tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/electronic-voting-15562/articlesElectronic voting – The Conversation2023-06-06T12:30:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1964552023-06-06T12:30:55Z2023-06-06T12:30:55ZBlockchain is a key technology – a computer scientist explains why the post-crypto-crash future is bright<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529878/original/file-20230602-15-hjwz91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C0%2C5665%2C3788&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Blockchain technology has many uses beyond cryptocurrency.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/abstract-blockchain-background-royalty-free-image/1401887553">Yuichiro Chino/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>People hear a lot about blockchain technology in relation to cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, which rely on blockchain systems to keep records of financial transactions between people and businesses. But a <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/7-biggest-crypto-collapses-of-2022-the-industry-would-like-to-forget">crash in public trust in cryptocurrencies</a> like <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/collapse-stablecoin-terrausd-sparks-bold-scheme-liability-suit-2022-06-21/">TerraUSD</a> – and therefore a massive drop in their market value – doesn’t mean their underlying technology is also worthless.</p>
<p>In fact, there are plenty of other uses for this type of system, which does not rely on centralized storage and where many people can participate securely, even if they don’t all know each other.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=fs2LVqkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">computer scientist</a> exploring new technologies for future smart communication network technologies, I, along with many engineers and developers, have shown that blockchain technology is a <a href="https://www.blockchainresearchinstitute.org">promising solution to many challenging problems</a> in trust and security of next-generation network-based applications. I see several ways blockchains are proving themselves useful that aren’t tied to cryptocurrency.</p>
<h2>Supply chains</h2>
<p>Modern global supply chains require a huge amount of information for the massive number of products being shipped around the world. They suffer from limits on data storage capacity, inefficient paper processes, disjointed data systems and incompatible data formats. These traditional centralized data storage methods cannot efficiently trace the origin of problems, like where a poor-quality product came from. </p>
<p>Storing information on a blockchain improves integrity, accountability and traceability. For example, <a href="https://www.ibm.com/products/supply-chain-intelligence-suite/food-trust">IBM’s Food Trust</a> uses a blockchain system to track food items from the field to retailers. The participants in the food supply chain record transactions in the shared blockchain, which simplifies keeping track.</p>
<h2>Health care</h2>
<p>Data ownership and privacy are top concerns in the health care industry. Current centralized systems cannot meet all the diverse needs of patients, health service providers, insurance companies and governmental agencies. Blockchain technology enables a decentralized system for access control of medical records where all stakeholders’ interests are protected. </p>
<p>Blockchain systems not only allow health care service providers to securely share patients’ medical records but also enable patients to <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/public-sector/articles/blockchain-opportunities-for-health-care.html">track who has accessed their records</a> and determine who is authorized to do so.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cargo ship is alongside a pier with ranks of hundreds of shipping containers stacked nearby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530131/original/file-20230605-29-a8ezcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Blockchain systems are already helping companies track items through complex global supply chains.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ClimateActionShippingLobby/38604bfa4b1f4e74999b2ab8c12702dc/photo">AP Photo/Michael Probst</a></span>
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<h2>Banking and finance</h2>
<p>Banking and finance benefit from integrating blockchain networks into their business operations. Instead of trying to develop cryptocurrencies with new or different capabilities, the financial sector has recognized that blockchain systems are a <a href="https://consensys.net/blockchain-use-cases/finance/">reliable way to store information</a> about traditional currencies like the dollar, euro and yen, as well as financial products.</p>
<p>Blockchains provide consumers with the convenience of being able to monitor their transactions as they are processed, almost in real time from anywhere. Banks also benefit from blockchains, with the opportunity to conduct business between institutions more efficiently and securely. </p>
<h2>Property records</h2>
<p>Today’s manual process of recording property rights is burdensome and inefficient. Traditional paper documentation is time-consuming, labor intensive, not transparent and <a href="https://consensys.net/blockchain-use-cases/real-estate/">vulnerable to loss</a>. Blockchain technology eliminates inconvenience, inefficiency and errors, and reduces the cost by migrating the entire process into a digital form. </p>
<p>Blockchain systems allow owners to trust that their deed is accurate and permanently recorded. Remote access is particularly meaningful to people living in areas without sufficient governmental or financial infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Voting</h2>
<p>Validating votes and maintaining voter privacy seem like conflicting requirements. Blockchain systems hold promise as a means to facilitate a fair and transparent modern voting system. Because it’s almost impossible to tamper with a blockchain-enabled voting system, it can maintain a transparent electoral process. </p>
<p>In the November 2018 midterm elections in West Virginia, a <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/west-virginia-secretary-of-state-reports-successful-blockchain-voting-in-2018-midterm-elections">blockchain-based voting system</a> was used and found to be secure and reliable.</p>
<h2>Smart cities</h2>
<p>A smart city <a href="https://corporate.enelx.com/en/question-and-answers/what-is-a-smart-city">embeds information and communication technologies</a> into its facilities, infrastructure and services to provide its residents a convenient, intelligent and comfortable living space. A smart city is essentially a network of many devices that can communicate with each other to share data. Connected devices can include people’s smartphones, vehicles, electrical meters, public safety monitoring systems and even homes.</p>
<p>These systems have performance, security and privacy requirements that centralized information systems cannot handle. Blockchain is a key networking technology for building smart cities because it’s able to optimize operations, enhance security guarantees and increase mutual trust among participants.</p>
<p>The future of information technology is all about decentralization. Today’s centralized architecture fails to meet the <a href="https://insidetelecom.com/the-future-is-decentralized-heres-what-it-will-look-like/">increasingly diverse needs</a> of people who want freedom to personalize their own services, control their digital assets and more easily participate in democratic processes. Blockchain is a key enabling technology for building any secure and durable decentralized information system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are many uses for digital systems that are not centrally controlled and that allow large numbers of people to participate securely, even if they don’t all know and trust each other.Yu Chen, Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2017512023-03-17T12:29:59Z2023-03-17T12:29:59ZEstonia’s e-governance revolution is hailed as a voting success – so why are some US states pulling in the opposite direction?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515523/original/file-20230315-20-f7nh74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas reacts to e-vote results on March 5, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/estonian-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-reacts-after-the-news-photo/1247815927">Raigo Pajula/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Estonia, a small country in <a href="https://data.un.org/en/iso/ee.html">northern Europe</a>, reached a digital milestone when the country headed to the polls on March 5, 2023. </p>
<p>For the first time, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608904730/estonia-sets-new-e-voting-record-at-riigikogu-2023-elections">over 50% of voters cast their ballots online</a> in a national parliamentary election. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=UZaVLvIAAAAJ&hl=en">political science researcher</a> who focuses on elections, I was in Estonia to learn about the process of internet voting. In the capacity of an international election observer, I visited standard polling places and also attended the final internet vote count held in the parliament building. </p>
<p>As someone who also regularly volunteers as a poll worker in the United States, I found the contrast between Estonia’s integrated information systems and internet voting, and the patchwork system operating in the U.S., to be notable. And with several U.S. states <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161374479/electronic-registration-information-center-eric-florida-missouri-west-virginia">withdrawing from the Electronic Registration Information Center</a>, or ERIC, that contrast is growing sharper.</p>
<p>I believe Estonia offers America an important example of how information sharing can be used to enhance the integrity of elections.</p>
<h2>Estonia’s e-governance system</h2>
<p>Estonia has long been seen as a pioneer in digitizing the democratic process.</p>
<p>Internet voting, which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101718">began in Estonia in 2005</a>, is just a small part of the e-governance ecosystem that all Estonians access regularly. Using a government-issued ID card that allows Estonians to identify themselves and securely record digital signatures, they can register a newborn baby, sign up for social benefits, access health records and conduct almost any other business they have with a government agency. This ID card is mandatory for all citizens.</p>
<p>Central to the success of Estonia’s digitization revolution is a secure data-sharing system known as the <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/interoperability-services/x-road/">X-Road</a>. </p>
<p>Government agencies collect only the personal information they require to provide their services, and if another agency has already gathered a piece of information, then it is accessible through the X-Road. In other words, each piece of personal information is collected only once and then shared securely when it is needed. A person’s home address, for example, is collected by the <a href="https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/activities/population-procedures/population-register">population register</a> and no other government entity. If it’s needed by election administrators, health care workers, a school or any other agency, those organizations request it from the population register online.</p>
<p>So, imagine that you are applying for admission to a university, which requires both your date of birth and your school grades. These are stored by two different agencies. By using your ID card, you can auto-populate <a href="https://www.sais.ee">the application</a> using data that the system instantaneously pulls in from the two agencies that store that information. </p>
<p>Because of this information sharing, election officials know who is eligible to vote and which online ballot they should receive no matter where they live in the country.</p>
<h2>A decentralized approach in U.S.</h2>
<p>For many reasons, the U.S. system of election management is very different from Estonia’s, and <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/02/17/despite-security-concerns-online-voting-advances">online voting is rare</a>. </p>
<p>Developing and maintaining an e-governance system requires technical, political and social forces to align. Because each U.S. state manages its own elections, and decisions can vary at the county level or below, it is difficult to envision a consistent technical solution. It is also more challenging to coordinate a solution across such a large country and <a href="https://verifiedvoting.org/internet-voting-faq/">safely implement secure online voting</a> given current U.S. internet voting technology.</p>
<p>Additionally, concerns about federal interference in state matters have prompted political and social pushback on <a href="https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-election-integrity-the-unnecessary-and-unconstitutional-john-r">recent election reforms</a>. Public consensus on instituting a nationally mandated electronic ID similar to the one that forms the foundation of Estonia’s internet voting appears unlikely. </p>
<p>Research shows that most <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101718">Estonians trust their e-governance systems</a>, although there are skeptics. Some critiques focus on <a href="https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/en/posts/perils-of-electronic-voting/">perceived security shortcomings</a>. </p>
<p>The internet voting process has also become politicized. In the most recent election, one political party that had discouraged its voters from using online voting – and unsurprisingly trailed its rivals in the online count – challenged the process in court. Its <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608911129/estonia-s-supreme-court-rejects-ekre-s-e-voting-election-complaint">effort to annul internet voting</a> failed. The U.S. witnessed a similar dynamic around <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/supreme-court-leaves-in-place-order-requiring-pennsylvania-to-count-absentee-ballots-after-election-day/">absentee ballots in the 2020 elections</a>.</p>
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<img alt="Long line of people standing outside waiting to vote" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nearly all U.S. voters vote in person or by absentee or mail-in ballot.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-in-line-for-early-voting-for-the-midterm-news-photo/1439028382">Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Balancing security, efficiency and access</h2>
<p>While <a href="https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/annex/electoral-management-case-studies/the-united-states-decentralized-to-the-point-of">the United States’ decentralized approach</a> has its advantages, it also creates shortcomings in security, efficiency and access. </p>
<p>Secure elections means that only people who have the right to vote are able to cast a ballot and that they aren’t improperly influenced in the process. Efficient elections means the process is smooth — voters don’t have to wait in long lines, and their ballots are counted quickly and accurately. And access emphasizes that people who have the right to vote can register, gather the information they need in order to vote, and successfully cast their ballot. </p>
<p>Sometimes changes to voting practices that enhance one of these values – say, security – may create impediments for another – say, access. Requiring a photo ID to vote, for example, may reduce the <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Voter_impersonation">small likelihood of voter impersonation</a>, but it also risks preventing a legitimate voter who forgets to bring, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html">or doesn’t have</a>, a valid photo ID from exercising their right to vote. Finding an acceptable balance among these values is a challenge for citizens and policymakers alike.</p>
<h2>Misinformation derails digital efforts</h2>
<p>Several states, including my own state of West Virginia, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161374479/electronic-registration-information-center-eric-florida-missouri-west-virginia">recently made a decision</a> that I believe undermines all three of these values by making our elections less secure, less efficient and less accessible.</p>
<p>In early March, West Virginia joined Florida, Missouri, Alabama and Louisiana in withdrawing from the <a href="https://ericstates.org">Electronic Registration Information Center</a>. ERIC is a multistate, data-sharing effort to make voter rolls more accurate and encourage eligible citizens to vote. The 28 participating states and the District of Columbia provide voter registration and driver’s license data to ERIC and receive an analysis that shows who has moved, who has died and who is eligible to vote but has not registered. </p>
<p>These reports help states clean up their voter rolls, <a href="https://www.statenews.org/government-politics/2023-03-07/larose-says-ohio-may-drop-out-of-voter-registration-program-he-praised-last-month">identify incidents of fraud</a> and <a href="https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ERIC_Bylaws.pdf">provide unregistered voters</a> with information about how to vote. </p>
<p>In other words, ERIC is designed to enhance security, efficiency and access. However, over the past year, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/08/republican-states-eric-voter-rolls-program-conspiracy">unsubstantiated claims have circulated</a> that ERIC is being used as a <a href="https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/west-virginia-resigns-from-electronic-registration-information-center/article_f68b2bc4-bc50-11ed-b356-5b309dab29c3.html">partisan tool to undermine election integrity</a>. </p>
<p>ERIC was established, however, as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18541-1_31">nonpartisan information provider with bipartisan support</a>. States that exit ERIC may be sacrificing the integrity of their election process based on <a href="https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2022/oct/17/mark-finchem/arizonas-mark-finchem-falsely-links-george-soros-t/">unfounded conspiracies</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. can learn a tremendous amount from Estonia’s e-governance revolution. Estonia faces a hostile security environment with an antagonistic Russia next door. But its integrated systems have helped balance security, efficiency and access in a wide range of government services. With the decision to withdraw from ERIC, some states are in danger of pulling the U.S. in the other direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik S. Herron receives funding from the US Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative. </span></em></p>Americans can look to Estonia for lessons on how online voting systems can improve election integrity.Erik S. Herron, Professor of Political Science, West Virginia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1931692022-11-01T12:46:31Z2022-11-01T12:46:31ZHow to ensure election integrity and accuracy – 3 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492364/original/file-20221028-37112-v87ln4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6348%2C3639&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A county clerk, far left, swears in a group of Nevada residents to conduct a hand count of ballots on Oct. 26, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Election2022NevadaHandCount/06a6371e4d1642f19d602d4f43f39785/photo">AP Photo/Gabe Stern</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s almost certain there will be questions about the integrity of the 2022 midterm elections. In fact, some concerns about machine counting have already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/28/politics/nevada-hand-count-ballots/index.html">sparked one Nevada county</a> to seek to hand-count all ballots. Several scholars of elections have written for The Conversation U.S. about ways to ensure voting is conducted and counted fairly and accurately. It all starts with paper ballots.</p>
<h2>1. Paper is secure</h2>
<p>Paper ballots, including those sent by mail, are not ripe for fraud, reported election law scholar <a href="https://hq.ssrn.com/submissions/MyPapers.cfm?partid=114356">Steven Mulroy</a> at the University of Memphis: “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-elections-amid-the-coronavirus-pandemic-134761">[H]aving a paper ballot is a key way</a> to protect public trust in elections, allowing recounts in case machines are hacked or suffer software or hardware problems that could affect vote counting.”</p>
<p>Even when many people vote by mail, which Mulroy also says is a secure method of voting: “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-elections-amid-the-coronavirus-pandemic-134761">Vote-by-mail states have not seen</a> a higher rate of election fraud cases than states with strict rules on who can vote absentee, according to a database of fraud cases compiled by the Heritage Foundation, an organization concerned about voting fraud.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-protect-elections-amid-the-coronavirus-pandemic-134761">How to protect elections amid the coronavirus pandemic</a>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323684/original/file-20200327-146671-1nv36x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Wisconsin voter casts a ballot ahead of primary election day in 2020, avoiding lines and finding a more convenient time to vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Election-2020-Primaries-in-Turmoil/7d9b5eb950704553a6feaf8e00b98406/3/0">AP Photo/Morry Gash</a></span>
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<h2>2. Paper is key</h2>
<p>In fact, paper ballots are the best way to ensure the votes are counted correctly, wrote <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/herbert_lin">Herbert Lin</a>, a Stanford cybersecurity scholar:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<a href="https://theconversation.com/iowa-caucuses-did-one-thing-right-require-paper-ballots-131181">If hacked, an electronic voting machine cannot be trusted</a> to count votes accurately. In an election conducted with paper ballots, the ballots themselves can be examined and recounted.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>“The idea of recounting electronically cast votes is meaningless,” he wrote. Without something physically marked by each individual voter, “[a]ny problems … would be impossible to fix, calling into public question the integrity of the whole process and the validity of any results.”</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iowa-caucuses-did-one-thing-right-require-paper-ballots-131181">Iowa caucuses did one thing right: Require paper ballots</a>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213234/original/file-20180404-95689-okiud6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Recounting very close races is not enough to ensure election integrity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Virginia-Election-Recount/ae358c5cf1484bc294b1be0f48695311/14/0">AP Photo/Ben Finley</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Manual counts aren’t necessary</h2>
