tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/morgan-tsvangirai-26551/articlesMorgan Tsvangirai – The Conversation2023-08-22T13:19:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2028582023-04-20T15:06:01Z2023-04-20T15:06:01ZZimbabwe’s ruling party vilifies the opposition as American puppets. But the party itself had strong ties to the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521045/original/file-20230414-16-97marz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa addressing a rally in Bulawayo recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), which has governed Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, is well known for denouncing the United States’ role as a superpower that polices the world. </p>
<p>In a 2007 address at the United Nations, then Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-zimbabwe-mugabe/mugabe-slams-bush-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-idUSN2627903020070926">assailed</a> his American counterpart, George W. Bush. Mugabe charged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Confrontation with the US, a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s political history since <a href="https://roape.net/2020/01/17/one-who-preferred-death-to-imperialism/">the 1960s</a>, surged after Washington adopted a bipartisan <a href="https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/11/2019/post-mugabe-zimbabwe-retreats-western-outreach-embraces-africa">sanctions package</a> in 2001. The European Union also imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>US officials have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1158">repeatedly stated</a> that the sanctions target specific individuals or entities that have abused human rights or undermined democracy. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200924-zimbabwe-leader-tells-un-that-sanctions-hurt-development">Zanu-PF has responded</a> by pointing to UN reporting which notes that the sanctions have weakened the country’s economy and impeded national development.</p>
<p>I am a historian of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pan-Africanism-Versus-Partnership-Decolonisation-Rhodesian-ebook/dp/B0BSKNHMYH/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1681393772&refinements=p_n_publication_date%3A1250228011&s=books&sr=1-2">forthcoming book</a> focuses on its formative stages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was when Mugabe first became active in politics and the US got more involved in the politics of what was then Rhodesia, a British colony. In my view, the 21st century hostility obscures a nuanced historical relationship between the US and Zanu-PF.</p>
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<p>At first, the fledgling liberation movement valued American support. Zanu-PF <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=18593742X">broke away</a> from the Soviet-aligned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in August 1963. Zanu-PF was originally known as Zanu, but adopted the “PF” suffix <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zanu-pf-wins-first-free-elections-zimbabwe">ahead of elections in 1980</a>.</p>
<p>This context is relevant now because Zanu-PF efforts to consolidate both domestic and pan-African support selectively overlook more compatible aspects of its historical relations with the US.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s anti-American bluster</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF has exploited sanctions to its advantage.</p>
<p>Emmerson Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s deputy, <a href="https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-mobilizes-anti-sanctions-day-25-october/">came to power</a> in a factional coup in late 2017. He has successfully mobilised pan-African support against sanctions.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union have observed 25 October as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/26/zimbabwe-regime-sanctions-zanupf">“Anti-Sanctions Day”</a> in solidarity with the Zanu-PF leadership.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/25/thousands-in-zimbabwe-denounce-evil-western-sanctions">anti-American rhetoric</a> is not only deployed to win friends abroad. It is also a prominent campaign tactic at home. </p>
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<p>With general elections expected <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2023.php">in July</a> or August, Zanu-PF is following the strategy again. It’s discrediting its leading opponent, Nelson Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change, as a <a href="https://twitter.com/TafadzwaMugwadi/status/1631150059122221056">“US pawn”</a>. </p>
<p>His predecessor, Morgan Tsvangirai, faced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election/mugabe-belittles-opponents-as-frog-and-puppet-idUSL2321227420080223">similar treatment</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man points ahead with his right index finger in front of banners bearing the acronym 'CCC'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Zimbabwe’s partisan state media routinely employ such terms as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/us-president-exposes-puppets-in-zim/">“puppets”, “pawns” and “lackeys”</a> to describe Chamisa and his party. These jibes are intended to convince Zimbabwean voters that Chamisa would prioritise foreign interests.</p>
<p>The rhetoric conceals ZANU-PF’s own American ties.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s American connections</h2>
<p>Historically, relations between the US and Zanu-PF have fluctuated. Mugabe formed a <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-walk-down-memory-lane-with-andrew-young/">close bond</a> with Andrew Young, the US ambassador to the UN during <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carters-african-legacy-peacemaker-negotiator-and-defender-of-rights-200744">Jimmy Carter’s presidency</a>. Carter’s government was the <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/encyclopedia/u-s-embassy-harare-zimbabwe/">first to open an embassy</a> in independent Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Solid relations continued during the early years of the Reagan administration. Harare was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/20/us-slashes-aid-to-zimbabwe-by-almost-half/e67886cf-9f52-4fde-beee-83ba1b40c3e0/">top three African recipients</a> of US aid in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>US vice-president <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/18/Vice-President-George-Bush-arrived-today-for-talks-with/7630406443600/">George H.W. Bush travelled to Harare</a> in 1982. In 1997, first lady Hillary Clinton made a <a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/03/1997-03-11-first-lady-travels-in-africa-later-this-month.html">goodwill visit</a> to Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Ties were even deeper in the early 1960s when the US government encouraged the party’s very establishment. Historian <a href="https://www.kent.edu/history/profile/timothy-scarnecchia">Timothy Scarnecchia</a>, who has mined records in the US national archives, has <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781580463638/the-urban-roots-of-democracy-and-political-violence-in-zimbabwe/">documented the ties</a> that Zanu forged with American officials 60 years ago. </p>
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<p>The organisation’s core leadership in temporary exile in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), regularly consulted with US embassy officials in that country. Its leading representatives, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137543462_5">including Mugabe</a>, lobbied the US government for funding. (There is no evidence that the new party received any directly.) </p>
<p>Zanu’s first president, <a href="https://www.sithole.org/biography.php">Ndabaningi Sithole</a>, received theological education in the US in the late 1950s. Archival records show that on the eve of Zanu’s formation he met with State Department officials in Washington DC who connected him to private American funders. In another archived account of a meeting with the US ambassador in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in July 1963, Leopold Takawira, subsequently Zanu’s first vice-president, relayed that Sithole regarded the US as his second home.</p>
<p>Herbert Chitepo, who became Zanu’s national chair, visited the US in July 1963 and also met with American diplomats. According to a record of their conversation in the US national archives, Chitepo expressed his desire to accept US funding and defied</p>
<blockquote>
<p>anyone to call him an American stooge.</p>
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<p>The 11 July 1963 issue of Zimbabwe Today, a periodical produced by Zapu in Tanzania, declared that following Sithole’s return from the US,</p>
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<p>the American dollar and its ugly imperialist head is clearly visible in the actions of Mr. Sithole. </p>
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<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on Chamisa and his party’s supposed American connections is a repackaging of the very attacks Mnangagwa’s party faced from Zapu when it was formed 60 years ago. </p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Although it has not been well documented, the US provided critical support during Zanu’s founding in 1963. It also helped the party consolidate its authority following independence in 1980. Since the US government imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2001, these ties have been overshadowed. </p>
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<p>As elections approach in Zimbabwe, the role of the US looms large. Zanu-PF overlooks historical aspects of its own relations with the US as it seeks to undermine its domestic opposition and appeal to continental allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s anti-American rhetoric is not only deployed to win friends abroad. As elections approach, it is also a prominent campaign tactic at home.Brooks Marmon, Post-doctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796832022-03-23T11:21:13Z2022-03-23T11:21:13ZZimbabwe by-elections are attracting huge crowds, but don’t read too much into them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453646/original/file-20220322-302-js9i5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's opposition Citizens Coalition for Change supporters attend an election campaign rally in Harare, in February. Zimbabwe, 20 February.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are set to cast their votes in key parliamentary and local government by-elections on 26 March 2022. The by-elections have the potential to set the tone for next year’s national elections. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s national assembly has <a href="https://parlzim.gov.zw/members/">270 parliamentarians</a> of which 210 are elected. The 60 additional parliamentarians are brought into the house through a quota system reserved for women. </p>
<p>The 28 parliamentary and 105 local government council seats that are up for grabs in these by-elections were left vacant due to recalls and deaths of representatives. The empty seats constitute 13.3% of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2773/">210 elective parliamentary seats</a>. The council positions represent <a href="https://genderlinks.org.za/news/zimbabwe-local-govt-quota-takes-shape-ahead-of-2023-elections/">5.4% of the 1,958 local government seats</a>. </p>
<p>Parliament is currently overly dominated by members of the governing Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The election of new parliamentarians will bring new voices. </p>
<p>The polls were initially due to take place in December 2020 but were <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-suspends-by-elections-indefinitely/">postponed</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The by-elections have attracted huge national and regional focus. They will give communities that have gone without representation for almost two years a chance to choose their candidates. They also provide an opportunity for the youthful and charismatic Nelson Chamisa to showcase the party he recently rebranded after breaking away from the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-lack-of-a-succession-plan-has-left-morgan-tsvangirais-party-in-disarray-91714">bitter leadership struggle</a> after the death of its founder Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">raised the political stakes</a> by leaving the original party and rebranding his political grouping to the “Citizens Coalition for Change” at the end of January 2022.</p>
<h2>Hopes for the opposition</h2>
<p>Twenty of the 28 parliamentary seats being contested – 71.4% – <a href="https://zimfact.org/factsheet-who-previously-held-seats-to-be-filled-on-march-26/">became vacant</a> after the controversial recall of the representatives by a faction of the Movement for Democratic Change party led by Douglas Mwonzora between May and October 2020.</p>
<p>The significance of these by-elections is also evident from the way the two main parties, ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change, have invested huge human and financial resources in organising campaign rallies across the country. </p>
<p>Rallies have attracted huge crowds and ignited political excitement in the country. They have also fuelled speculation that the 2023 national elections, due in less than a year, will be a tight political contest between the two main parties. Some even say Citizens for Coalition for Change poses an <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/politics-and-society/bsr-what-happens-when-zanu-pf-faces-an-existential-threat/">existential threat to ZANU-PF</a>. </p>
<p>The by-elections <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-28-zimbabwes-new-political-party-citizens-coalition-for-change-sparks-fear-and-violence-from-zanu-pf/">have even been described</a> as a dress rehearsal for the 2023 elections which some think could be a watershed poll.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58270973">wide expectations</a> that Zimbabwe’s opposition will be able to build on its earlier successes and capitalise on the deteriorating political and economic conditions in the country to break ZANU-PF’s authoritarian control since 1980. </p>
<p>There are, nevertheless, some caveats.</p>
<h2>Need for circumspection</h2>
<p>It’s important not to exaggerate the impact of the poll.</p>
<p>First, it is unlikely that the huge public turnout at the rallies is going to translate into a huge voter turnout. That’s partly because by-elections in Zimbabwe have always had a low voter turnout. For example, the 2018 general election showed a very low turnout. In some areas, <a href="https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ZESN-Cowdray-Park-By-election-Report.pdf">not even a quarter of the registered voters</a> showed up.</p>
<p>Second, political violence <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">has spoiled Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 1980, and even more so <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections">since 2000</a>. This is likely to dissuade some voters from turning up.</p>
<p>Most recently, there have been clashes between ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change supporters in the mining town of Kwekwe on 27 February 2022. One <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">person was killed and ten injured</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, media and human rights watchdog reports have <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/rights-groups-bemoan-escalating-political-violence/">noted</a> that some supporters and leaders of Citizens Coalition for Change have been violently attacked by ZANU-PF and state security agencies. This has included including candidates for the by-elections.</p>
<p>The violence could deter voters on election day.</p>
<p>Third, evidence from recent surveys suggest that Zimbabweans have become more politically disengaged since the 2018 elections. An example is <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-zimbabwe-afrobarometer_round_8-21jul21.pdf">one done in June by the independent pan-African network Afrobarometer</a>. Instead, they’re turning their focus on economic survival in the deteriorating economy. </p>
<p>The International Republican Institute’s survey on public perceptions of local government <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/iri-zimbabwe-poll-in-bulawayo-and-mashonaland-east-shows-concerns-over-corruption-and-the-economy-approval-of-basic-services/">of October 2021</a> also shows an increase in citizen apathy towards political parties and community leaders. This is especially so for local government councillors and members of parliament, due to loss of trust in representative leadership. The growing trust deficit is strongly linked to increased corruption and irresponsible leadership among parliamentary and local officials. </p>
<p>Fourth, a growing number of Zimbabweans are losing confidence in elections as a mechanism for bringing leadership change at both national and local levels. This is mainly because of <a href="https://kubatana.net/2018/06/04/electoral-irregularities-point-2018-electoral-fraud/">strong allegations of electoral fraud</a> and the <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/coup-constitution-and-the-count-zimbabwes-disputed-elections/">growing list of disputed election results since 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The disillusionment is fuelling voter apathy. Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.</p>
