tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/grace-mugabe-26550/articlesGrace Mugabe – The Conversation2022-07-03T08:10:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856482022-07-03T08:10:30Z2022-07-03T08:10:30ZBook on Zimbabwe strongman Robert Mugabe’s legacy has many flaws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470799/original/file-20220624-17-oop0y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe died in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Development studies professor David Moore’s new <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a>, Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe, attempts to understand the legacy of <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a>, who led Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017, when he lost power in a military coup. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-b-moore-285501">Moore</a> maintains that Mugabe’s legacy revolves around what he terms “the three Cs”: coups, conspiracies and conceits of political power. He shows that “the three Cs” have their origins in the perilous politics of the independence struggle, in which Mugabe was a key participant.</p>
<p>The book consists of a prologue and 10 chapters. The first chapter seeks “to erect a conceptual structure on which the Zimbabwe ‘facts’ will sit”. Chapters two to five set out “the making of Mugabe and his legacy” in the liberation struggle years. Chapters six to nine trace the independence time trajectory of Mugabe’s political career through to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">2017 coup</a>. Chapter ten examines Zimbabwean politics after Mugabe’s fall from power and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49604152">death in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>The scholars <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003026280/personality-cult-politics-mugabe-zimbabwe-ezra-chitando">Ezra Chitando</a>; <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Robert+Mugabe">Sue Onslow and Martin Plaut</a>; <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/11424894/mugabe">Stephen Chan</a>; and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2">Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya</a>, among others, have debated the legacies of Mugabe’s 37-year rule. </p>
<p>Moore largely ignores the contributions of these important contending studies about Mugabe’s legacies. This is subnormal academic practice. Consequently, the precise ways in which his book surpasses or buttresses competing works about Mugabe’s legacy are indistinct.</p>
<p>Bar an interview with the veteran nationalist politician Edgar Tekere (who had a mammoth lifelong axe to grind with Mugabe) in 2004, Moore did not interview anybody else in Zanu-PF who knew Mugabe well, or worked closely with him for an extended period. For that reason, the book is bereft of exceptionally revealing findings about Mugabe’s leadership, legacy and the politics of Zanu-PF. Moore’s main sources are unremarkable diplomatic cables in Western archives and material already in the public domain such as newspaper articles, NGO reports and published books. They do not make for a groundbreaking book.</p>
<h2>Missing the point</h2>
<p>We live in an age where the decolonisation of the knowledge agenda has, rightly, come to the fore in the academy. In light of this, I expected arguments about Mugabe’s leadership developed by black Zimbabwean scholars based in Zimbabwe to be central to Moore’s analysis. In place of debates about Mugabe by black Zimbabwean scholars, he has the thought of 20th century Italian Marxist intellectual-politician <a href="https://globalsocialtheory.org/thinkers/gramsci-antonio/">Antonio Gramsci</a> as his book’s central point of reference. </p>
<p>Moore invokes Gramsci <em>ad infinitum</em>, without ever properly contextualising his ideas or making clear their illuminating pertinence in debates about Mugabe’s legacy. Nor does Moore use his study of Mugabe’s legacy to extend and refine Gramscian theories. My comprehension of Mugabe, his legacy and Zanu-PF was not enhanced in any novel way after all that Gramsci. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=882&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470798/original/file-20220624-22-lqecj8.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1108&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Discussion of real and imagined coups is an important theme in Moore’s book. This is presented as a key component of Mugabe’s legacy. But, Moore does not engage relevant coup and military rule literature in order to enhance our understanding of Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup, and for the coup to advance broader studies about the nature and effects of coups, such as work by <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300040432">Samuel Decalo</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/african-government-politics-and-policy/when-soldiers-rebel-ethnic-armies-and-political-instability-africa?format=HB&isbn=9781108422475">Kristen Harkness</a>, <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10989/seizing-power">Naunihal Singh</a>, <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">Barbara Geddes</a> and <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/In+Idi+Amin%E2%80%99s+Shadow">Alicia Decker</a>, among others.</p>
<p>Moore states that he finds coup literature “boring” because it consists of “conservative tracts on the primordial-like prebendal and neo-patrimonial coupishness of Africans” (page 164). Serious coup scholars will bristle at his characterisation of their work as “conservative”, and defined by a propensity to regard Africans as innately prone to coup making because of personalised patronage-based politics. </p>
<p>Moore cursorily engages the African studies scholar <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1973.tb01413.x">Ali Mazrui’s 1973 article</a>, called Lumpen Proletariat and Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as New Political Class, about the consequences of coups, to underline why he finds coup literature “boring” and unhelpful.</p>
<p>The problem with this is that Mazrui’s article is dated and was hardly authoritative even in 1973. Moore depicts a crude caricature of a diverse, sophisticated, instructive and evolving coup and military rule literature.</p>
<h2>Portrayal of women</h2>
<p>Feminist scholarship has done much to challenge patriarchal erasure and trivialisation of women in political science. Moore’s book does precisely what feminist scholars have critiqued for decades now. It is laden with unquestioned patriarchal notions and gendered trivialisations that impoverish the study of politics.</p>
<p>Moore writes as if nothing can be gained analytically by treating women (Zimbabwe’s former <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Grace_Mugabe">first lady Grace Mugabe</a>, specifically) seriously. By this I mean methodically tracing, listening to and understanding women’s actual political incentives and experiences. </p>
<p>Moore employs sexist tropes when discussing Grace Mugabe’s role in politics and the 2017 coup. For example, he describes her as “the volatile former secretary”, “the woman who whipped her son’s girlfriend” and “incendiary Grace”. Yet there is no mention of the equally notable emotional volatility of the powerful political men – Mugabe, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Constantino_Chiwenga">Constantino Chiwenga</a>, <a href="http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Dzinashe%20Machingura.pdf">Dzinashe Machingura</a>, <a href="https://www.colonialrelic.com/biographies/joshua-nkomo/">Joshua Nkomo</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/samora-machel">Samora Machel</a> and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Josiah_Tongogara">Josiah Tongogara</a> – who he discusses in his book.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to an enhanced understanding of the making of Mugabe and his legacy, the politics of Zanu-PF, and coups and their corollaries.</p>
<p><em>Blessing Miles Tendi is the author of <a href="http://www.milestendi.com/books">The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe - Mujuru, the liberation fighter and kingmaker</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing-Miles Tendi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to them.Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421952020-07-26T09:52:15Z2020-07-26T09:52:15ZEternal mothers, whores or witches: being a woman in politics in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349183/original/file-20200723-29-8mzr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grace Mugabe at the funeral of former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The political arena in Zimbabwe is a de facto male space in which women play very peripheral and insignificant roles. <a href="https://www.theindigopress.com/these-bones-will-rise-again">Author</a> and scholar Panashe Chigumadzi sums the situation up in an op-ed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/opinion/zimbabwe-elections-mugabe-fear-women.html">article</a>, writing that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politics in Zimbabwe remains a man’s game, and virility is a measure of one’s ability to rule over others. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not the place of women to rule, especially over men. Women who dare to aspire to rule are considered to be wild and unruly.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30307333">Grace Mugabe</a>, the former first lady of Zimbabwe, is one such woman, I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10130950.2020.1749523">argue</a> in a paper on the tropes used to describe women in politics in the southern African country. </p>
<p>Grace rattled political cages in 2019 in her bid to replace her ageing <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">husband</a>, both as leader of the ruling <a href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/events/zanu-pf-history-1963-2017">ZANU-PF</a> party and also possibly as president of the country. </p>
<p>But instead of focusing on the merits and demerits of her political interests, the recurring comment was that she was a sex-starved <em>hure</em> (a Shona word for “whore”). This sexist slandering has not been used to describe just Grace Mugabe. It has been used systematically to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/mudslinging-sexism-scath-female-politicians/">denigrate women</a> who aspire for any political positions.</p>
<h2>From ‘gold-digger’ to mother figure</h2>
<p>Grace became a public figure in 1996 when she married Robert Mugabe after the death of his first wife. She had previously been his personal assistant. At the time of the marriage, she was defamed for having an affair while his first wife, Sally, was terminally ill. </p>
<p>Moreover, Grace was labelled a gold-digger because she had married a rich and powerful man who was 40 years her senior. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Sally Mugabe (1931-1992), former first lady.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>She was often compared to Sally, the latter characterised as womanly, motherly and homely. Sally was a saint, according to public opinion, partly because she had assumed a more ornamental role as first lady. </p>
<p>However with time, Grace was embraced as the proverbial mother of the nation and the endearing appellation of <em>Amai</em> (mother) was bestowed on her.</p>
<p>In 2014, she took her first steps in politics when she was elected president of the women’s league of the ruling Zanu-PF party. She was fronted as the face of the Generation 40 faction within the ruling party. Generation 40 was a group of young party members who felt there was need for a change of power from the old guard that had waged the liberation war. Grace began a series of rallies across the country. The rallying call at these events was the Shona phrase <em>Munhu wese kuna Amai</em> (Everyone, side with Mother). </p>
<p>She used the rallies to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/g40-plots-anti-mnangagwa-demo/">attack</a> not just members of the opposition but more importantly members of the competing faction which was headed by current president <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Her outbreaks were far from diplomatic, they were blunt, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/zimbabwe/mugabes-launch-scathing-attack-on-vp-mnangagwa-20170911">scathing and contemptuous</a>.</p>
<h2>From mother figure to ‘whore’</h2>
<p>It was around the time of the countrywide interface rallies that the name <em>Amai</em> was gradually replaced by the tag of <em>hure</em>. Academic and writer Rudo Mudiwa in the <a href="https://www.africasacountry.com/2017/11/on-grace-mugabe-coups-phalluses-and-what-is-being-defended">article</a> <em>On Grace Mugabe: coups, phalluses, and what is being defended</em>, explains how Grace came to be called <em>hure</em> and shows how the name was linked to the November 2017 “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/15/zimbabwe-when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup/">coup that was not a coup</a>”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grace, already branded a harlot, was considered a threat to the nation-state on the basis that she was improperly influencing Mugabe, weaponising their pillow talk to sway a senile old man. Her speeches, nakedly ambitious, only seemed to confirm that it was she who was in power in Harare. The phallus had been deposed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <em>hure</em> label was used because Grace had subverted the image of the domesticated first lady who was not interested in politics. In Mudiwa’s argument, the soft coup that overthrew Mugabe was actually a defence of patriarchy and a counter attack against the anxieties that Grace was causing men in politics. The military intervention could thus be read as the protection of male dominance which had been challenged by a woman who had left behind her decorative role as a silent, domesticated and thus respectable woman.</p>
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<span class="caption">Grace Mugabe addresses a religious gathering and rally in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
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<h2>What this tells us</h2>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s short stint in politics has shown that women are far from being afforded a place in Zimbabwean politics. </p>
<p>Sexist and misogynistic slurs such as <em>hure</em> point to how women continue to be sexualised and objectified. The treatment of women in politics is no different from how women in general are regarded in the country, because their competencies are often disregarded or unnoticed. Emphasis is placed rather on their bodies and sexualities.</p>
<p>In the few instances that women are accorded a space in politics, they are used as pawns in factional battles within political parties, as Grace was. </p>
<p>When she attacked other women politicians like former vice president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-35708891/joice-mujuru-mugabe-s-new-rival-in-zimbabwe-my-hands-are-clean">Joice Mujuru</a>, she was not considered dangerous. However, when her verbal attacks targeted men like Mnangagwa she was deemed to be treading treacherously. When the coup that toppled Mugabe was in progress, the men in the Generation 40 faction clandestinely left the country, leaving Grace alone to deal with the military.</p>
<h2>The future of women in Zimbabwean politics</h2>
<p>As long as safe and conducive spaces are not created for women in Zimbabwe, they will continue to be sidelined from positions of political power and authority. As Zimbabwe continues to aspire towards democracy and democratic ideals, despite the odds, more needs to be done to level the political playing field.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">Mugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa</a>
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<p>Women who do choose to venture into the field of politics will need to do so fully aware of the multifarious challenges that lie in wait. They will need to be strategic in their actions and how they navigate a space that is slanted heavily against them.</p>
<p>For as long patriarchal societies, such as Zimbabwe, do not recognise the vast potential women have as knowledgeable politicians and skilled decision-makers, an equitable society cannot be realised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sexist slandering has been used not just to describe Grace Mugabe, but to denigrate any women who aspire to political positions.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1070972018-12-17T12:10:59Z2018-12-17T12:10:59ZZimbabwe minus Mugabe: two books on his fall and Mnangagwa’s rise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250014/original/file-20181211-76956-5ex5kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Penguin Books has released two books by Zimbabwean journalists in time to celebrate the first anniversary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113249">coup</a> that finally put Robert Mugabe’s ruinous reign to an end. These are Ray Ndlovu’s <em>In the Jaws of the Crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power in Zimbabwe</em> and <em>The Graceless Fall of Robert Mugabe: The End of a Dictator’s Reign</em> by Geoffrey Nyarota.</p>
<p>The books, about the end of Mugabe’s nearly four decades of ruling Zimbabwe, arrive at a time when journalists have to constantly rush to beat tweets and Facebook posts. This haste can work against their claim to be offering something closer to truth’s complexities than can be rendered in 280 characters.</p>
<p>At the time of the coup the international community, the long-suffering urban unemployed and rural peasants, and the business players itching to embrace the graces of a régime “open for business”, hoped that a long-delayed nirvana was just over the horizon. </p>
<p>That vista remains distant: if there was a rainbow – President Emmerson Mnangagwa promised Zimbabwean whites their place back in Zanu-PF’s good books – the pot of gold keeps receding. The long lines of fuel-starved vehicles indicated more about the first birthday of Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic” than Zanu-PF’s comparatively muted celebrations. </p>
<p>‘Queuing after the coup’ seemed an alliteration appropriate to this review of the two books, neither of which does justice to the enormity both of events in Zimbabwe as well as the sheer scale of what’s required to rebuild the country. </p>
<h2>The coup</h2>
<p>‘Romancing the <a href="https://www.commonsensemedia.org/movie-reviews/romancing-the-stone">coup’</a> could also characterise such tales. Ndlovu’s chronicle of Mnangagwa’s adventures bears the hallmarks of a roller-coaster thriller. <em>In the Jaws</em> excurses excitedly through “The Crocodile’s” firing from the vice-presidency, forced exile and escape, his Pretoria-based saviour, corrupt police (contrasted with brave soldier-saints), and his triumphant return to the treasures surely to follow his presidential inauguration. </p>
<p>Nyarota’s more sober historical take characterises former First Lady Grace Mugabe as someone whose treasure map bore little relation to the route she and her fellow plotters in “Generation-40” – the faction conniving to rid their party and country of “Lacoste” (a play on Mnangagwa’s nickname) group – took when they persuaded then President Mugabe to fire his longtime lackey.</p>
<p>Could military commander Constantino Chiwenga save the day and grab the treasure? Now a Vice-President, many credit Chiwenga with organising the “militarily assisted transition” allowing Mnangagwa to cross the river. <em>In The Jaws</em> celebrates the bromance between Chiwenga and Mnangagwa. But circumspection regarding such claims is cautioned. </p>
<p>The real gold lies under Zimbabwe’s putrid piles of economic ruin. Thus hopes are pinned on Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s new finance minister. These hopes are tied tightly to Zanu-PF’s factional fights for pieces of a Zimbabwean pie as ethereal as the electronic “money” used in the absence of real currency.</p>
<p>Ncube’s fantastical neo-liberal solutions are eerily reminiscent of the economic structural adjustment policies that during the 1990s’ precipitated Zimbabwe’s nosedive. Even the International Monetary Fund had to restrain Ncube’s exuberant <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-11-23-zimbabwe-announces--austerity-measures-to-spur-stalling-growth/">“Austerity for Prosperity”</a> <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/11/23/imf-pressures-ncube-on-reforms-sequence/">plans</a>. Matched with the ruling party’s scrambles and the poor’s impatience, roiling ensues.</p>
<p>Keynesians and neo-liberals alike have little to which they can look forward, although the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry proclaims that industrial capacity rose <a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/industry-optimistic-of-growth">by 5% in early 2018</a>. Yet just after mid-year, the little electoral legitimacy on which the global citadels of finance and investment banked slid away. The military killed at least six demonstrators while, as many say, its intelligence corps took over counting the election’s votes.</p>
<p>Neither of the two books portend much of the coup’s consequences. They improve on an unhappy catalogue of books on Zimbabwean politics. But the bar is low. The best that can be said of them is that they are good in parts. </p>
<h2>Map still missing</h2>
<p>Nyarota’s enthusiasm for the new régime is muted, but he’s very happy to see the back of Mugabe and his unruly wife. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> is more about their drawn-out fall than the coup per se. The elder Nyarota’s world-weary schadenfreude contrasts vividly with Ndlovu’s youthful exuberance. Nyarota’s historical depth, if meandering, gives necessary context to last year’s events. His insight into the near-coups in the 1970s that Ndlovu misses completely – when not misconstruing history – are valuable indeed. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> has no interviews: Mugabe’s minders refused Nyarota’s requests. Yet Ndlovu’s one-on-ones are mostly with the victors. </p>
<p>Of course, purported “Generation-40” leader and former cabinet minister Jonathan Moyo’s unstoppable stream of tweets and interviews from wherever resides his physical self, features prominently. But since they are accessible to anyone with internet they need deconstruction, not replication. </p>