<p>But using paper ballots doesn’t mean counting has to happen by hand. </p>
<p>Computer scientist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ptI-HHkAAAAJ&hl=en">Eugene Vorobeychik</a> at Vanderbilt University has studied ways to count votes by machine – which is much faster than by hand – while still ensuring accuracy. Essentially, he said, paper ballots can help confirm – or not – a vote tally in the event of an audit.</p>
<p>“[A]fter the election,” he wrote, “<a href="https://theconversation.com/paper-trails-and-random-audits-could-secure-all-elections-dont-save-them-just-for-recounts-in-close-races-94243">auditors can compare electronic voting results</a> to the results documented in the paper trail. If they don’t agree, then something has gone wrong – either accidentally or as a result of outside interference – and a newly verified tally of the actual paper votes can be used to determine the winner.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paper-trails-and-random-audits-could-secure-all-elections-dont-save-them-just-for-recounts-in-close-races-94243">Paper trails and random audits could secure all elections – don't save them just for recounts in close races</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Amid discussion of how best to conduct and tally a hotly contested election that is potentially subject to nefarious meddling, three experts explain the basics.Jeff Inglis, Politics + Society Editor, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456282020-09-09T15:26:13Z2020-09-09T15:26:13ZHow to hold elections safely and uphold democracy during the COVID-19 pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356972/original/file-20200908-16-13dpl0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A campaign poster of John Magufuli of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party who is seeking re-election as president in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ericky Boniphace/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Free and fair elections face a new kind of threat. In addition to scheming leaders and compromised electoral commissions, there is now the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>In response, a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343787629_How_to_hold_elections_safely_and_democratically_during_the_COVID-19_pandemic">new report</a> published by the British Academy sets out how elections can be held safely and democratically amid COVID-19. Edited by renowned political scientist Sarah Birch, it covers a range of topics, including how to establish health protocols and manage the risk of election violence. The report sets out the options for international election observers.</p>
<p>This is critically important because despite the health crisis, there will be no letup in controversial elections – starting with Tanzania in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/tanzania-presidential-election-held-october-28-200721100331444.html">October</a> and the United States in <a href="https://ig.ft.com/us-election-2020/">November</a>. International observation will not insulate these polls from malpractice, but it will make it less likely and allow it to be exposed. </p>
<p>Yet the kind of observation carried out by the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a>, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/election-observation-missions-eueoms_en">European Union </a>, <a href="http://www.oas.org/EOMDatabase/default.aspx?Lang=En">Organisation of American States</a>, and other international organisations requires flying large numbers of people between countries. It is therefore one of the election activities threatened by the pandemic. </p>
<p>The report looks at how the observation industry can best adapt. It concludes that, instead of simply introducing short-term COVID-19 guidelines and protocols to get through the crisis, <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/press-release-how-to-hold-elections-democratically-and-safely-during-covid19/">observers should</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>look for new ways to harness technology and build stronger partnerships between domestic and international groups. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>By doing this they will be able to both respond to the COVID-19 challenge and more effectively counter new forms of electoral manipulation. </p>
<h2>Importance of election observation</h2>
<p>International observation has come in <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/09/21/see-no-evil-how-international-election-observers-lost-credibility-during-the-august-elections/">for criticism</a> in recent years – sometimes unfairly – for failing to call out electoral manipulation that was later condemned by the courts. But it nonetheless remains a vital weapon in the fight against election rigging. The verdicts of foreign observers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000140">carry more weight</a> than those of their domestic counterparts, and are more likely to prompt international intervention.</p>
<p>Simply not observing elections would be the easiest way to manage health risks. But it would significantly increase a variety of important political risks. In Burundi, for example, a late requirement that international monitors <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/05/10/burundi-warns-eac-observers-will-be-quarantined-for-14-days/">would be quarantined</a> made observation impossible. In its absence, there was no significant attempt by ruling party leaders to stop the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/widespread-violence-rises-ahead-burundis-2020-election">intimidation of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Even when observers do not condemn every electoral abuse, they can highlight and hence dissuade such explicit human rights violations. </p>
<p>So what options do observers have to respond to COVID-19? The report finds that they have a menu of three options to choose from: they can carry on regardless, observe through expats or work virtually and through partnerships.</p>
<h2>Carry on as normal - carefully</h2>
<p>The most obvious strategy is simply to observe “traditionally” while adopting strict social distancing protocols. This would involve dispatching teams of foreign nationals – usually between 15 and 140 people – earlier than usual in case they must quarantine. It would also mean holding fewer socially distanced meetings with key groups and individuals in the capital, and taking greater care when dispersing to polling stations. </p>
<p>Although this option represents the path of least resistance, it is problematic on health grounds and could mean <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/managing-elections-during-covid-19-pandemic.pdf">no international observation</a> in countries where the disease is spiking. It also represents a missed opportunity.</p>
<p>The health risk of flying in international observers is obvious. The missed opportunity is that the sector needs to adapt to the changing nature of electoral manipulation. More <a href="https://books.google.mw/books/about/How_to_Rig_an_Election.html?id=jaNUDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">subtle strategies of rigging</a> and the increasing <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1470165">digitisation</a> of electoral processes mean that the traditional model of international observation looks outdated.</p>
<p>By responding effectively to the pandemic, when constraints on public campaigning mean that there will be an even greater focus on digital politics, observers can also build a more effective model for the post-pandemic world.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-concerns-mount-over-integrity-of-us-elections-so-does-support-for-international-poll-monitors-144305">As concerns mount over integrity of US elections, so does support for international poll monitors</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Observe through expats</h2>
<p>If observers are to evolve new ways of working to deal with changing electoral realities it is essential that they do not simply look for stop-gap responses to COVID-19 such as working through foreign nationals already resident in the country.</p>
<p>This may at first appear to be a tempting option as it would enable observation groups to tap into a pool of people who would not need to travel, and would have greater knowledge of the context.</p>
<p>But it would also generate new problems. Most obviously, people who have spent a long time in a country may have developed political attachments that mean they are not seen as being independent. This undermines the fundamental point of international observation, which is to build teams around people who have no personal interest in the elections, and so are seen to be neutral.</p>
<p>It would also encourage observers to continue with business as usual just when they should be innovating.</p>
<h2>Observe virtually and through partnership</h2>
<p>A more radical alternative is for international observers to reduce the significance that they place on deploying their own staff on the ground, and to instead observe “virtually” and through partnerships with domestic organisations. While international donors already funding domestic civil society groups, and international observers do engage with their domestic counterparts, this rarely takes the form of a true partnership. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two local men and a woman wearing jackets idenifying them as election observers watch as a woman reads out results of the 2017 presidential election in Liberia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356964/original/file-20200908-20-nrlzks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">International and local election observers monitor the tallying of votes in Liberia recently.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Adopting three new ways of working could make observation more effective, both now and in the future:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Partnership</strong>. Working with domestic monitors and civil society groups, helping to fund their activities and then sharing the data collected, would reduce the need to deploy large numbers of international observers. Given that domestic groups deploy many more individuals to many more polling stations, working in this way would enhance both the geographical coverage of international missions and the resource base of domestic groups. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Virtual monitoring</strong>. With an increasing proportion of electoral activity taking place digitally and online, it makes sense for international observers to place greater emphasis on monitoring digital processes and online spaces such as Twitter and Facebook.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Crowd sourcing</strong>. Crowd sourcing (and then verifying) data from individuals on the ground can be a cost effective way of mapping the extent of electoral manipulation. A good example is how the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/4316">Ushahidi</a> platform famously tracked the violence in Kenya’s 2007/8 general elections.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>By allowing domestic and international groups to focus on areas in which they have particular strengths, this option would be more efficient and effective.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Of course, observing virtually and through partnership would generate new logistical challenges and require international observers to recruit new kinds of skills and experience. Observers would also need to be careful not to distort the priorities of domestic groups by adopting a rigid funding regime. But while global intergovernmental organisations don’t tend to do this at present, NGOs such as the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">Carter Centre</a> and the <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">National Democratic Institute</a> have been using elements of this strategy for many years. There is no reason these programmes can’t be deepened and extended.</p>
<p>This approach would also yield other benefits, such as boosting suitability. One of the aims of the international observation should surely be to make itself redundant by helping to build the capacity and authority of domestic observers. This may be a very long-term goal, but it is an important one. In addition to giving ownership of the process to the citizens concerned, it would also help to show that criticisms of poor quality electoral processes are not the result of foreign <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-hits-back-at-germany-over-election-interference-criticism/a-40162026">“meddling”</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International observation will not insulate controversial polls – such as Tanzania’s in October – from malpractices, but will make them less likely and allow them to be exposed.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1361632020-04-28T13:43:26Z2020-04-28T13:43:26ZHow e-voting could close Canada’s political gender gap<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330548/original/file-20200426-163110-17g7dd1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C28%2C1920%2C1247&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Allowing MPs to vote electronically would go a long way to promoting gender equity in Canadian politics.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The year 2019 was eventful in the struggle to close the gender gap in Canadian politics. </p>
<p>A record <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/women-mps-house-of-commons-2019-election-1.5404800">98 women</a> (29 per cent of seats in Parliament) were elected into the House of Commons, and a law was finally passed that gives <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">paid parental leave</a> to MPs. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, barriers continue to exist for equitable parliamentary practices. The requirement that House of Commons members are expected to vote <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_09_2-e.html">in person</a>, instead of via electronic voting, is a policy that discourages those recovering from childbirth or with care-giving responsibilities from <a href="https://ici.radio-canada.ca/info/2019/elections-federales/femmes-hommes-probabilites-vote-egalite-chateaux-forts/index-en.html">seeking political office</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330419/original/file-20200424-163110-xasxzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Democratic Institutions Minister Karina Gould pauses to talk to reporters as she carries her three-month-old baby on Parliament Hill in May 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>MPs must find child care if their child is under 18 months old (the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">minimum age</a> required to access the House of Commons daycare) and find a place to breastfeed (an act that can prompt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/jun/21/karina-gould-canadian-minister-breastfeeding-baby-footage-viral">international headlines</a>). In extreme cases, lack of equitable policies has even led an MP in the United Kingdom to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/12/tulip-siddiq-i-needed-a-caesarean-instead-i-was-at-parliament">delay child birth</a> to squeeze in a vote. </p>
<p>On the surface, paid parental leave for MPs addresses longstanding discrimination after years of docking <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/parental-leave-commons-1.5175413">$120 a day</a> from members who took leave longer than 21 days. It was a long time coming considering the first MP gave birth while in office <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/guergis-to-join-small-club-of-new-mothers-in-office-1.581142">in 1987</a>. </p>
<h2>What about voting?</h2>
<p>Yet the 2019 parental leave measures don’t address the logistics of MP voting while they’re on leave. That’s in keeping with other outdated House of Commons procedural measures that cause gender disparities among its members. </p>
<p>Those choosing to take leave under this policy are unable to take part in the parliamentary voting process and therefore perform the job they were elected to do. This could potentially negatively impact re-election campaigns and disincentivize MPs from taking leave at all, and therefore does little to address the systematic barriers to gender equity. </p>
<p>To boost inclusivity among its ranks, the House of Commons needs parliamentary reform of its voting procedures to allow electronic online voting, or e-voting, for its members.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-creating-huge-stressful-experiment-working-home/607945/">prompted discussions</a> on how to keep the House of Commons operational while respecting public health measures. But emergency relief policies, created in a parliamentary system that was <a href="https://www.democraticaudit.com/2016/07/29/designing-a-new-parliament-with-women-in-mind/">built to fit the needs</a> of men, are falling short in providing protections for all Canadians. </p>
<p>One example of this policy failure is illustrated by the industries most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="http://behindthenumbers.ca/2020/03/20/covid-19-crisis-response-must-address-gender-faultlines/">Women outnumber men</a> in low-paying positions that are most at risk of COVID-19 exposure.</p>
<p>For example, personal support workers, responsible for disinfecting primary-care facilities, are experiencing <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/women-disproportionately-bearing-the-brunt-of-coronavirus-crisis-advocates-say-1.4907309">inadequate safety measures</a> — including a shortage of personal protection equipment — <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6787770/coronavirus-canada-protective-equipment-cleaners-admin-workers/">despite efforts</a> by labour unions to increase health and safety measures for this industry. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330549/original/file-20200426-163067-4cv9hc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A health-care worker waves as she finishes her shift for the day at the Eatonville Care Centre in Toronto on April 24, 2020. The care centre has been one of the hardest hit by COVID-19 pandemic in the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Nathan Denette</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This issue, exacerbated by the pandemic, is an explicit example of how non-representative legislatures, coupled with a lack of empirical research on women, produce inadequate policies. E-voting acknowledges the need for flexibility and promotes more inclusive policy-making. </p>
<h2>We have the technology for e-voting</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/reports/online-voting-path-forward-federal-elections.html">Canada has the technology</a>. E-voting <a href="https://carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp-content/uploads/AComparativeAssessmentofInternetVotingFINALFeb19-a-1.pdf">exists in municipal elections</a> in Canada, parties already use online voting to cast ballots for internal matters such as leadership contests and more than <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2017/reforming-the-indian-act-to-allow-for-online-voting/">50 First Nations</a> in Canada use e-voting. </p>
<p>Designing MP voting practices that are integrated with existing online technologies has already been implemented within several parliamentary systems in varying degrees. </p>
<p>Recent coronavirus-related examples include the European Union adopting e-voting via <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/23/eu-parliament-moves-to-email-voting-during-covid-19/">email ballots</a> and the United Kingdom parliament approving e-voting <a href="https://irishtechnews.ie/blockchain-e-voting-is-real-where-how-when/">via Zoom</a>. Even the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-isle-of-man-52134400">oldest continuously sitting parliament</a> on the Isle of Man announced that it’s moving its voting online, using the <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/coronavirus-how-are-parliaments-worldwide-working-during-the-pandemic">chat box</a> of its videoconferencing software to vote. </p>
<p>Canada’s House of Commons should look to international e-voting practices to adopt a system that promotes both accessibility and public health measures for its members. </p>
<p>Critics of e-voting cite cybersecurity concerns, especially in the age of <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-voting-system-isnt-immune-interference">foreign electoral interference</a>. Canadian academics Nicole Goodman and Aleksander Essex point out <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2020/online-voting-entirely-possible-for-mps-during-times-of-crisis/">three reasons</a> why this critique does not apply to e-voting in Canada. </p>
<p>First, MP votes are public and easily verifiable. Second, educating MPs on e-voting best practices is feasible, no matter how archaic the institution. Third, registering e-votes via a secure remote device is well within the resources of the federal government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/330547/original/file-20200426-163126-g658nh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canada has the technology to allow MPs to vote electronically.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pixabay)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clearly, instituting remote online voting for Canada’s much smaller and institutionally younger parliamentary system is an easy win. Installing electronic online voting is necessary to bring Canada a step closer to closing the gender gap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Regan M. Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To boost inclusivity among its ranks, the House of Commons needs parliamentary reform of its voting procedures to allow electronic online voting, or e-voting, for its members.Regan M. Johnston, PhD Political Science Student, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1343122020-03-24T12:16:58Z2020-03-24T12:16:58ZCoronavirus restrictions likely to lead to remote voting for Congress<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322360/original/file-20200323-112661-dgipuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Together no more: remote voting for Congress could be the outcome of public health restrictions on gatherings.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.house.gov/media">House of Representatives</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The spread of the coronavirus has created unprecedented problems for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/22/members-congress-are-facing-potential-crisis-government-they-were-warned/">Congress as it confronts how to conduct legislative business</a> after <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/22/sen-rand-paul-tests-positive-for-coronavirus-142326">the infection of several members</a>. </p>
