tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/eu-politics-65077/articlesEU politics – The Conversation2023-04-19T13:53:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2030812023-04-19T13:53:16Z2023-04-19T13:53:16ZBrexit didn’t trigger the mass exodus from the EU that was once feared – but nor did it leave Europeans wanting more from their union<p>The British vote to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/brexit-9976">leave the European Union</a> in 2016 sent a shockwave across the European continent. With a large member state turning its back on the union, it seemed eminently possible that others could follow.</p>
<p>But when the UK was plunged into economic and political turmoil by its decision, however, it seemed that Brexit had set an unappealing precedent. European leaders had feared a potential surge in eurosceptic movements in their own countries but that did not fully materialise.</p>
<p>Now the EU appears to be enjoying a longer-term Brexit dividend. The decade before the Brexit vote had been characterised by political paralysis. Member states appeared divided on how to manage the fallout from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/eurozone-crisis-11464">eurozone crisis</a> and the rapid influx of refugees from Syria as well as other migrants <a href="https://eprints.ncl.ac.uk/file_store/production/259391/E172202B-79CA-4DAE-B644-677A106601CA.pdf">in 2015</a>. This led to a slump in public support for the EU.</p>
<p>While the benefits of EU membership are difficult to quantify or observe for ordinary citizens, the UK’s departure provided clear benchmark for public opinion in the remaining 27 member states about the costs and benefits of leaving.</p>
<p>I examined whether people’s opinions about the EU changed via two waves of <a href="https://eupinions.eu/de/data">eupinions surveys</a> conducted by my colleagues and I together with the Germany-based think-tank the Bertelsmann Foundation. The data I rely on here is from April 2016 (just before the Brexit vote) and August 2016 (just after). Respondents were asked if they would vote to remain in or leave the EU if a referendum were held today.</p>
<p><strong>Support for remaining in the EU April and August 2016</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A chart showing that Brexit generally induced higher support for remaining in the EU in Europe in the period immediately following the referendum." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519044/original/file-20230403-28-777o7x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Change in support for remaining in the EU before and after Brexit, with % wanting to remain in EU shown at different time points.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Overall, support for remaining in the EU was slightly higher in August 2016 than it had been in April, prior to the Brexit vote. The biggest jump in support for remaining in the EU was recorded in Germany.</p>
<p>Support for remaining in the EU was overall quite high, anyway, at an average of about 70% across EU member states. But looking at individual member states, differences become more evident. In Germany, Poland and Spain, support rested at or topped 70% before the Brexit vote and climbed even higher in the months that followed it – in Poland and Spain to higher than 80%. While France and Italy also saw a rise after the vote, any change happened at a much lower baseline. In fact, in Italy support for remaining inside the EU hovered between the 50 and 55% mark. </p>
<h2>The years after the referendum</h2>
<p>Of course, many things have happened in the years since the 2016 referendum – from the COVID pandemic to the <a href="https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-ukraine-standing-together_en">war in Ukraine</a>. But generally these events, like Brexit, are associated with increased <a href="https://eupinions.eu/de/trends">positivity towards remaining within the EU</a>.</p>
<p>The years following Brexit were characterised by a desire to work together. The various crises had the potential to remind the public in the remaining 27 member states of the raison d’être of the EU and boost support for European project as a result. </p>
<p>And indeed we’ve seen support for remaining the EU solidifying over this period – even after the initial referendum bump. In Spain support for staying in the EU has increased by 7 percentage points and even in Italy it is up by 12 percentage points.</p>
<p><strong>Attitudes towards the EU in August 2016 and December 2022</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table showing that support for staying in the EU held largely steady in key European nations between 2016 and 2022 but that support for further integration stagnated or declined." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519046/original/file-20230403-14-l90nqa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">No less, no more.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>However, while support for remaining in the EU is healthy, that does not mean people are looking for deeper political and economic integration in Europe. One does not necessarily translate into the other. While around 53% of Europeans wish to see more integration, there is significant variation across countries – which is very important for a project that is meant to work well for all its member states. </p>
<p>Support for more political and economic integration is high in Italy and Spain (68%) but low in the Netherlands (37%) and France (38%). In some countries, including Poland, support for more integration went up post-Brexit vote but in others, such as Germany, France and Italy, it went down. </p>
<p>So while Brexit did not trigger further departures from the EU or even a strong movement in that direction in terms of public opinion, it also hasn’t delivered increased enthusiasm for “more” Europe. That suggests the exit risk is not over, particularly if the UK proves able to mitigate the economic and political fallout of Brexit in the longer term – or if the EU 27 seems to be worse off politically and economically in the same timeframe. So far, Brexit is seen by much of the European public as a mistake – but how long will that last if the tide turns for the UK?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203081/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine de Vries receives funding from a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (GA No. 864687). </span></em></p>Opnion polls taken before and after the 2016 referendum suggest a Brexit dividend but that could change if the UK makes more of a success of its departure.Catherine de Vries, Professor of Political Science, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901162022-09-19T12:22:07Z2022-09-19T12:22:07ZGiorgia Meloni – the political provocateur set to become Italy’s first far-right leader since Mussolini<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485171/original/file-20220918-49267-igrjib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C18%2C4144%2C2318&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 'V' for victory for Giorgia Meloni?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/giorgia-meloni-leader-of-italian-far-right-party-fratelli-news-photo/1243215867?adppopup=true">Nicolò Campo/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the autumn of 1922, Benito Mussolini, the ambitious and charismatic founder of the Fascist Party, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/video/213452/Top-questions-and-answers-for-Benito-Mussolini#:%7E:text=In%201922%20Mussolini%20led%20a,(%22The%20Leader%22).">became Italy’s youngest prime minister</a> – seizing power in <a href="https://historyonthisday.com/events/italy/mussolini-march-on-rome/">a march on Rome</a> that ushered in a dark period of totalitarian rule.</p>
<p>A century on, Italy looks set to get its first far-right leader since Mussolini’s body was strung up for all to see at the end of World War II. On Sept. 25, 2022, voters are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">widely expected to elect</a> as prime minister Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy – a party whose lineage traces back to the rump of <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220906/political-cheat-sheet-understanding-the-brothers-of-italy/">Mussolini’s fascists</a>. </p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/15/world/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-right.html">Italians and Europeans are understandably worried</a>. Her likely ascent comes at a time of national fragility for Italy, which is wracked by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-07-15/it-s-summer-so-italy-is-in-crisis">economic woes</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-approve-new-package-against-inflation-next-week-minister-says-2022-09-01/">spiraling inflation</a> and an <a href="https://www.rescue.org/country/italy">immigration crisis</a>. It also poses uncomfortable questions over the idea of European identity and unity. Moreover, it is a symptom of the political malaise in Italy and of the winds that have seen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyd-populism-commentary/commentary-why-populists-are-becoming-more-popular-idUSKCN1GL2FC">populist right-wing leaders gain support</a> around the world.</p>
<h2>Who is Giorgia Meloni?</h2>
<p>Meloni has been accused of being a political provocateur. A proud nationalist, her policy stances stress <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220810-woman-mother-christian-guides-italian-far-right-to-brink-of-power">anti-immigration positions and the protection of Italy from “Islamization</a>.” In contrast, she presents herself as the defender of traditional family values, politicizing Christianity and motherhood as the cornerstones of the authentic Italian national identity. In a 2019 speech, she explained: “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220810-woman-mother-christian-guides-italian-far-right-to-brink-of-power">I am Giorgia. I am a woman, I am a mother, I am Italian, I am a Christian”</a> – a rhetorical flourish that went viral, even being <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhwUMDX4K8o">turned into a disco remix</a>.</p>
<p>But Meloni is also a political chameleon. She changes strategy when it is politically advantageous to do so. In her youth, she openly <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/inspired-by-mussolini-giorgia-meloni-makes-her-move-on-rome-41925810.html">admired Mussolini</a> and considered him a good politician. But asked in the run-up to the election if she agreed that the fascist leader was bad for Italy, <a href="https://9breakingnews.com/giorgia-meloni-may-lead-italy-and-europe-is-worried/">she said “yes</a>.”</p>
<p>Over the years, she has courted leaders deemed by many to be ultra nationalist, such as <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180319/italian-rightwing-politicians-matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-putin-russian-election/">Vladimir Putin of Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italys-meloni-backs-orban-says-hungary-is-democratic/">Viktor Orbán of Hungary</a> and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2019-06-03/ty-article-opinion/.premium/meet-italys-le-pen-the-defender-of-christian-identity-who-could-become-premier/0000017f-dbb3-d856-a37f-fff334e90000">Marine Le Pen of France</a>. Yet she has also tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-promises-defy-chinese-russian-expansionist-ambitions-2022-08-25/">position herself as aligned with the conservatism</a> of the British Conservative Party and the Republican Party in the U.S.</p>
<p>She has of late tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-promises-defy-chinese-russian-expansionist-ambitions-2022-08-25/">distance herself from prior support</a> for the strongmen of Russia and China and to reemphasize her willingness to patriotically serve her country.</p>
<h2>Fratelli d’Italia’s rise to power</h2>
<p>The ploy has seemingly worked. </p>
<p>The far-right alliance of Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and like-minded parties Lega and Forza Italia are on course to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">win an absolute majority in the Parliament</a>. But it is Meloni’s party that has stood out, with polls showing it is set to win around <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/polls-predict-easy-victory-for-italys-far-right-under-firebrand-giorgia-meloni/">a quarter of all votes</a>.</p>
<p>It marks a remarkable rise to power for Fratelli d'Italia. In the course of the past four years, the party’s polling numbers <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/italy/">have been steadily growing</a> from a little over 4% in 2018 to over 25% in 2022. The trajectory suggests that the party has either shrugged off its <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-fascist-giorgia-meloni-mario-draghi-silvio-berlusconi-matteo-salvini-racist-mussolini-election/">historical links to fascism</a> or that many Italians simply don’t care.</p>
<p>Fratelli d’Italia is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">descendant of the Italian Social Movement party</a>, formed by Mussolini supporters after World War II. Meloni has tried to put distance between the lineage, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">declaring that</a> the Italian right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">considers fascism</a> to be confined to Italy’s history.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men stand around a flag with 'Fratelli d'Italia' on it and a flame symbol below." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brothers of Italy’s emblem contains the flame symbol of the neofascist Italian Social Movement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-with-a-brothers-of-italy-flag-during-the-news-photo/1243340253?adppopup=true">Marco Cantile/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meloni has also exploited national <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/publication/documents/2021-05/Flair-Italy-2021-10-points_0.pdf">sentiments of insecurity and anxiety</a>, caused by the multiple crises the country has faced in the last couple of years. These include <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b76a212b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/b76a212b-en">the COVID-19 pandemic that hit Italy particularly hard</a> and the <a href="https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/02/28/behind-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-the-mediterranean-five-years-after-lampedusa-political-incoherence-and-dysfunction-continues-to-kill/">still-unresolved major humanitarian crises</a> caused by mass migration across the Mediterranean, with Italy being the main receiving country of migrants heading to Europe. Italy is also facing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-approve-new-package-against-inflation-next-week-minister-says-2022-09-01/">rising inflation</a> and an <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220901/energy-crisis-italy-to-urge-residents-to-turn-down-heating-this-winter/">ongoing energy crisis</a>, driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine and Putin’s strategy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-weaponization-of-natural-gas-could-backfire-by-destroying-demand-for-it-182102">weaponizing Russia’s gas supply to the European Union</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with these crises, Meloni has positioned herself as the person to “rescue” Italy. History has proved that in times of precarity, charismatic <a href="https://phys.org/news/2022-03-people-rethink-nationalist-beliefs-uncertain.html">ultra nationalists leaders tend to do well</a>.</p>
<p>With a familiar formula of putting Italy “first,” <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-political/149336">Meloni’s euroskepticism</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/in-italy-beating-the-right-means-thinking-beyond-the-ballot-box/">xenophobia</a> and <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2161376">Islamophobia</a> – repackaged as patriotism – has gained popularity among Italians.</p>
<h2>Out of the chaos of coalition collapse</h2>
<p>But the success of Fratelli d’Italia is not all about Meloni. The flip side of her success is the failure of other parties and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/world/europe/draghi-italy-prime-minister.html">chaos of a government collapse</a> that affected many of the parties running against her.</p>
<p>The snap election in Italy followed the resignation of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/business/mario-draghi-ecb-euro.html">Prime Minister Mario Draghi</a>, an internationally admired economist <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-super-mario-draghi-undone-by-political-infighting-2022-07-21/">nicknamed “Super Mario</a>” for his impressive handling of the eurozone crisis as the head of the European Central Bank. </p>
<p>Draghi presided over a wide coalition but was forced to resign in July 2022, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliecoleman/2022/07/14/italian-prime-minister-mario-draghi-moves-to-resign-leaving-government-in-turmoil/?sh=27da8d234d00">amid a worsening economic and political crisis</a> that saw some coalition partners turn against the prime minister.</p>
