tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/lab-leak-hypothesis-107486/articleslab leak hypothesis – The Conversation2023-04-21T00:15:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040252023-04-21T00:15:02Z2023-04-21T00:15:02ZPlagues, poisons and magical thinking – how COVID lab leak hysteria could be straight from the Middle Ages<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521740/original/file-20230419-20-yw3j9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4867%2C3237&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID “lab leak” story clearly isn’t going away soon. The theory that the pandemic began with an accidental release of the virus from a lab in Wuhan recurs like clockwork – most recently in a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/new-report-senate-republicans-doubles-covid-lab-leak/story?id=98656740">report from Senate Republicans</a> in the US this week.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, the US Department of Energy and FBI <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/world/us-canada/300819839/fbi-joins-us-energy-department-in-endorsing-covid-lab-leak-theory">endorsed the same theory</a>. It’s a very modern story – but as medievalists, we can tell you we’ve been here before, and we should be wary of simple narratives of blame. </p>
<p>The lab leak theory remains a <a href="https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023.03.08-Statement-of-Dr.-Robert-R-Redfield88.pdf">legitimate hypothesis to investigate</a>. Yet much of the discussion surrounding it shows evidence of the “contagion effect” of magical thinking – the belief that a visible effect is somehow contaminated by a hidden essence linked to its origin. </p>
<p>The anxieties still <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/28/lab-leak-natural-spillover-how-origins-covid-us-political-debate">whirling in conservative media</a> echo the escalating accusations of well-poisoning in medieval Europe. These exploded into mass violence in the mid-14th century, and survive in later legends about witches’ ability to concoct poisonous agents. </p>
<p>In an age of antibiotics and scientific explanations, we like to consider ourselves more advanced than our forebears. But our research into the early history of conspiracy theories and xenophobia tells a more complicated story about how magical thinking continues to shape our response to disasters like the pandemic.</p>
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<h2>Poisonous powders and plagues</h2>
<p>Fears of contagion often derive from anxieties about unknown or poorly understood aspects of disease. Who among us never felt compelled to disinfect our groceries or mail during the early months of the pandemic? </p>
<p>Our current research, “The First Era of Fake News: Witch-Hunting, Antisemitism and Islamophobia”, examines how myths that emerged during the Middle Ages are still being used to justify modern atrocities. It shows how the contagion effect also leads to scapegoating and faulty attributions of blame. The threat of disease is layered onto suspicious “others” – such as Jews during the Middle Ages, or Chinese labs today. </p>
<p>When Jews were accused of poisoning wells to cause outbreaks of plague in 1348-49, the “contagion” associated with them was both literal and metaphorical. Jews were accused of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673699903963?via%3Dihub">concocting poisonous powders</a> from spiders, toads and human remains – the ingredients form a running list of items invoking disgust and fear of infection. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-why-lab-leak-theory-is-back-despite-little-new-evidence-162215">COVID-19: why lab-leak theory is back despite little new evidence</a>
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<p>But Jews were also considered suspicious simply because they were Jews – exotic religious outsiders who might have connections with coreligionists in other cities, or who might travel far from home. Jews were feared to contaminate Christian communities by their very presence, and medieval preachers weren’t shy about saying so. </p>
<p>We can call this kind of contagion “magical” – fear that simple contact with a mistrusted outsider somehow makes us vulnerable to influences or activities we do not understand. We should take heed: in the case of well-poisoning accusations, those fears led to the wholesale slaughter of Jewish communities in Central Europe. </p>
<p>Individual Jews were tortured into elaborate confessions of guilt, then murdered along with their communities. They were blamed for the plague’s spread and devastation. The contagion effect easily convinced medieval Christians that a terrible disease must originate with people already considered suspicious.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521753/original/file-20230419-14-eipspl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Fear and superstition: an etching depicts medieval flagellants praying for protection against the plague.</span>
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<h2>Conspiracy and Christianity</h2>
<p>There are similar fears of magical contagion in theories about the lab leak being the pandemic’s origin. Blame is a powerful motivator. We continue to be swayed by the idea that some specific agency must be responsible, rather than unpredictable processes of virus mutation. </p>
<p>Even China has embraced this logic, with various suggestions made about the virus emerging somewhere (anywhere) outside its borders. The contagion effect has also been manipulated for political advantage. Donald Trump’s early fear mongering about a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-chinese-virus-the-politics-of-naming-136796">China virus</a>” was a convenient distraction from the failures of his own administration in the early days of the pandemic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/young-people-may-be-more-likely-to-believe-in-conspiracy-theories-that-deny-covid-facts-heres-how-to-respond-188318">Young people may be more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that deny COVID facts – here's how to respond</a>
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<p>Like medieval civic leaders, it was easier for some politicians to assuage the rage and anxiety of people with stories of blame than by acknowledging failures and unknowns.</p>