<p>Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/congress-coronavirus-pandemic-137414">told Politico</a>, “We probably cannot keep operating all in one location.”</p>
<p>For all of U.S. history so far, the House and Senate have had to take votes in person, in their respective chambers. Now, public health measures may prevent that.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/brand">former counsel for the House of Representatives</a> from 1976 to 1983, I believe the Constitution permits Congress to use a method of voting other than gathering on the floor of their legislative chambers. </p>
<p>Democratic leadership in the House evidently agrees: <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/21/democrats-push-proxy-voting-198912">They will soon bring a proposal to the House</a> to allow proxy voting during the pandemic. That means a member who is present in the House could cast a vote on behalf of a member who has been forced to stay at home.</p>
<h2>Framers’ language</h2>
<p>The Framers who designed the constitutional structure for how things would work in Congress based it on parliamentary and colonial practices. </p>
<p>Members of Congress had and still have to vote in person on the floor of the House or Senate. But when the first Congress officially convened on March 4, 1789, due to bad weather and difficult travel, <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/anecdote/days/009week_0304.htm">a quorum was not present</a>. Without a quorum - a simple majority – there weren’t enough members there to actually conduct business. The ballots for president and vice president could not be counted and no legislation could be passed or revenue raised. <a href="https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/The-opening-of-the-First-Congress-in-New-York-City/">A quorum finally assembled on April 1 in the House</a> and April 5 in the Senate. </p>
<p>The Framers might not have anticipated the extraordinary steps that Congress would have to take in a crisis such as today, when public health measures could dictate that hundreds of members be prevented from meeting on the floor of the House or Senate.</p>
<p>Yet the language the Founders used 233 years ago may nevertheless permit technological innovations now to facilitate voting from places other than the actual physical House and Senate chambers. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322361/original/file-20200323-112707-877dmz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the first electronic voting machines used by the House, after electronic voting was introduced in 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://history.house.gov/Collection/Listing/2005/2005-204-000/">House of Representatives</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Leeway in the rules</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/article/article-i">U.S. Constitution directs that Congress “shall assemble”</a> at least once a year. </p>
<p>While the dictionary definition of “assemble” includes “to meet” or “to gather,” there is no indication that virtual assembly would be prohibited under the Constitution. </p>
<p>What guidance the Constitution provides suggests wide leeway in deciding how to fulfill its requirements. </p>
<p>For example, the Constitution says that a <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/760">“majority of each [house] shall constitute a quorum to do business”</a> but does not specify how each house should determine what constitutes a quorum. </p>
<p>For years, until 1890, the view in the House was that satisfying the requirement for a quorum meant an absolute majority of members living and seated had to vote on any proposition. This resulted in members refusing to cast votes and thereby preventing a quorum and obstructing the House’s business. </p>
<p>In 1890, Speaker Thomas Reed ruled that <a href="https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/Speaker-Thomas-Brackett-Reed-of-Maine-proceeded-against-the-%E2%80%9Cdisappearing-quorum%E2%80%9D/">members present in the chamber but not voting would be counted</a> in determining a quorum. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/322449/original/file-20200323-112694-1xj1gc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed in 1890 made an important change in House voting rules.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/cwpbh.03701/">Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Brady-Handy Photograph Collection</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI_S5_C1_2/">The Supreme Court upheld Reed’s rule</a>, saying that the House’s ability to transact business is “created by a mere presence of a majority.” Since there was no method specified in the Constitution for determining the presence of a majority, it thus lay in the House’s hands <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/144/1">“to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.”</a> </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Rules_and_Procedure_vrd.htm">Senate has a slightly different rule</a> but has the same discretion to make a similar determination. </p>
<h2>Congress can make its own rules</h2>
<p>How Congress works is not dictated only by what is constitutional. There are rules within the House and Senate that also govern what each body can do.</p>
<p>Currently, House rules say that <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=glNCAQAAMAAJ&lpg=PA11&ots=TxmQqCiKZH&dq=%5Be%5Dvery%20Member%20shall%20be%20present%20within%20the%20Hall%20during%20its%20sittings...and%20shall%20vote%20on%20each%20question%20put...&pg=PA11#v=onepage&q=%5Be%5Dvery%20Member%20shall%20be%20present%20within%20the%20Hall%20during%20its%20sittings...and%20shall%20vote%20on%20each%20question%20put...&f=false">“[e]very Member shall be present within the Hall during its sittings … and shall vote on each question put.”</a> </p>
<p>The Constitution allows each house of Congress “to determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” The constitutionality of those rules has been challenged over the years, but the Supreme Court has said that Congress’ power to formulate and impose such rules is “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=LHUYAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PA325&ots=8ORmbnU59t&dq=%E2%80%9Cabsolute%20and%20beyond%20the%20challenge%20of%20any%20other%20body%20or%20tribunal%E2%80%9D.&pg=PA325#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%9Cabsolute%20and%20beyond%20the%20challenge%20of%20any%20other%20body%20or%20tribunal%E2%80%9D.&f=false">absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal</a>.” </p>
<p>That means both the House and Senate have the power to amend their rules to allow a method of voting that does not require them to assemble on the floor of their chambers. </p>
<h2>Securing the vote</h2>
<p>This change could be constitutionally allowed and technically feasible. But it raises many other questions, from people’s faith in Congress’ trustworthiness to the vulnerability of such a system to outside attacks.</p>
<p>If Congress adopts remote voting, its major challenge is to create a system that can be protected against fraud, hacking or proxy voting. </p>
<p>While the Senate still requires voice or hand votes, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34366.pdf">the House implemented electronic voting systems</a> in the early 1970s. By the 1980s, suspicions had arisen that House members, either for their convenience or to avoid an absence, lent their electronic voting cards to one another to enter their votes. Since no House rule specifically allowed such proxy voting on the floor, there was a question of whether such a practice was permissible under House Ethics rules. </p>
<p>Following a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=TSyrduVBpyMC&pg=PA1161&lpg=PA1161&dq=proxy+voting+House+floor+electronic&source=bl&ots=tqOzfi9__Y&sig=ACfU3U1m6-2brjJVgsX35B1HqP_uxY9IYQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwij-t2_67DoAhU8j3IEHfnDB4QQ6AEwD3oECA4QAQ#v=onepage&q=proxy%20voting%20House%20floor%20electronic&f=false">House Ethics Committee investigation</a> into these anomalies, they adopted a rule preventing proxy voting on the House floor. Obviously the House would have to come up with a system for preventing such abuses from recurring.</p>
<p>Of course, such a system could be devised for limited use during emergencies, with a return to traditional voting in the chamber once the emergency has passed.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on March 24, 2020.</em></p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stanley M. Brand serves as Vice President of Minor League Baseball.</span></em></p>Democrats may soon propose letting members of Congress vote by proxy during the pandemic. A legal scholar says the language the Founders used 233 years ago could allow voting remotely.Stanley M. Brand, Distinguished Fellow in Law and Government, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158792019-04-30T10:43:50Z2019-04-30T10:43:50ZHow the world’s largest democracy casts its ballots<p><a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-india-election-explainer-20190401-story.html">About 600 million Indian citizens</a> are expected to cast their votes over <a href="https://eci.gov.in/general-election/general-elections-2019/">a period of 39 days</a> ending May 19, in the ongoing election for their country’s parliament. There are <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/16/asia/india-election-numbers-intl/index.html">roughly 900 million eligible voters</a>, and the country has typically seen <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-23/biggest-round-of-voting-to-see-bjp-chief-make-debut-india-votes">about two-thirds</a> of them turn out to polling places. </p>
<p>I have been working on the security of electronic voting systems for more than 15 years, and, along with other colleagues, have been interested in understanding how a nation can tally that many votes cast over such a long period. India uses a <a href="https://eci.gov.in/files/file/8756-status-paper-on-evm-edition-3">domestically designed and manufactured electronic voting machine</a> – as many as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/04/13/world/asia/ap-as-india-remote-voting.html">4 million of them</a> at <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2019/04/indian-elections-190410185739389.html">1 million polling places</a>, at least some in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/election-workers-in-india-traveled-300-miles-over-4-days-to-set-up-a-polling-booth--for-one-voter/2019/04/17/44b4eb46-5bb1-11e9-98d4-844088d135f2_story.html">extremely</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/04/23/world/asia/23reuters-india-election-lone-voter.html">remote</a> locations. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=687&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271220/original/file-20190426-194637-a2b27o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=863&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Different areas of India vote on seven different days, over the course of a 39-day election period.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2019_Lok_Sabha_Election_Schedule.svg">Furfur, translated by RaviC/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first version of the Indian electronic voting machine debuted in the <a href="https://eci.gov.in/faqs/evm/general-qa/electronic-voting-machine-r2/">state election in Kerala</a> in 1982. Now they’re used in elections throughout the country, which happen on different days in different areas.</p>
<h2>How does it work?</h2>
<p>When a voter arrives at the polling place, she presents a <a href="https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9367-photo-voter-slips-not-to-be-valid-as-stand-alone-identification-document-for-voting/">photo ID</a> and the poll officer checks that she is on the electoral roll. When it’s her turn to vote, a polling official uses an electronic voting machine’s control unit to unlock its balloting unit, ready to accept her vote.</p>
<p>The balloting unit has a very simple user interface: a series of buttons with candidate names and symbols. To vote, the voter simply presses the button next to the candidate of her choice.</p>
<p>After each button press, a printer <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/what-is-vvpat/articleshow/68683682.cms">prints out the voter’s choice on paper</a> and displays it to the voter for a few seconds, so the person may verify that the vote was recorded correctly. Then the paper is dropped into a locked storage box.</p>
<p><a href="https://eci.gov.in/faqs/evm/general-qa/electronic-voting-machine-r2/">The whole system</a> runs on a battery, so it does not need to be plugged in.</p>
<p>When it’s time for the polling place to close at the end of the voting day, each electronic voting machine device and paper-record storage box is sealed with wax and tape bearing the signatures of representatives of the various candidates in that election, and stored under armed guard.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270504/original/file-20190423-175510-1kusqa0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman tests an electronic voting machine in India in advance of that country’s national elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/India-Elections/dd6866c05c9948b596536dc91d5a99db/4/0">AP Photo/Manish Swarup</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the election period is over and it’s time to tally the votes, the electronic voting machines are brought out, the seals opened and the vote counts for each control unit are read out from its display board. Election workers hand-tally these individual machine totals to obtain the election results for each constituency.</p>
<h2>Security protections – and concerns</h2>
<p>The Indian electronic voting machine primarily runs on specialized hardware and firmware, unlike the voting machines used in the U.S., which are software-intensive. It is intended for the single purpose of voting and specially designed for that, rather than relying on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/aging-voting-machines-threaten-election-integrity-54523">standard operating system like Windows</a>, which needs to be regularly updated to patch detected security vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>Each machine requires only a connection between a balloting unit and a control unit; there are no provisions to connect an electronic voting machine to a computer network, much less the internet – including wirelessly.</p>
<p>This design does offer some protections against possible tampering with how votes are recorded and tallied. The Election Commission of India has repeatedly claimed that the <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/evms-tamper-proof-machines-used-for-local-body-polls-not-our-responsibility-eci/articleshow/58092072.cms">electronic voting machines are tamper-proof</a>. However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866309">a scholarly study has demonstrated</a> there are ways to rig the machines. In particular, the simplicity of the design allows for simple attacks, such as <a href="http://amaldev.blog/hacking-indian-evms/">intercepting and modifying the signal</a> carried over the machine’s cable.</p>
<p>The Election Commission has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-46987319">not made public any independent security evaluations</a>, so it’s unclear exactly what is – or isn’t – possible. Parties that <a href="https://scroll.in/article/832003/the-great-evm-debate-convincing-the-losers-that-they-lost">lose elections</a> often <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/election-integrity/266878">suspect malfeasance</a> and <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/national/national-politics/first-evm-experiment-fiasco-led-to-ban-in-india-728958.html">question the equipment</a>.</p>
<h2>Manufacturing the machines</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://scroll.in/article/834553/hacking-evms-the-ec-has-issued-a-challenge-it-must-first-accept-the-challenge-it-faces">I and others have observed</a>, when the machines are being made, there are a number of opportunities for someone to physically tamper with an electronic voting machine in ways that preelection device testing might not detect. The machines’ software is designed, written and tested at <a href="https://eci.gov.in/files/file/8756-status-paper-on-evm-edition-3/">two electronics companies owned by the government of India</a>: Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited. The chips for the machines are manufactured outside India. In earlier versions of the machine, the chip manufacturer also wrote the machine code into the chip; today the electronics companies do it themselves.</p>
<p>At any time during manufacture, testing and maintenance, it may be possible to <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/interview-with-george-washington-university-professor-poorvi-vora-on-evm-security/article18451662.ece">introduce counterfeit chips</a> or swap out other components that could let hackers alter the results.</p>
<p>The Election Commission of India argues that any manipulation or error would be detected because the electronic voting machine is tested frequently and candidate representatives have opportunities to <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/how-safe-is-an-evm-election-commissions-10-step-process-to-secure-voting-machines/articleshow/58611014.cms">participate in mock elections</a> immediately before a machine is used in a real election. However, it is possible to make changes that will not be detected. Testing can reveal only some problems, and the absence of problems during testing does not mean that problems do not exist.</p>
<h2>Auditing the machines’ results</h2>
<p>There is, however, a mechanism for detecting attacks – that printed-out paper bearing the vote and stored securely with the electronic equipment. A <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/supreme-court-asks-election-commission-to-introduce-paper-trail-in-evms-213615-2013-10-08">2013 Supreme Court directive</a> asked the Election Commission to create that process to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paper-trails-and-random-audits-could-secure-all-elections-dont-save-them-just-for-recounts-in-close-races-94243">protect the integrity of the balloting</a> process. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270524/original/file-20190423-175524-1iowuif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Indian election official displays a sample paper record of an electronic ballot during a demonstration of how the equipment works.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/India-Elections/afda1b6a8547489a946a6d63242a2955/26/0">AP Photo/Manish Swarup</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/supreme-court-election-commission-increase-vvpat-verification-evm-1496819-2019-04-08">In each constituency, five electronic voting machines</a> will have their results audited by comparing a manual count of the printouts with the electronic tallies. (This means about 1% or 2% of each constituency’s machines will be tested.) Opposition parties have asked the Supreme Court to order <a href="https://indianexpress.com/elections/opposition-comes-together-on-vvpat-says-will-go-to-supreme-court-again-5675583/">audits of half of all electronic voting machines</a>, but that may not happen with this year’s election.</p>
<p>While the electronic voting machine system is useful and functional, officials and observers shouldn’t assume there’s no way to tamper with the results. The Election Commission should certainly continue to improve testing and provide public reports of independent testing. However, because no technology can be tamper-proof, each election outcome should be <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.03108">verified by a manual audit</a>, to ensure that the results are correct, whatever they may be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115879/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Poorvi Vora receives funding from the National Science Foundation and has received funding from the Maryland Procurement Office in the past. She is affiliated with Verified Voting and the Election Verification Network. </span></em></p>Explaining the equipment and the process by which hundreds of millions of ballots are collected and counted in India.Poorvi Vora, Professor of Computer Science, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1057642018-11-04T13:54:06Z2018-11-04T13:54:06ZProtecting online elections in Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242972/original/file-20181030-76399-18pq98z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The online voting glitches in Ontario's recent municipal elections show it's time to develop nationwide guidelines and standards for online voting in Canada.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A political scientist and a computer scientist walk into a polling place. </p>
<p>“Online voting is more convenient and accessible for many voters who face additional barriers when casting a ballot. It also increases voter turnout,” says the first. </p>
<p>“Compared to paper, online voting may be less transparent for voters and more risky for cities,” says the second. </p>
<p>Trouble is, they both have a point. And so the debate goes.</p>
<p>But here’s something we can agree on: Ontario municipalities must be able to make their own decisions about alternative voting methods. Why? </p>
<p>Because Ontario’s 444 municipalities are hugely diverse with respect to resources, capacity, demography and geography and they’re more attuned to what might work well for their communities than higher levels of government.</p>
<p>In short: A one-size-fits-all approach won’t work here. </p>
