Townson receives funding from QUT, PwC Australia, Queensland Government, and Brisbane Marketing.</span></em></p>Storing sensitive papers in a filing cabinet makes no sense when we could digitise them and control access.Paula Dootson, Research Fellow in the Chair in Digital Economy, Queensland University of TechnologyMarek Kowalkiewicz, Professor and Chair in Digital Economy, Queensland University of TechnologyPeter Townson, Senior Designer, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908402018-02-01T03:18:59Z2018-02-01T03:18:59ZNew bill would make Australia worst in the free world for criminalising journalism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204342/original/file-20180131-157481-116ctzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Would the ABC’s publication of confidential cabinet documents would be in breach of a proposed government bill?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Joel Carrett</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia is a world leader in passing the most amendments to existing and new anti-terror and security laws in the liberal democratic world. Since September 11, 2001, it <a href="http://www.mulr.com.au/issues/35_3/35_3_13.pdf">has passed 54 laws</a>.</p>
<p>The latest suggested addition is the Turnbull government’s crackdown on foreign interference. <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6022">The bill</a> has been heavily criticised by <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=71d3ba2a-dc24-42b8-baa9-fb31ddab7c28&subId=562618">Australian Lawyers for Human Rights</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/28/submission-parliamentary-joint-committee-intelligence-and-security-espionage-and">Human Rights Watch</a>, and <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=b2c1242a-6f21-40e7-85e5-5160cbabe5bd&subId=562624">major media organisations</a> for being too heavy-handed and far-reaching in the limits it would place on freedom of expression and several other civil liberties. </p>
<p>The government’s own intelligence watchdog, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=b7d2ee0c-62d0-4aaa-8e5a-3fca1fc37dff&subId=562628">argues</a> the bill is so widely worded that its own staff could break the law for handling documents they need to access to do their job.</p>
<p>A case in point is whether the ABC’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-31/cabinet-files-reveal-inner-government-decisions/9168442">publication</a> of confidential and secret cabinet documents would be in breach of the proposed bill. Two filing cabinets full of <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-31/cabinet-files-reveal-inner-government-decisions/9168442">thousands of confidential cabinet documents</a> were given to the ABC by a source who, astonishingly, had bought them for small change at an op-shop in Canberra. </p>
<p>The ABC made an assessment and chose to publish a very limited number of the documents it deemed in the public interest. The ABC has so far clearly acted responsibly, and no documents that could harm Australia’s national security were in the first publication. </p>
<p>Some of the published documents are embarrassing for both the current and former Coalition and Labor governments, but that should not stop publication – rather, the opposite.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-foreign-interference-laws-will-compound-risks-to-whistleblowers-and-journalists-88631">New foreign interference laws will compound risks to whistleblowers and journalists</a>
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<h2>What the bill would mean</h2>
<p>The foreign interference bill, in its current form, suggests it should be criminal for anyone to “receive” and “handle” certain national security information. It would seem that by just receiving the filing cabinets and assessing what to publish, the ABC staff would be in breach of the provisions suggested in the bill. </p>
<p>Furthermore, this makes an already heavy-handed whistleblower regime from <a href="https://theconversation.com/journalists-mckenzie-and-baker-go-unshielded-before-demands-to-reveal-sources-11914">an international perspective</a> even more draconian. It is sure to lose Australia several places on the <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table">Press Freedom Index</a> if implemented as suggested.</p>
<p>The bill is an overreach in many respects. But one of the worst aspects, from a transparency and accountability point of view, is that it seeks to extend the draconian <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca191482/s70.html">Section 70 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act</a>.</p>
<p>Section 70 makes it a crime, punishable by a maximum of two years in prison, for public servants to communicate or supply information to anyone outside government without permission. The ABC’s publication of the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-31/cabinet-files-reveal-inner-government-decisions/9168442">cabinet files</a> clearly illustrates that media organisations with ethical and thorough editorial polices are perfectly capable of assessing what to publish.</p>
<p>The bigger picture is that the current bill is part of a pattern that started after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. </p>
