tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/m23-rebels-41210/articlesM23 rebels – The Conversation2024-02-19T11:00:44Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238272024-02-19T11:00:44Z2024-02-19T11:00:44ZDRC protests: expert explains why Congolese anger against the west is justified – and useful to the government<p>Since early February, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, has been rocked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68273900">protests directed against western embassies</a>. Protests took place in front of the British and French embassies, and in front of United Nations buildings. Throughout the city, American and Belgian flags were burned. </p>
<p>The protesters are denouncing what they believed to be western complicity in the war in the east of the DRC. These protests were triggered by <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/m23-rebels-continue-battle-in-drc/7487566.html">the renewed advance of the rebel movement M23</a>. </p>
<p>M23 is led by Congolese Tutsi, and is the latest in a history of Congolese rebel groups supported by Rwanda. It emerged in April 2012, took control of the eastern city of Goma in November 2012, and was defeated in 2013. In late 2021, the group reemerged, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers">fuelled</a> by longstanding geopolitical tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It has since gained control over large parts of territory.</p>
<p>The movement <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/02/13/dans-l-est-de-la-rdc-l-etau-du-m23-se-resserre-autour-de-goma-faisant-craindre-une-deflagration-regionale_6216376_3212.html">now controls access to Goma</a>. The city of an estimated 2 million people is symbolically and strategically important as the biggest city of the northern Kivu province, bordering Rwanda. </p>
<p>The rebel group has now effectively surrounded the city, allowing it to cut off supplies or conquer the city. The possibility of this happening – as it did in 2012 – has led to widespread panic and more displacement.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://kristoftiteca.be/research">studied</a> the DRC and its geopolitics for close to two decades. In this article, I’ll explain the reasons for, as well as the ambiguity of, the protests. </p>
<p>First, it is striking how <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">silent the international community remains towards Rwanda</a>. Multiple recent United Nations reports have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/23/un-report-shows-rwandan-army-intervened-in-drcs-troubled-east/">extensively documented direct Rwandan military support for the M23 rebellion</a> – support that Kigali itself denies. </p>
<p>A number of countries, such as Belgium and France, have called on Rwanda to end its involvement. Most recently, on 17 February, the United States released a strong statement <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">condemning Rwanda’s support</a> for M23. Yet, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/12/16/drc-we-know-the-m23-is-backed-by-rwanda-but-france-has-looked-the-other-way_6007956_23.html">not much concrete action</a> has been taken: Rwanda remains a w<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">estern donor darling</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the current protests are an indictment of the lack of global attention to the Congolese crisis. The comparison with both Ukraine and Israel/Palestine is frequently made in the country: where is the attention to the Congolese crisis? </p>
<p>For Felix Tshisekedi, who recently began a second term as president of the DRC, the protests are convenient. They’re allowing the government to shift the blame to western countries. This is after five years of at best limited progress in resolving the crisis in the eastern part of the country.</p>
<h2>Failed policies</h2>
<p>The Congolese government has failed to solve the armed crisis in the east. The region continues to be plagued by a range of armed groups, including the M23 rebellion. </p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a>, conflict has kept brewing in eastern Congo, driven by interests and grievances at local, national and regional levels. This has spawned a multitude of armed groups, estimated to be over 100 at the moment. Access to natural resources – which are plentiful in eastern Congo – is one, <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/conflict-minerals-inc/">but not necessarily the most important</a>, driver of conflict. At the regional level, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have continued to protect their economic, political and security interests in eastern Congo. </p>
<p>When Tshisekedi first became president in 2019 he took measures to restore stability in the east.</p>
<p>But these had limited results. </p>
<p>First, he allowed some neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Burundi, to once again operate militarily in the east. This was controversial for many Congolese, given the involvement of Uganda in the looting of Congolese natural resources during the Second Congo War. </p>
<p>This policy, and particularly the presence of Ugandan military on Congolese soil, has been <a href="https://www.ebuteli.org/publications/rapports/https-lh6-googleusercontent-com-b-wr-fq4j-bw-o-yap-fc-pyp4p1uv9-uc-6-rusd27hl6v-f-oo-p-wdls75l-z-umwgv-la-wn-cju-gd-ji-l-mj-bswu-9-y5-mzm-1-llz-azq7fvjtv-hxm-bg7y-rrs-43-j-dd-wa-e-aqr-xt5-q-i-i-ee3-v1c-f-poim-tuj4-mu-ua-n-qi">blamed</a> by the Congolese research group Ebuteli for rekindling the M23 rebellion in 2022. The presence of these foreign troops in the DRC was seen to threaten Rwandan interests.</p>
<p>Second, Tshisekedi declared “martial law” in the conflict-ridden provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, in which the military took over civilian authority. But this too was ineffective. Violence escalated. And, as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-stop-using-prolonged-state-siege-excuse-crush-protests">as shown by Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east">Human Rights Watch</a>, the military misused the martial law powers to deepen repression by targeting the opposition in these provinces. </p>
<p>Third was a series of other military interventions. But these too have had limited success. </p>
<p>They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve">1,000 Romanian mercenaries</a>, led by a <a href="https://osintteam.blog/meet-the-romanian-ex-legionnaire-turned-businessman-part-1-3a5fd1f28726">Romanian ex-legionnaire</a> running his own private military company. They were specifically contracted to fight M23. </p></li>
<li><p>a collaboration with local vigilante groups and existing armed groups, many of which had been fought by the Congolese army. These fighters are referred to as <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/19/the-wazalendo-patriots-at-war-in-eastern-drc_6356363_4.html">Wazalendo</a> (patriots in Kiswahili). This too was specifically aimed at defeating M23.</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of a force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In mid-February 2024 it was announced that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-deploy-2900-troops-fight-armed-groups-eastern-congo-2024-02-12/">South Africa would send another 2,900 soldiers to the country</a>. This is the latest of a range of regional organisations which have became involved in trying to resolve the conflict since Tshisekedi came to power. Others include the East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>On the whole, these initiatives and agreements have yielded limited results, and done little to change the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. </p>