<p>At the same time, <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8610535/br-external/EssexAleksander-e.pdf">online voting is a uniquely difficult cybersecurity challenge</a>. In the 191 municipalities where online voting was available in the recent Ontario elections, voters saw delays of up to 90 minutes in 51 of them <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4583687/ontario-municipal-elections-voting-times-extended/">due to a technical issue in the network infrastructure of one of the top election technology providers</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://toronto.citynews.ca/2018/10/23/technical-problems-force-many-ontario-municipalities-to-extend-voting/">Voting was extended in more than 40 municipalities, with some calling states of emergency.</a></p>
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<p>The glitches have led some to question what kinds of operational and technical guidelines exist to help cities evaluate election technology during procurement and deployment. Many are surprised to discover that Canada has no such guidelines — despite having <a href="http://www.centreforedemocracy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/IVP_Report.pdf">more online voting activity at the local level than any other country in the world</a>. </p>
<p>While the Ontario election should not prompt a call to remove municipal autonomy over elections, an opportunity has presented itself to have a wider discussion about devising a Canadian version of guidelines for online voting implementation.</p>
<h2>Learning from other countries</h2>
<p>So what do election technology standards look like elsewhere in the world? </p>
<p>Many international jurisdictions that use online or other electronic forms of voting have overarching standards or guidelines in place to guide the use of digital voting.</p>
<p>In Europe, for example, the Council of Europe, an international organization with 47 member countries, has had <a href="http://www.centreforedemocracy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/IVP_Report.pdf">voluntary guidelines for the use of electronic voting in place since 2004</a>. They were recently updated in 2017.</p>
<p>In the United States, the Election Assistance Commission has <a href="https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/testing-standards/">standards</a> and <a href="https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-process-s/">certification</a> processes for electronic voting systems.</p>
<p>While some countries have more entrenched systems of online voting and use it for federal elections, they have smaller populations. Estonia, for example, <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/i-voting/">uses online voting for local, national and extra-parliamentary elections</a>, but has a population of 1.3 million, resulting in far fewer online voters than in Ontario, which has a population of 14.9 million and 10.2 million eligible voters.</p>
<p>The fact that municipalities make their own decisions about election technology has resulted in a <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7001134">patchwork of requirements and approaches</a> across the province and country. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243061/original/file-20181030-76405-1h0kdzp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nova Scotia municipalities use online voting for their elections, as do many First Nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rawpixel/Unsplash</span></span>
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<p>Municipalities in Nova Scotia also use online voting for their elections, and <a href="http://www.centreforedemocracy.com/impact-digital-technology-first-nations-participation-governance/">Indigenous communities across the country are increasingly drawing on online voting for their elections and votes</a>. </p>
<p>The diversity at the municipal level is great from a research perspective, as cities and towns serve as the laboratories of electoral modernization in Canada. At the same time, however, differing levels of capacity, resources and technical expertise have meant that some larger cities <a href="https://tvo.org/article/current-affairs/how-e-voting-is-taking-over-ontario-municipal-elections">can conduct additional research and other types of initiatives, such as risk assessments of voting channels and independent security assessments</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the technical knowledge by which one municipality chooses to assess a potential voting vendor — an entity that provides online voting technology — may be different than another.</p>
<h2>A way forward</h2>
<p>So how do we provide municipalities with access to expertise on election operations and technology issues in a cost-effective manner? </p>
<p>As researchers on electoral technology, the approach we believe will be most successful for communities across Canada <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/essex-and-goodman-internet-voting-will-happen-lets-make-sure-the-research-into-how-it-happens-is-sound">is the development of voluntary standards.</a></p>
<p>Together, we are proposing guidelines similar to those found in the U.S. and Europe, but unique to the Canadian context. The guidelines would outline baseline principles for the use of online voting in elections and votes across three respects: Technical, operational and legal.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/electronic-voting-may-be-risky-but-what-about-vote-counting-62171">Electronic voting may be risky, but what about vote counting?</a>
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<p>They would be applicable to all elections and votes in Canada at all levels of government. This resource could be used by municipalities across the country as well as Indigenous communities.</p>
<p>We are working together to compose baseline guidelines for the use of online voting in elections and votes in Canada and we’d ask governments to reach out and join us.</p>
<p>If the Ontario election glitches don’t underscore the pressing need and importance of such a resource, growth in online voting should. Initially used by three per cent of municipalities in 2003, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/reducing-the-cost-of-voting-an-evaluation-of-internet-votings-effect-on-turnout/6FF8DA77C59806F0175656D66DE66907">online voting is now used in 44 per cent of Ontario’s cities and towns</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/242974/original/file-20181030-76413-1ukiih4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Toronto Mayor John Tory celebrates his re-election on Oct. 22, 2018. Toronto is not one of the 191 Ontario municipalities that offer online voting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Frank Gunn</span></span>
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<p>However electoral modernization continues to take shape at the local level in Canada, it’s time to create voluntary, country-wide guidelines to balance the benefits and risks of online voting.</p>
<p>Guidelines will help communities make better-informed procurement and deployment decisions legally, operationally and technically. </p>
<p>They will also help vendors looking to innovate in cybersecurity by creating a marketplace that values it. </p>
<p>Finally, such developments have the potential to enhance public confidence in voting technologies by sending the message that Canada is doing everything it can to be a social and technical leader in the age of digital democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Goodman receives funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Brock University. She is also Director at the Centre for e-Democracy and a Senior Associate at the Innovation Policy Lab in the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleksander Essex receives funding from the National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>Online voting glitches in Ontario’s recent municipal elections show that Canada needs to develop voluntary standards on online voting.Nicole Goodman, Assistant Professor, Brock UniversityAleksander Essex, Assistant professor, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017652018-09-06T10:45:30Z2018-09-06T10:45:30Z4 ways to defend democracy and protect every voter’s ballot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233981/original/file-20180828-86123-bdmwev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4297%2C3047&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">How confident should voters be that their ballots will be counted accurately?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Florida-Primary/0b1cdb68c2b5403fb0b1884673e55b55/12/0">AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As voters prepare to cast their ballots in the November midterm elections, it’s clear that <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611830/hackers-are-out-to-jeopardize-your-vote/">U.S. voting is under electronic attack</a>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">Russian government hackers</a> probed some states’ computer systems in the runup to the 2016 presidential election and are <a href="https://theconversation.com/securing-americas-voting-systems-against-spying-and-meddling-6-essential-reads-99986">likely to do so again</a> – as might <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/technology/facebook-political-influence-midterms.html">hackers from other countries</a> or nongovernmental groups interested in sowing discord in American politics.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are <a href="http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/%7Ejones/voting/">ways to defend elections</a>. Some of them will be new in some places, but these defenses are not particularly difficult nor expensive, especially when judged against the value of public confidence in democracy. I served on the Iowa board that examines voting machines from 1995 to 2004 and on the <a href="https://www.eac.gov/about/technical-guidelines-development-committee/">Technical Guidelines Development Committee</a> of the <a href="https://www.eac.gov/">United States Election Assistance Commission</a> from 2009 to 2012, and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/guardian-of-the-vote/544155/">Barbara Simons</a> and I coauthored the 2012 book “<a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/B/bo13383590.html">Broken Ballots</a>.”</p>
<p>Election officials have an important role to play in protecting election integrity. Citizens, too, need to ensure their local voting processes are safe. There are two parts to any voting system: the computerized systems tracking voters’ registrations and the actual process of voting – from preparing ballots through results tallying and reporting.</p>
<h2>Attacking registrations</h2>
<p>Before the passage of the <a href="http://legislink.org/us/pl-107-252">Help America Vote Act of 2002</a>, voter registration in the U.S. was largely decentralized across 5,000 local jurisdictions, mostly county election offices. HAVA changed that, requiring states to have centralized online voter registration databases accessible to all election officials.</p>
<p>In 2016, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-12-russian-intelligence-officers-hacking-offenses-related-2016-election">Russian government agents</a> allegedly tried to access <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/23/what-we-know-about-the-21-states-targeted-by-russian-hackers/">voter registration systems in 21 states</a>. Illinois officials have <a href="http://www.govtech.com/security/Hacked-Voter-Records-in-Illinois-Soar-to-Half-a-Million.html">identified their state</a> as the only one whose databases were, in fact, breached – with <a href="http://www.govtech.com/security/Hacked-Voter-Records-in-Illinois-Soar-to-Half-a-Million.html">information on 500,000 voters</a> viewed and potentially copied by the hackers. </p>
<p>It’s not clear that any information was corrupted, changed or deleted. But that would certainly be one way to interfere with an election: either changing voters’ addresses to assign them to other precincts or simply deleting people’s registrations.</p>
<p>Another way this information could be misused would be to fraudulently request absentee ballots for real voters. Something like that happened on May 29, 2013, when Juan Pablo Baggini, an overzealous campaign worker in Miami, <a href="https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/After-Raid-at-Home-of-Campaign-Worker-Mayoral-Candidate-Francis-Suarez-Says-No-Election-Laws-Were-Violated-211516981.html">used his computer to file online absentee ballot requests</a> on behalf of 20 local voters. He apparently thought he had their permission, but <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1952450.html">county officials noticed the large number of requests</a> coming from the same computer in a short period of time. Baggini and another campaign worker were <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1954359.html">charged with misdemeanors and sentenced to probation</a>.</p>
<p>A more sophisticated attack could use voters’ registration information to select targets based on how likely they are to vote a particular way and use common hacking tools to file electronic absentee ballot requests for them – appearing to come from a variety of computers over the course of several weeks. On Election Day, when those voters went to the polls, they’d be told they already had an absentee ballot and would be prevented from voting normally.</p>
<h2>Two defenses for voter registration</h2>
<p>There are two important defenses against these and other types of attacks on voter registration systems: provisional ballots and same-day registration.</p>
<p>When there are questions about whether a voter is entitled to vote at a particular polling place, federal law requires the person be issued a <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx">provisional ballot</a>. The rules vary by state, and some places require provisional voters to bring proof of identity to the county election office before their ballots will be counted – which many voters may not have time to do. But the goal is that no voter should be turned away from the polls without at least a chance their vote will count. If questions arise about the validity of the registration database, provisional ballots offer a way to ensure every voter’s intent is recorded for counting when things get sorted out.</p>
<p>Same-day voter registration offers an even stronger defense. <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx">Fifteen states</a> allow people to register to vote right at the polling place and then cast a normal ballot. <a href="http://www.pewtrusts.org/%7E/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2009/uwisconsin1pdf.pdf">Research on same-day registration</a> has focused on turnout, but it also allows recovery from an attack on voter registration records.</p>
<p>Both approaches do require extra paperwork. If large numbers of voters are affected, that could cause long lines at polling places, which <a href="https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/02/24/waiting-in-line-to-vote-white-paper-stewart-ansolabehere/">disenfranchise voters who cannot afford to wait</a>. And like provisional voting, same-day registration may have more stringent identification requirements than for people whose voter registrations are already on the books. Some voters may have to go home to get additional documents and hope to make it back before the polls close.</p>
<p>Further, long lines, frustrated voters and frazzled election workers can create the appearance of chaos – which can play into the narratives of those who want to discredit the system even when things are actually working reasonably well.</p>
<h2>Paper ballots are vital</h2>
<p>Election integrity experts agree that <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/defcon-election-threat-funding/">voting machines can be hacked</a>, even if the devices themselves are <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/14/first_virus_elk_cloner_creator_interviewed/">not connected</a> <a href="https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/">to the internet</a>. </p>
<p>Voting machine manufacturers say their <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tensions-flare-as-hackers-root-out-flaws-in-voting-machines-1534078801">devices have top-notch protections</a>, but the only truly safe assumption is that they have not yet found additional vulnerabilities. Properly defending voting integrity requires assuming a worst-case scenario, in which every computer involved – at election offices, vote-tallying software developers and machine makers – has been compromised.</p>
<p>The first line of defense is that in most of the U.S., <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/">people vote on paper</a>. Hackers can’t alter a hand-marked paper ballot – though they could <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144">change how a computerized vote scanner counts</a> it, or what <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/an-11-year-old-changed-election-results-on-a-replica-florida-state-website-in-under-10-minutes">preliminary results are reported on official websites</a>. In the event of a controversy, paper ballots can be recounted, by hand if needed. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/ft_16-11-07_votingtechnology/"><img width="640" height="600" src="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png" class="attachment-large size-large" alt="" srcset="http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology.png 640w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-300x281.png 300w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-200x188.png 200w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-260x244.png 260w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-432x405.png 432w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-50x47.png 50w, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/11/07164119/FT_16.11.07_votingTechnology-160x150.png 160w" sizes="(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px"></a></p>
<h2>Conduct post-election audits</h2>
<p>Without paper ballots, there is not a way to be completely sure voting system software hasn’t been hacked. With them, though, the process is clear.</p>
<p>In a growing number of states, paper ballots are subject to routine statistical audits. In California, post-election audits have been required <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/AUDIT%20PILOT%20FINAL%20REPORT%20TO%20EAC%20FINAL.pdf">since 1965</a>. Iowa allows <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/50.50.pdf">election officials who suspect irregularities</a> to initiate recounts even if the result appears decisive and no candidate asks for one; these are called <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/recounts.pdf">administrative recounts</a>. </p>
<p>Based on that experience, some election officials have told me that they suspect the current generation of scanners may be misinterpreting 1 vote in 100. That might seem like a small problem, but it’s really way too much opportunity for error. Voting simulations show that changing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1022594.1022621">just one vote per voting machine</a> across the United States could be enough to allow an attacker to determine which party controls Congress.</p>
<p>Recounts are expensive and time-consuming, though, and can create illusions of disarray and chaos that reduce public confidence in the election’s outcome. A better method is called a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2012.56">risk-limiting audit</a>. It’s a straightforward method of determining how many ballots should be randomly selected for auditing, based on the size of the election, the margin of the initial result and – crucially – the statistical confidence the public wants in the final outcome. There are even <a href="https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/%7Estark/Vote/auditTools.htm">free online tools</a> available to make the calculations needed.</p>
<p>Preliminary experiences with risk-limiting audits are <a href="https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/AUDIT%20PILOT%20FINAL%20REPORT%20TO%20EAC%20FINAL.pdf">quite promising</a>, but they could be made even more attractive by <a href="https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/calandrino/calandrino_html/">small changes to ballot-sheet scanners</a>. The main problem is that the method is based in math and statistics, which many people don’t understand or trust. However, I believe relying on verifiable principles that any person could learn is far better than believing the assurances of companies that make voting equipment and software, or <a href="https://triblive.com/news/allegheny/11013043-74/machines-election-county">election officials who don’t understand</a> how <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/40448876/how-hackers-are-teaching-election-officials-to-protect-their-voting-machines-learned-from-hackers-to-improve-security-for-future-elections">their machines</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html">actually work</a>. </p>
<p>Elections must be as transparent and simple as possible. To paraphrase Dan Wallach at Rice University, <a href="https://www.cs.rice.edu/%7Edwallach/pub/texas-senate-state-affairs-15oct08.pdf">the job of an election is to convince the losers that they lost fair and square</a>. The declared winners will not ask questions and may seek to obstruct those who do ask. The losers will ask the hard questions, and election systems must be transparent enough that the partisan supporters of the losers can be convinced that they indeed lost. This sets a high standard, but it is a standard that every democracy must strive to meet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas W. Jones was a co-principal investigator in the National Science Foundation funded ACCURATE (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections) project. He was a co-founder of the Open Voting Consortium, but is not currently affiliated with that group, and he is a registered Democrat.</span></em></p>Ensuring the integrity of democratic elections from hackers and electronic tampering, and boosting public confidence in democracy, isn’t very difficult, nor expensive.Douglas W. Jones, Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/824142017-11-14T02:43:48Z2017-11-14T02:43:48ZDesigning better ballots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194412/original/file-20171113-27573-1az46ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should the future of voting look more like the past?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Alex Brandon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election Day 2017 seems to have gone smoothly. </p>
