tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/drone-strikes-28750/articlesDrone strikes – The Conversation2023-12-01T13:39:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186862023-12-01T13:39:32Z2023-12-01T13:39:32ZWhy all civilian lives matter equally, according to a military ethicist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562255/original/file-20231128-22-svbtks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=103%2C25%2C8510%2C5613&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The scene in the Bureij refugee camp following an Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip on Nov. 14, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestiniansBuriedInRubble/8cbb263c97d94eed9d66f53d553e2a3f/photo?Query=gaza%20destruction&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=735&currentItemNo=15&vs=true&vs=true">AP Photo/Adel Hana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/89960/enough-self-defense-and-proportionality-in-the-israel-hamas-conflict/">Some commentators</a> have criticized Israel for causing <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/assessing-israel-s-approach-to-proportionality-in-the-conduct-of-hostilities-in-gaza">what is claimed</a> to be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/14/gaza-unlawful-israeli-hospital-strikes-worsen-health-crisis">disproportionate harm</a> to civilians in its military response to Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack.</p>
<p><a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/118788/israels-war-gaza-morally-justified">Others have defended</a> Israel’s actions, claiming that such force – and the risk to civilians involved – is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/defence-minister-says-israeli-forces-heart-gaza-city-2023-11-07/">necessary to eliminate</a> Hamas, which some Israelis believe poses an <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-israels-war-against-hamas-is-existential-and-carries-no-time-limit/#:%7E:text=The%20former%20defense%20minister%20and,%22Zionist%20and%20democratic%22%20values.">existential threat</a> to Israel.</p>
<p>As of Nov. 25, according to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/25/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-death-toll.html">health officials in the Gaza Strip</a>, more than 14,000 Palestinians have been killed, the majority of whom are women and children.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/11/10/what-winning-the-war-means-for-israelis">But one of the arguments</a> given by defenders of Israel’s actions is that, tragic though these deaths are, the harm inflicted on civilians is proportionate because it is outweighed by the importance of destroying Hamas. </p>
<p>But what does “proportionate” mean in the context of civilian deaths? And how should we assess Israel’s claims of proportionality against critics who argue that Israel’s actions have caused disproportionate harm to civilians? As a <a href="https://philosophy.case.edu/faculty/jessica-wolfendale/">scholar of war crimes and military ethics</a>, I argue that to assess these claims requires careful thought about what it really means to value civilian lives. If all civilian lives are morally equal, as international law holds, then the lives of civilians on both sides of a conflict should be treated with the same degree of respect. </p>
<h2>Why targeting civilians is wrong</h2>
<p><a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule1">International humanitarian law</a>, or IHL, prohibits direct attacks on noncombatants – a category that includes civilians as well as wounded and surrendered soldiers. IHL also prohibits direct attacks on civilian objects such as schools, religious centers and hospitals and other civilian infrastructure. </p>
<p>However, because it is impossible to avoid all harm to civilians in a war zone, <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/proportionality#:%7E:text=The%20principle%20of%20proportionality%20prohibits,and%20direct%20military%20advantage%20anticipated">IHL permits</a> attacks on military targets that are likely to cause harm to civilians if two conditions are met: First, the foreseeable harm to civilians must be proportionate to the military advantage sought by the attack. And second, the choice of tactics and weapons – what is referred to in IHL as the “<a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/proportionality#:%7E:text=The%20principle%20of%20proportionality%20prohibits,and%20direct%20military%20advantage%20anticipated">means and methods</a>” – must also aim to minimize risk to civilians, even if it means putting more soldiers in harm’s way.</p>
<p>The prohibitions on directly targeting civilians and exposing civilians to disproportionate risk of harm exist because, under IHL, civilians have <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-protection-civilian-persons-time-war">protected status</a> as long as they take “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-protection-civilian-persons-time-war">no active part in the hostilities</a>.” This means that, as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-protection-civilian-persons-time-war">stated in the Geneva Conventions</a> – the set of <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm">international treaties</a> governing the conduct of armed conflict – all civilians must be “treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.” </p>
<p>Directly targeting civilians or exposing them to disproportionate harm is therefore wrong for the same reasons that it is wrong to kill or harm innocent people in peacetime. People who pose no threat to others deserve respect and protection from violence regardless of their nationality or group identity. To violate that respect in war is not only a <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">war crime</a> but a moral crime, which is why <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-what-we-know.html">Hamas’ massacre</a> of at least 1,200 Israeli citizens and the taking of 240 hostages is rightly condemned as an atrocity. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protestors marching with placards that have photographs of individuals with 'Bring her home,' or 'Bring him home,' written at the bottom." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562270/original/file-20231128-15-ggfica.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli protesters in Tel Aviv call for the release of the hostages held in the Gaza Strip by Hamas on Nov. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/ef40ba52e7064a04b7fc9b089502fb9e/photo?Query=2023%20hostage&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1083&currentItemNo=11">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span>
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<p>How should the lives of innocent people be weighed against important military objectives? </p>
<h2>Proportionality and moral assessment</h2>
<p>The condemnation of Hamas’ crimes is based on the same moral principle as the laws that protect noncombatants in war: All innocent people deserve protection.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557942">scholars</a> and legal experts <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943418.013.24">disagree</a> about how the legal framework laid out in the Geneva Conventions should be applied in war zones. </p>
<p>For example, in 1987 <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-expert-meeting-report-principle-proportionality">the International Committee of the Red Cross</a> argued that the definition of “military advantage” – the advantage against which potential civilian harm must be weighed – should only include “ground gained” and “annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces.” </p>
<p><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-expert-meeting-report-principle-proportionality">But the 2016 U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual</a> claimed that “military advantage” should also include other goals such as “diverting enemy forces’ resources and attention.”</p>
<p>There is also disagreement about what counts as “civilian harm.” For example, scholar <a href="https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/people/emanuela-chiara-gillard/">Emanuela-Chiara Gillard</a> <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-12-10-proportionality-conduct-hostilities-incidental-harm-gillard-final.pdf">argues</a> that “civilian harm” should include psychological and physical harms; legal expert Dr. <a href="https://www.state.gov/biographies/beth-van-schaack/">Beth Van Schaack</a> <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/32577/evaluating-proportionality-long-term-civilian-harm-law-war/">argues</a> that long-term harms should also be considered. </p>
<p>In short, there are no easy answers to questions about how to weigh harms against civilians against the value of military objectives. But while answers are difficult, there is a different way to frame this question: What does it mean – not just legally, but morally – to treat all civilian lives as equal, as the law requires?</p>
<p>As scholar <a href="https://philosophy.wvu.edu/faculty-and-staff/faculty-directory/matthew-talbert">Matthew Talbert</a> and I argue, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-611-6_11">first step in answering</a> this question is to ask what a military force would accept if it were “their” civilians who were at risk of harm from military action. </p>
<p>That is the standard we should apply when assessing potential military actions that threaten harm to enemy civilians. We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-611-6_11">call this standard</a> the “principle of the moral equality of noncombatants.” For example, Israel argued that its <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/15/middleeast/shifa-hospital-gaza-idf-intl/index.html">attack on Shifa hospital</a> was justified because, it claimed, Hamas was hiding a command base and weapons under the hospital. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/12/world/middleeast/gaza-hospitals-shifa.html">hospital, which was running low</a> on fuel, food and water, housed patients, including premature babies, and civilians seeking refuge from the conflict. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2023/11/26/dire-conditions-at-al-shifa-hospital-revealed-during-gaza-pause">According to footage</a> shown in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/26/wounded-patients-left-at-al-shifa-hospital-face-dire-conditions">news reports</a>, the attack left the hospital seriously damaged, filled with debris and lacking essential supplies for the remaining patients, who include the elderly and infirm.</p>
<p>Israel has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/19/idf-israel-army-footage-claims-hamas-tunnel-al-shifa-hospital-gaza">released footage</a> supporting its claim that there was a Hamas command center under the hospital. Does that mean Israel’s attack on the hospital meets the requirements of proportionality? In other words, was the harm to civilians caused by the attack – including the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protection-hospitals-during-armed-conflicts-what-law-says">ongoing harm</a> resulting from the loss of a major hospital – proportionate to the military value of destroying a Hamas command base? </p>
<p>In applying the principle Talbert and I proposed in our paper, the question would be phrased as follows: If Hamas was hiding a control base under an Israeli hospital and it was Israeli civilians at risk, would Israel think that attacking the hospital would be justified? If the answer is “no,” then the attack against Shifa hospital is also not justified. </p>
<p>This is because if the risk to Israeli lives outweighs the benefits of capturing a Hamas command base, then the risk to Palestinian lives should be given the same weight and lead to the same conclusion. Under IHL, all civilians are legally entitled to the same protection, regardless of their nationality. </p>
<h2>Taking civilian lives seriously</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, the debate about proportionality in the conflict between Israel and Palestine is only the latest of many debates about proportionality and civilian deaths in war zones. </p>
<p>For example, since 2001, the United States’ drone program has killed at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/sep/07/us-airstrikes-killed-at-least-22000-civilians-since-911-analysis-finds">22,000 civilians</a> in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere. A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/18/us/airstrikes-pentagon-records-civilian-deaths.html">New York Times report</a> on these deaths found multiple instances of “flawed intelligence,” cover-ups and cases of mistaken identity. Despite this record, civilians deaths <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/18/pentagon-drone-strike-syria-civilian-al-qaeda/">still occur</a>.</p>
<p>Using the principle of the moral equality of noncombatants to assess this track record would reveal whether the U.S. military is taking sufficient care to avoid harm to civilians. If the U.S. military would not accept these deaths – and the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/accountability-for-killing-9780199981724?cc=us&lang=en&">policies and practices</a> that contribute to them – if U.S. civilians were at risk, then these deaths are unjustified. </p>
<p>This would mean that the drone program must change in order to treat civilians in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere with the respect to which they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2011.14.4.519">legally and morally entitled</a>. This example illustrates that to meet the standards of IHL and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/35386/laws-war-nature-moral-function/">moral principles</a> that underlie those standards, military forces must apply the principle of the moral equality of noncombatants. There is no legal or moral justification, I argue, for treating some civilians lives as less important than others. </p>
<p>This is a demanding principle. Applying it would be difficult - military and political leaders would have to accept that there might be military objectives that are not important enough to justify risk to civilian lives. And it would require acknowledging that some military objectives might be so important that even harm to “their” civilians might be justified. </p>
<p>But one of the <a href="https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/Family___Holocaust_Tracing/IHL_HumanRights.pdf">functions of IHL</a> is to “limit the suffering and damage caused by armed conflict.” This principle reflects the moral and legal status of civilians in IHL and could lead to greater respect for and protection of all civilians during conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218686/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Wolfendale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Proportionality requires that lives of civilians on both sides of a conflict must be treated with the same degree of respect.Jessica Wolfendale, Professor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2064412023-06-07T15:30:25Z2023-06-07T15:30:25ZParamilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530621/original/file-20230607-15-idyoc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2772%2C1834&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Streets are flooded in Kherson, Ukraine, after the Kakhovka dam was destroyed. While the war in Ukraine is largely conventional, the use of paramilitary forces by both sides could escalate hostilities in the months to come.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Libkos)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-25-23/index.html">The war in Ukraine continues</a> more than a year after Russia’s invasion and shows no signs of abating. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kakhovka-dam-ukraine-russia-destroyed-rcna87852">An attack on a Ukrainian dam</a> is just the latest development in a long and drawn-out conflict.</p>
<p>In the coming months, Ukrainian forces <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/9/ukrainians-pin-hopes-on-counteroffensive-against-russia">hope to make impressive inroads</a> into Russian-occupied territory.</p>
<p>This war, by most analyses, is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/06/traditional-heavy-warfare-has-returned-to-europe-with-ukraine-conflict">conventional conflict</a>. While there have been unconventional elements in the war, such as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-fuels-a-refugee-crisis-that-could-help-putin-win-the-war-177951">weaponization of refugees</a>, the focus of both states remains on their regular armed forces.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-fuels-a-refugee-crisis-that-could-help-putin-win-the-war-177951">Russia's invasion of Ukraine fuels a refugee crisis that could help Putin win the war</a>
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<p>As the war progresses, however, we are witnessing more irregular elements — in particular, paramilitary groups — enter the conflict. Critically, they don’t <a href="https://www.econotimes.com/Russia-Ukraine-War-Kyiv-Says-Opposition-Russian-Paramilitary-Groups-Responsible-for-Belgorod-1656591">appear to operate</a> under the direct control of either Ukraine or Russia. </p>
<p>While these units give both parties tactical advantages they otherwise would not possess, the loose nature of their control also means they can undermine their respective war efforts.</p>
<h2>Approaches to war</h2>
<p><a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/war--created--modern-civilisation--scientists-claim-132549022.html">War often creates</a> elements that its practitioners could not, or did not, account for at the outset of the conflict. </p>
<p>For Russia, the war has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-russian-draft-isnt-likely-to-help-vladimir-putin-win-the-war-in-ukraine-191838">not gone</a> according to plan. Russia’s determination for the conflict to end in <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-desperate-victory-sends-troops-into-ukrainian-defenses-former-general-2023-1">some semblance of victory</a> alongside Ukraine’s desire to resist that by any means, however, is creating a potentially dangerous dynamic.</p>
<p>Both sides, from the outset, have employed non-traditional assets. Before the current phase of the conflict, Ukraine fully <a href="https://www.unian.info/politics/1526119-azov-regiment-announces-creation-of-own-party.html">integrated the Azov Assault Brigade</a>, a far-right military regiment, into its armed forces. Russia, meanwhile, has made extensive use of forces not directly affiliated with the army — most notably the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9voj_yspJ8I">the Wagner Group</a>, which is among several paramilitary organizations it’s employed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A sunbeam illuminates a coffin covered in flowers as a mother and young man stand in the shadow. The woman is crying." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530428/original/file-20230606-17-c7qb6p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A mother and son grieve at the coffin of an Azov Assault Brigade soldier who died defending the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol in April 2022 against the Russians.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)</span></span>
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<h2>Following orders</h2>
<p>While these forces aren’t traditional armies, many of them have been following state directives. </p>
<p>The Azov Brigade attempted <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/04/26/ukraine-azov-brigade-rebuilds-expected-counter-offensive/">to hold Mariupol</a> in the initial phase of the war. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group is still operating in a manner consistent with conventional army methods and goals, even though it employs tactics many find <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/russias-human-wave-attacks-are-another-stepinto-hell/2023/02/14/574e7202-ac27-11ed-b0ba-9f4244c6e5da_story.html">morally questionable, including human-wave attacks</a> that involve relying on sheer and overwhelming numbers of front-line attackers to subdue another force.</p>
<p>Paramilitaries have long been employed in conflicts. By their nature, paramilitaries <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825241.001.0001">operate outside</a> the standard army chain of command. Their removal from direct army hierarchy often creates ambiguity about who issues orders to them. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group, for example, has a documented <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-prigozhin-wagner-pressure-army-ammunition-ukraine/32283299.html">fraught relationship</a> with the traditional Russian armed forces.</p>
<p>This ambiguity has military and political advantages. Specifically, paramilitaries can <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003193227">perform actions</a> in which states do not want to be held complicit. In a world where the standard of proof is <a href="https://cilj.co.uk/2021/02/22/iccs-struggle-with-the-evidentiary-standard-of-proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt/">quite high</a> when it comes to justifying military attacks due to the consequences of war, paramilitaries largely fail to meet this standard.</p>
<p>While paramilitaries can be useful for states at war, their ambiguity can also create complications for the states employing them. Questions will always surround how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017699204">much control</a> a state possesses over them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent incursions of forces loyal to Ukraine in the Belgorod Oblast in eastern Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A badly damaged house." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530443/original/file-20230606-23-jmu61z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This handout photo released by the Belgorod governor’s Telegram channel shows damaged houses in Russia’s western Belgorod region in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Belgorod governor Telegram channel via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An alliance of convenience</h2>
<p>Soldiers recently crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65703548">attack Russian villages</a> in the Belgorod Oblast. Two Russian paramilitary groups operating with the Ukrainian Army, the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, <a href="https://twitter.com/France24_en/status/1661663513541066752">claimed responsibility</a> for the attacks. </p>
<p>While these forces are aligned with the Ukrainian government, they have their own agenda. Staunchly opposed to Russian leader Vladimir Putin — making them allies of convenience to Ukraine — both groups also have <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/belgorod-raid-russian-volunteer-corps-freedom-russia-legion-rcna86168">neo-Nazi</a> connections. </p>
<p>This is problematic given Russia’s repeated efforts to falsely <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230127-putin-blasts-neo-nazis-in-ukraine-on-holocaust-remembrance-day">portray Ukrainian authorities</a> as Nazi sympathizers.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/decrying-nazism-even-when-its-not-there-has-been-russias-invade-country-for-free-card-183695">Decrying Nazism – even when it's not there – has been Russia's 'Invade country for free' card</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Ukrainian government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65681806">claims the two groups acted independently</a>. In fact, it’s likely the groups operated without explicit orders from the Ukrainian government. That is standard operating procedure for paramilitary groups. </p>
<p>The problem is when paramilitaries work against a supposed ally’s interests. Ukraine’s current interests <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3L4eYpEEVQ">and focus</a> are on attacks against occupied Ukraine, not on Russian citizens on Russian soil.</p>
<p>Ukraine needs the continued support of western countries. Despite <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/interviews/1204547/the-west-wants-to-further-escalate-the-conflict/">Russian claims</a> that the West wants to escalate the conflict, outside countries’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/19/west-ukraine-win-war-military-support">ad-hoc, material support</a> of Ukraine indicates they want to prevent the conflict from expanding.</p>
<h2>Consequences beyond Russia</h2>
<p>While it’s true that Ukraine has had some success with attacks on Russian soil, they’ve primarily been aimed at military installations. <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russian-military-base-blown-ukraine-fights-back-1682558">Airfields</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/russia-alleges-ukrainian-helicopters-struck-belgorod-fuel-depot">supply depots</a> have been focal points as they advance the Ukrainian war effort.</p>
<p>The recent attacks by the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion, however, lack such focus.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in battle fatigues carrying large weapons smile and chat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530444/original/file-20230606-17-vlvfwd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian Volunteer Corps fighters gather for a break after a news conference near the Russian-Ukraine border in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even before the recent attacks, Russian government officials <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-blames-u-s-for-war-in-ukraine-f61cf634">blamed the United States</a> and its allies for Ukrainian-backed attacks on Russian soil. Officials in the U.S. and Europe, however, have been hesitant <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-to-investigate-use-of-belgian-made-rifles-by-russian-volunteers-in-ukraine-war-pm-alexander-de-croo/">to provide arms</a> that could be directly used against Russia. </p>
<p>The fact that both paramilitary organizations used equipment initially supplied to Ukraine <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/freedom-russia-legion-explains-got-180700678.html">by western donors</a> is likely to aggravate such concerns.</p>
<p>These attacks are likely to become commonplace as time progresses. Drones of unknown origin recently managed <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/europe/moscow-drone-attack-intl/index.html">to strike</a> several Moscow buildings. </p>