<p>Since October last year, the number of internally displaced people in the country has risen to <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million">6.9 million</a> – the highest number recorded yet.</p>
<h2>The role of the west</h2>
<p>The recent protests are to some extent convenient for the Tshisekedi government, allowing it to shift the blame to the west.</p>
<p>It has not escaped notice that the government remained relatively tolerant towards the protests. Anti-west protests were allowed to continue for several days, with public mobilisation on social media. This is markedly different from the response to other recent public protests. Opposition demonstrations against the <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/a-quoi-servent-les-elections-en-rdc/">disputed election results</a> in December <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231226-dr-congo-s-government-bans-protests-against-election-irregularities">were banned</a> or rapidly stopped.</p>
<p>At the same time, there is merit in people’s anger over the west’s role in the region – both its protective attitude towards Rwanda and its apparent indifference to what’s happening in the DRC. </p>
<p>First, the protests build on longstanding frustrations with the United Nations peacekeeping force in the country, better known by its acronym Monusco. Monusco has historically had a major <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">credibility problem</a> in the DRC due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem">its appalling record</a> in protecting the civilian population. This frustration has on a number of occasions <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">led to violent protests</a> against the UN in the country.</p>
<p>Second, a number of western diplomatic initiatives helped to entrench the idea that western policy in the region did not have the interests of the Congolese at heart. In December 2022, the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">announced its decision to give €20 million</a> (about US$21.6 million) to the Rwandan army for its military operations in Mozambique. By this time, there had been much evidence documenting Rwandan support to M23. The initiative was therefore understood by Congolese public opinion as direct European endorsement of M23. </p>
<p>Subsequent diplomatic initiatives to repair the damage, such as the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">same amount in European aid to the Congolese army</a>, did little to change this perception.</p>
<p>It is also true that there has been a lack of global – including western – attention to the Congolese crisis. A direct reason for the protests was that during the recent Africa Cup of Nations semi-final (which the DRC played against Côte d'Ivoire), anti-war <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/sports/football/dr-congo-protest-censorship-during-afcon-semi-final-4520850">protests by Congolese supporters in the stadium were not broadcast</a>. Although it’s up to the Confederation of African Football to sanction such broadcasts, in the DRC the decision was understood to have been made by the French TV broadcasting channel Canal+. It was seen as another illustration of the western attitude to the Congo conflict. </p>
<p>This led to attacks on Canal+ distribution points and protests against the French embassy. </p>
<p>Similar to other crises in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those in Sudan or Ethiopia, the crisis in the DRC is particularly low in the hierarchy of global attention politics, particularly in the west. The protests against western symbols in Kinshasa can therefore also be seen as distress signals: “we’re here too”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests in Kinshasa are an indictment of the lack of attention to the Congolese crisis.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192642024-01-03T09:38:27Z2024-01-03T09:38:27ZSouth Africa to lead new military force in the DRC: an expert on what it’s up against<p><em>The United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Monusco, is ending after 20 years. It will be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community (<a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/operationalisation-sadc-standby-force-mechanism-intervention-crises-situations-remain">SADC</a>), led by the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African military</a>. Thomas Mandrup, an expert in African security governance and South African military and foreign policy, recently wrote a <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2012%2023%20Mandrup.pdf">paper</a> on the subject. We asked him about the new mission and what awaits it.</em></p>
<h2>What prompted the deployment?</h2>
<p>The security situation in the eastern DRC has deteriorated <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143937">in recent months</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/dr-congo-president-says-un-peacekeepers-to-begin-withdrawal-this-year">criticism</a> has been raised against the UN force, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">Monusco</a>, which was due to start its <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-government-democratic-republic-congo-and-monusco-sign-disengagement-plan-withdrawal-mission">drawdown</a> shortly after the national elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-elections-three-factors-that-have-shaped-tshisekedis-bumpy-first-term-as-president-217018">on 20 December</a>.</p>
<p>There was also <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/11/fog-of-eastern-drc-fighting-clouds-eacrf-effectiveness/">increased frustration</a> with the <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">East African Community Regional Force</a> because of its lack of positive impact on the security situation in the eastern DRC. In addition, there was competition between the East African Community and SADC member states for future influence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The DRC became a member of the East Africa Community in 2022 and has historical trade relations with east Africa.</p>
<h2>What challenges await the SADC mission?</h2>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC – which carries the acronym (<a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/president-ramaphosa-to-participate-in-virtual-extraordinary-sadc-summit/">SAMIDRC</a>) – is expected to replace the East African Community Regional Force and help the national security forces in fighting especially the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">M23 rebels</a>, a group allegedly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">supported by Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>The SADC force is expected to attempt, in cooperation with the local security forces, to neutralise the main rebel groups operating in the eastern DRC. This is something that Monusco and the East African Community Regional Force have not been able to do for the last 20 years.</p>
<p>The rebel groups have operated in that area for many years, know the terrain, and are integrated with the local population.</p>
<p>The lessons learned from the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/asking-the-right-questions-about-the-force-intervention-brigade">SADC/Monusco Force Intervention Brigade</a> show that the new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. It must also have special forces capabilities, and mobility in very difficult terrain. Also required are tactical and operational intelligence and enough fire-power. </p>
