tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/independence-4316/articlesIndependence – The Conversation2024-03-19T13:09:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256892024-03-19T13:09:24Z2024-03-19T13:09:24ZSouth Africa’s election management body has done a good job for 30 years: here’s why<p>More than in previous elections, <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">South Africa’s Electoral Commission</a> (IEC) will be tested to the hilt in this year’s national and provincial elections <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">on 29 May</a>. For the first time in 30 years, the electoral majority of the ruling <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC) is <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/new-survey-shows-voters-punishing-anc-over-governance-and-foreign-policy/">in jeopardy</a>. This makes the upcoming poll the most consequential one <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">since 1994</a>, when the country commenced with its democratisation. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/about-us/what-we-do/">tasks</a> are to enforce the rules of the electoral game and the parties’ ethical conduct. It must also be the dispute resolution champion and ensure that the election is free and fair. These are the primary contributions the commission can make towards promoting and consolidating electoral democracy. </p>
<p>The circumstances of this year’s elections will put additional pressure on the IEC to be a fair umpire of this contest. It thus can’t afford to be <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/parliament-welcomes-dismissal-iec-staff-member-responsible-leaks-12-mar-2024">mired in controversy</a>. </p>
<p>The commission has to implement an amended but <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections/whats-new-in-the-2024-elections-electoral-amendment-act">interim electoral system</a> which allows independents to stand for the first time, but which is not yet well understood by the public.</p>
<p>In my view as a political scientist who has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oietezsAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> South African politics, elections, conflict resolution and comparative democratisation over the past three decades, the IEC’S track record is a sound reason to expect it to perform well in this year’s election.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">recent paper</a>, I set out how the IEC has developed a reputation as an effective electoral management body which maintains a high level of institutional independence and efficiency. The operational quality of elections under its jurisdiction is seldom challenged. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-changed-its-electoral-law-but-a-much-more-serious-overhaul-is-needed-204820">South Africa has changed its electoral law, but a much more serious overhaul is needed</a>
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<p>The electoral commission’s institutional independence is a very important factor. The fact that the elections in South Africa have always been declared free and fair, and by the international community, is another factor. The fact that public opinion in South Africa has been generally satisfied with the management of elections for the past 30 years is a critical condition for the quality of democracy to be strengthened.</p>
<h2>Democracy and institutional independence</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">research article</a> sets out how South Africa’s electoral body has cultivated an institutional independence that is envied by many other election commissions. Its composition contributes much to this independence. The commission’s five members are not allowed to have a prominent party-political profile. This contrasts with other electoral commissions, such as the one in Angola, which <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2022-08/Final%20Preliminary%20Statement_Angola%20SEOM_26082022.pdf">consist primarily of party representatives</a>.</p>
<p>Candidates for the South African commission positions are interviewed in public by a panel chaired by the <a href="https://www.judiciary.org.za/">chief justice</a>, and consisting of the <a href="https://www.pprotect.org/">public protector</a> and two members of the <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/government/iec-chairperson-mashininis-9-march-2022/">six other commissions set up in terms of chapter 9 of the constitution</a>. The National Assembly approves the short list, which is then submitted to the president for final appointment. The National Assembly is also the only body that can <a href="https://www.ecfsadc.org/members/south-africa-independent-electoral-commission/">remove an IEC commissioner from office</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-politicians-must-guard-against-killer-narratives-62562">South Africa's politicians must guard against killer narratives</a>
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<p>As an indication of its independence, the commission <a href="https://www.ecfsadc.org/members/south-africa-independent-electoral-commission/">accounts</a> to the National Assembly (public representatives) for all its actions and responsibilities, not to the cabinet. It must submit an <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Downloads/Documents-Library-Annual-Reports-IEC">annual report</a> to parliament’s multiparty portfolio committee on home affairs – not to a minister or government institution. Its budget is presented to parliament by the Department of Home Affairs but is ring-fenced for its exclusive use. In this respect the independence of electoral management is entrenched.</p>
<p>The IEC’s public accountability is enhanced by the way international and domestic observer missions scrutinise elections and the commission’s conduct. In the past, the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-election-observation-mission-releases-its-preliminary-statement-2019-national-and">Southern African Development Community</a> , the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38696-doc-report_of_the_african_union_election_observation_mission_to_the_08_may_2019_national_and_provincial_elections_in_the_republic_of_south_africa.pdf">African Union</a>, the <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/news/commonwealth-releases-observer-report-south-africa-elections">Commonwealth</a>, the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02128/05lv02130.htm">European Union</a> and even the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344899438439049">United Nations</a> have deployed <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-And-Results/Observers">observer teams</a> in South Africa. Their mandate was to observe all the components of an election, including the commission’s performance. Their verdicts determine whether an election is regarded as free and fair. The IEC has opened applications to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-And-Results/Observers">observe the 2024 election</a>.</p>
<h2>Free and fair elections as a democratic yardstick</h2>
<p>The IEC can be given credit for institutionalising important mechanisms to ensure that elections are free and fair. One of them is the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Parties-And-Candidates/Party-Liaison-Committees">party liaison committees</a> at different levels. They are a novel South African invention which serves as a communication channel between the electoral commission and all participating parties. It’s also a dispute resolution mechanism to identify problems at an early stage and resolve them. Many potentially debilitating problems have been identified and resolved by them over the years. Numerous electoral commissions have visited South Africa to <a href="https://liberia.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2020/03/3.-NEC_Study-Tour_South-Africa_2-5-Sep-2019.pdf">learn about these committees</a>.</p>
<p>The South African electoral dispensation expects the IEC to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections. At the end of the elections it has the responsibility to declare whether they were <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Final-results-of-2021-Municipal-Elections-Address-by-Chairperson-Glen-Mashinini/">indeed free and fair</a>.</p>
<p>As major players in elections, electoral management bodies are often compromised in disputes and cannot, therefore, be the referees of whether elections are free and fair. That’s why in many other countries, this judgment is made by their supreme court and not by the commissions themselves. </p>
<h2>The test of public opinion</h2>
<p>The main test of the IEC’s contribution towards democracy is public opinion. The Human Sciences Research Council (<a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/">HSRC</a>) in South Africa conducts <a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/news/general/most-voters-satisfied-following-elections-survey-finds/">surveys</a> before and after every election to determine the public’s opinion on the elections, the IEC and its performance, and their views on some democratic indicators. </p>
<p>The surveys show that, during the period 2013-2018, the highest democratic ideal in the public’s mind was “free and fair elections” followed by “freedom of expression”. Trust in “free and fair elections” showed the greatest decline <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2023.2269897">between 2013 and 2021</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-fed-up-with-their-prospects-and-their-democracy-according-to-latest-social-attitudes-survey-204566">South Africans are fed up with their prospects, and their democracy, according to latest social attitudes survey</a>
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<p>The HSRC researchers interpreted these trends as being influenced by declining trust in public institutions and dissatisfaction with democratic performance in general. Trust in the IEC <a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/news/capable-and-ethical-state/hsrc-election-survey-voters-positive-but-turnout-reflects-political-disillusionment/">remained very high</a>.</p>
<h2>An uncontroversial electoral body</h2>
<p>Constitutional institutions like the IEC cannot function in isolation. The social dynamics of democracy inevitably influence its own reputation for better or for worse.</p>
<p>Elections – especially managing the counting of ballots and announcing the results – can be very controversial. They have disrupted the political landscape in many countries. South Africa’s IEC has so far avoided such instability and managed to protect the integrity of the country’s elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Independent Electoral Commission cannot afford to put a foot wrong in the country’s most important election since democracy in 1994, on 29 May.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256632024-03-14T02:23:22Z2024-03-14T02:23:22ZThe federal government’s new Administrative Review Tribunal must avoid the pitfalls of ‘jobs for mates’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581805/original/file-20240313-16-zoge6w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The federal government is in the process of abolishing a powerful independent body that reviews government decisions on everything from child support to migration status. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) is being replaced by a new body, the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART), at least in part because of concerns about political stacking.</p>
<p>Appointments to the AAT represent one of the <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/new-politics-public-appointments/">most egregious examples</a> of political stacking in Australia in recent years. However, there is currently no guarantee the new body won’t succumb to the same fate. </p>
<p>To build public confidence in the ART, the government must ensure a best-practice appointments process, at arm’s length from political interference.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nowhere-to-hide-the-significance-of-national-cabinet-not-being-a-cabinet-165671">Nowhere to hide: the significance of national cabinet not being a cabinet</a>
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<h2>Political appointments undermined the AAT</h2>
<p>Appointments to the AAT were prestigious, powerful and very well paid (full-time members were paid between $207,310 and $530,630 per year). This made the tribunal an attractive target for political appointments – a nice job for a mate, a place to “park talent”, or perhaps a chance to return a favour. </p>
<p>In 2022, Grattan Institute <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/new-politics-public-appointments/">research</a> showed a staggering 20% of the AAT’s 320 tribunal members had a direct political connection to the government that appointed them. It is unlikely such a high proportion of former politicians, political advisers and party officials would emerge from a completely merit-based recruitment process.</p>
<p>Political appointments to the AAT grew in recent years, as the chart below shows. Many of these appointments were made in the lead-up to the 2019 and 2022 federal elections.</p>
<h3>Political appointments to the AAT have increased in recent years</h3>
<p>Politicisation of appointments to the AAT undermined the independence of this important expert body. Administrative merits review provides a critical check on government decisions to ensure they are right in all circumstances – recognising that routine government decisions can have a significant impact on people’s lives. Independence is vital to ensure public confidence in these decisions.</p>
<h2>The new body must be squeaky clean</h2>
<p>The government has decided to cut its losses and start again – creating a whole new tribunal.</p>
<p>In announcing this decision in December 2022, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus <a href="https://www.markdreyfus.com/media/media-releases/albanese-government-to-abolish-administrative-appeals-tribunal-mark-dreyfus-kc-mp/">said</a>:</p>
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<p>The AAT’s public standing has been irreversibly damaged as a result of the actions of the former government over the last nine years.</p>
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<p>Given the government’s concerns about politicisation of the AAT, one would expect a best-practice appointments process for the new body. But the government’s <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7117#:%7E:text=Introduced%20with%20the%20Administrative%20Review,establishes%20the%20Administrative%20Review%20Council.">bill to establish the ART</a> leaves a lot of wriggle room on appointments.</p>
<h2>A best-practice appointments process</h2>
<p>A 2022 <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/new-politics-public-appointments/">Grattan Institute report</a> recommended a better appointments process for all public boards, tribunals and statutory appointments (as shown below).</p>
<h3>A better process for public appointments</h3>
<p>Key recommendations are:</p>
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<li><p>all public board, tribunal and statutory appointments should be advertised, along with the selection criteria for each position</p></li>
<li><p>an independent panel should do the shortlisting</p></li>
<li><p>the minister should choose from the shortlist, or redefine and republish the selection criteria, but should not directly select any candidate not shortlisted</p></li>
<li><p>a new public appointments commissioner should oversee the process and report to parliament.</p></li>
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<p>The ART bill implements some elements of this process. Notably, it requires all positions to be advertised. But other elements are incomplete or absent. </p>
<p>The bill allows for a minister to establish an assessment panel but does not <em>require</em> an <em>independent</em> panel.</p>
<p>The minister must be “satisfied” a candidate “was assessed as suitable” through a “merit-based” process. “Merit-based” is defined in the bill, but not who makes the assessment.</p>
<p>And the new appointments process lacks the oversight of a public appointments commissioner who could report to parliament and provide further information on the process when questions inevitably rise about an appointment.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fix-is-in-how-to-restore-public-faith-in-government-appointments-187991">The fix is in: how to restore public faith in government appointments</a>
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<h2>What should happen now</h2>
<p>The government will need to negotiate to get its bill through the Senate, and a Senate committee is <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/ARTBills2447">considering</a> the bill.</p>
<p>The Coalition, Greens and cross-benchers in the Senate should be calling for a best-practice appointments process to ensure the ART doesn’t suffer its predecessor’s fate.</p>
<p>And if Labor is serious about cleaning up jobs for mates, it should look much further than the AAT. <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/new-politics-public-appointments/">My research</a> shows political appointments are common across many powerful, prestigious and well-paid public boards. </p>
<p>A best-practice appointments process for all public board, tribunal and statutory appointments would reduce jobs for mates, improve our institutions and ultimately enhance Australia’s political culture.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Grattan Institute began with contributions to its endowment of $15 million from each of the Federal and Victorian Governments, $4 million from BHP Billiton, and $1 million from NAB. In order to safeguard its independence, Grattan Institute’s board controls this endowment. The funds are invested and contribute to funding Grattan Institute's activities. Grattan Institute also receives funding from corporates, foundations, and individuals to support its general activities as disclosed on its website.</span></em></p>The former Administrative Appeals Tribunal was stacked with political appointments. The government must ensure the same does not happen with its replacement.Kate Griffiths, Deputy Program Director, Budgets and Government, Grattan InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186082023-12-08T13:03:35Z2023-12-08T13:03:35ZKenya at 60: the shameful truth about British colonial abuse and how it was covered up<p>It is fairly well known that the lives of hundreds of thousands of Kenyans were affected by terrible acts of violence under the British colonial administration. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/britain-maumau-empire-waiting">British government</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/king-charles-stops-short-of-apology-for-british-colonial-violence-kenya">King Charles</a> have acknowledged it, and some victims of violence have taken the British government <a href="https://www.leighday.co.uk/news/blog/2017-blogs/the-mau-mau-case-five-years-on/">to court</a> for these crimes. </p>
<p>Less-known is how much the British imperialist government tried to cover up these violations. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670796">research</a> reveals how harsh British detention camps in Kenya were, and the extremes to which the colonialists went to conceal information about this.</p>
<p>Much of this violence happened during the state of emergency, which lasted between 20 October 1952 and 12 January 1960. </p>
<p>As militant nationalism, including the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/mau-mau-uprising">Mau Mau rebellion</a>, grew against the colonial state, a state of emergency was declared in 1952. It introduced a raft of extraordinary regulations, akin to wartime powers. </p>
<p>The regulations paved the way for mass arrests, detention without trial, excess capital punishment, summary executions, evictions, fines and the forced resettlement of entire villages. </p>
<p>From 1953 to 1960, between <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/20529/15/LHR%20AM%20Duffy.pdf#page=16">70,000</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2011.611677">150,000</a> Mau Mau suspects were detained without trial in an archipelago of camps. Conditions in the camps were dire and British colonials and loyalist warders meted out violence with impunity. </p>
<p>The Kenya Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.khrc.or.ke/index.php/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/826-accept-without-equivocation-responsibility-over-the-atrocious-colonial-rule-british-investments-and-programmes-in-kenya-to-date">estimates</a> that more than 100,000 Kenyans were killed, tortured and maimed during this time. </p>
<p>Using declassified colonial files and government papers, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670796">my research</a> reveals the pressure that was exerted by the Colonial Office in London to conceal evidence of violence against detainees. It shows how a highly sophisticated propaganda machine controlled the public narrative of violent incidents. </p>
<p>It was a form of state-sanctioned amnesia that hid the victims’ perspectives. It officially depicted the British colonials as rational actors doing a difficult job under the circumstances. </p>
<p>Highlighting this colonial story enriches the present and sheds new light on these events.</p>
<h2>Violence in detention</h2>
<p>I identified flash-points of violence which revealed the brutality of the colonial detention regime. </p>
<p>One of these, known as screening, occurred when an entire village or community was confined and interrogated about their political allegiances. Many were subsequently detained. </p>
<p>To progress through the camp complex to eventual release, detainees (none of whom had been charged with or convicted of any crime) had to confess to their Mau Mau activities. </p>
<p>Camp staff achieved this by using systematic brutality that had been sanctioned by the colonial administration. </p>
<p>One example was the “dilution” technique. This occurred when a small number of non-cooperating detainees were housed with cooperating detainees who – through a concerted psychological and physical attack – would push them to accept the rehabilitation regime and confess to taking the Mau Mau oath. </p>
<p>A variation of this, the Mwea procedure, used physical force to break “hardcore” detainees when they first arrived at the detention camp. Incoming detainees would be abused by prison staff and cooperating detainees until they submitted. </p>
<p>Another form of sanctioned violence was the use of “overpowering force”. This was supposed to be executed by European rehabilitation and prison staff in the form of on-the-spot punishment of no more than 12 strokes using a regulation cane. </p>
<p>From 1953, a policy to compel detainees to engage in work was introduced and disobedience was redefined as a major offence. So when detainees refused to work, they were subject to corporal punishment. </p>
<p>The scene was therefore set for the sanctioned use of violence against detainees. And if people were injured or killed in defiance of a legal order, those consequences could more easily be justified by camp authorities.</p>
<p>These methods of corporal punishment resulted in many injuries and deaths because camp staff regularly exceeded the punishment specified in emergency ordinances.</p>
<p>For instance, on 3 March 1959 at Hola detention camp in the north province, 11 detainees were killed and many more injured after being set upon by guards for “refusing to work”. </p>
<p>The initial official account blamed the deaths on contaminated water. However, the local inquest magistrate revealed the deaths “were due to shock and haemorrhage due to multiple bruising caused by violence”. Still, no one was ever prosecuted for these killings.</p>
<h2>Memory and history</h2>
<p>The history that is remembered is no accident. Writing to the governor and the colonial secretary in 1953, Kenya’s attorney general advised, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/mau-mau-sinning-quietly">if we are going to sin, we must sin quietly</a>”. Thus, a version of British imperialism was projected that relied upon concealment of harsh facts.</p>
<p>The violent architecture of the camps was hidden behind complicated bureaucratic language that stripped away its real meaning. </p>
<p>The British public were spun a narrative by the colonial government about the “rehabilitative” nature of the camps – a way to convert people away from Mau Mau allegiance.</p>
<p>In addition to spin, there was a deliberate attempt to suppress information. I was able to pinpoint significant Colonial Office directives from the late 1950s, which I argue were central to official denial and amnesia. </p>
<p>As British colonial territories were inching toward independence in the mid-20th century, the government in Whitehall <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-history-review/article/abs/legacies-of-british-colonial-violence-viewing-kenyan-detention-camps-through-the-hanslope-disclosure/8B1F91BFF8D1F967A9220DA5F9D47551">redoubled its efforts to bury</a> any evidence that implicated its colonial officials in violations that occurred in territories under British administration. </p>
<p>All top secret classified materials were rapidly centralised in executive offices in Kenya and marked for “European eyes only”. </p>
<p>Certain colonial files were given a particular classification in a “Watch” series prior to Kenyan independence in 1963. This included “all papers which might be interpreted as showing racial discrimination against Africans on the part of the Government”. </p>
<p>The files <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-history-review/article/abs/legacies-of-british-colonial-violence-viewing-kenyan-detention-camps-through-the-hanslope-disclosure/8B1F91BFF8D1F967A9220DA5F9D47551">were then</a> either destroyed or removed to the UK in the 1960s. We know about the classification directives and destruction mandates <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/sins-colonialists-concealed-secret-archive">because</a> a paper trail covering those particular processes survived. </p>
<p>It is clear from these directives that evidence of serious human rights abuses would be destroyed in these document purges. Documents deemed to be safe were transferred to the new independent government.</p>
<p>All of these acts meant that the colonial portrayal of the Mau Mau uprising as irrational could be legitimised.</p>
<p>Selectivity over what could be mentioned was a successful colonial strategy, with resonance in how British colonial history is viewed today.</p>
<h2>Apology and reparations</h2>
<p>Those who continue to benefit from Britain’s historical violence are insensitive or unresponsive to the calls for acknowledgement, apology and reparations. </p>
<p>Public statements by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/king-charles-stops-short-of-apology-for-british-colonial-violence-kenya">King Charles</a> and former British foreign secretary <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2013-06-06/debates/13060646000005/MauMauClaims(Settlement)">William Hague</a> recognise that Kenyans were subjected to torture and ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration, but they fall short of a full apology.</p>
<p>There will be difficulty in examining and addressing historical harms. But my research reveals a need to reconcile the colonial narratives with historical facts. This holds the potential to foster genuine compassion and justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aoife Duffy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thousands of Kenyans were held in detention camps, and the British imperialist government tried to cover up brutal violations that occurred there.Aoife Duffy, Senior Lecturer, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165992023-10-30T16:14:06Z2023-10-30T16:14:06ZKing Charles in Kenya: despite past tensions, the visit is a sign of a strong relationship with Britain<p>King Charles’ <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">visit to Kenya this week</a> is the British monarch’s first to a <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/about-us">Commonwealth nation</a> since his coronation in September 2022. The visit comes during the country’s 60th anniversary of <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kenya-declares-independence-from-britain">independence from Britain</a>.</p>
<p>By choosing Kenya, the British government and monarchy seek to highlight the importance they attribute to the east African nation. It also shows other Commonwealth members that it’s possible for a republic to have a positive relationship with Britain. Some Commonwealth states like <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/jamaicas-transition-republic-process-matters">Jamaica</a> are contemplating removing the king as head of state.</p>
<p>King Charles’ visit is meant to celebrate <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">the warm relationship</a> between the two countries. It will also <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">acknowledge the more painful aspects</a> of the UK and Kenya’s shared history. </p>
<p>The relationship with Kenya remains one of Britain’s more positive post-colonial relationships. However, there have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/calls-for-king-charles-to-apologise-for-colonial-era-atrocities-on-kenya-visit-4398116">calls for Britain to apologise and make reparations</a> for its brutal suppression of freedom fighters. People in Kenya, Britain and other former colonies will be watching closely to see what the king has to say.</p>
<p>I’m a historian who has <a href="https://www.lboro.ac.uk/subjects/politics-international-studies/staff/poppy-cullen/#tab2">studied and written</a> about the political relationship between Britain and Kenya in the decades after independence. In my view, the relationship has taken a positive tilt since independence for three reasons. These are: the choices of Kenya’s first independent president; diplomatic, economic and ideological alignments; and military ties. </p>
<h2>Kenya and Britain’s history</h2>
<p>Kenya became a British colony in the late 19th century. A small minority of white British settlers held almost all of the <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-56276-6">political and economic power</a>. The British government planned to make Kenya a “multi-racial” state. The small white European and Asian populations of 55,700 and 176,600 people, respectively, would have equal or more power than the black majority of 8.3 million. Only in 1960 did the British government accept that Kenya should have majority rule and independence. </p>
<p>Independence celebrations in 1963 were preceded by a difficult period of negotiation and violence. A state of emergency was declared in 1952 in response to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mau-Mau">Mau Mau uprising</a>. This was an armed rebellion among one of Kenya’s major tribes, the Kikuyu, fighting for land and freedom. </p>