<p>In our forthcoming book, <a href="http://www.anthempress.com/in-the-name-of-security-secrecy-surveillance-and-journalism">In The Name of Security – Secrecy, Surveillance and Journalism</a>, my colleagues and I assess how the anti-terror laws and mass surveillance technologies in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/25/world/uk-us-five-eyes-intelligence-explainer/index.html">Five Eyes</a> countries has impacted on in-depth public interest journalism. We also compare the Five Eyes with several <a href="http://time.com/4923837/brics-summit-xiamen-mixed-fortunes/">BRICS</a> countries and the situation in the European Union.</p>
<p>Our main conclusions are that the current fear-driven security environment has made it much harder for investigative journalists to hold governments and security agencies to account. This is partly due to anti-terror and security laws making it harder for whistleblowers to act.</p>
<p>Add to this the truly awesome powers of mass surveillance making it increasingly difficult for investigative journalists to grant anonymity to sources that require it for their own safety, and you end up with a very complex journalist-source situation.</p>
<p>Another important factor in Australia and the UK is that all national security agencies are exempt from Freedom of Information laws. This makes it virtually impossible to independently acquire information from the security branch of government.</p>
<p>The balance between national security and transparency is complex. As citizens, we want to feel safe and know what is being done to keep us safe. In our book, we have labelled this the “trust us” dilemma, meaning governments argue they can’t disclose what they are doing security-wise, lest the “bad guys” find out. </p>
<p>That leaves us needing to trust the government’s security actions and policies. But the problem is, how can we as citizens decide if we trust the government if we don’t have the information on which to base this decision?</p>
<p>There is no easy answer to this question. Political philosopher <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo3534874.html">Giorgio Agamben</a> takes our reasoning one step further when he argues that the liberal democratic world has been in a “state of exception” since September 11. This has granted powers to security agencies that are creeping increasingly closer to those of the totalitarian regimes in Europe in the 1930s.</p>
<p>Agamben traces various states of exception all the way back to Roman times. The pattern is similar through history: governments point to an “other” – often a hard-to-define enemy – as a reason for increased powers to the security apparatus. They are convinced they are doing the right thing.</p>
<p>The problem is that if we don’t roll back the strengthened security laws in times of lower threat, we start from a high level next time we enter a “state of exception”. This in turn can lead to a never-ending war on real or perceived threats where our cherished democratic civil liberties become part of the collateral damage. </p>
<p>If we allow the “state of exception” to become permanent, we risk allowing the terrorists to win.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johan Lidberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s increasingly difficult for investigative journalists to hold governments to account – partly due to anti-terror and security laws making it harder for whistleblowers to act.Johan Lidberg, Associate Professor, School of Media, Film and Journalism, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/890132017-12-31T14:19:05Z2017-12-31T14:19:05ZKeating’s Working Nation plan for jobs was hijacked by bureaucracy: cabinet papers 1994-95<p>The White Paper called Working Nation became the Labor government’s major economic statement in Paul Keating’s second term. However, the policy was principally an after-the-fact attempt to clean up a mess in the labour market and be seen to be doing something even if a little belatedly.</p>
<p>Cabinet papers released today by the National Archives of Australia show the white paper began as a rational exercise but was soon overtaken by pressing contingencies and the desire to make the policy everything to everyone. While concerned ministers were anxious to reposition the government in the midst of an ongoing recession, the process of preparing the new White Paper became an exercise in opportunism and bureaucratic capture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-how-the-republic-was-doomed-without-a-directly-elected-president-88394">Cabinet papers 1994-95: How the republic was doomed without a directly elected president</a>
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<h2>How Working Nation was formed</h2>
<p>On 15th December 1993 the Keating government released a significant draft policy entitled <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/cib/1994-95/95cib01.pdf">Restoring Full Employment</a> – a nostalgic resonance to the original war-time <a href="http://www.billmitchell.org/White_Paper_1945/index.html">Full Employment paper of 1945</a>. Australia’s unemployment rate at the time was a staggering 10% and while younger school leavers found it hard to find work or were actively discouraged, many older workers (especially males) were being thrown out of jobs, many never to work again. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, unemployment had not featured significantly in the 1993 election (which was fought on the GST), but Labor was now worried that if nothing was done about the deterioration in the labour market (and specifically job creation) then the government would not hold onto office in 1996.</p>