<p>Fifth, attendance at political rallies cannot be taken as an indicator of likely voter turnout. Most people who attend rallies <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/27/politics/2016-election-crowd-size/index.html">don’t necessarily turn out to vote</a>. </p>
<p>Evidence from past elections indicates that crowd size is frequently not a good indicator of success on election day. Attendance of rallies is often motivated by <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/inside-shadowy-world-political-crowds-for-hire-3754652">different factors</a>. These include a range of incentives on offer, such as free music entertainment, alcohol, food, t-shirts and other items of clothing. All are absent on election day.</p>
<p>And most people who have been attending campaign rallies, especially in urban areas, are young. But a significant proportion of Zimbabwean youth – most of whom are unemployed and frustrated with the current political and economic status quo – are still not registered as voters. Analysis conducted by Pachedu (a group of data experts that has been analysing the Zimbabwe Voters Roll since 2018) showed that in 2018, 39% of Zimbabweans aged between 18 and 34 <a href="https://twitter.com/PacheduZW/status/1475526009017544709?t=_gzhe_EpIYvsKgWdIZm43A&s=08">were not registered and nearly 50% eligible young voters didn’t vote</a>. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission recently pointed out that <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/zec-revises-figure-on-registered-voters/">only 2,971 new voters</a> registered countrywide in 2021, and that <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2022/02/23/zec-registered-50000-new-voters-between-february-1-and-february-20/">just under 50 000</a> people registered during the Commission’s registration blitz conducted in January and February 2022.</p>
<p>For all these challenges, the upcoming poll cannot be dismissed. Coming a few months before the country goes for the 2023 national elections, the elections create an opportunity for electoral stakeholders, including political parties, the electoral management body, security sector agencies, civil society and citizens, to review opportunities and challenges ahead of the milestone elections. </p>
<p>The elections are coming at a time when the country, which has been experiencing political and economic crisis for the last two decades, is going through its <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2021/12/17/notable-risks-for-zim-economy-in-2022/">worst crisis since 2007-2008</a>, with unemployment and poverty soaring and political divisions worsening. </p>
<p>A peaceful and credible election is needed to restore political and economic normalcy in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Muzondidya is also an independent political and development analyst.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Munyaradzi Mushonga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.James Muzondidya, Part-time Lecturer, African History and Politics, University of ZimbabweMunyaradzi Mushonga, Senior Lecturer and Programme Director for Africa Studies in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129672019-03-11T14:18:25Z2019-03-11T14:18:25ZZimbabwe’s MDC faces a leadership contest. But can it be peaceful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262465/original/file-20190306-100793-m9f32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of MDC's Nelson Chamisa believe he could win Zimbabwe's 2023 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, has announced that it will hold its elective congress in May 2019. The announcement has stirred interest – inside and outside the party. This is because there could be an intriguing contest for the presidency of the party between the incumbent <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/nelson-chamisa/">Nelson Chamisa</a> and the secretary-general <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Douglas_Mwonzora">Douglas Mwonzora</a>. The two have a history of rivalry.</p>
<p>Mwonzora is Chamisa’s political nemesis. In 2014 Mwonzora unexpectedly won a contest for the position of secretary-general even though Chamisa, as organising secretary, was in a position to influence party structures in his favour and had been nominated by 11 out of 12 provinces. One theory is that the MDC’s former leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who died of cancer in <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">February 2018</a>, engineered Mwonzora’s victory by influencing the voting patterns of congress delegates. The reason given for this is that he wanted to curtail Chamisa’s political ambitions because of his perceived role in the MDC’s surprising poor showing in the 2013 national elections.</p>
<p>After his defeat, Chamisa was relegated to an ordinary party member, until Tsvangirai brought him back into the MDC’s executive. The speculation is that Tsvangirai did this because he sensed that Chamisa was still popular within the party’s structures, especially among younger members. </p>
<p>A Mwonzora victory is worrying for some of Chamisa’s most fervent supporters. This is because they believe Chamisa is the future of the party. He’s only 41 years old. Also, they believe he gave Zanu-Pf candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa a run for his money in the 2018 presidential elections. Chamisa’s camp believes he’s better placed to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2023 elections because of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-who-is-nelson-chamisa-16237399">widespread national appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Mwonzora too has his fair share of supporters. He’s also widely respected within the MDC because of his easy going temperament. </p>
<p>What this all adds up to is that a victory by either candidate could split the party for the umpteenth time. Even a contest carries risks because the MDC has a chequered history in which violence has been used regularly against opposing factions. If the two do contest the party presidency in May – and Mwonzora in the past few days has <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/i-will-be-tougher-for-zanu-pf-says-mwonzora/">hinted that he might</a> – their supporters’ tactics could heighten the danger of violence and intimidation. This could further divide or damage the party and set Zimbabwean democracy back after decades of authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>Troubled past</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s MDC had a “T” at the end – which stood for Tsvangirai himself. This was to distinguish his MDC from the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/MDC-Welshman_Ncube">Welshman Ncube MDC</a> which had cut ties with Tsvangirai. Ncube was the founding secretary-general of the MDC. </p>
<p>Just before he died Tsvangirai had agreed to bring back former “rebels” who had been founding members of the party. This included Welshman Ncube, Tendai Biti and Job Sikhala. For his part, Chamisa agreed to accommodate and rope in his former “comrades-in-arms” into his election campaign. </p>
<p>The coalition under their umbrella became known as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-chamisa-forced-to-register-mdc-alliance-as-a-political-party-amid-squabbles-20180616">the MDC-Alliance party</a> just before Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The reason for the name change was that former MDC member Thokozani Khupe was arguing in the courts that her formation was the bona fide MDC-T. </p>
<p>A succession puzzle was created in the MDC-Alliance when Tsvangirai, as president and before his death, appointed Chamisa as head of policy and research and then as one of three deputy presidents of the party. This muddying of the waters appears to have been deliberate. It meant that Tsvangirai could easily play his deputies against each other if he felt threatened by any one of them. </p>
<p>But having three vice-presidents – Chamisa, Elias Mudzuri and Thokozani Khupe – didn’t do the party any favours. After Tsvangirai’s death a bloody battle for succession ensued, and led to another split in the party.</p>
<h2>The contest hots up</h2>
<p>The MDC’s May congress has inevitably sucked in the ruling Zanu-PF. The two have been at loggerheads since 1999 when the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8338.html">original MDC was formed</a>. A succession of bruising electoral contests, including the highly disputed 2008 elections which the MDC-T was <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">widely believed to have won</a>, galvanised the ruling Zanu-PF party into resolving to weaken, if not destroy, the MDC brand. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that Zanu-PF is being accused of having a role in the unfolding MDC-Alliance drama ahead of the impending congress. </p>
<p>Some top MDC-Alliance leaders in Chamisa’s camp have been claiming that the governing Zanu-PF has set aside between US$ 4 million to US$6 million to pay MDC delegates to vote for Mwonzora <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2019/03/03/zanu-pf-pouring-millions-to-influence-mdc-congress/">at the party congress</a>. Biti, who is currently the party’s vice-chairperson, has said he will reject any candidates sponsored by Zanu-PF.</p>
<h2>Best case scenario</h2>
<p>As party leader Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy. He should make sure that the lead up to the congress is violence- free and that party members who are in good standing can contest any post without being intimidated.</p>
<p>He needs to be wary of political sycophants within his party who want to turn him into a demigod, as was the case during Mugabe’s long reign as the leader of Zanu-PF. Chamisa has already shown that he has nothing to fear from a fair contest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy within Zimbabwe’s main opposition party.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101932019-01-21T13:42:02Z2019-01-21T13:42:02ZWhat needs to be done to stop Zimbabwe’s violent meltdown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254725/original/file-20190121-100285-374wg5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters block a major road leading into centre of Zimbabwe' capital Harare. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is sliding into a violent meltdown and it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/20/zimbabwe-warns-brutal-crackdown-foretaste-of-things-to-come">expected</a> to worsen, unless there are some serious interventions. </p>
<p>Days of mass <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46862194">protests</a> have been characterised by violence, looting and heavy-handedness by the police and army. It has led to the deaths and injury of many people, largely in Harare and Bulawayo’s high-density areas. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/latest-zimbabwe-groups-say-at-least-12-killed-in-unrest-20190119">According</a> to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, at least 12 people have been killed and thousands injured. </p>
<p>In addition to placing many urban areas under military siege, the government has also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46917259?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/crr7mlg0rpvt/zimbabwe&link_location=live-reporting-story">shut down</a> social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. These are viewed as the avenue through which the opposition and other civil society bodies have been communicating messages of “anarchy”. The internet has been shut down twice on separate occasions. </p>
<p>The deadly violence was triggered by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s announcement of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">steep fuel price hikes</a> on Saturday 9 January. Made in the dead of night, the announcement proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back for a largely peaceful, if not somewhat passive, populace that has borne the brunt of two decades of economic meltdown. Mnangagwa’s regime increased the prices of fuel by a staggering 150%, making Zimbabwe’s fuel the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46878267">most expensive</a> in the world. </p>
<p>The sharp fuel hike prompted the country’s largest trade union body, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, and other civil society bodies such as the Crisis Coalition, to call for a three day mass stay away from work.</p>
<p>The reaction was hardly surprising. Conditions have become fertile for a massive militant mass revolt. Shortages of a lot of goods have become the order of the day. Long fuel queues, and incessant electricity and water cuts have not helped the situation for poverty-weary Zimbabweans. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, and those he can rally behind him in the ruling Zanu-PF, need urgently to take steps towards forming a government of national unity, as has been done before in the country. This will require the opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance) to get its act together by behaving maturely. Another urgent step that’s needed is that the country’s chaotic currency situation needs immediate resolution.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bold-steps-mnangagwa-should-be-taking-instead-of-fiddling-with-the-petrol-price-109890">Bold steps Mnangagwa should be taking instead of fiddling with the petrol price</a>
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<h2>Currency crunch</h2>
<p>Prior to the deadly protests, Zimbabweans endured a tumultuous few months economically as the country’s cash crunch worsened. </p>
<p>Just before Professor Mthuli Ncube was appointed Minister of Finance in September 2018, he <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/09/20/u-turn-on-bond-notes-gets-thumbs-up">said</a> he wanted to phase out the country’s quasi-currency, the bond note, nicknamed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/business/2024640/zim-bollar-a-guide-to-zimbabwes-black-market/">“bollars”</a> by the market. The rationale behind scrapping the bond note was that it was promoting the black market, as individuals were using this quasi-currency to mop up scarce US dollars. </p>
<p>Ncube also argued that Zimbabwe needed to come up with its own proper currency, which could be recognised as legal tender. </p>
<p>The bond note was introduced in the second half of 2016 in a bid to ease the cash squeeze the country was facing as a consequence of using a multiple currency regime which was anchored by the US dollar. But a lack of investment in Zimbabwe, combined with few exports, meant that the US dollar was not readily available on the market. </p>
<p>The bond note was meant to fill the cash gap on the market. Instead, it spawned a flourishing black market last witnessed during Zimbabwe’s dark days of hyperinflation in 2008. Dealers, including top government officials, used the quasi-currency to mop up scarce US dollars on the market. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean government has consistently argued that the bond note is equivalent to the US dollar. But the market has suggested otherwise. Most retailers have a three-tier pricing system – US$, bond notes or Ecocash, the country’s PayPal like service that is making transactions possible. The reason for providing these options is the shortage of US dollars and the bond notes. Those that are available are largely in the hands of currency speculators. </p>
<p>The bond note’s death knell, which was sounded by Ncube, has sparked panic and led to a devaluation of the quasi-currency. This in turn led to retailers increasing their prices of goods and services for people using bond notes.</p>
<p>The knock-on effect is that doctors, teachers and other civil servants are demanding that they be paid in dollars – not bond notes.</p>
<p>Shortages of foreign currency has also led to companies like <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/01/11/delta-on-the-brink/">Delta</a>, the country’s largest brewer, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zimbabwe-delta/zimbabwes-delta-beverages-to-accept-cash-only-amid-currency-crunch-idUSL8N1Z23G7">failing</a> to import adequate raw materials for alcohol and soft drinks.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s largest cooking oil producer, Olivine, has also <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-01-14-panic-buying-and-a-stayaway-as-zimbabwe-fuel-price-bites/">closed shop</a>, citing a lack of foreign currency to import raw materials for their products. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>To stem the tide of the current crisis, before it totally overwhelms Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF, the president needs to immediately cease the brutal onslaught on civilians. In addition, Mnangagwa and his officials have to get off their high horse and facilitate talks that can lead to a government of national unity with the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance).</p>
<p>This has proved to be successful before. A government of national unity was formed in the wake of the violent elections in 2008 that plunged the country into chaos. The 2009-2013 <a href="https://jppgnet.com/journals/jppg/Vol_2_No_2_June_2014/9.pdf">government of national unity</a> helped to stabilise the Zimbabwean economy and brought the country back from the brink. </p>