<p>Although Ukraine denies responsibility for the Belgorod attacks, and at this stage there is no reason to doubt this claim, the country’s employment of paramilitaries and other groups make it difficult to prove otherwise as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both Russia and Ukraine are using paramilitary forces in their enduring conflict. But employing such forces poses serious risks for both countries.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070582023-06-06T13:35:45Z2023-06-06T13:35:45ZUkraine war: the psychological and political impact of the drone attacks in Russia – an expert explains<p>Every military action communicates something. The recent drone strikes in Moscow during which three residential and high-rise buildings were targeted certainly did so. </p>
<p>This unprecedented attack arguably communicated to Muscovites that Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” is nothing but a euphemism for a war that has now reached the Russian capital. </p>
<p>It also communicated to the Kremlin that Russian soil is not immune from the sort of military strikes it has inflicted upon Kyiv.</p>
<p>Many commentators have argued that these attacks are a “<a href="http://theconversation.com/moscow-drone-attacks-are-a-morale-booster-for-ukraine-and-a-warning-for-russia-heres-why-206797">boost to morale</a>” for Ukrainians and undermine Putin’s hyperbolic narrative on the war’s success, and I agree. The Kremlin has downplayed the threat and reassured the public that its air defences can mitigate any future attack. </p>
<p>But what exactly is the psychological impact of these strikes on ordinary Russians themselves? And what sort of response could this enable?</p>
<p>The reaction from Moscow residents has been tainted by profound shock and fear. One woman who witnessed the attack <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/could-drone-attacks-in-moscow-change-how-russian-people-perceive-putins-war-in-ukraine">said</a> that the whole ordeal was “scary. You sit at home and this thing flies at your window. Of course it’s dangerous.” A security guard who was also present, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/30/moscow-drone-attack-mayor-reports-minor-damage-to-buildings">expressed that</a> “no one understood what was happening”.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine has felt like a distant issue for most Russians, until now. Muscovites now demonstrate a palpable fear of being injured or killed by one of those drones. Even though no civilian was killed or severely injured in this latest attack, the spectre of the war coming home can make the imagination run wild. </p>
<p>Since the invasion in February 2022, Russians (except for soldiers and their families) have yet to experience any sense of the trauma that Ukrainians have recently experienced. Westerners may hope that drone attacks will prompt the Russian public to put greater pressure on the Kremlin to bring the war to an end. </p>
<p>But director of the Moscow-based polling company the Levada Center, Denis Volkov, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/could-drone-attacks-in-moscow-change-how-russian-people-perceive-putins-war-in-ukraine">argues that</a> “single events do not have big impacts” on support for the Russian president. </p>
<h2>Rallying the Russian people?</h2>
<p>Conversely, these attacks could provide the Kremlin with the necessary rhetorical ammunition to bolster domestic support for their shameful foreign policy. They could exploit the psychological fragility, caused by the drone attacks, to turn the shock and anxiety of Russians into outright anger against Ukraine. </p>
<p>Those ideologically supportive of Putin are likely to have their views reaffirmed, while people who have thus far been politically indifferent or apathetic could all of a sudden become more receptive to the Kremlin’s narrative. Periods of emotional instability and anxiety can produce all sorts of behavioural changes – not least the search for violent retribution. </p>
<p>The attack on the dam in Nova Khakovka in southern Ukraine during the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65818705">early hours on Tuesday</a> could well be evidence of this psychological shift to further punish Ukraine. </p>
<p>My own <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/whats-the-psychology-behind-putins-decision-to-invade">research</a> on the psychology of war has shown that people are more likely to support a war when the dangers they themselves face are properly explained. It helps when the conflict is framed as a “clash of civilisations”. This has been the case with the war in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s propaganda has deliberately tied Ukraine to the terms fascism and Nazism.</p>
<p>Putin has argued that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are necessary to free people from the yoke of western neo-imperialism. Now there is evidence of the Kremlin framing this latest development in terms of “terrorism”. In response to the attack in Moscow, <a href="http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/71256">Putin stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Kiev regime has chosen a different path – attempts to intimidate Russian citizens with strikes at residential buildings. This is an obvious terrorist approach … Of course, Ukrainian citizens cannot speak out because of the total terror against civilians.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He framed the strikes as an attack on innocent Russian “citizens”. His choice to represent the drone strikes with the terms “intimidate” and “terrorist”, served to inscribe the Ukrainian regime as evil – a regime which had resorted to a path commonly associated with non-state actors. </p>
<p>He not only represented Moscow’s residents as victims of Ukrainian terrorism, but spoke of how the Ukrainian government had terrorised its own people – further evidence of his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/05/putin-ukraine-invasion-white-nationalists-far-right">saviour complex</a>. </p>
<p>His statement introduced the concept of terrorism as an additional frame to devalue the legitimacy of Ukraine’s political leadership. The use of the term and its labelling can have a dehumanising effect on the subject with which it is proscribed to.</p>
<p>This sort of discourse encourages public discussion around a “war on terror” narrative. This can enable a whole set of actions which would otherwise be harder to legitimise – including punitive attacks on key Ukrainian infrastructure and further mobilisation of Russian forces. </p>
<h2>The Motherland needs you</h2>
<p>Russia has suffered terrible losses in Ukraine, with the UK Ministry of Defence estimating that up to <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3864475-russian-death-toll-in-ukraine-war-could-be-up-to-60000-uk-intelligence/">60,000 of its soldiers have died</a>. The consequences of ordering up another round of mobilisation could be severe for Putin. </p>
<p>To avoid a mass exodus of fighting-age men and circumvent domestic unrest, he has relied on mercenaries such as the Wagner Group. Just after the incident in Moscow, deputy state duma chairman, Petr Tolstoy <a href="https://t.me/petr_tolstoy/1782.">wrote on his Telegram page</a>: “We need the mobilisation of all forces and means.”</p>
<p>Ordinary Russian men have no ambition of being used as cannon-fodder for a war which has no benefit to their lives. But answering the call to protect Russia from Ukrainian terrorists and assert control over national security, could persuade more to join up. </p>
<p>This would depend on how many more attacks occur inside Russia – and how effectively the Kremlin’s propaganda can exploit the emotions of a fearful and anxious public.</p>
<p>Given the strength of the Russian narrative surrounding the country’s massive sacrifice of lives in the fight against the Nazis in the second world war, giving one’s life for the motherland has a <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-patriotic-war-russia-invasion-ukraine">special meaning in Russian society</a>. Given the right conditions, it is very possible for Putin to exploit this to continue his military crusade in Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Soodavar works in the UK Parliament.</span></em></p>Now Russians may start feeling the fear that has afflicted ordinary Ukrainians since February 2022.Ben Soodavar, Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067412023-05-31T12:40:17Z2023-05-31T12:40:17ZDrone strikes hit Moscow and Kyiv – in the growing world of drone warfare, anything goes when it comes to international law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529174/original/file-20230530-21-ynq73b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian security forces take measures near a damaged site following a drone strike on May 30, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1258281328/photo/drone-attack-in-moscow-damages-several-buildings-with-no-casualties.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=fFRqMsFBSdxa7qh4flT00Xviw-RiQwO4Yhrtho9x0LE=">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At least eight drone <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-air-defences-battle-fresh-wave-russian-attacks-2023-05-30/">strikes hit Moscow</a> in the early morning of May 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/several-moscow-buildings-damaged-in-drone-attack-mayor-says#xj4y7vzkg">damaging several buildings</a> and injuring civilians.</p>
<p>This follows Russia’s targeting residential buildings in Ukraine with a wave <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news#russia-ukraine-kyiv-strikes">of drone attacks</a> in late May, killing civilians.</p>
<p>While Ukraine has said it is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-30-23/h_c2b6c6339841c69d4e2ebc3543598043">not “directly” responsible</a> for the strikes on Moscow, Russia’s government has called the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news">strikes a “terrorist attack</a>.” </p>
<p>For more than a year, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/drone-attacks-russia-bryansk-kursk-ukraine-kyiv-missiles-1800525">daily life in Ukraine</a> has been marked by aerial vehicles <a href="https://rmas.fad.harvard.edu/unmanned-aircraft-systems-drones">known as drones</a> littering the sky, creating unease and inflicting real damage in the war with Russia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165260201/russian-drone-strike-ukraine">Both Russia</a> and Ukraine are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-army-revamps-commercial-drones-attack-russian-tanks-trenches-2023-05-16/">using drones</a> in this war to remotely locate targets and drop bombs, among other purposes.</p>
<p>Today, drones are used in various <a href="https://www.deseret.com/23663271/things-you-can-do-with-a-drone">other conflicts but</a> are also used to <a href="https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/drone-delivery-services/">deliver packages</a>, <a href="https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2687/Drones-are-helping-scientists-understand-major-weather-events">track weather</a> and entertain drone hobbyists.</p>
<p>Military drones range from small consumer quadcopters to remotely piloted warplanes – and all types are being used by militaries <a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612">around the world</a>. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">public diplomacy</a> and foreign policy – and a former United States undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs – I know how important it is for people to understand drones and their proliferation, given the risks of war, terrorism and accidental drone clashes in the world today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing camouflage clothing and a green hat extends his hand and a small drone flys away from him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone from his hand in November 2022 in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1448799062/photo/drone-school-instructors-teach-ukrainian-military-aerial-reconnaissance-and-drone-control-in.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Ck4_N_iB9fcDwMnGvQwUHnv658v0CFkv2WTjIDaZEqE=">Elena Tita/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A buying spree</h2>
<p>The U.S. is among more than 100 countries using drones in times of conflict. </p>
<p>Terrorists have also been <a href="https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/2118451e-vt-mod5-unmanned_aircraft_systems_final-web.pdf">known to deploy drones</a> because they are relatively low-cost weapons with high degrees of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/nov/18/killer-drones-how-many-uav-predator-reaper">civilian damage</a>.</p>
<p>Consumer drone shipments, globally, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234658/worldwide-consumer-drone-unit-shipments/">topped 5 million units</a> in 2020 and are expected to surpass 7 million by 2025.</p>
<p><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/how-doctrine-and-delineation-can-help-defeat-drones/">Sales of drones globally</a> were up 57% from 2021 to 2022. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1754">the exponential rise</a> in drone purchases over the last few years, there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-drones.html">few constraints for buyers</a>, creating a wild, wild west of uncontrolled access and usage. </p>
<p>Each country is free to decide when and where drones fly, without answering to any other country or international authority governing drones. There is little on-the-ground guidance on the rules of the sky. </p>
<h2>Different purposes</h2>
<p>Each country has a unique interest in getting and using drones.</p>
<p>China is increasingly <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2022/11/23/the-chinese-drones-over-washington-00070641">using sophisticated drones</a> for covert surveillance, especially in international waters to patrol the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">disputed islands in the South China Sea</a>. Its expanding drone program has influenced other countries like the U.S. to also invest <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike-video.html">more in the technology</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey’s military has a highly sophisticated drone, the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a>, which is capable of carrying laser-guided bombs and small enough to fit in a flatbed truck.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates imports drones from China and Turkey to <a href="https://drones.rusi.org/countries/united-arab-emirates">deploy in Yemen and Libya</a> to monitor warlords in case conflict breaks out.</p>
<p>And South Korea is considering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-vows-advance-creation-military-drone-unit-2022-12-27/">starting a special drone unit</a> after it failed to respond to a recent North Korean drone incursion. When North Korea deployed five drones toward its southern neighbor in December 2022, South Korea <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/10/south-korea-drone-defense-leaked-documents/">had to scramble its fighter jets</a> to issue warning shots.</p>
<h2>No rules in the air</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-with-armed-drones/#:%7E:text=Over%20three%2Ddozen%20countries%20in,produced%20their%20UCAVs%20at%20home.">countries with armed drones</a> are individually navigating their own rules instead of an international agreed-upon set of regulations.</p>
<p>International law prohibits the <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/use-of-force-under-international-law/">use of armed force</a> unless the United Nations Security Council authorizes an attack, or in the case of self-defense.</p>
<p>But short of launching a full war, drones can legally be deployed for counterterrorism operations, surveillance and other non-self-defense needs, creating a <a href="https://news.nd.edu/news/the-future-of-us-drone-policy-a-conversation-with-international-law-professor-mary-ellen-oconnell">slippery slope to military conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Figuring out the national and international rules of the sky for drone usage is hard.</p>
<p>For 20 years, experts have tried to create <a href="https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf">international agreements</a> on arms – and some countries supported an informal <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_1_scope_holtom.pdf">2016 U.N. agreement</a> that recommends countries document the import and export of unmanned aerial vehicles.</p>
<p>But these efforts never evolved into <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2020/drones-and-the-development-of-international-standards/">serious, comprehensive standards and laws</a> that kept pace with technology. There are several reasons for that. In order protect their national sovereignty, governments do not want to release drone data. They also want to avoid duplication of their technology and to maintain their market share of the drone trade.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large gray drone is stationary in front of a large American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A MQ-9 Reaper drone awaits its next mission over the U.S.-Mexico border in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1439274747/photo/u-s-customs-and-border-protection-agents-pursue-migrants-along-mexico-arizona-border.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=PCc0OCblARHnSxxDsQj9lsCHBVb4wYSRfOL1LTAA7vk=">John Moore/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US and drones</h2>
<p>The U.S. has wrestled with how to balance drone warfare as it became involved in overseas operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and other conflict zones.</p>
<p>The U.S. killed a top al-Qaida leader with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-carried-out-drone-strike-afghanistan-us-officials-say-2022-08-01/">a drone strike</a> in Afghanistan in 2022.</p>
<p>But there have been other instances of drone strikes that resulted in unintended casualties and damage.</p>
<p>In 2021, The New York Times reported that a U.S. drone strike <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/asia/us-air-strike-drone-kabul-afghanistan-isis.html">on a vehicle thought to contain an Islamic State bomb</a> resulted in the deaths of 10 children – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/drone-strikes-biden-trump.html">not three civilians</a>, as the U.S. said might have happened.</p>
<p>There is scant public opinion research on how American feel about the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/us-faces-immense-obstacles-to-continued-drone-war-in-afghanistan/">use of drones overseas</a>, which makes building public support for their military use difficult.</p>
<h2>Drone dangers</h2>
<p>Drone dangers are real. </p>
<p>Many drone experts, including myself, believe it is <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=jlia#:%7E:text=A%20drone%20can%20be%20considered%20a%20weapons%20platform%20or%20a,the%20use%20of%20certain%20weapons.">unsafe for each country’s military</a> to make its own decisions on drones with no rules guiding drone transfers, exports, imports and usage – and no major forum to discuss drones, as the technology continues to evolve.</p>
<p>Multiple drones can communicate with each other remotely, creating shared objectives rather than an individual drone path or pattern. Like a swarm of bees, these drones form a deadly and autonomous aerial army ripe for accidents.</p>
<p>With the advent of artificial intelligence and more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles, drones can change speed, altitude and targeting in seconds, making them even more difficult to track and investigate. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html">Attacks can happen</a> seemingly out of the blue.</p>
<p>Drone detection is another complication, especially on the battlefield. </p>
<p>Ukrainian and Russian forces each want to know exactly where a drone originated. That can be difficult to determine, especially at night, as drones are fast-moving vehicles. Traditional radar detection has grown more sophisticated with new drone detection platforms to more accurately decipher the exact location of the drone operator.</p>
<p>In my view, the world needs new and consistent rules on drone usage for the decade ahead – better international monitoring of drone incursions and more transparency in the outcome of drone attacks.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-drones-are-swarming-the-skies-of-ukraine-and-other-conflict-hot-spots-and-anything-goes-when-it-comes-to-international-law-205898">article originally published on May 19, 2023</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As drone strikes become a more routine part of warfare, a set of rules or standards that can help determine how they are used in warfare is needed, writes a former US diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942952022-11-20T06:29:48Z2022-11-20T06:29:48ZAl-Shabaab in Somalia has resisted military force: now is the time for a new strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495037/original/file-20221114-22-1j0dek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali soldier looks out from a military base where a US special operations soldier was killed by a mortar attack south of Mogadishu in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2022, Somalia’s capital Mogadishu suffered yet another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/30/hundreds-killed-wounded-in-heinous-mogadishu-car-bombings">massive suicidal attack</a>. More than 100 people were killed. Hundreds more were wounded and thousands will have been traumatised by an attack claimed by the Somali insurgent group Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>The attack was carried out on the fifth anniversary of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia">most destructive suicide attack</a> in Somalia’s history, on 14 October 2017. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for that one too.</p>
<p>The devastation continues despite more than 15 years of effort by successive federal regimes in Mogadishu and the international community to end Al-Shabaab’s insurgent activities. These counter strategies included attacking them from the sky and sending Somali and African Union forces to fight them on the ground.</p>
<p>Some, such as Somalia’s recently elected president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and his inner circle, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-will-eliminate-terrorism-president-tells-un-general-assembly-/6760778.html">argue</a> that the organisation is a spent force. They say Al-Shabaab has been <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-somalias-security-conversation-he-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud">enfeebled and is now on the run</a>.</p>
<p>But in my perspective, based on my extensive <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186">studies</a> of Al-Shabaab since the time when it was part of the Union of Islamic Courts which governed Somalia in the mid-2000s, this isn’t true.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab remains a strong regional actor and has proved itself to be a resilient force. It has so far defeated all attempts (both internal and external) at eradicating it on the battlefield. This includes the deployment of Somali, western and African Union troops. </p>
<p>As the eminent Cambridge Horn of Africa veteran scholar Christopher Clapham rightly <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Horn_of_Africa.html?id=_SYFMQAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">wrote</a> in 2017, Al-Shabaab </p>
<blockquote>
<p>remains better placed than the officially recognised regime to build up its authority from below, by acting as the most visible defender of Somali nationalism and identity against an international attempt to impose political order from above. It remains a strong regional actor and is able to inflict terrible damage on Somalia itself.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests that pro-western local Somali actors should rethink the combative approach that has failed for the past 15 years. The federal regime in Mogadishu, which enjoys international support, should also change tack.</p>
<p>A non-war strategic option would aim at direct talks with Al-Shabaab leadership, just as the United States did with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This started with a series of talks in Qatar that culminated in the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-107386">withdrawal</a> from Kabul.</p>
<p>The image of Al-Shabaab described by Somalis living under their territories is that of a movement that is adaptable and incorruptible. This is in contrast to alternative centres of power built around clans and clan power dynamics in the periphery. This reveals that the organisation has remarkably disciplined leadership, despite the continuous elimination of its senior leaders by US drones. All in all, Al-Shabaab’s persistence is also due to its unique Islamic (though militant) leadership development, which promotes meritocracy in place of clannism.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/citizens-of-fragile-states-can-fund-public-services-directly-its-working-in-somalia-171541">Citizens of fragile states can fund public services directly – it's working in Somalia</a>
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<h2>Al-Shabaab’s strength and the government’s weakness</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab continues to show its might on the streets of Mogadishu. Following the October <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/twin-blasts-rock-mogadishu-as-somali-president-sheikh-mohamud-meets-security-officials-4001982">attack</a>, Al-Shabaab forces also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/">bombed</a> the busiest road during the day in Mogadishu. </p>
<p>A few days later, they shelled Maka Al-Mukarammah Road, the busiest road during the night in Mogadishu. This prompted a Somali security company to <a href="https://eagleranges.com/2022/10/15/eagle-ranges-services-security-bulletin-vol-2/">report</a> that Al-Shabaab had become more organised, dangerous and wealthy than it was before.</p>
<p>The armed group has gained informal control of Mogadishu. This is clear from its capture of the Laba-Buundaale settlement on the outskirts of Mogadishu in September.</p>
<p>This imperils a regime that is still standing only because of the continued presence of regional forces as well as the fact that the international community is sustaining it financially.</p>
<p>Somalia is profoundly fragmented, and the dysfunctionality of the state is unprecedented in the Africa. In my observation, Somalia has no functioning state and is no longer a state capable of protecting itself from Al-Shabaab, let alone protecting its people.</p>