<p>One would expect journalists to criticise Moyo’s nefarious role in his information portfolio (and many others). The elder and the younger don’t disappoint. Unsurprisingly, when the born-again constitutionalist Moyo was interviewed recently he judged Ndlovu’s work as a hagiography for <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2018/11/10/Big-Saturday-Read-One-year-after-the-Coup---A-Conversation-with-Professor-Jonathan-Moyo">Mnangagwa</a>. Unfortunately, Nyarota’s unpacking of Moyo’s past looks too much like Wikipedia to satisfy. </p>
<p>Moyo’s criticism of <em>In the Jaws</em> goes too far. But both books suggest more questions than answers. Even given publishers’ and the media rushes to keep up with insubstantial and fake news circulating via billions of clicks, this is not enough. Zimbabwe’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet, and these journalists-cum-authors haven’t drawn the map.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two new books about Zimbabwe deal with the coup in November 2017. But the country’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1078402018-12-05T12:09:51Z2018-12-05T12:09:51ZLiberation hero Mugabe evokes polarised emotions among Zimbabweans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247966/original/file-20181129-170250-1fqyfc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The end of Robert Mugabe’s rule was greeted with momentous national celebration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe’s name is <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">synonymous</a> with both Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and its post-colonial politics. His role and that of his Zanu-PF party have been central to the country’s dynamics since the early 1960s – and could well set the tone for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>For much of his political life Mugabe has often been viewed, in the words of one of his biographers <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=vQY4DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT23&lpg=PT23&dq=Martin+Meredith,+Mugabe+%22secretive+and+solitary%22&source=bl&ots=DmCK97xurM&sig=PymYcd-DCAyFl-2WFRS18fAIbao&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijmNmroPneAhWQsKQKHZANDhAQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Martin%20Meredith%2C%20Mugabe%20%22secretive%20and%20solitary%22&f=false">Martin Meredith</a>, as “secretive and solitary”, an “aloof and austere figure”.</p>
<p>However he is described, there’s no doubt that Mugabe’s political legacy is highly contested. To understand how this happened, it’s necessary to examine his personal history; his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/17/its-been-one-year-since-zimbabwe-toppled-mugabe-why-isnt-it-a-democracy-yet/?utm_term=.11c978401892">political demise</a> in 2017; and Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/19/zimbabwe-needs-aid-to-prevent-further-crisis-warns-ruling-party">deepening political and economic crisis</a> more than a year after Mugabe’s ouster.</p>
<p>For the faction that has succeeded Mugabe, led by President Emmerson Mnangagawa, moving beyond the highly problematic legacy that they helped to create remains a daunting task.</p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>Robert Mugabe was born 94 years ago at Kutama Mission in Zvimba District, west of what was then called Salisbury, the capital of then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Rhodesia">Southern Rhodesia</a> (today’s Zimbabwe). He received a <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/robert-mugabe">Jesuit education</a> and was by many accounts an exceptional student.</p>
<p>In 1945 Mugabe left Kutama Mission with a teaching diploma. He won a scholarship to South Africa’s Fort Hare University in 1949. There he met other emerging nationalists and was <a href="http://www.channelafrica.co.za/sabc/home/channelafrica/news/details?id=7aa25498-9448-4324-89c2-e4f62a324e17&title=The%20rise%20and%20fall%20of%20Mugabe">introduced to Marxist ideas</a>. </p>
<p>Armed with a BA degree in history and English Literature, Mugabe returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1952. He soon moved to the Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) in 1955 to take up a teaching post. In 1958 he moved again, to a teacher training college in Ghana. There, a year after Ghana’s independence in 1957, he experienced the thrill and sense of possibility of a newly independent African state. It was a seminal political moment for him.</p>
<h2>Making of a revolutionary</h2>
<p>Mugabe returned home in 1960 on extended leave to introduce his new wife <a href="https://www.zambianobserver.com/the-forgotten-story-of-sally-mugabe-the-beloved-mother-of-zimbabwe-robert-mugabes-first-wife-and-true-love-the-woman-whose-death-changed-president-mugabe-forever/">Sally Hayfron</a> to his family. Instead of returning to Ghana, he became entangled in nationalist politics. This included the turmoil that the two major nationalist parties, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30035743?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) and Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)</a>, split. </p>
<p>In 1963 he was arrested, along with many other nationalists. He was <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/dtente-the-release-of-nationalist/">released</a> after 11 years. </p>
<p>Mugabe and his colleague <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Edgar_Tekere">Edgar Tekere</a> escaped to Mozambique in 1974 to join the liberation war against the regime of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Prime Minister Ian Smith</a>, conducted from bases in that country. There have been different accounts of Mugabe’s rise to the top of the leadership in Mozambique. As liberation war veteran <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/a-real-zimbabwean-war-veteran-speaks-97206">Wilfred Mhanda tells it</a>, their support for Mugabe was premised on his commitment to building unity between the rival nationalist movements. </p>
<p>But he reneged on this, instead pursuing the supremacy of his own party Zanu.</p>
<p>Following the Lancaster House settlement and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395186?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1980 elections</a>, Mugabe’s Zanu emerged as the dominant party. He set out his policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">reconciliation with the white population</a>. This allowed the existing property and economic relations from the Rhodesian period to continue, while the politics of state control was transferred to Zanu. </p>
<p>This period witnessed the consolidation of Mugabe’s control of both his party and the state. The massive violence committed against the competing party of liberation, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_African_People's_Union">Zapu</a>, through the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacres</a>, signalled Zanu’s violent intolerance of opposition. </p>
<p>However, the 1980s were also evidence of Mugabe’s commitment to social policies such as health and education. Mugabe’s government greatly expanded the state expenditure in these areas in the <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/zimbabwe.-the-political-economy-of-transition-1980-1986">first decade of independence</a>. </p>
<p>The hostilities between Zapu, led by Joshua Nkomo, and Mugabe’s Zanu officially ended with the signing of a <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Unity_Accord">Unity Accord</a> by the two leaders on December 22, 1987. Zapu was effectively swallowed by Zanu PF. The ruling party had used the acronym since the end of the brief Patriotic Front coalition (1976-79) between the two liberation parties, on the eve of the 1980 elections. </p>
<h2>Things go south</h2>
<p>During the 1990s, opposition to Mugabe <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300366769_The_Movement_for_Democratic_Change_MDC_and_the_Changing_Geo-Political_Landscape_in_Zimbabwe">grew</a> in size and influence. Faced with the real possibility of political defeat – and dissent from the war veterans – Mugabe drew on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">longstanding land grievances</a> to reconfigure the politics of the state and Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">Fast Track Resettlement</a> programme radically reconstructed the land relations from the settler colonial period. There is a continuing debate about the effects of the land redistribution exercise. It resulted in the violent allocation of land to a combination of large numbers of small farmers and the ruling party elite, and its long term impact on the country’s economy remains problematic.</p>
<p>The process also created a massive rupture between <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111691/P202.pdf">human and redistributive rights </a>. By legitimising the Fast Track programme, Zanu-PF emphasised economic redistribution and settling the colonial legacy around the land question. </p>
<p>But in doing so, the ruling party opportunistically labelled the fight for human and democratic political rights – which had long been central to the anti-colonial struggle – as a foreign <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180218/282342565314857">“regime change agenda”</a> pushed by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civic movements. </p>
<p>The politics of the land reform process unleashed many questions around citizenship, belonging, and assertions of identity. Mugabe’s often valid critique of imperialist duplicity was accompanied by an unacceptable authoritarian intolerance of dissent within Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The armed forces were <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">central to his stay in power</a>. The push in his final years to have his wife Grace succeed him heralded a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">longer term reign for a Mugabe dynasty</a>. To further his wife’s ambitions, Mugabe first moved against Vice President Joyce Mujuru, the favoured contender to succeed him, in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/clues-to-successor-as-mugabe-names-vice-president/a-18122886">2014</a>.</p>
<p>Next, the Mugabes, with the support of a faction of Zanu-PF known as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX">G40 group</a>, took on another potential successor, Vice President Mnangagwa. He was dismissed from his state and party positions in <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/mnangagwa-fired-disloyal-disrespectful-deceitful2/">early November 2017</a>.</p>
<p>This set off a dramatic series of events. In mid- November 2017, following military chief Constantine Chiwenga’s warning of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/counter-revolutionaries-want-to-destroy-zanu-pf-army-chief-tells-mugabe-20171113">“counter-revolutionaries”</a> in the ruling party, the armed forces <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">effectively took power</a> away from the executive. </p>
<p>This was followed by the initiation of an impeachment process against Mugabe. But, on the day the process began, in November 2017, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">he resigned</a>. </p>
<h2>End of an era</h2>
<p>For many Zimbabweans Mugabe remains a contested figure. For those who lived through the humiliations of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/720978?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">settler colonialism</a>, his strident critique of its legacies still ring true. But others will find it impossible to accept his exclusivist assertions of <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-129803.html">national belonging</a> and authoritarian intolerance of dissent.</p>
<p>When combined with the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249599119_Zimbabwe_Now_The_Political_Economy_of_Crisis_and_Coercion">deep economic crisis</a> over which he presided, it is little surprise that the end of Mugabe’s rule was greeted with such momentous national celebration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is a Research Fellow in the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, and Research Director of Solidarity Peace Trust a Human Right Organisation working on Zimbabwe . </span></em></p>For many Zimbabweans Robert Mugabe will remain a contested figure.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/947662018-04-12T14:11:39Z2018-04-12T14:11:39ZHow Grace Mugabe poaching claims benefit Zimbabwe’s new president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214274/original/file-20180411-570-6e4pb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's former first lady Grace Mugabe is being investigated.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trong Khiem Nguyen/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The headline on the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/police-tighten-noose-on-grace-mugabe/">Zimbabwe Herald</a> could not have made it clearer: “Police tighten noose on Grace Mugabe.” </p>
<p>The newspaper, for 37 years the mouthpiece of Robert Mugabe’s government, is now the voice of the new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa. He replaced Mugabe when the long-time leader was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">deposed</a> in late 2017. Over the last couple of months the Herald and a number of other Zimbabwean media outlets have published detailed accounts on police investigations into former first lady Grace Mugabe’s suspected role in ivory smuggling.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-125665.html">first of these stories</a>, less than two months after Mnangagwa took office, said the former first lady was being investigated for “illicit and illegal activities”. Information said to have come from the very top of Mnangagwa’s government implicated the former first lady in an organised crime ring “responsible for the poisoning of hundreds of jumbos in the country”. She was also accused of illicitly obtaining ivory from legal government stocks and either illegally selling it or exporting it as gifts for high profile foreign allies.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe is one of the key elephant range states and home to Africa’s second largest estimated elephant population <a href="https://conservationaction.co.za/resources/reports/zimbabwe-national-elephant-management-plan-2015-2020/">of nearly</a> 83,000 individuals, following Botswana. Though there are high elephant numbers, alarms have been raised over poaching in the country including the use of cyanide poison to kill large numbers of them. The first reported case of this was in 2013 when a single massacre of over 100 elephants happened at Hwange National Park. Since then it has become a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201802130838.html">common means</a> of poaching throughout the country’s protected areas.</p>
<p>As more and more evidence has been leaked to the press, the government’s intention to prosecute her for ivory and rhino horn smuggling has become clear. If she has been involved in illegal wildlife trading and has links to poaching, then she should be prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished. But this is also all incredibly useful for the new president who stands to benefit politically from these investigations. </p>
<h2>Politically useful</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa needs to embed himself in power as presidential and parliamentary elections are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/18/zimbabwe-president-pledges-free-and-fair-vote-in-four-to-five-months">due to be held</a> later this year. For this, he needs to ensure the unity of ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe’s ruling party since independence – and root out any pockets of pro-Grace supporters. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe was his major rival to succeed President Mugabe and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/mugabe-family-military-takes-control-zimbabwe-mnangagwa">acted with</a> her husband’s support to sack Mnangagwa as Vice-President in 2017. This led to a military backed coup which forced the Mugabes to step down and saw Mnangagwa elected leader by ZANU-PF. </p>
<p>Though Grace Mugabe lacks the party’s majority support, she does have backing from a group of younger ministers and party officials known as <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201502230426.html">Generation 40</a>. If she is found guilty of these crimes, she could end up in prison and so politically neutralised. Also, by pursuing her on ivory and rhino horn smuggling charges, Mnangagwa averts accusations of political vindictiveness. </p>
<p>The move to pursue Grace Mugabe also wins the new leader international favour. Far from being criticised for oppressing political opponents, Mnangagwa would be praised for making a stand in the protection of elephants and rhinos – which, today, has huge <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/uniting-against-the-illegal-ivory-trade">global</a> concern. Between 2007 and 2014, the African elephant population <a href="http://www.greatelephantcensus.com/final-report/">declined by</a> 144,000 animals.</p>
<p>The government may also be attempting to put a lid on past <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/zimbabwe-crocodile-who-would-be-king">accusations</a> against Mnangagwa, who was said to be the godfather of rhino horn smuggling operations. Partly through his role as Mugabe’s director of intelligence, he was accused of being involved with supplying horns to Chinese buyers nearly a decade ago. But before any judicial hearings or convictions, the police docket, in the hands of then Attorney General Johannes Tomana, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/zimbabwe-crocodile-who-would-be-king">disappeared.</a></p>
<h2>Conservation drive</h2>
<p>Within a month of coming into power, the stress on conservation became part of the new government’s narrative, creating a discourse which places Mnangagwa as a conservation stalwart and Grace Mugabe as a corrupt ivory smuggler.</p>
<p><a href="https://zimetro.com/president-mnangagwas-daughter-tariro-joins-anti-poaching-unit/">Media</a> trumpeted news that Mnangagwa’s youngest daughter, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/dec/17/all-female-anti-poaching-combat-unit-in-pictures">Tariro</a>, had joined a group of young female rangers dedicated to fighting poaching in the Zambezi valley. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa was also quick to announce <a href="http://www.onegreenplanet.org/news/zimbabwe-president-banned-live-export-of-elephants/">the stop</a> of live elephant exports – a trade that had been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-use-of-elephants-to-pay-off-old-debt-to-china-is-problematic-70873">directly pinned</a> to Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>Now, there are clear signals that the government is amassing evidence to make a stand against poaching and prosecute Grace Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s special advisor, Ambassador Christopher Mutsvangwa, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/police-tighten-noose-on-grace-mugabe/">summed up</a> the case:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We received a report from a whistleblower…Police and the whistleblowers laid a trap for suppliers believed to be working for Grace Mugabe. The culprits were caught and that is how the investigations started. When we were confronted with so much evidence, there was no way we could ignore; we had to act.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If the allegations are true, then her actions are against CITES trade regulations, which bans the international trade in ivory. Zimbabwean law also outlaws poaching and the trade in ivory from poached elephants. It is also illegal, without a certified permit that meets CITES conditions, to remove ivory from the legal government stockpile for export and sale. </p>
<p>This is the first legal action against the Mugabe dynasty since Mnangagwa was elected president and appeared to allow the Mugabes a graceful exit. It could become a major political victory for the new Zimbabwean president, sanctioned by law and bolstering his international reputation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the allegations are true Zimbabwe intends to prosecute Grace Mugabe for ivory and rhino horn smuggling.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/891772017-12-29T08:23:21Z2017-12-29T08:23:21ZThe three barriers blocking Zimbabwe’s progress: Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the military<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199889/original/file-20171219-27557-8tx029.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=206%2C577%2C5544%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s new President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> has been cautiously welcomed with the hope that he will place Zimbabwe on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">more democratic trajectory</a>. He has spoken of a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">new democracy “unfolding”</a> in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>But this is wishful thinking.</p>
<p>There are three major barriers to a decisive break from the corrupt and dysfunctional political system that has been playing out in Zimbabwe: the ruling <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>, its president and what’s been their main sustainer – the military. </p>
<p>None would want to oversee real change because facilitating democratic rule with real contestation for power would mean running the risk of electoral defeat. This would endanger the networks of self enrichment that have been put in place over decades. </p>
<p>Instead, the next few months will see Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">military</a> continue to block democracy as they seek to hold onto the power. </p>
<h2>The nature of Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF presents a formidable obstacle to democratic progress in the country. Zimbabwe has maintained the outward appearance of a multiparty democracy since <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm">independence in 1980</a>. But it’s effectively been a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/towards-the-oneparty-state-in-zimbabwe-a-study-in-african-political-thought/BD356807617492EBE85877DB6CD815C7">one-party dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>The party brings a zero-sum game mindset to politics: it must always prevail, and its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">opponents must be crushed</a> rather than accommodated. Opposition parties formally exist but they have not been allowed to win an election. Should such a possibility arise – as it did in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">2002, 2008 and 2013</a> – elections will be rigged to preserve the status quo. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF provides the most egregious example of the culture of exceptionalism which has characterised the liberation party in power. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the belief that its entitled to rule indefinitely, </p></li>