<p>The emergency lasted until 1960. Over this period, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/18/uncovering-truth-british-empire-caroline-elkins-mau-mau">thousands of Kenyans were killed</a>, and tens of thousands were detained in camps without trial. The camps became sites of violence and abuse. </p>
<p>With this past, a close post-colonial relationship between Kenya and Britain can appear surprising. It was expected that Kenya would turn away from Britain and towards other international partners, such as the US or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union">Soviet Union</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, the relationship has largely been close and friendly, with trade benefits, alignment on significant issues and strong military ties.</p>
<h2>Positive relations</h2>
<p>Kenya’s first president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jomo-Kenyatta/Return-to-Kenya">Jomo Kenyatta</a>, had been imprisoned by Britain as a leader of the Mau Mau. But once he took leadership, he opted to work primarily with Britain. </p>
<p>Kenyatta saw the benefits he could get from this relationship. These included financial and military backing during the Cold War, and personal backing. In 1965, Britain made plans to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2016.1261917">protect</a> Kenyatta if a coup was attempted.</p>
<p>British officials were surprised but pleased by Kenyatta’s position. They had many interests in Kenya, ranging from trade to diplomacy. One key interest was Kenya’s white European and Asian populations who held British passports. To help achieve their security, the British government financed the purchase of their land, which could then be sold to Kenyans. Before independence, many in Kenya had hoped for land redistribution. Instead, European settlers got financial benefits.</p>
<p>For decades after independence, Britain was Kenya’s primary economic partner. Currently, Britain is the <a href="https://www.kenyahighcom.org.uk/kenya-uk-relations">largest European investor in Kenya and Kenya’s second-largest export destination</a>. There are <a href="https://www.britishchambers.org.uk/locations/british-chamber-of-commerce-kenya/#:%7E:text=As%20it%20stands%2C%20there%20are,139%20billion%20in%20value.">more than 200</a> British businesses operating in Kenya. </p>
<p>The British and Kenyan governments have <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-kenya-strategic-partnership-2020-2025">broadly aligned on international diplomatic issues</a> like the Cold War, and later the “war on terror”. There were some exceptions, and the Kenyan government did criticise British policies towards white rule in Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa. But in private the relationship remained cordial. </p>
<h2>Military connections</h2>
<p>Military ties have been especially close. Britain remains a training partner. The royal visit includes <a href="https://www.royal.uk/Kenya-announcement">meeting Kenyan marines trained by British marines</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2016.1261917">Britain has also sold arms to Kenya</a> and provided support to set up a navy and air force after independence. </p>
<p>After independence, many African countries expelled their British military commanders to replace them with Africans. Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta chose to keep British commanders. The Kenyan army was led by a British officer until 1966, the navy until 1972 and the air force until 1973. </p>
<p>Most important for Britain is that its military is allowed to <a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/africa/">train in Kenya</a>. This allows them to practise in different and difficult terrains.</p>
<h2>Closeness despite challenges</h2>
<p>The relationship between the two nations since independence has not always been smooth, however. </p>
<p>In 1967-68, Kenya increased policies that <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/4/newsid_2738000/2738629.stm">discriminated against Kenyan Asians</a>. The 1967 Immigration Act and 1968 Trade Licensing Act, for instance, meant non-citizens (including many Asians) needed work permits. This led to the immigration to Britain of <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1968-02-15/debates/e5e33ebe-b72f-4bae-82b4-1125bab0f265/AsianImmigrantsFromKenya">13,600 east African Asians</a> in 1967.</p>
<p>The British government then <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/9/pdfs/ukpga_19680009_en.pdf#page=4">passed legislation</a> to limit their right to enter the UK despite their holding British passports. </p>
<p>After Ugandan president Idi Amin <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/ugandan-asians-50-years-since-their-expulsion-from-uganda/">expelled the Asian population</a> in 1972 – about 40,000 Asian Ugandans moved to the UK – Britain offered aid to Kenya to ensure it didn’t follow a similar policy. </p>
<p>In 1982, after the Kenya Air Force <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/08/09/how-kenyas-rebels-botched-their-coup/ca1fdf2f-3961-476f-a682-45be109e583f/">attempted a coup</a>, many in Kenya’s elite became suspicious of Britain’s aims in the country. </p>
<p>Since independence, some in Kenya have <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/calls-for-king-charles-to-apologise-for-colonial-era-atrocities-on-kenya-visit-4398116">questioned</a> why British troops still train in the country. The killing in 2012 of a Kenyan woman, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10931549/British-soldier-accused-fatally-stabbing-Kenyan-prostitute-Agnes-Wanjiru-21-England.html">Agnes Wanjiru</a>, seemingly by British soldiers, exacerbated these grumblings.</p>
<p>The issue of the Mau Mau has also been a source of recent tension. </p>
<p>Kenya has repeatedly asked for archive files related to the Mau Mau, which the British government denied having. These files were only <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a824499e5274a2e87dc2089/cary-report-release-colonial-administration-files.pdf">acknowledged and released after 2011</a>. </p>
<p>In 2013, the British government finally acknowledged that the government had known about and been complicit in torture and violence during the emergency, and victims would be paid compensation of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/uk-compensate-kenya-mau-mau-torture">£19.9 million</a>. The then foreign secretary William Hague <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Pushing forward</h2>
<p>Despite moments of tension, the two governments have always sought to dispel difficulties. The king’s visit, for instance, is on the invitation of Kenya’s president William Ruto. Ruto made his first overseas visit as president to the UK for <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/ruto-attention-british-monarchs-funeral-150476/">Queen Elizabeth’s funeral</a> in September 2022. </p>
<p>Over six decades, the challenges that have arisen have not been enough to derail the relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216599/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Poppy Cullen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The visit will acknowledge the more painful aspects of the UK and Kenya’s colonial history.Poppy Cullen, Lecturer in International History, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079302023-07-19T14:08:02Z2023-07-19T14:08:02ZKenya’s politicians continue to use ethnicity to divide and rule – 60 years after independence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535299/original/file-20230703-259537-edbjvx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Kisumu confront police officers after Kenya's disputed 2017 elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1963, Kenya’s politicians have fed and manipulated ethnicity to win elections. </p>
<p>With some 40-odd ethnic groups, Kenya is a country of ethnic minorities – it has no single dominant community. During elections, political parties and candidates <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/27/specter-of-politics-as-usual-in-kenya-s-2022-election-pub-87578">do raise policy issues</a>, but ethnicity, or tribalism as it’s popularly called in Kenya, is the default vote-hunting strategy. </p>
<p>With few deviations, voting is akin to an ethnic census. Leading presidential candidates are usually from the populous ethnic groups. Of Kenya’s five presidents – three have been Kikuyu and two Kalenjin – come from two of the country’s biggest communities. This has raised <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62373083">issues of exclusion and fanned ethnic animosity</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320132659_The_Kenyan_State_and_the_Ethnicity_Challenge">My research</a> into <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">ethnicity in Kenya</a> has found that it is central to political power. The two have a symbiotic relationship. In my view, ethnicity is not an expression of cultural identity or a reservoir of talent for nation building. It has been politicised and is linked to social status. It determines people’s fortunes, making it integral to social mobility, stagnation or regression.</p>
<p>Since no single ethnic group is populous enough to politically impose its will on others, winning presidential candidates have had to build alliances with other ethnic groups. Political elites have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">built ethnicity into the system of governance and administration</a>. </p>
<p>For self-preservation, successive governments have arbitrarily <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/kenyans-of-indian-descent-become-44th-tribe-428220">created more ethnic groups</a>. They have cemented ethnically based administrative units and emphasised ethnic differences. </p>
<p>This has normalised the exploitation of ethnicity for political and economic gain. The populace buys into ethnic politics under the false hope that their respective ethnic leaders will help them better their lives.</p>
<h2>How ethnicity plays out</h2>
<p>Throughout 60 years of independence, Kenya has held <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322533176_'I_do_not_know_who_won_the_elections'_How_Not_to_Conduct_Elections_and_Kenya's_Democratic_Reversals">inconclusive elections</a> marred by rigging and executive interference. The transitional elections held in 2002 and 2022, however, were exceptions. Electoral disputes are <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=scr">often protracted</a>. They can degenerate into <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/ethnicity-and-violence-new-dynamics-kenyas-elections-35968">inter-ethnic violence</a>. </p>
<p>Ethnic politics in Kenya manifests itself in four major ways. </p>
<p>First, the Kenyan state is <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347999393_Ethnicity_and_Political_Pluralism_in_Kenya_in_Journal_of_African_Elections_Special_Issue_Kenya_72_pp_77-112">colonial in orientation</a>. It is extractive, discriminatory and oppressive. It is also insidiously ethnicised, elitist and classist. Successive Kenyan presidents, starting with the first, Jomo Kenyatta, anchored the state to ethnicity. </p>
<p>Second, historical land injustices in which communities and individuals have been dispossessed of their ancestral land – first by colonialists and then the post-colonial elite – manifests in ethnic politics and electoral violence. A lack of justice across the board, and especially for <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda-status-government-kenyas-0">victims of state-instigated ethnic violence</a>, has also contributed to ethnic consciousness. </p>
<p>Third, institutional disregard for the rule of law makes ethnic politics attractive, with the political elite evoking it to evade accountability. Their deliberate effort to erase memory and distort Kenya’s contested history fuels ethnicity, too. So does a lack of trust among the people, and between the people and the government. </p>
<p>Fourth, ethno-regional political figures – essentially, personality cults – have an outsized influence on Kenyans’ psyche and political choices. This comes at the expense of civic identity, personal agency and a pursuit of collective aspirations. </p>
<p>Ethnicity often <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-political-elites-switch-parties-with-every-election-how-this-fuels-violence-205005">determines party loyalty</a>. Individuals form political parties under the assumption that members of their ethnic group will rally behind them. Further, since independence, the president’s co-ethnics have <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2001385110/six-tribes-dominate-top-government-jobs-report">disproportionately held state positions</a>. </p>
<p>Ethnicity has been on the upsurge with urbanisation in Kenya. Contrary to popular belief, the <a href="https://www.khrc.or.ke/index.php/publications/183-ethnicity-and-politicization-in-kenya/file">Kenyan elite are fixated on ethnicity</a> – not the masses – since it determines access to the benefits of modernity. The elite tend to advance their political and economic interests through ethnicity. This has made it pervasive in the media, academy, politics, religious formations, civil society and state apparatus.</p>
<p>There is a link between ethnicity, elite ambitions and the impact of modernisation. Missionary education and the spread of infrastructure affected Kenyan communities differently. So did nature, which gave some communities arable land and others harsh environments. Disparities in development provide a basis for ethnicity. </p>
<h2>False starts</h2>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010">2010 constitution</a> sought to neutralise ethnicity. It requires that state appointments <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#chp_Seven">reflect Kenya’s diversity and enhance inclusivity</a>. It also seeks to <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/172-chapter-seven-representation-of-the-people/part-3-political-parties/258-91-basic-requirements-for-political-parties">streamline political parties</a> to enhance national cohesion and harmony. </p>
<p>The constitution also provides for the <a href="https://klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/139-chapter-eleven-devolved-government/part-1-objects-and-principles-of-devolved-government/343-174-objects-of-devolution">devolution of power and resources</a> through county governments. This aims to cure winner-take-all politics, which has fuelled resentment and animosity. </p>
<p>The constitution, however, is only as good as society’s political culture and norms. It cannot transform Kenyan society by itself. Governance shortfalls and excesses that have undermined the state for decades persist. </p>
<p>Ethnicity hasn’t always been Kenya’s bugbear. In elections held before independence in 1962, for instance, candidates won elections on the strength of vision and national appeal. <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/weekly-review/kenya-s-president-who-never-was-cia-files-reveal-fresh-details-about-tom-mboya-4297404#:%7E:text=Two%20years%20before%20Mboya%20was,he%20had%20acquired%20many%20enemies.">Tom Mboya</a>, a Luo, defeated <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/jomo-s-foreign-minister-dr-munyua-waiyaki-dies-at-91-389930">Munyua Waiyaki</a>, a Kikuyu, in a Kikuyu-dominated constituency. </p>
<p>However, ethnic consciousness heightened after a fallout among the post-colonial elite. The quest to monopolise political power and control national resources raised the stakes. This resulted in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Power-Tribalism-Westen-Shilaho/dp/331965294X">political assassinations, authoritarianism and a constriction of the political space</a>. Some politicians abandoned policy-oriented programmatic politics and resorted to ethnic mobilisation to claw back receding influence. </p>
<p>Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-young-voters-have-a-dilemma-they-dislike-ethnic-politics-but-feel-trapped-in-it-186855">inability to transcend the ethnic ideology</a> has made it hard to devise alternative bases for political organisation. </p>
<h2>Class vs tribe</h2>
<p>Kinship ties and ethnic bigotry have trumped class-based national identities. In the lead-up to Kenya’s 2022 elections, opponents of class politics <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/07/three-reasons-ethnicity-will-count-for-less-in-kenya-upcoming-vote/">equated it to ethnic politics</a>. They claimed it sought to incite the poor against the rich. </p>
<p>Unlike ethnic politics, however, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/122/487/205/7133587">class politics is programmatic</a>. It is not based on primordial identities and differences. It affords people an opportunity to resolve social, economic and political concerns through the ballot. </p>
<p>William Ruto, as a presidential candidate in 2022, shifted the discourse from <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-election-promises-an-economists-perspective-186480">ethnicity to the economy</a> through a “<a href="https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/9/hustlers-versus-dynasty-kenyas-new-class-politics/">hustlers vs dynasties</a>” ideology. He prevailed. Had Ruto designed his <a href="https://theconversation.com/william-ruto-how-kenyas-new-president-took-on-powerful-political-dynasties-178787">strategy</a> solely around ethnicity, he would likely have been defeated – the opposition lived true to tradition and crafted a <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/raila-unveils-odm-led-azimio-la-umoja-alliance-for-2022-race/">broader ethnic alliance</a>.</p>
<p>While Ruto’s margin of victory was thin – just over <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/QLTlLJx0Vr.pdf#page=3">230,000 votes</a> – it illustrates that Kenya is not impervious to class politics as an alternative form of political organisation. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Moving away from ethnic politics requires an overhaul of the Kenyan state to ensure social justice, the rule of law and access to opportunities for all. This would begin to dismantle ethnicity as an operative ideology. </p>
<p>It requires decolonising the state to rid it of oppressive, extractive and predatory inclinations. This has to start with an overhaul of the education system to make it relevant to Kenyan society. There is need to empower the minds of citizens by instilling in them a sense of national pride and consciousness. </p>
<p>The trouble is that the political elite have no incentive for such reform – it would render them vulnerable to a conscious citizenry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Westen K Shilaho does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s inability to move past ethnic ideology has made it difficult to develop alternative bases for political organisation.Westen K Shilaho, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for PanAfrican Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082422023-07-09T11:35:15Z2023-07-09T11:35:15ZKenya at 60: six key moments that shaped post-colonial politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533521/original/file-20230622-8708-1flywg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta waves at a crowd. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harry Benson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya celebrates 60 years of independence this year. As a political scientist who has <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">studied</a> Kenya for the past 20 years, I consider a turning point from each decade that helped to shape the east African country’s post-colonial politics. I haven’t selected elections, assassinations or other moments that have enjoyed much coverage over the years. Instead, I turn to often-forgotten moments that shed light on the country’s key steps forward – and backwards – and the role of agency and institutions.</em></p>
<h2>1964: The Lanet mutiny</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, governments across <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808104534id_/http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/mcgowan_2003jmas_-_african_military_coups_1956-2001-_frequency_trends_and_distribution.pdf">Africa fell</a> to military coups and countercoups. These nations suffered the arbitrary and authoritarian rule of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/ethnic-inequalities-in-kenya/EAFC4455E840815B624147EE930C1C34">military leaders</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya managed to avoid this fate. A regiment based at Lanet in Nakuru did stage an unsuccessful mutiny in 1964. In response, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta – as Kenyan political scholar <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">Musambayi Katumanga</a> has detailed – opted to keep the military small. He relied instead on various police units. </p>
<p>Kenyatta also “gradually altered the military’s ethnic composition”, which, at that time, was disproportionately composed of officers from Kalenjin, Kamba, Samburu and Somali communities. He increased the number of co-ethnic Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most economically dominant ethnic group. </p>
<p>These measures helped to ensure the military’s loyalty to the regime. But at a cost. The multiplication of security units undermined control and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">accountabiliy</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy of ethnic recruitment and promotion reinforced a sense of an ethnically biased state. It was a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">strategy copied</a> by Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, after a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/nation-prime/how-ochuka-coup-attempt-changed-kenya-1910656">coup attempt in 1982</a>. Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki, also adopted it after the country’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007/8 post-election crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>1976: The Change the Constitution Movement</h2>
<p>By the mid-1970s, Kenyatta was unwell. To prevent the automatic succession of his vice-president, Moi, a group of prominent Kikuyu politicians attempted to <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9h4nb6fv&chunk.id=d0e2582&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress">change the constitution</a>. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Power transferred peacefully to Moi upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the attempt had three important legacies:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the military had once again been kept out of national politics </p></li>
<li><p>the new president was made acutely aware of the insecurity of his position</p></li>
<li><p>a popular sense grew of how a Kikuyu elite felt entitled to rule.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>1980: The crackdown begins</h2>
<p>For the first year or so, Moi largely followed in Kenyatta’s footsteps, or “nyayo” in Kiswahili. He blocked any real opposition but left space for broader political debate. </p>
<p>However, in 1980, Moi’s more authoritarian streak began to show. He banned the Nairobi University Students’ Organisation and deregistered the University Academic Staff Union and Kenya Civil Servants Union. He also ordered ethnicity-based associations to wind up their affairs in the interest of “national unity”. </p>
<p>Authoritarianism came to characterise the 1980s as people were required to follow in Moi’s footsteps. </p>
<h2>1990: Timothy Njoya’s new year speech</h2>
<p>In November 1991, the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/">Paris Club of donors</a>, an informal group of western creditors, suspended US$350 million in aid to Kenya until political reforms were initiated. The following month, a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament, paving the way for a return to multi-party elections. </p>
<p>This timeline could mistakenly be taken to suggest that it was donor pressure that forced constitutional reform. But there was already substantive pressure for multi-party politics from within Kenya. </p>
<p>A tidal change occurred at the dawn of 1990 when, in a new year speech, theologian Timothy Njoya <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tmmTQgt0iXQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=i+say+to+you+ethnic+politics+kenya+lynch+&ots=u7HbNNpU6Q&sig=Fc0hDJagdL31LFjKxkRkf8E4qkc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=i%20say%20to%20you%20ethnic%20politics%20kenya%20lynch&f=false">speculated</a> on how much longer Kenya would be a one-party state. Opposition elements –- most notably, religious and civil society leaders, and politicians marginalised from the political centre –- became increasingly vocal in their demands for multi-party politics.</p>
<p>It was these domestic demands – together with the threat of suspended aid – that forced Moi’s hand and prompted a return to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. Still, Moi <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-kenyan-politics-9780192887429?cc=us&lang=en&#">sought to control</a> the transition. </p>
<h2>2005: The constitutional referendum</h2>
<p>In 2002, Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition ousted independence party Kanu in a landslide victory. This prompted a moment of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518447">great optimism</a> in Kenya. </p>
<p>However, divisions soon wracked the coalition as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2005.9627591">reports emerged</a> of corruption scandals and ethnic bias. Promises of constitutional reform were watered down. Popular frustration showed when Kenyans rejected the draft constitution in the 2005 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00020180601035674">referendum</a>.</p>
<p>The referendum and general elections that followed meant that Kenya was in intense campaign period for over two years. This elongated campaign drew attention to frustrated hopes. It also presented the government as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020180601035674">from and for the Kikuyu</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum also increased confidence in the electoral commission. This meant that people paid relatively little attention to developments like Kibaki’s unilateral <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2019.1592326">judicial appointments</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, the referendum fostered a sense that the opposition would win the 2007 election unless it was rigged. Together with a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf">problematic election</a> and history of unpunished election-related violence, these factors fuelled Kenya’s greatest post-colonial crisis. More than 1,000 people were killed and almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056240903346194">700,000 displaced</a> in violence after the 2007 election.</p>
<h2>2011: A new chief justice</h2>
<p>The 2007/8 crisis paved the way for a new <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2023-03/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf">constitution</a> in 2010. Among other things, it devolved power to 47 new county governments. It also established a new bill of rights and created the supreme court. The latter has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine presidential election petitions, and determine appeals from the court of appeal. It also determines cases that involve interpretation or application of the constitution. </p>
<p>As the highest court in the land, the leadership of the supreme court is critical. It marked a turning point when Willy Mutunga –- a highly respected human rights advocate –- was appointed as the court’s first chief justice. Some criticise Mutunga for having <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2015.1029296">validated</a> Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s election in 2013. However, he also presided over <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/SPECJU/2015/6.html">decisions</a> that protected the devolution of power and the bill of rights. And he oversaw <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/kenyas-democracy-hinges-strong-chief-justice">reforms and judicial learnings</a> that helped to establish a more independent court. Reforms that – together with his successor’s brave leadership – made the supreme court’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenyan-court-scraps-presidential-vote-kenyatta-calls-for-calm-idUSKCN1BC4A5">annulment of the August 2017 election</a> possible.</p>
<p>The lesson from these moments: individuals can make a difference for good or bad, particularly when they help to reshape the institutions that will outlive them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In recent years Gabrielle Lynch has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and University of Warwick. </span></em></p>Jomo Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi set the tone for ethnic and authoritarian politics which Kenya has wrestled to free itself from in recent decades.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069902023-06-08T14:08:37Z2023-06-08T14:08:37ZKenya’s opposition wants to split up the country – but secession calls seldom succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530907/original/file-20230608-22-hj7i1j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s opposition politicians recently called for <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">secession</a> – which is the withdrawal of territory and sovereignty from part of an existing state to create a new state. Led by Raila Odinga, who received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62554210">48.8%</a> of the presidential vote in Kenya’s 2022 election, the politicians want the country split into two republics to create a new state for Kenyans unhappy with President William Ruto’s leadership.</p>
<p>Calls for secession are not a new political phenomenon in Kenya. </p>
<p>Even before the territory gained independence from Britain in 1963, some Kenyan Somalis had <a href="https://medium.com/@muturi/kenya-that-was-never-kenyan-the-shifta-war-the-north-eastern-kenya-e7fc3dd31865">sought to secede</a> and join neighbouring Somalia. And the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-mombasa-republican-council-liberators-or-nascent-radical-fanatics">Mombasa Republican Council</a>, established in the 1990s, has called for an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist-party">independent state</a> for the coastal people, citing their marginalisation.</p>