<p>There were few contests of major consequence and turnout was low – with Virginia the most notable exception. Election integrity – the extent to which the outcome of the election matches the will of the voters – was not an issue in the news.</p>
<p>Things could, however, be different in 2018. Concern over election integrity could become amplified if turnout is high and margins close. Given the stakes in the 2018 midterms – now less than a year away – and other concerns such as widespread reports about Russian hacking, now is the time when election officials must begin the critical work of ensuring the integrity of the vote.</p>
<p>When most people think about threats to election integrity, security and fraud are the primary concerns. For example, were the ballots or the election totals hacked? Were ballot boxes stuffed? Were there ballots cast by people who were not eligible to vote?</p>
<p>However, there is another threat to election integrity that has received increasing attention from election officials and researchers <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DalLJdYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">like me</a> over the past dozen or so years: voting system usability. That is, does what actually gets recorded on to the ballots accurately reflect the will of the voters? </p>
<p>All the security in the world means little if ballots are inaccurate. </p>
<p>But how could what’s on the ballots themselves be wrong? </p>
<h2>Good design is critical</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=747&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=747&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=747&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=938&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=938&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194011/original/file-20171109-13303-13h0533.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=938&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Florida election official examines a ‘butterfly ballot’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Incorrect ballots happen when the ballot itself is badly designed and that poor design leads voters to make errors. </p>
<p>While concerns about voter fraud are mostly unfounded, major elections – including one U.S. presidential election – have almost certainly been decided by poor ballot design. In 2000, Palm Beach County, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117714">Florida deployed a now-infamous “butterfly ballot”</a> with a two-column design that caused thousands of likely Al Gore voters to either cast a vote for Pat Buchanan or cast an invalid ballot.</p>
<p>In that same election, Duval County, Florida saw over <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Better%20Ballots.pdf">20,000 votes in a highly Democratic county thrown out</a> because the presidential race was split across the front and back of the ballot, and voters voted on both sides. </p>
<p>Either one of these poorly designed ballots alone would have tipped the state of Florida, and thus the presidency, as <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Better%20Ballots.pdf">Gore lost Florida by fewer than 400 votes</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, a combination of poor screen layout and an unsophisticated computer touchscreen interface likely turned the outcome of a U.S. congressional race in <a href="http://chil.rice.edu/research/pdf/Greene_10.pdf">Sarasota, Florida in 2006</a>.</p>
<p>Even apparently well-designed paper ballots are not immune to problems. <a href="http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/round1/index.shtml">Thousands of ballots were contested</a> in the 2008 Minnesota Senate race, many of them thrown out because voters attempted to correct mistakes on their ballots rather than making the effort to get a new one. Whether these errors determined the result is unclear, but the state and the candidates spent substantial time and money sorting out the outcome.</p>
<p>The point is that even well-designed paper ballots can produce error rates of about <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7e10/3c4fa4be567215b18ed8c3bbf82b6be7fd4f.pdf">1 to 2 percent</a>, which is larger than the margin of victory in many elections. It is highly unlikely that deliberate bad design is what occurred in any of these historic cases. Bad design usually results from a lack of understanding of good design, not ill intent. For example, in Palm Beach County in 2000, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117714">the poor ballot was actually designed by a Democrat</a>, certainly not someone trying to defeat Gore. </p>
<p>Rather, the problem is that good design is difficult and requires deep understanding of how people interact with technology. There are academic disciplines devoted to studying how to make things usable, as well as active research in many corporate and government labs. Historically, little of this work has centered on voting, but the 2000 presidential election served as a catalyst for change on many fronts.</p>
<h2>Spending too fast?</h2>
<p>Wanting to avoid a repeat of the problems in the 2000 presidential election, Congress in 2002 passed the <a href="https://www.eac.gov/about/help-america-vote-act/">Help America Vote Act</a>, which not only created the federal Election Assistance Commission to set standards, but allocated billions of dollars for local jurisdictions to purchase new voting equipment. Unfortunately, these purchases preceded the relevant science.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that systems like punch cards, lever voting machines and paper ballots had been in use for decades, there had been almost zero research on how usable these systems were prior to 2005. Computer voting systems purchased with Help America Vote Act money were deployed in the early 2000s with no idea whether they were better or worse than the technologies they replaced. We have since learned that paper ballots were the best legacy technology, as <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7e10/3c4fa4be567215b18ed8c3bbf82b6be7fd4f.pdf">paper ballots are generally superior to lever machines and punch cards</a>. Unfortunately, most <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/voting-technology/">computer voting systems are also worse than paper in terms of error rate</a>.</p>
<p>Many jurisdictions that switched from paper to computers likely made things worse for the voters. Most commercial computer voting systems also suffer from many <a href="http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/oversight/top-bottom-review/">well-documented security flaws</a>, which are compounded in many cases by lack of a paper record. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, even paper is not an ideal technology. Paper ballots are a poor choice for accessibility. They are particularly challenging for voters with visual and motor impairments. Paper ballots are also logistically difficult for election administrators, especially in large jurisdictions that have to deal with many ballot styles and multiple languages.</p>
<p>The good news is that it is possible to design computer interfaces that are superior to paper. This requires careful design by usability experts and a commitment to multiple cycles of usability testing during the design process. While the systems that were available for election officials to purchase in the early 2000s did not meet this standard, careful design and usability testing of voting systems is now starting to happen. In fact, it is local election officials who are leading the way.</p>
<p>In Los Angeles County – the most populous county in the U.S. – the county clerk came to the conclusion that none of the commercially available systems met the needs of his voters and the county embarked on <a href="http://vsap.lavote.net">an ambitious multi-year design process</a>. </p>
<p>Information used in the design of LA County’s voting system was gathered from many stakeholders. A professional design firm was contracted, with oversight from a technical group made up of experts from many relevant disciplines, including usability, security, election administration and technology policy. While this system is computer-based, the computer produces a paper record that voters can verify before casting their vote.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/evtwote13/jets-0101-bell.pdf">The county clerk in Travis County, Texas</a> – with input from usability experts – is also leading an effort to design a voting system with even more sophisticated security mechanisms.</p>
<p>While these efforts are an important start, differences in local election laws, customs and budgets means that it is unlikely that a “one size fits all” system will be developed that would be effective everywhere. Voting is much more complicated than it appears on the surface. There are over 3,000 counties in the U.S., and each one is unique. What is critical is that each jurisdiction treat usability as an essential concern and seek out expertise to protect election integrity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82414/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Byrne receives funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>Have you ever struggled to understand exactly what to do inside a voting booth?Michael Byrne, Professor of Psychology and of Computer Science, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/849252017-10-03T11:40:16Z2017-10-03T11:40:16ZAfrica leads the way in election technology, but there’s a long way to go<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-fresh-election-ruling-just-another-instalment-in-a-highly-contested-process-83524">recently annulled elections</a> will soon be re-run, but the long-term questions they raised about election management are still unanswered. The spotlight is on the work of international observer teams, but there are also much wider questions of electoral capacity – problems that extend to the top of the African Union, and thence across the whole continent.</p>
<p>African democracies are in the process of co-ordinating a generation jump in applied technology. So far, they have actually done a remarkable job by global standards. After all, something like electronic voting is still not used in the UK, where people in raincoats wait patiently while someone with a pencil draws a line through their name on a paper spreadsheet. The rain-sodden voter drips into the polling booth and makes a choice, casts their vote with a pencil on a sheet of paper, and shuffles outside again while putting up an ineffectual umbrella. Nothing has changed for 100 years. </p>
<p>It’s Africa that has led the way – and the West isn’t the place to look for immediate answers for all the problems of running a 21st-century election. One such problem is the use of multiple forms of electronic voting. Voter identification by electronic means is given priority in Nigeria, but even there, it’s not implemented consistently: there are different systems provided by different companies, all submitting tenders on a competitive basis. </p>
<p>The African Union needs to devise a standard set of requirements and attributes for electronic voting across the continent. It’s no longer enough to have a protocol that says paper votes have to be placed into clear plastic ballot boxes. But the African Union has fallen behind. Its previous head, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was hardly technologically minded; in fact, her successor has apparently stressed the commission urgently needs an email system fit for purpose. </p>
<p>Dlamini-Zuma has now returned to <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/30/dlamini-zuma-reveals-priorities-for-sa-presidential-bid">line up for the presidency</a> of her home country, South Africa, whose cabinet is renowned for its technological illiteracy. There are very few images of its current president, Jacob Zuma, working on a laptop or PC, and possibly none of him actually pressing the keys. (His next door neighbour, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, has seemingly never been pictured with a laptop at all.)</p>
<p>But if the presidents might have trouble sending simple emails, the thousands of local observers at each election will need special training of the sort never attempted before. They need to know not just how the system works, but how it can be made not to work – or at least, to work in ways that do not reflect the electorate’s will. Only after that does the question of international observer capacity come into play. </p>
<h2>Mastering the system</h2>
<p>It’s fair to say that although EU observers to Kenya were deployed far in advance of the election and had good geographical coverage, the team was not replete with electronic expertise. And it’s not as if there was no advance knowledge that this would be an electronic election. </p>
<p>Well before the elections began and before the EU observer team was deployed, senior members of both the EU team and the Kenyan opposition were given access to a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/election-monitoring-neither-free-nor-fair/">detailed paper</a> I prepared on the problems of electronic observation. And there was ample evidence from the 2015 Nigerian elections that these things could be <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/nigeria-in-need-of-electronic-voting-system/">bumpy rides</a>. To be fair, electoral commissions need to upgrade their capacities as well; whatever happened in Kenya, whether wicked or incompetent, it was clear electoral officials were not on top of their game, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, who managed to resolve their problems in the end.</p>
<p>Electoral commissions need to open up all stages of the electronic process to knowledgeable observers, and especially the verification stage. This is where subtle algorithmic adjustments can be inserted to preserve close parity between voting patterns on the ground and “verified” results that “just” deliver very narrow victories to a ruling party.</p>
<p>At least electronic cheating can only really work persuasively in close elections. The days of 90% victories are almost (if not quite) over, but they will be followed a rash of elections “won” by about 2%. Margins of about 4%, as in the Kenyan elections, will have to be open to expert interrogation. As it turned out, Kenya’s elections were annulled on grounds of non-electronic irregularities, but neither the opposition nor the electoral commission seemed able to make sustained cases for or against electronic abuse. </p>
<p>Still, it is Africa that has come almost of age in electronic and digital voting. The West’s elections look like Sony Walkmans in the age of the smartphone. Even that comparison might be a bit flattering: in the UK, going to vote is like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxHVvkUw7Ro">cranking up an LP on a turntable to 78rpm</a>. Let’s hope Africa’s new leaders and technocrats will make the generational jump more smoothly in the future, and keep showing the creaky old West the way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African democracies are embracing electronic voting far more confidently than the West.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/749062017-04-05T09:45:08Z2017-04-05T09:45:08ZWhat a ballot-rigging conspiracy theory says about India’s toxic political climate<p>The headline story from India’s recent provincial elections was the staggering victory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the state of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/bjp-uttar-pradesh-win-turning-point-modi-170312142735789.html">Uttar Pradesh</a>. But a range of politicians and observers, however, have claimed it wasn’t Modi’s charisma that won it for the BJP, but <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/evm-tampering-allegations-kejriwal-says-bjp-s-up-win-questionable-asks-ec-to-release-machines-for-probe/story-AOVDqJ181zPWWTXXREmXcO.html">rigged voting machines</a>. </p>
<p>Normally, such claims – currently unproven – would be laughed off as nothing but sour grapes. But in this case, the conspiracy theory appears to have taken root. And that it has done so illuminates some deeper concerns with the state of Indian democracy. </p>
<p>In Uttar Pradesh, the BJP annihilated all political opposition including the Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP), led by the Dalit icon <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cracks-show-up-in-mayawatis-bsp-only-19-seats-why-no-action-4597027/">Mayawati</a>. Another surprise came in the state of Punjab, with a surprisingly poor performance by the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), led by the current chief minister of Delhi, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6cf59c42-d059-11e3-8b90-00144feabdc0">Arvind Kejriwal</a>. It was widely expected to do better, having dramatically halted Modi’s momentum in the <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/delhi-news/delhi-election-result-sirf-aap-delhi-picks-arvind-kejriwal-again-738364">Delhi elections of February 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Both Mayawati and Kejriwal, supported by various other voices, have since been arguing that the <a href="http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/evm.aspx">Electronic Voting Machines</a> (EVMs) now used in all Indian elections were tampered with. Each candidate cites different “evidence” for their claims. <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/assembly-elections/bsp-to-launch-agitation-over-evm-tampering-warns-mayawati-after-up-poll-loss/story-eD9ja3xsmq4TCwG6zRrPJM.html">Mayawati</a> explained that the large crowds at her election rallies surely must have translated into more votes than she officially received; <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/elections/punjab-2017/kejriwal-alleges-major-evm-tampering-in-punjab/article17465937.ece">Kejriwal</a>, meanwhile, claims that in one particular area, five of his party volunteers swear they voted for his AAP, but the registered votes show that just one did. </p>
<p>Both candidates are adamant that votes given to them were transferred to the BJP via voting machines, with Kejriwal claiming that as many as 20-25% of his party’s votes were stolen.</p>
<h2>Trust eroded</h2>
<p>The Indian state is not known for its prowess at <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9781107106970">delivering welfare services</a>, or even efficient everyday governance, but its election commission is generally credited with the ability to hold “free and fair” elections. With the exception of several dubious elections in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2223364.stm">Kashmir</a>, as well as stray incidents of <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/ec-identifies-62-critical-polling-booths-in-mumbai/">intimidation</a> at polling booths, the country’s democratic processes generally command widespread trust. The EVM conspiracy theory is a sign that that trust is now much shakier than it was.</p>
<p>To preserve its positive reputation, the election commission <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/election-commission-should-dispel-doubts-on-evm-tampering/article17465899.ece">plans</a> to “proactively and aggressively” prove the machines’ utter infallibility. But try as it might to pacify the complainants, this conspiracy theory is not going away any time soon.</p>
<p>In fact, it was given a new lease of life in early April when a machine being tested in the state of Madhya Pradesh appeared to be dispelling <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/ec-seeks-report-on-alleged-evm-malfunction-in-bhind/article17756485.ece">only BJP votes</a> whichever button was pressed. After this public fiasco, <a href="https://thewire.in/120637/evm-tampering-row-erupts-votes-go-bjp-demo-mp/">other parties</a> – notably the Congress – have joined the expanding chorus of EVM sceptics. </p>
<p>Worries that voting machines can be tampered with are far from unique to India. Indeed, several countries around the world have <a href="https://scroll.in/article/831908/evms-cant-be-rigged-election-commission-should-reiterate-this-vociferously-ex-poll-chief-quraishi">abandoned electronic voting</a> altogether because of these concerns. These international examples are being repeatedly discussed as further evidence of the dubiety of EVMs.</p>
<p>But in a sense, whether or not the machines were rigged in the BJP’s favour isn’t the point. Conspiracy theories flourish where people feel besieged; they offer a way to make sense of the world, and can be read as critiques of the operations of power. This particularly conspiracy theory is less an uproar about rigged machines than an expression of fear at the ascendance of a dangerous Hindu majoritarianism. </p>
<p>The anxiety that it reflects is not with the tool – a mere machine – but with democracy itself. </p>
<h2>Hostile majoritarianism</h2>
<p>These latest provincial elections made it clear that the BJP is now the dominant national party of India. The future belongs to Modi and his increasingly strident Hindu nationalism, with little if any space for Muslims and other minorities. Across India, the BJP’s triumphalism has created a palpable sense of disenfranchisement among minorities and those opposed to the vision of a Hindu nation, or <a href="http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/aakarvani/the-ideal-hindu-rashtra-will-be-no-different-from-this-demo-version/">rashtra</a>. </p>
<p>The institutionalisation of Islamophobia is already evident even at the highest levels in Uttar Pradesh, where the self-styled holy man <a href="https://scroll.in/article/833510/through-yogi-adityanaths-rise-democracy-has-held-up-a-mirror-to-us-now-its-our-turn-to-reflect">Adityanath</a> – notorious for his <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/uttar-pradesh-yogi-adityanath-had-opposed-women-quota-defied-bjp-line-in-parliament/articleshow/57722872.cms">misogyny</a>, rabble-rousing and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/19/the-guardian-view-on-a-key-poll-victory-for-anti-muslim-bigotry?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Facebook">Islamophobia</a> – has been appointed chief minister. His counterpart in the neighbouring Himalayan state of Uttarakhand, <a href="https://scroll.in/latest/832026/uttarakhand-former-rss-activist-trivendra-singh-rawat-bjps-reported-choice-for-chief-minister">Trivendra Singh Rawat</a>, is a longtime member of the BJP’s militant grassroots wing, the RSS. </p>
<p>The first-past-the-post system might be acceptable in less authoritarian and more secular times, but now it’s enabling a belligerent and nationalistic religious majority to rule India. Mayawati won 20% of the Uttar Pradesh vote share, but it translated into a mere handful of seats, while the BJP won 40% of the vote share and 75% of the seats. It is quite possible that the BJP swept Uttar Pradesh <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/03/14/there-is-no-evidence-that-a-single-muslim-voted-for-the-bjp-in-u/">without a single Muslim vote</a>, even though Muslims make up almost 20% of the state’s population. </p>