<p>In early February 1994, the Keating cabinet began work on a follow up government policy statement provisionally entitled: a White Paper on Employment and Industry. </p>
<p>The resulting Working Nation paper was one of five “Nation” statements favoured by the two Keatings (Paul the PM and Mike his head of department, not related). The cabinet papers show it began life with the worthy goal of “achieving sustainable high economic growth,” but soon became a “jobs and training compact” to reduce long-term unemployment. </p>
<h2>What Working Nation was designed to do</h2>
<p>Working Nation was meant to provide an employment strategy, stimulate regional development, introduce a new industry policy, and assist Australia “going global” in expanded trade opportunities. Ministers hoped the policy would lead the economic transformation of Australia. </p>
<p>It began life under ministers Kim Beazley (then head of the Department for Employment, Education and Training) and Peter Baldwin (Department of Social Security). The focus was on the job seekers who would be helped by individual case management, but with the insistence on “reciprocal obligation” - that those on income support had a responsibility to stay in education, be in training or doing other productive work.</p>
<p>But this obligation could easily be evaded through the misuse of medical certificates. Only women over 40 whose partners were unemployed were spared these expectations.</p>
<p>In its implementation by the federal bureaucracy, and the beleaguered Commonwealth Employment Service in particular, the policy descended into a treadmill of labour market programs. There was a saturation of jobs advertisements in the media – that even <a href="https://www.allenandunwin.com/browse/books/academic-professional/social-work/Social-Policy-Public-Policy-Meredith-Edwards-Cosmo-Howard-and-Robin-Miller-9781864489484">according to senior administrators</a> led to considerable “churning” of people through 12-18 month job compacts back onto the unemployment queues. </p>
<h2>Cost blow outs</h2>
<p>Cabinet deliberations at the time show two prominent political aspects of the policy. First, when money was up for grabs the policy intent expanded exponentially and ministers from tangential portfolios rushed to put their hands up for a share of the proceeds.</p>
<p>Second, fiscal circumstances were tight at the time, but costings for the multi-faceted White Paper went from estimates of A$200 to A$300 million for income support, to A$1 billion to A$1.4 billion a few days later. Then it became a maximum of A$1.7 billion. </p>
<p>When the program was announced in May 1994 it came in at an annual cost of A$2 billion, with claims of a total cost of A$6.5 billion before it was wound up in 1996.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200289/original/file-20171220-4997-hqq82l.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=759&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ministers like Simon Crean were largely left out of the process of forming the policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives of Australia</span></span>
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<p>The formulation process showed how a determined bunch of policy entrepreneurs, senior bureaucrats led by the head of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and academic economists, were able to drive a policy response based on detailed research and theoretical propositions. Social Security bureaucrats were also able to exploit the opportunity to implement their own preferred policy adjustments, almost unrelated to the main thrust of the policy statements. At the same time these bureaucratic players largely marginalised ministers in the process. Indeed, the 1994 Employment Minister Simon Crean had to be briefed by officials on the content of the policy when Working Nation was released. </p>
<p>Moreover, these insider policy entrepreneurs carefully sidelined the government’s main economic adviser, the Treasury department, during the whole process. This perhaps reflects the deep suspicion of some of these actors to the ideological bent of the then Treasury officials. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1994-95-how-a-security-agreement-allayed-australian-anxiety-over-indonesia-89143">Cabinet papers 1994-95: How a security agreement allayed Australian anxiety over Indonesia</a>
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<p>While a jobs training package sounded a simple response to a pressing problem, the Working Nation policy created more headaches for a government with umbilical links to the trade union movement. There was contention over a “training wage,” whether it should be greater than the Newstart allowance and how it related to the minimum wage. There was also debate on whether workers could jobshare (which was not endorsed by cabinet) and how increased income support impacted on housing and rental relief measures. </p>