<p>Opposition groups also made <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/446/48/10197">secession calls</a> after Kenya’s 2007-08 <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These calls were repeated in the run-up to the elections in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-coast-mrc-idUKBRE86M0H820120723">2013</a>. Then in 2017, a bill tabled in parliament proposed creating a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mp-peter-kaluma-drafts-bill-for-secession-of-40-counties-476322?view=htmlamp">People’s Republic of Kenya</a> from 40 of the country’s current 47 counties. Geographically, this new republic would retain nearly 87% of Kenya’s population and 97% of the land mass, leaving behind a nation that would not be economically viable. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements around the world usually result from the belief by some groups within a region or state that they aren’t able to exercise their right to <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">self-determination</a>. This is their right to determine “<a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">their own future, political status and independence</a>”, according to the UN. </p>
<p>Self-determination can be <a href="https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/511#:%7E:text=External%20self%2Ddetermination%20is%20the,an%20exercise%20of%20self%2Ddetermination.">external or internal</a>: full independence from other states, or access to political and social rights within a state. The two kinds are related. When governments fail to guarantee internal self-determination, affected groups may seek secession, or external self-determination. </p>
<p>The politicians calling for secession in Kenya argue that some Kenyans have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">systematically deprived</a> of the right to participate in the country’s government and economy. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-muslims-a-divided-community-with-little-political-clout-184436">Kenya's Muslims: a divided community with little political clout</a>
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<p>Aggrieved groups may seek to form their own independent sovereign state, like the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafrans of Nigeria</a> did between 1967 and 1970. Or they may seek to join another independent state, as the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/oped/comment/what-can-kenya-s-budding-secessionist-movement-learn-from-elsewhere--1378732">Somalis of Kenya</a> did in the 1960s. </p>
<p>In my view as a legal scholar and economist who has studied the political economy in Africa for close to two decades, any group in Kenya that unilaterally declares independence is unlikely to find support on the continent. Additionally, Kenyan politicians have yet to prove that aggrieved groups have been systematically denied the right to participate in the government and the economy in meaningful ways. </p>
<h2>Colonial borders</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-totally-rejects-the-so-called-declaration-of-independence-by-a-rebel-group-in-northern-mali">African Union</a> has been against secession since it was first established as the Organisation of African Unity in <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">1963</a>. </p>
<p>The organisation refused to intervene in the Nigerian civil war sparked by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafran secession of 1967</a>, calling it an internal affair. And in Mali, in response to the declaration of the independent state of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">Azawad</a> by northern Tuaregs in 2012, the union rejected this, terming it “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">null and of no value whatsoever</a>”. </p>
<p>The union’s chairperson at the time, <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-comm-mali-2-06-04-2012.docx-eng.pdf">Jean Ping</a>, emphasised the </p>
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<p>fundamental principle of the intangibility of borders inherited by African countries at their accession to independence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This echoes <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=8">Article 4(b)</a> of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. It states that the continental organisation shall respect the borders that existed at independence. The act also calls on the union to defend the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=7">territorial integrity</a> of its member states. This presents it with a dilemma when it comes to addressing secessionist movements. </p>
<p>The answer to this dilemma is for the African Union to establish a legal mechanism for recognising legitimate struggles for secession. These include struggles that offer a <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=114130#:%7E:text=Van%20Der%20Driest%20defines%20remedial,or%20domestic%20constitutional%20authorization%2C%20yet">remedy</a> for grave and systematic injustices.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-breakdown-of-biafra-separatism-and-where-kanu-fits-into-the-picture-166235">A breakdown of Biafra separatism, and where Kanu fits into the picture</a>
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<p>This was seen in South Sudan in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">2011</a>. The South Sudanese people based their push to secede on the argument that since independence in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0721/South-Sudan-5-key-questions-answered/Why-did-the-Republic-of-South-Sudan-secede-from-the-North#:%7E:text=The%20decision%20to%20secede%20can,Sudan%20became%20independent%20in%201956.">1956</a>, Khartoum had systematically marginalised them and denied them the right to pursue their political, economic and social development within a united Sudan. </p>
<p>At the end of a brutal civil war (<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/">1985 to 2005</a>), the warring parties signed a peace agreement. It granted southerners the option to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">pursue self-determination</a>. Sudan <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20100628-sudan-agrees-commission-southern-referendum">approved</a> of South Sudan’s independence push.</p>
<p>National governments can also establish constitutional processes that allow aggrieved groups to peacefully and constitutionally petition for separation. This has been done in the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9104/">UK</a> and <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-31.8/page-1.html">Canada</a>. Such constitutional mechanisms <a href="https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/secession">can encourage</a> aggrieved groups to seek internal instead of external self-determination.</p>
<p>While secession can involve the use of force – as it did in Biafra and South Sudan – it can also be achieved through peaceful means. Scotland’s ongoing bid to become independent of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-16/nicola-sturgeon-resigned-what-s-next-for-scottish-independence#xj4y7vzkg">Britain</a> is a case in point. </p>
<h2>Kenya’s obstacles</h2>
<p>Secession by Kenya’s aggrieved groups or peoples is unlikely to succeed as it faces four major obstacles.</p>
<p>First, as is clear from the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, any move to interfere with Kenya’s territorial integrity is unlikely to be supported by the organisation. </p>
<p>Second, it’s not likely that the post-secession state will gain the approval of the UN Security Council and then that of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly to be admitted to the UN. This is largely because the secessionists have not yet made a credible case for splitting Kenya into two states. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-secessionist-conflict-has-its-genesis-in-colonialism-its-time-to-reflect-158953">Ghana's secessionist conflict has its genesis in colonialism: it's time to reflect</a>
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<p>Third, secession as <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">envisioned</a> by Kenya’s opposition will create two states, one of which is not likely to be economically viable. This could lead to a civil war. </p>
<p>Fourth, the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=3979#:%7E:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya%2C%202010,specified%20in%20the%20First%20Schedule.">2010 constitution</a> <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/brief/kenyas-devolution">devolved power</a> from the central government in Nairobi in favour of local communities in 47 regions. This significantly improved the ability of various groups to govern themselves and participate in their own economic, social and cultural development. </p>
<p>Politicians and aggrieved groups need to exercise the right to self-determination through this decentralised governance process. Through it, they can help create a participatory, inclusive and development-oriented government and economy in a united Kenya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls to secede have been heard from time to time in Kenya – most often around elections.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051412023-06-05T14:38:45Z2023-06-05T14:38:45Z‘Peter Pan’ Enahoro, Nigerian journalist and publisher, was not afraid to speak his mind<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530100/original/file-20230605-25-26kq3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The late Peter Enahoro.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">New African magazine</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are some people whose lives intersect with yours even if you never meet them in the flesh. One of these was Peter Osajele Aizegbeobor Enahoro, the Nigerian journalist who was also known by his pen name, Peter Pan. Enahoro <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/594967-nigerian-journalist-peter-enahoro-is-dead.html">died on 24 April 2023</a> in London, aged 88. He had worked in Nigeria from 1954 to 1967. </p>
<p>As a journalist and journalism teacher, I have followed his career – one of professional excellence and achievements. He was a bold journalist who was not afraid to say what he thought was right. </p>
<p>Enahoro served as subeditor, features editor, (the Nigerian) Sunday Times editor, editor of the Daily Times and editor in chief of Times Group. He was to return from exile <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2023/04/30/exit-of-two-grandees-of-nigerian-letters/">in 1996 to be the sole administrator</a> of the Daily Times under a military government. He wrote his Peter Pan column first in the Sunday Times. When he was appointed the editor of the daily paper, the column was transferred there. </p>
<p>By the time he started his career, the battle against colonialism had been fought and won. The task was to demand good governance. He understood this very well. He put his satirical pen to full service and took regular digs at political leaders of the period. </p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>Born on 21 January 1935, he came from a well-heeled and well-known political family in Uromi, now in Edo State. His parents were educationists and he was one of 10 siblings. His elder brother, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/chief-anthony-enahoro-obituary">Anthony Enahoro</a>,
was also a journalist and nationalist. He was renowned as the parliamentarian who moved <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/chief-anthony-enahoro-obituary">the first motion for Nigeria’s independence</a> in 1953. Another well-known sibling was also a journalist: Mike Enahoro, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2015/10/10/ace-broadcaster-mike-enahoro-is-dead/">who died in 2015</a>, was a broadcaster of note in the 1980s. </p>
<p>After his secondary school education, as was the practice during his time, Peter Enahoro joined the government service as assistant publicity officer in the Department of Information. There he showed his talent as an inquisitive officer whose skills went beyond just writing government statements. </p>
<p>Like most journalists of his time, he never got a university education. </p>
<h2>A great journalist</h2>
<p>Enahoro became perhaps the youngest Nigerian journalist to edit a national newspaper, Daily Times, <a href="https://punchng.com/peter-pan-his-daily-times-odyssey/#:%7E:text=At%2023%20in%201958%2C%20Peter,Times%20Editor%2C%20the%20youngest%20ever.">in 1962</a>. He was 27. </p>
<p>The editor of Daily Times, another legendary Nigerian journalist, Biodun Aloba, had spotted him taking on a politician at a press conference and invited him to join the paper, then owned by the Daily Mirror of London. </p>
<p>It was the beginning of Enahoro’s rise to become “perhaps Africa’s best-known international journalist”, as Frank Barton described him in his book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/press-Africa-Frank-Barton/dp/B001TYMI1K"><em>The Press in Africa</em></a>. </p>
<p>As editor of Sunday Times in Nigeria (from 1958) and later the flagship Nigerian paper of the period, Daily Times (succeeding <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354278017_Alhaji_Ismail_Babatunde_Jose_OFR_1925-2008_A_Short_Biography_of_the_Pen_Guru">Babatunde Jose</a>), he was unsparing of politicians and soldiers who were at the helm of affairs in the country. By the time the military struck on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370">15 January 1966</a>, cutting short the elected government that had ushered the country into independence, he had become a household name whose pen was feared by those in power.</p>
<p>Enahoro and his managing director, Jose, were on opposite sides of the divide in politics. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Samuel-Ladoke-Akintola">Samuel Ladoke Akintola</a> was the premier then of the western region in Nigeria. According to Jose’s account in his memoir <a href="https://books.google.com.ng/books/about/Walking_a_Tight_Rope.html?id=T8NDAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Walking a Tight Rope</a>, “Peter did not agree with my pro-Akintola stand and I told him from the start that he had the freedom to express his views in his Peter Pan column, but that the editorial column of the Daily Times would reflect my stand.” (page 207). This never in any way affected their relationship.</p>
<p>Enahoro escaped from Nigeria in 1966, fearing for his life after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370">the 15 January coup</a>, as stated in his memoir. In Germany and later Britain, his career blossomed and his name became well known all over the world through his work in publications such as Africa, New African and his own, which he called Africa Now. </p>
<h2>A long shadow</h2>
<p>Enahoro was long gone from Nigeria by the time I became a journalist in the mid-1980s but his reputation loomed large. Magazine publishing was flourishing at that time. Many younger journalists of the day became interested in international reporting because of Peter Pan’s example and success. </p>
<p>In 2015, when he turned 80, while reflecting on the role of the media in national development, he <a href="https://dailytrust.com/peter-enahoro-80-why-corruption-will-not-end-soon/">told</a> the Daily Trust that newspapers</p>
<blockquote>
<p>are very good at saying what is wrong. But we are not yet very good at suggesting what can be done to heal it so that we don’t become part of the problem.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He knew that making suggestions to those in power had repercussions. He lost his job.</p>
<h2>Romance with a dictator</h2>
<p>A part of his life that he only touched on in his memoir was his return to Nigeria in 1996 to work for the government of the late dictator Sani Abacha. The same government had declared his older brother Anthony a wanted man. </p>
<p>In his memoir <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/53241762-then-spoke-the-thunder">Then Spoke the Thunder</a> (2009) he tried to justify his acceptance of the offer to “take over the Daily Times”. Enahoro accepted the offer made to him by Tom Ikimi, the then foreign affairs minister in the Abacha junta. He said he accepted the offer after <a href="https://blerf.org/index.php/biography/aikhomu-vice-admiral-augustus-akhabue-rtd/">Augustus Aikhomu</a>, retired military leader and his kinsman, told him: “They want you to come and clear up the mess in Daily Times … Your country needs you.” </p>
<p>His acceptance eroded the respect some had for him. He was appointed in 1996 and did the job for less than two years.</p>
<p>He wrote four books: <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/how-to-be-a-nigerian">How to be a Nigerian</a> (1966), <a href="https://www.amazon.com/You-gotta-laugh-Peter-Enahoro/dp/B0006CB64G">You gotta cry to laugh!</a> (1972), <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/the-complete-nigerian">The Complete Nigerian</a> (2016) and <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/53241762-then-spoke-the-thunder">Then Spoke the Thunder</a> (2009). </p>
<p>For his incisive writings and commentaries, Enahoro’s seat in the pantheon of journalism in Nigeria is assured, his latter-day romance with the military notwithstanding.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Oyegbile does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Peter Enahoro, Nigerian journalist, columnist and author, died on 24 April 2023.Olayinka Oyegbile, Journalist and Communications scholar, Trinity University, LagosLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2045362023-05-09T01:50:37Z2023-05-09T01:50:37ZWith independence off the table for now, what’s next for New Caledonia’s push for self-determination?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524818/original/file-20230508-174052-qxlqc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=98%2C12%2C7873%2C5444&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mathurin Derel/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/address-new-caledonias-congress">visit to New Caledonia</a> a few weeks ago made few headlines. In fact, it barely made the news. </p>
<p>Yet, her visit came at a crucial juncture for the French overseas territory, which is trying to negotiate a viable path towards a lasting self-determination, which balances the rights of New Caledonia’s Indigenous populations with the political reality of three failed independence referendums.</p>
<p>A new country is still emerging just off Australia’s coast, albeit in a slow path towards decolonisation in a process guided, but not governed, by France. </p>
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<h2>Self-determination is not a straightforward path</h2>
<p>Officially, the subject of sovereignty has been put to bed for a while, with the defeat of the most recent referendum on full independence in late 2021. A large majority <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20211213-new-caledonia-says-non-to-breakaway-from-france-for-third-time-referendum-independence-kanak-flnks">voted to remain part of France</a>, albeit with a very low turnout rate. </p>
<p>However, the main pro-independence group, the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-presence-kanak--9782738103994-page-241.htm">Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front</a> (FLNKS) refused to recognise the result, as most Indigenous New Caledonians had boycotted the poll due to the traditional burial and mourning rituals following a high number of COVID deaths in the community.</p>
<p>Talks resumed in <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2023/03/31/flnks-message-to-french-pm-about-kanak-humiliation-over-referendum/">Paris last month</a> around the validity of the third independence referendum in 2021 and on ways to devolve powers further. </p>
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<p>Even the fact the Ministry of Overseas France, which oversees France’s vast remaining colonial holdings, is still talking about these things is in stark contrast to the Anglo-Saxon, winner-takes-all approach to referendums. </p>
<p>Compare, for example, the United Kingdom government’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-top-court-rule-legality-new-scottish-independence-referendum-2022-11-23/">refusal to authorise a new independence referendum in Scotland</a>, despite 62% of Scots having voted to remain in the European Union in the Brexit vote. Nationalists there contend that conditions have fundamentally changed since the failed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-61798553">2014 independence referendum</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of New Caledonia and other former French possessions, there is an understanding that issues as complex as Indigenous rights take time and patience to explain and execute. And that systems and institutions need time to gain trust. </p>
<p>Before Wong became the first <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2023/04/25/new-caledonia-the-stone-in-french-diplomacy-s-shoe_6024320_5.html">Australian minister ever to address New Caledonia’s Congress</a>, she first met representatives of the Customary Senate, a 16-member Indigenous body that consults with the government on issues related to the Indigenous Kanak people.</p>
<p>As Wong diplomatically put it in her <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/address-new-caledonias-congress">address to the legislature</a>, “New Caledonia is at a complex, historic juncture”. Its path to decolonisation is not a straightforward question of restoring power to the traditional owners of the land. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-caledonias-final-independence-vote-could-lead-to-instability-and-tarnish-frances-image-in-the-region-172128">Why New Caledonia's final independence vote could lead to instability and tarnish France's image in the region</a>
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<h2>A unique power structure</h2>
<p>Indigenous Melanesians, who reclaimed the once-pejorative term “canaques” and adopted the word <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/en/kanaky-new-caledonia/4689-iw-2022-kanaky-new-caledonia.html">Kanak for themselves</a>, make up 40% of the population. A further 10% is made up of Polynesians (largely from Tahiti or another French Pacific territory, Wallis and Futuna).</p>
<p>Despite a long colonial history – first as a penal colony, and later as a destination for French free settlers – New Caledonia’s European population has only ever accounted for 40% of the population. Today, <a href="https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4964074">around a quarter of the 270,000 New Caledonians</a> identify as having European heritage.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-caledonias-instability-is-not-just-a-problem-for-france-154567">Why New Caledonia's instability is not just a problem for France</a>
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<p>But almost as large as the European population are those of mixed heritage. A legacy of colonisation, workers from Vietnam, Vanuatu, Algeria and other former French colonies settled in New Caledonia, married and had children. These New Caledonians often hold the balance of power in the political process. </p>
<p>As a result, a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2760677">complex web of power-sharing structures</a> has emerged over the past 20 years to give a voice to all New Caledonians. There are three provincial governments. One, called South Province, is centred around the capital, Nouméa, on the main island and is home to two-thirds of the population and the majority of the economic activity. </p>
<p>To balance out the disproportionate power of Greater Nouméa, two other provinces, North and Loyalty Islands, were established. Both have Kanak majority populations.</p>
<p>This seemingly unwieldy power structure has been designed from the bottom up. The basic law of New Caledonia, as <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000393606">enshrined in an amendment to the French constitution</a>, is referred to as “organic law” because it is not prescriptive, but rather, flexible. </p>
<p>For example, while some local councils hold elections for the Customary Senate seats, others do not. This is true to the spirit of the organic law – that each Kanak tribe can determine its own system, under a broad umbrella. </p>
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<h2>Charting a path forward</h2>
<p>The French state has progressively devolved power to New Caledonia since the historic <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new-caledonia/new-caledonia-country-brief">Nouméa Accord of May 1998</a>. Its predecessor, the Matignon Accord, was essentially a peace agreement that ended an occasionally bloody campaign for independence from France, led by the the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front. </p>
<p>Today, the coalition holds 20 of the 54 seats in the quasi-federal parliament that Wong addressed. And, in December, Louis Mapou became the first independence politician to hold the post of president of New Caledonia. </p>
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<p>The coalition’s mission remains a sovereign, independent New Caledonia, or Kanaky (<a href="https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Kanaky/180860">the group’s preferred name for the new country</a>). Yet, given the complex demographics, it has failed to win a majority in three referendums.</p>
<p>For now, the country remains a French territory, albeit one with substantial autonomy. France maintains responsibility for defence, internal security and currency controls. </p>
<p>But New Caledonia <a href="https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2021-01/dpa_discussion_paper_anthony_tutugoro_2020_05_incompatible_struggles_reclaiming_indigenous_sovereignty_and_political_sovereignty_in_kanaky_and_or_new_caledonia.pdf">now has many of the rights associated with statehood</a>, including a New Caledonian citizenship that sits alongside French. It now has the right to conduct foreign policy and trade talks with its Pacific neighbours. Japan recently opened a consulate in Nouméa and other countries are beefing up their presence to counter Chinese influence in the region. </p>
<p>This most recent devolution of powers made Nouméa an obvious stop for Wong, who also visited <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Australia-foreign-minister-visits-Pacific-islands-with-eye-on-China">Tuvalu on the same trip</a>, completing her pledge to visit every member of the 17-member Pacific Islands Forum in her first year.</p>
<p>In doing so, on <a href="https://www.senat-coutumier.nc/aires-coutumieres/carte-des-autorites-coutumieres">Djubéa-Kaponé land</a>, she pledged deeper partnership with a key regional ally and one of the world’s largest nickel producers. And she gained insight into one of the world’s most ambitious power-sharing structures created since the fall of apartheid in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Wastnage has previously received funding from the French Ministry of Overseas France and has written a tourism guide to New Caledonia funded by the South Province government of New Caledonia. </span></em></p>Officially, sovereignty has been put to bed with three straight independence referendum defeats. But France is continuing to devolve powers to its territory in an ambitious power-sharing experiment.Justin Wastnage, Adjunct Industry Fellow, Griffith Institute for Tourism, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2024482023-04-03T13:57:39Z2023-04-03T13:57:39ZTanzania-South Africa: deep ties evoke Africa’s sacrifices for freedom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517946/original/file-20230328-16-hrrcio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, left, hosts his Tanzanian counterpart during a state visit in March 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan recently paid a <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/opening-remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-during-official-talks-state-visit-tanzanian-president-samia-suluhu-hassan%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">state visit to South Africa</a> aimed at strengthening bilateral political and trade relations. As the South African presidency <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-host-her-excellency-president-hassan-tanzania-state-visit">noted</a>, ties between the two nations date back to Tanzania’s solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle. </p>
<p>This history is an important reminder of the anti-colonial and pan-African bonds underpinning international solidarity with southern African liberation struggles. It’s also a reminder of the sacrifices many African countries made to realise continental freedom.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Tanganyika">Tanganyika</a>, as Tanzania was known before independence in 1961, was the first safe post for South Africans fleeing in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> on 21 March 1960, when apartheid police shot dead 69 peaceful protesters. The apartheid regime <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/origins-formation-sharpeville-and-banning-1959-1960">banned liberation movements</a> shortly thereafter. </p>
<p>Among those who left South Africa to rally international support for the liberation struggle were then African National Congress deputy president <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Reginald Tambo</a>, Communist Party and Indian Congress leader <a href="https://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/people.php?kid=163-574-661">Yusuf Mohammed Dadoo</a>, and the Pan Africanist Congress’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-nana-mahomo">Nana Mahomo</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/peter-hlaole-molotsi">Peter Molotsi</a>.</p>
<p>Not many people will know that on 26 June 1959 <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-128;jsessionid=5715EBDE3CC6DEEF837F2753FC3A4D39">Julius Nyerere</a>, the future president of Tanzania, was among the speakers at a meeting in London where the first boycott of South African goods in Britain was launched. Out of this campaign, the <a href="https://www.aamarchives.org/">British Anti-Apartheid Movement</a> was born a year later. It spearheaded the international solidarity movement in western countries over the next three decades.</p>
<h2>Liberation struggle bonds</h2>
<p>Tanzania’s support for South Africa’s liberation struggle needs to be understood as part of its broader opposition to colonialism, and commitment to the achievement of independence in the entire African continent. In 1958, Nyerere <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/panafrican-freedom-movement-of-east-and-central-africa-pafmeca/A08CAFDC63C736384E47D52AA94191E2">helped establish</a> the Pan African Freedom Movement of Eastern and Central Africa to coordinate activities in this regard. This was extended to the Pan African Freedom Movement of Eastern and Central and Southern Africa at a conference in Addis Ababa in 1962. Nelson Mandela <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/1962-nelson-mandela-address-conference-pan-african-freedom-movement-east-and-central-africa/">addressed the conference</a> with the aim of arranging support for the armed struggle in South Africa. These efforts eventually led to the creation of the <a href="https://www.africanunion-un.org/history">Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963</a>.</p>