<p>There are bad as well as good reasons to investigate the lab-leak hypothesis. Using the theory as a way to target and punish enemies is a bad reason. So is the <em>a priori</em> assumption that nefarious intentions lie somewhere behind every major event, a cornerstone of <a href="http://sks.to/conspiracy">conspiratorial thinking both ancient and modern</a>. </p>
<p>We should be on the alert for this style of thinking. It tends to get people killed. When Jews were accused of poisoning wells in medieval Europe, they were <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315521091-5/pestis-manufacta-jon-arrizabalaga">believed by many</a> to be doing so “in order to destroy and eradicate the whole Christian religion”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-only-now-revealed-crucial-covid-19-origins-data-earlier-disclosure-may-have-saved-us-3-years-of-political-argy-bargy-202344">China's only now revealed crucial COVID-19 origins data. Earlier disclosure may have saved us 3 years of political argy-bargy</a>
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<h2>Viral magical thinking</h2>
<p>In some political quarters, the lab-leak theory operates as the thin edge of a similar civilisational struggle, with the Chinese as the villains working in secret on various schemes to dominate or destroy Western democracies. </p>
<p>Such accusations attempt to impose coherence on a profoundly uncertain situation, and suggest a reassuring narrative of clear cause and effect rather than random chance. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-ufos-to-covid-conspiracy-theories-we-all-struggle-with-the-truth-out-there-163483">From UFOs to COVID conspiracy theories, we all struggle with the 'truth out there'</a>
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<p>China’s tight-lipped approach to information-sharing <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2023/02/covid-pandemic-origin-china-lab-leak-theory-energy-department/673230/">isn’t helping to allay suspicions</a>. In the eyes of lab-leak theory advocates, the desire to hide information suggests something more nefarious than a simple desire to avoid blame. </p>
<p>But embracing an argument built on a tissue of circumstantial evidence is also part of the conspiracy theory playbook: magical thinking enters the grey zone of unanswered questions to create elaborate narratives of false reassurance. </p>
<p>Some questions about the origin of COVID-19 may never be answered. For many, that is an unpalatable idea. Yet if we are to intervene in this historical pattern of overreaction, conspiracy theory and blame, we need to be honest about the limits of our knowledge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204025/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simone Celine Marshall and Hannah Johnson have received Fulbright funding for their project, "The First Era of Fake News: Witch-Hunting, Antisemitism and Islamophobia".</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Work on this project is being supported by a Fulbright fellowship. Neither Fulbright International nor Fulbright NZ pays fellowship recipients for publication. The authors' opinions are entirely their own, and do not represent the views of any organisation.</span></em></p>In an age of antibiotics and scientific reason, we like to think we’re more rational than our forebears. But the early history of conspiracy theories suggests some behaviours persist through time.Simone Celine Marshall, Professor of Medieval Literature, University of OtagoHannah Johnson, Professor of English, University of PittsburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881632022-08-14T20:04:15Z2022-08-14T20:04:15ZThe COVID lab leak theory is dead. Here’s how we know the virus came from a Wuhan market<p>My colleagues and I published the most <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.abp8715">detailed</a> <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abp8337">studies</a> of the earliest events in the COVID-19 pandemic last month in the journal Science.</p>
<p>Together, these papers paint a coherent evidence-based picture of what took place in the city of Wuhan during the latter part of 2019.</p>
<p>The take-home message is the COVID pandemic probably did begin where the first cases were detected – at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. </p>
<p>At the same time this lays to rest the idea that the virus escaped from a laboratory.</p>
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<h2>Huanan market was the pandemic epicentre</h2>
<p>An analysis of the geographic locations of the earliest known COVID cases – dating to December 2019 – revealed a strong clustering around the Huanan market. This was true not only for people who worked at or visited the market, but also for those who had no links to it.</p>
<p>Although there will be many missing cases, there’s no evidence of widespread sampling bias: the first COVID cases were not identified simply because they were linked to the Huanan market.</p>
<p>The Huanan market was the pandemic epicentre. From its origin there, the SARS-CoV-2 virus rapidly spread to other locations in Wuhan in early 2020 and then to the rest of the world.</p>
<p>The Huanan market is an indoor space about the size of two soccer fields. The word “seafood” in its name leaves a misleading impression of its function. When I visited the market in 2014, a variety of live wildlife was for sale including raccoon dogs and muskrats.</p>
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<img alt="Dark image of the closed Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, January 2020" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478649/original/file-20220811-20-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chinese authorities closed the Huanan market on the first day of 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>At the time I suggested to my Chinese colleagues that we sample these market animals for viruses. Instead, they set up a virological surveillance study at the nearby Wuhan Central Hospital, which later cared for many of the earliest COVID patients.</p>