<p>Democracy, especially in a country with India’s incredible diversity, derives credibility from its claim to speak for the people. India’s atmosphere of hostile Hindu majoritarianism is making a mockery of any such claim to representativeness. </p>
<p>So it’s not surprising that suspicion and alarm at the state of contemporary Indian democracy are manifesting themselves in the EVM conspiracy theory. And whatever the truth, the concerns driving the speculation demand attention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nayanika Mathur receives funding from The British Academy. In the past she has received funding from the Leverhulme Trust for a project on 'Conspiracy and Democracy' at Cambridge's Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH). </span></em></p>Election results almost always come with conspiracy theories attached, but India’s latest round of recriminations goes deeper than usual.Nayanika Mathur, Lecturer and British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in Social Anthropology, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644182016-09-02T02:12:44Z2016-09-02T02:12:44ZElection legitimacy at risk, even without a November cyberattack<p>We’ve heard a lot in recent weeks about the potential for Russian meddling in the presidential election. A lot of circumstantial evidence – and the fact that Russia has the means, motive and opportunity to conduct these attacks – suggests an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/after-dnc-leaks-obama-hints-at-possible-motive-for-russia-to-help-trump/2016/07/26/cfd33692-538a-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html">important Russian role</a> in the leaks of confidential emails from the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/world/europe/russia-dnc-putin-strategy.html">Democratic National Committee</a>, the release of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html">opposition research on Donald Trump</a> compiled by the DNC and <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hackers-claim-released-house-democrats-personal-information/story?id=41355544">personal contact details</a> of many prominent Democrats. And just this week, news broke that the FBI has found <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/fbi-says-foreign-hackers-penetrated-000000175.html">evidence of foreign penetrations of voter registration databases in Arizona and Illinois</a> and warned officials in every state to improve the cybersecurity of election-related systems.</p>
<p>We also know that most citizens will cast their ballots on <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Voting_equipment_by_state">electronic voting machines</a>; in <a href="https://theconversation.com/aging-voting-machines-threaten-election-integrity-54523">43 states</a> those machines are more than a decade old. These are the computers that were introduced immediately after the Bush-Gore election in 2000, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/politics/16-years-after-bush-v-gore-still-wrestling-with-ballot-box-rules.html">to correct the problems with balloting</a> that had cast doubt on the actual choices of many Florida voters. Over the last decade or so, it has been conclusively demonstrated that at least some models of electronic voting machines are <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144">vulnerable to hacking by people with the skills of graduate students</a> in computer science. No one knows how secure the other machines are, because many vendors have <a href="https://www.ndi.org/files/2267_elections_manuals_monitoringtech-ch4.pdf">asserted their intellectual property rights</a> to prevent the security of their machines from being examined by independent parties.</p>
<p>If hacked, an electronic voting machine cannot be trusted to count votes accurately. In an election conducted with paper ballots, the ballots themselves can be recounted. But with many electronic voting machines, there is no record of the votes cast, other than the digital information contained in the machine itself. The idea of recounting electronically cast votes is, therefore, meaningless.</p>
<p>These separate concerns – that machines can be hacked to alter voting records, leaving no way to verify or recount and that Russia has the motive, means and opportunity to meddle in the November election – combine to raise a warning that <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/08/officials-blame-sophisticated-russian-hackers-for-voter-system-attacks/">Russian hackers</a> might be able to tilt the election to a candidate who would act favorably toward Russian interests. I myself have <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/russia-probably-meddling-us-election-no-surprise-486054">suggested this possibility</a>. But the much more likely threat to democracy is sore losers who cast doubt on the integrity of the voting process.</p>
<h2>Peaceful transition of power</h2>
<p>The political stability of the United States over the past 240 years is due in large part to the <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F0CE5DC1030EF3ABC4852DFB767838B679EDE&legacy=true">willingness of election losers to concede victory</a> to election winners. To be sure, close elections, like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-2000">Bush-Gore in 2000</a>, have resulted in disputes about who actually won. But in the end, courts and legislators have found ways to <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/future/landmark_bush.html">declare victors</a> – and the losers have <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/al-gore-concedes-presidential-election">accepted those declarations</a> even if they have disagreed with them. The same cannot be said of elections held in many other nations, which have seen election losers call for revolutions in the streets and violent force to challenge <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/in-thailand-mass-protests-against-democracy/">unfavorable election outcomes</a>.</p>
<p>In the U.S., when voting results are very close – whether for president, state senator or town councilor – the apparent loser often has the <a href="http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/Contested%20Elections%20&%20Recounts%202.pdf">legal right to demand a recount</a> of the ballots cast. That is a recognition of the very real possibility that the vote-counting process may have been accidentally or deliberately flawed in a way that affected the overall outcome.</p>
<p>Generally, there is no such right when the margins of victory are large: The reason is that large-scale vote fraud or miscounts are assumed to be much less likely than their small-scale counterparts. But when computers are involved in vote counting, much of the public – especially those supporting the losing candidate – may not be willing to make that assumption.</p>
<h2>The day after</h2>
<p>Imagine that on November 9, the day after Election Day, the early presidential election returns show that Donald Trump has lost. Even now, <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-is-making-more-states-competitive-red-states/">polls</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/get-better-election-predictions-by-combining-diverse-forecasts-64103">other prediction systems</a> and even <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/insiders-to-trump-drop-out-226689">Republican Party insiders</a> suggest that is the most likely outcome. It takes many days for election results to be officially certified. During that time Trump would have an opportunity to claim – loudly, and with a great deal of media attention – “We were robbed by a rigged election system!” He has already repeatedly claimed he is up against just such a “<a href="http://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/trumps-rigged-claim/">rigged</a>” system.</p>
<p>Trump could call the electronically tallied vote counts obviously fraudulent. Even without pointing to any internal campaign polling suggesting he would win, he could highlight the indisputable fact that no one knows what is going on inside the voting machines. Many past reports have <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vulnerable-to-hacking-is-the-us-election-cyber-infrastructure-63241">extensively documented</a> how <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-to-hack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144">easy it is to hack</a> them.</p>
<p>Knowing no recount was even possible, Trump could remind his supporters of his campaign trail complaints about court decisions that make it <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/20/politics/donald-trump-african-american-voters-virginia-voting-rights/">easier for minorities to vote</a>, and his warnings about <a href="http://articles.philly.com/2016-08-20/news/75073164_1_voter-fraud-donald-trump-voter-impersonation">large-scale voter fraud</a>. He could also point to some <a href="http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/08/some-swing-states-decline-dhs-voting-security-offer/131037/">states’ lack of concern</a> about election cybersecurity as an opportunity for wrongdoers to have tampered with the results.</p>
<h2>The threat posed by sore losers</h2>
<p>How could anyone respond to the objections of Trump and his supporters? It is well-known that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/election-day-impersonation-an-impetus-for-voter-id-laws-a-rarity-data-show/2012/08/11/7002911e-df20-11e1-a19c-fcfa365396c8_print.html">voter fraud</a> – votes being cast by people ineligible to vote – is quite rare. Hacking electronic voting machines on a scale large enough to tilt the election nationally would be enormously complicated: It would require coordinated targeting of thousands of different machines, running different software and handling different localized ballots, in government offices across the nation.</p>
<p>This would be essentially impossible for any attacker other than a large, sophisticated nation-state. The only evidence we have today suggests that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html">Russia would intervene in favor of Donald Trump</a> rather than against him. A Trump loss would be unlikely to be the result of a Russian cyberattack.</p>
<p>In today’s political climate, such facts may not matter. State and local election officials can and should provide for paper backup of voting this (and every) November. But in the end, debunking claims of election rigging, electronically or otherwise, amounts to trying to prove something didn’t happen – it can’t be done. </p>
<p>So here is where what we learned in kindergarten becomes really important. If Trump supporters are unable to remember the lessons we were all taught about not being sore losers, American democracy itself is at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author's election-related work for the National Academies in the 2000s was paid for in part by funding from the National Science Foundation and the Election Assistance Commission. He is also a registered Republican, but embarrassed by that fact.</span></em></p>It’s true that sophisticated hackers may be able to tilt the presidential election. But the more likely threat to democracy comes from sore losers who sow doubt about voting integrity.Herbert Lin, Senior Research Scholar for Cyber Policy and Security, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632412016-07-29T16:58:37Z2016-07-29T16:58:37ZHow vulnerable to hacking is the US election cyber infrastructure?<p>Following the hack of Democratic National Committee emails and reports of a new <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/3102024/security/fbi-probing-possible-hack-of-another-democratic-party-organization.html">cyberattack against the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee</a>, worries abound that foreign nations may be clandestinely involved in the 2016 American presidential campaign. <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/clues-dnc-hacking-point-russia-trump-claims-40965742">Allegations swirl that Russia</a>, under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, is secretly working to undermine the U.S. Democratic Party. The apparent logic is that a Donald Trump presidency would result in more pro-Russian policies. At the moment, the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-07-25/fbi-investigating-dnc-cyber-hack-some-democrats-blame-on-russia">FBI is investigating</a>, but no U.S. government agency has yet made a formal accusation.</p>
<p>The Republican nominee added unprecedented fuel to the fire by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clinton-emails.html">encouraging Russia to “find”</a> and release Hillary Clinton’s missing emails from her time as secretary of state. Trump’s comments drew sharp rebuke from the media and politicians on all sides. Some suggested that by soliciting a foreign power to intervene in domestic politics, his musings bordered on criminality or treason. Trump backtracked, saying his <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/28/politics/donald-trump-russia-hacking-sarcastic/">comments were “sarcastic,”</a> implying they’re not to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>Of course, the desire to interfere with another country’s internal political processes is nothing new. Global powers routinely monitor their adversaries and, when deemed necessary, will try to clandestinely undermine or influence foreign domestic politics to their own benefit. For example, the Soviet Union’s foreign intelligence service engaged in so-called “<a href="http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/kgb/su0523.htm">active measures</a>” designed to influence Western opinion. Among other efforts, it spread conspiracy theories about government officials and fabricated documents intended to exploit the social tensions of the 1960s. Similarly, U.S. intelligence services have conducted their own secret activities against foreign political systems – perhaps most notably its repeated attempts to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/11/the-history-of-absurd-american-plots-in-cuba/">help overthrow</a> pro-communist Fidel Castro in Cuba.</p>
<p>Although the Cold War is over, intelligence services around the world continue to monitor other countries’ domestic political situations. Today’s “<a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG654.pdf">influence operations</a>” are generally subtle and strategic. Intelligence services clandestinely try to sway the “hearts and minds” of the target country’s population toward a certain political outcome.</p>
<p>What has changed, however, is the ability of individuals, governments, militaries and criminal or terrorist organizations to use internet-based tools – commonly called <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-is-dropping-cyberbombs-but-how-do-they-work-58476">cyberweapons</a> – not only to gather information but also to generate influence within a target group.</p>
<p>So what are some of the technical vulnerabilities faced by nations during political elections, and what’s really at stake when foreign powers meddle in domestic political processes? </p>
<h2>Vulnerabilities at the electronic ballot box</h2>
<p>The process of democratic voting requires a strong sense of trust – in the equipment, the process and the people involved.</p>
<p>One of the most obvious, direct ways to affect a country’s election is to interfere with the way citizens actually cast votes. As the United States (<a href="https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/electronic-voting-and-counting-around-the-world">and other nations</a>) embrace electronic voting, it must take steps to ensure the security – and more importantly, the trustworthiness – of the systems. Not doing so can endanger a nation’s domestic democratic will and create general political discord – a situation that can be exploited by an adversary for its own purposes.</p>
<p>As early as 1975, the U.S. government <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/sourcefiles/saltman1975.pdf">examined the idea of computerized voting</a>, but electronic voting systems were not used <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.source.php?sourceID=001042">until Georgia’s 2002 state elections</a>. Other states have adopted the technology since then, although given ongoing fiscal constraints, those with aging or problematic electronic voting machines are <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470-states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines">returning to more traditional</a> (and cheaper) paper-based ones.</p>
<p>New technology always comes with some glitches – even when it’s not being attacked. For example, during the 2004 general election, North Carolina’s Unilect e-voting machines <a href="http://www.the-dispatch.com/news/20050730/lawmakers-shouldnt-experiment-with-ballots---remember-carteret-county">“lost” 4,438 votes</a> due to a system error.</p>
<p>But cybersecurity researchers focus on the kinds of problems that could be intentionally caused by bad actors. In 2006, Princeton computer science professor <a href="https://www.cs.princeton.edu/%7Efelten/">Ed Felten</a> demonstrated how to install a self-propagating piece of vote-changing malware <a href="http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/pub/ts06full.pdf">on Diebold e-voting systems</a> in less than a minute. In 2011, technicians at the Argonne National Laboratory showed <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/article/2511508/security0/argonne-researchers--hack--diebold-e-voting-system.html">how to hack e-voting machines remotely</a> and change voting data. </p>
<p>Voting officials recognize that these technologies are vulnerable. Following a 2007 study of her state’s electronic voting systems, Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer L. Brunner <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=4008511">announced that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>the computer-based voting systems in use in Ohio do not meet computer industry security standards and are susceptible to breaches of security that may jeopardize the integrity of the voting process.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the first generation of voting machines ages, even maintenance and updating become an issue. A 2015 report found that electronic voting machines in 43 of 50 U.S. states <a href="http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Americas_Voting_Machines_At_Risk.pdf">are at least 10 years old</a> – and that state election officials are unsure where the funding will come from to replace them. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/80kUed21j9s?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A rigged (and murderous) voting machine on ‘The Simpsons’ satirized the issue in 2008.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Securing the machines and their data</h2>
<p>In many cases, electronic voting depends on a distributed network, just like the electrical grid or municipal water system. Its spread-out nature means there are many points of potential vulnerability.</p>
<p>First, to be secure, the hardware “internals” of each voting machine must be made tamper-proof at the point of manufacture. Each individual machine’s software must remain tamper-proof and accountable, as must the vote data stored on it. (Some machines provide voters with a paper receipt of their votes, too.) When problems are discovered, the machines must be removed from service and fixed. Virginia did just this in 2015 once numerous glaring <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/virginia-hacking-voting-machines-security">security vulnerabilities were discovered</a> in its system. </p>
<p>Once votes are collected from individual machines, the compiled results must be transmitted from polling places to higher election offices for official consolidation, tabulation and final statewide reporting. So the network connections between locations must be tamper-proof and prevent interception or modification of the in-transit tallies. Likewise, state-level vote-tabulating systems must have trustworthy software that is both accountable and resistant to unauthorized data modification. Corrupting the integrity of data anywhere during this process, either intentionally or accidentally, can lead to botched election results.</p>
<p>However, technical vulnerabilities with the electoral process extend far beyond the voting machines at the “edge of the network.” Voter registration and administration systems operated by state and national governments are at risk too. Hacks here could affect voter rosters and citizen databases. Failing to secure these systems and records could result in fraudulent information in the voter database that may lead to improper (or illegal) voter registrations and potentially the casting of fraudulent votes.</p>
<p>And of course, underlying all this is human vulnerability: Anyone involved with e-voting technologies or procedures is susceptible to coercion or human error.</p>
<h2>How can we guard the systems?</h2>
<p>The first line of defense in protecting electronic voting technologies and information is common sense. Applying the <a href="http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf">best practices</a> of cybersecurity, data protection, information access and other objectively developed, responsibly implemented procedures makes it more difficult for adversaries to conduct cyber mischief. These are essential and must be practiced regularly.</p>
<p>Sure, it’s unlikely a single voting machine in a specific precinct in a specific polling place would be targeted by an overseas or criminal entity. But the security of each electronic voting machine is essential to ensuring not only free and fair elections but fostering citizen trust in such technologies and processes – think of the chaos around the infamous <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/the-legacy-of-hanging-chads">hanging chads</a> during the contested 2000 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_v._Gore">Florida recount</a>. Along these lines, in 2004, Nevada was the first state to mandate e-voting machines <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115/ns/politics-voting_problems/t/paper-trail-voting-system-used-nevada/">include a voter-verified paper trail</a> to ensure public accountability for each vote cast. </p>