<p>Italy has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/boris-johnson-covid-health-italy-western-europe-2f8c454104ae3544fb04e958f8105749">often struggled with its political leadership</a>. The country’s political system all but <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-heading-to-snap-election-as-unity-coalition-crumbles-explaining-the-nations-fragmented-party-system-187213">ensures government by coalition</a>. But that often means rule by a group of parties, whose agendas and visions may be drastically different – sometimes almost mutually exclusive. And the collapse of Draghi’s wide coalition has tainted many parties across the political spectrum, including the once-popular 5-Star Movement.</p>
<p>On top of this, there has been the individual failures of the parties challenging Meloni in the election. This has included <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/its-been-25-years-since-anyone-in-italy-trusted-the-government/">cases of corruption</a>, with the former leader of the Democratic Party – and later the centrist Italia Viva – Matteo Renzi being <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italys-matteo-renzi-charged-with-illegal-party-financing/">charged with illegal party financing</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, attempts to forge a successful center-left coalition to challenge the right-wing bloc have failed, with an alliance <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-07/italy-s-center-left-coalition-collapses-days-after-agreement?sref=Hjm5biAW">falling apart just days after being formed</a>. </p>
<h2>Ready to govern?</h2>
<p>The political parties gaining from this political mess have largely been on the right. In alliance with Meloni’s Fratelli d'Italia are the euroskeptic, anti-immigrant Lega and Forza Italia – the party of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/i-chased-ageing-playboy-silvio-berlusconi-says-expremier-s-young-fiancee-as-he-attempts-to-rebuild-reputation-8839537.html">85-year-old former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi</a>. </p>
<p>But while Forza Italia and Lega had been part of Draghi’s coalition, Meloni has been able to run on a campaign that is unblemished by association to that failed government.</p>
<p>Meloni is also symptomatic of an emerging European political climate that has seen growth in support for hard-right politicians such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-le-pen-now-second-most-liked-french-politician-poll-shows-2022-03-31/">Marine Le Pen</a> in France and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungary-election-triumph-for-viktor-orban-is-a-warning-to-progressive-parties-seeking-a-marriage-of-convenience-with-the-far-right-180196">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán</a>. </p>
<p>Meloni has <a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">run under a campaign slogan of</a> “<a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">Pronta a governare</a>” or “<a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">Ready to govern!</a>”</p>
<p>The big question now is whether Italy is ready for Meloni as prime minister.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The far-right leader of the Brothers of Italy has tried to distance the party from its fascist lineage, but many are still worried about the direction she will take the country.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityEvgeniya Pyatovskaya, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1827322022-05-26T10:47:28Z2022-05-26T10:47:28ZWhy Denmark is voting on its defence relationship with the EU – and what it says about democracy in Europe<p>On June 1, voters in Denmark will take part in a referendum on whether to end the country’s opt-out from EU defence policy, which prohibits Denmark from participating in EU defence matters. This means that when the EU deploys personnel under its <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy_en">common security and defence policy</a>, Denmark <a href="https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/3400436/European_defence_cooperation_and_the_Danish_defence_opt_out_diis_april_2020.pdf">participates</a> in civilian but not military operations. </p>
<p>This was one of <a href="https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/eu-information-centre/the-danish-opt-outs-from-eu-cooperation">four arrangements</a> secured when Danes voted “no” to the 1992 Maastricht treaty to establish the EU. Along with defence policy, Denmark opted out of the euro, justice and home affairs. The European Council also agreed to a Danish <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41992X1231&rid=1">declaration</a> that EU citizenship could only ever complement national citizenship – not replace it. These four arrangements for Denmark persuaded voters to support the Maastricht treaty in a second referendum in 1993. </p>
<p>The citizenship arrangement later became the norm for all member states through the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf">1997 Amsterdam treaty</a>, which ratified that EU citizenship is supplementary to citizenship of a member state and cannot replace it.</p>
<p>The decision to hold a vote on the defence opt-out reveals a deeper shift in EU constitutional politics. Faced with contentious issues, governments are increasingly turning to single-issue referendums.</p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed the security situation in Europe in a heartbeat. Finland and Sweden previously opted to remain outside Nato but have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-sweden-and-finland-eye-the-nato-option-but-its-a-security-dilemma-for-the-west-181354">now submitted applications</a>. Denmark, a founding member of Nato, is now forced to rethink its foreign policy, including its arm’s-length relationship with the EU.</p>
<p>Faced with a war on its eastern border, and the arrival of <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">more than four million Ukrainian refugees</a>, the EU has agreed to supply <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729301/EPRS_ATA(2022)729301_EN.pdf">lethal weapons to Ukraine</a> – the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/eu-adopts-new-set-of-measures-to-respond-to-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine/">first time</a> it has done so for any country. EU member states also agreed to commit up to <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-rapid-deployment-capacity_en#:%7E:text=To%20that%20end%2C%20the%20EU,EU's%20broad%20crisis%20management%20toolbox.">5,000 troops</a> to a new rapid reaction force, and to engage in live exercises on land and sea. This is part of a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/">new strategy</a> to make the EU a stronger military actor. </p>
<p>Denmark cannot participate in such efforts, potentially leaving it more vulnerable to external threats than most EU member states. The EU’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf">mutual defence clause</a> guarantees aid and assistance from other member states when one is subject to aggression. It <a href="https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Ambiguous-alliance-Neutrality-opt-outs-and-European-defence.pdf">remains unclear</a> the extent to which Denmark can invoke or benefit from that provision, given its special status. </p>
<p>A coalition of four Danish political parties proposed the referendum in March, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/denmark-to-hold-referendum-eu-defence-opt-out">calling on Danes</a> to reverse the opt-out. If the Danish people vote to remove the opt-out, Denmark will be able to fully participate in EU military operations and cooperate on the growth of EU military capabilities, while also growing its own military budget. If the people vote no, Denmark will remain outside EU defence policy, which will continue to develop without it.</p>
<h2>Single issue referendums</h2>
<p>In the past, national governments primarily looked to national parliaments to approve changes to their countries’ relationship with the EU. But persistent problems of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1867">public trust in both governments and parliaments</a> make it difficult for these institutions alone to give their consent to EU policies and questions of European integration. </p>
<p>Since 1972, nearly 50 referendums have been held on issues relating to the EU, the most common being treaty revision or a decision to join the EU. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2022.2032286">Our research</a> shows the growing importance of single-issue referendums focused on specific policies or questions about European integration. Member states are rarely obliged to hold single-issue referendums. They choose to do so when the way they usually engage with the EU is under strain. Examples include Greece’s 2015 referendum on negotiations with the EU and International Monetary Fund, Hungary’s 2016 referendum on the relocation of refugees and the UK’s 2016 vote to leave the EU. </p>
<p>After Denmark secured its four opt-outs from elements of the Maastricht treaty, the political consensus was that a referendum would be required to opt into any of these areas. This was not a legal but a political requirement – and it established single-issue referendums as integral to how Denmark participates in the EU.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An EU flag and the flag of Denmark flying side by side against a blue sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464762/original/file-20220523-26-xrglrz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In the June 1 referendum, Danish voters will decide on whether to change the country’s defence relationship with the EU.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/european-union-eu-danish-flag-denmark-1086053966">oleschwander / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far, two opt-in referendums have been held in Denmark, but have not resulted in change. In 2000, voters rejected joining the euro despite widespread support from political parties and <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2000/denmark-votes-no-to-the-euro">trade union leaders</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, a referendum on ending the country’s <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E%2FPRO%2F22">opt-out</a> from <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E067">EU justice and home affairs</a> also ended in defeat. </p>
<h2>Voting against the government</h2>
<p>Denmark is no isolated case. Of the six single-issue EU referendums called by governments since 2000, four went against the preferences of the government. And Hungary’s controversial refugee relocation referendum resulted in the “no” vote that the government sought, but failed to secure the required turnout. Greece’s government won a “no” vote against the terms of financial assistance from its international creditors, but this made little practical difference to negotiations. </p>
<p>This makes Denmark’s upcoming referendum politically fraught, with polls giving the “yes” side an <a href="https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/trods-klodset-start-paa-kampagnen-fastholder-ja-siden-sin-foering-i-afstemningen-om-forsvarsforbeholdet">unconvincing lead</a>, given the large share of undecideds. The fact that four political parties have proposed the referendum means it will not simply be a vote on the popularity of the government. It will also be on the single issue of whether voters think the security situation has changed enough to allow “more EU” in Denmark.</p>
<p>The Danish government has already <a href="https://www.thelocal.dk/20220411/danish-government-promises-new-referendum-in-event-of-supranational-eu-army/">promised</a> that should the EU seek to establish a supranational army, there would be yet another referendum to decide whether Denmark would participate. Whatever the result, single-issue referendums will remain a feature of EU constitutional politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>EU member states are increasingly turning towards single-issue referendums to decide major constitutional issues.Imelda Maher, Dean of Law and Sutherland Full Professor of European Law, University College DublinDermot Hodson, Professor of Political Economy, Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1745662022-01-12T14:17:26Z2022-01-12T14:17:26ZWhy European defence cooperation still matters for the UK – despite Brexit<p>European Council President Charles Michel recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/charles-michel-declares-2022-year-of-european-defense/">declared 2022</a> the “year of European defence”. Indeed, the EU’s plans for stepping up its defence efforts this year are ambitious. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89047/towards-strategic-compass_en">Strategic Compass</a> plan, which the EU aims to adopt in March, outlines the bloc’s ambitions for crisis management, resilience and other security capabilities. It clearly shows that the EU is willing to level up in the coming years. Although the UK is mentioned as a partner, a defence cooperation agreement between the two is not yet in sight. </p>
<p>The UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy">Integrated Review</a> – its post-Brexit foreign policy and defence plan – was published one year ago. This document focuses much more on the UK’s role as “Global Britain” than on partnership with the Europeans, except for cooperation within Nato. </p>
<p>The UK’s participation in <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/aukus-lessons-of-policy-objectives-and-secrecy/">AUKUS</a>, a submarine and defence deal with the US and Australia, has underlined its appetite for strengthening its transatlantic links. This was at the cost of France, its most important European partner in security and defence, which lost a major submarine supply contract with Australia because of the pact. </p>
<p>While the focus on Global Britain may seem tempting now that the UK is out of the EU, it is still located in Europe and shares interests with other European countries. Particularly in 2022, European defence cooperation should matter more than before to the UK, despite – or rather even because of – Brexit. </p>
<p>One opportunity for more British engagement with its European partners is so-called “coalitions of the willing”, also known as ad hoc coalitions. In these formats, states cooperate on a specific security challenge outside existing institutions like the EU or Nato. These coalitions are exclusively based on common interests and ambitions. In the absence of a formal agreement or treaty to join this coalition, states are only bound through their political declaration.</p>
<p>In recent years, European states have increasingly made use of these coalitions, for example to ensure freedom of navigation in the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eight-member-states-back-european-led-naval-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/">strait of Hormuz</a>, and the France-led counterterrorism <a href="https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/03/31/task-force-takuba-vers-un-engagement-europeen-robuste-dans-la-region-du-sahel/">task-force Takuba</a> in Mali. While the UK has not deployed soldiers into the task force, it supports the political declaration. In 2017, France also created the <a href="https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention">European Intervention Initiative</a>, a joint military project involving 13 European states, the UK included. </p>
<h2>British interests</h2>
<p>These coalitions of the willing would give the UK an escape from a political dilemma: on the one hand, the Integrated Review does not outline specific plans for defence cooperation with the EU, and changing that course might harm the credibility of the British government. On the other hand, the UK <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/ambition-versus-affordability-tackling-the-defence-review-dilemma">faces a gap</a> between its global ambitions and what it can afford given the decline of British defence spending over the last 50 years.</p>
<p>However, its options for partnerships are limited. The UK traditionally seeks close cooperation with the US on security challenges, but will not find a good ally in Washington to address security crises in the European neighbourhood. For the US, this is European business – and in light of the US focus <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-evolution-of-us-strategic-priorities/">on the Indo-Pacific</a> and its willingness to decrease its military footprint, US-British military cooperation in Europe’s near abroad seems highly unlikely. </p>
<p>The fact that the UK has joined the European Intervention Initiative and politically supports the Takuba task force is a good starting point. It shows that London understands that this form of engagement is a promising opportunity for achieving British objectives. </p>
<p>Many years of defence cooperation with other European states, <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-bilateral-defence-cooperation/">particularly France</a>, have already established mechanisms for cooperation. Maintaining these links is crucial for Europeans, inside or outside the EU, to ensure their security in the long term. </p>
<h2>Pros for Europe</h2>