<p>In February 1961, James Hadebe for the ANC and Gaur Radebe for the PAC opened an office in Dar es Salaam representing the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/sacp/1962/pac.html">South African United Front</a>. It was the first external structure set up by the two liberation movements. Their unity was short-lived. But, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s capital, grew into a centre of anti-colonial activity after independence from Britain in December 1961. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man with a serious look on his face rests his chin on his left shoulder. His watch shows." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518130/original/file-20230329-20-z2y2c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The late Julius Nyerere was a staunch supporter of the movement for Africa’s independence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">William F. Campbell/Getty Images)</span></span>
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<p>At independence, Tanzania faced a shortage of nurses as British nurses left in droves rather than work for an African government. On President Nyerere’s request, Tambo arranged the underground recruitment of 20 South African nurses (“the 20 Nightingales”) to <a href="https://www.jamboafrica.online/clarence-kwinana-the-untold-story-of-the-20-nightingales-a-contribution-never-to-be-forgotten/">work in Tanzanian hospitals</a>. The remains of one of them, Kholeka Tunyiswa, who died on 5 March 2023 in Dar es Salaam, were repatriated to South Africa for reburial in <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/remains-sa-nurse-tunyiswa-repatriated/">her home city of Gqeberha</a>, Eastern Cape.</p>
<p>In the early 1960s, Tanzania was the southernmost independent African country from which armed operations could be carried out into unliberated territories in southern Africa. Its capital was chosen as the operational base of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394216">OAU’s Liberation Committee</a>. The committee provided financial and material assistance to liberation movements. Its archives remain in Tanzania. </p>
<p>In 1963, the ANC officially established its Tanzania mission, with headquarters in Dar es Salaam. A military camp for guerrillas of its armed wing, <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-1098?rskey=uSBACj&result=1">uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK)</a>
, who had returned from training in other African and socialist countries, was opened in Kongwa. The Tanzanian government donated the land. </p>
<p>Also stationed there were the armies of other southern African liberation movements – <a href="https://www.saha.org.za/collections/the_mafela_trust_collection_7.htm">ZAPU</a>, <a href="https://www.aluka.org/struggles/partner/XSTFRELIMO">Frelimo</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41502445">SWAPO</a> and the <a href="https://www.tchiweka.org/">MPLA</a>.</p>
<p>In 1964, the PAC also moved its external headquarters to Dar es Salaam after it was pushed out of Lesotho. It <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0018-229X2015000200002">established military camps</a> near Mbeya and later in Mgagao, and a settlement in Ruvu. Both the PAC and the ANC held important conferences in Tanzania, in Moshi in 1967 and in Morogoro in 1969, respectively. These led to internal reorganisation and new <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1969/strategy-tactics.htm">strategic positions</a>.</p>
<h2>Hitches in the relationship</h2>
<p>In spite of Tanzania’s support for the liberation movements, their relationship was not without its contradictions or moments of ambivalence. </p>
<p>In 1965, for example, the ANC had to move its headquarters from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, a small upcountry town far from international connections. The Tanzanian government had decided that only four members of each liberation movement would be allowed to maintain an office in the capital. This reflected Tanzania’s anxiety over the growing numbers of revolutionaries and trained guerrillas it hosted. </p>
<p>In 1969 Tanzania, Zambia and 12 other African countries issued the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45312264">Lusaka manifesto</a>, which was also adopted by the OAU. It expressed preference for a peaceful solution to the conflict in South Africa over armed struggle. There were also rumours of ANC involvement in an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/13/archives/tanzanian-treason-trial-entering-third-week.html">attempted coup against Nyerere</a>. In this climate, the ANC had to evacuate its entire army to the Soviet Union. Its soldiers were allowed back in the country a couple of years later.</p>
<h2>Lived spaces of solidarity</h2>
<p>In the 1970s, ANC headquarters moved to Lusaka, in Zambia, and uMkhonto we Sizwe operations <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-1098?rskey=uSBACj&result=1">moved</a> to newly independent Angola and Mozambique. But Tanzania remained a significant place of settlement for South African exiles. </p>
<p>In the late 1970s and 1980s, additional land donations from the Tanzanian government enabled the ANC to open a school and a vocational centre near Morogoro. The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Mazimbu and the Dakawa Development Centre were set up <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/education-in-exile">to address the outflow of young people</a> from South Africa following the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">June 1976 Soweto uprising</a>. Its other aim was to counter the effects of <a href="https://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/sidebar.php?kid=163-581-2">Bantu education</a>, a segregated and inferior education system for black South Africans. </p>
<p>These became unique spaces of lived solidarity between the ANC and its international supporters. They accommodated up to 5,000 South Africans. Some of them died before they could see a liberated South Africa. Their graves are in Mazimbu. Besides educational facilities, the camps included an hospital, a productive farm, workshops and factories. They were all developed with donor funding.</p>
<p>Tanzanians, too, contributed to these projects through their labour. Many Tanzanian women became entangled in South Africa’s liberation struggle through intimate relationships, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2014.886476">marriage and children</a>. Thanks to these everyday social interactions, Tanzania became “home” for many South African exiles. The ANC handed over the facilities at Somafco and Dakawa <a href="https://www.conas.sua.ac.tz/historical-sites">to the Tanzanian government</a> on the eve of the first democratic elections in 1994. But these personal and affective connections live on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arianna Lissoni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ties between the two nations date back to Tanzania’s solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle.Arianna Lissoni, Researcher at History Workshop, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016772023-03-20T14:08:47Z2023-03-20T14:08:47ZKenya’s police are violent, unaccountable and make most citizens feel less safe – should they be abolished?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515187/original/file-20230314-1506-fjivlu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyans protest against police extrajudicial killings in Nairobi in December 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A world without the police is inconceivable to many people. The police are viewed as part of modern society’s foundation, ensuring democracy and keeping people safe. </p>
<p>In practice, however, police around the world sometimes repress <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/29/fbi-coordinated-crackdown-occupy">social movements</a>, stifle <a href="https://sociologytwynham.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/policing-the-crisis.pdf">democracy</a>, and exacerbate social and racial <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/06/10/ruth-wilson-gilmore-makes-the-case-for-abolition/">injustice</a>. Across the African continent, they often use force to prop up repressive regimes. And in Kenya in particular, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-art-of-bribery-a-closeup-look-at-how-traffic-officers-operate-on-kenyas-roads-185551">extortion</a> and <a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/who-is-next/">extrajudicial killings</a> by the police are <a href="http://parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2021-11/Report%20on%20Inquiry%20into%20Extrajudicial%20Killings%20and%20Enforced%20Disappearance%20in%20Kenya_.pdf">rampant</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya is unusual for its extensive attempts to reform the police. Reform efforts began in earnest in 2008, when the police were found to be <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov">complicit in post-election violence</a>. And yet, after 15 years and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/kenya-police-reforms-to-cost-sh81-4bn--746284">billions of shillings spent</a>, the police reform project has <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/06/01/set-up-to-fail-police-reforms-in-kenya/">largely failed</a>. </p>
<p>The Kenyan police remain repressive, unaccountable and effectively unreformable. Many citizens complain about how the police treat them <a href="https://theworld.org/stories/2016-05-23/police-officers-treat-nairobi-neighborhood-atm-machine-residents-say">like ATMs</a> – a source of cash. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the police <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/kenya-police-have-killed-15-people-injured-31-in-covid-19-curfew-enforcement-ipoa-334522">killed tens of Kenyans</a> while enforcing curfew measures. </p>
<p>Given such failures, we posed the question: are the Kenya police <a href="https://www.akpress.org/areprisonsobsolete.html">obsolete</a>? </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-killings-point-to-systemic-rot-and-a-failed-justice-system-193468">Kenya: police killings point to systemic rot and a failed justice system</a>
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<p>We’ve conducted hundreds of interviews, discussion groups and over a decade of ethnographic research into how <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1463499617729295">counter-terrorist policing</a> and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1463499617729229">securitisation</a> have shaped <a href="https://www.african-cities.org/safety-and-security/">Nairobi</a>. And in turn, how local residents <a href="https://www.sapiens.org/culture/police-violence-kenya/">respond to police violence</a> and build their own <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0078-8">practices of care</a>, mutual aid and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0042098018789059">security</a>. </p>
<p>We have come to the conclusion that the police make most people feel less safe. Many residents told us they don’t depend on the police for their safety: they keep each other safe. Given the impasse of police reform – and citizen responses to this – there is a strong argument to be made for the abolition of the Kenyan police altogether. </p>
<h2>Policing at an impasse</h2>
<p>Modern police institutions made their first appearances on the African continent as part of colonisation and the expansion of European capitalist interests.</p>
<p>In Kenya, the roots of policing lie in early colonial “<a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/unhappy+valley">conquest</a>”. The Imperial British East African Company developed security forces to protect its expanding economic interests in the 1890s, and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kenya/The-East-Africa-Protectorate#ref419085">Kenya-Uganda Railroad</a> developed its own police force in 1902. </p>
<p>After Kenya’s independence in 1963, the police were “Africanised” but retained much of their <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137558305_4">colonial character</a>. Under <a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel arap Moi’s authoritarian regime</a> (1978-2002), the police continued to play a key role in repressing dissent. </p>
<p>There have been calls to reform the Kenyan police for decades. But the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">2007-08 post-election violence</a>, in which police were complicit in widespread ethnic violence, accelerated attempts at reform.</p>
<p>Over the past 15 years, police reform has been enshrined in the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/158-chapter-fourteen-national-security/part-4-the-national-police-service/413-244-objects-and-functions-of-the-national-police-service">2010 constitution</a> and actualised in numerous acts of parliament. It’s been supported internationally with <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Briefs/2018/KENZ04_Final_Evaluation_Brief_June_2018.pdf">funding and technical expertise</a> from the UN, the US and the EU, among others. It prompted the <a href="https://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/pages/search.html">reorganisation of the police service</a> and the establishment of <a href="https://www.ipoa.go.ke/#">civil oversight mechanisms</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, despite all of these efforts, the Kenyan police <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-killings-point-to-systemic-rot-and-a-failed-justice-system-193468">remain corrupt, violent and unaccountable</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">Kenya has tried to reform its police force, but it's left gaps for abuse</a>
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<p>Civilian oversight over the police has proved ineffectual. The Independent Policing Oversight Agency has managed to bring only <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-03/Report%20of%20Independent%20Policing%20Oversight%20Authority%20on%20Performance%20for%20January%20%E2%80%93%20June%202021.pdf">12 cases of police violence to conviction</a> out of more than 20,000 complaints received between 2012 and 2021. That is only one out of every 1,667 complaints. The under-resourced agency simply can’t grapple with the immense volume of reported police abuses.</p>
<h2>The case for abolition</h2>
<p>Police reform <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2017/06/01/set-up-to-fail-police-reforms-in-kenya/">has failed</a>. Is it time to consider abolition?</p>
<p>Abolition is not about simply tearing things down, but rather asking what should exist in place of outdated and violent systems that no longer serve people. Abolition is a <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/mariame-kaba-interview-til-we-free-us/">creative</a> and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/06/10/ruth-wilson-gilmore-makes-the-case-for-abolition/">constructive project</a> with deep <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwYik8nn63U">philosophical roots</a>. </p>
<p>So why abolish the Kenya police?</p>
<ol>
<li><p>The police are functionally obsolete for most Kenyans. In many low-income neighbourhoods, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0042098018789059">our research shows</a> that people avoid calling the police to respond to crises or crimes. For many, experience shows that the police can <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64509793">make matters worse</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>The police often exacerbate insecurity, violence and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-art-of-bribery-a-closeup-look-at-how-traffic-officers-operate-on-kenyas-roads-185551">corruption</a>. To provide for their own safety, residents increasingly <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publishing/journal-british-academy/10s3/to-retreat-or-to-confront-grassroots-activists-navigating-everyday-torture-in-kenya/">organise themselves into networks</a> of friends, family and neighbours for basic safety. For instance, women in Mathare, Nairobi, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0042098018789059">organise their own security practices</a>, which include conflict resolution, de-escalation of violence and <a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/mothers-of-victims-and-survivors-network-from-victims-to-community-defenders/">support for survivors</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>In more affluent neighbourhoods, residents increasingly rely on private companies to provide <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1463499617729295">security in their compounds</a>. Police are seen as one among <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263775820923374">many security services</a> available for hire. In our research, the few positive experiences with the Kenyan police were reported (predominantly) by such affluent residents.</p></li>
<li><p>The remaining function of the police is “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Enforcing+Order:+An+Ethnography+of+Urban+Policing-p-9780745664804">enforcing order</a>” and protecting the state against society. Officers uphold and protect a rarefied governing class and political elite against the population. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>Police abolition, therefore, would mean dismantling ineffective and repressive institutions and replacing them with <a href="https://www.akpress.org/we-do-this-til-we-free-us.html">systems of actual safety</a>, systems that enable society to thrive.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">Many Kenyans have embraced vigilante cops – an ineffective police force is to blame</a>
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<h2>What should replace the police?</h2>
<p>When confronted with the idea of “abolition” for the first time, many people often respond: “but who will keep us safe?” </p>
<p>In Nairobi, the answer is to be found in existing social practices. The problem is that there’s a lack of resources to support alternatives to punitive security. We call for defunding the police and investing these resources in such alternatives.</p>
<p><strong>1. Invest in communities.</strong> When we ask about local security problems, residents often answer that the lack of schools, food, land, quality housing, <a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org/category/maji-ni-haki-water-campaign/">water</a>, electricity, toilets, healthcare and safe places for kids to play are what cause “insecurity”. Reinvestment in community means funding such social infrastructure to allow people to thrive. This reduces <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/want-to-reduce-violence-invest-in-place/">crime and violence</a>. </p>
<p><strong>2. Invest in alternative safety mechanisms.</strong> This means strengthening dispute-resolution mechanisms that help resolve conflicts without violence. The government needs to support existing <a href="https://www.matharesocialjustice.org">social justice centres</a>, <a href="https://africa.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2021/08/inside-kenyas-social-justice-centres">networks</a> and movements fighting for change. </p>
<p>When these forms of social reinvestment are pursued, the need for the police is greatly diminished.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201677/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wangui Kimari is the participatory action research coordinator for the Mathare Social Justice Centre (MSJC) </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zoltán Glück received research funding from the Social Science Research Council, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Fulbright IIE, and the African Cities Research Consortium. The views expressed in this article are solely the authors' and do not represent the positions of any of these funding organizations. </span></em></p>Alternatives to violent policing already exist in the daily practices of Nairobi residents who don’t depend on the police for safety.Wangui Kimari, Anthropologist, University of Cape TownZoltán Glück, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992412023-02-13T21:34:30Z2023-02-13T21:34:30ZMarry or mingle: The risks and rewards of being single<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508940/original/file-20230208-27-aolhe7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=115%2C77%2C5026%2C3345&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Marriage has traditionally been touted as the goal to which everyone should strive, but remaining single is increasingly common.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pexels/Freestocksorg)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/marry-or-mingle--the-risks-and-rewards-of-being-single" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>For many people, Valentine’s Day can be an isolating time. The dominant Valentine’s Day narrative insists that to be in a romantic relationship is to be happy. And for many single people, the day can come with pressure to find a partner. </p>
<p>The sensationalization of romance on Valentine’s Day puts pressure on people. Singles wonder whether there is something “wrong” with being single (or with them for being single). Couples wonder whether their relationship measures up to the ideal and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6811.2004.00095.x">often break up</a> if they find it doesn’t.</p>
<p>Marriage has traditionally been touted as a goal to which everyone should strive, but that norm is changing. In past decades, the stigma caused by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20447267">societal disapproval</a> was a driving motive to “find love.” But those <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/583033">pressures</a> have slowly decreased. It is <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2134600">more normal than ever</a> to remain single or live in a common-law <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjk2x42">relationship</a>.</p>
<p>More than <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710006001">40 per cent of Canadians are single</a> and the number of single-person households is increasing. In 2021, Canada had around just as many <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220713/g-a001-eng.htm">single-person households</a> (29.3 per cent) as it did couple-only households (25.6 per cent) and family households (25.3 per cent).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/single-on-valentines-day-and-happily-so-155191">Single on Valentine's Day and happily so</a>
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<p>Still, the expectation remains that people should be actively trying to find a partner. Valentine’s Day reinforces that. Rest assured, there is nothing wrong with remaining or becoming single — in fact, there can be benefits.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.542">stereotype</a> is that singles are lonely, miserable, and unhealthy. That’s just not true. Single people tend to be more social, active and independent.</p>
<h2>The rewards of being single</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people at a restaurant sharing a toast." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509011/original/file-20230208-19-n4e0m4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Research shows that single people tend to have stronger and wider social circles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p><strong>Being single increases connectedness:</strong>
Single people are not necessarily isolated. In general, singles often have stronger social networks. Their networks tend to be more expansive, with singles more actively involved in their broader community. Moreover, not only do they have more connections, but single people are more likely to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407515597564">maintain the social relationships</a> they have by reaching out and depending on connections.</p>
<p>Marriage can be more insular. When you have a partner, you are less likely to look outwards for support or rewarding social interactions because you already have a close relationship at home to depend on.</p>
<p><strong>Being single increases physical fitness:</strong>
Single people are more likely to take better care of their physical health. Singles spend <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3599846">more time exercising</a> than married people and consequently have, on average, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.06.001">lower BMI</a>. Single people also report similar levels of overall <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.542">well-being</a>, self-esteem and life satisfaction in comparison to couples.</p>
<p><strong>Being single increases independence:</strong>
Single people are usually more self-sufficient. They are more likely to experience <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/019251398019006001">personal and psychological growth and development</a> than married people, likely because they have to be more autonomous.</p>
<h2>The risks of being single</h2>
<p>However, it’s not all roses. There are also some detriments associated with being single. In general, married people <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2061670">live longer</a>. There’s an ongoing debate about whether this means healthier people are more likely to get married (the marriage selection effect) or that marriage provides a protective environment (the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwr111">marriage protection effect</a>). </p>
<p>It’s likely that both contribute to the statistics. Research suggests that individuals with poor <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(95)00347-9">physical</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/585665">psychological</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.043">emotional</a> health are both less likely to marry and more likely to die at an earlier age. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man holds a ring box while proposing to a woman." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509013/original/file-20230208-18-2cj53m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The quality of our social interactions is what matters most, whether we are single or in a relationship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Single people, while more physically active, have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/hea0000654">poorer diets</a> than married people. Married people also have built-in social and emotional support in each other, are less likely to participate in <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2061670">risky behaviours (such as problem drinking) and have better economic conditions</a> compared to single people. </p>
<p>However, it is important to note that not all romantic relationships are satisfying. If romantic relationships are loving and supportive, then there are physical and psychological benefits. But when marriages and long-term relationships dissolve, the physical, mental, emotional and economic stress can have significant negative effects on health. </p>
<p>Similarly, if romantic relationships are of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2005.0103">poor quality</a>, the corresponding stress can affect a person’s well-being. And there’s no evidence to suggest that staying in a poor relationship is beneficial. </p>
<p>Altogether, research supports a single message: social connection is important. The number and quality of our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022146510383501">social relationships</a> affect our mental and physical health, behaviour and mortality risk. Relationships, whether romantic, familial, friendships or otherwise, keep you healthy. Love <em>should</em> be celebrated. </p>
<p>Let’s refocus Valentine’s Day less on romance and more on cultivating and celebrating having happy lives full of loving relationships in whatever form they take.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Sherry receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Valentine’s Day can be isolating for people who aren’t in romantic relationships. But research shows there are benefits to remaining single.Simon Sherry, Clinical Psychologist and Professor in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979952023-01-27T12:37:41Z2023-01-27T12:37:41ZSomaliland’s oil find could reset the regional balance: here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504851/original/file-20230117-24-k69nqy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> Somaliland has been assessed as holding commercial quantities of oil and gas. EDUARDO SOTERAS/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-walk-in-front-of-a-gas-station-in-the-city-of-news-photo/1235886286?phrase=somaliland%20&adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The presence of oil in Somaliland has been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2023-01-09-somaliland-announces-first-oil-discovery/">confirmed</a> by a recent exploration. The discovery has raised the stakes in Somaliland’s claim for independence from Somalia as it holds the potential for a new stream of revenue for the semi-autonomous state. But the oil exploration is deepening <a href="https://www.worldoil.com/news/2022/12/28/genel-oil-s-oil-operations-in-east-african-region-declared-illegal-by-somalia/">the rift with Somalia</a>, which claims sovereignty over the region. Michael Walls answers five key questions.</em></p>
<h2>What is Somaliland’s hydrocarbon potential?</h2>
<p>In 2020, Norwegian seismic survey company, TGS, estimated that the Somali basin as a whole likely holds <a href="https://www.petro-online.com/news/analytical-instrumentation/11/breaking-news/somalia-agrees-to-offshore-oil-plans-with-shellexxon/51729">offshore reserves of about 30 billion barrels</a>, with additional onshore reserves, although land estimates are considerably less consistent. Assessments generally include Somaliland and would place Somalia reserves <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/oil/oil-reserves-by-country/">at about the same level as Kazakhstan</a>, which would give the area the 18th or 19th largest reserve globally, as assessed in 2016. </p>
<p>Geological conditions seem to support the view that there are likely to be commercially viable deposits in the region. Whether they prove close to estimates remains unknown at this stage. </p>