<p>The MDC-Alliance also has to stop fomenting acts of violence that have become the party’s hallmark since its leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-morgan-tsvangirai-dies-of-cancer-1.4535490">death</a> in February 2018. </p>
<p>Lastly, Zimbabwe needs to introduce its own currency so the cancerous black market that’s been wreaking havoc on the economy can be eliminated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110193/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>To stem the tide of the current crisis before it totally overwhelms President Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF, he needs to immediately cease the brutal onslaught on civilians.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006792018-07-27T16:17:05Z2018-07-27T16:17:05ZZimbabwe poll explained: ballot papers galore, and loads of new politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229580/original/file-20180727-106517-sf0fv6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters at a campaign rally addressed by the party leader Nelson Chamisa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Zimbabeans go to the polls they will be voting in what’s been dubbed <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-harmonised-elections-too-close-to-call-15411721">“harmonised” elections</a>.</p>
<p>When I see the word “harmony” used in the context of Zimbabwean politics, I shudder a bit. Instead of turning my gaze to the complicated combination of votes to be cast in this election, the term takes my mind back to the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (Zanu) guerrilla camps based in Mozambique in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273537?src=recsys">mid-1977</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu had been through some tough years. In early 1975, the Lusaka-based national chairman Herbert Chitepo and his Volkswagen Beetle were <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=21858">blown to bits</a> – just after a rebellion had been quelled. Robert Mugabe used the word “harmony” chillingly at the historic Chimoio central committee meeting as he took a large and nearly final step towards consolidating his rule over the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/rMgI4U3XnXMEkDA33t4X/full">fractious party and its army</a>.</p>
<p>Mugabe was referring to the 1974 rebellion and another perceived one in 1976 when he uttered these chilling words, to be printed and published in Zimbabwe News, Zanu’s globally circulated magazine. He <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">warned</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony that binds us all.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, we can forget these menacing words now, when those striving to change the country’s leadership can do so via the ballot box (as long as the slips deposited in it are counted correctly) and a vigorously debated campaign (given no intimidation and open violence). </p>
<p>But the process is complicated. Voters much chose the next president from 23 candidates. They must also choose MPS from over 1 600 candidates for 210 parliamentary seats. Then they will have to chose from thousands more contenders for municipal councillors’ <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_mayor_ele_zim_legisl_131029.pdf">posts</a>. There are also 60 senators – each of the 10 provinces have six each, half of whom are women. But the voters don’t have to choose them: they are on party lists and will fit in according to proportional representation. </p>
<p>All make for a huge number of ballot papers, and a large contingent of new politicians. </p>
<h2>What is a ‘harmonised’ election?</h2>
<p>From 1980 to 2008 Zimbabwean voters experienced a plethora of electoral forms, but not a lot of real choice. There was a prime minister and his ceremonial president surrounded by MPs. Until 1987, 20 of the parliament’s 100 seats were reserved for whites.</p>
<p>After 1987 things became close to one-partyism. Robert Mugabe assumed far-reaching powers and soon had no limits to his terms. This was after the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacre</a> of thousands of Matabeleland-and Midland-based Zimbabweans in which current President Emmerson Mnangagwa played a key <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">role</a>. It also followed Joshua Nkomo’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/content/chapter-two-brief-history-context-zapu-guerrillas">Zapu-PF</a>, the long-time opposition party overwhelmed by Zanu’s violence, being swallowed into Zanu. </p>
<p>By 1990 the presidential race took place every six years and parliament’s twice per decade, including a Senate reinstated after 2005.</p>
<p>The system changed again in 2008 – a game changer year in many respects. Since then, Zimbabwe’s voters have made many electoral choices with one visit to the polling station every five years. They have deposited their choices for presidents, the 210 MPs as well as local councillors in their separate boxes. </p>
<p>The presidential choices in the first round of the 2008 election resulted in less than the 50%+1 majority needed for either Mugabe (at about 43%) or Morgan Tsvangirai (at around 48%) to claim victory. Thus a run-off was <a href="http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin80.pdf">required</a>. </p>
<p>The vengeance wreaked by Mugabe’s henchmen was so bad – at least 170 MDC, and some Zanu-PF voters who split their presidential and assembly votes, were killed and hundreds more <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/200812MPVR.pdf">abducted or beaten</a> – that Tsvangirai withdrew. This led the Southern African Development Community to push for a <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/index.php/store/history-and-%20politics/the-hard-road-to-reform-detail">government of national unity</a>. </p>
<p>Violence like this wasn’t repeated in 2013, although that election was <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717/715">suspect in many ways</a>.</p>
<h2>New goalposts</h2>
<p>Now we have another contest, with new goalposts. No more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-disgraceful-coup-must-be-undone">Mugabe</a>. No more <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Tsvangirai</a>. At last count Nelson Chamisa and Mnangagwa were only separated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">three percentage points</a>. </p>
<p>The other 21 runners – some more or less planted by Zanu-PF to confuse things while others are angry splinters from the main <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/24888-full-list-of-all-the-133-political-parties-that-are-going-to-contest-in-zimbabwes-2018-elections.html">contenders</a> – do not amount to much, unless they help keep the winner’s margin down under 50%. </p>
<p>A runoff? Such a nuisance and so scary. Maybe a wee fudge of counting would make a respectable win for the incumbent amid lots of horsetrading to cool the ardour of the increasingly fiery aspirant.</p>
<p>Aside from the big race, the over 1 600 candidates for MPs (including less than 250 women) were chosen at some fairly shambolic primaries. Some constituencies, such as Bulawayo’s Pelandaba Mpopoma, host 17 candidates including two from the MDC-Alliance (which does not include Thokozani Khuphe’s MDC-T) and Strike Mkandla - who has experienced many bruising moments in his political <a href="https://www.amazon.com/My-Life-Struggle-Liberation-Zimbabwe/dp/1496983238">history</a> - for Zapu. </p>
<p>If the election will be judged by the hundreds of international observers as credible and the parties accept the verdict, then harmony won peaceably – not by a falling axe – would have won. </p>
<p>That would be no small victory in itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans face a complicated array of choices at the polls.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/927592018-03-07T08:09:02Z2018-03-07T08:09:02ZZimbabwe’s opposition struggles to recalibrate itself for elections<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-obituary">death of opposition heavyweight Morgan Tsvangirai</a> robbed Zimbabwe of the strongest challenger to Robert Mugabe for almost 20 years – and no successor will be able to emulate him fully. Mugabe has now gone, but Tsvangirai’s party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), is bitterly divided. </p>
<p>The furious machinations among his rival successors were downright indecent. After much bad blood, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-t-endorses-nelson-chamisa-as-morgan-tsvangirais-successor-13558886">Nelson Chamisa</a> was appointed the MDC’s leader, but the party’s faultlines are such that he will not bind them in time for national elections this year. More to the point, none of the rivals actually put forward a policy platform. We have no idea what kind of Zimbabwe any of them, Chamisa included, wishes to build.</p>
<p>The right to inherit also marked the vicious power struggles in ZANU-PF before Mugabe finally fell. Neither Grace Mugabe nor Emmerson Mnangagwa talked about policy, planning and, above all, how the country would attract investment and liquidity to its bankrupt economy.</p>
<p>Since assuming the presidency, Mnangagwa has made all the right moves and all the right noises, to persuade the West he is economically competent and politically savvy. But so far, no significant inflow of funds is forthcoming. Not even the Chinese seem impressed. Instead, everyone is waiting for the elections Mnangagwa has promised will be <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/01/elections-july-mnangagwa/">held before July</a>.</p>
<p>This will be the first proper litmus test of Zimbabwe’s new order – not just the conduct of the elections themselves, but the shape of the post-election cabinet. Will it still be <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42190457">militarised</a>? And will the opposition get a token seat or two? No one yet knows. But what’s clear already is that the opposition is most unlikely to take control itself.</p>
<h2>Hamstrung</h2>
<p>Bitterly divided, technically unprepared for an election run with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-07-11-zimbabwe-awaiting-delivery-of-biometric-voter-registration-kits-for-elections/">new biometric technology</a>, and unable to make common cause with those expelled from ZANU-PF, the opposition is already <a href="http://www.zambianobserver.com/zimbabwe-mdc-leader-chamisa-threatens-election-boycott/">predicting</a> it will lose because the government will cheat. </p>
<p>But that’s not a foregone conclusion. It may be that ZANU-PF for once actually trusts its own party organisation and manages to announce a set of clear policies and leave the feeble, disorganised MDC to emulate them. That might just be enough to win the election fair and square.</p>
<p>Still, while the government will want at least one quick, clean “win” before the election – probably some breakthrough in terms of foreign direct investment – it’s hard to see where it will find one. It won’t come from the West, and the Chinese are wary of being forever associated with Mugabe’s fall and the immediate consequences. In any case, they are as anxious as anyone else to see Mnangagwa actually clean up corruption and ensure that what money they send him isn’t simply siphoned off.</p>
<p>But clearly China is mostly just happy to see Mugabe gone. Economic competence and administrative success are at the core of the modern Chinese model, and the abysmal late years of Mugabe’s presidency were anathema. And for all that Mnangagwa is making the right noises, the Chinese, like everyone else, will be wondering why he and the ZANU-PF establishment simply stood by and watched as the country went into disastrous decline.</p>
<p>According to all the old theories of elite formation and the even older ones of class formation, the solidity of society depends on well-defined, well-integrated classes. But Zimbabwe has no countervailing working class, no organised proletariat, no solid revolutionary grouping. Like its South African counterpart the ANC, ZANU-PF was once a revolutionary force – but like the ANC, it’s now a textbook example of how noble values can decay into sheer venality. Mnangagwa has a long way to go to restore it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Emmerson Mnangagwa has a struggle on his hands as president of Zimbabwe, but he doesn’t face much of a challenge from the opposition.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/917142018-02-15T14:21:55Z2018-02-15T14:21:55ZThe lack of a succession plan has left Morgan Tsvangirai’s party in disarray<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206540/original/file-20180215-131006-13dig9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morgan Tsvangirai built the Movement for Democratic Change into a formidable party and credible contender for power at its height.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The absence of a party leader and a clear succession path often leads to political parties losing political direction. This is exemplified by Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, who has <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died at 65</a>. Despite its efforts to conceal infighting over who will succeed him, evidence points to a party in disarray.</p>
<p>Before his death, media reports about his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/tsvangirai-critically-ill-in-sa-his-condition-has-deteriorated-rapidly-reports-20180206">worsening condition</a> had fuelled the latent tussling to replace him. There have been spirited efforts to douse the flames of infighting, but matters came to a head at a recent <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-127383.html%20%22%22">rally in Chitungwiza</a>.</p>
<p>The infighting over who should take over from Tsvangirai has been heightened by the party’s curious arrangement of having three vice-presidents. One, Thokozani Khupe, was elected at the party’s 2014 congress while Nelson Chamisa and Elias Mudzuri were <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-30216-Chamisa,+Mudzuri+new+MDC-T+Vice+Presidents/news.aspx">appointed by Tsvangirai</a>. </p>
<p>At the rally Chamisa clashed with Mudzuri over who should speak first. This spectacle pushed the leaders of the alliance to convene an urgent crisis meeting to address the <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-127383.html">bickering within the party</a>, among other things. </p>
<p>The internal party wrangles were also exposed by differences over the attendance of the party secretary general, Douglas Mwonzora as well as Khupe and Mudzuri at a meeting held in Cape Town, South Africa to map a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201802080446.html">grand opposition alliance</a> against the governing Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>In the absence of a unifying father figure like Tsvangirai, the prospects and stability of the party now stand in question. This comes at a time when the party, more than ever, needs to consolidate his vision of a united opposition party that will one day unseat Zanu-PF. Sadly, its disunity can only be playing into Zanu-PF’s hands.</p>
<h2>A party divided</h2>
<p>In an effort to douse deep seated factional clashes which were threatening to tear the party apart, Tsvangirai played his game well – for a while – by having the three acting presidents. By doing so he managed to forge a modicum of unity by balancing competing factions and interests among the top three leaders. Others would have wished that Tsvangirai could have used such an opportunity to call for a congress to facilitate leadership succession. </p>
<p>But cosmetic efforts at balancing factional politics through rotational leadership didn’t hide deeper issues over succession. It now seems that jostling for the coveted post of the MDC-T presidency will continue after Tsvangirai’s death. </p>
<p>Prior to Tsvangirai death some of the party’s top leadership and grassroots membership alike had hinted that they would resist any move by him to appoint or anoint a successor. Judging from the ongoing party fissures and following Tsvangirai’s passing things might actually get worse before they get better. In particular, the latest decision in the wake of Tsvangirai’s death to appoint Chamisa as acting president for <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/headlines/chamisa-says-appointed-acting-president/">a year</a> will likely further deepen divisions rather than building unity within the party.</p>
<p>In all this it is important to note that Tsvangirai’s long absence due to illness, and now his death, have created a leadership void. Internal party conflicts will take a long time to resolve. A few examples illustrate how tense the situation is.</p>
<p>In February, Tsvangirai appointed Chamisa as the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-02-07-morgan-tsvangirai-appoints-nelson-chamisa-acting-mdc-president/">acting president</a>. But, in a dramatic change of events, Obert Gutu, the party’s spokesperson <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/obert-gutu-mdc-party-opposition/4245741.html">disputed the appointment</a>, creating more confusion over who was in charge. </p>
<p>Mudzuri stuck to his guns saying he was still the acting president. But Khupe also argued that she was the legitimate vice-president by virtue of being elected at the last party congress held in 2014. </p>