<p>Wildlife were also on sale in the Huanan market in 2019. After the Chinese authorities closed the market on January 1 2020, investigative teams swabbed surfaces, door handles, drains, frozen animals and so on.</p>
<p>Most of the samples that later tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 were from the south-western corner of the market. The wildlife I saw for sale on my visit in 2014 were in the south-western corner.</p>
<p>This establishes a simple and plausible pathway for the virus to jump from animals to humans.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-viruses-mutate-and-jump-species-and-why-are-spillovers-becoming-more-common-134656">How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are 'spillovers' becoming more common?</a>
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<h2>Animal spillover</h2>
<p>SARS-CoV-2 has evolved into an array of lineages, some familiar to us as the “variants of concern” (what we call Delta, Omicron and so on). The first split in the SARS-CoV-2 family tree – between the “A” and “B” lineages – occurred very early in the pandemic. Both lineages have an epicentre at the market and both were detected there.</p>
<p>Further analyses suggest the A and B lineages were the products of separate jumps from animals. This simply means there was a pool of infected animals in the Huanan market, fuelling multiple exposure events.</p>
<p>Reconstructing the history of mutations in the SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence through time showed the B lineage was the first to jump to humans. It was followed, perhaps a few weeks later, by the A lineage. </p>
<p>All these events are estimated to have occurred no earlier than late October 2019. Claims that the virus was spreading before this date can be dismissed.</p>
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<img alt="A team of people doing disinfecting work at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, March 2020" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478648/original/file-20220811-617-wdm2i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A team of people working on disinfecting the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market, March 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">China News Service/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>What’s missing, of course, is that we don’t yet know exactly which animals were involved in the transfer of SARS-CoV-2 to humans. Live wildlife were removed from the Huanan market before the investigative team entered, increasing public safety but hampering origin hunting. </p>
<p>The opportunity to find the direct animal host has probably passed. As the virus likely rapidly spread through its animal reservoir, it’s overly optimistic to think it would still be circulating in these animals today.</p>
<p>The absence of a definitive animal source has been taken as tacit support for counter claims that SARS-CoV-2 in fact “leaked” from a scientific laboratory – the Wuhan Institute of Virology.</p>
<h2>Death knell for the lab leak theory</h2>
<p>The lab leak theory rests on an unfortunate coincidence: that SARS-CoV-2 emerged in a city with a laboratory that works on bat coronaviruses.</p>
<p>Some of these bat coronaviruses are closely related to SARS-CoV-2. But not close enough to be direct ancestors.</p>
<p>Sadly, the focus on the Wuhan Institute of Virology has distracted us from a far more important connection: that, like SARS-CoV-1 (which emerged in late 2002) before it, there’s a direct link between a coronavirus outbreak and a live animal market.</p>
<p>Consider the odds that a virus that leaked from a lab was first detected at the very place where you would expect it to emerge if it in fact had a natural animal origin – vanishingly low. And these odds drop further as we need to link both the A and B lineages to the market.</p>
<p>Was the market just the location of a super-spreading event? Nothing says so. It wasn’t a crowded location in the bustling and globally connected metropolis of Wuhan. It’s not even close to being the busiest market or shopping mall in the city.</p>
<p>For the lab leak theory to be true, SARS-CoV-2 must have been present in the Wuhan Institute of Virology before the pandemic started. This would convince me. </p>
<p>But the inconvenient truth is there’s not a single piece of data suggesting this. There’s no evidence for a genome sequence or isolate of a precursor virus at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Not from gene sequence databases, scientific publications, annual reports, student theses, social media, or emails. </p>
<p>Even the intelligence community has found nothing. Nothing. And there was no reason to keep any work on a SARS-CoV-2 ancestor secret before the pandemic.</p>
<p>To assign the origin of SARS-CoV-2 to the Wuhan Institute of Virology requires a set of increasingly implausible “what if?” scenarios. These eventually lead to preposterous suggestions of clandestine bioweapon research.</p>
<p>The lab leak theory stands as an unfalsifiable allegation. If an investigation of the lab found no evidence of a leak, the scientists involved would simply be accused of hiding the relevant material. If not a conspiracy theory, it’s a theory requiring a conspiracy.</p>
<p>It provides a convenient vehicle for calls to limit, if not ban outright, gain-of-function research in which viruses with greatly different properties are created in labs. Whether or not SARS-CoV-2 originated in this manner is incidental.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-want-to-know-where-covid-came-from-but-its-too-soon-to-expect-miracles-172155">We want to know where COVID came from. But it’s too soon to expect miracles</a>
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<h2>Wounds that may never be healed</h2>
<p>The acrid stench of xenophobia lingers over much of this discussion. Fervent dismissals by the Chinese scientists of anything untoward are blithely cast as lies.</p>
<p>Yet during this crucial period these same scientists were going to international conferences and welcoming visitors. Do we honestly believe they would have such a pathological disdain for the consequences of their actions?</p>
