tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/khartoum-process-54323/articlesKhartoum Process – The Conversation2019-07-07T09:03:33Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1199312019-07-07T09:03:33Z2019-07-07T09:03:33ZHow glow of the historic accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea has faded<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282851/original/file-20190705-51305-n6h8ph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) and Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki at the re-opening of the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Exactly a year ago Eritreans could hardly contain their joy as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/ethiopia-pm-abiy-ahmed-eritrea-landmark-visit-180708083000438.html">touched down in Asmara</a>. The city had seen nothing like it in a generation that knew war rather than peace. Men and women lined the streets and waved Ethiopian flags as Abiy arrived to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44764597">seal a peace deal</a>. </p>
<p>Less than a week later Eritrea’s president Isaias Afwerki made a reciprocal visit, landing in Addis Ababa to an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44824676">equally rapturous welcome</a>. In September a formal treaty was signed between the two leaders in the Saudi capital, Jeddah, witnessed by King Salman and the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who described it as an <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1372886/saudi-arabia">“historic event.”</a></p>
<p>The treaty <a href="http://shabait.com/news/local-news/27076-agreement-on-peace-friendship-and-comprehensive-cooperation-between-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-state-of-eritrea-">covered a number of things</a>. It ended the state of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; declaring a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation.</p>
<p>As part of this deal, there were two important provisions. One called for “the establishment of joint special economic zones. The other was a pledge to establish a high-level joint committee, as well as sub-committees where needed to guide and oversee the implementation of this agreement.</p>
<p>But there has been little apparent progress on either front. Economic co-operation was probably one of the key drivers of this reconciliation. These included plans to develop a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/eritrea-mulls-new-port-as-ethiopia-rapprochement-spurs-investors">massive potash mine that would straddle the border</a>. But little has been heard of the project in recent months.</p>
<p>Much the same can be said of the joint committees that were given the job of sorting out the many issues bedevilling relations between the two countries. </p>
<p>What’s become clear is that the warmth of a year ago has largely gone. With little progress on implementing and institutionalising the relations between the two countries an air of uncertainty and suspicion is <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/01/31/politicized-eritrea-peace-perpetuates-conflict-cycle/">creeping back</a>.</p>
<h2>Disputed border</h2>
<p>One of the sticking points between the two countries is the disputed border. The border was <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/eritrea-ethiopia-boundary-commission-decision-regarding-delimitation-border">formally designated</a> by the Boundary Commission established after the 1998–2000 border war. The conflict had many causes: rivalry between the liberation movements that had been operating in both countries and economic competition. But it was competing claims to the insignificant border town of Badme that was the spark that <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-eritrea-border-ethiopia-conflict-zone-469739">ignited the war.</a> </p>
<p>The two countries signed what became known as the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2000. The agreement made clear that the boundary commission could only make decisions based strictly on legal and historical grounds. This barred it from being able to allow for what might be considered just and fair – what’s known as <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/eritrea_ethiopia_12122000.pdf">ex aequo et bono</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the border the Boundary Commission came up with resulted in settlements being dissected and villagers separated from their farmlands. And it left some people on both sides of the border concerned at being transferred from one state to the other. </p>
<p>Changes could only be made by both countries agreeing to any adjustments. This was one of the questions that the joint commissions agreed to in Jeddah was meant to resolve. Others included the terms of trade between Eritrea and Ethiopia, for example exchange rates and economic relations which were seen as important <a href="http://www.dehai.org/conflict/analysis/alemsghed2.html">contributing factors</a> in the 1988 – 2000 border war.</p>
<h2>Distractions</h2>
<p>Rather than working to consolidate the peace, the leaders of both countries have drifted elsewhere. Ethiopia has been caught up in increasingly <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-needs-act-fast-solve-its-internal-displacement-problem">complex and bloody ethnic conflicts</a> that have driven more than a million people from their homes. Coming to grips with this is taking much of Abiy’s time and attention. </p>
<p>He has also been working <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXHBo4Sug6k">on behalf of the African Union</a> to help resolve the political crisis in Sudan. Eritrea’s Isaias has also been to Sudan, but with a rather different remit. <a href="http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67719">Welcomed warmly by</a> by the deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemetti”, Isaias issued a statement that showed his agenda was quite <a href="http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67719">different</a>, as shown by his recent statement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Government of Eritrea requests the AU to refrain from internationalising and exacerbating the situation in Sudan. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>His approach isn’t difficult to understand. Isaias enjoys <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201904110180.html">strong relations</a> with Saudi Arabia and the UAE both of which have been embroiled in a war in Yemen. Eritrea has <a href="http://www.madote.com/2016/09/how-eritreas-assab-port-became-major.html">allowed its ports and airfields</a> to be used by both countries to prosecute this war. At the same time the Sudanese military <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67591">provide troops</a> to fight in Yemen and have been open in their support for the Saudi and UAE in their war aims. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia was therefore <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/05/saudi-arabia-sudan-uprising-omar-al-bashir">alarmed</a> at the challenge posed to the Sudanese government by the popular uprising in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns and cities. </p>