<p>Working Nation was a classic case of just how complex and interrelated such well-intentioned policy statements can become when they cut across other areas of established policy. </p>
<p>Even before it was wound up, there were concerns, noted by cabinet, that the program was not achieving its objectives and that those on the Job Compacts program remained without work when their program entitlements expired. </p>
<p>Even after economic growth in Australia improved, the unemployment rate remained stubbornly stuck at 8.5% before the 1996 election, - an election at which Labor suffered a heavy defeat. Working Nation led to the Commonwealth Employment Service being disestablished and replaced by the now familiar network of private or community job-seeker agencies delivering services under competitive contracts. </p>
<p>While Working Nation was a major economic and social policy statement of the government, it was an inadequate response (too late and too slow) to the imperatives of the 1991-92 recession. And in the process of producing the White Paper, strategically placed insiders grabbed the opportunity to flex their own policy muscles inserting their preferred options into the statement. </p>
<p>Once released, Working Nation had a short-lead in time for implementation (eight weeks) placing huge burdens on a centralised bureaucracy, not generally equipped to respond so receptively to such demands. Working Nation highlighted not only the policy-making inadequacies of the federal government but also the tardy delivery capacity of large unwieldy bureaucratic organisations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Wanna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cabinet papers released today by the National Archives show Working Nation began as a rational exercise but was soon overtaken by a desire to make the policy everything to everyone.John Wanna, Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894902017-12-31T14:19:01Z2017-12-31T14:19:01ZCabinet papers 1994-95: Keating’s climate policy grapples sound eerily familiar<p>A highly publicised international deal on climate change is two years old. Australia’s federal government, under pressure from environmentalists and with a new prime minister at the helm, signs up and <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-to-ratify-the-paris-climate-deal-under-a-large-trump-shaped-shadow-68586">quickly ratifies it</a>. However, its emissions reductions actions don’t work, and the government faces a dilemma: strengthen the measures (including perhaps carbon pricing), or keep cooking up voluntary measures, spiced with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-federal-climate-policy-review-a-recipe-for-business-as-usual-89372">dash of creative accounting</a>.</p>
<p>While the paragraph above might just as well describe the present day, it also sums up the situation in 1994, when Paul Keating’s government was wrestling with Australia’s climate policy. The period is better remembered for <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/133332774">angry timber industry workers blockading Parliament</a>, but there were also important battles over carbon pricing and Australia’s international negotiating position.</p>
<p>Cabinet papers from 1994 and 1995, <a href="http://naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/by-year/index.aspx">released today</a> by the National Archives of Australia, show how Keating’s cabinet fought an internal civil war over how to respond to climate change, while working hard to protect Australia’s fossil fuel exports.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-30-years-since-scientists-first-warned-of-climate-threats-to-australia-88314">It's 30 years since scientists first warned of climate threats to Australia</a>
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<h2>International pressure building</h2>
<p>Two years previously, in 1992, Australia’s environment minister Ros Kelly had <a href="https://theconversation.com/twenty-five-years-of-australian-climate-pledges-trumped-78651">enthusiastically signed up</a> to the new <a href="https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf">United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)</a> at the Rio Earth Summit. Australia’s willingness to support targets and timetables for emissions reductions (something the United States ultimately vetoed) gave it credibility. </p>
<p>Australia used this credibility to propound a “fossil fuel clause,” which made the now-familiar argument that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products and/or the use of fossil fuels … have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The cabinet papers released today reveal that defending this clause was a major preoccupation of the government of the day.</p>
<p>In early 1994 Ros Kelly’s political career was brought low by the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/close-keating-ally-resigns-in-grants-scandal-1426241.html">“sports rorts” affair</a>. She was briefly replaced by Graham Richardson, and then the highly respected John Faulkner.</p>