<p>The debate over the origins of COVID has opened wounds that may never be healed. It has armed a distrust in science and fuelled divisive political opinion. Individual scientists have been assigned the sins of their governments. </p>
<p>The incessant blame game and finger pointing has reduced the chances of finding viral origins even further. History won’t judge this period kindly.</p>
<p>Global collaboration is the bedrock of effective pandemic prevention, but we’re in danger of destroying rather than building relationships. We may even be less prepared for a pandemic than in 2019. Despite political barriers and a salivating media, the evidence for a natural animal origin for SARS-CoV-2 has increased over the past two years. To deny it puts us all at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188163/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward C Holmes receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical Research Council. He has received consultancy fees from Pfizer Australia and has held honorary appointments (for which he has received no renumeration and performed no duties) at the China CDC in Beijing and the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center (Fudan University)</span></em></p>For the lab leak theory to be true, SARS-CoV-2 must have been present in the Wuhan Institute of Virology before the pandemic started. But there’s not a single piece of data suggesting this.Edward C Holmes, ARC Australian Laureate Fellow and Professor, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1684732021-09-23T20:05:52Z2021-09-23T20:05:52ZNew preliminary evidence suggests coronavirus jumped from animals to humans multiple times<p>The origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which has caused the COVID-19 pandemic, has been hotly debated.</p>
<p>This debate has caused substantial difficulties in the Australia-China relationship, with a call by Foreign Minister <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-19/payne-calls-for-inquiry-china-handling-of-coronavirus-covid-19/12162968">Marise Payne for another inquiry into its origin</a> being considered by China as a hostile act.</p>
<p>What’s not in doubt is the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0820-9">closest relatives of the virus are found in bats</a>. How, where and when the virus spilled over into humans is the contentious issue. </p>
<p>One widely supported hypothesis is the spillover occurred in the “wet markets” of Wuhan, where many species of wildlife from across China are held in crowded conditions.</p>
<p>However, there’s no evidence the species of bats in which the closest relatives of SARS-CoV-2 are found were sold through the Wuhan wet markets at any time in the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-91470-2">two years before the pandemic</a>. This hypothesis requires the existence of a “bridge host”, another species that becomes infected via spillover from the original bat hosts, and then passes the virus onto humans.</p>
<p>Bridge hosts are well-known in many emerging human diseases. For example, Hendra virus, which my group studies, has flying foxes as its reservoir. Hendra spills over to horses <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspb.2014.2124">with some frequency</a>. Horses then amplify the virus as a bridge host and can infect humans.</p>
<p>Fortunately, this is extremely rare, with only <a href="https://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/controlguideline/Pages/hendra-case-summary.aspx">seven known cases</a>. Tragically, four of those people died. Hendra has never been known to spread directly from flying foxes to humans.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-was-the-australian-doctor-on-the-whos-covid-19-mission-to-china-heres-what-we-found-about-the-origins-of-the-coronavirus-155554">I was the Australian doctor on the WHO's COVID-19 mission to China. Here's what we found about the origins of the coronavirus</a>
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<h2>More evidence a lab leak is very unlikely</h2>
<p>A second, much more <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-covid-19-lab-leak-hypothesis-is-plausible-because-accidents-happen-i-should-know-162430">contentious hypothesis</a> is the origin of the pandemic was the result of a “lab leak”. </p>
<p>Wuhan has one of the most sophisticated virological laboratories in China, and the laboratory does work on bat viruses. The suggestion is the virus may have inadvertently been released into the general community via one of the workers. No direct evidence supports this hypothesis.</p>
<p>A new pre-print study, <a href="https://virological.org/t/evidence-against-the-veracity-of-sars-cov-2-genomes-intermediate-between-lineages-a-and-b/754">released online this month</a>, provides <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02519-1">strong evidence</a> to support the “natural spillover” hypothesis, with results that are hard to reconcile with the “lab leak” hypothesis.</p>
<p>The study is yet to be peer reviewed. But it’s based on a detailed examination of the genetic sequences of two early lineages obtained from people infected in late 2019 and early 2020. </p>
<p>For convenience, these two lineages are called A and B. The two lineages differ by just two nucleotides (letters in the genetic code) at two different key sites in the genetic sequence.</p>
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<p>If there was a single lab escape event, the separation into lineages A and B must have happened after the lab escape. We would therefore expect to see a substantial number of intermediate lineages, with the lineage A nucleotide at one site, and the lineage B nucleotide at the other site.</p>
<p>However, if almost all of the genetic sequences obtained from humans are “pure” lineage A or pure lineage B, this suggests there were at least two different spillover events, either directly from bats or via bridge hosts. </p>
<p>And the evolution of the two lineages occurred before humans were infected.</p>
<p>The researchers downloaded all complete genetic sequences for SARS-CoV-2 that had been lodged in a widely used genomic database. Of these sequences, 369 were lineage A, 1,297 were lineage B and just 38 were intermediates. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-it-will-soon-be-too-late-to-find-out-where-the-covid-19-virus-originated-166743">Why it will soon be too late to find out where the COVID-19 virus originated</a>