<p>Conversely, Europeans should step up their efforts to cooperate with the UK on issues of European defence. The UK might not be an easy partner to deal with, but it brings critical military capabilities, for instance through its navy and as a nuclear power. British participation in European defence efforts can motivate other European countries or international partners, particularly those traditionally wary of French influence, to cooperate. The UK’s diplomatic network and status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council are also important strategic assets. </p>
<p>Lastly, if Europeans want to remain an attractive partner for the US, there is barely a way around working with the UK. Although US and UK interests might diverge to some extent, AUKUS shows that the US still sees the UK as a key partner in international security. Support from Washington for European defence cooperation, such as logistical support for ad-hoc crisis management coalitions, is much more likely if the UK is involved.</p>
<p>Those hesitant about the added value of European defence cooperation need to ask themselves a simple question. What is the concept of Global Britain, of multilateralism as a key principle, and the aspiration to play an important role in international security, actually worth, if it does not start in the UK’s immediate neighbourhood? </p>
<p>If partnerships between the Europeans and the UK in defence and security do not go beyond consultation, Global Britain could quickly turn into “Britain all alone”. This is neither in the interest of the UK nor other European states. If the UK is serious about its defence objectives, participating in European defence cooperation is an opportunity it must not miss.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gesine Weber works for the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. </span></em></p>2022 has been declared the ‘year of European defence’. If the UK wants to be Global Britain, it should take part.Gesine Weber, PhD Candidate in Defence Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1727982021-12-06T16:14:24Z2021-12-06T16:14:24ZEU solidarity with Poland on migration: a violent response to an imagined threat<p>Just in the month of November 2021, migrant boats have capsized in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/22/aid-workers-say-mediterranean-a-liquid-graveyard-after-75-feared-dead-off-libya">central Mediterranean Sea</a>, the <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36606/two-migrants-dead-en-route-to-canary-islands">Atlantic</a>, the <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36648/one-migrant-found-dead-off-greek-island-of-crete-during-sea-rescue-operation">Aegean</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-59412329">English Channel</a>. </p>
<p>The official death toll at the external borders of the EU stands at over <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ips/article-abstract/14/3/252/5818334?redirectedFrom=fulltext">1,600</a> so far this year, though acknowledged to be a massive underestimate. At the same time, people have frozen and starved to death at <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36166/tenth-migrant-found-dead-on-belaruspolish-border">EU land borders</a> to Belarus. Most of those who have lost their lives appear to have done so on EU territory.</p>
<p>People seeking safety and protection are dying within and all around Europe. While they are clearly at risk themselves, on precarious boats or in forests in the winter, they have been portrayed as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/03058298040330020101">a risk</a> to Europe that needs defending against. The whipping up of defence narratives by connecting migration with security risks is <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-5965.00263">not new</a>, but has not lost any political potency.</p>
<p>In the case of the Poland-Belarus border, people on the move have been referred to as “weapons” and “<a href="https://digit.site36.net/2021/11/22/european-union-and-nato-military-police-and-secret-services-against-hybrid-threats/">hybrid threats</a>”. The EU defines hybrid threats as a mixture of tactics used to “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/hybrid-threats_cs">exploit the vulnerabilities of the EU</a>” while “remaining below the threshold of formal warfare”.</p>
<p>According to Polish prime minister <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/polish-pm-mateusz-morawiecki-belarus-migrant-pressure-greatest-threat-in-30-years/">Mateusz Morawiecki</a>, migrant crossings via Belarus are the greatest threat that the EU has faced in decades. Morawiecki says “we are dealing with a new type of war, a war in which migrants are <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36643/poland-belarus-crisis-is-greatest-attempt-to-destabilize-europe-since-cold-war">weapons</a>”.</p>
<p>In response to this ostensible war, Poland has further militarised its border, carrying out mass “pushback” operations to force migrants back into Belarus, and creating a de facto <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/the-deadly-woods/">rights-free zone</a>. Doctors, non-governmental organisation workers and journalists are prohibited from entering, and as a result, we are learning of human rights violations largely through those subjected to them.</p>
<p>Poland <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/belarus/poland-abuse-pushbacks-border">systematically breaches</a> international law and refugee conventions and does not, according to <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/il-legal-gymnastics-by-poland-and-hungary-in-eu-border-procedures/">legal experts</a> “even purport to conceal its disrespect of EU asylum and migration law”. </p>
<p>This could have worsened existing tensions between Poland’s government and the EU. Poland, along with Hungary, has long been considered a rather “rogue” EU member state showing signs of democratic backsliding due to its failure to respect EU rules, the primacy of EU law and judicial independence.</p>
<h2>EU solidarity</h2>
<p>One might think that forcibly pushing people seeking protection back into the hands of a dictator would cause alarm bells to ring throughout Europe. And yet Poland’s radical “no entry” policy has earned support from the EU level. The European Commission has <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_6249">made clear</a> that it stands in “solidarity with the Member States on the front line”. </p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/EU_Commission/status/1466031477800513538?t=gTDTEEf4s7Yh-bN5czlW4Q&s=19">Tweeting</a> “when one of us is attacked, we are all attacked”, the commission has proposed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-seeks-ease-rules-poland-baltics-migration-standoff-with-belarus-2021-12-01/">allowing further reduction</a> of migrants’ rights at the border. The proposal would restrict where migrants can claim asylum to specific locations at the border and allow them to be detained there for a considerably longer period of 16 weeks.</p>
<p>Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has joined the effort to turn migration into a security threat: “Let’s call it what it is: this is a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701">hybrid attack</a> to destabilise Europe.” </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/1458430400225808385?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1458430400225808385%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fnotesfrompoland.com%2F2021%2F11%2F10%2Feu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus%2F">tweet</a>, European Council president Charles Michel also offered “full EU solidarity with #Poland … facing hybrid attack from #Belarus”.</p>
<p>Such EU solidarity with member states, despite overwhelming evidence of migrant rights violations, is not new. Despite its implication in mass pushback operations, Greece, depicted as Europe’s “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-51721356">shield</a>”, was lauded by Von der Leyen in spring 2020. “I am fully committed to mobilising all the necessary operational support to the Greek authorities,” she said.</p>
<p>Why is the European Commission, an institution that cherishes its image as the EU’s humane and moral compass, choosing to stand with member state governments widely condemned for migrant rights violations?</p>
<p>One possible explanation could be that the current European Commission has realised that engaging in rhetorical balancing acts in matters of migration is no longer politically expedient or necessary. The Juncker Commission was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-47294183">repeatedly criticised</a> by the likes of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for being too soft on migration. In contrast, the commission under Von der Leyen appears to have followed Orbán’s <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/orban-ignores-dead-frog-european-commission-on-migration-1.3578325">call</a> in 2019 for “a new commission … with a new approach”.</p>
<p>Rather than downplaying and concealing the EU’s active role in creating a violent and deadly migrant deterrence regime, the commission has gone on the offensive. This is exemplified in the EU’s handling of migration, including EU border agency <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-border-agency-frontex-complicit-in-greek-refugee-pushback-campaign-a-4b6cba29-35a3-4d8c-a49f-a12daad450d7">Frontex’s</a> involvement in mass pushback operations, and the financing of authoritarian regimes and militia forces in <a href="https://interactive.thenewhumanitarian.org/stories/2021/11/17/mediterranean-migration-europe/">Libya</a> to <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/06/the-secretive-libyan-prisons-that-keep-migrants-out-of-europe">outsource</a> border control. </p>
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<p>What we currently see unfolding along the EU’s external borders is not a series of unfortunate tragedies, but the consequence of policy decisions made in the name of defending Europe against an imagined threat. Through its unwavering support for Poland’s migrant rights violations, the current commission sends a signal to all those who believe that violent deterrence is the only response to precarious migration. </p>
<p>While the death toll at the external borders of the union keeps rising, we see other defenders come onto the scene. Along the border to Belarus, ordinary Polish citizens have begun to illuminate their homes with <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/35889/green-light-initiative-help-for-migrants-in-polandbelarus-border-area">green lights</a> at night to signal that people in need are welcome to seek shelter. In doing so, they defy the efforts of both EU member states and institutions to portray people on the move as security threats. By offering refuge, they open their homes not to weapons, but humans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172798/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Between May 2018 and June 2021, Maurice Stierl received funding from the Leverhulme Trust.
He is also a member of the network "Alarm Phone". </span></em></p>The European Commission is standing with Poland, despite evidence of serious human rights violations.Maurice Stierl, Lecturer in International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680042021-09-17T14:04:34Z2021-09-17T14:04:34ZState of the EU: tech and defence challenges cloud COVID success<p>In her second “state of the European Union” speech, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen used the political momentum generated by a series of crises to announce a batch of new initiatives and funding.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen is confident she’s steered the EU successfully through the challenges of COVID, but the bloc still faces the threats of climate change, security and defence challenges, tech and economic competition, and political struggles among and within member states.</p>
<p>Missing was an honest acknowledgement of the ongoing, grievous rule of law infractions in Poland and Hungary (including the progressive <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/the-fate-of-the-union">erosion of democracy</a>, judicial independence and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2020">media pluralism</a>) as well as a clear plan to mitigate the ongoing fallout in Afghanistan and rebuilding relations with the UK.</p>
<h2>COVID challenges</h2>
<p>Having pulled back from the precipice of a full-blown disaster over vaccine rollout a year ago, Von der Leyen could justifiably boast about 70% of EU adults are now fully vaccinated. She conceded that complacency still posed a threat, from the widely varying vaccine rates to the risk of new variants in many member states.</p>
<p>Europe’s responsibility now appears twofold. With a €50 million cash investment between now and 2027, the EU is putting more energy into establishing a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_21_4701">European Health Union</a>, on the basis of the existing European Medicines Agency, the recent rollout of EU digital health certificates, plus a new pan-European health authority. </p>
<p>Externally, the EU must play a greater role in accelerating global vaccine distribution.</p>
<p>The EU’s commitment to the COVAX programme is admirable, to be sure. But -– as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/live-blog-ursula-von-der-leyen-state-of-the-union-speech/">MEPs</a> quickly pointed out -– the EU is continuing to block the waiver on intellectual property rights on vaccine patents, limiting the ability of non-EU producers to manufacture and distribute vaccines more widely. </p>
<p>Furthermore, European companies themselves are not precisely supplying vaccines abroad, but <a href="https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/using-trade-to-fight-covid-19-manufacturing-and-distributing-vaccines-dc0d37fc/">selling them</a> – and not necessarily to countries in the most need.</p>
<h2>Economic recovery</h2>
<p>Europe’s economy appears to be recovering well from COVID. Estimates for the second quarter of 2021 indicate growth has risen by 2.0% in the Eurozone and by 1.9% in the EU as a whole. This is a good shift of direction after a disappointing first quarter, which saw GDP decline by 0.3% in the Eurozone and 0.1% in the EU. </p>
<p>However, China and the US, the EU’s chief economic and trade rivals, have also seen rapid post-COVID growth. The challenge for the commission is to ensure that the EU remains at the top of its game in terms of trade deals, competition and output. </p>
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<p>The EU needs to send clear signals to markets and investors, so expect further developments arising from the upcoming Economic Governance Review. The message now is that the EU single market is open for business, and prepared to take on competitors. </p>
<p>Indeed, Von der Leyen suggested that the single market is not merely the motor of employment and competition, but a driver of industrial innovation (including artificial intelligence), and a “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_21_4701">gatekeeper power</a>” for democratic reform of big tech – keeping firms like Amazon and Facebook equitable and accountable in their practices.</p>
<p>She also unveiled a plan to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_21_4701">enhance work</a> on semi-conductors (tiny chips that make everything from smartphones to electric trains work) to reduce Europe’s dependence on Asian markets. </p>
<h2>Climate change</h2>
<p>The EU has worked hard to forge, and maintain, its green credentials, sometimes clashing with member states on targets, costs and public opinion.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen’s preferred stick and carrot approach – tough regulations offset by generous support packages – is unlikely to change as the EU prepares for COP26, the global climate change conference in November. </p>
<p>In readying the EU for its leading role, she pledged a further €4 billion (beyond the existing US$25 billion yearly) aimed principally at getting China and the US to close the climate finance gap.</p>
<p>Despite the ambitious <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en">European Green Deal</a> and the target to <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/">cut emissions by 55%</a> by 2030, many would still argue that the commission has still not done enough. </p>
<p>There was no mention of tackling soaring energy prices, or how to equitably redistribute the cost of climate change measures beyond the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action/delivering/fund_en">Social Climate Fund</a> used to alleviate energy poverty among vulnerable households and small businesses across Europe. </p>
<h2>Security and defence</h2>
<p>Perhaps most surprising was the lack of any clear guidance on Europe’s role in supporting the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/josep-borrell-fears-humanitarian-crisis-afghanistan/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=0d40f6184e-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2021_09_15_02_36&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-0d40f6184e-190407085">increasingly dire situation</a> in Afghanistan. There were lukewarm platitudes for the Afghan people, but by stating that Europe’s support was for Afghans “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_21_4701">in the country and in neighbouring countries</a>”, the EU’s contribution feels remote at best.</p>