<p>All these factors have led to a vicious leadership succession conundrum and power struggle that seems set to continue.</p>
<p>Smear campaigns, conflicting messaging, counter claims and mudslinging have become the order of the day within the once formidable MDC–T. All show a party at sixes and sevens, and pulling in different directions. </p>
<p>The misdirected energies will make it difficult for the party to reunite, refocus and embark on effective programmes and mobilisation ahead of the country’s July elections. If left unchecked this infighting will negatively affect the party’s prospects of unseating Zanu-PF. This will also have an impact on the process of democratisation of Zimbabwe, which Tsvangirai set in motion in the past decades. A weak and divided MDC-T will simply hand over power to Emmerson Mnangagwa, thus perpetuating Zanu-PF’s misrule. </p>
<p>In the end, Tsvangirai’s long absence engendered a leadership crisis and void. This underscores the dangers of leaders – especially party founders like <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Tsvangirai</a> – not managing succession properly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Mwonzora is affiliated with Rhodes University as a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies in the Sociology Department. </span></em></p>Despite spirited efforts to douse the flames of infighting within the MDC-T, matters came to a head at a recent rally in Chitungwiza.Gift Mwonzora, Post-Doctoral Research fellow (specializing in Political Sociology) in the Unit of Zimbabwean studies - Sociology Department at Rhodes University, South Africa., Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/919252018-02-15T08:59:46Z2018-02-15T08:59:46ZMorgan Tsvangirai: the man who dared Zimbabweans to dream again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206532/original/file-20180215-131010-9l2lt6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morgan Tsvangirai was a thorn in the side of Robert Mugabe's government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Peter Andrews</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One never forgets their first job. For me it was not the work experience that left an indelible impression, though it was appreciated. It was that one day at work when all seems to be ordinary and then mundane, routine tasks are disrupted for just a few minutes and everything changes.</p>
<p>It was a hot summer’s day, the typical Harare heat burning us up. Hope was on the horizon; the type that brings storm clouds on a clear day to usher in rain. I worked until 4pm in a popular grocery store located in the affluent suburb of Chisipite. Unannounced, a burly stout imposing figure approached the till with a broad smile and distinctive round cheeks. </p>
<p>It was <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> himself. </p>
<h2>A man of the people</h2>
<p>We all knew who he was. A seasoned <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-obituary">trade unionist</a>, that face most often featured on newspapers’ front pages. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKP_X-blQu4">A thorn in the side</a> of Robert Mugabe and his regime, Tsvangirai was the man with whom Zimbabwe’s working class most identified. Many times when a stay-away was called and we didn’t go to school, this smiling customer had been the chief architect. To some, he was seen as a messiah.</p>
<p>Others saw him as little more than a rabble rouser and accused him of being the root cause of Zimbabwe’s economic decline and political hostility.</p>
<p>On that day, he was clad in his party t-shirt and holding a basket full of groceries. All the attention in the shop was centred on him. But Tsvangirai was a man of the people, and shifted that focus back to those around him. He engaged in small talk, bemoaned the lack of rain – the earth was dusty and thirsty for a drink, he said.</p>
<p>Approached by two mothers with suckling infants, he expressed his desire that the Zimbabwean health system would improve so that no child would ever have to die of malnutrition or another preventable ailment again.</p>
<p>He teased a young man in a Zimbabwe football t-shirt. Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai said, would qualify for the next soccer world cup. </p>
<p>As a young man doing his first job during that long hot summer, I gained more than work experience that day. I got life experience from a man who was not only simple but humane. There was a dissonance, too. This couldn’t be the same man the state told us brought sanctions and troubles to a country once viewed as Africa’s breadbasket. He’d even been blamed for keeping the rain from falling. </p>
<p>His parting shot to us that afternoon was sobering, and arresting. It challenged all the stereotypes and falsehoods that had been circulated as facts. Walking out, unaccompanied by bodyguards and fresh from chats with the many ordinary Zimbabweans in the store, he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don’t be afraid of the idea of change. A new Zimbabwe is upon us and we need you.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A unique power</h2>
<p>That was Morgan Tsvangirai’s unique power. He made Zimbabweans excited about the idea of change. Our ability to dream had been quashed. But he wasn’t afraid of this idea of change – he even had the bruises to show for it.</p>
<p>It is a hope and a dream he never let go of. Frail in his last days and consumed by cancer, Tsvangirai saw some of that change begin to unfold. It’s <a href="https://www.africanindy.com/news/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11533915">sad that he will</a> not be around to experience the next steps on Zimbabwe’s journey. But his ability to make us dream will live on,<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">even beyond his</a> own life. </p>
<p>His legacy, ideologies, and simplicity carry the nation of Zimbabwe forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Willie Chinyamurindi receives funding from National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Morgan Tsvangirai’s unique power was that he made Zimbabweans excited about the idea of change.Willie Tafadzwa Chinyamurindi, Associate Professor, University of Fort HareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/918452018-02-15T08:05:12Z2018-02-15T08:05:12ZZimbabwe’s Morgan Tsvangirai: heroic herald of an epoch foretold<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206529/original/file-20180215-131010-a12rtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe opposition Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai addressing a crowd outside parliament in Harare last year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Morgan Tsvangirai, who was born March 10 1952 in Buhera, in Manicaland just across the border from Zimbabwe’s Gutu District in Masvingo, <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/02/14/morgan-tsvangirai-timeline-mdc-icons-life/">became leader</a> of Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change in September 1999. </p>
<p>He was a very brave and iconic figure in the leadership of Zimbabwe’s anti-authoritarian and social justice movements that emerged in the wake of the austerity inducing structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s. Workers, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00219096080430020501">students</a>, and progressive church leaders were combined into the MDC. Later many white farmers and global supporters were to join. As a combined force they came to threaten the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) as never before . </p>
<p>But for ZANU-PF’s coercion, chicanery, and corruptive influences – with the help of its southern neighbour’s ruling party – Tsvangirai could well have become Zimbabwe’s second president, ushering in a democratic era for that country, still struggling to be born.</p>
<p>Alas, that historical moment of optimism and opportunity has passed for the present. Yet, with its inevitable revival, Tsvangirai will be remembered as an heroic herald for the epoch foretold, albeit ignobly postponed by the current ruling party and its pervasive, <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2016/11/23/On-the-possibilities-of-a-new-Zimbabwean-political-discourse">debilitating effect on Zimbabwe’s politics</a>. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/obituary-morgan-tsvangirai-a-veteran-opposition-fighter-who-never-reached-his-goal-20180215">his death</a>, combined with Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">coup-led removal</a> as president of ZANU-PF and the country just a few months ago, could mark the end of the Zimbabwean political parties’ internecine fighting. Unfortunately the men in uniform who filled the vacuum created by both parties’ factionalism won’t budge easily.</p>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s rise to represent many Zimbabweans’ hopes for a democratic polity beyond Mugabe and ZANU-PF started with his leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-obituary">late 1980s</a>. He was instrumental in divorcing it from a corrupt relationship with ZANU-PF. He also supported <a href="http://www.ibtauris.com/Books/Society--social-sciences/Education/Organization--management-of-education/Students--student-organisations/Revolt-and-Protest-Student-Politics-and-Activism-in-Subsaharan-Africa">the efforts of university students</a> and the Zimbabwe Unity Movement to deconstruct the one-party state. </p>
<p>The 1990s witnessed many serious and violently suppressed strikes, demonstrations and stay aways. One nearly entailed Tsvangirai’s assassination and another brought the public servants into the union’s fold. Tsvangirai was viewed as a transformative leader. He commissioned serious evidence based research from his team on how to conjoin the unions and other civil society groups to a new social project. As one researcher told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>He knew what ‘hegemony’ meant – he read the stuff – and he could use it correctly. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus he chaired the National Constitutional Assembly as it emerged in 1997. He also set the groundwork for the Movement for Democratic Change to be catapulted into action with the Working People’s Convention in early 1999. A new social democratic impulse had been ushered into Zimbabwe’s political order. Tsvangirai headed it.</p>
<h2>The state reacts</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Mugabe and ZANU-PF promised the unruly war veterans huge monthly pensions and that he would speed up the takeover of around 1,500 white farms. He also depleted the fiscus when <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518590?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">he joined</a> Laurent Kabila in his efforts to stave off Paul Kagame’s proxies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war. </p>
<p>But by the end of 1999, with Mugabe’s constitution up for referendum and promising takeovers of the white farms, the commercial farmers joined the new party’s bandwagon. So too did the UK government, as if to atone for its wilful blindness during the massacres in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">Matabeleland known as Gukurahundi</a> . </p>
<p>Thus even at its birth, the MDC <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708933?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">was placed</a> between the social democratic rock of the working class and new social movements and the hard place of private property rights and other neo-liberal verities. These were the only some of the tensions plaguing the leader of an opposition party rather than a trade union or social movement. </p>
<p>As one young ex-MDC activist has put it, movements aren’t parties. Rather, they are “narrow in focus. They are susceptible to early political liquidation.” Yet parties without this foundation wax and wane as new <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518590?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">socio-economic</a> forces come in and of focus.</p>
<h2>Stolen elections</h2>
<p>By 2000, with Mugabe’s February referendum loss and mid-year parliamentary elections approaching, the MDC faced the first of five coerced and corrupted – stolen, to be blunt – ZANU-PF electoral roadblocks over the next 18 years. </p>
<p>In 2008 unprecedented hyperinflation, unemployment, infrastructural decay and millions facing famine undoubtedly had a lot to do with Tsvangirai’s victory in the March elections. But his 47% to Mugabe’s 43% meant a run-off. ZANU-PF then waged what some observers called its mini-Gukurahundi. To save his party members’ lives Tsvangirai withdrew. He was also forced to agree to the South Africa initiated “government of national unity” from 2009 to 2013. This certainly encouraged many MDC members to abandon movement politics for the elitist parliamentary and semi-governance option. </p>
<p>The highly suspect 2013 election put ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe’s driver’s seat again – although it took four years for it to reject its sleeping pilot via a coup that gave the country as well as ZANU-PF a slightly new president. That the coup-makers could only make it light, with democratic pretence, was due in large part to the MDC’s efforts over the decades to keep the democratic discourse strong. </p>
<p>But the 2013 to 2017 <a href="http://journals.giga-hamburg.de/index.php/afsp/article/view/1487/917">political drought</a> also caused the MDC to fragment even further: the sad end being what appeared to be a scramble of pretenders to the MDC’s fragile throne as a man deserving a much neater end to his career reached the last of his mortal coil. </p>
<p>They have done little to honour the man who veteran Zimbabwean journalist Peta Thornycroft remembers did <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Citizen_of_Zimbabwe.html?id=ijMhDEetQCwC&redir_esc=y">more than anyone</a> “in Zimbabwe’s sad history to challenge the fearful state created by Mr Mugabe”.</p>
<h2>Honouring his legacy</h2>
<p>If those inheriting Morgan Tsvangirai’s legacy want to restore it to its previous shine they should stop challenging each other long enough to revive the energy and clarity their leader had at millennium’s turn – perhaps inventing a new social base with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>But for ZANU-PF’s coercion, Tsvangirai could well have ushered in a democratic era in Zimbabwe as the country’s second president.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888202017-12-14T08:09:58Z2017-12-14T08:09:58ZSouth Africa needs electoral reform, but president’s powers need watching<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198518/original/file-20171211-27693-1jk3w15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa. There are renewed calls for citizens to directly elect their president and other representatives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within a short time, the 4000 odd delegates to South Africa’s governing African National Congress’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> will elect a new party leader. In turn – save death, disaster or unlikely electoral defeat – a parliament stuffed with an ANC majority will at some point elect that leader as the new <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-anc-presidential-elections-trump-south-africas-constitution-78553">President of South Africa</a>. The expectation is that this will be <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nkosazana-clarice-dlamini-zuma">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> or <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00057409.html">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. But, if the ANC elects a pig, the ANC parliamentary majority will vote for the pig.</p>
<p>Although it is by no means unusual for parliaments to elect countries’ political leaders, there is widespread complaint in South Africa that it is the small ANC elite which attends the conference that effectively selects the next president of the country. This, it is said by many, is undemocratic. </p>
<p>Two main reasons are cited. First, ANC electoral procedures are deeply corrupted by money <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantashe-warns-anc-delegates-against-selling-their-votes-20171126">changing hands</a>, personal ambition and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/armed-guards-for-anc-factions-20171107">factionalism</a>. Second, it should be the people, not the party, which should be charged with electing the country’s leader.</p>
<p>It is therefore of considerable interest that, rather than emanating from civil society or another political party, the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/12/04/anc-gauteng-proposes-expansion-of-party-leadership">proposal</a> has been made by the ANC’s Gauteng provincial conference that consideration should be given to ordinary voters voting directly for presidents, premiers and mayors. This is of particular interest given that Gauteng is one of the ANC’s most powerful provinces, and at the same time, one which is often at odds with the party’s current leadership.</p>
<p>The proposal that the state president, provincial premiers and mayors be directly elected is a most welcome one, as there is much need to consider the quality of South Africa’s democracy, and to encourage public participation in decision-making. However, direct election of such offices simultaneously holds its risks.</p>
<h2>The electoral reform debate</h2>