<li><p>its refusal to view itself as an ordinary political party, </p></li>
<li><p>its conflating of party and state, and </p></li>
<li><p>its demonising of other parties as ‘enemies of liberation’ seeking to restore colonialism or white minority rule. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The way in which Zanu-PF has colonised the state over almost four decades means that there is a vast web of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2013.862100?src=recsys">patronage networks</a> that have been entrenched to facilitate the looting of the state’s resources. Democratic change and clean government pose a mortal threat to these networks and such privileges are unlikely to be surrendered without intense resistance.</p>
<h2>The new president</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s ominous record makes it difficult to build a persuasive case that he represents a new beginning. </p>
<p>He served as <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">Mugabe’s “chief enforcer”</a> until November 2017. He was pivotal to the collapse of the rule of law and the implosion of the Zimbabwean economy. And he has been a central player in the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20161116-Zimbabwe-Early-Warning-Report.pdf">gross human rights abuses</a> that have characterised Zanu-PF rule. This includes the killings in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland killings</a> in the 1980s. This is a past for which he has refused to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/#.WjFR4Ux2trQ">acknowledge any responsibility</a>. </p>
<p>His more conciliatory language has not matched his actions. After becoming president he appointed an administration of cronies, <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-40875-Chiwenga+appointed+defence+minister/news.aspx">military hardliners</a> and ‘war veterans’. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at his inauguration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The appointments appeared to consolidate the power of the now dominant faction of Zanu-PF: the old guard securocrats who routed Grace Mugabe’s equally malign <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G40 faction</a> through the barrel of a gun rather than democratic processes. </p>
<p>Having waited such a seemingly interminable length of time to land the top job, it is difficult to envisage Mnangagwa now placing his hard earned spoils at the mercy of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-11-20-justice-malala-dont-fool-yourself-zimbabwe-wont-be-fixed-by-mugabes-ex-cronies/">a programme of democratisation</a>.</p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The Zimbabwean Defence Force’s role in the removal of the president means that it has secured a place for itself as a privileged political actor and overseer of the entire political system. </p>
<p>The defence force has never been a neutral custodian of constitutional rule. Instead it has always been a highly politicised extension of the ruling party, a party militia in effect. </p>
<p>Previously its role was confined to repressing the ruling party’s opponents and maintaining the party’s dominance. The principle of civilian rule was respected even if this model of civil-military relations failed to meet any reasonable democratic standards. But with the coup, the military crossed a line. They determined the outcome of power struggles within the ruling party itself. </p>
<p>In the same way that the military has been politicised, the political system has been heavily militarised. This can be seen in the several key military veterans who have been appointed to the cabinet as well as Mnangagwa being the military’s candidate for the presidency. Essentially this is the civilian face of quasi-military rule in Zimbabwe. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing a press conference in Harare, in November.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What this points to is an effective “barracks democracy” emerging in Zimbabwe. The military has secured a veto over the leadership of the ruling party and over the wider political process. It also reserves the right to reject election results that it does not approve of, or to take action that could prevent such results materialising in the first place. </p>
<p>To see the military’s removal of Mugabe as an overriding good ignores the fact that it has no concept of the national interest, or that it views that national interest as synonymous with its own and Zanu-PF’s. </p>
<p>It is dangerously naïve to expect such a force to help facilitate genuine democratic transition when its entire raison d’etre has been to preserve one-party rule (under a leadership of its choosing), to disable meaningful opposition and to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/09/15/military-looted-diamonds-report/">preserve its own corruption networks</a>.</p>
<h2>Unsettling prospects</h2>
<p>True democratisation – as opposed to merely maintaining the procedural forms of democratic government – is anathema to Zimbabwe’s ruling party, its president and the military. </p>
<p>It is evident that their task is threefold over the next few months. They have to secure support for a measure of liberalisation; arrest political enemies for corruption rather than tackling corruption <em>per se</em>; and provide a smokescreen of a largely vacuous democratic rhetoric. </p>
<p>The hope is that this will be sufficient to secure aid, investment and an endorsement by external donors while virtually nothing changes in the actual power relations inside the country. </p>
<p>Anyone committed to democracy in Zimbabwe -– whether inside or outside the country – should begin mobilising against this project sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe is over. But the country’s road to democracy remains a bumpy one as Zanu-PF, the new president and the military go about entrenching power.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880852017-12-03T10:19:57Z2017-12-03T10:19:57ZA clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882542017-11-29T15:09:28Z2017-11-29T15:09:28ZMnangagwa has the capacity to focus on the new Zimbabwe. But will he?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196956/original/file-20171129-29117-1f64oim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabweans welcome Emmerson Mnangagwa back from his brief exile in South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emmerson “Crocodile” Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe’s crafty new interim President, is known as a ruthless, deeply unprincipled and a political infighter. He has lost several recent parliamentary elections but retained his party positions over four decades largely because he was ex-President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">chief enforcer</a> and tribute collector. </p>
<p>But now President Mnangagwa has a golden opportunity to leave that unsavoury reputation behind and revive Zimbabwe’s economy and spirit. It is not unlikely that he could recast his legacy and even become genuinely electable in next year’s national <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">presidential poll</a>.</p>
<p>Governance in Zimbabwe is terrible and the rule of law is mostly only honoured in the breach. Mismanagement throughout the entire apparatus of administration, and outright theft by <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/zimbabwes-vast-diamond-riches-exploited-secretive-political-and-military-elites-report-shows/">political and military elites</a> are the ingrained, Mugabe-imposed, impediments to Zimbabwe’s regrowth. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa can truly break from those inherited modes of rule – and if he has the inner strength to do so – his interim presidency could really become a leadership that all Zimbabweans, even nominal opponents, could celebrate.</p>
<p>To achieve this transformation Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame. He would need to appoint a cabinet of all talents rather than one composed of compromised politicians from his side of Zanu-PF’s recent internal succession sweepstakes. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa foreswore business as usual and appointed, say, opposition leader Tendai Biti as finance minister and Nelson Chamisa, another opposition leader, as minister of home affairs, he would depart strikingly from the desolate, destructive path followed by the Mugabe regime. </p>
<p>He would exit from this path followed by Mugabe if he also reached out to former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangerai, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Giving prominence to some of his own key Zanu-PF supporters like former finance and justice minister Patrick Chinamasa and Chris Mutsvangwa, leader of the War Veterans Association, would be easier but also important. It’s telling that he’s appointed Chinamasa as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mnangagwa-gives-sacked-zim-finance-minister-chinamasa-his-job-back-12171719">acting finance minister</a>.</p>
<p>Making those, or analogous, appointments would give support and substance to his <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/mnangagwa-pledges-wide-reforms/">inaugural pledges</a> to end the country’s appalling cash shortages and “ensure financial sector stability.” </p>
<p>He also promised to crack down on corruption, one of the leading causes of Zimbabwe’s fiscal instability and its widespread <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2016/06/the-liquidity-cum-cash-challenges-in-zimbabwe-a-fiscal-policy-crisis/">loss of liquidity</a>. Further, as he has hinted, Mnangagwa could compensate the 4 000 or so white farmers who were <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/mnangagwa-vows-to-tackle-graft-compensate-white-farmers-12143032">driven off their land</a>.</p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Seeing is believing, of course, so Mnangagwa’s early moves will be watched closely. If the government-owned press and national broadcaster lose some of their shackles, that would also be an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>But an even more significant indication of whether the new Mnangagwa will be strikingly different than the old Mnangagwa is what relationship he has with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-22-zim-2-a-general-with-political-aspirations/">General Constantine Chiwenga</a>. The head of the armed forces was the chief architect of the military coup that ended Robert and Grace Mugabe’s gambit and brought Mnangagwa back from the outer rings of purgatory. The ouster of the Mugabes was precipitated by Grace’s intention to deprive Chiwenga and Mnangagwa of the privileges and lavish perquisites. And, since the coup cemented their continued control of illicitly-derived riches, how can Mnangagwa’s promise to curb corruption be achieved? He promised</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Swift action will be taken … to weed out corrupt elements.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If he cracks down only on the small fry, Zimbabweans will lose heart. But, if he really means to weed out the main malefactors, then he will have trouble with his generals and many of his own close followers. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s potential break with the past, and with his own service to Mugabe, could transform his interim presidency from a mere cynical holding operation into a major transformative revival of Zimbabwe’s much battered sense of itself. He could infuse the country with a sense of purpose, and with the ability to resume its rightful place as Africa’s agricultural and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-economic-growth-could-be-huge-after-mugabe-.html">industrial success story</a>. Zimbabwe could rise from the ashes, but only if Mnangagwa clearly rejects the ways of Mugabe.</p>
<p>As Deng Xiaoping <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-a-political-wizard-who-put-china-on-the-capitalist-road.html">rewrote</a> Mao Tse-tung’s baleful prescription for China and Mikhael Gorbachev realised that Soviet Communism <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikhail-Gorbachev">was a fraud</a>, Mnangagwa has the capacity as a determined pragmatist to focus forward on the new Zimbabwe, not the old. </p>
<h2>Well placed</h2>
<p>With the securocrats behind him and his party position buttressed by a Zanu-PF vote of confidence, he can immediately take progressive steps to right the economy and lift the curtain of fear that has long enveloped his country. If so, he will begin the arduous trek back toward national stability and prosperity, and be regarded as the saviour of the nation.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could indeed be such a man for all seasons. That would surprise longtime observers of Zimbabwean political machinations (like myself). But, he possesses the inner grit and the inner sense that, post-Mugabe, he and Zimbabwe can only advance if there is a decisive, open, and firm departure from the sleaze and sheer opportunism of the past. </p>
<p>In an important sense, no one else at this time has the stature to build the new Zimbabwe effectively. No one else can rely on military support. No one else can face down those in the ruling party and the police who backed Grace Mugabe, and lost. It is not that Mnangagwa will suddenly regain a long lost sense of commonweal, but instead, it is that he knows that Mugabe’s removal must mark the end of the bad old ways that Mugabe orchestrated and from which he himself profited.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa knows what Zimbabwe desperately now requires. Having struggled to ascend to the top of the country’s political tree, he may well be poised to perform responsibly in ways that, a few weeks ago, would have been wholly unexpected and wildly out of character. But it is never too late to change.</p>
<p><em>The author’s most recent book is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10975.html">The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, 2017)</a>. He was in Zimbabwe in October</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg is President Emeritus, World Peace Foundation.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame.Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881122017-11-26T13:25:57Z2017-11-26T13:25:57ZBreakfast with Mugabe: a play, a friend and a tragedy in two acts<p>More than a decade ago I wrote a play called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2006/apr/15/theatre1">Breakfast with Mugabe</a> which was directed by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/stage/antony-sher">Antony Sher</a> and produced by The Royal Shakespeare Company in 2005. The play suggests why the former Zimbabwean leader spiralled into paranoia – and then remarkably recovered in the build-up to the 2001 presidential elections in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The character of Grace Mugabe features strongly in the play, conniving for survival and power during Zanu PF’s last major wobble – to comic, as well as tragic effect.</p>
<p>At the play’s first premiere in Stratford, two suited gentleman showed up – identified by a Zimbabwean member of the company as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/zimbabwes-security-sector">security police (CIO)</a>. They sat in the Swan Theatre, making careful notes. When the play transferred to the Duchess Theatre in the West End, we were visited by a woman claiming to be Grace’s niece and, on another night, by a man who claimed he was a former security guard at State House. Both confirmed details related by the play – including the portrayal of <a href="http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/outrage-over-graces-sa-episode/">Grace’s bullying temperament</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196376/original/file-20171126-21798-4m7xlp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A scene from Breakfast with Mugabe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the play opened at the Signature Theatre, New York in 2013, a representative from the consulate attended the show after our fearless producer Ezra Barnes spotted that Robert Mugabe was visiting the UN, and extended an invitation. The official maintained an impressive poker face throughout the performance, but his lieutenant for the night could barely keep his shoulders from shaking – giggling helplessly, I’m afraid, at the play’s portrayal of Grace. Afterwards, we were politely, but firmly, informed the president would not be attending.</p>
<h2>Our mutual ‘friend’</h2>
<p>The second time Grace and I came close, was through my friend, the Zimbabwean <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/22/heidi-holland">journalist and author Heidi Holland</a>, who died in 2012. I’ve been thinking about Heidi a lot as events unfolded this week. Heidi was based in the Johannesburg suburb of Melville where, in addition to her writing work, she kept a guesthouse. I stayed with her in the mid 2000s, on two separate research trips.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196378/original/file-20171126-21838-15qs8xd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Investigative journalist Heidi Holland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Penguin SA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Her house was a home-from-home for journalists. At “sundowner” time, the place would miraculously fill with writers from the Johannesburg press pack, plus overseas visitors – many of them passing through on the way up to or down from Zimbabwe. They were often travelling under assumed identities after Mugabe banned foreign journalists from entering the country. </p>
<p>I remember sitting on the end of a bed one night, watching film rushes of the market clearances in Harare. I saw “Bob’s” bulldozers pushing though flimsy shacks, destroying livelihoods with not the slightest care for the life or limb of his own citizens. The policy was called <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4715635.stm">Operation Murambatsvina</a> – “Restore Order” (or, more literally, “<a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/180/discarding-the-filth-operation-murambatsvina/">Discarding the Rubbish</a>”.</p>
<p>Heidi was a redoubtable journalist. Hearing that I was planning a follow-up play, to focus on Nelson and Winnie Mandela, she immediately unleashed a barrage of phone calls, trying to get me face time with Winnie. When that drew a blank, she insisted on us climbing into her cherry red 4x4 and screeching around Soweto – first trying to doorstep “Ma Winnie” (we passed a copy of Breakfast with Mugabe to the security guards at her house – probably not a productive move) and then staking out a supermarket where, Heidi remembered, Winnie liked to shop. I learned more that day than I really wanted to know about the danger, exhilaration, tenacity and sheer tedium that make up an investigative journalist’s working life.</p>
<p>Heidi’s own project at that time was the book she would publish in 2008, the coincidentally-titled <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/dinner-with-mugabe-by-heidi-holland-1607027.html">Dinner with Mugabe</a>. It tells the story of how, as a young mother with a less-than-liberal husband, she would let the ANC use her house to conduct clandestine meeting with liberation leaders from around Africa – whenever her husband was away on business. Heidi’s role was to make dinner.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196381/original/file-20171126-21798-t1ftq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dinner with Mugabe: by Heidi Holland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amazon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One night, the man on the doorstep with his collar turned up and his hat pulled low, turned out to be Robert Mugabe. What follows is a remarkable tale, and confirmed in Heidi the unshakeable conviction that monsters are made, not born – a conviction we shared. Her book also makes clear she was not over-impressed with my analysis of Mugabe’s descent from liberation hero to tyrant. </p>
<p>In the play, Mugabe has been damaged by his imprisonment by white Rhodesia, and driven to the brink by his guilt over the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-27-mystery-zim-car-crash-deaths">death of Josiah Tongogara</a>, a one-time comrade in the armed struggle and rival for power in the new Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>For Heidi, my portrayal smacked too much of the psychotic-black-African-leader trope – very much a Western way of looking at him. Her own take was subtly different – Mugabe felt deeply slighted on a personal level, and let down politically by the British establishment he so admired. After that, he began to see British imperial strings attached to every opponent, and soon reclassified them all as enemies – to be destroyed, before they could destroy him.</p>
<p>Despite our differences, we joked that once her book was published in the UK, Heidi and I would embark on a joint book tour together, called “Out to Lunch with Mugabe”. Sadly, that never happened, but the book was a great success.</p>
<h2>Tragic loss</h2>
<p>In 2012, when Heidi’s body was found in her house in Melville, her family confirmed she had taken her own life. It was a great shock to me, as to many. She had her demons, like everyone else, but still … I guess I didn’t know her that well. We were more associates – fellow travellers rather than confidantes, after all.</p>
<p>And then Grace crossed our path again, <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zimbabwe-grace-mugabe-cursed-journalist-heidi-holland-suicide-help-god-1470882">cropping up in news reports</a>, claiming that Grace had “cursed Heidi” to kill herself. That Grace had waved Heidi’s book at God and asked him to judge if the terrible things in it were true. And now this “white woman” was dead. QED.</p>
<p>If only Grace had known how much she would one day need a journalist like Heidi Holland. Who else in Zimbabwe today is interested in her perspective?</p>
<p>If, during the dark, frightening hours of the coup-that-wasn’t-a-coup Grace had been able to put in a call to the house in Melville, she would have met with absolute professionalism. I can quite imagine Heidi, phone clamped between shoulder and chin, while her hands made a blaze with pen and pad.</p>