<p>Instead of clarity about the use of the new Afghan support package, or the reworked pact on migration and asylum (mentioning the Mediterranean rather than Afghanistan), Von der Leyen referenced the renewed <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_186263.htm">EU-Nato joint declaration</a> and the European Defence Union, a project to gradually enhance Europe’s overall <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/15/von-der-leyen-eu-state-of-union-speech-political-will-build-own-military">strategic abilities</a> in security and defence. </p>
<p>Providing stability in Europe’s neighbourhood needs to include far more than the endless trope of the EU becoming – in Von der Leyen’s words – a “unique security provider”, or the need to push back against disruptive technology, or even the need for yet another new centre to enhance intelligence-gathering.</p>
<h2>Britain who?</h2>
<p>Notably absent was an assessment of the EU’s post-Brexit relations with the UK. Von der Leyen might have used this opportunity to voice disappointment at the increasingly fractious trade and diplomatic relations arising from the 2020 Brexit deal, or even pressed the “reset” button by engaging with Britain on defence in new ways</p>
<p>Few expected a wholesale rehabilitation at this point, but failure to connect Britain -– even loosely –- to EU security policy, work in the western Balkans, the new Trade and Technology Council (developed in tandem with the US), or the EU’s new “Global Gateway” strategy to boost business, seems a missed opportunity. </p>
<p>Let’s hope the next year provides opportunities for the EU to work harder on its own jobs list, remembering that cooperation with others makes those jobs much more challenging.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Hadfield receives funding under the Erasmus+ scheme for a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. </span></em></p>After Brexit, COVID, Afghanistan and more, a look at where the EU stands on key issues.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1637672021-07-05T15:17:53Z2021-07-05T15:17:53ZConcern over rule of law as Slovenia takes over EU presidency<p>At the beginning of July, Slovenia took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union from Portugal. The six-month role is focused on being a neutral arbiter in coordinating and facilitating member state contributions within EU decision-making processes. </p>
<p>This is clouded by the reputation of Slovenia’s prime minister, Janez Janša, for indulging in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/11/election-2020-trump-biden-slovenia-jansa-lost/">conspiracy theories and alliances</a> with leaders such as former US president Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary. Slovenia’s time at the helm of the Council could enable one of the EU’s highest decision-making organs to ignore anti-democratic developments across the European Union. </p>
<p>Janša and his party, the SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party), formally belong to the political mainstream, as members of the European People’s Party. This centre-right organisation is the largest political party in the European Parliament and European Council. However, since gaining power in 2020, Janša’s government has been extensively criticised for trying to suppress potential checks on his power and influence. This has drawn the country into debates about the “rule of law” within the EU, a concept referring to respect for due process, plurality in politics and media and the upholding of civic freedoms such as free speech. </p>
<p>Janša’s government has been accused of undermining some of these principles. In this vein, Janša has labelled journalists reporting on his government as “<a href="https://twitter.com/jjansasds/status/1182660786344337408">presstitutes</a>” and withheld funding from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/slovenias-sta-a-symbol-of-resistance-within-the-country/a-57757060">STA, the national press agency</a>. His government is also currently <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/06/08/slovenia-criticised-for-delay-in-choosing-eu-graft-fighting-prosecutors/">blocking</a> the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, an EU anti-corruption agency, from beginning efforts to prosecute fraud involving EU funds. This while Janša <a href="https://sloveniatimes.com/report-pm-jansa-formally-indicted-over-2005-real-estate-deal/">faces charges</a> of corruption himself. </p>
<h2>Similarities with Orbán</h2>
<p>Janša’s interest in controlling the media is shared with Orbán, who leads the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2021">only non-“free” country</a> in the EU according to human rights oganisation Freedom House. Orbán and his party, Fidesz, are infamous proponents of “<a href="https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/illiberal-democracy-and-the-struggle-on-the-right/">illiberal democracy</a>” and have focused on dismantling the rule of law in Hungary over the past decade.</p>
<p>Janša and Orbán’s ties go beyond simple similarities. Hungarian oligarchs allied to Orbán have invested millions of euros into Slovenian media – arrangements that have circumvented Slovenia’s media laws through a <a href="https://mediaobservatory.net/radar/behind-foreign-investments-slovenian-media-market">sophisticated network</a> of intermediaries and shell companies. This is reminiscent of how <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/hungary-orban-media.html">Orbán controls Hungarian media</a>, and it is clear he sees Janša, a former journalist, as a worthy ally and investment in his quest to expand his sphere of influence.</p>
<p>Despite concerns from the <a href="https://rm.coe.int/final-version-annual-report-2021-en-wanted-real-action-for-media-freed/1680a2440e">Council of Europe</a> and democratic watchdog <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovenia/nations-transit/2021">NGOs</a>, many do not see any problems with Slovenia assuming the presidency of the EU Council. Currently (and unlike Orbán) Janša lacks a parliamentary super-majority, and his multiparty government has limited powers to dramatically reshape the Slovenian state. Many fellow EPP member parties and politicians believe Slovenian issues are mainly related to domestic political posturing and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-conservatives-stand-by-controversial-slovenian-pm-european-peoples-party-janez-jansa/">do not represent</a> a systemic issue for the EU. </p>
<p>But it is important to keep in mind that they said the very same things about Hungary <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/">a few years ago</a>. Many in the EPP genuinely believed that waiting and just tolerating Orbán in their fold would make these issues go away. This did not happen. In the end, Orbán <a href="https://euobserver.com/political/151119">left</a> the EPP in March 2021, just before it was about to expel him and his party after 11 years of appeasement and Hungary’s slide towards authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Orbán, a former liberal flagbearer during Hungary’s democratisation in the 1990s, now focuses on <a href="https://hungarianspectrum.org/2021/06/02/will-viktor-orban-succeed-in-realigning-the-far-right-forces-in-the-european-parliament/">courting far-right and neo-fascist parties</a> to form a parliamentary group within the European Parliament to promote his authoritarian ideals and policies.</p>
<h2>The Council under Janša</h2>
<p>With regards to the Council, it is important to recall that a single dissenting government can significantly disrupt EU decision-making processes in some policy areas. This is especially true in the case of the rule of law itself, where Hungary and Poland have been mutually helping each other hamper disciplinary action <a href="https://euobserver.com/opinion/152161">directed at them</a> within EU institutions. The continuation of this process, as well as discussions around the upcoming annual “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4169">Rule of Law Review Cycle</a>” reports which review associated issues across all of the EU, will require focused leadership from a supposedly neutral Council presidency.</p>
<p>For the second half of 2021, Janša’s government will be at the helm of these discussions. It is telling that Janša generally perceives such concerns simply as <a href="https://www.gov.si/en/news/2021-02-26-letter-of-prime-minister-janez-jansa-to-the-president-of-the-european-comission-ursula-von-der-leyen/">politically motivated witch hunts</a>. While this was how he dismissed concerns about the rule of law in Slovenia, he might apply the same logic within EU-wide debates about the matter. It is not implausible to suggest that this perception will shape the way Janša approaches the case of his ally and business partner, Orbán. </p>
<p>Janša’s view of current rule of law procedures as the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovenian-prime-minister-janez-jansa-battles-eu-slovenia-european-council-presidency/">“[application of] double standards”</a> can be seen as a statement of intent to shield countries such as Hungary and Poland from repercussions.</p>
<p>It is too early to tell how Janša’s perceptions will shape Slovenia’s approach to the EU Council presidency. Nevertheless, Janša’s domestic policies and his political and economic proximity to Orbán paint a worrying picture about his views on political pluralism and civic freedoms. </p>
<p>All EU member states should proceed with significant caution. The erosion of democracy across the EU and the resulting democratic backsliding finally spurred the EU to start acting against anti-democratic developments, such as through the launch of the Rule of Law Review Cycle. Meaningful action in this field is impossible if member states in leading positions stymie processes or define the problem out of existence by trivialising such critiques. </p>
<p>The EPP party family have a heightened responsibility in this context as well. Tolerating Orbán and Fidesz among the ranks of EPP lent legitimacy to their anti-democratic project on the European stage for a decade. Janša should not be able to walk the same road without consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nándor Révész does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Slovenia takes over the rotating EU Council presidency, other member states should not let Janez Janša follow in Hungary’s authoritarian footsteps.Nándor Révész, Teaching Fellow and PhD Student in Politics/IR, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1629742021-06-23T16:09:28Z2021-06-23T16:09:28ZBrexit: five years after the referendum, here are five things we’ve learned<p>On June 23 2016 the UK went to the polls to decide the future of the country’s EU membership. The vote to leave the EU – decided by a slim but definite majority of 51.9% to 48.1% – ushered in major constitutional, social, economic and political upheavals, as the country sought to define exactly what Brexit would mean. Five years later, here’s what we’ve learned.</p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<h2>1. We know a lot more</h2>
<p>The day after the referendum, the second most Googled question in the UK was “What is the European Union?”. The most frequent question for the search engine was: “What does it mean to leave the European Union?”.</p>
<p>This is not entirely surprising. Even the Brexit secretary himself, Dominic Raab, it turns out, “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46142188">hadn’t quite understood</a>” how reliant the UK’s goods trade is on crossing the English Channel. Some expectations were thus necessarily confounded. The promise on the <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/our-eu-membership-fee-55-million/">side of a bus</a> to use the £350 million the UK spent on the EU to fund the NHS turned out to be good advertising but bad misuse of statistics. Yet the <a href="https://fullfact.org/economy/brexit-and-economic-apocalypse/">economic apocalypse</a> foretold by those opposing Brexit has failed to materialise, too. </p>
<p>What we have learned instead is a vast array of details about trade and governance we never knew we needed. From Article 50 to Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, from <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/what-are-the-henry-viii-powers/">Henry VIII powers</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47216870">GATT XXIV</a>, from the fish we like to eat and the kind of chicken we don’t, Brexit has been a steep learning curve for us all. And not all of it in good time: underestimating Northern Ireland and the <a href="https://www.cer.eu/insights/theresa-mays-irish-trilemma">border trilemma</a> may turn out to be one of Brexit’s biggest blind spots.</p>
<h2>2. We are still divided</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/news/2018/oct/will-people-new-project-albert-weale">The myth</a> of the “will of the people” has been a political linchpin of Brexit. But while the referendum result was definitive, it showed an electorate split practically down the middle. In five years, this rift between Remainers and Leavers has not dissipated. On the contrary, Brexit identities <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103485/1/Divided_by_the_vote.pdf">now mean more</a> to us than party-political affiliations.</p>
<p>The vast majority of referendum voters have stuck to their initial vote – over <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/WUKT-Brexit-Analysis-v4.pdf">four in five say</a> they would vote the same way again. Although <a href="https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/should-the-united-kingdom-remain-a-member-of-the-european-union-or-leave-the-european-union-asked-after-the-referendum/">surveys have shown</a> a consistent majority for Remain since 2016, this is very slight: the British public are still more or less evenly divided on the issue. This was clear even in the 2019 general election, decisively won by the Conservatives under the first past the post system, where 52% of votes were cast for (opposition) parties advocating a second referendum. </p>
<p>Only one issue seems to unite both sides: a general <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-success-five-years/">dislike of the deal</a> that was obtained.</p>
<h2>3. We trust a lot less</h2>
<p>In a more complex, interconnected world, trust – in our fellow members of society, our institutions, between governments – is pivotal. Trust <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41802142">describes acts</a> not yet committed but to be reckoned with: it is a vehicle for coping with the essential unpredictability of people and institutions. </p>
<p>If distrust in government was a major <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-political-trust/">predictor of Leave</a> voters, it also arguably fuelled discontent with parliament and the judiciary, which the Conservatives accused in their 2019 election manifesto of “thwarting the democratic decision of the British people”. Now it is Remain voters, feeling they are on the losing side, who are <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/brexit-and-beyond-public-opinion/">less satisfied</a> with democratic standards. </p>
<p>Following often acrimonious negotiations, trust between the EU and the UK has also taken a hit. Both sides have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-uk-brexit-talks/">told the press</a> only this month that trust is now at an all-time low – and increasingly hinges on the good faith in the way the Brexit divorce deal, including the Northern Ireland protocol, is being implemented or challenged. </p>
<p>A highly complex <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5801/ldselect/ldeucom/246/24606.htm">governance structure</a> with specialised committees, working groups, partnership councils and dispute settlement mechanisms will seek to ameliorate problems. Whether it is enough remains to be seen.</p>
<h2>4. Brexit is far from done</h2>
<p>Boris Johnson famously vowed to “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50222315">Get Brexit Done</a>”. While we have indeed exited the European Union, Brexit is far from over. Given the UK’s decision to leave the customs union and the single market, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en">trade and cooperation agreement</a> is the thinnest of deals. It provides for duty and quota-free trade of all goods, but introduces business, industry, and Brexit observers to a rich vocabulary of non-tariff barriers, level playing field provisions, and customs red tape. </p>
<p>Not least due to this “disintegration shock”, there will be pressure (and incentives) to improve on the deal. Negotiations are likely to go on for years, perhaps even decades. A particular sticking point remains the Northern Ireland protocol – which Boris Johnson negotiated, signed, convinced parliament to approve and won a general election on, yet which the UK’s chief negotiator now <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eb35a108-6186-42a4-b401-5e1df0e2c64a">describes as</a> unexpectedly unworkable. The protocol is the Brexit conundrum in a nutshell: until we reach an agreement on its implementation, Brexit will not be done.</p>
<h2>5. Brexit will have lasting effects on both sides</h2>
<p>In the past decade, the <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/news/2011/oct/10-questions-about-eurozone-crisis-and-whether-it-can-be-solved">global financial and eurozone crises</a> exposed the weaknesses of the EU’s economic governance; the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis">migration crisis</a> exposed the limits of intra-European solidarity, and the <a href="http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/07/new-leaders-and-old-problems-brexit-and-the-rule-of-law-crisis/">rule of law crisis</a> in Hungary and Poland exposes its very <em>raison d’etre</em> as fragile. </p>