<p>The debate about electoral reform in post-1994 South Africa has largely focused on the system used to elect MPs and their counterparts in the country’s nine provinces. The standard argument for a change was captured succinctly by ANC dissident and Umkhonto we Sizwe veteran <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-13-when-will-we-wake-up-and-reform-our-crooked-electoral-system/">Omry Makgoale</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When will we wake up and reform our crooked electoral system? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The argument is that the list proportional representation system results in the election of MPs who are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-20-sas-electoral-system-fails-the-people">accountable to party bosses</a> rather than voters. Such an outcome is rendered more certain by the fact that <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">South Africa’s constitution</a> lays down that MPs or provincial legislature representatives who leave or are ejected from their parties lose their seat in the relevant legislature, plus the handy salary that goes with it. To continue with the animalistic referencing, parties’ elected representatives become sheep, devoid of any capacity for independence.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198533/original/file-20171211-27714-1xx858k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-ZumaChairperson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Francois Lenoir</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such critiques often suggest (very sensibly) that the electoral system should become a mixed one which combines proportionality of outcomes with the direct election of representatives from constituencies. This was recommended in 2002 by the <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">Van Zyl Slabbert Commission</a> on electoral reform. But there has been relatively little debate about whether the President and premiers should be directly elected.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf">survey</a> conducted on behalf of the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission indicated that 63% of respondents would have liked to vote for the president directly. This level of preference was pretty much the same across all racial groups. Given the disastrous nature of the Zuma presidency, it is very possible that the preference for direct election would be considerably higher if the issue was put to survey respondents today.</p>
<h2>Virtue of direction election</h2>
<p>The virtue of the direct election of key political leaders is said to be that it renders them directly accountable to voters rather than to their political parties. On the face of it, it is an attractive argument, and it is one which could usefully introduce more diversity into the South African political system.</p>
<p>If they wanted to maximise their vote, parties would have to look at the qualities of their candidates, and ask themselves whether they would appeal to the electorate as a whole. (On this reckoning, it is a dead cert that Cyril Ramaphosa would streak home and dry, rather than, as under the ANC’s present system, running neck and neck with his chief rival, whose popular appeal is that of a wet fish). This would mean that candidates would end up openly campaigning for the leadership, dispensing with the ANC’s absurd pretence that individuals should not demonstrate political ambition. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility that voters would elect a president from a party other than the one which enjoys a majority in the National Assembly. </p>
<p>Would direct election of the president, premiers and mayors be a good idea? And, if so, what system should be adopted?</p>
<p>The second question is easily answered. To avoid the election of a president who gains less than 50% of a popular vote but more than any other candidate, provision would wisely be made for a second round of a presidential election in which the top two candidates engage in a run off.</p>
<h2>A good idea?</h2>
<p>So would direction elections be a good idea? </p>
<p>Parliamentary systems work well because they devolve the election of prime ministers to the legislature. On the continent, countries that inherited a parliamentary system from Britain subsequently opted for elective presidencies. </p>
<p>The results are not unambiguously encouraging. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/198536/original/file-20171211-15358-6s5noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1000&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Kenya and Zambia, for instance, the direct election of presidents may have weakened the link between legislatures and executives. This has allowed executives to trample over legislatures, and for leaders to claim a legitimacy separate from that of their party. Presidents from <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2161868.stm">Daniel Arap Moi</a> through to <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2014/0210/Kenya-slides-toward-authoritarianism">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> in Kenya and from <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/africa/20chiluba.html">Frederick Chiluba</a> through to <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">Edgar Lungu</a> in Zambia have all proved exceedingly authoritarian.</p>
<p>It follows that changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be rendered accountable to parliament. Would the change enhance the accountability of the government by empowering MPs, or would it render them increasingly irrelevant?</p>
<h2>Dangers of an all-powerful president</h2>
<p>It is also worth recalling that there is now much greater awareness about how much power is concentrated in the Presidency, in a way, it would seem, that the makers of the country’s constitution did not intend. Under Zuma, the presidency has a direct say in far too much, such as the right to appoint the head of a National Prosecuting Authority which might have the responsibility of calling him to legal account. </p>
<p>South Africans need to be wary of any change in the system which ends up making the President less – rather than more – accountable.</p>
<p>In any case, while there can be very good reasons for reforming an electoral system, this will not automatically result in better governance. Form can rarely trump substance. Robert Mugabe only “won” the Zimbabwean presidency in 2008 through his army and police terrorising the opposition and effectively forcing his rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2175377/Zimbabwe-Morgan-Tsvangirai-withdraws-from-poll-citing-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror.html">to withdraw</a>.</p>
<p>It will take more than a piecemeal change to South Africa’s constitution to improve it’s democracy. South Africans should be careful what they wish for, as they can never be quite sure what they will get.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88820/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Changing the South African system to allow for direct election would require the country to look carefully at how a directly elected president should be held accountable to parliament.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880852017-12-03T10:19:57Z2017-12-03T10:19:57ZA clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882542017-11-29T15:09:28Z2017-11-29T15:09:28ZMnangagwa has the capacity to focus on the new Zimbabwe. But will he?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196956/original/file-20171129-29117-1f64oim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabweans welcome Emmerson Mnangagwa back from his brief exile in South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emmerson “Crocodile” Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe’s crafty new interim President, is known as a ruthless, deeply unprincipled and a political infighter. He has lost several recent parliamentary elections but retained his party positions over four decades largely because he was ex-President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">chief enforcer</a> and tribute collector. </p>
<p>But now President Mnangagwa has a golden opportunity to leave that unsavoury reputation behind and revive Zimbabwe’s economy and spirit. It is not unlikely that he could recast his legacy and even become genuinely electable in next year’s national <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">presidential poll</a>.</p>
<p>Governance in Zimbabwe is terrible and the rule of law is mostly only honoured in the breach. Mismanagement throughout the entire apparatus of administration, and outright theft by <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/zimbabwes-vast-diamond-riches-exploited-secretive-political-and-military-elites-report-shows/">political and military elites</a> are the ingrained, Mugabe-imposed, impediments to Zimbabwe’s regrowth. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa can truly break from those inherited modes of rule – and if he has the inner strength to do so – his interim presidency could really become a leadership that all Zimbabweans, even nominal opponents, could celebrate.</p>
<p>To achieve this transformation Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame. He would need to appoint a cabinet of all talents rather than one composed of compromised politicians from his side of Zanu-PF’s recent internal succession sweepstakes. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa foreswore business as usual and appointed, say, opposition leader Tendai Biti as finance minister and Nelson Chamisa, another opposition leader, as minister of home affairs, he would depart strikingly from the desolate, destructive path followed by the Mugabe regime. </p>
<p>He would exit from this path followed by Mugabe if he also reached out to former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangerai, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Giving prominence to some of his own key Zanu-PF supporters like former finance and justice minister Patrick Chinamasa and Chris Mutsvangwa, leader of the War Veterans Association, would be easier but also important. It’s telling that he’s appointed Chinamasa as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mnangagwa-gives-sacked-zim-finance-minister-chinamasa-his-job-back-12171719">acting finance minister</a>.</p>
<p>Making those, or analogous, appointments would give support and substance to his <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/mnangagwa-pledges-wide-reforms/">inaugural pledges</a> to end the country’s appalling cash shortages and “ensure financial sector stability.” </p>
<p>He also promised to crack down on corruption, one of the leading causes of Zimbabwe’s fiscal instability and its widespread <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2016/06/the-liquidity-cum-cash-challenges-in-zimbabwe-a-fiscal-policy-crisis/">loss of liquidity</a>. Further, as he has hinted, Mnangagwa could compensate the 4 000 or so white farmers who were <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/mnangagwa-vows-to-tackle-graft-compensate-white-farmers-12143032">driven off their land</a>.</p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Seeing is believing, of course, so Mnangagwa’s early moves will be watched closely. If the government-owned press and national broadcaster lose some of their shackles, that would also be an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>But an even more significant indication of whether the new Mnangagwa will be strikingly different than the old Mnangagwa is what relationship he has with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-22-zim-2-a-general-with-political-aspirations/">General Constantine Chiwenga</a>. The head of the armed forces was the chief architect of the military coup that ended Robert and Grace Mugabe’s gambit and brought Mnangagwa back from the outer rings of purgatory. The ouster of the Mugabes was precipitated by Grace’s intention to deprive Chiwenga and Mnangagwa of the privileges and lavish perquisites. And, since the coup cemented their continued control of illicitly-derived riches, how can Mnangagwa’s promise to curb corruption be achieved? He promised</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Swift action will be taken … to weed out corrupt elements.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If he cracks down only on the small fry, Zimbabweans will lose heart. But, if he really means to weed out the main malefactors, then he will have trouble with his generals and many of his own close followers. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s potential break with the past, and with his own service to Mugabe, could transform his interim presidency from a mere cynical holding operation into a major transformative revival of Zimbabwe’s much battered sense of itself. He could infuse the country with a sense of purpose, and with the ability to resume its rightful place as Africa’s agricultural and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-economic-growth-could-be-huge-after-mugabe-.html">industrial success story</a>. Zimbabwe could rise from the ashes, but only if Mnangagwa clearly rejects the ways of Mugabe.</p>
<p>As Deng Xiaoping <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-a-political-wizard-who-put-china-on-the-capitalist-road.html">rewrote</a> Mao Tse-tung’s baleful prescription for China and Mikhael Gorbachev realised that Soviet Communism <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikhail-Gorbachev">was a fraud</a>, Mnangagwa has the capacity as a determined pragmatist to focus forward on the new Zimbabwe, not the old. </p>
<h2>Well placed</h2>
<p>With the securocrats behind him and his party position buttressed by a Zanu-PF vote of confidence, he can immediately take progressive steps to right the economy and lift the curtain of fear that has long enveloped his country. If so, he will begin the arduous trek back toward national stability and prosperity, and be regarded as the saviour of the nation.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could indeed be such a man for all seasons. That would surprise longtime observers of Zimbabwean political machinations (like myself). But, he possesses the inner grit and the inner sense that, post-Mugabe, he and Zimbabwe can only advance if there is a decisive, open, and firm departure from the sleaze and sheer opportunism of the past. </p>
<p>In an important sense, no one else at this time has the stature to build the new Zimbabwe effectively. No one else can rely on military support. No one else can face down those in the ruling party and the police who backed Grace Mugabe, and lost. It is not that Mnangagwa will suddenly regain a long lost sense of commonweal, but instead, it is that he knows that Mugabe’s removal must mark the end of the bad old ways that Mugabe orchestrated and from which he himself profited.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa knows what Zimbabwe desperately now requires. Having struggled to ascend to the top of the country’s political tree, he may well be poised to perform responsibly in ways that, a few weeks ago, would have been wholly unexpected and wildly out of character. But it is never too late to change.</p>
<p><em>The author’s most recent book is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10975.html">The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, 2017)</a>. He was in Zimbabwe in October</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg is President Emeritus, World Peace Foundation.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame.Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880232017-11-23T11:29:45Z2017-11-23T11:29:45ZWill Mnangagwa usher in a new democracy? The view from Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196100/original/file-20171123-18012-fj36hx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa, President-elect of Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr/UN</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe has a new leader. Robert Mugabe is out. His former ally turned rival, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is in. What now?</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/21/zimbabwe-celebrates-as-mugabe-resignation-announced-in-pictures">ecstatic celebrations to mark Mugabe’s resignation</a> thoughts have began to turn to what comes next. Mugabe may have exited the political scene, but it remains dominated by the same political party – <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">Zanu-PF</a> – that sustained his rule.</p>
<p>Moreover, the country’s president-elect, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is hardly a breath of fresh air. Having held a series of cabinet positions under Mugabe, and served as first vice president between December 2014 and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41914768">his sacking in November 2017</a>, he looks more like a force for continuity than change.</p>
<p>As a result, talk in Harare quickly turned to what kind of leader Mnangagwa will be, and the system of government that would best serve ordinary Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>The fork in the road</h2>
<p>My conversations with people on the streets of the capital, Harare, about the political system the country needs suggests that two distinct camps are emerging: those who want elections to be held as soon as possible, and those who say the polls should be postponed and a <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-moves-to-set-up-interim-govt-as-mugabe-is-apparently-ousted/">transitional government</a> established.</p>