<p>Make no mistake, Heidi would have rejoiced in the last few days – she despised everything the Mugabes stood for: the bullying abuses of power, the unabashed kleptomania. But she would have been under no illusions about the incoming president Emmerson Mnangagwa either – and she would have recognised the deep undercurrent of misogyny among those manoeuvring around Robert, blaming everything on the upstart woman. When troops <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/23/road-to-ruin-how-the-mugabes-time-ran-out">invaded her home</a> and told Grace to “stay in the kitchen” and not involve herself in anything that was taking place, it’s hard not to see a greater significance to those words.</p>
<p>More than that, Heidi would have seen in Grace a fellow Zimbabwean, in deep, possibly irreversible trouble. That is more compassion than Grace has ever showed her compatriots – more, frankly, than she deserves. But Heidi knew what it was like to be in a position of utter defeat, and had a special compassion for the fallen. </p>
<p>I offer the final words of my play in memory of her: “Fambai Zvakanaka”. You’ll travel well, I hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fraser Grace does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A playwright whose work detailed Mugabe’s decline into despotism recalls his brushes with Zimbabwe’s former leader and his wife.Fraser Grace, Fellow of the Royal Literary Fund, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879612017-11-22T16:19:07Z2017-11-22T16:19:07ZZimbabweans must draw on years of democratic struggle to stop a repeat of Mugabe’s militarism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195860/original/file-20171122-6013-1nxg72y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C229%2C2977%2C1711&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans at home and abroad celebrated gloriously from the moment Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s belated resignation ended his 37 years of misrule. But University of South Africa doctoral candidate Enock Mudzamiri’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20November%2021%202017%20-%2088457403+CID_ea6d76bea35a7c7889437092f5c5d958&utm_source=campaign_monitor_africa&utm_term=cautions">cautionary note</a> bears heeding: don’t trust the military replacement for the 93-year old Machiavellian; don’t forget that intra-party fighting for the spoils instigated the end of Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<p>There is an even more comprehensive way to examine Mugabe’s legacy and to think about how to work beyond it. Historian and decolonial theorist Professor Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s take on <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">“Mugabeism”</a> can help. </p>
<p>Mugabeism is a system of ideology and practice finely honed during almost four decades of Mugabe’s reign over Zimbabwe’s party-state complex. It constitutes a constant combination of <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/T84_Part7.pdf">coercion and consent</a>, from force and fraud to <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717">chicanery and compulsion</a>. </p>
<p>It is all-embracing and insidious, running through the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">military and the media</a> and even the songs and dances of Zimbabwean society. Mugabeism is almost a culture, imbricated deeply in the multifaceted and <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2295">deep crisis</a> in the kitchen coup that almost escaped the <a href="https://omny.fm/shows/the-best-of-night-talk/who-is-the-zanu-pf-generation-40-g40">confines of Zanu-PF itself</a>.</p>
<p>Yet there is a small dimension to Mugabeism that has positive attributes. The words that evoke this dimension include liberation and freedom – positive attributes that need buttressing by democratic forces outside Mugabeism’s closed circle.</p>
<p>Bear in mind that countries – including many in Africa – have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes <a href="http://www.socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597#.WhUzeXlx0d">regressed</a>. Not all of this activity can be dismissed as window-dressing.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s coup, or non coup, should be seen in this light. The question is: at the core of Mugabeism, can one see contradictions that can spell transformation out of today’s militaristic morass? </p>
<p>The answer is mostly no - due to its inextricable intertwining with the man himself. But those elements tied to more conventional ideas of democracy and reconciliation have been relevant during the past tumultuous days.</p>
<p>At one level, we cannot forget that a level of democratic discourse has infiltrated the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Many years of dealing with coups and their consequences have taught these organisations – shambolic as they are – that coups should not be encouraged. A “real” and very bloody coup would not have been recognised, and Mugabe knew this. The military men had to feint their way to regain their position at Zanu-PF’s head. They came very close to <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">blowing it</a>.</p>
<p>At a more local level, it was the humiliation of a parliamentary impeachment that forced Mugabe’s hand. This dovetailed with the neighbours’ constraints. The crafters of the 2013 constitution with rules for impeachment in <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013._pdf">Section 97</a>, should take a bow. Without it, worse would have happened to the <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">democrats</a> in parliament and civil society on the streets. </p>
<p>Mugabe probably thought he could foil Zanu-PF’s rather messy <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/19/BSR---Implications-of-Mugabes-removal-from-ZANU-PF-presidency">attempt</a> to dump him, but the next step was too hard to fathom. Could it have been, too, that the friendly guitarist from north of the Zambesi had a big role to play: Kenneth Kaunda had accepted his denouement by election as long ago as 1991.</p>
<h2>The issue of unity</h2>
<p>A problematic element of “Mugabeism” is the question of “unity”. It’s not an easy one in a society riven by <a href="https://oldsite.issafrica.org/country-file-zimbabwe/society">ethnic</a>, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=MR8EiMlHw-YC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=class+in+zimbabwe&source=bl&ots=YcFGc-CX-g&sig=bf_qiwKK21AAzM0_2gRSwk5jCAo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJv7aAq9LXAhVXF8AKHZZkDJ4Q6AEIYDAK#v=onepage&q=class%20in%20zimbabwe&f=false">class</a>, and <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/harare/about-this-office/single-view/news/calls_to_bridge_intergenerational_divide_in_africa/">generational</a> divides. </p>
<p>Perhaps we can give Mugabe the last word on this given his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">utterances made in near desperation</a> after his party threw him to the wolves. While he studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s mind – resigning – he invoked “comradeship and collegiality”. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The party must go “back to the guiding principles … of traditions … served by successive generations who have shared ideals and values which must continue to reign supreme in our nation”. A “new ethos” too, could be “nourished by an abiding sense of camaraderie” that just might override the recent “era of victimisation and arbitrary decisions”. He zoomed in on one that had created the tensions between the <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G-40</a> – his wife Grace Mugabe’s faction – and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, the faction behind the man chosen to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>our inter-generation conflict must be resolved through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Therein is buried a nutshell of tensions: old traditions of suppression jostled with the ways in which new political pretenders could be accommodated. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s key problem was thus revealed: he had wrapped up the party and state on his own person to the extent that he thought neither would survive without him. On the cusp of recall over the weekend, Mugabe was not going anywhere. He felt that after him the storms would be unleashed. This of course is the conundrum of a politics wherein the man appears to be the state and vice versa. Mugabe thought only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<p>If, he said, in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with “those who oppressed us … surely this cannot be unavailable to our own … we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.” </p>
<p>Yet he forgot that the spirits of reconciliation and revenge at the heart of Mugabeism, and his incarnation of these, were never resolved.</p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books;%20https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. But this time, axes were not invoked as directly as before.</p>
<p>The roots of the faction fight that led to a very old <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">crocodile</a> taking the throne were not resolved by Zanu-PF’s old guard embracing and welcoming the new contenders for power. The forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance did not happen within his discourse. It took the democratic phase – in this case parliament, augmented by civil society on the streets – to push the progressive elements within Mugabeism. It bears noting that these elements had to leave the party’s shell. If anything is clear at this moment, it is that Zimbabwe’s problems cannot be handled within the confines of a single political party. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF cannot pull off the unfulfilled dimensions of Mugabeism. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, it is all too possible that the new man will take all. The problems of absolute power loom. Yet Zimbabwean society has become more complex as years of democratic struggle have left their trace. This is the moment to push them into the era that began with Mugabe’s <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">fall</a>. If they are not at the forefront now, the old patterns of militaristic Mugabeism will win once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries - including many in Africa - have moved towards democracy incrementally. They have zig-zagged and sometimes regressed. Events in Zimbabwe should be seen in this light.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877122017-11-21T14:04:31Z2017-11-21T14:04:31ZZimbabwe beware: the military is looking after its own interests, not democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195615/original/file-20171121-6031-14lazje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing the media.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 2017 will go down in the history of Zimbabwe as the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/">37 year tyranny</a>. A tumultuous week finally culminated in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">his resignation</a> on November 21st. One cannot understate the widespread jubilation at the demise of Mugabe and his desire to create a dynasty for himself <a href="https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/660122/Zimbabwe-news-Robert-Mugabe-Grace-Zanu-PF-Twitter-latest-situation-coup-Emmerson-Mnangagwa">through his wife Grace</a>. </p>
<p>But the optimism is misplaced because it doesn’t deal directly with the dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>First, contrary to popular sentiment that the coup was meant to usher in a new era of political <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42035981">liberalisation and democracy</a>, the takeover is actually meant to deal with a succession crisis in Zanu-PF. The military made this clear when it said that it was dealing with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-military-statement-seizing-power-171115061457199.html">criminals around Mugabe</a>. And the party’s secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa indicated that removing Mugabe from the party’s Central Committee was an <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">internal party matter</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, I would argue that the military resorted to a “smart coup” only after its preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was fired from the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">party and government</a>. </p>
<p>The way in which the military has gone about executing its plan upends any conventional understanding of what <a href="http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/powell_and_thyne_2011jpr_-_global_instances_of_coups_from_1950_to_2010.pdf">constitutes a coup d'etat</a>. It’s a “smart coup” in the sense that the military combined the frustrations of a restive population, internal party structures and international sympathy to remove a sitting president. It thereby gained legitimacy for an otherwise partisan and unconstitutional political act – toppling an elected government. </p>
<p>This begs the question: Is the military now intervening for the collective good or for its own interests?</p>
<h2>Why the military intervened</h2>
<p>It is baffling to imagine how the military has suddenly become the champion of democracy and regime change in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>It’s clear that what motivated the military commanders was a fear of losing their jobs and influence after their preferred successor was purged. They launched a preemptive strike against Mugabe to safeguard their own selfish interests as a military class and the future of their careers. </p>
<p>Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military and the <a href="https://rusi.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf">ruling Zanu-PF party</a>, it was inevitable that the top commanders would be embroiled in the party’s succession crisis. After all, the military has been the key lever behind the power of both Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF since 1980. </p>
<p>In the past they have acted as part of the Zanu-PF machinery, openly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">campaigning for Mugabe</a> alongside other security agencies.</p>
<p>And they have played a key role in neutralising political opponents. Back in the 1980s the military was responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians and Zapu supporters in <a href="https://archive.org/stream/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport_djvu.txt.">Matebeleland</a>. More than two decades later in 2008 they were responsible for the torture, death and disappearance of 200 opposition activists and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">maiming of hundreds more</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf">the UN</a> has implicated Mnangagwa and the generals in the illegal plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also been fingered in the disappearance of diamond revenues from Zimbabwe’s Marange <a>diamond fields</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this the military and Zanu-PF share a special relationship that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) was the political wing of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) during the liberation war. They therefore have vested interests in the survival of the party.</p>
<p>After independence, the relationship remained intact as the military became the <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-86814.html">guarantors of the revolution</a>. Some of the same surviving commanders of Zanla are still senior high ranking officials. The commanders are also bona fide members of the ruling party and <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">guarantors of Zanu-PF power</a>. </p>
<p>The same securocrats are also members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Liberation_War_Veterans_Association">War Veterans Association</a>. This quasi paramilitary group is an auxiliary association of the ruling party and has fiercely opposed Mugabe’s attempt to create a dynasty.</p>
<h2>Military must step aside</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe goes to the polls next July to choose a new president and parliament. The elections – if conducted in a credible way – will provide the next government with the legitimacy it needs to take the country out of its political and <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">economic crises</a>.</p>
<p>Now that Mugabe <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">has resigned</a> the hope is that the military will allow a genuinely democratic transition to take place. All political players, including opposition parties, would need to be incorporated into a broad-based transitional authority pending credible elections. </p>
<p>But for the elections to be credible, the transitional authority would need urgently to reform the electoral system. This would ensure Zimbabweans can freely and fairly choose their leaders. Without this, peace and prosperity will continue to elude Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In the long run, the military would do well to get out of politics instead of continuing to view itself as <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/14/chiwenga-warns-mugabe-zanu-pf">“stockholders”</a> in the country’s political affairs because of its liberation struggle credentials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, American Political Science Association and the National Endowment for the Humanities</span></em></p>Contrary to popular sentiment that the coup in Zimbabwe would usher in a new era of democracy, the military intervention is much more about a succession crisis in the ruling Zanu-PF.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/878682017-11-21T13:35:37Z2017-11-21T13:35:37ZWhen the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195591/original/file-20171121-6051-ntf8kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters at a rally outside parliament in preparation ahead of the proposed impeachment of President Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary impeachment of beleaguered President Robert Mugabe - in terms of section 97 of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> – could be the culminating moment of a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-11-17-hope-remains-that-the-soft-coup-in-zimbabwe-could-lead-to-nine-easy-victories/">soft coup</a> that staves off the indignity of slipshod regional interventions, while saving the legitimacy of a régime sans a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/is-zimbabwe-set-for-a-mugabe-dynasty-with-first-lady-grace-as-vp-20171113">disgraced Mugabe dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-in-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-era-ends/article37015276/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links">might just work</a>. But it might not.</p>
<p>Events have not transpired as the faction loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president of Zanu-PF and of the country who was deposed by Mugabe earlier this month, had planned. The aim of the faction – known as the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a> because of Mnangagwa’s nickname “The Crocodile” – was to get their leader back on the road to power. That was after his derailment by the Zanu-PF Generation 40 group <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_">(aka G-40)</a>
that ostensibly rallies younger, savvy party members to take the lead, but favours Grace Mugabe to succeed her husband.</p>
<p>A number of unintended developments have led to a situation in which, a week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place and a new avenue - parliamentary impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.</p>
<p>It is by no means certain that Zanu-PF’s crocodiles can pull off the next stage. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall.</p>
<h2>The plans that didn’t quite go to plan</h2>
<p>First, the army chiefs’ warning to Mugabe on the <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/13/BSR-General-Chiwenga%E2%80%99s-statement---all-bark-and-no-bite">night of November 13</a> that he vacate office, wasn’t met with the desired response. Rather than Mugabe taking the hint and welcoming Mnangagwa back, or telling G-40 to stop their shenanigans, Zanu-PF accused the Military Chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425">of treason</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the effect of this was to trigger a real coup. The military’s round-up and detention of their enemies in G-40 was not quite bloodless: at least one of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/17/mugabes-chief-security-battered/">security guards</a> protecting finance minister Ignatius Chombo was killed. The Central Intelligence Organisation’s security director Albert Ngulube came within a few inches of the same fate. And there was no ambiguity about the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had been detained by his underlings – albeit in his own chintzy <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/inside-robert-mugabes-lavish-blue-11552658?service=responsive">“Blue Roof” mansion</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the delight displayed for the well-organised war vets’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/18/protesters-in-zimbabwe-call-for-mugabe-to-step-down-in-pictures">demonstrations</a> on Saturday was never going to last long. On Saturday it served the purpose of providing the army with a veneer of legitimacy. But by Monday the patience of the soldiers had begun to wear thin. They warned students <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-20-students-shut-down-university-of-zimbabwe/">who had closed down</a> the university to return to classes, encouraging them to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>be calm and to proceed with their <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122553.html">educational programmes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And when Christopher Mutsvangwa, head of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/organise-sit-in-as-calls-for-president-to-resign-intensify/">announced</a> that the war vets want “the whole population to descend upon Harare”, the putschists soon released a document entitling their project <a href="http://zimbabwedigitalnews.com/2017/11/20/calm-down-zimbabwe-operation-restore-legacy-is-on-track-mugabe-and-mnangagwa-now-talking/">“Operation Restore Legacy”</a>, as if to dampen the masses’ enthusiasm. </p>