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<p>Genetic sequencing isn’t perfect. Close examination of the 38 intermediates strongly suggested they were more likely to be sequencing errors of pure lineage A or lineage B than to be true intermediates.</p>
<p>The genetic evidence, therefore, suggests very strongly there have been at least two separate spillover events into human populations, one being from lineage A and another being from lineage B.</p>
<h2>Did a human bring SARS-CoV-2 to the wet markets?</h2>
<p>The data don’t tell us there have been only two spillover events — there may have been more. Nor do they tell us whether these spillovers happened directly from bats, or whether some or all happened via an intermediate bridge host.</p>
<p>A Nature news article suggests this evidence <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02519-1">points to the spillover having happened via the wildlife trade</a>, but I think this is taking it a step too far. </p>
<p>While some of the wildlife species sold through the Wuhan wet market can indeed become infected with SARS-CoV-2 (for example <a href="https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/12/20-3733_article">raccoon dogs</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1473309920309129?via%3Dihub">mink</a>), there’s no evidence any sold through the market were infected.</p>
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<p>Many of the earliest human viral sequences (all lineage B) were recovered from the Wuhan seafood market, but wet markets and abattoirs are well-known to be places where the SARS-CoV-2 virus spreads very well from human to human.</p>
<p>So, it may have been a human who brought the virus to the Wuhan seafood market, rather than a species of wildlife.</p>
<p>One thing we do know is this pandemic originated through a human coming in contact with another species infected with the virus.</p>
<p>It’s unknown whether this was a bat or a bridge host, and whether this contact occurred in a wildlife market, or in a bat cave, or somewhere else entirely different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, as humans encroach more and more on the habitats of wild animals and as wild animals are brought more frequently into close contact with humans, we can expect further spillovers and pandemics to occur.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-viruses-mutate-and-jump-species-and-why-are-spillovers-becoming-more-common-134656">How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are 'spillovers' becoming more common?</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hamish McCallum receives funding from the Australian Reserch Council and from the US agencies NSF, NIH and DARPA</span></em></p>It’s more evidence a lab leak is very unlikely.Hamish McCallum, Director, Centre for Planetary Health and Food Security, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1667432021-08-26T03:36:32Z2021-08-26T03:36:32ZWhy it will soon be too late to find out where the COVID-19 virus originated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417957/original/file-20210826-1194-ww7ksz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C47%2C3944%2C2589&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>SARS-CoV-2 has caused the greatest pandemic of the past 100 years. Understanding its origins is crucial for knowing what happened in late 2019 and for preparing for the next pandemic virus. </p>
<p>These studies take time, planning and cooperation. They must be driven by science — not politics or posturing. The investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 has already taken too long. It has been more than 20 months since the first cases were recognised in Wuhan, China, in December 2019.</p>
<p>This week US President Joe Biden was briefed by United States intelligence agencies on their investigation into the origins of the virus responsible for COVID-19, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-review-covids-china-origin-unlikely-solve-vexing-questions-2021-08-24/">according to</a> <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2021/08/25/biden-reportedly-receives-inconclusive-report-about-covid-origins-from-intelligence-services/?sh=60ae48b02aaa">media</a>. Parts of the investigation’s report are expected to be publicly released within the next few days.</p>
<p>An early report from the New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/24/world/covid-delta-variant-vaccine#us-intelligence-agencies-delivered-a-report-to-biden-on-the-viruss-origins">suggests the investigation</a> does not conclude whether the spread of the virus resulted from a lab leak, or if it emerged naturally in a spillover from animals to humans. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-do-viruses-mutate-and-jump-species-and-why-are-spillovers-becoming-more-common-134656">How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are 'spillovers' becoming more common?</a>
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<p>While a possible lab leak is a line of inquiry (should scientific evidence emerge), it musn’t distract from where the current evidence tells us we should be directing most of our energy. The more time that passes, the less feasible it will become for experts to determine the biological origins of the virus.</p>
<h2>Six recommendations</h2>
<p>I was one of the experts who visited Wuhan <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-was-the-australian-doctor-on-the-whos-covid-19-mission-to-china-heres-what-we-found-about-the-origins-of-the-coronavirus-155554">earlier this year</a> as part of the World Health Organisation’s investigation into SARS-CoV-2 origins. We found the evidence pointed to the pandemic starting as a result of zoonotic transmission of the virus, meaning a spillover from an animal to humans.</p>
<p>Our inquiry culminated in a <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus/origins-of-the-virus">report published in March</a> which made a series of recommendations for further work. There is an urgent need to get on with <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-report-into-the-origin-of-the-coronavirus-is-out-heres-what-happens-next-says-the-australian-doctor-who-went-to-china-158212">designing studies</a> to support these recommendations.</p>