<p>There is also evidence of offshore (undersea) reserves in the region, as well as onshore (beneath the land) in the Somali region of the neighbouring Ethiopia. Bordering Somalia, and located next to Oromia Regional State, the Somali Regional State (also Ogaden) is Ethiopia’s second largest federal region.</p>
<h2>Why has it taken so long to make an oil find?</h2>
<p>This find is being billed as the first discovery in Somaliland but in fact there have been several instances of oil seepage. An oil seep occurs when geological or unrelated human activity results in oil “seeping” into the ocean or onto land. In such cases, the physical appearance of oil occurs unexpectedly rather than as a result of deliberate exploration. It is unsurprisingly taken as evidence of a substantial reserve that is close to the surface, but doesn’t always indicate the presence of commercially viable quantities or accessibility.</p>
<p>Genel Energy, the UK oil exploration firm on whose concession this discovery occurred, has held rights to explore in Somaliland since 2012. So the find isn’t quite the sudden and unexpected bonus that’s been implied by some reports.</p>
<p>Progress has been slow because Somaliland’s lack of international sovereign recognition creates an uncertain context for significant investment. Somalia still claims sovereignty over Somaliland even though the region has operated as a fully if informally independent state since 1991. </p>
<p>This creates a vacuum. The Somali federal authorities cannot enter into meaningful agreements over exploration or extraction in Somaliland. Somaliland is limited by investment risk. And Somalia’s threats and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/somalia-rejects-genel-energy-claim-to-oil-permits-somaliland-4070698">complaints</a> emphasise that risk.</p>
<p>This has not stopped Somaliland from entering into agreements, but it has slowed activities taking place under them.</p>
<p>In addition, there have been disputes within Somaliland over how the proceeds of hydrocarbon exploitation would be shared. </p>
<p>One of the areas with significant potential is the Nugaal Valley, which stretches across the border of eastern Somaliland into Puntland. Genel Energy was already exploring in that zone a decade ago. It <a href="https://www.africa-energy.com/news-centre/article/genel-suspends-somaliland-operations-enis-scaroni-meets-somali">withdrew</a> for a time in 2013, citing security concerns. In the same time period, Africa Oil secured rights from the Puntland administration that overlapped with those issued by Somaliland to explore in the Nugaal Valley. A 2014 UN report expressed concern that hydrocarbon exploration in the Nugaal Valley risked fuelling violent conflict. Africa Oil <a href="https://ejatlas.org/conflict/oil-exploration-within-somalias-semi-autonomous-puntland-region">ceased active operation in the area a year later</a>.</p>
<p>The most recent find is in a different area of Somaliland: Salaxley in the Maroodi Jeex region, which is less politically volatile. This makes it more likely that Genel Energy will be able to advance its work.</p>
<h2>What challenges lie ahead?</h2>
<p>The uncertainty created by a lack of international recognition makes it difficult to mobilise sufficient investment. And there is little doubt that Somalia will continue to remain hostile to both exploration and extraction. </p>
<p>Similarly, local sensitivities around the sharing of financial rewards will need to be managed with care and deep local engagement.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-africa-oil-somaliland-20111101-idAFJOE7A00AB20111101">commentaries</a> have suggested that the newly discovered oil could be abundant. But the reserves could also prove limited and may present technical challenges in extraction. It is therefore possible that extractive plans will operate at the margin of financial feasibility. </p>
<p>The latest find was the result of an <a href="https://www.share-talk.com/drilling-for-water-in-the-bahadhamal-village-sallahley-area-somalia-rig-hits-a-near-surface-oil-vein/">accidental release of oil</a> during drilling for water rather than from deliberate exploration. This may be evidence of a significant and easily accessed reserve, but seepages and strikes like this have happened in the past in Somaliland. A more extensive geo-seismic surveying will be needed before the full extent of the reserve is confirmed.</p>
<h2>What would be the political implications of oil wealth in Somaliland?</h2>
<p>I had previously studied the place of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263593602_Somalia_Oil_and_insecurity">oil in Somalia and its breakaway states</a> . Somali society is kinship-based. Specific groups identify with particular geographic areas. This means that the political implications vary sharply depending on the location of any oil discovery. </p>
<p>Previous experience of exploration in the Nugaal Valley showed how socially and politically volatile the exercise could be. </p>
<p>The area of the latest find, around Salaxley, is likely to prove less volatile. Unlike the Nugaal Valley, Salaxley has not customarily been subject to the same inter-clan and political disputes. But there will still need to be significant negotiation over sharing of the proceeds of exploration. The government will be keen to ensure that the windfall advantages those in power. Local clan groups will be keen to ensure there is a clear benefit accruing to their communities. Other clans will equally want a say in how increased wealth benefits Somaliland as a whole. </p>
<p>Depending on how negotiations conclude, there is potential for this clan-based process to mitigate the <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf">“resource curse” effect</a>. In other words, the system of inter-group negotiation that underpins Somali society might provide some protection from the narrow economic impact of oil wealth that has been felt elsewhere. However, that is by no means certain and the process of negotiation itself has the potential to fuel violence, just as the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/16961">UN worried in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Either way, the Somaliland economy remains tiny. Any influx of significant new wealth, even on a fairly modest scale, will create new social, economic and therefore political tensions.</p>
<h2>What are the implications for regional dynamics?</h2>
<p>The regional impact will depend on the extent of the discovery. Somalia has consistently objected to hydrocarbon exploration in Somaliland as all concessions have been granted under Somaliland legislation. It would object even more strongly to commercial extraction. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s interest is likely to be more equivocal. Salaxley is close to the Ethiopian border, and not far from active hydrocarbon exploration concessions in Ethiopia’s Somali region. If the Somaliland reserves prove to be extensive after a technical appraisal, it would suggest that those in the adjacent Ogaden Basin are also significant. In this case Somaliland and Ethiopia would hold a mutual interest in ensuring sufficient regional security to enable extraction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Walls has in the past received funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and other research funders to conduct research and consultancy. All such funding has been to undertake specified and time-limited research or consultancy work through UCL. </span></em></p>Any new wealth will create new social, economic and political tensions.Michael Walls, Professor of Development Politics and Economy & DPU Director, Faculty of the Built Environment, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1907192022-10-07T07:26:15Z2022-10-07T07:26:15ZUganda’s Owen Falls dam: a colonial legacy that still stings, 67 years later<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485174/original/file-20220918-52595-ss59az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The sluice gates open at the Owen Falls dam across the White Nile in Uganda on 14 October 1962. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-sluice-gates-open-at-the-owen-falls-dam-later-the-news-photo/1365173292?adppopup=true">McCabe/Express/Hulton Archive via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Uganda’s Owen Falls hydropower plant has a rich history that predates the country’s independence in 1962. The plant is located across the White Nile and sits between the towns of Jinja and Njeru on the shores of Lake Victoria. It is about 85 kilometres east of Kampala.</p>
<p>Uganda was a protectorate of the British empire from 1894 to 1962. In 1947, English engineer Charles Redvers Westlake recommended the construction of a hydroelectric dam at Owen Falls that was supposed to be East Africa’s largest power project. </p>
<p>The governor of the Protectorate of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen, <a href="https://www.archive.observer.ug/features/spec/spec200805011.php">wrote</a> at the time that the Owen Falls dam would open new horizons of opportunity and prosperity for Uganda and all who lived there. Cohen went on to note: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Despite its technical complexity and the fact that we have had to draw upon skill and experience from many parts of the world, it belongs to Uganda and to Uganda’s people. The power which the dam will provide and the industries it will make possible will bring solid benefit to everybody in the shape of increased wealth; above all, it will bring new opportunities to Africans.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At its completion in 1954, the dam <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2021.1950751">immediately expanded</a> Uganda’s electricity supply capacity from 1MW to 150MW. But the expected boom in electricity consumption didn’t happen. One textile mill and a copper smelter were the only industrial establishments to crop up. </p>
<p>The Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) – which was established on <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/110-years-of-electricity-in-uganda-1751826">15 January 1948</a> – resorted to selling between one third and one half of the electricity generated to Kenya.</p>
<p>The institutional arrangements for constructing the dam left a damaging legacy that is still felt today. The British established governance arrangements for Nile waters that effectively granted Egypt veto power over all construction projects on the Nile. This legal regime continues to cause conflict between Nile riparian states to this day.</p>
<p>Owen Falls’ construction has to be seen as part of a racist colonial project, the sole objective of which was the exploitation of peoples and their resources to maximise British interests. </p>
<h2>Empire’s twisted logic</h2>
<p>At the end of World War II there were protests throughout the British empire as demands for independence began picking up pace. </p>
<p>In Uganda, the country’s new colonial governor, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/building-of-owen-falls-dam-begins-in-jinja-1636524">Sir John Hathorn Hall</a>, was forced to take action. Some of the steps he took were informed by the need for the colonial government to show restless and poverty-stricken Ugandans that it was interested in promoting economic growth, industrialisation and development.</p>
<p>The dam was supposed to help Ugandans utilise their own natural resource – the water in Lake Victoria – to provide themselves with a significant level of energy independence.</p>
<p>But, in the twisted logic of the empire, achieving this goal was constrained by London trying to achieve interests elsewhere. In this case, British agricultural interests in Egypt. </p>
<p>In 1929, Egypt and Britain had signed the <a href="https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=64266">Anglo-Egyptian Treaty</a>, which was designed to harness the waters of the Nile River and its tributaries to produce raw materials, notably cotton, for British industries.</p>
<p>The treaty, which created what are today known as historically acquired rights, was concluded without input from Uganda or other <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/#:%7E:text=%5B2%5D%20The%20Nile%20River%20riparian,Sudan%20are%20downstream%20riparian%20states">Nile riparian states</a>. </p>
<p>These rights allocate virtually all Nile waters to Egypt and Sudan. They also grant Egypt veto power over all construction projects on the Nile River and its tributaries.</p>
<p>As Ugandans would later find out, the British had, without their permission, placed Egyptian officials in a position to <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">veto</a> development projects in Uganda and other upstream Nile Basin states.</p>
<p><strong>The Nile Basin states</strong></p>
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<p>Despite the fact that the Owen Falls dam was to be constructed on the White Nile in Uganda, Uganda was forced to obtain permission for its construction from <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/building-of-owen-falls-dam-begins-in-jinja-1636524">Egypt</a>. </p>
<h2>Source of tension and conflict</h2>
<p>The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English.pdf">1959 Nile Treaty</a> – which was a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan – continue to fuel conflict between the downstream and upstream states in the Nile Basin. </p>
<p>In fact, Ethiopia’s refusal to abide by and be bounded by these colonial anachronisms has forced officials in Cairo to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/hacked-stratfor-emails-egypt-could-take-military-action-to-protect-its-stake-in-the-nile-2012-10">threaten to go to war</a> to maintain Egypt’s acquired rights. </p>
<p>In accordance with the spirit of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, colonial Uganda was forced to submit the documents for constructing the Owen Falls dam to Cairo for approval.</p>
<p>The construction of the dam would be the responsibility of the UEB, which was also to administer and maintain the project. However, the interests of Egypt were to be represented at the construction site by an Egyptian resident engineer, who would instruct the UEB on the discharges to be passed through the dam.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nile-basin-at-a-turning-point-as-ethiopian-dam-starts-operations-178267">Nile basin at a turning point as Ethiopian dam starts operations</a>
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<p>It is no wonder that when Ethiopia announced its intention in 2011 to construct a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">dam on the Blue Nile</a>, Egypt sought similar concessions. Just as it had demanded of colonial Uganda, Egypt sought to maintain technical staff at the site of Ethiopia’s dam to monitor its operations.</p>
<h2>Racism on site</h2>
<p>The racist foundations of colonialism were quite evident at the Owen Falls dam site. For example, after estimating that the job would require a labour force of 2,000, the UEB built labour quarters for Europeans and Asians, complete with a club, community centre and swimming pool, at the Amberly Estate north of Jinja. </p>
<p>But it chose to house all African staff in quarters located across the bridge in Njeru. </p>
<p>These discriminatory economic and social policies would spill into the post-independence period and be exploited by dictator <a href="https://theconversation.com/thousands-of-recently-discovered-photographs-document-life-in-uganda-during-idi-amins-reign-119131">Idi Amin</a> for his personal interests.</p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61585886">she died on 8 September 2022</a>, some Ugandans remembered Queen Elizabeth II as the young monarch who, in 1954, inaugurated the Owen Falls dam as a symbol of energy independence and ushered in a new era of industrialisation and economic development in Uganda. </p>
<p>But others remember her as the person who, over 70 years, presided over a country that reminds them of brutal exploitation, including the theft of their resources.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku is affiliated with Weber State University (Ogden, Utah, USA) and The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.)</span></em></p>The mega dam in Jinja was meant to give Uganda energy independence, but this was constrained by Britain’s agricultural interests in Egypt.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1848952022-06-23T14:50:35Z2022-06-23T14:50:35ZWhy Uber drivers aren’t unionizing in Québec<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468243/original/file-20220610-28309-qtm2nc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Uber model hinders any possibility of drivers acting collectively and generates significant cognitive dissonance among them.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As of mid-June, the Uber platform will extend its services to the entire province of Québec. On a global scale, Uber is in nearly <a href="https://s23.q4cdn.com/407969754/files/doc_downloads/2021/07/Uber-2021-ESG-Report.pdf">10,000 cities and 71 countries and has more than 3.5 million workers</a>.</p>
<p>This model, based on on-demand work and the algorithmic distribution of tasks, fundamentally transforms ways of thinking about, organizing and carrying out work, both on an individual and collective basis.</p>
<p>The expansion of Uber’s service across Québec provides an opportunity to examine the reality of the work being carried out by thousands of drivers and delivery personnel in the province. What is their work day like? How do they make social connections?</p>
<p>To try to answer these questions, I observed Facebook groups of drivers and interviewed about 50 Uber workers in Québec.</p>
<p>As a doctoral student in communications at Université du Québec à Montréal and a research student at the Université du Québec’s Institut national de la recherche scientifique, my research examines the profile and motivations of Uber drivers, their ideas about collective action and, more generally, the psychosocial issues involved in work that is mediated by algorithms.</p>
<h2>Many encounters, but solitary work</h2>
<p>Although Uber workers encounter many people on a daily basis (customers, restaurant owners, passengers), their activity is essentially solitary. Their work takes place without ever meeting another human from Uber. Their registration on the platform is done online and their daily tasks are distributed to them by an algorithm through the Uber app.</p>
<p>If a problem prompts a driver to contact the company’s technical service, the people they interact with are located in <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1525/9780520970632/html">out-of-country call centres</a>. What’s more, the answers they get are most often formatted by scripts, reinforcing the robotic nature of their relationship to work.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="man wearing a mask driving a car with an Uber badge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467558/original/file-20220607-18-79q23t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The organization of their work limits Uber drivers’ possibilities to socialize and hinders the possibility of forming a union.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As for the few moments when workers might meet — in restaurants waiting for orders or in drop-off areas at airports — drivers’ interactions are limited to brief exchanges about the number of orders they got that day, as expressed by Katia, an Uber Eats delivery driver in Montréal:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When I pass another delivery driver, I say “Hey Uber! Lots of business tonight,” or “Not much business tonight,” and that’s about it. After that, I probably won’t ever see them again, but if I do, I just say hello. I don’t even know their name.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A competitive atmosphere</h2>
<p>Uber drivers’ Facebook groups do provide a place to share information and vent about frustrating situations. However, these spaces play a very limited role in building a collective since they don’t make it possible for drivers to have extended conversations about work.</p>
<p>The architecture of the groups favours short-term interactions, with posts quickly fading into the thread. Constructive exchanges would require conversations over a long period of time in an atmosphere of listening and trust. However, the competition felt by drivers, combined with the brief and anonymous interaction mode of social networks, contributes to a hostile climate. As Diane, an Uber Eats delivery driver in Laval, says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I think that the negative comments are made to discourage others because it’s not a group where we encourage each other. It’s a group where we try to discourage others, because it’s competition. If I want to earn a living, I have to run more races than you.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Collective action is a threat</h2>
<p>Surprisingly, this absence of a collective identity is not perceived as a problem by most of the workers I interviewed. Despite difficult working conditions over which they have no control, workers do not tend toward gathering and mobilizing in an effort to establish a power relationship with Uber.</p>
<p>While Uber drivers in other jurisdictions <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8816204/uber-union-reach-settlement-ontario-unionization-case/">have tried to unionize</a>, the idea of collective action is perceived as a threat by most of the Québec workers. The competitive climate pushes drivers to develop a repertoire of tactics and tinkering to stand out, as Bertrand, an Uber driver in Québec City, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We all go to the Facebook group for the same thing, to find others like us and see if they can give us tips and tricks to better understand how it works, to get information. But we quickly understand that, no, we are all in the same boat, we are all there for our own pocketbook.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Among the tactics used to optimize their income, some drivers will, for example, call customers to find out their destination before picking them up. If drivers feel the trip is unprofitable, given the distance to the customer, they will cancel the trip. Others use two phones to maintain access to the map and show the location of the surcharge zones.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Uber app on a Samsung phone showing several available cars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/467536/original/file-20220607-13238-andol3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Québec, many Uber users appreciate the app’s ease of use and the convenience of the service.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>No sense of belonging</h2>
<p>To many workers, a work collective that strives to harmonize practices and replace individual tactics with collective strategies, looks like a loss of competitive advantage.</p>
<p>Now that Uber drivers’ struggles against cab drivers is over — thanks to <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5096891/taxi-drivers-protest-montreal-quebec-city/">the adoption of Bill 17 in 2020</a> which deregulated Québec’s taxi industry — they no longer share a common enemy.</p>
<h2>Fraught consequences</h2>
<p>Each driver has to learn how the business works and cope with its challenges on their own, cobbling together their own tactics, conscious that not all drivers benefit from the same resources. Moreover, drivers are deprived of the opportunity to develop a collective reaction about their working conditions. </p>
<p>The absence of meaningful exchanges, opportunities to listen and the presence of other drivers hinders the development of any meaningful relationships and solidarity between drivers. Their activity is reduced to their relationship with technology.</p>
<p>In fact, without the power to act collectively in the face of rigid working conditions, the dysfunctions and health problems of workers are always treated <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278777956_Collective_work_and_rules_re-writing_process_a_way_of_workers%27_health">as isolated realities rather than as a consequence of the way their work is organized</a>. As Kader, an Uber driver in Montréal, puts it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never opened my heart on the Facebook group. All I have to do is make one comment and I feel attacked by the others. Often, drivers who speak honestly are verbally attacked. Drivers are suffering. We could discuss it. But the climate we need to do this does not exist in the group.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The profiles of Uber drivers in Québec vary greatly. For example, the fact that it’s impossible to negotiate higher incomes does not have the same consequences for a Tesla engineer, who drives three hours a week to take their mind off things, as it does for an immigrant who works 60 hours a week to support their family.</p>
<h2>Low revenues and lack of transparency</h2>
<p>For some individuals being an Uber driver brings in extra income, but the model also takes advantage of the precariousness of a part of the population. Those who carry out the activity as their only source of income, often do so because they lack a better option. </p>
<p>Although the majority of the drivers I interviewed do not aspire to become employees and are reluctant to join a union, many deplore the low income and the platform’s lack of transparency over how the algorithm and the remuneration system work.</p>
<p>Faced with this situation, they see the government as the only stakeholder that could establish a power relationship with Uber and force the platform to offer better working conditions to its drivers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184895/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucie Enel has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie, and the J.A. DeSève Foundation.</span></em></p>When it comes to dealing with Uber’s difficult working conditions, Uber drivers are on their own.Lucie Enel, Doctorante en communication, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1831862022-05-20T10:09:36Z2022-05-20T10:09:36ZWhat Scotland can learn from Irish independence: it won’t control interest rates and inequality will widen<p>The UK <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-61344176">local elections</a> in May saw gains for nationalists in Scotland and Northern Ireland, raising the prospect of increased debates over the future make-up of the country. In Scotland, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, is <a href="https://www.thenational.scot/news/20146166.nicola-sturgeon-tells-us-media-plan-hold-scottish-independence-referendum-2023/">hoping to</a> hold a second independence referendum in 2023. </p>
<p>The economic context may have deteriorated since 2014 due to Brexit and COVID, but two key issues <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">remain pertinent</a>: Scotland’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13101">choice of currency</a> and whether its public finances would be sustainable. On both subjects, there are some useful lessons that can be drawn from the last secession from the UK, namely that of Ireland in 1922. </p>
<p>Sturgeon has indicated that an independent Scotland would be open to “sharing” the UK pound for a while to help bring stability. Ireland took the same approach until 1928, when it launched its own currency, the punt, pegged one-for-one to the pound sterling, which made sense because Ireland was heavily integrated into the UK economy. </p>
<p>The peg was managed by a currency board and was comparatively stable for over 50 years. The price for Ireland was the loss of monetary policy, choosing to follow UK interest rates, set by the Bank of England, instead. This is in line with the so-called “<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trilemma.asp#:%7E:text=The%20trilemma%20is%20an%20economic,the%20trilemma%20are%20mutually%20exclusive.">policy trilemma</a>” in economics that says that a country cannot maintain a fixed exchange rate, control over interest rates and free capital flows at the same time, but must choose two out of the three alternatives. </p>
<p>Had interest rates not been harmonised, foreign investors might have pulled their money out of Ireland for fear that the currency peg wouldn’t hold and they would lose out as a result. Such a withdrawal would only increase the chances of a currency collapse, potentially making necessary imports unaffordable (this is known as a balance of payments crisis). Indeed, this <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/033248939802500104">happened in 1955</a> when Ireland did not raise interest rates in line with the Bank of England, resulting in a sharp recession and increases in emigration. </p>
<p>Over the years, UK monetary policy was also a constraint on the Irish government’s budget. Although in theory it was free to decide how to tax and spend, the need to maintain the sterling peg prevented various Irish governments from deviating too far from the UK’s approach to borrowing. </p>
<p>An independent Scotland is likely to face similar constraints. In 2018, the <a href="https://www.sustainablegrowthcommission.scot/">Sustainable Growth Commission</a> (SGC), an economic body set up by the Scottish government to come up with credible financial plans for independence, stipulated that a pegged Scottish currency would require significant fiscal discipline. It noted that the “6% to 7% fiscal deficit is not sustainable”. In 2022-23, Scotland’s deficit is projected to <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/publications/15418#:%7E:text=But%20the%20gap%20with%20respect,a%20significant%20degree%20of%20uncertainty.">exceed 10%</a>. </p>
<p>The punt abandoned its sterling peg in 1979. By that time, the Irish volume of trade with continental Europe had grown significantly, following its accession to the pre-EU European Economic Community in 1973. Sterling was in the midst of a major appreciation in value on the back of the discovery of North Sea oil, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/changing-times-9780199552788?cc=ie&lang=en&">rising 55%</a> between 1977 and 1981. </p>
<p>However, Irish fiscal policy now lacked its traditional disciplinary anchor. Ireland’s debt grew significantly <a href="http://www.tara.tcd.ie/handle/2262/91634">after 1979</a> and began to look precarious until the government reined in its budget and introduced pro-growth policies, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/currency-choice-what-lessons-from-ireland-for-an-independent-scotland">including devaluing the punt</a>, in the second half of the 1980s.</p>
<h2>Fiscal liabilities</h2>