<p>The federal government is both weak and without public legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy – developed from its lack of inclusiveness and unwillingness to share power – prevents the federal regime from consolidating its authority outside of Mogadishu. Since the ouster of the military regime in January 1991, no group or government has proved capable of restoring the once unified state, let alone controlling the entirety of Somalia.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab is now on the verge of capturing the capital, especially its concentration is geared towards seizing the presidential palace and the airport. They are back clandestinely to Mogadishu after many trained rank-and-file members were forced by the US airstrikes in recent months to flee to the southern port city of Kismayu for sanctuary.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-somali-clan-elders-could-hold-the-key-to-opening-dialogue-with-al-shabaab-152759">Why Somali clan elders could hold the key to opening dialogue with Al-Shabaab</a>
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<h2>The case for power-sharing</h2>
<p>Successive Somali regimes, including the current one, have never attempted to officially negotiate with Al-Shabaab. Instead, all presidents wore military fatigues and insisted on the military approach. But they didn’t achieve a decisive victory.</p>
<p>The current regime has gone even further by <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/farmers-turned-fighters-in-somalias-grassroots-offensive-against-al-shabaab-12719627">declaring</a> a clan-based war on Al-Shabaab. To this end, various clans in central Somalia regions have been mobilising ragtag militia to fight Al-Shabaab alongside the federal regime forces. Hundreds of peripheral clan militias were involved in clashes that began in August.</p>
<p>While encouraging clans to fight against Al-Shabaab, the federal regime did not provide those clans with the necessary resources and equipment. Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the disorganised nature of these clans to seize more territory and to attack in the centre of Mogadishu in broad daylight.</p>
<p>The military strategy of dealing with Al-Shabaab through clan militias ignores the fact that it, in the first place, operates freely in areas run by clans that feel marginalised by the broader clan-dominated “federal” fiefdoms. The current “federal” state structure in Mogadishu, which is <a href="https://hiiraan.com/op4/2022/jun/186645/clan_federalism_in_somalia.aspx">clan-centric</a> in nature, is legitimate in the eyes of the international community that <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/political-representation-somalia-citizenship-clanism-and-territoriality">imposed</a> it. But it is not legitimate in the eyes of so many Somalis, both inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<h2>A political settlement</h2>
<p>The calls for clans to intensify the war against Al-Shabaab without the lead of the centre is the last desperate attempts to face Al-Shabaab militarily. American drones have failed to do that. So has more than 15 years of the African Union armed mission inside Somalia. The clan strategy appears to be ending up in failure after failure.</p>
<p>The military approach cannot continue to be the only one approach. What’s needed is support for a Somali-owned political settlement between the federal regime and Al-Shabaab. Without seeking domestic legitimacy through genuine power-sharing, it would be hard for the federal regime to win over Al-Shabaab. The only way left for dealing with Al-Shabaab is initiating a political settlement. This is the right time to seize such an opportunity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Haji Ingiriis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab remains a strong regional actor and has proved itself to be a resilient force. It’s time to weigh a non-war strategic optionMohamed Haji Ingiriis, Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1921702022-10-16T19:02:23Z2022-10-16T19:02:23Z‘Killer robots’ will be nothing like the movies show – here’s where the real threats lie<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489521/original/file-20221013-12-lm966h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=143%2C201%2C1386%2C862&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghost Robotics Vision 60 Q-UGV.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/7351259/ghost-robotics-vision-60-q-ugv-demo">US Space Force photo by Senior Airman Samuel Becker</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You might suppose Hollywood is good at predicting the future. Indeed, Robert Wallace, head of the CIA’s Office of Technical Service and the US equivalent of MI6’s fictional Q, has recounted how Russian spies <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a12043/4267549/">would watch the latest Bond movie</a> to see what technologies might be coming their way.</p>
<p>Hollywood’s continuing obsession with killer robots might therefore be of significant concern. The newest such movie is Apple TV’s forthcoming <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/florence-pugh-dolly-movie-murderous-sex-robot-apple-tv-plus/">sex robot courtroom drama Dolly</a>.</p>
<p>I never thought I’d write the phrase “sex robot courtroom drama”, but there you go. Based on a <a href="https://apex-magazine.com/short-fiction/dolly/">2011 short story</a> by Elizabeth Bear, the plot concerns a billionaire killed by a sex robot that then asks for a lawyer to defend its murderous actions.</p>
<h2>The real killer robots</h2>
<p>Dolly is the latest in a long line of movies featuring killer robots – including HAL in Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, and Arnold Schwarzenegger’s T-800 robot in the Terminator series. Indeed, conflict between robots and humans was at the centre of the very first feature-length science fiction film, Fritz Lang’s 1927 classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Metropolis-film-1927">Metropolis</a>.</p>
<p>But almost all these movies get it wrong. Killer robots won’t be sentient humanoid robots with evil intent. This might make for a dramatic storyline and a box office success, but such technologies are many decades, if not centuries, away.</p>
<p>Indeed, contrary to recent fears, robots may never be sentient.</p>
<p>It’s much simpler technologies we should be worrying about. And these technologies are starting to turn up on the battlefield today in places like Ukraine and <a href="https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-analyzing-the-data/">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-fears-of-russian-killer-robots-have-failed-to-materialise-180244">Drones over Ukraine: fears of Russian 'killer robots' have failed to materialise</a>
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<h2>A war transformed</h2>
<p>Movies that feature much simpler armed drones, like Angel has Fallen (2019) and Eye in the Sky (2015), paint perhaps the most accurate picture of <a href="https://theconversation.com/eye-in-the-sky-movie-gives-a-real-insight-into-the-future-of-warfare-56684">the real future of killer robots</a>. </p>
<p>On the nightly TV news, we see how modern warfare is being transformed by ever-more autonomous drones, tanks, ships and submarines. These robots are only a little more sophisticated than those you can buy in your local hobby store. </p>
<p>And increasingly, the decisions to identify, track and destroy targets are being handed over to their algorithms. </p>
<p>This is taking the world to a dangerous place, with a host of moral, legal and technical problems. Such weapons will, for example, further upset our troubled geopolitical situation. We already see <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/amirhusain/2022/06/30/turkey-builds-a-hyperwar-capable-military/?sh=1500c4b855e1">Turkey emerging as a major drone power</a>.</p>
<p>And such weapons cross a moral red line into a terrible and terrifying world where unaccountable machines decide who lives and who dies. </p>
<p>Robot manufacturers are, however, starting to push back against this future.</p>
<h2>A pledge not to weaponise</h2>
<p>Last week, six leading robotics companies pledged they would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/07/killer-robots-companies-pledge-no-weapons">never weaponise their robot platforms</a>. The companies include Boston Dynamics, which makes the Atlas humanoid robot, which can <a href="https://youtu.be/knoOXBLFQ-s">perform an impressive backflip</a>, and the Spot robot dog, which looks like it’s <a href="https://youtu.be/wlkCQXHEgjA">straight out of the Black Mirror TV series</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1578400002056953858"}"></div></p>
<p>This isn’t the first time robotics companies have spoken out about this worrying future. Five years ago, I organised <a href="https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/science-tech/world%E2%80%99s-tech-leaders-urge-un-ban-killer-robots">an open letter</a> signed by Elon Musk and more than 100 founders of other AI and robot companies calling for the United Nations to regulate the use of killer robots. The letter even knocked the Pope into third place for a <a href="https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/science-tech/unsws-toby-walsh-voted-runner-global-award">global disarmament award</a>.</p>
<p>However, the fact that leading robotics companies are pledging not to weaponise their robot platforms is more virtue signalling than anything else.</p>
<p>We have, for example, already seen <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7gv33/robot-dog-not-so-cute-with-submachine-gun-strapped-to-its-back">third parties mount guns</a> on clones of Boston Dynamics’ Spot robot dog. And such modified robots have proven effective in action. Iran’s top nuclear scientist was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-fakhrizadeh-assassination-israel.html">assassinated by Israeli agents</a> using a robot machine gun in 2020.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lethal-autonomous-weapons-and-world-war-iii-its-not-too-late-to-stop-the-rise-of-killer-robots-165822">Lethal autonomous weapons and World War III: it's not too late to stop the rise of 'killer robots'</a>
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<h2>Collective action to safeguard our future</h2>
<p>The only way we can safeguard against this terrifying future is if nations collectively take action, as they have with chemical weapons, biological weapons and even nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Such regulation won’t be perfect, just as the regulation of chemical weapons isn’t perfect. But it will prevent arms companies from openly selling such weapons and thus their proliferation. </p>
<p>Therefore, it’s even more important than a pledge from robotics companies to see the UN Human Rights council <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/10/human-rights-council-adopts-six-resolutions-appoints-special-rapporteur-situation">has recently unanimously decided</a> to explore the human rights implications of new and emerging technologies like autonomous weapons. </p>
<p>Several dozen nations have already called for the UN to regulate killer robots. The European Parliament, the African Union, the UN Secretary General, Nobel peace laureates, church leaders, politicians and thousands of AI and robotics researchers like myself have all called for regulation. </p>
<p>Australian is not a country that has, so far, supported these calls. But if you want to avoid this Hollywood future, you may want to take it up with your political representative next time you see them.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-could-take-a-global-lead-in-controlling-the-development-of-killer-robots-so-why-isnt-it-166168">New Zealand could take a global lead in controlling the development of 'killer robots' — so why isn't it?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toby Walsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sentient, murderous humanoid robot is a complete fiction, and may never become reality. But that doesn’t mean we’re safe from autonomous weapons – they are already here.Toby Walsh, Professor of AI at UNSW, Research Group Leader, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880562022-08-02T13:16:52Z2022-08-02T13:16:52ZWho was Ayman al-Zawahri? Where does his death leave al-Qaida and what does it say about US counterterrorism?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477165/original/file-20220802-19-5lqhr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C85%2C2986%2C2250&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Who will replace the man who replaced bin Laden?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/osama-bin-laden-sits-with-his-adviser-ayman-al-zawahiri-an-news-photo/681898?adppopup=true">Visual News/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ayman al-Zawahri, leader of al-Qaida and a plotter of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">has been killed in a drone strike</a> in the Afghan city of Kabul, according to the U.S. government.</em></p>
<p><em>Al-Zawahri was the the successor to Osama bin Laden and his death marked “one more measure of closure” to the families of those killed in the 2001 atrocities, U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/08/01/remarks-by-president-biden-on-a-successful-counterterrorism-operation-in-afghanistan/">said during televised remarks</a> on Aug. 1, 2022.</em></p>
<p><em>The operation came almost a year after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/30/politics/us-military-withdraws-afghanistan/index.html">American troops exited Afghanistan</a> after decades of fighting there. The Conversation asked <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/team/dr-daniel-milton/">Daniel Milton</a>, a terrorism expert at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/dr-haroro-ingram">Haroro J. Ingram</a> and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">Andrew Mines</a>, research fellows at the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to explain the significance of the strike on al-Zawahri and what it says about U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan under the Taliban.</em></p>
<h2>Who was Ayman al-Zawahri?</h2>
<p>Ayman al-Zawahri was an Egyptian-born jihadist who became al-Qaida’s top leader in 2011 after his predecessor, Osama bin Laden, was <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">killed by a U.S. operation</a>. Al-Zawahri’s ascent followed years in which al-Qaida’s leadership had been devastated by <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/43/2/45/12208/What-Explains-Counterterrorism-Effectiveness?redirectedFrom=fulltext">U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan</a>. Bin Laden had himself been <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined/">struggling</a> in the years leading up to his death to exert control and unity across al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A laptop screen shows Ayman al-Zawahri speaking with the English translation below reading 'Bush do you know where I am. I am in the midst.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C11%2C1982%2C1341&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri challenging then-president George W. Bush.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BidenAfghanistan/32481436d03047e8892fd3cef111ea9b/photo?Query=Zawahri&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=67&currentItemNo=23">AP Photo/B.K.Bangash</a></span>
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<p>Al-Zawahri succeeded bin Laden despite a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/01/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-killed-drone-strike-afghanistan/">mixed reputation</a>. While he had a long history of involvement in the jihadist struggle, he was viewed by many <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/08/opinions/where-is-bin-ladens-partner-in-crime-ayman-al-zawahiri">observers</a> and even jihadists as a languid orator without formal religious credentials or battlefield reputation.</p>
<p>Lacking the charisma of his predecessor, al-Zawahri’s <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2017/issue-1/0620171-deciphering-ayman-al-zawahiri-and-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-strategic-and-ideological-imperatives-by-sajjan-m.-gohel.pdf">image</a> as a leader was not helped by a tendency to embark on long, meandering and often outdated speeches. Al-Zawahri also struggled to shake rumors that he was a <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">prison informer</a> while detained in Egypt and, as author and journalist Lawrence Wright <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">detailed</a>, acted as a wedge between the young bin Laden and his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.</p>
<p>Al-Zawahri’s influence further waned during a series of popular uprisings known as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East</a>, when it seemed that al-Qaida had been sidelined and unable to effectively exploit the outbreak of war in Syria and Iraq. To analysts and supporters alike, al-Zawahiri appeared symbolic of an al-Qaida that was outdated and rapidly being eclipsed by other groups that it had <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/">once helped onto the global stage</a>, most notably the Islamic State.</p>
<p>But with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate">collapse of the Islamic State group’s caliphate</a> in 2019, the return to power in Afghanistan of al-Qaida ally the Taliban and the persistence of al-Qaida affiliates <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/islamic-state-and-al-qaeda-linked-african-insurgencies">especially in Africa</a>, some experts <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">argue</a> that al-Zawahri guided al-Qaida through its most challenging period and that the group remains a potent threat. Indeed, one senior Biden administration official <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">told the Associated Press</a> that at the time of his death, al-Zawahri continued to provide “strategic direction” and was considered a dangerous figure.</p>
<h2>Where does his death leave al-Qaida?</h2>
<p>Killing or capturing top terrorist leaders has been a key counterterrorism tool for decades. Such operations remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield and force <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/terror-in-transition/9780231192255">succession struggles</a> that disrupt group cohesion and can expose security vulnerabilities. Unlike the Islamic State, which has clear <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">leadership succession practices</a> that it has showcased four times since the 2006 death of its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida’s are less clear. Al-Zawahri’s successor will only be the movement’s third leader <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/al-qaeda-international">since forming</a> in 1988.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">top contender</a> is another Egyptian. A former colonel in the Egyptian army and, like al-Zawahri, a member of the al-Qaida affiliate Egyptian Islamic Jihad, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/saif-al-adel">Saif al-Adel is connected to</a> the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that launched al-Qaida as a global jihadist threat. His reputation as an explosives expert and military strategist has won him strong standing within the al-Qaida movement. A number of other possibilities are behind al-Adel, with a recent <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">U.N. Security Council report</a> identifying several possible successors. </p>
<p>Either way, we’d argue that al-Qaida is at a crossroads. If al-Zawahri’s successor is broadly recognized as legitimate by both al-Qaida’s core and its affiliates, it could help to stabilize the movement. But any ambiguity surrounding al-Qaida’s succession plan could see the new leader’s authority challenged, which in turn could fracture the movement further.</p>
<p>Evidence suggests al-Qaida’s presence as a global movement will survive al-Zawahri’s death, just as it did bin Laden’s. The network has seen <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">a number of recent successes</a>. Longtime allies the Taliban successfully took control of Afghanistan with help from <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis">al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent</a> – an affiliate which is now <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">expanding its operations in Pakistan and India</a>. Meanwhile, affiliates across the African continent – from Mali and the Lake Chad region to Somalia – remain a threat, with some <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">expanding beyond their traditional areas of operation</a>.</p>
<p>Other affiliates, like the group’s Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, remain loyal to the core and, according to the U.N. monitoring team, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">are keen to revive</a> overseas attacks against the U.S. and its allies.</p>
<p>Now, al-Zawahri’s successor will be looking to retain the allegiance of al-Qaida’s affiliates as it strives to remain a potent threat.</p>
<h2>What does this tell us about US operations in Afghanistan under the Taliban?</h2>
<p>The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 prompted questions over whether the U.S. could keep pressure on al-Qaida, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a> and other militants in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/11/20/sof-leader-calls-over-the-horizon-ops-in-afghanistan-hard-but-doable">U.S. officials explained</a> that an “over-the-horizon” strategy – launching surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside any given state – would allow the U.S. to deal with problems that emerged, such as terrorist attacks and the resurgence of groups.</p>
<p>But many experts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">disagreed</a>. And when an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-strikes-islamic-state-group-b8bd9b0c805c610758bd1d3e20090c2c">errant U.S. drone strike</a> killed seven children, a U.S.-employed humanitarian worker and other civilians last fall, that strategy came under sharp scrutiny.</p>
<p>But for those who doubted whether the U.S. still had the desire to go after key terrorists in Afghanistan, the killing of al-Zawahri gives a clear answer. This strike <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">reportedly involved</a> long-term surveillance of Zawahri and his family and robust discussion within the U.S. government before receiving presidential approval. Biden claims it was carried out without civilian casualties.</p>
<p>At the same time, it took the U.S. 11 months to strike its first high-value target in Afghanistan under the Taliban. This contrasts with the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-significantly-reduced-global-airstrikes-in-2021-/6392771.html">hundreds of airstrikes</a> executed in the years before the U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<p>The strike occurred in a Kabul neighborhood populated by senior Taliban figures. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">The safehouse itself belonged</a> to a senior aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani, a terrorist <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorinfo/sirajuddin-haqqani">wanted by the U.S.</a> and a top Taliban leader. </p>
<p>Aiding and abetting al-Zawahri was a violation of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Doha agreement</a>, under which the Taliban agreed “not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies.” The circumstances of the strike suggest that if the U.S. wants to do effective over-the-horizon operations in Afghanistan, it cannot <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/26/how-to-partner-with-the-taliban/">count on</a> the Taliban for support. </p>
<p>The strike on al-Zawahri also tells us little about whether the U.S. strategy post-pullout can contain other jihadist groups in the region like <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>, which is vehemently opposed to the Taliban and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">expanding in Afghanistan</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, we believe that if more jihadists perceive the Taliban to be too weak to protect the top leaders of al-Qaida and its affiliates, while at the same time unable to govern Afghanistan without U.S. aid, many may consider <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">ISIS-K to be the best choice</a>.</p>
<p>These and other dynamics speak to the many challenges of pursuing an over-the-horizon counterterrorism in Afghanistan today, ones that are unlikely to be solved by occasional high-profile drone strikes and assassinations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views expressed by Dr. Milton are his own and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Mines and Haroro J. Ingram do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US strike against al-Zawahri leaves the future of al-Qaida at a crossroads as the terrorist movement looks for a new leader.Haroro J. Ingram, Senior Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAndrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityDaniel Milton, Director of Research, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721972021-11-23T11:51:16Z2021-11-23T11:51:16ZCollateral damage: crushing the myths of accuracy and accountability in modern warfare<p>The US military is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/14/us-confirms-2019-airstrike-hit-crowd-of-syrian-women-and-children">facing allegations</a> it covered up civilian casualty cases in the US-led coalition war against Islamic State (IS). It’s an issue that has drawn attention to one of the most worrying aspects of US and coalition involvement in the Middle East: the large numbers of civilian casualties or what has come to be known as “collateral damage”. </p>
<p>On November 13 2021, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html">the New York Times</a> revealed that over 70 people had been killed in an F-15 airstrike on the Syrian town of Baghuz in 2019. Legal officers flagged the incident as a possible war crime at the time and requested an investigation. </p>
<p>But this investigation never took place. Instead, information on the strike was buried, inconvenient questions were ignored, reports were “deleted, sanitised and classified”, and defence analyst Gene Tate, the whistleblower in question, was fired. Only after he finally turned to the media, the Pentagon acknowledged that there had been 80 deaths. That these casualties were civilians was not acknowledged - and nor was the potential for this to have been a war crime. The Pentagon maintained that the civilian identity of the people killed was impossible to determine because women and children in IS sometimes took up arms.</p>