<p>Yet Sunday’s setback – the fourth – was the most severe. Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">press conference</a> shocked just about <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-11-19-zimbabwes-mugabe-defies-expectations-of-immediate-resignation/">everybody</a>. He studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s minds: his resignation. Instead, Mugabe noted that the soldiers had raised the concerns causing all of the fuss with “comradeship and collegiality”. This issue was the, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>open public spurts [sic] between high ranking officials in party and government exacerbated by multiple conflicting messages from both the party and government [that] made the criticisms [of lack of unity] levelled against us inescapable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There we had it. The curse of Zanu-PF’s history: disunity. It was in our faces once again. “It has to stop,” Mugabe warned, and scoled: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zimbabweans must resolve their “inter-generation conflict … through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession”. The party must go “back to the guiding principles”, he said.</p>
<h2>Last-ditch attempt to repeat history</h2>
<p>Mugabe was not going anywhere. He was determined to preside over December’s extraordinary Zanu-PF conference that had hastened this crisis. In his view, he and only he could ensure the “processes that must not be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine [the congress] or to compromise the outcomes in the eyes of the public”. Only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe addressing the nation at the State House in Harare, on Sunday night.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/The Herald handout.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>those who oppressed us… surely this cannot be unavailable to our own… we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consciously or not, Mugabe was repeating a history of at least 40 years, albeit in almost mirror image. The coup makers had not forgotten: their Monday Manifesto referred clearly to the <a href="https://openparly.co.zw/2017/11/13/full-press-statement-general-chiwenga-there-is-instability-in-zanu-pf-today/">vashandi moment</a>. This was when in early 1977 Mugabe and others in the “old guard” squashed a group of young and rebellious “political soldiers” who were proving far too threatening to his liking. He sent them to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.1995.10804395">Mozambique’s prisons</a>. </p>
<p>This too was “inter-generation” conflict. But four decades ago he was on the dominant side, and dealt with the disunity somewhat differently than on November 19 2017. In 1977 he said that “we must negate” those who, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>arduously strive in any direction that militates against the party or who, in any way, seeks… to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party by maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks. This is… the negation of the negation… the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">that binds us all</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. Yet, with a Panglossian view, one could believe that Mugabe has learned something over the past four decades. Now he wants all the older generations in Zanu-PF to embrace and welcome the new contenders for power. Forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance, shall prevail – under his leadership of course.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this self-interested repentance is too late for most members of Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s rhetoric is falling on deaf ears. Impeachment through parliamentary means is not a hard landing, although many hitches could <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/20/BSR-presidential-impeachment-in-Zimbabwe">still arise</a>, including a messier militaristic denouement. </p>
<p>Yet, as political scientist Ralph Mathekga <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">puts it</a>, if we assume the impeachment’s success and a relatively smooth Zanu-PF congress, only fully free and fair elections can resolve the contradictions unleashed by the half-measured coup that started as even less than that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place, and a new avenue - impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877742017-11-20T17:23:20Z2017-11-20T17:23:20ZLessons for South Africa’s Jacob Zuma in Robert Mugabe’s misfortunes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195466/original/file-20171120-18574-kx9gwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The political troubles of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe comes with lessons for his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">endgame</a> in Zimbabwe holds various lessons for his South African counterpart, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africans-should-resist-an-amnesty-deal-for-zuma-68101">Jacob Zuma</a>, as the latter too, considers his prospects towards the end of his presidency. The first, obviously, is that while, from the pinnacle of power, a country’s president may feel the monarch of all he can survey, it is always possible that the blade of the guillotine is just around the corner. </p>
<p>Accordingly, it is always prudent to keep at least two bags packed for a hasty exit: one full of suit, shirts, underwear and socks, another full of foreign currency (preferably dollars or Euros). You just never know how things might pan out, so it is best to be prepared.</p>
<p>Following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">almost-coup</a>, Mugabe has been in a stronger position than many African dictators before him because the African Union has in recent years become a lover of democracy and a hater of coups. It therefore now demands that changes of leadership must have at least a veneer of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zuma-slams-unconstitutional-take-over-of-zim-20171115">constitutionality</a>. </p>
<p>This has always been the Zimbabwean military’s weak point during this past week of flirting with political power. Hence its insistence that, despite its take-over of the airwaves, State House and parliament, alongside its house-arrest of the president and his family, its actions are not a coup. </p>
<p>In turn, this has provided Mugabe with a considerable degree of wriggle room, which he has sought to exploit to the full. Indeed, it has remained his key bargaining chip, not least because the African Union does not want to be seen as party to the overthrow of a hero of African liberation. </p>
<h2>Explicit political actor</h2>
<p>Zuma will feel confident that whereas in Zimbabwe the army has long been deeply involved in the ruling party’s internal affairs and the wider political arena, the South African National Defence Force is not an explicit political actor. He stands in no fear of a military coup (or even a Zimbabwe-style non-coup). Yet he does have to worry about what happens within his political party, the African National Congress (ANC).</p>
<p>Even if his favoured candidate, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-woman-president-in-south-africa-sadly-top-contender-offers-more-of-the-same-71944">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, were to win the party leadership at the ANC’s December congress, Zuma’s continuing as South African President might be seen as a political embarrassment. If strong contender <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1643579/zumas-popularity-slides-again-ramaphosa-favourite-to-lead-anc-survey/">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> wins, even more urgent calls will be made from within the ANC for the him to be “recalled” because he will be viewed as an electoral liability. </p>
<p>It is a fair bet that, whoever wins, an excuse will be made for a delegation from the party leadership to visit the president and to ask him to stand down. Just ask former <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-20-anc-recalls-mbeki">President Thabo Mbeki</a> who was fired by his own ANC. If Zuma refuses to cooperate, then the ANC might turn to parliament, where enough ANC MPs might feel emboldened to vote with the opposition to dethrone him.</p>
<h2>Fighting for survival</h2>
<p>Like Mugabe, Zuma will be battling for a dignified exit. Even more urgently, he will be fighting for survival. In previous years, Mugabe may have feared the prospect of retribution for his sins, and would have been determined to secure immunity from prosecution. </p>
<p>Now, at 93, he is confident that once out of office he will be left in peace. He may or may not appreciate the irony that, unlike his country’s last white ruler Ian Smith, he will not be able to stay in Zimbabwe after he has been forced to stand down, but he will know that he has to leave.</p>
<p>Neither the army nor Zanu-PF will want him hanging around, fearing his ability to continue pulling strings. So off he must go, to South Africa, Dubai or Singapore (anywhere with a few decent shops for his shopaholic wife Grace). His major immediate concern then, we may presume, is safe passage and immunity for his family. We may further presume, that there is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/17/robert-grace-mugabe-missing-millions-money-zimababwe">lots of money</a> stashed away in foreign bank accounts to keep the crocodile from the door.</p>
<h2>Zuma’s tricky position</h2>
<p>Zuma is differently placed. If he loses the Presidency he stands in all sorts of dangers, not least of which is prosecution for past financial crimes and the prospect of his ending his days in prison. In other words, he has much more to bargain for, and he will be doing so from a considerably weaker position. Not least of his problems is that he is a lot younger than Mugabe, so could spend quite a few years in jail. </p>
<p>Zuma’s major strength is that, whoever wins the party leadership, the ANC will probably want to grant him immunity and get him out of the way, as otherwise they face the prospect of their former leader facing a corruption trial during the lead up to elections in 2019.</p>
<p>But for a start, there is no provision for presidential immunity in the constitution, and its grant would face a strong challenge in the courts. Furthermore, if the Gupta or other Zuma allies in the project of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-and-anc-run-out-of-road-as-bad-news-piles-up-68197">state capture</a>” were to be prosecuted, Zuma could face being dragged into court as a witness. </p>
<p>In short, Zuma will realise that it will make sense to hot-foot it out of the country, preferably to a comfortably authoritarian country which will turn down requests for extradition. </p>
<h2>The fickle people</h2>
<p>What Mugabe is learning now, and it is something of which Zuma should take good note, is that the people are an ungrateful lot, and are likely to turn against you just when you most need their support. Up till a week ago, it was presumed that Mugabe retained the backing of all who mattered in Zanu-PF and that he would again be its candidate for president at the next election. But now, like many a dictator, he is having to learn fast that the people no longer love him. </p>
<p>Past allies, like the war veterans, had already turned against him, repudiating his apparent bid for his wayward wife, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-robert-mugabe-successor">Grace</a>, to replace him. Zanu-PF Youth leader, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-16-watch--from-die-for-mugabe-to-fawning-apology-zanu-pf-youth/">Kudzai Chipanga</a>, initially declared his willingness to “die for Mugabe” and labelled Major-General Constantino Chiwenga, the leader of the non-coup, a traitor when the army first intervened. After being locked up, he shamefacedly read out an abject apology, begging forgiveness, and pleading the inexperience of youth. </p>
<p>This has been followed by all 10 provincial organisations of Zanu-PF calling for Mugabe to go, and even encouraging ordinary people to join the marches being organised by opposition parties and civil society demanding his dismissal. </p>
<p>Zuma is too wily a politician not to know that once he loses the party presidency, his support base will drain away, and that he will become known as yesterday’s man. Yet like Mugabe, he will take comfort from the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), for there is nothing his fellow presidents dread more than the prospect of any one of their number facing impeachment.</p>
<p>He will also know that, unlike Mbeki, whose stature in Africa remains high, he has no viable future as a roving ex-president. Zuma will know that if he wants to enjoy his retirement in peace, he has to leave South Africa before he gets tangled up in court proceedings.</p>
<p>His best option will be to grab those two suitcases, make a hasty exit and move in next door to Bob and Grace in Dubai.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The unfolding misfortunes of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe hold key lessons for his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma who faces the possibility of a forced exit.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876892017-11-19T09:15:50Z2017-11-19T09:15:50ZMugabe and Dos Santos: Africa’s old men seem, finally, to be fading away<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195298/original/file-20171119-11467-i9mm17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his chosen successor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philimon Bulawayo/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Soon after Zimbabwe’s army confined President Robert Mugabe to his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-latest-leader-over-years-to-be-placed-under-house-arrest-20171115">palatial Harare home</a> this week – allegedly for his safety – it was announced in Luanda that Angola’s new President, João Lourenço, had relieved Isabel dos Santos of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/angolan-president-sacks-predecessors-daughter-as-state-oil-chief">her position</a> as head of the state-run oil company Sonangol. </p>
<p>While there may not be any direct connection between these two events, they suggest some intriguing comparisons. In both countries ruling families seem to have failed to secure themselves in power. </p>
<p>When Mugabe, as leader of the <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF)</a>, became ruler of Zimbabwe at independence in <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/15/as-he-turns-93-years-old-today-who-is-robert-mugabe/">April 1980</a>, José Eduardo dos Santos was already <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036738">President of Angola</a>. He had succeeded to that position after the death of Agostinho Neto in <a href="https://afrolegends.com/2011/08/04/agostinho-neto-doctor-poet-president-and-father-of-angolan-independence/">September 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Dos Santos had to deal with <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/429/Default.aspx">external intervention</a> and over two decades of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">civil war </a>, during which he ruled dictatorially. Mugabe, despite a facade of constitutionalism and regular elections, also became increasingly dictatorial. He abandoned adherence to the rule of law and his country’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-10-02-hopes-dim-for-zimbabwes-economy/">economy collapsed</a>. Angola became notorious for the scale of the corruption linked especially to its <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-luandas-residents-are-asking-where-did-all-the-oil-riches-go-49772">oil riches</a>. Zimbabwe went from bread-basket to basket-case. With the great majority of the people of both countries living in dire poverty, Dos Santos flew to Europe when he needed medical attention, while Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/10/robert-mugabe-ruling-zimbabwe-from-hospital-bed-says-opposition">went to Singapore</a>. </p>
<p>Though Dos Santos was probably as reluctant as Mugabe to give up power, he decided to quit as president of the country and try to retain influence through the ruling party and members of his family. Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">chosen successor</a> and then to cling on to his positions even when the army took effective control of his country.</p>
<p>Given recent developments in Luanda and Harare, it would seem that neither of these two old men have succeeded in securing their family dynasties.</p>
<h2>Dos Santos’s succession plan</h2>
<p>By 2016, suffering health problems that took him to Spain <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/angolan-president-back-home-after-treatment-in-spain">for treatment</a>, Dos Santos announced that he would step down as president of Angola and he <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">approved</a> his Minister of Defence, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço as his successor. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, president of Angola.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Fernando Villar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the victory of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the general election held in August this year, Lourenço took over as <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/26/new-angolan-president-joao-lourenco-sworn-in">president</a> in September. But Dos Santos remained president of the MPLA, and clearly expected Lourenço to look after his interests and that of his family, who had become enormously wealthy. </p>
<p>From the action Lourenço has now taken against Dos Santos’ billionaire daughter Isabel, it would seem that he’s becoming his own man. It appears he wishes to distance himself from the Dos Santos family, which for many Angolans is associated with corruption on a vast scale. </p>
<p>The London-educated Isabel has proved herself to be a very capable businesswoman, and though the Angolan economy has been suffering because of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices/oils-bull-run-hides-a-deep-disconnect-crude-traders-warn-idUSKBN0NR1Q320150506">low oil-prices</a>, on top of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/elections_in_angola_time_to_tackle_corruption">massive corruption</a>, it’s unlikely she was sacked to bring in a better chief executive to run the country’s most important state owned company. There is talk in Luanda that Isabel’s brother, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-02-00-angola-whos-who-in-the-palace">José Filomeno dos Santos</a>, will be relieved of his position as head of the country’s large <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-24/angolan-wealth-fund-plans-shift-away-from-external-managers">Sovereign Wealth Fund</a> and that his father, the former president of the country, will be replaced as president of the ruling party, though that may have to wait until a party congress is held.</p>
<h2>Mugabe’s succession plan</h2>
<p>In Zimbabwe Mugabe has sought to arrange that his wife will <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/fall-from-grace-mugabes-wife-was-his-weakness-20171116">succeed him</a>. But <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/gucci-grace-from-benoni-robert-mugabes-biggest-mistake-12024383">Gucci Grace</a> and Robert made the mistake of trying to ensure this by <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">firing</a> Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa. </p>
<p>Though at the time of writing, the 93-year-old Mugabe remains president both of the country and of the ruling Zanu-PF party, it’s widely expected that he will soon be relieved of both positions, probably by Mnangagwa, with the assistance of the army.</p>
<h2>Changes for the better?</h2>
<p>New leadership in Angola and Zimbabwe will have an impact on the region as a whole. </p>
<p>Given Mnangagwa’s record as a long serving member of government in Zimbabwe, and his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">involvement</a> in the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">mass killing of Ndebele</a> in the early 1980s, it is hardly likely that he will emerge as a champion of democracy. </p>
<p>In Angola, Lourenço is still finding his feet as head of government. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fired Zimbabwean Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is therefore unrealistic to hope that either country will soon move from decades of repressive rule and lack of transparency to greater constitutionalism and closer adherence to the rule of law. </p>
<p>But if we are witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">in power for decades</a> and tried to secure their continuing influence through their families, and if we are seeing the diminishing importance of liberation movements turned political party, this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for the southern African region as a whole. </p>
<p>It should also hold lessons for those who rule in neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are we witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed in power for decades? If so this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for southern Africa as a whole.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876952017-11-17T13:48:13Z2017-11-17T13:48:13ZThe house of Mugabe crumbles – but it’s too soon to celebrate in Zimbabwe<p>It seemed that Robert Mugabe, the 93-year-old Zimbabwean president, would rule his country until he died – but in the end, his fall was very swift. Mugabe’s decision to depose vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa, at the behest of his 52-year-old wife Grace, was the last straw, and the army <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">stepped in to depose him</a> in a smooth operation that met no opposition. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s political assassination attempt on Mnangagwa – a move to position herself as her husband’s successor – drew comparisons with Lady Macbeth, not least since her hunger for power finally brought about the Mugabes’ downfall. The only real question was how her veteran husband let her lead him to that fatal step without seeing the blowback coming.</p>
<p>The first lady started out as a young secretary in Robert Mugabe’s typing pool. She became his mistress in the early 1990s and <a href="http://matookerepublic.com/2017/11/17/photos-robert-and-grace-mugabes-1996-wedding-that-was-graced-by-nelson-mandela/">married him in 1996</a> in a lavish wedding ceremony. She began her formal rise to power in 2014, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwes-grace-mugabe-to-head-zanu-pfs-womens-league/a-17842387">as head</a> of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party’s Women’s League. But where she really flexed her muscles was in a ruthless campaign to expel Mugabe’s vice-president, war heroine <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-39255394/joice-mujuru-zimbabweans-will-judge-me-on-my-record">Joice Mujuru</a>, first from office and then from the party. </p>