<p>In addition, a SADC internal document is instructive: it says the regional force found it difficult to fulfil <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/samim-shifting-scenario-six-scenario-five">its mandate</a> of disarming the Al-Sunnah insurgents in Mozambique because of a lack of a clear mandate and the necessary capabilities.</p>
<h2>What role will the South African National Defence Force play? What resources does it have?</h2>
<p>Post-apartheid South Africa has played a central role as a mediator and peacemaker in Africa. The DRC has been at the centre of these efforts. The South African National Defence Force will lead the SADC intervention force. </p>
<p>However, the South African National Defence Force is <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">overstretched and underfunded</a> and has been for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">a long time</a>.</p>
<p>There is a discrepancy between what the politicians want it to do and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">resources available</a> for this. In addition, the South African government has increasingly used the military for <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">domestic security and policing tasks</a> while also <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/money-recovered-from-crime-will-go-to-fight-crime/">deploying soldiers</a> and equipment in complex international peace missions, including combat missions in the DRC and Mozambique and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">ad hoc shorter international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force faces a host of challenges. The politicians are seemingly unwilling to prioritise its tasks. Instead of releasing forces by closing one operation, the force is expected to handle an ever increasing number of tasks and deployments at the same time. Many of these are of a more civilian nature, such as sending out army engineers to stop the pollution of the Vaal River or <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">protecting installations of Eskom</a>, the power utility, without additional funding. </p>
<p>The defence force has problems keeping its equipment operational and has, for instance, only one operational C-130 transport aircraft. It has only a few helicopters available for all domestic and international missions – <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">five Oryx</a>, out of an initial 39, and three Rooivalk, out of 11.</p>
<p>Hence it will not be able to provide the much-needed air transport and air cover for offensive operations. The soldiers will have to use road transport in the DRC. But the country has very limited functional roads, making it especially difficult to operate and move around <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">during the rainy season</a>.</p>
<p>The specialised elements and mobile elements, like the paratroops, the reconaissance units and the <a href="https://www.recce.co.za/the-hq/">Special Forces</a>, which can be effective against groups like the M23, are overstretched to such an extent that it negatively affects their operational readiness.</p>
<p>The reserve force, in principle numbering 19,000, constitutes an important augmenting tool for the permanent force. Due to personnel shortages, the reserve force has increasingly been used for both <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-holds-second-defence-reserves-indaba/">domestic and international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is ageing and only at half its supposed strength. The average age of the personnel is 46 years old, which is a big operational challenge. Active soldiers <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-defence-department-must-urgently-consider-appointment-chief-defence-reserves-and-chairperson-reserve-force-council">should be young and fit</a>. Ideally the majority of the force (private-level) should be 25 or younger. Officers and non-commissioned officers will have a higher average age. </p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force has reached a stage where it can no longer continue to deploy without significant additional funding and intake of recruits. The force will also have to take a critical look at its institutional structure and set-up. It has <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">too many expensive senior officers</a>, and too few young deployable soldiers. </p>
<h2>What are the risks?</h2>
<p>The risks are multifaceted. If the needed funding is not secured, the troop contributing countries will have to fund the missions from their own budgets. The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief">SADC mission in Mozambique</a>, for instance, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/36712/">has struggled</a> with funding, which has hampered its operational capabilities. </p>
<p>The next challenge is whether the SADC member states will make the needed capabilities and equipment available to the new force, allowing it to successfully fulfil its mandate. The discrepancy between what a mission needs and what is provided has been seen in Mozambique, negatively affecting the mission’s ability to achieve its operational objectives. </p>
<p>In the operational area the new force will face an adversary allegedly supported by Rwanda. If the SADC force comes under-equipped or wrongly equipped, it increases the risk to the soldiers. The lessons learned from the strategic failure of the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1322">in 2013 in Central African Republic</a> is a clear warning. Then a small bilateral South African training mission, augmented by a few hundred lightly armed special operation forces and paratrooper elements, fought a rebel force of 7,000 for two days. A small airborne element was left stranded, facing an overwhelming enemy without air cover, logistical support, heavy equipment or extraction possibilities.</p>
<p>It was only the bravery and skills of the deployed force that limited the number of casualties to 17. However, the mission was a strategic failure, which illustrated the limitation of the South African National Defence Force in logistically and practically supporting a force deployed several thousand kilometres away. Notably, the South African National Defence Force is in a worse shape than it was in 2013.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Mandrup receives funding from The Carlsberg Foundation. </span></em></p>The new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. None are guaranteed.Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership In Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2034862023-04-17T12:35:03Z2023-04-17T12:35:03ZEast Africa’s peace mission in the DRC: why it’s in Burundi’s interest to help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520222/original/file-20230411-26-di0c2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundian military personnel arrive at Goma airport in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on 5 March, 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/burundian-military-personnel-arrive-at-goma-airport-in-news-photo/1247777334?adppopup=true">Alexis Huguet/AFP via </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi was the first country to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">offer troops</a> to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2022 as part of east Africa’s peace drive after a wave of attacks from the rebel group known as Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). </p>