<p>The Baghuz airstrike is not an isolated event. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">Recent research</a> on a Dutch-led coalition airstrike on an IS weapons factory in the Iraqi town of Hawija in 2015 that killed over 70 civilians shows that neither the shocking civilian death toll nor its denial and cover-up are unique. Dutch politicians initially denied responsibility for any civilian casualties – then attempted to keep civilian casualty numbers classified in the name of “operational security”. </p>
<p>When journalists irrefutably demonstrated that the Hawija attack had been carried out by the Netherlands, here too officials claimed nobody could know if the people killed were civilians or IS fighters.</p>
<p>This denying that casualties take place and questioning their civilian identity is a systematic feature of the remote war waged against IS. Respected monitoring agency Airwars <a href="https://airwars.org/conflict/coalition-in-iraq-and-syria/">estimates</a> that between 8,150 and 13,174 civilians have been killed in the wake of the 35,000 airstrikes that were conducted since the war began in 2014 (and which destroyed over 70% of cities such as Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria). Yet the coalition as a whole acknowledges just over 10% of these (1,417).</p>
<h2>‘Precision warfare’</h2>
<p>The US-led coalition war against IS is a good example of how advanced militaries are turning to remote warfare. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010618777890">Remote warfare</a> is characterised by a shift away from “boots on the ground”. It involves drone and airstrikes and special-operation teams training local forces to do the actual <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ORG_RemoteControl_SecCoop.pdf">fighting and dying</a>. This “zero-risk warfare” is appealing to western democratic leaders: with fewer returning body bags, they no longer fear public outcry and electoral losses.</p>
<p>Remote war is sold to the public by emphasising things like the “precision” of the missiles and the “care” taken to avoid civilian casualties. The US coalition commander, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/15/reports-of-civilian-casualties-from-coalition-strikes-on-isis-are-vastly-inflated-lt-gen-townsend-cjtf-oir/">Stephen J Townsend,</a> for instance, challenged anyone to find a more “precise air campaign in the history of warfare … The coalition’s goal is always for zero human casualties.” </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-warfare-precision-missiles-will-not-stop-civilian-deaths-heres-why-171905">Modern warfare: 'precision' missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here's why</a>
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<p>For coalition strategists, this new sort of “<a href="https://intimacies-of-remote-warfare.nl/publications/perfect-war-and-its-contestations/">perfect warfare</a>”, based on “smart technologies” and “proportionality principles” allows them – in principle at least – to save the lives of not just western military personnel, but also friendly civilians.</p>
<h2>Denial, secrecy and the impossibility of knowing</h2>
<p>So, incidents that involve mass civilian casualties have the potential to undercut the legitimacy of not just a particular operation, but the new nature of warfare more broadly. This is why in situations such as the two outlined above, <a href="https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/pentagon-revelations-increase-pressure-on-european-militaries-to-acknowledge-killing-civilians/">western governments are secretive</a> about the civilian harm their remote attacks cause and go to great lengths to keep these quiet. </p>
<p>To uphold the myth of a “clean war”, officials turn to routine strategies of denial (“civilians didn’t die”) and secrecy (“we cannot disclose whether civilians died because of operational security”). If, however, civilian casualties can no longer be kept under wraps, officials resort to emphasising the sheer impossibility of knowing the identity of those targeted. With this, they ironically undermine their own precision discourse: exactly because strikes take place far away and there are no boots on the ground, it apparently is impossible to determine who died. </p>
<p>Regarding Hawija, the Dutch Ministry of Defence <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">initially claimed</a> that only Centcom – the American central command that led the war against IS – had the authority and the capacity to establish the occurrence of civilian casualties in Hawija. </p>
<p>But when Centcom subsequently acknowledged the 70 casualties were part of its official civilian body count, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">the Dutch defence minister Ank Bijleveld argued</a> that even Centcom could never know the true civilian nature of the casualties, because of “the difficulty of distinguishing retrospectively between IS fighters and civilians”. In many ways, the US responses to Baghuz echo this logic, by stating that the civilian identity of the 80 people killed was inherently impossible to determine.</p>
<h2>Remote warfare and accountability</h2>
<p>This systematic and strategic refusal to “know about” the harm done to civilians undermines transparency, recognition and accountability for human suffering in remote wars. It also undermines the ability of western citizens and parliaments to exert democratic control over the wars waged in their name. This will make western advanced militaries more – not less – war prone, and allows for the continued unaccountable killing of civilians. </p>
<p>Monitoring organisations, journalists, academics and military whistleblowers are doing their best to uncover and make visible the asymmetrical death and suffering that occurs in remote wars. It is now up to people in the west and their governments to care and question the logic of this type of violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Western militaries all too often try to hide the fact of civilian casualties as they spoil the popular narrative of a “clean” war.Lauren Gould, Assistant Professor, Conflict Studies, Utrecht UniversityJolle Demmers, Professor in Conflict Studies, Utrecht UniversityNora Stel, Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies, Radboud UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673932021-09-07T10:48:10Z2021-09-07T10:48:10Z9/11’s legacy of drone warfare has changed how we view the military<p>In October 2001, nearly one month after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, a US Air Force pilot made history as the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2015/12/how-rogue-techies-armed-the-predator-almost-stopped-911-and-accidentally-invented-remote-war/">first person</a> to conduct a lethal strike with a modern drone – <a href="https://sts-program.mit.edu/book/robots-robotics-myths-autonomy">the Predator</a>.</p>
<p>In the months and years following that first strike, the drone – or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), as it is referred to by military professionals – has become the <a href="https://www.littlebrown.com/titles/lieutenant-colonel-wayne-phelps-usmc-ret/on-killing-remotely/9780316628297">“weapon of choice”</a> for the states who can afford them. </p>
<p>The “war on terror” that ensued demanded the use of military means, but did not have the legal or conceptual <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/stares_yacoubian_terror.pdf">legitimacy required</a> to convince the public in Nato countries that human casualties were necessary. The “war on terror”, due to its elusive nature as a war with blurry and unachievable objectives, has resulted in the west fighting an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/31/how-the-us-created-a-world-of-endless-war">“endless war”</a>.</p>
<p>The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a nonprofit news organisation, estimates that <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Q1eBZ275Znlpn05PnPO7Q1BkI3yJZbvB3JycywAmqWc/edit#gid=1997258237">since 2015</a>, the US has conducted more than 14,000 <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data">drone strikes</a> in Afghanistan alone.</p>
<p>The relentless push by governments for more drone strikes has led to three key military developments. First, the global development of drones has expanded, as evidenced by the use of drones by major global powers – such as China and Russia – as well as <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/introduction-how-we-became-a-world-of-drones/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20ten%20countries%20have,armed%20drones%20in%20their%20arsenals">regional ones</a>. Many US allies and specifically Nato members are equipping their armed forces with drones, either for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) missions, or to arm them and use them in combat functions. </p>
<p>In the European defence environment, some countries are <a href="https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/cws/files/cws_military_drones_in_europe_report.pdf">developing their own</a> drone production programmes. </p>
<h2>Fighting from afar</h2>
<p>The second development is a natural consequence of the first: in order to use drones, someone has to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/19/australian-pilots-drafted-to-help-fly-uk-drones-over-syria-and-iraq">fly them</a>. In a way that is hardly different from manned aircraft, a crew is required for the operation of drones. Military professionals who have been trained on the particular type of aircraft they are operating do so from within a cockpit, according to the relevant codes of conduct and <a href="https://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/images/documentation/DIA/20200529_NP_DIA-3.3.8_ESDAO_VF.pdf">laws of war</a>.</p>
<p>The third development is the arming of the drone. The US began this after 9/11, but recently other countries, such as <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-french-turn-to-armed-drones/">France, have armed</a> their military drones as well.</p>
<p>Drones are not a modern invention – they were created very soon after the birth of aviation, with the 1920s and 1930s seeing a spike in the efforts to create a weapon that can <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/problem-pilots">kill from a distance</a>. Enter the guided missile, which was remotely guided, expendable and had no surveillance capabilities. </p>
<p>What makes the modern drone so different is that its crew is protected from harm. It can be precise enough to avoid collateral damage compared to more indiscriminate weapons, and it is connected to a network that allows the real-time view of its feed by military and technology professionals. </p>
<p>The crew has to follow, survey and collect information about a target for months and sometimes years before conducting a strike. Then, drone crews have to sit through the aftermath of their attack for a “bomb hit assessment”. </p>
<p>There is a lack of transparency around drone operations, attributed to the highly sensitive nature of information regarding military operations. One process not often discussed publicly is the request and confirmation of authorisation (from top officials, such as the US president) before a crew engages lethally, as well as the circumstances and criteria behind target selection. </p>
<h2>Misconceptions</h2>
<p>This secrecy has led to popular misconceptions about drones, how drone operations are conducted, and drone pilots themselves.</p>
<p>These military professionals are pilots, either allocated to fly drones, or recruited and trained exclusively for that function. While they have responsibility and accountability for their actions on a mission, both the military profession and society views them unfavourably. </p>
<p>Flying drones has been mockingly compared to <a href="https://geographicalimaginations.com/2013/09/15/theory-of-the-drone-10-killing-at-a-distance/">playing video games</a>, and drone pilots are being denied the <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA624215">same career opportunities</a> as fighter pilots, as demonstrated by the lack of drone pilots in the higher echelons of the various forces that <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1756.html">use drones</a>.</p>
<p>Drone pilots <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315530659">experience PTSD symptoms</a>, but are hardly taken seriously even by their <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/reexamination-distance-modern-warfare/">military colleagues</a>. At the same time, society’s view on drone strikes is highly ambivalent: while for some it is a necessary evil that can protect our own forces from having to deploy and engage in risky situations, for others it spells the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2011.596085">death of military virtue</a>. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Drone-Warfare-and-Lawfare-in-a-Post-Heroic-Age,6228.aspx">post-heroic</a> societies no longer tolerate losses of our own people. At the same time, they demonise or ostracise the very people who strive to operate in hostile environments <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA627394">from a distance</a>.</p>
<p>Both sides have arguments in their favour, but while this discussion is taking place, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/29/asia/afghanistan-kabul-evacuation-intl/index.html">latest drone strike</a> of August 31 in Afghanistan resulted in ten civilian deaths, seven of whom were children. This tragedy is only the latest in the death strikes that started with the attacks of 9/11 and have exacerbated society’s desensitisation of war casualties and lowered trust in international law.</p>
<p>Victims of drone strikes are often killed indiscriminately and without prior trial or fulfilling Geneva conventions criteria for the status of “combatant”. Two decades later, the legacy of 9/11 has been a completely changed international security environment, a distrust towards governments and their respect for human rights, and the way we fight our wars.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:karyoti@sam.sdu.dk">karyoti@sam.sdu.dk</a> receives funding from the Carlsberg Foundation (Carlsbergfondet).</span></em></p>The first modern, lethal drone strike took place one month after 9/11. Twenty years later, our view of warfare and military personnel has completely changed.Vicky Karyoti, PhD Candidate at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1512242020-12-10T16:04:49Z2020-12-10T16:04:49ZGuns, drones and poison: the new age of assassination<p>Nobody has officially claimed responsibility for deploying the satellite-controlled machine-gun with “artificial intelligence” used to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/07/mohsen-fakhrizadeh-iran-says-ai-and-satellite-controlled-gun-used-to-kill-nuclear-scientist">Mohsen Fakhrizadeh</a> in Tehran at the end of November. But you would get fairly short odds were you to bet on it being the Mossad, Israel’s aggressive – and notoriously inventive – foreign intelligence service.</p>
<p>Israel has been carrying out what it calls “targeted killings” ever since its foundation in 1948. In his book, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/jul/22/rise-kill-first-secret-history-israel-targeted-assassinations-ronen-bergman-review-mossad">Rise and Kill First</a>, leading Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman estimates the number of targeted killings at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/dec/28/secret-world-christopher-andrew-review">approximately 2,700</a>.</p>
<p>Israel’s intelligence agencies are renowned for the inventiveness of their assassinations. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/02/archives/wadi-haddad-palestinian-hijacking-strategist-dies-directed-first.html">Wadi Haddad</a>, the director of foreign operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was murdered in 1978 with poison in his toothpaste. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/how-the-phone-bomb-was-set-up-1323096.html">Yahya Ayyash</a>, “the Engineer” who masterminded a number of Hamas suicide bombings in Israel, was killed in 1995 by an explosive charge placed in his cellphone. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure-in-car-bombing/2015/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html">Imad Mughniyeh</a>, Hezbollah’s chief of staff, was killed by a car bomb in Damascus in February 2008. According to Bergman, the Israelis might have killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani with Mughniyeh, but only had the United States’ agreement to killing Mughniyeh. </p>
<p>Of course, it’s not just Israel which disposes of its foes via extra-judicial killings. We are living in the greatest-ever age of assassination as states, fearful of the twin threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, are using increasingly sophisticated intelligence to track and kill dangerous people and deprive other states of dangerous knowledge.</p>
<h2>New technology</h2>
<p>The modern era of assassination began on 9/11 when the US realised how exposed it was to mass casualties from terrorist attacks on its soil. The “war on terror” took both crude and more subtle forms, the former being the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the latter including an airborne assassination programme enabled by new technology.</p>
<p>The drone has been a very effective assassin of terrorists. The first killings by drone took place in Yemen in 2002 – and, by the end of 2013 US drones and aircraft had killed between <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12521">719 and 929 people in Yemen alone</a>. Meanwhile between 2004 and the end of 2013, the number of people killed by drone in Pakistan was <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12521">between 2,080 and 3,428</a>. </p>
<p>Special forces have been used to kill key targets such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/magazine/what-do-we-really-know-about-osama-bin-ladens-death.html">Osama Bin Laden</a> in Pakistan in 2011 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> in Syria in 2019. In finally killing Quds Force commander <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">Qasem Soleimani</a> in a drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020, the US took the radical step of eliminating a key state actor it considered to be a terrorist. The killing was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-53345885">deemed unlawful</a> by the United Nations.</p>
<p>Russian president Vladimir Putin has also been ruthless, particularly when it comes to eliminating political foes. The attempted murder, by nerve agent, of former intelligence officer and British spy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/world/europe/sergei-skripal-russian-spy-poisoning.html">Sergei Skripal</a> in Salisbury, south-west England, in 2018 and the successful murder of former Russian intelligence officer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/alexander-litvinenko-the-man-who-solved-his-own-murder">Alexander Litvinenko</a> by polonium-210 slipped into a cup of tea in a London hotel in 2006 are merely the most high-profile killings in a chain of assassinations during Putin’s presidency. Among his victims have been opposition politicians and journalists, as well as veteran fighters from the bitter war in Chechnya who had been designated as terrorists by Moscow.</p>
<h2>Preventing proliferation</h2>
<p>Since the 1940s, the world’s leading powers have tried to prevent their enemies from developing weapons of mass destruction. Assassination to prevent the development of these technologies was pioneered by Britain in the second world war. One night in August 1943 the <a href="https://ww2db.com/facility/Peenem%C3%BCnde_Army_Research_Center">Royal Air Force bombed</a> the German missile development and testing site at Peenemünde, on the Baltic. The RAF targeted the living quarters of the scientists, engineers and technicians with the aim of killing as many as possible. Approximately 130 German scientific workers were killed in the attack. </p>
<p>Britain and the US also feared that Nazi Germany might be developing an atomic bomb. In 1944 an American agent was dispatched to Switzerland to attend a lecture by Germany’s leading nuclear physicist, the Nobel Prize-winning <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/28/world/new-book-says-us-plotted-to-kill-top-nazi-scientist.html">Werner Heisenberg</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Nobel Prize-winning physicist Werner Heisenberg." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374220/original/file-20201210-16-8wtgos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Targeted: Nobel Prize-winning physicist Werner Heisenberg was targeted by the US during the second world war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">German Federal Archives</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The agent was armed and had orders to assassinate Heisenberg if anything the physicist said indicated that Nazi Germany was close to developing an atomic bomb. In the event Heisenberg’s lecture gave no hint of this, which is why he survived his visit to Switzerland.</p>
<p>Israel has also <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/the-long-tradition-of-killing-middle-eastern-nuclear-scientists/251338/">used assassination</a> to try to prevent its neighbours from developing missiles and nuclear weapons. In the 1960s, it tried to obstruct Egypt’s missile development project by <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2018/04/20/israel-secret-war-mossad-hitler-scientists-world-war-ii-egypt-nasser-883630.html">murdering German engineers</a> working on it. In 1980-1981 scientists and engineers working on Iraq’s nuclear weapons project <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/6/7/the-death-of-a-nuclear-dream">were murdered</a> while outside Iraq. </p>
<p>In 1990 the Israelis killed Canadian scientist <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160317-the-man-who-tried-to-make-a-supergun-for-saddam-hussein">Dr Gerald Bull</a>, who was manufacturing for Saddam Hussein a “supergun”, the largest cannon ever assembled, which would have fired rocket-assisted projectiles thousands of kilometres. Bull’s murder ended the project. </p>
<p>Since 2007 Israel has tried to kill <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-pressure-to-halt-hits-on-iran-scientists-1.5327888">Iranian nuclear scientists</a>: four have been assassinated, and an attempt made on the life of a fifth. Israel has never accepted responsibility for the assassinations but is universally thought to be behind them. Killing a small number of scientists won’t stop the project.</p>
<p>Assassination is as old as politics itself. But the increase in terrorism and the spread of the technology and know-how for the development of weapons of mass destruction are increasing its use. For the foreseeable future states will continue to assassinate terrorists and scientific workers employed on WMD projects because they regard them as dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151224/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Maddrell is the author of Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (Oxford University Press, 2006).</span></em></p>States are increasingly using assassination to guard against the twin threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.Paul Maddrell, Lecturer in International History and International Relations, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465892020-09-24T14:19:54Z2020-09-24T14:19:54ZWhy US diplomatic muscle could achieve more in Somalia than drone strikes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359056/original/file-20200921-14-hk9khd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A military drone replica is displayed in front of the White House during a protest against drone strikes on January 12, 2019 in Washington, DC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has used airstrikes against <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/everything-you-have-told-me-is-true/">al-Shabaab</a> forces in Somalia since January 2007, including armed drone strikes from June 2011. From early 2017, Donald J. Trump’s administration loosened the targeting rules and significantly increased the number of strikes in Somalia, apparently with the consent of the Somali federal government. </p>
<p>The new rules were intended to degrade al-Shabaab and reduce its ability to continue its series of particularly deadly attacks on African Union and Somali army bases between June 2015 and January 2017.</p>
<p>Now Trump’s administration is reportedly considering <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/us/politics/shabab-drone-authorities-kenya.html">expanding</a> its use of such airstrikes against the militants into parts of eastern Kenya. This follows al-Shabaab’s deadly attack on the US naval base at <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/world/africa/shabab-kenya-terrorism.html">Manda Bay</a> in January 2020. Three US security personnel – one service member and two Department of Defence contractors – were killed.</p>
<p>Most American airstrikes have been conducted in defence of US personnel or in collective defence of <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">African Union forces</a> and Somali National Army troops. A smaller number have been offensive strikes designed to kill “high-value” members of al-Shabaab. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/">In general</a>, Barack Obama’s administration conducted far fewer strikes. Most of these were aimed at high-value targets. Trump’s administration has often struck rank-and-file al-Shabaab fighters as well as high-value figures. Some US strikes have also caused <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/9952/2019/en/">civilian casualties</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Although the number and types of airstrikes often capture the media headlines, Washington’s strategy to counter extremist groups in the region has remained consistent across three administrations for well over a decade. A 2016 <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.pdf">report</a> called it a “tailored engagement strategy.” </p>
<p>Under this strategy, the US supports various partner forces in order to resurrect a Somali state based on a federal system of governance that could contain those extremist groups. To achieve this strategic goal, successive US administrations have poured most resources into their military operations in Somalia. But there have been <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/understanding-us-policy-somalia-current-challenges-and-future-options">political, economic, and humanitarian</a> forms of engagement too.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/understanding-us-policy-somalia-current-challenges-and-future-options">report</a>, I argued that despite these American efforts, the war against al-Shabaab has been effectively stalemated since 2016. This is partly because the Somali federal and regional authorities remain fragmented. It is also because the US, African Union and Somali troops have no obvious way to inflict a decisive military defeat on a transnational, networked organisation like al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Consequently, instead of intensifying airstrikes or simply disengaging militarily from Somalia, the US should increase its diplomatic muscle in order to help secure a negotiated end to the country’s civil war.</p>