<p>In this context, Brexit brought on unprecedented unity among the 27 – yet also, if perhaps not sufficiently, a soul-searching: a function of longer-term dissatisfaction with the nature of the union. Having lost a key member state, the EU will need to address not only a changed internal landscape, but also redefine its complicated and not always satisfactory relationship to neighbours and partners. </p>
<p>On the UK side, Brexit has heralded what some have called a “<a href="https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/05/28/the-united-kingdoms-constitution-and-brexit-a-constitutional-moment/">constitutional moment</a>”. We have seen an increasingly strained relationship between <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/74/2/443/5855887">parliament and the executive</a>, antagonistic relationships with devolved governments, and an ongoing discussion over the role of the courts. How the government will use its new regulatory powers may also change the shape of the British state. </p>
<p>As far as the future relationship between both sides is concerned, this is still being defined. Yet geographical proximity, volume of trade, the importance of the “EU orbit” and the very entrenchment of our links means the UK will not float off into the Atlantic. We will wrangle with each other, and ourselves, for some time to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162974/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The UCL European Institute, which Uta Staiger directs, has received funding from the European Commission through its Jean Monnet programme.</span></em></p>After the Brexit referendum, the most-Googled question in the UK was ‘What does it mean to leave the European Union?’ Five years later, we still don’t have the full answer.Uta Staiger, Executive Director, UCL European Institute, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462772020-10-27T12:14:31Z2020-10-27T12:14:31ZViktor Orbán’s use and misuse of religion serves as a warning to Western democracies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365046/original/file-20201022-16-z0amur.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C6%2C4473%2C2984&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Viktor Orbán speaking at a summit on Poland on Sept. 11.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-prime-minister-of-hungary-viktor-orban-takes-part-on-a-news-photo/1271947526?adppopup=true">Omar Marques/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Somewhere in his journey to power in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had a radical religious conversion. </p>
<p>An atheist when he started in politics in the late 1980s, Orbán now calls himself a defender of Christianity. In an August <a href="https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-christianity-europe-persecuted/">speech commemorating the 1920 Treaty of Trianon</a> – a traumatic event in which Hungary lost much of its territory – Orbán argued that Western Europe had given up on “a Christian Europe” and was choosing instead to experiment with “a godless cosmos, rainbow families, migration and open societies.”</p>
<p>As experts in <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-tackle-climate-change-immigration-and-threats-to-democracy-europes-fractious-new-parliament-will-have-to-work-together-117717">European politics</a> and the <a href="https://www.politicalresearch.org/2019/05/24/aberration-or-reflection-how-understand-changes-political-right">religious right</a>, we argue that Orbán’s embrace of religion has served to consolidate his power, “other” his opponents and shield Hungary from EU criticism of its attacks on the rule of law. </p>
<p>It is also, we believe, a dangerous model for how religion can be used to fuel democratic backsliding. </p>
<h2>Consolidating power</h2>
<p>In 2014, during an address to the nation, Orbán spoke of building “an <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/14/viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe">illiberal state, a non-liberal state,” in Hungary</a>. While an illiberal state is an ambiguous concept, Orbán praised it as better able to <a href="https://www.boell.de/en/2014/08/21/announicing-illiberal-state">protect Hungary’s national interests and preserve its cohesion</a>. Four years later, his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist">tone had shifted</a>: Hungary was now a “Christian democracy.” </p>
<p>Such a shift is emblematic of Orbán’s career, with its many <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-viktor-orbans-victory-means-for-hungary-and-the-west/2014/04/07/a4ab440c-bb87-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_9How%20Orban%20changes%20his%20view">ideological twists and turns</a>. He has changed his tune on many major issues, from being a firm supporter of European integration to becoming a strong defender of national sovereignty. He has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/10/29/eastern-bromance-hungary-s-orban-and-russia-s-putin-set-to-meet-again">befriended Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-and-viktor-orbans-special-relationship/a-45512712">since his return to power in 2010</a>, despite his past anti-Russian stance. </p>
<p>And he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-ivanyi.html">renounced his past atheism during the 1990s</a> – a decision that went hand in hand with his courting of religious and conservative voters. According to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-viktor-orbans-victory-means-for-hungary-and-the-west/2014/04/07/a4ab440c-bb87-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_9How%20Orban%20changes%20his%20views">European politics scholar Charles Gati</a>, “no European leader since Napoleon may have changed his spots more.” </p>
<p>Far from consistently adhering to clear principles, Orbán, <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/04/02/how-hungarys-leader-viktor-orban-gets-away-with-it">according to The Economist</a>, over the years has instead been “dedicated to the accumulation and maintenance of power.” </p>
<p>That ruthlessness grew after Orbán was voted out as prime minister in 2002. Deeply shocked by this turn of events, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-viktor-orban-degraded-hungarys-weak-democracy-109046">he vowed not to lose power again </a> if he ever returned to office. </p>
<p>During the 2010 election campaign, Orbán <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/20/the-generation-that-betrayed-hungarian-democracy/">declared</a> that “we need to win only once, but need to win big” – an apparent warning that he would use any large electoral victory to strengthen his position, so not to have to relinquish power. Cynically claiming the mantle of Christian Democracy, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/03/false-advertising-christian-democracy-or-illiberal-democracy/">according to Princeton scholar Jan-Werner Mueller</a>, became a key tool of his strategy in the following decade to consolidate his grip on Hungarian politics. </p>
<h2>Wedge issues at home</h2>
<p>Like much of Europe, Hungary is somewhat secular. In the 2011 census, <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/religion-in-hungary">45% of the population</a> did not list any religious affiliation. Hungary’s communist regime <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/05/world/hungarian-cardinal-is-reburied-in-homeland-as-red-star-is-extinguished.html">had certainly scorned and discouraged religion</a> for many decades. After the 1989 fall of the Iron Curtain dividing Europe between the communist Eastern bloc and free market West, <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/">people did not flock to churches</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, when Orbán returned to power in 2010, he began to rely on religion to mobilize voters. For instance, he framed his harsh <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-migrants-threaten-christian-europe-identity-refugees-asylum-crisis/">anti-immigration policies as a defense of Christianity</a>.</p>
<p>As the Syrian civil war reached a crescendo in 2015, hundreds of thousands of migrants fled the violence. Although most migrants to Europe were trying only to transit through Hungary, Orbán declared that Syrian migrants were trying to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/04/hungarys-orban-invokes-ottoman-invasion-to-justify-keeping-refugees-out/">invade the country and change its culture and religion</a>. Officials of Orbán’s party, Fidesz, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/">have echoed these claims over the years</a>, suggesting Muslim refugees are trying to impose their culture and establish a caliphate on the continent.</p>
<p>For a country with a history of invasion that stretches from the <a href="https://www.ancient.eu/article/1453/the-mongol-invasion-of-europe/">sacking of cities by Mongols</a> through the <a href="https://codenames.info/operation/margarethe-i/">Nazi invasion in 1944</a> and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-put-brutal-end-to-hungarian-revolution">Soviet occupation</a>, the terminology raised fear and unease. </p>
<p>Orbán has also resurrected older anti-Semitic conspiracy theories about Jews and leftists to consolidate his Christian credentials, such as sponsoring exhibits <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-anti-semitism-problem-hungary-jews/">implicitly associating communists with Jews</a>. It has also helped to cement an “us or them” narrative in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1493051">which opponents of Orbán are “othered</a>.” To do this, Orbán chose billionaire philanthropist George Soros as his major foil. </p>
<p>Soros, who is Jewish, was born in Hungary. He went into hiding during the Holocaust and fled the country once communists took control. After the Iron Curtain fell in 1989, Soros <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/viktor-orbans-campaign-against-george-soros-mercenaries/a-44954661">donated millions of dollars to Hungary’s fledgling civil society</a>. </p>
<p>Yet he was easy to demonize for some Hungarians, not only because he was Jewish, but because he had spent most of his adult life outside the country. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, a government tax-funded campaign <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-launches-campaign-targeting-jean-claude-juncker-george-soros/">attacked Soros and then European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker</a>, accusing them of using migration plans to undermine Hungary’s security. </p>
<p>The year before, during the 2018 Hungarian elections, Orbán used even <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-speech-hungarys-orban-attacks-enemy-who-speculates-with-money/">more explicit anti-Semitic undertones to attack Soros</a>: “We are fighting an enemy that is different from us. Not open, but hiding; not straightforward, but crafty; not honest, but base; not national, but international; does not believe in working, but speculates with money.”</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<h2>Deflecting criticisms, seeking allies</h2>
<p>Orbán’s use of Christianity also serves wider foreign policy goals.</p>
<p>The continued erosion of the rule of law in Hungary, including attacks against the free media and the independence of the judiciary, is a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/05/08/how-the-eu-can-better-protect-the-rule-of-law-in-its-member-states/">long-standing concern for the European Union</a>. </p>
<p>But Orbán has, up to now, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/">skillfully taken advantage of the EU’s divisions and weaknesses</a> to avoid any major consequences for his country’s democratic backsliding. He has conveniently used Christianity as a shield to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist">deflect and delegitimize the criticisms from Brussels</a>.</p>
<p>Orbán also invokes Christianity to court allies, close and far. This has been the case with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hungary-general-election-viktor-orban-latest-christianity-nationalism-muslims-migrants-europe-racism-populism-a8293836.html">solidifying the alliance with Hungary’s conservative neighbor Poland</a>. Orbán, after all, understands the importance of close friends in the EU. Not only can they help to counter policies he objects to, but major rule of law sanctions in the EU require unanimity. Poland and Hungary can thus <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c888d73b-e6d0-496d-ba7b-37992427afc7">provide cover for each other</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, Orbán has also made use of Christianity, highlighting Hungary’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist">policies to help persecuted Christians</a>, to build ties with key players beyond Europe. It is noteworthy that Orbán was the only EU leader to attend <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist">the inauguration of the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro</a> in Brazil in 2019. And the Hungarian government has gone out of its way to <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/viktor-orban-among-the-christians/">court religious conservatives and conservative nationalists in the United States</a>.</p>
<h2>Religious embrace</h2>
<p>In many respects, Viktor Orbán’s use of religion is no different from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/religion-politics-evangelicals.html">Ronald Reagan’s embrace of Christian evangelicals</a> in the late 1970s. Both leaders relied on <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1057/9780230616196_9">religious imagery</a> to build bigger voting coalitions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President Ronald Reagan gestures as he speaks to the National Association of Evangelicals" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365542/original/file-20201026-13-1vvqib0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Orbán is far from the first leader to use religion to increase his base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-ronald-reagan-gestures-as-he-speaks-to-the-news-photo/515564272?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Every Republican candidate for president since has <a href="https://www.politicalresearch.org/2019/05/24/aberration-or-reflection-how-understand-changes-political-right">tried to appeal to evangelicals and invoked Christian values</a>. And even <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-use-of-religion-follows-playbook-of-authoritarian-leaning-leaders-the-world-over-140050">ham-handed attempts such as those by President Donald Trump</a> have done little to undermine such unions. </p>
<p>Such an embrace of religious groups is not in itself a problem. But calculated uses of religion to attack domestic and foreign opponents, or to weaken democratic checks and balances, is, we believe, a major concern. Orbán’s Hungary provides a clear warning of how easily Christianity can be distorted and used to erode democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the Transatlantic Policy Center that he co-directs at American University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Gallaher is affiliated with The Latin American Working Groups Education Fund (past board president). I also write for Greater Greater Washington (I'm on the edit board) and Political Research Associates. </span></em></p>Once an atheist, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban embraced Christianity on his way to power – and has used it to consolidate his position since.Garret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International ServiceCarolyn Gallaher, Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1452512020-09-04T08:59:44Z2020-09-04T08:59:44ZBrexit: as the deadline looms, why are negotiations stalling?<p>The UK left the EU on January 31 this year. Yet, the trading relationship between the two parties will not change until January 1 2021, when the transition period agreed by both sides expires. And with negotiators heading into their eighth round of talks to decide what the <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-negotiations-what-does-europe-want-75263">future relationship between the two sides</a> should look like, the pressure is truly on. </p>
<p>A brief stocktaking of the negotiations to date illustrates how they differ from other EU trade negotiations, and how this might affect the outcome. </p>
<p>For one thing, there is a deadline, and the timeframe is extremely tight. There is often a political incentive to conclude trade agreements quickly, as was the case when the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/index_en.htm">EU and Japan</a> intensified negotiations to sign a trade deal to show their commitment to international trade following the US withdrawal from the <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>. But there is never a legal deadline.</p>