<p>Burundi shares a 243km <a href="https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/burundi-drc-land">border</a> with the DRC. Most of it runs through the Rusizi/Ruzizi river to the north and Lake Tanganyika to the south. It has been described as one of the <a href="https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/AOAV-DRC-Burundi-Border-Assessment-Report-FINAL_en.pdf#page=7">most porous borders</a> in Africa’s Great Lakes region. This makes it particularly vulnerable to the <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol1/iss1/3/">spillover effects</a> of conflict from one country into the other. Burundi <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc?id=212">currently</a> hosts around 86,857 refugees from the DRC, a large number given <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/BI">Burundi’s population size</a> of around 12.6 million.</p>
<p>The number of Burundian troops stationed within the DRC is not publicly known. The country already had troops in South Kivu – which hosts Burundian refugees – under a bilateral arrangement with the DRC. On 4 March 2023, Burundi <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/burundi-to-deploy-troops-to-east-drc-4145612">deployed</a> 100 soldiers to North Kivu in the eastern DRC as part of the <a href="https://www.eac.int/statements/2733-status-of-deployment-of-eac-troops-and-verification-mechanisms-in-eastern-drc">East African Community’s</a> regional peacekeeping force. </p>
<p>M23’s aim appears to be control of the eastern part of the DRC, which is endowed with strategic minerals. This area is near the border with Rwanda and Uganda. The group is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">believed</a> to benefit from strategic and logistic support from the Rwandan government. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23: Four things you should know about the rebel group's campaign in Rwanda-DRC conflict</a>
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<p>The Burundi troops deployed to the DRC have <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burundi-army-contingent-takes-over-areas-vacated-by-m23-rebels-in-dr-congo/2854380">the mission</a> of securing areas the M23 rebel group has withdrawn from. </p>
<p>Apart from Burundi, only three of the <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states">seven</a> East African Community members have offered to provide peacekeeping troops. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/10/kenya-to-spend-37-million-on-sending-forces-to-congo">Kenya</a> and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-to-deploy-troops-to-dr-congo-4170662">Uganda</a> committed to deploy about 1,000 soldiers each. South Sudan <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/south-sudan-to-send-750-troops-to-dr-congo-to-fight-rebels-4069472">promised</a> to send 750 soldiers. Tanzania, the remaining East African Community member, had already provided its troops under the UN’s <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">peace mission</a> in the DRC. </p>
<p>Burundi is interested in seeing a stable and secured DRC, especially along the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-south-kivu-humanitarian-snapshot-31-december-2022#:%7E:text=The%20province%20of%20South%20Kivu,the%20vulnerabilities%20of%20the%20population">border area</a> that the two countries share. Burundi’s government and army consider the absence of stability and security, especially in the DRC’s South Kivu, as a serious threat. It is one of the most important reasons Burundi is involved in supporting the peace process in the DRC. </p>
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<p>Other reasons include issues related to bilateral trade and business, regional integration opportunities and the geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region. </p>
<h2>Pursuit of rebels</h2>
<p>The number of Burundian rebel groups with a rear base in South Kivu increased after 2015, when a military coup attempt against President Pierre Nkurunziza failed. These armed groups have conducted incursions into Burundi from the DRC, increasing the level of insecurity.</p>
<p>The governments of Burundi and DRC agreed to collaborate in eradicating these rebel groups, through sharing intelligence and through joint operations when necessary. In its <a href="https://burundihri.org/english/july_2022.php">latest report</a> the Burundian Human Rights Initiative says the government has secretly been deploying hundreds of soldiers and armed ruling party youths to pursue rebels in the eastern DRC since 2021.</p>
<h2>Trade links</h2>
<p>The DRC has a population of <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/#people-and-society">around 111 million people</a>. This is an important market for Burundi and the whole East African Community. </p>
<p>Economically important minerals from the DRC are transported through its neighbours like Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. This trade involves both legal and illegal exchange of strategic minerals such as gold, coltan, cobalt and cassiterite. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Burundi, Tanzania and the DRC share a <a href="https://www.freightnews.co.za/article/east-africa-electrified-railway-tender-signed">plan</a> to build an electrified railway from Dar es Salaam’s port through Burundi to the DRC. This project is set to increase the volume of trade between the three countries. Without permanent security in the DRC, this project will not be realised. </p>
<p>In addition, the proximity of cities like Bujumbura (Burundi), Kigoma (Tanzania) and Bukavu and Uvira (DRC) has the potential to create an important triangular trade hub.</p>
<h2>Regional politics</h2>
<p>Being the current <a href="https://www.eac.int/about-eac/leadership">chair</a> of the East Africa Community heads of state summit, Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye had to lead the DRC peace process. But there is also some regional history to it. </p>
<p>Since the 1990s, Africa’s Great Lakes Region has become a theatre for some of the bloodiest conflicts on the continent. The particular trait of these conflicts is their interconnectedness. The civil war that erupted in 1993 in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda spilled over into the DRC and were closely linked to the 1996 and 1998 wars that devastated the Congolese people. An estimated four million lives were lost. </p>
<p>Political decisions in one country in the region inevitably affect other countries. For instance, discrimination against the Banyamulenge and the contestation of their Congolese identity seem to drive Rwanda’s support for M23. The Congolese refute this claim and accuse Kigali of having ambitions to annex the eastern part of the DRC (the so called <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2012.761603">balkanisation of the Kivus</a>). The result is severed diplomatic ties between Rwanda and the DRC. </p>
<p>Burundi’s interest is in demonstrating that it can be a reliable political ally for the DRC. Developing such political ties offer advantages linked to having an upper hand over the security situation and benefit from arising business opportunities.</p>
<h2>Colonial heritage</h2>
<p>Burundi and the DRC are the only countries within the EAC where French is used as a key official language and dominates political, trade and diplomatic exchange. The two still share a lot from the colonial era when they were both under Belgian colonial authority. These factors play a role in developing bilateral agreements and in building trust between the two countries.</p>