<h2>Military muscle</h2>
<p>Ethiopian forces installed the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu in December 2006. Since then, Washington’s principal goal has been to degrade and contain al-Shabaab, the Somali federal government’s principal opponent. To that end, successive US administrations have considered al-Shabaab to be an <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf">“associated force”</a> of al-Qaeda, for the purposes of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. </p>
<p>Since 2006 the United States has spent approximately <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155/13">$2.5 billion</a> on bilateral and multilateral forms of security assistance for contributing countries of the African Union Mission in Somalia. This includes training, equipment, advising and field mentoring programs, often implemented by contractor firms. </p>
<p>Washington has also provided security assistance to some Somali forces, now totalling over <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155/13">$500 million</a>. The plan was to help build local security forces that could take on al-Shabaab and stabilise the country. This would then allow the African Union mission to draw down and eventually leave the country. But attempts to build an effective Somali army encountered <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210">many problems</a>. </p>
<p>In December 2017, concerns about corruption led to the suspension of Washington’s security assistance to non-mentored units of the Somali National Army. The main exception was the <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/21/us-troops-nonprofit-trainers-and-a-lightning-brigade-battle-for-somalia/">Danab</a> advanced infantry units that have been trained, equipped, financed and mentored by the United States since 2014. </p>
<p>In July 2019, enough concerns had been allayed for Washington to resume some non-lethal assistance to Somali national army units engaged in <a href="https://wavellroom.com/2019/12/03/stabilization-2-0-insights-somali-african-union-operations-lower-shabelle/">Operation Badbaado</a>. This was a joint effort with African Union troops to recapture several towns southwest of Mogadishu. The United States also provided information and surveillance support for these operations. </p>
<p>In February 2020, Washington restored lethal, direct security assistance to the European Union-trained 143rd battalion of the national army, which was involved in this operation.</p>
<p>In addition, several hundred US troops have been deployed in Somalia since at least 2014. They operate out of several commands, including the US Africa Command, US Army Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Joint Special Operations Command, as well as a Military Coordination Cell based in Mogadishu. </p>
<p>These American forces have regularly conducted offensive operations, usually in partnership with Danab units, targeting important al-Shabaab figures and facilities. So far, two US soldiers have been killed in such operations, and several others injured.</p>
<h2>Negotiated settlements</h2>
<p>It is difficult to measure the effect of US military actions on the overall war. </p>
<p>This is evident from the relevant fatalities and conflict data produced by the <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a> and the <a href="https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a>. These suggest there is no obvious or direct relationship between US airstrikes and either the number or lethality of al-Shabaab attacks across south-central Somalia.</p>
<p>It is my view that rather than intensify airstrikes, the US should increase its diplomatic muscle in Somalia in order to secure two linked negotiated settlements. </p>
<p>First, a genuine political deal between Somalia’s Federal Government and regional administrations, now known as the Federal Member States. This must clarify the outstanding details of Somalia’s federal governance and set out a new, comprehensive security strategy. </p>
<p>To that end, Washington should be willing to place more conditions in order to increase its political leverage. These could apply on security force assistance, airstrikes and potential debt relief to the Somali government.</p>
<p>If such a deal can be achieved, the US should then support the idea of peace talks between the reconciled Somali authorities and al-Shabaab. In this scenario, Washington should see the strategic function of its airstrikes as being to incentivise al-Shabaab’s leadership to negotiate an end to the civil war. </p>
<p>Extending its air war into Kenya would only make strategic sense if there was good evidence it would help make a negotiated settlement more likely. At present, it’s difficult to see how this would be the case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In spite of a massive military effort the war against al-Shabaab has been effectively stalemated since 2016.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294112020-01-07T15:58:43Z2020-01-07T15:58:43ZIran attack: how Reaper drones really carry out airstrikes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308786/original/file-20200107-123403-wityew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/las-vegas-nov-17-mq9-reaper-1572510682">Kit Leong/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent killing of senior Iranian general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/03/baghdad-airport-iraq-attack-deaths-iran-us-tensions">Qassem Soleimani</a> has been widely reported as conducted by an <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/">MQ-9 Reaper</a> drone. But what does such an operation actually involve? While the ultimate decision to carry out the attack has clearly been placed with <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-the-us-and-iran-on-the-brink-of-war-the-dangers-of-trumps-policy-of-going-it-alone-become-clear-129295">the Trump administration</a>, much of the reporting and commentary has still bought into the misleading idea that drones enable instant killing using machines that take away the risks and responsibilities of warfare from military personnel.</p>
<p>The US and other militaries that use attack drones are generally very secretive about their operations, adding to the lingering false perceptions. As such, no official statements have confirmed the use of the Reaper in this instance, although <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">several reports</a> include quotes from unnamed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-pentagon/pentagon-says-iranian-commander-soleimani-was-developing-plans-to-attack-americans-idUSKBN1Z2056">government sources</a> that do so. However, a drone strike seems likely in this case because of the precise nature of the attack, and the Reaper is the only publicly known attack drone now operated by the US military.</p>
<p>I spent <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reaper-Force-Inside-Britains-Drone/dp/1789460786/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">two years working</a> with two RAF Reaper squadrons to research the people who fly this aircraft. This included watching real-time lethal strikes alongside crews at Creech Air Force Base and RAF Waddington. It also included 90 interviews with people who work with Reapers. Based on what I learnt, here are the key things you need to know about how such an attack would probably play out, and the importance of understanding the role of human military operators.</p>
<p>First, Reapers aren’t launched at the touch of a button from <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7852845/BBC-NORTH-AMERICA-EDITOR-JON-SOPEL-Decision-Trumps-White-House.html">thousands of miles away</a>. It takes up to two seconds for a satellite control signal to reach a Reaper on another continent, so such a delay would cause crashes on take-off or landing. </p>
<p>Instead, the Reaper has to be taken off within the line of sight of a nearby launch and recovery pilot. This happens in or near the location where the drone’s mission will take place. Once the Reaper is safely airborne, control can be transferred to a crew thousands of miles away. </p>
<p>One report claimed that the drone used in the Soleimani killing “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7852845/BBC-NORTH-AMERICA-EDITOR-JON-SOPEL-Decision-Trumps-White-House.html">was overhead</a> Baghdad airport” when its missile was launched. True, Soleimani was killed at Baghdad airport and a Reaper may have been orbiting the target area. But Hellfire missiles are not fired straight downwards, and nor does a Reaper hover like a helicopter or the smaller <a href="https://www.dji.com/uk/phantom-3-adv">DJI Phantom drone</a>.</p>
<p>The Reaper is an aircraft with a 20-metre wingspan. It is <a href="https://www.aerospacengineering.net/flight-control-surfaces/">piloted using flight control surfaces</a> like flaps and ailerons, which are moved via satellite signal. For a successful missile firing, the Reaper needs to be up to a few kilometres away from its target and then pointed towards it to create the right firing angle. The missiles typically take around 30 seconds to hit their target, depending on the launch height and distance.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dr Peter Lee spent two years researching the MQ Reaper and the people who operate it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Lee</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once a target is identified, it’s up to the human operators to launch the attack. Reapers are not autonomous, decision-making weapon systems that select victims or choose how and when to kill them. Soleimani <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/laser-guided-hellfire-missile-traveling-230-mph-killed-qassem-soleimani">was killed by a Hellfire laser-guided missile</a> that may have come from a drone, but it would have been fired by a pilot in a ground control station located in the US.</p>
<p>Each missile would then have been guided by a sensor operator onto Soleimani’s car or his escort vehicle. This represents the final stage in a highly human operation. Sometimes we get the impression that the drone does it all. It doesn’t.</p>
<h2>Not a video game</h2>
<p>This is important to understand because drones are often portrayed as turning killing “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-7852247/PETER-HITCHENS-killing-Iranian-General-Qasem-Soleimani-state-murder.html">into a video game</a>”. But that’s not an accurate analogy. </p>
<p>At a purely ergonomic level, the controls of an MQ-9 Reaper drone are actually neither as sophisticated nor as sensitive as state-of-the-art gaming controllers. The MQ-1 Predator, on which the MQ-9 Reaper is based, was <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Seeking-Security-Insecure-World-3/dp/1442252146/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=Seeking+Security+in+an+Insecure+World&qid=1578301089&s=books&sr=1-2">rushed into service after 9/11</a> and typical military aircraft testing and development was not carried out because of time constraints. As a result, the controls were not developed to be as user-friendly as they will be in the Reaper’s successors.</p>
<p>More important is the human dimension. When Reaper crews have followed someone for days or weeks, their target is not just pixels on a screen but a living human being. Operators watch targets spend time with family and friends and even playing with their children.</p>
<p>Crews, commanders and image analysts also continue to watch from above after a missile or bomb strike, conducting battle damage assessment. They see the bits of bodies being collected and taken for burial. They see grieving, devastated family members. And they know it is no game with a reset button.</p>
<p>As a result, operating a drone carries real risks. For one thing, terrorists have tried to target Reaper pilots and <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-hackers-publish-hitlist-of-drone-pilots-xz59sq5bb">published a hit-list</a>. But more prevalent is the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33384526">psychological risk</a> in repeatedly witnessing traumatising events and lethal strikes in close-up detail. A senior Reaper commander has described the impact of this as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33384526">far greater</a> than it ever was with a manned cockpit”. These psychological effects are not yet fully understood but the risk is there. </p>
<p>As one sensor operator <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reaper-Force-Inside-Britains-Drone/dp/1789460786/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr">I interviewed said</a>: “If anybody on the Reaper fleet says it doesn’t affect them, then they’re lying. It does. It has to.”</p>
<p>Remotely piloted aircraft like the Reaper will provide key air force capabilities for generations to come. For people to debate this technology in a useful way, they need to know what they can and cannot do. And understand that their governments are not using autonomous drones to kill random victims. Human operators are making life-and-death decisions with huge consequences for everyone involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lee is the author of Reaper Force: The Inside Story of Britain's Drone Wars.</span></em></p>The drone probably used to kill Iranian general Qassem Soleimani doesn’t take away all risks and responsibilities from military personnel.Peter Lee, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director, Security and Risk Research, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293062020-01-06T18:30:51Z2020-01-06T18:30:51ZIn Iran showdown, conflict could explode quickly – and disastrously<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308656/original/file-20200106-123364-1k5psvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C0%2C1800%2C1199&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mourners at the funeral for Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani burn Israeli and U.S. flags.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-take-part-in-the-funeral-procession-of-irgc-quds-news-photo/1192142025">Hamid Vakili/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">optimists</a>, the odds that an international conflict will snowball into a bloody war haven’t gone down significantly since the end of World War II. Trump administration officials’ confidence that the present conflict with Iran can be managed could be dangerously misplaced.</p>
<p>Since a drone strike at Baghdad airport that killed a top Iranian general, Iranians have been <a href="https://twitter.com/Seamus_Malek/status/1213039666519166976">protesting in the streets</a> in massive numbers, and their country has <a href="https://apnews.com/e043255bd33ab318f71d1947716a5b94">pulled out of the 2015 deal</a> limiting its development of nuclear weapons. Iraq’s prime minister and Parliament have moved to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html">kick the U.S. military out</a> of their country – troops who have in the meantime <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/us-suspends-training-iraqi-troops-to-focus-on-base-security/">stopped fighting the Islamic State group</a> and are instead focusing on keeping themselves safe.</p>
<p>Iran has vowed “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/baghdad-airport-strike-live-intl-hnk/h_996c3bed1255e7e3e30357771c7be380">harsh revenge</a>” for the Jan. 3 killing of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/03/qassim-soleimani-shadowy-iranian-general-undermined-washington/">Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</a>. </p>
<p>Policymakers in the Trump administration have said they believe that the use of force will <a href="https://twitter.com/OKnox/status/1213219771178770432">prompt Iran to back down</a>, or at least that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/pompeo-says-administration-would-have-been-culpably-negligent-not-launch-n1110566">any escalation will be manageable</a>. <a href="https://braumoeller.info">My research</a> into how conflicts begin and how deadly they get <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ZW-QEygAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">shows</a> that while most wars don’t escalate very far, those that do can easily become catastrophic.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1213219771178770432"}"></div></p>
<p>As memories of World War II and the Cold War fade into history, policymakers and the public are increasingly prone to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">think of large-scale warfare as a thing of the past</a>. </p>
<p>But while most wars remain small, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/only-the-dead-9780190849535?cc=us&lang=en&">my own analysis</a> of trends in warfare concludes that the threat of wars with large numbers of casualties has not decreased. It’s dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the U.S. could limit any violence that might ensue.</p>
<h2>Big wars are more common than people think</h2>
<p>Especially bloody deadly wars, while rare, are not actually as rare as most Westerners may think. </p>
<p>World War I and World War II are not even in the top three deadliest international wars in the past two centuries, based on the number of battle deaths as compared with the combined populations of the warring nations. </p>
<p>Two South American wars, the Paraguayan War of the late 1860s and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Chaco-War">Chaco War</a> from the mid-1930s, are the deadliest on record. The Paraguayan War, little known outside of military history circles, may have cost Paraguay <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568594-how-terrible-little-known-conflict-continues-shape-and-blight-nation">half – or more – of its total prewar population</a>. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/iraniraq-war/7C6E42D57383472EA9B9F6101BEABD94">Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s</a>, the most recent of the top five, was the third when ranked by death rates. Only then come the two world wars.</p>
<p>Not every conflict becomes a massive war, of course. It is possible that Iran could be deterred by the threat of large-scale American retaliation, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/pompeo-trump-iran.html">argued on Jan. 5</a>. But it is dangerous to assume there won’t be a war, even if it’s true that neither Iran nor the U.S. wants one.</p>
<p><iframe id="l3MJF" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/l3MJF/8/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Escalation is very hard to predict</h2>
<p>In late summer 1914, as World War I began, German Kaiser Wilhelm II famously promised his troops that they would be “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/04/30/135803783/wwi-the-battle-that-split-europe-and-families">home before the leaves have fallen from the trees</a>.” </p>
<p>In World War II, even after Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00117.x">American diplomats believed</a> that economic pressure alone would suffice to bring Nazi Germany to its knees. In both cases, years of bloody warfare followed.</p>
<p>What I’ve found is that escalation typically results from chance occurrences that simply can’t be foreseen. </p>
<p><a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Strange-Defeat/">Virtually no one predicted</a> the fall of France to the Nazis in the summer of 1940. No one could have known that President Harry Truman would decide, against the advice of his National Security Council, to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/The-Korean-War">send U.S. forces across the 38th parallel</a> during the Korean War, and few observers anticipated that <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1988-11-01.pdf">doing so would bring China into the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Major wars are “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/176226/the-black-swan-second-edition-by-nassim-nicholas-taleb/">black swans</a>” – rare but incredibly consequential events that cannot be predicted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Marines in northern Korea are stalled by a Chinese counterattack on Dec. 14, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-PRK-APHS288575-Korean-War/9d490a77008e4800b4bf29a8c9bb6437/12/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Chance plays a huge role in war</h2>
<p>The role of chance events in warfare can be dramatic. </p>
<p>Hitler’s successful invasion of France transformed what had been a problem of regional containment into a years-long global conflict with <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war">more than 16 million people killed</a> in battle. A <a href="https://www.history.com/news/the-assassination-of-archduke-franz-ferdinand-100-years-ago">driver’s wrong turn</a> in Sarajevo in 1914 turned what would have been a botched assassination attempt into World War I. </p>
<p>Chance works both ways, of course: The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented a hair-raising array of <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/close-calls-nuclear-weapons">nuclear near-misses</a> that mostly caused no harm but could have resulted in millions of deaths.</p>
<p>War can be volatile – while most remain small, big ones can come out of almost nowhere. I see in this imbalance a similarity to a concept called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle">“80/20” rule</a>, in which 80% of outcomes come from 20% of cases: About 80% of world income, for example, is held by 20% of the global population. </p>
<p>In warfare, lethality of international conflict is considerably more concentrated. The data I analyzed shows that over the past 200 years, the deadliest 20% of wars are responsible for 98% of all battle deaths.</p>
<p>No one wants very large wars, and most wars do end up being relatively small. But the potential for chance events to blow up into massive conflicts means nobody really knows, and nobody can predict, when the next really big one will come along.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bear F. Braumoeller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s very dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the US could limit any violence that might ensue.Bear F. Braumoeller, Baranov and Timashev Chair in Data Analytics and Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1292952020-01-03T21:09:05Z2020-01-03T21:09:05ZWith the US and Iran on the brink of war, the dangers of Trump’s policy of going it alone become clear<p>President Donald Trump’s policy toward Iran is in deep crisis. The president’s <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-trumps-strategy-against-iran-likely-fail">approach has the support neither of America’s allies nor of its strategic rivals</a>, China and Russia. And his policy – made even more confrontational by the shooting of a high-ranking Iranian official – has boxed him into a situation where, short of dramatic reversal, Washington and Tehran are edging close to war. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-claim-support-iran-dont-have-1449353">failing to forge policies in cooperation with allies</a>, the U.S. was robbed of advice and expertise in how to tackle the problems posed by Iran. Above all, it led to the <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf">dangerous deterioration of relations</a> between the U.S. and Iran after the U.S. became the sole country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal</a>. That deal was painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration in cooperation with five other world powers.</p>
<p>Instead of Trump’s harsh policy imposing maximum pressure on Iran, Iran has turned the tables and has put pressure on a freshly impeached U.S. president whose reelection is by no means assured and whose international diplomatic isolation and weakness is no secret in the region. </p>
<p>And once again, Trump took unilateral action early on the morning of January 3rd. The killings of Iran’s revered and powerful military commander, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">General Qassem Soleimani</a>, and Iraqi militia leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/03/abu-mahdi-al-muhandis-iraq-iran-militias-suleimani">Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis</a> in a U.S. drone strike on Baghdad airport further escalated tension in the region. </p>
<p>The killings immediately caused <a href="https://twitter.com/Seamus_Malek/status/1213039666519166976">huge anti-American protests in Iran</a> and led to the <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-skyrockets-us-stock-futures-sink-after-iranian-general-killed-in-iraq-airstrike-2020-01-02">rise of global oil prices and the fall of stock markets</a> around the world. <a href="https://apnews.com/e043255bd33ab318f71d1947716a5b94">Iran announced it would no longer heed the restrictions</a> in the 2015 nuclear deal that restricted its development of nuclear weapons. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">Iraq’s lawmakers voted on a bill drafted by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi</a> to expel U.S. forces from the country. The bill must be signed by the prime minister to take effect. </p>
<p>And the coalition led by the U.S. that has fought ISIS in Iraq and Syria for <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/us-suspends-training-iraqi-troops-to-focus-on-base-security/">years announced it was suspending operations</a> and instead focusing on defending its forces.</p>
<p>“…We are now fully committed to protecting the Iraqi bases that host Coalition troops,” a press release said.</p>
<p>Iran vowed “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/baghdad-airport-strike-live-intl-hnk/h_996c3bed1255e7e3e30357771c7be380">harsh revenge</a>” for the killing, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-live-updates/2020/01/07/896c70a2-30d5-11ea-9313-6cba89b1b9fb_story.html">on January 7, attacked two U.S. bases in Iraq</a> with ballistic missiles. There were no casualties. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/03/qassim-soleimani-shadowy-iranian-general-undermined-washington/">Soleimani was the strategic mastermind</a> behind Tehran’s entire ambitious Middle East policy. He also <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf">coordinated Iran’s widespread covert operations program</a> and provided much of the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/qassem-soleimani-powerful-iranian-commander-and-formidable-u-s-foe-is-dead-11578042373">strategic expertise for President Bashar Assad’s war</a> in Syria. </p>