<p>In contrast, the trade deal between the EU and the UK must be decided before a specific date or the UK will simply leave the current trading arrangements without a deal. Prime Minister Boris Johnson could have asked for an extension to the transition period but he <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/06/09/boris-johnson-will-not-ask-extension-brexit-transition-period/">chose not to</a>. This was despite pressure from opposition parties and businesses worried about being able to prepare for new trading arrangements while also having to deal with the effects of COVID-19. </p>
<p>Given the two months needed for the EU’s institutions to formally ratify the agreement, the negotiating teams need to agree on a final text by the end of October at the latest. While it is in both parties’ interest to reach a deal, it will be difficult given that their positions remain far apart on many of the key issues. </p>
<p>Sticking points include access to fishing waters and whether the Court of Justice of the EU should be allowed to arbitrate legal disputes between the two sides. There is also the tricky matter of how far UK regulations and standards should match those in the EU to ensure what is called a <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/future-relationship-level-playing-field">“level playing field”</a> between the two sides. </p>
<h2>Making trade harder</h2>
<p>Another unusual aspect of these talks is that even if they succeed, they will produce an arrangement that will make trade between the two sides harder than it used to be. Normally, a trade negotiation facilitates and increases trade between the negotiating partners. Even if a comprehensive, no-tariff no-quota free trade agreement is reached, in this case the two parties will face significant new barriers to trade on January 1 2021. </p>
<p>As the UK leaves the single market and the customs union, there will need to be customs controls between the UK and the EU. There will also need to be controls between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, since the latter will, at least initially, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51271807">predominantly follow EU rules on goods</a>. </p>
<p>Due to this reverse dynamic, where the UK moves away from its highly integrated relationship with the EU, much of the negotiations focus on how to minimise the disruption caused by the UK’s new position as a third country. Clearly, continued trade without tariffs and quotas will help. Yet, for the EU this cannot be offered without guarantees that its businesses are not placed at a disadvantage when the UK gains regulatory autonomy. </p>
<p>The EU does not want the UK to be able to offer more generous state aid to businesses, enabling it to undercut European industry. It also wants the two sides to be aligned on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/02/13/employment-and-social-policy-will-be-a-sticking-point-in-negotiations-between-london-and-brussels/">social security and environmental protection</a>. These are areas where the EU has high standards, and it is worried that any lowering of these in the UK will give British companies a competitive advantage. The UK, however, is unwilling to commit.</p>
<h2>No Canada-style deal</h2>
<p>Unlike in other negotiations, where solutions to impasses are often found in previously concluded agreements, these talks can’t fall back on past precedents. Although the EU has offered nearly tariff and quota-free access to its market to other countries – including Japan, Canada and Singapore – without requiring the same commitments on a level playing field, it will not do the same for the UK. That’s because the overall ambition of these other agreements was to move towards regulatory convergence. The UK, in contrast, is seeking regulatory divergence.</p>
<p>What’s more, the volume of trade between the EU and the UK is such that any undercutting of EU businesses will be felt strongly. The negotiators thus face a challenge in finding a solution to this unique situation of two trading partners moving further away from each other.</p>
<p>They have just a few weeks to find a way through. Otherwise, there will be a no-deal scenario. In line with WTO requirements, tariffs and quotas will then be applied to goods crossing the border. Border checks will need to be carried out by both sides. And the administrative burden for businesses will increase significantly. </p>
<p>A substantial breakthrough is needed when the negotiators meet next week to avoid such a scenario.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trade deals are usually about breaking down barriers. This one is about putting them up.Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1372252020-04-30T15:04:47Z2020-04-30T15:04:47ZProtective gear, rescue packages and research: now the EU spends big to beat coronavirus<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331817/original/file-20200430-42956-1i2ltoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=186%2C42%2C4589%2C3737&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Olivier Hoslet</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the event of a “natural or man-made disaster”, the European Union has a <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E222">treaty-bound duty</a> of solidarity. But the Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, has deplored the <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-what-is-the-european-union-doing-to-manage-the-crisis-135097">lack of help</a> from other EU states in the early days of the crisis. Indeed, member states continue to disagree over the main financial package that will be needed to manage the economic fallout of the pandemic. But some other highly valuable work is being carried out by the EU and its states.</p>
<p>More than <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/summary_tables_of_repatriation_flights_28_april_2020.pdf">500,000 citizens</a> have been brought home by EU states. And when commercial flights have not been available, they have been able to activate the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/76203/good-stories-consular-support-eu-citizens-stranded-abroad_en">EU civil protection mechanism</a> to bring back 53,000 Europeans stranded around the world. </p>
<p>The bloc has also supported a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-g20-freezes-poor-countries-debts-to-add-20b-for-pandemic-fight/">wider international effort</a> to freeze developing countries’ debt for a year. It has approved a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_604">€20 billion support package</a> to help countries around the world manage the crisis, including €3.25 billion for African nations. The Commission has proposed a €3 billion financial package in the form of loans to the Western Balkans, Jordan, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine. It has given €37 million as immediate support to the Balkans, and said it would reallocate €140 million for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Financial support to EU states</h2>
<p>For its own members, the EU is working on a massive plan to provide one trillion euros to states in economic difficulty. This is <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/emmanuel-berretta/si-l-europe-joue-petit-bras-elle-finira-comme-un-vieux-vase-sur-une-etagere-31-03-2020-2369571_1897.php">considered vital</a> for the <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-corriere-covid-19/2329332">survival of the European Union</a>. Its member states are <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-is-gridlocked-over-1-trillion-coronavirus-fund-heres-a-way-forward-137180">struggling</a> to agree on whether financial support should be given as loans or grants but the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has said she <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/merkel-open-to-bigger-eu-budget-bonds-to-finance-post-crisis-recovery/">would consider</a> backing EU bonds through a bigger EU budget – this would mean direct funds for states.</p>
<p>The EU has suspended member states’ growth obligations to allow them to spend billions of euros to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-countries-warn-of-severe-economic-downturn-suspend-stability-pact/">mitigate the economic crisis</a>. EU state aid rules have been relaxed, so states can provide support to their own companies. The European Central Bank announced it would spend €750 billion in bond purchases to <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1%7E3949d6f266.en.html">relieve government debt</a>. The EU put forward a €540 billion support package to tackle the crisis and support workers and businesses. It will make available temporary assistance of up to €100 billion for companies to ensure that employees keep their jobs.</p>
<p>Then there is funding for research related to the virus. The EU offered a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-weighs-into-german-american-spat-over-vaccine-company/">guaranteed loan of €80 million</a> to the German company CureVac to prevent it from being bought by the United States. The European Commission has allocated €48 million to 18 research projects. It is also planning to spend €90 million on the <a href="https://www.imi.europa.eu/">Innovative Medicines Initiative</a> for research on therapeutics and diagnostics (not on preventive vaccines), and private companies working on a virus will be able to apply for funding from the European Innovation Council’s €164 million budget. Another €37 billion from existing EU structural funds is going towards supporting healthcare, businesses and workers through the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative.</p>
<h2>Equipment</h2>
<p>The supply of personal protection equipment got off to a rocky start, with different countries <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/health-ministers-squabble-over-face-masks-at-coronavirus-talks/">refusing to supply to each other</a> or work together. This was despite the fact that the EU coordinated the supply of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_178">12 tons of PPE to China</a> in February 2020. </p>
<p>However, there is now far greater coordination. The Commission eventually convinced Germany and France to <a href="https://www.europe1.fr/societe/la-possibilite-dexport-de-materiel-medical-est-retablie-en-france-et-en-allemagne-assure-thierry-breton-3955408">authorise</a> exports of medical equipment from their own states to other EU states. In addition, member states must now <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2020:077I:FULL&from=EN">authorise </a> their own companies to export medical equipment to non-EU countries. The Commission has <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_575">waived</a> customs duties and VAT on the import of medical equipment from non-EU countries.</p>
<p>New rules also mean that member states can request financial assistance for health emergencies (up to €800 million) from the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/covid-19-coronavirus-outbreak-and-the-eu-s-response/10-things-against-covid-19/">EU Solidarity Fund</a>. An EU-organised joint procurement scheme provides personal protective equipment to member states (the UK controversially refused to take part in this scheme). It has a similar scheme for respiratory ventilators and testing kits, but these have not yet arrived.</p>
<p>In March 2020, the Commission announced the EU would provide 90% of the funding to stockpile €50 million worth of medical equipment. The EU allocated all two million surgical masks, 200,000 N95 masks and 50,000 testing kits it ordered from China <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/coronavirus/news/eu-allocates-chinese-aid-to-italy-to-fight-against-the-pandemic/">to Italy</a>. In Greece, 500 mobile medical units co-financed by the EU will soon <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/coronavirus-european-solidarity-action_en">test citizens at their homes</a>. </p>
<p>In early April 2020, a team of European doctors and nurses from Romania and Norway, deployed through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, was <a href="https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/coronavirus-eu-medical-corps-deployed-to-italy-eu-commission-press/">sent to Italy</a>. Independently of the EU initiatives, Austria, Germany and Luxembourg have made their intensive care units available to Dutch, French and Italian patients. </p>
<p>Germany is taking care of 200 patients from <a href="http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/berlin-va-payer-les-soins-des-patients-europeens-hospitalises-en-allemagne-20-04-2020-8302515.php?fbclid=IwAR1gljkw1-nprKmhK_-JvtvaAUK3tVqkAw3CtKBoFyRhiyKAJEtiXDLTRfw">other EU states</a> and both Poland and Germany have sent teams of doctors to help treat patients in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/coronavirus-european-solidarity-action_en">hospitals in Italy</a>. Denmark is sending ventilators and field hospital equipment to Italy. </p>
<p>The Czech Republic delivered 20,000 protective suits to Italy and Spain. France has donated one million masks to Italy and 20,000 protective suits. Germany has delivered 300 ventilators to Italy, and 60 to the UK (a ventilator costs $25,000).</p>
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<p>Despite all this, the EU could do more. It could establish a common position on <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/its-not-too-late-to-go-on-offense-against-the-coronavirus">testing, contact tracing, isolation, social distancing (including mask wearing), and treatment</a>. It could do much more to learn from those states dealing relatively well with the epidemic, such as China, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam, New Zealand, Portugal, Greece and Germany. And it could encourage states to <a href="https://www.change.org/p/uk-parliament-pay-all-key-workers-at-least-15-an-hour?recruiter=11520784&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=psf_combo_share_initial&recruited_by_id=5a808cb0-c07d-012f-fbec-4040aa777426">increase the wages of its care workers</a>.</p>
<p>EU state leaders could also even decide to supranationalise health policies – that is, transfer power to EU institutions in order to have a common health policy. They could follow the steps of the founding members of the European Communities, when they decided to supranationalise trade policies in 1957. By doing so, there would be better chances to ensure a common and immediate response to future health emergencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout has received funding from the British government and the European Union.</span></em></p>The union has understandably faced criticism for failing to agree on some important issues, but vital work is going on too.Catherine Gegout, Jean Monnet Research Fellow, EUI, Firenze, 2019-20, and Associate Professor in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1232212019-09-12T09:47:09Z2019-09-12T09:47:09ZBrexit: what will the EU’s next move be?<p>The latest political drama and developments surrounding Brexit in the UK have had a distinctly domestic focus. There has been little consideration of the other side in the Brexit negotiations.</p>
<p>The UK’s prime minister, Boris Johnson, claims he can reach a new deal with the EU27 at the next European Council meeting on October 17 and 18 with very little discussion about how the EU might respond. Even the British bill demanding he seek a Brexit extension if he fails to strike a deal has been adopted by parliament without considering that the EU simply might not grant him one. </p>
<p>London is signalling renewed energy and momentum and a commitment to <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/103009/boris-johnson-vows-to-up-tempo-in-brexit-negotiations">up the tempo in the negotiations </a> with the EU. But that contrasts significantly with <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-boris-johnson-eu-no-deal-michael-barnier-ireland-a9093396.html">claims from Brussels</a> that no real negotiations have taken place since Johnson entered Number 10, despite the EU’s continued readiness to engage.</p>
<p>While positive political statements by French president <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49427007">Emmanuel Macron</a> and German chancellor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/aug/21/angela-merkel-challenges-boris-johnson-to-find-backstop-solution-in-30-days-video">Angela Merkel</a> can influence the pace and direction of negotiations, no real progress will be made without concrete proposals from the UK, particularly on the contentious issue of how to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland.</p>
<p>The EU has repeatedly made it clear that a <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/irish-backstop-62530">backstop solution</a> for the Irish border, which will only come into effect unless and until it is superseded by a new agreement, is indispensable. The EU has also stressed that it will not reopen talks on the 600-page withdrawal agreement, which was the result of one-and-a-half years of intense negotiations between the EU and the UK. Furthermore, it is wholly committed to maintaining the integrity of the single market. With all this in mind, what might the EU’s next moves be?</p>
<h2>Nobody wants no deal</h2>
<p>Although significant preparations for a no-deal Brexit have taken place across the EU, it wants to avoid such a scenario – up to a point. It will therefore seriously consider any proposal presented by the UK to reach a deal.</p>