<p>In sum, Burundi has deployed troops to the DRC to protect its national interests and to implement bilateral agreements and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark">Luanda road map</a> for peace (named after the talks between the DRC and Rwanda in the Angolan capital Luanda that unlocked a truce with the M23). The Angolan, agreement signed 23 November 2022, provided for the withdrawal of the M23 rebels from all the occupied areas of eastern DRC by 15 January 2023.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Hajayandi works for the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. He receives funding from the Robert Bosch Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cori Wielenga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Insecurity, especially in the DRC’s South Kivu, is considered a serious threat by Burundi’s army.Patrick Hajayandi, Research Affiliate, University of PretoriaCori Wielenga, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Sciences and Director of the Centre for Mediation in Africa, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959372022-12-09T07:31:24Z2022-12-09T07:31:24ZEast African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499498/original/file-20221207-26-fw7v41.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan troops fly the flags of the East African Community and Kenya in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East African Community decided to deploy troops in one of its member states for the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">first time</a> in June 2022. The deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will test the regional body’s ability to respond to complex conflicts. </p>
<p>Already, the regional bloc has scored some early victories. Most significantly, on 6 December, following peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, 53 of the over 100 armed groups operating in the DRC <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">agreed to a ceasefire</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC – which joined the East African Community in April 2022 – has been trapped in <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">cycles of violence</a> for nearly three decades. The reasons include ethnic intolerance, illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos. </p>
<p>The most recent wave of conflict follows the reemergence of the armed group <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. International forces drove the group out of the country in 2013. Its resurgence this past year has led to heightened levels of violence and mass displacement. </p>
<p>This has prompted the East African Community to mobilise a <a href="https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf">regional force</a> that could comprise up to 12,000 troops from member states. It will operate under <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/military-deployments-in-east-dr-congo-4009492">Kenyan command</a>, with a six-month renewable mandate to support the DRC’s national forces in containing, defeating and eradicating negative forces in the restive eastern region. </p>
<p>This is the second time regional actors have deployed a military force to tamp down an M23 insurgency. Following the armed group’s initial uprising in 2013, the 12-member <a href="https://icglr.org/">International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</a> proposed an intervention brigade. It was eventually brought under the <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background">umbrella</a> of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. It became known as the Force Intervention Brigade.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">June decision</a> to deploy an east African force may feel like déjà vu. While some factors are different now, not all developments are promising.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">research </a> has focused on armed conflict settings, with an in-depth analysis of the DRC. In my view, while the current Congo crisis is unlikely to be resolved without military force, any hope for success requires that operations remain closely tied to a political process.</p>
<h2>What’s changed?</h2>
<p>One difference between the East African Community’s intervention now and the 2013 Force Intervention Brigade mission is the merging of political and military processes.</p>
<p>The East African Community will retain authority over the regional force, while also leading the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2695-the-third-inter-congolese-dialogue-under-the-eac-led-nairobi-process">ongoing political dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">downfalls</a> of previous military responses in the Congo is that they haven’t been adequately linked to a political process. When the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, it was intended to be the “teeth” of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013">regional political agreement</a>. However, these military and political interventions were never fully integrated. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the east African region’s effort to integrate the two processes will succeed. Decades of violence indicate just how intractable the conflict is. For instance, so far there has been no indication that Rwanda will cease (or even acknowledge) <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">its support of the M23</a>. The international community hasn’t done much to call for accountability on this front. </p>
<p>Further, the DRC has refused to enter into dialogue with the M23, which it considers a terrorist organisation, for fear that this will embolden other armed groups. </p>
<h2>Crowded theatre</h2>
<p>Deploying a force overseen by the East African Community presents the challenge of communication and coordination with other actors in the region. The confusion this can create was seen in the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/12/ugandan-congolese-troops-joint-operations-monusco/">2021 deployment</a> of Ugandan forces to the DRC to combat the armed group, the Allied Democratic Forces. This confusion largely had to do with the extent of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate to support operations involving foreign forces. </p>
<p>While the mission has indicated its intention to partner with the east African regional force, the practicalities for doing so remain unclear. </p>
<p>There is also a concern that the east African force could elevate the risk of human rights violations. <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/the-sum-of-all-parts/">Past reports</a> have documented the potential harm to civilian protection that can arise from crowded theatres. Actors may interpret their civilian protection obligations in different ways. And it may not be clear who is accountable for violations. </p>
<p>As opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission, the east African force doesn’t have a protection mandate. It is unclear to what extent it will prioritise civilian harm mitigation in its planning and operations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Protests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission's crisis of legitimacy</a>