<p>Both of these options have genuine “pros” but also strong “cons”. As is so often the case, there is no perfect answer that solves all problems.</p>
<p>It is understandable that many Zimbabweans want a period of calm and orderly government after the twists and turns of recent weeks, and believe that it would be better to form an inclusive government that would feature representatives of all of the main political parties – a kind of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">power sharing</a> in all but name.</p>
<p>Even though I have consistently argued in favour of the value of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/3FFB8B40059192D449B77A402ADC82A1">democracy and elections in Africa</a>, I have to admit that the “transitioners” have some viable arguments.</p>
<p>The most obvious is that a period of stability and more consensual government might facilitate much needed reform of the economy and also the wider political and legal system. After all, rival parties are unlikely to come to agreement on these issues if they are immediately thrust into an <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387803001329">election campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The “transitioners” also have a point when it comes to democracy. Few people in Zimbabwe believe that it’s possible for elections to be <a href="https://erczim.org/">free and fair</a> if they are held between July and August next year, as currently scheduled. Given this, and the current divisions within the opposition, a rush to elections is likely to result in a convincing victory for Zanu-PF under problematic circumstances.</p>
<p>A transitional arrangement would allow for much needed <a href="http://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/_protected/publications/publication_265.pdf">electoral reforms</a> to be put in place, creating the potential for a better quality process and a more consensual outcome later on.</p>
<h2>Testing the Crocodile</h2>
<p>But there is also another camp that wants to see Mnangagwa, popularly known as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">The Crocodile</a>, to face an election as soon as possible. </p>
<p>Just like their counterparts in the “transitioner” camp, “electioneers”, have some strong arguments. Whatever one wants to call Mnangagwa’s rise to power – from <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mnangagwa-coup-mphoko-missing-chipanga-now-custody-warrent-arrest-mzembi/">a coup</a> to an <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/dont-meddle-in-zanu-pf-affairs-vp-mnangagwa/">internal party squabble</a> – it is clear that it has not been a high quality democratic transition. And while it is clear that the overthrow of Mugabe was hugely popular, we don’t know if the same applies to a Mnangagwa presidency. An election would settle that question.</p>
<p>It would also give the new government a popular mandate to undertake <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/10/14/zim-needs-bold-economic-reforms-us-envoy">economic reforms</a>, whoever wins power. This could be important to the success of the reform project, because things are likely to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/12/2017-looks-gloomier-zim/">get worse</a> before they get better, and the country’s economic medicine may prove to be a bitter pill to swallow.</p>
<p>Holding elections would also do one thing that postponing them will not; it will test the commitment of the new government to democratic norms and values from the get-go. One of the main reasons that Zimbabwean elections have been poor quality is that <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/03/24/zanu-pf-revives-rigging-machinery/">Zanu-PF and the military</a> have intervened to make sure this was the case. As another friend put it, “If they are really committed to doing the right thing, they can do it right away and the elections will not be too bad”.</p>
<h2>Learning from the past</h2>
<p>“Electioneers” are also motivated by scepticism that an inclusive transitional government would get much done. Both Zimbabwe and Kenya have had power-sharing governments in the recent past, and while they both introduced new constitutions they also saw high levels of corruption and limited <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">security sector reform</a>. They also both led to elections that were denounced by opposition parties as being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/12/24/2-million-votes-used-to-rig-2013-election-raila_c1478146">unfree and unfair</a>.</p>
<p>It’s fair to ask: why would it be different this time?</p>
<p>The question is particularly pertinent given the current composition of parliament. Because Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change boycotted a <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/05/04/mdc-upholds-poll-boycott-stance">series of by-elections</a> on the basis that they would not be free and fair, it has lost many of the seats it won in 2013. As a result, any transitional arrangement that deferred elections and “froze” the current parliament for the next three years would have a big legislative advantage to Zanu-PF.</p>
<p>It is also important to keep in mind that economics cannot be divorced from politics: Zimbabwe’s current economic difficulties stem precisely from an unaccountable political framework that ignored the interests of the people. Given that recent events have <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">emboldened the military</a> and given them an even stronger voice within government, this is a pressing concern.</p>
<p>Deferring electoral reforms in order to focus on economic recovery may therefore prove to be a self defeating strategy.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Ultimately, the form of government that evolves in Zimbabwe will not be a product of popular dialogue. One of the distinctive features of this process is that for the most part it has been conducted behind closed doors by a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/zimbabwean-not-coup/">small elite</a>.</p>
<p>Don’t be fooled by the pictures of tens of thousands of people marching on Saturday – all sides have invoked popular support, but none have actually <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/press-statement-army-gives-update-negotiations-mugabe/">encouraged ordinary people</a> to say what they want, or given them a seat at the table. This is a worrying sign if strengthening democracy is the long-term goal.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122715.html">public statements</a> by the main parties at the time of going to press suggests that they are not converging on an interim administration, and so the “electioneers” may get their wish. That could still change because <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/mdc-calls-mnangagwa-repent-join-big-tent/">talks are ongoing</a> and both sides would gain something from a delay. But if it doesn’t the people will be able to have their say on how they want their country to be run.</p>
<p>Of course, voting will not actually equate to “having a say” unless the country’s new leader follows through on his promise to build a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/emmerson-mnangagwa-to-be-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president-on-friday">new democracy</a>”, and the ruling party can kick the habit of a lifetime. Watch this space.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the fall of autocratic ruler Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe faces a difficult choice between the stability of a transnational government or a potentially divisive election contest.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876952017-11-17T13:48:13Z2017-11-17T13:48:13ZThe house of Mugabe crumbles – but it’s too soon to celebrate in Zimbabwe<p>It seemed that Robert Mugabe, the 93-year-old Zimbabwean president, would rule his country until he died – but in the end, his fall was very swift. Mugabe’s decision to depose vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa, at the behest of his 52-year-old wife Grace, was the last straw, and the army <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">stepped in to depose him</a> in a smooth operation that met no opposition. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s political assassination attempt on Mnangagwa – a move to position herself as her husband’s successor – drew comparisons with Lady Macbeth, not least since her hunger for power finally brought about the Mugabes’ downfall. The only real question was how her veteran husband let her lead him to that fatal step without seeing the blowback coming.</p>
<p>The first lady started out as a young secretary in Robert Mugabe’s typing pool. She became his mistress in the early 1990s and <a href="http://matookerepublic.com/2017/11/17/photos-robert-and-grace-mugabes-1996-wedding-that-was-graced-by-nelson-mandela/">married him in 1996</a> in a lavish wedding ceremony. She began her formal rise to power in 2014, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwes-grace-mugabe-to-head-zanu-pfs-womens-league/a-17842387">as head</a> of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party’s Women’s League. But where she really flexed her muscles was in a ruthless campaign to expel Mugabe’s vice-president, war heroine <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-39255394/joice-mujuru-zimbabweans-will-judge-me-on-my-record">Joice Mujuru</a>, first from office and then from the party. </p>
<p>In so doing, she antagonised the war veterans who saw Mujuru as one of their own, but she shored herself up with the support of ZANU-PF’s Youth League. She became a leader among the so-called G40 – the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/mugabe-succession-generation-40-grace-mugabe-kasukuwere/2997245.html">Generation of 40</a>, a faction of younger ZANU-PF party members in their 40s and 50s who conspired to target her rivals. Mnangagwa, a veteran and former spymaster, was next on her hitlist. </p>
<p>Although she did not officially join the cabinet of ministers, her G40 allies there worked against Mnangagwa and his allies. They drummed up the relentless refrain that Mnangagwa was working to undermine Robert Mugabe.</p>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s volatile temperament made news across the continent when she <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-looks-for-mugabes-successor-after-a-surreal-month-83182">attacked a 20-year-old woman</a>, who had been partying with her sons in a Johannesburg hotel, with a power cord. She escaped prosecution by claiming diplomatic immunity, conducting herself very much like a president-in-waiting. It seems the South Africans took note.</p>
<h2>Raising hell</h2>
<p>Jacob Zuma, the South African president, responded to the Zimbabwean coup with <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zuma-slams-unconstitutional-take-over-of-zim-20171115">tact and moderation</a>, calling for for “calm and restraint” in line with the constitution. His statement came with an implicit sigh of relief, a note of hope that something like predictability might be returning across his country’s northern border.</p>
<p>The Chinese, longtime friends of Zimbabwe, took a similar tack. It is no coincidence that General Constantine Chiwenga, the Zimbabwe army chief, was visiting China when Mnangagwa was booted out. It seems likely that Chiwenga discussed his plan to intervene with the Chinese. Having supported and trained Mugabe’s rebel liberation army in the late 1970s and helped finance the country’s grossly mismanaged economy, Bejing must be relieved at the prospect of a return to actual economic management.</p>
<p>Again, the Mugabes’ recent conduct is what really stuck in the craw. The distinguishing characteristic of Grace Mugabe’s long campaign against first Mujuru and then Mnangagwa was her total lack of concern for Zimbabwe’s increasingly impoverished citizens. By the time the coup came around, some economists estimated inflation at <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/zim-inflation-quicken-imf/">well over 300%</a>. The “bond notes” printed to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-02/zimbabwe-dollar-dearth-causes-shortages-return-of-inflation">compensate for a paucity of US dollars</a> never earned popular confidence – the country seemed doomed to return to the fiscal madness of the mid-2000s, when Zimbabwean dollars were being printed so fast that <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/0325/p06s02-woaf.html">a loaf of bread cost millions</a>. </p>
<p>Grace Mugabe and her G40 supporters had little concern for monetary policy, and neither the Chinese nor anyone else wanted to channel open-ended financial flows to such a country. The South Africans, meanwhile, wanted to slow the number of economic refugees, about 3m of whom have fled Zimbabwe for Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, all of which already suffer from rising unemployment. And so when the coup came, there was little reason for anyone to help the Mugabes cling on – even their oldest allies.</p>
<h2>Rescue mission</h2>
<p>It is far from certain a coalition will be possible, but opposition leader <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Morgan-Tsvangirai">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> has flown back to Zimbabwe from Johannesburg and is reportedly ready to discuss possibilities. Tsvangirai knows that Mnangagwa has a ruthless past. He was an animating figure behind the brutal suppression of largely fictitious dissent in Matabeleland in the 1980s, when Zimbabwean soldiers <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201603310075.html">trained by North Korea</a> killed thousands of innocent citizens.</p>
<p>But what is really occupying people’s minds – including those of the military figures that launched the coup – is the need for a coherent policy programme to help Zimbabwe climb out of a shockingly deep economic hole. If Mnangagwa can form a unity government with the opposition, there will be enough financial brains involved to make a fresh start.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195215/original/file-20171117-7545-5jcfz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/unisgeneva/25388472376/in/photolist-kJ5p9s-kJ3jK2-EajFUe-EFuyjm-CcmYYo">UN Geneva via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>Mnangagwa is no economist, but he understands the need for economic planning and revival – and what the country’s old hands lack in new ideas they may at least make up for in competence. The new president could build a good team from two former ministers of finance, <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/opposition-peoples-democratic-party-members-fire-tendai-biti/4048357.html">Tendai Biti</a> of the opposition and Mnangagwa supporter <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/chinamasa-saved-bell/">Patrick Chinamasa</a>, demoted recently from the finance portfolio at Grace Mugabe’s behest. At minimum, both men would be trusted by crucial patrons in both the West and China.</p>
<p>So far, the world’s great powers have stood aside in this Shakespearean drama. The Mugabes were swiftly put under house arrest in the <a href="https://gistmagazine.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/10-photos-of-president-mugabes-private-mansion-in-zimbabwe/">presidential palace</a> the Chinese helped build, an opulent structure crested by blue Chinese porcelain tiles that looks like the Temple of the Dawn in a kung fu movie. Without explicitly approving a military coup – and despite their reservations about Mnangagwa’s ruthless history – they seem content to embrace the lesser of two evils. As the tanks rolled in, everybody breathed a quiet sigh of relief.</p>
<p>Any new government will not start on a firm foundation. Perhaps Grace Mugabe will try to somehow organise a comeback. It’s not clear if Zimbabwe still has enough of an economic base to start rebuilding itself in earnest, and the military may yet try to extract a price for its role in bringing Mugabe down. Should that price be too high, Zimbabwe might fall prey to the old Turkish phenomenon of “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024450?journalCode=ctwq20">tutelary democracy</a>”, where for decades a powerful military peered over the shoulders of a weak government. </p>
<p>But for now, it seems the Mugabe era is over – and as far as Zimbabwe’s most important backers go, that’s a start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With their cavalier power plays and gross economic negligence, the Mugabes squandered the goodwill of crucial backers.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637932016-08-26T09:13:50Z2016-08-26T09:13:50ZConverting tweets into feet: can Zimbabwe’s social media activism oust Robert Mugabe?<p>Protests against the rule of Zimbabwe’s ageing president, Robert Mugabe, have become commonplace in recent months. In one of the latest incidents on August 24, police used tear gas and water cannons <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-protests-idUSKCN10Z1HF">to disperse</a> a “Mugabe Must Go” protest in the capital Harare. </p>
<p>In April, <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-22-the-simple-genius-of-zimbabwes-thisflag-protest-and-the-man-who-started-it/#.V6xje_krKUk">Evan Mawarire</a>, an unknown pastor, inadvertently started a wave of online activism when he started the #ThisFlag movement in a pleading Facebook post. Within hours, copycats had appeared online and the ZANU-PF regime found itself party to an upsurge in online and offline criticism. </p>