<p>One proposal hinted at is an all-Ireland solution, whereby Northern Ireland remains more closely aligned to the regulatory framework and customs territory of the EU. Given that this was the initial proposal for the backstop – before it was rejected by the DUP and changed to incorporate all of the UK, the EU would most likely agree to this. But before it can be discussed, the proposal needs to be detailed and presented formally by the UK. </p>
<p>The prime minister would also have to convince the EU that this deal could be ratified domestically – something that is far from certain, given the political sensitivities of having a border down the Irish Sea. Yet, at this stage, if the UK is serious about wanting a deal, it needs to concentrate its efforts on options that are acceptable to the EU. </p>
<p>If – and this is a big “if” – a political deal were to be reached at the European Council meeting in October, there is very little time for both sides to formally give it the green light in time for the current deadline of October 31. Even if the EU has, so far, acted swiftly in relation to Brexit, the actual process of getting member states and the European Parliament to ratify the deal will have to happen in an extremely tight timeframe to meet the deadline. </p>
<p>That raises the question of whether to grant an extension and how long it should be. The bill that recently passed in the UK parliament provides a way of avoiding a no-deal scenario in the short term. Either an agreement is reached and only a short technical extension is required or no agreement is reached and Johnson has to ask for an extension until January 31 2020.</p>
<p>The short technical extension for ratification purposes is unlikely to be controversial. From a domestic UK perspective, the longer January date would allow time for a general election that could potentially change the arithmetic in Parliament. </p>
<p>But how will the EU respond to such an extension request? It has previously granted extensions but has, each time, rejected the lengths originally proposed by the UK. The UK’s first request for an extension from March 29 to June 30 2019 was shortened to April 12 to ensure a UK exit prior to the European Parliament election campaign. And its second request for an extension to June 30 was lengthened to October 31, to allow for meaningful progress on negotiations instead of just more time debating the same agreement in the UK, and to see Brexit concluded before the new Commission takes office on November 1 2020. </p>
<p>There are strong reasons for why the EU might be hesitant to agree to yet another extension. The 27 member states and the EU institutions have spent an enormous amount of time, energy and financial, administrative and political resources on dealing with Brexit – and they want to move on. The extensions granted so far have led to little progress on the UK side. And the levels of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-delay-extension-france-macron-veto-article-50-boris-johnson-a9094221.html">trust </a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/09/eu-losing-patience-britain-dutch-minister">patience</a> with the UK are declining. </p>
<p>Yet, the EU does not want to be the one responsible for causing a no-deal exit. It is in its interest to have a deal, as it reduces the uncertainty following from Brexit, and provides a solid base from which to start negotiations on the future EU-UK relationship. It would also be difficult for the EU to refuse an extension if its purpose is for the UK to engage in a democratic exercise, such as holding a general election. As a result, the EU is most likely to agree to an extension. The question is until when?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All the drama has played out in the UK lately – with very little regard for whether any of the options under discussion would be acceptable to the EU.Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, Lecturer in Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1232182019-09-11T12:53:01Z2019-09-11T12:53:01ZBrexit: how the people are using ‘news avoidance’ to escape the post-truth world of politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291938/original/file-20190911-190031-1onzr3f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Brexit is dominating headlines.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU2ODIyMjM4MiwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMTI4NjMxNDM1MSIsImsiOiJwaG90by8xMjg2MzE0MzUxL21lZGl1bS5qcGciLCJtIjoxLCJkIjoic2h1dHRlcnN0b2NrLW1lZGlhIn0sIjhMNVg4SFlIdW1lVWxRQ2FyODVNMmNQbDcvYyJd%2Fshutterstock_1286314351.jpg&pi=33421636&m=1286314351&src=AK6Qfg8nEM1AhoI4pW55JQ-1-1">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When war breaks out among the political class, <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-suspends-parliament-what-does-it-mean-for-brexit-and-why-are-mps-so-angry-122574">as it has over Brexit</a>, journalists are bound to get excited. It works the other way, too: excitement among journos puts the wind up the politicos. Accordingly, in recent weeks, their frenzied interaction blew a perfect storm across <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episodes/b006mk25/newsnight">College Green</a>, the media’s favoured haunt outside the Palace of Westminster.</p>
<p>For journalists who’ve reported the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5h6io2Nstvg">near-death</a> of professional news media as we know it, strife among the politicos presents an even more exciting prospect. Recalling the editor’s adage that “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/two-takes-depression/201106/if-it-bleeds-it-leads-understanding-fear-based-media">if it bleeds it leads</a>”, they may hope this bout of political bloodletting will lead to a revival of journalism’s public ratings. </p>
<p>No such luck, according to The Guardian columnist John Harris. During his most recent perambulation, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/series/anywhere-but-westminster">Anywhere But Westminster</a>, the people from northern England he interviewed were largely uninterested in reports of Westminster shenanigans, prompting Harris to warn of “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/09/brexit-chaos-boris-johnson-tory-crisis-public-mood">the media combusting with excitement, while millions of people look the other way</a>”.</p>
<p>This tallies with findings from the <a href="http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/">Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism</a>, which reports that approximately 32% of people regularly avoid the news, a rise of 11% since 2017, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/commentisfree/2019/jun/30/how-can-we-lure-back-all-the-people-who-avoid-news">mainly due to the intractable and polarising nature of Brexit</a>”. Understandably, <a href="https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/06/why-do-some-people-avoid-news-because-they-dont-trust-us-or-because-they-dont-think-we-add-value-to-their-lives/">news avoidance</a> has become a hot topic.</p>
<h2>Reality? No thanks</h2>
<p>The term “news avoidance” suggests that these people are avoiding reality. The underlying principle of public journalism is that readers are also citizens whose actions in the real world are based on the reality they have come to know from the news. While acknowledging that this “reality” is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08821127.1989.10731188">put together</a> by journalists, in line with the Frankfurt School’s concept of the “<a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1944/culture-industry.htm">culture industry</a>”, many academics accept that “not to know” is to retire from reality. </p>
<p>Yet this way of thinking about journalism and its role in society fails to address the recent experience of Harris’ interviewees and millions more. For them, journos and politicos have combined to produce the “unreal”, distant world of the “Westminster Village”, a world that many ordinary people feel disconnected from, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-surprising-origins-of-post-truth-and-how-it-was-spawned-by-the-liberal-left-68929">“post-truth” world</a>. Seen from this perspective, avoiding the news may be an attempt to escape the unreality concocted exclusively by residents of that gated community.</p>
<p>This would further explain how an unstable consensus seems to have emerged away from the Westminster Village. Regardless of what they voted for in the 2016 referendum, more than three years on, many Leavers and Remainers just want Brexit sorted. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/09/brexit-chaos-boris-johnson-tory-crisis-public-mood">As Harris reports</a>, it seems “as if a particularly awful working week has somehow failed to end, and most of us simply want to switch off the lights and go home, wherever that is”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-surprising-origins-of-post-truth-and-how-it-was-spawned-by-the-liberal-left-68929">The surprising origins of 'post-truth' – and how it was spawned by the liberal left</a>
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<p>Nor is this the first time that voters have asked to return to the real world. Much of the Leave vote was always motivated by the desire to escape the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/30/voted-leave-eu-racist-idiot-intolerance-brexiters">unaccountably</a> <a href="https://graziadaily.co.uk/life/real-life/meet-young-women-voted-brexit/">baffling</a> and seemingly <a href="https://euobserver.com/economic/135348">“Kafkaesque” world of the EU</a>, while Remainers were equally keen to get off the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2018/07/remainers-who-blame-brexit-english-nationalism-are-making-big-mistake">fantasy island</a> identified with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/england-eu-referendum-brexit">narrow-minded Englishness</a>. Indeed, away from Westminster, <em>both</em> groups of voters have seemingly been requesting a reality check. This means checking out of the unreality foisted on them for 20 years by the journo-politico class.</p>
<h2>Living on Thin Air</h2>
<p>In 1999, journalist and policy wonk Charles Leadbeater announced in his book of the same name that we were <a href="https://charlesleadbeater.net/1999/01/living-on-thin-air-the-new-economy/">Living On Thin Air</a>. The old order is giving way to a new economy in which “knowledge, ideas and creativity are the most important factors,” Leadbeater declared; and Westminster Villagers waved their order papers in approval.</p>
<p>Though there never was a frictionless “new economy”, since the 1990s, the distance between financial gain and the social production of new value, has grown ever greater. The City of London established itself as the world capital of “<a href="https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/f/i.htm">fictitious capital</a>” (identified by Karl Marx as the “money business” in which the greater portion of this “money capital” is purely illusory); and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264999994_The_Crunch_and_the_Crisis_the_unravelling_of_lifestyle_capitalism">the rest of the British economy</a> has come to resemble it.</p>
<p>Journalism, as I have explained <a href="https://utpjournals.press/loi/topia">elsewhere</a>, has also largely been “financialised”. Many journalists, rather than reporting new stories, have been “<a href="https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/ripping-debate-reporters-at-national-newspaper-website-were-asked-to-rewrite-seven-stories-a-day-without-making-any-phone-calls/">ripping</a>” their content from what has already been published elsewhere – just as the financial economy operates in the sphere of circulation rather than investing in new production.</p>
<p>Fine if you’ve managed to find your niche in this rarefied atmosphere. But, as commentator <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jya7nThQp8I">David Goodhart</a> pointed out, Britain is now divided between the minority – educated, affluent and mobile “anywheres” – who’ve been invited into this intensively globalised existence, and the millions of others – less well-educated and more rooted “somewheres” – for whom it remains unreal.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291939/original/file-20190911-190016-1als0bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Tony Blair put distance between the people and politics.</span>
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<p>Those who cannot escape reality are bound to resent the virtual world inhabited by the few – and the EU became the target of their resentment. To them, it is the political counterpart to financialisation: the latter is distant from production while the EU is seen as equally removed from the people who make up its member states. Thus, in 2017, a Demos <a href="https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Nothing-to-Fear-but-Fear-Itelf-final-short.pdf">survey</a> “found that more than half of respondents in Britain, France, Germany and Spain have low levels of trust in the European Commission”.</p>
<p>But besides Brussels, a politics distant from the people already had a home in Westminster. Manoeuvres to stall the 2016 referendum result, block the Boris Brexit and delay a general election are further episodes in the depopulated politics piloted by New Labour as far back as the 1990s. Tony Blair’s New Labour made politics into a <a href="https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/new-labour-brand-10-years/653501">brand</a> which is not only unrecognisable to traditional Labour voters but also unreal to a people increasingly <a href="https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/publications/reports/audit-of-political-engagement-16">disengaged</a> from the public sphere. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-suspends-parliament-what-does-it-mean-for-brexit-and-why-are-mps-so-angry-122574">Boris Johnson suspends parliament: what does it mean for Brexit and why are MPs so angry?</a>
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<p>I would like to think that a new actor – possibly in the guise of the Brexit Party – will arrive on the scene and cut short the pantomime that passes for politics today. If my position is identified with “populism”, so be it. I might add that in my opinion such drastic action would not amount to the birth of a new politics, but is simply one of the preconditions for rebirth to occur.</p>
<p>But perhaps even this can’t happen just yet. It may be that before we become truly political again, we will need to find new ways of describing what we have in common. Drama did this for the Ancient Greeks in the run-up to their greatest invention – democracy; Shakespearean theatre performed a similar role for the proto-politics of the early 17th century. If it’s still too early for a different type of politician, maybe the order of the day is for artists, thinkers and journalists to address social reality in ways which prepare the common ground for change. </p>
<p>A new journalism would have to prove itself to people who are not resident or connected to the Westminster Village. It could begin by getting to grips with the extra-parliamentary consensus against unreality. Then journalism would start to be the real thing once more.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Calcutt is not a member of any political party, but he supports his wife who has been selected by The Brexit Party as prospective parliamentary candidate for East Ham.</span></em></p>The political class is tearing itself to pieces, and journalists are making sure we can read all about it. But beyond Westminster, why would people care about things they can do nothing about?Andrew Calcutt, Principal Lecturer in Journalism, Humanities and Creative Industries, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1155902019-05-10T13:03:31Z2019-05-10T13:03:31ZEuropean elections: voters are being short changed, despite the appearance of choice<p>The 2019 European elections are odd in several ways. Any candidate standing in the UK who wins a place in the European Parliament may not take their seat for long. The country is only a reluctant participant in the vote and British MEPs will of course have to leave the parliament as soon as the UK leaves the EU. </p>
<p>And even though this has become a one-issue vote, the choice of parties is more kaleidoscopic than in any recent UK contest. The outcome may tell us more about the failings of the British party system than about the will of the people.</p>
<p>At the last EU elections in 2014, six parties had enough votes to win representation in mainland Britain. This year, it looks like as many as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48027580">nine parties</a> will have the support required to claim seats. This is the result of the fracturing of the minor parties alongside division within the major players. It also means that voters will have to vote carefully if their voice is to be heard.</p>
<h2>Small parties</h2>
<p>Among Remainers and those hoping for another EU referendum, the Liberal Democrats, Greens and Scottish and Welsh nationalists have been joined by Change UK. This is a new alternative party, born out of the formation of the Independent Group of MPs defecting from Labour and the Conservatives. It has the allure of celebrity candidates including journalists Gavin Esler and Rachel Johnson (sister of Boris). Former Conservative cabinet minister Stephen Dorrell is also standing as an MEP for the party.</p>