<p>Among the most challenging issues for any dissolving nation state is apportioning government debts. In 2014, in language remarkably similar to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-59460774">Anglo-Irish Treaty</a> a century before, the UK Treasury <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-debt-and-the-scotland-independence-referendum">issued a communiqué</a> stating that, “[an] independent Scotland would become responsible for a fair and proportionate share of the UK’s current liabilities”.</p>
<p>With Ireland, that wasn’t what transpired. It ended up being granted the <a href="https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/35344312/LUP_166_002_.pdf">largest debt relief</a> in modern history, in return for accepting the status quo border with Northern Ireland. Scotland doesn’t have a comparable bargaining chip, though the British nuclear submarine base at Faslane near Glasgow is very contentious. Perhaps the Scottish government would be allowed to write off debts in exchange for abandoning its anti-nuclear stance and allowing the UK unfettered access to Faslane. </p>
<p>Having said that, the Irish civil war (1922-23) and the Northern Ireland troubles (1969-97) demonstrate that the people may still decide that sacrificing something of great political importance in exchange for a debt write-off may ultimately be a step too far. </p>
<h2>Fiscal constraints</h2>
<p>Scotland currently runs a slightly different income tax policy to the rest of the UK. It charges an extra percentage point of tax to those in its two higher income bands: 41% on earnings between £43,663 and £150,000 and 46% on earnings above £150,000. It also has slightly wider bands than the rest of the UK so that people pay these rates on more of their income. </p>
<p>Instead of extracting greater revenue from wealthier citizens, Ireland was compelled after independence to lower the income taxes of these people who had supported the British union to discourage them from taking their money out of the country. The government then had to raise revenues in other ways, such as via budget cuts and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/033248937600300104">increased duties</a> on alcohol and tobacco. This <a href="https://www.quceh.org.uk/uploads/1/0/5/5/10558478/wp22-05.pdf">increased inequality</a> by inflicting most of the pain on the (predominantly nationalist) working classes. </p>
<p>This was quite a shift for Ireland. In contrast to 19th century nationalist rhetoric, Ireland had received comparatively <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/financial-history-review/article/abs/capitalising-on-the-irish-land-question-land-reform-and-state-banking-in-ireland-18911938/8AF25FEEBADBB9AF7B71AA4CC7D1148F">generous social spending</a> in the final decades of the union. A significant share of the Irish economy had <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/enterprise-and-society/article/business-establishment-opposition-to-southern-irelands-exit-from-the-united-kingdom/A1162C3560E8D5561506545BBE2D5AA7">also benefited</a> from free trade with Britain. Again, the same could be said of Scotland. </p>
<p>A final contentious issue is pension contributions. While the SGC said back in 2018 that they would be affordable, the nation has an elderly population. Would the state pension be compatible with a balanced Scottish budget? Ireland learned that tackling the pension issue can produce a disproportionately negative political response, when <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3600770">the electorate</a> voted against the ruling Cumann na nGaedheal party in 1932 for “tampering with the old age pensioners”.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that Scotland, like Ireland in the early 20th century, could succeed as an independent state. Indeed, <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-referendum-why-the-economic-issues-are-quite-different-to-2014-154119">key strengths</a> such as oil and gas, renewables, financial services and higher education suggest it would start off in a wealthier position. </p>
<p>But managing the transition won’t be straightforward. Ireland’s experience shows that the need for fiscal discipline may be politically costly and adjustment may not be shared equally. Those who are promised the most through independence may be the ones that find themselves having to do the bulk of the heavy lifting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eoin McLaughlin received funding from The Leverhulme Trust for his project ‘A messy divorce? Irish debt and default, 1891–1938’</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Kenny receives funding from the Irish Research Council. </span></em></p>After 1922, the people that had supported independence often weren’t the ones who benefited from it.Eoin McLaughlin, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University College CorkSeán Kenny, Post-Doctoral Researcher in Economics, University College CorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1773812022-02-21T17:52:22Z2022-02-21T17:52:22ZChagos Islands: Mauritius’s latest challenge to UK shows row over sovereignty will not go away<p>A superyacht hired by Mauritius recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/mauritian-ship-takes-scientific-team-to-contested-chagos-islands">set out</a> to conduct a scientific survey of the Blenheim reef, 230km off the coast of Diego Garcia in the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/chagos-question">Chagos archipelago</a>. A group of Chagossians accompanied the scientists in what <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mauritius-sets-sail-chagos">has been hailed</a> as an “historic” event by Mauritian prime minister Pravind Jugnauth. </p>
<p>This trip was controversial not only <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/meridian/2022-02-14/chagos-islanders-living-in-sussex-criticise-problematic-flag-raising">among Chagossians</a> but also because the international legal status of the islands has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mauritius-and-the-uk-are-still-sparring-over-decolonisation-40911">in contention</a> for the past 60 years. The visit took in the outer atolls of Peros Banhos and the Salomon, the last to be inhabited by Chagossians before the British government removed them in the 1960s to establish an American military base in the archipelago. </p>
<p>This was the first time Chagossians were visiting their homeland without UK support. The Mauritian flag was raised by Mauritian officials on both atolls and on Blenheim reef. At stake is the issue of Mauritian sovereignty.</p>
<h2>British involvement</h2>
<p>The Chagos archipelago is a collection of seven coral atolls made up of over 60 islands in the Indian Ocean, about 500km south of the Maldives, midway between Tanzania and Indonesia. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/oceanindien.2003">In the late 18th century</a> French planters established coconut plantations and brought in enslaved people, initially from Senegal, and later labourers from Madagascar, Mozambique and India to work on these plantations. </p>
<p>Today many of those identifying as Chagossians are the descendants of these enslaved and indentured labourers. Some research refers to them as the islands’ <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20179938?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">indigenous people</a>. </p>
<p>These issues are significant because of the historical and contemporary relationship of the UK, US and Mauritius with the islands. The Chagos islands, which were dependencies of Mauritius, came under British sovereignty in 1814, having formerly been part of the French empire. </p>
<p>Internationally, the islands were largely neglected until the cold war. In the 1960s the US and the UK jointly identified Diego Garcia, the largest of the islands, as an ideal location for a military base in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, in 1965, the UK government <a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/sand-gcybilj2-copy.pdf">detached</a> the Chagos islands from Mauritius and from Seychelles. </p>
<p>While some islands were already uninhabited, between 1967 and 1973 the remaining population, around 1,500 inhabitants, was <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/chagos-question">removed and relocated</a>. Some were resettled in Mauritius, some in Seychelles and some in the UK. Laws were subsequently passed by the UK government to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10854681.2021.1888514">prevent people resettling</a> to the islands. </p>
<p>Britain created a new colony from islands formerly part of Seychelles and Mauritius (the former were returned to Seychelles on its independence in 1976)- the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). In 1966 the UK and US concluded the agreement to establish a joint military facility on the BIOT island of Diego Garcia. The agreement was to last for 50 years with an option of a 20-year rollover which was triggered in 2016. The agreement now lasts to 2036.</p>
<h2>Contemporary litigation</h2>
<p>Considerable litigation has been brought before the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights by Chagossian Oliver Bancoult and as a group action by the Chagos Islanders regarding <a href="https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004204416/Bej.9789004202603.i-293_013.xml">the right to return</a> to the islands. In recent years there have been three important decisions.</p>
<p>In 2010, the UK established a no-fishing protected area around the Chagos archipelago. Mauritius claimed this infringed Mauritian fishing rights and instituted proceedings against the UK under <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">international law</a>. </p>
<p>In March 2015, the tribunal established under international law, to which the matter had been referred for <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex8.htm">arbitration</a>, ruled in favour of Mauritius. It held that the UK had breached its obligations under international law and, in particular, the fishing rights of <a href="https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf">Mauritius</a>.</p>
<p>Since Mauritian independence in 1968, consecutive governments have challenged the detachment of the Chagos islands, claiming they are part of Mauritius. In 2019, the International Court of Justice published an <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169">Advisory Opinion</a> in response to a request from the United National General Assembly on behalf of Mauritius, stating that decolonisation had <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/mauritius-v-uk-chagos-marine-protected-area-unlawful">not been lawfully carried out</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, it said that detaching the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius was not based on the free and genuine will of the people. Consequently, the UK’s continuing administration of the Chagos archipelago was unlawful.</p>
<p>The United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm">accepted this Advisory Opinion</a> in a resolution that ordered the UK to withdraw from the archipelago within a period of six months. Almost four years on, the UK <a href="https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-uk-refusal-to-return-archipelago-to-mauritius-show-the-limits-of-international-law-127650">has still not done so</a>. Instead the British government continues to hold that neither the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion nor the UN resolution have any legally binding effect. </p>
<p>The UK has consistently indicated that it will cede the islands to Mauritius once they are no longer required for defence purposes. The UK has made a number of financial payments to Chagossians and is currently delivering about £40 million in support to <a href="https://www.chagossupport.org.uk/post/2017/03/02/british-government-comment-on-40m-support-package-for-chagossians">improve the livelihoods</a> of those in Seychelles, Mauritius and UK</p>
<p>Mauritius has said that the recent visit was not intended as a hostile act towards the UK. Nor was it an overture to resettlement. Nevertheless, it is a clear indication that Mauritius is not going to let the dispute of sovereignty disappear any time soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sue Farran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By raising the Mauritian flag on the Chagos Islands, the east African nation has reasserted – if only symbolically – its claim to sovereignty.Sue Farran, Reader of Law, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721282021-12-06T00:48:51Z2021-12-06T00:48:51ZWhy New Caledonia’s final independence vote could lead to instability and tarnish France’s image in the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435526/original/file-20211203-21-wbbhmu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=233%2C61%2C6928%2C5395&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mathurin Derel/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>France is persisting with its decision to hold the final of three independence referendums in New Caledonia on December 12, disregarding Indigenous independence leaders’ calls for a <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article/politique/referendum/nouvelle-caledonie/les-partisans-du-oui-demandent-d-une-seule-voix-le-report-du-referendum">postponement of the vote</a> and now for “<a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20211023-new-caledonia-s-separatists-call-for-boycott-of-december-independence-vote">non-participation</a>” – effectively a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20211021-new-caledonia-separatists-call-for-boycott-of-independence-referendum">boycott</a> – due to the impact of the COVID pandemic on their communities.</p>
<p>The decision threatens France’s own 30-year peace process in the semi-autonomous territory, as well as stability in its preeminent Pacific possession. A boycott of the vote by the Indigenous Kanak population could potentially return the territory to the turmoil of the 1980s, with regional consequences.</p>
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<h2>Why is another independence referendum happening?</h2>
<p>The Indigenous-based independence movement gathered strength in New Caledonia in the 1970s and early 1980s as <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/france-south-pacific#tabanchor">France rolled back</a> autonomy provisions it had agreed to and <a href="https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/7915/dp-202005-incompatible-struggles-reclaiming-indigenous">encouraged immigration</a> from other parts of France to outnumber independence supporters. </p>
<p>By the 1980s, Kanak frustration led to violent protests in the territory and a boycott of an independence referendum in 1987. This was followed by <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2018/11/01/flashback-to-kanaky-in-the-1980s-blood-on-their-banner/">deadly shootings</a> between Kanaks and French militias months later during the French presidential elections.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mncparis.fr/uploads/accords-de-matignon_1.pdf">Matignon/Oudinot Accord</a> in 1988, negotiated by the French government between pro- and anti-independence groups, ended the violence. This was followed by the <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/article_jo/JORFARTI000001944885">Noumea Accord</a> in 1998, which promised a three-vote process for independence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-new-caledonias-independence-referendum-and-how-it-could-impact-the-region-105387">Explainer: New Caledonia's independence referendum, and how it could impact the region</a>
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<p>The first two referendums, held in 2018 and 2020, delivered record turnouts (over 80%) and a slight majority for staying with France. There was, however, a large (and growing) Kanak support base for independence, rising from <a href="https://www.nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr/Actualites/Archives/2018/Referendum-Retrouvez-ici-les-resultats-definitifs-de-la-consultation-du-4-novembre-2018">43.3%</a> to <a href="https://www.nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr/Politiques-publiques/Elections/Elections-2020/REFERENDUM-2020/Les-resultats/Resultats-definitifs">46.7%</a>. Just 10,000 votes separated the two sides in 2020. </p>
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<img alt="Voting at a polling station in Noumea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435734/original/file-20211205-15-1bcceuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Voting at a polling station in Noumea in the 2018 independence referendum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mathurin Derel/AP</span></span>
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<p>A third vote was expected to be close, with both sides courting the 25,000 people who abstained in 2020 (of 180,000 total eligible voters). However, Kanak “non-participation” would render the vote politically void, as it did in 1987. </p>
<p>This final vote can be held any time before October 2022. The loyalist parties who support remaining a part of France favoured an earlier vote to consolidate their majority and allow for speedy recovery of the stagnating economy. </p>
<p>Independence parties preferred a later vote to maximise their chances to gain a majority. </p>
<p>To avoid overlap with French elections next year, the French government chose December 12 for the referendum over the opposition of independence parties. </p>
<h2>France takes a less neutral approach</h2>
<p>In the first two campaigns, France scrupulously observed impartiality and invited international observers. For this final vote, it has been <a href="https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/8208/dp-202103-uncertainties-new-caledonia-prepares-its-final">less neutral</a>. </p>
<p>For starters, the discussions on preparing for the final vote did not include all major independence party leaders. The <a href="https://www.nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr/Politiques-publiques/Elections/Elections-2021/REFERENDUM-2021/Les-consequences-du-oui-et-du-non/Le-document-sur-les-consequences-du-oui-et-du-non">paper required by French law</a> explaining the consequences of the referendum to voters favoured the no side this time, to the point where loyalists used it as a campaign brochure. </p>
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<p>The French government also selectively commissioned and released opinion polls on the role of France in New Caledonia, while the local media has highlighted the potential negative effects of independence on health and other services. </p>
<p>Visiting Tahiti in July, <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/07/28/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-depuis-papeete">President Emmanuel Macron spoke</a> in strong terms of the threats to small isolated Pacific islands without France to protect them. France is also deploying more security personnel to New Caledonia for this year’s vote. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-caledonias-instability-is-not-just-a-problem-for-france-154567">Why New Caledonia's instability is not just a problem for France</a>
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<h2>An ominous impasse with the Kanaks</h2>
<p>The impact of the COVID pandemic has played a major role in this year’s referendum.</p>
<p>New Caledonia had experienced few cases and no deaths from the start of the pandemic until the Delta variant made its way to the territory in September. Since then, there have been <a href="https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/new-caledonia/">nearly 300 deaths</a>, most in the Kanak community. </p>
<p>Citing Kanak mourning rites involving lengthy community grieving, independence leaders sought a postponement of the December 12 vote, emphasising the potential effect on campaigning and turnout. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article-direct/covid/referendum/nouvelle-caledonie/le-senat-coutumier-decrete-un-deuil-kanak-d-un-an-et-demande-le-report-du-referendum">Customary Senate</a>, the assembly of the Kanak area councils, declared a 12-month mourning period, while the pro-independence leaders <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article/politique/referendum/covid/nouvelle-caledonie/si-le-scrutin-se-tient-le-12-decembre-nous-ne-serons-pas-la-le-13-pour-discuter-de-l-apres">threatened Kanak “non-participation”</a> in the vote. </p>
<p>However, France’s overseas territory minister, Sebastien Lecornu, confirmed the December date. He said France’s non-compulsory voting system allowed anyone to choose not to participate if they wished.</p>
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<p>The reaction among Kanaks was strong. Independence leaders reaffirmed their call for peaceful non-participation, eschewing the term “boycott” because of its association with the 1987 referendum boycott and the violence that followed. They noted, though, their 30,000 young Kanak supporters would not necessarily obey. </p>
<p>They also formed a <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article/politique/referendum/nouvelle-caledonie/flnks-l-etat-veut-il-encore-decoloniser-la-nouvelle-caledonie">new strategy committee</a> to prepare a response to France’s decision to proceed with the vote. One leader described the decision as an “<a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article-direct/politique/covid/referendum/nouvelle-caledonie/pour-le-palika-le-maintien-du-referendum-au-12-decembre-s-apparente-a-une-declaration-de-guerre">apparent declaration of war on Kanaks</a>”.</p>
<p>On December 5, a group of largely Kanaks <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvelle-caledonie-le-conseil-d-etat-saisi-par-une-demande-de-report-du-referendum-1171426.html#xtor=EPR-1-%5BNL_1%C3%A8re%5D-20211205-%5Binfo-titre6%5D&pid=726375-1494324169-07d467e2">asked</a> France’s highest court of appeal to urgently review the decision and postpone the vote until after the June French elections.</p>
<p>The pro-independence parties have said they would contest the result if the referendum goes ahead, and would not participate in discussions about the territory’s future that France has proposed for the day after the vote.</p>
<h2>What the referendum means for the region</h2>
<p>If there is instability or violence in New Caledonia, or a contested referendum outcome, it will impact the region. </p>
<p>France’s role in the Pacific will again be at issue, as it was in the 1980s. Then, regional governments focused international attention on France’s handling of its territories’ decolonisation demands and its nuclear testing in French Polynesia, ultimately leading France to change its ways. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/315-nuclear-bombs-and-ongoing-suffering-the-shameful-history-of-nuclear-testing-in-australia-and-the-pacific-148909">315 nuclear bombs and ongoing suffering: the shameful history of nuclear testing in Australia and the Pacific</a>
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<p>France’s revised policies and serious diplomatic efforts have enabled it to <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australia-france-strategic-partnership">forge new partnerships</a> with Australia, New Zealand and Pacific island governments. Thus, France’s treatment of its overseas territories ultimately underpins its role in the region and its Indo-Pacific vision.</p>
<p>Regional leaders and analysts have urged the French government to have a rethink of its handling of this decisive vote. </p>
<p>The Melanesian Spearhead Group, comprising Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia’s independence coalition, has <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article-direct/nouvelle-caledonie/politique/referendum/covid/l-ambassadeur-de-papouasie-nouvelle-guinee-plaide-a-l-onu-pour-un-report-du-referendum">called for postponing the referendum</a> in the United Nations. </p>
<p>A “<a href="https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/new-caledonia-referendum-3/">Pacific Elders Group</a>” has also written to Macron, seeking respect for Kanak grieving custom. <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/456145/vanuatu-backs-kanak-call-to-delay-vote-on-independence-in-new-caledonia">Vanuatu Prime Minister Bob Loughman</a> and French Polynesian independence leader <a href="https://www.lnc.nc/article-direct/politique/nouvelle-caledonie/oscar-temaru-lance-un-appel-aux-polynesiens-de-caledonie-pour-soutenir-les-freres-kanaks">Oscar Temaru</a> have lent their vocal support to the independence leaders. </p>
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<p>And late last month, over 60 international academics with years of experience working on New Caledonia expressed concern over the referendum date in an <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/11/23/respectons-le-deuil-kanak-reportons-le-referendum-en-nouvelle-caledonie_6103237_3232.html">open letter</a> published by Le Monde.</p>
<p>For France, Australia and the rest of the region, New Caledonia’s referendum may not be the democratic beacon for the future it was designed to be, but instead, a portent of instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172128/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denise Fisher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Pro-independence parties had sought a delay for the third and final referendum due to the impact of the pandemic on the Indigenous Kanak population. It was denied.Denise Fisher, Visiting Fellow, ANU Centre for European Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1697772021-10-13T14:24:26Z2021-10-13T14:24:26ZWestern Sahara conflict risks spilling over into the Sahel: how it can be resolved<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426142/original/file-20211013-19-wb0lir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstration in support of the Sahrawi people's rights.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fermin Rodriguez/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations recently <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sga2068.doc.htm">appointed</a> a new envoy for Western Sahara – Staffan de Mistura. This is a welcome step towards resolving the long-running conflict between the pro-independence <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario</a> movement, which represents the people of Western Sahara, and Morocco, which has <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/icla/20/3/article-p492_492.xml">occupied</a> the territory since 1975.</p>
<p>The appointment comes as the UN Security Council prepares to renew the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. But the UN must do more than simply facilitate talks between Morocco and Polisario on the basis of an ambiguous call for a “political solution”. This approach has failed to deliver an agreement, and it will fail again.</p>
<p>It is time for a new diplomatic initiative to develop a realistic means of fulfilling Sahrawi self-determination in line with international legal norms. The aim should be to develop a UN plan for <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/">free association</a> between Western Sahara and Morocco. The arrangement would provide for true power-sharing, taking as its starting point the Sahrawi people’s inherent sovereignty over their own land, while providing greater protections for their rights. </p>
<p>The current peace process is facing an existential crisis. This year marks <a href="https://minurso.unmissions.org/background">the 30th anniversary of the creation of the UN mission</a>. In 1991, the UN brokered a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario, but effectively abandoned the idea of holding an outright vote on independence a decade later. </p>
<p>Since then, the UN Security Council has overseen an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/western-sahara/b82-time-international-re-engagement-western-sahara">unravelling peace process</a>. It finally collapsed last year with the resumption of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-westernsahara/polisario-leader-says-western-sahara-ceasefire-with-morocco-is-over-idUSKBN27U0GE">armed clashes</a>.</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, unchecked violence between Morocco and Polisario could spill over into neighbouring countries and further destabilise the Sahara-Sahel region. Former US president Donald Trump’s <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-recognizing-sovereignty-kingdom-morocco-western-sahara/">recognition</a> of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara – a policy <a href="https://www.axios.com/biden-keep-trump-western-sahara-recogntion-morocco-349f187f-bfe7-444b-a4e2-437045ae5dcf.html">maintained</a> by the Biden administration – has complicated the search for peace.</p>
<p>There are plenty of reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects for a negotiated agreement that finally fulfils Sahrawi self-determination. Still, there are reasons to be optimistic. A timely, durable and just resolution to the Western Sahara conflict is possible. </p>
<p>This means rectifying past mistakes.</p>
<h2>Big ask</h2>
<p>The new UN envoy is a tough and principled diplomat with deep experience of complex diplomacy after serving as the UN’s envoy to Syria. Past envoys have shared similar qualities. But this will count for little without strong support from the Security Council, particularly the US and France, when tough decisions must be made.</p>
<p>De Mistura must also change diplomatic tack. He can’t simply facilitate dialogue between the parties. He must be given the political strength to drive forward a realistic UN-developed plan to achieve Sahrawi self-determination in the face of strong opposition from Morocco, which claims the territory as its own. </p>
<p>This will certainly be no small feat. But it is the most realistic path forward.</p>
<p>For over two decades, the UN Security Council has called on Morocco and Polisario to reach a negotiated political solution that respects UN norms of decolonising <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt">non-self-governing territories</a>. Implicitly, this mandate assumes that a solution will be found between the options of independent statehood or integration into Morocco.</p>
<p>Over the past decades, this search for an alternative – a “third way” – has been dominated by the idea of autonomy. This has been an additional source of failure.</p>
<p>It isn’t surprising, for a number of reasons. </p>
<p>Firstly, autonomy is merely a form of integration – it’s not an alternative to it. </p>