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<p>Since then social media activism in Zimbabwe has ignited. <a href="https://www.whatsapp.com/">WhatsApp</a>, a mobile messaging service that is frequently subscribed to in a prepaid form in Zimbabwe, has been widely used as a tool to mobilise. It accounts <a href="http://www.techzim.co.zw/2016/03/whatsapp-internet-zimbabwe-accounts-34-mobile-internet-traffic/#.V7wftPkrKUm">for 34%</a> of all mobile data use in Zimbabwe. <a href="https://facebook.com/ads">Facebook</a> reports 260,000 daily users, of 890,000 Zimbabweans online, but this only accounts for <a href="http://www.techzim.co.zw/2016/05/whatsapp-facebook-emerge-kingmakers-social-media-becomes-zimbabwean-political-tool/#.V7whOfkrKUk">3% of mobile broadband usage</a> in the country. <a href="https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/detail/123875667-newsdayzimbabwe">Newsday Zimbabwe</a>, an independent news outlet, increased its Twitter network by 10,000 followers in the past month alone. </p>
<p>The ruling ZANU-PF responded to this upswell by drafting new legislation, the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/07/new-zimbabwe-law-allows-seizure-of-smartphones-and-laptops-as-mu/">Computer Crime and Cyber Crime Bill</a>, to control online activism. But it might find it difficult to keep track of services such as WhatsApp, which now operate with <a href="https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015">end-to-end encryption</a> making them very hard to keep track of. </p>
<h2>Social protest</h2>
<p>Protests coordinated on social media have emerged in recent weeks throughout the country addressing issues from <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/06/thisflag-protests-arrests-cricket-match-bulawayo-pictures/">socio-economic governance</a>, to the <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-30537-ZRP+brutally+crush+anti-bond+notes+demo/news.aspx">introduction of bond notes</a> (a cash substitute in the country which no longer has its own currency), <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/06/zimbabwe-paralysed-by-general-strike-as-mugabe-runs-out-of-money/">corruption</a>, and <a href="http://www.thezimbabwenewslive.com/zimbabwe-23753-thisgown-imagesunemployed-graduates-protesting-harare.html">frustration by graduates</a> at a lack of employment opportunities. When groups do mobilise on Zimbabwe’s streets, protests have increasingly been challenged by riot police using <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2016/08/08/zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-says-protesters-have-forgotten-democracy">tear gas and water cannons</a>. </p>
<p>These protests are different from previous efforts to challenge the government’s record in Zimbabwe. Social media mobilisation is more fluid and dynamic than traditional protests, such as trade union strikes, that tend to require the building of solidarity and a common position among workers in an industry. Previous anti-regime protests, such as those by the Movement for Democratic Change, have a traditional leader and grassroots form. It has been easy for the regime to identify and pick off individual leaders such as the opposition figure <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/28/zimbabwe1">Morgan Tsvangirai before the 2008 election</a>, leaving movements temporarily rudderless.</p>
<p>The leaderless, issue-driven format of social media protest is different. It works best when organised and executed quickly, and when responding to a crisis. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-time-the-uprising-in-zimbabwe-is-different-but-will-it-bring-regime-change-62447">fluidity</a> makes it difficult for the state to track, but it can also pose difficulties for the social movements, which can quickly lose momentum as activists lose motivation. The strength of new movements can become their downfall if not managed well.</p>
<h2>Legal clampdown</h2>
<p>Growth of social media has happened in a political environment that has become more and more hostile. On August 5, all mobile phone operators <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/08/05/mobile-operators-suspend-data-bundles-promotions/">suspended data promotions</a> meaning that internet access became significantly more <a href="http://www.techzim.co.zw/2016/08/promotions-bonuses-suspended-zimbabwes-mobile-network-operators/#.V7wmCfkrKUk">expensive</a> in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Two days later the government announced draft legislation to address so-called <a href="http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/social-media-abusers-to-be-jailed/">cyber-terrorism</a>. The draft law contains <a href="http://www.techzim.co.zw/2016/08/ict-minister-says-zimbabwes-cybercrime-bill-not-targeted-campaigns-like-thisflag-tajamuka/#.V7woF_krKUk">provisions</a> that deal with the use of digital platforms to incite violence and to cause civil unrest that could undermine future mobilisation.</p>
<p>Although mobile operators have offered little explanation about why data promotions suddenly stopped, the near-simultaneous introduction of cybercrime legislation smacks of state attempts to curtail freedom of expression. </p>
<p>All this feels familiar. In previous periods of anti-government mobilisation and during elections, ZANU-PF successfully used both <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/25/zimbabwe-surge-state-sponsored-violence">state-sponsored violence</a> in combination with legislative tools to quell public protest. In the early 2000s, the government introduced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0807/2.htm">legislation</a> aimed at restricting mobilisation, including the 2003 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act to control the press, and the Public Order and 2002 Security Act to monitor and break up public meetings. These tools routinely undermine human rights including freedom of expression and assembly. </p>
<p>In 2012, the government <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17462531">charged six people with treason</a> for organising and attending a lecture to learn lessons from the Arab Spring. Although the charges were later dropped, it is clear that ZANU-PF is sensitive to the impact that free expression could have on the stability of the regime. </p>
<h2>The state of ZANU-PF</h2>
<p>ZANU-PF faces this upsurge of mobilisation in the midst of a party crisis. Mugabe is 92-years-old and his party is beset by <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2016/02/zimbabwe-hamstrung-by-uncertainty-over-mugabes-successor/">factionalism</a> with rivals vying for position as his successor. A diverse political opposition is developing, formally rooted in ZANU-PF itself. The former vice president, Joice Mujuru, recently launched <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/joice-mujuru-launches-the-zimbabwe-people-first-party-20160301">Zimbabwe People First party</a> to challenge ZANU-PF in the upcoming 2018 elections. </p>
<p>In late July, a group of war veterans from Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, historically a core support base for ZANU-PF, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/zimbabwe-veterans-condemn-robert-mugabe-surprise-revolt">condemned</a> Mugabe’s running of the country. ZANU-PF’s current structure lacks the organisational stability to effectively manage such dynamic threats to the regime. </p>
<p>This situation could bode well for the demise of authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. A <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html">majority of the population</a>, around two-thirds, are now “born frees” – Zimbabweans with no memory of the liberation struggle before 1980. Even though the regime regularly uses rhetoric that plays on ZANU-PF’s part in the liberation victory to maintain support, this strategy is losing ground, shown by the groundswell of on and offline protest among Zimbabwe’s disaffected youth. Nonetheless, Mugabe has successfully mobilised <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zanu-pf-youth-league-warns-protesters-against-attempts-to-destabilise-govt-20160721">ZANU-PF youth league</a> members to counter anti-government protests. </p>
<p>The coming months hold enormous potential for political change in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF’s hold on power is tenuous and both physical and digital repression may not be enough to quell the tide of discontent rocking the regime. Instead, the power of social media may be an effective tool to undermine the already cracked foundations of ZANU-PF and contribute to the development of a more democratic political framework in Zimbabwe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ciara McCorley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s ruling party is facing a wave of online and offline protest.Ciara McCorley, Research Fellow, African development and democracy, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632382016-08-03T15:04:13Z2016-08-03T15:04:13ZZimbabwe’s interregnum: new wine, old bottles?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132488/original/image-20160729-25624-153vk01.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Zimbabwean Pastor Evan Mawarire outside the Harare Magistrates’ Court during his trial.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Analysts have celebrated <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36776401">July’s events</a> in Zimbabwe as indications of a vibrant and social media-based <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-time-the-uprising-in-zimbabwe-is-different-but-will-it-bring-regime-change-62447">new citizenry</a> with possibilities of leading an African Spring. Like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/fading-hope-why-the-youth-of-the-arab-spring-are-still-unemployed-60588">Arab one</a>, but successful. </p>
<p>Some invoke the generation of “born-frees” – those born after Zimbabwe’s liberation in 1980 – as a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-22-the-simple-genius-of-zimbabwes-thisflag-protest-and-the-man-who-started-it/#.V5dF0aLmOec">new political force</a>. Others suggest that the public stayaways and vendors’ protests are evidence of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-riots-the-rise-of-the-informal-trader-and-a-new-political-economy-62452">informal sector’s new power</a>. More still herald the political arrival of the “middle class”, not forgetting that teachers and nurses’ unions instigated the first stayaway with their strike for <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/why-pastor-mawarires-revolution-took-hold-2046186">delayed pay</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/07/08/national-shutdown-architect-speaks/">Religious leaders</a> too are pegged as leaders of Zimbabwe’s renaissance amid an economic <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-to-be-learnt-from-zimbabwes-blunt-use-of-an-import-ban-63128">meltdown</a> and the imminent <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-finance-minister-makes-a-doomed-pitch-to-londons-big-businesses-62015">disappearance of the dollar</a>. Or they are seen as <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/07/12/makandiwa-wades-mugabe-succession-storm/">heralds of change</a> within the ever fracturing but still ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (<a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">ZANU-PF</a>). </p>
<p>The new forms of protest raise the possibility that the long-simmering <a href="http://zimbabwenetzwerk.de/Kalender/20140404/brian.raftopoulos.end-of-an-era.pdf">Zimbabwean crisis</a> may have reached <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-s-threadbare-theatre-reform">boiling point</a>. </p>
<p>The time could indeed be ripe for a unique form of politics. This, as more formal modes of political opposition have split into factions after their failure to take power from those much better at the chicanery and coercion of Zimbabwe’s <a href="http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/717/715">electoral game</a>, and the leader of the still-largest challenger, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Morgan Tsvangirai, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/28/zimbabwe-politician-morgan-tsvangirai-cancer">battles cancer</a>. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that July’s brave protests – which were met with the expected doses of violence and intimidation from the country’s increasingly embattled rulers – and the hundreds defending Pastor Evan Mawarire at Harare’s <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-30176-Pastor+Mawarire+in+Court+Chaos+as+crowds+turn+up/news.aspx">courts</a> indicate profound alterations within Zimbabwe’s body politic.</p>
<p>Combined with the public indictment of Robert Mugabe by the “<a href="http://www.shutdownzim.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/War-Vets_statement_160721.pdf">war vets</a>” and a group of wise Zimbabwean political veterans called the Platform for Concerned Citizens testing the idea of a National Transitional <a href="http://www.shutdownzim.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pcc_position_160723.pdf">Authority</a>, it seems clear that big changes will happen soon. </p>
<p>That is unless the global guardians of monetary rectitude – the International Monetary Fund – bail out Zimbabwe’s ruling party by the <a href="http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11717/Dollar_crisis_puts_opposition_on_the_streets">end of September</a> so that soldiers and other civil servants can be paid regularly. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding, the “non-party” nature of the protests and their social-media based preludes suggest new, non-hierarchical and non-elite political modes arising: all very hopeful for a country – and a world – tired of old-style rule.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Zimbabwe’s political history</h2>
<p>It might be wise, though, to join at least one <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/07/22/2016-year-failed-uprisings/">sceptical observer </a> cautioning against excessive exuberance. It could be more instructive to focus on Zimbabwe’s own political history instead of comparing its uprisings to any internationally. </p>
<p>Thus, calculations on the ratio of new and old wine within similarly mixed bottles might lead to accurate judgments about their potency. The blends could be far more volatile than the promulgators of peaceful revolution could dream.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132491/original/image-20160729-25650-d1de1a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe at the burial of National Hero Charles Utete in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Phillip Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political past reminds us that new players enter its power struggles when cracks appear within the old leadership. The new actors become intricately and inextricably imbricated in these conflicts, interlaced as they are with the dialectics of identity, ideology and plain old internecine competition. As the cracks turn into vacuums it usually takes a good dose of violence to turn the corner. </p>
<p>If new entrants arrive into these vortexes with their eyes wide shut they will simply be incorporated into the old patterns rather than transforming them. Can they learn from history in order to (re)make it? Can – as <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/7084.Karl_Marx">Karl Marx </a>might have put it – the tragedies of the past not be repeated as farce?</p>
<p>Think of the early days of Zimbabwean nationalism and its progression to the eve of liberation. As the founding party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, split and ZANU emerged, youth enthusiastically threw stones and firebombed houses. Trade unionists nearly killed each other as they lined up behind the <a href="http://cba1415.web.unc.edu/files/2014/07/zapu.pdf">two parties</a>.</p>
<p>A decade later, a group of young militants in ZAPU’s military camps in Zambia tried to solve some of their leaders’ conflicts over military strategy, political tactics, and ethnicity. The young cadres’ 1971 “<a href="http://www.authorhouse.co.uk/Bookstore/BookDetail.aspx?Book=618473">March 11 Movement</a>” tried to force the elder politicians to a conference to iron out these problems, but their tactics failed them. More than 40 young leaders were rounded up by the Zambian army and incarcerated in Zambia’s prisons for more than three years, until exiled to the UK while the <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/dtente-the-release-of-nationalist/">“détente” exercise</a> unfolded as Angola and Mozambique’s release from Portuguese rule galvanised regional actors to moderate the Zimbabwean nationalists’ quest. Many more “rebels” were sent to Rhodesia to a much worse fate. </p>
<p>Until today, many of the old guard believe these young Turks were acting at the behest of those who hived off to form the short-lived Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, or <a href="http://www.thepatriot.co.zw/old/posts/struggle-for-zimbabwe-formation-of-frolizi/">FROLIZI</a>. In any case, ZAPU never fully recovered its national character.</p>