<p>Today, myself and other independent authors of the WHO report have <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02263-6">written</a> to plead for this work to be accelerated. Crucial time is disappearing to work through the six priority areas, which include: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>further trace-back studies based on early disease reports</p></li>
<li><p>SARS-CoV-2-specific antibody surveys in regions with early COVID-19 cases. This is important given a number of countries including Italy, France, Spain and the United Kingdom have often reported inconclusive evidence of early COVID-19 detection</p></li>
<li><p>trace-back and community surveys of the people involved with the wildlife farms that supplied animals to Wuhan markets</p></li>
<li><p>risk-targeted surveys of possible animal hosts. This could be either the primary host (such as bats), or secondary hosts or amplifiers</p></li>
<li><p>detailed risk-factor analyses of pockets of early cases, wherever these have occurred</p></li>
<li><p>and follow up of any credible new leads.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Race against the clock</h2>
<p>The biological feasibility of some of these studies is time dependent. SARS-CoV-2 antibodies emerge a week or so after someone has become infected and recovered from the virus, or after being vaccinated. </p>
<p>But we know antibodies decrease over time — so samples collected now from people infected before or around December 2019 may be harder to examine accurately. </p>
<p>Using antibody studies to differentiate between vaccination, natural infection, or even second infection (especially if the initial infection occurred in 2019) in the general population is also problematic. </p>
<p>For example, after natural infection a range of SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies, such as to the spike protein or nucleoprotein, can be detected for varying lengths of time and in varying concentrations and ability to neutralise the virus.</p>
<p>But depending on the vaccine used, antibodies to the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein may be all that is detected. These, too, drop with time.</p>
<p>There is also a need to have international consensus in the laboratory methods used to detect SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies. Inconsistency in testing methods has led to arguments about data quality from many locations. </p>
<p>It takes time to come to agreement on laboratory techniques for serological and viral genomic studies, sample access and sharing (including addressing consent and privacy concerns). Securing funding also takes time — so time is not a resource we can waste.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-is-evolving-but-so-are-our-antibodies-156810">Coronavirus is evolving but so are our antibodies</a>
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<h2>Distance from potential sources</h2>
<p>Moreover, many wildlife farms in Wuhan have closed down following the initial outbreak, generally in an unverified manner. And finding human or animal evidence of early coronavirus spillover is increasingly difficult as animals and humans disperse. </p>
<p>Fortunately, some studies can be done now. This includes reviews of early case studies, and blood donor studies in Wuhan and other cities in China (and anywhere else where there was early detection of viral genomes). </p>
<p>It is important to examine the progress or results of such studies by local and international experts, yet the mechanisms for such scientific cross-examination have not yet been put in place. </p>
<p>New evidence has come forward since our March report. These papers and the WHO report data have been reviewed by scientists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2021.08.017">independent of the WHO group</a>. They have came to similar conclusions to the WHO report, identifying: </p>
<ul>
<li>the host reservoir for SARS-CoV-2 has not been found</li>
<li>the key species in China (or elsewhere) may not have been tested</li>
<li>and there is substantial scientific evidence supporting a zoonotic origin.</li>
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<h2>Teetering back and forth</h2>
<p>While the possibility of a laboratory accident can’t be entirely dismissed, it is highly unlikely, given the repeated human-animal contact that occurs routinely in the wildlife trade.</p>
<p>Still, the “lab-leak” hypotheses continue to generate media interest over and above the available evidence. These more political discussions further slow the cooperation and agreement needed to progress with the WHO report’s phase two studies. </p>
<p>The World Health Organisation has called for a new committee to oversee future origins studies. This is laudable, but there is the risk of further delaying the necessary planning for the already outlined SARS-CoV-2 origins studies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the WHO’s investigation earlier this year, several papers have come to the same conclusion regarding the likely origins of SARS-CoV-2. Yet progress is too slow.Dominic Dwyer, Director of Public Health Pathology, NSW Health Pathology, Westmead Hospital and University of Sydney, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1634722021-07-19T12:07:04Z2021-07-19T12:07:04ZBioweapons research is banned by an international treaty – but nobody is checking for violations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410440/original/file-20210708-15-1j917yr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C985%2C655&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A global treaty bans research or stockpiling of biological weapons — but allows bioweapon defense planning.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/169940/technician-course-prepares-chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-uncertainty">US Dept. of Defense via DVIDS</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scientists are making dramatic progress with techniques for “gene splicing” – modifying the genetic makeup of organisms. </p>