<p>By this time, all climate eyes were on the first UNFCCC summit, to be held in Berlin in March-April 1995. As an August 1994 cabinet memo noted: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…international pressure is mounting to strengthen the Convention’s emission reduction commitments,</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…Australia’s measures will fall short of reaching greenhouse gas emission targets and that Australia’s greenhouse performance is likely to compare unfavourably with that of most other OECD countries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was a reference to the 1992 <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUMPLawJl/1997/48.pdf">National Greenhouse Response Strategy</a>, which was already being shown to be toothless, with state governments approving new coal-fired
power stations and renewable energy ignored. Environmentalists wanted more mandatory action; business wanted to keep everything voluntary. After a roundtable hosted by Keating in June, cabinet debated climate change in August.</p>
<p>The political calculations involved are evident in the official record, which states: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Australia’s] ability to influence international negotiations away from unqualified, binding uniform emissions commitments towards approaches that better reflect Australia’s interests will be inhibited by a relatively poor domestic greenhouse response.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And what are Australia’s national interests? It won’t surprise you to learn that the government worried that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…action by the international community could have a major impact on Australia’s energy sector and on the economy in general, by changing the nature and pattern of domestic energy use and/or by changing the world market for energy for Australian exporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Cabinet pondered finding international allies – such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and New Zealand – for the get-out-of-jail idea of “burden sharing”, which would allow countries to finesse their climate commitments by funding emissions reductions elsewhere.</p>
<p>Cabinet also canvassed the possibility of adopting either a proactive or reactive stance, or even withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations altogether. That last option – one that in essence would be adopted by John Howard, at least after George Bush opened up that space in 2001 by withdrawing from Kyoto – was seen as too risky. While the UNFCCC didn’t contain provisions for banning imports from recalcitrant countries, nevertheless:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As a major exporter of energy and energy intensive products, Australia would need to be involved in the negotiations to guard against the possibility of this occurring.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Carbon tax?</h2>
<p>Faulkner had already flagged that he would bring a proposal to December 1994’s cabinet meeting, possibly including a small carbon tax – something the Greens, Democrats and Australian Conservation Foundation were <a href="https://theconversation.com/tax-or-trade-the-war-on-carbon-pricing-has-been-raging-for-decades-46008">all pushing for</a>.</p>
<p>His opponents were ready, with a two-pronged approach. First, they produced economic modelling (with, it later emerged, <a href="http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/26286/investigation_1998_01.pdf">significant help from fossil fuel companies</a>), which warned that “to stabilise emissions at 1988 levels by 2000, taxes per tonne of CO₂ would need to be around US$192 for Australia and US$24 for the OECD.</p>
<p>So far, so frightening. But given that decisions reached at the Berlin summit might have consequences for Australia’s prized coal exports, some sort of
response was necessary. Fortunately, the Department of Primary Industry and Energy had prepared a document, called Response to Greenhouse Challenge "in consultation with key industry organisations” such as the Business Council of Australia. This had provided a “basis for discussions with industry and incorporates the key principles that industry wants included in the scheme”.</p>
<p>The carbon tax decision was deferred, and ultimately after a series of meetings in February 1995, Faulkner was forced to concede defeat. A purely voluntary scheme – the “Greenhouse Challenge” – was agreed, with industry signing on to what was essentially a reboot of the demonstrably ineffective National Greenhouse Response Strategy.</p>
<p>The Berlin meeting did lead to a call for <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644019508414218">binding emissions cuts for developed countries</a>, and
Australia signed on, albeit grudgingly. By the end of the year, the same industry-funded modelling was used to produce a <a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2351285">glossy report</a> which argued that Australia deserved special consideration because of the makeup of its economy. Australian diplomats would use this argument as a basis of their lobbying all the way through to the 1997 Kyoto climate summit.</p>
<p>In one of history’s ironies, on the same day that this report was released – December 1, 1995 – Keating’s cabinet discussed “the development of a more comprehensive effort in greenhouse science”, noting that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Climate change is capable of impacting severely on coastal infrastructure, living marine resources and coastal ecosystems such as reefs. The Australian