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<p>Violations against civilians could undermine the east African force’s legitimacy, which is already likely to be weak given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-exploitation-by-un-peacekeepers-in-drc-fatherless-children-speak-for-first-time-about-the-pain-of-being-abandoned-188248">history of abuses</a> committed by foreign forces in the Congo. Already, Kinshasa has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-agrees-to-eac-force-deployment-no-rwandan-army-3852276">refused</a> to allow Rwanda to deploy troops as part of the regional force. Other contributing countries have a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">history of supporting</a> armed groups in the region. And the political economy of war in the Congo has been of benefit to a number of its neighbours. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211260015.html">noted</a> by Daniel Levine-Spound, a researcher with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (<a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/">CIVIC</a>) based in the Congo:</p>
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<p>Because many of the countries involved in the force have recently undertaken military operations on Congolese soil, there is a significant amount of mistrust and uncertainty among civilians that the force will need to overcome.</p>
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<p>This will require adequate engagement with civil society organisations and prioritising civilian safety in military operations. </p>
<h2>The task ahead</h2>
<p>The M23 of today is not the same M23 of 10 years ago. It has more <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">sophisticated weaponry and tactics</a>, and a more centralised command and control. </p>
<p>Additionally, it’s operating more strategically than in 2013. The boldness of the group’s 2013 march directly on Goma – the capital of North Kivu in eastern DRC – elicited a swift response from the region and the international community. This ultimately led to the group being routed into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. </p>
<p>While M23 is currently operating within the vicinity of Goma, it has avoided taking the city. It has instead focused on taking over larger areas of surrounding territory and could gain control over both roads into Goma. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Whether the east African regional force is up to the task remains unclear. </p>
<p>Its member states’ proximity to the conflict may lead to more sustained political will to tamp down the violence and find a political resolution. Yet, the countries’ individual interests in the conflict mean that not all players will have the DRC’s best interest at heart. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">Previous experience</a> casts doubt on the effectiveness of bringing in foreign military forces to resolve unrest in the Congo. These interventions have in some cases increased violence against civilians, led to the exploitation of natural resources and undermined Congolese authority over its own territory. </p>
<p>A successful intervention will require that neighbouring countries remain accountable to support the security and sovereignty of the Congo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.</span></em></p>There are advantages to a regional force overseen by the East African Community – particularly as the bloc is leading new political talks.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1878612022-07-28T14:02:57Z2022-07-28T14:02:57ZThe UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476473/original/file-20220728-25-l9hirx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Congolese in Goma protest against the UN peacekeeping mission on 26 July 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michel Lunanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Demonstrators in the volatile eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have called for the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/26/un-peacekeepers-troops-shoot-two-protesters-dead-in-goma-drc">Recent protests</a> in Butembo-Beni, Goma, Bukavu and Uvira turned into deadly attacks against the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). </p>
<p>By 26 July 2022, at least 15 people had died, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/cp_la_monusco_annonce_la_mort_dun_casque_bleu_et_de_deux_membres_de_la_police_des_nations_unies_26_juillet_2022.pdf">including UN peacekeepers</a>, as demonstrators stormed and burnt the mission’s bases in Goma, Butembo and Uvira. They accused the 22-year-old mission of failing to stop decades of fighting in the country.</p>
<p>The UN mission, however, has long been blamed for what should be the DRC government’s responsibility: de-escalating violence in the country’s eastern region and finding long-term solutions to peace.</p>
<p>Across the entire eastern region, from Ituri to South Kivu, and for roughly three decades now, local populations have suffered daily due to the violence meted out either by armed groups or Congolese security services. </p>
<p>The situation remains volatile despite the presence of the world’s largest UN mission, which was first established and deployed in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/">1999</a>. Its mandate was expanded in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">2010</a> to include the protection of civilians. As of November 2021, it had more than 16,000 uniformed personnel in the DRC.</p>
<p>Violent reactions against the UN mission are an expression of the local population’s frustrations about the past and the present, but also the uncertainty of their future.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://pure.eur.nl/en/persons/delphin-ntanyoma/?relations=publications">my research</a>, undertaken since 2017 to understand the motivations of individuals, groups and communities in violent conflicts, particularly in eastern DRC, I would argue that the UN mission shouldn’t be held responsible for what the Congolese state should be doing. </p>
<p>In the 22 years since the current UN mission was deployed, the Congolese state, and the country’s elite, bear huge responsibility for failing to form and build an army able to preserve harmony and protect the population. </p>
<h2>The triggers</h2>
<p>The latest attack on the UN mission followed a political meeting held on 15 July 2022 in Goma, the capital city of North Kivu in eastern DRC. While on parliamentary recess, Bahati Lukwebo, the president of the senate, stopped to speak to his supporters in Goma. North Kivu is currently facing diverse forms of armed insurgencies, including from the M23. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnmkWS5i7rw">In his speech</a>, Lukwebo asked the youth to consider joining the Congolese national army, the Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). He also blamed the UN mission for failing to stabilise the country. </p>
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<p><em>Pendant 22 ans, ils n’ont pas ramené la paix dans notre pays</em> (For 22 years, they did not bring peace to our country).</p>
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<p>The crowd responded in Swahili, a national language: “<em>Baenda, baende</em> (Let them go, let them go).”</p>
<p>Lukwebo, a long-time politician, asked the crowd to raise their hands if they wanted the UN mission to leave. The hands shot up. He then said the UN peacekeepers should pack their bags, and allow the Congolese to take care of their own peace, security and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>In the country’s fragile socio-security context, these remarks were dangerous. The UN mission has <a href="https://issblog.nl/2020/02/24/whose-responsibility-is-it-anyway-questioning-the-role-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-monusco-in-stabilizing-the-eastern-drc-by-delphin-ntanyoma/">long been accused</a> of failing to protect civilians from rebel groups in the country. </p>