<p>Secondly, autonomy arrangements have a poor track record of permanently resolving ethnic conflicts in postcolonial and developing regions. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the bloody wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea both have their roots in failed autonomy arrangements.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the <a href="http://www.moroccoembassy.org.au/?q=full-text-moroccan-initiative-autonomy-plan">autonomy plan</a> put forward by Morocco in 2007 lacks any safeguards to ensure continuing respect for Sahrawi rights and self-governance by the Moroccan regime. This is a critical issue since the plan would formally integrate Sahrawis into an <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf">autocratic system</a> that has a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/western-sahara">history</a> of suppressing their nationalism, human rights and political agency. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Polisario has rejected Morocco’s plan as a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4415284.stm">non-starter</a>.</p>
<p>Fourthly, autonomy runs contrary to Western Sahara’s international legal status as a non-self-governing territory that is separate from Morocco. This was recently affirmed in a <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=246701&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3011736">ruling</a> of the EU Court of Justice.</p>
<p>But this doesn’t mean that the UN Security Council should stop searching for middle ground. </p>
<h2>Free association as an alternative?</h2>
<p>The UN should explore the lesser-known concept of free association. </p>
<p>Under this arrangement, the Sahrawis (through Polisario) would delegate aspects of their sovereignty to Morocco and to a newly created state of Western Sahara. Robust international guarantees and supervisory mechanisms would help to ensure both sides respect the agreement.</p>
<p>The concept has been put forward in UN General Assembly <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/about">resolutions</a> as well as International Court of Justice <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf">deliberations</a> as one means of de-colonising Western Sahara.</p>
<p>Any future arrangement with Morocco must above all reflect the consent of the Sahrawi people through an informed and democratic process. A free association agreement would therefore still need to be accepted by the Sahrawis in a referendum. A limited number of Moroccan settlers could also be given the right to vote in a referendum.</p>
<p>Critics point out that neither side has much reason to back such a solution. This is true. But if a negotiated agreement is ever to be found, it is most likely to fall within the realm of free association rather than outright independence or integration in Morocco.</p>
<p>A diplomatic solution is possible. But it will require both sides to make concessions to get what they want. This can only happen through increased international diplomatic activism. The UN Security Council, the EU, and their respective members all have the capacity to shape this future by deploying the right combination of incentives and disincentives.</p>
<p>Polisario will need to be convinced that delegating some authority to Morocco is a suitable price to pay for an end to the Moroccan occupation and internationally recognised Sahrawi statehood. This will have to include guarantees that any future deal will be enforced by the international community.</p>
<p>To make progress, the UN Security Council and the EU will also need to apply real leverage on Morocco – something they have proven reluctant to do. By virtue of its status as the <a href="https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/military-occupation-of-western-sahara-by-morocco">occupying power</a>, the overwhelming control it exerts on the ground, and its obligations under previous UN resolutions and international law, it is Rabat that will have to move the most.</p>
<p>France and the US also need to apply pressure. As a start, France and the US should remove their automatic protection for Morocco at the UN Security Council. And Washington should suspend Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty should Rabat block UN-led peace efforts. </p>
<p>Few in the international community consider Western Sahara to be a pressing foreign policy issue. Yet, given the slow deterioration of security in Western Sahara and potential wider implications for north-west Africa and Europe, the appointment of a new UN envoy offers a rare moment to reboot international diplomacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Mundy is a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh Lovatt is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). </span></em></p>If a negotiated agreement is ever found, it is most likely to fall within the realm of free association rather than outright independence or integration in Morocco.Jacob Mundy, Associate Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640922021-07-08T20:09:16Z2021-07-08T20:09:16ZCan Taiwan rely on Australia when it comes to China? New poll shows most Australians don’t want to send the ADF<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410109/original/file-20210707-23-u578jw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=106%2C106%2C5226%2C3399&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ritchie B Togo/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I have been in Taiwan since April as a visiting fellow. During this time, there are two questions I’ve been consistently asked. What’s happened to Australia’s relationship with China? And what does it mean for Australian support for Taiwan?</p>
<p>The Australia-China relationship I can explain somewhat. I can chart the causes of the <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/144763-opinion-australia-china-relations-downward-spiral-can-be-reversed/">downward spiral</a> of relations. I can say <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-china-policy-cant-be-based-on-paranoia-or-corporate-interests-there-is-a-better-way-163494">why it’s unlikely to improve</a> anytime soon. The 2021 <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org">Lowy Institute poll</a> shows how deep the negative sentiment now runs, with only 16% of surveyed Australians expressing trust in China compared with 52% just three years ago. </p>
<p>But how to answer what level of support there is for Taiwan in Australia? </p>
<h2>New poll: what do Australians and Taiwanese think?</h2>
<p>The Lowy poll last asked Australians this question in <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2019">2019</a>. Given the most compelling scenario — where Chinese invades and the United States decides to intervene — only 43% of respondents supported deploying military forces. </p>
<p>With the deterioration of the Australia-China relationship and the talk of war, would we expect this to go up or down?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
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<p>To try to answer this, I worked with the Australia Institute <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/should-australia-go-to-war-with-china-in-defence-of-taiwan">to survey</a> both Taiwanese and Australians citizens (asking more than 600 people in each country with a 4% margin of error) about each nation’s security and relationship with China.</p>
<h2>A China attack?</h2>
<p>The results are surprising on two fronts.</p>
<p>First, the degree of threat felt by Australians surveyed is striking. A similar number of Australians think China will launch an armed attack on Australia (42%) as on Taiwan (49%). I don’t think I could find a military planner in the world that would agree with this. </p>
<p>Despite Australia’s distance from China, Australians and Taiwanese have a similar threat perception. Both see China as being a very aggressive country (62% and 65%). Given the great differences of geography and history, this convergence is noteworthy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Crowds wait for an Anzac Day march." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Australians support Taiwanese independence but not necessarily to the point of sending the Australian military.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren England/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Second, more Australians (13%) than Taiwanese (4%) think a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is likely sometime soon. Perhaps Taiwanese think it more likely that China will continue to use “grey zone” coercive tactics rather than attack. Certainly they are not in imminent fear.</p>
<p>Taiwanese are very clear they want independence, with 73% surveyed preferring independence if peaceful relations with China could be maintained. This is in line with <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-opinion-polling-on-unification-with-china/">other polls</a>. </p>
<p>About half still want independence, even if this leads China to attack. Only 14% of Taiwan’s citizens think they could defend themselves unaided. And only 26% of Taiwanese think the US would commit its armed forces to fight a war against China in defence of Taiwan. But they still want independence. That’s the depth of feeling.</p>
<h2>The importance of support for Taiwan</h2>
<p>Taiwan has an overriding fear of abandonment. It doesn’t want its security and independence to be seen as something for China and Taiwan to “solve by themselves”. So it is highly relevant whether other countries would come to Taiwan’s aid.</p>
<p>Clearly, Australians are sympathetic to Taiwanese aspirations for independence. Two thirds of those polled agreed Taiwan should still become a new country, even if China decides to attack after Taiwan declares independence. </p>
<p>But in a crisis, could Taiwan rely on Australia? With these polling numbers, I’d advise Taiwanese to be very cautious.</p>
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<img alt="Taiwanese Air Force personnel conduct a drill." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Taiwan is on high alert after an increase in Chinese military activity in Taiwan’s air zone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ritchie B Togo/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Only 21% of Australians agreed the Australian people are prepared to go to war to help the Taiwanese people gain their independence from China. A further 40% were against and 39% were undecided. When we asked the question as “if China incorporated Taiwan, do you agree Australia should send its defence forces to Taiwan?” 37% agreed, 29% were against and 34% were undecided.</p>
<p>While neither is directly comparable to the Lowy poll result (where 43% supported deploying the military), the response is consistent with a relatively low level of support. By contrast, 80% supported using the military to stop a government from committing genocide and 77% to restore law and order in a Pacific nation in the 2019 Lowy poll.</p>
<p>These results suggest that the number of people who support military involvement in Taiwan may even have decreased in the last two years as there has been more talk of war. In the 2021 Lowy Poll, 57% of Australians said in the event of a military conflict between China and US, Australia should stay neutral.</p>
<h2>The trouble for Taiwan</h2>
<p>Some of the recent tough talk about China from Canberra (think “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/australia-security-official-warns-staff-drums-war-77331057">drums of war</a>”) might give the Taiwanese the impression they can rely on Australia. But Australia should not give Taiwanese false hope. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Australia would be wise not to pound 'war drums' over Taiwan with so much at stake</a>
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<p>Whether Australia would decide whether to become involved in a crisis in the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-once-again-increases-military-activity-against-taiwan/news-story/125212f353a0b0c909515ca5e5530029">Taiwan Strait</a> would depend on a host of factors, including political and public opinion. Yet the high number of undecideds in the polling figures suggest it would be unwise to assume it would be an easy or popular decision.</p>
<p>Taiwan would be unwise to count on Australia as things currently stand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Conley Tyler is in Taiwan as a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, funded by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship.</span></em></p>A new survey of Taiwanese and Australian citizens has revealed some surprising results about their views on security and China.Melissa Conley Tyler, Research Associate, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1469432020-10-01T14:41:05Z2020-10-01T14:41:05ZNigeria is still struggling at 60. But hope is still alive<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361095/original/file-20201001-24-1r8ru5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sixty years after independence, Nigeria has yet to achieve its potential</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s population is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/">estimated at over 200 million</a>, which means the country has skilled and unskilled labour in abundance. The population also makes it a fertile ground for global trade. Nigeria is also rich in mineral resources. It is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest, and the world’s 13th largest, producer and exporter of oil.</p>
<p>These endowments should have made Nigeria one of the key destinations for global investment. And with its wealth in <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm">petroleum and natural resources</a> as well as its vast agricultural potential, Nigeria should have by now become Africa’s undisputed economic giant.</p>
<p>However, 60 years after independence, Nigeria, like a vehicle struggling to climb a hilly road, has yet to achieve its potential. Its large population has thus become a source of weakness, not strength.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1892237/nigerias-unemployment-rate-tripled-in-five-years/#:%7E:text=While%20Nigeria's%20unemployment%20rate%20has,%E2%80%94has%20increased%20to%2028.6%25.">mass unemployment</a> and overstretching of <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Menace-of-Inadequate-Infrastructure-in-Nigeria-Akinwale/0cc821d9d6407f6cc2a403a5a8dc62769d1bc012">inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure</a>, many Nigerians have had to seek their fortunes abroad.</p>
<p>Smaller nations such as Ghana, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are beginning to catch up. At the same time big corporations from industrialised and wealthy countries in Europe and South Asia find the Nigerian business climate inauspicious. That’s largely due to decaying infrastructure, corruption and insecurity. Big European corporations have over the years shut down or <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/General/Why-companies-will-continue-to-leave-Nigeria-for-Ghana-/7324#">relocated</a> their Nigerian manufacturing plants. They point to a lack of stable electricity supply and endemic corruption, both of which impede their smooth operations.</p>
<h2>There was a giant</h2>
<p>At independence, all eyes were on the most populous black country on earth. For good reason. Nigerians were high flyers in intellectual and educational endeavours, business, international diplomacy, and in military and political leadership. In continental leadership, only Ghana rivalled Nigeria just before independence. When <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup</a>, attention shifted to <a href="https://www.thejournalist.org.za/pioneers/nnamdi-azikiwe-african-philosopher-scholar-and-eminent-journalist/">Nnamdi Azikiwe</a>, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261949131_Obafemi_Awolowo_and_the_Making_of_Remo_The_local_politics_of_a_Nigerian_Nationalist">Obafemi Awolowo</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-56686-7_8">Ahmadu Bello</a> – Nigerian political leaders who were also great leaders of thought.</p>
<p>Nigeria <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/02/1002901">provided leadership and enormous support</a> to the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Congo and other countries. It <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6432757/Visibility_and_Relevance_in_International_Politics_National_Role_Conceptions_and_Nigerias_Foreign_Policy_in_Africa">led the movement</a> for the end to apartheid rule in Southern African countries, including South Africa, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It supported other liberation movements, including those of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria’s influence in the <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Organization%20of%20the%20Petroleum,Kuwait%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20and%20Venezuela.">Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</a> was so monumental that it rose to the leadership for decades. The country’s <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3256/1/Folarin%2017.pdf">economic muscle</a> made it more politically relevant in Africa and by the mid-1980s, its voice was always sought on resolution of intra-state conflicts. The African Union and Economic Community of West African States <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3256/1/Folarin%2017.pdf">regarded the country as their livewire</a> – and to some extent, they still do. </p>
<h2>The fall</h2>
<p>The journalist and author Karl Maier, in his classic, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/This-House-Fallen-Karl-Maier/dp/0813340454">“This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis”</a>, cites a litany of problems as remote causes of the fall of Nigeria. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>succession of failed administrations;</p></li>
<li><p>political instability; </p></li>
<li><p>structural adjustment programme (which destroyed the local economy);</p></li>
<li><p>moral bankruptcy in public institutions; </p></li>
<li><p>military misadventure up to 1993; </p></li>
<li><p>the season of anomie occasioned by the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections and the international backlash; and</p></li>
<li><p>religious and ethnic bigotry. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The Nigerian scholar Eghosa Osaghae, author of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318530057_Crippled_Giant_Nigeria_Since_Independence">“Crippled Giant”</a>, agrees with Maier. He also identifies immediate triggers of state failure which include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the growing rot in public bureaucracy;</p></li>
<li><p>sleaze in the oil sector and overdependence on oil revenue; </p></li>
<li><p>public office allure – which has attracted more thieves and charlatans to politics; </p></li>
<li><p>the ceaseless plunder of the national treasury; and </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of public accountability.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A lack of commitment by leaders and the people to the Nigerian project – a united, stable, developed and prosperous country – and flooding of the polity with hard-line ethnic or proto-nationalists in a country of over 250 groups – will inexorably land the country in destruction.</p>
<p>Then there is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/nigeria">insecurity</a>, which, for the past 10 years, has been intractable. Insecurity refers to the absence of internal stability or safety and a state of vulnerability to internal danger and threats. Insecurity arises from a weak and compromised national security architecture, which has been one of the stumbling blocks to Nigeria’s realisation of its development potential. </p>
<p>Put differently, while several other factors have combined over the decades to hold Nigeria down, the horrific state of security in the past 10 years has weakened the fabric of the state. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-96137766-d334-424d-aeb5-4e531d5af8a0?q=9cb9f82d-7d61-47a2-add6-287e53cbe2ae$2&qt=IN_PAGE">study</a> shows that the frequency of insurgent attacks has resulted in collateral damage to the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of Nigeria. We also discovered that the present government has not been decisive enough in tackling insecurity.</p>
<p>The overused and poorly trained military is becoming less fit to fight Boko Haram, secure the borders or sustain the country’s previously enviable image. The police secures little or nothing, is corrupt and inefficient and has become a big burden to the state. Ordinary citizens resort to legitimate self-help or criminal ways to survive. At home and abroad. No one cares. The image problem soars.</p>
<p>Can Nigeria reverse the decline and spring up again?</p>
<h2>‘Happily ever after’ is possible</h2>
<p>“No condition is permanent,” scream inscriptions on many commercial vehicles on the streets of Lagos. </p>
<p>So, change is possible. But first, there has to be a mental and moral reorientation. Who will start it? If the government is irresponsibly disconnected from its role, civil society organisations should take up the task. Religious organisations with their massive and committed followers have a role to play in reorientation and rebirth.</p>
<p>Closely following this will be a social revolution. This will flow from a reborn mind. Mental reorientation produces a decent moral consciousness and when it is on a massive scale, society will change. </p>
<p>For its part, government has to truly commit to fight corruption. Corruption has <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/8519/1/Untitled%204.pdf">bled Nigeria</a> to a near-death. It could <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/press-room/impact-of-corruption-on-nigeria-s-economy.html">cost up to 37% of gross domestic product</a> by 2030 if not dealt with immediately. </p>
<p>When honesty is rewarded and corrupt acts are publicly punished, more Nigerians will more likely embrace honesty in their endeavours. Government should purge itself of corrupt elements and prosecute those found culpable. This internal purge will not only show commitment and the will to fight corruption, but will also serve as a deterrent to others across the country. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>A <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3242/1/Dr%20Edewor.pdf">paper</a> I coauthored argues that national integration and its benefits can be realised only with the development and entrenchment of a supportive public culture. Nigerians must understand, respect and tolerate differences occasioned by socio-cultural diversity and also develop new institutions and mechanisms that address poverty, revenue allocation and other national issues peacefully.</p>
<p>Nigeria can transform its potential into success. With a huge population, its citizens can be mobilised and empowered to engage in manufacturing as China, Singapore and South Korea have done. This will change the society from a consuming country to a powerhouse in manufacturing and exportation. </p>
<p>At 60, Nigeria should not be groping in the dark. There have been numerous wasted opportunities, no doubt, but it takes just a right turn at any second for a vehicle in the middle of nowhere to find its bearing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheriff Folarin receives funding from US Dept of State, Carnegie. </span></em></p>Sixty years after political independence, it is clear that Nigeria has not fulfilled its huge potential, but with a supportive public culture it can transform that into success.Sheriff Folarin, Professor of International Relations, Covenant UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1461012020-10-01T00:12:18Z2020-10-01T00:12:18ZNew Caledonians will vote again on independence. Will the answer this time be ‘Oui’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360716/original/file-20200930-20-kpcx5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=419%2C157%2C2216%2C1943&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mathurin Derel/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On October 4, the people of New Caledonia will go to the polls. For the second time in the past two years, they will be asked if they wish to remain a part of France or become an independent country. </p>
<p>In the first vote in November 2018, 57% voted in favour of <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-caledonia-votes-to-stay-with-france-this-time-but-independence-supporters-take-heart-106329">maintaining the status quo</a> — remaining a French territory. This was a much narrower margin than had been anticipated, with some pre-referendum polls <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/426198/new-caledonia-nears-referendum-without-polls">suggesting up to 75%</a> would support staying with France. </p>
<p>These referendums take place under the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25169446?seq=1">Noumea Accord</a>, an agreement signed by France in 1998 allowing New Caledonians three referendums on independence. If there is another “Non” vote this year, a third referendum will be held, most likely in 2022.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1308558713590964224"}"></div></p>
<h2>Why independence might be likely</h2>
<p>Even in the short time since the last referendum, a number of relevant things have changed. Most significantly, <a href="http://www.pina.com.fj/index.php?p=pacnews&m=read&o=7533769175cd8c8d63469e6eed57c9">local elections</a> were held last year, which deepened the polarisation in the territory between those favouring independence and those opposed.</p>
<p>In the “Non” camp, an alliance of six political groupings has come together under the umbrella of the “loyalists”. On the “Oui” side, advocates are working harder to get young people politically involved. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-caledonia-votes-to-stay-with-france-this-time-but-independence-supporters-take-heart-106329">New Caledonia votes to stay with France this time, but independence supporters take heart</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is some sense the independence “struggle” is an issue for the older generation of indigenous Kanaks and not embraced fully by those who were born after the <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2018/11/01/flashback-to-kanaky-in-the-1980s-blood-on-their-banner/">violence of the 1980s</a> when Kanaks revolted against French rule. This is what led to the Noumea Accord being signed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360721/original/file-20200930-22-1vssklb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Casting ballots in the 2018 referendum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mathurin Derel/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There will be <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-independence-on-the-cards-for-new-caledonia/">6,000 new voters</a> eligible to take part in this year’s referendum who weren’t old enough to vote in 2018.</p>
<p>In France, a <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/06/france-s-new-prime-minister-castex-to-announce-government-reshuffle">new prime minister</a>, Jean Castex, has also recently been appointed, as well as a <a href="https://www.faxinfo.fr/en/politique-le-nouveau-ministre-des-outre-mer-sebastien-lecornu-est-deja-venu-plusieurs-fois-a-saint-martin/">new overseas minister</a>. Neither has engaged significantly with New Caledonia, nor do they have much <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-caledonia-heads-to-second-independence-referendum/">experience</a> with self-determination issues.</p>
<p>There are some in New Caledonia who simply feel the issue <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/new-caledonias-bleu-blanc-rouge-vote/">isn’t high on France’s list of priorities</a> at the moment.</p>
<p>However, just days out from the vote, some on the right of French politics have <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/426898/french-right-wing-parties-urge-new-caledonians-to-stay-french">spoken out strongly</a> against New Caledonia becoming independent. National Rally leader Marine Le Pen warned a vote for independence would lead to uncertainty and danger. </p>
<p>And Castex has said in recent days <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/427243/castex-plans-to-meet-new-caledonia-leaders-after-referendum">he will meet</a> with New Caledonia’s political leaders after the referendum.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360719/original/file-20200930-20-aq3nx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron visited New Caledonia just days before the 2018 vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Theo Rouby/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A key aspect of the debate around independence is what the economic future would hold. Magalie Tingal, a member in the Northern Provincial Congress, was recently at pains to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoE-pZBAJ_M">point out</a> that France currently provides only 10% of the territory’s budget. </p>
<p>However, French rule has certainly led to a higher level of development than in the neighbouring countries of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands — at least in and around the capital, Noumea. </p>
<p>One of the major concerns of the pro-independence movement is the lack of equitable development in New Caledonia. The lack of services in predominantly Kanak areas is a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-caledonia-decolonisation-conversation">source of significant discontent</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rebel-music-the-protest-songs-of-new-caledonias-independence-referendum-105580">Rebel music: the protest songs of New Caledonia's independence referendum</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Will COVID-19 cause voters to stay home?</h2>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic will also likely affect the level of scrutiny on the forthcoming vote. </p>
<p>In 2018, there were numerous delegations of international observers in New Caledonia for the vote, but that presence will be significantly reduced this time around. The same goes for the amount of international reporting we can expect, with only French journalists likely to be present. </p>
<p>Election observers, as well as officials coming from France to administer the vote, have been <a href="http://www.cookislandsnews.com/regional/small-world/item/78343-hundreds-of-officials-expected-ahead-of-referendum/78343-hundreds-of-officials-expected-ahead-of-referendum">required to undergo 14 days of quarantine</a> on arrival.</p>
<p>Perhaps more significantly, there is the question of whether COVID-19 will significantly reduce voter turnout, despite the fact New Caledonia has had <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/426977/new-caledonia-reports-one-covid-19-case-in-managed-isolation">no cases of community transmission</a>. </p>
<p>In 2018, turnout was exceptionally high, <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-caledonia-independence-referendum-reminder-realities">at more than 80%</a>, which no doubt caused the vote to be closer than expected. </p>
<h2>Would a new nation drift toward China?</h2>