<h2>Wishful thinking?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308455/original/file-20200103-11929-12r8f1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Trump holding the memorandum announcing the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, May 8, 2018, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump/4787c3312dd243699698220d05da70d5/50/0">AP/Evan Vucci</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since coming to office in January 2017, President Trump’s approach to resolve America’s longstanding quarrel with Iran has consisted of two stages. </p>
<p>The politics of <a href="https://apnews.com/e6bd6334ff4148f2985de059f93dc390">maximum pressure</a> – imposing stiff economic sanctions – combined with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40006734">harsh rhetoric</a> toward Tehran’s leaders was to be followed by a second stage of intense personal diplomacy that would culminate in the signing of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-05-09/art-new-iran-deal">a great new deal of cooperation with longtime enemy Iran</a>. </p>
<p>It would turn Trump into one of America’s greatest foreign policy presidents and might even, or so he hoped, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/24/trump-cant-stop-talking-about-nobel-peace-prize-it-might-have-something-do-with-obama/">earn him a Nobel Peace Prize</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="http://www.klauslarres.org/">international relations scholar and former diplomatic and foreign policy adviser</a> at the German embassy in Beijing, I believe this approach consisted of a lot of wishful thinking.</p>
<p>Iran’s Supreme Leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-trump-administration.html">Ali Khamenei simply refused to engage with Washington on the conditions</a> laid down by Trump. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/mike-pompeo-lays-out-next-steps-on-iran-1526909126">Those conditions included</a> Iran halting all uranium enrichment and ceasing support for the region’s militant groups. </p>
<h2>Tables turned</h2>
<p>Trump’s unorthodox idea – conducting the nation’s diplomacy singlehandedly and without asking for much advice from experts in the State Department or from his allies – <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/25/trumps-iran-policy-is-a-failure/">has been revealed as untenable</a>. </p>
<p>Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 multi-party nuclear deal with Iran was caused by his unhappiness that <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/8/17328520/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-withdraw">the deal was not meant to restrain Iran’s aggressive politics</a> in the region. Trump also believed it would not effectively prevent Tehran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons in the long run. </p>
<p>But his policy toward Iran appears not to have contained and intimidated the country’s leaders. It has instead <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-us-tensions-flare-in-the-persian-gulf-whats-at-stake/a-49221479">emboldened the country to aggressively challenge U.S. policies</a> in the Middle East.</p>
<p>U.S. withdrawal from the deal was <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/05/the-strategic-fallout-of-us-withdrawal-from-the-iran.html">deeply resented by both Iran and the international community</a>. And it started the rapid deterioration of relations with Tehran. </p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/01/world/middleeast/us-embassy-baghdad-iraq.html">siege of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad</a> by violent protesters who were clearly directed by the Tehran regime recalled the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/11/04/776173370/iran-hostage-crisis-continues-to-cast-shadows-over-u-s-iran-relations-40-years-l">Iranian hostage crisis 40 years ago</a> that decisively contributed to President Jimmy Carter’s electoral defeat. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/20/middleeast/iran-drone-claim-hnk-intl/index.html">shooting down of an expensive American drone by Iran in June</a> as well as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-why-iran-backed-assad-in-syria/">Tehran’s open support of the Assad regime in Syria</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Hezbollah terrorist organization in Lebanon</a> were further indications of Iran’s challenge to the U.S. </p>
<p>It appears that Trump’s airstrike on the Baghdad airport was an attempt to demonstrate America’s power and to break out of a largely self-inflicted foreign policy failure.</p>
<h2>New tack</h2>
<p>I believe that President Trump’s diplomacy toward Iran requires urgent course corrections. </p>
<p>The only option left – and one not yet seriously considered by the Trump administration – is to fall back on cooperation with other great powers, not least with Washington’s many allies, such as the U.K., France and Germany, who are still anxious for American global leadership. The Trump administration has little option but to return to the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran, though perhaps it could be somewhat modified to enable Trump to save face. </p>
<p>The administration could then embark on a unified Western policy to restrain both Iranian leadership ambitions in the Middle East and Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.</p>
<p>The killing of Soleimani and the angry reaction to his death, however, has made this almost impossible in the short run. But tempers may cool. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-russia-china-naval-maneuvers-persian-gulf-oman/30348593.html">recent joint Russian-Chinese-Iranian naval maneuvers</a>, Moscow and Beijing are also still interested in containing Iranian ambitions. Iranian dominance in the Middle East and the resulting further tension and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iranian-saudi-hegemonic-rivalry">escalating rivalry with Saudi Arabia</a> for regional control would hardly benefit the great powers and the stability of the region. </p>
<p>Whether or not the Trump administration is capable of and willing to embark on such a major change of course is unclear. But I believe it is the only way out of a crisis largely caused by Trump’s unilateral policies.</p>
<p>[ <em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus W. Larres does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Trump’s Iran policy took a dramatic turn when the US killed Iran’s top military commander in a drone strike. To avoid war, one foreign policy scholar says Trump has to reverse his stance.Klaus W. Larres, Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor; Adjunct Professor of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131652019-03-13T10:40:04Z2019-03-13T10:40:04ZTrump’s executive order on drone strikes sends civilian casualty data back into the shadows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263390/original/file-20190312-86710-8qpzlz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An unmanned U.S. Predator drone flies over southern Afghanistan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Drone-Policy/c9e5f4c6d1c74964859ac5f72b7ab517/1/0">AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When it comes to drones and warfare, the U.S. seems to have forgotten some valuable historical lessons. </p>
<p>On March 6, <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-civilian-deaths-drone-strikes-1207409">President Trump signed an executive order</a> that revoked the requirement, formulated under the Obama administration, that U.S. intelligence officials must publicly report the number of civilians killed in CIA drone strikes outside declared war zones. </p>
<p>In this decision, Trump is bringing the U.S. back to where it once was: the state of non-transparency that defined Obama’s first term.</p>
<p>As a researcher who has <a href="https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=5355">studied the ethics of war</a> and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/can-we-wage-a-just-drone-war/260055/">written extensively on drones</a>, I recognize that the U.S. has returned to a time when the CIA drone program was not governed by ethics, but shrouded in mystery, a time when it discounted the importance of civilian casualties.</p>
<h2>Remembering the past</h2>
<p>One of the U.S. founding fathers understood the importance of civilian casualties.</p>
<p>In 1782, Benjamin Franklin, then U.S. ambassador to France, circulated a copy of a Boston newspaper with an article that detailed British atrocities against American civilians in the ongoing Revolutionary War. Franklin intended to have the article reprinted by British newspapers, which would get the story out to the British public and turn popular opinion against the government in power. </p>
<p>The catch: The story was completely fabricated. Franklin made it up based on anecdotes he had heard, counting on the supposition that the British public had little access to actual statistics on civilian casualties to ascertain its truth. </p>
<p>Recounted with pride today on the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html">CIA’s website</a>, Franklin’s antics touched off a public uproar in 18th-century Britain. The article was used by opposition Whig politicians to challenge continued British participation in the war. </p>
<p>This quaint historical anecdote reveals valuable moral lessons for today. On the one hand, it shows how civilian casualties are a tool of propaganda. On the other, it shows the role that the suffering of enemy civilians plays in establishing an eventual peace. </p>
<h2>The Obama era</h2>
<p>During Obama’s first term, there were hundreds of strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan that the U.S. did not publicly acknowledge, with <a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone-strikes/counting-drone-strike-deaths">wildly divergent reports</a> of civilian casualties.</p>
<p>During Obama’s tenure, there was <a href="https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf">warranted backlash from the international human rights community</a> and <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg64921/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64921.pdf">congressional hearings</a> at home. In the security realm, enemies of the U.S. such as al-Qaida and the Taliban used exaggerated reports of civilian deaths as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/obama-drone-war-isis-recruitment-tool-air-force-whistleblowers">propaganda</a> to recruit new members. </p>
<p>In discussions about how to end what some experts were calling the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/49387/the-forever-war-by-dexter-filkins/9780307279446/">forever war,</a> <a href="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2013/KOHSPEECH.pdf">a more disciplined and restrained use of drones</a> was seen as part of the solution. </p>
<p>This opposition led to Obama’s ethical turn, defending drones by way of the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university">just war doctrine</a>. This centuries-old body of thought <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Just-War-Thinkers-From-Cicero-to-the-21st-Century-1st-Edition/Brunstetter-ODriscoll-Rosenthal/p/book/9781138122482">addresses the rights and wrongs of warfare: when a state can go to war and what it can do in war</a>. </p>
<p>When it came to drones, Obama was swayed by the principle of noncombatant immunity: the moral necessity of sparing civilians from the horrors of war whenever possible. He limited drone strikes to scenarios with near certainty that there would be no civilian casualties.</p>
<p>Obama also decided to provide greater transparency to the American public by reporting civilian casualties. This had a strategic purpose. According to one expert who served under Obama, former intelligence officer Ned Price, reporting allowed the U.S. to <a href="http://time.com/5546366/trump-cancels-drone-strike-rule/">“counter with facts and figures the misinformation and disinformation that terrorist groups and others issued to undermine our counter-terrorism operations around the globe.”</a> </p>
<h2>A step backward</h2>
<p>Obama’s ethical turn was a step forward. It emerged from <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university">his moral reckoning</a> with the act of killing and the tragedy of civilians getting caught in the crossfire. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s reversal on reporting civilian casualties is a step backward. It says a lot about the value – or lack thereof – placed on the lives of those <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2015.1094319">living under drones</a>. Trump’s executive order insulates the U.S. public from the tragedy of civilian deaths. Removing civilian deaths from the public view dehumanizes them, and in the process, eliminates the common threads of humanity that make peace possible. </p>
<p>Without public accountability, I worry that the Trump administration is paving the way for a more robust use of drones. Perhaps it will be similar to or even more permissive than Obama’s policy during his first term, when the U.S. carried out <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/obamas-most-dangerous-drone-tactic-is-here-to-stay/">signature strikes,</a> which targeted unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and personal networks rather than the threat they posed. Trump has already taken steps to remove <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/trump-war-terror-drones/567218/">targeting constraints</a> that had been codified under Obama. </p>
<p>Does discounting civilian casualties make the U.S. more secure in the long run? It’s an open question. The White House called the requirement <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-06/trump-cancels-u-s-report-on-civilian-deaths-in-drone-strikes">“superfluous” and claimed that it distracts “intelligence professionals from their primary mission,”</a> which is presumably protecting American security interests. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/03/06/us/politics/ap-us-trump-civilian-casualties.html">Despite the White House claims to the contrary</a>, research shows that such reporting is important for preventing civilian casualties. A lack of transparency leads to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.869390">the disproportionate use of drones</a>. Such a policy risks causing more civilian casualties, and has the potential to make more enemies than friends, diminish cooperation with allies in the global struggle against terrorist groups, and put the drone controversy back in the news in a negative way. </p>
<h2>Looking back and moving forward</h2>
<p>Franklin’s ruse demonstrates the power of using the tragedy of civilian casualties as propaganda. There is little doubt that U.S. enemies will use exaggerated reports of civilian casualties for propaganda purposes. Public transparency is a means to combat this propaganda, and perhaps more importantly, it provides a measure of checks and balance on the CIA. </p>
<p>More poignantly, Franklin abhorred the ease with which men kill and gloat about it. “Men,” <a href="http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-37-02-0277">he wrote later in 1782</a>, “I find to be a Sort of Being very badly constructed, as they are generally more easily provok’d than reconcil’d, more disposed to do Mischief to each other than to make Reparation … without a Blush they assemble in great armies at NoonDay to destroy, and when they have kill’d as many as they can, they exaggerate the Number to augment the fancied Glory.” </p>
<p>Amidst this exaggerated killing, Franklin saw a common connection shared between enemies: the suffering of civilians. This made, in his mind, peace between enemies a genuine possibility. </p>
<p>With Trump’s executive order, the American public risks being lulled into ignorance about the plight of civilians living under drones, and does so at the peril of perpetual war with future enemies of America’s own making.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel R. Brunstetter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Civilian casualty counts are a powerful tool for propaganda – and for establishing peace.Daniel R. Brunstetter, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, IrvineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1118452019-02-19T14:36:52Z2019-02-19T14:36:52ZSomalia drone strikes are a potent weapon, but not the game changer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259259/original/file-20190215-56208-minrgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In 2017 US President Donald Trump intensified the use of drones in Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Lt-col Leslie Pratt</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent years, drones have emerged as the United States’ <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/">weapon of choice</a>. They enable the US to intervene in conflicts without putting its soldiers in harm’s way, and seemingly offer an alternative to costly interventions – as in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p>
<p>Armed drones have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/">performed remarkably well</a> in US counter-terrorism strategy in Pakistan and Yemen. There, they’ve killed leaders and driven out terror groups. </p>
<p>But the case of Somalia illustrates that there are limitations to this strategy. <a href="https://flipboard.com/@WashPost/deadly-nairobi-attack-comes-as-u.s.-military-ramps-up-airstrikes-against-al-shab/a-iiIwDHj6Tpai4jPsRdzidg%3Aa%3A419161690-7794263b4b%2Fwashingtonpost.com">Intensified drone strikes</a> in Somalia have not created anything close to a strategic victory against the terror group al-Shabaab. The US military has <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/world/US-General--Strikes-in-Somalia-won-t-stop-Al-Shabab/1068-4972234-h7vygv/index.html">admitted as much</a>.</p>
<p>There are examples of lower level victories, such as the drone strike on 1 September 2014 <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/shebabs-leader-devout-ruthless-hardliner-sources-105730104.html;_ylt=AwrBEiSgiwxUUkoAbqrQtDMD">that killed</a> Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane. But none of this kind of targeting has proved capable of seriously crippling al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>There are pros and cons to the use of drones. But the underlying problem is that casualties alone cannot defeat a terrorist group like al-Shabaab. In all, drone strikes in Somalia are not a game changer. They are a tool to manage the threat of al-Shabaab, but there’s no way they’ll defeat the group entirely.</p>
<h2>The changing face of drone warfare</h2>
<p>Drone strikes inside Somalia have a long history. As early as January 2007, a predator drone was used to track Al Qaeda operative Abu Taha Al Sudani’s convoy, which was then <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/09/usa">attacked</a> by a US gunship. However, until June 2011, drones were not used as a separate attack medium. The US preferred to rely on a <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2017#SOM010">combination</a> of cruise missiles, gunships and attack helicopters. </p>
<p>The increase in US bases with launch capacity in the <a href="http://afjn.org/u-s-military-presence-and-activity-in-africa-east-africa/">vicinity</a> in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and within Somalia, has, in the past eight years or so, made it easier for the US to launch drones in Somalia. </p>
<p>In March 2017, US President Donald Trump intensified the use of drones by designating parts of Somalia an “area of active hostilities.” This gave lower level commanders the power to designate targets and approve drone strikes. By September, the Trump administration dismantled several Barack Obama–era restrictions, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/drone-somalia-al-shabaab-al-qaeda-terrorist-africa-trump/569680/">granting more freedom</a> to local commanders to order drone strikes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259257/original/file-20190215-56240-si778v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Author Provided.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Different uses of drones</h2>
<p>Today there are numerous types of drone strikes.</p>
<p>Some of these target al-Shabaab bases. In 2018, bases in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle area were repeatedly attacked by US <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2018/12/17/somalia-6-us-airstrikes-kill-62-al-shabaab-militants-gandarshe/">drones</a>. These attacks left more than 80 al-Shabaab militants dead in the space of about six weeks.</p>
<p>A second type of attack uses drones as tactical support. Here, drones are used to back friendly ground force in their offensive and defensive operations. Support for ground forces often includes US special forces. The Somali army is now <a href="https://mareeg.com/us-strike-kills-52-al-shabaab-in-somalia/">supported by such attacks</a>. </p>
<p>A third type of attack is the VIP killing mission, which targets senior al-Shabaab leaders. Only three of these were launched in 2018 – and all failed. Such operations often depend on inside intelligence from spies on the ground close to the targeted leaders.</p>
<p>Random targets of opportunity, for example an al-Shabaab patrol spotted by drones or friendly forces, constitute the fourth category of drone strikes. Such attacks are launched on short notice, and usually have few casualties.</p>
<h2>Drone warfare and recruitment</h2>
<p>In Somalia, there are many factors that keep al-Shabaab going. Among these are clan allegiances, the lack of local protection against forced recruitment, and poverty. In one study, for instance, a majority of 39% of al-Shabaab recruits cited <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/radicalisation-and-al-shabaab-recruitment-in-somalia/">economic reasons</a> as what finally “pushed” them to join the group.</p>
<p>These ensure that al-Shabaab can fill up the ranks with fresh recruits after drone attacks, especially if friendly ground forces cannot be deployed to take advantage of the situation. The <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/07/somalia-is-a-country-without-an-army-al-shabab-terrorism-horn-africa-amisom/">troubled</a> Somali army often lacks the capacity to move in and sweep up after a drone attack, which would do more to hamper al-Shabaab’s activities in the long run. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/259258/original/file-20190215-56226-1ryjl2x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Author Provided.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>VIP killing missions also seem to have been of limited effect, perhaps because of limited US intelligence in the region. The killing of al-Shabaab leader’s in 2014 did not lead to the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140906201659/http:/www.wsvn.com/story/26458182/pentagon-confirms-death-of-somalia-terror-leader">predicted</a> fragmentation and internal conflict. </p>
<p>Drone strikes also kill ordinary people who aren’t affiliated with any terror groups. These deaths are seldom highlighted by the US military – but they’re often reported in Somali media, which leads to some animosity from civilians who fear they will be accidentally targeted.</p>
<h2>Boots on the ground</h2>
<p>What’s needed is local protection for ordinary Somalis: both to prevent the group from recruiting more members and to guard them against al-Shabaab’s attacks. This will require boots on the ground which Somalia’s own army is best placed to do in the long run.</p>
<p><em>Stig Jarle Hansen is the author of the forthcoming book, <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">Horn, Sahel and Rift:
Fault-lines of the African Jihad</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Drones are a tool to manage the threat of al-Shabaab, but there’s no way they’ll defeat the group entirely.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1022882018-09-03T09:22:12Z2018-09-03T09:22:12ZInterviews with Pakistani civilians and Pervez Musharraf tell a complicated story of drone warfare<p>“I often wonder if the drone will appear again and linger there forever like the all-seeing eye of God,” says Saifullah Dawar, 65, as he looks up at the bright blue sky over Pakistan’s tribal agency (or district) of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39191868">North Waziristan</a> – the centre of an intense US aerial campaign against militant Islamist groups between 2009 and 2014. Along with many Pakistanis we spoke to, former president Pervez Musharraf among them, Saifullah painted a picture of a particular chapter in recent Pakistani history that’s left a profound mark on the country.</p>
<p>Since the success of Pakistan’s own offensive against the radical Islamist <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-tehreek-i-taliban-confirms-death-of-its-leader/4077097.html">Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</a> (TTP), which began in 2014, North Waziristan is no longer a centre of insurgency and drone strikes. But even though the drone is not the ever-present force it once was in the region’s skies, it still captures the imagination of the tribal people who live there – not just by dint of its capacity to damage and kill, but also because of its massive political, social, cultural, and psychological impact.</p>
<p>US drone strikes in this corner of Pakistan began in 2004, escalated after 2008, and rose sharply between 2010 and 2014. As the campaign unfolded, an anti-drone narrative took hold in Pakistani society, sustained by print and electronic media, politicians, and all manner of civil society actors. This narrative framed the US’s use of drones as the main barrier to achieving a settlement between Islamabad and the TTP, an umbrella organisation of more than 40 militant groups that’s been at war with the Pakistani state since 2007. While Nawaz Sharif’s government initiated a dialogue with the TTP in September 2013, the process <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-taliban/peace-talks-between-pakistan-and-taliban-collapse-after-killings-idUSBREA1G0MP20140217">broke down</a> in 2014. But were American drones really the main reason?</p>
<p>As part of a <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/centres/iccs/research/projects/unmanned-aerial-vehicles.aspx">research project</a> to try and understand what happened, we carried out more than 30 interviews and two general surveys, with more than 400 respondents, in Pakistan to assess the impact of the drones in the tribal areas. From what they told us, we learned that conflicting perceptions of the use of drones can shape not only conflict but also coexistence – and even cooperation.</p>
<h2>Pointing fingers</h2>