<p>Proactive examination and analysis of electronic voting machines and voter information systems are essential to ensuring free and fair elections and facilitating citizen trust in e-voting. Unfortunately, some <a href="https://www.eff.org/cases/online-policy-group-v-diebold">voting machine manufacturers have invoked</a> the controversial <a href="http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf">Digital Millennium Copyright Act</a> to prohibit external researchers from assessing the security and trustworthiness of their systems.</p>
<p>However, a 2015 <a href="https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2015/10/28/new-dmca-exemption-is-a-positive-step-for-security-researchers">exception to the act</a> authorizes security research into technologies otherwise protected by copyright laws. This means the security community can legally research, test, reverse-engineer and analyze such systems. Even more importantly, researchers now have the freedom to publish their findings without fear of being sued for copyright infringement. Their work is vital to identifying security vulnerabilities before they can be exploited in real-world elections.</p>
<p>Because of its benefits and conveniences, electronic voting may become the preferred mode for local and national elections. If so, officials must secure these systems and ensure they can provide trustworthy elections that support the democratic process. State-level election agencies must be given the financial resources to invest in up-to-date e-voting systems. They also must guarantee sufficient, proactive, ongoing and effective protections are in place to reduce the threat of not only operational glitches but intentional cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Democracies endure based not on the whims of a single ruler but the shared electoral responsibility of informed citizens who trust their government and its systems. That trust must not be broken by complacency, lack of resources or the intentional actions of a foreign power. As famed investor <a href="http://business.time.com/2010/03/01/warren-buffetts-boring-brilliant-wisdom/">Warren Buffett once noted</a>, “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.” </p>
<p>In cyberspace, five minutes is an eternity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Forno has received research funding related to cybersecurity from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the State of Maryland during his academic career.</span></em></p>With the DNC email leak and Trump calling on Russia to hack Clinton’s emails, concern about foreign meddling in the 2016 presidential election process is rising. Is e-voting the next cyber battleground?Richard Forno, Senior Lecturer, Cybersecurity & Internet Researcher, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/624362016-07-19T03:00:03Z2016-07-19T03:00:03ZIs the new Senate vote capture system as risky as electronic voting?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130815/original/image-20160718-2138-czdp3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The new vote capture system is a consequence of the recent Senate voting rule changes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Richard Wainwright</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article was co-authored by Ian Brightwell, former director of IT at the New South Wales Electoral Commission.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>A computerised system is being used for the first time in the 2016 election count for all Senate ballot papers to capture voters’ preferences.</p>
<p>On the surface, this process, conducted out of the public gaze, may not seem to have significant risk compared to <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-why-cant-australians-vote-online-57738">electronic voting and electronic counting</a>. However, it has similar risks to full-scale electronic voting.</p>
<p>Electronic election systems can fail catastrophically (wrong person elected), irreversibly (hold the election again?) and invisibly (could I notice if my vote was counted incorrectly?). This is significantly different from commercial systems such as electronic banking.</p>
<p>Accordingly, electronic election systems need to be engineered extremely carefully to control the risk and rate of flaws and bugs, and be developed and operated openly with scrutiny so that bugs, errors and vulnerabilities, which will inevitably be present, can be detected before they have a difficult-to-reverse impact.</p>
<p>However, the new Senate vote capture system had to be built rapidly, with little time for design or testing, and is being operated in a way that allows only part of the process to be scrutinised.</p>
<p>There are risks that time pressures over the next few weeks may encourage shortcuts to be taken that would further reduce the level of scrutiny, and also reduce the integrity of the vote capture process. This new system may well prove to be the weakest link in the election process.</p>
<h2>How does it work?</h2>
<p>The new vote capture system is a consequence of the Senate voting rule changes <a href="https://theconversation.com/senate-voting-changes-pass-so-how-do-we-elect-the-upper-house-now-55641">made in March</a> – voters are allowed to mark multiple preferences for both above-the-line and below-the-line voting. As a result, the vote preferences in all Senate ballots must be captured for electronic counting.</p>
<p>Previously, multiple preferences were allowed only for below-the-line voting, which occurred in <a href="http://results.aec.gov.au/17496/Website/SenateUseOfGvtByState-17496.htm">just 3% of Senate ballots</a>. With the new voting rules nearly 100% of ballots have multiple preferences.</p>
<p>To handle the substantial increase in data entry volume, a more efficient vote capture system needed to be rapidly developed.</p>
<p>The new system scans each Senate ballot and determines the preferences using optical character recognition (OCR) software. A human operator may check and correct these preferences as needed. Separately, another human operator views the scanned image and manually enters the preferences. </p>
<p>The computer’s preferences and the manually entered preferences are compared. If they don’t match, the preferences are corrected by a different operator.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131011/original/image-20160719-13837-1anzwi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Senate vote capture process (recommended additional steps shown with dashes).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Scrutineers can observe this process as it is happening and intervene if they notice anything being entered incorrectly.</p>
<p>This process has commendable features. The dual checking of preference marking is important: OCR software has notorious difficulties correctly interpreting the highly variable handwriting of millions of voters.</p>
<h2>What are the risks?</h2>
<p>With all automated election systems (voting, capturing, counting) the key danger to be controlled is of the votes eventually counted not being the same as those cast by the voters.</p>
<p>The impact of even infrequent errors is amplified in the current Senate vote capture system because all votes are potentially affected, rather than the smaller proportion of votes processed in previous elections.</p>
<p>Suppose an optimistic capture accuracy of 99.9%. In New South Wales, which has 4.6 million Senate ballot papers, there would be about 4,600 incorrect votes. This could easily change Senate outcomes.</p>
<p>In reality, the capture accuracy could be reduced by a number of critical weak points in the system:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>operators making corrections could introduce deliberate or unintentional errors: vote tampering by officials has been reported in the past;</p></li>
<li><p>all scrutiny and checking is against a displayed image of a ballot, not the physical ballot itself. Vote changes due to accidental or malicious bugs in the image scanning or display software will be entirely invisible to operators and scrutineers;</p></li>
<li><p>operators and scrutineers working long shifts will make mistakes and overlook errors. This is exacerbated by fast processing of ballot papers as part of the system’s design, and by potential shortages of scrutineers; and</p></li>
<li><p>mounting time pressure over the coming weeks could lead to manual checks and scrutiny being reduced or dropped to speed up the process.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Another critical vulnerability is that votes could be altered by tampering or error after capture but before being transferred to the counting system. The current process doesn’t provide a way for the Australian Electoral Commission or scrutineers to check that the system preserves vote integrity.</p>
<p>This is an underlying problem with election technology: scrutiny requires highly specialised skills to check what is electronic, invisible and cryptic. And candidates with concerns over undetected technological bugs and failures currently have no recourse aside from <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cea1918233/s278.html">general provisions for recounts</a>.</p>
<h2>Mitigating the risks</h2>
<p>It is essential that a random sample of the paper Senate ballots be checked against the final published electronic votes used for counting. This will help assure the integrity of the entire vote capture process.</p>
<p>To mitigate the emerging risks of election technology a new approach to scrutiny and transparency is necessary.</p>
<p>A good first step, already adopted overseas (<a href="http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/carter-center-norway-2013-study-mission-report2.pdf">such as in Norway</a>), would be to establish an independent electronic election board to provide oversight and scrutiny of election technology. This board would consist of experts from a range of fields, including election management, failure-critical engineering, security, risk, audit and statistics.</p>
<p>With technology increasingly pervading elections, immediate steps towards effective, meaningful scrutiny of election technology is the only way to maintain trust in Australia’s traditionally high-quality electoral process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new Senate vote capture system had to be built rapidly, with little time for design or testing, and is being operated in a way that allows only part of the process to be scrutinised.Roland Wen, Visiting Fellow, UNSW SydneyRichard Buckland, Associate Professor in Computer Security, Cybercrime, and Cyberterror, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/621712016-07-07T07:14:10Z2016-07-07T07:14:10ZElectronic voting may be risky, but what about vote counting?<p>Several advantages of online voting were identified in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-experts-fears-australia-should-be-moving-to-electronic-online-voting-61832">recent post</a> by Conversation columnist and software researcher David Glance who backed the introduction of such a scheme in Australia.</p>
<p>He is correct that an online voting system would be faster, more convenient and have fewer accidental informal votes. It would also reduce the donkey vote problem (though the “donkey vote” bias can also be dealt with by the use of <a href="http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/backg/HAElections.htm">Robson rotation</a> on printed ballots).</p>
<p>But in my view he dismisses the very real risks not only of actual election tampering, but something equally important – the confidence that Australian elections aren’t being tampered with.</p>
<p>A vote-counting system not only needs to be secure against threats to its integrity, it needs to be seen to be secure against such threats. </p>
<p>The right technologies, deployed in the right way, can assist with speeding up vote counts without putting the integrity of our voting system at risk. The place for that technology is not as a replacement for the paper ballot.</p>
<h2>Voting is not like paying your bills</h2>
<p>Most Australians conduct many financial transactions online, such as paying bills or online banking, with a reasonable degree of confidence.</p>
<p>But while these systems do work acceptably well most of the time, there is a steady stream of fraud committed against them. Some estimates put the cost of cybercrime in Australia at <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/Cybercrime/Documents/national-plan-to-combat-cybercrime.pdf">around A$2 billion annually</a>.</p>
<p>Furthermore, there are some key differences between voting and financial transactions which will make electronic voting harder to secure.</p>
<p>For example, financial transactions are private, but not anonymous, and they are conducted on a continuous basis, not once every three years or so.</p>
<p>The two parties to a financial transaction can see how the transaction is interpreted by the financial institution involved, and can report any problems.</p>
<p>Any fraudulent financial transactions can often be reversed or compensated for on an individual basis. If an online election is found to be unsound, the only remedy may be to rerun the election.</p>
<p>Further concerns over online voting have been raised <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-why-cant-australians-vote-online-57738">elsewhere on The Conversation</a>.</p>
<h2>Confidence in elections is social, not just technical</h2>
<p>If we propose to radically change Australia’s vote-counting system, we should at least do so only after fully considering the nature of the existing system.</p>
<p>It’s pretty widely acknowledged that Australia’s vote counting system is <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-robust-voting-system-deserves-praise-not-criticism-18320">generally accurate</a> and not subject to widespread tampering. So let’s ask the question: why do we have confidence in Australian elections?</p>
<p>Partly, it’s by direct observation as voters: as we vote, we also observe the process. We see the ballots, we see them being placed in the ballot box. But it’s also through our network of relationships. </p>
<p>Many Australians would probably know one of the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-02/election-2016-3m-queenslanders-to-vote-and-gobble-down-snags/7562296">75,000 temporary poll workers</a>. Those more interested in politics are likely to know a scrutineer, a representative of a party on the ballot who directly observes the vote counting.</p>
<p>Confidence in Australian elections is therefore the result of the observations of a large fraction of the Australian population. The confidence that a conspiracy to rig a vote involving many ordinary Australians is beyond the realms of plausibility. </p>
<p>While all manner of other conspiracy theories circulate on social media, election-rigging conspiracy theories are almost unknown in Australia.</p>
<p>An online, or even an electronic voting system in polling booths, would shift the responsibility for electoral integrity to a tiny technical elite with the time and skills to audit the voting technology used.</p>
<p>We are supposed to trust both their personal incorruptibility, and their competence. Serious security flaws are often missed by such professionals until they have been systematically exploited by criminals.</p>
<h2>Automate the count, not the recording</h2>
<p>People with disabilities have been among the strongest advocates for electronically aided voting, for good reason. But that does not mean that paper ballots should be discarded to this end.</p>
<p>With the right technology, instructions expressed by voice commands, a touchscreen, or whatever interface the voter can use unaided can do the job of marking their ballots. That way voters with disabilities will be able to vote with the same level of privacy and autonomy that others take for granted.</p>
<p>Regardless of how they are marked, paper ballots do not necessarily need to be counted by hand. Senate ballot papers are <a href="http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/candidates/files/counting/css-faqs.pdf">currently being counted</a> with the assistance of handwriting recognition systems similar to the ones used to read postcodes on hand-addressed envelopes.</p>
<p>The present system is only semi-automated, in that every ballot scan is then checked by a human operator.</p>
<p>In the future, it is likely that the system can be refined so as not to require every vote to be human-verified. For instance, using two or more independently implemented automated counting systems, combined with randomised spot checking by AEC staff and scrutineers, may be sufficient to ensure an accurate count. </p>
<p>This would allow much faster initial Senate counts but, if there is any doubt, a hand recount is always possible.</p>
<p>In the United States, which uses a wide variety of vote-counting technologies, the one most favoured by academic experts is <a href="http://www.eac.gov/eac_certifies_third_optical-scan_voting_system/">optical scanning ballots</a>. Many people would have come across these in multiple-choice tests such as driving tests: you fill in the box corresponding to your choice. </p>
<p>These work very well in the American context. They are fast, accurate and can be hand-counted in case of a technical problem or dispute. But American elections do not use the preferential voting system. </p>
<p>Designing a system and educating Australians to use this kind of ballot for preferential votes would present a significant challenge and would probably result in a high informal vote.</p>
<p>In any case, expert opinion is clear – no voting system that relies on electronics to record votes, including systems that produce some kind of human-readable audit trail, has any substantial advantages over paper and pencil (or, perhaps indelible pen).</p>
<p>Even the inventor of the “voter-verified paper audit trail”, Dr Rebecca Mercuri, has <a href="http://www.notablesoftware.com/RMstatement.html">concluded</a> that such systems are inferior to paper ballots marked by the voter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Merkel has donated to and volunteered for the Australian Greens.</span></em></p>There’s something about seeing the ballot process take place – the vote, the count – that inspires confidence. That wouldn’t be the same with any electronic voting system.Robert Merkel, Lecturer in Software Engineering, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/396892015-04-08T20:06:40Z2015-04-08T20:06:40ZEarly voting hits new highs in NSW and Australia, but is it a good idea?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77287/original/image-20150408-26515-ujbvqs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">About one in four Australians are skipping the polling day queues and voting early.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sunanda Creagh</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ultimate result of the New South Wales election is still waiting on the resolution of the upper house where <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/nsw-election-2015/results/lc/">counting continues</a>. A <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/mike-baird-better-off-sacrificing-seat-than-face-re-run/story-e6frg6n6-1227294795925">possible court challenge</a> could lead to a fresh upper house poll being called. That leaves the re-elected Baird government’s plans hanging in the balance.</p>
<p>Unlike the narrow Labor wins at the recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-01/queensland-election-2015-kap-ready-to-cut-deal-with-labor/6060296">Queensland</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/bushtelegraph/vic-election/5931224">Victorian</a> elections, which caught many pollsters off-guard, the comfortable NSW Liberal National victory on <a href="https://theconversation.com/nsw-voters-set-to-back-baird-but-upper-house-is-too-close-to-call-38034">March 28</a> was widely predicted. </p>
<p>But the elections did all have one thing in common: they showed that the old notion of “polling day” is increasingly outdated. Early voting is rising rapidly across Australia, including in the latest NSW election.</p>
<p>In 1995, only <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/about_elections/electoral_statistics">4% of NSW electors</a> voted early. By the 2011 election, it was <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/about_elections/electoral_statistics">15%</a>. The early figures indicate that could climb to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-state-election-2015/prepoll-results-for-nsw-election-2015-electoral-commission-says-increasing-numbers-voting-before-election-day-20150331-1mb8ii.html">about 25%</a> in 2015. (That includes about 640,000 prepoll votes and 284,000 online votes via the iVote system, while the final number of postal votes is still to be confirmed.)</p>
<p>According to the company operating iVote at this election, <a href="http://www.scytl.com/en/">Scytl</a>, NSW <a href="http://www.scytl.com/en/news/new-south-wales-leads-the-way-in-internet-voting-and-edemocracy-innovation/">set a record</a> for the most online votes in any government election worldwide, beating the previous record of more than 240,000 online votes set by <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/documents/speaker/digital-democracy/FR_Successcase.pdf">France</a>, as well as recent online votes in <a href="https://theconversation.com/thousands-of-nsw-election-online-votes-open-to-tampering-39164">Estonia and Norway</a>. It also represented a sixfold increase from the <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/96297/SGE_2010-2011_Amended.pdf">46,864 iVotes</a> at the 2011 NSW election. That’s entirely in line with Australians being early adopters of technology, such as <a href="http://landing.deloitte.com.au/rs/deloitteaus/images/Deloitte_Mobile_Consumer_Survey_2014.pdf">smartphones</a>.</p>
<p>Overall, the high early vote in NSW mirrors a trend seen <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-more-and-more-australians-are-voting-before-election-day-37159">in other state</a> and federal elections. For instance, at the 2013 federal election, more than 26% of voters voted early. That was more than double the rate of a decade earlier.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76850/original/image-20150402-31287-1ko0v8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Early voting in Australian federal elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440075">Australian Electoral Commission, 2014</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=70&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=70&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=70&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=89&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=89&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/76849/original/image-20150402-31312-ae42vl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=89&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian Electoral Commission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440075">Early Voting in Australian Federal Elections: Causes and Consequences, 2014</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But is it good for democracy to have so many people voting before polling day? And how are Australia’s political parties likely to change their campaign strategies to woo early voters?</p>