<p>The 1974 détente exercise produced more examples of “new entrants” – and their neutralisation. The <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:275556/FULLTEXT01.pdf">Nhari rebellion</a> – quelled ruthlessly – combined with the release of the first generation of nationalists from Salisbury’s prisons led almost inexorably to Lusaka-based National Chairman Herbert Chitepo’s <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=21858">assassination</a>. It took Robert Mugabe nearly two years to fill the vacuum. </p>
<p>Much of that time was taken up by his sidelining another group of young militants who took the war to a new level while trying to unite the contending nationalist armies and forging the struggle on a firmer ideological footing than the older leaders’ <a href="http://roape.net/2016/03/29/a-prison-notebook-mhandas-treatise-on-zimbabwes-liberation/">fragile one</a>. These young militants spent three years in Mozambique’s prisons for their troubles: international interlocutors (then, as now, always watching and intervening, often welcomed from inside) portrayed them as “Karanga” columns also prone to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Soviet designs</a>.</p>
<p>What do these brief notes from the past illuminate about the present? </p>
<h2>New wine and new bottles needed</h2>
<p>Whether the protagonists know it or not, “new struggles” are always tightly tied to old ones dominated by internecine competition (which infuses new parties too) within the ruling party or its offshoots.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132490/original/image-20160729-25646-1ewya5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean Pastor Evan Mawarire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s hard to tell how many fractions of the fracturing ruling party and the state apparatuses woven into it have hands in the “new” protests. But the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2014/11/15/zanu-pfs-night-long-knives/">viral video</a> (from <em>inside</em> a police van) of police beating demonstrators suggests cracks in the gendarmerie. The police commissioner, who was a victim of a 1978 crackdown against supposed plotters within ZANU, knows these stories well.</p>
<p>As the contest for the throne becomes even more intense while the economic crisis deepens, the “new citizens” must weigh their options, and the role they can play in new political configurations, very carefully. </p>
<p>Do they have to make choices between the two main factions in ZANU-PF? Would that be “<a href="http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40</a>”, supporting the first lady, Grace Mugabe, to prepare a Mugabe dynasty they hope to manage? Or would they choose ZANU-PF Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his backers, the so-called <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201607280534.html">“Lacoste” group</a> and the rebellious group of war veterans, all taking on an anti-Mugabe veneer of democratic decency while harbouring designs for “order” that appear more enticing than ever for <a href="http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597#.V5i3XKLmOec">“western” watchers</a>. Is the Zimbabwe People First <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mugabes-latest-challenger-will-find-it-hard-to-break-the-mould-57587">party</a> more than it appears (a place for jilted ZANU-PFers)? </p>
<p>And can any of the two Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/africa/09zimbabwe.html?_r=0">parties</a> or Tendai Biti’s <a href="http://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-mdc-renewal/2955790.html">People’s Democratic Party</a> recover the social democratic glories of 1999? As <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/mugabe-zimbabwe-chimurenga-this-flag-protests/">Leo Zeilig</a> reminds us, the lead-up to the MDC’s birth at the turn of the millennium was not unlike today – but the endpoint keeps receding. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s new citizens will have to strategise very carefully. The compromises and alliances will not be easy. But they must bring new wine and new bottles to Zimbabwe’s very barren political table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The new forms of protest in Zimbabwe raise the possibility that the country’s long-simmering crisis may have reached boiling point. The time could indeed be ripe for a unique form of politics.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/575872016-04-13T09:47:08Z2016-04-13T09:47:08ZWhy Mugabe’s latest challenger will find it hard to break the mould<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118368/original/image-20160412-15858-16vz1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joice Mujuru, leader of the new opposition Zimbabwe People First party.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former Zimbabwean vice-president <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6507993.stm">Joice Mujuru</a> has her sights set on upsetting President Robert Mugabe’s 36-year hold on power with her newly formed <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/joice-mujuru-launches-the-zimbabwe-people-first-party-20160301">Zimbabwe People First party</a>. But it won’t be easy.</p>
<p>Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has held <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/07/31/multimeida-a-history-of-zimbabwean-elections/">ten elections</a> characterised by multiparty competition. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party has <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/laakso_opposition_politics_zim_050123.pdf">dominated all of them</a>.</p>
<p>Opposition parties have emerged at different stages of Zimbabwe’s post-independence history but none have seriously threatened ZANU-PF dominance. Several reasons account for their weaknesses. The most evident is that they are at the receiving end of the incumbent’s use of state power. The governing party employs various coercive and non-coercive measures to disable <a href="http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/otago/109848.pdf">political opposition</a>, particularly during elections. </p>
<p>So what are Mujuru’s chances of succeeding where others – such as the <a href="http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement</a> and the <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Movement_for_Democratic_Change_-_Tsvangirayi_(MDC-T)">Movement for Democratic Change</a> – have failed?</p>
<h2>ZANU-PFs hold on power</h2>
<p>Since the historic 1980 elections that ended <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs263.aspx">white domination</a>, ZANU-PF has entrenched state control largely through state apparatus to strengthen its <a href="http://publications.dlprog.org/The%20Anatomy%20of%20Political%20Predation.pdf">grip on power</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe fits the description of an <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510340902777800">“hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime”</a>. Such regimes hold elections regularly but with minimal prospects of a democratic change of government. While allowing opposition parties to exist and contest elections, authoritarianism favours incumbents. In weak states, this seriously undermines constitutional, multiparty and democratic consolidation.</p>
<p>Countries such as Uganda, Cameroon, Angola and Ethiopia also travel along this path, corroborating the view that in African politics, it’s hard for incumbents to lose an election given all the state resources at their disposal.</p>
<p>Despite the complexities of opposition parties’ survival in Zimbabwe, Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume2n1/ajps002001007.pdf">(ZUM)</a> and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Movement-for-Democratic-Change">(MDC)</a> presented strong challenges to ZANU-PF in 1990, 2000, 2002 and 2008.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118349/original/image-20160412-15880-1s8wp9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Morgan Tsvangirai in hospital after a brutal assault by police in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stringer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The MDC even won against ZANU-PF in the March 2008 <a href="http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2010/05/Defying_4.pdf">elections</a>. These were known as “harmonised elections” because they incorporated national and local government polls. But such victory was disputed and <a href="http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2010/05/Defying_4.pdf">short lived</a>. A run-off election produced no outright winner and its result was even more contested because of political violence. </p>
<p>Tsvangirai’s subsequent withdrawal from the race exacerbated Zimbabwe’s political crisis. An inclusive government later brokered and drafted a new constitution which was put to a referendum in March 2013. Parties in the inclusive government mobilised for its adoption, securing a <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-referendum-on-constitution-approved/a-16683897">94% “yes” vote</a>. </p>
<h2>Will Mujuru succeed against ‘Goliath’?</h2>
<p>ZANU-PF’s continued hegemony and grip on power are threatened by factional fighting, a lack of a succession plan, and a lack of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/04/09/zanu-pf-shambles-mugabe/">elite cohesion</a>. </p>
<p>Primarily, the biggest source of tension is the race to succeed the <a href="http://buzzsouthafrica.com/im-not-dying-shame-on-you-mugabe-mocks-zimbabweans/">ageing but defiant</a> party leader, Mugabe, who has led the party since 1975.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/01/10/mujuru-supporters-in-zanu-pf-find-new-home/">Mujuru</a> is a prominent casualty in Zimbabwe’s polarised and militarised politics. A veteran of Zimbabwe’s armed struggle against white minority rule, she held various cabinet portfolios since 1980, becoming vice president in 2004.</p>
<p>Mugabe purged Mujuru from ZANU-PF in 2014 along with many top-ranking party functionaries, accusing them of trying to depose him. This is not the first time that senior ZANU-PF members who criticised Mugabe for clinging to power have been kicked out. But the current purge is remarkable given the vast number of officials dismissed and the fact that they occupied prominent positions in the party.</p>
<p>Following expulsion, Mujuru formed her own party, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/joice-mujuru-zimbabwes-former-vice-president-forms-new-party-to-challenge-robert-mugabes-zanu-pf-a6905721.html">Zimbabwe People First</a>, with some senior axed ZANU-PF members <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201509110261.html">joining</a>. </p>
<p>Promising “people centeredness”, Mujuru’s party might be a welcome development for a weary electorate. In 2015 the party launched its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/JOYCE-MUJURU-ADVERT-40X7-X2-newEST.pdf">political manifesto</a>, promising to restore democracy and attracting foreign investment for socioeconomic development.</p>
<p>But she faces an uphill struggle to convince the electorate to vote for her in elections in <a href="http://zimbabweelection.com/elections/">2018</a>. Exposing corruption, alleged electoral fraud and perpetrators of violence might boost her party’s image.</p>
<p>ZANU-PF <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/03/08/zanu-pf-dismisses-mujuru-s-party">dismissed</a> the launch of the new party. But there was jubilation and a sense of reinvigoration in some opposition quarters, particularly given the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">MDC’s poor run</a> in the 2013 elections. Leaders of the main opposition parties have welcomed her decision to join opposition politics. But apart from rumours, it is unclear whether Mujuru’s party will join forces with them. </p>
<h2>What works against her</h2>
<p>A great deal of scepticism surrounds the new party partly because it includes “disgruntled” former ZANU-PF stalwarts who carry significant historical baggage. This includes accusations of corruption, electoral manipulation, violence and maladministration while they <a href="http://zimbabweelection.com/2016/03/18/mujuru-ally-ready-die/">occupied public office</a>. </p>
<p>This is the new party’s Achilles’ heel. It must satisfy the court of public opinion that its ex-ZANU-PF members have reformed, that it will challenge ZANU-PF’s hegemony and that it will behave differently. It also needs to gain the confidence of international donors and investors to offset Zimbabwe’s economic crises.</p>
<p>Mujuru’s party also faces a systemic problem: the challenge of entrenching multi-party democracy in a political culture tainted by decades of heavy-handed rule.</p>
<figure class="align-right" zoomable"="">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118351/original/image-20160412-15853-jzj1sx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace attend his 92nd birthday celebrations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Research suggests that political parties are indispensable for making <a href="http://www.msu.ac.zw/elearning/material/1257171344Africa_report_inlay_final.pdf">democracy work and deliver</a>. But a glance at older political parties in Africa suggests that there are challenges to building sustained multi-party democracy on the continent. These include <a href="http://ccm.or.tz/">Chama cha Mapinduzi</a> in Tanzania, the <a href="http://global.britannica.com/topic/Botswana-Democratic-Party">Botswana Democratic Party</a>, the <a href="http://www.times.mw/trouble-in-malawi-congress-party/">Malawi Congress Party</a>, the <a href="http://www.elections.co.ug/new-vision/election/1000307/uganda-people-congress-upc">Uganda People’s Congress</a>, Yoweri Museveni’s <a href="http://www.cas.ed.ac.uk/research/publications/archive/show_paper?result_page=37">National Resistance Movement</a>, <a href="http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad29">FRELIMO</a>, in Mozambique, and the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056248508703635?journalCode=crea20#.VwylLDB97IU">Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</a> in South Sudan. These parties include national liberation movements that habitually treat the party as synonymous with government. </p>
<p>Another major challenge facing Africa’s opposition parties is widespread use of the winner-takes-all majoritarian <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/DPI403%20Fall09/12%20DPI403%20%20Constitutions.pdf">electoral systems</a>. Such systems, despite their advantages of producing predominant winners, primarily undermine minority interests, values and <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/DPI403%20Fall09/12%20DPI403%20%20Constitutions.pdf">perspectives</a>. </p>
<p>Thus, the key question is whether, and to what extent, Mujuru’s party will strengthen democratic structures and contribute to nation- and state-building. This is particularly pertinent given the perennial fragility of the Zimbabwean state.</p>
<p>It is unclear how much support Mujuru will garner before the 2018 elections. And it would probably be unreasonable to expect an outright win for her party.</p>
<h2>What Mujuru has going for her</h2>
<p>In ZANU-PF, Mujuru was perceived to be one of its moderates, especially during the 2009-13 <a href="http://jppgnet.com/journals/jppg/Vol_2_No_2_June_2014/9.pdf">Government of National Unity</a>. This was due to her more conciliatory interaction with the opposition. </p>
<p>She may well benefit from a sympathy vote following her acrimonious dismissal from ZANU-PF and her <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2014/11/18/grace-claims-video-mujuru-mini-skirt-insulting-mugabe/">public ridicule</a> at the hands of Mugabe’s wife Grace. She still commands respect among some war veterans within ZANU-PF.</p>
<p>The fact that she is a woman, in an African continent with a negligible number of female politicians and presidents, might be in her favour. In Zimbabwe she is the second woman to lead an opposition party after another former ZANU-PF stalwart, <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Margaret_Dongo">Margaret Dongo</a>, formed the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=pKnOM8irpPgC&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=Margaret+Dongo,+Zimbabwe+Union+of+Democrats&source=bl&ots=QZe3txfYMM&sig=CVKW1W5KBpTRwnRpX2-h6VfTifM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjo4eHFw4bMAhUDPhQKHaedBsAQ6AEIPzAH#v=onepage&q=Margaret%20Dongo%2C%20Zimbabwe%20Union%20of%20Democrats&f=false">Zimbabwe Union of Democrats</a> in the 1990s. But whether women voters will flock to the new party remains uncertain.</p>
<p>Mujuru’s new party could enrich Zimbabwe’s political culture and give the voters an alternative political voice. This might in turn lead to further democratisation of politics in what could be a post-Mugabe political era. But first she needs to spell out her party’s ideology and values.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57587/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the American Political Science Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye is affiliated with WIPHOLD-Brigalia Bam Chair in Electoral Democracy in Africa, University of South Africa. </span></em></p>Opposition parties have emerged at different stages of Zimbabwe’s post-independence history but none have seriously threatened ZANU-PF dominance.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaKealeboga J Maphunye, Wiphold-Brigalia Bam Chair in Electoral Democracy in Africa, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.