<p>There is more than enough blame to go around for the peace process’s collapse, and no clear agreement on where the buck stops. Several of our civilian interviewees, from a cross-section of Pakistani society, blamed General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime (1999-2008) for secretly allowing US drone strikes within Pakistan. They asserted that amid Pakistan’s security challenges, the military establishment continued to be the dominant player in the formulation of foreign and national security policies. Hence civilian governments since 2008 had no choice but to back the armed forces and to accept the American operations.</p>
<p>But when we spoke to Musharraf himself, he told us it was the civilian government that permitted the unrestrained US drone campaign, seeking to stay in power and to divert public attention from massive corruption. Other interviewees held both the civilian and military leadership responsible, arguing that “it has been clear to us that US arrogance is tolerated by our leaders out of fear or greed for dollars”.</p>
<p>Yet the common theme in all of these accounts and from both supporters and critics of the strikes – that the drones were the primary catalyst in relations between successive Pakistani governments, the TTP, and local tribes – was not borne out in our interviews and surveys.</p>
<p>Strikes were only one of several factors driving the cycle of fighting and fruitless negotiations. Far more important, both then and now, are Pakistan’s internal politics and civil-military relations – a deep state-society distrust aggravated by Islamabad’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09584935.2012.670204?src=recsys&journalCode=ccsa20">ambiguous and fraught role</a> in the American “War on Terror”.</p>
<h2>Suspicion and distrust</h2>
<p>The Pakistani army leadership was from the start suspicious of various short-lived peace deals struck since 2002, which ultimately gave insurgents the space they needed to regroup and reorganise. Small surprise then that the army high command, in the words of Musharraf, viewed the Sharif-TTP peace initiative as “nothing but a hoax”.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare">surge in US drone attacks</a> between 2009 and 2013 did not encourage negotiations. Yet they did not completely disrupt the opening of talks in early 2014, and their five-month suspension in 2013-14 did nothing to keep the negotiations from falling apart.</p>
<p>Other factors were far more decisive. An influx of Taliban and other foreign fighters from Afghanistan after September 11 2001 greatly weakened the tribal structures in North Waziristan, and the Pakistani government and military alike failed to protect the tribes. The civilian deaths from not just US drone strikes but also Pakistani military operations only made matters worse, both fuelling support for the insurgents and inflaming the mutual distrust between state and society.</p>
<p>It was in these circumstances that the CIA-operated drone strikes came to reinforce the conflict, inadvertently giving the TTP space to strengthen its hold over tribal areas under its control.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, the reason the drone campaign helped dash hopes of a settlement was the social, political, and cultural dynamics of Pakistan’s tribal region and the way the tribal system’s core elements were undermined. If you want to explain what happened to the short-lived peace process in Pakistan in 2013-14, you have to start there. And so does anyone charged with coming up with any new counter-insurgency strategy, whether it includes drone strikes or not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is based on research for the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. An forthcoming study by the authors and Professor Stefan Wolff of the University of Birmingham is due to be published.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Talat Farooq does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Interviews with civilian and military figures paint a complex picture of what went wrong with crucial peace negotiations.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamTalat Farooq, Honorary Research Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/859202017-10-31T15:30:50Z2017-10-31T15:30:50ZTrump needs to explain why he thinks military action is justified<p>The ever-present Russia scandal and the constant gaslighting, coming mostly from the White House, have been obscuring a serious, underlying problem with the Trump administration: its conduct of counter-terrorism and its approach to military action overseas.</p>
<p>The problem became clear in October 2017, when four US soldiers were killed in an ambush <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/oct/22/big-picture-niger-and-what-we-know-about-what-happ/">in Niger</a> The ensuing controversy mostly surrounded Trump’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-niger-special-forces-deaths-benghazi-response-compare-how-low-willing-sink-a8005521.html">incompetent response</a> to the families of the victims. What was not discussed was the Trump Administration’s failure to provide a rationale as to why US soldiers were in Niger in the first place. </p>
<p>Now come the latest strikes in Syria, which the US and its allies have grounded in an international obligation to stop the <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-latest-chemical-massacre-demands-a-global-response-94668">spread and use of chemical weapons</a>. But the legal grounds for intervention in this case are <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-could-a-new-foreign-military-intervention-be-illegal-94838">far from cut and dried</a>, and the UK government for one is already under serious domestic pressure because of its decision to take part.</p>
<p>It all fits a disturbing pattern. The administration has so far failed to explain the strategic objectives of its counter-terrorism and military operations, and it’s failed to offer legal justification and public legitimation for its policies. More worryingly still, this is not a new problem.</p>
<p>Since the start of his presidential campaign, Trump has couched his philosophy of counter-terrorism in the most aggressive terms. His promises on the campaign trail included to “bomb the shit out of” the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWejiXvd-P8">so-called Islamic State</a> (IS) and, more controversially, to “take out” the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/27/trump-said-he-would-take-out-the-families-of-isis-fighters-did-an-airstrike-in-syria-do-just-that/?utm_term=.c62a5c3ac8ef">families and relatives</a> of IS fighters and terrorists – a policy that would <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/dec/17/rand-paul/rand-pauls-right-geneva-conventions-bar-donald-tru/">constitute a war crime</a>. But as with many other issues, candidate Trump refused to provide details or to delineate a coherent counter-terrorism strategy, suggesting that doing so would simply telegraph US intentions to the enemy. </p>
<p>In its first months in office, the Trump administration adopted a tough counter-terrorism approach. One of Trump’s first speeches as president, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cia-speech-transcript/">at the CIA’s headquarters</a>, included the suggestion that the agency had been unnecessarily constrained in its conduct of counter-terrorism. In several contexts, Trump’s policies simply continue and expand Barack Obama’s – but it’s the differences that are crucial. </p>
<h2>Ramping up</h2>
<p>Unlike his predecessor, Trump seems to take the very narrow view that US power is above all else military. The president reportedly conceives of that power in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/10/11/trump-sees-power-as-military-strength-and-nukes-as-the-apex-of-that-power/?utm_term=.63bb4c05b5f5">strictly quantitative terms</a>, with nuclear weapons as its “apex”. That may explain the administration’s overuse of such “hard” power, and in its penchant for military spectacle – think of the use of the so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/15/us-mother-of-all-bombs-moab-afghanistan-donald-trump-death-toll">mother of all bombs</a> in Afghanistan and the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/06/us-military-has-launched-more-50-than-missiles-aimed-at-syria-nbc-news.html">59-missile strike</a> on Syria. </p>
<p>Whereas the Obama administration tried to broaden US policy in the gulf and the Middle East beyond its traditional narrow focus on Saudi and Israeli priorities, Trump publicly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39989548">accepts Saudi Arabia’s view of terrorism</a> and recently <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/13/politics/iran-deal-decertify/index.html">refused to recertify</a> the Iran nuclear deal. Those moves were welcomed in Riyadh and Tel Aviv, but antagonised and rattled other US allies. All the while, Trump’s vitriolic rhetoric about Muslims in the US and his travel ban targeting majority Muslim countries have also weakened the US’s position in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Crucially, there’s the administration’s decision to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html">relax some Obama-era constraints</a> on drone strikes and commando operations. In its second term especially, the Obama administration adopted policies to guarantee a more accountable and structured approach to counter-terrorism. These policies included the <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3006440-Presidential-Policy-Guidance-May-2013-Targeted.html">2013 Presidential Policy Guidelines for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets</a> and a <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures">2016 executive order</a> meant to improve pre and post-strike assessment to reduce civilian casualties. The Trump administration seems to have rolled back these measures; the US is conducting more air strikes in Iraq and Syria and getting more involved in countries such as Yemen and Niger. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">Civilian casualties are mounting</a> in areas where the US has intervened.</p>
<p>And yet, having relaxed Obama’s rules, the Trump administration has refused to publicly legitimate its counter-terrorism operations, and it has provided no strategic rationale for its use of force. </p>
<h2>Making the case</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/obama-administrations-conceptual-change-imminence-and-the-legitimation-of-targeted-killings/15DB8DEE802628A4F76D300C2E82421F">I have argued elsewhere</a>, the Obama administration’s policies were part of an effort to publicly justify and explain its counter-terrorism operations, and to make the case that those policies were grounded (at least partially) in international law. </p>
<p>Starting in 2011, administration officials began making <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011/0909/Hillary-Clinton-more-smart-power-needed-in-terrorism-fight">speeches</a> to explain their efforts to keep counter-terrorism policy in line with international law and to articulate the end game of the administration’s strategy. This effort was certainly strategic, not altruistic; making a case grounded in international law helped the Obama administration solve a key conundrum between respect of international law and continuation of its counter-terrorism policy. </p>
<p>The effort at legitimation, however, also clarified the boundaries of what the US government could and could not do, culminating in a <a href="https://fas.org/man/eprint/frameworks.pdf">December 2016 report</a> on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the US use of force. This coincided with a reduction in drone strikes and in casualties from counter-terrorist operations; an exhibit for <a href="http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Internationalists/Oona-A-Hathaway/9781501109867">those who</a> identify the restraining power of international law. But unlike Obama, Trump has refused to discuss strategy, and the administration has not discussed its legal rationale for use of force. </p>
<p>It’s not clear the administration can distinguish between tactic and strategy: force is being used, but what is the endgame? Along with the administration’s cavalier attitude towards increased civilian casualties, this lack of a strategic rationale could erode support among foreign allies, and might well fuel <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/01/30/why-trumps-policies-will-increase-terrorism-and-why-trump-might-benefit-as-a-result/">terrorism and radicalisation</a>.</p>
<p>This poses serious problems. At home, the administration is insufficiently accountable to the US public, still relying on measures passed after 9/11 – and abroad, the secretive use of force, the disregard for international law and the acceptance of higher civilian casualties, set a dangerous example that other powers might be tempted to follow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85920/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luca Trenta receives funding from the British Academy.</span></em></p>Without a strategy or a legal case to legitimate the use of force, the US is endangering crucial alliances and civilian lives.Luca Trenta, Lecturer in International Relations, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/857812017-10-18T13:12:14Z2017-10-18T13:12:14ZWas the drone strike on IS recruiter Sally Jones lawful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190412/original/file-20171016-30957-2to19z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">via shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sally Jones, a British member of Islamic State (IS), was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41593659">reportedly</a> killed by a US drone strike in June 2017 inside Syria. Her 12-year-old son, JoJo, is believed to have been killed alongside her.</p>
<p>In news reports about the strike, which has come to light only recently, there has been confusion about the legal framework governing the operation. An article in the Guardian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/12/is-targeting-of-isis-member-sally-jones-legally-justified">assessed</a> its legality in light of the rules governing the use of force, which determine under what circumstances states may use force in international relations.</p>
<p>However, whether or not Jones and her son were lawful targets depends on an entirely different body of law, known as the law of armed conflict – or international humanitarian law – which regulates the conduct of hostilities once an armed conflict has come into existence. Among other things, the law of armed conflict determines under what circumstances a person may or may not be attacked. What complicates matters is the fact that not all states agree on how to interpret and apply the relevant rules.</p>
<p>With this in mind, what does the law of armed conflict actually say about the strike?</p>
<h2>Targeting members of IS</h2>
<p>The UK and the US are engaged in a non-international armed conflict against IS, an organised armed group. The operation to kill Jones was carried out by US forces, possibly with UK support, in the context of this ongoing conflict. </p>
<p>In line with the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf">Interpretive Guidance</a> on direct participation in hostilities adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), members of an organised armed force are not civilians. This means that they are liable to direct attack on the basis of their membership status, rather than on the grounds that they may pose an individual threat. </p>
<p>Jones was therefore a legitimate target of attack if she was a member of the armed forces of IS. But this raises the question of whether she satisfied the relevant membership criteria.</p>
<p>According to the ICRC, only a person who carries out a continuous combat function may be deemed to be a member of an organised armed group. This approach has attracted some support, but it has also been criticised, including by leading <a href="http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Vol.-1_Schmitt_Final.pdf">experts</a>, for being too restrictive.</p>
<p>The US Department of Defense adopts a wider approach in its <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=797480">Law of War Manual</a>, declaring that membership of an organised armed group may depend on a broader range of functional criteria. These include whether the person performed combat or combat-supporting tasks on behalf of the group similar to those carried out by members of a country’s armed forces. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"918221517170786304"}"></div></p>
<p>Jones is widely <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41593659">reported</a> to have acted as a recruiter for IS. According to <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/sally-jones">other reports</a>, she was also responsible for training new recruits. Under the ICRC guidelines, recruitment and training do not qualify as a continuous combat function unless the person also directly participates in hostilities. By contrast, on the wider approach adopted by the US Department of Defense manual, carrying out recruitment and training activities on behalf of an organised armed group may qualify as membership.</p>
<h2>Targeting children</h2>
<p>Several press <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/12/sally-jones-isis-britons-michael-fallon-fight-legitimate-target">reports suggested</a> that Jones’s son JoJo could not have been a “combatant” due to his age and was therefore not a legitimate target of attack. This does not reflect the law of armed conflict. Membership in an organised armed group is not dependent on age with minimum or maximum age limits. Child soldiers are a deplorable, but nonetheless very real, aspect of warfare. </p>
<p>If JoJo satisfied the criteria of membership of the armed forces of IS, he was liable to attack. The fact that JoJo appeared in IS <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3761804/That-s-son-Father-identifies-British-boy-killer-seen-executing-captured-prisoner-Syria.html">propaganda videos</a>, clad in military uniform and participated in the execution of detainees, means that there are at least some indicators to suggest that he might have assumed membership.</p>
<p>By contrast, if JoJo was not a member of an organised armed group and did not directly participate in hostilities, it would not have been lawful to target him directly. However, the law of armed conflict accepts that civilians may suffer a certain amount of <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14">incidental harm</a>, colloquially known as “collateral damage”, as a result of attacks on lawful targets. So as long as the US took all feasible steps to minimise causing JoJo harm, and any expected harm was not excessive in relation to the military benefit of attacking his mother, his death satisfied the rule of proportionality and therefore conformed with the law of armed conflict.</p>
<h2>The law and the facts</h2>
<p>Whether or not Jones constituted a lawful target of attack depends on what the relevant criteria are for membership in an organised armed group. The point is not fully settled, but the broader approach adopted by the US better reflects the logic of the law of armed conflict. </p>
<p>The legality of the strike also depends on the facts, as they were known to the US forces that carried out the operation. Key to this is the role that Jones and her son played in IS. What is legally relevant in this respect is their formal and functional relationship with IS. Age, the existence of a threat and its imminence are not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurel Sari is affiliated with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. He is writing in a personal capacity. </span></em></p>It hinges upon whether she was a member of IS, and what that means.Aurel Sari, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/851542017-10-13T04:20:31Z2017-10-13T04:20:31ZUnder the Trump administration, US airstrikes are killing more civilians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190071/original/file-20171012-31395-qkq5hm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C929%2C2775%2C3158&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke from an airstrike rises in the background as a man flees during fighting between Iraqi special forces and IS militants in Mosul, Iraq, on May 17, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Donald Trump took office in January, it was unclear whether the bombast from his campaign would translate into an aggressive new strategy against terrorism. At campaign rallies he pledged to “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/middleeast/donald-trump-isis-strategy/index.html">bomb the hell”</a> out of the Islamic State. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/27/trump-said-he-would-take-out-the-families-of-isis-fighters-did-an-airstrike-in-syria-do-just-that/?utm_term=.03bc589dc87a">openly mused</a> about killing the families of terrorists, a blatant violation of <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm">the Geneva Conventions</a>, which prohibits violence against noncombatants.</p>
<p>Ten months into his presidency, a clearer picture is emerging. The data indicate several alarming trends.</p>
<p>According to research from the nonprofit monitoring group Airwars, the first seven months of the Trump administration have already resulted in <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-has-already-killed-more-civilians-obama-us-fight-against-isis-653564">more civilian deaths</a> than under the entirety of the Obama administration. <a href="https://twitter.com/airwars/status/900034913839312897">Airwars reports</a> that under Obama’s leadership, the fight against IS led to approximately 2,300 to 3,400 civilian deaths. Through the first seven months of the Trump administration, they estimate that coalition air strikes have killed between 2,800 and 4,500 civilians. </p>
<p>Researchers also point to <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2017/06/20/disturbing-civilian-death-trends-iraq-syria-air-war-researcher%E2%80%99s-view">another stunning trend</a> – the “frequent killing of entire families in likely coalition airstrikes.” In May, for example, such actions led to the deaths of at least 57 women and 52 children in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>The vast increase in civilian deaths is not limited to the anti-IS campaign. In Afghanistan, the <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_midyear_report_2017_july_2017.pdf">U.N. reports</a> a 67 percent increase in civilian deaths from U.S. airstrikes in the first six months of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016. </p>
<p>The key question is: Why? Are these increases due to a change in leadership? </p>
<h2>Delegating war to the military</h2>
<p>Experts offer several explanations.</p>
<p>One holds that Trump’s “<a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trumps-total-authorization-military-gives-deep-concerns">total authorization</a>” for the military to run wars in Afghanistan and against IS has loosened Obama-era restrictions and increased military commanders’ risk tolerance. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">Micah Zenko</a> of the Council on Foreign Relations notes: “Those closer to the fight are more likely to call in lethal force and are less likely to follow a value-based approach.”</p>
<p>In other words, an intense focus on destroying IS elements may be overriding the competing priority of protecting civilians. Because Trump has scaled back civilian oversight and delegated authority to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">colonels rather than one-star generals</a>, the likely result is higher casualties.</p>
<h2>Urban battlefield?</h2>
<p>A second explanation points to the changing nature of the counter-IS campaign. <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/has-the-us-air-war-killed-685-civiliansor-more-than-5200">The Pentagon contends</a> that the rise in casualties is “attributable to the change in location” of battlefield operations towards more densely populated urban environments like Mosul and Raqqa.</p>
<p>This is a partial truth. While urban warfare has increased, Trump’s team has substantially escalated air strikes and bombings. According to CENTCOM data, the military has already used <a href="http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-%20September%202017.pdf?ver=2017-10-06-082818-797">20 percent more</a> missiles and bombs in combined air operations in 2017 than in all of 2016. One notable airstrike in March, for example, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/05/25/pentagon-confirms-airstrike-killed-more-than-100-civilians-in-mosul-blames-isis-explosives/?utm_term=.159a53b63bc0">killed 105 Iraqi civilians</a> when U.S. forces dropped a 500-pound bomb in order to take out two snipers in Mosul. In fact, a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/08/iraq/us-led-coalition-weapons-choice-endangers-mosul-civilians">Human Rights Watch analysis</a> of bomb craters in West Mosul estimates that U.S. coalition forces are routinely using larger and less precise bombs – weighing between 500 and 1,000 pounds – than in prior operations. Finally, the urban battlefield explanation also does not account for increased civilian deaths in Afghanistan from airstrikes, where the environment has remained static for several years.</p>
<h2>Pressure from the president</h2>
<p>A third explanation of higher civilian casualties is that aggressive rhetoric from the president is inadvertently pressuring the military to take more risks and to deprioritize protecting civilians. </p>
<p>As former Assistant Secretary of State <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/president-trumps-air-war-kills-12-civilians-per-day">Tom Malinowski observes</a>: “If your leaders are emphasizing the high value of Raqqa and Mosul, while saying less about the strategic and moral risks of hurting civilians, it’s going to affect your judgment.” Words matter, especially coming from the commander-in-chief. In the face of such aggressive rhetoric, it should not come as a surprise that military officers feel encouraged – if not indirectly pressured – to take greater risks.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the increased trend of civilian casualties is unlikely to diminish. In fact, signs abound that the White House is developing a new set of policies and procedures that will authorize more sweeping discretion to the military. In September, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html">The New York Times reported</a> that White House officials were proposing two major rules changes. First, they would expand the scope of “kill missions” and allow for the targeting of lower-level terrorists in addition to high value targets. Second – and more notably – they would suspend high-level vetting of potential drone attacks and raids.</p>
<p>These changes represent a sharp about-face. The Obama administration carefully crafted a deliberate set of rules guiding the use of force. In 2013, Obama released the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download">Presidential Policy Guidance for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets</a> (PPG), which created specific rules for determining when the use of force against terrorists was legally justified.</p>