<p>These remarks followed a June 2022 briefing from a top official for the UN mission in the DRC, Bintou Keita. She <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/un-well-armed-m23-rebels-resurgent-in-drc/6638775.html">warned</a> the Security Council that the mission in the DRC “may find itself confronted by a threat that goes beyond its current capabilities” in tackling the resurgence of a highly organised M23. </p>
<p>To <a href="https://twitter.com/luchaRDC/status/1551983126930460674">some Congolese</a>, this sounded like the UN mission would no longer play a role in supporting the national army or protecting civilians. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, Lukwebo’s address fanned the flame of protest. Political manipulation may aim to shift the blame for the DRC’s insecurity from the national army to the UN mission. However, for communities in eastern DRC, their continued exposure to violence is evidence of an unfulfilled promise to keep them safe.</p>
<h2>The blame game</h2>
<p>A few months back, the widely unstable North Kivu province experienced a resurgence of the M23 rebel group. Rwanda has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-m23-problem-kigali-s-headache-and-some-hard-truths-3876884">accused</a> of backing the M23 – Kigali has vehemently denied these allegations. </p>
<p>The rebel group was initially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-rebels-idUSBRE9A30PE20131105">defeated in 2013</a>. But beyond M23, eastern DRC has hundreds of local and foreign armed militia groups. From Ituri to South Kivu provinces, communities witness violence daily. </p>
<p>These armed groups include the jihadist-linked <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests.pdf">Allied Democratic Forces</a> operating in Beni (North Kivu) and Ituri. In Ituri specifically, a militia group known as Coopérative de Développement du Congo has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethnic-militia-kills-18-in-eastern-dr-congo-3742996">attacking Congolese civilians</a> over their ethnic affiliation. The UN has said these attacks could be characterised as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/01/drc-inter-ethnic-violence-ituri-may-constitute-crimes-against-humanity-un?LangID=E&NewsID=25459">crimes against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>Similar attacks that target individuals due to their ethnic affiliation are committed in South Kivu on the basis that these victims are “not real Congolese”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-is-endemic-in-eastern-congo-what-drives-it-156039">Violence is endemic in eastern Congo: what drives it</a>
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<p>As insecurity heightens, local communities keep forming defence groups. However, many of these groups eventually turn on those they are supposed to protect. Whether or not these armed groups and rebellions have legitimate claims to exist, their failure to uphold their grievances and their attacks on civilians overshadow why they were formed.</p>
<p>The UN mission has faced <a href="https://issblog.nl/2020/02/24/whose-responsibility-is-it-anyway-questioning-the-role-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-monusco-in-stabilizing-the-eastern-drc-by-delphin-ntanyoma/">various challenges</a> in executing its mandate. This includes its being unfamiliar with local contexts, as well as having to operate in a region that’s mostly inaccessible. In Beni, it has expressed concerns over the national army launching military operations without sufficiently engaging peacekeepers. </p>
<p>These – and other internal and external challenges – call for a redefinition of the mission’s mandate in relation to local contexts. If this doesn’t happen, the UN risks spending another decade trying, but failing to contribute to long-lasting peace in eastern DRC.</p>
<h2>Congo government’s failures</h2>
<p>The Congolese elite have formed a network of predators who have preyed on their constituencies since independence in 1960. The country is among the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">poorest in the world</a> despite its rich mineral and natural resources. The majority of Congolese live in extreme poverty, while the elite are extremely rich. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>On top of this, the national army comprises military officers and generals whose prime concern is to serve their own interests. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-drcs-army-and-police-arent-yet-ready-to-protect-citizens-114326">Embezzlement and corruption</a> have ruined the military to the extent that rank and file soldiers are poorly equipped and sometimes go unpaid, while generals build financial empires. </p>
<p>The UN mission has come to be seen as part and parcel of this situation. Local communities have lost trust in the intervention of government and international security forces, and their capacity to bring change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UN mission is being held responsible for something the Congolese state should be doing.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/992202018-07-03T15:20:59Z2018-07-03T15:20:59ZDRC faces upsurge of violence unless a deal is done with Kabila<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225890/original/file-20180703-116152-zmz6ac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Kabila’s time in government has shown an inability to bring together the various ethnic groups. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Kappeler</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">fresh wave of civil unrest</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the international community must question its confidence in President Joseph Kabila to achieve stability in a turbulent region. He has been at the helm since he took over as president in 2001 after his father, Laurent, was assassinated. The young Kabila ruled for a transitional period until 2006, before winning two elections. </p>
<p>He is now in his seventh year of what should have been just five years of his second term and is constitutionally barred from standing again. But he has remained in office after his mandate ended in late 2016. This, as the country awaits a long-delayed election. The delay has sparked deadly protests. </p>
<p>While Kabila cannot legally stand for a third term, the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/06/05/drc-opposition-enraged-as-pro-kabila-campaign-clip-appears-on-social-media//">opposition is concerned that he might</a>. Fears among opposition and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-20/court-shakeup-fuels-fears-that-congo-s-leader-plans-another-term">church leaders</a> have been further fuelled by Kabila’s appointment of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-20/court-shakeup-fuels-fears-that-congo-s-leader-plans-another-term">three new judges</a> to the constitutional court. Two are well-known allies. </p>
<p>But Kabila has no legitimacy and his authority is disintegrating. If the elections are delayed again there’s a real possibility that central Africa will slide into violent conflict once again. The armed violence is likely to be bloodier than in the past due to the number of fragmented localised groups aiming to grab their slice in one of the world’s most resource-rich countries.</p>