<p>Leave purists face a dilemma. They could support UKIP, the established brand for those ready to quit the EU without a deal, or the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage. The latter was of course originally a central figure in UKIP but now accuses his former colleagues of allowing themselves to be associated with racism. This contest between party label and personal appeal seems at present to be going <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/04/17/brexit-party-leading-eu-parliament-polls">Farage’s way</a>, but UKIP increased its vote at the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-47786885">Newport West by-election</a> and still likes to see itself as the true voice of Brexit.</p>
<p>This mitosis of the minor parties has, in turn, caused infighting and inertia within Labour and the Conservatives. Many of Theresa May’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-party-latest-theresa-may-eu-parliament-elections-nigel-farage-a8879806.html">councillors</a> are reported to be enthusiasts of Farage and as many as 40% may vote for him in the European elections rather than their own party. This would be an unprecedented level of public mutiny among the elected officials of a British political party.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Labour leadership continues to vacillate about a second referendum and its attempts to convince May to break her red lines have so far failed. For parties to have a mandate, they must have a message - but neither major party does.</p>
<p>Some find this situation laughable but it should be more than an object of ridicule: it robs voters of their voice at the moment it is most needed.</p>
<p>A simplification of party functions in a democratic system might be that they provide voters with policies to choose between, people to represent them and the chance to participate by mobilising them. This relies on the parties having unity and distinctiveness.</p>
<p>In these elections, the main parties don’t have distinct platforms. And, in fact, neither are even united around their own platform. The Tory civil war is over the kind of Brexit the party wants; Labour’s is about whether it should support Brexit at all.</p>
<p>The minor parties don’t have enough candidates with the recognition, experience and support to act as a sizeable, stable force. Even UKIP has found that 21 of its 24 MEPs from 2014 <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gerard-batten-ukip-resignations/">will not stand</a> for the party again.</p>
<h2>Tough choice</h2>
<p>The Conservatives are losing the will to mobilise voters, and Labour is losing the power. The minor parties – even in a proportional representation system – run the risk of splitting the vote of their constituency so far that it loses representation. Despite getting nearly 7% of the vote last time, for example, the Greens only scraped over the threshold required to win a seat in three of the UK’s 12 regions last time. The Liberal Democrats, with 6.6%, won only one of 73 UK seats. </p>
<p>The institutions of British politics – its government, parties and parliament – have failed miserably to find a solution to Brexit because visible public opinion was frozen in time on June 23 2016. A clear balance of preference at these elections – however futile they are for securing representation – could break that deadlock.</p>
<p>Voters need to pay close attention to which candidates are standing for their party, and which party of their view has the best chance. If that doesn’t happen – and public attention has not been a feature of EU elections in the past – the best that can be hoped for is a giant opinion poll which is at least as hard to interpret as the word “Leave” in a referendum.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115590/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Cole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are more parties than ever running for the European parliament in the UK – but that isn’t necessarily a good thing.Matthew Cole, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1125762019-03-01T15:37:12Z2019-03-01T15:37:12ZBrexit delay: what it would take for the EU to agree article 50 extension<p>For the first time – 23 months after the UK triggered the article 50 negotiations to begin the process of leaving the European Union – Theresa May acknowledged that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">it might be necessary</a> to delay Brexit day. Reportedly under pressure from a number of the Remainers in her cabinet, keen to emphasise her own opposition to a delay, but also hoping to push hard-line Brexiteers towards support of her deal, the prime minister conceded that an extension of the two-year article 50 period beyond March 29 might be necessary.</p>
<p>Missing from the discussion in the House of Commons was any reference to what say the other member states – the EU27 – would have in the matter. Such an omission is typical of what has gone on in the UK in the past few years. Much of the debate about the negotiations and the UK’s future relationship with the EU has proceeded without any reference to the position of the EU27, still less recognition of their interests, aims or strategy.</p>
<p>An extension to article 50 could, however, disrupt the UK’s solipsism. If it looks like the UK is heading down this course, loose talk about the desirability of extending the negotiations will confront a hard reality: the UK cannot unilaterally decide on an extension to the negotiations. London would have to make a proposal, to which the EU27 would have to agree – with unanimous consent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-how-article-50-could-be-extended-to-delay-uks-departure-from-the-eu-109966">Brexit: how article 50 could be extended to delay UK's departure from the EU</a>
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<h2>Not yes to every request</h2>
<p>Let’s assume that May fails again to get her deal through the UK parliament and that MPs vote “no deal” off the table in mid-March when given the option. She then decides to ask the EU for an extension. This would already be a difficult move for the prime minister, who has reiterated – <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/bill-cash-and-peter-bone-on-theresa-may-brexit-betrayal-1-5907600">reportedly 108 times</a> – that the UK will leave the EU on 29 March. </p>
<p>The EU27’s response to such a request would depend on the circumstances. Generally positive comments on the issue have come from the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, who said he now regarded an extension as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/feb/25/donald-tusk-article-50-extension-rational-solution-brexit-video">“rational solution”</a>, and president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who said a request from the UK <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-juncker/no-one-in-europe-would-oppose-extension-to-brexit-talks-juncker-idUKKCN1Q71RF">would be welcomed</a>.</p>
<p>But as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, said on February 27, the reason would <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-article-50-extend-macron-merkel-theresa-may-france-germany-eu-talks-a8799506.html">need to be “clear”</a>. It’s unlikely, for example, that the EU27 would agree to an extension in order to renegotiate the EU-UK withdrawal agreement, or the complicated issue of the Irirhs backstop. They consider both issues closed. They would also want to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/28/extension-article-50-must-be-one-off-brussels-eu27-uk-brexit-delay">avoid repeated requests</a> from the UK.</p>
<p>The EU’s first preference since the referendum has for been for a change of mind in the UK and for the country to remain in the EU. If that isn’t possible, the EU wants an orderly departure. It regards “no deal” as a disaster, even if the EU27 stand to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-no-deal-brexit-would-be-less-costly-for-the-eu-than-the-uk-110407">less badly hit</a> than the UK. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely, however, that the EU27 would give their consent to just any request from London. They see no evidence that May has been able to make any progress since the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration">withdrawal agreement</a> was agreed in late November 2018, and they have little confidence in her ability to secure a majority for her deal at Westminster.</p>
<h2>Two, three or six months</h2>
<p>The prime minister told MPs that any extension would <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47373246/brexit-may-statement-on-future-votes-and-article-50-extension">have to be short</a>. She would be subject to intense political pressures from Brexiteers in her party, sections of the press, and public opinion, which polls suggest would favour no more than three months. May would also want to avoid UK participation in elections to the European parliament. She said that people would find it strange for a country that is about to leave the EU to vote in the elections. </p>
<p>Since the elections are <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/elections">scheduled for 23-26 May</a>, that would allow an extension of just under two months. Or, if the aim is for any extension to finish before the members of the European parliament (MEPs) take up their seats on July 1, that could allow for an extension of three months. Though since hearings to select a new commission president – one of the new parliament’s first major tasks – will not begin until the autumn, six months might be a possibility.</p>
<p>On the EU side, however, there is scepticism about what a short extension would achieve. Although the timing of the European elections does complicate the situation, the problem they present is not insurmountable. Even the fact that seats have been re-allocated in anticipation of the UK’s departure <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/the-european-council-establishes-the-composition-of-the-european-parliament/">could be dealt with</a>. </p>
<p>From an EU perspective, the obligation to contribute to the EU budget beyond March 29 on the part of the UK would not be overly problematic. As part of the arrangements for the transition period built into the withdrawal agreement, the UK has already agreed that it would maintain its contributions in 2019 and 2020. Problems would arise only if an extension period went beyond 2020, since that’s when the current EU budget period ends and the EU is currently negotiating the EU budget for the seven-year period that follows.</p>
<p>In the event, if the alternative is a no-deal Brexit with the disruption that such an outcome would entail, the EU27 may reluctantly agree to a short extension. However, it’s unlikely to do so without imposing conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Kassim receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. He is an Associate Fellow of 'The UK in a Changing Europe'.</span></em></p>Even if parliament votes to delay Brexit beyond March 29, the EU27 would have to unanimously agree. Would they?Hussein Kassim, Professor of Politics, Political, Social and International Studies, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099662019-01-16T16:15:25Z2019-01-16T16:15:25ZBrexit: how article 50 could be extended to delay UK’s departure from the EU<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46885828">crushing defeat</a> of the government’s Brexit plan in the House of Commons, the question on everyone’s lips is “what next?” Opinion is divided: some say the UK is now heading for “no deal”, others for “no Brexit”. </p>
<p>If nothing is agreed, current UK law means the UK will leave the EU without a deal on March 29 – two years after the prime minister, Theresa May, triggered <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M050">article 50</a>, the article of the EU treaty which governs a state’s withdrawal. If the UK takes the decision to revoke <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M050">article 50</a> the UK remains within the bloc with all its rights under EU law intact. </p>
<p>But both major parties insist that it is still possible to conjure up a new Brexit deal. As time is now very short, debate is turning to extending article 50, deferring the date on which the UK leaves the EU. </p>
<p>Under domestic law, extending article 50 would require changes to the March 29 exit date set in the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/contents/enacted">EU Withdrawal Act</a>. As a matter of EU law, the text of article 50 states that the UK cannot unilaterally extend the two-year negotiation period. Nor can it “demand” an extension. It can only “ask for” one. The request would then be considered by the European Council, and an extension would only be granted with the unanimous agreement of the remaining 27 member states, the EU-27. In principle, the extension could be short or long. There is no legal bar to the article 50 period being extended more than once.</p>
<p>That is the law. The rest is politics – and so, inevitably in these volatile times, rather speculative. But it is – and this is a lesson which many have yet to learn – important to be alert to EU politics, as well as goings on in Westminster. </p>
<h2>The type of request matters</h2>
<p>Any extension requires the unanimous agreement of the EU-27. On the EU side the messaging has been clear: the EU will consider an extension request in the light of its strategic interests. All member states will need to be persuaded that they will benefit from granting the UK extra time. And there are practical – but not insurmountable – difficulties with any extension which runs beyond the start of July, when the new European Parliament is first scheduled to sit after <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/en/your-meps/european_elections.html">May elections</a>. Guy Verhofstadt, the EU parliament’s chief Brexit representative, for example, tweeted that it would be “unthinkable” that “article 50 is prolonged beyond the European elections”.</p>
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<p>This means that a lot depends on the nature of the UK’s request. If the extension is to allow time for a new Brexit deal, the EU will want assurances that the new deal commands the support of the UK parliament. So the UK could not obtain an extension now. It could only do so once it could demonstrate to the EU that there is majority House of Commons support for a new approach – and once the EU had been able to ascertain that the new approach was viable from its perspective. </p>
<p>I welcome the signs that there will now be cross-party attempts to find a new deal, for example along the lines of a “Norway-plus” model. But I see few grounds to be optimistic that a better Brexit deal, which commands majority support, can suddenly be found. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/would-a-norway-option-break-the-brexit-stalemate-heres-what-new-polling-tells-us-109823">Would a Norway option break the Brexit stalemate? Here's what new polling tells us</a>
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<p>From the EU’s perspective, changes to the non-binding <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759021/25_November_Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom__.pdf">political declaration</a> for the future EU-UK relationship are much more likely to be accepted than changes to the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf">withdrawal agreement</a> itself, which EU officials insist has been locked down. </p>
<p>Any attempt to reopen the withdrawal agreement, with the aim to find a new approach to the controversial issue of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/irish-border-46135">Irish border</a>, will very likely be rejected out of hand. In any event, for an extension on the basis of a new deal to be granted, UK politics would have to move uncharacteristically quickly and decisively in the days and weeks ahead.</p>
<h2>In the EU’s hands</h2>
<p>There are a host of other reasons for which an extension might be sought. In each case, the EU will evaluate the attractiveness of the UK’s request and decide whether the extension should be granted. </p>
<p>A short extension may be sought to enable UK legislation to be passed to prepare for Brexit, whether on the basis of a new deal or no deal. </p>
<p>A longer extension would be needed for a second referendum. Given the complexities involved, any such extension would likely have implications for the European parliamentary elections. But, in the light of the government’s defeat and the ongoing divisions within parliament, a second referendum surely looks less likely – it is not easy to see that there is a “leave” option for another referendum ballot that enough MPs will agree to. </p>
<p>A longer extension again would be needed for a general election – though perhaps not as long as a second referendum. Given the timescale, the inherent uncertainty about the outcome and the lack of clarity about the main parties’ position, the EU would be very unlikely to accept an extension on that basis.</p>
<p>So, while an extension is possible, it is the EU’s to grant. To obtain an extension the UK will have to look beyond Westminster and appeal to the EU’s interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phil Syrpis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After a huge defeat for the government’s Brexit deal, could it ask for more time to negotiate?Phil Syrpis, Professor of EU Law, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.