<p>Then, in 2016, Obama issued an <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures">executive order on civilian harm</a> that established heightened standards to minimize civilian casualties from military actions, and required the public release of information pertaining to strikes against terrorist targets.</p>
<p>While the latest actions from the Trump administration stop short of reversing Obama-era restraints, they are unsettling steps in the opposite direction. For example, it appears for now that the White House will preserve the “near certainty” standard, which requires commanders to have near certainty that a potential strike will not impact civilians. But this could change over time.</p>
<p>One senior official quoted in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html">The New York Times article</a> bluntly asserts that the latest changes are intended to make much of the “bureaucracy” created by the Obama administration rules “disappear.” As the White House dissolves the existing bureaucracy and relinquishes civilian oversight, Trump is embarking on a slippery slope that will potentially lead to major diminutions of civilian protection. </p>
<p>The current battle to take the Syrian city of Raqqa is emblematic of the stakes at hand. The U.S. is leading a punishing air war to soften IS defenses. In August, U.S. forces <a href="https://airwars.org/news/raqqa-bombardment/">dropped 5,775 bombs and missiles</a> onto the city. For context, this represented 10 times more munitions than the U.S. used for the whole of Afghanistan in the same month and year. The resulting civilian toll has been gruesome. At least 433 civilians <a href="https://airwars.org/news/raqqa-bombardment/">likely died in Raqqa</a> due to the August bombings, more than double the previous month’s total. Since the assault on Raqqa commenced on June 6, more than 1,000 civilians have been reported killed. </p>
<p>U.N. human rights chief <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21810&LangID=E">Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein cautions</a> that the intense bombardment has left civilians caught between IS’s monstrosities and the fierce battle to defeat it. Zeid insists that “civilians must not be sacrificed for the sake of rapid military victories.” </p>
<p>Trump would be wise to heed this warning. Even as U.S. forces continue to turn the tide on IS, the trail of destruction left in the campaign’s wake is unsettling. The specter of massive civilian casualties will remain a rallying point for new terrorist organizations long after anti-IS operations conclude.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of the Board for IHC Global.</span></em></p>Ten months of data reveal some alarming trends.Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/633772016-09-20T09:03:54Z2016-09-20T09:03:54ZIf Donald Trump takes control of the US drone fleet …<p>When future historians look back on his presidency, Barack Obama will be remembered <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/53-historians-on-obamas-legacy.html">for many things</a> – but among them all, perhaps the most stark is his open embrace of unmanned aerial systems, popularly referred to as drones.</p>
<p>Armed drones were first widely used to support American combat operations in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-drones-exclusive-idUSKCN0XH2UZ">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/military-drones-flood-war-skies-over-syria-and-iraq/3330150.html">Iraq</a>. In 2011, they also played a pivotal role in the NATO air campaign over <a href="https://www.wired.com/2011/10/predator-libya/">Libya</a>. This included a strike on the convoy carrying Muammar Gaddafi that led directly to the dictator’s capture and death. </p>
<p>More controversially, drones have also formed the centrepiece of Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy. The CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command have conducted hundreds of drone strikes in “non-battlefield theatres” – countries where the United States has not been at war. </p>
<p>According to estimates published by the <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/">Bureau of Investigative Journalism</a> (BIJ), 373 strikes were launched in <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=1000652376">Pakistan</a> between Obama’s inauguration in January 2009 and the end of August 2016. Dozens of other strikes are reported in <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2Al_Kz5KQ/edit#gid=977256262">Yemen</a> and <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=1110953463">Somalia</a>.</p>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Bureau Of Investigative Journalism</span></span>
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<p>In July 2016, the Obama administration broke its long silence on the human costs of drone warfare. <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI+Release+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.PDF">No more than 116</a> “non-combatants”, it claimed, had been killed in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya from January 2009 to the end of 2015. </p>
<p>The BIJ, which also publishes its own estimates on the number of people killed in American drone operations, places this figure much higher, estimating that between <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2016/07/01/obama-drone-casualty-numbers-fraction-recorded-bureau/">380 and 801 civilians</a> had been killed.</p>
<p>These statistics shatter <a href="http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Drone-Chic-Briefing-April-2016.pdf">the myth</a> that drones are somehow a uniquely precise and ‘risk-free’ form of warfare. Whilst they may eliminate the risk to American military personnel, for those living under drones the human, psychological and social costs have been <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/organization/149662/doc/slspublic/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf">substantial</a>.</p>
<p>Whilst it is often claimed that drone strikes have been <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/">successful</a> in killing al-Qaeda leaders, even American military officials have raised the spectre of serious ‘blowback’ from the ill-feeling that drone strikes create. In the words of the retired four-star Marine <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/general-cartwright-warns-drone-blowback/">General James Cartwright</a> “If you’re trying to kill your way to a solution, no matter how precise you are, you’re going to upset people even if they’re not targeted”.</p>
<p>As the presidential election draws closer, this “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-drone-war-is-a-shameful-part-of-his-legacy/2016/05/05/a727eea8-12ea-11e6-8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html">shameful</a>” aspect of Obama’s legacy raises a troubling question: how worried should we be about the prospect of a Donald Trump drone programme?</p>
<h2>From bad to worse</h2>
<p>While he has only publicly committed to deploying unarmed drones to patrol the <a href="http://www.syracuse.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/trump_tells_syracusecom_us_drones_should_patrol_both_borders_247.html">Canadian and Mexico borders</a>, Trump’s plan to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/11/18/donald-trump-promises-to-bomb-the-hell-out-of-isis-in-new-radio-ad/">bomb the hell out of ISIS</a>” is a major cause for concern.</p>
<p>During a December 2015 interview with “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/">Fox and Friends</a>”, Trump was asked how he would combat the group. His response was startling: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their lives, don’t kid yourself. When they say they don’t care about their lives, you have to take out their families.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Let that sink in for a moment. A presidential candidate has suggested “taking out” the civilian families of Islamic State fighters; that would almost certainly breach <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/dec/17/rand-paul/rand-pauls-right-geneva-conventions-bar-donald-tru/">Article 51.2 of the Geneva Convention</a> which states that individual civilians “shall not be the object of attack”. </p>
<p>Whether he actually means what he says or not, Trump has essentially made plans to commit <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/272067-ex-cia-chief-trump-asking-for-a-war-crime-from-soldiers">war crimes</a> as part of his campaign platform. And now that the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/11/obama-drone-wars-normalisation-extrajudicial-killing">all but normalised targeted killings</a> as a tool of US statecraft, drone strikes potentially offer Trump the perfect tool to accomplish this goal.</p>
<p>To compound this danger, Trump has also gone on record to insist that he would strong-arm any military commander who refused to conduct such attacks. This followed former CIA director<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/28/former-cia-director-military-may-refuse-to-follow-trumps-orders-if-he-becomes-president/"> Michael Hayden’s</a> insistence that US military commanders would refuse the order to attack the families of ISIS fighters. “They won’t refuse. They’re not going to refuse me”, Trump later postured during a Republican primary debate in March. “If I say do it, they’re going to do it.”</p>
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<p>There is much to fear from a potential Trump presidency in terms of both <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-serious-foreign-policy-speech-doesnt-make-trump-any-less-terrifying-58328">US foreign policy</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-promises-america-law-and-order-but-he-is-a-dire-threat-to-both-62851">world politics</a> more generally. This is not a partisan Democratic talking point: 50 senior Republican national security officials have already come out publicly and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/national-security-gop-donald-trump.html">warned</a> that Trump “would be the most reckless president in American history”.</p>
<p>Of course, it is not possible to predict with complete certainty what Trump’s drone policies would actually be if he is elected president. It is also unclear whether the outgoing Obama administration can successfully institutionalise barriers to prevent the next president, whoever that may be, from inheriting the expansive drone playbook that it has developed.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, as with Trump’s remarks on <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/exactly-what-kind-of-torture-does-donald-trump-want-to-use/">torture</a> and <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/03/trump-asks-why-us-cant-use-nukes-msnbcs-joe-scarborough-reports.html">nuclear weapons</a>, it’s important that his comments are scrutinised and taken seriously.</p>
<p>As Trump begins receiving the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/16/politics/donald-trump-intelligence-briefing/">classified intelligence briefings</a> that all presidential candidates are given during the general election, it’s time to face the very real prospect that he may soon inherit one of the most troubling components of Obama’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom F.A Watts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Trump becomes president, he’ll inherit one of the US’s most dangerous military tools.Tom F.A Watts, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636222016-08-26T10:43:22Z2016-08-26T10:43:22ZThe US has blurred the lines on assassination for decades<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135533/original/image-20160825-6614-1xjqt0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold lands in Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MR._Dag_Hammarskj%C3%B6ld_ARRIVES_AT_LYDDA_AIRPORT,_ON_HIS_WAY_FROM_BEIRUT_TO_CAIRO,_1956.jpg">http://www.gpo.gov.il</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki Moon, is set to open a new investigation into the death of former secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold, whose plane crashed during a peace mission in the Congo in September 1961. New documents have surfaced that seem to implicate the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/01/u-n-to-probe-whether-iconic-secretary-general-was-assassinated/">CIA</a> – which should, perhaps, not come as a complete surprise.</p>
<p>From the late 1950s, the CIA was involved more or less directly in plots to assassinate several foreign leaders. Among them was Cuba’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/03/cuba.duncancampbell2">Fidel Castro</a>, Congo’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/21/usa.davidpallister">Patrice Lumumba</a>, and the Dominican Republic’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/13/archives/cia-is-reported-to-have-helped-in-trujillo-death-material-support.html">Rafael Trujillo</a>. In the mid-1970s, a series of revelations about the CIA’s involvement in assassination attempts prompted numerous inquiries by the government and Congress.</p>
<p>One Senate committee <a href="http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf">concluded</a> that the CIA had been able to get involved in these incidents thanks to a combination of secrecy, ambiguity about lines of responsibility between the agency and the White House, and “plausible deniability”. The term – initially coined to suggest that US covert operations should be conducted in such a manner as to plausibly deny US involvement – was later interpreted as the need to isolate the president from the details of covert operations in order for him to plausibly deny knowledge of them.</p>
<p>The committee recommended establishing a statute that would outlaw “assassination” and would specify the meaning of the word and identify categories of foreign officials that could not be targeted (including leaders of movements and parties). But in 1975 the <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB522-Church-Committee-Faced-White-House-Attempts-to-Curb-CIA-Probe/">Ford administration</a> blocked any congressional effort to reform the intelligence services. Ford did ban assassination in an <a href="http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo11905.htm">Executive Order</a> of 1976 but the meaning of assassination remained deeply vague. It stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The order was expanded during the Carter years by dropping the adjective “political” and was confirmed by Reagan in <a href="http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html">Executive Order 12333</a>. This remains the standing regulation when it comes to US involvement in assassination. Its inherent ambiguity has not ceased to cause problems ever since.</p>
<h2>Skirting around the order</h2>
<p>In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration identified Muammar Gaddafi as its main enemy. Gaddafi had been sponsoring terrorist attacks and after Libya was connected to a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1653848.stm">1986 bombing in Berlin</a> in which two US servicemen and a Turkish woman were killed. The US retaliated. In Operation El Dorado Canyon, US planes bombed one of Gaddafi’s residences and military targets.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-truth-about-1986-us-bombing-in-libya/2011/07/03/gHQAjAWHyH_story.html">US officials denied</a> that the bombing constituted an assassination attempt. They argued that the strike was not directly aimed at the Libyan dictator, but at degrading his military capabilities and support for terrorism. Officials, including the secretary of state George Shultz, argued that terrorists represented a particular category of enemy and that a more aggressive posture – including pre-emptive strikes – was needed. </p>
<p>In 1989, officials in George H W Bush’s administration allegedly lamented that the constraints imposed by the ban on assassinations had prevented the US from playing a larger role in a (failed) coup to oust Panama’s dictator Manuel Noriega. A few months later, a memorandum written by <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/ParksMemorandum.pdf">Hays Parks</a> in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army seemed to ease these concerns. The memorandum provided a new legal position for counter-terrorism operations. </p>
<p>The memorandum clarified that “a decision by the president to employ clandestine, low visibility or overt military force” did not constitute assassination.</p>
<p>It also added that the ban on assassination didn’t prevent the targeting of a broad category of enemy, including terrorists. Since they could be said to pose an imminent threat, they could be targeted in self-defence under both international law and the power of the president as commander-in-chief. These arguments – similar to those used in the Reagan years – would provide a baseline for future justifications.</p>
<p>Later on, the administration, targeted <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/18/world/confrontation-gulf-air-force-chief-dismissed-for-remarks-gulf-plan-cheney-cites.html">Saddam Hussein’s</a> residence and headquarters. When Air Force chief of staff Michael Dugan admitted that Saddam himself had been the target of the bombing, secretary of defense Dick Cheney <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1990-09-18/news/mn-585_1_air-force-official">fired him</a>.</p>
<p>In 1998, the Clinton administration also targeted the residence of Saddam Hussein. Once again, officials denied that Saddam himself was the target. </p>
<h2>Al-Qaeda and 9/11</h2>
<p>The rise of al-Qaeda in the late 1990s brought the issue of assassination back to the fore. The <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/911Report.pdf">9/11 Commission report</a> revealed that the Clinton administration had authorised several kill or capture operations against Osama Bin Laden. The operations never went ahead but US officials agreed that if Bin Laden had been killed in one of them, it would not have amounted to an assassination. He was a terrorist leader, they reasoned, and the US would have been acting in self-defence against him. </p>
<p>The waters were muddied further after 9/11. George W Bush gave the CIA authority to <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cias-license-to-kill/">target terrorists</a> abroad (including American citizens). The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress also made clear that the US could now target “persons,” that is, conduct premeditated strikes against individual targets. </p>
<p>The Obama administration has dramatically increased the number of operations against suspected terrorists, especially through drone strikes. The alleged imminence of the threat posed by terrorists still plays a key role in the <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/whence-imminence-drone-memo-puzzle-and-theory">justification</a> used for these operations.</p>
<h2>Where are we now?</h2>
<p>So, while <a href="https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf">Executive Order 12333</a> prohibits any form of assassination, a series of targets has been identified as permissible. Several operations (such as those described above) have been defined as legal, regardless of how close they have come to the commonsense understanding of assassination. What started as a black-and-white distinction soon developed into an endless series of qualifications and exceptions.</p>
<p>In this context, two main interpretations can be identified. If we interpret the order as being a ban on killing outside war, its erosion is almost complete. However, it could be argued that the order only aimed to prevent the type of stealth assassination conducted in the 1960s – operations using explosive shells, poisoned darts and other devices, like those conducted against Castro and Lumumba. In this second interpretation, the order has stood the test of time, but its applicability is so narrow as to be, perhaps, meaningless. </p>
<p>Still, the fact that the Obama administration has been hard pressed to explain why its policies – and even its aggressive drone campaign – do not constitute a violation of the ban might suggest that it prefers to assume the second interpretation over the first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luca Trenta receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p>Attempts to outlaw the practice have proven difficult, thanks to a tendency on the part of leaders to skirt around the rules.Luca Trenta, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/623362016-07-12T12:05:28Z2016-07-12T12:05:28ZCan policing by consent involve remote control bombs and pre-emptive strikes?<p>Technology makes us capable of things that were previously impossible, such as rapid travel by car or aircraft, or sending messages around the world in an instant. But often technology also changes the way we do those things we’re already capable of. The use of remotely controlled aerial drones to launch strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example. </p>
<p>It is argued that delivering destruction by remote control changes the rules of the game. And the same argument is now directed at police following the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-36742835">events in Dallas</a>, Texas. When Micah Johnson holed himself up in a building having shot and killed several police officers, Dallas Police Department officers ended the stand-off by killing Johnson with an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/08/police-bomb-robot-explosive-killed-suspect-dallas">explosive delivered by a remote-controlled robot</a>, something more often used to detonate suspect packages or bombs. </p>
<p>Both of these uses of bomb-by-remote-control are controversial and raises the question of <a href="http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/imminent-danger/">imminent threat</a>. </p>
<p>Critics of drone strikes argue that their surveillance capability leads to many more deaths than would be justified by a strict interpretation of those that are “imminent threats”. This is especially true where “<a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/07/01/drone-war-report-january-june-2015-controversial-signature-strikes-hit-yemen-and-pakistan/">signature strikes</a>” are carried out – those based on the target’s “pattern of life activity”, rather than clear knowledge of the target’s identity, actions or even motivations. Critics argue that this technology makes “targeted killing” a method that is chosen too easily: the lack of accountability of the machine algorithms chewing through surveillance data and recommending action means there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/use-of-drones-should-be-a-matter-of-life-not-just-death-19362">no impediment to their escalating use</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130210/original/image-20160712-9271-1jg9df7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bomb disposal robot, of the sort used to carry an explosive towards Johnson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Explosieven_Opruimingsdienst.jpg">JePe</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For police officers in Dallas, it was clear from his communications that Johnson had <a href="http://abc7chicago.com/news/dallas-shooting-suspect-taunted-police-during-2-hours-of-negotiation/1421122/">no intention of surrender</a>. He had shot 12 of their colleagues, killing five and was adopting “shoot and move” tactics learned from his time in the US army to confuse and evade capture. Under such circumstances, police concluded that any means to take out Johnson was justified. But to other observers, the fact that Johnson was hiding behind a wall when the bomb-disposal robot detonated its explosives – not shooting or directly threatening police – meant the police’s decision looked a lot like summary justice. This raises three issues.</p>
<p>First, did Johnson pose an imminent threat to others when attacked? As far as the police were concerned, it was better to target him while inactive than to wait to engage him when he started a fresh volley of shots. Given the scale of the wounding and killing Johnson had already accomplished, this is a powerful argument. </p>
<p>Second, if they were able to get close to him with a robot, could they not have tried to incapacitate him with a taser, chemical spray or gas, or tranquilliser dart? Using a robot to do so would make this as risk-free to officers as was killing him with explosives. The possibility of using robots in this way to avoid killing armed suspects is another potential solution other than the use of lethal force in situations like these.</p>
<p>Third, is the question of what precedent the police’s actions set for the future. Although the killing was carried out using the fairly old technology of a tracked bomb-disposal robot in a novel way, there is a much larger issue as to the rules of engagement that should govern the use of armed drones or other remote control weapons by police. </p>
<p>Firefighters are already <a href="http://www.popsci.com/manchester-firemen-use-drones-with-infrared-cameras">experimenting with small drones</a> that can search burning buildings for bodies to rescue using infrared cameras. It’s only a short step from here to police using the same to search buildings for persons of interest to them. In the UK, drones are <a href="http://statewatch.org/observatories_files/drones/uk/bftb.html">already used by the National Crime Agency</a> to see behind buildings and walls and to carry out surveillance on suspects. In these cases, if the suspects were planning to plant a bomb or launch an attack, would the police be justified in using an armed drone to pre-emptively stop such an attack – delivering death by remote control? At what point do we relinquish the idea that the police are there to bring suspects to justice in a court of their peers, and move instead towards a military-style approach of defence through use of force – if necessary, pre-emptive force. </p>
<p>The potential use of drones, particularly as they become smaller, for crime or terrorist purposes is of great concern. How we are to counter these potential threats, and to respond in general to these early iterations of the robotic revolution are up for debate. The events in Dallas are but the first chapter of a controversy that has only just begun.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn is supported in his work on various aspects of drone technology by the ESRC, the Open Society Foundation, and the Gerta Henkel Foundation.</span></em></p>Technology poses a challenge to how we treat suspects and police society.David Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics and Head of Department, Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.