regional oceans strongly influence global climate, and Australia is vulnerable to oceanic changes affecting rainfall and possibly the incidence of tropical cyclones.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A look at <a href="https://theconversation.com/2017-the-year-in-extreme-weather-88765">2017’s weather</a> tells you they may have been onto something there.</p>
<p><em><strong>Read more</strong>: <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-ten-years-since-rudds-great-moral-challenge-and-we-have-failed-it-75534">It’s ten years since Kevin Rudd’s ‘great moral challenge’, and we have failed it</a></em></p>
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<h2>The ominous parallels</h2>
<p>As I pointed out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1992-93-australia-reluctant-while-world-moves-towards-first-climate-treaty-70535">last year’s cabinet records article</a>, “when it comes to climate policy, there are no real secrets worthy of the name. We have always known that the Australian state quickly retreated from its already hedged promise to take action, and told us all along that this was because we had a lot of coal”.</p>
<p>Reading these documents is a bit like yelling at a person in a horror movie not to open the door behind which the killer lurks. You know it is futile, but you just can’t help yourself. The December 1994 cabinet minutes contain sentences like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Greenhouse is expected to generate future commercial opportunities for Australia with increased export of renewable energy technology e.g. photovoltaic, wind and mini-hydro technology, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region [to] support renewables.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At yet, several governments later, we’re stuck having the same debates while standing by and letting other countries embrace those exact opportunities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc Hudson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Paul Keating’s government, faced with the prospect of international action on climate change, took steps to preserve the coal industry - a tactic that has been rebooted many times since.Marc Hudson, PhD Candidate, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/356912014-12-31T22:34:47Z2014-12-31T22:34:47ZCabinet papers 1989: The origins of Asian engagement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/67873/original/image-20141221-31573-o1za3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bob Hawke on a 1984 visit to China. His government implemented policies which boosted Asian engagement.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Archives</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Hawke government in the 1980s is widely considered to be the most competent and effective of recent years. Some may say this is not setting the bar terribly high, but the cabinet papers of 1988-89 demonstrate a degree of coherence about foreign policy that hasn’t always been evident since.</p>
<p>This is not to say that policymakers and advisers in the Hawke era got everything right. On the contrary, India was seen as the long-term potential economic force in the region, rather than China. Likewise, 25 years ago it was Japan that was the regional economic colossus and cabinet discussions reflected this apparently immutable reality.</p>
<p>And yet on the big foreign policy issues, the Hawke government not only looks prescient, but it also displayed a surprising degree of independence of thought at times. The discussions around the formation of what came to be the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping reveal a noteworthy recognition of the possible advantages of a “western Pacific” regional membership that excluded the US and Canada, and which could act as a “third voice” in international trade negotiations.</p>
<p>It is difficult to imagine any recent government even contemplating any policy initiative that didn’t have at least the imprimatur of the US, if not its active participation. APEC’s membership eventually expanded because its other prospective members – especially the all-important Japanese – weren’t interested in any grouping that didn’t include the US and facilitate access to north American markets.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding such diplomatic complexities, the Hawke government’s focus remained steadfastly on facilitating what has now come to be known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-walker-8317">“Asian engagement”</a>. While it may be the taken-for-granted orthodoxy among the major political parties and commentators now, it was still very much a work in progress 25 years ago.</p>
<p>Ross Garnaut’s <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/17491110">seminal report</a> on the Northeast Asian Ascendancy did more than anything else to give a coherent rationale for greater economic integration with the region. Even if some still question the basis of this engagement and the heavy reliance on supplying resources to a rapidly industrialising neighbourhood, the Garnaut report provided a vital part of an overarching, multi-dimensional plan with which to develop economic activity in Australia.</p>