<p>Officials in Australia and New Zealand have not taken a position on the referendum. However, in security and strategy circles, there is no doubt concern that an independent New Caledonia (also known as Kanaky by the Kanak people) may become a target for Chinese influence. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoE-pZBAJ_M">recent webinar hosted by Griffith University</a>, those in favour of independence said it would give the Kanak people more choices when it came to foreign policy. </p>
<p>China is already New Caledonia’s <a href="https://www.dommccarthy.com/post/economic-landscape-in-new-caledonia">number one trading partner</a> and it is reasonable to expect this would be one of several relationships an independent Kanaky/New Caledonia would focus on as it built an international presence as a new country. </p>
<p>As Patricia Goa, a member of New Caledonia’s Congress said in the webinar, independence would offer a choice.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What’s wrong with having cooperation with China and others? </p>
</blockquote>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1311092797596983296"}"></div></p>
<h2>The unfinished business of decolonisation</h2>
<p>New Caledonia’s trajectory towards possible independence is also part of a wider discussion taking place in the Pacific on decolonisation and sovereignty.</p>
<p>Just last year, we saw the people of Bougainville <a href="https://theconversation.com/bougainville-has-voted-to-become-a-new-country-but-the-journey-to-independence-is-not-yet-over-128236">vote for independence</a> from Papua New Guinea by an overwhelming majority. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360723/original/file-20200930-18-1veyxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People lining up to vote in Bougainville’s referendum last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Post Courier/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/400723/french-polynesian-independence-leader-calls-for-referendum">ongoing calls</a> for the people of French Polynesia to be given an opportunity to vote on independence from France. </p>
<p>And in West Papua, the struggle for self-determination has <a href="https://theconversation.com/fight-for-freedom-new-research-to-map-violence-in-the-forgotten-conflict-in-west-papua-128058">gained renewed attention</a>, with Vanuatu’s prime minister calling out Indonesia for “<a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/427114/indonesia-lashes-out-at-vanuatu-over-west-papua-at-the-un">human rights abuses</a>” at the UN General Assembly. </p>
<p>All of these movements are significant not only for the people who live in these territories, but for the stability of the region more generally. With increased geo-strategic focus on this part of the world, these are important shifts to watch and understand, whether from near or far.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bougainville-has-voted-to-become-a-new-country-but-the-journey-to-independence-is-not-yet-over-128236">Bougainville has voted to become a new country, but the journey to independence is not yet over</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tess Newton Cain is the Project Lead for the Pacific Hub at the Griffith Asia Institute</span></em></p>A similar 2018 referendum failed, but was much closer than anticipated. Some believe independence might pass this time around, particularly with the issue not high on France’s list of priorities.Tess Newton Cain, Adjunct Associate Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1441892020-08-17T06:14:05Z2020-08-17T06:14:05ZHow Indonesia’s most innovative filmmakers portrayed society and culture through 70 years of cinema<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352663/original/file-20200813-22-txb9xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene depicting the jatilan dance in _November 1828_.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of a series to commemorate Indonesian Independence Day on August 17.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The evolution of the Indonesian film industry is marked not only by its economic development, but more importantly by the contribution of the country’s best filmmakers.</p>
<p>In a chapter of my book, <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319408736">Cultural Specificity in Indonesian Film: Diversity in Unity</a>, I highlight some of Indonesia’s most innovative and culturally significant films and directors over the past 70 years.</p>
<p>Since the nation’s independence Indonesian cinema has gone through three main periods – the Sukarno era, the Suharto New Order, and the post-reform era – in parallel with the rise and fall of the country’s changing regimes.</p>
<h2>The birth of modern Indonesian cinema</h2>
<p>Within months of the <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/former-trust-and-nsgts">international recognition</a> of Indonesia as an independent nation at the end of 1949, Perfini – a company formed months after the creation of the new nation – was addressing issues raised during the struggle for independence.</p>
<p>The company was headed by Usmar Ismail. He is regarded as a <a href="https://time.com/5206668/google-doodle-usmar-ismail-indonesia/">key pioneer of Indonesian film</a> in the early independence period.</p>
<p>Perfini’s first film after independence, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0042378/"><em>Darah dan Do’a</em></a> (“The Long March”, 1950), and the later <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0045997/"><em>Lewat Djam Malam</em></a> (“After the Curfew”, 1954) were inspired by <a href="http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/italians/resources/Amiciprize/1996/index.html">Italian neorealists of the 1940s</a> such as Roberto Rossellini. Rossellini’s neorealist films depicted the struggle against the Nazi presence and continuing fascist rule in Italy in the later stages of the second world war.</p>
<p>However, Usmar Ismail went even further than the Italians by highlighting moral ambiguities and human rights abuses during the revolutionary period. In <em>Lewat Djam Malam</em>, for instance, the central character, Iskandar, is shown to be troubled by war crimes he committed as a freedom fighter.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352685/original/file-20200813-14-huwpp4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iskandar in <em>Lewat Djam Malam</em> (1954).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So highly regarded are the early Usmar Ismail films that March 30 – the anniversary of the first day of shooting of his first post-independence film, <em>Darah dan Do’a</em> – is celebrated as <a href="https://time.com/5206668/google-doodle-usmar-ismail-indonesia/">National Film Day</a> in Indonesia.</p>
<p>In 1955, Perfini made what is probably the first political satire by an Indonesian filmmaker, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0048694/"><em>Tamu Agung</em></a> (“Exalted Guest”). The film satirised Sukarno’s cult of personality and explored the dangers of charismatic political leadership. In 1957, Perfini produced the first Betawi comedy film, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/tiga-buronan/oclc/50513017"><em>Tiga Buronan</em></a> (“Three Fugitives”), directed by Nja Abbas Akup.</p>
<p>However, Indonesia’s film industry experienced periods of decline as well as growth.</p>
<p>There was a decline, for instance, in the late Sukarno period and the years following <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-1965-1966-anti-communist-purge-remade-a-nation-and-the-world-48243">the post-September 1965 anti-communist purge</a>. Only seven feature films were made in 1968.</p>
<h2>Social critique in the New Order</h2>
<p>Between 1970 and 1988, average production of Indonesian features rose to 70 per year, partly due to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/history-of-the-motion-picture/The-threat-of-television">introduction of wide screen and colour</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1970s new directors, such as Moscow-trained Sjuman Djaya, emerged. Another was Teguh Karya, who, working with his <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Teguh_Karya.html?id=vQGzswEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Teater Populer</a> group, made 13 films between 1970 and 1988.</p>
<p>These included the culturally significant historical epic, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0079644/"><em>November 1828</em></a>, completed in 1979. Aside from depicting events from the point of view of ordinary villagers in resisting Dutch colonialism during the Java War of 1825-1830, it also provides ways of seeing cultural contrasts between Javanese and colonial Western values.</p>
<p><em>November 1828</em> was the first Indonesian film to become widely known in Europe. It was screened at the London and Berlin film festivals.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352872/original/file-20200814-16-gx6pie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Padepokan dance scene in <em>November 1828</em> (1979).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1985, Teguh wrote and directed his most innovative film, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0288210/"><em>Secangkir Kopi Pahit</em></a> (“Bitter Coffee”). Using an original flashback structure, the film depicts the fates of people migrating to the city from rural areas in different parts of Indonesia.</p>
<p>Sjuman Djaya also made important contributions, including films that expanded the range of social critique in film. His film <em>Si Mamad</em> (1973), in its satire on corruption among bureaucrats, widens the tradition of using film for social critique.</p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0336691/"><em>Kerikil Kerikil Tajam</em></a> (“Sharp Gravel”, 1984) traces the dangers that beset village women journeying to Jakarta to find employment not available to them in their villages. </p>
<p>Another of Sjuman Djaya’s films, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0337194/"><em>Si Doel Anak Betawi</em></a> (“Doel the Betawi Child”, 1973) – in combination with the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2019/03/28/a-celebration-of-benyamin-suebs-films.html">numerous B-movies of Benyamin Sueb</a> – helped Indonesian society as a whole develop some important identification with the Betawi lifestyle.</p>
<p>The popular culture of the Betawi, regarded as the original inhabitants of Jakarta, went on to become an important staple in Indonesian popular culture over the next 40 years.</p>
<p>Sjuman Djaya’s adaptation of major works of Indonesian literature provided vivid depictions of religion and patriarchy in Indonesian history. Notable examples include <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395106/">Atheis</a> (1974), based on <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/1283619.Atheis">Achdiat Kartamihardja’s novel</a>, and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0337076/">Raden Ajeng Kartini</a> (1982), his film biography of the Indonesian women’s emancipatist, R.A. Kartini, based on her letters.</p>
<p>In the 1990s the production of feature films declined dramatically. This was due to competition from the newly established commercial television industry. Only four features films were produced in 1998.</p>
<h2>Post-reform era: international recognition and the rise of women filmmakers</h2>
<p>Talented young women who had studied at the Jakarta Institute of the Arts – such as Nan Achnas and Mira Lesmana – played an important role in achieving a breakthrough for women into the film industry. Other major women writer-directors include Nia Dinata, Mouly Surya, Djenar Maesa Ayu and Kamila Andini.</p>
<p>Nia Dinata directed some very innovative films that explored new topics such as the limits of polygamous marriages in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0799938/"><em>Berbagi Suami</em></a> (“Sharing Husbands”, 2006).</p>
<p>Another aspect of the post-reform era is the continuing presence of internationally acclaimed filmmakers.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2019/09/04/garin-nugroho-keeps-rediscovering-film.html">Garin Nugroho</a> made his first feature film, <em>Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti</em> (“Love on A Slice of Bread”) in 1991. But in the post-reform era he has continued to make films that challenge audiences in numerous ways.</p>
<p>In 2002 he made <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0344801/"><em>Aku Ingin Menciummu Sekali Saja</em></a> (“Bird-Man Tale”), a feature film that raises questions about the behaviour of the Indonesian army in its attempts to control the indigenous Papuan population.</p>
<p>His most recent film, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt8900302/"><em>Kucumbu Tubuh Indahku</em></a> (“Memories of My Body”, 2018) – dramatising the experiences of a young <em>lengger</em> (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-51152952/the-traditional-dance-where-men-perform-as-women">a traditional cross-gender dance</a> from Central Java) dancer – engages with issues of gender in Indonesian society.</p>
<p>The film challenges its audiences by deliberately portraying Indonesian traditions of bisexuality and homosexuality and the prejudice fostered towards them.</p>
<p>Newly emerging director Ifa Ifansyah’s <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1989598/"><em>Sang Penari</em></a> (“The Dancer”, 2009) depicts dance groups in Java including left-wing dance groups that become victims of the repression of the left in Indonesia after the events of September 30 1965.</p>
<p>Kamila Andini has made films about young people in distinctive local communities. Notable examples include <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1934427/"><em>Laut Bercermin</em></a> (“The Mirror Never Lies”, 2011) filmed among the seaborne Bajau people in South Sulawesi, and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt07215548/"><em>Sekala Niskala</em></a> (“The Seen and Unseen”, 2018), filmed in Bali.</p>
<h2>Preserving ‘critical national cinema’</h2>
<p>The early films of the Perfini company are often seen as providing a foundation for a “national cinema”. However, these films are also a form of “critical national cinema”, which highlight and engage with negative aspects of the new nation.</p>
<p>Their themes included human rights abuses by freedom fighters, corruption in the army, and the dangers of charismatic political leadership.</p>
<p>This concern to make socially relevant films evident in the early Perfini films has been taken up in new and inventive ways by the second, third and fourth generations of Indonesian filmmakers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hanan tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>In a chapter of my latest book, I highlight some of Indonesia’s most innovative and culturally significant films and directors over the past 70 years.David Hanan, Honorary Fellow at the Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1337032020-03-17T14:30:46Z2020-03-17T14:30:46ZNamibia is showing wear and tear after 30 years under SWAPO rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/320743/original/file-20200316-128091-1el5qat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Namibians queue to vote. Fewer and fewer cast it for the ruling party SWAPO.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Gianluigi Guercia/ AFP) (Photo by GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Namibia turns 30 this month. Its former liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-west-africa-peoples-organisation-swapo">SWAPO</a>, has been in power all these years and the country has been relatively stable, with a wide range of civil liberties. </p>
<p>But not all is well in the state of Namibia. Despite what seems to be a positive track record, many will not celebrate this year. As President Hage Geingob prepares to take the oath for a second term in office on Independence Day (21 March), the republic is more divided than ever.</p>
<p>The national assembly and presidential elections of 27 November 2019 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1717090">were a rude awakening</a>. For the first time, the ruling party massively lost votes. The two-thirds majority secured in the first parliamentary elections in 1994 and consolidated towards an 80% dominance in 2014 melted down to 65%.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibian-elections-the-sands-are-shifting-slowly-127656">Namibian elections: the sands are shifting -- slowly</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For the first time Geingob, as presidential candidate, obtained fewer votes than his party. His 87% of 2014 shrank to a mere 56%. He warded off the challenge by another member of the party who registered as an “independent” candidate, but enters the second term in office much weaker than before. The party faces internal battles eroding his authority.</p>
<h2>The things that have gone wrong</h2>
<p>Recent years have been rocky economically. Fiscal prudence was neglected and despite continued warnings the government lived above its means. By 2016 a full-blown recession kicked in. Populist <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2018.1500360">narratives</a> backfired. Promises were no substitute for realities. Geingob’s <a href="http://www.op.gov.na/harambee-p-plan">Harambee Prosperity Plan</a>, announced during his first year as president, remained wishful thinking.</p>
<p>Almost a million people (40% of the 2.3 million inhabitants) have been estimated to live in shacks. Geingob <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/185139/archive-read/Shacks-offend-Geingob-wants-them-gone-in-5-years">declared this</a> a national humanitarian crisis and promised to deal with it. No visible improvements have happened since. Over half of the population has no access to proper sanitation and an outbreak of <a href="https://www.who.int/csr/don/15-january-2018-hepatitis-e-namibia/en/">hepatitis E in 2018</a> continues to take its toll.</p>
<p>In his 2019 state of the nation address <a href="https://www.gov.na/documents/10181/802360/STATE+OF+THE+NATION+ADDRESS+BY+HIS+EXCELLENCY+DR.+HAGE+G.+GEINGOB%2C+PRESIDENT+OF+THE+REPUBLIC+OF+NAMIBIA+%282019+04+17%29/24588586-d858-4faf-9929-702ba1e2f25f">he repeated</a> his mantra for</p>
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<p>an inclusive, united, and prosperous Namibian House.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite all evidence to the contrary, he confidently claimed</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a social compact where ‘No One Should Feel Left Out’ and where citizens live in harmony as ‘One Namibia, One Nation’. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But after his first term in office the country is further away from this than ever since independence.</p>
<p>Namibia <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NAM.pdf">ranked</a> 130th out of 189 in the 2019 Human Development Index. Discounted for inequality, the value declined by over a third. Nearly 40% of the population were classified as multi-dimensionally poor – a definition that includes having insufficient access to education and health services, energy and water – and another fifth as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty.</p>
<h2>Corruption</h2>
<p>In late 2019 a major fraud in fishing quotas, known since then as <a href="https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2020/01/06/namibias-fishrot-scandal-from-start-to-present/">#fishrot</a>, made international headlines. It involved the biggest Icelandic fishing company, the Namibian ministers for fisheries and for justice, several high-ranking officials from state-owned enterprises, and lawyers involved in money laundering.</p>
<p>A documentary by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/anatomyofabribe/">Al Jazeera</a> disclosed delicate details. When the ministers <a href="https://www.icelandreview.com/news/namibian-ministers-resign-following-samherji-scandal/">resigned</a>, Geingob thanked them “for their patriotism and contribution to the work of government”. A few days later they were arrested and remain in custody awaiting trial.</p>
<p>In mid-2019, the minister of education, arts and culture, Katrina Hanse-Himarwa, <a href="https://economist.com.na/45508/headlines/hanse-himarwa-tenders-resignation-as-education-minister-amid-graft-charges/">resigned from office</a> after being found guilty of corruption. But she remains a member of parliament. Much to the indignation of the wider public, she <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/88463/read/Hanse-Himarwa-appointment-receives-backlash">was appointed</a> earlier this year to the parliamentary committee on constitutional and legal affairs.</p>
<h2>Invective no substitute for politics</h2>
<p>Geingob gave his years in office programmatic titles: the year of planning (2015), implementation (2016), rededication (2017), reckoning (2018) and accountability (2019). But planning was not implemented. He has declared 2020 <a href="http://www.op.gov.na/documents/84084/986732/Speech+by+President+Geingob+at+the+New+Years+Greetings.pdf/a367bad2-6ad6-4728-b016-f9204162ccc7">the year of introspection</a>, to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>undergo extensive soul-searching to define our place, purpose and role in the quest for a better life for the citizens of this country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Opening the first cabinet meeting of the year, Geingob <a href="http://www.op.gov.na/documents/84084/973353/2020+cabinet+opening/3f58d312-b639-442b-8a2b-6cb5d966eb64">explained</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… we as a government and as individuals need to reflect through critical enquiries on the quality and efficacy of our work. For example, to what extent have we done what the people required from us to meet their basic needs?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The honest answer as his second term gets under way is that Namibia, considered for many years a success story internationally, has shown wear and tear. The <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/limits-to-liberation-in-southern-africa">“limits to liberation”</a> have poisoned the social fabric. A common Namibian identity, welcomed with enthusiasm 30 years ago, has been perforated by divisions along class and ethnicity, or both. </p>
<p>Cronyism and self-enrichment of a new elite is no prosperity plan beyond individual greed in <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/8925597">“a rich country with poor people”</a>, as a study by the local Labour Research and Resource Institute dubbed it. The “born free” are sick and tired of politics in which the first and second <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214">“struggle generations”</a> promote a heroic narrative stuck in the past.</p>
<p>While a social, inter-generational contract vanishes, insults are hurled. During the election campaign, the SWAPO secretary-general referred to the independent presidential candidate as <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/195720/archive-read/Who-is-a-Threat-to-Democracy-and-Peace">an insect</a>. His supporters were not shy to retaliate. At a public rally in early March, Geingob was insulted <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/swapo-condemns-insults-against-its-president">as a dog</a>.</p>
<p>But invective is no substitute for politics. Dehumanisation of others dehumanises oneself. This cannot build a sustainable future for democracy and human rights. And it certainly offers no political alternatives. As the local newspaper Namibian Sun <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/lets-raise-debate-levels2020-03-13/">commented</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What the country can ill afford is a political circus that may offer entertainment and newspaper headlines, but which, at the end of the day, further polarises support bases and voters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the interest of the people, a new social contract for the benefit of all should be the priority. After 30 years of independence, Namibians deserve better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of SWAPO since 1974. </span></em></p>The hunger, frustration and desperation of ordinary Namibians should be first on the political agenda. But this isn’t the case.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1282362019-12-12T23:17:51Z2019-12-12T23:17:51ZBougainville has voted to become a new country, but the journey to independence is not yet over<p>The Autonomous Region of Bougainville, a chain of islands that lie 959 kilometres northwest of Papua New Guinea’s capital, Port Moresby, has voted unequivocally for independence.</p>
<p>The referendum saw 85% voter turnout during three weeks of voting, with <a href="http://bougainville-referendum.org/">97.7%</a> of voters choosing independence from Papua New Guinea over the second option, which was remaining, but with greater autonomy from PNG. As the Bougainville Referendum Commission stated, the numbers told an important story, reflecting the support for independence across genders and age groups. </p>
<p>It’s a momentous event, not only because it could a new country, but also because the referendum marks an important part of a <a href="http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed almost 20 years ago. The 2001 <a href="http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf">Bougainville Peace Agreement</a> ended the <a href="https://bougainville-referendum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/the_bougainville_referendum_low_res_1.pdf">deeply divisive nine year conflict</a> (1988-1997) that lead to the deaths of approximately 20,000 people, or about 10% of Bougainville’s population. </p>
<p>The referendum, however, is non-binding. The ultimate outcome will be determined by a vote in Papua New Guinea’s National Parliament following negotiations between the Papua New Guinean government and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. </p>
<p>But as former President James Tanis said to me hours after the result was announced: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we survived the war, ended the war, delivered a successful referendum, what else can now stop us from becoming a successful independent nation?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>China’s interest in Bougainville</h2>
<p>For the broader region, an independent Bougainville has a number of implications. Firstly, it sends a strong signal for other self-determination movements across the Pacific, including in New Caledonia which will hold a second referendum for independence in 2020. </p>
<p>There are also geopolitical implications. The referendum has taken place during a period of heightened strategic anxiety among the Pacific’s so-called traditional partners – Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, France and Japan. </p>
<p>There have long been concerns China will seek to curry influence with an independent Bougainville. As one Bougainvillean leader informed me, Chinese efforts to build relationships with Bougainville’s political elite have increased over the past few years. </p>
<p>Beijing’s interest in Bougainville is two-fold: first, it is seeking to shore up diplomatic support in the Pacific Islands region, thereby reducing support for Taiwan which lost a further two Pacific allies this year. And second, to access to resources, namely fisheries and extractive minerals.</p>
<p>Although it will be tempting for many in Canberra, Washington and Wellington to view an independent Bougainville through the current strategic prism – adhering to narratives about debt-trap diplomacy – doing so undermines the importance of local dynamics and the resilience of Bougainville people. </p>
<p>An independent Bougainville navigating a more disordered and disruptive international environment will need nuanced grounded advice, rather than speculation. </p>
<p>The road ahead for Bougainville will be challenging and it will need its friends – particularly New Zealand and Australia. </p>
<p>The much vaunted respective “Pacific Reset” and “<a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/pages/the-pacific.aspx">Pacific Step Up</a>” policies provide entry points for the kind of genuine engagement and support that Bougainville will require in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Celebration with cautious anticipation</h2>
<p>Following the result’s announcement, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape said his government had heard the voice of Bougainvilleans, and the two governments must now <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/405344/next-stage-in-bougainville-peace-process-begins-png-pm">develop a road map</a> that leads to lasting political settlement. </p>
<p>And Bougainville Referendum Commission chairman Bertie Ahern urged all sides to recognise the result and said the vote was about “your peace, your history, and your future” and reflected “the power of the pen over weapons”. Acknowledging the result is non-binding, Ahern said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the referendum is one part of that ongoing journey.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And here lies the challenge. The post-referendum period was always going to be one of celebration, cautious anticipation and the management of expectations. </p>
<p>As one of Bougainville’s formidable women leaders told me, there are concerns about security in the post-referendum period as expectation turns to frustration if there are perceived delays in determining Bougainville’s future political status. </p>
<p>What’s more, the negotiations are likely to take a long time, since there’s no deadline they’re required to meet. </p>
<p>There are, however, critical milestones that still need to be hit first. This includes the Autonomous Bougainville Government elections, the first elections following the referendum, so will likely see intensified politicking as politicians jockey for a potential role in building an independent Bougainvillean state. </p>
<p>The Papua New Guinea’s national elections are also scheduled for 2022. The risk in both cases is that Bougainville’s future becomes a political pawn. </p>
<p>An independent Bougainville will face significant challenges and diverse choices. </p>
<p>Not least of which is Bougainville’s economic security and the choices that will need to be made about the Panguna Mine, the gold and copper mine at the heart of much of the conflict, and fisheries, once the new nation’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is created. </p>
<p>A young nation built on a past mired by the extremes of resource nationalism, Bougainville has difficult decisions to make about how it secures its economic self-reliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Powles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With an overwhelming referendum result, Bougainville has just taken an important step to becoming an independent nation.Anna Powles, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Massey UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.