<p>If the international community wants to avoid another major armed conflict on the African content – in addition to the outstanding conflicts in Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan – urgent action is needed to negotiate with Kabila for his own peaceful exit before the country slides back into full-scale armed conflict. </p>
<h2>Deteriorating situation</h2>
<p>In the wake of Kabila’s refusal to cede power, the security situation has deteriorated. At least 10 of Congo’s 26 provinces are in the grip of armed <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/15/congos-war-was-bloody.-it-may-be-about-to-start-again">conflict</a>. This has forced over two million people to flee their homes, 800,000 of them children. The total number of internally displaced people is <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/unicef-drc-humanitarian-situation-report-april-2018">estimated to be 4.5 million</a> while refugees are flocking into Uganda, Tanzania, Angola and Zambia. </p>
<p>The security situation in the DRC is dire. As the violence in Kasai and eastern parts of the <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/07/31/briefing-conflict-kasai-drc">country intensifies</a>, escalating conflict in south eastern Congo looks set to continue. </p>
<p>More than <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-Eastern-Congo1.pdf">70 rebel groups</a> are estimated to be <a href="http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory">operating</a> in the country. They are all variously involved in skirmishes with the army or, more commonly, prey on civilians. This in turn creates a tangle of ethnic and tribal grievances for warlords to exploit.</p>
<p>In 2012, the M23 rebel <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739">movement</a> briefly took the city of Goma. They were eventually thrown out by the Congolese army, supported by the UN. But the current violence in Kasai is threatening to overshadow even that disaster. In August 2017, for example, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/drc-opposition-mounts-dead-city-protest-against-kabila-20170808">“dead city” movements</a> ensured that significant parts of the country’s urban population went on strike.</p>
<p>Some reports have suggested that more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/keeping-watch-kasai-congo">3,000 people</a> have been killed since the start of 2017. More than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/over-33000-refugees-fled-violence-dr-congo-angola-people-need-helps-water-sanitation">33,000</a> Kasai residents have fled <a href="http://www.msf.org/en/article/angola-people-camp-had-one-goal-stay-alive">into Angola</a>. It has been suggested that the <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/kamwina-nsapu-rebels-drc-un-investigators-589469">Bana Mura</a> - a government sponsored militia - was behind the violence. </p>
<p>Last year major fighting <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/10/59eefe3e4/unhcr-warns-worsening-displacement-democratic-republic-congo.html">occurred</a> between Twa and Bantu populations in Tanganyika province. And as the year entered its last quarter, Uvira, on the outskirts of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence/congo-naval-boats-battle-rebels-on-lake-tanganyika-idUSKCN1C31DJ">Lake Tanganyika</a>, was the site for fighting between the rebel Yakutumba militia and government forces. Government forces fled and the rebels would have taken the city had they not been <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/15/congos-war-was-bloody.-it-may-be-about-to-start-again">repulsed by Pakistani peacekeepers</a>.</p>
<p>Despite a failure by the Yakutumba militia to take Uvira, it was a reminder of the level of dissatisfaction rising in the east, since the end of the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/dr-congo-5-questions-understand-africas-world-war-1524722">Second Congo War</a> in 2003. The rise of rebels operating in the east means violence could potentially spread to Kivu and beyond.</p>
<h2>Uncertain times ahead</h2>
<p>In 2017, presidential and legislative elections were delayed despite the Catholic Church <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">reaching a deal</a> with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">Kabila</a>. The political crisis was further complicated by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/africa/etienne-tshisekedi-dead-congo-opposition.html">death</a> of long-standing opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi later in the year.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-primeminister-exclusive/congo-election-remains-on-track-for-december-says-prime-minister-idUSKCN1GK1F9">election</a> planned for December this year is unlikely to bring together the various groups or solve the outbreak of violence in the country. The most likely candidate with the perceived ability to bring together the different groups is Moïse Katumbi. He has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/congo-opposition-forms-coalition-before-presidential-elections">succeeded</a> in rallying together opposition parties into a coalition backing his candidacy – an impressive feat in a country as fragmented as the Congo. </p>
<p>He also has by far the best broad plan to reconcile the country, which is what the country needs if the fragile peace is going to hold. But the country’s attorney general announced recently that Katumbi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/04/drc-opposition-leader-may-be-barred-from-elections-over-italian-citizenship">may not be eligible to stand</a> in presidential elections because he held Italian citizenship from October 2000 until January 2017. </p>
<p>Under Congo’s constitution, its nationals cannot hold <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-congo-politics/congo-opposition-leader-held-italian-citizenship-for-16-years-town-says-idUKKCN1HB18B">dual citizenship</a> and have to petition the government to regain their citizenship if they take up a foreign nationality. But the provision, however, is loosely enforced and many prominent politicians are believed to have second citizenships.</p>
<p>Kabila’s time in government has shown an inability to bring together the various ethnic groups and to control the growth of dissatisfied rebel groups. This is despite the fact that the DRC has the world’s largest UN peacekeeping force, numbering <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">18,000 blue helmets</a>, who try to enforce a measure of calm in the east of the country. </p>
<p>Botswana’s President Mokgweetsi Masisi has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL6WXCr9DAU">said</a> that he hopes to see a commitment from Kabila to <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2018-41aa/april-6332/peace-and-stability-in-africa-botswanas-perspective-da7f">leave office at year’s end</a>. More African leaders need to acknowledge the gravity of the crisis and apply pressure on Kabila through existing African Union mechanisms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew E. Yaw Tchie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African leaders need to acknowledge the gravity of the Congo crisis and apply pressure on Kabila.Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Conflict and Policy Advisor on Syria, Senior Visiting Research Follow Kings College London Centre for Conflict and Health, Visiting Researcher at PRIO, and PhD Candidate at University of Essex., University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.