<p>This work includes bioengineering pathogens for medical research, techniques that also can be used to create deadly biological weapons. <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-gene-editing-tools-such-as-crispr-be-used-as-a-biological-weapon-82187">It’s an overlap</a> that’s helped <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2021/05/the-origin-of-covid-did-people-or-nature-open-pandoras-box-at-wuhan">fuel speculation</a> that the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus was bioengineered at China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology and that it subsequently “escaped” through a lab accident to produce the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>The world already has <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1089%2Fhs.2017.0082">a legal foundation</a> to prevent gene splicing for warfare: <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/">the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention</a>. Unfortunately, nations have been unable to agree on how to strengthen the treaty. <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/07/soviet_bw/">Some countries</a> have also pursued bioweapons research <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/">and stockpiling</a> in violation of it.</p>
<p>As a member of President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council from 1996 to 2001, I had <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/facultyguide/person.html?emplid=45b03f10247276eeaf30fadbc8afc2261b06795d">a firsthand view</a> of the failure to strengthen the convention. From 2009 to 2013, as President Barack Obama’s White House coordinator for weapons of mass destruction, I led <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-05/pursuing-prague-agenda-interview-white-house-coordinator-gary-samore">a team that grappled with</a> the challenges of regulating potentially dangerous biological research in the absence of strong international rules and regulations. </p>
<p>The history of the Biological Weapons Convention <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/06/the-biological-weapons-convention-at-a-crossroad/">reveals the limits</a> of international attempts to control research and development of biological agents. </p>
<h2>1960s-1970s: International negotiations to outlaw biowarfare</h2>
<p>The United Kingdom <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340211407400">first proposed</a> a <a href="https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/brandeis-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3300058">global biological weapons ban</a> in 1968. </p>
<p>Reasoning that bioweapons had no useful military or strategic purpose given the awesome power of nuclear weapons, the U.K. had <a href="http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C14396">ended its offensive bioweapons program</a> in 1956. But the risk remained that other countries might consider developing bioweapons as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509049">poor man’s atomic bomb</a>. </p>
<p>In the original British proposal, countries would have to identify facilities and activities with potential bioweapons applications. They would also need to accept on-site inspections by an international agency to verify these facilities were being used for peaceful purposes.</p>
<p>These negotiations gained steam in 1969 when <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092154">the Nixon administration ended</a> America’s offensive biological weapons program and supported the British proposal. <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpdpsbbtwd/cpdpsbbtwd.html">In 1971, the Soviet Union announced its support</a> – but only with the verification provisions stripped out. Since it was essential to get the USSR on board, the U.S. and U.K. agreed to drop those requirements. </p>
<p>In 1972 the treaty was finalized. After gaining the required signatures, it took effect in 1975. </p>
<p>Under <a href="https://treaties.unoda.org/t/bwc">the convention</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/about/membership-and-regional-groups">183 nations have</a> agreed not to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” biological materials that could be used as weapons. They also agreed not to stockpile or develop any “means of delivery” for using them. The treaty allows “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful” research and development – including medical research. </p>
<p>However, the treaty lacks any mechanism to verify that countries are complying with these obligations.</p>
<h2>1990s: Revelations of treaty violations</h2>
<p>This absence of verification was exposed as <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/the-biological-weapons-convention-protocol-should-be-revisited/">the convention’s fundamental flaw</a> two decades later, when it turned out that the Soviets had a great deal to hide. </p>
<p>In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed the Soviet Union’s massive <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/07/soviet_bw/">biological weapons program</a>. Some of <a href="https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674045132-007">the program’s reported experiments</a> involved making viruses and bacteria more lethal and resistant to treatment. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065260">The Soviets also</a> weaponized and mass-produced a number of dangerous naturally occurring viruses, including the anthrax and smallpox viruses, as well as the plague-causing <em>Yersinia pestis</em> bacterium. </p>
<p>Yeltsin in 1992 <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-09-15-mn-859-story.html">ordered the program’s end</a> and the destruction of all its materials. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-russia-violating-the-biological-weapons-convention/">But doubts remain</a> whether this was fully carried out. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/0401/02-hist-08.html">Another treaty violation</a> came to light after the U.S. defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. United Nations inspectors discovered <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9244334/">an Iraqi bioweapons stockpile</a>, including 1,560 gallons (6,000 liters) of anthrax spores and 3,120 gallons (12,000 liters) of botulinum toxin. Both had been loaded into aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads, although Iraq never used these weapons.</p>