<p>These days we might call this a “whole of government” approach. While something of a cliché, this phrase does capture the character of the Hawke government’s reformist zeal. Other cabinet papers reveal the thinking behind the structural adjustment policies that would come to be the domestic counterpart to the sort of market-oriented reforms outlined by Garnaut.</p>
<p>Whatever one may think about the wisdom of some of these initiatives 25 years later, what is most striking is that this was plainly a government that had big ideas and ambitions, as well as the people and policies to put them into place. The contrast with recent governments of both political persuasions is striking and illuminating.</p>
<p>Perhaps such confidence and ambition reflected the spirit of a time when the world seemed on the brink of momentous change – possibly, but not inevitably, for the better. 1989 was, after all, the year of wonders – bookended by the crushing of student protest in <a href="https://theconversation.com/tiananmen-25-years-on-ccp-now-fears-the-masses-gathering-online-27454">Tiananmen Square</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/berlin-wall-25-years-after-its-fall-germany-is-a-curious-mix-of-success-and-struggle-33977">fall of the Berlin Wall</a>. As the paper on Australia’s regional security interests rightly observed, Soviet communism had:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… failed to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Significantly, even in late 1989, no-one was expecting the Soviet Union’s abrupt demise. By contrast, the cabinet papers were half-right about China. Although the expectation was that China would be the weakest of the world’s great powers, cabinet documents show remarkable prescience in suggesting that trouble may be in store if China pursued a “more aggressive assertion of its territorial rights”. And this is precisely <a href="https://theconversation.com/senkaku-islands-the-latest-battleground-as-japan-gets-tough-under-abe-19650">what has happened</a>.</p>
<p>This judgement is all the more remarkable, perhaps, when we remember that policymakers were preoccupied with how to deal with China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. This was an event that not only demolished the hopes a generation of democratic activists in China itself, but it also shattered illusions about the triumph of liberal values across the region and the world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/67875/original/image-20141221-31560-1ublaf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia’s response to the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square demonstrated political pragmatism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cabinet advice about how to respond to Tiananmen indicated the sort of pragmatic self-interest that has come to characterise policy across the political spectrum, despite some occasionally lofty rhetoric and posturing at times:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s response needs to be carefully crafted to walk the fine line between continuing to condemn the leadership’s actions while avoiding unnecessary and enduring damage to our strategic and commercial interests.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Plus ça change? But before we rush to condemn the apparent cynicism in such sentiments, we need to recognise that difficult, unpalatable decisions are a necessary part of being in government. In any case, there are limits to what a country like Australia can do. </p>
<p>Despite the occasional compromises and inevitable misjudgements, the cabinet documents reveal a government that not only had ideas and plans about what it might do while in power, but one that clearly had the capacity to implement them. Perhaps times do change after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Hawke government in the 1980s is widely considered to be the most competent and effective of recent years. Some may say this is not setting the bar terribly high, but the cabinet papers of 1988-89…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/354192014-12-31T22:34:41Z2014-12-31T22:34:41ZCabinet papers 1989: Hawke government considered interest on HECS<p>The release of the <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/by-year/1988-89/">1988-89 cabinet documents</a> show that the Hawke government’s plans for Australian higher education were in some ways as radical as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/higher-ed-bill-explainer-what-will-pass-and-what-will-be-blocked-31019">policies</a> that Education Minister Christopher Pyne floated in 2014. What we pay for higher education and how the HECS system works came close to being very different.</p>
<p>Then-education minister <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dawkins">John Dawkins</a> oversaw some of the biggest changes to higher education in Australia, including the introduction of HECS in 1989. This was at a time when the Hawke government had already gently shocked the country with a series of major economic reforms which changed Australia, including floating the Australian dollar.</p>