<p>In so doing, she antagonised the war veterans who saw Mujuru as one of their own, but she shored herself up with the support of ZANU-PF’s Youth League. She became a leader among the so-called G40 – the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/mugabe-succession-generation-40-grace-mugabe-kasukuwere/2997245.html">Generation of 40</a>, a faction of younger ZANU-PF party members in their 40s and 50s who conspired to target her rivals. Mnangagwa, a veteran and former spymaster, was next on her hitlist. </p>
<p>Although she did not officially join the cabinet of ministers, her G40 allies there worked against Mnangagwa and his allies. They drummed up the relentless refrain that Mnangagwa was working to undermine Robert Mugabe.</p>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s volatile temperament made news across the continent when she <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-looks-for-mugabes-successor-after-a-surreal-month-83182">attacked a 20-year-old woman</a>, who had been partying with her sons in a Johannesburg hotel, with a power cord. She escaped prosecution by claiming diplomatic immunity, conducting herself very much like a president-in-waiting. It seems the South Africans took note.</p>
<h2>Raising hell</h2>
<p>Jacob Zuma, the South African president, responded to the Zimbabwean coup with <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zuma-slams-unconstitutional-take-over-of-zim-20171115">tact and moderation</a>, calling for for “calm and restraint” in line with the constitution. His statement came with an implicit sigh of relief, a note of hope that something like predictability might be returning across his country’s northern border.</p>
<p>The Chinese, longtime friends of Zimbabwe, took a similar tack. It is no coincidence that General Constantine Chiwenga, the Zimbabwe army chief, was visiting China when Mnangagwa was booted out. It seems likely that Chiwenga discussed his plan to intervene with the Chinese. Having supported and trained Mugabe’s rebel liberation army in the late 1970s and helped finance the country’s grossly mismanaged economy, Bejing must be relieved at the prospect of a return to actual economic management.</p>
<p>Again, the Mugabes’ recent conduct is what really stuck in the craw. The distinguishing characteristic of Grace Mugabe’s long campaign against first Mujuru and then Mnangagwa was her total lack of concern for Zimbabwe’s increasingly impoverished citizens. By the time the coup came around, some economists estimated inflation at <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/zim-inflation-quicken-imf/">well over 300%</a>. The “bond notes” printed to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-02/zimbabwe-dollar-dearth-causes-shortages-return-of-inflation">compensate for a paucity of US dollars</a> never earned popular confidence – the country seemed doomed to return to the fiscal madness of the mid-2000s, when Zimbabwean dollars were being printed so fast that <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/0325/p06s02-woaf.html">a loaf of bread cost millions</a>. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe and her G40 supporters had little concern for monetary policy, and neither the Chinese nor anyone else wanted to channel open-ended financial flows to such a country. The South Africans, meanwhile, wanted to slow the number of economic refugees, about 3m of whom have fled Zimbabwe for Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, all of which already suffer from rising unemployment. And so when the coup came, there was little reason for anyone to help the Mugabes cling on – even their oldest allies.</p>
<h2>Rescue mission</h2>
<p>It is far from certain a coalition will be possible, but opposition leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Morgan-Tsvangirai">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> has flown back to Zimbabwe from Johannesburg and is reportedly ready to discuss possibilities. Tsvangirai knows that Mnangagwa has a ruthless past. He was an animating figure behind the brutal suppression of largely fictitious dissent in Matabeleland in the 1980s, when Zimbabwean soldiers <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201603310075.html">trained by North Korea</a> killed thousands of innocent citizens.</p>
<p>But what is really occupying people’s minds – including those of the military figures that launched the coup – is the need for a coherent policy programme to help Zimbabwe climb out of a shockingly deep economic hole. If Mnangagwa can form a unity government with the opposition, there will be enough financial brains involved to make a fresh start.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/unisgeneva/25388472376/in/photolist-kJ5p9s-kJ3jK2-EajFUe-EFuyjm-CcmYYo">UN Geneva via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mnangagwa is no economist, but he understands the need for economic planning and revival – and what the country’s old hands lack in new ideas they may at least make up for in competence. The new president could build a good team from two former ministers of finance, <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/opposition-peoples-democratic-party-members-fire-tendai-biti/4048357.html">Tendai Biti</a> of the opposition and Mnangagwa supporter <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/chinamasa-saved-bell/">Patrick Chinamasa</a>, demoted recently from the finance portfolio at Grace Mugabe’s behest. At minimum, both men would be trusted by crucial patrons in both the West and China.</p>
<p>So far, the world’s great powers have stood aside in this Shakespearean drama. The Mugabes were swiftly put under house arrest in the <a href="https://gistmagazine.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/10-photos-of-president-mugabes-private-mansion-in-zimbabwe/">presidential palace</a> the Chinese helped build, an opulent structure crested by blue Chinese porcelain tiles that looks like the Temple of the Dawn in a kung fu movie. Without explicitly approving a military coup – and despite their reservations about Mnangagwa’s ruthless history – they seem content to embrace the lesser of two evils. As the tanks rolled in, everybody breathed a quiet sigh of relief.</p>
<p>Any new government will not start on a firm foundation. Perhaps Grace Mugabe will try to somehow organise a comeback. It’s not clear if Zimbabwe still has enough of an economic base to start rebuilding itself in earnest, and the military may yet try to extract a price for its role in bringing Mugabe down. Should that price be too high, Zimbabwe might fall prey to the old Turkish phenomenon of “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024450?journalCode=ctwq20">tutelary democracy</a>”, where for decades a powerful military peered over the shoulders of a weak government. </p>
<p>But for now, it seems the Mugabe era is over – and as far as Zimbabwe’s most important backers go, that’s a start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With their cavalier power plays and gross economic negligence, the Mugabes squandered the goodwill of crucial backers.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876462017-11-16T16:25:34Z2017-11-16T16:25:34ZMnangagwa and the military may mean more bad news for Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195045/original/file-20171116-15428-u8p65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The military has taken control of the national broadcaster, troops are in the streets and the president is being held in a secure environment. All military leave is cancelled and a senior general has addressed the nation. Yet the Zimbabwean military continues with the pretence that this is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-15-zimbabwe-army-in-control-of-state-institutions-but-insists-not-a-coup/#.Wg2PqE27LL8">not a coup d’etat</a>. </p>
<p>The obvious response to this is: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then the chances are it’s a duck. And the sole reason the Zimbabwean military is not acknowledging this as a coup d’etat is to avoid triggering the country’s automatic suspension from the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> and the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/">(SADC)</a>. Both bodies frown on coups.</p>
<p>A perfect storm formed ahead of these events and made military action predictable. The country had once again entered a steep economic decline (not that its “recovery” had been anything of note). A clear and reckless bid for power was being made by the so-called <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40 (G40) faction</a> around Grace Mugabe in direct opposition to the Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the standard bearer for the so-called <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a>. </p>
<p>This culminated in <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Mnangagwa’s dismissal</a> by President Mugabe: a clear indication that Grace Mugabe was now calling the shots. It also served as a follow up to the 2015 Grace-engineered dismissal of another Vice President and rival, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30400178">Joice Mujuru</a>. </p>
<p>The coup means that Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The only questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.</p>
<h2>Why the coup</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa is a long time Zanu-PF stalwart and is clearly closely integrated with the military high command and the intelligence services. Both institutions are concerned that the succession is being arranged for a faction led by people with no liberation credentials but who have been skilled in manipulating Mugabe himself and in making him do their bidding. The G40 now appear to have overreached, perhaps believing that their proximity to the “old man” made them invincible.</p>
<p>This coup’s explicit purpose is twofold. First, it’s trying to definitively kill off Grace Mugabe’s ambitions to become president and to set in place a ruling dynasty akin to the Kims in North Korea. Second, it’s a bid to clear Mnangagwa’s path to power, first in Zanu-PF and then within the state itself (over the last three decades these have been virtually one and the same thing). </p>
<p>What we do not yet know is what counter force, if any, the G40 can bring to bear against the military. The calculation of the military hierarchy appears to be that Grace and company are paper tigers who will have few cards to play against such force majeure and who lack the popular appeal to bring angry and disillusioned masses out onto the streets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Could this be the end of President Robert Mugabe’s 37 year reign?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup has formally stripped away the façade that Zimbabwe is a constitutional state. This is clearly a militarised party-state where the military is a pivotal actor in the ruling party’s internal politics. It is not simply a neutral state agency subordinate to the civilian leadership. And the idea that this military intervention is an aberration – a departure from the constitutional norm – is misplaced. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is a de facto military dictatorship. It serves as a guarantor of Zanu-PF rule rather than as a custodian of the constitution. It has helped Zanu-PF rig elections. And it was central to the state terror which was unleashed against the population to reverse Mugabe and Zanu-PF’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">electoral defeat in 2008</a>. The military has always been a key political actor. The only difference this time is that its intervention is designed to control events within Zanu-PF rather than to crush opposition to it.</p>
<p>But, a highly politicised military is a major impediment to the re-establishment of a democratic order in Zimbabwe. It has nothing to gain, politically or financially, from democratic rule given the lucrative networks of embezzlement and plunder it’s put in place over decades. Most recently it seized and siphoned off of the country’s diamond wealth for military officers and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/12/zimbabwe-diamonds-mugabe-marange-fields">party hierarchy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This intervention is designed to secure the presidency for Mnangagwa. So it is hard to avert our eyes from the elephant –- or in this case the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Crocodile</a> –- in the room. Mnangagwa is the Mugabe henchman who helped enable the misrule and tyranny of the last 37 years. He was one of the principal architects of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> -– the genocidal attack on the Ndebele – in the early to mid-1980s which left at least 20 000 people dead.</p>
<p>He has also been instrumental in rigging elections and crushing all opposition to Zanu-PF rule, including the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next?utm_source=Mail+%26+Guardian&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+newsletter&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next">atrocities of 2008</a>. </p>
<p>Expecting such a person to now make a deathbed conversion to the democracy, constitutional government and good governance he has spent an entire career liquidating is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/15/mugabe-gone-zimbabweans-decide-future-mnangagwa">dangerous nonsense</a>.</p>
<h2>Dilemmas to come</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa will soon have to confront a series of dilemmas. How can he put in place an administration which has the appearance of a national unity government, can secure international approval and the financial assistance required to help rebuild a shattered economy – but avoid ceding any meaningful power or control? Can this circle be squared? </p>
<p>The best hope for Zimbabweans is that the international community uses its leverage wisely and sets stringent conditions for such assistance: free elections closely monitored by an array of international organisations, the establishment of a new electoral commission, free access to the state media and the right of parties to campaign freely. </p>
<p>There should also be a role here for South Africa to restore its badly tarnished image as a champion of democracy in Africa. It has followed a malign path over the last two decades, facilitating Zanu-PF authoritarianism in the name of a threadbare and increasingly degenerate “liberation solidarity”.</p>
<p>Such a combination of pressures will severely restrict Mnangagwa’s room for manoeuvre. Anything short of that will deliver an outcome which is essentially Mugabeism without Mugabe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Zimbabwe means Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/875632017-11-16T01:02:07Z2017-11-16T01:02:07ZAfter coup, will Zimbabwe see democracy or dictatorship?<p>For decades, Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/how-mugabes-reign-over-zimbabwe-became-a-byword-for-misrule">ruthless, even reckless</a> manner. Over nearly 40 years, he turned the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-country/302845/">“jewel of Africa” into an economic basket case</a> that’s seen inflation of up to 800 percent. </p>
<p>Then, late in the night of Nov. 14, the country’s security services detained and put Zimbabwe’s 93-year-old president under house arrest in what appeared to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/africa/zimbabwe-mugabe-coup.html?_r=0">a military coup</a>. The whereabouts of his powerful wife, Grace, are unconfirmed. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"930775695785185286"}"></div></p>
<p>Much remains unclear at this early stage. Will violence erupt? Is this really the end of the Mugabe era? </p>
<p>I don’t know the answers to those questions yet. I’m not sure even Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa, who <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5084379/Deposed-Zimbabwe-VP-75-London-educated-ex-spymaster.html">appears to have orchestrated Mugabe’s overthrow</a>, knows how his gambit will turn out. </p>
<p>But with each passing hour, it is increasingly evident that Zimbabwe – a country whose politics I spent uncountable hours <a href="https://zw.usembassy.gov/senior-state-department-officials-visit-zimbabwe/">grappling with as a State Department official</a> – is poised to see its first real leadership transition since 1980. </p>
<h2>Setting the stage for Zimbabwe’s coup</h2>
<p>For decades, Mugabe’s grip on Zimbabwe was iron-clad. Even when challenged by an invigorated opposition in 2008, he kept the presidency by entering into a nominal power-sharing agreement. After a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">decisive electoral victory</a> in 2013, though, he cast the coalition aside.</p>
<p>But as the elderly president grew <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mugabe-makes-third-trip-to-singapore-treatment/3934529.html">increasingly frail this year</a>, the power struggle to succeed him became frenzied. Two major camps were vying for power. </p>
<p>Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa, who as a soldier fighting for Zimbabwe’s liberation earned the nickname “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">the crocodile</a>,” represented the old guard. The 75-year-old enjoyed strong military backing, particularly from the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/tag/zimbabwe-national-liberation-war-veterans-association/">veterans’ association</a>, a powerful coalition of former combatants from Zimbabwe’s independence struggle which began in 1964 and ended in 1979.</p>
<p>Last year, the group <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/22/487048056/zimbabwes-powerful-veterans-withdraw-support-for-president-mugabe">broke with Mugabe</a> in a <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2997229-Zimbabwe-War-Vets.html">public letter</a>, declaring that he had “presided over unbridled corruption and downright mismanagement of the economy, leading to national economic ruin.” Many <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/05/25/mnangagwa-behind-secret-meetings">believed</a> that Vice President Mnangagwa orchestrated the group’s letter as a shot across the bow to warn would-be rivals.</p>
<p>The second camp jockeying to control Zimbabwe before the coup was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/15/how-grace-mugabes-power-grab-ended-up-backfiring/">led by Mugabe’s current wife, Grace Mugabe</a>. At a relatively spry 53, she represented the younger generation, drawing significant support from the ruling party’s loyalist <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-zanu-pf-youth-wing-ready-die-mugabe-171114133805737.html">Youth League</a> and from an informal grouping of emerging leaders known as “Generation 40.” </p>
<p>But Grace Mugabe was deeply unpopular among ordinary Zimbabweans, who called her “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/everything-need-know-gucci-grace-mugabe/">Gucci Grace</a>” because of her extravagant spending. Plus, she had a reputation for cruelty. Earlier this year, the president’s wife faced accusations of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/24/south-african-woman-challenges-grace-mugabes-immunity-over-assault-claim">beating a 20-year old South African model</a> with an electric cable.</p>
<p>In September, after Vice President Mnangagwa was emergency airlifted to South Africa due to a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/latest-on-zim-vp-mnangagwa-sa-doctors-detected-traces-of-palladium-poison-20170821">strange illness</a>, Grace Mugabe had to publicly deny, on state TV, that she had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/06/grace-mugabe-denies-plotting-to-poison-rival-for-zimbabwe-presidency">poisoned her rival</a>.</p>
<p>As recently as early November, it appeared that Grace’s camp had prevailed. President Mugabe <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0d0eff58-ca06-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e">sacked Mnangagwa</a>, who fled to South Africa. Mnangagwa, it seems, had a different plan. While in exile, he stayed in touch with his military allies.</p>
<p>On Nov. 14, Mnangagwa’s camp struck back. By the next morning, Mugabe was under house arrest, his wife had reportedly <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/grace-mugabe-zimbabwe-flee-leave-military-coup-namibia-army-take-over-a8055936.html">fled to Namibia</a> seeking asylum and Mnangagwa’s cohort appeared to control the country.</p>
<h2>Democracy or dictatorship?</h2>
<p>At least, that’s the picture right now. Events have moved swiftly in the last 24 hours, and some big questions remain unanswered. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa officially takes power, the first unknown is whether he will rule by fiat or cobble together a transitional government. It’s unclear whether Mnanangwa and his allies have any real interest in introducing democracy to Zimbabwe. To do so, they would need to hold an election within a reasonable period of time, say six months. </p>
<p>Military coups don’t have a promising track record of ushering in democracy. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630837">Recent scholarship</a> finds that while “democratization coups” have become more frequent worldwide, their most common outcome is to replace an incumbent dictatorship with a “different group of autocrats.”</p>
<p>Signals in Zimbabwe are mixed so far. Experts <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/coup-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-emmerson-mnangagwa/545984/">generally describe the latest developments</a> as “an internecine fight” among inner-circle elites and ask two key questions: Which side will prevail, and will violence break out? </p>
<p>In my assessment, the answers hinge on Mnangagwa, a hard-nosed realist and survivor who was critical in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">securing Mugabe’s four-decade rule</a>. Mnangagwa has an appalling human rights record. Many consider him responsible for overseeing a series of massacres between 1982 and 1986 known as the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">Gukurahundi</a>,” in which an estimated 20,000 civilians from the Ndebele ethnic group perished. </p>
<p>More recently, in 2008, civil society groups accused Mnangagwa of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2010/07/22/civil-society-to-press-au-over-political-crisis/">orchestrating electoral violence</a> against the political opposition and rigging polls in Mugabe’s favor.</p>