<h2>Border remains tense</h2>
<p>Even though the glow of last year’s events has faced, Eritrea has nevertheless reaped many gains from the rapprochement with Ethiopia. One consequence is that it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47934398">signalled</a> the end of its international isolation. Limited United Nations sanctions were <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-being-lifted-against-eritrea-heres-why-106881">lifted</a> and the country now holds a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eritrea-in-the-un-human-rights-council-fox-guarding-the-henhouse/a-49378901">seat on the UN Human Rights Council</a>, a body that frequently criticised its lack of adherence to international human rights norms.</p>
<p>Eritrea has also taken the chair of the <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/actors-and-governance">Khartoum Process</a>. This is a critical position, since it is the key forum in which African states negotiate with the European Union.</p>
<p>But the situation along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remains tense. The Ethiopian government attempted to move its heavy artillery away from the border, but this was <a href="https://ecadforum.com/2019/01/09/military-trucks-blocked-in-tigray-region/">blocked by local residents</a> of Tigray, fearful that there might be renewed conflict with Eritrea. </p>
<p>Their concerns are hardly surprising. Isaias has made <a href="http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/26520-president-isaias-speech-on-martyrs-day">vituperative statements</a> about his immediate neighbours, describing the Trigrayan ruling party - the TPLF – as “vultures”, and accusing them of following a “toxic and malignan” agenda.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know how relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara will develop. The fear is that Isaias has gone back to his unpredictable ways, making any predictions difficult.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>It’s unclear how relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara will develop but the warmth has largely gone.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076162018-11-28T12:37:49Z2018-11-28T12:37:49ZConcerns over Eritrea’s role in efforts by Africa and EU to manage refugees<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247244/original/file-20181126-140507-1sg92g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migrants arriving on the island of Lampedusa, southern Italy in April 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ettore Ferrari</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Early in 2019 the Eritrean government will take over the chair of the key Africa and European Union (EU) forum dealing with African migration, known as <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoum-process">the Khartoum Process</a>.</p>
<p>The Khartoum Process was established in the Sudanese capital in 2014. It’s had little public profile, yet it’s the most important means Europe has of attempting to halt the flow of refugees and migrants from Africa. The official title says it all: The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative. Its main role is <a href="https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process">spelled out as being</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>primarily focused on preventing and fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Chairing the Khartoum Process <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/actors-and-governance">alternates</a> between European and African leaders. In January it will be Africa’s turn. The steering committee has five African members – Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan. A number of others nations, such as Kenya to Tunisia, have participating status. </p>
<p>The African countries chose Eritrea to lead this critical relationship. But it’s been heavily criticised because it places refugees and asylum seekers in the hands of a regime that is notorious for its human rights abuses. Worse still, there is evidence that Eritrean officials are directly implicated in human trafficking the Khartoum Process is meant to end. </p>
<p>That the European Union allowed this to happen puts in question its repeated assurances that human rights are at the heart of its foreign policies.</p>
<h2>The Khartoum Process</h2>
<p>The Khartoum Process involves a huge range of initiatives. All are designed to reduce the number of Africans crossing the Mediterranean. These include training the fragile Libyan government’s coastguards, who round up migrants at sea and return them to the brutal conditions of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/08/refugee-libyan-camp-people-dying">Libyan prison camps</a>.</p>
<p>The programme has sometimes backfired. Some EU-funded coastguards have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/08/un-accuses-libyan-linked-to-eu-funded-coastguard-of-people-trafficking">accused of involvement in people trafficking</a> themselves. </p>