<p>In the mid-1990s, during South Africa’s transition to majority rule, evidence emerged of <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/project-coast-apartheids-chemical-and-biological-warfare-programme">the former apartheid regime’s chemical and biological weapons program</a>. As revealed by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/">the program</a> focused on assassination. Techniques included infecting cigarettes and chocolates with anthrax spores, sugar with salmonella and chocolates with botulinum toxin. </p>
<p>In response to these revelations, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0002930000030098">as well as suspicions</a> that North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria were also violating the treaty, the U.S. began urging other nations to close the verification gap. But despite 24 meetings over seven years, a specially formed group of international negotiators <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/414675a">failed to reach agreement on how to do it</a>. The problems were both practical and political.</p>
<h2>Monitoring biological agents</h2>
<p>Several factors make verification of the bioweapons treaty difficult.</p>
<p>First, the types of facilities that research and produce biological agents, <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-medical-innovations-fueled-by-covid-19-that-will-outlast-the-pandemic-156464">such as vaccines</a>, antibiotics, vitamins, <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-random-bits-of-dna-lead-to-safe-new-antibiotics-and-herbicides-83550">biological pesticides</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/moving-beyond-pro-con-debates-over-genetically-engineered-crops-59564">certain foods</a>, can also produce biological weapons. Some pathogens with legitimate medical and industrial uses can also be used for bioweapons.</p>
<p>Further, large quantities of certain biological weapons can be produced quickly, by few personnel and in relatively small facilities. Hence, biological weapons programs are more difficult for international inspectors to detect than nuclear or chemical programs, which typically require large facilities, numerous personnel and years of operation.</p>
<p>So an effective bioweapons verification process would require nations to identify a large number of civilian facilities. Inspectors would need to monitor them regularly. The monitoring would need to be intrusive, allowing inspectors to demand “challenge inspections,” meaning access on short notice to both known and suspected facilities. </p>
<p>Finally, developing <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pandemic-and-americas-response-to-future-bioweapons/">bioweapons defenses</a> – as permitted under the treaty – typically requires working with dangerous pathogens and toxins, and even delivery systems. So distinguishing <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/enhancing-biological-weapons-defense">legitimate biodefense programs</a> from illegal bioweapons activities often comes down to intent – and intent is hard to verify.</p>
<p>Because of these inherent difficulties, verification faced stiff opposition.</p>
<h2>Political opposition to bioweapons verification</h2>
<p>As the White House official responsible for coordinating the U.S. negotiating position, I often heard concerns and objections from important government agencies. </p>
<p>The Pentagon expressed fears that inspections of biodefense installations would compromise national security or lead to false accusations of treaty violations. The Commerce Department opposed intrusive international inspections on behalf of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Such inspections might compromise trade secrets, officials contended, or interfere with medical research or industrial production. </p>
<p>Germany and Japan, which also have large pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, raised similar objections. China, Pakistan, Russia and others opposed nearly all on-site inspections. Since the rules under which the negotiation group operated required consensus, any single country could block agreement. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>In January 1998, seeking to break the deadlock, <a href="https://fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/news/98022001_ppo.html">the Clinton administration proposed</a> reduced verification requirements. Nations could limit their declarations to facilities “especially suitable” for bioweapons uses, such as vaccine production facilities. Random or routine inspections of these facilities would instead be “voluntary” visits or limited challenge inspections – but only if approved by the executive council of a to-be-created international agency monitoring the bioweapons treaty. </p>
<p>But even this failed to achieve consensus among the international negotiators.</p>
<p>Finally, in July 2001, the George W. Bush administration <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/cbwcb53-Pearson.pdf">rejected the Clinton proposal</a> – ironically, on the grounds that it was not strong enough to detect cheating. With that, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/world/conference-on-biological-weapons-breaks-down-over-divisions.html">the negotiations collapsed</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, nations have made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/world/09biowar.html">no serious effort to establish a verification system</a> for the Biological Weapons Convention. </p>
<p>Even with the amazing advances scientists have made in genetic engineering since the 1970s, there are few signs that countries are interested in taking up the problem again. </p>
<p>This is especially true in today’s climate of accusations against China, and China’s refusal to fully cooperate to determine the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary Samore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sketchy history of international efforts to control bioweapons suggests that nations will resist cooperative monitoring of gene hacking for medical research.Gary Samore, Professor of the Practice of Politics and Crown Family Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.