<p>It is also true that Mnangagwa is massively invested in ensuring his continued and unfettered access to power, which has proven highly <a href="https://impacttransform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2010-Jun-Diamonds-and-Clubs-The-Militarized-Control-of-Diamonds-and-Power-in-Zimbabwe.pdf">lucrative for him</a>. The vice president is “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/robert-mugabe-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-vice-president-successor">reputed</a>” to be one of Zimbabwe’s richest people. All of this suggests he might become yet another dictator. </p>
<h2>‘Unity’ for Zimbabwe?</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/mugabe-family-military-takes-control-zimbabwe-mnangagwa">reports</a> indicate that Mnangagwa is currently talking to several opposition parties about potentially forming a transitional government. </p>
<p>A key stakeholder in any such arrangement would be Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change, who served as prime minister to Mugabe as part of the 2009 power-sharing agreement. </p>
<p>That coalition <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/coup-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-emmerson-mnangagwa/545984/">achieved some success</a> on economic matters, but Mugabe’s party <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-coalition-term-ends-on-shaky-ground/a-16961547">never relinquished any real authority</a>. Mnangagwa was among those who clung to power back then, but I believe he might play things differently now. Mnangagwa is no reformer, but he does need to find ways to bolster his legitimacy. Not to mention he will quickly need to confront Zimbabwe’s massive economic woes.</p>
<p>The choices that Zimbabwe’s political leadership makes in the coming weeks will have immense consequences for the future of a country whose <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2016-07-10/zimbabwes-dying-dictatorship">development has stagnated</a> under 40 years of authoritarian rule.</p>
<p>Real transitions in Zimbabwe are all too rare. Mugabe <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm">led the country to independence</a> in March 1980, assumed the presidency and never left. His demise represents a chance for a political reset.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is a nonresident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. </span></em></p>Mugabe and his powerful wife have been overthrown in an apparent coup orchestrated by Zimbabwe’s vice president. Will the country transition into democracy or get strapped with yet another dictator?Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/875282017-11-15T10:20:54Z2017-11-15T10:20:54ZA military coup is afoot in Zimbabwe. What’s next for the embattled nation?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194773/original/file-20171115-19836-oyw8n1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace have become increasingly divisive figures in Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nobody is safe from the rages of Zimbabwe’s First Lady, “<a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2014/09/21/grace-mugabes-doctorate-uz-remains-mum/">Dr</a>. Amai” Grace Mugabe. There was the young <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/grace-mugabe-split-my-head-open-claims-joburg-woman-10788605">South African model</a> Grace lashed with extension cords. 93-year-old President Robert Mugabe’s longtime and usually trusted ally <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, was next in the firing line: he was sacked because his supporters allegedly <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/an-ordinary-man-after-all-mugabe-fires-right-hand-man-mnangagwa-20171106">booed</a> her at a rally. </p>
<p>The consequences of her vengeance may have <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/11/14/live-updates-situation-zimbabwe/">led to a coup</a> headed by Zimbabwe’s army chief General Constantino Chiwenga, who is commonly perceived to be Mnangagwa’s protégé. But <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/who-is-emmerson-mnangagwa/4115612.html">ex-freedom fighter Mnangagwa</a> has his own presidential aspirations.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been exiled from the party in which he has served since he was a teenager. But he is not just skulking in the political wilderness. On arrival in South Africa he issued a statement calling those who wanted him out <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-statement-im-not-going-anywhere-zanu-pf-is-not-your-personal-property-mnangagwa-tells-mugabe-20171108">“minnows”</a>. He promised to control his party “very soon” and urged his supporters to register to vote in the national elections next July.</p>
<p>As if to back Mnangagwa, on November 13 General Chiwenga announced that he and his officers could not allow the “counter-revolutionary infiltrators”, implied to be behind Grace Mugabe, to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/zimbabwe-army-chief-warns-mugabes-party-military-may-intervene/">continue their purges</a>. </p>
<h2>Factions and purges</h2>
<p>Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41992351">declared</a> that the armed forces must ensure all party members attend the extraordinary Zanu-PF congress next month with “equal opportunity to exercise their democratic rights”. He flashed back through Zanu-PF’s history of factionalism, reminding his listeners that although the military “will not hesitate to step in” it has never “usurped power”. Chiwenga promised to defuse all the differences “amicably and in the ruling party’s closet”. </p>
<p>Although this airbrushed more than it <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">revealed</a> about the party’s rough patches when leadership vacuums appeared, the statement appeared more as a cautionary note than a clarion call to arms. It’s not often a coup is announced before it starts; but once in motion direction – and history – can change. Grace Mugabe may have unleashed a perfect storm and her own undoing.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194774/original/file-20171115-19772-qfet4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soldiers stand next to a tank on a road in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All the “shenanigans” that have inspired the generals to consider a coup have set the stage for an extraordinary Zanu-PF congress this December instead of in the expected 2019: that is, <em>before</em> rather than <em>after</em> the July 2018 national elections.</p>
<p>This suggests some people were in a hurry to settle the succession issues for the president, who is now showing every one of his 93 years. Maybe Robert Mugabe won’t rule until he is <a href="http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2114&freedownload=1">100-years-old</a>. If not, and <a href="https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/mugabes-zimbabwe-has-an-angry-population-and-a-potentially-violentfuture/article36934238/">members of his family</a> or party wanted to keep their dynasties alive, they had to work quickly lest some similarly inclined contenders are in their way.</p>
<p>These contenders include Mnangagwa and a slew of his <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">“Lacoste” faction</a> consisting of war veterans and the odd financial liberal. The best-known of these is Patrick Chinamasa. This former finance minister tried to convince the world’s bankers he could pull Zimbabwe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">out of the fire</a>. He was demoted to control cyberspace and then fired. Perhaps he may make a comeback in the wake of the semi-coup.</p>
<p>The pro-Grace faction includes the members of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40, or “G-40”</a>. Many are well over 40. But in Robert Mugabe’s shadow they appear young, as does the 52-year-old First Lady. Without a base in the liberation-war cohort, they resorted to working with the Mugabe couple: sometimes their ideology appears radical, espousing indigenous economics and more land to the tillers. </p>
<p>If the history of their best-known member – the current Minister of Higher Education <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Jonathan_Moyo">Jonathan Moyo</a> – is indicative, however, they are pragmatic; or less politely put, opportunist. </p>
<p>But with Grace Mugabe sans Robert, they would have to muster inordinate amounts of patience and manipulation to steer the sinking ship to the shores of stable statehood and incorporate yet <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Search-Elusive-Zimbabwean-Dream-Autobiography/dp/0994707924">younger generations</a> who cut their political teeth as Robert Mugabe’s rule faltered. </p>
<h2>Perfidious ‘saviours’</h2>
<p>Yet the possible plan for the upcoming congress – to create a third vice-president – appears not to move far beyond the cold hands of the old. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/People/phelekezela_mphoko">Phelekezela Mphoko</a> would be pushed to third vice-president status. Grace would be the second vice-president. </p>
<p>The current defence minister, <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/10/mnangagwas-great-escape-details/">Sydney Sekeramayi</a> would be first vice-president and so, next in line for the presidential palace. He is a quiet but no less tarnished member of the Zanu-PF old guard; especially when one remembers the massacre of thousands of Ndebele people during the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a>. </p>
<p>When performing the calculus necessary to rectify Zimbabwe’s graceless imbalances, remember that Mnangagwa was perhaps the key architect of the nearly genocidal <em>Gukurahundi</em>, now chronicled in archival detail in historian Stuart Doran’s <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">Kingdom, Power, Glory: Mugabe, Zanu, and the Quest for Supremacy</a>. Among the scores implicated therein are the British, condemned by Hazel Cameron, another meticulous archivist, as exercising <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">“wilful blindness”</a> during what Robert Mugabe has dismissed as a “moment of madness”.</p>
<p>Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, that many are suspicious of Mnangagwa’s <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">relationship</a> with the UK. Many suspect he has been swimming with perfidious Albion for a very, very long time.</p>
<p>Those waters, in the shadow of Mugabe’s heritage, will take a few more generations of hard political work to clear. It hardly seems propitious that a coup, and the same generation that has ruled since 1980, starts it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The protracted political crisis in Zimbabwe has worsened since President Mugabe fired vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Now the military has entered the fray, raising fears a coup is imminent.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/831822017-08-31T07:35:00Z2017-08-31T07:35:00ZZimbabwe looks for Mugabe’s successor after a surreal month<p>Before she landed herself in hot diplomatic water by allegedly attacking a South African model with a power cord, Zimbabwe’s notoriously ill-tempered first lady, Grace Mugabe, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-robert-mugabe-successor">joined the clamour</a> for her aged husband Robert to name a successor. Curiously, she also called for a female vice president, stirring up rumours that she’s positioning herself for a presidential bid in 2023, not next year. That may take her name off a growing list of potential successors to one of the world’s oldest presidents. </p>
<p>Mugabe still plans to be his ZANU-PF party’s presidential candidate in 2018, but were he to win and complete a full term he would be 99 years old. A new potential candidate to succeed him is political veteran <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2017/06/04/mugabe-anoints-chosen-successor/">Sydney Sekeramayi</a>, seemingly endorsed by the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/08/18/zhuwao-tears-chiwenga-war-veterans/">Generation 40</a> group long associated with Grace. As with his rival presidential hopeful <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/emmerson-mnangagwa">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, the septugenarian Sekeramayi does not represent a new generation. What both men stand for is the liberation generation’s last chance to redeem itself after Mugabe, before the “born frees” or “young frees” finally get to build a future their elders seem unable to imagine.</p>
<p>At the start of August, Robert Mugabe took a call from an emeritus of another liberation movement: the former South African president, <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mbeki-mugabe-meet-in-harare-for-private-talks-20170802">Thabo Mbeki</a>. Rumours abounded that Mbeki semi-officially endorsed Mnangagwa as South Africa’s preferred successor. </p>
<p>South Africa needs guaranteed stability on its northern borders. Pretoria can be expected to throw its lot in with the man who out guns the others, and Mnangagwa’s strong historical links with the military make him perhaps the strongest contender.</p>
<p>The frenzied speculation over the future of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was matched only by the almost surreal clumsiness of opposition politics. Attempting by command and fiat to form a coalition of opposition parties, Morgan Tsvangirai only succeeded in alienating his own party lieutenants, trading away their parliamentary seats as inducements to others to join a new alliance under the banner of his MDC party. </p>
<p>Curiously, MDC thugs beat up those party lieutenants who seemed to be protesting against the giving away of their seats. And the alliance did not include such key figures as former ZANU-PF vice president, Joice Mujuru, and former ZANU-PF ministers Simba Makoni and Nkosana Moyo. </p>
<p>Despite the efforts at a coalition, the alliance is brittle. The seat-trading exercise has riven Tsvangirai’s reliable base with faultlines, and long-running quarrels between Tsvangirai and his new partners are still only papered over. Still, Tsvangirai is at last attracting the support of key war veterans already at odds with Mugabe. They will lend him and his alliance a smidgen of liberationist credibility for the first time.</p>
<h2>Disgrace</h2>
<p>Most bizarre of all, of course, was the political storm Grace Mugabe stirred up on her visit to Johannesburg, when she allegedly used a power cord to strike a South African model who had been partying with her sons. </p>
<p>The first lady promptly disappeared, and border alerts were issued to stop her absconding from South Africa altogether. Zimbabwe sought to secure her <a href="https://theconversation.com/grace-mugabe-why-diplomatic-immunity-isnt-always-an-out-of-jail-ticket-82721">diplomatic immunity</a>. Robert Mugabe arrived early for a regional meeting. After three days, immunity was granted, and she slipped back across the border. </p>
<p>The South African leadership had been in two minds about what to do. On the one hand, they were keen to avoid unnecessary diplomatic tension, not just with Zimbabwe but with other African governments who still see Zimbabwe as a complicated but real icon of African nationalism. But on the other hand, this was a chance to improve Mnangagwa’s chances by leaving a Mugabe in public ignominy. </p>
<p>Zuma’s former wife and preferred successor, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, said that Grace Mugabe <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q54TRik2K-w">must answer before the law</a> – but if it had come to that, Grace Mugabe’s own sons would have had to testify in the case. The embarrassment and mileage in the cross-examination would have been profound, and even in Zimbabwe, it would have made her permanently unelectable.</p>
<p>Grace Mugabe escaped that particular humiliation – but where she previously seemed temporarily reconciled to biding her time, she may now have no choice.</p>
<h2>Dollars and disaster</h2>
<p>Set against a severe economic meltdown, of course, this all looks like soap opera. As things stand, the country’s greatest accomplishment is its pretence of relative normality in a time of deep crisis. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is highly dependent on imports, including for food. There is no liquidity; a <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/no-more-zimbabwe-bond-notes-for-now-bank-governor-20170423">parallel market</a> has developed between the US dollar (widely used in cash form) and the Zimbabwean central bank’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/no-more-zimbabwe-bond-notes-for-now-bank-governor-20170423">bond notes</a>, and the Zimbabwean currency is increasingly at a disadvantage. </p>
<p>Despite the introduction of bond notes, more and more electronic money transfers are denominated in dollars. If all those electronic dollars can’t be backed up on demand with physical dollars, that will create a dangerous bubble. As soon as a large company seeks to reclaim its electronic dollar deposits but is given only bond notes, the game will be up. And ultimately, Zimbabwe needs to service its gargantuan debts in dollars: if those dollars run out, prices will rise, raising the prospect of severe food shortages.</p>
<p>What will the nonagenarian president say on the campaign trail? Will he really try and convince people he can print bonds faster than they lose value? Can he really keep blaming the West for wrecking his own economy? He may be counting on the fractious, chaotic opposition to fall apart – but the economy could still make retaining legitimacy harder than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a nonagenarian president apparently still planning to run for re-election in 2018, Zimbabwe’s runners and riders are making themselves known.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/827682017-08-22T08:19:51Z2017-08-22T08:19:51ZExplainer: Grace Mugabe and the intricacies of diplomatic immunity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182749/original/file-20170821-27160-146vdoc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean first lady Grace Mugabe
has been granted immunity.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Khaled el-Fiqi </span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Zimbabwe’s first lady, Grace Mugabe, has been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-08-20-dirco-confirms-grace-mugabe-has-been-granted-diplomatic-immunity/">granted diplomatic immunity</a> and allowed to leave South Africa after allegedly attacking and injuring a young South African woman, Gabriella Engels (20), in Sandton, Johannesburg. Politics and Society Editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international law expert, Professor Hennie Strydom to unpack the issues.</em></p>
<p><strong>Was Grace Mugabe entitled to diplomatic immunity?</strong></p>
<p>Broadly speaking, there are three scenarios in which immunity as a form of procedural protection against criminal proceedings in the courts of a foreign country can arise. </p>
<p>Firstly, in the case of immunity granted to foreign heads of state and government; secondly in the case of immunity enjoyed by diplomatic and other special envoys, their families and staff; and thirdly in the case of an ad hoc granting of immunity to a person to perform an official function in another state. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe doesn’t qualify under the first two categories. </p>
<p>South Africa is, by law, entitled to extend immunity to people in the third ad hoc category. But I am of the view that doing so to cover an incident retrospectively is an unlawful and fraudulent use of immunity. </p>
<p>According to the department of international relations, she didn’t <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/no-diplomatic-immunity-for-grace-mugabe-10792922">have immunity</a> when she entered the country and she was apparently not on the department’s list of persons entitled to immunity. Whether or not she was on an official visit is also in dispute.</p>
<p><strong>What is diplomatic immunity and how does it work?</strong></p>
<p>The granting of diplomatic and other immunities is one of the oldest practices in international law. It’s intended to make it possible for special envoys to perform their official functions without hindrance when they’re visiting another country on official international relations business. </p>
<p>But immunity comes with responsibilities too. Under international law, envoys have a duty to respect the laws of the country that they’re in. </p>
<p>The rules and principles regulating the granting and use of diplomatic immunities are well-established. The main sources are the <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/protocol-protocole/vienna_convention-convention_vienne.aspx?lang=eng">Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961</a>, the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en">Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)</a> and national legislation. In the case of South Africa, the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/38310_gon1009.pdf">Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act </a> and the Foreign States Immunities <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/foreign-states-immunities-act-24-mar-2015-1355">Act of 1981</a> set out who can get immunity and under what conditions.</p>
<p><strong>Can immunity be used to deny a victim justice?</strong></p>
<p>Yes it can. Where immunity applies, the remedies are limited to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the receiving state declaring the perpetrator of the unlawful act a <em>persona non grata</em> and sending them back to their country of origin; </p></li>
<li><p>the sending state waiving the immunity in which case the perpetrator can be prosecuted; and,</p></li>
<li><p>the perpetrator being prosecuted in the country of origin. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the case of Grace Mugabe there is no realistic prospect that immunity will be waived nor that she’ll be prosecuted in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p><strong>How else can victims get justice?</strong></p>