<p>The EU has also established a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/regional-operational-centre-support-khartoum-process-and-au-horn-africa_en">regional operational centre</a> in Khartoum. But this has meant European officials collaborating with the security forces of a government which has regularly abused its own citizens, as well as foreigners on its soil. President Omar al-Bashir himself has been <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">indicted</a> for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>The centre requires European police and other officers to work directly with the security officials who uphold the Sudanese government. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html">According</a> to the head of the immigration police department,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The planned countertrafficking coordination centre in Khartoum – staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy – will partly rely on information sourced by Sudanese National Intelligence. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The centre also receives support from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2017/11/sudan-rsf-unit-accused-abuses-migrants-171117133237654.html">which grew out of the Janjaweed</a>: notorious for the atrocities it committed in Darfur. </p>
<p>These initiatives are all very much in line with the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf">migration agreement</a> signed in the Maltese capital in 2015. Its action plan detailed how European institutions would co-operate with their African partners to fight</p>
<blockquote>
<p>irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Europe promised to offer training to law enforcement and judicial authorities in new methods of investigation and to assist in setting up specialised anti-trafficking and smuggling police units.</p>
<p>It is this sensitive relationship that will now come under Eritrean supervision. They will be dealing with some of the most vulnerable men, women and children who have fled their own countries. It is here that the process gets really difficult, because Eritrean government officials have themselves been implicated in human trafficking. UN researchers, working for the Security Council <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1869.pdf">described how this took place</a> in 2011. </p>
<p>More recently, survivors of human trafficking interviewed by a team led by Dutch professor Mirjam van Reisen, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mirjam_Reisen/publication/316989834_Human_Trafficking_and_Trauma_in_the_Digital_Era_The_Ongoing_Tragedy_of_the_Trade_in_Refugees_from_Eritrea/links/59f0afeda6fdcc1dc7b8e9c9/Human-Trafficking-and-Trauma-in-the-Digital-Era-The-Ongoing-Tragedy-of-the-Trade-in-Refugees-from-Eritrea.pdf">described</a> how the Eritrean Border Surveillance Unit ferried refugees out of Eritrea, at a price. </p>
<p>The danger is that implicated Eritrean officials will play a critical role in the development of the Khartoum Process.</p>
<h2>Europe’s commitment to human rights</h2>
<p>The EU has repeatedly stressed that its commitment to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTXT">human rights runs through everything it does</a>. Yet the Eritrean government, with which the EU is now collaborating so closely, has been <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23272&LangID=E">denounced</a> for its human rights abuses by no less than the Special Rapporteur for Eritrea to the UN Human Rights Council as recently as June 2018. </p>
<p>As Mike Smith, who chaired the UN Commission Inquiry into Eritrea in 2015, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=16139&LangID=E">put it</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The many violations in Eritrea are of a scope and scale seldom seen anywhere else in today’s world. Basic freedoms are curtailed, from movement to expression; from religion to association. The Commission finds that crimes against humanity may have occurred with regard to torture, extrajudicial executions, forced labour and in the context of national service.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The EU itself has remained silent. It is difficult to see how the EU can allow its key African migration work to be overseen by such a regime, without running foul of its own human rights commitments. European leaders need to reconsider their relationships with African governments implicated in gross human rights abuses if they are to uphold these values. </p>
<p>The Khartoum Process may have reduced the flow of refugees and asylum seekers across the Mediterranean. But it hasn’t eliminated the need for a fresh approach to their plight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>It is difficult to see how the EU can allow its key African migration work to be supervised by Eritrea.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973472018-05-30T13:28:43Z2018-05-30T13:28:43ZKenya may never close Dadaab, but its threat has exposed system failures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220746/original/file-20180529-80620-1ivyw1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the refugee camps in Dadaab, northern Kenya, where more than 300,000 call home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Boris Roessler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Kenya announced it would close the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2016, the world reacted with <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/04/495812-un-urges-kenya-reconsider-dadaab-camp-closure-displacing-some-350000-refugees">shock and recriminations</a>. Some <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/crisis-looms-for-somali-refugees-as-kenya-orders-closure-of-dadaab-refugee-camp-1/">pointed</a> to its commitments as a signatory to conventions protecting refugees. Others argued that Kenya must not close the camp <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/09/kenya-says-it-will-close-all-refugee-camps-displacing-600000-people/?utm_term=.b309570c0836">under any circumstances</a>.</p>
<p>Dadaab was opened in 1991 in north eastern Kenya and is made up of five camps. It’s home to more than 300,000 refugees, <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/05/28/from-here-to-eternity">95% of whom are from Somalia</a>. The camp was in fact never closed largely due to a Kenya High Court <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/africa/kenyan-court-blocks-plan-to-close-dadaab-refugee-camp.html">decision</a>. The court ruled that Kenya’s plan to close Dadaab was “illegal” and “discriminatory,” and that the refugees could not be forcefully relocated.</p>
<p>But we point out in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">analysis</a> that the negative reactions Kenya got weren’t justified, and obscured a number of fundamental issues. We also argue that Kenya had valid reasons for wishing to close Dadaab. </p>