<h2>Electoral commissions offering more options</h2>
<p>Australian election commissions like to be thought of as custodians of their electoral system and tend to see themselves as the most <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/%7E/%7E/link.aspx?_id=AE1A1EC4416D423A94F9BFAB52215FD2&_z=z">independent parts of the public service</a>. With a limited role in policing candidates’ political behaviour (with the exception of South Australia, where the commission <a href="http://www.eca.gov.au/systems/australia/by_area/sa.htm">regulates truth in political advertising</a>), their focus is on protecting the integrity of the electoral administrative process and expanding participation.</p>
<p>While the former is most visible in the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/wa-senate-2014/">breach rather than the observance</a>, the latter is seen in voter awareness campaigns, personalised reminder services, electoral reminder mail, easier voter enrolment (such as <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/enrol_to_vote/smartroll">automatic enrolment in NSW</a>) and an increased range of options for early voting.</p>
<p>In NSW, those options include pre-poll voting at physical voting locations, postal ballots and the predominantly online <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/voting/ivote">iVote</a> electronic voting system.</p>
<p>iVote is not without its <a href="https://theconversation.com/nsws-online-gamble-why-internet-and-phone-voting-is-too-risky-37465">critics</a> – and in this election a <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-state-election-2015/nsw-election-2015-19000-electronic-votes-considered-valid-despite-error-on-ballot-paper-20150318-1m21pi.html">human error</a> meant 19,000 votes were cast online while two minor parties (the Outdoor Recreation Party and the Animal Justice Party) were not listed above the line on the upper house ballot paper. The Animal Justice Party is still in the race against the Coalition for the final upper house seat. If it narrowly misses out, there is a strong chance of a <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/mike-baird-better-off-sacrificing-seat-than-face-re-run/story-e6frg6n6-1227294795925">legal challenge</a>.</p>
<p>But even amid widespread media coverage of that error and other <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4202723.htm">potential security concerns</a>, the popularity of online voting in this election beat even the state electoral commission’s <a href="http://www.cio.com.au/article/545546/nsw_electoral_commission_cio_says_ivote_system_will_ensure_counting_accuracy/">forecasts</a> of 200,000 to 250,000 iVotes.</p>
<h2>Convenience vs cohesion: the pros and cons of early voting</h2>
<p>It is generally agreed why electors vote early: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440075">convenience</a>. Rather than lining up on a Saturday, what many people see as a chore can now be completed at leisure. </p>
<p>Swinburne’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-more-and-more-australians-are-voting-before-election-day-37159">Nathan Reader</a> has previously pointed out that that this matches a changing tempo of life: more Australians work on weekends, are busier than ever before and are less tolerant of what they perceive as inflexible compliance with government.</p>
<p>So the real question is whether the early voting trend in Australia is significant, or just another part of the larger change that has come with the rise of the convenience economy.</p>
<p>The most prevalent argument against early voting is that it undermines the “function” of elections: that in a representative democracy, citizens who are largely absent from the day-to-day governmental process should stop once every few years and have a good, hard think before voting.</p>
<p>This is a “republican” (as in Rome) model of citizenship that places emphasis on the individuals adherence to the civic duties to be <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/early-voting-the-case-against-102748.html#.VSHPZOThlC0">engaged, informed and participative</a>. In this context, then, elections should be “focusing events” filled with information-rich political discourse: from candidates to electors in the form of policy ideas; from electors to candidates in the form of questions; and between electors, debating the key issues. </p>
<p>This allows citizens to make informed decisions they can feel committed to. It also gives governments legitimacy for their programs and allows political elites to accurately gauge popular opinion.</p>
<p>The idea is that the contest of ideas runs right runs up to polling day. And the electronic media blackout just before the poll gives us all time to retire to our homes unmolested to reflect, weigh up what policies matter most to us and consider all the pros and cons, opportunity costs, risks and trade-offs.</p>
<p>There is another argument against early voting: that it undermines an important <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/dft/publications/electoral-simultaneity-expressing-equal-respect">social cohesion process</a>, emphasising collectivity and equality, which is the point of having elections in the first place. Some people feel that by removing the “gathering together” aspect of elections, pre-poll, postal and online voting also undermine a key civil ritual.</p>
<p>These perspectives do have merit, but they overstate the significance of elections. Indeed, these views make elections synonymous with democracy itself: a formalistic view of a complex concept. Elections can be important civic rituals, but they can also be ritualistic. Elections are often not competitive, but simply serve to re-endorse an existing government. </p>
<h2>The battle for swinging voters</h2>
<p>Concerns that early voting will significantly change exactly “when” people make a vote decision also appears unfounded. As the figure below shows – drawing from <a href="http://aes.anu.edu.au/">Australian Electoral Study</a> data – the majority of Australian voters have already made a decision on how to vote before a federal election is called.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77079/original/image-20150406-26481-7irnu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Drawn using data from the 2013 Australian Electoral Study.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://aes.anu.edu.au">aes.anu.edu.au</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Swinging voters who decide how to vote late in the campaign are often disparaged as uninformed, “soft” and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-11/throsby-swinging-voters/4950200">under-engaged</a>. </p>
<p>Whether that is true or not, our political parties have tended to respond as if it is. Electoral messages are simplistic and put on high rotation, following a model of audiences that assumes low levels of attention, interest, recall and cognitive processing. The rise of early voting in Australia does not appear to have significantly changed this jaundiced view of the public.</p>
<p>However, one way that increased early voting is changing elections campaigns is that parties know that electors may “defect” from the campaign and vote early. </p>
<p>Traditional election campaigns have four distinct time periods: frame (the campaign); defame (the opponent); explain (the policy); and acclaim (move to a positive commitment decision close to polling day).</p>
<p>The increased availability of early voting options will mean there is a stronger incentive for parties to “win” the political communication game in each day of the campaign.</p>
<p>Early voting options also means that campaign communications will try to be more persuasive: don’t just vote for me, but vote for me <em>right now</em>. Opposition parties will need to have higher visibility between elections, so will need to campaign rather than attempt small-target strategies. Governments, as always, will need to perform because elections are theirs to lose, not to win.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John Chen is a bad republican citizen and has voted early.</span></em></p>More than 280,000 votes were cast online at the NSW election, which has been claimed as a new world record. The state’s early vote also looks set to hit a new high, mirroring a trend across Australia.Peter John Chen, Senior Lecturer, Department of Government and International Relations, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/391642015-03-22T19:17:35Z2015-03-22T19:17:35ZThousands of NSW election online votes open to tampering<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/76115/original/image-20150326-8716-1igpufe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Security experts discovered that the iVote practice server was vulnerable to tampering; after checking that the same weakness affected the real voting server, they alerted the authorities.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Teague and Alex Halderman</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>UPDATED 3:20PM AEDT: The NSW Electoral Commission has now <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-23/ivote-security-hack-allowed-change-of-vote-security-expert-says/6340168">publicly commented</a> on the security flaw uncovered by Dr Vanessa Teague and J. Professor Alex Halderman. But as the authors explain below, “we are concerned that the NSW Electoral Commission does not seem to understand the serious implications of this attack”. Read the rest of their response at the end of this article.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>If you’re one of the 66,000 people from New South Wales who voted in the state election using iVote between Monday March 16 and midday on Saturday March 21, your vote could have been exposed or changed without you knowing. </p>
<p>How do we know that? Because we uncovered a security flaw in the popular <a href="http://www.ivote.nsw.gov.au/">iVote</a> system that would have let us do exactly that, if we’d chosen to. That’s despite <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-04/computer-voting-may-feature-in-march-nsw-election/6068290">repeated assurances</a> from the New South Wales Electoral Commission that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People’s vote is completely secret. It’s fully encrypted and safeguarded, it can’t be tampered with</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As we’ve been able to show, that’s not true. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75571/original/image-20150322-14627-1p3f6v4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screenshot demonstrating how a security flaw could have allowed two online security experts to intercept and change votes using the NSW iVote system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Teague and Alex Halderman</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We should stress that rather than do anything illegal or disrupt the <a href="http://www.votensw.info/">March 28 state election</a> result, we tested this security weakness only on our own practice vote at the iVote practice server. After checking that the same weakness affected the real voting server, we alerted the authorities late last week. We also waited until we could see the problem had been fixed before talking publicly about it.</p>
<h2>Less than a week to expose iVote’s vulnerability</h2>
<p>The problem we found was that the voting server had loaded some code from a third-party site vulnerable to the FREAK attack, a major security flaw that left Apple and Google devices vulnerable to hacking (you can read a recent Washington Post article <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/03/03/freak-flaw-undermines-security-for-apple-and-google-users-researchers-discover/">explaining the FREAK flaw</a>).</p>
<p>How did that global security problem affect iVote? For a longer, more technical explanation of what we did and found, <a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/teaguehalderman/ivote-vulnerability/">read more here</a>.</p>
<p>The shorter version is that with less than a week of concerted effort, the two of us discovered that the FREAK flaw allowed us – or potentially anyone with the right technical knowledge – to intercept a NSW voter’s internet traffic, and insert different code into vulnerable web browsers. Many, but not all, browsers have been appropriately patched over the last week – <a href="https://freakattack.com/">this site</a> lets you check whether yours is still vulnerable.</p>
<p>We demonstrated that we could make the voter’s web browser display what the voter wanted, but secretly send a different vote to the iVote voting server.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/75572/original/image-20150322-14639-1es63fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Real hackers rarely leave such obvious clues – but online security experts testing the NSW iVote system used this Ned Kelly symbol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Teague and Alex Halderman</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The iVote system does include a <a href="http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/voting/ivote/overview">vote verification process</a> for people who choose to vote online or by phone, where they can subsequently call an automated interactive phone line to double-check what vote the system holds for them. </p>
<p>However, that verification system could have errors or security vulnerabilities; we can’t tell you with any certainty either way, since there’s no publicly-available source code or system details. </p>
<p>Given the supposedly “fully encrypted and safeguarded” iVote system proved so vulnerable to attack, we certainly would not recommend people take any chances by voting online in the NSW election.</p>
<h2>The NSW online vote is globally significant</h2>
<p>The 2015 NSW election is Australia’s biggest-ever test of electronic voting, which has largely been limited to small trials in the past. The official predictions have been that <a href="http://www.governmentnews.com.au/2015/03/nsw-elections-ivote-set-for-six-fold-jump/">200,000</a> to <a href="http://www.cio.com.au/article/545546/nsw_electoral_commission_cio_says_ivote_system_will_ensure_counting_accuracy/">250,000</a> people would vote using iVote in this election.</p>
<p>And this NSW election already ranks as one of the world’s biggest online votes to date, on track to exceed the <a href="https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kmd/komm/rapporter/isf_internettvalg.pdf">70,090 Norwegians who voted electronically in 2013</a>, and perhaps even beat the <a href="http://news.err.ee/v/elections/953ac902-eb86-411a-92ce-ea2960c8c6d1">176,491 people who voted online in the 2015 Estonian election</a>. </p>
<p>In just its first week, even apart from our discovery things haven’t run smoothly. </p>
<p>Early voting using iVote opened at 8am on Monday March 16, and it will close at 6pm on election night, Saturday March 28.</p>
<p>On Tuesday March 17, the NSW Electoral Commission <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/nsw-election-online-voting-suspended-due-to-ballot-paper-error/6326106">suspended voting for six hours</a> after it turned out that two minor parties had been left off the “above the line” section of the NSW upper house online ballot paper. That problem, blamed on human error, was fixed – but not before <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-state-election-2015/nsw-election-2015-19000-electronic-votes-considered-valid-despite-error-on-ballot-paper-20150318-1m21pi.html">19,000 votes</a> had already been cast.</p>
<p>Serious human errors do sometimes happen in elections, and they can affect <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/probe-launched-into-lost-wa-senate-ballot-papers/story-fn59niix-1226750519018">paper ballots</a> too. </p>
<p>Our concern about online voting – and specifically about the NSW iVote system – is that security flaws like the one we found last week are still too <a href="http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/25066/estonia-online-voting-system-not-secure">prevalent</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/nsws-online-gamble-why-internet-and-phone-voting-is-too-risky-37465">predictable</a>. </p>
<h2>NSW vs Washington DC’s approach</h2>
<p>Less than a fortnight ago, one of us (Dr Teague) wrote in The Conversation about the potential <a href="https://theconversation.com/nsws-online-gamble-why-internet-and-phone-voting-is-too-risky-37465">privacy and vote tampering</a> problems with iVote. That article reflected concerns expressed in a letter to the NSW Electoral Commission in 2013. Yet the commission has never responded meaningfully to those concerns, and also chose not to <a href="http://iview.abc.net.au/programs/abc-news-nsw/NC1501H069S00#playing">publicly comment</a> on the FREAK security flaw that we exposed. </p>
<p>However, that’s not the approach taken by electoral authorities elsewhere wanting to deliver trustworthy election results.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/rise-of-e-voting-is-inevitable-as-is-risk-of-hacking/article21311244/">in 2010</a>, the Washington D.C.
Board of Elections and Ethics invited a <a href="https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/dcvoting-fc12.pdf">team of experts</a> from University of Michigan (led by Professor Halderman) to try to hack the district’s new online voting system. </p>
<p><a href="https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/dcvoting-fc12.pdf">Within 48 hours</a>, the University of Michigan team had broken in, taken over the election server, added fictional movie and TV characters as candidates (including for mayor and the member of congress), changed every vote, and revealed almost every secret ballot. </p>
<p>The election officials didn’t realise their system had been hacked for nearly two business days. When they did, it was only because the hacking team left behind a musical “calling card”, changing the Thank You page that appeared at the end of the voting process so that it played the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EF--ldYIBnM">University of Michigan fight song</a>.</p>
<h2>A note for NSW voters</h2>
<p>We hope there are no more exploitable security problems in iVote and that the rest of the NSW election runs more smoothly. </p>
<p>But since we’ve had no opportunity to inspect the server side code or systems, there’s no way to be sure. When you’re working on the internet, new vulnerabilities emerge all the time.</p>
<p>That’s why, if you want to be sure your vote counts in the NSW election, we recommend you stick with an old-fashioned paper ballot.</p>
<h2>An update from the authors</h2>
<p><em>3:20PM UPDATE:</em> Since publishing this article, this issue has been widely covered in by other news outlets, including on <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4202723.htm">ABC radio</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-23/ivote-security-hack-allowed-change-of-vote-security-expert-says/6340168">online</a>.</p>
<p>The NSW Electoral Commission’s chief information officer Ian Brightwell <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-23/ivote-security-hack-allowed-change-of-vote-security-expert-says/6340168">told the ABC</a> that there was a problem, but it had been fixed and the system was safe.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are confident however that the system is yielding the outcome that we actually initially set out to yield, and that is that the verification process is not telling us any faults are in the system.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While we are pleased that the NSW Electoral Commission rapidly made changes to iVote in response to our findings, we are concerned that it does not seem to understand the serious implications of this attack.</p>
<p>Before the commission patched the system, the problem could be exploited under realistic and widespread conditions, and the iVote system cannot prove that this did not occur.</p>
<p>The problem was a direct consequence of faulty design in the iVote system, particularly the decision to include code from an external source. Its effect was to allow an attacker to modify votes, which shows the NSW Electoral Commission’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-04/computer-voting-may-feature-in-march-nsw-election/6068290">past claim</a> that the vote was “fully encrypted and safeguarded [and] can’t be tampered with” to be false.</p>
<p>We had to demonstrate a breach with the practice system because breaching the actual iVote process carries a penalty of three years in gaol, according to the electoral commission’s website. Since the real system uses identical code, the real system would have been susceptible to the same attack.</p>
<p>The integrity of this NSW election now relies on iVote’s verification and auditing processes – but these provide only limited defence, at best. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s security testing failed to expose the vulnerability we found, and may have also missed flaws in the server software, verification protocol, and auditing process. The commission has so far declined to make these critical components available for public scrutiny.</p>
<p><em>* You can listen to the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2015/s4202677.htm">ABC World Today program’s</a> coverage of this issue on March 23, which includes the NSW Electoral Commission response. Or read more of The Conversation’s coverage of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/nsw-election-2015">2015 NSW election</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Vanessa Teague receives funding from the Australian Research Council for work in electronic voting privacy. She is on the advisory board of Verifiedvoting.org. She worked on a voluntary basis for the Victorian Electoral Commission's electronic voting project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof. J. Alex Halderman receives funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the New America Foundation, and the University of Michigan. He serves on the advisory board of Verifiedvoting.org.</span></em></p>UPDATED 3PM: The NSW Electoral Commission has now publicly commented on the security flaw we uncovered. But we’re concerned that it does not seem to understand the serious implications of this attack.Vanessa Teague, Research Fellow in the Department of Computing and Information Systems, The University of MelbourneJ. Alex Halderman, Director, University of Michigan Center for Computer Security and Society; Morris Wellman Faculty Development Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.