<p>In certain cases, civil action against the perpetrator is possible, including the attachment of property owned by them in the country where the abuse has taken place. In the case of the Grace Mugabe incident, the alleged victim of the assault, Gabriella Engels, has a constitutional right to a remedy. If this right is infringed by the granting of immunity, there is a heavy onus on the South African government to justify why it did so. Failure to justify it in review proceedings may render the South African government liable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hennie Strydom receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>According to South Africa’s department of international relations, Grace Mugabe didn’t have immunity when she entered the country.Hennie Strydom, Professor in International Law, NRF Research Chair in International Law, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/827212017-08-21T12:13:20Z2017-08-21T12:13:20ZGrace Mugabe: why diplomatic immunity isn’t always an ‘out of jail’ ticket<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182751/original/file-20170821-27163-jy38xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean first lady Grace Mugabe with her husband, President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Khaled el-Fiqi </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Grace Mugabe, the wife of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, is accused of <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/grace-fury-20170819">assaulting a young woman</a> while on a visit to South Africa. A week after the incident in a hotel in Sandton, Johannesburg’s upmarket central business district, a South African government minister announced that she had been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-08-20-dirco-confirms-grace-mugabe-has-been-granted-diplomatic-immunity/">granted diplomatic immunity</a>. She has subsequently <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/breaking-grace-mugabe-returns-to-zimbabwe-despite-assault-claim-20170820">returned to Zimbabwe</a> without any attempt by the South African Police Service to arrest her.</p>
<p>The incident has sparked a <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2017/08/grace-mugabe-no-right-diplomatic-immunity-must-arrested/">furious debate</a> about whether she should have been granted immunity, and what this means for the victim of the alleged assault. </p>
<p>At the time of the alleged assault Grace Mugabe was on a private, not official, visit to South Africa. She wasn’t <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-15-grace-mugabe-to-appear-in-court-over-johannesburg-assault-charge/">granted immunity before her visit</a> and it’s not clear on what basis she’s now been granted it. Normally diplomatic immunity is granted to an individual envoy by prior agreement, or by the Minister of International Relations if it is in the interests of a country. </p>
<p>Since it is conceivable that Grace Mugabe might visit South Africa again in future it’s worth reviewing the rules, considerations and implications of diplomatic immunity.</p>
<h2>Rules governing diplomatic immunity</h2>
<p>Grace Mugabe was neither a visiting head of state or government, nor a diplomat representing her country – both of which would have qualified her for diplomatic immunity. </p>
<p>There is no basis in customary, conventional international law or domestic law for the spouse of a head of state to claim – as a right or entitlement – some form of immunity when visiting a foreign state. </p>
<p>A foreign state – in this case South Africa – can, of course, grant immunity. But there’s a legal framework that governs this. In her case, as the spouse of a foreign head of state, she could be granted immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the courts in South Africa if, for instance, she was on a visit as an envoy of her country to attend an international conference, or if she was accompanying her husband on an official visit. The fact that she happens to be an important person isn’t a good enough criterium. </p>
<p>In other words, it’s not status that serves as a basis for granting immunity. Rather, it’s the nature of the person’s visit. </p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/diplomaticimmun.htm">Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act</a> gives the minister of International Relations and Cooperation the power to grant immunity to foreign visitors who represent their countries on official business. The act sets out how this must be done. If there’s no prior agreement that already covers the visit, a notice must be published in the Government Gazette. </p>
<p>What’s clear is that the spouses of foreign heads of states, members of foreign royal families, international celebrities and the like, can’t be granted immunity on a whim. There are laws, protocols, and procedures to be followed. </p>
<p>Formalities aside, it’s also important to keep in mind the underlying rationale of diplomatic immunity in international law and international relations. Diplomatic immunity is a principle with ancient roots and forms an integral part of international relations. At the heart of it is the idea that diplomats – or others representing their countries or international organisations – must be able to pursue their official duties free from interference by the host state. </p>
<p>Foreign envoys who are granted immunity therefore enjoy immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the courts of the host country.</p>
<h2>What about justice for the victim?</h2>
<p>Diplomatic immunity can indeed be seen as a shield against accountability for criminal conduct or civil obligations. The abuse of diplomatic immunity can therefore lead to impunity. </p>
<p>If a person who enjoys diplomatic immunity is accused of a crime, and their immunity isn’t waived, it’s normal practice for the host country to declare the person to be <em>persona non grata</em>. They are then expected to leave the country. But that also means there is no justice for the victim of the crime. </p>
<p>Nevertheless it’s important to remember that the immunity initially granted to the diplomat or envoy does not attach to that person in his or her personal capacity. It would have to have been granted in one or other other official capacity. </p>
<p>The right to institute a prosecution for most crimes (including assault) lapses only after 20 years. There are exceptions. This right never lapses in the case of serious offences such as murder, rape, robbery with aggravated circumstances, and the atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>It’s conceivable that a person who once enjoyed diplomatic immunity, but who no longer benefits from it, will face justice at some future date. This assumes that they find themselves back in the country in which the alleged crime took place.</p>
<p>It would be hard to justify continued immunity for someone accused of a crime given that criminal conduct, including assault, is not normally associated with official business between two sovereign states.</p>
<p>That’s not to say that the victim can easily get justice. Diplomatic immunity conferred on visiting envoys and representatives means immunity from prosecution and civil action. This means that a victim will be frustrated in their quest for justice in the courts. </p>
<p>However, that doesn’t mean it’s impossible. Taking into account the rules around the prescription of the right to institute prosecution of crime, and the underlying rationale of diplomatic immunity as a tool to facilitate official political and commercial relations between sovereign states, it can be argued that diplomatic immunity isn’t the impenetrable shield of impunity imagined by some.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerhard Kemp receives funding from the National Research Foundation. He serves on the board of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Views are his own and in his personal capacity.</span></em></p>There is no basis in customary, conventional international law or domestic law for the spouse of a head of state to claim - as a right - some form of immunity when visiting a foreign state.Gerhard Kemp, Professor of Criminal Law and International Criminal Law, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738682017-03-03T09:50:42Z2017-03-03T09:50:42ZAfrica’s elderly leaders get no prizes for hanging on<p>The Mo Ibrahim Foundation <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2017/mo-ibrahim-foundation-announces-no-winner-2016-ibrahim-prize-achievement-african-leadership/">recently announced</a> that once again, no-one had earned its annual prize for Achievement in African Leadership. The prize is meant to recognise probity and commitment to democracy and, crucially, it is awarded to people who have relinquished power with grace rather than outstaying their welcome. </p>
<p>Alas, such people are few and far between – and, in its short history, the prize has not often been awarded. In previous years members of the prize committee, such as Kofi Annan, have addressed packed press briefings to say no-one has won – these days, a single press release does the same job.</p>
<p>Standing in the way are the African continent’s persistent “gerontocrats” – ageing leaders hell-bent on ruling in perpetuity. Once they realise they aren’t immortal, they cling on in hopes of dying in office. Right up until the moment of death, they indulge in every medical technology the world can offer to stave off the inevitable. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s president, Muhammadu Buhari, is currently on extended sick leave in London to be treated for <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2017/02/28/president-buhari%E2%80%99s-doctors-also-treating-crohn%E2%80%99s-disease-intestinal-malady">various ailments</a>, most likely in an expensive private clinic. Eritrea’s president of 24 years, Isaias Afewerki, is <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/288615">rumoured</a> to have secretly received urgent high-level medical treatment in Israel in the 1990s on a trip that paved the way for <a href="http://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/02/05/Eritrean-president-visits-Israel/9629981034440/">closer bilateral ties</a>. </p>
<p>And most notoriously of all, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe is well-known for his <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-idUSKBN168509">medical visits to Singapore</a>. He’s officially being treated for a persistent eye complaint, but rumours abound that the treatment is for cancer. An increasingly frail 93-year-old, he always returns noticeably sprightly and rejuvenated.</p>
<p>Africa is hardly the only part of the world lumbered with such people. Various long-serving heads of state in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34499387">post-Soviet Europe</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-azerbaijan-election-idUSBRE99812Z20131009">Transcaucasia</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-uzbekistans-dictator-dead-russia-seeks-to-extend-its-influence-64991">Central</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-25-years-of-independence-tajikistan-is-a-bastion-of-torture-and-repression-64945">Asian</a> countries find it hard to leave office – they too “win” election after election and disingenuously claim to be loved by their people. But even they have their limits. </p>
<h2>Preserving the line</h2>
<p>By and large, these leaders don’t seek to engineer their inevitable succession by members of their own family. Of course, family succession is hardly unique to Africa, and nor is it in itself wicked or anti-democratic: Singapore’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/singapore/1469191/Lee-Kuan-Yews-son-takes-over-as-Singapore-leader.html">Lee Kwan Yew</a> was succeeded by his son, as was Mauritius’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritius-politics-idUSKBN1550S2?il=0">Anerood Jugnauth</a>. In the US, Robert Kennedy might have been elected president had he not been assassinated as his elder brother was, George H. W. Bush’s son served twice as long as he did, and Hillary Clinton very nearly became the 45th president instead of Donald Trump.</p>
<p>But the point is that anyone aspiring to lead, regardless of whether they share the genes or surname of another officeholder, must earn their mandate to do so in a fair and transparent election after a fair process of selection. Power, unlike money, is not something to be inherited – and public accountability is a crucial safeguard against abuse of office. More than that, the privilege that elevates hereditary rulers has nothing to do with political or personal merit.</p>
<p>Sure enough, several creaking African leaders have loved ones waiting in the wings to take over without earning the right to do so. In Zimbabwe, Grace Mugabe is still thought to be manoeuvring to succeed her husband; in South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s former wife, seems a favourite to succeed him. </p>
<p>Things are a little more subtle in Angola. Long-serving president, José Eduardo Dos Santos, has announced he will finally step down this year, and his rumoured successor is not a member of his family. But that doesn’t mean the Dos Santos family will lose their grip on the country – they still control civil society, private capital and the central bank’s sovereign wealth fund. Dos Santos’s daughter Isabel heads up <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/the-growing-empire-of-angolas-first-daughter-isabel-dos-santos/a-36162875">Sonangol</a>, the state-owned oil company.</p>
<p>Holding on while elderly and sick, living on through wives and family members – these are the symptoms of an almost clinical psychotropic condition in the elite African political class. Power is a drug – eventually it addles even the longest-lived presidents, draining them of any impetus to do anything except to cling onto life, and therefore to power itself.</p>
<p>Many of these leaders once used their tenacity to serve not just themselves, but their people. Some of those still clinging would do well to remember there are prizes for stepping down. The Mo Ibrahim Prize, for one, comes with enough money to fund a long retirement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s hard to award a prize to esteemed former leaders when so many are determined to die in office.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708732017-01-08T07:14:26Z2017-01-08T07:14:26ZWhy Zimbabwe’s use of elephants to pay off old debt to China is problematic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151813/original/image-20170105-18668-deutm4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe are looking to sell 35 young elephants to China in the hopes of settling an old debt.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A bizarre story has recently come out of Zimbabwe. Grace Mugabe, the politically powerful wife of the ageing president Robert Mugabe, has come up with a plan to settle <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/zimbabwark-to-settle-mugabe-debt-vww9ctqrb">a debt to China</a> with 35 young elephants, eight lions, 12 hyenas and a giraffe. The debt was incurred in 1998 when Zimbabwe sent troops and bought equipment from China to help President Laurent Kabila in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Kabila needed help fighting off a rebel movement backed by Uganda and Rwanda.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s use of live wildlife as a commodity is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/23/zimbabwe-ships-live-elephants-to-wildlife-parks-in-china">nothing new</a>. And it’s not the only country to do so. It is quite common for southern African states to sell what they consider to be surplus animals to zoos or safari parks outside Africa. </p>
<p>In January 2016, the US Fish and Wildlife Service gave the go ahead for Swaziland to export 18 elephants to <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/01/160122-Swaziland-Elephants-Import-US-Zoos/">zoos in the US</a>. Between 2010 and 2014 an estimated 500 white rhinos and 20 elephants were exported from <a href="http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2016/09/28/live-elephant-and-rhino-trade-debated-at-wildlife-convention/">African range states</a>. </p>
<p>Animals are also exported to restock parks or reserves elsewhere on the continent. <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/05/20/overpopulated-conservancy-seeks-ship-excess-lions/">Zimbabwe’s Bubye Valley Conservancy</a>, for example, is arranging to send 8-10 lions to Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia. The aim is to help them re-establish prides in areas depleted of lions.</p>
<p>The sale of live animals is <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141217-zimbabwe-china-elephants-zoos-tuli-botswana-south-africa/">highly controversial</a>, but not illegal as long as rules established by <a href="https://www.cites.org/">CITES</a> are followed. These require that live exports only be between two CITES members and that both parties’ management authorities for CITES ensure that the export permits are valid.</p>
<p>The authorities need to ensure that “the export of the animals would not be detrimental to the survival of the species in the wild” and would be taken to “to appropriate and acceptable destinations”. </p>
<p>But the removal of young elephants from their herds – as happened in Zimbabwe – is highly damaging to the animals and to the herd as a whole. This form of removal has been called a <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/grace-mugabe-pays-military-debt-to-china-with-35-zim-jumbos-report-20161227y">“a mad act of cruelty”.</a></p>
<p>The Zimbabwean embassy in China has denied the reports of the sale and there has been no word from the environment minister in Harare. The story will be embarrassing for China at a time when it is basking in praise over its announcement of a coming ban on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/china-ban-ivory-trade-2017-161230183540915.html">ivory working and retail sales</a>.</p>
<h2>Why selling live elephants is a problem</h2>
<p>At the CITES Conference of the Parties in Johannesburg last year members of the <a href="https://cites.org/eng/news/Current_rules_commercial_international_trade_elephant_ivory_under_CITES_Proposals_CITES_CoP17_200716">African Elephant Coalition</a> – a 29 member grouping of African states opposed to any trade in ivory or the export outside the continent of live elephants – attempted to get the CITES regulation changed to limit exports to relocation inside Africa and to ban exports to other continents. It was opposed by southern African states and China and did not get sufficient support to go to a vote. Instead a US compromise proposal was passed tightening the export regulations and attempting to ensure that ivory or horn from exported live animals did not enter the illegal trade system.</p>
<p>One of the concerns raised by NGOs and wildlife activists about the export of live elephants to China is that they will at some stage be farmed and their ivory harvested to be sold at a huge profit. <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/grace-mugabe-pays-military-debt-to-china-with-35-zim-jumbos-report-20161227">This fear was expressed by conservationists</a> when news about Zimbabwe’s most recent debt-settling plan emerged. </p>
<p>There is also concern that animals go to zoos with <a href="http://varsity.com.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php/2012/01/animal-performance-china/">poor welfare records</a> or where cruel methods will be used to make the animals into little more than circus performers.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe’s justification</h2>
<p>Zimbabwean ministers and wildlife officials have for years defended the regular sale of elephants and other wildlife to China. They have justified it by saying they need to reduce pressure of numbers in over-stocked reserves and raise funds for conservation. But there is no proof that the money raised goes back into conservation and clearly using elephants to settle military-related debts does little for conservation. </p>
<p>The official Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority <a href="http://www.zimparks.org/index.php/mc/176-live-sales-of-elephants">website</a> justifies live exports as a means of sustainably supporting conservation and reducing pressure of numbers on eco-systems. Over-population of elephants, in particular, can damage habitats, put pressure on other vulnerable species and lead to conflict with local communities, whose crops may be damaged or destroyed.</p>
<p>But while a conservation case may be made quite cogently for limiting numbers, the export of live animals seems more related to profit than sustainable use conservation. And the fate of live animals exported is also being questioned. There are <a href="http://traveller24.news24.com/Explore/Green/shockwildlifetruths-zim-baby-elephants-heading-for-chinese-zoo-20161107">reports</a> that, when the young elephants were being captured in Zimbabwe, 37 were caught but only 35 were sold to China because two died soon after capture.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwean Minister of the Environment, Water and Climate, Oppiah Muchinguri-Kashiri strongly advocates the sale of animals to raise money. But she doesn’t appear to have a strong grasp of the facts of conservation and the trade in animals or their products. This is evident in how adamant she was that Zimbabwe could sell its ivory stockpile to China despite the CITES decision.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is forging ahead with planned sales to raise desperately needed cash. Reports from the <a href="http://savetheelephants.org/about-elephants-2-3/elephant-news-post/?detail=cecil-the-lion-family-might-be-targeted-for-zimbabwe-export-to-china-zoo">Zimbabwe Conservation Task Force</a> in September last year said that the Zimbabwe Wildlife Department was capturing animals to meet an order from China for 130 elephants and 50 lions. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35233259">January last year</a> the minister defended past sales and said they would be continued. In the previous six months Zimbabwe had sold 100 elephants to Chinese zoos at a cost of $40,000 each.</p>
<p>It is very clear that Zimbabwe’s environment minister and wildlife authorities have no qualms about the questionable trade in live animals. They are willing to sell animals to Chinese zoos and safari parks, some of which have less than <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150925-elephants-china-zimbabwe-cites-joyce-poole-zoos-wildlife-trade/">spotless records for animal welfare</a> and are <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2861424/Is-cute-cruel-Activists-fear-treatment-animals-Chinese-wildlife-park-home-biggest-population-koalas-outside-Australia.html">barely distinguishable from circuses</a>. </p>
<p>One destination for Zimbabwean elephants is the huge and widely criticised <a href="http://varsity.com.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php/2012/01/animal-performance-china/">Chimelong Wildlife Park</a>, which includes a circus and stages a variety of dubious performances and stunts involving its animals. </p>
<p>It is hard to draw a clear line to show where justifiable sustainable-use and sheer exploitation for profit begins. But it is clear that Zimbabwe and China have crossed that line.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe are looking to resolve a debt to China by selling animals to them. But one of the concerns is that the elephants sold will eventually be farmed and their ivory harvested.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.