<p>One of the most dramatic changes during <a href="http://www.randomhouse.com.au/books/gwilym-croucher/the-dawkins-revolution-25-years-on-9780522864151.aspx">John Dawkins’ short few years</a> as education minister was turning Australia’s other institutions of higher education at the time – the Colleges of Advanced Education – into universities. This changed who taught in universities, who undertook research, and ultimately who was allowed to attend, as the system quickly expanded to include new students, teachers and researchers. In doing this he took an elite education system and turned it into a mass education system. </p>
<p>To fund this expansion in student numbers, Dawkins finalised the move away from Whitlam’s policy of no tuition fees for students by creating the Higher Education Contribution Scheme. A scheme now universally known as HECS.</p>
<p>Australians had become more used to the market driving much that government did, but as the cabinet documents reveal, higher education may have meant a different world for many Australian students.</p>
<p>Some of what could have become higher education policy then is being debated now. There has been a strong reaction against the government’s proposal earlier this year – since dropped – that <a href="https://theconversation.com/higher-ed-bill-explainer-what-will-pass-and-what-will-be-blocked-31019">HECS be subjected to a real interest rate</a>. The cabinet documents now show this was a live option in the design of the original HECS. The Department of Finance supported:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a suitable real interest rate be applied to outstanding debts.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>HECS may never have been implemented at all</h2>
<p>In 1988, former NSW premier Neville Wran handed down a report on options for higher education financing. This examined, among others options, the world-first policy that was to become HECS. In assessing the findings of Wran’s report, a caucus consultative group was appointed to help guide options for the major government decision on how to pay for an expanded higher education system. </p>
<p>The powerful cross-factional caucus group looked at a number of options: direct student contributions through HECS, a levy on business, higher taxes for high-income earners and greater funding from general government revenue. All supported the idea that business should pay something towards the graduates they were employing (one recommendation never directly implemented). </p>
<p>But there was serious disagreement. A couple of working group members did not agree with the HECS proposal at all. In the end, the group came to recommend that HECS be supported while unanimously rejecting the push for a real interest rate. A uniform per year charge was also recommended for all students, irrespective of field of study. The group was worried that any attempt to match course cost to teaching costs in different courses might be disincentive to study in:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… relatively high cost courses in areas of national priority (eg science and engineering).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unfortunately for many students in high-cost disciplines and those that are thought to offer high-wage potential, the policy of a uniform charge was overturned by subsequent education ministers, with students now paying different amounts for different courses.</p>
<p>Dawkins finally had cabinet agree on a HECS system where debts were indexed at consumer price index (CPI), as is still the case for HECS loans. </p>
<p>It is interesting to note in the current debate over <a href="http://www.alp.org.au/debtsentence">“debt sentences”</a>, the original projections included in the cabinet documents the anticipated time that it would take students to pay back their debt – albeit at a lower repayment requirement than is anticipated should the Pyne changes go through. The cost of most degrees were expected to take a decade or longer to repay. Some, like teachers, were expected to be burdened for at least 16 years. The current average time to repay across the board is <a href="http://andrewnorton.net.au/">about ten years</a>.</p>
<p>It is also worth reflecting that the original cabinet minutes recorded the fact that there was almost never a University of Canberra. Cabinet had agreed that the ANU should merge with the School of Music and the Canberra College of Advanced Education, the latter of which was to become University of Canberra. Given University of Canberra Vice Chancellor Stephen Parker has been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/stephen-parker-higher-education-changes-a-fraud-on-the-electorate-34909">vocal opponent</a> of Pyne’s proposed changes, you have to wonder whether the present government has days when it wishes the merger had gone ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gwilym Croucher is a higher education policy analyst in the office of the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Melbourne.</span></em></p>The release of the 1988-89 cabinet documents show that the Hawke government’s plans for Australian higher education were in some ways as radical as the policies that Education Minister Christopher Pyne…Gwilym Croucher, Higher Education Policy Adviser, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.