<p>The international community, and particularly the UNHCR and affiliated aid organisations, have failed to offer effective solutions for Dadaab’s refugees and their host country Kenya for decades. Whether or not Kenya actually closes the camp remains to be seen, but its decision to do so is novel and important for a number of reasons. It serves to highlight the failure or unwillingness to seek durable solutions for refugees. </p>
<p>Kenya’s threat certainly uncovered numerous defects in the planning, preparation and modus operandi of the UNHCR and other organisations. </p>
<p>In this scenario, various international organisations and states conveniently carried on with business as usual at the expense of refugees, well-meaning donors and particularly Kenyans. Kenya suffered from terrorism and instability, a drop in tourism and a bad reputation as a result of that status quo. Equally as important, Dadaab’s refugees suffered the indignities of statelessness and an utter lack of options.</p>
<h2>Explaining reactions</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">research</a> highlighted five variables that influenced the reactions from states, international organisations such as the UNHCR, and the plethora of NGOs involved in Dadaab. </p>
<p><strong>Path dependence and increasing returns:</strong> The prospect of the closure of Dadaab by Kenya – or even other alternatives – have been stoutly resisted by a number of organisations. This can be explained under what William H. Sewell Jr., professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2017.1408475">defines</a> as path dependence or dependency. The longer the camp complex remains open, the more entrenched the interests become as the costs of exit rise.</p>
<p>As such, a combination of increasing returns and job security <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/vajint54&div=13&id=&page=">all form a mix</a> that keeps Dadaab running. </p>
<p><strong>Refugee discourse:</strong> Debates about refugees that have developed since the UN’s inception have had a real, physical effect on the way in which states and individuals react to – and deal – with refugees. It has developed into a system replete with laws, institutions, and camps requiring the requisite professions and jobs. </p>
<p><strong>Funding and budgets:</strong> Opponents of Kenya’s decision have argued that Kenya stands to lose close to <a href="https://abacus.co.ke/newsfeed/kenya-at-risk-of-sh10bn-loss-from-dadaab-shutdown/">USD$100 million in revenue</a> associated with housing refugees in Dadaab. But these economic benefits have come at a steep cost. And Kenya maintains that the long-term benefits of Dadaab’s closure outweigh the short-term costs.</p>
<p><strong>Organisational perpetuation:</strong> Organisations seek to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/35/2/79/2223325">perpetuate</a> their existence. Because financial sustainability is critical for the survival and effectiveness of all organisations – the UNHCR for example – priority is given to attracting charitable contributions by being seen to be active in <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049362">high-visibility situations</a>. The mission of providing succour to refugees allows the UNHCR and others to advertise their indispensability to donors, fill their coffers and maintain relevance. It also reifies path dependency. </p>
<p><strong>5. Corruption:</strong> Many of the protests levelled by the UN and others at Kenya <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/kenya-close-worlds-biggest-refugee-camp-dadaab">focused on corruption</a>. For example, some argued that Kenya’s politicians were using the threat of closing Dadaab as a <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/05/19/will-kenya-really-close-dadaab">ploy to extort </a> more money from the European Union. Yet this may be a case of the pot calling the kettle black. While the Kenyan body politic can be <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/115/459/246/2195223">classified as largely corrupt</a>, this is also the case for <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107918">much of the UN</a>, including the UNHCR. </p>
<p>Allegations of grand corruption at the UNHCR in Kenya <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/201738">date back to 2002</a>. In their “Nairobi bubble” <a href="http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/forwa37&section=17">far removed</a> from parallel world of Dadaab, UNHCR officials have reportedly extorted <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/">bribes</a> from Dadaab’s refugees as part of a resettlement process that never comes to fruition. </p>
<p>Kenyan journalist Rasna Warah – formerly at UN-Habitat in Nairobi – <a href="https://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/item/24524-unsilenced-whistleblower-exposes-un-culture-of-corruption">documented</a> the deliberate exaggeration or underestimation of problems by UN agencies in order to keep donor funding flowing in. This thereby sustained the political economy of Dadaab and extending the run of the corruption gravy train.</p>
<h2>Ending a cycle</h2>
<p>Kenya may never close Dadaab, but it had good reasons for wishing to do so. The threat has demonstrated path dependence and how ill-prepared the refugee regime is for a situation in which a sovereign state decides its security may trump international treaty obligations. </p>
<p>It further demonstrates a double standard whereby European states can shutter refugee camps for ostensible security reasons but Kenya cannot. This is not only disingenuous but callous.</p>
<p>While calls for a continuation of the status quo in Dadaab have inundated Nairobi, what is noticeably absent are offers to resettle Dadaab’s refugees outside of Kenya. Kenya’s closure of Dadaab could eventually be positive, ending a cycle wherein the international community – not Kenya – continues to fail Dadaab’s refugees.</p>
<p><em>Hirotaka Fujibayashi, a graduate student at University of Tokyo, contributed to the research.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97347/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya may never close Dadaab, but it has good reasons for wishing to do soBrendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.